<p>Downplaying the external world (is &quot;external world&quot; quite the same as 'form (<em>rūpa</em>)'?), saying that our ideas of it are reified fabrications of the mind created from (or dependent on) <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayatana" rel="nofollow noreferrer">sense-contact</a>, seems to me a feature even of the Pali suttas ... with the proviso that nihilism (e.g. &quot;<a href="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.117.than.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">There is nothing given</a>, nothing offered, etc.&quot;), and presumably solipsism, are identified as a &quot;wrong view&quot;.</p>
<p>Distinguishing or reconciling these views is I think known as the 'two truths' doctrine[s].</p>
<p>The following answer is not expert; it's slightly referenced but just recently researched because of your question.</p>
<hr />
<p><a href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/#Yog" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The Theory of Two Truths in India</a> seems to me to support the thesis (that Yogacara explicitly refute the existence of an external world).</p>
<p>Some quotes from this article are:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The central thesis in the Yogācāra philosophy, the theory of the two truths echoes this, is the assertion that all that is conventionally real is only ideas, representations, images, creations of the mind, and that there is no conventionally real object that exists outside the mind to which it corresponds. These ideas are the only objects of any cognition. The whole universe is a mental universe.</p>
<p>Apart from those representations, consciousnesses, which appear to be external objects, there is no conventionally real external content which corresponds to what appears.</p>
<p>All these arguments based on the facts of experience show that the objects do not exist really outside the mind, that they are the products of mental creation and that their appearance is entirely mind dependent. Therefore Yogācāra's theory of the two truths concludes that the whole world is a product of mind—it is the collective mental action (karma) of all beings. All living beings see the same world because of the identical maturation of their karmic consequences. Since the karmic histories of beings are same, there is homogeneity in the way in which the world is experienced and perceived. This is the reason there is an orderly world instead of chaotic and arbitrariness. This is also the reason behind the impressions of the objectivity of the world.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I expect you'll want to investigate the author's claims in more detail (using the references which he cites).</p>
<hr />
<p>Conversely <a href="https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/4-publikationen/hamburg-buddhist-studies/hamburgup-hbs03-yao-linradich-mirror.pdf" rel="nofollow noreferrer">Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths</a> seems to me to present a different picture, in which the Yogacara aren't so external-world-doesn't-exist extreme:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>These remarks of Vasubandhu’s are probably the very first attempt on
the Yogācāra side to incorporate the two truths into their more complicated
structure of the three natures. Based on these remarks, we can
draw the following diagram:</p>
<pre><code>                      emptiness of persons &amp; dharmas —existent(?)
ultimate truth —
                      no persons or dharmas —nonexistent(?)


                      dependent nature —existent(?)
conventional truth —
                      imagined nature —nonexistent(?)
</code></pre>
<p>As we see, the conventional truth is described as having two aspects.
Viewed as the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), it does not exist;
while viewed as the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), it does exist.
So conventional reality cannot be one-sidedly taken as purely imaginary
or illusory; this would be to fall into nihilism. Nor can conventional reality
be taken as utterly existent, on the other hand, because the imagined
nature does not exist. That is why the Yogācāra criticizes both of the extremes
into which his Madhyamaka opponent tends to fall.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>According to this paper, the Yogacara doctrine isn't just that the conventional (external?) world is imaginary: it has a merely-imaginary (unreal) component but also a dependent (existent albeit empty) component.</p>
<p>And allegedly the Yogācāra criticizes and accuses their &quot;Madhyamaka opponents&quot; of nihilism and extremism, which implies that they hold their own doctrine to be innocent of such extremism.</p>
<p>In conclusion:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>One of the goals of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures was to
improve on this two-tiered paradigm, and to restore a more robust and
holistic worldview. My study of some scattered sources from Maitreyanātha,
Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu has demonstrated that they criticized
the Madhyamaka version of two truths doctrine on the basis of the Yogā-
cāra theory of the three natures.</p>
</blockquote>
<hr />
<p>So the Yogācāra develop the doctrine of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yogachara#The_Three_Natures" rel="nofollow noreferrer">The Three Natures</a>, one of which is the world as it's understood according to the theory of dependent origination.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2016-01-21T13:18:32.753Z
2016-01-21T13:25:52.783Z
2020-06-17T09:56:10.877Z
ChrisW
<p>I think Cittamatra texts do explicitly refute it. Vasubhandu's Twenty Stanzas and autocommentary is a text that gives logical arguments against the presence of an external world. The very begining of this text reads:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>"The three realms are consciousness only" of the Mahayana is
  established through the scriptural expression, "the three realms are
  mind only." "Mind," "thought," "consciousness," and "perception"
  (uijñapti) are different names. Here, "mind" and "thought" are lumped
  together with mental activities (caitta). "Only" excludes objects of
  perception (artha) that are external to consciousness, not associates
  of consciousness. When internal consciousness is born, it appears
  resembling external objects of perception, I but in the same way that
  one with diseased eyesight sees nonexistent hairs, flies, etc. Here
  there is not the slightest aspect of reality.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>and the text goes on to refute various objections to the nonexistence of external objects.</p>

<p>Also, in his autocommentary on the Thirty Verses he writes:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>If there is nothing at all but consciousness and no external condi-
  tions at all, from what are the many imaginations born? The Verses
  say,</p>
  
  <p>From the consciousness that is all seeds Transformation [occurs] in
  such - and -such ways. Due to the power of mutual influence, That- and
  -that imagination is born. (18)</p>
  
  <p>Even though internal consciousness exists, still, there are no
  external conditions, so what is the basis for the continuity of birth
  and death among sentient beings? The Verses say,</p>
  
  <p>The habit energy of various actions Together with the habit energy of
  the two graspings, When prior retribution is exhausted, Subsequently
  produce other retribution. (19)</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Asanga's Mahayana-Samgraha is probably another good place to look but I haven't read that text yet so I'm not sure if it is explicit.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2016-01-24T05:39:32.860Z
2016-01-24T05:39:32.860Z
Bakmoon
<p>No. Nothing exists as we perceive it. We are seeing through eyes, hearing through ears, never experiential: or first hand. So essentially the world does not exist as we think it does, so is that non-existent or different?</p>

CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-12-08T16:12:35.557Z
Is this your personal opinion? To answer the question properly, you would need to provide authoritative sources regarding cittamatra / yogacara.
A_P
CC BY-SA 4.0
2020-11-30T13:43:53.630Z
2020-11-30T13:43:53.630Z
AlOhm
<p>According to Kagyu understanding, Yogacara's position isn't metaphysical, it is methodological. It's not that the external world does not exist, it is that our experience of the world is 100% always represented by organs and/or mind, there is no experience outside of that, so practically speaking mind-made experience is "all we have"*</p>

<p>Which is why trying to figure out how exactly the experience is generated and mastering the practical skills for working with mind and experience is of key importance in Yogacara (comparing to the earlier Buddhism's focus on discipline/ethics and the Madhyamika's focus on philosophy).</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>Yogacarins put so much emphasis on the mind because they are concerned with
  practice. Some people have thought they were saying that everything is in your
  mind. Some of these people were influenced by certain Western philosophies.   -- <sub><em>Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche</em></sub> </p>
</blockquote>

<p>Generally speaking Kaguypas seem to prefer to stay away from philosophical discussions and focus on practice, which makes sense given their self-identification as "the practice lineage":</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>We are not concerned about whether or not a chair exists. That's
  secondary. Why spend so much time arguing about whether or not a chair exists,
  instead of learning how we experience and relate to the chair, and what sort of
  experience we've got? -- <sub><em>Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche</em></sub></p>
</blockquote>

<hr>

<p>*<sub>Using the modern language we could say, reality is an interpretation we make, there is no reality to be experienced outside of an interpretation. In other words, there is no absolute truth separate from the conventional truth.</sub></p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2016-01-21T17:39:33.517Z
2016-01-25T17:18:30.657Z
2016-01-25T17:18:30.657Z
Andriy Volkov
<p>Tibetan texts that belong to the genre of <em>tenets</em> (doctrinal classification) usually claim that the Cittamatra school refutes external existence. These texts further claim that Cittamatrin posit that <em>'the apprehended object and the apprehending consciousness are empty of being different substances'</em>. They say that, according to Cittamatrin, the apprehending consciousness and the object it apprehends both arise simultaneously from a seed that was left in the mind-basis-of-all (alaya-vijñana), and that, given so, the object is not a cause of the consciousness apprehending it (as opposed to what Vaïbashikas and Sautrantika posit). Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen writes:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>An illustration of the selflessness of phenomena is, for example, the
  emptiness that is a form and the valid cognizer apprehending that form
  being empty of being different substances.</p>
</blockquote>

<p><br>
It is difficult for me to conceive, and to admit, that Cittamatrin refute external existence altogether. It would mean they refute that one is born from a mother and a father, and so forth. Moreover, I doubt Tibetan scholars who claim that 'Cittamatrin refute external existence' because they have an agenda. Tibetan scholars often simplify (if not even caricature) their opponent's positions (in this case, Cittamatrin). So, not sticking to Tibetan literature only, my idea was to seek whether Cittamatrin actually refute external existence by reading works written by proponents of the Cittamatra school. Let us consider Suzuki, in <em>Studies in the Lankavatara</em> (p. 114). He writes:</p>

<blockquote>
  <p>As indeed the idealistic Mahayana does not admit the
  existence of an external world, whatever qualities we ordinarily think
  as belonging to the latter are creations or constructions of our own
  mind.</p>
</blockquote>

<p>Suzuki seems to say <em>"Cittamatra refute external existence"</em>, but <strong>he does not do so explicitly</strong>. He says "they do not admit the existence of an external world" but this does not necessarily amount to "refuting the existence of external world". As far as I know, he could be saying "We can not know anything but the aspects our consciousness takes. We can not see beyond our perceptions. We can not know for sure whether our perceptions are perceptions of something external. So, let us not bother with thinking of an external world - be it to refute its existence or claim its existence - and let us stick with what we know: that the eye-consciousness seeing blue takes the aspect of blue, and that we know nothing else."</p>

<hr>

<p>Thus, the question is: Do Cittamatra / Yogacara <strong>explicitly</strong> refute the existence of an external world? Or do they simply "not admit, not take into acount" the existence of an external world?</p>

<p>References are welcome.</p>

CC BY-SA 3.0
2016-01-21T15:59:07.803Z
Also see [What is the different between Yogacara Buddhism and Idealism?](http://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/10925/what-is-the-different-between-yogacara-buddhism-and-idealism)
Andriy Volkov
<reference-request><philosophy><mahayana><zen><yogacara>
Do Cittamatra / Yogacara explicitly refute the existence of an external world?
# Do Cittamatra / Yogacara explicitly refute the existence of an external world?

(Asked by: username_0 on 2016-01-21)

Tibetan texts that belong to the genre of *tenets* (doctrinal classification) usually claim that the Cittamatra school refutes external existence. These texts further claim that Cittamatrin posit that *'the apprehended object and the apprehending consciousness are empty of being different substances'*. They say that, according to Cittamatrin, the apprehending consciousness and the object it apprehends both arise simultaneously from a seed that was left in the mind-basis-of-all (alaya-vijñana), and that, given so, the object is not a cause of the consciousness apprehending it (as opposed to what Vaïbashikas and Sautrantika posit). Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen writes:

> An illustration of the selflessness of phenomena is, for example, the
> emptiness that is a form and the valid cognizer apprehending that form
> being empty of being different substances.

It is difficult for me to conceive, and to admit, that Cittamatrin refute external existence altogether. It would mean they refute that one is born from a mother and a father, and so forth. Moreover, I doubt Tibetan scholars who claim that 'Cittamatrin refute external existence' because they have an agenda. Tibetan scholars often simplify (if not even caricature) their opponent's positions (in this case, Cittamatrin). So, not sticking to Tibetan literature only, my idea was to seek whether Cittamatrin actually refute external existence by reading works written by proponents of the Cittamatra school. Let us consider Suzuki, in *Studies in the Lankavatara* (p. 114). He writes:

> As indeed the idealistic Mahayana does not admit the
> existence of an external world, whatever qualities we ordinarily think
> as belonging to the latter are creations or constructions of our own
> mind.

Suzuki seems to say *"Cittamatra refute external existence"*, but **he does not do so explicitly**. He says "they do not admit the existence of an external world" but this does not necessarily amount to "refuting the existence of external world". As far as I know, he could be saying "We can not know anything but the aspects our consciousness takes. We can not see beyond our perceptions. We can not know for sure whether our perceptions are perceptions of something external. So, let us not bother with thinking of an external world - be it to refute its existence or claim its existence - and let us stick with what we know: that the eye-consciousness seeing blue takes the aspect of blue, and that we know nothing else."

---

Thus, the question is: Do Cittamatra / Yogacara **explicitly** refute the existence of an external world? Or do they simply "not admit, not take into acount" the existence of an external world?

References are welcome.

**Tags:** reference-request, philosophy, mahayana, zen, yogacara

> **Comments:**
> **username_1**: Also see [What is the different between Yogacara Buddhism and Idealism?](http://buddhism.stackexchange.com/questions/10925/what-is-the-different-between-yogacara-buddhism-and-idealism)  

---

## 4 answers

### Answer by username_1 on 2016-01-21. Score: 4

According to Kagyu understanding, Yogacara's position isn't metaphysical, it is methodological. It's not that the external world does not exist, it is that our experience of the world is 100% always represented by organs and/or mind, there is no experience outside of that, so practically speaking mind-made experience is "all we have"\*

Which is why trying to figure out how exactly the experience is generated and mastering the practical skills for working with mind and experience is of key importance in Yogacara (comparing to the earlier Buddhism's focus on discipline/ethics and the Madhyamika's focus on philosophy).

> Yogacarins put so much emphasis on the mind because they are concerned with
> practice. Some people have thought they were saying that everything is in your
> mind. Some of these people were influenced by certain Western philosophies. -- *Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche*

Generally speaking Kaguypas seem to prefer to stay away from philosophical discussions and focus on practice, which makes sense given their self-identification as "the practice lineage":

> We are not concerned about whether or not a chair exists. That's
> secondary. Why spend so much time arguing about whether or not a chair exists,
> instead of learning how we experience and relate to the chair, and what sort of
> experience we've got? -- *Traleg Kyabgon Rinpoche*

---

\*Using the modern language we could say, reality is an interpretation we make, there is no reality to be experienced outside of an interpretation. In other words, there is no absolute truth separate from the conventional truth.


---

### Answer by username_2 on 2016-01-21. Score: 3

Downplaying the external world (is "external world" quite the same as 'form (rūpa)'?), saying that our ideas of it are reified fabrications of the mind created from (or dependent on) sense-contact, seems to me a feature even of the Pali suttas ... with the proviso that nihilism (e.g. "There is nothing given, nothing offered, etc."), and presumably solipsism, are identified as a "wrong view".
Distinguishing or reconciling these views is I think known as the 'two truths' doctrine[s].
The following answer is not expert; it's slightly referenced but just recently researched because of your question.

The Theory of Two Truths in India seems to me to support the thesis (that Yogacara explicitly refute the existence of an external world).
Some quotes from this article are:

The central thesis in the Yogācāra philosophy, the theory of the two truths echoes this, is the assertion that all that is conventionally real is only ideas, representations, images, creations of the mind, and that there is no conventionally real object that exists outside the mind to which it corresponds. These ideas are the only objects of any cognition. The whole universe is a mental universe.
Apart from those representations, consciousnesses, which appear to be external objects, there is no conventionally real external content which corresponds to what appears.
All these arguments based on the facts of experience show that the objects do not exist really outside the mind, that they are the products of mental creation and that their appearance is entirely mind dependent. Therefore Yogācāra's theory of the two truths concludes that the whole world is a product of mind—it is the collective mental action (karma) of all beings. All living beings see the same world because of the identical maturation of their karmic consequences. Since the karmic histories of beings are same, there is homogeneity in the way in which the world is experienced and perceived. This is the reason there is an orderly world instead of chaotic and arbitrariness. This is also the reason behind the impressions of the objectivity of the world.

I expect you'll want to investigate the author's claims in more detail (using the references which he cites).

Conversely Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths seems to me to present a different picture, in which the Yogacara aren't so external-world-doesn't-exist extreme:

These remarks of Vasubandhu’s are probably the very first attempt on
the Yogācāra side to incorporate the two truths into their more complicated
structure of the three natures. Based on these remarks, we can
draw the following diagram:
                      emptiness of persons & dharmas —existent(?)
ultimate truth —
                      no persons or dharmas —nonexistent(?)


                      dependent nature —existent(?)
conventional truth —
                      imagined nature —nonexistent(?)

As we see, the conventional truth is described as having two aspects.
Viewed as the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), it does not exist;
while viewed as the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), it does exist.
So conventional reality cannot be one-sidedly taken as purely imaginary
or illusory; this would be to fall into nihilism. Nor can conventional reality
be taken as utterly existent, on the other hand, because the imagined
nature does not exist. That is why the Yogācāra criticizes both of the extremes
into which his Madhyamaka opponent tends to fall.

According to this paper, the Yogacara doctrine isn't just that the conventional (external?) world is imaginary: it has a merely-imaginary (unreal) component but also a dependent (existent albeit empty) component.
And allegedly the Yogācāra criticizes and accuses their "Madhyamaka opponents" of nihilism and extremism, which implies that they hold their own doctrine to be innocent of such extremism.
In conclusion:

One of the goals of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures was to
improve on this two-tiered paradigm, and to restore a more robust and
holistic worldview. My study of some scattered sources from Maitreyanātha,
Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu has demonstrated that they criticized
the Madhyamaka version of two truths doctrine on the basis of the Yogā-
cāra theory of the three natures.


So the Yogācāra develop the doctrine of The Three Natures, one of which is the world as it's understood according to the theory of dependent origination.


---

### Answer by username_3 on 2016-01-24. Score: 1

I think Cittamatra texts do explicitly refute it. Vasubhandu's Twenty Stanzas and autocommentary is a text that gives logical arguments against the presence of an external world. The very begining of this text reads:

> "The three realms are consciousness only" of the Mahayana is
> established through the scriptural expression, "the three realms are
> mind only." "Mind," "thought," "consciousness," and "perception"
> (uijñapti) are different names. Here, "mind" and "thought" are lumped
> together with mental activities (caitta). "Only" excludes objects of
> perception (artha) that are external to consciousness, not associates
> of consciousness. When internal consciousness is born, it appears
> resembling external objects of perception, I but in the same way that
> one with diseased eyesight sees nonexistent hairs, flies, etc. Here
> there is not the slightest aspect of reality.

and the text goes on to refute various objections to the nonexistence of external objects.

Also, in his autocommentary on the Thirty Verses he writes:

> If there is nothing at all but consciousness and no external condi-
> tions at all, from what are the many imaginations born? The Verses
> say,
>
> From the consciousness that is all seeds Transformation [occurs] in
> such - and -such ways. Due to the power of mutual influence, That- and
> -that imagination is born. (18)
>
> Even though internal consciousness exists, still, there are no
> external conditions, so what is the basis for the continuity of birth
> and death among sentient beings? The Verses say,
>
> The habit energy of various actions Together with the habit energy of
> the two graspings, When prior retribution is exhausted, Subsequently
> produce other retribution. (19)

Asanga's Mahayana-Samgraha is probably another good place to look but I haven't read that text yet so I'm not sure if it is explicit.


---

### Answer by username_4 on 2020-11-30. Score: 0

No. Nothing exists as we perceive it. We are seeing through eyes, hearing through ears, never experiential: or first hand. So essentially the world does not exist as we think it does, so is that non-existent or different?

> **Comments:**
> **username_5**: Is this your personal opinion? To answer the question properly, you would need to provide authoritative sources regarding cittamatra / yogacara.  

---

