French general of the First World War
Maurice Paul Emmanuel Sarrail (6 April 1856 – 23 March 1929) was a French general of the First World War. Sarrail's openly socialist political connections made him a rarity amongst the Catholics, conservatives and monarchists who dominated the French Army officer corps under the Third Republic before the war, and were the main reason why he was appointed to command at Salonika.
At the start of the war, Sarrail commanded VI Corps then Third Army in the Ardennes and around Verdun, where his army played an important role in the final stages of the First Battle of the Marne and where he took the credit for holding Verdun (later the site of an important battle in 1916). He was dismissed for poor leadership, amidst political uproar, in July 1915.
The Salonika campaign – chosen out of several strategic options presented by Sarrail – was intended originally to support Serbia, with Bulgaria entering the war on the side of the Central Powers, and later (as the Gallipoli campaign was winding down) to provide a chance for France to assert her economic and political influence over Greece and the declining Ottoman Empire. Sarrail ended up commanding a multinational Allied force amidst political intrigue and a state of near civil war in Greece, whose King Constantine was pro-German, whilst the Prime Minister Venizelos was pro-Allied and also keen to gain territory from the Turks in western Anatolia. Despite a number of offensives, Sarrail's forces did not succeed either in conquering Bulgaria or in preventing the Central Powers' conquest of Serbia in 1915 or Romania in 1916. Sarrail was dismissed from his Salonika command in December 1917. 
He later played a role in the French suppression of the Great Syrian Revolt in the mid-1920s.
Biography.
Early career.
Sarrail was born at Carcassonne, and attended St Cyr, graduating in third place on 1 October 1877. He was posted as a sub-lieutenant to the infantry. His regimental service and promotion followed the normal course. He was promoted to lieutenant in October 1882, captain in 1887, and chef-de-bataillon (major) in 1897. In 1901 he was appointed Commandant of the École Militaire d'Infanterie (St. Maixent), where rankers were turned into loyal republican officers.
In 1902 he was promoted lieutenant-colonel. From 1904 to 1906 he was Military Commandant of the Palais Bourbon, which housed the Chamber of Deputies, and he was promoted colonel in 1905. In 1907 he became Director of Infantry at the War Office,  an appointment which he held for four years. He was made "General de Brigade" in 1908. In 1911 he was promoted "General de Division" when his radical Socialist friend Caillaux formed his first government, and on 1 November 1913 he was given command of VIII Corps.
Unlike many French officers, Sarrail was a freemason and a Dreyfusard. After a left-wing government came to power in 1914, he was due to be appointed Commander-in-Chief designate in Joffre's place in the autumn, but war broke out before this could take place.
First World War: western front 1914–15.
Battle of the Ardennes.
At Virton in the Ardennes in August 1914 he commanded VI Corps, part of Ruffey's Third Army. VI Corps was strengthened with an extra (third) infantry division, and faced German VI Reserve Corps. Sarrail's was the only corps of Ruffey's Third Army to withstand the strong German counterattacks (the others being Brochin's V Corps and Victor-Rene Broelle's IV Corps). It was eventually forced to fall back to avoid encirclement. Sarrail told 42nd Division, which formed the rearguard, "you have given proof of "cran" (guts)".
On 30 August Sarrail was promoted to succeed Ruffey in command of Third Army.
In early September IV Corps was removed from his command and sent to Maunoury's new Sixth Army near Paris.
Fighting around Verdun.
In early September Sarrail, along with Franchet d’Esperey (Fifth Army) and Foch (Ninth Army), was ordered ("Instruction Generale No 5") to stop retreating and be ready to counterattack. However, during the Battle of the Marne, unlike those other French generals, Sarrail was ordered simply to pin down German Crown Prince Wilhelm's Fifth Army opposite him, in the vicinity of Verdun.
The Revigny Gap had opened up between the right of de Langle's Fourth Army and the left of Third Army. A similar, larger, gap, 20 km wide, had opened up between Fourth Army's left and the right of Foch's Ninth Army. Whilst Joffre was bringing up XV and XXI Corps from Lorraine to plug the gaps, the Germans attacked, although these attacks were unsuccessful in part as a result of squabbling between Albrecht (commander of German Fourth Army) who wanted Wilhelm to support him whilst he enveloped de Langle from the west, whilst Wilhelm wanted Albrecht to support "him" while he pushed into the Revigny Gap between de Langle and Sarrail. Wilhelm eventually appealed directly to his father the Kaiser.
Sarrail attacked on the morning of 6 September, his right pivoting on Verdun whilst the main body of his force, 20 km to the southwest, attacked in a roughly north-westerly direction. Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, had expected Sarrail to take the German Fifth Army on its eastern flank as it advanced south from the Argonne into the Revigny Gap, but instead Crown Prince Wilhelm was advancing south-east towards Bar-le-Duc, so his army and Sarrail's clashed head on. Sarrail's forces were again mauled by von Pritzelwitz's VI Corps, which had beaten the French colonials so badly at Rossigny, earning Sarrail (6 September) a blistering written rebuke from Joffre. Joffre criticised Sarrail's men for abandoning equipment and officers for poor leadership and demanded that he "re-establish order, taking whatever measures necessary".
Beginning on 8 September, the Germans were also attacking around Troyon (south-east of Verdun), threatening the heights of the Meuse in Sarrail's rear. Combined with the chance of breakthrough in the Revigny Gap, there was a chance that Verdun and Third Army would be encircled altogether, allowing the Germans then to attack Second Army in Lorraine. At 20.00 on 8 September Joffre authorised Sarrail to break contact with the Fortified Region of Verdun, so as to shift his forces west and better block the German advance. Sarrail refused and would later describe himself as the "Saviour of Verdun", claiming that his actions had saved Verdun from capture. This is an exaggeration: Verdun, defended by 350 heavy and 442 light guns, and 65,774 soldiers, was probably in little real danger of immediate capture. His actions, which risked the encirclement of his army, are described as "churlish" by Herwig, whilst Doughty is equally critical.
The German Fifth Army made a final major attack on 10 September, running into heavy fire from the soixante-quinzes ("black butchers" as the Germans called them) of Micheler's V Corps and Verraux's VI corps. Moltke, increasingly concerned at the failure of the German attacks at Nancy, initially rescinded his permission for the final night attack until Wilhelm threatened to appeal to his father again. In the first ten days of September the German Fifth Army suffered 15,000 casualties, with some units suffering up to 40% officer casualties. At 9am on 10 September Lt-Col Hentsch, returning from ordering von Kluck and von Bülow to fall back from the Marne at the west of the German line, ordered Fifth Army to retreat also, an order which Wilhelm and his chief of staff Schmidt von Knobelsdorff refused to obey unless received in writing from the Kaiser or from Moltke. That day Sarrail was able to signal Joffre "situation satisfactory", whilst at 2pm Joffre was able to inform Millerand (War Minister) that the Battle of the Marne was now an "incontestable victory".
Despite the German retreat, neither Third nor Fourth Army made much progress. Joffre rebuked Sarrail over the telephone on 13 September 1914, demanding a formal inquiry of how Sarrail had "not been informed" of the enemy retreat 48 hours previously, a demand which Sarrail sidestepped by having his staff telephone a routine progress report to Joffre. To the south-east of Verdun the Germans took Fort Troyon on 13 September and Fort Camp des Romains on 26 September, creating the Saint-Mihiel Salient. The salient cut off one of the railway lines supplying Verdun, which would force the defenders to rely heavily on road transport in the 1916 battle.
Winter 1914–15.
The railway into Verdun from Paris and Chalons, which passed through Aubreville, 20 km west of Verdun, was under shelling from the German occupied Heights of Aubreville, 7 km to the north. After attacks by French artillery, directed by aircraft, had failed to do the trick, Sarrail spent much of the winter of 1914–15 attempting to drive the Germans from the Heights. Third Army suffered 10,000 casualties alone in November.
On 7 November Sarrail reported that in the previous month alone sixteen men of Third Army had been sentenced to death for self-inflicted wounds or for deserting their posts.
Argonne and dismissal: 1915.
Early in 1915 Sarrail's political allies touted him as a replacement for Joffre as commander-in-chief.
The Germans attacked in the Argonne on 20 and 30 June and 12 and 13 July 1915. Joffre complained that Third Army had performed poorly and had "yielded the initiative to the adversary". Joffre transferred Third Army from Dubail's Eastern Army Group to de Castelnau's Central Army Group, and on 16 July Dubail wrote to de Castelnau expressing his concerns about Sarrail's leadership, and noting that the Germans opposite had kept up an "aggressive attitude" without undue casualties, whereas Sarrail had attempted to maintain "moral ascendancy" with many small attacks, and had ended up being driven back. On 16 July Joffre asked Dubail to investigate the "persistent lack of success" in the Argonne. Dubail sent two separate reports to Joffre: the one on operations was partly positive, but criticised Sarrail's plans for being "too simplistic" and for keeping his divisions in "rigid zones". The report on morale criticised the "malaise" at Third Army – "lack of mutual confidence" between Sarrail and the XXXII Corps commander and problems in Third Army staff, including allegations of false reports being sent to higher headquarters – and recommended Sarrail's removal.
Joffre replaced Sarrail with Humbert on 22 July 1915, an act which created the war's first direct clash between politicians and soldiers in France. The resulting uproar on the political left nearly swept away the Sacred Union government. During the preparations for the upcoming offensive, Castelnau supervised Humbert closely, criticising Sarrail's legacy of poor construction of obstacles and shelters and "defective practices" amongst the artillery.
Salonika.
1915.
Strategic options.
Viviani (French Prime Minister) shored up his coalition government by appointing Sarrail, a republican socialist general, to command an expedition to the Eastern Mediterranean. He was initially given a British division (committed with great reluctance by the British authorities) and Bailloud's division from the Dardanelles. Joffre described Sarrail as "a factious general", suspected him of having plotted a "coup d’etat" in France and would have preferred Franchet d’Esperey for the job. Sarrail initially felt that commanding a corps-sized force was a severe demotion. After meeting Millerand (War Secretary) on 3 August he accepted on condition the name of his force was changed to "Army of the Orient", a title with Napoleonic overtones, and that it was reinforced with an extra four divisions, and was not under British generals. He was formally appointed on 5 August. Sarrail's memo of 11 August proposed landing at Smyrna, Alexandretta or Salonika or land in the Bay of Adramyti and march on Chanak. Joffre was strongly critical of the logistical feasibility of these proposals. Throughout August President Poincaré, Viviani and Millerand pushed Joffre to release four divisions for the planned Asian expedition, and he eventually promised to do so after his autumn offensive. He had the Office of National Security Studies criticise the logistics of the operation.
On 31 August 1915 Kitchener (British War Secretary) was informed that France was to land six divisions on the Asian coast of the Dardanelles. Joffre was probably involving the British to help block Sarrail's plans. The entry of Bulgaria into the war on 6 September, threatening Serbia's rear, finally meant that Sarrail's more ambitious plans had to be shelved. Joffre had already agreed (4 August) to a military mission going to Salonika, but it was not ready until 22 September, the day the Bulgarian Army mobilised. On 28 September Sarrail was told he was to command an expedition at Salonika, not in Turkey-in-Asia. The Greek government, pro-Allied but technically still neutral, went through the motions of formal diplomatic