2010 United States Supreme Court case
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held that, unless and until a criminal suspect explicitly states that they are relying on their right to remain silent, their voluntary statements may be used in court and police may continue to question them. The mere act of remaining silent is not sufficient to imply the suspect has invoked their rights even when the suspect actually intended their silence to have that effect. Furthermore, a voluntary reply even after lengthy silence can be construed as waiving the right to remain silent.
The Court was split, 5–4. The dissent, authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, argued that "Miranda v. Arizona" and other previous cases had required the waiver of a constitutional right to be much clearer, especially because of the "compelling influence" that an interrogation causes after police have spent several hours pressuring a suspect.
Many considered "Berghuis" the latest in a line of cases eroding "Miranda", perhaps "turning the clocks back" on safeguards for people being investigated by the police. At least one scholar argued that "Berghuis" effectively gutted "Miranda". The opinion is commonly criticized as giving police permission to compromise vulnerable citizens in interrogation and, in effect, making it easier for the police to work around the theoretical existence of those citizens' rights.
Background of the case.
Legal background.
Under U.S. law and with rare exceptions, people (whether criminal suspects or defendants or not) have the right to remain silent as part of their right not to incriminate themselves under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Remaining silent is optional—they may speak or be silent as they wish. The "Miranda" warning concerns the duty of the police or other formal questioners to make sure that the suspect is aware they have that right prior to questioning, in case they want to be silent at some point or the suspect later pleads ignorance that they had the right (and would have relied upon it had they been aware). "Miranda v. Arizona", 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and related cases contemplate that a suspect might invoke their rights (make clear they wish to rely on them), waive their rights (make clear they do not wish to rely on them), or do neither of these. A number of cases such as the present one, refine "Miranda" by addressing when and at what point a suspect, who is aware that they have the right to remain silent, is said to have begun to rely on that right, as opposed to when they were aware of the right but were not choosing to rely on it.
Interrogation and conviction.
Police considered Van Chester Thompkins a suspect in a fatal shooting on January 10, 2000, in Southfield, Michigan. After advising Thompkins of his "Miranda" rights, police officers interrogated him. Thompkins did not state at any time that he wanted to rely on his right to remain silent, that he refused to talk to the police, or that he wanted an attorney. The court record suggested that he had been almost completely silent during the three-hour interrogation and the few sporadic comments he made had no bearing on the case (police described it as "nearly a monologue"). Towards the end, detectives tried a "spiritual" approach to "appeal to his conscience and religious beliefs". The police asked Thompkins three questions: did he believe in God, did he pray to God, and did he pray to God to forgive him for shooting the victim. He answered "yes" to each of these.
Thompkins made a motion to suppress the statements, claiming that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by remaining silent, that he had not waived that right, and that his incriminating statements were involuntary. The trial court denied his motion, a jury found Thompkins guilty, and the court sentenced Thompkins to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Of note, there had been significant other evidence of guilt corroborating the conviction.
State court appeal and federal court "habeas corpus" proceedings.
Thompkins appealed his conviction on grounds that included suppression of his admission—that he had invoked and not waived his right to remain silent—and deficient representation related to improper jury instructions, but the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Thompkins' "Miranda" claim. Thompkins then filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal District Court but it denied his request. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision, holding that the state court was unreasonable in finding an implied waiver of Thompkins' right to remain silent.
Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The state's petition to the Supreme Court said the questioning had in the case had not been coercive, and the state offered the Court theories to support the idea that extended silence should not be construed as an invocation. For example, it said that "initial" reluctance to talk was not inherently a communication by the suspect to the officer that they were terminating the interview, which is what an exercise of the right to silence is. If the suspect was terminating the interview, then the suspect would not be able to hear any of the evidence against them before making a decision. In other words, the state asserted that requiring the suspect to explicitly invoke the right to silence was actually in the suspect's best interest.
Opposing the state's position, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and American Civil Liberties Union filed a joint "Amicus Curiae" brief that argued the police officers strategically "chose" to never asked Thompkins if he would willingly waive his "Miranda" rights because that would have invited him to do so explicitly. In their view, a so-called "waiver-first" rule where the police must ask for a waiver was "the most effective way to avoid the very evil that ["Miranda"] sought to address, namely that the highly coercive and intimidating custodial environment compels unwilling suspects to speak." They warned that, if the Court embraced a so-called "waiver by confession" rule, "Miranda" would be directly undermined because the coercive effect of hours of pressure in the interrogation environment could be ignored by courts just because the police heard what they wanted to hear.
The Court's decision.
On June 1, 2010, by a vote of 5–4, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision. In the Opinion of the Court, written by Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that Thompkins's silence during the interrogation did not invoke his right to remain silent and that he had waived his right to remain silent when he knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to police.
The Court quickly dismissed Thompkins's ineffective assistance of counsel claim with the test from "Strickland v. Washington": Thompkins needed to show that his lawyer's performance was objectively deficient "and" that he was prejudiced by the result. The Court said that it was "doubtful" that the lawyer's performance was objectively deficient because the lawyer neglected to request a jury instruction informing the jury of the acquittal of Thompkins's alleged accomplice. But, even if it had been deficient, the Court said there was enough other evidence of guilt corroborating the conviction that it was unlikely the jury instruction would have made a difference, so there was no prejudice.
Majority opinion.
The Court reasoned as follows on Thompkins' various arguments:
There was no good reason why the standard for invoking the "Miranda" right to remain silent and the "Miranda" right to counsel should differ because both require the interrogation to end when the right is explicitly invoked. Making either of these statements would have ended the questions but Thompkins made neither of them.
The Court further concluded (in line with previous cases such as "Davis v. United States") that there was good reason why invoking "Miranda" rights should require an unambiguous act of the accused and that courts should not look for implied invocations in the words of actions of the accused. These reasons included certainty for the police, the prosecutors, and the accused. The Court also cited social benefits from law enforcement.
The Court then considered whether the accused had taken action that waived those rights. Waiver must be a free choice with full awareness ("Moran v. Burbine"). "Miranda v. Arizona" (the "Miranda" ruling) states that "[A] heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." It was noted that the accused had read and expressed understanding of the rights, and had them read aloud, he had not pleaded lack of understanding, was given time, and therefore knew his rights. Specifically, having read the 5th warning ("you have the right to decide at any time before or during questioning to use your right to remain silent and your right to talk with a lawyer while you are being questioned") he was aware this right was enduring and could be applied at any time in the questioning if he chose, and the police would have to honor the invocation if he did so. The Court observed that "[p]olice are not required to rewarn suspects from time to time". That a question is linked to religious beliefs does not cause the reply to be "involuntary". The accused, understanding his rights and that they were capable of invocation at any point, had not chosen to invoke them.
The case of "North Carolina v. Butler "441 U.S. 369 (1979) showed that a waiver of "Miranda" rights may be implied through "the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver". The Court held that where a "Miranda" warning had been given and was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement established an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. Thompkins' answer to the police question, having understood but not chosen to invoke his rights, was sufficient to show a course of conduct indicating waiver. Further corroboration was that he had sporadically made other comments as well.
The Court concluded that:
 ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;In sum, a suspect who has received and understood the "Miranda" warnings, and has not invoked his "Miranda" rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Thompkins did not invoke his right to remain silent and stop the questioning. Understanding his rights in full, he waived his right to remain silent by making a voluntary statement to the police.
Sotomayor's dissent.
Associate Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote the dissenting opinion for four Justices, her first major dissenting opinion on the Court. She wrote that the case represented "a substantial retreat from the protection against compelled self-incrimination that "Miranda v. Arizona" has long provided during custodial interrogation", and that "[S]uspects must now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent—which, counterintuitively, requires them to speak. At the same time, suspects will be legally presumed to have waived their rights even if they have given no clear expression of their intent to do so."
The dissent noted that the government must satisfy the "high standar[d] of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights [set forth in] "Johnson v. Zerbst"." It cited from "Miranda" that:
 ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained [...] the fact of lengthy interrogation... before a statement is made is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circumstances the fact that the individual eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of the privilege.
and that "Miranda" and "North Carolina v. Butler" both agreed that:
 ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;[a] court 'must presume that a defendant did not waive his right[s]'; the prosecution bears a 'heavy burden' in attempting to demonstrate waiver; the fact of a 'lengthy interrogation' prior to obtaining statements is 'strong evidence' against a finding of valid waiver; 'mere silence' in response to questioning is 'not enough'; and waiver may not be presumed 'simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained'.
The Court had previously observed that "while the privilege [against self-incrimination] is sometimes a shelter