1899–1900 battle of the Second Boer War
The siege of Kimberley took place during the Second Boer War at Kimberley, Cape Colony (present-day South Africa), when Boer forces from the Orange Free State and the Transvaal besieged the diamond mining town. The Boers moved quickly to try to capture the area when war broke out between the British and the two Boer republics in October 1899. The town was ill-prepared, but the defenders organised an energetic and effective improvised defence that was able to prevent it from being taken.
Outside Kimberley, the Boers treated the occupied territory as part of one of the republics, appointing a 'landdrost' (magistrate) and changing the name of the neighbouring town of Barkly West to Nieu Boshof.
Cecil Rhodes, who had made his fortune in the town, and who controlled all the mining activities, moved into the town at the onset of the siege. His presence was controversial, as his involvement in the Jameson Raid made him one of the primary protagonists behind war breaking out. Rhodes was in constant disagreement with the military, but he was nonetheless instrumental in organising the defence of the town. The Boers shelled the town with their superior artillery in an attempt to force the garrison to capitulate. Engineers of the De Beers company manufactured a one-off gun named Long Cecil; however the Boers soon countered with a much larger siege gun that terrified the residents, forcing many to take shelter in the Kimberley Mine.
The British military had to change its strategy for the war as public opinion demanded that the sieges of Kimberley, Ladysmith and Mafeking be relieved before the Boer capitals were assaulted. The first attempt at relief of Kimberley under Lord Methuen was stopped at the battles of Modder River and Magersfontein. The 124-day siege was finally relieved on 15 February 1900 by a cavalry division under Lieutenant-General John French, part of a larger force under Lord Roberts. The battle against the Boer general Piet Cronjé continued at Paardeberg immediately after the town itself was relieved.
Background.
Prior to the onset of the Second Boer War, Kimberley was the second-biggest city in the Cape Colony, and vibrant and prosperous as the centre of diamond mining operations of the De Beers Mining Company, who supplied 90% of the world's diamonds. The town had a population of 40,000, of which 25,000 were white. It was one of a handful of British outposts in the far north east of the colony, located just a few kilometres from the borders of the Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State; Cape Town was away by rail, while Port Elizabeth was . The closest Boer settlements were Jacobsdal to the south and Boshof to the east.
Preparation.
The De Beers company was concerned about the defence of Kimberley some years before the outbreak of the war, particularly its vulnerability to attack from the neighbouring Orange Free State. In 1896, an arms depot was formed, a plan of defence sent to the authorities and a local defence force set up. As it began to look more likely that war would break out, the nervous citizens of Kimberley appealed to the premier of the Cape Colony, William Philip Schreiner, for additional protection, but he did not believe the town to be under serious threat and declined to arm it further. His reply to an appeal for arms in September 1899 stated: “There is no reason whatever for apprehending that Kimberley is or will be in any danger of attack and your fears are therefore groundless.”
The town next appealed to the high commissioner, this time with more success. On 4 October 1899, Major Scott-Turner was permitted to summon volunteers to join the town guard and raise the Diamond Fields Artillery. Three days later, the town was placed under the command of Colonel Robert Kekewich of the 1st Battalion, Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire), and secured against a "coup de main", but not against sustained siege.
Colonel Kekewich's troops consisted of four companies of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, some Royal Engineers, six RML 2.5-inch mountain guns and two machine guns. Also at his disposal were 120 men of the Cape Police (recalled from various outposts along the railway line), 2,000 irregular troops, the Kimberley Light Horse, and a battery of obsolete seven-pounder guns. Eight Maxim machine guns were mounted on redoubts built atop tailing heaps around the town.
Cecil John Rhodes, the founder of De Beers, was contemplating moving into the town. The citizens feared that his presence there, given his prominent role in the breakdown of Anglo-Boer relations leading up to the war, would antagonise the Boers. Consequently, the mayor of Kimberley, as well as various associates of Rhodes, tried to discourage him. However, Rhodes ignored the advice and moved into the town just prior to the onset of the siege, very narrowly evading capture when the Boer ultimatum expired at 5 pm on 11 October while he was still "en route". It was a calculated move to raise the political stakes and thereby force the British government to divert war resources to lifting the siege on his mining operation. Since most of the resources in the garrison were owned by De Beers, Rhodes inevitably became an important factor in the defence organised by Colonel Robert Kekewich. As head of the mining company that owned most of the assets in the town, the military felt that Rhodes proved to be more of a hindrance as he did not co-operate fully with them; civil and military authorities were not always working together, especially after the death of the second in command of the garrison, Major Scott-Turner. The military took the following view of Rhodes:
In practice, unlike Baden Powell at Mafeking, Kekewich did not have free rein to conduct the defence as he saw fit.
Kekewich decided to include the neighbouring municipality of Beaconsfield as well as the outlying suburb of Kenilworth inside the defensive perimeter he established around the town. Rhodes sponsored the raising of a new regiment called the Kimberley Light Horse, but Lord Methuen advised Kekewich that “Rhodes is to leave Kimberley the day after I arrive. Tell him he is not to interfere in military matters.”
Siege.
The conflict at Kimberley started on 14 October 1899. Colonel Baden-Powell, anticipating the inevitable onset of hostilities, encouraged all the women and children to leave the town. Some civilians left in a special train, escorted as far as Vryburg by an armoured train. On the return journey, the armoured train was captured in the first action of the war between Kimberley and Mafeking at Kraaipan by Boers under the command of fighting general De la Rey, the hero of the western Transvaal. On 12 October, the Jacobsdal Commando severed the railway line at the bridge over the Modder River south of Kimberley, whereafter the Boers entrenched themselves in the hills at Spytfontein. Meanwhile, the Boshof Commando severed the railway line north of the town at Riverton Road, then shut off the primary water supply at Riverton on the Vaal River. For the first time, water in the mines became more precious than the diamonds in them. On 14 October the Boers cut the telephone line to the Cape. Heliograph and dispatch riders consequently had to make hazardous journeys through Boer lines to the Orange River and then to Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. On 15 October, martial law was declared in the town.
The cattle that usually grazed on the outskirts of the town presented a problem; if they were left, they would be lost to the Boers, but if they were slaughtered, the meat would perish quickly in the summer heat. The De Beers chief engineer, George Labram, provided a solution by building an industrial refrigeration plant underground in the Kimberley mine to preserve the meat.
The Boer commander, Commandant Cornelius Wessels, presented Kekewich with an ultimatum on 4 November, demanding the town's surrender. Kekewich replied the same day, stating: “...you are hereby invited to effect the occupation of this town as an operation of war by the employment of the military forces under your command”. When the siege of Kimberley itself began in earnest on 6 November, the situation favoured an attack. The Boers were in control of the railway from the Orange River to Mafeking, while arms and ammunition were in short supply in Kimberley. On 7 November, the Boers started shelling the town. Communication with the outside world was not seriously impeded however. The Boer strategy was not to attack the town in a full battle, but rather to wait for the defenders to capitulate, all the time wearing them down with shelling. The defenders tried to send the large contingent of migrant native labourers that was working in the mines home, but twice the Boers drove them back into the town in an apparent attempt to put pressure on the limited food and water supply.
Rhodes had his own agenda, which differed from the greater war goal of redressing wrongs in the Transvaal that had triggered the conflict. He used his position and influence to demand relief of the siege vociferously in both the press and directly of the government. However, Kekewich was a more cool-headed man, and was careful to let the authorities in Cape Town know that the situation was by no means desperate and that he would be able to hold out for several weeks. The feud between the two men escalated when the "Diamond Fields Advertiser", the local newspaper which was under Rhodes's control, ignored the military censor and printed information that compromised the military. Kekewich obtained permission from his superior to place Rhodes under arrest if necessary.
The food and water supply was managed closely by the military authorities. Rationing was imposed as the food supply dwindled, with the inhabitants eventually resorting in the final states of the siege to eating horse meat. Vegetables could not be grown easily because of a shortage of water. The scarcity of vegetables took the hardest toll on the poorest people, notably the 15,000-strong indigenous population; a local doctor suggested that they eat aloe leaves to avoid contracting scurvy, while Rhodes organised a soup kitchen.
On 25 November, the British garrison launched an attack on the Boer redoubt at Carter's Ridge, west of the town. Kekewich's men held the belief that the action would assist Methuen's relief column at Magersfontein by keeping more Boers occupied at Kimberley. A detachment of 40 members of Cape Police and Light Horse under the command of Major Scott-Turner of the Black Watch set out at midnight and completely surprised their enemy in the early hours of the morning. Thirty-three Boers were captured at the cost of four killed. Scott-Turner tried to repeat the successful raid three days later, but it was a disaster for the British the second time round, with Scott-Turner among those killed.
The engineers of Rhodes's company, under Chief Mechanical Engineer George Labram, were instrumental in the defence of the town. They manufactured fortifications, an armoured train, a watch tower, shells, and a gun, known as "Long Cecil", for the defenders in order to supplement their inadequate weapons. "Long Cecil" was rifled with a bore of capable of propelling a shell . The gun was completed on 21 January 1900, and successfully test fired against a previously untouchable Boer position north of the town.
The Boers countered on 7 February with a much heavier 100-pounder named "Long Tom"; it had been disabled by British saboteurs at Ladysmith, before being repaired at Pretoria, and brought to Kimberley. In addition to having larger shells than any of the siege guns used up to that point, its longer range meant that it could also target any location in Kimberley. The town's inhabitants had become accustomed to shelling by smaller guns and were to some extent able to take shelter and to carry on their daily lives. The new gun immediately changed the status quo, as terrified residents were no longer able to find sanctuary anywhere at ground level. Rhodes published a notice inviting people to take shelter in the Kimberley Mine in order to avoid its lethal shelling. Fortunately for the defenders, the gun did not use smokeless powder, so observers were able to give residents up to 17 seconds warning to take cover when a shell was incoming. Labram was the most notable civilian casualty, when he was killed within