Part of the Vietnam War (1968)
The Battle of Kham Duc was a major battle of the Vietnam War. The event occurred in Khâm Đức, now district capital of Khâm Đức District, then in Quảng Tín Province (now part of Quảng Nam Province, Vietnam), from 10–12 May 1968. During the Tet Offensive of 1968, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 2nd Division tried to capture Đà Nẵng, but they were defeated in the Battle of Lo Giang by elements of the U.S. 1st Marine Division and the 23rd Infantry Division (Americal Division). PAVN General Chu Huy Mân disengaged from the fight on the outskirts of the city, and pulled the 2nd Division into the mountains to rest, rebuild, and prepare for the next major operation. The US and allied defenders of the Special Forces camp at Khâm Đức, a small district in the north of Quảng Tín, were chosen as the next target for the 2nd Division. Although the Special Forces camp had never been an obstacle to the constant infiltration of PAVN troops around it, the North Vietnamese hoped to attract major US reinforcements away from the lowland populated areas, kill or capture them and film the battle, presumably to make it look like a US Điện Biên Phủ on the eve of the 1st Paris peace conference.
Following the 2nd PAVN Division's defeat at Đà Nẵng, U.S. military intelligence agencies in I Corps Tactical Zone were confused by its the movements. Beginning in late February, intelligence reports confirmed the presence of large units of the 2nd Division in the Khâm Đức area. Coincidentally, General William Westmoreland sent U.S. Army engineers to upgrade the camp's airstrip for sustained use by large transport aircraft in preparation for an incursion into Laos titled Operation York. An Australian-led indigenous MIKE Force company was ordered to hold their vulnerable position at Ngok Tavak (Ngok Ta Vak), the ruins of a small, earthen French fort on a hill about south of Khâm Đức, to boost Special Forces intelligence-gathering capabilities in the area. More and more reports of patrol contact with elements of the 2nd Division heightened the alert status of the MIKE Force troops.
In the early hours of 10 May, the 40th Battalion attacked Ngok Tavak and overran much of the outpost. By dawn, the 11th MIKE Force company was devastated, but they later received reinforcements from the 12th MIKE Force company. The Australian MIKE Force commander then decided to evacuate his troops and move towards Khâm Đức. The survivors of the PAVN battalion had left behind a mortar squad and a recoilless rifle squad to cover their retreat and harass the remaining MIKE Force and Marine artillery platoon. Meanwhile, a reinforced infantry battalion with an attached artillery battery of the 23rd Infantry Division was airlifted into Khâm Đức as part of Operation Golden Valley, to defend the airstrip in preparation for a possible evacuation. On the morning of 12 May, the day before the Paris peace talks began, both regiments of the 2nd Division attacked Khâm Đức. It began with assaults on two of the three hilltop outposts surrounding the camp. Westmoreland then ordered his Deputy MACV CO for Air, General Momyer, to make an all-out effort to extract all the people in Khâm Đức, both military and civilian. The PAVN mass attacks on the airstrip in broad daylight under clear skies were ravaged by an unprecedented concentration of some 350 sorties of almost 150 US Air Force, Marine, Navy and South Vietnamese tactical aircraft, causing an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 PAVN casualties without allowing them to penetrate, much less overrun, the airstrip or the camp. By the time the operation was completed, about 1,500 military and civilian personnel had been evacuated. For the following two days, US Air Force B-52s bombed the surrounding area intensively.
Background.
The Tet Offensive.
1968 marked a decisive turning point in the history of the Vietnam War. Towards the end of January, regular units of the PAVN and the VC initiated large-scale attacks on Saigon and all 34 provincial cities of South Vietnam. Several major towns, villages, and allied military installations throughout the country were also attacked during the same period. In doing so, the PAVN and VC violated the Tết holiday truce, which had enabled South Vietnamese military personnel to go on leave. The combined PAVN/VC forces were able to achieve the element of surprise, but despite some early victories, they could only sustain their offensive for a few days, or in the case of the Battle of Huế several weeks, before being ejected with heavy losses.
In I Corps the PAVN had mixed results against allied military forces. On 7 February 1968, PAVN infantry armed with satchel charges, tear gas, and flamethrowers, and reinforced with Soviet-made PT-76 amphibious tanks, successfully seized the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp. At Khe Sanh Combat Base, about east of Lang Vei, the U.S. 26th Marine Regiment was able to hold their ground against a multi-division PAVN assault. During the siege U.S. Air Force (USAF), Navy, and Marine fighter-bombers dropped 40,000 tonnes of bombs on PAVN positions, while B-52 bombers dropped more than 60,000 tonnes of ordnance on areas where the PAVN were believed to have concentrated their forces.
In the same period, the PAVN 2nd Division under the command of Colonel Giáp Văn Cương clashed with elements of the 1st Marine Division, the Americal Division, and the South Korean Marine Brigade in their attempts to capture Đà Nẵng. The PAVN, however, were defeated in the Battle of Lo Giang. After 9 February, the PAVN 2nd Division seemed to withdraw from the battlefield, so Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr. Commander of III Marine Amphibious Force ordered his troops to continue their attacks on the retreating forces. In the aftermath of the battle for Đà Nẵng, U.S. military commanders in I Corps held disparate views on the fighting ability of the PAVN 2nd Division. Americal Division commander Major General Samuel W. Koster claimed losses sustained by the PAVN 2nd Division had "impaired its future effectiveness", after his units killed more than 1,000 PAVN soldiers in the month of January alone. In contrast, 1st Marine Division commander Major General Donn J. Robertson told his superiors that the 2nd Division may have several uncommitted units they could deploy for future operations.
Whether the PAVN 2nd Division had been rendered ineffective or not was uncertain, as U.S. military intelligence did not know the whereabouts of the enemy unit or their intentions. The PAVN had been fighting continuously since January 1968 with U.S. and other allied military forces in I Corps, so their resupply capabilities were overstretched and their soldiers were not given the opportunity to rest before the Tet Offensive. Thus, following the failed attack on Đà Nẵng, PAVN General Chu Huy Mân, Commander of Military Region 5, made the decision to pull the 2nd Division into the mountains where they could rest, resupply, and integrate replacements before going on the offensive again. Mân ordered Cương to split the 2nd Division into two fighting arms: one regiment would tie down the Americans in the Quế Son Valley, while the rest of the division would withdraw to their base areas near Laos, to link up with the 70th Transport Regiment. Then, their next target would be Khâm Đức and the surrounding areas; Mân told his senior officers that they would attack Khâm Đức to force an American retreat.
The plans for Khâm Đức.
Khâm Đức was in the northern section of Quảng Tín Province, South Vietnam, in I Corps Tactical Zone. It sat beside National Highway 14 (QL 14), which paralleled the international border with Laos, surrounded by high mountains on all sides. The Special Forces Camp was named after the main village which was about to the northeast, and was constructed about mid-way along a asphalt runway. Before his abdication, Emperor Bảo Đại (and possibly Ngô Đình Nhu)199 had used Khâm Đức as a hunting lodge, so the airfield was constructed there for Bảo Đại's use. The Khâm Đức Special Forces Camp was garrisoned by Detachment A-105, U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group. The camp was downgraded from a major outpost due to its unpredictable weather6 and now functioned as a training centre for Civilian Irregular Defense Group program (CIDG) personnel, reconnaissance of enemy movements, and combat operations. The village had 272 inhabitants, most of whom were dependents of the South Vietnamese and ethnic lowland CIDG soldiers. Ngok Tavak, about southwest of Khâm Đức, was an observation outpost for Detachment A-105. Following the loss of Lang Vei, Khâm Đức was the last remaining Special Forces camp adjacent to the Ho Chi Minh Trail in I Corps.
Khâm Đức suffered from a disability that made it less than ideal. The monsoon season, mixing storms from the Pacific Ocean with mountain storms moving east from Laos, meant that visibility was often near zero, rendering air support impossible. The weather is affected by two monsoon seasons. From April until November, northern-eastern monsoons carry moisture from the Gulf of Tonkin to the mountains of the Truong Son range, where it is released in torrential downpours every afternoon. Between May and November, the southern monsoons compete, the wind blowing west to east over the Gulf of Thailand. Even when it wasn't raining, dense fog often precluded flights. It was not at all unusual for flights to Khâm Đức to be grounded for a week or longer until a break in the weather allowed access to the base. PAVN forces were counting on the weather to prevent air support from saving the base. Westmoreland gambled that air support would be possible, saving the lives of the elements deployed there as well as offering an opportunity to inflict massive damage on the attacking forces.
From their base area positioned between Highway 14 and the Đăk Mi River, elements of the PAVN 2nd Division planned their attack on Khâm Đức and the surrounding outposts. The 1st Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyễn Chơn, was to lead the attack, including sweeping aside the small outpost of Ngok Tavak (Ngok Ta Vak). The PAVN remained hidden to avoid detection by the South Vietnamese and their American allies. Consequently, during that period the GK.31 Anti-Aircraft Battalion was prohibited from opening fire on U.S. reconnaissance aircraft that flew over their area. At the same time, the GK.40 Engineer Battalion was told to conduct training on its new equipment—satchel charges, tear gas, and flamethrowers—before early-May 1968. The 1st Regiment Headquarters made their preparations for the initial attack by regularly sending out CIDG units to conduct reconnaissance patrols around Ngok Tavak to observe enemy activities in the area.
Throughout March and April, allied intelligence was baffled by the movements of the units belonging to the PAVN 2nd Division, and that was reflected in the information obtained by U.S. military forces. For example, the U.S. 1st Marine Division reported that the 2nd Division Headquarters, the 3rd Regiment, the 21st Regiment, and the 1st Regiment were in the vicinity of Khâm Đức, Thượng Đức and Hội An, respectively. In contrast, information released by the U.S. 27th Marine Regiment showed the presence of the 3rd and 21st Regiments near Go Noi Island, whereas the 2nd Division Headquarters was reported to be in the Quế Sơn Valley. Despite the lack of accurate information, allied intelligence generally agreed the PAVN might begin attacking isolated outposts and units as their next course of action. Subsequently, on 4 May 1968, the 23rd Infantry Division made amendments to their "Golden Valley Plan", the plan for the relief and reinforcement of CIDG camps, to enable the deployment of the 1st Battalion, 46th Infantry Regiment, 196th Light Infantry Brigade to support Khâm Đức.
Starting on 9 April, the U.S. 70th Engineer Battalion was flown in from Pleiku, about to the south, to repair and upgrade the airfield for sustained use by C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. This work was a part of a secret plan, codenamed Santa Barbara, to improve several airstrips located near Laos in preparation for operations in Laos to cut off the Ho Chi Minh trail. The work had originally been planned to begin in January but was postponed due to the diversion of all transport aircraft to support Khe Sahn. By 8 May, the USAF had airlifted about 400 tonnes of cargo into Khâm Đức, including two bulldozers, by a C-124 Globemaster.
To counter a possible major