World War II battle on Crete in 1941
The Battle of Rethymno was part of the Battle of Crete, fought during World War II on the Greek island of Crete between 20 and 29 May 1941. Australian and Greek forces commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Ian Campbell defended the town of Rethymno and the nearby airstrip against a German paratrooper attack by the 2nd Parachute Regiment of the 7th Air Division commanded by Colonel Alfred Sturm.
The attack on Rethymno was one of four airborne assaults on Crete on 20 May, and part of the second series, following on from German attacks against Maleme airfield and the main port of Chania in the west of Crete in the morning. The aircraft which had dropped the morning attackers were scheduled to drop the 2nd Regiment over Rethymno later the same day; confusion and delays at the airfields in mainland Greece meant the assault was launched without direct air support and spread over an extended period rather than simultaneously. Those German units dropping near the Allied positions suffered very high casualties, both from ground fire and upon landing.
The German overall commander, Lieutenant-general Kurt Student, concentrated all resources on the battle for Maleme airfield, to the west, which the Germans won. The Allied Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Archibald Wavell, ordered an evacuation of Crete on 27 May, but the Allied commander on Crete, Major-general Bernard Freyberg, was unable to communicate this to Campbell. Faced by a superior force of Germans equipped with tanks and artillery, Campbell surrendered on 29 May. Some Australians retreated into the hills to the south and, aided by the Cretans, 52 eventually escaped to Egypt.
Background.
Greece became a belligerent in World War II when it was invaded by Italy on 28 October 1940. A British and Commonwealth expeditionary force was sent to support the Greeks; this force eventually totalled more than 60,000 men. British forces also garrisoned Crete, enabling the Greek Fifth Cretan Division to reinforce the mainland campaign. This arrangement suited the British: Crete could provide the Royal Navy with excellent harbours in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Ploiești oil fields in Romania would be within range of British bombers based on the island. The Italians were repulsed by the Greeks without the aid of the expeditionary force. In April 1941 a German invasion overran mainland Greece and the expeditionary force was withdrawn. By the end of the month, 57,000 Allied troops were evacuated by the Royal Navy. Some were sent to Crete to bolster its garrison, although most had lost their heavy equipment.
The German Army High Command ("Oberkommando des Heeres", OKH) was preoccupied with the forthcoming invasion of the Soviet Union and was largely opposed to an attack on Crete. Adolf Hitler was concerned about attacks on the Romanian oil fields from Crete and Luftwaffe commanders were enthusiastic about the idea of seizing the island by an airborne attack. In Führer Directive 28, Hitler ordered that Crete was to be invaded to use it "as an airbase against Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean". The directive also stated the operation was to take place in May and must not be allowed to interfere with the planned campaign against the Soviet Union.
Opposing forces.
Allies.
On 30 April 1941, Major-general Bernard Freyberg, who had been evacuated from mainland Greece with the 2nd New Zealand Division, was appointed commander-in-chief on Crete. He noted the acute lack of heavy weapons, equipment, supplies and communication facilities. Equipment was scarce in the Mediterranean, particularly in the backwater of Crete. The British forces on Crete had had seven commanders in seven months. No Royal Air Force (RAF) units were based permanently on Crete until April 1941, but airfield construction took place, radar sites were built and stores delivered. By early April, airfields at Maleme and Heraklion and the landing strip at Rethymno, all on the north coast, were ready, and another strip at Pediada-Kastelli was nearly finished. In the space of a week 27,000 Commonwealth troops arrived from mainland Greece, many lacking any equipment other than their personal weapons, and some not even those; 9,000 of them had been further evacuated when the battle commenced and 18,000 remained. With the pre-existing garrison of 14,000, this gave the Allies a total of 32,000 Commonwealth troops to face the German attack, supplemented by 10,000 Greeks.
The Rethymno area was garrisoned by two Australian and two Greek battalions, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Ian Campbell. Both Australian battalions had fought in mainland Greece in April, suffering 180 casualties between them, and the first had only arrived at Rethymno on the 30th. The Australians totalled 1,270 experienced veterans and there were several smaller attached Commonwealth units. The Greeks were 2,300 strong, but most had received little training and were ill-equipped and extremely short of ammunition. Not all of the Greeks had rifles. For those who had, ammunition averaged fewer than 20 rounds per man; many were issued with only three rounds. Campbell also had eight artillery pieces: four 75 mm calibre and four captured Italian 100 mm guns. Rethymno itself was defended by a battalion of 800 well-armed Greek Gendarmerie (paramilitary police) cadets. Campbell was in radio contact with Freyberg, but did not possess a code to decipher encrypted messages; as any messages sent in clear were liable to be intercepted by the Germans this severely restricted communications.
The Rethymno landing strip was about east of the town, near the village of Pigi. A ridge dominated the coast road and the landing strip in this area, running from "Hill A" in the east overlooking the landing strip and the village of Stavromenos to "Hill B" to the west near the village of Platanes. To the south "Hill D" gave a clear view of the terrain inland. The Australian 2/1st Battalion (2/1st) was dug in on Hill A and the ridge to its west, supported by six field guns, while the Australian 2/11th Battalion (2/11th), supported by two field guns and several machineguns, was positioned on and around Hill B. The Greek 4th Regiment was situated on the ridge between the two Australian units and the 5th Regiment was positioned south of the ridge as a reserve. Two Matilda II heavy tanks were in a gully immediately west of the landing strip and Campbell's headquarters was established on Hill D. All of the Allied units were well dug in and well camouflaged. Food stocks were limited and were supplemented by local foraging.
Germans.
The entire assault on Crete was code-named "Operation Mercury" () and was controlled by the 12th Army commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm List. The German 8th Air Corps () provided close air support; it was equipped with 570 combat aircraft. The infantry available for the assault were the German 7th Air Division, with the Air-landing Assault Regiment () attached, and the 5th Mountain Division. They totalled 22,000 men grouped under the 11th Air Corps (), which was commanded by Lieutenant-general Kurt Student, who was in operational control of the operation. Over 500 Junkers Ju 52s were assembled to transport them. Student planned a series of four parachute assaults against Allied facilities on the north coast of Crete by the 7th Air Division, which would then be reinforced by the 5th Mountain Division, part transported by air and part by sea; the latter component would also ferry much of the heavy equipment.
Before the invasion, the Germans conducted a bombing campaign against Crete and the surrounding waters to establish air superiority. The RAF rebased its surviving aircraft to Alexandria after 29 of their 35 Crete-based fighters were destroyed. A few days before the attack, German intelligence summaries stated that the total Allied force on Crete consisted of 5,000 men, that the garrison of Heraklion was 400 strong and that Rethymno was not formally garrisoned. For the assault on Rethymno the Germans assigned the 2nd Parachute Regiment of the 7th Air Division, minus one battalion. This force was approximately 1,700 strong and was commanded by Colonel Alfred Sturm. Sturm's plan was for the regiment's 3rd Battalion (2/III), reinforced by two artillery units, to drop approximately east of Rethymno and capture the town. At the same time its 1st Battalion (2/I), reinforced by a machinegun company, would drop immediately to the east of the landing strip and capture it. Sturm himself would land mid-way between the two battalions with the regimental headquarters section and a reinforced company to act as a reserve.
Paratroopers.
The design of the German parachutes, and the mechanism for opening them, imposed operational constraints on the paratroopers. The static lines, which automatically opened the parachutes as the men jumped from the aircraft, were easily fouled and so each man wore a coverall over his webbing and equipment. This precluded their jumping with any weapon larger than a pistol or a grenade. Rifles, automatic weapons, mortars, ammunition, food and water were dropped in separate containers. Until and unless the paratroopers reached these they had only pistols and hand grenades with which to defend themselves.
The danger of fouling the static lines also required that German paratroopers leapt headfirst from their aircraft, and so were trained to land on all fours – rather than the usually recommended feet together, knees-bent posture – which resulted in a high incidence of wrist injuries. Once out of the plane, German paratroopers were unable to control their fall or to influence where they landed. Given the importance of landing close to one of the weapons containers, doctrine required jumps to take place from no higher than and in winds no stronger than . The transport aircraft had to fly straight, low and slowly, making them easy targets for any ground fire. Paratroopers were carried by the reliable tri-motored Ju 52. Each transport could lift thirteen paratroopers, with their weapons containers carried on the planes' external bomb racks.
Battle.
Initial assault.
On the morning of 20 May two reinforced German regiments landed by parachute and assault glider at Maleme airfield and near the main port of Chania in the west of Crete. The aircraft which dropped them were scheduled to make further drops at Rethymno and Heraklion in the afternoon. In mainland Greece the Germans were having problems with their hastily constructed airfield facilities, which were to have consequences for their attack on Rethymno. They were blanketed with dust clouds, reducing safe taxiing speeds and making taking off and landing hazardous. Several Ju 52s which had been damaged by Allied ground fire in the morning crashed on landing and had to be towed clear of the runways. Refuelling was carried out by hand and took longer than anticipated. Aware this would mean a significant delay to when the drop around Rethymno would commence, the commander of the Ju 52 wing, Rüdiger von Heyking, attempted to have the air support attack similarly delayed. Inadequate communication systems prevented this message from getting through in time.
The parachute drop was scheduled to take place at 14:00, immediately after a pre-assault softening up from German air support intended to force the defenders to take cover, distract them from the paratrooper attack and interrupt communications. It was 16:00 before this pre-assault air attack commenced; as fewer than 20 aircraft were involved it was ineffective. Having been informed at 14:30 of the attacks to the west, Campbell's forces realised this might be the prelude to a paratrooper assault. At 16:15 the first 24 of an eventual total of 161 Ju 52s appeared. They flew parallel to the coast on their drop runs, in easy sight and range of the Allied troops on the ridge. During the afternoon at least seven of the transport aircraft were shot down and several others disappeared from sight trailing thick smoke.
Evasive action by the German pilots resulted in some paratroopers landing in the sea. One group landed in a cane break resulting in all of its members being impaled and the parachutes of three Germans failed to open. Many Germans were shot and killed before they landed. Because of the disorder at the Greek mainland airfields, the German air operations over Rethymno were ill-coordinated. The paratrooper drops did not occur simultaneously. instead a succession of easy targets for Allied ground fire flew low, straight and level past the Allied-held coastal ridge. During this period no German fighters nor bombers returned to suppress the ground fire. The historian Antony Beevor describes the Germans' situation at this point as "chaotic".
The surviving Germans of the 2/I Battalion who