1917 Last Russian offensive of WW1
The Kerensky offensive (), also called the summer offensive, the June offensive () in Russia, or the July offensive in Western historiography, took place from 1 July [O.S. 18 June] to 19 July [O.S. 6 July] 1917 and was the last Russian offensive of World War I. After the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II during the February Revolution, the Russian Provisional Government pledged to fulfill Russia's existing commitments to the Triple Entente, which included launching an offensive in the spring of 1917. The operation was directed at capturing Lemberg and the rest of Galicia from Austria-Hungary.
The Southwestern Front of the Russian Army was tasked with the offensive, as it was the least affected by revolutionary agitation and would be mostly fighting Austria-Hungary, which had not fully recovered from the Brusilov offensive. The main attack was launched by the Seventh Army and Eleventh Army, which made a limited advance, though the Eleventh Army's Czechoslovak brigade notably captured the town of Zborov from the Austrians. Further to the south, General Lavr Kornilov's Eighth Army was more successful, pushing back the Austrian Third Army and creating a breach along the front that was wide, leading to the capture of the towns of Kalush and Galich. Secondary attacks to assist the main offensive were also launched by the Russian Western, Northern, and Romanian Fronts in other locations, but they were mostly unsuccessful, with the exception of the one in the Romanian theater.
The advance in the first days was in large part due to the volunteer shock battalions that were recruited and organized by the Provisional Government in the spring of 1917. But they were too few in number to hold the line against a counterattack by German reinforcements, and the regular infantry were less reliable. The Russian forces were then pushed back after 19 July, losing all of the territory they had gained. The Germans and Austrians continued advancing into Russian territory by as much as . By the time the German counter-offensive was over on 5 August, nearly all of Eastern Galicia had been retaken by the Central Powers. The retreat of the Russian army eventually stopped, and Kornilov managed to stabilize the front by mid-August, but the failure of the operation eliminated the offensive potential of the Russian Army and increased support for the Bolsheviks among the troops. 
The offensive was a disaster for Kerensky and the Provisional Government, contributing to the July Days and the Kornilov affair. General Kornilov, the leader of the most successful Eighth Army, was appointed the commander of the Southwestern Front, and then army supreme commander just days later, because Kerensky hoped he could restore discipline and order among the retreating troops. He also gained support from conservative circles, and in September they decided to launch a coup against the Petrograd Soviet. But the Kornilov coup failed when his troops refused to fight, and instead strengthened the revolutionary tendencies among soldiers. The collapse of the Provisional Government's popularity as a result of the offensive, and even more so after the Kornilov coup, was critical to the Bolsheviks increasing their influence over both the army and the Petrograd Soviet shortly before the October Revolution.
Background.
Initial planning.
The British and French high commands held a conference in Chantilly, France, in November 1916 to decide on a strategic plan for the Entente war effort in 1917. The Stavka, the Russian high command, initially proposed a limited operation after having taken heavy losses in the East Prussia offensive in 1914, the Lake Naroch offensive in early 1916, and the Brusilov offensive in the summer of 1916. These offensives were all started early at the request of the Western Allies, before the Russian Imperial Army was fully ready, to alleviate the pressure against France in the West. But when Germany and Austria-Hungary were advancing on the Eastern Front in mid-1915, France and Britain did relatively little to assist Russia, waiting for months before starting their own offensive and providing too few supplies to address the Russian Army's munition shortages. Therefore the Russian delegation to the conference instead proposed a Russian offensive from Romania that would invade Bulgaria from the north, and together with a pincer movement from the south by the Anglo-French army in Greece, remove Bulgaria from the war. This would also increase Russian influence in the Balkans and cut off the Ottoman Empire from the rest of the Central Powers.
The Russian high command's proposal was rejected by the Western Allies, which had already decided that Russia would launch an offensive in coordination with their efforts in the West, initially set for February 1917. But at a meeting of the Stavka on 30–31 December 1916 involving Emperor Nicholas II, who had assumed the post of Supreme Commander himself, the generals told him that the Russian Army would not be ready for an offensive by the requested date. On 1 February 1917, at a conference with French, British, and Italian delegations in Petrograd, it was agreed by Entente military leaders that an offensive in the West would start in April and the Russians would begin about one month later, giving them more time. The Petrograd conference also resulted in the Western Allies promising to provide Russia with supplies, including heavy artillery, aircraft, and railway rolling stock. On 6 February, Nicholas accepted the suggestion of his chief of staff, General Mikhail Alekseyev, that the offensive would be conducted by the Southwestern Front with the focus on capturing Lemberg and the region of Galicia. Their main opponent there would be the Austro-Hungarian Army, which still had not fully recovered from its losses in the Brusilov offensive the previous summer. These plans were concluded by the Russian high command just before the outbreak of the February Revolution.
February Revolution.
Protests and riots that broke out in Petrograd in March [O.S. February] 1917 caused a series of events that led to the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II, becoming known as the February Revolution. Russia experienced a decline in grain production since the start of the war in 1914, which, combined with the demands of the army and problems with the rail system, caused shortages in Petrograd and other cities. Furthermore, the government's inability to finance the war effort led to a large deficit, which was partly covered by printing money, and the resulting inflation caused food prices to more than triple by the start of 1917. On 8 March [O.S. 23 February], women that worked in factories began marching on International Women's Day to demand bread. They were joined by male factory workers, and soon after that the crowds began also making political demands. The initial marches were endorsed by revolutionary workers' committees, who began organizing more protests. As the protests became violent the emperor sent a telegram ordering the use of force to end the unrest. After police were attacked on 10 March, the Petrograd Military District commander, General Sergei Khabarov, gave soldiers permission to shoot at rioters. The next day, the troops killed people in the crowds, but several units refused to fire on protestors. Some of them joined the protests and over next two days the demonstrations grew beyond what the government could control, and they were also now armed with weapons from the rebellious soldiers. By 12 March the remaining police and loyal troops were overwhelmed and the Council of Ministers resigned as Petrograd was taken over by the uprising. Out of the protests emerged two new political forces that both met at the Tauride Palace: the Petrograd Soviet, a workers' and soldiers' council led by socialist parties, and a Provisional Government that was formed by the liberal parties of the State Duma. These two shared political authority in what became known as dual power.
The Duma asked Nicholas to abdicate, but the most important factor in him making that decision was his chief of staff at the Stavka, General Alekseyev, who had the support of all of the senior army generals. Alekseyev, once he realized the liberal parties in the Duma would form a pro-war government, initially asked him to form a constitutional monarchy with the revolutionaries that could focus on restoring national unity and leading Russia to victory in the war. The main concern of the generals at the Stavka was the end the domestic unrest so that Russia could return to the war effort. After meeting with representatives of the Provisional Government, the generals persuaded Nicholas abdicate on 15 March [O.S. 2 March] 1917, which was demanded by the revolutionaries in Petrograd. Before he abdicated the emperor approved Prince Georgy Lvov to lead the Provisional Government, which consisted mostly of liberals and a few socialists, though it had no control over the revolutionary mobs in Petrograd without cooperation from the Soviet.
The leaders of the Provisional Government wanted to continue the war against the Central Powers alongside the Entente, and in April 1917 this led to a political crisis. The workers and soldiers in Petrograd wanted to end the war, though the Petrograd Soviet initially did not address the subject and focused on ending the monarchy. Whether or not the war should continue was not one of the main topics in Russian politics during the events of March 1917, but this changed by April, when the Soviet declared that it wanted peace "without annexations or reparations," but also stating that the revolution could not retreat in the face of foreign conquest. Prince Lvov addressed this with a declaration stating that Russia was fighting the war to establish peace and self-determination for all nations. The Soviet's Executive Committee wanted the declaration to be sent to the other Allies, and when it was, Pavel Milyukov, the new government's minister of foreign affairs, added a private note which said that Russia still wanted to gain Constantinople and the Bosporus straits after the victory, as had been promised by the Entente earlier. This note was revealed to the public on 20 April 1917, and it caused large protests against the government. The more radical Bolshevik faction took advantage of the crisis to agitate for the overthrow of the Provisional Government, but the Soviet Executive Committee opposed this and worked to prevent another uprising. The April crisis led to the resignation of several ministers and a coalition agreement between Lvov and the Soviet, while Alexander Kerensky was appointed the Minister of War. Kerensky was among those who supported continuing the war and wanted to proceed with Russia's earlier agreement to go on the offensive.
Prelude.
Army democratization.
In the weeks after the tsar's abdication the Russian Army began experiencing a rapid decline in discipline and willingness to continue the war. The immediate effect of the loss of the monarchy and the weakness of the Provisional Government was to undermine the authority of the officer corps over the enlisted troops. The day before the abdication, the Petrograd Soviet issued its Order No. 1 to the troops, with the goal of preventing officers in Petrograd from using the garrison against the revolution and to make officers treat soldiers with more respect. But it eventually reached the soldiers at the front, and was interpreted by many soldiers to mean that they no longer had to obey their officers and could elect their own commanders. On 17 March 1917 the Soviet, together with the State Duma, tried to fix this situation by issuing Order No. 2, which stated that soldiers must still obey orders on military matters, but it was ineffective at restoring discipline. Although incidents of violence between soldiers and officers were not common, the officers now depended on the cooperation of the elected soldiers' committees. The committees were formed to manage the relationship between the officer corps and the enlisted troops, functioning as a soviet at the battalion level and higher, and tended to be dominated by "praporshchiks" (warrant officers) and NCOs. Members of the prewar officer corps, who often were members of the nobility, looked at the soldiers' committees with contempt, while those who had been promoted into officer ranks or volunteered during the war were able to mediate between these two groups. The Stavka, the high command, initially refused to cooperate with the committees, but front line officers did so because it was necessary.
The Russian officer corps itself was divided between prewar career officers, student volunteers and reservists, and a large number of mobilized civilians who