Pakistani military operation in the 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence
Operation Searchlight was a military operation carried out by the Pakistan Army in an effort to curb the Bengali nationalist movement in former East Pakistan in March 1971. Pakistan retrospectively justified the operation on the basis of anti-Bihari violence carried out en masse by the Bengalis earlier that month. Ordered by the central government in West Pakistan, the original plans envisioned taking control of all of East Pakistan's major cities on 26 March, and then eliminating all Bengali opposition, whether political or military, within the following month.
West Pakistani military leaders had not anticipated prolonged Bengali resistance or later Indian military intervention. The main phase of Operation Searchlight ended with the fall of the last major Bengali-held town to West Pakistan in mid-May 1971. The operation also directly precipitated the 1971 Bangladesh genocide, in which between 300,000 and 3,000,000 Bengalis were killed while around 10 million fled to neighbouring India as refugees, in which most of them were Hindus.
Bengali intelligentsia, academics and Hindus were widely targeted alongside Bengali nationalists—with widespread, indiscriminate extrajudicial killings. The nature of these systematic purges enraged the Bengalis, who declared independence from West Pakistan to establish the new nation of Bangladesh in the erstwhile region of East Bengal.
The widespread violence resulting from Pakistan's Operation Searchlight ultimately led to the Bangladesh War of Independence, in which Mukti Bahini guerrillas fought to remove Pakistani forces from East Pakistan. The civil war escalated in the following months as East Pakistani loyalists, primarily Biharis, formed militias to support West Pakistani troops on the ground against the Mukti Bahini. However, the conflict took a decisive turn in the Bengalis' favour following the ill-fated Operation Chengiz Khan, which resulted in direct Indian military intervention in the civil war, eventually prompting Pakistan's unconditional surrender to the joint command of Indian forces and the Mukti Bahini on 16 December 1971.
Background.
After the Bengali Awami League had won a decisive majority (capturing 167 out of 313 seats) in the 1970 Pakistan parliamentary elections, the Bengali population expected a swift transfer of power to the Awami League based on the Six Point Programme. On 28 February 1971, Yahya Khan, then President of Pakistan, under the pressure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), postponed the national assembly meeting scheduled for March. The PPP had already started lobbying to weaken the stand of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and Bhutto was heard saying that he wanted the Bengalis to stay away. The Awami League, in response to the postponement, launched a program of non-cooperation (largely outlined in the 7 March Awami League rally) which was so successful that the authority of the Pakistani government became limited to military cantonments and official government institutions in East Pakistan.
Clashes between Bengalis and the Pakistan Army, and between the Bengalis and Biharis erupted and had now become commonplace. President Yahya Khan flew to Dacca to hold talks with Mujibur Rahman, then leader of the Awami League, in March and was later joined by Bhutto, whose party had secured the second-largest share of seats (81 out of 300) in the general elections. Unwilling to transfer federal power from West Pakistan to East Pakistan as demanded by the Awami League (fearing a transfer of power would weaken or destroy the multiethnic Pakistani federation), or to lose face by backing down in face of the non-cooperation movement, the West Pakistani generals, most of which (including Commander-in-Chief Gul Hassan Khan) supported the PPP, finally decided on a military crackdown against the rebelling Bengalis in East Pakistan. 
After the convening of the Pakistan National Assembly was postponed by Yahya Khan on 1 March, ethnic Biharis in East Pakistan, who supported West Pakistan, were targeted by the Bengali majority. In early March 1971, over 300 Biharis were killed in rioting by Bengali mobs in Chittagong. Following these series of incidents, the Government of Pakistan used the "Bihari massacre" to justify its military intervention in East Pakistan on 25 March, when it initiated "Operation Searchlight".
Prior to the launch of the operation, a final meeting was held at the Army General Headquarters (GHQ). The Governor of East Pakistan, Vice-Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan objected to the planned operation. Air Commodore Muhammad Zafar Masud, the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) of the Pakistan Air Force base in Dacca, also objected to the operation. Masud was wary of a military crackdown, suspecting that it would only provoke East Pakistan's Bengali-majority population into more violence. However, under pressure during the meeting from Pakistan Army and Air Force generals, Yahya Khan gave orders to his commanders to launch the operation. Syed Mohammad Ahsan was subsequently relieved of the governorship. When the operation came into effect, Zafar Masud refused to conduct air sorties and was likewise removed from his post on 31 March.
Operational plan.
Planning process.
The plan was drawn up in March 1971 by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, GOC 14th Division, and Major General Rao Farman Ali, as a followup of decisions taken at a meeting of the Pakistan Army staff on 22 February. The 16th infantry division from Quetta and the 9th division from Kharian, West Pakistan, were ordered to prepare to move to East Pakistan in mid-February also as a result of that meeting.
The governor of East Pakistan, Vice Admiral Syed Mohammad Ahsan, did not believe that military action was the right course. He was relieved of the governorship. His replacement, Lt. General Shahabzada Yakub Khan, GOC East Pakistan, was of the same mind, and resigned. Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan became the Governor and GOC of East Pakistan. On 17 March, General Raja was given authority to plan the operation via telephone by General Abdul Hamid Khan, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army. On the morning of 18 March, General Raja and Major General Rao Farman Ali wrote the plan at the GOC's office at Dhaka (Dhaka) cantonment. The plan was written on a "Light Blue Office Pad with a Lead Pencil" by General Farman containing "16 Paragraphs Spread Over Five Pages".
General Farman defined the operational premises and conditions for success, while General Khadim Raja dealt with the distribution of forces and tasks assigned to the individual brigades and other units. It assumed that the Bengali Army and other military units would revolt at the onset of operations and the planners suggested that all armed Bengali units should be disarmed prior to commencing the operation, and the political leadership arrested during a planned meeting with the President, General Yahya Khan. No operational reserves were earmarked.
The handwritten plan was reviewed by General Abdul Hamid Khan and Lt. General Tikka Khan on 20 March at the flag staff house. General Abdul Hamid Khan objected to the immediate disarming of regular army Bengali units, but approved the disarming of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), armed police and other para-military formations. Yahya Khan refused to sanction the arrest of Awami League leaders during a meeting with him, as the plan had proposed. The amended plan was approved and distributed to various area commanders.
The Operation was to start on the night of 25 March 1971 in Dhaka, and other garrisons were to be alerted via phone about their zero hour to start their activities. General Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of the province was commanded by General Khadim. Lt. General Tikka Khan and his staff were present in the 31st field command centre, to supervise and support the command staff of the 14th division. The initial plan to arrest by a company of No 3 SSG, led by major ZA Khan was scheduled at 0100 on 26 March night.
Major components of the plan.
Operational premises.
As outlined by the Pakistani planners, the operation aimed to eliminate the Awami League apparatus and any civilians and personnel of the armed forces supporting the Awami League movement in defiance of martial law. Cunning, surprise, deception and speed was emphasised as crucial for success. Use of free and greater force was authorised. Search and assault of civilian areas and Hindu areas also were authorised.
Requirements for success.
Requirements for success:
The designated centres of offensive operations under that plan were Dhaka, Khulna, Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Saidpur and Sylhet, areas where West Pakistani army units were concentrated. Pakistani Army units and paramilitary elements in other areas of East Pakistan were to maintain control of their respective areas and await reinforcements during the initial phase of the operation. Once Dhaka had been secured, the 9th and 16th divisions from Pakistan were to be airlifted into East Pakistan as reinforcements. Cities with airfields (Chittagong, Sylhet, Jessore, Rangpur, Comilla) would be reinforced via C-130 aircraft or heliborne troops directly from Dhaka.
Although the plan did not specify the time needed to subdue East Pakistan, it was assumed that after the arrest of the political leadership and disarming of the Bengali military and paramilitary units, civilians could be terrorised into submitting to martial law within a week. Lt. Gen. Tikka Khan estimated that no resistance would remain after 10 April.
Composition of Pakistan Armed Forces in East Pakistan.
The 14th infantry division was the only Pakistan Army division stationed in East Pakistan in March 1971. This division had four infantry brigades attached to it, instead of the normally allotted three brigades. The 57th infantry brigade (under Brig. Jahanzab Arbab – W. Pakistani) was headquartered in Dhaka, the 53rd (Brig. Iqbal Shafi- W. Pakistani) was in Comilla, the 23rd (Brig. Abdullah Khan Malik – Pakistani) in Rangpur and the 107th (Brig. A.R. Durrani – W. Pakistani) was in Jessore. Brig. M.H. Mozumdar, a Bengali, was in command of the Chittagong area. Normally, each brigade contained 3 or 4 infantry battalions and a field artillery regiment and various support elements.
These four brigades had 12 infantry battalions (regiments normally had 915 soldiers each) containing purely West Pakistani personnel (mainly hailing from Punjabi, Baluch, Pathan and Sindhi background) before 25 March 1971. This division also had 5 field artillery regiments, a light anti aircraft regiment, a commando battalion (the 3rd), all of which contained a majority of Pakistani personnel, in various East Pakistani bases. The only armoured regiment in East Pakistan, the 29th Cavalry in Rangpur, was a mixed unit.
20% of the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) personnel were also from West Pakistan, while the support elements of the various units and cantonments were mostly of mixed nationality. Most of the individual unit commanders and majority of the officers were from West Pakistan. West Pakistani Army personnel were also posted at Station HQ, Dhaka, Pakistan Ordnance Factory, Gazipur, Central Ordnance Depot, Dhaka, Ammunition Depot, Rajendrapur, Embercation Unit – Chittagong and with some field intelligence units.
The Pakistan Air Force had 20 F-86 Sabre Jets and 3 T-33 Trainers at the Dhaka airbase. The Army aviation wing had a flight of 2 Mil Mi-8 and 2 Alouette III helicopters, under the command of Major Liakat Bukhari posted in East Pakistan. The whole squadron was transferred to Dhaka after 25 March 1971. C-130 Hercules planes were transferred from West Pakistan to Dhaka for the operation. Airfields were located in Chittagong, Comilla, Lalmonirhat near Rangpur, in Salutikor near Sylhet, in Jessore and near Thakurgaon.
Rear-Admiral Mohammad Shariff (later 4-Star Admiral) was given the command of the navy in East Pakistan. The Pakistan Navy had 4 gunboats ("Rajshahi", "Jessore", "Comilla", and "Sylhet") a patrol boat ("Balaghat") and the destroyer PNS "Jahangir" in East Pakistan. PNS "Babur", flagship of the Pakistan Navy would visit East Pakistan after the operation started. Major naval bases were located in Dhaka, Chittagong and Mongla.
Pakistan Army Bengali units in East Pakistan.
Six regular army Bengali infantry regiments were present in East Pakistan in March 1971. The 1st East Bengal Regiment (EBR) was in Jessore, attached to the 107th Brigade. The 2nd EBR was in Joydebpur north of Dhaka, attached to the 57th Brigade. The 3rd EBR was in Saidpur with the 23rd Brigade, and the 4th EBR was in Comilla with the 53rd Brigade. The 8th EBR was preparing to ship to West Pakistan and was at 75% strength in Chittagong.
The East Bengal Regimental Center (EBRC) in Chittagong housed 2,000 Bengali troops including the newly raised 9th EBR. The 10th EBR, a training unit, was in the Dhaka cantonment attached to the 14th Division. Bengali officers commanded the 1st, 2nd and the 10th EBR, while the rest were under Pakistani officers.
Other Bengali forces.
East Pakistan Police, almost exclusively Bengali,