1992 wildfire in Northern California
The 1992 Fountain Fire was a large and destructive wildfire in Shasta County, California. The fire ignited on August 20 in an act of probable but unattributed arson, and was quickly driven northeast by strong winds. It outpaced firefighters for two days, exhibiting extreme behavior such as long-range spot fires, crown fire runs, and pyrocumulonimbus clouds with dry lightning. The fire was contained after burning for nine days, though work to strengthen and repair fire lines continued for more than two months.
The Fountain Fire consumed and destroyed hundreds of homes, primarily in Round Mountain and Montgomery Creek along the State Route 299 corridor. In 1992, it was the third most destructive wildfire in California's recorded history, though it no longer features among the 20 most destructive California wildfires. At a suppression cost of more than $22 million (~$ million in 2023), it was also for a time the most expensive fire to contain in state history.
At the time, the Fountain Fire was recognized not just as a major disaster, but also as a 'fire of the future'. The devastation the fire left as it moved through private timberlands interspersed with rural communities made it emblematic of the challenges residents and firefighting personnel both face in the wildland-urban interface. The Fountain Fire was surpassed by later California wildfires in metrics for losses, but it remains notable for its speed, its widespread destruction in multiple communities, and the long-term alteration of the landscape within its footprint.
Background.
The Fountain Fire burned in eastern Shasta County, part of the southern extent of the Cascade Range. The area was a secondary forest, having entirely regrown after logging in 1886–1923. The forest contained mixed conifers, comprising incense cedar, Douglas fir, sugar pine, and ponderosa pine, among other species. Most of the forest that the Fountain Fire burned—65 percent—was owned and managed by timber companies, including Roseburg Forest Products, Sierra Pacific Industries, and Fruit Growers Supply. Only one percent of the forest was owned by the state or the federal government; the other 34 percent belonged to smaller private landowners.
Climate and weather.
Both long-term climatic patterns and short-term weather conditions helped create an environment conducive to a large and uncontrollable wildfire in late August 1992. Between 1987 and 1992, California experienced a six-year drought of a duration and severity not seen in the state since the 1920s and 1930s. Four of these six years ranked in the driest 10 percent of years by runoff.53 The stress on forests led to widespread bark beetle infestations.57
Several weeks of high temperatures—equal to or exceeding for 22 days—also preceded the fire in Shasta County.426 There were also fewer firefighting personnel and equipment available than normal due to an already-active fire season in California; during the Fountain Fire's first day four thousand firefighters were deployed on the destructive Old Gulch Fire in Calaveras County.
Lastly, a critical fire weather pattern developed in Northern California. The influence of an upper-level trough moving onshore in the Pacific Northwest and a strong upper-level jet situated over Northern California created strong flow out of the southwest and Foehn winds on the eastern slopes of the Cascade Range and the Sierra Nevada. Those winds also brought dry air, a result of the dry slot—a zone of clear, dry air which often accompanies low-pressure systems. The Northern California Geographical Coordination Center identifies this as a typical critical fire weather setup in northeastern California and the southern Cascades: "Pre-frontal conditions occur when strong, southwesterly or westerly winds are generated by the dry, southern tail of a rapidly moving cold front." In the Fountain Fire's vicinity on August 20, southwest winds were blowing at speeds of up to .426
Progression.
August 20.
The Fountain Fire was first spotted by a fire lookout atop Hogback Mountain in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest at about 12:50 p.m. PDT on August 20. The lookout reported a smoke column behind a ridge, near a historic drinking fountain along Highway 299 (which gave the incident its name). They could not see the actual ignition point of the growing fire, which was confirmed by the Shasta Bear Mountain lookout's cross-check to be about from the fountain in dry grass off of Buzzard Roost Road, just west of Phillips Road and south of Highway 299. When a resident of Phillips Road spotted the fire shortly before 1:00 p.m., it was already across and it had climbed into the tree canopy.
The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (then CDF, now Cal Fire) dispatched numerous resources over the next 10 minutes; an observation aircraft arrived overhead by 1:07 p.m., reporting that the fire had already spread to and was moving north quickly. Ground personnel arrived at 1:19 p.m., 29 minutes after the first report. The first two fire engines on the scene were forced to defend an under-construction house that was at risk from blowing embers. Firefighters saved multiple homes, but the fire still grew rapidly. By 2:17 p.m. the Fountain Fire had burned in its first 90 minutes, and Cal Fire officials later marked this as the point where the fire exceeded the ability of the resources on scene to control it. By 2:50 p.m. these resources included 25 fire engines, ten air tankers, and three helicopters. At around 3:30 p.m., per a Roseburg Forest Industries brochure, fire activity intensified still further.
Officials initially hoped to hold the fire at Highway 299 outside of Round Mountain, keeping it under . They were nearly successful, but the high winds drove the fire into brush beneath power lines, which arced, starting multiple spot fires. Firefighters were unable to keep the Fountain Fire from continuing towards the community of Round Mountain. Round Mountain, Montgomery Creek, and the small subdivision of Moose Camp were all evacuated around 4:00 p.m. By 4:30 p.m., the fire had crossed Highway 299. This was also the approximate time that a new wildfire, the Barker Fire, began in Trinity County and further stretched firefighting resources in Northern California.
The Fountain Fire's northeastern push developed into an intense crown fire, with flame lengths of up to that kept ground crews from safely engaging. The wind helped embers ignite spot fires at least ahead of the main fire. The pyrocumulonimbus plume generated by the Fountain Fire reached at least in altitude, as detected by weather radars in Medford, Oregon, and generated numerous lightning strikes. The jet stream blowing out of the west created a chimney effect when it met the billowing smoke plume, ventilating the fire and increasing fire behavior.
A Forest Service meteorologist speculated that, based on witness reports and debris, intense fire-generated vortices developed in the Fountain Fire. A National Weather Service meteorologist in Redding assigned to the incident concurred, noting that investigators found pine trees in diameter snapped in half by possible "fire tornadoes". Such vortices have been recorded in other Northern California wildfires, including the 2014 Eiler Fire near Hat Creek and the 2018 Carr Fire on the outskirts of the city of Redding.
As the fire swept through the community of Round Mountain, it burned at temperatures of up to , melting a cast-iron bathtub, stainless steel knives, chrome car bumpers, glass bottles, and even cooking potatoes growing underground. No one was killed or severely injured when the fire front pushed through the town, but multiple people drove out through the flames or left their properties just before the fire reached them.
By 5:00 p.m., fifteen people were trapped in an meadow at the end of Frisby Road after flames blocked the way out to Highway 299. The McMillan family, ranchers and owners of the meadow property, had planned to go there in case of a fire and were able to wet the area down with water trucks and flood it by blocking irrigation ditches. The group remained there as the fire moved through with flame lengths, blowing the roofs off of nearby barns with the force of its passage. Two men put out spot fires with a bulldozer. A helicopter looking for people who had not evacuated eventually discovered the group, surrounded by flames. It was able to land and extricate two women and a two-year-old child, but could not return. Firefighters could not safely reach the remaining people and evacuate them until 10:00 p.m., five hours after they had taken refuge in the meadow.
Meanwhile, the fire continued moving north and east: by midnight, the fire had pushed further along the Highway 299 corridor and was south of Montgomery Creek. By then it had burned approximately and forced 1,000–2,000 people to evacuate.
August 21.
The following day marked the single largest day of growth for the Fountain Fire as similar weather conditions continued to fuel extreme fire behavior. At one point the fire burned every minute and spread at a rate of . This growth was enabled by more long-range spotting, as wind-borne embers started spot fires between and ahead of the main body of the fire.
In the morning, fire crews focused on protecting Montgomery Creek by attempting to stop one branch of the fire's advance at Fenders Ferry Road off of Highway 299, south of the community and north of Round Mountain. While firefighters were able to protect many structures along the road, they were unable to prevent the winds (a combination of continuing gusts from the southwest and inflow winds towards the Fountain Fire's massive plume to the east) from pushing the flames across the road. This happened shortly after noon, and the fire then pressed towards Montgomery Creek. The fire entered the center of the community along Highway 299 by 3:00 p.m. Multiple homes were destroyed, but firefighters protected the local school, post office, and other major structures with assistance from aircraft.
Meanwhile, the larger head of the fire to the east continued advancing, forcing the communities of Big Bend, Hillcrest, and Moose Camp to be evacuated. The fire burned through Moose Camp—a community of 60 summer cabins and several permanent homes—later that day, leaving about 20 cabins standing. By 6:00 p.m. on August 21, the larger town of Burney was placed under a voluntary evacuation advisory. California Highway Patrol officers used bullhorns to warn residents, and the Red Cross shelter that had been established there was also forced to move.
The fire moved so quickly and fiercely that firefighters did not expect to be able to stop it short of where the conifer forests gave way to old lava beds east of Burney. By dusk, the fire had advanced all the way to Hatchet Mountain and Hatchet Mountain Pass, damaging radio equipment on the mountain's summit. Flames were visible from Burney. By 10:00 p.m., the fire front was within of the town, and had set a log deck on fire at Sierra Pacific Industries' mill on its western outskirts. However, once the Fountain Fire crested the hills west of Burney, it was no longer in alignment with the wind and up-slope terrain that had driven it along the Highway 299 corridor for the previous 36 hours. By midnight, the fire had burned more than in total.
August 22 onwards.
The Fountain Fire's behavior and growth over its first two days were sobering to firefighters. On August 22, the third day of the fire, Cal Fire deputy incident commander Bill Clayton predicted that the fire would grow to . A memo posted for crews read: "The fire has moved 7 miles in 6.5 hours the first day, faster the second day (Friday). Prepare for more of the same today. It is critically dry, fueled with variable winds, has produced rapid fire runs and heavy spotting which have ran out crews many times."
However, August 22 ended up bringing much more moderate weather conditions and fire behavior. Cooler temperatures and lighter winds allowed firefighters to gain ground. That morning, firefighters lit backfires off Highway 299 near Hatchet Mountain to prepare and strengthen control lines. This tactic was repeated in the afternoon as the fire closed to within of Burney. By the end of the day, it was clear that the head of the fire was progressing to the northeast of Burney and not towards it, and the Forest Service was calling the fire 30 percent contained.
During the 22nd and 23rd, the flanks of the fire remained problematic: the fire moved both northeast towards the Pit River and southwest towards Oak Run and other communities. Stopping the Fountain Fire from crossing the Pit River was a high priority, as officials cited the steepness of the terrain beyond it, dense fuels,