Covert operation by SISMI
On 4 March 2005, the Italian military secret service, SISMI, conducted a covert operation to rescue Italian journalist Giuliana Sgrena from kidnappers in Iraq. After the successful retrieval of Sgrena, the car with her and two secret agents came under friendly fire by US Army troops along the Baghdad airport road; secret agent Nicola Calipari was killed by US Army Specialist Mario Lozano. The incident created tension between the two countries, and arguably increased the Italian public's hostility towards the United States.
Background.
Giuliana Sgrena had been kidnapped a month earlier, on 4 February, while working as a non-embedded journalist in Iraq for the Italian communist newspaper "Il Manifesto". Some have argued she was overconfident because she thought kidnappers would only target pro-American journalists, but others counter she was fully aware of the risks.
Rescue and incident.
Sgrena's rescue.
Sgrena was rescued in circumstances yet unclear by Italian secret-service agents from SISMI, the Italian Military Intelligence service, on 4 March 2005. One of the agents was Nicola Calipari, the other was Andrea Carpani. One unconfirmed allegation is that the Italian government paid a ransom in the range of millions of US dollars. The agents and Sgrena left by car, heading for Baghdad International Airport. The route from downtown Baghdad to the airport has been widely described as the most dangerous road in Iraq.
The shooting of the car.
At around 20:55, the car Sgrena was riding in was fired upon by U.S. troops while on the way to the airport. Nicola Calipari, who had negotiated her release, was killed while allegedly protecting Giuliana Sgrena with his body. Giuliana Sgrena was hit in the shoulder.
Autopsy of Calipari's body allegedly showed that he was struck by a single bullet in the temple. Sgrena and Carpani were wounded. Sgrena was treated by US Army medics on the scene and medivaced to a US Army field hospital shortly after the incident. US Army medics also treated the injured officer on the scene, but he refused a medical evacuation for further assistance. Sgrena underwent surgery to extract shrapnel from her shoulder. The US military did not disclose their whereabouts later. Sgrena arrived in Rome a day after the fatal incident.
Reactions.
The incident prompted criticism from Italian government officials:
In response, White House press secretary Scott McClellan offered condolences stating that "we regret the loss of life" and added that "details are still unclear", and that an investigation would be conducted.
Leading figures of the Italian left-wing opposition renewed criticism of Italy's participation in the occupation of Iraq, also with support from some members of the right-wing ruling coalition:
Tens of thousands of Italian citizens paid their respects to Calipari before the state funeral on March 8, 2005, at Santa Maria degli Angeli e dei Martiri in Rome.
The resulting strain on the political relationship between Italy and the United States is the most significant since the Cavalese cable car disaster of 1998. The case, which saw a hostage being released unharmed by Iraqi kidnappers and almost killed by American troops, strengthened the already widespread opposition to the presence of Italian troops in Iraq.
Accounts of the incident.
Due to the conditions in which the facts unraveled, and due to a mutually suspicious attitude of some of the involved parties, widely different accounts of the incident have been proposed.
Speculations on assassination attempt.
On 6 March, Sgrena claimed that she might have been deliberately targeted, a consequence of the United States' disapproval of the means of her liberation. "The fact is that they do everything to prevent the adoption of this practice to save the lives of people held hostages, everybody knows that. So I do not see why I should rule out that I could have been the target", she told Sky TG24. The White House responded to this, denying that US troops would specifically target civilians, and stating that the zone is "a dangerous road, and it is a combat zone that our coalition forces are in. Often, they have to make split-second decisions to protect their own security". Pier Scolari said "I hope the Italian government does something because either this was an ambush, as I think, or we are dealing with imbeciles or terrorized kids who shoot at anyone".
American version.
According to initial statements from a senior U.S. military official, the car was traveling at speeds of more than 150 km/h (about 100 mph). He said that troops manning the checkpoint also claimed that car almost lost control several times before the shooting as the car hydroplaned through large puddles.
In the first few days following the incident, US spokesmen said that the Italian vehicle had been fired upon when it approached U.S. Checkpoint 504 (Camp Victory) at excessive speed, and did not slow down or stop after US troops used hand gestures, flashing lights and fired warning shots. The U.S. troops were then allegedly forced to disable the vehicle by firing into the engine block. Checkpoint 504 is a permanent roadblock.
Within the first week after the incident the version of events acknowledged by US spokesmen was significantly modified. In the second version of events, extra security patrols had recently been added to the airport route because a "senior diplomatic VIP" was going to use the road that evening; the shooting occurred at a temporary "blocking position" (not a "checkpoint"). The "senior diplomatic VIP" was later acknowledged to have been Ambassador John Negroponte, who was unable to have used helicopter transport due to bad weather.
Italian version.
This version of the events contrasts markedly with a version subsequently referred to the Italian Parliament by the minister of foreign affairs Gianfranco Fini.
Speaking in the "Camera dei Deputati" on 8 March 2005, Fini stated that there had been no roadblock, that no warning was given, that the car "was not over 40 km/h, and was illuminated from inside to facilitate control and allow phone calls to be made", that "[w]hen a strong source of light, like a projector, was turned on a few tens of meters from the car, it slowed down until it was almost stopped, and the shooting began", and that Calipari, described as one of Italy's most experienced intelligence agents with a history of successful operations in Iraq, not only had previously made "all necessary contacts" with US authorities in Baghdad and had obtained all the necessary clearances, but had also spoken to US and Italian authorities from his mobile phone just minutes before the attack.
Fini asserted that photographs taken of the car established that it was not shot at from the front (or into the engine block), as one would expect if it were approaching a checkpoint, but rather that it was shot at from the right side, with the bullets entering through that side. Fini's version of the events was also based on the testimony of a second Italian intelligence agent, who was driving the car.
He also said that the theory of a deliberate attack against Sgrena was "totally unfounded;" he finally repeated his wish that Calipari's death would not induce "unnecessary anti-US feelings" in the Italian public opinion.
American rebuttal.
The Italian version in contrast with the statements of General George Casey, commander of US forces in Iraq, who said that the Italian government had not given the US advance warning about the convoy carrying Ms Sgrena. "I personally do not have any indication of that, even on a preliminary basis", General Casey said.
General George Casey's statements are backed by General Mario Marioli, Italy's top military commander in Iraq. Marioli informed US officials that Calipari and the other Italian officer were there, but gave no information about the specifics of Calipari's operation. However, the Italian investigators' report, released 2 May 2005, claims that the American authorities were informed that Calipari was due to return to the Baghdad airport with a hostage on the night of the shooting.
Giuliana Sgrena's version of the events also only mentions the contact between Calipari and the Italian authorities, but says nothing about any contact with the American authorities whilst she was with him. US forces confiscated cell and satellite phones from the car's occupants in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, and according to the US Army's official report, gave them back before the Italians were taken from the scene. The official report also notes that "both HMMWVs involved in the blocking position were moved to transport Ms Sgrena to the Combat Support Hospital in the International Zone. Further, the scene was not deemed to be a crime scene, and efforts were made to clear the roadway." The report further concluded that the vehicle was shot while it was traveling towards the road block, not from a point perpendicular to the road, as Gianfranco Fini has insisted.
Military reports.
Two military reports were produced, one by the US Army and one by the Italian government.
Release of classified information in US report.
The Multinational Force In Iraq released an official report that was posted on its website. Classified information (such as the name of the other Sismi agent, the names of the soldiers involved, and coalition troop movements) in the report was redacted but the report was accidentally published in a form that allowed the redacted information to be easily retrieved.
The report was published in the PDF file format, and the classified sentences were covered by a black bar. However, the text below it had not been erased, and was present in the file. A copy-and-paste from the PDF reader to a word processor was sufficient to make the lines reappear.
The possibility of reading the complete report was quickly discovered by a Greek exchange student in Bologna, who preferred to maintain anonymous, and by Gianluca Neri, who posted the versions on his blog, Macchianera. There has been some argument about who was first out, but as Neri himself wrote, it was such a simple task that more people could well have noticed in a short time independently of each other.
Content of the US report.
The US report cleared the soldiers of the 69th Infantry of any wrongdoing, claiming the unit followed proper procedures and defending the decision by one soldier, Spc. Mario Lozano, to open fire after flashing a light and firing warning shots.
The report indicated that the soldiers had already turned away about 15–30 cars before the incident, and were alert because of two warnings (BOLOs, Be On LookOut") about two possible VBIEDs (Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device"), a black and a white car. The blocking position had been maintained for longer time than planned due to faulty communications procedure, which was caused by a failure of the VOIP system used by US Army; whereas FM was available, it was not used.
The spotlight and the green laser used by the US soldiers had proven effective at halting and making the previous cars turn around. Specialist Mario Lozano had first maneuvered the spotlight, and then switched to the machine gun to shoot the Italian's vehicle.
The car was estimated to travel at , and it did not brake until fired upon. Eleven rounds were shot on the car, of which five hit the front.
A series of unrelated events were registered as contributing to the tragedy:
The US report did note that the unit involved in the incident had received inadequate training on how to deploy armored vehicles in blocking position before a roadblock before leaving for Iraq, and for only 10 days with another unit once it arrived.
Only one US officer, Captain Green, knew of the fact that Ms. Sgrena was being rescued, after Italian General Mario Marioli mentioned it to him. However, since Marioli added "it is best if no one knows", Green took it as an order not to pass the information on to others.
Italian report.
A report by the Italian government was published by 2 May. The Italian investigators disagreed on the subjects of the speed of the car, the signaling (or lack of it) before the Americans opened fire, and the question of whether the Americans were aware of Calipari's presence and activities in Baghdad. The Italian report also noted that the Italian investigators claim that "senior US officers who arrived on the scene of the shooting had criticized the checkpoint for being poorly illuminated, inadequately signaled and badly positioned."
The Italians point that, whereas the US forces were unaware of Calipari's objectives, they were surely aware of his presence, as Calipari and Carpani were given ID badges and obtained sleeping quarters at Camp Victory. Furthermore, they claimed