1923 successful push for unification with Lithuania in the Klaipėda Region of East Prussia
The Klaipėda Revolt took place in January 1923 in the Klaipėda Region (also known as the Memel Territory or ). The region, located north of the Neman River, was detached from East Prussia, German Empire by the Treaty of Versailles and became a mandate of the League of Nations. It was placed under provisional French administration until a more permanent solution could be worked out. Lithuania wanted to unite with the region (part of Lithuania Minor) due to its large Lithuanian-speaking population of Prussian Lithuanians and major port of Klaipėda (Memel) – the only viable access to the Baltic Sea for Lithuania. As the Conference of Ambassadors favoured leaving the region as a free city, similar to the Free City of Danzig, the Lithuanians organized and staged a revolt.
Presented as an uprising of the local population, the revolt met little resistance from either the German police or the French troops. The rebels established a pro-Lithuanian administration, which petitioned to unite with Lithuania, citing the right of self-determination. The League of Nations accepted the "fait accompli" and the Klaipėda Region was transferred as an autonomous territory to the Republic of Lithuania on February 17, 1923. After prolonged negotiations, a formal international agreement, the Klaipėda Convention, was signed in May 1924. The convention formally acknowledged Lithuania's sovereignty in the region and outlined its extensive legislative, judicial, administrative, and financial autonomy. The region remained part of Lithuania until March 1939 when it was transferred to Nazi Germany after a German ultimatum.
Background.
Lithuanian and Polish aspirations.
The German–Lithuanian border had been stable since the Treaty of Melno in 1422. However, northern East Prussia had a significant Lithuanian-speaking population of Prussian Lithuanians or Lietuvninkai and was known as Lithuania Minor. The Klaipėda Region covered , which included the Curonian Lagoon of approximately . According to the Prussian Census of 1910, the city of Memel numbered 21,419 inhabitants, of whom 92% were German and 8% were Lithuanian, while the countryside was inhabited by a Lithuanian majority of 66%. In the Memel region as a whole, the Germans constituted 50.7% (71,191), the Lithuanians 47.9% (67,345), and the bilingual population (composed mostly of Lithuanians) – 1.4% (1,970). According to contemporary statistics by Fred Hermann Deu, 71,156 Germans and 67,259 Prussian Lithuanians lived in the region. The census that was carried out just after the revolt demonstrated slightly different results in 1925. It recorded the region's total population at 141,000. Declared language was used to classify the inhabitants, and on this basis 43.5% were German, 27.6% were Lithuanian, and 25.2% were "Klaipėdan" (Memeländisch) – those who spoke Lithuanian, but named themselves "locals" to distinguish from other Lithuanian population. Other sources give the interwar ethnic composition as 41.9% German, 27.1% Memeländisch, and 26.6% Lithuanian. 
The idea of uniting Lithuania Minor with Lithuania surfaced during the Lithuanian National Revival of the late 19th century. It was part of the vision to consolidate all ethnic Lithuanian lands into an independent Lithuania. The activists also eyed Klaipėda (Memel), a major sea port in the Baltic Sea. It would become Lithuania's only deep-water access to the sea and having a port was seen as an economic necessity for self-sustainability. On November 30, 1918, twenty-four Prussian Lithuanian activists signed the Act of Tilsit, expressing their desire to unite Lithuania Minor with Lithuania. Based on these considerations, the Lithuanians petitioned the Allies to attach the whole of Lithuania Minor (not limited to Klaipėda Region) to Lithuania. However, at the time Lithuania was not officially recognized by the western powers and not invited into any post-war conferences. Lithuania was recognized by the United States in July 1922 and by most western powers in December 1922.
The Second Polish Republic regarded the Klaipėda Region as possible compensation for Danzig. After World War I, the Polish Corridor provided access to the Baltic Sea, but the Free City of Danzig was not granted to Poland. In early 1919, Roman Dmowski, the Polish representative to the Paris Peace Conference, campaigned for the incorporation of Klaipėda Region into Lithuania, which was then to enter into a union with Poland (see Dmowski's Line and Międzymorze federation). The Polish formula was Klaipėda to Lithuania, Lithuania to Poland. Until the Polish–Lithuanian union could be worked out, Klaipėda was to be placed under the temporary administration of the Allies. While such a union had a historic tradition in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Lithuania categorically refused any such proposals. Worsening Polish–Lithuanian relations led to the Polish–Lithuanian War and dispute over the Vilnius Region. However, the union idea was met favorably in Western Europe. In December 1921, Poland sent Marceli Szarota as a new envoy to the region. Due to his initiative, Poland and Klaipėda signed a trade agreement in April 1922. In addition, Poland attempted to establish its economic presence by buying property, establishing business enterprises, and making connections with the port.
French administration.
Influenced by the Polish proposals, the Allies took Klaipėda Region into account when signing the peace treaty with Germany. According to article 28 of the Treaty of Versailles, effective January 10, 1920, lands north of the Neman River were detached from the German Empire and, according to article 99, were placed under a mandate of the League of Nations. The French agreed to become temporary administrators of the region while the British declined. The first French troops, the 21st Battalion of "Chasseurs Alpins" under General Dominique Joseph Odry, arrived on February 10, 1920. The Germans officially handed over the region on February 15. Two days later General Odry established a seven-member Directorate—the main governing institution. After Lithuanian protests, two Prussian Lithuanian representatives were admitted to the Directorate, increasing its size to nine members. On June 8, 1920, France appointed Gabriel Jean Petisné as the head of the civilian administration in the Klaipėda Region. Petisné showed anti-Lithuanian bias and was favorable towards the idea of a free city. General Odry resigned on May 1, 1920, leaving Petisné the highest-ranking official in the region.
French Prime Minister and chairman of the Paris Peace Conference Georges Clemenceau commented that the Klaipėda Region was not attached to Lithuania because it had not yet received "de jure" recognition. The Lithuanians seized this statement and further campaigned for their rights in the region believing that once they received international recognition, the region should be theirs. As the mediation of the Polish–Lithuanian conflict over the Vilnius Region by the League of Nations was going nowhere, the Klaipėda Region became a major bargaining chip. Already in 1921, implicit "Klaipėda-for-Vilnius" offers were made. In March 1922, the British made a concrete and explicit offer: in exchange for recognition of Polish claims to Vilnius, Lithuania would receive "de jure" recognition, Klaipėda Region, and economic aid. The Lithuanians rejected the proposal as they were not ready to give up on Vilnius. After the rejection, the French and British attitudes turned against Lithuania and they now favored the free city solution ("Freistadt" like the Free City of Danzig). Thus the Lithuanians could wait for an unfavorable decision or they could seize the region and present a "fait accompli".
Preparations.
Decision.
On November 3–4, 1922, a delegation of Prussian Lithuanians unsuccessfully pleaded the Lithuanian case to the Conference of Ambassadors. This failure became the impetus to organize the uprising. During a secret session on November 20, 1922, the Lithuanian government decided to organize the revolt. They recognized that the diplomatic efforts through the League of Nations or the Conference of Ambassadors were fruitless and economic measures to sway the inhabitants towards Lithuania were too expensive and ineffective in international diplomacy. General Silvestras Žukauskas claimed that the Lithuanian Army could disarm the small French regiment and take the region in 24 hours. However, a direct military action against France was too dangerous, both in military and diplomatic sense. Therefore, it was decided to stage a local revolt, using the example of the Polish Żeligowski's Mutiny in October 1920.
The preparations were left in the hands of Prime Minister Ernestas Galvanauskas. While he delegated specific tasks, the grand plan was kept secret even from the First Seimas or Ministry of Foreign Affairs and thus very few Lithuanians understood the full role of the government in the revolt. Thus the main credit for organization of the revolt is sometimes given to Vincas Krėvė-Mickevičius, Chairman of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, which provided the manpower. Galvanauskas planned to present the revolt as a genuine uprising of the local population against its German Directorate and not against the French or Allied administration. Such plan was designed to direct Allied protests away from the Lithuanian government and to exploit the anti-German sentiment in Europe. Galvanauskas was careful to hide any links between the rebels and the Lithuanian government so that if the revolt failed he could blame the Riflemen and the rebels absolving the government of any responsibility. Galvanauskas warned that all those involved could be subject to criminal prosecutions if it was necessary for Lithuania's prestige.
Propaganda campaigns.
The local population was engaged in the political tug of war between Germany, Lithuania, and free city. Reunion with Germany was a political impossibility, but local Germans wished to preserve their political and cultural dominance in the region. While Prussian Lithuanians spoke the Lithuanian language, they had developed their own complex identity, including a different religion (Lutherans as opposed to Roman Catholic Lithuanians). The Lithuanians were seen as both economically and culturally backward people. Farmers and industry workers worried that cheaper produce and labor from Lithuania would destroy their livelihood. Therefore, the idea of a free city was gaining momentum. At the end of 1921, Arbeitsgemeinschaft für den Freistaat Memel (Society for Free State Memel) collected 54,429 signatures out of 71,856 total eligible residents (75.7%) in support of the free state.
Therefore, even before the decision to organize the revolt, Lithuania attempted to maximize its influence and attract supporters in the region. Lithuania restricted its trade to demonstrate region's economic dependence as it did not produce enough food. The economic situation was further complicated by the beginning of hyperinflation of the German mark, which the region used as its currency. The Lithuanian cause was also supported by industrialists, who expected cheap labor and raw materials from Lithuania. Lithuanians also engaged in intense propaganda. They established and financed pro-Lithuanian organizations and acquired interest in local press. Many of these activities were coordinated by Lithuanian envoy Jonas Žilius, who received 500,000 German marks for such purposes. Banker Jonas Vailokaitis donated US$12,500 () for the cause and pledged another $10,000 if needed. Additional support was provided by Lithuanian Americans, including Antanas Ivaškevičius (Ivas) and Andrius Martusevičius (Martus). For several weeks before the revolt, the local press reported on alleged Polish plans for the region. This was designed to strengthen the anti-Polish sentiment and paint Lithuania as a more favorable solution. It seems that these actions had the intended result and public opinion shifted towards Lithuania.
International diplomacy.
Germany understood that the region would not be re-attached. Therefore, they favored the lesser of two evils and tacitly supported the interests of Lithuania. The Weimar Republic saw both Poland and France as its major enemies while Lithuania was more neutral. Also, once Germany restored its might, it would be much easier to recapture the region from weaker Lithuania than from larger Poland. Already on February 22, 1922, the Germans unofficially informed the Lithuanians that they were not opposed to Lithuanian action in Klaipėda and that, understandably, such a stance would never be officially declared. Such attitudes were later confirmed in other unofficial German–Lithuanian communications and even during the revolt, when Berlin urged local Germans not to hinder the Lithuanian plans.
When the Allies contemplated turning Klaipėda into a free city like Danzig, Polish Foreign Minister Konstanty Skirmunt believed that such a free city would hurt the Polish interest by allowing Germany to maintain its influence in the region. Skirmunt instead supported the transfer of the region to Lithuania if Poland would secure unrestricted trade via the Neman River and the port. At the same time Poland was preoccupied by other issues (assassination of President Gabriel Narutowicz, economic crisis, territorial disputes in Silesia, tense relations with Soviet Russia) and paid less attention to Klaipėda. Lithuania understood that a military action against Polish interest in the region could resume the Polish–Lithuanian War. To counter the expected backlash from Poland and France, the Lithuanians