A joint military operation between France and Spain
Operation Écouvillon, also known as Operation Ouragan or Operation Teide, was a joint military operation conducted by France and Spain against the Moroccan Army of Liberation during the Ifni War. The operation took place from 10 to 24 February 1958 in the northern Sahara, which was under Spanish control. Its primary objective was to suppress Saharan resistance and secure Spanish dominance over the territory. 
Planned in secrecy, Operation Écouvillon was significant in understanding the broader context of Western Sahara. It occurred within a complex geopolitical landscape, as the operation took place in a strategically significant territory claimed by Spain and various independence movements that had complicated relationships with the newly independent Morocco at the time. The decolonization processes in Algeria and Mauritania further complicated the political context. Additionally, many insurgents from the Moroccan Army of Liberation received support from members of the Berber peoples and tribes in the Sahel region.
The Franco-Spanish operation was deemed successful, with Spain retaining control over the Spanish Sahara. France was able to further its interests in the region and temporarily gain the support of the Reguibat tribe. Another outcome of the operation was Spain's return of Tarfaya to Morocco. Following the operation, Morocco adopted the doctrine of Greater Morocco, among other strategic decisions. The operation also played a significant role in transferring military power during Mauritania's path to independence.
Background.
Morocco's independence and decolonization.
In 1956, Morocco gained independence, but some territories in what is now Western Sahara, including Ifni, remained under Spanish control. The Spanish occupation of Ifni led to violent clashes between Spanish forces and Saharan resistance fighters starting on 10 April 1957. At the same time, resistance against French colonial rule emerged on the Mauritanian side, led by the Mauritanian Berber tribe of Reguibat, with support from nearly 1,200 Moroccan soldiers from the Moroccan Army of Liberation (AL). This combined group later renamed itself the Mauritanian Liberation Army.
This situation led to a disagreement between the King of Morocco, who was hesitant to fully commit to the liberation of these territories, and some resistance fighters from the Moroccan Army of Liberation (AL), who were unwilling to join the royal forces. This dissident faction believed that these territories should be liberated independently. Instead of integrating into the Royal Armed Forces, the dissidents joined the Sahrawi resistance fighters who were actively fighting against the Spanish military. Despite these differing viewpoints, the Sahrawi resistance, primarily led by dissidents with the support of local tribes, received partial funding from the Moroccan monarchy, which viewed the struggle against Spanish occupiers favorably. The composition of the Moroccan liberation army was complex; Camille Evrard describes it as a 'multiform' army that included dissidents from the national liberation army who refused to join the Royal Armed Forces, as well as members of Saharan tribes from the Spanish Sahara and what is now Mauritania, which was then part of French West Africa.
By the end of August 1957, Spanish forces were forced to withdraw from several towns in the region, including Smara, which fell under Moroccan control. Spain subsequently requested assistance from French forces, leading to the deployment of Operation Ecouvillon. This operation was carried out under secret agreements, although its implementation required a pretext for French intervention. The operation took place within the larger context of the decolonization of North Africa, a factor that likely influenced the decisions of the key actors involved.
Geography.
The operation was conducted mainly in the Rio de Oro region, extending to Bir Moghreïn in Mauritania. Key locations involved in the operation included the towns of Es-Semara, Saguia el-Hamra, Laâyoune, Ifni, and Tarfaya. The region is characterized by a desert climate, featuring sparse vegetation with occasional depressions and predominantly shrubby plant life. The harsh environmental conditions of the desert played a significant role in shaping the strategies and outcomes of the military operation.
The idea of "Greater Morocco" and Moroccan demands.
The Moroccan claims to the territory involved in the operation were an important factor in the French rationale for participating. These claims are closely linked to the doctrine of Greater Morocco, which was developed after Morocco's independence by Allal al Fassi. Al Fassi argued that Morocco's independence was incomplete because large portions of its "historic" territories remained under foreign control. Initially popular within the nationalist Istiqlal party, the doctrine eventually gained broader acceptance, including within the Moroccan monarchy, particularly after the actions of the Army of Liberation in the Spanish Sahara and what is now Mauritania. In 1958, the Moroccan government officially adopted the concept of Greater Morocco as part of its national doctrine. Allal al Fassi also maintained that Western Sahara, which had previously been under Almoravid rule, should be included within Greater Morocco's boundaries, further bolstering Morocco's territorial claims in the region.
In 1956, the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) were established and placed under the command of Crown Prince Hassan II. Unlike the Moroccan Liberation Army, the FAR was primarily composed of Moroccan goumiers and French officers. Hassan II aimed to integrate the liberation army into the FAR, while the Istiqlal party, led by Mehdi Ben Barka, sought to maintain control over the Army of Liberation, viewing it as a critical tool for continuing the struggle against colonial powers and advancing the concept of Greater Morocco. To avoid integration into the FAR and continue the armed struggle for Greater Morocco, some troops from the liberation army were stationed in southern Morocco. This strategy was successful, with the AL-Sud becoming the only branch of the Army of Liberation that had not joined the FAR by 1956. This branch, working in collaboration with local Berber tribes, led the resistance against colonial rule.
In France, Operation Écouvillon was presented as a necessary action to counter perceived "Moroccan expansionism." This narrative was communicated to the Mauritanian population, then under French control, as well as to the broader international community.
Geopolitical background.
On the Spanish side, maintaining control over the entire Spanish Sahara is a significant political issue. The strategic importance of the Spanish presence in the region, along with the discovery of significant natural resources, has contributed to the relevance of the Sahara for Spain. In the late 1940s, Spanish geologist Manuel Alia Medina discovered phosphate deposits near Bou Craa, prompting the Spanish government to commission geological surveys in the area, which were conducted by the Spanish Institute of Geology. These surveys, initiated during Franco's regime, confirmed the existence of large deposits of pure phosphate and indicated the presence of oil. However, Spain faced challenges in exploiting these resources due to logistical limitations. Despite this, Spain was hesitant to allow the newly independent Morocco to utilize these resources. Meanwhile, Morocco maintained a diplomatic appearance towards Spain while reportedly providing financial and military support to insurgents in the Spanish Sahara, leading to a series of attacks against Spanish forces.
At the French level, Operation Écouvillon had several main objectives. The primary aim was to address concerns regarding Morocco's expansionist ambitions, particularly its interest in the Mauritanian Sahara, which was then under French control. Additionally, the operation was a response to the activities of the ALM (Army of Liberation Mauritanian ), composed of members from the Moroccan AL and Berber tribes such as the Reguibat, who were conducting armed actions in the Mauritanian Sahara. France sought to prevent these actions, as there were worries that pro-independence sentiments could spread to sub-Saharan territories under national control.
The rising independence demands among Sahelian populations under the French administration, encouraged by the Moroccan Army of Liberation, further motivated the operation. General Burgund’s policies were instrumental in making this operation feasible. After World War II, French West Africa, which included the area of modern-day Mauritania, faced a troop shortage, with the National Liberation Army of Algerian and the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces outnumbering French forces. In a 1957 communication to the Ministry of Overseas France, General Burgund noted that the military presence in French West Africa was limited to about 20,000 personnel.
The Governor of Mauritania, Albert-Louis Mouragues, supported the request for additional military resources, citing fears of potential Algerian independence movements and Moroccan expansionism. Consequently, in May 1957, Mauritania received military reinforcements aimed at ensuring security in the region. This reinforcement was seen as a key step in allowing French companies to access available resources and make necessary investments. France's military support for Spain was therefore influenced by a desire to safeguard its financial interests in the region while also preventing the proliferation of independence movements into sub-Saharan Africa.
Towards the end of 1957, the Moroccan Army of Liberation (AL) was involved in conflict with the monarchy and its former allies from the Reguibat tribe. The Reguibat tribe claimed that the Moroccan contingent within the AL was trying to dominate their territory and military resources. As a result, the Reguibat, who were already engaged in guerrilla warfare against the French military, formed an alliance with the French forces to counter the Moroccan AL troops.
Spanish wave of defeats 1957-January 1958.
After gaining independence, Morocco provided financial and military support to the Sahrawi insurgents and the AL-Sud in their struggle against Spanish colonial forces. As a result, between 1957 and 1958, the Spanish army in Western Sahara experienced a series of defeats against both Sahrawi troops and Moroccan forces from the AL-Sud. The main aim of the Sahrawi attacks during this period was to regain control of the Ifni strip and the town of Ifni.
On 23 November 1957, Moroccan forces cut the telephone lines, allowing insurgents to launch a series of coordinated attacks on strategic locations, including the airfield and arms depots, as well as various points within the town. These locations were defended by the 3rd Infantry Battalion, the 3rd Artillery Battery, and a Saharan police unit, totaling around 1,500 Spanish soldiers and 500 Saharan police officers. The attackers maintained an intense artillery barrage on the town for several hours, followed by an assault involving approximately 1,200 rebels armed with automatic weapons. The Spanish forces reported 55 fatalities and 128 injuries, with seven individuals listed as missing. The Moroccan insurgents also faced significant casualties and, in the weeks that followed, shifted their focus to smaller attacks against minor Spanish outposts, particularly targeting Taliouine.
The Taliouine fortress was defended by a platoon of Tiradores and a platoon of Sahrawi police officers, with support from the local Bedouin community. However, by 25 November 1957, the situation had worsened, necessitating the deployment of rescue units. This relief force consisted of personnel from the Legion, parachutists, and an 88-millimeter artillery battery. Although the operation was successful in preserving the outpost, the defenders incurred significant casualties, leading to their withdrawal from the fortress and subsequent relocation to Ifni. Other outposts faced similar difficulties, with Spanish forces determined to maintain their positions despite the considerable losses.
By 9 December 1957, the Spanish had lost all their outposts and were compelled to retreat towards Sidi Ifni, which soon became fully surrounded by Moroccan troops.
On 12 and 13 January 1958, insurgent forces attacked the town of Laâyoune, which was defended by the 13th Battalion of the Spanish Legion. Despite having a numerical advantage, the insurgents were ultimately unsuccessful and retreated. Spanish troops then pursued the insurgents but were ambushed near Dcheira El Jihadia. During the ambush, Captain Jauregui was mortally wounded. After the attack concluded, the Spanish forces were forced to withdraw, engaging in defensive operations that resulted in 37 fatalities and 50 injuries. The challenging military circumstances led the Spanish to agree to Operation Écouvillon, a collaborative initiative with the French army.
Operation preparation.
France and Spain historically sought to conduct joint operations to maintain control over the Saharan territories, particularly amidst rising tensions in the region. In 1957, multiple negotiations took place between the two countries aimed at reaching an agreement for a coordinated response to the insurgent threats. However, these discussions ultimately proved unsuccessful. General Burgund, the French general responsible for leading the negotiations, was eager to formalize an agreement quickly. In contrast, his Spanish counterpart, General Mariano Gómez-Zamalloa, showed hesitance to proceed with a joint operation. The situation escalated with the offensives launched by the Armée de Libération Nationale-Sud (ALN-South) in the Spanish-held Saharan territories, compelling Spain to pursue a resolution through diplomatic means.
On 14 January 1958, General Burgund convened with the Spanish generals overseeing operations in the Spanish Sahara to devise a comprehensive action plan. This meeting yielded positive results, and a follow-up meeting was arranged for 24