Political polarization is a prominent component of politics in the United States. Scholars distinguish between ideological polarization (differences between the policy positions) and affective polarization (a dislike and distrust of political out-groups), both of which are apparent in the United States. In the last few decades, the U.S. has experienced a greater surge in ideological polarization and affective polarization than comparable democracies.
Differences in political ideals and policy goals are indicative of a healthy democracy. Scholarly questions consider changes in the magnitude of political polarization over time, the extent to which polarization is a feature of American politics and society, and whether there has been a shift away from focusing on triumphs to dominating the perceived abhorrent supporters of the opposing party.
Polarization among U.S. legislators is asymmetric, as it has primarily been driven by a rightward shift among Republicans in Congress. Polarization has increased since the 1970s, with rapid increases in polarization during the 2000s onwards. According to the Pew Research Center, members of both parties who have unfavorable opinions of the opposing party have doubled since 1994, while those who have very unfavorable opinions of the opposing party are at record highs as of 2022.
Definition and conceptualization.
The Pew Research Center defines political polarization in the United States as "the vast and growing gap between liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats". According to psychology professors Gordon Heltzel and Kristin Laurin, political polarization occurs when "subsets of a population adopt increasingly dissimilar attitudes toward parties and party members (i.e., affective polarization), as well as ideologies and policies (ideological polarization.)" Polarization has been defined as both a process and a state of being. A defining aspect of polarization, though not its only facet, is a bimodal distribution around conflicting points of view or philosophies. In general, defining a threshold at which an issue is "polarized" is imprecise; detecting the trend of polarization, however, (increasing, decreasing, or stable) is more straightforward.
The relationship between ideological and affective polarization is complicated and contested but, generally speaking, scholars recognize an increase in both ideological and affective polarization in the United States over time. Some research suggests that affective polarization is growing more rapidly than ideological polarization and perhaps even driving it. Political scientists debate the relationship between elite-driven polarization and mass polarization (among the general public). Morris Fiorina argues that the American public is not as polarized as is often assumed, suggesting that elite polarization is wrongly imputed to the general public. Conversely, Alan Abramowitz argues that mass polarization is actually imposing polarization upon elites through the electoral process.
Affective polarization is closely related to political tribalism and "us-them" thinking. There is mounting psychological evidence that humans are hardwired to display loyalty towards in-groups and hostility and distrust towards out-groups, however they are defined. One way to describe this is to say that humans evolved to be "partial empathizers", ready to empathize with those from whom they can expect reciprocity, while being incredibly skeptical towards outsiders. Indeed, many of our cognitive biases and failures of reason can be traced directly back to our apparent need to defend our group against threats, even when those threats consist mainly of ideas and words. Motivated reasoning and confirmation bias (or myside bias) help to explain the cognitive blindspots that lead us to dismiss or discredit challenging information while granting unwarranted credence to information that supports our pre-existing views.
For example, in one study, subjects were asked to evaluate "neutral" quantitative data regarding the efficacy of skin cream. In this treatment, subjects' performance was determined simply by their numeracy, that is, their mathematical skill level. In a second treatment, however, subjects were presented with data concerning the efficacy of gun control laws. Partisans performed much more poorly when asked to evaluate data that challenged their pre-existing views about gun control laws; moreover, high mathematical skill levels did not prevent this. In fact, those who had the strongest mathematical skills were best able to rationalize a false interpretation of the data that conformed with their pre-existing views. Similarly, Americans' views on gun control seem to stem almost entirely from their cultural worldview and how they position themselves in that cultural schema; statistics do not persuade them to change their minds. In fact, cognitive scientists Mercier and Sperber argue that human reason did not evolve in order to produce logical arguments, but rather to finesse social relationships. On this view, the evolutionary purpose of reason is not truth but rather persuasion and collaboration. These studies suggest that our social and partisan identities (often discussed in the context of identity politics) affect the ways in which we engage information and may sometimes drive political polarization.
History.
Antebellum period.
Starting in the early 1830s, the country became progressively more polarized over the issue of slavery: whether it was a great wrong, a sin, or a necessary evil or even a positive good. Neither the Missouri Compromise nor the Compromise of 1850 succeeding in dealing adequately with the problem. The pro-slavery Southern states, thanks to the Three-fifths compromise, dominated the Federal government. Congress passed repeated gag rules preventing the issue from even being discussed.
Gilded Age.
The Gilded Age of the late 19th century (c. 1870 – 1900) is considered to be one of the most politically polarized periods in American history, with open political violence and highly polarized political discourse. A key event during this era was the election of 1896, which some scholars say led to an era of one-party rule, created "safe seats" for elected officials to build careers as politicians, increased party homogeneity, and increased party polarization. Political polarization was overall heightened, with Republicans strengthening their hold on industrial areas, and Democrats losing ground in the North and upper Midwest.
1950s and 1960s.
The 1950s and 1960s were marked by high levels of political bipartisanship, the results of a post-World War II "consensus" in American politics, as well as ideological diversity within each of the two major parties.
1990–present.
In the 1990s, House Speaker Newt Gingrich's use of "asymmetric constitutional hardball" led to increasing polarization in American politics driven primarily by the Republican Party. Media and political figures began espousing the narrative of polarization in the early 1990s, with a notable example being Pat Buchanan's speech at the 1992 Republican National Convention. In the speech, he declared a culture war for the future of the country. In 1994, the Democratic Party lost control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. Congress went Republican for the first time since 1952. The narrative of political polarization became a recurring theme in the elections of 2000 and 2004. After President George W. Bush barely won reelection in 2004, English historian Simon Schama noted that the US had not been so polarized since the American Civil War, and that a more apt name might be the Divided States of America.
From 1994 to 2014, the share of Americans who expressed either "consistently liberal" or "consistently conservative" opinions doubled from 10% to 21%. In 1994, the average Republican was more conservative than 70% of Democrats, compared to more conservative than 94% of Democrats in 2014. The average Democrat went from more liberal than 64% of Republicans to more liberal than 92% of Republicans during the same era. In contrast, families are becoming more politically homogenous. As of 2018, 80% of marriages had spousal alignment on party affiliation. Parent-child agreement was 75%. Both of these represent significant increases from family homogeneity in the 1960s. A 2022 study found that there had been a substantial increase since 1980 in political polarization among adolescents, driven by parental influence.
A Brown University study released in 2020 found that the U.S. was polarizing faster compared to other democratic countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia. According to Stony Brook University political scientists Yanna Krupnikov and John Barry Ryan, polarization in American politics is primarily a phenomenon among Americans who are deeply involved in politics and very expressive about their political views. Americans who are not as involved in politics are not as polarized.
Politically polarizing issues.
As of February 2020, a study conducted by the Pew Research Center highlights the current political issues that have the most partisanship. By far, addressing climate change was the most partisan issue with only 21% of Republicans considering it a top policy priority as opposed to 78% of Democrats. Issues that are also extremely partisan include protecting the environment, reforming gun policy, and bolstering the country's military strength. These differences in policy priorities emerge as both Democrats and Republicans shift their focus away from improving the economy. Since 2011, both parties have gradually placed economic stimulation and job growth lower on their priority list, with Democrats experiencing a sharper decline of importance when compared to Republicans. This is in stark contrast to the 1990s, when both Democrats and Republicans shared similar views on climate change and showed significantly more agreement. A 2017 poll conducted by Gallup identifies issues where the partisan gap has significantly increased over a period of about fifteen years. For Republicans, the most significant shift was the idea that the "federal government has too much power", with 39% of Republicans agreeing with that notion in 2002 as opposed to 82% agreeing in 2016. On the Democratic side, the largest shift was increasing favorability towards Cuba, changing from 32% in 2002 to 66% in 2017. Ultimately, as partisanship continues to permeate and dominate policy, citizens who adhere and align themselves with political parties become increasingly polarized.
On some issues with a wide public consensus, partisan politics still divides citizens. For instance, even though 60% of Americans believe that the government should provide healthcare for its citizens, opinions are split among party lines with 85% of Democrats, including left-leaning independents, believing that healthcare is the government's responsibility and 68% of Republicans believing that it is not the government's responsibility. Likewise, on some prominent issues where the parties are broadly split, there is bipartisan support for specific policies. For example, in health care, 79% of Americans think pre-existing conditions should be covered by health insurance; 60% think abortion should be broadly legal in the first trimester but only 28% in the second trimester and 13% in the third trimester. 77% of Americans think legal immigration is good for the country. On gun rights, 89% support more mental health funding, 83% support closing the gun show loophole, 72% support red flag laws, and 72% support requiring gun permits when purchasing. In the federal budget, there is 80% or more support to retain funding for veterans, infrastructure, Social Security, Medicare, and education.
Political polarization also shaped the public's reaction to COVID-19. A study that observed the online conversations surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic found that left-leaning individuals were more likely to criticize politicians compared to right-leaning users. Additionally, left-leaning social media accounts often shared disease prevention measures through hashtags, while right-leaning posts were more likely to spread conspiracies and retweet posts from the White House's Twitter account. The study continues to explain that, when considering geographic location, because individuals in conservative and right leaning areas are more likely to see COVID-19 as a non-threat, they are less likely to stay home and follow health guidelines.
Potential causes.
Many factors contribute to polarization in American society. While scholars disagree about which factors carry the most explanatory weight, each of the factors below provides a partial explanation of polarization.
Elite-driven polarization.
Elite partisanship.
Elites are more polarized than the general public. High-information citizens tend to hold strong opinions, whereas low-information citizens have "fewer and weaker" opinions. When it comes to politics, many citizens are low-information. In one study, 35% of American voters could be classified as low-information "know-nothings."
Research on the relationship between elite and mass polarization has not settled the question of whether elite polarization "drives" mass polarization, or vice versa. Some studies suggest that ideological polarization among elites tends to increase affective polarization among the public. Other research suggests that elites are actually more ideologically "and" affectively polarized, and that it is their affective polarization that drives mass affective polarization. This implies that even though elites are better informed about politics and more ideologically consistent, they are also more emotional about politics.
Several institutional and structural features of the American electoral system contribute to elite-driven polarization, by selecting more ideologically extreme candidates and rewarding antagonistic legislative behavior over compromise. These are described below.
Party primaries.
Primary elections select candidates for upcoming general elections. In many