Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 3201, is a United States federal law declaring that nuclear explosive devices pose a perilous threat to the security interests of the United States. The law restricts U.S. export of civil nuclear programs to other nations.
The H.R. 8638 legislation was passed by the 95th United States Congress and signed into law by the 39th President of the United States Jimmy Carter on March 10, 1978.
Provisions of the Act.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act provided several policy elements for the control and limitations of nuclear technology.
(a) As used in this Act, the term —
(1) "Commission" means the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(2) "Director" means the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Replaced in 1999 by US Department of State Hence "DIRECTOR" = "SECRETARY OF STATE" post 1999;
(3) "IAEA" means International Atomic Energy Agency
(4) "nuclear materials and equipment" means source material, special nuclear material, production facilities, utilization facilities, and components, items or substances determined to have significance for nuclear explosive purposes pursuant of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(5) "physical security measures" means measures to reasonably ensure that source or special nuclear material available only be used for authorized purposes and to prevent theft and sabotage
(6) "sensitive nuclear technology" means any information (including information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part thereof) which is not available to the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water, but shall not include Restricted Data controlled pursuant of the 1954 Act
(7) "1954 Act" means the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
(8) "the Treaty" means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(b) All other terms used in this Act not defined in this section shall have the meanings ascribed to them by the 1954 Act, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and the Treaty.
The United States, as a matter of national policy, shall take such actions and institute such measures as may be necessary and feasible to assure other nations and groups of nations that may seek to utilize the benefits of atomic energy for peaceful purposes that it will provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to those nations and groups of nations which adhere to policies designed to prevent proliferation . Such nuclear fuel shall be provided under agreements entered into pursuant of the 1954 Act or as otherwise authorized by law. The United States shall ensure that it will have available the capacity on a long-term basis to enter into new fuel supply commitments consistent with its non-proliferation policies and domestic energy needs. The Commission shall, on a timely basis, authorize the export of nuclear materials and equipment when all the applicable statutory requirements are met.
Secretary of Energy is directed to initiate construction planning and design, construction, and operation activities for expansion of uranium enrichment capacity, as elsewhere provided by law. Further the Secretary as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency are directed to establish and implement procedures which will ensure to the maximum extent feasible, consistent with this Act, orderly processing of subsequent arrangements and export licenses with minimum time delay.
The President shall promptly undertake a study to determine the need for additional United States enrichment capacity to meet domestic and foreign needs and to promote United States non-proliferation objectives abroad. The President shall report to the Congress on the results of this study within twelve months after the date of enactment of this Act.
(a) Consistent with this Act, the President shall institute prompt discussions with other nations and groups of nations, including both supplier and recipient nations, to develop international approaches for meeting future worldwide nuclear fuel needs. In particular, the President is authorized and urged to seek to negotiate as soon as practicable with nations possessing nuclear fuel production facilities or source material, and such other nations and groups of nations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, as may be deemed appropriate, with a view toward the timely establishment of binding international undertakings providing for —
(b) The President shall submit to Congress not later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act proposals for initial fuel assurances, including creation of an interim stockpile of uranium enriched to less than 20 percent in the uranium isotope 235 (low enriched uranium) to be available for transfer pursuant to a sales arrangement to nations which adhere to strict policies designed to prevent proliferation when and if necessary to ensure continuity of nuclear fuel supply to such nations. Such submission shall include proposals for the transfer of low-enriched uranium up to an amount sufficient to produce 100,000 MWe years of power from light water nuclear reactors, and shall also include proposals for seeking contributions from other supplier nations to such an interim stockpile pending the establishment of INFA.
(c) The President shall address in the report the desirability of and options for foreign participation, including investment, in new United States uranium enrichment facilities. This report shall also address the arrangements that would be required to implement such participation and the commitments that would be required as a condition of such participation. This report shall be accompanied by any proposed legislation to implement these arrangements.
(d) The fuel assurances contemplated by this section shall be for the benefit of nations that adhere to policies designed to prevent proliferation. In negotiating the binding international undertakings called for in this section, the President shall, in particular, seek to ensure that the benefits of such undertakings are available to non-nuclear weapon states only if such states accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, do not manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device, do not establish any new enrichment or reprocessing facilities under their de facto or de jure control, and place any such existing facilities under effective international auspices and inspection.
(e) The report required shall include information on the progress made in any negotiations pursuant to this section.
(f) The President may not enter into any binding international undertaking negotiated pursuant to
(a) which is not a treaty until such time as such proposed undertaking has been submitted to the Congress and has been approved by concurrent resolution.
(b) shall be submitted to the Congress as part of an annual authorization Act for the Department of Energy.
The President shall take immediate initiatives to invite all nuclear supplier and recipient nations to reevaluate all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, with emphasis on alternatives to an economy based on the separation of pure plutonium or the presence of high enriched uranium, methods to deal with spent fuel storage, and methods to improve the safeguards for existing nuclear technology. The President shall, in the first report required, detail the progress of such international reevaluation.
The United States is committed to continued strong support for the principles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to a strengthened and more effective International Atomic Energy Agency and to a comprehensive safeguards system administered by the Agency to deter proliferation. Accordingly, the United States shall seek to act with other nations to —
(a) continue to strengthen the safeguards program of the IAEA and, in order to implement this section, contribute funds, technical resources, and other support to assist the IAEA in effectively implementing safeguards
(b) ensure that the IAEA has the resources to carry out the provisions of Article XII of the Statute of the IAEA
(c) improve the IAEA safeguards system (including accountability) to ensure —
(1) the timely detection of a possible diversion of source or special nuclear materials which could be used for nuclear explosive devices
(2) the timely dissemination of information regarding such diversion
(3) the timely implementation of internationally agreed procedures in the event of such diversion
(d ) ensure that the IAEA receives on a timely basis the data needed for it to administer an effective and comprehensive international safeguards program and that the IAEA provides timely notice to the world community of any evidence of a violation of any safeguards agreement to which it is a party
(e) encourage the IAEA, to the maximum degree consistent with the Statute, to provide nations which supply nuclear materials and equipment with the data needed to assure such nations of adherence to bilateral commitments applicable to such supply.
The Department of Energy, in consultation with the Commission, shall establish and operate a safeguards and physical security training program to be made available to persons from nations and groups of nations which have developed or acquired, or may be expected to develop or acquire, nuclear materials and equipment for use for peaceful purposes. Any such program shall include training in the most advanced safeguards and physical security techniques and technology, consistent with the national security interests of the United States.
The United States shall seek to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations to —
(1) adopt general principles and procedures, including common international sanctions, to be followed in the event that a nation violates any material obligation with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear materials and equipment or nuclear technology, or in the event that any nation violates the principles of the Treaty, including the detonation by a non-nuclear weapon state of a nuclear explosive device
(2) establish international procedures to be followed in the event of diversion, sabotage, or theft of nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities, and for recovering nuclear materials that have been lost or stolen, or obtained or used by a nation or by any person or group in contravention of the principles of the Treaty.
(a) The authority to distribute special nuclear material under this section other than under an export license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall extend only to the following small quantities of special nuclear material (in no event more than per year of the uranium isotope 233, the uranium isotope 235, or plutonium contained in special nuclear material to any recipient).
(1) which are contained in laboratory samples, medical devices, or monitoring or other instruments
(2) the distribution of which is needed to deal with an emergency situation in which time is of the essence
(b) The authority to distribute source material under this section other than under an export license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall in no case extend to quantities of source material in excess of per year per recipient.
(c) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized to license the distribution of special nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material by the Department of Energy pursuant of this Act, respectively, in accordance with the same procedures established by law for the export licensing of such material by any person : Provided, That nothing in this section shall require the licensing of the distribution of byproduct material by the Department of Energy under this Act.
The Department of Energy shall not distribute any special nuclear material or source material under this Act other than under an export license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission until —
(1) the Department has obtained the concurrence of the Department of State and has consulted with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Defense under mutually agreed procedures which shall be established within not more than ninety days after the date of enactment of this provision
(2) the Department finds based on a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided and the information available to the United States Government, that the criteria in this Act or their equivalent and any applicable criteria are met, and that the proposed distribution would not be inimical to the common defense and security.
(1) Prior to entering into any proposed subsequent arrangement under an agreement for cooperation (other than an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant of this Act), the Secretary of Energy shall obtain the concurrence of the Secretary of State and shall consult with the Director, the Commission, and the Secretary of Defense : Provided, That the Secretary of State shall have the leading role in any negotiations of a policy nature pertaining to any proposed subsequent arrangement regarding arrangements for the storage or disposition of irradiated fuel elements or approvals for the transfer, for which prior approval is required under an agreement for cooperation, by a recipient of source or