World War II battle in the Pacific theatre
The battle of Buna–Gona was part of the New Guinea campaign in the Pacific theatre during World War II. It followed the conclusion of the Kokoda Track campaign and lasted from 16 November 1942 until 22 January 1943. The battle was fought by Australian and United States forces against the Japanese beachheads at Buna, Sanananda and Gona. From these, the Japanese had launched an overland attack on Port Moresby. In light of developments in the Solomon Islands campaign, Japanese forces approaching Port Moresby were ordered to withdraw to and secure these bases on the northern coast. Australian forces maintained contact as the Japanese conducted a well-ordered rearguard action. The Allied objective was to eject the Japanese forces from these positions and deny them their further use. The Japanese forces were skillful, well prepared and resolute in their defence. They had developed a strong network of well-concealed defences.
Operations in Papua and New Guinea were severely hampered by terrain, vegetation, climate, disease and the lack of infrastructure; these imposed significant logistical limitations. During the Kokoda Track campaign, these factors applied more-or-less equally to both belligerents but favoured the defender in attacks against well-fortified positions. The battlefield and logistical constraints limited the applicability of conventional Allied doctrine of manoeuvre and firepower. During the opening stages of the offensive, the Allies faced a severe shortage of food and ammunition. This problem was never entirely resolved. The battle also exposed critical problems with the suitability and performance of Allied equipment. The combat effectiveness of US forces, particularly the US 32nd Division, has been severely criticised. These factors were compounded by repeated demands from General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, for a rapid conclusion to the battle. The demands were more to politically secure MacArthur's command than for any strategic need. In consequence, troops were hastily committed to battle on repeated occasions, increasing Allied losses and ultimately lengthening the battle.
Allied air power interrupted the Japanese capacity to reinforce and resupply the beachheads from Rabaul. This ultimately made the Japanese position untenable. There was widespread evidence of the Japanese defenders cannibalising the dead. In the closing stages of the battle, significant numbers of the defenders were withdrawn by sea or escaped overland toward the west and the Japanese base around Salamaua and Lae. The remaining garrison fought to the death, almost to the man.
The resolve and tenacity of the Japanese in defence was unprecedented and had not previously been encountered. It was to mark the desperate nature of fighting that characterised battles for the remainder of the Pacific War. For the Allies, there were a number of valuable but costly lessons in the conduct of jungle warfare. Allied losses in the battle were at a rate higher than that experienced at Guadalcanal. For the first time, the American public was confronted with the images of dead American troops.
Background.
Japan's entry into World War II and the war in the Pacific commenced with the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, which was coordinated with closely coinciding attacks on Thailand, the Philippines, the American bases on Guam and Wake Island, and the British possessions of Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Japanese forces rapidly secured territory in South-East Asia, the East Indies, and the Central and South-West Pacific. Australia had been shocked by the speedy collapse of British Malaya and the fall of Singapore. With the fall, nearly 15,000 Australian soldiers became prisoners of war along with the rest of the garrison of some 85,000 (mostly British and Indian troops).
US President Franklin Roosevelt ordered General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines to formulate a Pacific defence plan with Australia in March 1942. The Australian prime minister, John Curtin, agreed to place Australian forces under the command of MacArthur, who became Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area. MacArthur moved his headquarters (HQ) to Melbourne in March 1942.
The Japanese assaulted Rabaul on 23 January 1942. Rabaul became the forward base for the Japanese campaigns in mainland New Guinea. Japanese forces first landed on the mainland of New Guinea on 8 March 1942 when they invaded Lae and Salamaua to secure bases for the defence of the important base they were developing at Rabaul.
The Japanese 17th Army under Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake was a corps-sized command involved in the New Guinea, Guadalcanal, and Solomon Islands campaigns. The Japanese 8th Area Army, under General Hitoshi Imamura, was mobilised to take overall command in the areas from 16 November 1942. It was responsible for both the New Guinea and Solomon Islands campaigns. Imamura was based at Rabaul. The Japanese 18th Army, under Lieutenant General Hatazō Adachi, was also formed, to take over responsibilities for Japanese operations on mainland New Guinea, leaving the 17th Army responsible for the Solomon Islands.
Despite Australian fears, the Japanese never intended to invade the Australian mainland. While an invasion was considered by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters in February 1942, it was judged to be beyond the capability of the Japanese military and no planning or other preparations were undertaken. Instead, in March 1942 the Japanese adopted a strategy of isolating Australia from the United States; planning to capture Port Moresby in the Territory of Papua and the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia. The first part of this plan, codenamed Operation Mo, was an amphibious landing to capture Port Moresby, capital of the Australian Territory of Papua. This was frustrated by the Japanese defeat in the Battle of the Coral Sea and postponed indefinitely after the Battle of Midway.
The Japanese then planned an overland attack to capture the town by advancing from the north coast. Having already captured much of the Territory of New Guinea earlier that year, they landed on 21 July 1942, to established beachheads at Buna, Gona and Sanananda. This marked the beginning of the Kokoda Track campaign. The South Seas Detachment, under command of Major General Tomitarō Horii, advanced using the Kokoda Track to cross the rugged Owen Stanley Range.
As the Kokoda Track campaign was taking place, a Japanese invasion force made up of Japanese Special Naval Landing Force units attempted to capture the strategically valuable Milne Bay area in August 1942. The Battle of Milne Bay, fought from 25 August to 7 September 1942, resulted in a Japanese defeat. This was the first notable Japanese land defeat and raised Allied morale across the Pacific theatre.
Allied forces identified a Japanese airfield under construction at Guadalcanal, and 19,000 US marines were embarked to capture the airfield. An amphibious landing was made on 7 August. The battle lasted until 9 February 1943 and was strongly contested, on land, at sea and in the air.
By 16 September, Horii's force had advanced as far as Ioribaiwa, from Port Moresby and was close enough to see the town's lights. In light of reverses at Guadalcanal, Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake determined he could not support both battles and on 23 September, ordered Horii to withdraw his troops on the Kokoda Track, until the issue at Guadalcanal was decided. Limited provision had been made for the supply of Horii's force. The situation had reached a crisis. There were also concerns that Allied forces might land at Buna at any time.
On 26 September, the Japanese began to withdraw. They fought a well-ordered rear-guard action back over the Owen Stanley Range, with the Australian 7th Division in close pursuit. The US 32nd Infantry Division had been sent to New Guinea in September and was ordered to make a circling move against the Japanese eastern flank near Wairopi. This move commenced on 14 October. These plans were rendered ineffectual by the rate of the Japanese withdrawal but it left the division well positioned to co-ordinate its advance on the beachheads with the Australians that were approaching from the southwest.
Major General Arthur Allen was controversially relieved of command of the 7th Division on 28 October, and replaced by Major General George Vasey, previously commander of the 6th Division. Horii's force had been severely depleted by the lack of supplies but at Oivi it was replenished and reinforced. The Japanese suffered heavy casualties in the battle around Oivi–Gorari, from 4 to 11 November. The well-ordered withdrawal that had been planned quickly disintegrated into a rout. The 7th Division was about from Buna–Gona. Although experience demanded caution, the way before them was clear of Japanese forces.
Geography.
Climate and terrain.
The Japanese beachheads from which the Kokoda campaign was launched were located about three key positions along a stretch of the north coast of New Guinea: Gona to the west, Buna to the east and Sanananda–Giruwa in the centre. Roughly northeast of Port Moresby, it approximates to the most direct line from there to the north coast. The settlements are located on a thin coastal strip that separates the sea from a tidal forest swamp of mangroves, nipa and sago. Rivers flowing across the broad, flat, coastal plain from the Owen Stanley Range disappear into the swamps and discharge to the sea through many coastal creeks. The coastal strip is rarely more than a few hundred yards at its widest, to little more than a foot pad separating the swamp from the sea. The few paths through the swamp were seldom more than wide.
The area is low-lying and featureless – Buna air strip is above sea level. The elevation is only double this at Soputa, inland and at Popondetta, inland. The water table is reportedly shallow at about . This affected the digging of weapons pits and construction of defensive positions.
Areas not waterlogged were either dense jungle or swathes of kunai grass. Coconut plantations filled the wider areas of dry ground along the coastal strip but had been neglected and undergrowth had reclaimed the ground. The dense kunai grass could grow to 6 feet (nearly 2 m) and the leaves were broad and sharp. Temperatures over the period of the battle ranged from but with a humidity of 82 percent, this could be oppressive. In the humid conditions, kunai grass trapped the heat and it was not uncommon for temperatures to reach .
The battle was conducted during the tropical wet season. Average rainfall for December was , although this figure does not lend itself to a full appreciation of the impact of rain. It was characterised by heavy tropical storms, usually in the afternoon. While the worst of the monsoon held off until after the battle, rain was nonetheless a prevalent feature of the battle. Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger wrote: "At Buna that year it rained about a hundred and seventy inches [4,300 mm]. I have found out since that we got more than our share in December and January 1942–43." Daily rainfall totals of were not uncommon. Under these conditions, the few tracks, seldom more than foot trails, quickly became boggy.
Disease.
The area was one of the most malarial regions in the world. While malaria was the greatest disease threat, other tropical diseases such as dengue fever, scrub typhus, tropical ulcers, dysentery from a range of causes and fungal infections were common. The impact and susceptibility to disease was exacerbated by a poor and insufficient diet.
While the Australian Army had encountered malaria in the Middle East, few doctors with the militia had seen the disease before. Supplies of quinine, which was still the primary drug in use, were unreliable. Atebrin only became the official suppressive drug used by the Australian forces in late December 1942 and the change to its use was not immediate. The need for a strict anti-malaria program was not fully understood.Many officers saw this as a medical rather than a disciplinary issue and did not compel their men to take their medicine. It was common for Australian soldiers to wear shorts and rolled sleeves in response to the oppressive heat. Mosquito nets and repellent were in short supply, while the repellent that was supplied was considered ineffective.
Bergerud states that 85–95 percent of all Allied soldiers in the area carried malaria during the battle. There were 4.8 men hospitalised through sickness for one Allied battle casualty. 75 percent of the cases were attributed to malaria. After he had relieved Harding, Eichelberger gave orders to take the temperature of an entire company near the front. Every member of that company was running a fever. By necessity, many men remained in the front lines