Naval battle of 1 November 1914 near Chile in World War I
The Battle of Coronel was a First World War naval battle that led to an Imperial German Navy victory over the Royal Navy on 1 November 1914, off the coast of central Chile near the city of Coronel. The East Asia Squadron ("Ostasiengeschwader" or "Kreuzergeschwader") of the Imperial German Navy ("Kaiserliche Marine") led by Vice-Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee met and overpowered a British squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock.
The engagement probably took place as a result of misunderstandings. Neither admiral expected to meet the other in full force. Once the two met, Cradock understood his orders were to fight to the end, despite the odds being heavily against him. Although Spee had an easy victory, destroying two enemy armoured cruisers for just three men injured, the engagement also cost him almost half his supply of ammunition, which was irreplaceable.
Shock at the British losses led the Admiralty to send more ships, including two modern battlecruisers, which in turn destroyed Spee and the majority of his squadron on 8 December at the Battle of the Falkland Islands.
Background.
At the outbreak of war the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy, with assistance from New Zealand and Japanese naval and land forces in the Far East, had captured the German colonies of Kaiser-Wilhelmsland, Yap, Nauru, and Samoa, instead of searching for the German East Asia Squadron commanded by Vice-Admiral Maximilian von Spee, which had abandoned its base at the German concession at Tsingtao in the expectation of war breaking out with Japan. The East Asia Squadron rendezvoused at Pagan Island in the Marianas in early August 1914. Eventually, recognising the German squadron's potential for disrupting trade in the Pacific, the British Admiralty decided to destroy it and searched the western Pacific Ocean after the East Asia Squadron had conducted the Bombardment of Papeete (22 September 1914), where a French steamer reported its presence.
On 4 October 1914, the British learned from an intercepted radio message that Spee planned to attack shipping on the trade routes along the west coast of South America. Having correctly guessed the intention of the German commander, Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock patrolled the area with a squadron consisting of the armoured cruisers (flagship) and , the modern light cruiser , and the armed merchantman . The Admiralty had planned to reinforce the squadron by sending the newer and more powerful armoured cruiser from the Mediterranean, but temporarily diverted this ship to patrol the western Atlantic. "Defence" reached Montevideo two days after the battle, and Cradock instead received the pre-dreadnought battleship .
The change of plan meant that the British squadron comprised obsolete or lightly armed vessels, crewed in the case of "Good Hope" by inexperienced naval reservists. "Monmouth" and "Good Hope" had a large number of 6-inch guns but only "Good Hope" was armed with two 9.2-inch guns mounted in single turrets. Spee had a superior force of five modern vessels (the armoured cruisers and and the light cruisers , and ), led by officers hand-picked by Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz. "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" carried eight 8.2-inch guns each, which gave them an overwhelming advantage in range and firepower; the crews of both ships had earned accolades for their gunnery before the war. The Admiralty ordered Cradock to "be prepared to meet them in company", with no effort being made to clarify what action he was expected to take should he find Spee. On receiving his orders, Cradock asked the Admiralty for permission to split his fleet into two forces, each able to face Spee independently. The two groups would operate on the east and west coasts of South America to counter the possibility of Spee slipping past Cradock into the Atlantic Ocean. The Admiralty agreed and established the east coast squadron under Rear-Admiral Archibald Stoddart, consisting of three cruisers and two armed merchantmen.
The remaining vessels formed the west coast squadron, which was reinforced by "Canopus" on 18 October. At the outbreak of war and said to be in need of overhaul, "Canopus" had a top speed of . (After the fleet sailed, it was found that the ship could only make and that the senior engineer was mentally ill.) The Admiralty agreed that with "Canopus" the fleet would be too slow to force an engagement with the German cruisers and that without "Canopus" the west coast squadron stood no chance. Cradock sailed from the Falklands on 20 October, still under the impression that "Defence" would soon arrive and with Admiralty orders to attack German merchant ships and to seek out the East Asiatic Squadron. As the British squadron rounded Cape Horn, wireless transmissions from "Leipzig" increased in power and it seemed that the British would catch the ship while isolated, but Spee had made rendezvous with "Leipzig" on 14 October and had enforced wireless silence on the other ships.
Lines of communication.
On 30 October, before the battle but due to communications delays too late to have any effect, Admiral Jackie Fisher was re-appointed First Sea Lord, replacing Prince Louis of Battenberg, who, along with Churchill, had been
preoccupied with fighting to keep his position as First Sea Lord in the face of widespread concern over the senior British Admiral being of German descent. Battenberg was a proven and reliable admiral but was replaced to appease public opinion. The crisis drew the attention of the most senior members of the Admiralty away from the events in South America: Churchill later claimed that if he had not been distracted, he would have questioned the intentions of his admiral at sea more deeply.
A signal from Cradock was received by Churchill on 27 October, advising the Admiralty of his intention to leave "Canopus" behind because of her slow speed and, as previously instructed, to take his remaining ships in search of Spee. He re-stated that he was still expecting reinforcements in the form of "Defence", which he had previously been told was coming and that he had given orders for her to follow him as soon as possible. Although "Defence" had once been sent to reinforce Cradock, it had then been recalled part way, returned to the Mediterranean and then been sent again to form part of a new squadron patrolling the eastern coast of South America. A misunderstanding had arisen between Cradock and the Admiralty over how ships were to be assigned and used. Cradock believed he was expected to advance against Spee with those forces he had, whereas the Admiralty expected him to exercise caution, using "Canopus" for defence and merely to scout for the enemy or take advantage of any situation where he might come across part of the enemy force. Churchill replied to the signal, telling Cradock that "Defence" was to remain on the east coast and that Cradock was considered to have sufficient forces for his task, making no comment about his plan to abandon "Canopus". Churchill had passed on the message to the Admiralty staff, saying he did not properly understand what Cradock intended.
Cradock probably received Churchill's reply on 1 November with the messages collected by "Glasgow" at Coronel, giving him time to read it before the battle. Thus, Cradock would have taken the message as final confirmation that he was doing what was expected. Departing from Stanley he had left behind a letter to be forwarded to Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hedworth Meux in the event of his death. In this, he commented that he did not intend to suffer the fate of Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge, a friend of Cradock, who at the time was awaiting court-martial for failing to engage the enemy. The governor of the Falklands reported that Cradock had not expected to survive, as did the governor's aide. Luce reported that "Cradock was constitutionally incapable of refusing or even postponing action if there was the smallest chance of success".
On 3 November, Fisher in London received news from Valparaíso that Spee had been sighted. He urgently gave orders for "Defence" to join Cradock and stressed the need to keep "Canopus" together with the other ships. On 4 November, German reports of the battle started to reach London.
Prelude.
British preparations.
On 22 October, Cradock cabled the Admiralty that he was going to round Cape Horn and was leaving "Canopus" behind to escort his colliers. Admiral John Fisher replaced Battenberg as First Sea Lord on 27 October, and the following day Fisher ordered Cradock not to engage Spee without "Canopus". He then ordered HMS "Defence" to reinforce Cradock. The previous week Cradock had sent "Glasgow" to Coronel to pick up any messages the Admiralty might have sent. Spee, having learned of the presence of "Glasgow" off Coronel, sailed south from Valparaíso with all five warships with the intention of destroying her. "Glasgow" intercepted radio traffic from one of the German cruisers and informed Cradock, who turned his fleet north to intercept the cruiser.
Given the German superiority in speed, firepower, efficiency and numbers, why Cradock chose to engage puzzles historians. At the time Rear Admiral Ernest Troubridge, a friend of Cradock, was awaiting court-martial for failing to engage the enemy, and he had been told by the Admiralty that his force was "sufficient". The accepted view among Cradock's colleagues was that he was "constitutionally incapable of refusing action". On 31 October, he ordered his squadron to adopt an attacking formation. Both sides are thought to have expected to encounter a single ship until they sighted each other at 16:40 on 1 November.
Battle.
On 31 October, "Glasgow" entered Coronel harbour to collect messages and news from the British consul. Also in harbour was a supply ship—"Göttingen"—working for Spee, which immediately radioed with the news of the British ship entering harbour. "Glasgow" was listening to radio traffic, which suggested that German warships were close. Matters were confused because the German ships had been instructed to all use the same call sign, that of "Leipzig". Spee decided to move his ships to Coronel to trap "Glasgow" while Admiral Cradock hurried north to catch "Leipzig". Neither side realised the other's main force was nearby.
At 09:15 on 1 November, "Glasgow" left port to meet Cradock at noon, west of Coronel. Seas were rough so that it was impossible to send a boat between the ships to deliver the messages, which had to be transferred on a line floated in the sea. At 13:05, the ships formed into a line abreast formation apart, with "Glasgow" at the eastern end, and started to steam north at searching for "Leipzig". At 16:17 "Leipzig", accompanied by the other German ships, spotted smoke from the line of British ships. Spee ordered full speed so that "Scharnhorst", "Gneisenau" and "Leipzig" were approaching the British at , with the slower light cruisers "Dresden" and "Nürnberg" some way behind.
At 16:20, "Glasgow" and "Otranto" saw smoke to the north and then three ships at a range of . The British reversed direction, so that both fleets were moving south, and a chase began which lasted 90 minutes. Cradock was faced with a choice; he could either take his three cruisers capable of , abandon "Otranto" and run from the Germans, or stay and fight with "Otranto", which could only manage . The German ships slowed at a range of to reorganise themselves for best positions, and to await best visibility, when the British to their west would be outlined against the setting sun.
At 17:10, Cradock decided he must fight, and drew his ships closer together. He changed course to south-east and attempted to close upon the German ships while the sun remained high. Spee declined to engage and turned his faster ships away, maintaining the distance between the forces which sailed roughly parallel at a distance of . At 18:18, Cradock again attempted to close, steering directly towards the enemy, which once again turned away to a greater range of . At 18:50, the sun set; Spee closed to and commenced firing.
The German ships had sixteen guns of comparable range to the two guns on "Good Hope". One of these was hit within five minutes of the engagement's starting. Of the remaining guns on the British ships, most were in casemates along the sides of the ships, which continually flooded if the gun doors were opened to fire in heavy seas. The merchant cruiser "Otranto"—having only eight guns and being