The Battle of Tápióbicske was a battle in the Spring Campaign of the Hungarian War of Independence (1848–1849), fought on 4April 1849 between the Austrian Empire and the Hungarian Revolutionary Army. The Habsburg forces consisted of the I Corps of the Imperial Army led by Lieutenant Field Marshal Josip Jelačić. The Hungarians deployed I and III Corps led by General György Klapka and General János Damjanich respectively. Although initially the careless soldiers of the I. corps were put to flight by the Croatian and Austrian soldiers, after entering in their trap, the Hungarians were victorious, thanks to the intervention of the III. corps, and the main Hungarian armies could advance towards the Hungarian capitals (Buda and Pest), forcing the Austrian high commander, Field Marshal Alfred I, Prince of Windisch-Grätz fight a decisive battle at Isaszeg, which would decide the fate of Central and Western Hungary until the intervention of the Russian forces on the Habsburg side in June 1849.
Background.
After the Hungarian Revolutionary Army's Spring Campaign started well with a victory at the Battle of Hatvan. Although this victory was not very important, its psychological significance for the Hungarian soldiers, was enormous, facilitating also the success of the plan of the campaign, because of the commander of the III. corps, General Franz Schlik could not gather information about the real size of the opposing army, keeping Windisch-Grätz uncertain about where the Hungarian army will attack from. After the battle Schlik considered that the Hungarian army that faced him was at least 12,000-15,000 stronger, making Windisch-Grätz think that his general was beaten by the main Hungarian army, which is still at Hatvan. 
On 1 April Görgei gave the order for the I, II, and III Corps, to start their encircling march towards the southwest. General Artúr Görgei, the interim commander-in-chief of the Hungarian armies, issued the marching orders. György Klapka was to depart with I Corps at 4 the next morning towards Tápióbicske via Nagykáta. János Damjanich with III Corps was to set off at 5am Nagykáta. Lieutenant-Colonel István Szekulits, with II Corps, was to move off at 6am towards Farmos. The army headquarters was to be at Nagykáta. The Hungarian plan for the Spring Campaign, as elaborated by Antal Vetter, was that VII Corps, commanded by András Gáspár, had to attract the attention of the Austrian Windisch-Grätz by making a feint attack from the direction of Hatvan. Meanwhile, the other three corps (I, II, and III) would encircle the Austrian forces from the southwest and cut them off from Pest and Buda. These three corps needed not to be detected by the Austrians as they advanced towards Windisch-Grätz.
On 3 April the I., II., and III. corps marched to Jászberény and Jászjákóhalma, as was scheduled in the marching plan for that day, but although his formulation recommended to his officers to accomplish that night, also the marches scheduled for the next day, these were not carried out, probably because of the fatigue of the soldiers, or the uncertainty about the enemies purposes. On the same day being informed that Jelačić's I. corps marched out of Szolnok, Görgei sent orders to Colonel István Mesterházy stationing at Cibakháza and Colonel Lajos Asbóth stationing at Törökszentmiklós, to cross the Tisza, attack the railroad between Szolnok and Pest, and cause as many damages as possible to the enemy.
On 2 April, Field Marshal Windisch-Grätz ordered Lieutenant General Anton Csorich to march with his division from Vác to Gödöllő, and join with Schlik's III. corps. Jelačić's I. corps, which had the duty to transport away the valuable goods from Szolnok, and to march to Alberti, did not carry out Windisch-Grätz's order because he did not finish the transfer of the salt stock yet. Windisch-Grätz was infuriated by his corps commander's slowness, asking him to hurry to support the III. corps if they needed. In this situation Windisch-Grätz ordered Jelačić to march towards Kóka and Dány, and to watch the Alberti-Monor road with smaller detachments. Receiving this letter at 4:00 p.m., Jelačić promised that on the same day he will march to Tápióbicske, and on the next day, he will continue his march to Tápiószecső, Kóka, and Dány, hoping to reach the last with the bulk of his army at 10:00 a.m. He also mentioned that the Rastić and Sternberg brigades from the rearguard will only arrive at Kóka in the evening. Then he gave the order to his troops to prepare for the march, asking them to hurry. This order was especially hard to be fulfilled for the Rastić brigade, which on that day already made a march from Abony to Cegléd, and now, during the night, he had to move to Alberti, then, only after two hours resting, at 4:00 p.m., they had to continue their way to Kóka, to join with the bulk of the I. first corps.
Prelude.
According to Görgei's orders regarding the troops' movements for 4 April, Klapka's I. corps had to march from Jászberény, through Nagykáta, towards Tápióbicske at 4:00 a.m., Damjanich's III. corps follow them at 5:00 a.m. to Nagykáta, while the II. corps had to depart from Jászberény at 6:00 a.m., and march to Farmos, and Nagykáta was designed to be the new headquarters. Klapka planned to depart with his troops an hour earlier than was planned at, 3:00 a.m., but because of an unknown reason, they only departed from Jászberény at 6:00 a.m. On the way he received news from the locals, that Jelačić's troops had spent the night at Tápióbicske but departed, leaving only their baggage and a few soldiers in the village. So, without thinking about the danger of revealing the campaign plan to the enemy, Klapka decided to fall on them by surprise and take this, apparently, easy booty. But in the meanwhile, without Klapka's knowledge, Colonel Leopold Sternberg had arrived in Tápióbicske with his cavalry brigade, as had an infantry brigade under the command of Major-General Daniel Rastić.
On 3 April the bulk of the Jelačić corps arrived in Tápióbicske, while the Rastić and Sternberg brigades reached Tápiószele. The next day in the morning, the bulk of the corps continued its march, arriving at noon at Tápiószecső and Kóka. The Rastić and Sternberg brigades, which followed them from a 15 km distance, arrived at Tápióbicske around 10:00 a.m., from where they could still see the end of the corps supply wagons. Here, after leaving the Croatian banderial hussars in Tápióbicske, colonel Sternberg made a with the rest of the cavalry (8 companies) reconnaissance towards Nagykáta, and finding nothing suspicious in the area which stretched until the Tápió river, he gave to his brigade a longer break to feed their horses.
Meanwhile, the Rastić brigade also arrived at Tápióbicske, and let his soldiers rest for an hour. When this hour was over, right when the brigade started to prepare for leave, suddenly on the hills east of the village, the Hungarian guns started to shoot.
The Hungarians
I. corps
"Máriássy division":
"Kazinczy division":
III. corps
"Knezić division":
"Wysocki division":
The Austrians
From the Austrian side, only two brigades were involved in the battle. The Rastić infantry brigade, and the Sternberg cavalry brigade. Unfortunately, there are no data about the exact number of the soldiers of these two brigades. So we can only estimate their number, knowing the number of the companies of these brigades: 22 infantry and 16 cavalry companies. The number of soldiers in an infantry company from the armies in the Habsburg empire was between 214 and 234 men, while the cavalry companies had 178 officers and soldiers, as well as a couple of assistants, which counted also as soldiers. So the two Austrian brigades involved in the battle had, in total, around 7556-7996 soldiers.
Battle.
Klapka attacked Tápióbicske, where he thought to find only minor units with the Dipold brigade as the vanguard, supported by the Bobich brigade and 4 companies of the Koburg hussars, while the rest of the corps (the Sulcz and Zákó brigades and the cavalry division led by Colonel Arisztid Dessewffy) remained in reserve on the shore of the Tápió river. Klapka sent envoys to inform Damjanich and Görgei about his action. The vanguard crossed the Tápió river on the unprotected bridge, then repulsed the weak Croatian vanguard, found on the other side of the river, which retreated northwest from Tápióbicske, The Hungarians deployed on the sand dunes along the road which led to Tápióbicske. Klapka sent envoys to inform Damjanich and Görgei about his action. Only when the Hungarians started to shoot with their cannons Tápióbicske, learned Major General Daniel Rastić about their presence. The latter quickly ordered his troops to prepare for the battle, but to win them some time for this, he sent the 6 companies of Croatian banderial hussars in attack, then deployed his 6-pounder battery, under the protection of the Ogulin-Slunj border guard battalion, on a hill which laid 1000 paces northwest from the village. Meanwhile, the Dipold brigade repulsed the attack of the Banderial Hussars, which retreated behind the village, then entered Tápióbicske, which they thought unoccupied by the enemy, in tight company columns. But here they were caught by surprise by the crossfire (or a bayonet charge) of two Otočac battalions, hidden among and in the houses of the village and suffered heavy losses. When the Croatians appeared at the back of the Hungarians, closing their way of retreat, Captain Dénes Bég took the lead of the battalions and attacked the Croatian battalion attacking from behind, breaking the encirclement, and running out from the village Although, initially, the Hungarian retreat was ordered, the close pursuit of the enemy caused panic among the soldiers, who started to retreat in disorder towards the Tápió bridge. The soldiers of the fleeing Dipold-brigade ran into the Bobich-brigade which had just crossed the river and deployed its horse battery, causing disorder and panic among them. Their infectious panic routed Bobich's infantry and artillery as well, then also the Sulcz and Zákó brigades, which were waiting in the reserve outside of Tápióbicske. Because of the frequent rains in the last few days, the water of the, usually shallow river was swollen, and many soldiers, who, instead of the crowded bridge, tried to cross Tápió by swimming, drowned in the marshy waters. Two of the 12-pounder cannons, which they tried to bring over the river, sunk, while 5 were captured by the enemy. The Hungarians also lost an entire battery because the gunners were confused by the attacking enemy infantry with theirs, due to them having the same color uniforms.
This predisposition to panic was a common problem in the Hungarian revolutionary army because they often used irregulars alongside the regular soldiers, especially in the first months of the Hungarian War of Independence. The panicking irregulars caused major problems, for example in the Battle of Schwechat. This was due to the poor quality of their training, or the short period of their instruction, caused by the urgent need for new troops to replace losses and the pressures of defending a country attacked from every direction, and the unpreparedness and lack of training of the officers; all of these down to the fact that the Hungarian army was only a few months old, while its enemy, the Habsburg army was the product of many centuries of uninterrupted institutional tradition.
To save his troops from the disaster, Klapka sent the VIIIth (Koburg) and the I. (imperial) and hussar regiments to stop the advancing enemy. 4 companies of Koburg VIIIth (Koburg) hussar regiment along the Tápióbicske road to stop the charging two Otočac battalions, but they too were put to flight by the bayonet charge of the Croatian infantry.
Right to them I. (imperial) hussars came face to face with the Croatian Ban's Hussars, who were also participating in the pursuit of the Hungarian infantry. At the head of the I. Hussar Regiment was Major Alajos Sebő, a very good officer, while at the head of the Croats was Major Hermann Riedesel, a strapping man, one of the best duelists in the imperial army. The two men knew each other. Riedesel challenged Sebő to a duel, and this he accepted, despite fearing that he would certainly be killed, as he said later, to set a courageous example for his regiment, which was known as one of the weakest in the Hungarian army. After they had charged each other twice, neither of them was wounded, but on the third charge, after Riedesel had injured his hand or arm, Sebő