Military action of the Vietnam War (1968)
Operation Coburg (24 January − 1 March 1968) was an Australian and New Zealand military action during the Vietnam War. The operation saw heavy fighting between the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and Viet Cong (VC) forces during the wider fighting around Long Binh and Bien Hoa.
American and South Vietnamese intelligence reports had indicated that an imminent PAVN/VC offensive during the Tết New Year festival was likely, and in response the Australians and New Zealanders were deployed away from their base in Phuoc Tuy Province to bolster American and South Vietnamese forces defending the Long Binh–Bien Hoa complex north-east of Saigon. 1 ATF deliberately established fire support bases astride the PAVN/VC lines of communication in the vicinity of the village of Trang Bom, expecting that they would attempt to destroy them.
The Australians subsequently clashed with the VC during early patrols in Area of operations (AO) Columbus, while later Fire Support Base (FSB) Andersen was repeatedly subjected to major ground assaults. Although the operation was mounted too late to prevent the attacks on Saigon, the Australians and New Zealanders successfully disrupted the PAVN/VC lines of communication, limiting their freedom of manoeuvre to attack the Long Binh–Bien Hoa complex, while they were also able to successfully interdict their withdrawal, causing heavy casualties.
The operation was also significant as it was the first deployment of 1 ATF outside its Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) in Phuoc Tuy, and in this it set a precedent for later operations outside the province. Meanwhile, the remaining Australian forces in Phuoc Tuy Province also successfully repelled repeated VC attacks against Bà Rịa and Long Điền, as part of the Tet Offensive that had engulfed population centres across South Vietnam. ;templatestyles src="Template:TOC limit/styles.css" / ;
Background.
Military situation.
At 18:00 on 29 January 1968, South Vietnamese forces began a 36-hour ceasefire in celebration of the arrival of the Year of the Monkey. Earlier, the PAVN/VC had declared a seven-day ceasefire as part of the Tết festival, that was normally a period of truce and for community gatherings and family reunions in Vietnamese society. However, unbeknown to the South Vietnamese and their allies, the North Vietnamese leadership had decided to use the ceasefire to launch a large offensive in the south in order to break the deadlock that had developed in the conflict—despite the reluctance of Democratic Republic of Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh and Defence Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap.
Primarily the brainchild of General Nguyen Chi Thanh, the upcoming offensive would be timed to provoke a popular general uprising among the South Vietnamese people against the government and its American supporters. Yet prudence required that the South Vietnamese maintain 50 per cent of their forces on standby, while American and allied forces under General William Westmoreland—the Free World Military Forces—remained on full alert. However, despite such measures the fighting at Khe Sanh had largely succeeded in diverting American resources and attention away from Saigon and towards the demilitarized zone, affording the PAVN/VC the element of surprise.
Meanwhile, after a number of VC units mistakenly began the planned offensive against South Vietnam a day early—attacking several towns in I and II Corps on the morning of 30 January—the President of the Republic of Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu, subsequently cancelled the ceasefire. Regardless, the offensive proper began in the early hours of 31 January when 85,000 to 100,000 PAVN/VC troops simultaneously assaulted population centres and allied installations across South Vietnam. US and South Vietnamese intelligence reports of the impending attacks had afforded some forewarning, and although failures had caught some allied units unprepared, they did not come as a complete surprise. Indeed, the growing threat had earlier prompted Lieutenant General Frederick Weyand, commander of III Corps Tactical Zone, to request the use of the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF)—now at full strength with three infantry battalions and support arms—outside of their usual base in Phuoc Tuy Province in order to defend the vital bases in the Long Binh–Bien Hoa complex north-east of Saigon. The request was subsequently approved, although the Australians only agreed on the basis that one of their battalions—3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR)—would remain at Nui Dat to secure it in case of attack.
Opposing forces.
On 24 January 1968, 1 ATF headquarters under the command of Brigadier Ron Hughes inserted by air into their new area of operations, between Bien Hoa and Long Khanh provinces east of Bien Hoa, approximately from Nui Dat. Initially the force would consist of two battalions—2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment with Victor Company Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (RNZIR) and 7 RAR—with armour from A Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment, M2A2 Howitzers from 106th Battery and 108th Battery, 4th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, 161st Royal New Zealand Artillery as well as aviation assets in support; while later elements of 3 RAR including Whisky Company RNZIR, would also be committed. Coincidentally they would be operating in the same area that 1 RAR had fought in as part of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in November 1965. On that occasion 1 RAR had encountered heavy resistance in a series of bunker systems protecting key VC supply lines at Gang Toi. This time 1 ATF would establish itself astride the PAVN/VC lines of communication in the expectation of provoking an aggressive response. Within days the Australians would establish a fire support base in order to deny the PAVN/VC access to suitable sites for launching rocket attacks on the important allied bases and installations in the Long Binh–Bien Hoa complex, including Bien Hoa Air Base and the large Long Binh Logistics Depot.
As part of the plan to protect these bases a combined US-Australian force would establish a screen to interdict movement along the northern approaches to Long Binh–Bien Hoa. 1 ATF was subsequently allocated the north-eastern sector, into a new area of operations named AO Columbus. Only sparsely inhabited, AO Columbus was situated east of Long Binh between Highway 1 to the south, and the Song Dong Nai river to the north. Rectangular in shape, it measured from east to west and from north to south. The west of the AO was mainly covered in jungle, whilst grassland predominated in the east. Meanwhile, Bien Hoa Air Base itself would be defended by the US 199th Light Infantry Brigade, occupying AO Uniontown to the west. Across the Song Dong Nai the US 101st Airborne Division occupied AO Manchester, while the South Vietnamese 18th Infantry Division defended its TAOR to the north-west.
The concept of operations for Operation Coburg called for two infantry companies from 7 RAR to move by road with the rear echelon units in order to secure FSB Andersen, that had been established north of Trang Bom for easy access to Route 1. The remainder of the battalion was deployed by helicopter along with 2 RAR and V Coy, while the 4th Field Regiment, RAA was inserted by road. The Task Force Maintenance Area was subsequently located at Andersen, with 1 ATF re-supplied throughout the operation by elements of 1st Australian Logistic Support Group deployed forward in Long Binh. FSB Harrison was located to the west of Andersen with both bases positioned so that each could support the other in the event of attack. A small number of SASR patrols would be used to provide reconnaissance for the task force.
PAVN/VC forces identified in AO Columbus included a battalion group from the VC 274th Regiment, 5th Division, a battalion of the PAVN 84A Artillery (Rocket) Regiment equipped with rocket launchers and mortars and a small element of the "Dong Nai" Regiment, as well as other Main Force elements of the 273rd Regiment from the VC 9th Division. Local force elements included a number of company and platoon strength units in addition to various district and village guerrilla forces. These forces were believed to be lying in wait to attack the nearby American bases as part of the planned offensive.
Battle.
Patrolling in AO Columbus, 24 January − 16 February 1968.
The Australians began an intensive patrol program in AO Columbus and were soon fighting up to platoon-sized VC units in a series of bunker complexes. Between 25 and 29 January the Australians conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations and a series of minor patrol clashes followed up to the end of January. On 26 January B Company, 2 RAR fought a two-hour action against about 25 VC entrenched in a bunker system. While on the same day 9 Platoon, C Company, 2 RAR also assaulted and occupied a camp initially believed to be of similar strength and held it for 19 hours after repeated attacks from a VC force estimated to be of company strength. Meanwhile, whilst providing flank security the New Zealanders in V Company, engaged in a series of skirmishes which resulted in 12 VC dead and many weapons captured with two New Zealanders wounded. On 27 January there were heavier contacts still, resulting in 14 Australians wounded and one VC killed.
Although 1 ATF was well placed to deny the PAVN/VC the use of its AO, it was increasingly obvious that there was little role for the SAS. Indeed, the heavy presence of VC prevented them from operating normally, and the first attempt to insert a patrol was called off due to the presence of hostile forces in the vicinity of the landing zone; two VC were subsequently killed and the patrol was extracted after only 30 minutes. A second attempt lasted only fifteen minutes longer, and they were also extracted following a brief contact. Finally, two patrols were joined in an effort to provide more protection, and on 29 January they patrolled out from 7 RAR battalion headquarters. After only 30 minutes the Australians encountered a small party of VC; however, they tried again two hours later but were detected. The following day they tried for a third time and were contacted. Unable to operate effectively, the SAS patrols were withdrawn and returned to Nui Dat on 1 February.
Meanwhile, on 29 January D Company, 7 RAR contacted a battalion concentrating in bunkers during a two and half-hour battle that saw nine Australian casualties, including one killed, while seven VC were also killed. On 31 January VC overran the village of Trang Bom, just south-west of FSB Andersen. The Australians reclaimed it that afternoon only for the VC to attack again the next day. Once again the Australians recaptured it, this time in savage house-to-house fighting involving D Company, 2 RAR and A Squadron, 3 CAV. C Company, 3 RAR was subsequently inserted to assist with the protection of FSB Harrison. In response to the attack on Trang Bom, D Company, 7 RAR was dispatched forward to search the area. The lead platoon advanced on a VC camp—later found to be battalion-size—and was almost destroyed in the ensuing firefight. With half the platoon soon becoming casualties, another platoon was moved forward to aid their extraction. Close support from artillery protected the Australians from further casualties however, and the VC were eventually forced to withdraw. Six Australians had been killed and 36 wounded in the engagements up to that point, while one New Zealander had also died and one wounded. More than 40 VC had been killed and nine wounded.
In the early hours of 31 January key installations in the Long Binh–Bien Hoa complex in AO Uniontown had come under heavy attack by the Viet Cong 5th Division, as part of the second prong of the VC attacks against Saigon. With the Tet offensive erupting across South Vietnam, Bien Hoa Air Base received heavy rocket fire that caused extensive damage to buildings, aircraft, and facilities, while the Long Binh Logistics Depot and the prisoner of war camp were also hit. Over the next three days the US 199th Light Infantry Brigade—later reinforced by the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and an infantry battalion from the US 101st Airborne Division—were forced into heavy combat fending off PAVN/VC indirect fire and ground attacks. By 1 February the Americans had gained the upper hand however, winkling out the last remaining PAVN/VC following a sweep of Bien Hoa that cleared the town.
The attacks on Bien Hoa forced a change in tactics for the Australians, and 1 ATF's mission was quickly changed from reconnaissance-in-force to a blocking operation designed to intercept withdrawing PAVN/VC forces.