Diplomatic note.
The ultimatum of July 23, 1914, was a diplomatic note the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Belgrade delivered to the Serbian Minister of Finance, the sole member of the royal government present in the capital that day. The text was drafted with great care by Baron Musulin von Gomirje, a Viennese diplomat. It constituted Austria-Hungary's response to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of Austria and Hungary, on June 28 of the same year in Sarajevo. This delayed response resulted from an agreement between Austria-Hungary and its principal ally, the German Empire, reached as early as July 7.
Following a period of more than two weeks during which intense negotiations were conducted within the leadership of the dual monarchy, those in favor of initiating a conflict with the Kingdom of Serbia—deemed responsible for the assassination—secured the agreement of their colleagues, who had previously been reluctant to proceed. Subsequently, a subordinate diplomat, renowned for his proficiency in drafting, was assigned the task of formulating the ultimatum. The text was meticulously constructed to appear untenable, thereby ensuring its rejection by the Serbian government. Delivered to Serbian authorities on July 23, the Austro-Hungarian note compelled the Serbian royal government to issue a response, ultimately dismissed by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy.
General context.
The Sarajevo assassination.
On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of Austria and Hungary, was assassinated alongside his wife, Sophie Chotek, while attending Austro-Hungarian army maneuvers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The attack, carried out by Gavrilo Princip, a young Serbian activist, occurred during the couple's visit to Sarajevo, the provincial capital of annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Princip's actions were organized by Bosnian Serbs, who had been Austro-Hungarian subjects since 1909. The assassination marked the culmination of a decade of attacks against key Austro-Hungarian officials in the southern Slavic territories of the dual monarchy.
The repercussions of this event extended beyond the moral implications it held across Europe, prompting a comprehensive investigation by the Austro-Hungarian police force. The preliminary findings of this investigation swiftly identified the involvement of Serbs hailing from the Kingdom of Serbia.
Austro-Hungarian suspicions.
Since there was no definitive proof, the Austro-Hungarian authorities were inclined to implicate Serbian officials. The preliminary findings of the investigation, obtained through prompt inquiries, indicated the existence of a complex scheme with extensive connections in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Additionally, the investigation brought to light the involvement of a clandestine Serbian organization, the Black Hand, which was headed by Dragutin Dimitrijević, the chief of Serbian military intelligence. Austro-Hungarian police suspected that the terrorists had benefited from the complicity of Serbian military personnel and border guards during both the preparation of the attack and the subsequent exfiltration of accomplices who remained at large following the police investigation. In Serbia, Austrian diplomats also observed a discrepancy between official expressions of condolence and the public's reaction.
Furthermore, as early as 1914, the political leaders of the Dual Monarchy, influenced by reports from their intelligence services, anticipated a significant crisis in the Balkan Peninsula. Austro-Hungarian intelligence sources indicated that not only had Tsar Nicholas II expressed support for initiating a conflict with the Dual Monarchy, but that the political and diplomatic crisis anticipated earlier in the year was expected to erupt before the year's end. This assessment was corroborated by numerous intelligence agents stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during their investigation following the assassination of the imperial and royal crown prince.
Subsequently, Austria-Hungary had been progressively marginalized from the Balkans by Russia since the Balkan Wars. Bulgaria, which had been an ally of the Dual Monarchy, had suffered a decisive defeat during the Second Balkan War.
Serbia, the "Piedmont of the South Slavs".
Since its declaration of independence in 1878, the Kingdom of Serbia has constituted a primary concern of the foreign policy of the Dual Monarchy.
While the Obrenović dynasty, which ruled until 1903, was dependent on Austria-Hungary for its continued existence, the violent dynastic change in 1903 resulted in the dissolution of this dependency. The Obrenović dynasty had relied on Austria-Hungary for political and economic support, aligning the small kingdom with its northern neighbor. The new monarch, Peter I, with the support of Serbian radicals, initiated a shift in alliances toward France. The victories of Serbia in the First and Second Balkan Wars of 1913 served to heighten nationalist pride in Belgrade and to demonstrate the consequences of Romania, a traditional ally of the Dual Monarchy, repositioning itself against Bulgaria. To counter Serbia, a mid-sized but rapidly growing power that was closely tied to Russia, the Austro-Hungarians and Germans sought to force it back into strict dependency on the Central Powers.
Internal tensions within the Austro-Hungarian Empire also intensified. Beginning in 1905, representatives of South Slavic peoples in the Empire's legislative assemblies formed joint parliamentary groups in Dalmatia and Croatia, thereby securing a majority in the Sabor of Zagreb by 1908.
In the early months of 1914, Serbia was beset by a significant political crisis. Crown Prince Alexander, who had been appointed regent due to his father's weakened state, engaged in a series of disputes with certain military factions, while Prime Minister Nikola Pašić effectively held executive power. The election campaign for the parliamentary elections of August 14, 1914, in which Pašić was deeply involved, served to further exacerbate these internal divisions.
The position of the central powers in 1914.
By 1914, the German Empire was no longer in a position to retain smaller Balkan states like Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece within its alliance. The Balkan Wars had exacted a significant toll on these kingdoms, and their governments were seeking financial support to reinforce their claims to territories that had been annexed. However, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary demonstrated the capacity to provide more than token commitments.
German influence in the Ottoman Empire also faced threats, acknowledged by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his close advisors. By the autumn of 1913, the Ottoman government, despite its pro-German stance, could no longer secure funding from German banks, which were themselves struggling. It turned instead to markets in London and Paris. On May 29, 1914, Karl Helfferich, a representative of Deutsche Bank, sent an alarming memorandum to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, highlighting the Reich's weakening position in the Ottoman Empire. Although short-term financial assistance was arranged in June, German bankers deemed this insufficient to address future demands from their allies.
By the advent of spring in 1914, the Dual Monarchy remained Germany's sole reliable ally, in stark contrast to the Balkan states, which were increasingly estranged from their erstwhile allies. Leopold Berchtold, the foreign minister of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, assigned a trusted aide, Franz Matscheko, the task of preparing a report on the developments in the Balkans since the Balkan Wars. The preliminary report, delivered on June 23, 1914, assessed the consequences of these developments, advised against the proposed alliance with Romania, advocated for a more aggressive stance against Serbia, and proposed focusing diplomatic efforts on Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire to ally against Belgrade.
July 7 – July 23, 1914: Intense preparations.
In the wake of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Austro-Hungarian leaders devised a meticulously orchestrated response in collaboration with the German Reich, aimed at Serbia.
The German "blank check".
Despite differing perspectives among Austrians and Hungarians, the leaders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire concurred on the importance of seeking counsel from Germany.
Austro-Hungarian diplomats were promptly apprised of Kaiser Wilhelm II's stance. On July 2, Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold convened with the German ambassador in Vienna, who counseled prudence and cautioned against hastily ascribing culpability to the Serbian government.
On July 5, Count Hoyos, in possession of a memorandum that was highly critical of Serbia and a handwritten letter from Franz Joseph to Wilhelm II, undertook an official journey to Berlin to secure the support of the German government for the measures that the Austro-Hungarian Empire planned to take against Serbia. On the preceding day, Viennese diplomats had been given an informal briefing on Germany's position. On July 4, Kaiser Wilhelm II conveyed his personal support for his ally in a statement that reiterated positions he had taken the previous autumn. These included his willingness to provide backing to the Dual Monarchy should it take decisive action against Serbia. This support was formally confirmed to the Austro-Hungarian envoy on July 6, 1914.
Wilhelm II had carefully prepared his stance in advance. In the days following the assassination, he held extensive consultations with his ministers and advisors to shape Germany's policy on the Austro-Serbian crisis. Reassured by their ally's backing, Austro-Hungarian leaders began implementing measures in response to the crown prince's assassination. German officials also emphasized the importance of acting swiftly to capitalize on the outrage sparked by the attack.
Ultimately, as part of the Reich's policy realignment, Wilhelm II assured Romania regarding its neutrality in the context of an Austro-Serbian conflict. Bulgaria, the Central Powers' newly-forged ally, had previously threatened intervention on Romania's southern flank, thereby further ensuring that Romania would maintain its neutral stance.
However, as Fritz Fischer has demonstrated in his historical analysis, the Reich did not limit itself to mere declarations of support or a diplomatic balancing act. To limit the Austro-Serbian conflict, German initiatives sought to engage with Serbia's potential allies through diplomatic and political means. In a statement made on July 21 and 22, before the issuance of the ultimatum, Reich Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg expressed his view that the Austro-Hungarian note to Serbia was "fair and moderate." On July 24, a circular from the German Foreign Ministry instructed Reich ambassadors to underscore the bilateral nature of the Austro-Serbian dispute. Moreover, Germany's ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich Leonard von Tschirschky und Bögendorff, exerted considerable influence over the Austro-Hungarian monarchy through his daily interactions and frequent meetings with key policymakers. He advocated for a robust response as a means of restoring the monarchy's waning prestige. It was assumed by officials from both the Reich and Austria-Hungary that a rapid offensive, limited to the capture of Belgrade and its surroundings, would present the Triple Entente with a fait accompli.
The different centers of power in Austria-Hungary (July 7–23).
During the crisis, various institutions within the Dual Monarchy exerted, at times, contradictory pressures on Austro-Hungarian foreign policy. The common Minister of War, Alexander von Krobatin; Foreign Minister Leopold Berchtold; and Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf advocated for prompt military action. However, they encountered resistance from Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza, who was disinclined to portray the monarchy as the aggressor.
Emperor Franz Joseph promptly endorsed a resolute policy towards Serbia. Despite his disinclination towards his nephew, Franz Ferdinand, the Emperor was resolved to safeguard the interests of his dynasty and the integrity of his dominions from any external encroachment. The emperor was supported in this endeavor by several individuals, including Alexander Hoyos, Janos Forgach, Alexander von Musulin, and Franz von Matscheko, as well as the Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf and the Foreign Minister Berchtold. Collectively, these figures exerted considerable influence, enabling the emperor to pursue a confrontational policy towards Serbia. Nevertheless, he sought to demonstrate the involvement of Serbian intelligence in the assassination, to gain Berlin's support before any Austro-Hungarian initiative, and to persuade Tisza to approve military action against the Kingdom of Belgrade.
Tisza was concerned about the potential response of the minority and marginalized Slavic populations in Hungary and was opposed to military action against Serbia. This stance placed him at odds with other decision-makers in the Dual Monarchy. From the outset of the crisis, he encountered resistance from the military, particularly from Conrad, who advocated a swift assault on Belgrade without an ultimatum or declaration of war. Tisza persisted in his opposition to military action against Serbia throughout the Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers on July 7 and the subsequent days, until July 14. In a move to reinforce his stance, Tisza invoked the memorandum he had drafted on June 30, outlining his position on the matter. On July 7, he put forth an alternative diplomatic solution, aiming to bolster alliances with Bulgaria and Romania. This strategy sought to isolate Belgrade and compel Serbian leaders to concede to Austro-Hungarian demands. After protracted deliberations, his consent was ultimately obtained. On July 14, Germany's ambassador in Vienna, Heinrich von Tschirschky, conveyed to Berlin that Tisza had acquiesced to the proposal of conveying a missive to the Serbian government.
On July 19, during a joint council of ministers in Vienna, Tisza's remaining objections were overcome after consulting with his close associate, Stephan Burián von Rajecz. Furthermore, Conrad guaranteed