Military coup in splitting Syria from the UAR
The Syrian coup d'état of 1961 was an uprising by disgruntled Syrian Army officers on 28 September 1961, that resulted in the break-up of the United Arab Republic and the restoration of an independent Syrian Republic.
While the army had all the power, it chose not to rule directly and instead entrusted politicians from the traditional political parties of the earlier Syrian Republic to form the secessionist government. The restored country was a continuation of the Syrian Republic, but due to the influence of Nasserists and Arab nationalists it adopted a new name and became the Syrian Arab Republic. The restored regime was fragile and chaotic as internal army struggles influenced government policy. The traditionalist conservative politicians were increasingly out of touch with the radicalized army, which eventually swept the old order away in the coup of 8 March 1963.
Syrian dissatisfaction with UAR.
After the rushed and overtly enthusiastic decision to unite with Egypt, Syrians realized that they had joined a very centralized, autocratic military dictatorship which increasingly destroyed Syria's traditional politics and economy. In fact, during this period Syria did not exist, it was Northern Region of the UAR.
Political parties were dissolved. Communists were the first to be purged. The Ba’ath Party, despite being the champions of unity and the most natural political allies of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, was also removed from the positions of influence during 1959–1960. Syrian officers felt threatened in their previously secure positions. Hundreds of Syrian officers were either posted in far-away Egypt or sent into retirement. In their place came Egyptian administrators and officers. Syria was ruled by the secret police of Abdel Hamid al-Sarraj.
Economy.
During the first months of 1961 state control over the Syrian economy was greatly increased. The governor of the Central Bank of Syria resigned at the end of January, warning about the dangers of nationalization and planned currency unification (Egypt and Syria still had their own currencies). On 5 February currency control was introduced, all foreign currency deposits were frozen, and the export of currency over 100 Syrian piasters from Syria was prohibited. The official goal was to increase currency reserves and to prevent the flight of capital, in reality just the opposite occurred as capital started to flee the country. On 10 February existing import licenses were revoked and importers had to reapply for new ones. On 4 March all banks had to become joint stock companies owned by UAR Arab citizens. Of the 16 banks operating in Syria at this time, 6 were UAR-Arab owned, 6 were owned by non-UAR Arabs and 7 were owned by non-Arabs.
From 20 February until 8 March 1961, Nasser was on his fifth and final visit in Syria, where he made speeches denouncing liberal economy and promoting a more socialist, state controlled model. He also promised that more factories and industrial infrastructure would be developed in the still largely agricultural country.
In early July government seized grain from storage and announced increased import of cattle in order to meet food and meat shortages that were caused by severe drought that had plagued Syria for three years.
In July 1961 Nasser announced his Second (Social) revolution by promoting a number of laws that nationalized most of the industries, toughened the agrarian reform, introduced employee management participation and profit sharing rights. As usual for Nasser, these laws were not discussed beforehand. Syrian elites were united in the realization that they were about to lose everything. This was coupled with the increasing dissatisfaction among army officers.
Regional government abolished.
On 16 August the Northern Executive council, the regional government of Syria since 1958, was abolished and all executive power was concentrated in Cairo. Syrian executives were transferred to Cairo and given positions of in the unified government. On 30 August the Northern Region was divided in 11 governorates with governors appointed by Nasser and accountable to the Minister of the Interior. Syria had become just another Egyptian province.
Sarraj crisis.
Abdel Hamid al-Sarraj was the last Syrian with real power in Syria. The President of the Northern Executive Council, Secretary General of the local branch of the ruling National Union, Syrian Minister of Interior and the long-time head of the secret police Sarraj had also been a significant supporter of Nasser and his rise to power with the United Arab Republic.
Already in June 1961 Nasser had told Sarraj about his plan to liquidate the local administration. As a way of removing him from the power, on 17 August 1961 Sarraj was made one of UAR's Vice Presidents with responsibility over internal affairs and moved to Cairo. On 13 August Nasser sent his confidant Abdel Hakim Amer (in the role of Inspector General) to take control in Damascus. On 26 August Amer and Sarraj both went to Cairo for a government meeting. On 15 September Sarraj returned to Damascus, and on 16 September he convened a meeting of Northern region's National Union Executive committee meeting.
On 16 September, Amer announced that Sarraj no longer had authority to convene such meetings, to which Sarraj replied that as an elected Secretary General of the regional National Union, he remained in power until the next Secretary General was elected. The National Union at that time was the UAR's ruling party and, at least in theory, had control over the government. To eliminate this conflict, on 18 September Nasser ordered the merger of Egyptian and Syrian National union branches.
A struggle over Sarraj's power base, the secret police, started. During 16–17 September Amer ordered the dismissal or arrest of leading security officers. On 17 September Amer published a decree prohibiting the arrest of any person without a warrant from the Attorney General. This curbed the freedom of the secret services to arrest anyone at will. At the same time, it was decided to unite the Egyptian and Syrian security services, bringing them under Cairo's control.
Amer also tried to rebuild positive contacts with Ba'ath politicians, including Salah ad-Din al-Bitar, who were enemies of Sarraj but supporters of Nasser's socialism, by awarding pensions to the former Ba’ath ministers on 17 September.
The struggle between Amer and Sarraj had caused further consolidation of all power structures in the hands of Cairo. As the week progressed, some underground parties started street demonstrations against increased Egyptian control and the army was brought out to guard key buildings in Damascus.
On 20 September 1961 Sarraj and Amer went to Cairo for a crisis meeting with Nasser. Sarraj was expected to continue in his duties, but on 26 September he submitted his resignation from all posts. Nasser ordered Amer to return to Damascus immediately.
During this tumultuous time amongst the UAR leadership, the coup plotters were able to plan and launch their coup unnoticed.
The coup.
At 4am on 28 September an armoured column under the command of Lt-Colonel Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi, the chief of Amer's bureau in Syria, and Desert Guard units under the command of Lt-Colonel Haydar al-Kuzbari entered Damascus, and met with the troops of the Damascus garrison and air force. Army HQ, the radio station and airport were seized, checkpoints established and tanks patrolled the streets. The Syrian Army's commanding officers and Amer were arrested. Sarraj was placed under house arrest. Just before his arrest at 4am, Amer had time to order Egyptian Major General Anwar al-Qadi to move a field artillery brigade from its base 40 km away from Damascus to the city and to suppress the uprising. While the Egyptian officers, ignoring Syrian complaints, dutifully obeyed the order, en route to Damascus these troops were met by their Syrian commanding officer who ordered them back to the base and arrested all the Egyptian officers.
At 7:25am Damascus radio broadcast communique #1 of the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces (SARCAF) in which they announced that "the army has taken steps to remove corruption and tyranny and to restore the legitimate rights of the people". Communique #2 was more political and listed complaints against "the oppressive, corrupt clique" that had discredited the union between the Arab peoples. Socialist laws that had been introduced in July and plans to purge Syrian officers were also criticized. Communique #3 announced that SARCAF was in full control and asked that all Egyptians be treatred with care. Communique #4 announced the closure of all airports and harbors.
While SARCAF at this time did not announce the break-up of the UAR or secession from it, most Syrians had had enough of Egyptian rule, and despite the never-ending professions towards the goal of Arab unity, they were happy to regain their traditional freedoms.
At 9:07am Nasser took the unusual step of responding to the rebellion via live radio broadcast. He announced that he would not dissolve the UAR (this was to be done by Anwar Sadat in September 1971), that the rebellion in Damascus was small scale and that he had given orders to the Syrian army to suppress it.
Meanwhile, Amer, along with other arrested Syrian army commanders and ministers spent the day negotiating with the rebels. Amer was certain that the UAR could be saved by meeting the rebel demands for greater local autonomy, softening the July laws and through agrarian reform. It is still unclear if Amer was sincere during these negotiations or was simply playing for time and awaiting Egyptian troops. Amer was allowed to get in touch with Nasser via shortwave radio and to get his approval for this agreement. On this conciliatory note, SARCAF communique #9 was broadcast at 1:26pm in which it was announced that SARCAF wanted to preserve Arab unity and that Amer had "made the necessary decisions to safeguard the unity of the armed forces of the United Arab Republic. The army matters had been restored to their normal course." Radio Damascus once again identified itself as the "radio station of the UAR in Damascus".
While for a few hours it seemed that the UAR was saved, both sides were far from agreement. By early afternoon the rebels had received support from nearly all the Syrian army units and felt certain of victory. Nasser refused to negotiate with the rebels or to change his policies in Syria. At 5:20pm, Amer and a group of Egyptian officers and loyalists were put on a plane to Cairo; this was announced in communique #12 at 5:45pm.
At 6:55pm Nasser went on the radio once again. He refused to negotiate and called on the armed forces to do their duty by crushing the rebels. In fact, at around 9:30am that morning, Nasser had ordered some Egyptian troops to Syria in an effort to suppress the rebellion. As Egypt and Syria shared no land border, airborne paratroopers and some seaborne troops were ordered to leave for Latakia and Aleppo, where army bases were still loyal to Nasser. However, a short time before the Egyptian forces reached these bases they were taken over by rebel troops. The fewer than 200 Egyptian paratroopers who landed in Latakia were surrounded by the rebel troops and later returned to Egypt. Nasser called off the whole operation. On 2 November 870 Egyptian officers and soldiers were sent home while 960 Syrians returned home peacefully from Egypt.
Later in the evening of 28 September, rebel radio announcements started attacking Nasser personally, calling him a tyrant. A curfew was imposed on Damascus from 7pm until 5:30am. If during the day it was unclear if rebels want greater freedom for Syria within UAR or restoration of total independence, when Radio Damascus ended its last broadcast for that day after midnight with the Syrian national anthem it was clear that they had chosen independence.
Secessionist government period (29 September 1961 – 8 March 1963).
At 7:30am on 29 September, Radio Damascus announced that SARCAF has entrusted Maamun al-Kuzbari (a relative of one of the coup organizers) to form a new government which consisted of the old National Party and People's Party politicians. It was government of the traditional Syrian elites, but it promised to maintain some of Nasser's progressive and socialist policies. On the same day Jordan and Turkey recognized the new regime.
During that day, Major-General Abd al-Karim Zahreddine, a Druze, who was not involved in the planning of the coup, was appointed the army's commander-in-chief. He was a compromise figure and survived in the post until the 8 March 1963, coup. The restored republic kept the flag and anthem of the old Syrian Republic but changed its