WW II Battle in February of 1944 in Burma
The Battle of the Admin Box (sometimes referred to as the Battle of Ngakyedauk or the Battle of Sinzweya) took place on the southern front of the Burma campaign from 5 to 23 February 1944, in the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II.
Japanese forces attempted a local counter-attack against an Allied offensive with the aim of drawing Allied reserves from the Central Front in Assam, where the Japanese were preparing their own major offensive. After initial setbacks, the Allies recovered to thwart the Japanese attack, pioneering the methods which would lead to further Allied victories over the following year.
The battle takes its name from the "administration area" of the Indian Army's 7th Division, which became a makeshift, rectangular defensive position for Major-General Frank Messervy and his staff after their divisional headquarters was overrun on 7 February.
Background.
During 1941 and early 1942, the Japanese army had driven Allied troops (British, Indian and Chinese) from Burma. During 1943, the Allies had fought the Arakan Campaign 1942–1943 a limited offensive into Arakan, the coastal province of Burma. The aim had been to secure Akyab Island at the end of the Mayu Peninsula. The island possessed an important airfield, from which the Japanese Army Air Force had raided Calcutta and other Indian cities, and which also featured prominently in Allied plans to recapture Burma.
This offensive had failed disastrously. Because the British Indian Army was being massively expanded, most of the Indian (and British) units committed to the attack lacked training and experience. Exhausted units were left in the front line, and their morale declined. Allied tactics and equipment were not suited to the jungle-covered hills, and Japanese units repeatedly achieved surprise by crossing rivers and hills which the Allies had dismissed as impassable. Finally, the Allied command structure was inefficient, with an overworked division headquarters trying to control a large number of sub-units and also a large line-of-communications area. During the following months, the Allies reorganised, engaged in extensive jungle training, and prepared for a renewed effort in 1944. Under the Fourteenth Army, the offensive was to be launched by XV Corps (Lieutenant General Philip Christison).
Second Allied offensive.
The Mayu Peninsula consisted of a coastal plain, indented by several "chaungs" (tidal creeks), and separated from the fertile valley of the Kalapanzin River by the jungle-covered Mayu Range of hills. The 5th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Harold Briggs), which had fought in East Africa and the Western Desert, attacked down the coastal plain. The well-trained 7th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Frank Messervy) attacked down the Kalapanzin Valley. The 81st (West Africa) Division was advancing further east down the Kaladan River valley but would not directly affect the battle. The 36th Infantry Division in Calcutta and 26th Indian Infantry Division at Chittagong, were in reserve.
The advance began cautiously at first, but steadily gained momentum. On 9 January 1944, 5th Indian Infantry Division captured the small port of Maungdaw. While they reduced Japanese positions south of the port (the village of Razabil and a hill known from its shape as the "Tortoise"), the corps prepared to take the next major objective. This was part of the Mayu Range where two disused railway tunnels provided a route through the hills linking Maungdaw to the towns of Buthidaung and Letwedet in the Kalapanzin Valley. To reposition troops and resources for this attack, the engineers of the 7th Indian Division improved a narrow track, known as the Ngakyedauk Pass ("Okeydoke Pass"), across the hills, while a large administration area, later to be known as the Admin Box was established at Sinzweya, near the eastern end of the pass.
Japanese plans.
The Twenty-Eighth Army (Lieutenant General Shōzō Sakurai), defended Arakan and southern Burma. Its 55th Division (Lieutenant General Tadashi Hanaya) occupied Arakan. Most of the division's troops (five battalions) were grouped as "Sakurai Force" in the Mayu area, under its Infantry Group headquarters commanded by Major-General Tokutaro Sakurai, no relation to the Army commander. (A Japanese division had a separate headquarters to administer its infantry units which, as in this case, could take tactical control of any substantial detachment from the division.) The Japanese were confident that they could repeat their success of the previous year in a local counter-attack, and perhaps even advance on Chittagong, the port on which XV Corps relied for supplies. Also, it was intended that by launching their attack (given the name Ha-Go or Operation Z) in the first week of February, they would force the Allies to send reinforcements to Arakan from the Central Front, thus clearing the way for the main Japanese offensive there, planned to begin in the first week of March.
Battle.
Japanese advances.
Beginning on 5 February, "Sakurai Force" infiltrated the front lines of the 7th Indian Division, which was widely dispersed and moved north undetected on the small town of Taung Bazaar. Here they crossed the Kalapanzin River and swung west and south, and on the early morning of the 6 February they attacked the HQ of 7th Division at Luang Cheng a few miles to the south-west of Taung. The HQ was up on a hillock. There was heavy close fighting, but 7th Division's signallers and clerks eventually had to destroy their documents and equipment and split up into small parties and retreat to the Admin Box. (Other radio operators listening on the division's frequency heard a voice say, "Put a pick through that radio", then silence.) The Motor Transport, with 22 radio sets, had already been sent to the Administrative Area which was being turned into a defensive box, and the HQ Defence battalion sent to intercept Japanese to the north
Sakurai's force then followed up towards Sinzweya and the rear of 7th Division. A Japanese battalion (I/213 Regiment, known as "Kubo Force" from its commander), crossed the Mayu Range at a seemingly impossible place, to set ambushes on the coastal road by which the 5th Indian Division was supplied. The Japanese still holding Razabil and the railway tunnels area ("Doi Force") launched a subsidiary attack to link up with Sakurai, and made smaller raids and diversions, while unexpectedly large numbers of Japanese fighter aircraft flew from Akyab to contest the skies over the battlefield. It was evident to all of XV Corps that the situation was serious. However, the Fourteenth Army had spent much time considering counters to the standard Japanese tactics of infiltration and encirclement. The forward divisions of XV Corps were ordered to dig in and hold their positions rather than retreat, while the reserve divisions advanced to their relief.
The next obvious objective for the Japanese was the administrative area at Sinzweya, defended by headquarters and line of communication troops, with 25 Light AA / Anti Tank Regiment, RA. As Messervy was in the jungle, out of contact and possibly dead, Christison, the corps commander, ordered Brigadier Geoffrey Evans, who had recently been appointed commander of 9th Indian Infantry Brigade, part of the 5th Indian Division, to make his way to the Admin area, assume command and hold the position against all attacks. Christison also ordered 5th Division to send 2nd Battalion, the West Yorkshire Regiment (from Evans brigade) over the Ngakyedauk pass and two batteries of 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment IA. The most vital reinforcements of all were two squadrons of M3 Medium tanks of the 25th Dragoons who crossed the pass on the night of the 4/5 February. The defenders were later joined by part of the 4th Battalion of the 8th Gurkha Rifles (from the 89th Indian Infantry Brigade, part of 7th Indian Division) and also the artillery of 8 (Belfast) Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Royal Artillery and 6 Medium Regiment RA.
Defence of the Admin Box.
Under Evans, drawing on his experience of the war in North Africa, the area was converted into a defended area. He established a quick perimeter turning it into a "box" similar to those of the Western Desert fighting Two squadrons, B and C, of the 25th Dragoons were ordered back from a position to the north-east between 7th Division and the Admin Area; A squadron was with 5th Division on the other side of the Mayu range. 9th Brigade HQ ("Sally" Solomons and his staff) arrived and set up.
The site was about square. The majority of the ground was dry paddy fields separated by clay earth bund walls. Ammunition dumps were piled up at the foot of the western face of a scrub-covered central hillock, high and 200 yards long north-south, named "Ammunition Hill" with rations and other stores on the eastern side. To the south of the Ngakyedauk Chaung (which crossed east to west across the site) was the larger "Artillery Hill". Further supply dumps were across the site and there was a mule park and Motor Transport park with workshops. The Main Dressing Station, a field hospital in tents, was on a low hillock on the edge of the jungle between a southwards heading chaung and the pass. When Messervy reached the Admin Box, followed by several of his HQ personnel who had made their way in small parties through Japanese forces, he left the defence of the Box to Evans while he concentrated on re-establishing control over and directing the rest of the division.
From 11 February RAF and USAAF Douglas Dakota transport aircraft parachute-dropped rations and ammunition to the troops, including the defenders of the Admin Box. They flew a 714 sorties, dropping of supplies. The Japanese had not foreseen this development. While they ran short of supplies, the Indian formations could fight on. The Japanese tried to supply "Sakurai Force" with a convoy of pack mules and Arakanese porters, following the route of Sakurai's original infiltration but this was ambushed and the supplies were captured.
The first air-drop missions met opposition from Japanese fighters and some transport aircraft were forced to turn back but three squadrons of Supermarine Spitfires, operating from new airfields around Chittagong, gained air superiority over the battlefield. Sixty-five Japanese aircraft were claimed shot down or damaged for the loss of three Spitfires (though the Japanese fighters also shot down several Hawker Hurricane fighter-bombers and other aircraft.) Whatever the true figures, the Japanese fighters were quickly driven from the area.
On the ground, the fighting for the Admin Box was severe and for the most part hand to hand. On the night of 7 February, some Japanese troops captured the divisional Main Dressing Station. In what was undoubtedly a war crime, thirty-five medical staff and patients were murdered. This may have increased the resolve of the defenders who were now aware what fate would befall them if they surrendered. The following morning, a company of the West Yorks with tank support attacks the MDS
On 8 February, a company (about 110 men) of Japanese infantry was wiped out trying to infiltrate the box along a nullah (afterwards named "Blood Nullah"). Maps and other documents were recovered from a Japanese officer; they turned out to be a full set of operations orders for "Ha-Go" with troop timetables and sites marked where Japanese would form up before beginning an attack.
On Wednesday 9th, Spitfires (the new Mark VIII flown by No. 81 Squadron from Imphal) and Hurricanes (No. 28 Squadron) engaged Japanese aircraft. Over 100 men of the 7/2nd Punjabi Infantry (of the 89th Brigade) reached the box that day and were sent south to 33rd Brigade.
Japanese fire caused heavy casualties in the crowded defences and twice set ammunition dumps on fire. All attempts to overrun the defenders were thwarted by the tanks, to which the Japanese had no counter once their few mountain guns were out of ammunition. The Japanese tried an all-out attack on the night of 14 February and captured a hill on the perimeter. The 2nd West Yorkshire with support from the tanks recaptured it the next day, although they suffered many casualties.
Japanese retreat.
By 22 February, the Japanese had been starving for several days. Colonel Tanahashi, commanding the Japanese 112th Infantry Regiment, which provided the main body of Sakurai's force, stated that his regiment was reduced to 400 men out of an original strength of 2,150 and refused to make further attacks. On 24 February (19 February by other sources), he broke radio communications and retreated without authorisation. On 26 February, Sakurai was forced to break off the operation. The 26th Indian Division had relieved 5th Division, which sent a