Part of the Vietnam War (1968)
The Battle of South Saigon (also known as the Battle of the Y Bridge) took place from 7–12 May 1968 during the Vietcong (VC) May Offensive of the Vietnam War. Four VC battalions attempted to advance over a series of bridges into south Saigon, but were blocked by US Army units and eventually forced to retreat with heavy losses.
Background.
When the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 33rd and 38th Ranger Battalions left south Saigon on the morning of 6 May to block the VC thrust toward Chợ Lớn in west Saigon, II Field Force, Vietnam commander General John H. Hay arranged for US troops to fill the gap until ARVN units could be found to do the job. What was intended as a temporary expedient turned into one of the most vicious and sustained battles the Americans would experience in the Saigon area at any point in the war.
Under orders from Hay, the 9th Infantry Division sent Company C, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, up Highway 4 and then east along Route 232, a two-lane road that ran along the southern edge of the city. The road passed through the Eighth District, a Catholic working-class slum that in recent years had sprouted along the southern edge of the Doi Canal. The mechanized unit, commanded by Captain Edmund Scarborough, parked its M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) at two of the three bridges that spanned the Doi Canal. Scarborough set up his headquarters near the Tung Tien Vuong Bridge (), situated approximately three kilometers due south of the Phú Thọ racetrack. It was also known as the 5A Bridge because Route 5A entered the city at that point. Four kilometers to the east was the Y Bridge (), so named because it resembled that letter when viewed from above. Scarborough sent his 1st Platoon to guard that span. Another four kilometers beyond that lay the Tan Thuan Bridge (), but for the moment that remained under the protection of South Vietnamese Marines.
Unknown to the US forces, four VC battalions under the control of Sub-Region 3 were headed their way. The goal of the 506th and 508th Battalions, the Phu Loi I Battalion and the 5th Nha Be Battalion was to seize the three bridges in the Eighth District and enter the city to attack the National Police headquarters and other targets. The Phu Loi I Battalion aimed to take the 5A Bridge, while the 506th Battalion headed for the Y Bridge. The 5th Nha Be Battalion, only 110 men strong, advanced on their right flank toward the Tan Thuan Bridge. Coming up behind the 506th Battalion was the 508th Battalion, a below-strength outfit with just 173 men, which had orders to preserve a line of communications into the countryside. Using the many streams and canals that crisscrossed southern Gia Định Province, the four battalions travelled by foot and sampan right up to the edge of the city without being detected.
Battle.
The VC began their assault at 03:45 on 7 May. Soldiers from the 506th Battalion opened fire on the APCs that were standing guard on the Y Bridge. A company from the Phu Loi I Battalion, having already crossed the canal on sampans without being detected, also opened fire from the north bank. The 1st Platoon fired back with their own weapons as AK-47 bullets chipped away the bridgework and pinged off their vehicles. The troops hoped that the intimidating firepower of their .50-caliber and M60 machine guns would keep the VC at a safe distance. Several Rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) whooshed out of the darkness, but the rounds slammed into the bridge instead of the vehicles.
At 05:30, the 506th Battalion shifted its focus from the 1st Platoon to a police station located just south of the Y Bridge. The outgunned policemen were on the verge of abandoning the building when several helicopter gunships appeared overhead and their guns forced the VC to seek cover. Scarborough immediately sent his 2nd Platoon racing from the 5A Bridge to the police station. An estimated company of VC was getting ready to attack the station from a nearby rice paddy when the four APCs rolled into the compound. Their machine guns forced the VC to stay put behind a series of dikes. The fight remained hotly contested until an AH-1 Cobra gunship strafed the length of the dike, putting the VC to flight.
While soldiers from the 506th Battalion continued to snipe at the 1st and 2nd Platoons, the main VC threat shifted to the hamlet of Cầu Mật (), which sat on the canal road a few hundred meters to the west. Now occupied by the Phu Loi I Battalion, the hamlet became Scarborough’s most pressing problem. As long as the VC controlled Cầu Mật, Company C would be effectively cut in two. He radioed the commander of the 5/60th Infantry, Lieutenant colonel Eric F. Antila, for instructions. Antila told him to keep his men where they were until more help arrived. Two platoons from Company A were already on their way from Bến Lức District in northeastern Long An Province. Antila also told Scarborough that helicopter gunships from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, would arrive shortly. Nine APCs and 58 soldiers from Company A, 5/60th Infantry, arrived in the Eighth District a few hours later.
After ARVN troops established a blocking position on the east side of Cầu Mật, the US soldiers began working their way among the ramshackle buildings and narrow streets on the western side of Cầu Mật. Many already knew something about urban combat; Company A had fought in the Tet Offensive battle of Cholon and Phu Tho Racetrack. The advance was slow and methodical. In the confusing warren of houses and alleyways, there was always a risk that the VC could sneak through the cordon and double back for a surprise rear attack. The Americans also had to be discriminating in their use of fire because the hamlet was still full of civilians. Air and artillery strikes were ruled out for the same reason. As a result, most of the fighting took place at close range with small arms, grenades, and machine guns. By evening, Company A had killed several dozen VC while losing two killed and 47 wounded. Much of Cầu Mật still remained in VC hands.
As the battle for Cầu Mật heated up, Hay directed Major general George C. O'Connor to commit more men from his 9th Infantry Division. On the afternoon of 7 May, a composite company of the 3rd Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment and part of the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment, landed onto a dry rice paddy some 1.5 km south of Cầu Mật. Antila assumed operational control over those units. Antila now had the equivalent of six companies at his disposal, but many more would be needed to clear the Eighth District.
On the morning of 8 May, the infantry company from the 3/39th Infantry, began to sweep Cầu Mật from south to north. The scout platoon from the 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment, joined the action a short time later, adding some extra punch with its APCs and .50-caliber machine guns. The sweep was a harrowing affair. VC spider holes and makeshift bunkers seemed to be everywhere and many houses contained snipers. From those darkened interiors they were often invisible to the US soldiers moving around on the streets outside. Progress was frustratingly slow.
The VC’s tenacity convinced South Vietnamese authorities to permit limited air and artillery strikes. The commander of the 3/39th Infantry, Lt. Col. Anthony P. DeLuca, directed those strikes from his circling command helicopter. South Vietnamese officials did their best to move the residents of Cầu Mật out of harm’s way. In some cases, frightened civilians ran straight through ongoing firefights in a desperate attempt to reach safety.
Early on 9 May, the 506th Battalion resumed its attack on the Y Bridge. At around 02:30, the VC began mortaring a pagoda where DeLuca had set up his command post. Things quieted down after thirty minutes, but an RPG broke the calm at 04:00 when it slammed into the pagoda. That signalled the start of another mortar barrage against DeLuca’s command post. As shells exploded outside, the colonel began to get reports of VC activity up and down the length of the Eighth District. No major assault developed, but the shooting continued at a steady pace even after the sun rose. In hindsight, the sudden burst of activity was probably designed to draw attention away from the western suburbs where the Cuu Long II Regiment and the 9th Division were trying to withdraw from the Battle of West Saigon.
At daybreak, Antila sent his 5/60th Infantry, on another sweep through Cầu Mật to clear out the Phu Loi I Battalion. He also dispatched Company B, 6/31st Infantry to assist DeLuca who was strongly engaged with the 506th Battalion around the Y Bridge. As the fighting spread north of the canal, thousands of residents streamed south across the Y Bridge. ARVN troops tried to maintain order but some people were pushed into the coils of barbed wire that lined the bridge. Others were trampled by panicked neighbors. At least 100 civilians either died or became injured while crossing the bridge. Other residents died in the fighting as they ran through the city streets. In the end, most of the terrified civilians made it across the bridge. As their numbers dwindled, the allies began to scour the neighborhood with a more liberal application of firepower.
The fighting on 9 May spread well beyond Cầu Mật and the Y Bridge area. When Company B, 6/31st Infantry, arrived at DeLuca’s command post early in the afternoon, he ordered them to assist a police facility that had come under attack. The station was located some 800 meters to the southeast (), situated next to the Ong Lon Canal that fed north into the Doi Canal. The VC who had attacked the station was likely the 508th Battalion, which was trying to keep the tributary open for use as a supply and escape route. When Company B’s APCs rolled up to the embattled station, the VC initially stood their ground, but melted back into the surrounding countryside an hour later when Company A, 3/39th Infantry, joined the fight.
Around that same time, another fight was developing in the nearby hamlet of Xom Ong Doi (), two kilometers east of the Y Bridge and the same distance west of the Tan Thuan Bridge. A company from the South Vietnamese 1st Marine Battalion was locked in battle with the 5th Nha Be Battalion, which had been trying to reach the bridge for the past several days. The Marines had enough men to protect the bridge, but not enough to clear Xom Ong Doi, so the 9th Infantry Division extended its zone of responsibility to cover the eastern part of the Eighth District. It gave the mission of securing Xom Ong Doi to the 6/31st Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Joseph H. Schmalhorst, which was currently patrolling the region south of the 5A Bridge. It would be joined by the 2/47th Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. John B. Tower, a mechanized unit stationed at the 3rd Brigade’s Bearcat Base.
Company A and the greater part of Company C, 6th/31st Infantry, landed just east of Xom Ong Doi shortly after noon. The pilots flew fast and low to evade the heavy ground fire that greeted the incoming helicopters. Once the infantrymen got their feet on the ground, they fanned out toward the southern side of the hamlet. Vietnamese marines set up a blocking position to the west. The advancing Americans came under small arms fire but it was not particularly heavy; the 100 or so living members of the 5th Nha Be Battalion were likely stretched thin across the hamlet. The men from the 6/31st Infantry, killed several snipers on the southern edge of Xom Ong Doi and then entered the hamlet at 15:00. About that same time, the 2/47th Infantry, minus Company A, completed its journey from Bearcat to the Eighth District. The mechanized unit sped through downtown Saigon and then crossed over the Tan Thuan Bridge before pulling up along the north side of Xom Ong Doi. The arrival of Tower’s men meant that the 5th Nha Be Battalion was