Operation Sunrise was the name given to a police and military action conducted by the authorities in the Central African protectorate of Nyasaland (now known as Malawi) which started on 3 March 1959, initially to detain and intern 350 individuals who were considered a potential threat to law and order in anticipation of the declaration of a State of Emergency. Although it is sometimes considered to involve only the incidents of 3 March, the Devlin Commission report is clear that it was one of two distinct operations by the security forces, reinforced from outside Nyasaland, involving the arrest and detention members of the Nyasaland African Congress. It involved not only those members of Congress initially arrested, but others arrested and detained without trial in the course of the emergency. The operation was described in some detail in the Devlin Commission report (Colonial Office Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, HMSO, London, 1959) and that account has been amplified by Colonial Office documents not made available to the Devlin Commission.
Background.
There had been some sporadic unrest in Nyasaland in the early 1950s, most recently in 1953 when unrest among African tenants of the British Central Africa Company led to the "Cholo riots", and after Nyasaland was forced into the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Northern and Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively) against the wishes of the Nyasaland people, by a campaign of non-violent resistance initiated by the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC). The Cholo riots were more serious: attempts by the British Central Africa Company to increase the rents of tenants, and evict those who resisted this, led to many local people in the Cholo (now Thyolo) District refusing to pay taxes or attend courts, and to riots breaking in August 1953, resulting in eleven dead and seventy-two injured.
However the NAC campaign against Federation was abandoned in early 1954 and the party lost much of its support and, following the Cholo riots, the Nyasaland government agreed to purchase land in Cholo District from the company for resettlement. The protectorate was relatively quiet until, in early 1957, the Nyasaland African Congress revived under a number of young activists, including Henry Chipembere, Kanyama Chiume and the brothers Dunduzu Chisiza and Yatuta Chisiza, who organised Congress as a mass political party and created support for Hastings Banda, a long-term expatriate who had campaigned against Federation, to return to Nyasaland as party leader. The activities of these young activists as they toured the protectorate led to unrest including demonstrations and the intimidation of opponents.
On 6 July 1958, Hastings Banda returned to Nyasaland at the invitation of the activists to lead a movement against Federation and towards independence. Banda, together with some of these lieutenants, toured the country rousing support and the disturbances continued. At the end of 1958, Banda and other NAC leaders attended an All-African People's Conference in Accra, in recently-independent Ghana, and they returned to Nyasaland determined to press for constitutional change. When the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was set up in 1953, provision had been made for the Federal constitution to be reviewed in 1960, including a review of which territories it would include, and Banda wanted to ensure African, and hopefully Congress, majorities on the Nyasaland bodies that would take part in this review. However, when Banda presented the Congress proposals to the governor, Sir Robert Armitage that would have led to withdrawal from the Federation, Armitage refused to accept them, although Banda continued discussions with the governor and leading officials on proposed constitutional changes.
When talks ended in stalemate at the start of January 1959, Chipembere and Chiume led calls to intensify the protest campaign. Their programme proposed disobedience to colonial laws and demonstrations which would lead to arrests, to be followed by protests in favour of those arrested and further arrests of protesters, and the intimidation of, and sometimes assaults on, police and government workers trying to enforce the laws, in an escalatory cycle designed to cause chaos. The disturbances particularly affected four heavily populated districts in the south of the protectorate, including the two largest towns and, by mid-February, Armitage considered that the situation was serious enough to prepare for a State of Emergency throughout Nyasaland.
The authorities' concerns were bolstered by reports from several police informers, only one of which was actually present at the clandestine Congress meeting on the night of 24–25 January to discuss the possible action to be taken if Banda were arrested. It seems probable that this discussion including loose talk about attacking Europeans, and that this was the basis for the claim made by the Head of Special Branch of a plan for the indiscriminate killing of Europeans, Asians and Africans opposed to Congress, the so-called "murder plot". The Nyasaland government took no immediate action against Banda, and continued to negotiate with him, and the governor also made no specific reference to the "murder plot" until after his declaration of a State of Emergency. The Devlin Commission strongly criticised talk of the "murder plot", which it said did not exist, and the use made of this claim trying to justify the Emergency.
Armitage's preparations for a State of Emergency were made in February 1959, and included requests for police reinforcements from other British dependencies. He consulted the Federal Prime Minister Roy Welensky and the Southern Rhodesia Premier and, with the approval of the Colonial Office, over 1,000 troops were sent to Nyasaland from Southern Rhodesia, including European troops of the Royal Rhodesia Regiment and African troops of the Rhodesia African Rifles. In the days immediately following, the arrival of Rhodesian troops police or troops opened fire on rioters in several places, leading to four deaths.
The plans for Operation Sunrise, the first stage in the overall two-stage stabilisation operation, were prepared by the Nyasaland Operations Committee on 27 February 1959. Special Branch had been keeping lists of potential detainees since at least 1954, and the latest revision, made in November 1958, contained 617 names.
A State of Emergency was declared at midnight on 2–3 March 1959. In a broadcast at 7am on 3 March the governor, Sir Robert Armitage, explained his decision as follows:
 ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;" I have taken this step because of the action of the leaders of the Nyasaland African Congress. It has day by day become increasingly apparent that they are bent on pursuing a course of violence, intimidation and disregard of lawful authority . . . . Under emergency powers the principal organisers of the campaign of violence and unlawful demonstrations are being arrested and will be detained "
The Operation.
Operation Sunrise was the first step taken after the declaration of the Emergency and was so named because its mission was to detain, at or just before dawn, 350 people who had been identified by police special branch as "hard core" or militant members of the native population. A quota of police and military personnel was designated for each province and district in the protectorate. Each of the 350 individual pick-up operations was to be made by a separate team consisting of about six men (which was taken by the Devlin Commission to mean that they were prepared for violence). The teams were also directed, of circumstances permitted, to search the detainee's house for documents.
Because of the potential for violence after the arrests, the authorities decided that most of the detainees should be imprisoned outside of Nyasaland. Accordingly, many detainees were taken immediately to temporary prisons erected at Chileka Airport in the south and Lilongwe Airport in the Central Province, in preparation for airlifting to Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia where they were to be interned in Khami Prison. In the Northern Province, there were ultimately 75 detainees, who were taken from Nkhata Bay on Lake Nyasa in the motor vessel m.v. Mpasa to Chipoka (although, because of unanticipated events, the vessel didn't arrive there until 6 March), whence they went by rail to Salima and by road to Lilongwe Airport (with the exception of 12 who were sent on by rail to Limbe).
The procedure for the detention of Banda was more elaborate. The force consisted of six groups: A Police Mobile Force (PMF) platoon, a supporting platoon from the King's African Rifles, a diversion group under a police inspector, a "snatch party" of six men also under a police inspector, an escort group of three special constables (civilian volunteers), and a search group of two Special Branch (internal security) personnel. Banda's house was situated off the road between Limbe and Blantyre. At 4:35am, led by the diversion party, the Land Rovers coasted down hill towards the house with their lights extinguished. The diversion group arrived via the back roadway and rushed the servants' quarters at the back of the house in order to divert attention away from the main house. Having arrested the occupants they tear-gassed the interior to make sure there was nobody still hiding within.
The PMF assault group, meanwhile, stormed the main house. There were about 60 men sleeping in the surrounding yard – it had been anticipated for some time that Banda might be arrested – who immediately fled, leaving behind an armory of two bows and arrows, four catapults (slingshots, in American parlance), one spear, twelve batons and knobkerries, three axes and some iron bars. Although the Banda supporters had apparently planned to beat a drum to alert the general populace – who would relay the news with more drums – in the event of his arrest, the drum was never beaten.
The assault group tried to force the front door with an axe, to no effect. As it happened, the door was not locked. Banda's bodyguard, Yatuta Chisiza, who had been lying on a sofa in the front room, led the group to Banda's bedroom. Banda, in his pyjamas, was allowed to put on a dressing gown (housecoat) and taken to a waiting Land Rover. He was also permitted to take a suit of clothes (but not, by some oversight, underwear). He was driven immediately to Chileka Airport, barely avoiding a potentially fatal collision with an oncoming Saracen armored vehicle on the narrow road, and shortly afterwards flown to Gwelo (now Gweru) in Southern Rhodesia with one of his lieutenants, Henry Chipembere who had been detained by chance on the Chileka Airport road.
The numbers detained in Operation Sunrise on the 3 March 1959 were 22 dissidents by 6am, 60 dissidents by 10am, 90 dissidents by 1:30pm, and 120 dissidents by 5pm. By 9pm on the following day, 4 March, 130 dissidents had been arrested and 44 dissidents more detained on "28-day orders" (limited-duration detention/review). By 5 March, 263 dissidents had been arrested, some having given themselves up voluntarily, with a further 87 dissidents on the list remaining at large. Some of the detainees were released immediately. All but a few high-level remaining were first detained at Khami. Banda, Chipembere, F.W.K. (Kaphombe) Nyasulu, and Dunduzu Chisiza were interned at Gwelo (later to be joined by Dunduzu's brother, Yatuta, who was initially sent to Khami).
Further arrests took place during the course of the emergency, and by 18 July there were 381 dissidents held in Nyasaland, and 125 dissidents in Southern Rhodesia, as well as 18 persons held under 28-day orders: by then, 1,163 detention orders in total had been made. By 1 November 1959 the number had risen to 1,328. Many of the detainees were soon released; by 1 November 1959, 830 dissidents had been released.
Although most of the arrests were carried out without lethal force or excessive violence, five injuries in cases where resistance was allegedly offered. More significantly, in two incidents involving demonstrations by crowds against the arrests, at least 21 people were killed and 29 injured.
Of those killed, 20 were demonstrators at Nkhata Bay, where those detained in the Northern Region were being held before being transferred by steamer to the south. A local Congress leader who had not been arrested encouraged a large crowd to gather at the dockside, apparently to secure the release of the detainees. Only a few troops had arrived by ship, as those who should have arrived by road early on 3 March were delayed. Before these arrived, the district commissioner felt the situation was beyond the control of the few soldiers available, and he ordered then to open fire when the crowd refused to disperse after