Milestone in the history of East Timor
East Timor formally occurred on 20 May 2002. The country was occupied by Indonesia for 24 years from 1976 to 1999, a period during which many observers consider a genocide to have taken place. It was estimated by one report that the Indonesian occupation of East Timor was responsible for 180,000 deaths in the 24-year period. The human rights violations of the Indonesian government resulted in a home-grown resistance movement pushing for independence. Several pro-independence organisations such as the centre-left Fretilin (and its armed wing Falintil) and the centre-right Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) joined forces in 1986 in the National Council of Maubere/Timorese Resistance, a coalition which grew over time and by 1998 included all East Timorese political parties. The 1991 Dili Massacre, which was recorded on video and was widely reported to have killed between 180 and 200 people, was a turning point for the independence cause. Publicity about the atrocity stimulated the emergence of an East Timor solidarity movement in Portugal, the Philippines, Australia, and other Western countries. United States support for Indonesia ended and the U.S. military pulled out of Indonesia. Following civil unrest and protests, long-time president Suharto (presidency 1967–1998) fell from power in May 1998 and was replaced by B. J. Habibie.
Although Habibie was opposed to outright independence, he allowed an East Timorese referendum on special autonomy or independence on 30 August 1999. In the lead-up to and aftermath of the referendum, in which 78.5% of voters chose independence rather than special autonomy, the 1999 East Timorese crisis occurred, with lethal violence between pro-Indonesia militias and pro-independence forces. UN peacemaking troops of the INTERFET intervened on 20 September 1999 to address the humanitarian and security crisis. The Indonesian government formally recognised the result of the referendum on 19 October 1999, after which UN peacekeeping troops of the UNTAET oversaw the transition period to independence until 2002, during which some deadly clashes continued to occur.
Australian shift in policy and letter from John Howard.
Around this time Australian support for Indonesia over East Timor had been changing. Under the past Fraser and Hawke governments, there had been support for Indonesia over its rule of East Timor. Even after the Dili Massacre, when the US military pulled out in protest, Paul Keating's Government had increased military support, Keating himself was close to Suharto, and had financial dealings with Indonesian business. At this time, there was an increase in East Timor itself of more overt feelings towards independence. The Australian Government's policy was also shifting, and while in the past it was one of the few countries that recognised Indonesia's control over East Timor, the Government's view at this time changed towards the possibility of some sort of autonomy. This shift in policy was initially revealed by journalists, and then formally acknowledged by the Australian Foreign minister, Alexander Downer, on 12 January 1999. Australian Prime Minister John Howard, proposed by letter to the president of Indonesia that there should be a referendum for the people of East Timor, to do with their autonomy. While the letter advocated that the referendum take place over the next 10 or 20 years, Indonesian President B. J. Habibie, however, prompted by the letter, decided to have a referendum on independence immediately.
Though it was noted there had been a fair amount of diplomacy between the two leaders, who generally had good relations, It was said that Habibie was not happy with the letter, which prompted him to act. Also, from the Indonesian point of view, there was a reluctance to continue to support and invest money into East Timor, for an extended period of time, if in fact Timor would simply leave Indonesia at some point in the future.
This was unexpected by the Australian government, who expected the letter to be rejected, and even if it was considered, expected a move to autonomy to be planned and to take place years if not decades in the future. However, the fact that it signalled a change in policy by the Australian government, obviously indicated a change in support for Indonesia over its governance of Timor.
Declaration of Referendum.
On 27 January, at the urging of Habibie, the Indonesian cabinet agreed that the issue of East Timor's future should be put to a consultative process in the province. Habibie had gone ahead without the approval of the military, who were largely against the vote. While they didn't stop it, the military frustrated the process, including supporting pro integration militia. They also delayed acceptance of peacekeepers.
Vote.
Widespread slayings by the Indonesian military and associated militias followed the vote's announcement. It was estimated that around 1500 East Timorese were killed and more than 250,000 forcibly displaced into Indonesian territory. A huge amount of infrastructure was destroyed, estimated to be around 80%. Those that survived struggled to feed and look after themselves and their families.
The United Nations organised a mission to conduct the vote. This body, UNAMET, was unarmed, and was specifically designed to set up voting centres and register voters. However, there was wide-ranging violence designed to impair the vote. Despite this, UNAMET managed to register 451,792 voters out of a population of around 800,000 in East Timor and abroad.
When the 1999 East Timorese independence referendum was held on 30 August 1999, some 98% of registered voters went to the polls. The result was markedly for a break with Indonesia, 78.5% of East Timorese chose independence from Indonesia. Immediately following this, the Indonesian military being resistant to the deployment of peacekeepers, some politicians involved on both sides, including Downer and Habibie, expected that there could have been a war between Indonesia and those countries supplying the peacekeeping forces.
Following the vote, there was a period where the Indonesian military resisted peacekeepers. However, continued diplomatic requests by John Howard, as well as covert U.S. pressure on the Indonesian military, saw Indonesia back down. On 12 September, Habibie said that Indonesia would accept peacekeepers.
East Timor devolved into violence following the 4 September 1999 ballot result, with the people overwhelmingly voting for independence. The Indonesian army declared martial law on 6 September, but also aided the militias who were causing the violence and destruction.
Peacekeeping force.
Australian Government representatives, in particular the Prime Minister and John Howard, used diplomacy to get support for peacekeepers and the peaceful governance of East Timor while it transitioned. The US military also made overtures to the Indonesian military that they needed to accept peacekeepers, and that the violence was unacceptable. In particular, pro Indonesia militia caused destruction, and much infrastructure, including school and university buildings, were destroyed. This took place during the APEC summit held in Auckland, where a lot of diplomatic action amongst the attendees saw more support for protecting the East Timorese from violence.
The Australian-led peacekeeping force, INTERFET arrived on 20 September 1999, though many people had been killed and much destruction had been done.
The lead-up to the operation remained politically and militarily tense. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) re-deployed frontline combat aircraft—F/A-18s and F-111s—northward to Tindal in the Northern Territory to act as a deterrent against escalation of the conflict by the Indonesian military. On at least one occasion, Australian P-3C aircraft were intercepted by Indonesian aircraft, while an Indonesian submarine was also detected by Coalition surveillance within the vicinity of Dili Harbour as INTERFET forces approached. Ultimately no serious incidents occurred and the intervention was successful; however, Australia–Indonesia relations would take several years to recover.
Of the 22 nations involved in INTERFET, 10 provided naval vessels. Australia provided 14 ships with INTERFET between 19 September 1999 and 23 February 2000: the frigates "Adelaide", "Anzac", "Darwin", "Sydney", "Newcastle", and "Melbourne"; the landing ship "Tobruk", the landing craft "Balikpapan", "Brunei", "Labuan", "Tarakan", and "Betano"; the fast transport "Jervis Bay"; and the replenishment vessel "Success". The United States contributed seven ships: the cruiser "Mobile Bay"; the amphibious assault ships "Belleau Wood", "Peleliu", and "Juneau"; and the replenishment ships "Kilauea", "San Jose", and "Tippecanoe". France supplied four vessels: the frigates "Vendémiaire" and "Prairial" plus the landing ships "Siroco" and "Jacques Cartier". Singapore contributed the amphibious landing ships "Excellence", "Intrepid", and "Perseverance". New Zealand deployed the frigates "Te Kaha" and "Canterbury" and the replenishment ship "Endeavour". Other naval vessels deployed during the operation included the Canadian replenishment ship "Protecteur", the Italian amphibious assault ship "San Giusto", the Portuguese frigate "Vasco da Gama", the Thai landing ship "Surin", and the British destroyer "Glasgow".
The International Forces East Timor (INTERFET) coalition began deploying to East Timor on 20 September 1999, as a non-UN force operating in accordance with UN Resolutions. Australia led the operation and contributed 5,500 personnel and the force commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove. It was tasked with restoring peace and security, protecting and supporting UNAMET, and facilitating humanitarian assistance. The Australian Deployable Joint Force Headquarters provided overall command and control. The main Australian combat element included infantry and cavalry provided by the 3rd Brigade. Due to the nature of the operation the force deployed without its artillery and other heavy weapons and equipment; however, 105 mm and 155 mm guns and Leopard tanks were available and on standby in Darwin for rapid deployment if required. It was supported by the 3rd Combat Engineer Regiment, 103rd Signals Squadron, 110th Signals Squadron, and elements of the 3rd Brigade Administrative Support Battalion. Twelve Black Hawk helicopters from the 5th Aviation Regiment were also deployed. Other force level troops included military police, an intelligence company, an electronic warfare squadron, elements of an artillery locating battery, and topographic survey personnel.
Special forces played a key role, with an Australian squadron from the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), a troop from the New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS) and a troop from the British Special Boat Service (SBS) forming Response Force (RESPFOR). An advance party of Gurkhas from the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles (2 RGR) and British Royal Marines Commandos from the Fleet Standby Rifle Troop (FSRT) secured the foothills and areas to the south of the city. 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) began landing the next day at the port, along with the 2nd Cavalry Regiment equipped with ASLAV light armoured vehicles and the remainder of the Company Group from 2 RGR arrived. No. 2 Airfield Defence Squadron (2AFDS) arrived the following day to permanently secure Komoro airport replacing 2 RAR. Additional Australian forces and support personnel arrived in the days that followed as INTERFET continued to grow, as did forces from a number of other countries, in particular from New Zealand.
Most United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) personnel had already been evacuated from the region in the preceding months by the Royal Australian Air Force, although a small number had remained behind. With the withdrawal of the Indonesian forces and officials, UNAMET re-established its headquarters in Dili on 28 September and on 19 October 1999, Indonesia formally recognised the result of the independence referendum. Soon after, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established as a peacekeeping operation which was also fully responsible for the administration of East Timor to oversee its transition to independence. With only limited forces available, Cosgrove adopted the 'oil spot' concept of dominating key areas from which the surrounding areas could be influenced and then secured, moving quickly by helicopter to keep the militia off balance. The large airfield at Baucau was secured by two platoons from 2 RAR on 22 September, who were relieved by the Philippine Army non-combat contingent known as the Philippine Humanitarian Support Mission to East Timor (PhilHSMET) three days later.
INTERFET saw a number of engagement with Militia, in which there were casualties on both sides. On 28 February 2000, INTERFET handed over command of military operations to United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The force suffered one battle death, a New Zealand private shot dead in an engagement with Indonesian forces/militia.
UNTAET.
On 19 October 1999, the Indonesian Government, formally recognized the result of the vote. On 25 October, the United Nations Security Council, created UNTAET (The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor). This was an armed peacekeeping operation that would be responsible for the administration of East Timor during its transition to an independence state. It would provide law, order and public administration during this period.
Various countries supplied personnel for UNTAET. Australia led the forces, and provided the largest contingent as well