The action of 22 August 1917, took place during the First World War, in the Ypres Salient on the Western Front as part of the Third Battle of Ypres. The engagement was fought by the Fifth Army (General Hubert Gough) of the British Expeditionary Force and the German 4th Army (Lieutenant-General Friedrich Sixt von Armin). During the Battle of Langemarck (16–18 August), the British had advanced north of the village but had been defeated further south and failed to capture the , the third German defensive position. At a conference with the Fifth Army corps commanders on 17 August, Gough arranged for local attacks to gain jumping-off positions for another general attack on 25 August. At the action of the Cockcroft on 19 August, XVIII Corps and the 1st Tank Brigade had captured five fortified farms and strongpoints for a fraction of the casualties of a conventional attack.
The attack on 22 August was much bigger effort, which advanced the British front line up to in places, on a front but failed to reach the more distant objectives. On 24 August, a German (methodical counter-attack) recaptured Inverness Copse on the Gheluvelt Plateau and the more ambitious British attack due on 25 August was cancelled. It began to rain again on 23 August and torrential rain fell on 26 August, flooding the battlefield. Haig transferred responsibility for the offensive to General Herbert Plumer and the Second Army, to include the southern edge of the Gheluvelt Plateau in the offensive. As reinforcements were transferred from the armies further south, the Fifth Army continued with minor operations. On 27 August, the Springfield and Vancouver blockhouses were captured by tanks supported by infantry from the 48th (South Midland) Division but most attacks were costly failures. The quantity of casualties and the cold, wet and muddy conditions lowered morale among the infantry on both sides.
Background.
German defensive tactics.
In July 1917, the 4th Army defence in depth began with a front system of three breastworks Ia, Ib and Ic, about apart, garrisoned by the four companies of each front battalion, with listening-posts in no-man's-land. About behind was the (second or artillery protective line), the rear boundary of the forward battle zone (). About 25 per cent of the infantry in the supporting battalions were (security detachments) to hold strong-points, the remainder being (storm troops) to counter-attack towards them from the back of the .
Dispersed in front of the line were divisional (machine-gun armed sharpshooters) in the (strongpoint line) a line of pillboxes, blockhouses and fortified farms prepared for all-round defence. The also marked the front of the main battle zone () which was about deep, containing most of the field artillery of the (ground holding divisions) behind which was the . In the pillboxes of the were reserve battalions of the front-line regiments, held back as divisional reserves.
Battle of Langemarck.
At the Battle of Langemarck, (16–18 August), XVIII Corps (Lieutenant-General Ivor Maxse) had attacked at 4:45 a.m. with a brigade each from the 48th (South Midland) Division and the 11th (Northern) Division, supported by eight tanks. The tanks were ordered to keep off the roads but the approach to the front line was so boggy that the tanks were cancelled and sent back. The 48th (South Midland) Division attacked with one brigade and after a long fight managed to capture the last house at the north end of St Julien, taking forty prisoners and a machine-gun. The advance resumed and as the first wave went over a rise east of the Steenbeek, it was caught in cross fire from Hillock Farm and Maison du Hibou beyond. Border House and the gun pits either side of the north-east bearing St Julien–Winnipeg road were captured but attempts to press on were bloodily repulsed and parties that reached Springfield Farm disappeared.
The 48th (South Midland) Division consolidated on a line from the village to the gun pits, Jew Hill and Border House. At 9:00 a.m., German troops massed around Triangle Farm and made an abortive counter-attack at 10:00 a.m. Another counter-attack after dark was repulsed at the gun pits and at 9:30 p.m., a counter-attack from Triangle Farm was repulsed. The Germans in Maison du Hibou and Triangle Farm, opposite the 48th (South Midland) Division, caught the troops on the right of the 34th Brigade, 11th (Northern) Division in enfilade as it was fired on from pillboxes to the front. The British captured Haanixbeer Farm and the cemetery but lost the barrage and were unable to capture the Cockcroft and Bülow Farm. On the left, the brigade dug in north-east of Langemarck, opposite the White House and Pheasant Farm and on the right facing Maison du Hibou and Triangle Farm to the east. With observation from higher ground, German artillery-fire inflicted many casualties on the British troops holding the new line beyond Langemarck.
Fifth Army.
After the Battle of Langemark, Major-General Oliver Nugent, commander of the 36th (Ulster) Division, reported that German artillery could not bombard advancing British troops once they were inside the German forward zone, where the German positions were lightly held and distributed in depth. The advance of British troops following-up had been much easier to obstruct by bombarding no man's land but helping the foremost British infantry was more important than counter-battery fire, even if it had failed to suppress the German guns. Nugent wanted fewer field guns in the creeping barrage and the surplus to fire sweeping (side-to-side) barrages. Shrapnel shells should be fuzed to burst higher up, to hit the inside of shell holes where German troops took cover and creeping barrages should be slower, with more and longer pauses, during which the barrages from field artillery and 60-pounder guns should sweep and search (fire from side-to-side and back-and-forth). The infantry should change formation from skirmish lines to company columns accompanied by a machine-gun and a Stokes mortar. The advance should be on a narrower front, since skirmish lines were impractical in muddy crater fields and broke up under machine-gun fire.
Tanks to help capture pillboxes had bogged down behind the British front-line and air support had been impeded by the weather, particularly by low cloud early on and a lack of aircraft for battlefield support. One aircraft per corps had been reserved for counter-attack patrols and two aircraft per division for ground attack. Only eight aircraft had been available to cover the army front and engage German counter-attacks. Signals had failed at vital moments and deprived the infantry of artillery support, making German counter-attacks much more effective in areas where the topography gave German artillery observers sight of the British infantry. The 56th (1/1st London) Division report recommended that the depth of the advance be shortened to give more time for consolidation and to minimise the organisational and communication difficulties being caused by the muddy ground and wet weather. Artillery commanders asked for two aircraft per division exclusively for counter-attack patrols.
Prelude.
British preparations.
At the Battle of Langemarck, XIV Corps and the French I Corps in the north had overrun the and XVIII Corps, to their right, captured Langemarck and a short stretch of the east of the village. On the rest of the corps front and on the XIX Corps and II Corps fronts further south, most captured ground had been lost to German counter-attacks. Dispersed German strong points, fortified farms and pillboxes in the (main battle zone), the area between the and the , were greater in number than in the (battle zone) between the original front line and the . German artillery had concentrated on cutting off the leading British troops from their supports by bombarding the British front line and its approach routes, causing casualties and delays to the delivery of supplies and troops following up the advance.
German machine-gunners in their strong points, pillboxes and fortified farms had severely depleted the British infantry as they advanced, even though German artillery could not bombard the area for fear of hitting their infantry. Once the II Corps attack on the Gheluvelt Plateau had been repulsed, the defenders were free to fire on the British in the Steenbeek valley north of the Ypres–Roulers railway, sweeping them with machine-gun fire in enfilade from their right (southern) flank. On 17 August, the fresh 15th (Scottish) Division and the 61st (2nd South Midland) Division (the second line Territorial Force duplicate of the 48th [South Midland] Division) relieved the 16th (Irish) Division and the 36th (Ulster) Division in the XIX Corps area. In the XVIII Corps area further north, the 48th (South Midland) Division (Major-General Robert Fanshawe) had been in the line since 4 August and the 11th (Northern) Division (Major-General Henry Davies) since 7 August but had to remain. North of the Ypres–Roulers railway, five days of preparatory artillery-fire and constant patrolling had established the positions of some of the defenders but on 21 August, an attack on Borry House was stopped by German small-arms fire, about short of the objective.
Fifth Army plan.
At a conference with the Fifth Army corps commanders on 17 August, Gough complained that troops had failed to hold captured ground and considered court-martialling some NCOs and officers to make examples. Gough also thought that divisions had been relieved too frequently, which had exhausted fresh divisions before the attack. Where divisions had fallen short on 16 August, the corps commanders were asked for proposals for attacks to reach the final objective. Lieutenant-General Claud Jacob (II Corps) wanted to attack the brown line and then the yellow line, Lieutenant-General Herbert Watts (XIX Corps) wanted to attack the purple line but Maxse (XVIII Corps) preferred to attack the dotted purple line, ready to capture the yellow line at the same time as XIX Corps. The proposed attacks on the plethora of "lines" marked on staff maps were intended to reach good jumping off points for a much larger attack on the by II, XIX and XVIII corps on 25 August but attacking in different places, at different times, risked defeat in detail.
In June, the 1st Tank Brigade had been allotted to XVIII Corps, the 3rd Tank Brigade to XlX Corps and the 2nd Tank Brigade to II Corps. The Action of the Cockcroft, a small, surprise attack by XVIII Corps and twelve tanks 1st Tank Brigade on 19 August succeeded but for the bigger effort on 22 August, the artillery would have to suppress the German artillery and machine-gunners on a much wider front, if the infantry were to struggle through the mud and waterlogged shell-holes to their objectives. On 19 August, a British intelligence estimate reported 558 German guns around the Ypres salient, which meant that the Fifth Army had a 3:1 advantage but the British guns were firing outwards on a front, which diluted their effect. The XVIII Corps divisions were to advance to the Zonnebeke–Langemarck road and XIX Corps was to get across the morass of the Hanebeek stream and capture the Potsdam, Vampir, Borry Farm, Iberian Farm, Pommern and Bremen redoubts, Gallipoli Farm and Somme Farm, to advance up Frezenberg Ridge closer to the .
An overhead machine-gun barrage was to be fired and six platoons of pioneers were to consolidate new positions on Hill 35. On the five days before the attack, night harassing fire from artillery and machine-guns was conducted; field artillery and heavy artillery bombarded all known strong points and patrols covered the front, looking for German positions. To guard the right flank of the 15th (Scottish) Division, II Corps to the south was to provide smoke barrages and covering fire from artillery and machine-guns. The 47th (1/2nd London) Division on the northern flank of II Corps, was to set up posts along the Ypres–Roulers railway line between Railway Dump and Potsdam. On 21 August, a patrol reached Beck House and bombed it, then a party was sent to occupy the post but was forestalled by the Germans and had to occupy a trench short.
German defences.
On 31 July, the German front line north of the Ypres–Roulers railway and the had been overrun and the garrisons lost. The front line had been pushed back between the and the , behind which was the rearward battle zone (). The main defensive engagement had been fought in the by the reserve regiments and divisions, against depleted, tired and disorientated attackers, whose advance had been slowed by the forward garrisons before they were overrun. The new German front