1936 Carlist coup d'état was a plan to topple the Spanish republican government and install a Traditionalist monarchy. It was conceived by top executive of the Carlist organisation, Comunión Tradicionalista, and developed in March and April 1936. Preparations were under way until July 1936, though since June 1936 the plan was gradually being abandoned. The scheme, named "Plan de los Tres Frentes", envisioned some 25,000 armed requeté volunteers advancing from Navarre, Maestrazgo and Extremadura towards Madrid, combined with an attempt to seize key governmental buildings by Madrid-based conspirators. The political leader behind the plan was Manuel Fal Conde, the key military planner was general , and the coup was tentatively to be led by general José Sanjurjo Sacanell. The scheme of a Carlist-only insurgence did not enjoy unanimous support within the CT; it was undermined by a competitive plan of a joint Carlist-military coup, promoted mostly by the local Navarrese executive. Eventually this alternative option prevailed; "Plan de los Tres Frentes" remained in the preparation phase and there were no attempts to put it into action.
Political background.
art: Carlists at war, 19th c.
Carlism has been notorious for its penchant for violence. Since the 1830s the country was multiple times rocked by Carlist attempts to topple the ruling regime, and its principal means when striving for power has usually been a rifle, not a ballot paper. Upon emergence of the Second Republic in 1931 initially the Carlist claimant Don Jaime issued statements which might have sounded conciliatory. However, following the wave of anti-religious violence and militantly secular reforms advanced by the government, the movement soon assumed a decisively anti-regime stand. Nevertheless, in the early 1930s the newly united Carlist party, Comunión Tradicionalista (CT), stopped short of embracing insurgent designs. Its paramilitary branch, Requeté, was developed with defensive strategy in mind and its immediate objectives amounted to protecting religious premises or party rallies, even though some might have been contemplating unspecified subversive schemes in the future. At times single highly positioned individuals might have joined right-wing plots and could have pledged requetés' participation in insurgent action – like in case of the 1932 Sanjurjada – but the official CT executive preferred to stay away from rebellious conspiracy plans.
 Fal Conde
The Carlist approach changed in 1934 with assumption of political leadership by Manuel Fal Conde. The new Jefe Delegado was confident that modus vivendi with the republican regime was out of the question, and that violent confrontation was a mere matter of time. The same year he set up Junta Técnica Militar (JTM), an auxiliary body composed of retired army officers; its purpose was to co-ordinate Carlist preparations for future violent action, whatever shape it would assume: a coup, a move to suppress an unfolding revolution, or self-defense against crackdown by state security. Initially the body remained rather dormant. Paramilitary gear-up was managed by Delegación Nacional de Requeté, a sub-unit within Junta Nacional headed by José Luis Zamanillo, though military training was provided by professional military, first colonel Enrique Varela and since 1935 lieutenant colonel Ricardo Rada. At that time Requeté emerged already as the key branch of the organisation, its budget and role dwarfing these of political, female or youth sections. The results of the February 1936 elections, Frente Popular rule and radical left-wing turn of the government convinced the Carlist executive that imminent revolution was behind the corner, and that the time for action has arrived.
Requeté.
requeté: paramilitary
Requeté was an organisation set up in 1907 and it has gone through various phases, from juvenile section dedicated to culture, sports and leisure to urban hit-squads. In the early 1930s CT tried to turn it into sort of a party militia, but with rather poor results; the branch consisted of no more than few thousand young males in groups scattered across some cities, mostly in Catalonia and Levante. However, since 1932 the organisation underwent major change; apart from increased recruitment, it re-focused on smaller towns and villages, moved its centre of gravity to Navarre, got re-structured in paramilitary terms, and its members were undergoing weekend countryside trainings in infantry tactics and usage of firearms. Eventually in 1934 it was united under a nationwide command, no longer functioning as add-ins to local CT "círculos". In 1935 it gained a convincingly military character which it had previously lacked and grew to some 20,000 men. Vague plans for military action were prepared, though until 1936 they were still intended as counter-revolutionary defense rather than as insurrectional coup. December 1935 produced first case of Requeté on alert awaiting the order to rise.
requeté: leisure
One major problem of the organisation was that it remained dramatically short of competent NCOs and there were few professional officers involved, usually these forced to early retirement during the Azaña reform. Some 150 of mid-level volunteer commanders underwent few-week military training in Fascist Italy, but it barely sufficed. Another issue of major concern became weapons, so far reduced mostly to privately owned hunting rifles, old units stockpiled from earlier violent attempts, and firearms obtained by smuggling from abroad or procured illegally in Spain. To some extent the efforts to arm the paramilitary were successful; in 1935 the organisation owned 450 machine-guns. Another problem was uneven geographical distribution; the organisation numbered some 6,000 men in Navarre, 4,000 in Catalonia, 4,000 in Levante, 3,000 in Vascongadas and 1,000 in Old Castile, but in other regions there were only few hundred volunteers on its rolls. In early 1936 and according to its own statistics Requeté grouped 10,000 armed and trained men plus 20,000 in auxiliary pool. In contrast to urban-oriented action groups "primarily accustomed to street fighting and pistolerismo", maintained by other parties, Requeté became a "genuine citizen army" capable of performing small-scale tactical military operations.
Forming of insurgency command.
 Don Alfonso Carlos and Don Javier
On February 22, 1936, barely a week after elections which produced the victory of Frente Popular, the Navarrese requetés were put on state of "permanent war-readiness"; one scholar lines it up as a first step towards insurrection, but another claims it might have been a defensive measure, adopted in anticipation of post-electoral unrest. However, some time in March the Carlist political command was already decided to move and to mount an own coup d'état, supposed to topple the Madrid government. At unspecified time in March, though prior to March 28, a supreme military command body entrusted with leading the way was formed. According to some authors it was a re-activated and so far dormant Junta Técnica Militar; others scholars refer rather to "Supreme Military Junta", "Junta Militar" or "Junta de Conspiración". Its headquarters was the French resort of Saint-Jean-de-Luz, in the villa serving as residence of prince Xavier de Borbón-Parma (Don Javier). He was representing the 87-year-old Carlist claimant Don Alfonso Carlos, who normally resided in Vienna but since late 1935 lived in the nearby seaside town of Guethary.
The command Junta consisted of 9 sections: "Dirección y coordinación" (general command, Don Javier, Manuel Fal Conde, José María Lamamie de Clairac), "Estado Mayor Central" (general staff, general Mario Muslera, colonels Eduardo Baselga, Fidel de la Cuerda and Emilio Esteban-Infantes), "Cuadro de Oficiales" (cadres, Luis Villanova Rattazzi and Francisco Javier Ruiz Ojeda), "Requeté" (paramilitary, José Luis Zamanillo, Ricardo Rada), "Armas y Transportes" (weapons, Don Javier), "Entrada y Depósito" (logistics, Rafael de Olazabál), "Financiera" (financing, Fausto Gaiztarro, José Luis Zuazola), "Propaganda y Prensa" (propaganda, Manuel González-Quevedo, ) and "Información" (communications, Calixto González-Quevedo, José María de Oriol). It was theoretically presided by Don Alfonso Carlos represented by Don Javier, but strictly military issues were decided by Muslera, Baselga and Cuerda. Not all members of the Junta were dedicated Carlists: Muslera and Baselga were merely sympathetic. Neither Esteban-Infantes had any links with Comunión Tradicionalista; he acted as liaison officer with Sanjurjo. It is not clear whether the Junta has ever met in corpore; many of its members lived elsewhere, e.g. Zamanillo left his native Santander but he settled in the Navarrese border town of Elizondo, some 30 km from Saint-Jean-de-Luz.
Political maneuvering.
 Varela
The Carlist conspiracy unfolded in parallel to the military conspiracy, but it is not clear what the relation between the two was. It is known that Enrique Varela and Manuel Fernández Pérez, involved in the military plot, were "colaboradores de la CT" and most likely informed Carlist command about at least some developments. However, no direct co-ordination link has been identified, even though some scholars assume there was one. A document issued by the Carlist Junta in March stressed the need of "colaboración en el Ejército", but only in appropriate conditions; it seems that the Carlists expected the army conspirators to join their own coup, probably on Traditionalist conditions only.
 Sanjurjo on exile
One scholar claims that the Carlists and personally Fal Conde intended to build a "Gran Coalición", which would provide political support for the rising and perhaps enhance its military potential with volunteers from other political currents. Some sort of talks or consultations were probably held with Juventud Vasca, Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Falange Española, Renovacion Española and CEDA, but there is nothing closer known on either details or outcome; PNV might have offered support, but only in case of a revolutionary coup to be countered. However, other historians claim that Fal was anxious not to compromise Carlist principles by political deals and was determined to proceed with plans for the Carlist-only rising.
Some time in March Fal went to Lisbon to speak to general José Sanjurjo, leader of the failed 1932 coup. The purpose was to sound the general – with some earlier family links to Carlism – about the idea of him leading the coup. Sanjurjo was highly skeptical and avoided any commitments except that he was prepared to step in only in case the army fails to move. Another meeting followed late in March. The initially planned their own coup for April 20, but it went to nothing due to indecision of local Madrid commander, assigned the key role. In either late April or early May Fal and Don Javier met Sanjurjo again. The general, courted by both military and Carlist conspiracy, was anxious not to burn the bridges with any of them. He reiterated that the Carlist-only coup was doomed if not supported at one stage or another by military, though he agreed to study a detailed plan, should there be one.
Insurgency plans.
Carlist plans of the rising remain a rather obscure issue. According to one author at unspecified time (late April or early May) there were 2 plans drafted, one by Baslera and Muslera, and another one by Cuerda. They were focused on the same 3 major zones of action: Navarrese-Riojan borderland, Maestrazgo and Andalusian-Extremaduran provinces near the Portuguese frontier. According to Cuerda minor disturbances were to be staged as distraction away from these zones. Rapid and violent nightly takeover of municipalities in 3 focos of rebellion was to follow; units of some 250 men each were to depose local authorities, cut communications, seize weapons from Guardia Civil or army depots and recruit new volunteers. In total some 5,500 men, grouped mostly in the north, were supposed to start the insurgency. Neither of the plans specified what would happen further on; it seems the authors assumed that at that stage the army would be triggered to join the coup.
Other scholars do not mention two competitive plans and some refer to a joint plan, produced by Baselga and Cuerda and supervised by Muslera. One historian mentions 2 initial focos of rebellion: Sierra de Aracena (Andalusian units) and Sierra de Gata (units from Leon, Castile and Extremadura). Most prefer to note 3 focos: near Portugal (Extremaduran units commanded by and Andalusian ones by ), Maestrazgo (; units from Levante, Catalonia, Aragón) and Navarre (Sanjurjo; units from Cantabria, Burgos, Navarre and Vascongadas). Some single out 4 focos: Sierra de Gata (Villegas), Sierra de Aracena (Redondo), Maestrazgo (Serrador) and Navarre (Sanjurjo). 
The final version of the insurgency plan is at times named "Plan de los Tres Frentes". Overall command was to be with Sanjurjo. Insurgent troops were to be organized in 6 columns; 3 (14,000 men) from Navarre/Rioja (Miranda, Calahorra, Tudela), 1 (9,500 men) from Maestrazgo (Teruel) and 2 (1,000 men) from Sierra de Gata at the Leonian/Extremaduran borderland (Garrobillas, Fregeneda), plus diversionary guerilla in Huelva. All were supposed to approach Madrid, where another group (Varela) was to take control over key ministerial buildings and declare the state of