US friendly fire incident over Iraq
The 1994 Black Hawk shootdown incident, sometimes referred to as the Black Hawk Incident, was a friendly fire incident over northern Iraq that occurred on 14 April 1994 during Operation Provide Comfort (OPC). The pilots of two United States Air Force (USAF) F-15 fighter aircraft, operating under the control of a USAF airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, misidentified two United States Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters as Iraqi Mil Mi-24 "Hind" helicopters. The F-15 pilots fired on and destroyed both helicopters, killing all 26 military and civilians aboard, including personnel from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the Kurdish community.
A subsequent USAF investigation blamed the accident on several factors. The F-15 pilots were faulted for misidentifying the helicopters as hostile. Also, the crew members of the AWACS aircraft were blamed for their inaction in failing to exercise appropriate control and for not intervening in the situation. In addition, the identification friend or foe (IFF) systems had not functioned to identify the helicopters to the F-15 pilots. Furthermore, USAF leaders had failed to adequately integrate U.S. Army helicopter operations into overall OPC air operations. As a result of the investigation several USAF officers received administrative discipline but only one, Jim Wang, an AWACS crew member, was tried by court-martial, in which he was acquitted.
As a result of complaints by family members of the victims and others that the military was failing to hold its personnel accountable, the U.S. Senate and U.S. House conducted their own investigations into the shootdown and the U.S. military's response to it. Also, Ronald R. Fogleman, the USAF's new Chief of Staff, conducted his own review of the actions taken by the USAF against the officers involved in the incident.
Fogleman's investigation led to several of the officers involved in the incident receiving further administrative discipline. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) subsequently refused U.S. Senate subpoenas for four USAF officers to be interviewed for the Senate investigation, which was never publicly released. The U.S. House investigation, conducted in part by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), found that the military investigative and judicial systems had operated mostly as designed, but also noted that the DoD had refused access to key witnesses.
Background.
On 7April 1991, Iraq accepted United Nations (UN) ceasefire conditions and resolutions, thereby officially ending the Gulf War. This same day, a large multinational, multiple-agency humanitarian effort under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution No. 688 began to aid the approximately 500,000 Kurdish refugees who had fled from Iraqi military forces into the hills of northern Iraq. On 18 April 1991, John Shalikashvili took command of the U.S.-led operation to ensure security for UN relief operations and the Kurdish refugees, called Operation Provide Comfort (OPC).
OPC took place in an area of northern Iraq above the 36th parallel. This area, approximately in size, was designated a "no-fly" security zone by UN coalition forces, enforced by a combined task force (CTF) of daily armed aircraft patrols from participating nations, including the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and the United States. The United States Army was tasked with assisting civilian relief agencies to build communities and facilities for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Over the next three years, 27,000 fixed-wing and 1,400 helicopter coalition flights took place in the zone to support humanitarian operations without interference from Iraqi aircraft or other military units.
In April 1994 OPC was co-commanded by USAF Brigadier General Jeffrey Pilkington. The OPC combined air forces were commanded by Colonel Curtis H. Emery, USAF. Colonel Douglas J. Richardson, USAF, was the director of operations for the combined air forces.
Incident.
On 14 April 1994, at 07:36 local time, a USAF E-3 AWACS aircraft from the 963d Airborne Air Control Squadron (based at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma) departed Incirlik Air Base (AB), Turkey in support of OPC. The AWACS, with its 19-member crew under the mission crew command of Major Lawrence Tracy, was to provide airborne threat warning and air control for all OPC aircraft during its time aloft. The AWACS crew reported on station at its assigned surveillance orbit altitude of located inside Turkey just north of the northern border of Iraq at 08:45. The weather that day was fair and clear over northern Iraq.
At 08:22, two U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from the 6th Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment (based in Giebelstadt, Germany), called Eagle Flight, departed Diyarbakır, near Pirinçlik Air Base, Turkey headed for the OPC military coordination center (MCC) located away in Zakhu, Iraq. Both helicopters were fitted with external, fuel tanks on sponsons mounted beside each side door with each tank emblazoned with large American flags. In addition to the flags on the fuel tanks, each helicopter was marked with American flags on each side door, on the nose, and on the belly. The lead Black Hawk was piloted by U.S. Army Captain Patrick McKenna, commander of the Eagle Flight detachment of six helicopters.
At 09:21, the Black Hawks reported their entry into the no-fly zone by radio on the en route frequency to the AWACS en route controller, Lieutenant Joseph Halcli, and then landed six minutes later at the MCC. Halcli and his superior officer, Captain Jim Wang, the AWACS's senior director, added "friendly helicopter" tags to their radar scopes, noted that both helicopters were displaying identification friend or foe (IFF) Mode I and Mode II signals, and then suspended the radar symbols after the Black Hawks disappeared from their scopes upon landing at the MCC at 09:24. Although the helicopters were squawking (signalling) the wrong IFF Mode I code for the no-fly zone (called the Tactical Area of Responsibility or TAOR), neither Wang nor Halcli informed the Black Hawk pilots of that (both helicopters, however, were squawking the correct Mode II codes). Wang and Halcli also neglected to direct the Black Hawks to begin using the TAOR radio frequency instead of the en route frequency.
At the MCC, the Black Hawks picked up 16 members of the UN Provide Comfort coalition leadership team including four Kurdish civilians, one Assyrian civilian, three Turkish, two British, and one French military officer, plus five U.S. civilian and military officials. At 09:54, the helicopters departed the MCC for Erbil, Iraq, a distance of . The Black Hawks reported their departure, flight route, and destinations by radio which was acknowledged by Halcli. Halcli then re-initiated the friendly helicopter track on his scope. Two of the Black Hawk passengers were Colonel Jerry Thompson, U.S. Army, commander of the MCC, and his replacement, Colonel Richard Mulhern, U.S. Army. At Arbil and later at Salah ad Din, Iraq, Thompson planned to introduce Mulhern to two prominent Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, as well as to UN representatives. Halcli placed tags on his radar screen to show the two Black Hawks' track and notified Wang of the helicopters' movement. In addition to Halcli's screen, the friendly helicopter symbols were visible on the radar screens of Wang, Tracy, and USAF Major Doug Martin. Martin was the "Duke" or "ACE" airborne command element on the AWACS, meaning he was a rated aircrew member assigned to the crew to ensure that all engagement (combat) mandates were adhered to and executed as written in OPC policies.
En route to Arbil, at 10:12, the Black Hawks entered mountainous terrain and their radar returns disappeared from the AWACS's scopes. Captain Dierdre Bell, an air surveillance officer on the AWACS, noticed that the Black Hawks' radar and IFF returns had disappeared and sent an electronic "attention arrow" to Wang's scope. Wang took no action and the large blinking green arrow automatically disappeared from his screen after one minute.
Meanwhile, at 09:35, two USAF F-15C fighter aircraft from the 53d Fighter Squadron, piloted by Captain Eric Wickson and Lieutenant Colonel Randy W. May, departed Incirlik AB. Their mission was to perform an initial fighter sweep of the TAOR to clear the area of any hostile aircraft prior to the entry of coalition forces. The air tasking order (ATO) that was supposed to list all scheduled coalition aircraft missions for that day and which the two pilots reviewed before takeoff, mentioned that U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters would be operating in the TAOR but did not list takeoff times, routes, or flight durations for them. At 10:15, Wickson radioed Martin on the AWACS and asked if he had any information to pass to them to which Martin replied in the negative.
At 10:20, Wickson, the F-15C flight lead, reported entering northern Iraq to the AWACS controller responsible for air traffic inside the TAOR, USAF Lieutenant Ricky Wilson. The TAOR frequency the F-15s were using was different from the en-route frequency being used by the two Black Hawks. Wilson, however, was monitoring both frequencies and was able to see both Black Hawks on his radar scope before they disappeared at 10:12. Neither Wilson nor any of the other AWACS crew members, many of whom were monitoring the F-15s' radio frequency, informed the F-15s that Black Hawks were currently operating in the TAOR. At 10:21, Wilson, believing the Black Hawks had landed again, asked Wang if he could drop the friendly helicopter symbols from the AWACS's scopes and Wang approved the request. An AWACS crew instructor, Captain Mark Cathy, who was on the mission to assist the AWACS crew and supervise Wilson on this, his first mission into the TAOR, had retired to the back of the airplane at 10:00 to take a nap.
At 10:22, Wickson, flying at , reported a radar contact on a low-flying, slow-moving aircraft southeast of his current position. Wilson acknowledged Wickson's report with a "clear there" response, meaning he had no radar contacts in that area. Unknown to the two F-15 pilots, the unidentified aircraft were the two U.S. Army Black Hawks. Contrary to standard procedure, neither Tracy nor Wang spoke up at this point to request that the AWACS crew members attempt to identify the F-15s' radar contacts.
Both F-15 pilots then electronically interrogated the radar target with their on-board IFF systems across two different modes (Mode I and Mode IV). Their IFF systems responded negatively to the attempt to identify the contact on Mode I. The Mode IV momentarily gave a positive response, but thereafter responded negatively and the F-15s moved to intercept the unidentified aircraft. Intermittent IFF Mode I and Mode II returns from the Black Hawks now began to show on Wilson's and other AWACS crew members' scopes and friendly helicopter symbols reappeared on Wang's scope. After closing to of the radar contacts, at 10:25 the F-15s again reported the contact to the AWACS and Wilson this time responded that he now had a radar contact at that reported location. Although the Black Hawk intermittent radar and now steady IFF returns on the AWACS scopes were in the same location as the unidentified contacts being tracked by the F-15s, none of the AWACS controllers advised Wickson or May that the contacts they were tracking might be friendly helicopters.
The two F-15s now initiated a visual identification (VID) pass of the contact. The VID pass entailed violating one of OPC's rules of engagement, which prohibited fighter aircraft from operating below above the ground. At this time the two Black Hawks had entered a deep valley and were cruising at a speed of about above the ground. Wickson's VID pass was conducted at a speed of about , above and to the left of the helicopters. At 10:28 Wickson reported "Tally two Hinds" and then passed the two Black Hawks. "Hind" is the NATO designation for the Mil Mi-24 helicopter, a helicopter that the Iraqi and Syrian militaries operated and was usually configured with armament on small, side-mounted wings. Wilson responded with "Copy, Hinds" and asked Wang, "Sir, are you listening to this?" Wang responded, "Affirmative" but offered no further guidance or comments.
May then conducted his own VID pass about above the helicopters and reported, "Tally 2." May later stated to a USAF accident investigation board that his "Tally 2" call meant that he saw two helicopters but did not mean that he was confirming Wickson's identification of them as Hinds. Neither F-15 pilot had been informed that U.S. Army Black Hawks participating in OPC often carried auxiliary fuel tanks mounted on wings nor had either been instructed in the paint scheme that Iraqi Hind helicopters used, light brown and