International agreement on the nuclear program of Iran
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; (, BARJAM)), also known as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal, is an agreement to limit the Iranian nuclear program in return for sanctions relief and other provisions. The agreement was finalized in Vienna on 14 July 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations S.C.—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, U.S.—plus Germany) together with the European Union.
Formal negotiations began with the adoption of the Joint Plan of Action, an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for the following 20 months and, in April 2015, agreed on an Iran nuclear deal framework, which later led to JCPOA, along with a Roadmap Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Negotiations centered around sanctions relief and restrictions on Iran's nuclear facilities, including the Arak IR-40 reactor, Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, Gachin Uranium Mine, Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, Isfahan Uranium Conversion Plant, Natanz Uranium Enrichment Plant, and the Parchin Military Research complex.
The agreement took effect on 20 January 2014. It was criticized and opposed in the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, and by Iranian principlists.
The U.S. withdrew from the pact in 2018 and imposed sanctions under the policy of "maximum pressure". The sanctions applied to all countries and companies doing business with Iran and cut it off from the international financial system, rendering the nuclear deal's economic provisions null.
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Timeline.
The agreement included a series of provisions describing actions that Iran would undertake for specified periods of time. 
For 13 years, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its gas centrifuges. 
For 15 years, Iran agreed to enrich uranium only up to 3.67% and not to build heavy-water facilities. 
For 10 years, uranium enrichment would be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges. Other facilities would be converted to avoid proliferation risks. 
IAEA would have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities to monitor compliance.
In return for verifiably abiding by those provisions, Iran would receive relief from U.S., European Union, and United Nations S.C. nuclear-related sanctions.
The JCPOA formed part of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231. The Security Council (S.C.) enacted it on 20 July 2015 and adopted it on 18 October. 
It took effect on 16 January 2016 (Adoption Day). JCPOA was to remain in effect for eight years or until receipt by the S.C. of an IAEA report stating that IAEA had reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, and terminated ten years from Adoption Day.
On 12 October 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would not make the certification provided for under U.S. domestic law, but stopped short of terminating the deal.
In 2018, IAEA inspectors spent an aggregate of 3,000 calendar days in Iran, installing seals and collecting surveillance camera photos, measurement data, and documents for further analysis. In March 2018, IAEA Director Yukiya Amano said that the organization had verified that Iran was implementing its nuclear-related commitments. On April 30, the U.S. and Israel said that Iran had not disclosed a past covert nuclear weapons program to the IAEA, as required.
On 8 May 2018, Trump announced U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA. On 7 August 2018, the E.U. enacted a blocking statute to defeat U.S. sanctions on countries trading with Iran. In November 2018, U.S. sanctions came back into effect, intended to force Iran to alter its policies, including its support for militant groups in the region and its development of ballistic missiles.
In May 2019, IAEA certified that Iran was abiding by the main terms, though questions were raised about how many advanced centrifuges Iran was allowed to have, which was only loosely specified in the deal.
On 1 July 2019, Iran announced that it had breached the limit set on its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, which the IAEA confirmed.
On 5 January 2020, Iran declared that it would no longer abide by the deal's limitations but would continue to coordinate with IAEA.
Background.
Nuclear technology.
A fission-based "atomic" nuclear weapon uses a fissile material to cause a nuclear chain reaction. The most commonly used materials are uranium 235 (235U) and plutonium 239 (239Pu). Both uranium 233 (233U) and reactor-grade plutonium have also been used. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium. Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3% uranium 238 (238U) and only 0.7% 235U. 
To make a weapon, either uranium must be enriched or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is required for nuclear power, although not to the same purity. For this reason, uranium enrichment is a dual-use technology required for both civilian and military purposes. Key strategies to prevent proliferation of nuclear arms include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of nuclear technology and fissile material.
Iranian nuclear activity, 1970–2006.
Iranian development of nuclear technology began in the 1970s, when the U.S. Atoms for Peace program began providing assistance. Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.
After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Iran's nuclear program fell into disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution". The new leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, initially opposed nuclear technology.
In the late 1980s Iran reinstated its nuclear program, with assistance from China (which entered into an agreement with Iran in 1990), Pakistan (which did the same in 1992), and Russia (which did the same in 1992 and 1995), and from the A.Q. Khan network. Iran began pursuing nuclear capability, including uranium mining and experimenting with uranium enrichment.
In August 2002 the Paris-based Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the Arak heavy-water production facility and the Natanz enrichment facility. In February 2003, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami acknowledged the existence of the facilities and acknowledged that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for power plants. IAEA inspectors visited Natanz. In May 2003 Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company, but not to take samples.
In June 2003, an IAEA report concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the safeguards agreement. Iran, faced with the prospect of a U.N. S.C. referral, entered negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the E.U. 3). The U.S. took no part. In October 2003, Iran and the E.U. 3 agreed to the Tehran Declaration. Iran agreed to full IAEA cooperation, to sign the Additional Protocol, and to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment. In September and October 2003 the IAEA inspected several facilities. This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, including those related to centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a diplomatic solution".
In August 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the Iranian negotiators of treason. Over the following two months, the E.U. 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the Long Term Agreement broke down; the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement". Iran notified IAEA that it would resume enrichment at Esfahan.
In February 2006, Iran ended its implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting IAEA to refer Iran to the S.C.. In April 2006 Ahmadinejad claimed that Iran had explored nuclear technology for power generation, not weapons. In June 2006 the E.U. 3 joined China, Russia, and the U.S., to form the P5+1. That July, the S.C. passed its first resolution (nr. 1696), demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing. S.C. resolution 1737 was adopted in December; followed by others. The legal authority for IAEA referral and the S.C. resolutions derived from the IAEA Statute and the United Nations Charter. The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities, and imposed sanctions, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities.
In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to another S.C. resolution.
S.C. resolutions, 2007–2013.
Four more S.C. resolutions followed: 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). In Resolution 1803 and elsewhere the S.C. acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides the "inalienable right... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes".
In 2007, IAEA director-general Mohamed ElBaradei said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations. ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as a confidence-building measure, under which sanctions and enrichment would be suspended. 
A November 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003; that estimate and U.S. Intelligence Community statements assessed that Iran was maintaining its option to develop nuclear weapons".
In September 2009 U.S. President Barack Obama revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near Qom. Israel threatened military action.
Joint Plan of Action (2013).
In March 2013 the U.S. and Iran began talks in Oman, led by William Burns and Jake Sullivan (U.S.) and Ali Asghar Khaji (Iran). In June 2013 Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran. In a 2006 negotiation with Europe, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran had mastered the conversion of uranium yellowcake at Isfahan. In August 2013, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for negotiations with the P5+1. 
In September 2013 Obama and Rouhani spoke by telephone, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and Secretary of State John Kerry met with Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Former officials alleged that, in order to advance the deal, the Obama administration shielded Hezbollah from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the Drug Enforcement Administration's Project Cassandra investigation regarding drug smuggling. Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered an investigation.
On 24 November 2013, after several rounds of negotiations, the interim Joint Plan of Action was signed between Iran and the P5+1. It consisted of a short-term program freeze in exchange for decreased economic sanctions. The IAEA began inspections under this interim agreement. The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014. That day, an IAEA report stated that Iran was adhering to the terms of the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20%, beginning to dilute half of the stockpile of 20% enriched uranium to 3.5%, and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor.
A major focus of the negotiations was limitations on the Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor and production plant (which was under construction, but never became operational. Iran agreed in the Joint Plan of Action not to commission or fuel the reactor; the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant; the Gachin uranium mine; the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; the Isfahan uranium-conversion plant; the Natanz uranium enrichment plant; and the Parchin military research and development complex.
In 2015, the U.S. enacted the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. Under the Act, once a nuclear agreement was negotiated with Iran, Congress had 60 days in which to pass a resolution of approval, a resolution of disapproval, or do nothing. The Act included time beyond the 60 days for the president to veto a resolution and for Congress to vote on whether to override the veto.
Provisions.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) covered 109 pages, including five annexes. The major provisions are:
Stocks.
Over 15 years, Iran would reduce its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 97%, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg, and limit enrichment to 3.67%, sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for weaponry. This represented a "major decline" in Iran's nuclear activity. Iran had produced stockpiles near 20% (medium-enriched uranium). Stocks in excess of 300 kg enriched up to 3.67% would be diluted to 0.7% or sold in return for uranium ore, while uranium