1893 shipwreck
 
The sinking of HMS "Victoria" took place at approximately 15:30 on 22 June 1893, after , the flagship of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet, collided with while on fleet manoeuvres in the Eastern Mediterranean. The collision caused significant damage to "Victoria"'s bow, with a large hole produced causing the ship to rapidly capsize. "Victoria" took approximately fifteen minutes to sink, with 358 members of the crew, including Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, lost in the disaster.
Background.
In 1893, the Royal Navy saw the Mediterranean Sea as a vital sea route between Britain and India, under constant threat from the navies of France and Italy. The impressive naval force that the British concentrated to protect these sealanes made Mediterranean Fleet one of the most powerful in the world. On 22 June 1893, the bulk of the fleet, eleven ironclads (eight battleships and three large cruisers), were on their annual summer exercises off Tripoli in the Ottoman Empire (now Lebanon).
Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, was a strict disciplinarian who believed that the best way to keep his crews taut and efficient was by continuous fleet evolutions, which before the invention of wireless were signalled by signal flags, semaphore and signal lamp. He had devised a new system of ship handling intended to depart from the system of flag signalling, which was limited in what could be imparted by whatever was in the existing signal book. His speciality was the "TA" system, which took its name from the signal that would indicate it was in operation. Tryon developed the "TA" system as a means for complex manoeuvres to be handled by only a few simple signals, but which required his ships' captains to use their initiative; upon his flying the flag signal "TA", all ships in the formation were to follow the movements of the flagship without the need to wait for or acknowledge any other signals. However, initiative was a quality that had become blunted by decades of naval peace since Trafalgar, and which was unwelcome in a hierarchical navy that deified Admiral Horatio Nelson while misunderstanding what he had stood for. A taciturn and difficult man to his subordinate officers, Tryon habitually avoided explaining his intentions to them, to accustom them to handle unpredictable situations.
The collision.
In June 1893, the bulk of the Mediterranean Fleet departed Malta for the Eastern Mediterranean to take part in the annual exercises. On 23 June, having anchored at Beirut, the fleet weighed anchor and headed for sea, with the eleven major ships split into two columns, led by the flagships of the fleet commander and his deputy.
Disposition of the fleet.
Tryon led one column of six ships, which formed the first division of his fleet, in his flagship "Victoria" travelling at . His deputy – Rear-Admiral Albert Hastings Markham – was in the lead ship of the second division of five ships, the "Camperdown". Markham's normal divisional flagship – – was being refitted. Unusually for Tryon, he had discussed his plans for anchoring the fleet with some of his officers. The two columns were to turn inwards in succession by 180°, thus closing to and reversing their direction of travel. After travelling a few miles in this formation, the whole fleet would slow and simultaneously turn 90° to port and drop their anchors for the night. The officers had observed that was much too close and suggested that the columns should start at least apart; even this would leave insufficient margin for safety. The normal turning circles of the ships involved would have meant that a gap between the two columns of would be needed to leave a space between the columns of on completion of the manoeuvre. Tryon had confirmed that eight cables should be needed for the manoeuvre the officers expected, but had later signalled for the columns to close to six cables . Two of his officers gingerly queried whether the order was what he intended, and he brusquely confirmed that it was.
He ordered speed to be increased to and at about 15:00 ordered a signal to be flown from "Victoria" to have the ships in each column turn in succession by 180° inwards towards the other column so that the fleet would reverse its course. However, the normal "tactical" turning circle of the ships had a diameter of around each (and a minimum of , although standing orders required "tactical rudder" to be used in fleet manoeuvres), so if they were less than apart then a collision was likely.
As there was no pre-determined code in the signal book for the manoeuvre he wished to order, Tryon sent separate orders to the two divisions. They were:
"Second division alter course in succession 16 points to starboard preserving the order of the fleet."
"First division alter course in succession 16 points to port preserving the order of the fleet."
The phrase "preserving the order of the fleet" would imply that on conclusion of the manoeuvre the starboard column at the start would still be the starboard at the finish. This theory was propounded in 'The Royal Navy' Vol VII pages 415–426.
It is suggested here that Tryon intended that one division should turn outside the other; as the two columns began apart, turning outside the other, with a turning circle of would have left them at apart. This manoeuvre would have required that the two columns turn at separate times and/or with different speeds, rather than simultaneously with the same speed.
Tryon's flag-lieutenant was Lord Gillford, and it was he who received the fatal order to signal to the two divisions to turn sixteen points (a half circle) inwards, the leading ships first, the others of course following in succession.
Although some of his officers knew what Tryon was planning, they did not raise an objection. Markham, at the head of the other column, was confused by the dangerous order and delayed raising the flag signal indicating that he had understood it. Tryon queried the delay in carrying out his orders, as the fleet was now heading for the shore and needed to turn soon. He ordered a semaphore signal be sent to Markham, asking, "What are you waiting for?" Stung by this public rebuke from his commander, Markham immediately ordered his column to start turning. Various officers on the two flagships confirmed later that they had either assumed or hoped that Tryon would order some new manoeuvre at the last minute.
However, the columns continued to turn towards each other and only moments before the collision did the captains of the two ships appreciate that this was not going to happen. Even then, they still waited for permission to take the action that might have prevented the collision. Tryon's flag captain, Maurice Bourke, asked Tryon three times for permission to order the engines astern; he acted only after he had received that permission. At the last moment, Tryon shouted across to Markham, "Go astern! Go astern!"
"Camperdown" strikes "Victoria".
By the time that both captains had ordered the engines on their respective ships reversed, it was too late, and "Camperdown"'s ram struck the starboard side of "Victoria" about below the waterline and penetrated into the ship. The engines were left turning astern, and this caused the ram to be withdrawn and to let in more seawater before all the watertight doors on "Victoria" had been closed. Two minutes after the collision, the ships were moving apart.
It was a hot afternoon, and a Thursday, which was traditionally a rest time for the crew. All hatches and means of ventilation were open to cool the ship. There was a hole in the side of the ship open to the sea, but initially, Tryon and his navigation officer, Staff Commander Thomas Hawkins-Smith, did not believe the ship would sink, as the damage was forward and had not affected the engine room or ship's power. Tryon gave orders to turn the ship and head for the shore away so she could be beached. Some of the surrounding ships had launched boats for a rescue, but he signalled for them to turn back. Just two minutes after "Camperdown" backed out of the hole she had created, water was advancing over the deck and spilling into the open hatches. A party under Lieutenant Herbert Heath attempted to unroll a collision mat down the side of the ship to patch the hole and slow the inrush of water, but by the time they could manhandle it into position they were standing in water, and had to abandon the attempt. Five minutes after the collision, the bow had already sunk , the ship was listing heavily to starboard and water was coming through the gun ports in the large forward turret. The foredeck became submerged, with the top of the gun turret forming a small island. Although the engine room was still manned and the engines running, hydraulic power for the helm failed so the ship could not be turned and there was no power to launch the ship's boats. Eight minutes after the collision, the entire fore end of the ship was under water, and the water was lapping the main deck. The stern had risen so that the screws were nearly out of the water.
Immediately after the collision, Captain Bourke had gone below to investigate the damage and close the watertight doors. The engine room was dry, but forward in the ship men were struggling to secure bulkheads even as water washed in around them. Already men had been washed away by incoming water or had been trapped behind closed doors. Yet still there had not been sufficient time to close up the ship to stop the water spreading. He returned on deck and gave orders for the men to fall in. The assembled ranks of sailors were ordered to turn to face the side, and then to abandon ship.
"Victoria" capsized just 13 minutes after the collision, rotating to starboard with a terrible crash as her boats and anything free fell to the side and as water entering through the funnels caused explosions when it reached the boilers. With her keel uppermost, she slipped into the water bow first, propellers still rotating and threatening anyone near them. Most of the crew managed to abandon ship, although those in the engine room never received orders to leave their posts and were drowned. The ship's chaplain, Rev S. D. Morris RN, was last seen trying to rescue the sick: "In the hour of danger and of death, when all were acting bravely, he was conspicuous for his self-denying and successful efforts to save the sick and to maintain discipline. Nobly forgetful of his own safety, he worked with others to the end, and went down with the vessel ... seeing escape impossible he folded his arms upon his breast, and looking up to heaven, his lips moving in prayer, he died." The area around the wreck became a "widening circle of foaming bubbles, like a giant saucepan of boiling milk", which the rescue boats did not dare enter. Onlookers could only watch as the number of live men in the water steadily diminished. Gunner Frederick Johnson reported being sucked down three times, and said that while originally there were 30–40 people around him, afterwards there were only three or four. Lieutenant Lorin, one of the survivors, stated: "All sorts of floating articles came up with tremendous force, and the surface of the water was one seething mass. We were whirled round and round, and half choked with water, and dashed about amongst the wreckage until half senseless."
"Camperdown" was also in a serious condition, with her ram nearly wrenched off. Hundreds of tons of water flooded into her bows, and her foredeck went underwater. Her crew had to construct a cofferdam across the main deck to stop the flooding. As with "Victoria", the watertight doors had not been closed in time, allowing the ship to flood. After 90 minutes, divers managed to reach and close a bulkhead door so that the flooding could be contained. The ship returned to Tripoli at one quarter speed with seven compartments flooded.
The other ships had more time to take evasive action, and avoided colliding with each other. was already turning to follow "Victoria" when the collision happened and came to within of her as she tried to turn away.