Soviet single-seat WWII fighter aircraft
The Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-3 () is a Soviet fighter-interceptor used during World War II. It was a development of the MiG-1 by the OKO (opytno-konstruktorskij otdel — Experimental Design Department) of Zavod (Factory) No. 1 in Moscow to remedy problems found during the MiG-1's development and operations. It replaced the MiG-1 on the production line at Factory No. 1 on 20 December 1940 and was built in large numbers during 1941 before Factory No. 1 was converted to build the Ilyushin Il-2.
On 22 June 1941, at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, some 981 were in service with the Soviet Air Forces (VVS), the Soviet Air Defence Forces (PVO) and Soviet Naval Aviation. The MiG-3 was difficult to fly in peacetime and much more so in combat. Originally designed as a high-altitude fighter-interceptor, combat over the Eastern Front was generally at lower altitudes, where it was inferior to the German Messerschmitt Bf 109 as well as most of its Soviet contemporaries. It was also pressed into service as a fighter-bomber during the autumn of 1941 but it was equally unsuited for this. The losses suffered in combat were very high, in percentage the highest among all the VVS fighters, with 1,432 shot down. The survivors were concentrated in the PVO, where its disadvantages mattered less, the last being withdrawn from service before the end of the war.
Development.
The large number of defects noted during flight testing of the MiG-1 forced Mikoyan and Gurevich to make a number of modifications to the design. Testing was done on a full-size aircraft in the T-1 wind tunnel belonging to the Central Aero and Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI) to evaluate the problems and their proposed solutions. The first aircraft to see all of these changes applied was the fourth prototype of the I-200. It first flew on 29 October 1940 and was approved for production after passing its State acceptance trials. The first MiG-3, as the improved aircraft was named on 9 December, was completed on 20 December 1940 and another 20 were delivered by the end of the year.
These changes included:
State acceptance testing of two production aircraft was conducted between 27 January and 26 February 1941. They were found to be over heavier than the MiG-1, which reduced maneuverability and field performance. Time to decreased by over a minute and the service ceiling proved to be less. The MiG-3 was faster at sea level and at altitude. While the ranges reached by both aircraft were farther than that of the older aircraft, they were still less than the required. Mikoyan and Gurevich protested against the range results as their calculations showed that the MiG-3 could reach based on a specific fuel consumption (SFC) of 0.46 kg/km (1.64 lb/mile). During the State acceptance trials the SFC was 0.48 kg/km (1.71 lb/mile) but the operational trials conducted earlier showed a SFC of 0.38 kg/km (1.35 lb/mile). They blamed the deficiency on a failure to use an altitude correction and that the engines had not been properly adjusted. They went as far as arranging for two more flights between Leningrad and Moscow to prove that the MiG-3 could fly 1,000 km (621 mi). Two production aircraft were flown on ranges of and , flying at 90% of maximum speed and at an altitude of , contradicting the report of the NII VVS ("Naoochno-Issledovatel'skiy Institoot Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily"—Air Force Scientific Test Institute).
Despite the teething problems with the MiG-3, in 1941, one of the aircraft's designers—Mikhail Gurevich—was awarded the State Stalin Prize for his contribution to Soviet aviation.
A number of reports had been received about poor quality aircraft received by the regiments which pointed directly at the NII VVS as it was responsible for monitoring the quality of the aircraft delivered to the VVS. On 31 May 1941 the People's Commissariat of Defense decreed that the NII VVS had been negligent. A number of senior managers were demoted and the head of the Institute, Major General A. I. Filin was summarily executed.
A number of MiG-3s were found to have unacceptable performance at high altitudes despite having been designed as a high-altitude interceptor. The oxygen supply was often insufficient and the stall and spin characteristics were very dangerous, especially to inexperienced pilots. This was demonstrated on 10 April 1941 when three pilots of the 31st Fighter Regiment of the Air Defenses (IAP PVO) attempted to intercept a German high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft over Kaunas, Lithuania flying at . All three aircraft entered irrecoverable spins and the pilots were forced to bail out, one being killed. The NII VVS sent an engineer to investigate and he found that the pilots had flown very few hours on the MiG-3 and that that was their first high-altitude sortie. Other problems included insufficient fuel and oil pressure at altitude due to problems with the pumps.
Comparison with other fighters.
The MiG-3's top speed of at was faster than the of the German Messerschmitt Bf 109 F-2 in service at the beginning of 1941 and the British Supermarine Spitfire V's . At lower altitudes the MiG's speed advantage disappeared as its maximum speed at sea level was only while the Bf 109F-2 could do . Unfortunately for the MiG-3 and its pilots, aerial combat over the Eastern Front generally took place at low and medium altitudes where it had no speed advantage.
The MiG's loaded weight of was greater than the Bf 109F-2's and it was less maneuverable in the horizontal plane than the Bf 109 due to its higher wing loading. This lack of maneuverability was exacerbated by the MiG-3's poor climb performance, its instability at high speeds (which can make aerial gunnery difficult due to the point of aim "wandering" and requiring constant pilot input to remain on target), and its underpowered armament.
The MiG-3's standard armament was one UBS machine gun and two ShKAS machine guns, all mounted in the engine cowling and synchronized to fire through the propeller arc. In contrast, most versions of the German Messerschmitt Bf 109 that it encountered had one cannon and two machine guns (although the Bf 109F used during Operation Barbarossa had a 15 mm MG 151/15, meaning that it was armed little better than the MiG). To remedy this problem, 821 aircraft were built with one 12.7 mm UBK machine gun in a pod under each wing in mid-1941. This lowered its speed by about at all altitudes, which was unpopular with the pilots, some of whom removed the pods. One hundred aircraft were equipped with a pair of UBS machine guns in lieu of the ShKAS weapons. Another 215 aircraft also had just the UBS machine guns but were fitted to carry six RS-82 rockets. A total of 72 aircraft mounted a pair of 20 mm ShVAK cannon. A wide variety of armaments were experimented with by various units at the requests of their pilots or to make up shortages.
Production.
The NKAP ("Narodnyy komissariat aviatsionnoy promyshlennosti"—People's Commission of the Aircraft Industry) announced its 1941 production plan on 9 December 1940. Zavod Nr. 1 in Moscow-Chodinka would be required to build a total of 3,500 in 1941. Zavod Nr. 43 in Kiev would begin construction of the MiG-3 and complete one hundred aircraft by the end of the year and Zavod Nr. 21 in Gor'kiy would start to plan construction of an upgraded version of the MiG-3, although this last program was canceled shortly afterwards. 140 were delivered in January 1941 and Zavod Nr. 1 was on pace to exceed its quota with 496 delivered in July, 562 in August and 450 in September. In October the German advance on Moscow forced the Zavod Nr. 1, and its OKO, to evacuate to Kuybyshev where production resumed under unsuitable conditions. However, shortly afterwards, Stalin sent a telegram to the directors of the plants building the Ilyushin Il-2 and the MiG-3 demanding more Il-2 production, resulting in MiG-3 production being terminated in favor of the Il-2, with a final thirty aircraft built in 1942 from spares. An additional factor in cancellation of the MiG-3 was that its Mikulin AM-35A engine was closely related to the Il-2's AM-38 allowing production to be quickly switched from one to the other.
MiG-3 production at Zavod Nr. 1 had already been planned to be reduced from a NKAP order of 27 August that required the factory to produce 420 fighters in September, declining to 100 in December with Il-2 production ramping up to 250 in December while the former aircraft repair plant at Khodynka Aerodrome (Moscow) was to be transferred to the NKAP, redesignated as Zavod Nr. 165, and begin production of MiG-3s. The German advance disrupted these plans for Zavod 165 and it never produced a single MiG-3.
Operational history.
Deliveries to frontline fighter regiments began in the spring of 1941 and were a handful for pilots accustomed to the lower-performance and docile Polikarpov I-152 and I-153 biplanes and the Polikarpov I-16 monoplane. It remained tricky and demanding to fly even after the extensive improvements made over the MiG-1. Many fighter regiments had not kept pace in training pilots to handle the MiG and the rapid pace of deliveries resulted in many units having more MiGs than trained pilots during the Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion. By 1 June 1941, 1,029 MIG-3s were on strength, but there were only 494 trained pilots.
In contrast to the untrained pilots of the 31st Fighter Regiment, those of the 4th Fighter Regiment were able to claim three German high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft shot down before war broke out in June 1941. High-altitude combat of this sort was to be rare on the Eastern Front where most air-to-air engagements were at altitudes well below . At these altitudes the MiG-3 was outclassed by the Bf 109 in all respects, and even by other new Soviet fighters such as the Yakovlev Yak-1. The shortage of ground-attack aircraft in 1941 forced it into that role as well, for which it was totally unsuited. Pilot Alexander E. Shvarev recalled: "The Mig was perfect at altitudes of 4,000 m and above. But at lower altitudes it was, as they say, 'a cow'. That was the first weakness. The second was its armament: weapons failure dogged this aircraft. The third weakness was its gunsights, which were inaccurate: that's why we closed in as much as we could and fired point blank".
On 22 June 1941, most MiG-3s and MiG-1s were in the border military districts of the Soviet Union. The Leningrad Military District had 164, 135 were in the Baltic Military District, 233 in the Western Special Military District, 190 in the Kiev Military District and 195 in the Odessa Military District for a total of 917 on hand, of which only 81 were non-operational. An additional 64 MiGs were assigned to Naval Aviation, 38 in the Air Force of the Baltic Fleet and 26 in the Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet.
The 4th and 55th Fighter Regiments had most of the MiG-3s assigned to the Odessa Military District and their experiences on the first day of the war may be taken as typical. The 4th, an experienced unit, shot down a Romanian Bristol Blenheim reconnaissance bomber, confirmed by postwar research, and lost one aircraft which crashed into an obstacle on takeoff. The 55th was much less experienced with the MiG-3 and claimed three aircraft shot down, although recent research confirms only one German Henschel Hs 126 was 40 per cent damaged, and suffered three pilots killed and nine aircraft lost. The most unusual case was the pair of MiG-3s dispatched from the 55th on a reconnaissance mission to Ploieşti that failed to properly calculate their fuel consumption and both were forced to land when they ran out of fuel.
Most of the MiG-3s assigned to the interior military districts were transferred to the PVO where their lack of performance at low altitudes was not so important. On 10 July 299 were assigned to the PVO, the bulk of them belonging to the 6th PVO Corps at Moscow, while only 293 remained with the VVS, and 60 with the Naval Air Forces, a total of only 652 despite deliveries of several hundred aircraft. By 1 October, on the eve of the German offensive towards Moscow codenamed Operation Typhoon, only 257 were assigned to VVS units, 209 to the PVO, and 46 to the Navy, a total of only 512, a decrease of 140 fighters since 10 July, despite