1971 aviation accident in the Soviet Union
Aeroflot Flight 1912 ( "Reys 1912 Aeroflota") was a scheduled domestic Aeroflot passenger flight on the Odessa-Kiev (Kyiv)-Chelyabinsk-Novosibirsk-Irkutsk-Khabarovsk-Vladivostok route that crashed on 25 July 1971, making a hard landing at Irkutsk Airport. It touched down short of the runway, breaking the left wing and catching fire. Of the 126 people on board the aircraft, 29 survived.
Aircraft.
The aircraft involved in the accident was a Tupolev Tu-104B, registered СССР-42405 to the West Siberia Civil Aviation Directorate, a division of Aeroflot. At the time of the accident, the aircraft operated 19,489 flight hours and sustained 9,929 pressurization cycles.
Crew.
The crew of the fatal flight took over in Novosibirsk. A total of eight crew members were aboard the flight, of which five were from the cockpit crew.
The cockpit crew consisted of:
Flight attendants G. K. Eselevich, L. B. Shokina and A. N. Sorokin served as the cabin crew.
Synopsis.
The Odessa-Kyiv-Chelyabinsk-Novosibirsk part of the route was carried out by a different aircraft, Tu-104B registered СССР-42402; as well as a different crew. At the stopover in Novosibirsk at Tolmachevo Airport, a new crew and aircraft took on the route. At 04:34 local time (01:34 Moscow time) the airliner departed Novosibirsk for Irkutsk. After takeoff the flight maintained an altitude of .
In Irkutsk, the sky was completely covered with stratus clouds with a ceiling of , mild north-easterly winds were present, and visibility was at . The crew was instructed to proceed on the final approach on a bearing of 116°. At 08:10 local time (03:10 Moscow time) the air traffic controller gave flight 1912 permission to begin descent. At 08:29:35 the crew received a landing instructions and permission to descend to an altitude of . The flight crew responded that they heard the information and would begin approach with the ILS. In response, the air traffic controller reported weather conditions to the flight. At 08:31:52 the flight was on approach from the runway. At first, the aircraft stayed on the correct trajectory; but when the aircraft was from the runway, the air traffic controller warned the flight that it was straying to the left. At 08:33:45 local time, when the flight was just from the runway, the air traffic controller warned that they were close to missing the glide slope. In response, the flight crew notified the controller that the landing gear had been released and they were ready to land.
At 08:33:58 received permission to land; the crew confirmed they received the information. At 08:34:18 the crew reported they were near the non-directional beacon. The controller again warned the flight of the slight deviation to the left. The recommended instrument approach speed for the Tu-104 is , but it is very likely that the aircraft's instruments overstated the speed, causing the misinformed crew to try to reduce speed. In reality, the aircraft's speed was around , causing a left bank and a lateral deviation of . At 08:34:47 the aircraft passed the non-directional beacon at an altitude of .
Due to flying less than the recommended speed, the aircraft reached a critical angle of attack. At 08:35:00 with a vertical speed of approximately , the Tu-104 hit the right landing gear on the runway from the base of the runway; milliseconds later the left landing gear, then the front gear, stuck the runway. Shortly thereafter the left wing of the plane broke, fuel leaking from the broken left tanks ignited. The plane skidded on the runway, causing the fuselage to break into pieces. The wreckage of the plane was strewn over an area of . 97 people perished in the crash; the captain, the co-pilot, the flight engineer, a flight attendant, as well as 73 adult passengers and 20 children. 36 of the deaths were from carbon monoxide poisoning.
Causes.
The flight was on an approach speed far below the recommended parameters. The instruments most likely gave inaccurate readings, causing the crew to reduce speed before touching the runway led to a hard landing. Examination of the airspeed indicators showed that the indicators themselves were functional, but flight tests showed that changes in cabin pressure affected the pressure in the full-pressure pipeline of the speed indicator used by the co-pilot and the navigator; resulting in an overstatement of the speed ranging from . While simulating the flight to determine the cause of the erroneous indications, the depressurization happened approximately three minutes after turning off the cabin pressurization. The probability of such events occurring during descent was supposed to be 0.000001%.
The investigation cited the three primary causes of the accident as follows: ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;The lack of objective airspeed reading available to the crew on approach due to mechanical errors upon depressurization of the cabin when reaching a low altitude. ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;Flying at too slow a speed at a dangerous rate of climb, below the recommended parameters, which, with insufficient forward speed, led to the impossibility of performing a normal leveling and a rough blow to the runway surface, exceeding the design load and destroying the aircraft. ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;
References.
 ;templatestyles src="Reflist/styles.css" / ;