1997 aviation accident
Aerosvit Flight 241 (VV241/AEW241) was a scheduled international passenger flight from the Ukrainian city of Odesa to Thessaloniki, Greece. On 17 December 1997, the Yakovlev Yak-42 operating the flight registered as UR-42334 flew into a mountainside during a missed approach into Thessaloniki in Greece. All 70 people aboard were killed.
Investigation by the Greek Aircraft Accidents Inquiry Council concluded that the crash was caused by the flight crew's navigational error. The crew were disoriented and lost during the aircraft's second approach to Thessaloniki. Despite numerous cues, the confused crew refused to declare emergency over the situation and decided to re-orient themselves. The crew failed to follow the route that they were supposed to take and the aircraft ultimately crashed onto the mountains.
In light of the investigation, both the Ukrainian and Hellenic authorities were urged to create a compulsory CFIT training for all pilots in both countries. The Ukrainian State Department of Aviation Transport was urged to include compulsory cockpit resource management (CRM) training to all flight crews and the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority was asked to provide radar facility for Thessaloniki Airport.
Flight.
Aerosvit Flight 241 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Odesa, Ukraine to Thessaloniki, the capital of Greece's Macedonia region and the second-largest city in the country. The flight was originally scheduled to be operated by a Boeing 737. The first sector of the flight from Lviv-Odesa was operated by a Boeing 737 but due to engine issues the aircraft was replaced with a Yakovlev Yak-42. The flight continued towards Thessaloniki through Ukrainian and Bulgarian airspace.
Flight 241 entered Greek airspace from Odesa at 20:39 local time. The crew immediately contacted Thessaloniki's Makedonia Approach. At the time, the air traffic controller was instructing an Olympic Airways flight near the area to descend to . The crew of Flight 241 mistook this message, thinking that it was for them, and read the message back to the controller. The controller later clarified the issue and asked the crew of Flight 241 to stand by. Flight 241 was then cleared to descend for a VOR-DME-ILS approach to Runway 16.
The aircraft somehow arrived in Thessaloniki at a very high altitude and continued to pass over the airport, heading south. The controller noticed this and informed the crew on the situation. They were then instructed to climb to and maintain their flight within the south holding pattern, before later instructed to get out of the holding pattern and to turn back to the airport's VOR by turning right, towards the north, which was acknowledged by the crew.
During the flight crew's attempt to approach the airport for the second time, the controller repeatedly asked about their position for confirmation. The crew stated that they were on the right track and the controller instructed them to follow the route. At this time, based on the information from the crew, they should have been at the north of the airport. The crew didn't report any problems regarding the approach procedure. However, later on the crew suddenly requested a radar vector to the controller. Since Thessaloniki was not provided with a radar, the controller refused for radar vectoring and asked the crew to comply with the written procedure for an approach to Runway 16. The controller then began to worry about the crew's actual comprehension on the procedure for an approach to the airport. He later asked the crew on whether they actually knew the VOR-DME-ILS approach procedure for Runway 16, to which the crew answered with "Now…proceeding VOR… 3,500 feet confirm?". The controller was relieved with the answer and then asked the crew to adhere with the ILS approach and report back when they were established on the localizer.
At 21:11 local time, the controller asked the crew on whether they had been established on the localizer. The crew responded with "Turn right to beacon". ATC then asked the crew to report back if they had reached the localizer's outer marker, to which the crew answered with "Outer marker will report". This was the last transmission from the crew. Flight 241 then ceased all contact with Thessaloniki. The aircraft was declared as missing.
Search and rescue.
The Greek military was notified on the disappearance of Flight 241 and a search and rescue party was immediately formed. The search and rescue operation were initially concentrated to the north as it was the last reported position from the crew. After obtaining the radar data from the Hellenic Air Force, it was subsequently revealed that the aircraft was actually flown towards the west and later to the southwest of the airport. Locals also reported that there was a bright flash near the area. The search and rescue operation were eventually shifted to the area around Katerini and specifically around the Pieria Mountains. Operation was commenced at 23:00 local time, involving members of the Hellenic Coast Guard, Hellenic Navy, Hellenic Army, Hellenic Air Force, Hellenic Police and the Special Disaster Intervention Unit. Members of local ski clubs and mountains climbers also participated as volunteers.
The search and rescue operation were hampered by adverse weather condition in the area. Low dense fogs had prevented rescuers to conduct low flights around the area. The search for the wreckage was also rendered difficult due to the fact that the Yak-42 was not equipped with an Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT).
On 19 December, the Greek army deployed 5,000 people to participate in the search and rescue operation. Twenty-nine helicopters and five hundred vehicles were also deployed to join the operation. However, bad weather still hampered the search and rescue effort and the search was later suspended.
On 20 December, three days after the initial accident, a Hellenic Navy helicopter spotted signs of treetops that had been cut. The site was pinpointed and the search and rescue team immediately reached the site. The wreckage was found at an elevation of 1,100 m, located in a gorge and was buried in heavy snow with debris strewn over a large area. No survivors were found at the crash site. All 70 passengers and crew aboard Flight 241 had perished. In a coincidence, a Lockheed C-130 Hercules operated by the Hellenic Air Force, participating in the search for Flight 241, crashed at Pastra Mountain during its descent to Tanagra Air Base, killing all five crew members.
Aircraft.
The flight was operated by a Yakovlev Yak-42, registration UR-42334. The aircraft first flew in 1986 and was delivered to Aeroflot in June 1986 as CCCP-42334. It was later delivered to Air Ukraine with a registration of UR-42334. In November 1997 it returned from a seven-month lease period to Tiger Air, a Yugoslavia-based charter company. The accident flight was operated under a Wet_lease agreement with Aerosvit. The aircraft had accumulated 12,008 flight hours and 6,836 cycles.
The Yak-42 was equipped with three Lotarev D-36 turboshaft engines. As it was designed by the Yakovlev Design Bureau under the USSR, the aircraft was equipped with the Eastern European navigation system, which was different than the ones that were used in the West. To comply with the western navigation system for the VOR-DME-ILS approach procedure, the Yak-42 should be equipped with a small control panel, above the cockpit instrument panel. There was no evidence, however, that such modification had been conducted. The aircraft manufacturer, Yakovlev, claimed that the data from the involved aircraft had not been recorded by them.
Passengers and crews.
Flight 241 was carrying 62 passengers and 8 crew members. The passengers were consisted of 6 children, 16 women and 40 men. There were conflicting reports on the nationalities of the passengers. According to the President of Aerosvit Airlines, Leonid Pogrebnyak, at least 34 passengers were Greeks, 24 were Ukrainians, 2 were from Poland, and 1 was from Germany. However, Head of Ukraine's Ministry of Emergency, Tatiana Pomazanova, stated that 42 passengers were Greeks and the others were Ukrainians. The instructor pilot, captain and the co-pilot were Russian, while the flight engineer and the rest of the crew were Ukrainian. The Director of Thessaloniki State Construction Company, Melina Emfietzoglou, stated that 23 of the passengers were employees of the company who were travelling home to spend their Christmas holiday with their families.
Among the passengers were Masha Lobas, the wife of Ukrainian football player Volodymyr Lobas and daughter of former USSR biathlon athlete Ivan Biakov, who was travelling with her children to visit the funeral of her husband's grandmother; and Rinata Iosifovna Lemeshko, the wife of Ukrainian football coach Yevhen Lemeshko and the mother-in-law of Ukrainian football player Oleh Protasov.
The commander of the flight was identified as Aleksii Vcherashnyii. He was the captain of the flight and had accrued a total flying time of 9,850 hours with 2,300 total hours on the Yak-42. The unnamed co-pilot had accumulated a total flying time of 6,700 hours in which 3,000 of them were on the Yak-42. The unnamed instructor pilot had a total flying time of 16,210 hours. According to the Greek investigation agency, he had accumulated 5,350 total flying hours on the Yakovlev Yak-42.
Investigation.
As the crash happened in Greece, an independent committee was immediately set up by the Greek government to investigate the crash. Under the Hellenic Civil Aviation Authority, the government formed the Aircraft Accidents Inquiry Council. The investigation was also assisted by representatives from Russia as the state of the aircraft manufacturer and from Ukraine as the state of the aircraft registration.
The flight recorders were recovered from the crash site in good condition and were taken to the German Flight Accident Investigation in Braunschweig for a readout.
Navigational error.
It was apparent that some sort of navigational error had occurred on board Flight 241. The ATC had instructed the crew to head north for a second landing attempt and the crew had confirmed to the ATC that they were on the right track. Hence, if Flight 241 did crash then the wreckage should have been discovered at the north. However, it somehow ended up in the Pieria Mountains, southwest of the airport.
Examination on the recorder revealed that the No. 1 VOR receiver of the aircraft, located on the captain side, was actually inoperative. According to the investigation, the instrument had malfunctioned during the aircraft's approach to Odesa. Despite the condition, the aircraft somehow was allowed to fly to Greece. Due to the malfunction, the localizer signal could not be obtained by the faulty instrument. The CVR and FDR recording further showed that during the crew's attempt to approach Thessaloniki, they didn't follow the supposed procedure for an approach. In accordance with the approach chart of Runway 16 of Thessaloniki Airport, the crew had to come from the north of the airport first. The crew had been instructed by the ATC to pass through waypoint LAMBI, a waypoint located at the northeast of the airport, and then to enter a north holding area. For a VOR-DME ILS approach through waypoint LAMBI, the crew had to turn towards an "arc" first and later turned to the left towards the ILS localizer of Runway 16. The localizer was supposed to help the crew make a stabilized approach by guiding the pilots to the runway with two beams, one of which was to tell the pilots on whether they were high or low and the other was to tell the pilots on whether they were on the right or the left of the runway centerline. These beams would have eventually guided the crew to Runway 16. Flight 241 didn't follow the ATC's instruction to turn towards the supposed "arc" for waypoint LAMBI. Instead, the aircraft flew directly towards the airport's beacon. As such, they were unable to make a stabilized approach. Due to the crew's decision to fly directly towards the beacon, the aircraft overshot the ILS localizer and the crew were unable to descend with the required rate of descent for landing. The aircraft eventually arrived at the airport at a very high altitude and missed its landing at the airport.
The flight crew, who were unaware of the missed landing, were informed by the ATC that they had passed the airport. They were then instructed to climb to and maintain their flight within the south holding pattern, before later instructed to get out of the holding pattern and to turn back to the airport's VOR by turning right, which was acknowledged by the crew. The crew were later asked to confirm their position again if they