1994–95 invasion of the Chechen capital by Russia during the First Chechen War
The First Battle of Grozny was the Russian Army's invasion and subsequent conquest of the Chechen capital, Grozny, during the early months of the First Chechen War. The attack would last from December 1994 to March 1995, which resulted in the military occupation of the city by the Russian Army and rallied most of the Chechen nation around the government of Dzhokhar Dudayev.
The initial assault resulted in considerable Russian casualties and demoralization in the Russian forces. It took another two months of heavy fighting, and a change in tactics, before the Russian Army was able to capture Grozny. The battle caused enormous destruction and casualties amongst the civilian population and saw the heaviest bombing campaign in Europe since the end of World War II.
Tactics.
Chechen units were organized into combat groups, typically composed of around twenty personnel, further divided into three- or four-person fire teams. Each fire team consisted of an anti-tank gunner armed with Russian-made RPG-7s or RPG-18s, a machine gunner, and a rifleman. To effectively engage Russian armored vehicles in Grozny, multiple hunter-killer fire teams coordinated their actions on the ground level, as well as in second and third-story positions and basements. Snipers and machine gunners provided suppressive fire on the supporting infantry, while the anti-tank gunners engaged any armored vehicles.
The majority of Chechen fighters were irregulars and militia members who operated under the command of their respective leaders, often warlord. This arrangement complicated effective battle coordination for Colonel Aslan Maskhadov, Grozny's Chief of Staff. The Chechen forces, which included foreign volunteers, among them a group of Ukrainian nationalists, had limited access to heavy weapons. They possessed only a small number of T-62 and T-72 tanks, with the bulk of heavy weaponry being utilized by regular forces.
During the initial stages of the conflict, the Russian forces were taken by surprise as they encountered fierce resistance from Chechen combat groups. The armored columns, originally intended to swiftly seize the city, found themselves in a devastating battle reminiscent of the historic Battle of Budapest in late 1944. To address the immediate challenges, the Russian military implemented a short-term strategy by deploying self-propelled anti-aircraft guns such as the ZSU-23-4 and 9K22 Tunguska. These anti-aircraft guns were utilized due to the limitations of the tanks' main guns, which were unable to elevate or depress sufficiently to effectively engage the Chechen fire teams. Furthermore, the machine guns mounted on the armored vehicles proved inadequate in suppressing the simultaneous firepower unleashed by multiple fire teams. As a result, the Russian forces had to adapt their tactics to counter the determined and coordinated resistance put forth by the Chechen fighters.
Subsequently, the Russian forces implemented a strategy that involved reinforcing their infantry presence for a meticulous house-to-house advance within the city. Dismounted Russian infantry provided support to the armored units throughout the operation. To gain an advantage, the Russians strategically positioned themselves at ambush points and lured the Chechen fighters into carefully orchestrated traps by moving their armored vehicles towards them. In a similar fashion to Soviet tank crews during the Battle in Berlin in 1945, some of the Russian armored vehicles were equipped with 'field-expedient' cages made of wire mesh. These improvised structures were mounted approximately 30 centimeters away from the hull armor, aiming to counteract the shaped charges employed by the Chechen RPGs, and provide an additional layer of protection. Russian forces proportionally lost more tanks during the battle than they did during the Battle of Berlin in 1945.
Battle.
Air and artillery bombings.
On 22 December 1994, at 5 am, the shelling of Grozny began, but only on 24 December did the Russian troops begin to drop leaflets from airplanes with explanations for the population. During these shelling and bombings, according to some reports (the Memorial Society, human rights activist S. Kovalev), several thousand civilians died and were injured. Aviation began the assault from the airfields of Yeysk, Krymsk, Mozdok and Budyonnovsk. Due to adverse weather conditions, the effectiveness of aviation operations was low. Simultaneously with the start of air strikes, artillery opened fire. On the morning of 31 December, the United Group of Federal Forces entered Grozny. The so-called "New Year's assault on Grozny" began.
New Year's Eve assault.
Citizens of the city woke up at 5 am Moscow Time on New Year's Eve to a Russian bombardment. Bombs and shells hit oil tanks on the western side of the city, creating heavy black smoke. The Oil Institute, in the center of the city, was also set ablaze after coming under aerial bombardment, creating more smoke. Pamphlets urging the Chechens to surrender were air-dropped. Early in December, the Russian Defense Minister, General Pavel Grachev boasted he could seize Grozny in two hours with just one airborne regiment. Before the battle, Grachev said:
It is not a question of an assault in the classic sense of the word. What does an assault on a city mean? It means the use of all the forces and weapons in the country's arsenal. It primarily means heavy rocket preparation lasting several hours. It means heavy bombing raids on the whole city with the aim of disabling 60% of the defenders and de-moralizing the rest.
Plan and composition of the Russian Federal Forces.
The plan for the Russian Federal Forces—invade the city in three columns: "Northern group", "Western group", and "Eastern group".
Because of unexpected heavy and mobile resistance of the Chechens, this was modified to Russian Federal Forces attacking in four columns:
Staging area – in the foothills 3–5 km beyond "Severny" (northern) airfield on the northern outskirts of Grozny
Objective – "Severny" airfield and Maskhadov's "Presidential Palace"
Approach route – Altayskaya street to Staropromishlovskoye highway to Mayakovskogo street (for 131st MR Br); Khmel'nitzkogo to Pervomayskaya to Ordzhonikidze streets (81st Gd MR Regt.), with the two units converging in the Palace/Railway station area of the east Zavodskoy Rayon (Industrial Suburb)
81st Guards Samara Motor-Rifle Regiment (1st and 2nd battalions, Guards Subcolonels Perepelkin and Shilovsky commanding), 90th Guards Tank Division (Commander Colonel Yaroslavetz, Chief of Staff Colonel Burlakov)
3rd battalion, 6th Guards Tank Regiment, Commander Guards Major Zakhryapin
7th tank company – Commander Guards Senior Lieutenant Kovdrya
8th tank company – Commander Guards Captain Vechkanov
9th tank company – Commander Guards Captain Batretdinov 
Personnel and equipment: 157 officers and 1,174 enlisted personnel, 96 BMPs, 2 BREM-1 recovery vehicles, 4 pontoon vehicles, 5 BRM-1Ks, 4 BRDM-2s, 31 T-80BV tanks, 4 Tunguska SP AA vehicles, and 24 guns. With the invasion of Afghanistan, the regiment was at half-strength, and lacked riflemen. One third of their officers and half of enlisted personnel were reserve with little training for the operation.
elements of the 131st Maikop Motor-Rifle Brigade (1st and 2nd battalions) (Colonel Savin)
Personnel and equipment: 1,469 officers and enlisted personnel, 42 BMPs, 20 tanks and 16 guns
276th Motor-Rifle Regiment (Colonel Bunin)
Personnel and equipment: 1,297 officers and enlisted, 73 BMPs, 31 tanks, 24 guns
Objectives – M-29 highway approach to the city, "Lenin Park", and Grozny Railway Central Station
Approach route – Industrialnaya street into Mayakovskogo street
693rd Motor-Rifle Regiment
503rd Motor-Rifle Regiment
237th Parachute Regiment
Objective – Central Hospital Complex
Approach route – Petropavlovskoye highway
255th Guards Motor-Rifle Regiment
74th Independent Motor-Rifle Brigade
33rd Motor-Rifle Regiment
Objectives – Grozny Airport and covering R-305/R-306 highway junctions
Approach routes – Gudermesskaya street and Khankal'skaya street
129th Guards Motor-Rifle Regiment
133rd Guards Independent Tank Battalion
98th Guards Parachute Regiment
Russian advance.
The Russian armored columns invading Grozny on 31 December 1994, were amalgamated from various army units, including untrained conscripted soldiers. The force's columns aimed to provide blunt firepower, hoping to intimidate the Chechens through the sheer scale of the armored operation. However, all armored and mechanized units were under-staffed and under-trained. Although the Russian forces enjoyed air superiority, weather kept the Russians from using their precision-guided munitions effectively. Advancing troops were supported only by Mi-24 attack helicopters, with the Group East losing five vehicles alone due to a friendly-fire incident by Russian air. The previous day, the Russian Air Force bombed nearby villagers, including those anti-Dudayev and pro-Russian. Simultaneously, Moscow made the implausible claim that Chechens blew up buildings in Grozny to simulate bomb-damage by Russian warplanes. From the ground, the assaulting troops were supported by hundreds of artillery pieces positioned on the hills near Grozny, including rocket artillery batteries such as the BM-27 Uragan and BM-21 Grad.
The Plan:
Four Russian armored columns were ordered to move in a sudden and co-ordinated attack, and, after defeating all defenders, were to meet at the Presidential Palace in the center of the city. The key to the plan was all four columns reaching the center of the city simultaneously. However, the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) was late arriving to the group West, commanded by Major General Ivan Babichev, and the bloated column could barely move, with disputed reports of friendly artillery fire. In the east, units of Major General Vadim Orlov's 104th Airborne Division did not join the 129th MRR from the Leningrad Military District after they moved on Grozny and were subsequently hit by friendly artillery fire, the 129th Regiment was badly demoralised and retreated the next day without accomplishing much. Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin's forces of the 8th Corps from the city of Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) attacked the Chechens from the north.
Following their plan, the Chechen command concentrated most of their regular forces against the Russian Main Assault Force commanded by Lieutenant General Anatoly Kvashnin. The MAF comprised the 131st Separate Motor Rifle Brigade and the 81st Guards Motor Rifle Regiment from the city of Samara. The 131st brigade's job was to move into the city from the north at dawn toward the train station. On the brigade's left flank, the 81st regiment drove down Pervomaiskaya Street.
Pervomaiskaya Ulitsa (Street).
One of the two assault groups of the 81st regiment drove toward Pervomaiskaya Street, stretching along the road for a mile. They were delayed while the advanced detachment removed demolition-charges at the River Neftyanka bridge along their route. The first casualty was a T-72 tank attached to the reconnaissance platoon at the crossroads of the Mayakovskogo and Khmel'nitzkogo streets just before the Pervomaiskaya street, with the gunner and driver killed from multiple RPG hits and internal ammunition detonation; the commander survived. Small-arms fire was also received, and one of the reconnaissance vehicles was disabled. Another was attacked from the school building at the start of Pervomaiskaya Street, while a third reconnaissance vehicle was abandoned.
As the reconnaissance platoon retreated into the column, the troopers were confused because they were followed by a truck, and there was hesitation to fire on it because Russian troopers were ordered only to return fire. However, the truck was approaching the leading tank platoon at high speed, so it was destroyed by the accompanying Tunguska. The huge detonation indicated it was a suicide truck bomb. Accompanying artillery fired into the area around the school building for about 45 minutes, and all incoming fire ceased.
At 2 pm, the leading assault group reached the Mayakovskogo street objective. However, while the first echelon was conducting artillery fire, the 1st echelon vehicles (81st Gd MR Regt.) were stationary, and this caused the leading vehicles of the second echelon (2nd Bn., 131st IMR Br.) to mingle with them due to lack of coordination. This lack of experience, including by the individual vehicle drivers, caused a considerable traffic jam at the Mayakovskogo and Khmelnitzkogo intersection for much of an hour. However, that intersection represented the objective for the first day of operation, and both battalion commanders prepared their command for a defensive over-night position.
Suddenly, Pulikovsky ordered them to resume the advance. Captain Arkhangelov, 81st Regiment's deputy for training with the 1st Company, 1st Motor Rifle Battalion, reported call-sign "Mramor" ordering them to advance into the city. In retrospect, some field troopers thought this call sign belonged to General Leonti Shevtsov, Chief of Staff of the Combined Group of Forces in the Chechen Republic.
At this point, the advance guard of the "North" Group reached their 'first day of operation' objective, and the columns of the two battalions of the 81st Guards Motor-Rifle Regiment arranged into a defensive position. Supporting artillery was tasked with firing into citizen defenders.
The Russians had no operational plan for an advance that day. After the order from "Mramor" came to continue the advance toward the Presidential Palace, the advancing column quickly formed during the lingering confusion from the Mayakovskogo and Khmelnitzkogo intersection fiasco. The elements of 1st battalion departed first, but, with them, elements of