1974 Ugandan coup d'état attempt against Idi Amin
The Arube uprising, also known as Arube mutiny and Arube Coup, was a military coup d'état attempt organized on 23–24 March 1974 by discontented elements of the Uganda Army to overthrow Ugandan President Idi Amin. Led by Brigadier Charles Arube, the coupists aimed not only for a government takeover, but also to remove many influential foreign-born soldiers from the Ugandan military. Although the rebels initially succeeded in capturing much of Uganda's capital Kampala, Arube was killed by Amin as he attempted to capture him, resulting in the gradual collapse of the coup. With the aid of loyal troops from outside the capital, the President was able to put down the coup after two days of heavy fighting.
After the coup, the Ugandan government claimed that Arube had committed suicide, and initiated a limited purge of suspected dissidents in the army. Most coup supporters and sympathizers were treated leniently, however, as their cause was popular in the military. Amin consequently made several concessions, including releasing surviving coup leaders, appointing Mustafa Adrisi as the new army chief, and reorganizing the unpopular Military Police to avoid another uprising. Nevertheless, unrest continued in the Uganda Army during the remainder of his rule, and he faced several more coup attempts as well as mutinies until his overthrow in 1979.
Background.
Colonel Idi Amin seized power in Uganda during the 1971 coup d'état, overthrowing President Milton Obote who had previously planned to arrest Amin. The takeover was achieved with the support of a small coterie of low ranking Uganda Army officers—most of whom were of Nubian or West Nile origin—who felt their positions would have been threatened by Amin's arrest. Several higher-ranking officers also did not oppose his takeover. Over time, Amin began to promote several poorly educated and recently recruited soldiers, causing growing tensions with officers who had previously supported or tolerated his regime.
As discontent grew, several attempts were made by officers of West Nile origin to overthrow the President. Ethnic tensions in the military worsened, as various factions representing the interests of different West Nile tribal groups conspired to gain power. One of the most numerous ethnic groups within the Uganda Army, the Lugbara, became increasingly dissatisfied with Amin's government as the President attempted to disempower them. The Ugandan President suspected Christian Lugbara officers of plotting a coup. To maintain control over the military, Amin recruited many foreign-born soldiers into the army, regarding them as more loyal to his own regime. However, native Ugandan officers and soldiers felt increasingly marginalized by the growing number of foreigners, resulting in more unrest. Amin also began to favor Muslims, prompting opposition from Christian troops. As resistance to Amin increased, loyalist elements in the Uganda Army became more energetic in advocating and organizing violence against suspected dissidents within the military. The Military Police under Hussein Marella took a leading role in terrorizing other soldiers, and consequently became very unpopular. Many troops viewed Marella as representative of the brutal, recently promoted foreigners who were leading Amin astray. This image was only partially correct: Marella was indeed of Sudanese origin, had been promoted after the 1971 coup, and was one of the most important advocates of violent suppression of anti-government elements. However, he was also a long-time army veteran who had lived in Uganda since 1954, and his actions were generally supported or tolerated by Amin.
As time went on, Amin dispersed several high-ranking Lugbara, removing them from key positions in the government and military. The Lugbara resistance to Amin grew in the army due to the murder of Lieutenant Colonel Michael Ondoga. Ondoga, an ethnic Lugbara, had served as foreign minister until being removed from his position in February 1974. He was then kidnapped and killed by the State Research Bureau (SRB), causing outrage among the Lugbara soldiers despite Amin's attempts to implicate outside powers in the murder. Several other Lugbara officers were also arrested and sentenced to death. On 21 March 1974, Amin also replaced the Lugbara commander of the Malire Battalion with Lieutenant Colonel Juma Butabika. According to journalist Felix Ocen, "it is thought" that the Ugandan President's actions against the Lugbara officers was a deliberate move to provoke his opponents into open resistance so that he had "ample ground to crush them".
Prelude.
While unrest in the Uganda Army as a whole was high, tensions also grew among its high-ranking officers. Two Christian Kakwa, namely Brigadier Charles Arube and Lieutenant Colonel Elly Aseni, proved to be particularly upset at the growing power of the military's foreign soldiers. In contrast to several of the officers recently promoted by the President, both were career soldiers. Arube had served as Uganda Army chief of staff, while Aseni was Governor of North Buganda Province and also a relative of the President. Arube was regarded as one of the more moderate officers in the army in regards to treating suspected dissidents; this contributed to him gradually falling out of favor with the government. In 1973, Arube was sent to the Soviet Union for a training mission. The United States Central Intelligence Agency suspected that this was a deliberate move by Amin to remove Arube from the country, as the President had become wary of the latter's influence. When he returned to Uganda in March 1974, Arube found that his temporary replacement as chief of staff, Hussein Marella, refused to vacate his new position. The anger felt towards Marella, the Military Police, and foreign troops in general caused many soldiers to sympathize with Arube. Arube already had good relations with the Lugbara troops. In contrast to Arube's grievances, Aseni's opposition to Marella was more personal. According to another officer, Isaac Bakka, the two had developed a rivalry which culminated in an assassination attempt on Aseni, killing the latter's family. Aseni consequently vowed to take revenge on Marella.
Faced with Marella's obstruction, Arube asked Amin to intervene, but the President put off the issue. Frustrated, Arube called a meeting at the Officer's Mess at Nakasero, Kampala. Several officers attended, including Aseni, Butabika, Major Moses Galla (Mountains of the Moon Battalion commander), Major Amin Lomo (Air and Sea Battalion commander), Captain Steven Galla (Kilembe Mines general manager), Lieutenant Enoc Maturima (Malire tank commander), and Lieutenant Michael Akonyu (paratroopers school commander).
At the meeting, Arube voiced his grievances, and asked the other officers for advice. Aseni reportedly advised him to talk to Amin again, Butabika offered to talk to the President on his behalf, while Galla argued that another high-ranking officer, namely Brig. Smuts Guweddeko, possibly could convince Marella to vacate his position. Arube thanked them, and decided to tell them his decision at a second meeting. Instead, Arube and Aseni allied themselves with the discontented Lugbara troops garrisoned in Kampala, and began to plan a coup to depose Amin and purge the Uganda Army of foreigners. To maintain secrecy, Arube and Aseni decided to only inform others of their plans on the day of their supposed coup. They were sure that several other, lower-ranking officers would support them: These included Captain John Maturima, Isaac Bakka (son of then-Minister of Education Barnabas Kili), Second Lieutenant Moses Mawa, Captain John Simba, Captain Birimbo, Lieutenant Mazamir, and Sergeant Anguyo. The coup plotters assumed that most of the troops in Kampala would side with them when the coup started. Accordingly, they planned to mobilize the city's garrisons to seal off Kampala, preventing loyalist reinforcements from entering the city, while occupying important locations such as Radio Uganda and Uganda Television.
Two strike teams were supposed to eliminate Amin as well as Marella: One was supposed to be commanded by Maturima, and attack the command post at Kololo Hill to take Amin dead or alive. The other was led by Mawa and targeted the Makindye Military Barracks, the Military Police's base, where Marella was presumed to stay. The putschists also intended to arrest or kill Ali Towelli who headed the Public Safety Unit (PSU), Isaac Maliyamungu, staff officer in charge of training and all operations, and Taban Lupayi, Marine Regiment commander. The plotters agreed that Arube and Aseni should initially stay hidden until Radio Uganda was secured, whereupon Arube would make a radio broadcast and announce a leadership change to the public. In addition, certain officers were supposed to visit army units outside the capital, convincing them to purge the foreigners in their ranks and join the coup. The coup plotters had supporters in Jinja, Mbale, and Arua. The operation was scheduled to start at 9am on 23 March 1974. At the time, several other high-ranking commanders, including General Mustafa Adrisi, were absent from the capital.
On the morning of 23 March, Arube and Aseni personally contacted those they considered trustworthy, including Bakka, and convinced them to join the operation. In the case of Bakka, they claimed that they were acting to remove the foreigners from the military and depose the government, as it had murdered several native military and political figures.
Coup d'état attempt.
The coup began as planned on 23 March 1974, as the Lugbara troops initiated an uprising at the Malire Barracks in Kampala. According to Ocen, the Lugbara troops were provoked into action after hearing rumours about Arube having been kidnapped by security forces. The coup plotters rallied the troops to their cause by portraying their uprising as attack on "foreign elements" in the Uganda Army. The operation initially went as planned, as the putschists seized much of Kampala, although many foreign soldiers managed to flee the city. Mawa and his troops blocked the Entebbe Road, and captured Nateete, Katwe, and the surroundings of the Makindye Barracks. However, Marella had been informed of the uprising early enough to flee Kampala, moving to the village of Kitubulu near Entebbe. Mawa's men still sealed off the Makindye Barracks, and eventually stormed it. Captain Simba blocked the Busega junction, and Captain Birimbo secured the Bank of Uganda, the Post Office and their surroundings. The soldiers led by Lieutenant Mazamir and Sergeant Anguyo captured Radio Uganda and Uganda Television, followed by the neighborhoods of Wandegeya, Mulago and Nakasero. In addition, Mazamir and Anguyo blocked the Jinja Road to prevent the loyalist Marine Regiment, stationed in Bugoloobi, from supporting Amin at Kololo. The rebels also attacked the PSU headquarters in Naguru. In the south of Uganda, some troops blocked the Kabale-Masaka road to prevent the movement of Rwandan Tutsi SRB agents.
After failing to capture Marella, Arube called Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Kisule, commander of the Artillery Regiment at Masindi, falsely believing that the Military Police leader had fled north. Arube tried to convince Kisule to arrest Marella on sight, arguing that many people had been forcibly disappeared by Marella and his companions, while also threatening an attack by the Malire Battalion if the Artillery Regiment failed to act upon his appeals. Kisule refused to do anything without the President's orders, and ordered his troops to take defensive positions. No attack on Masindi by the putschists materialised. Instead, coup member Bakka arrived at Masindi to convince Kisule to arrest the foreigners. The Artillery Regiment commander still refused, arguing that Arube's coup was a "uprising against Muslim leadership" which would once again marginalize Muslims as they were under previous Ugandan governments. Bakka consequently left for Bondo near Arua. The local commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel, promptly arrested Bakka.
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Amin was a brave soldier, let us recognise that. Despite being besieged, he was still struggling to arrest the situation. He did not attempt to flee. He wanted if he was to be captured, it must be after a bloody battle.
—Isaac Bakka
Meanwhile, Arube changed his plans. Captain Maturima was travelling toward the Kololo Hill with a strong force of about 60 soldiers and several armoured personnel carriers (APCs) when Arube called him, ordering him to wait as he himself would come and take charge of the assault on Amin's command post. After a few minutes Arube arrived, and the attack proceeded. As Arube was not at Radio Uganda to make an announcement, the radio broadcast "Anglican hymns, popular music and other bland material" such as "Onward, Christian Soldiers" during most of the coup. One of the coup plotters, Isaac Bakka, later claimed that Arube had reasoned that Amin should be captured by a senior officer due to military traditions. When the putschists arrived at the command post, they surrounded it while encountering heavy resistance by the Presidential