Last major German offensive on the Eastern Front of World War II
Operation Spring Awakening () was the last major German offensive of World War II. The operation was referred to in Germany as the Plattensee Offensive and in the Soviet Union as the Balaton Defensive Operation. It took place in Western Hungary on the Eastern Front and lasted from 6 March until 15 March 1945. The objective was to secure the last significant oil reserves still available to the European Axis powers and prevent the Red Army from advancing towards Vienna. The Germans failed in their objectives.
The operation, initially planned for 5 March, began after German units were moved in great secrecy to the Lake Balaton () area. Many German units were involved, including the 6th Panzer Army and its subordinate Waffen-SS divisions after being withdrawn from the failed Ardennes offensive on the Western Front. The Germans attacked in three prongs: "Frühlingserwachen" in the Balaton-Lake Velence-Danube area, "Eisbrecher" south of Lake Balaton, and "Waldteufel" south of the Drava-Danube triangle. The advance stalled on 15 March, and on 16 March the Red Army and allied units began their delayed Vienna offensive.
Background.
On 12 January Hitler received confirmation that the Soviet Red Army had begun a massive winter offensive through Poland, named the Vistula–Oder offensive. Hitler ordered OB West Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt to withdraw the following units from active combat in the Battle of the Bulge: I SS Panzer Corps with 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) and 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, along with II SS Panzer Corps with 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich and 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen. These units were to be refitted by 30 January and attached to the 6th Panzer Army under the command of Sepp Dietrich for the upcoming Operation Spring Awakening. Hitler wanted to secure the extremely vital Nagykanizsa oil fields of southern Hungary, as these were the most strategically valuable assets remaining on the Eastern Front. The deadline of 30 January proved impossible for refitting to be completed.
As Operation Spring Awakening would be of great importance, lengthy preparation and strategic care was taken to preserve the operation's secrecy. But while the 6th Panzer Army was refitting in Germany, Hitler ordered a preliminary offensive with a similar object to be conducted, resulting in Operation Konrad III beginning 18 January. The objectives of Konrad III included relieving besieged Budapest and the recapturing of the Transdanubia region. By 21 January, only 5 days into Operation Konrad III, the Germans had taken the towns of Dunapentele and Adony which are on the Western shore of the Danube. Their push resulted in the annihilation of the Soviet 7th Mechanized Corps. This sudden and savage push caused the Soviet command to contemplate an evacuation to the opposite shore of the Danube. Before the end of the 4th day, the Germans had recaptured 400 square kilometers of territory, an achievement comparable to the initial German gains during the Ardennes offensive and the Western Front in December 1944. At the height of Operation Konrad III, January 26, the Axis front lines had reached within 20 km of Budapest's southern perimeter, and within about 10 km of the northern perimeter, but their forces were exhausted.
From 27 January through 15 February, the Soviets conducted numerous successful counter-attacks, forcing the Germans to give up the greater portion of their territorial gains, pushing the front line back to the area between Lake Velence, the village of Csősz, and Lake Balaton. This area had the Margit Line running right through it, and would see more fighting in the upcoming Operation Spring Awakening. By mid-February, the Soviet bridgehead across the Garam River north of Esztergom was identified as a threat. This bridgehead would jeopardize the upcoming Spring Awakening's southeastern push past Lake Balaton to secure the southern Hungarian oilfields while also exposing a straight route towards Vienna. Thus, beginning on 17 February, Operation Southwind began the effort to secure the Garam bridgehead from the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and by 24 February the task was successfully achieved, proving to be the very last successful German offensive of the war.
German plan.
Creation of Operation Spring Awakening.
During a Situation Conference on 7 January 1945, at which both Hermann Göring and Rundstedt were present, Hitler proposed his intention of pulling the 6th SS Panzer Army to reserve due to severe Allied air attacks. Rundstedt received the withdrawal orders on January 8, and the Panzer Army's divisions began preparations to withdraw from the stalled Ardennes Offensive. The slow withdrawal was greatly hampered by Allied air superiority.
On 12 January, the Soviet 1st Ukrainian and 1st Belorussian Fronts began their Vistula–Oder offensive with over 2 million men, placing considerable new pressure on the Eastern Front. When this news reached Hitler, he immediately began to plan a major offensive of his own on this Front. Unfortunately, at the time, Hitler's best remaining panzer forces were still engaged on the Western Front. On 20 January, Hitler ordered Rundstedt to withdraw forces from the ongoing Battle of the Bulge; the 1st SS, 2nd SS, and 12th SS Panzer Divisions managed to disengage and withdraw the same day. Almost all support units of the 6th SS Panzer Army were pulled from the Ardennes by 22 January, while the 9th SS Panzer Division was the last to leave on 23 January.
On this same day, 22 January, Hitler committed to send the fatigued 6th SS Panzer Army to Hungary for his new counteroffensive, a view Heinz Guderian (OKH) partially agreed with. Guderian wanted the 6th SS Panzer Army on the Eastern Front, but would have preferred its employment in the defence of Berlin. A glimpse of the ensuing verbal exchange during this argument was captured in Alfred Jodl's (OKW) post-war interrogation, where he quotes Hitler saying: "You want to attack without oil – good, we'll see what happens when you attempt that".
Hitler's reasoning for sending the 6th SS Panzer Army south into Hungary can be understood through the list of main strategic points listed in a Situation in the East conference held on January 23: 1) The Hungarian oil region and Vienna oil region, which made up 80% of remaining reserves, had to be defended and/or retaken, and without which the war effort could not be continued; 2) the defense of the Upper Silesian industrial region, vital for the war economy and coal production. Two quotes illustrate how seriously Hitler viewed this ruling: ""Hitler considered the protection of Vienna and Austria as of vital importance and that he would rather see Berlin fall than lose the Hungarian oil area and Austria", "He" [Hitler] "accepted the risk of the Russian threat to the Oder east of Berlin"". Hitler chose to ignore Guderian's view for how the 6th SS Panzer Army should be deployed.
On 27 January, Guderian was tasked by Hitler to stop the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the vicinity of the Margit Line in order to protect the vital oil fields. The following day, 28 January, this operation received its preliminary name, Operation Süd (German: South). The main objectives of the operation were as follows: 1) the security of vital raw materials such as oil, bauxite, and manganese for iron, 2) the defense of arable land for food and crops, the Austrian military industrial complex, and the city of Vienna, and 3) to stop the Soviet advance. Interestingly, an additional side-objective was the hope that the counteroffensive would force the Soviet command to divert some forces from its northern offensives headed to Berlin instead towards Hungary.
Operation Süd was scheduled to start after a path to Budapest had been established. The operation would be considered a success if 1) Operation Konrad III could pin the Soviets between the Vértes mountains and the Danube, 2) the 8th Army could secure its Front in Northern Hungary, and 3) if the incoming panzer armies could be refitted during transit to maintain the element of surprise.
Four plans for Operation Süd were produced by high-ranking officials from Army Group South, the 6th SS Panzer Army, and the 6th Army: "Lösung A" (German: Solution A) by Fritz Krämer of the 6th SS Panzer Army; "Lösung B" and "Lösung C2" by Helmuth von Grolman of Army Group South; and "Lösung C1" by Heinrich Gaedcke of the 6th Army. There was much fighting and bickering as to which plan should be implemented. The commander of Army Group South, Otto Wöhler, chose "Lösung B".
The four plans were sent to Guderian on 22 February for review, and Army Group South informed Army Group F commander Maximilian von Weichs on 23 February that the operation would commence on 5 March, in anticipation that Operation Südwind (German: South Wind) would have finished successfully by 24 February. If Operation Südwind was successful, Operation Süd's start could be deferred by 8 to 9 days. On 25 February, Hitler ordered Wöhler, Weichs, and Dietrich to personally present the plans for Operation Süd to him, along with Guderian and Jodl, at the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where he ultimately chose "Lösung C2", disagreeing with the commander of Army Group South, Otto Wöhler. Guderian then ordered Wöhler to increase the daily fuel allowance from 400 to 500 cubic meters (400k to 500k liters) of fuel on February 26, and by February 28 the specifics of the operation, now officially named "Operation Frühlingserwachen" (Spring Awakening), were completed. As per "Lösung C2", 3 offensive prongs were planned, with the main attack of the 6th Army and 6th SS Panzer Army, "Frühlingserwachen", being directed towards the Danube through Lakes Velence and Balaton; the 2nd Panzer Army’s "Eisbrecher" (Icebreaker) attack directed eastward from the western end of Lake Balaton; and the LXXXXI Corps’ "Waldteufel" (Forest Devil) attack directed north from the Drava River.
Overarching German military structure.
OKW was the overarching military command for the German army in WW2, while the OKH was officially a high command operating under OKW. Adolf Hitler was the Commander-in-chief of OKH, while also being the supreme commander of OKW. Finding itself issuing more and more direct orders, OKW eventually became responsible for Western and Southern commands, while OKH was responsible for Eastern commands. This operational overlap caused by the centralized command led to disagreements, shortages, waste, inefficiencies, and delays, often escalating to the point where Hitler himself would have to give the final ruling on a matter.
For Operation Spring Awakening, the area for the new offensive was set on the borderline between OKW (Army Group F) and OKH (Army Group South), and this would cause troubles. Army Group E wanted to assemble its troops north of the Drava River by February 25, but Army Group South was not prepared to start the offensive this early due to the ongoing Operation Southwind; subsequently, the OKW and Hitler grew more impatient. The chosen course of action on 25 February, "Lösung C2", favored the quicker and farther-reaching joint operation of the 2nd Panzer Army and 6th SS Panzer Army, while "Lösung B" opted to first secure the left flank of the main thrust "Frühlingserwachen" (between Lake Velence and the Danube) before moving south toward the 2nd Panzer army. Guderian was in favor of "Lösung C2" because this plan would shorten the time the 6th SS Panzer Division would need to stay in Hungary. The OKW and OKH did not use common terminology for parts of the offensive, as OKH referred to the entire offensive as Frühlingserwachen, while the OKW referred to the operation attacking north of the Drava as "Waldteufel".
Army Group South and the OKH could not agree on how to best utilize the 1st Cavalry Corps. OKH wanted to send the Corps south-west to the 2nd Panzer army, a move Wöhler saw of little use since the 2nd Panzer army would have a lower chance of success compared to the main attacking thrust of “Frühlingserwachen”. Wöhler wanted to use the 1st Cavalry Corps on the eastern shore of Lake Balaton, as German intelligence reported that "the enemy is still the weakest between Lake Balaton and the Sárviz Channel".
To further complicate matters, due to the limited number of newly trained personnel this late in the war, units under Waffen-SS command were often kept at acceptable capacity levels using Wehrmacht personnel. For instance, only 1/3 of the 6th SS Panzer Army's staff were actually from the Waffen-SS.
Arrival into the Hungarian theater.
When withdrawing from the Western Front, elements of the