1945 WWII Luftwaffe air operation
Operation Gisela () was the codename for a German military operation of the Second World War. "Gisela" was designed as an aerial intruder operation to support the German air defence system in its night battles with RAF Bomber Command during the Defence of the Reich campaign. It was the last big operation launched by the Luftwaffe "Nachtjagdgeschwader" (Night Fighter Wings) during the conflict.
By March 1945 the Luftwaffe had lost air superiority over all fronts. Western Allied Air Forces held air supremacy over the German Reich and remaining German-occupied territory. German industrial cities were now subjected to intensive bombardment which inflicted enormous damage on the German war effort. The United States Army Air Forces attacked by day, while RAF Bomber Command operated by night.
Allied armies had also reached the pre-war German territorial borders and now occupied some German towns and cities. In the West the defeat in Normandy and the Allied advance across Western Europe had significant consequences for the Luftwaffe's ability to defend Germany from British night attacks. The Kammhuber Line—German air defence system—which had extended through occupied France, Belgium and the Netherlands was now broken and much of its early warning network had been lost. Along with the battlefield reverses was the inability of the Luftwaffe to produce enough experienced night fighter crews which was exacerbated by the crippling shortage of fuel at this stage in the war which contributed to the collapse of training programs and grounded combat units. Equally serious was the threat posed by RAF de Havilland Mosquito night fighter intruders operating over Germany.
To hamper British operations, a number of experienced night fighter commanders and pilots suggested restarting intruder operations over England. In 1940–1941, German night fighters, lacking airborne radar sets and a means to locate them over Germany, had flown intruder sorties against British bomber bases to attack RAF bombers as they tried to land. Adolf Hitler had ordered a cessation of these activities for propaganda and practical reasons but these operations had met with reasonable success in 1941 and it was felt they might do so again. Hermann Göring, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe, sanctioned the operation. The Germans waited for an opportunity to begin the intruder operation and one presented itself on the night of the 3/4 March 1945, when Bomber Command attacked targets in western Germany. The operation failed to achieve the results hoped for; the success of the attacking force were not commensurate with the losses sustained.
Background.
Intruder history.
German air doctrine had seen little need for the development of a nocturnal night air defence system and the Luftwaffe concentrated on the offensive use of air power. The failure of the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain in 1940 ended hopes for an early conclusion of the war. Faced with German domination of the continent, the only weapon the British could use to exert immediate military pressure on Germany was the night bombing operations of RAF Bomber Command. Bomber Command had been forced to operate at night since December 1939 and the Battle of the Heligoland Bight when debilitating losses in daylight forced the RAF to abandon these operations. These raids, though inaccurate and wholly ineffective, were causing embarrassment to the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe and the second most powerful man in Germany, "Reichsmarschall" (Imperial Marshal) Hermann Göring, who had once boasted "You may call me Meyer" if enemy bombers ever flew over Germany. He ordered the creation a new force set up on 26 June 1940, to combat the night raids.
Göring appointed a respected and experienced pilot, "Geschwaderkommodore" (Wing Commander) Wolfgang Falck to develop a new organisation and consequently Falck founded "Nachtjagdgeschwader 1" (Night Fighter Wing 1 or NJG 1). Within a year four more "Geschwader" (Wings) were founded; "Nachtjagdgeschwader 2" (NJG 2), "Nachtjagdgeschwader 3" (NJG 3), and "Nachtjagdgeschwader 4" (NJG 4). All of these units were in existence by April 1941. To improve the management of the expanding night fighter force, the "Erste Nachtjagd Division" (1st Night Fighter Division) was established on 17 July 1940, commanded by "Oberst" (Colonel) Josef Kammhuber. An aggressive commander, Kammhuber founded the "Fernnachtjagd", or long-range night fighter intruder force. The nucleus of this force was derived from I./NJG 2 which would remain the only intruder unit.
The Germans quickly developed a series of basic tactics for intercepting enemy intruders. The lack of airborne radar at this stage in the war meant finding and destroying Allied bombers at night was a difficult prospect, thus it was decided to use the "Fernnachtjagd" in operations over Britain. "Major" Kuhlmann, head of the wireless telegraphy interception service played a significant part in assisting the Luftwaffe night fighter force as did Wolfgang Martini's "Luftnachrichtentruppe" (Air Signal Corps). Intercepting British signal communications by monitoring the radio traffic of enemy ground stations and aircraft the Germans could determine where and at what airfields RAF night activity was occurring. With the British base identified Falck could then move against them over their own airfields. Three waves could then be deployed; one to attack the bombers as they took off, one to cover the known routes taken by the enemy over the North Sea, and the third to attack them on landing at a time when, after a long flight, enemy crews were tired and much less alert. For operational purposes, Eastern England was divided into four regions or "Räume" (areas). "Raum A" was Yorkshire, bounded by Hull, Leeds, Lancaster and Newcastle. "Raum B" covered the Midlands and Lincolnshire whilst "Raum C" encompassed East Anglia bounded by London Peterborough, Luton and The Wash. Operations began in earnest in October 1940.
While sound in theory, it proved much more difficult in practice. Inexperience told and by December 1940 NJG 2 had lost 32 aircrew killed in action and 12 aircraft lost in exchange for 18 RAF aircraft claimed shot down. Despite the claims made by German crews, evidence showed a considerable amount of over claiming, and the difficulty in substantiating claims at night and over enemy territory became evident.
In 1941, the German night fighter intruders began achieving substantial successes. British ground defences, which had taken their toll on the German units in 1940, were now side-stepped by a decision to shift the area of operations to the North Sea, by the English coast. In June German night fighter units claimed 22 RAF aircraft; 18 over the sea. In July 19 British aircraft were claimed for four losses. By October 1941 British loss records listed 54 aircraft of all types destroyed and a further 44 damaged in these operations to all causes. German losses amounted to 27 destroyed and 31 damaged to all causes.
While the number of losses incurred against German night fighters was not significantly large the psychological damage was substantial. A high number of crashes owed much to nervous British bomber pilots who did not feel safe over their own airfields and consequently landed too hard and fast, or refused to go around a second time for fear of enemy intruders. Just as it appeared that night intruder sorties were showing promise. Adolf Hitler ordered a cessation of operations. For propaganda purposes, he thought that the morale of the German people would be better served by seeing British bombers destroyed and wrecked over German territory. Hitler was also reticent owing the fact there had been no noticeable reduction in British air raids and the RAF had not adopted these methods during The Blitz. This order came into effect on 12 October 1941. Kammhuber would unsuccessfully lobby to have intruder operations reinstated and his efforts to expand the intruder force beyond a single unit were thwarted by an uninterested High Command which was inundated with requests for reinforcements in other theatres.
Operational situation (1945).
Over the next three years the Combined Bomber Offensive had forced the Luftwaffe to devote resources to air defence. In the campaign against the RAF, the German system, named the Kammhuber Line, had become increasingly sophisticated. In 1942 the introduction of Lichtenstein radar, despite its early teething troubles and greater improvements in the armament and capability of German night fighters produced a force capable of inflicting heavy losses on British bomber streams. Though British losses rarely reached more than ten per cent of a raid—considered a minimum target to irreparably damage British combat power—the night fighter force grew in size and potency. British losses in the Battle of the Ruhr (March–July 1943) and most notably in the Battle of Berlin (November 1943 – March 1944) reached an all-time high; 569 bombers in the latter campaign.
To increase the toll on Allied bombers further, intruder operations restarted briefly in August 1943 and took place intermittently or on the initiative of single crews, since no organised "Fernnachtjagd" existed after October 1941. Success was still possible, on 22 April 1944 the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) 1st Bombardment Division and 3rd Bombardment Division were returning to England in darkening skies after a daylight raid over Germany. They were attacked by an element of Messerschmitt Me 410 bomber destroyers of "Kampfgeschwader 51" (KG 51—Bomber Wing 51) over their bases. Over the next twenty minutes, ten aircraft, nine of them B-24 Liberators, were shot down and 61 men killed for the loss of only two Me 410s and four airmen. The attack coincided with Operation Steinbock, a bombing and intruder offensive against Greater London and in response to the British offensive against German industrial cities, but the operation was aimed at the British capital rather than British bomber bases.
In mid-1944 a series of developments impaired the German night fighter defence permanently. The most serious was the collapse of the German front in the Battle of Normandy in August. The defeat led to the advance of the Allied armies across France into Belgium and the southern Netherlands. The Kammhuber Line, which ran through these countries, was eliminated leaving only the northern portions, in northern Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark intact and exposing the Ruhr. Night fighting over France and Europe was also proving increasingly costly. The RAF consistently struck on moonlit nights and bombers were accompanied by a strong number of long-range de Havilland Mosquito night fighter intruder escorts from No. 100 Group RAF. As a consequence of these developments, and just three months after the German night fighter arm's most successful campaign over Berlin, it was fast becoming an insignificant force. Although numerically stronger and with more formidable aircraft designs than ever before (including the Heinkel He 219), the British were winning the electronics war and had succeeded in jamming German radar and radio communications to the extent German countermeasures were "useless". German SN-2 radar and Naxos radar detector had been negated by new Bomber Command tactics. These tactics resulted from the capture of the sets by the British in July 1944 which allowed the RAF to develop counter-measures.
The oil campaign over Romania and against the synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr—in which most oilfields had been destroyed, captured or damaged by 1945—triggered a critical fuel shortage from the autumn of 1944 onwards which denied the Luftwaffe the resources to capitalise on its numerical strength. Paradoxically, production was able to replace the relatively small losses and operational serviceability reached an all-time high since ground crews had more opportunity to work on machines. The Luftwaffe was still capable of taking a toll on Bomber Command on occasion, but unless more powerful radars and communications could be introduced in time it was doubtful British air superiority at night could be challenged. The impotence of the night fighter force "as an organisation" was demonstrated during the attack on Dresden when the second wave of Allied bombers was hardly opposed. Operation Clarion, launched later that month, was not adequately opposed either.
German plan.
The removal of Kammhuber as commanding officer of night air defences in September 1943 did not prevent further appeals for the reinstatement of intruder operations. His replacement as "General der Nachtjagd" (General of Night Fighters), was "Generalleutnant" (Lieutenant General) Joseph Schmid, commanding "1. Jagdkorps" (1st Fighter Corps). Schmid had long argued for a repeat of intruder operations and first pressed for their resumption in December 1943. His proposals were rejected by Göring on the grounds that intruder operations were not his business. Schmid did not receive substantive support from other field commanders, most notably Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, who objected to the operation after meeting with Schmid in January and February 1944 on the grounds that Hitler opposed