Military offensive by the Taliban in Afghanistan
The 2006 Taliban offensive was a major military offensive launched by the Taliban in southern Afghanistan in the spring of 2006. The offensive was planned to unfold on three main fronts concentrated in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar: the first front was to target northern Helmand, focusing on the districts of Sangin, Nowzad, and Kajaki. The second front aimed at southern Helmand, with a focus on the districts of Garmser and Nawa. The third, and most important, would be western Kandahar, targeting the districts of Maiwand, Zharey, and Panjwayi.
The offensive sparked a resurgence of the Taliban insurgency and marked the most significant escalation of the war in Afghanistan since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001. It led to the Taliban gaining control over a considerable amount of territory in the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, Uruzgan, Farah, and Ghazni by the year's end, in which the Taliban established their own administration based on Islamic law, operating independently from the Afghan government.
Background.
At the end of 2001, the Taliban regime was eliminated, but the movement continued to pose a threat to the newly established US-backed Afghan government. Many Taliban fighters and most of its leadership escaped into Pakistan, some of them by being directly airlifted from the northern city of Kunduz by the Pakistani Air Force. This set the stage for a resurgence of Taliban activity with direct support from Pakistan. The Haqqani network, a Taliban affiliated Islamist group centered around the family of Jalaluddin Haqqani, began to carry out small-scale operations almost immediately. By the end of 2002, the Taliban had regrouped, established training camps across Pakistan, and made Quetta their operational hub, forming what became known as the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST). Mullah Omar served as the spiritual leader of the QST, while the strategy was crafted by two Taliban councils: the leadership council and the consultative council.
Between 2002 and 2005, Afghanistan appeared relatively calm, but underlying tribal tensions and flawed US military actions led to a resurgence of Taliban support in rural areas. Kandahar, where the Taliban had been founded in the 1990s, became a focal point for their comeback. The new Afghan government, led by President Hamid Karzai, struggled to deliver basic services in rural areas. It faced systemic issues like fragmented administrative structures and could not attract or maintain skilled professionals effectively. By 2005, only 6% of Afghans had access to electricity. A study by the World Bank found that government aid primarily benefitted the urban elite, leading to widespread frustration and resentment among rural communities. Moreover the tribes that had wielded political power under Taliban rule—Ishakzai, Noorzai, and Ghilzai—were largely excluded from the new administration, further complicating reconciliation between the tribes and Karzai's administration.
In June 2002, Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, took charge of combat operations for the 8,000 US troops stationed in Afghanistan. The US prioritized counterterrorism efforts and refrained from interfering in local tribal matters. Their main focus was to track down and capture leaders of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, with Osama bin Laden being their top target. US special forces were eager to act on any leads they received, sometimes overlooking thorough intelligence gathering. In February 2002, special forces stationed in Kandahar carried out a nighttime raid on compounds in Uruzgan, believing them to be Al-Qaeda hideouts based on local intelligence. However the "targets" turned out to be allies of President Hamid Karzai, and the so-called "intelligence sources" turned out to have been their tribal rivals. This resulted in the death of 16 people as a result of hasty actions by US forces based on faulty intelligence.
By 2004, the Taliban had established communication routes into Afghanistan from Pakistan and strengthened their control over mountainous regions bordering Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan. Violence surged In the south as the Taliban mobilized more fighters from Pakistan. The Taliban brought Iraqi insurgents into the tribal areas of Pakistan to learn about the newest insurgency tactics. This resulted in the adoption of IED attacks and suicide bombings, which were previously uncommon in Afghanistan. Suicide bombings had not been used during the Soviet-Afghan War, but Mullah Omar sanctioned these extreme measures, viewing them as necessary for jihad. Afghan police struggled to maintain security in rural areas, often arriving late when communities sought protection. With the government unable to safeguard them, rural areas became safe havens for the Taliban. Locals had no choice but to support the insurgents due to the lack of protection provided by the government.
Further weakening the government's ability to defend the south, there was an initiative to disarm the Afghan tribal militias to facilitate the creation of a new Afghan National Army (ANA). This effort, known as the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program (DDR), was carried out by the United States, the United Nations, and Japan. As a result, militia numbers decreased from 100,000 to 8,000 by 2005. President Karzai supported the disarmament, recognizing that it would undermine his political rivals.
In early 2006, Afghan analysts, led by the director of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), conducted a study that showed that the Taliban was much more sophisticated than generally perceived. Amrullah Saleh, head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security, believed the Taliban had devised a comprehensive strategy based on undermining the democratic process, persuading key Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan such as the Noorzai, Popalzai, Alikozai, and Ishakzai to switch sides, and ultimately to establish a parallel government in rural villages in the south.
ISAF expansion.
NATO allies, initially supporting the US after the 9/11 attacks, got more and more involved in Afghanistan over the following years. The US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, believed that the US had become too deeply engaged in Afghanistan, and having NATO take over security responsibilities was seen as the solution. On August 9, 2003, NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, initially confined to Kabul. In October 2003, a UN Security Council Resolution expanded ISAF's mandate to operate beyond the capital, eventually leading to the deployment of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan in 2006.
By 2004, thirteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) had been established in northern and southern Afghanistan. These areas, dominated by non-Pashtun populations and with strong Northern Alliance influence, faced no major security threats. However, as the ISAF was next to expand into the Pashtun-dominated south, it presented more significant challenges for the mission.
On December 8, 2005, NATO completed its plan for deploying coalition forces in southern Afghanistan. The Canadians were tasked with Kandahar, the British with Helmand, the Dutch and Australians with Uruzgan, and the Romanians with Kabul. These governments and their military leaders underestimated the severity of the situation. They expected only a few minor skirmishes, not prolonged combat.
In December 2005, British advance teams arrived in Helmand and reported difficulties with the local governor, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada. This led to the most significant foreign infringement in Afghan politics during the whole war as the British lobbied President Karzai to replace Akhundzada with the more Western-oriented Mohammed Daoud. Karzai agreed, but the move left lasting tension. On January 17, Martin Howard, from the Ministry of Defense, testified to the House of Commons Defence Committee. He stated that the violence in Helmand consisted mainly of isolated incidents rather than a widespread campaign, contrasting it with the situation in Iraq. Howard also said that there was "no evidence that the population is turning back to the Taliban."
The Canadian deployment faced difficulties from the start. Glyn Berry, the director of the Canadian PRT, was killed in a suicide attack in Kandahar City on January 15, 2006. In February, around 2,000 troops from the Canadian Task Force Orion were deployed in Kandahar Province for the security handover. The new Canadian force included a combat battalion with three mechanized companies and a PRT. They planned to position their three companies in forward operating bases: one in the northern martello, one in Zharey, and one in Spin Boldak.
Initial moves.
The Taliban's military leadership was led by Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Osmani, Mullah Omar's trusted deputy, and Mullah Dadullah, a notorious Taliban commander known for his brutality. Dadullah had returned to the southern theater after orchestrating suicide bombings in Kabul in 2003. In late 2005, Dadullah deployed larger groups of fighters into Kandahar. These groups traveled through various routes: some came up from Pakistan through the red desert south of Panjwayi, while others descended from the Hindu Kush foothills in Uruzgan and Helmand, or moved west from Zabul. In November and December 2005, fighters from Pakistan gathered in Maiwand District, leading to increased skirmishes and IED attacks. The police were overwhelmed by these threats, with only about 35-50 officers stationed in Zharey, Panjwayi, and Maiwand respectively.
In early 2006, Mullah Omar instructed his deputies, Mullah Baradar and Mullah Obaidullah, to start making their move. Mullah Dadullah headed to northern Helmand and began exerting influence over an area inhabited by around 100,000 Afghans spread across five districts: Baghran, Nowzad, Sangin, Musa Qala, and Kajaki. Dadullah spent several months in northern Helmand orchestrating operations and strengthening the Taliban's presence. "His return was like the arrival of rain after five years of drought," said a local commander. The US embassy warned about the strengthening of the insurgency, pointing out that the Taliban had launched simultaneous attacks against Nowzad, Sangin and Musa Qala in February. The Taliban may have chosen to make their move at this time because the transition of security duties to the ISAF, which was to be completed by July 1, was seen as evidence that the American military's presence in Afghanistan would not sustained long-term.
The defense against the insurgent attacks relied heavily on the Afghan police forces since the Afghan army was still too small to handle the situation. In Helmand, there were around 1,700 police units, while Kandahar had 1,900. Many of these forces were stationed in urban areas and struggled to maintain control in rural regions. The Afghan police were poorly trained and poorly equipped, with only 15% possessing functional Kalashnikov assault rifles. Most lacked motivation, having joined primarily for the salary rather than out of a sense of duty or patriotism. While there were a few exceptions, such as Abdul Razziq's border police forces in Spin Boldak and Naqib Alikozai's police forces in Arghandab, they were not representative of the overall situation.
By spring, the Taliban moved into Panjwayi south of the Arghandab River, aiming to establish themselves with the support of sympathetic Noorzai and Ghilzai tribes. However, these tribes, unwilling to see conflict erupt in their villages, told the Taliban to go elsewhere. Accepting the request, the Taliban moved into Zharey in April and launched attacks on police forces, engaging in several clashes throughout the month. On April 30, an ANA convoy was struck by an IED while traveling on the highway near Gereshk. The explosion resulted in the deaths of four Afghan soldiers. Stuart Tootal, commander of the 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment described the aftermath as he saw "[t]he grisly residue of the body parts of the dead [as they were] lifted off the back of an ANA pick-up truck."
In May, Mullah Dadullah stated in an interview with Al-Jazeera that their ultimate goal was to capture the provincial capitals of Lashkhar Gar and Kandahar City, and use these cities as a launching point to conquer the remainder of Afghanistan. Dadullah could probably muster around a total of 4,000 fighters in Helmand and Kandahar.
Platoon house strategy.
The escalating situation would ultimately result in British troops being deployed into the district centers of Sangin, Nowzad, and Musa Qala. This marked the beginning of what came to be known as the "platoon house strategy." British forces found themselves stationed in remote outposts across northern Helmand, facing sustained and intense Taliban attacks. These outposts remained under siege for extended periods. A "district center" served as the administrative hub of a district, housing government offices, including those of the district governor and police chief. A bazaar was also located in the district center, but only a tiny number of people actually lived there. Most of the bazaar's shopkeepers and business owners lived in the surrounding villages. Thus, controlling the district center did not equate to control over the people who frequented it.
In April, a new British unit, the Helmand Task Force, was deployed to tackle the Taliban threat. The main combat force