Operation Appearance (16 March – 8 April 1941) was a British landing in the British Somaliland Protectorate against troops of the Italian Army. The Italian conquest of British Somaliland had taken place seven months previously, in August 1940. The British had withdrawn from the protectorate after a delaying action at the Battle of Tug Argan. This withdrawal, after the disastrous conclusion of the Battle of France and the Italian declaration of war on 10 June 1940, had repercussions among British leaders. It led Prime Minister Winston Churchill to lose confidence in General Archibald Wavell, the British commander in the Middle East, which culminated in Wavell's sacking on 20 June 1941.
British, Empire and Commonwealth forces from the United Kingdom, British India, Australia and South Africa in Aden trained for a prospective invasion of British Somaliland. The Far Eastern Fleet provided Force D, comprising two cruisers, two destroyers and a collection of adapted troop transports. To deceive the Italians in Ethiopia about British intentions in East Africa, Operation Camilla was leaked, suggesting that troop movements to Sudan were for an invasion of British Somaliland and that a diversionary operation would come from Kenya in the south. In Operation Canvas, the real invasion plan, Kenya was the base for the main invasion.
Force D and the Aden Striking Force conducted a beach landing at Berbera on 16 March 1941, taking the port by 10:00 a.m. The Italian garrison made a precipitate retreat back to Ethiopia and local troops deserted en masse. In a few days, Berbera was developed to receive troops and supplies for the operations against Ethiopia, reducing the supply distance to the fighting front by . A British military administration was imposed on the protectorate, the local police and the Somaliland Camel Corps were re-established, civilians were disarmed and the economy was revived.
Background.
Strategic situation, 1940.
On 10 June 1940, when Italy declared war on Britain and France, Italian military forces commanded by the viceroy and governor general of (AOI, Italian East Africa), the Duke of Aosta became a threat to the British and French holds on their colonies in East Africa. Italian forces in Eritrea endangered British sea routes along the coast of East Africa, to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, French Somaliland, British Somaliland and Kenya Colony (British Kenya) were vulnerable to attacks from the AOI. The collapse in France and the Armistice of 22 June 1940 drastically weakened the British strategic position in the Middle East and East Africa. The closure of the Mediterranean to British sea traffic left only the voyage around Africa, to supply the British forces in the Middle East. On the eve of the Italian declaration of war, the Italian colonies in East Africa had 91,203 Italian members of the armed forces and police and 199,973 Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somali . In July, the British had 47,000 men in British Kenya, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and British Somaliland.
Italian invasion.
On 3 August 1940, British reconnaissance aircraft discovered that about 400 Italian troops had crossed the Ethiopian–British Somaliland frontier at Biyad, near Borama (Boorama). The Italian invasion force moved in three widely dispersed columns, co-ordinated by wireless and liaison aircraft. The main (central) Italian column advanced from the region of Harar in Italian Ethiopia, crossed the border south of Borama and reached Hargeisa on 5 August. The Somaliland Camel Corps skirmished with the Italians as they advanced and the central column attacked Hargeisa with infantry and light tanks covered by artillery and air attacks. A Rhodesian infantry company blocking the road retreated, after knocking out three light tanks, while the main British force slowly retired from the town. On the same day, the northern invasion column captured the port of Zeila (Saylac), not far from French Somaliland and then slowly advanced the down the coast road to Berbera, taking Bulhar (Bulaxaar), about from Berbera, on 17 August.
The main Italian force advanced in the centre from Hargeisa along the road to Berbera, only slightly delayed by road demolitions and improvised land mines. British troops in advanced positions were withdrawn on 10 August and the Battle of Tug Argan took place from 11 to 15 August. The Italians had achieved air superiority by 6 August and the defenders held the gap against Italian attacks for 72 hours, eventually running out of ammunition. Italian artillery superiority led to the defenders gradually being overwhelmed. By the time that the northern Italian column reached Bulhar, the defence of the Tug Argan gap had begun to collapse. Major-General Alfred Reade Godwin-Austen had been sent to command the forces in British Somaliland and on 14 August, judged that the situation at Tug Argan was irretrievable and was instructed by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Middle East Henry Maitland Wilson to withdraw from the protectorate (Wavell was in Britain). The garrison retreated to Berbera and by 2:00 p.m. 18 August, most of the contingent had been evacuated to Aden, with the HQ sailing in on the morning of 19 August; Italian forces entered Berbera that evening. The British suffered 38 men killed and 222 men wounded; the Italians 2,052 casualties.
Operation Camilla.
After the retreat to Aden, the British established Military Mission No. 106 (Hamilton's Mission) to conduct sabotage and subversion operations in occupied British Somaliland. The former Senior Administrative Officer of the protectorate, Reginald Smith, made several secret journeys to the land to glean information. In Cairo, General Archibald Wavell, GOC-in-C Middle East Command concocted Operation Camilla, a deception to mislead the Italians about the transfer of troops to Sudan. The operation was intended to convince the Italians that the troops movements were part of a plan to invade British Somaliland in February 1941 and then advance on Harar. Wavell wrote in a document that,
 ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;...the loss of British Somaliland has always rankled bitterly between my government and myself. I got a rocket from the government and nearly lost my job at the time... I have orders to recapture it as soon as resources are available and am most anxious to remove this blot on my reputation.
The document purported Operation Canvas, the invasion of Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia from Kenya, to be a diversion; it was sent to the local commanders in East Africa using means by which the British expected it to leak to the Italians. The main invasion from Kenya required a huge supply effort and the plan to re-capture British Somaliland was intended to create a much closer supply route from Berbera for the southern invasion force. The port was rudimentary but improvements could quickly be effected. Aosta, the Italian commander of the AOI was convinced by February that an invasion of the colony was imminent.
Prelude.
Plan.
The British made use of such resources as were available to British Forces Aden (Air Vice-Marshal Ranald Reid) to re-capture Berbera and expand it into a bridgehead sufficient to supply 15,000 troops. About 3,000 men of the Aden Striking Force, comprising the 1/2nd Punjab Regiment and 3/15th Punjab Regiment of the British Indian Army (1895–1947), which had fought in the colony during the Italian invasion, a Somali commando detachment and the 1401/1402 (Aden) Companies, Auxiliary Military Pioneer Corps Group and 150 motor transport (MT) would be transported across the Gulf of Aden. The East Indies Fleet, comprising ships of the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Navy were to contribute Force D (Captain Harold Hickling), the cruisers and , the destroyers and , the auxiliary cruisers "Chakdina" and "Chantala", Royal Indian Navy trawlers "Netravati" and "Parvati" (Lieutenant HMS Choudri, R.I.N.), the troop transports S.S. Beaconsfield and Tuna and ML 109. Force D was to conduct the voyage in two parts, the advanced part comprising "Kandahar", "Chantala", "Chakdina", "Parvati", "Netravati" and the cargo ships "Beaconsfield" and "Tuna", carrying troops and towing three tugs and six lighters. The second wave of Force D comprised "Glasgow", "Caledon", "Kingston" and M.L. 109, all transporting troops.
Preparations.
Training began in January, ships were converted to carry troops, two of the lighters, designed by the Sea Transport Officer, Aden, Commander Vernon were to be used as floating piers, fitted with ramps to ease the unloading of the MT, including armoured cars. The RAF flew reconnaissance sorties to find suitable landing points, discover Italian defensive preparations and find potential landing grounds for their aircraft. With fire support from the cruisers and destroyers, the invasion force was to land on beaches between reefs to the east and west of Berbera, create a bridgehead and then re-occupy the protectorate. The air photographs obtained were an incomplete set and the Navy considered that towing vessels from Aden was risky because the tows could part and delay the voyage. In poor visibility finding Berbera could not be guaranteed and approaching an unsurveyed, hostile and dark shore at night, then finding gaps in the reefs wide enough to tow through the lighters was a gamble. The importance of Berbera to the British offensive against Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia was such that the risks were accepted. On the three nights before the landings, the RAF bombed the big Italian base at Dire Dawa in Ethiopia.
Voyage.
On 14 March the first echelon departed Aden at 10:45 p.m. but only out, tows parted, some wrapping around the ships' propellers. To keep to the schedule a quick change of plan was made; "Kandahar" left the tugs and lighters for "Beaconsfield" and "Tuna" to tow. The naval ships went ahead to make rendezvous north of the Berbera Light at 1:00 a.m. on 16 March according to the plan. The sloop was sent from Aden to assist "Beaconsfield" and "Tuna" by 3:30 p.m. on 15 March. The second echelon sailed an hour later and rendezvoused as planned. At 1:00 a.m. on 16 March "Glasgow", " Caledon", "Chantala", "Chakdina", "Netravati", "Parvati" and M.L. 109 were to land the 1/2 and 3/15 Punjab at Main Beach, west of Berbera Light covered by a bombardment from "Glasgow", along with "Kandahar" and "Kingston", which carried the (mostly Somali) 200-man Commando of Force G (R) who were to make the subsidiary landing east of Berbera, covered by "Kandahar". The ships were to close on the coast at . "Shoreham", "Beaconsfield", "Tuna" with the three tugs and six lighters in tow, were about midway between Aden and Berbera, moving at .
Invasion.
Landings.
At 1:01 a.m. on 16 March "Glasgow", "Kandahar", "Kingston" and M.L. 109 moved forward at towards Berbera Light and to find the gaps in the reefs off the landing beaches. "Caledon", "Chantala", "Chakdina", "Netravati" and "Parvati" were to arrive off the west beach at 2:30 a.m. and drop anchor near "Glasgow" which would be showing a red light out to sea. During the approach lights were seen ashore from vehicles on the Hargeisa Road, bound for Berbera. At 2:03 a.m. on 16 March, the Berbera Light was seen on a bearing 186° at distance. "Kandahar" and "Kingston" separated from the force and made for the eastern beach; "Glasgow" stopped and launched a motor boat and skiff for Commander Vernon to use to find the gap in the reef off the western beach. The gap was hard to find and there was a delay of 63 minutes in landing the first tows. "Kandahar" and "Kingston" found their gap in the reef off the eastern beach at 3:00 a.m. although the reconnaissance photographs had shown this to be the harder of the two to find. The delay led to apprehension by Colonel Pollock and Captain Hickling (the captain of Glasgow) that the landing might occur in daylight.
The landing at the eastern beach due at 3:30 a.m. was also delayed; at 3:26 a.m. a Somali fisherman in a canoe rowed up to "Glasgow". The fisherman said that Italians still occupied the town but some had left by lorry that night; there were Italians near the Berbera Light. The Somali was sent to find the gap in the reefs but Vernon found it at 3:58 a.m. At 4:13 a.m. the signal "Land, follow Glasgow's boats" was given and four minutes later "Glasgow" began to bombard the main beach with H.E. from its 4-inch guns and 2-pounder pom-poms. The fire from the 4-inch main armament was that used for E-boat attack, with half the shells bursting on impact and the other half bursting over the target, until 4:20 a.m. when "Kingston" received the order to begin landing on the eastern beach. "Kandahar" bombarded the beach from