Military actions undertaken by the Polish Army during the invasion of Poland
The Defense of Ochota and Wola refers to military actions undertaken by the Polish Army on 8–9 September 1939 during the September campaign, in the districts of Ochota and Wola in Warsaw. The result was the repulsion of the German assault by the 4th Panzer Division and thus the thwarting of the German plan for a rapid capture of the Polish capital.
On 8 September 1939, German tanks reached the outskirts of Warsaw. Believing that merely their presence would break the defenders' will to fight, General Georg-Hans Reinhardt attempted to capture the city that same afternoon. However, the German tanks advancing along the Kraków Avenue were repelled by the fire of Polish artillery and infantry. The next day, after bringing up artillery and the main forces of the 4th Panzer Division, the Germans launched a regular assault. The main focus of the attack was on Ochota, although fighting also broke out in Wola and at Mokotów Field after a while. The Polish defenders managed to repel the enemy assault, and the 4th Panzer Division suffered the loss of up to 50% of its tanks during its unsuccessful attempt to capture Warsaw.
The defense of Ochota and Wola was the greatest success achieved by the Poles during the defense of Warsaw in September 1939. The repulsion of the attack had a positive impact on the morale of both soldiers and civilians. Combined with the Polish counteroffensive that began at the same time on the Bzura river, it forced the Germans to temporarily cease their attempts to capture Warsaw through direct assault.
Background.
Plan West assigned Warsaw a relatively modest role in the event of war with Germany. Polish planners assumed that the fighting would take place far from the capital, and the possibility of the enemy quickly reaching its borders, let alone Warsaw being surrounded, was not even considered. The main military tasks planned for the city focused primarily on repelling "Luftwaffe" attacks.
On 1 September 1939, Germany launched its armed aggression against Poland. On the night of 1 to 2 September, the German 10th Army broke through the Polish front near Częstochowa. By the evening of September 5, the Łódź Army, which had been defending against the German advance, was forced to abandon its main defensive position and begin a general retreat. Meanwhile, in battles near Piotrków Trybunalski and Tomaszów Mazowiecki, the Germans defeated the not fully concentrated and poorly led Prussian Army. These victories opened the way for them towards central Wisła and Warsaw.
On September 3, the Commander-in-Chief of the Border Guard, Brigadier General Walerian Czuma, was summoned by the Minister of Military Affairs, General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, and tasked with organizing the defense of the capital. Work began on forming the staff of the Warsaw Defense Command. The next day, General Mieczysław Ryś-Trojanowski officially appointed General Czuma as the commander of the Warsaw garrison. Due to previous neglect by the high command, Czuma had to organize the city's defense from scratch, in conditions of complete improvisation. Worse still, the preparations were disrupted by chaos and panic, caused by the hasty evacuation of government authorities. The situation was further worsened by the exodus of civilians, driven by an ill-conceived radio appeal made by the Head of Propaganda of the Supreme Command, Lieutenant Colonel Roman Umiastowski, on September 6. Ultimately, General Czuma, with significant support from the city's commissioner president, Stefan Starzyński – who became Civil Commissioner of the Warsaw Defense Command on September 8 – managed to bring the situation under control and prepare the city for defense in less than four days.
By September 8, the Warsaw garrison consisted of 17 infantry battalions, 10 light artillery batteries, 6 heavy artillery batteries, and the equivalent of a tank battalion (the so-called Armored-Motor Group of the Warsaw Defense Command, under Captain Bolesław Kowalski).
Polish defense in Ochota and Wola.
On 8 September 1939, the Warsaw Defense Command reorganized the defense of the left-bank part of the city, dividing it into three sectors. The districts of Wola and Ochota were included in the "West" sector, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Józef Kalandyk, who also led the 40th Infantry Regiment of the Lviv Children. The command post was located in the Mounted Police barracks at 13 Ciepła Street.
The forward defensive line of the "West" sector began in Ochota, starting at Sucha Street, running along the northern edge of the Mokotów Field, along Wawelska Street, and reaching Opaczewska Street at Ludwik Pasteur Street. From there, it continued along Opaczewska Street to Mszczonowska Street and, crossing the railroad tracks, reached Wola. In Wola, it ran first along Gizów and Redutowa streets, reaching the Koło neighborhood and covering its western edge. This line was defended by three infantry battalions supported by artillery units equivalent to slightly more than a division.
The II Battalion of the 41st Suwałki Infantry Regiment held positions along Wawelska Street (starting from Sucha Street), with its defensive line continuing along Ludwik Pasteur and Opaczewska streets to Białobrzeska Street. Its commander, Major Roman Zagłoba-Kaniowski, set up his command post at 24 Grójecka Street. The individual subunits were deployed as follows:
The II Battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment of the Lviv Children held positions starting at the intersection of Opaczewska and Mątwicka streets, continuing along the western part of Opaczewska Street, and then along Mszczonowska (on both sides of the Warsaw Cross-City Line) and Gizów streets to Jan Kazimierz Street (including the intersection with Wolska Street). Its commander, Major Antoni Kassian, set up his command post at 11 Sękocińska Street. The individual subunits were deployed as follows:
The III Battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment of the Lviv Children held positions from Wolska Street, along Redutowa and Księcia Janusza streets, to Fort Bema. Its commander, Major Antoni Sanojca, set up his command post at a pencil factory on Syreny Street. The individual subunits were deployed as follows:
The second line of defense in Ochota stretched from the Warsaw University of Technology buildings to Szczęśliwicka Street. It was manned by the III Battalion of the not-yet-fully-formed 360th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Major Wacław Niedzielski. The second line of defense in Wola was manned by the I Battalion of the 360th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Artemi Aroniszydze.
If needed, additional fire support could be provided by two platoons from the 1st Battery of the Warsaw Defense, deployed at the end of Independence Avenue near the Mokotów Field and in the vicinity of Artur Zawisza Square (a total of 5 guns, 75 mm). This meant that the infantry of the "West" sector could count on the support of approximately 20 guns, 75 mm, and several dozen anti-tank guns, 37 mm.
As early as September 5, barricades and anti-tank barriers began to be constructed in Ochota, particularly blocking key routes leading into the city. The civilian population actively participated in their construction. Minefields were laid in the outskirts. Obstacles, fortifications, and mines were also set up in Wola.
Like in other sectors, General Czuma based the Polish defense on the compact urban fabric, hoping to offset the enemy's advantage in armored forces. Polish units primarily manned the main routes leading into the city, while the spaces between them were only guarded by outposts. The course of the fighting proved this to be a wise decision. However, it was a mistake to leave Fort Szczęśliwice unguarded, as the Germans later used it as a base for attacks on Ochota.
Fighting on September 8.
Prelude.
On September 8 at around 5:00 AM, the reconnaissance company of the 40th Infantry Regiment, acting on the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Kalandyk, sent out two patrols to reconnoiter the approaches to the capital. A mounted platoon led by the company commander, Second Lieutenant Tadeusz Düring, headed towards Ożarów Mazowiecki and Piastów. A platoon of cyclists commanded by Reserve Second Lieutenant Zdzisław Szczudłowski went in the direction of Falenty. Both subunits returned to Warsaw around 10:00 AM, having failed to make contact with the enemy. Two officer patrols sent at 8:00 AM by the II and III battalions of the 40th Infantry Regiment (the first heading towards Rakowiec and Szczęśliwice, the second towards Włochy) also did not encounter any Germans.
Before noon, independent of Lieutenant Colonel Kalandyk, Colonel Tadeusz Roman Tomaszewski, the chief of staff of the Command of the Defense of Warsaw, decided to direct reconnaissance towards the western approaches to the capital. Motorized pioneer patrols and a reconnaissance tank company under the command of Captain Antoni Brażuk set out on this task.
On the same day, the German XVI Army Corps, commanded by General Erich Hoepner, reached Warsaw. Its right-flank 1st Panzer Division captured Góra Kalwaria. Meanwhile, the 4th Panzer Division reached the Pruszków – Raszyn line around noon. Its leading units encountered and defeated Captain Brażuk's reconnaissance tank company. The Poles lost 12 soldiers and 5 TK-3 tankettes.
Before noon, civilians brought news to Warsaw about the advancing German troops. Around 2:00 PM, a reconnaissance company from the 40th Infantry Regiment was sent towards Ożarów and Grodzisk. It was forced to retreat by superior enemy forces. By 3:00 PM, German tank crews had taken control of the airport at Okęcie. They also captured the unprotected Włochy and Raszyn, where they seized the Raszyn radio transmitter. The Polish personnel managed to disable it in time, for which almost all of its members were immediately arrested.
The commander of the 4th Panzer Division, General Georg-Hans Reinhardt, set up his command post in Raszyn. Later that same day, he was visited there by the commander of the 10th Army, General Walter von Reichenau, accompanied by General Hoepner. Both superiors reassured Reinhardt that Warsaw would not be defended. In this situation, the division commander decided to attempt to seize the city in a rapid assault that very afternoon.
The 4th Panzer Division had suffered losses during the previous fighting; however, it still had between 250 and 260 tanks and 50 armored vehicles. Additionally, it was reinforced by the 33rd Motorized Infantry Regiment from the 13th Motorized Infantry Division and a battalion of artillery and sappers. The division was still not fully concentrated. Nevertheless, Reinhardt was convinced that the mere sight of tanks would paralyze the defenders' will to fight. Regular soldiers also approached the battle with great optimism. As Reinhardt recalled:"An extraordinary tension prevailed in the division. In every eye, there was proud joy at experiencing the momentous occasion of entering the enemy's capital on the eighth day of war. Without orders, the crews decorated their vehicles with reconnaissance flags featuring the swastika. No one thought of serious combat. Many saw themselves already as masters of the city, enjoying hotels and the best accommodations."That day, General Czuma issued a daily order, urging soldiers to fight for the defense of the capital. It included the following words:"Soldiers of the Warsaw garrison! The Supreme Commander has entrusted us with the defense of the Capital. He demands that the enemy's assault break against the walls of Warsaw, that an end be put to the destruction of Polish lands; to avenge our fallen comrades in battle, men, women, and children who have died a soldier's death. We must extend a helping hand to the weary fighting units, facilitating their further combat tasks. Soldiers! We have taken a position from which there is no retreat. In this position, the enemy may only hear one answer: 'Enough! Not one step further!' And we may submit only one report: 'The order of the Supreme Commander will be fulfilled'."General Czuma, together with Colonel Marian Porwit, also conducted an inspection of the distant front. When they were near Błonie, they received a report from a lone motorcyclist that German tanks were just one and a half kilometers away. They immediately returned to Warsaw, heading for Ochota, where they personally informed the garrison of this most threatened sector about the approaching enemy. General Czuma ordered vehicles with refugees to be removed from the Kraków Avenue, correctly anticipating that the German attack would come from that direction.
Course of the first battle.
The German armored column set out around 5:00 PM from the Okęcie area. At the same time, German artillery from the vicinity of Raszyn bombarded the Polish capital for the first time in the September campaign. When the tanks reached the allotment gardens on the outskirts of Ochota, a radio message was sent from the 4th Panzer Division headquarters: "German troops entered Warsaw today at 5:15 PM".