The Battle of Abu Tellul (called the Affair of Abu Tellul by the British Battles Nomenclature Committee) was fought on 14 July 1918 during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I after German and Ottoman Empire forces attacked the British Empire garrison in the Jordan Valley. The valley had been occupied by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) from February 1918 when Jericho was captured. Following two raids east of the River Jordan by the EEF the first in March and second in April the defence of the valley became the responsibility of the Desert Mounted Corps.
A German and Ottoman force attacked the Australian Light Horse units defending the heights at Mussallabeh and Abu Tellul on the edge of the Judean Hills, while a German force attacked those defending the Wadi Mellaha midway between Abu Tellul and the Jordan River. As these attacks were taking place on the western bank of the river, on the eastern side the Ottoman Caucasus Cavalry Brigade deployed two regiments, to attack the bridgeheads at the fords of El Hinu and Makhadet Hijla. However, the Ottoman formation was overwhelmed by a combined force of British and Indian troops before it could launch its attack. These were the last attacks against the British forces in this campaign.
Background.
Military situation.
Abu Tellul was a strategically important ridge located near the west bank of the Jordan river which, together with another ridge to the north called Mussallabeh, formed a salient in the British defensive line in the Jordan valley. A number of defensive posts were constructed by the Australian and New Zealand garrison which were often between and apart, consisting of either dug or built up stone sangars, while the ravines in between were covered with barbed wire. The British artillery batteries were concealed close behind the front line just south of the ridge.
El Mussallabeh had been attacked on 11 April, between the first and second Transjordan raids. The attack had been launched by a composite force of four Ottoman infantry battalions and several batteries. Subsequently, defensive work was carried out. From early May, when the withdrawal of the forces involved in the second Transjordan attack was complete, the occupation of the Jordan Valley by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was unchallenged, except for the attacks on 14 July and shelling by long-range Ottoman and German artillery.
The Ottoman and German attack occurred on the front line protecting the garrison in the valley; the main focus being a salient in the wilderness to the north north west of the Wadi el Auja on the western side of the Jordan River. They sought to cut off the British force in the Jordan Valley from the infantry holding the front line in the Judean Hills by creating a wedge between the infantry and the mounted force in the valley. Such an action would, if successful, have destabilised British control of the Jordan and Dead Sea area, effectively ending the threat of a third Transjordan attack by pushing Lieutenant General Harry Chauvel's forces back out of the Jordan Valley. If the attack succeeded, the front line stretching from the Mediterranean Sea would have been considerably shortened and potentially destabilised. The Ottoman Eighth Army defending the coastal sector, the Seventh Army defending the Judean Hills and the Fourth Army defending the east would have been able to strengthen their considerably shorter line to threaten General Edmund Allenby's right flank making the attacks in September at Megiddo very difficult, if not virtually impossible.
Deterioration of German–Ottoman relations.
Bad feelings between the two allies arose when it was believed by sections of the Ottoman Army in Palestine that some German units had been withdrawn and sent to the Caucasus. In fact, no units of the Ottoman Army were withdrawn from Palestine to support the Trans-Caucasian campaigns, one infantry division and an infantry regiment were sent to eastern Anatolia in 1918 but from Constantinople. Indeed, considerable reinforcements arrived in Palestine from Caucasia in 1918 including the 2nd Caucasian Cavalry Division and the 37th Division. The cordial relations developed between Ottomans and Germans during three years of war in the Sinai and Palestine were, however, seriously undermined in May 1918 when Enver Pasha violated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and aggressively expanded the Ottoman presence in Georgia.
Prelude.
Attacking force.
The force consisted of the German 702nd and 703rd Battalions with one battalion of the 146th Regiment, the Ottoman 24th and 53rd Divisions, one company of the 11th Jäger Regiment (German light infantry), the Ottoman Caucasus Cavalry Brigade's 2nd (not engaged), the Ottoman 32nd, 58th and 163rd Regiments and two regiments of 3rd Cavalry Division. Included in this force was a group of 100 Germans who were armed with 42 automatic rifles.
Defending force.
The Abu Tellul sector was held by two regiments of the 1st Light Horse Brigade; the 2nd Light Horse Regiment held four posts; "Mussallabeh", "Maskera" "The Bluff" and "Vyse" while the 3rd Light Horse Regiment held the "Vale", "View", "Vaux", "Zoo" and "Zeiss" posts which surrounded the high plateau of Abu Tellul where the "Abu Tellul East" and "Abu Tellul West" posts were separated by a gully. Before the attacks began, the commander of the 3rd Light Horse Regiment was asked if he thought the front line could stop a determined attack at Abu Tellul –
The 1st Light Horse Regiment formed the brigade reserve. The defence of these Mussallabeh and Abu Tellul positions was supported by the 1/1st Nottinghamshire Royal Horse Artillery (RHA), 1/B Battery, Honourable Artillery Company (HAC), C/301 and C/303 Howitzer Batteries (60th (2/2nd London) Division), the 11th Mountain Battery and the Hong Kong Mountain Battery. The British artillery in the sector between the river and the villages of Abu Tellul and Mussallabeh were the 11th Mountain Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery and Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery of the 10th (Irish) Division. These and other British artillery stationed south of the river also took part in supporting the Australian Light Horse counter-attack, which regained all that had initially been lost before the day's end. Hard close quarter fighting earned battle distinctions for Captain Boyd, Lieutenant Macansh and Second Lieutenant Byrnes.
The 2nd Light Horse Brigade held the Wadi Mellaha which flowed from the north, southwards into the Wadi el Auja, some to the east; approximately halfway between the Abu Tellul – Mussallabeh positions and the Jordan River. The 4th Light Horse Brigade formed part of corps reserve south of the Auja while the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, armed with one Hotchkiss machine-gun for every thirty-five men, was in divisional reserve south of Mussallabeh on the Wadi Nueiameh.
The fords on the Jordan River at Makhadet Hijla and El Hinu were held by the Mysore and Hyderabad Lancers while the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead was garrisoned by the Alwar and Patiala Infantry Battalions and the 14th and 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigades of the 2nd Mounted Division. Riding out to attack the massing Ottoman cavalry were the Jodhpur and Mysore Lancer's, from the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade, the Poona Horse and the Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry from the 14th Cavalry Brigade.
By June work was continuing on the defences and the men worked hard to complete sangars, digging and wiring although the area was overlooked by the Ottomans and much of the work had to be done at night. Early in July the 1st Light Horse Regiment was in reserve while the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Regiment held Vyse and Zeiss posts.
On 13 July the section of the front line which passed through the Jordan Valley to the Dead Sea was commanded by Chauvel's Desert Mounted Corps. The Ghoraniyeh bridgehead and the area of the valley stretching south towards the Dead Sea was held by the 2nd Mounted Division with two Indian infantry battalions (Alwar Infantry (I.S.) and 1st Battalion, Patiala Infantry (I.S.) of 20th Indian Brigade). While the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (ANZAC Mounted Division) held the Auja and Mellaha areas including the Abu Tellul salient. This salient was difficult to defend, as the posts and sangars were isolated owing to the hilly terrain interspersed by rocky crevasses. Under orders, a series of posts and sangars were constructed at Abu Tellul and Mussallabeh which were designed for all-round defence. Work to strengthen these defences included heavily wiring all the posts which were kept supplied with water, ammunition and food.
After a few relatively cool days, around 7 August the temperature began to rise steadily and it was noticed that the Ottoman forces had increased their activities, in particular the shelling of Abu Tellul had greatly increased. On 14 July the maximum shade temperature was recorded at .
Battle.
The attack commenced with long-range artillery shelling from both sides throughout the night, then 17 German aircraft bombed the Jordan Valley garrison at 04:00 in the morning of Sunday 14 July, causing dozens of casualties.
Attack on the Abu Tellul and Mussallebeh salient.
Movements were heard between Vale and View posts defended by the 3rd Light Horse Regiment just after 01:00 when the regimental commander ordered an artillery barrage in front of Vale post. Ottoman artillery also started shelling Mussallabeh and Abu Tellul. This bombardment ceased about 02:30 when the movement of many Ottoman units was again heard by the defenders. These were the German 702nd and 703rd Battalions, one company of the 11 Regiment Jäger Battalion and one company of the 146th Regiment. This force was supported on the left by the 32nd Regiment attacking Mussallabeh, and on the right by the 163rd and 58th Regiments facing Abu Tellul, with 2nd Regiment forming a reserve in the rear.
At 03:30 the Mussallabeh salient protecting the Wadi el Auja was attacked by 1,250 Germans in two and a half battalions. Just before the attack began, the regimental commander of 2nd Light Horse Regiment withdrew his headquarters, located just behind Vale position, which was the first position attacked, narrowly escaping capture to Abu Tellul West where they established and maintained their position throughout the attack. The 2nd Light Horse regimental commanding officer observed from his new position on Abu Tellul West, just before dawn, a large body of troops coming up the hill towards his twelve-man post. At first he assumed they were some of his own men retiring from the outer posts, but when they reached the wire and began to cut it, he at once gave the order to open rapid fire.
The German battalions forming the centre of the attacking force made a considerable advance circling over the Vale position and across Abu Tellul; establishing a post on Abu Tellul East and then pushing on to eastern side; to The Bluff where they occupied a post with their backs to Kh al Beiyudak. This move cut off all the Light Horse posts at Vyse and on Mussallabeh as well as those on The Bluff and Abu Tellul East, all were without communication to regimental or brigade headquarters. Despite being isolated, heavily attacked and in a number of cases surrounded, they held their ground. They were able to successfully defend their sangars and posts from whatever direction the attack came. Only the troop at Vale and Maskera posts were forced to retire, while one trench on Mussallabeh was captured for a short period before being retaken, and one sangar on Abu Tellul East held by a troop of the 2nd Light Horse Regiment was captured after all the garrison was killed or wounded.
The Germans found themselves caught in numerous cross fires from the front, flank and rear from the mutually-supporting defensive positions, while the Ottoman forces deployed on their left and right flanks were unable to strongly support the German attack. On the left of the main attack the Ottoman 32nd Regiment made a frontal attack on Mussallabeh and captured a post, which was retaken by the defenders shortly after. Three attempts were made by the left of the attacking force on Mussallabeh, but were driven back each time with heavy loss by well placed machine-gun fire leaving about 200 dead. The whole position was completely restored and 380 German and about 200 Ottoman prisoners were sent back to headquarters. On the right flank, Ottoman units from the Ottoman 58th Regiment climbed a cliff to attack View post but a sentry shot the leaders; one of whom must have been carrying incendiary bombs as he burst into flames. By the light of this human torch the remaining would-be attackers