The Battle of Szőreg was a battle in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, fought on 5 August 1849 at Szőreg, Hungary, fought between the Hungarian Revolutionary Army led by Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński and the main army of the Habsburg Empire led by Field Marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau. The Austrian army was pressing on Szeged, a well fortified city from Southern Hungary. Dembiński decided to leave the fortifications and retreat to Szőreg near the Tisza river, where he placed many artillery batteries in the place named Kamaratöltés, preventing the frontal attack of Haynau's troops. The Austrian commander's response was sending his cavalry to cross the Tisza and flank the Hungarian troops. The cavalry managed to cross the river between Törökkanizsa and Makó, then engaged with the Hungarian cavalry in a huge battle around and in Szőreg, in which Dembiński himself was wounded, and the Hungarians safely retreated.
Background.
Starting with June, Hungary's Governor-President Lajos Kossuth's plan was to concentrate the Hungarian troops in southern Hungary, around Szeged, which created a conflict between him and the Hungarian main commander and minister of war Artúr Görgei, who wanted to stop the Austrian armies at Komárom. The result was that Kossuth deposed Görgei from the ministership, allowing him though to lead the Army of the Upper Danube to the concentration point at Szeged. Kossuth's order of concentrating around Szeged was followed by other Hungarian troops too: after securing the region of Bácska with his victory from 14 July in the Battle of Kishegyes, General Richard Guyon arrived there with the IV. corps, joining with the Army of the Middle Tisza of General Mór Perczel and the units of the Reserve Corps, concentrating there 48,000 soldiers. Szeged and its environs were protected by a wide, but not totally finished system of fortifications. In addition to this, the region from Orsova to the Tisza-Danube confluence, was protected by the 7000 soldiers of Colonel József Kollmann, the left bank of the Lower Tisza was guarded by the 7000 men strong troops of Major General György Kmety and the 5000 soldiers of Colonel Lajos Bene. The Austrian held fortress of Temesvár was encircled by the 9300 soldiers of Major General Károly Vécsey, and the fortress of Arad was held by a 1500 strong Hungarian garrison. So the province of Bánság was held by around 78,000 Hungarian soldiers.
After his victory at the Third Battle of Komárom from 11 July, Field Marshal Julius Jacob von Haynau, on 16 July marched from Komárom towards Budapest. Initially he left two corps (28,000 soldiers, 114 cannons) at Komárom, but shortly after that he ordered to one of them (I. corps led by General Franz Schlik) to march to Budapest, and join his troops. As a result, between 21 and 24 July, Haynau marched towards Szeged with 46,000 soldiers and 284 cannons. Haynau learned that Görgei was prevented from marching towards Szeged through the Danube–Tisza Interfluve by the Russian army in the Second Battle of Vác, and had to head towards northwest, followed by the Russian main army. This created for him the opportunity to defeat the Hungarians from around Szeged by himself. For this plan he needed all the troops at his disposal, and because of this, despite the fact that he promised to do so, he did not fulfil the Russians request of sending one of his corps to Szolnok to prevent an eventual crossing of Görgei's troops to the left bank of the Tisza. Another cause of his advance towards Szeged was the defeat of Lieutenant General Josip Jelačić in the Battle of Kishegyes, which threatened total Hungarian occupation of southern Hungary east from the Danube, and he was also concerned about the situation of the Austrian garrison of Temesvár, besieged by the Hungarians.
The troops of Haynau marched in three columns through the Danube–Tisza Interfluve towards Szeged. The main column under the personal leadership of Haynau (the Reserve Corps, the Panyutyin-division, the Bechtold cavalry division), followed the Pest - Kecskemét - Szeged road, the left wing consisting of the I. corps of General Schlik marched on the rout through Cegléd – Nagykőrös – Tiszaalpár – Szentes – Hódmezővásárhely – Makó, and finally the right wing under Lieutenant field marshal Georg Heinrich von Ramberg went through Soltvadkert – Kiskunhalas – Szabadka towards Törökkanizsa.
Haynau's plan was to force the Hungarians to retreat from the fortifications around Szeged by crossing, on 4 August, with his left wing the Maros, and with his right wing the Tisza rivers. But behind the fortifications from Szeged the Hungarians were in an advantageous central position, being able from there to attack the separated Austrian columns. This opportunity was not sensed by the commander Lieutenant General Henryk Dembiński, designated on 30 July for this position after his predecessor Lieutenant General Lázár Mészáros resigned. He took an inexplicable decision to withdraw from the fortifications of Szeged, retreating on the left bank of the Tisza. Dembiński's decision caused outrage among the Hungarian officers: hearing about this decision, Lieutenant General Antal Vetter resigned of the commandement of the Hungarian troops from Southern Hungary. The position could have been defended. However, Dembiński did not wanted to engage Haynau, and he retreated further East behind the dike from Szőreg which was connecting the Tisza and the Maros, leaving only a couple of cannons and several hundreds of soldiers in the bridgehead from Újszeged (New Szeged).
When Kossuth heard about these decisions of Dembiński, and fearing similar actions, he immediately sent an envoy in Transylvania to Lieutenant General Józef Bem, to come to Szeged and take over the high commandment from Dembiński. At the same time he ordered Dembiński to lead the army in forced march to Arad, he ordered to the commander of the siege corps of Temesvár, Major General Károly Vécsey as well to march with his forces to Arad, sending a couple of infantry battalions and hussar companies ahead, to help to defend Arad, threatened by an Austrian corps. In this way Kossuth hoped to gather 80,000 soldiers.
Prelude.
At Szőreg, on the northern side of the dike connecting the Maros and Tisza, Dembiński ordered the digging of a 1,2 km long trench, in which he placed 50 cannons, which had the mission to stop the advance of the imperial troops. This section was defended by the IX. corps, the Polish Legion and a division of the X. corps. In order to stop Schlik's I. corps crossing of the Maros river, at Makó stood the division of the X. corps led by János Lenkey, while at Gyála the IV. corps of Richard Guyon and the Italian Legion of Colonel Alessandro Monti had the duty to prevent the crossing of the Tisza by the III. corps led by Lieutenant field marshal Georg Heinrich von Ramberg. 
Haynau learned about the retreat of the Hungarian troops from their advantageous defensive position from Szeged at 2 August. He sent immediately two of his brigades to occupy it, then in the next day he established there his headquarters. From here he sent the Bechtold cavalry division to Martonos to cross the Tisza there, while he, together with the Reserve corps and the Panyutyin-division started the crossing of Tisza at Újszeged. Haynau gave the task of crossing first the Tisza, to build a bridge on the river, and to secure the bridgehead to two brigades of the Reserve corps and a Russian Jäger. The commander of the Reserve corps Lieutenant General Prince Franz de Paula of Liechtenstein ordered an extensive artillery preparation to ease the job of his units. The four cannons of First Lieutenant Zsigmond Szijjártó tried to withstand to the six time more numerous Austrian artillery, but when the Russian cannons joined the fight and caught the Hungarians in a crossfire, they were forced to retreat. Then, from a place North from szeged two Austrian battalions crossed the Tisza on barges to Újszeged, while the brigade of General Ludwig von Benedek crossed the river between the Szeged castle and the bridgehead, and built a bridge. The Benedek brigade pushed the Hungarian units out of Újszeged, but these dig themselves in the trenches south and east to the locality, and only with the help of the newly arrived Austrian battalions which crossed the Tisza north from Szeged managed Benedek to force them to retreat behind the dike from Szőreg. During these fights, Dembiński remained totally inactive, despite the fact that his subalterns, like Lieutenant Colonel Vilmos Lázár, begged him to attack the not yet fully deployed Austrians, which could easily drive the enemy back, taking back Újszeged, and push a part of the Austrian troops into the Tisza river. Dembiński gave, only after the darkness installed, the order of an uncoordinated attack to merely 4 battalions, and these scattered units lost their way, which forced them to retreat. In that day the Hungarians lost at Újszeged 70 dead, the Austrians lost 4 dead and 19 wounded, while the Russians 3 wounded soldiers. 
In the night from 3 to 4 August the Austrians finished the bridges, as a result of which their troops from Szeged could cross the river to Újszeged, then they deployed behind its trenches. The day of 4 August passed peacefully around Szőreg and Újszeged, although Haynau initially wanted to start the decisive attack at that day, but then renounced to it, because he waited for Schlik's and Ramberg's encircling corps to finish their crossings, and to arrive in the vicinity, to influence 
the future battle. His plan was to encircle from south with his cavalry the Hungarian army, and to sweep them up. The only Austrian combat arms which was active on 4 August, was the artillery, which continued to shoot at the Hungarian positions the whole day, responding to the Hungarian artilleries shootings, which started 7.00 a.m. Dembiński, considering the Austrian artilleries response quite weak, he concluded that the Austrians will not start a decisive attack that day, so he continued to make plans to retreat further eastwards.
In the meanwhile the left and right wings of Haynau's army also approached to their objectives. The I. corps led by General Franz Schlik arrived to the Tisza river on 31 July at Tiszaalpár, then on the next day they crossed unhindered the river, and at Kunszentmárton also the Körös. On 2 August they reached Szentes, and on the 3. Hódmezővásárhely, then on the 4. they marched towards the Maros, in order to cross the river at Makó. At Gajdos Schlik's corps found the rearguard of the Hungarian X. corps's Lenkey division. The 1 infantry battalion, 1 Hussar company and 3 cannons strong Hungarian detachment under the leadership of Major Sándor Szerdahelyi managed to hold back the Austrian corps, until the Lenkey division crossed the Maros, then, dismantling the bridge, retreated on the left bank of the river. Then the Lenkey division retreated to Zombor, where they took position. Schlik occupied Makó, Apátfalva and Magyarcsanád, and started to rebuild the bridge over the Maros river, finishing it only on 6 August.
The III. corps led by Lieutenant General Ramberg entered in Szabadka on 30 July, then on 2 August in Magyarkanizsa, and started to prepare the crossing of the Tisza. But in the afternoon a strong detachment of the IV. corps of Guyon arrived in Törökkanizsa from the opposite shore of the Tisza. Ramberg tried to build a bridge further upstream, but on 3 August around the midnight Haynau ordered him to march towards Horgos, because he heard a rumour that the Hungarians crossed on the right bank of the Tisza, and want to attack his troops from the side. Ramberg prepared for the departure, even sending one of his brigades to march towards Horgos, but on 4 August Haynau sent him another order to remain at Magyarkanizsa, and to try again to cross the river.
On 5 July at dawn the troops of Ramberg started to cross the Tisza, chasing away the one battalion and 3 cannons strong Hungarian detachment from the other side, capturing the cannons, then repulsed the two Hungarian battalions attacking from the direction of Törökkanizsa. A part of the Hungarians retreated to Ráckeresztúr and Gyála the other part through Törökkanizsa towards Oroszlámos, the first group being chased by the smaller, the second by the larger part of Rambergs corps. During the fights around Magyarkanizsa and Törökkanizsa the Hungarians lost around 60 dead and 100 men,