Attempts by soldiers of the Home Army to capture the Warszawa Gdańska railway station in Warsaw
Insurgent attacks on the Warszawa Gdańska railway station were multiple attempts by soldiers of the Home Army to capture the Warszawa Gdańska railway station in Warsaw during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.
The station, along with a complex of neighboring facilities, formed one of the strongest centers of German resistance in the northern part of Warsaw. Due to the failure of Polish attacks at the "W" Hour, the station, along with the bypass railway line, created a barrier that separated the Home Army units in the Old Town from the insurgent Żoliborz. From the first days of the uprising, the Polish command intended to establish a corridor between the two districts, but it only became possible to undertake serious offensive actions after the arrival of nearly 900 Home Army soldiers from the Kampinos Forest to Żoliborz. However, two night assaults, carried out on August 20/21 and August 21/22, ended in complete failure due to the enemy's firepower superiority and mistakes made by the Polish command in planning and organizing the assault. The Home Army units suffered heavy losses, with between 500 and 600 killed and wounded.
The assaults on the Warszawa Gdańska railway station were among the bloodiest combat actions of the Warsaw Uprising. According to many historians, their failure contributed to the subsequent fall of the Old Town.
Polish attack at "W" Hour.
Warszawa Gdańska railway station and its garrison.
Following the onset of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, occupied Warsaw rose to become one of the key communication hubs behind the Eastern Front. Among the crucial facilities on Warsaw's railway mainline at that time was the complex of buildings at Warszawa Gdańska railway station, adjacent to the Orbital Railway. The Germans attached great importance to its proper defense, hence the station, along with the nearby Citadel Rail Bridge (railway and road), formed the core of one of the strongest German defensive centers in northern Warsaw. According to intelligence available to the Polish Home Army in July 1944, the personnel and fortifications of German installations along the Żoliborz section of the orbital railway were as follows:
In reality, at the outbreak of the uprising, the German forces in the vicinity of the Warszawa Gdańska railway station turned out to be significantly stronger. From mid-July 1944, the section of the orbital railway line from the railway bridge near the Citadel to Warszawa Zachodnia station was secured by an armored train, Panzerzug 75. Additionally, on August 1, elements of the 73 Armored Grenadier Regiment of the 19 Panzer Division (2nd Battalion and a sapper company) were unloaded at Warszawa Gdańska railway station. They were sent later that same day towards Warka, but their soldiers had already supported the station's garrison in combat against the insurgents. Furthermore, following the outbreak of fighting, the station's defense was temporarily reinforced with three self-propelled guns "Grille" sent from the SS barracks at Rakowiecka Street.
Forces and plans of the Home Army.
The insurgent plans envisaged that Warszawa Gdańska railway station and its neighboring facilities would be seized by soldiers from Region I of the Żoliborz Subdistrict. The assault on the station buildings was to be carried out by platoons No. 201 and 210 ("railway platoons"), departing from their base at the municipal concrete plant on Inflancka Street. After capturing the facility, Polish soldiers were to occupy the station equipment, establish communication with the Warszawa Praga railway station, and set in motion captured locomotives, which along with several empty freight cars were then to be made available to units advancing on the Institute of Chemistry and Bema Fort.
At the same time, other units of Region I were to capture: the Citadel, positions of the German anti-aircraft artillery in Traugutt Fort and Romuald Traugutt Park, the left-bank abutment of the bridge complex near the Citadel, the high school, and the PAST telephone exchange at 39 Feliński Street. It was also planned to engage the defenders of the Institute of Chemistry, with the capture of the building scheduled after the seizure of Warszawa Gdańska railway station. The assault engineer platoon was tasked, among other things, with blowing up the railway viaduct over Krajewski Street and the road viaduct near Warszawa Gdańska railway station.
During the planning stage of the insurgent operation, some officers of the Żoliborz Subdistrict argued that due to the weak armament of their own units, the number of attack objectives should be reduced, and in the initial phase of combat, they should focus on blocking the strongest points of German resistance. Particularly active in this discussion was Captain Marian Kamińskicodenamed "Ster", commander of Region I, who advocated for his units to strike with full force at the Citadel during "W" Hour, and subsequently concentrate on capturing Warszawa Gdańska railway station. "Ster" argued that the capture of the relatively lightly defended Citadel would not only increase supplies of weapons and ammunition but also significantly facilitate the capture of the bridge complex near the Citadel and provide access to the Vistula and connection to Śródmieście. However, these proposals were rejected by the command of the Warsaw District, which believed that a swift and simultaneous assault on all German facilities in Warsaw would surprise and incapacitate the enemy garrison. According to the operational order issued by the district command on July 25, 1944, the Żoliborz Subdistrict was to attack 18 "targets of combat", with the task of Region I being to capture the Citadel, Warszawa Gdańska railway station, the bridges, the Institute of Chemistry, and the school at Krajewski Street. Additionally, the headquarters of the Żoliborz Subdistrict decided that, in addition to the targets indicated in the district command's order, all those objects that had been considered primary targets in the district's previous tactical plans would also be attacked. In the case of Region I, these were high school and the telephone exchange on Feliński Street. Adopting this tactic led to the dispersal of insurgent forces and largely contributed to the failure of subsequent attacks.
Attack of Region I.
On July 27, 1944, in Warsaw, Governor of the Warsaw District, Ludwig Fischer, issued an order requiring 100,000 Polish men and women to report the following day for work on fortifications along the Vistula. Later that same day, Colonel Antoni Chruścielcodenamed "Monter", the commander of the Warsaw District of the Home Army, declared an alert for Home Army units in the capital. However, in the afternoon of July 28, the state of alert was rescinded, and Home Army soldiers dispersed to their homes without major incidents. The prolonged waiting period, especially the evident disparity between their own forces and the enemy, negatively affected troop morale. These tendencies did not spare the Żoliborz Subdistrict. In the "railway platoons", only 30% of soldiers remained at their assembly points by the early morning hours of July 29, as the rest, who lacked weapons, returned home. In Platoon 208, composed mostly of "blue policemen", there was even a mutiny, as most soldiers, including the platoon commander, Lieutenant "Jacek", disobeyed orders and left the assembly points on their own initiative.
In the morning of August 1, the units of the Żoliborz Subdistrict resumed mobilization efforts. Soon, reports began to arrive at the district headquarters indicating that the Germans were reinforcing their main strongholds. Captain Eugeniusz Muszyńskicodenamed "Paweł", who commanded the "railway platoons", reported that the enemy had significantly increased the garrison at Warszawa Gdańska railway station, occupying the station and fortifying the tracks, and had deployed a company-sized unit to secure the locomotive depot. In response, during a briefing at 2:00 PM, the district headquarters decided that "Paweł" would conduct reconnaissance by combat in the station area only, and in case of encountering strong resistance, he would break off the attack and join the main forces of the region. However, this order did not reach the soldiers of the "railway platoons". Meanwhile, by around 2:00 PM, regular fighting had erupted in Żoliborz, seriously disrupting preparations for the insurgent action. Surprise was lost, the district's communication system was paralyzed, and the entire district quickly became isolated from the rest of the city. Amidst the ensuing chaos, many soldiers failed to arrive on time at assembly points, and a portion of weapons and ammunition did not reach them either.
Shortly before "W" Hour, approximately 50 soldiers (50% of their strength) gathered at the assembly point of the "railway platoons" in the municipal concrete plant on Inflancka Street. Their armament was very modest, consisting of only two submachine guns, nine rifles, several pistols, and grenades. A group of unknown insurgents, whose assembly point was the nearby Customs Office building, joined the fight a few minutes before 5:00 PM. The firefight further heightened the vigilance of the Warszawa Gdańska railway station crew, prompting "Paweł" to order an immediate attack. However, only a dozen armed Home Army soldiers launched the attack. The rest, lacking weapons, refused to participate in combat. Faced with this situation, "Paweł" abandoned the earlier plan to capture the railroad crossing along Feliński Street and instead directed his meager forces to attack the station buildings. The insurgents came under heavy machine gun fire just meters away from the German fortifications. Two Polish soldiers were killed, and one was wounded. The insurgents managed to capture a German heavy machine gun position briefly, but "Paweł" soon ordered a retreat.
The remaining units of Region I also failed to achieve success. The assault by Platoon 204 on the bridge complex near the Citadel stalled under the fire of German machine guns shortly after departing from their starting positions. Platoon 207 and 209 managed to approach within striking distance of enemy positions in Traugutt Fort and Romuald Traugutt Park and even destroyed one of the machine gun nests. However, the final assault faltered under intense fire, and both platoons suffered heavy casualties, amounting to 59% of their initial strength. Nearly two hours of fighting later, the attack on the Citadel by Platoons 202, 203, and 205 was also repulsed. Platoon 206 and 208, where only 30% of soldiers arrived punctually at assembly points, limited themselves to firing upon the Institute of Chemistry building. The assault by the Military Protection Service on the high school and the telephone exchange did not materialize at all.
The consequences of the failure suffered by the soldiers of Region I at "W" Hour were very serious. Although the insurgents managed to capture the high school building and the telephone exchange on August 2, Warszawa Gdańska railway station and other strongpoints along the orbital railway line remained in German hands. These now constituted a barrier separating insurgent-held Żoliborz from Home Army units in the Old Town.
First attempts to break through the German barrier.
August 5, 1944, saw the start of the German counteroffensive against the insurgent forces in Warsaw. After three days of fierce fighting, a battle group led by "SS-Gruppenführer" Heinz Reinefarth captured most of Wola and then broke through to the Government District around Józef Piłsudski Avenue. The area controlled by Home Army forces shrank to four isolated districts: Śródmieście with Powiśle, Old Town, Żoliborz, and Mokotów. After the fall of Wola, the main objective of the German offensive became the Old Town of Warsaw. The German command aimed to secure access to the Vistula river from the Cross-City Bridge to the Kierbedź Bridge, thus permanently securing the rear of German forces fighting the Red Army on the river's right bank. According to Adam Borkiewicz, the Old Town became the "decisive battlefield" that would determine the fate of the uprising.
Even before the fall of Wola, Colonel "Monter" decided to organize an insurgent bastion in the northern part of the city with a command center in Żoliborz. The district commander hoped that this would establish a supply base for the fighting capital and relieve the main Home Army forces fighting in Śródmieście. "Monter" temporarily lost confidence in the commander of the Żoliborz Subdistrict, Lieutenant Colonel Mieczysław Niedzielski, codenamed "Żywiciel", so he entrusted command of the Home Army forces in Żoliborz and Kampinos Forest to Colonel Karol Ziemski, codenamed "Wachnowski". Early on August 6, "Wachnowski" attempted to reach Old Town twice from Wola but failed. Meanwhile, on August 6, General Tadeusz Komorowski, codenamed "Bór", evacuated from Wola to Old Town. The underground army commander then modified the tasks set by "Monter" before "Wachnowski". The Home Army Headquarters decided to focus on maintaining Old