Napoleon abdicated on 22 June 1815, in favour of his son Napoleon II. On 24 June, the Provisional Government then proclaimed his abdication to France and the rest of the world.
After his defeat at the Battle of Waterloo, Napoleon I returned to Paris, seeking to maintain political backing for his position as Emperor of the French. Assuming his political base to be secured, he aspired to continue the war. However, the parliament (formed according to the Charter of 1815) created a Provisional Government and demanded Napoleon's abdication. Napoleon initially considered a "coup d'état" similar to Eighteenth of Brumaire, but ultimately discarded this idea. On 25 June, after a stay at the Palace of Malmaison, Napoleon left Paris towards the coast, hoping to reach the United States of America. Meanwhile, the Provisional Government deposed his son and attempted negotiating a conditional surrender with the Coalition powers. As they failed obtaining concessions from the Coalition, which insisted on a military surrender and the restoration of Louis XVIII, Napoleon realised he could not evade the Royal Navy and surrendered to Captain Maitland, placing himself under his protection aboard . The British Government refused Napoleon to set foot in England and arranged for his exile to the remote South Atlantic island of Saint Helena, where he lived until his death in 1821.
Return to Paris, 21 June.
Following the defeat at Waterloo, the French people's initial fascination with Napoleon, which had been prevalent since his return from exile, quickly faded as several Coalition armies advanced into France, reaching the gates of Paris.
Although his commanders urged him to remain and continue leading the troops in the field, Napoleon reasoned that if he did so, the home front might surrender to the Coalition forces, thereby undermining any progress he had achieved on the battlefield. Napoleon had previously acknowledged that his presence in Paris confounded his critics. However, the sword that had raised and controlled the Empire, captivating and nearly conquering Europe itself, had slipped from his grasp, rendering him devoid of the might and will of imperial France. These powers had been delegated through the constitution to the national organs, the elected representatives of the people. He no longer possessed the administrative and executive authority personally but was subject to the control of the power he had feared more than the enemy he was about to face—the power of French public opinion, expressed legitimately. If he had keenly felt its influence prior to his defeat in battle, the task of calming its fervor and securing its support for renewed sacrifices must have seemed daunting, if not hopeless, when he suddenly arrived in Paris on June 21, just one week after assuming command of his army, to announce the disastrous outcome of his campaign.
The imperialists in the capital, who had harbored extravagant hopes following news of the victory at Ligny, barely had time to express their elation before ominous rumors of sudden reversals in Napoleon's cause began to circulate. Soon, all doubts and suspense were dispelled by the unexpected arrival of Emperor Napoleon himself, fueling the darkest forebodings. Napoleon reached Paris a mere two hours after news of his defeat at Waterloo reached the city, temporarily causing those plotting against him to halt their schemes.
Napoleon's calculated return to Paris could be seen as a political mistake, as some perceived it as desertion of his men and even an act of cowardice. If he had remained in the field, the nation might have rallied, and fortune might have favoured him. Had the Chambers received news of his Waterloo defeat and moved to depose him, their decrees might not have been met with a nation still armed and ready.
Mary, an English woman residing in France, arrived in Paris shortly after the defeat and observed that the French were growing accustomed to regime changes, having experienced two within 15 months. To many, these transitions seemed no more disruptive than a change in government in early 19th-century Britain. Not only had most civil servants retained their positions, but even some ministers had survived the regime shifts. Consequently, many individuals were hesitant to risk their lives or property for any particular regime. This stood in stark contrast to the perceptions of the general populace during the initial revolution and Napoleon's subsequent rise to power, which had brought about widespread upheaval and the terror.
Cabinet deliberations.
Napoleon immediately summoned a Cabinet Council. He frankly explained to his ministers the critical state of affairs; but, at the same time, with his usual confidence in his own resources, declared his conviction, that if the nation were called upon to rise "en masse", the annihilation of the enemy would follow; but that if, instead of ordering new levies and adopting extraordinary measures, the Chambers were to allow themselves to be drawn into debates, and to waste their time in disputation, all would be lost. "Now that the enemy is in France", he added, "it is necessary that I should be invested with extraordinary power, that of a temporary dictatorship. As a measure of safety for the country, I might assume this power; but it would be better and more national that it should be conferred upon me by the Chambers".
The ministers were too well acquainted with the general views and disposition of the Chamber of Representatives to pronounce a direct approval of this step; but Napoleon, perceiving their hesitation, called upon them to express their opinion upon the measures of public safety required by existing circumstances. Lazare, Count of Carnot, the Minister of the Interior, conceived it to lie essential that the country should be declared in danger; that the "Fédérés" and National Guards should be called to arms; that Paris should be placed in a stage of siege, and measures adopted for its defence; that at the last extremity the armed force should retire behind the Loire, and take up an entrenched position; that the Army of La Vendee, where the Civil War had nearly terminated, as also the Corps of Observation in the south, should be recalled: and the enemy checked until sufficient force could be united and organised for the assumption of a vigorous offensive, by which he should be driven out of France. Decrès, the Minister of the Navy, and Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely, the Secretary of State, supported this opinion; but Fouché, the Minister of Police, and the remaining ministers, remarked that the safety of the state did not depend upon any particular measure which might thus be proposed, but upon the Chambers of the Estates (Parliament); and upon their uniting with the head of the government: and that by manifesting towards them confidence and good faith, they would be induced to declare it to be their duty to unite with Napoleon in the adoption of energetic measures for securing the honour and independence of the nation.
Fouché's policy.
This advice on the part of Fouché was an artful piece of dissimulation. No man in France possessed so intimate a knowledge of the secret workings of the public mind; he knew precisely the dispositions and views of the different factions, as also the character and temperament of their leaders. He knew also that the great parties in the Chambers, with the exception of the imperialists, who were in the minority but whom he secretly flattered with the prospect of a Napoleon II, were fully prepared to depose the Emperor, in favour of full constitutional freedom and liberal institutions. This knowledge, obtained with an adroitness and a precision quite peculiar to this celebrated Minister of Police, he made completely subservient to his own personal views. These had been, from the commencement of Napoleon's second reign, to coquet with the factions in such a manner as to induce each to consider him an indispensable instrument in the realisation of its hopes, and to exert this extraordinary influence either to support or to undermine the power of Napoleon, according as the fortunes of the latter might be in the ascendant or on the decline. The resolute attitude assumed by the allies soon satisfied him that, although the Emperor might once more dazzle the world with some brilliant feat of arms, he must eventually succumb to the fixed determination of the other sovereign powers to crush his usurped authority; and to the overwhelming masses with which Europe was preparing to subjugate the country. He had been, and was still, in secret communication with the ministers and advisers of Louis XVIII; and was consequently in full possession of the general plans and intentions of the coalition powers.
When, therefore, Napoleon's enterprise had so signally failed, and the re-occupation of Paris appeared to be its necessary consequence: Fouché foresaw clearly, that were the proposed dictatorship to be assumed by means of a sudden and forced dissolution of the Chambers, implying that the recent reverses had been produced by treachery on the part of the Representatives; and were new levies to be raised "en masse", in support of the force that yet remained available; the result would inevitably be anarchy and confusion in the capital, disorder and excesses throughout the whole country, renewed disasters to the nation, together with an awful and useless sacrifice of life. To prevent such a catastrophe (as Fouché thought it would be), it was necessary to lull Napoleon's suspicions of the intentions of the Chambers; with which, at the same time, Fouché was fully acquainted. Hence it was, that to gain sufficient time for the development of these intentions, Fouché gave to the Council the advice before mentioned.
Fouché strongly expressed his disapproval of the projected Dissolution of the Chambers, and assumption of the Dictatorship; declaring that any measures of that kind would only turn to distrust, and, not improbably, a general revolt. But, at the same time, his agents were making known throughout Paris the fullest extent of the disasters that had befallen Napoleon, and which had caused his sudden and unexpected return; and the Representatives were assembling in all haste, and in great numbers, to take a bold and decided step in the great national crisis.
In thus concealing from his Master the real disposition of the great political Parties, and the true state of the public mind, Fouché, no doubt, betrayed the trust reposed in him; but, setting aside the question whether he was really influenced by patriotic motives, or merely acting upon a system of deep duplicity and time serving expediency, there can also be no doubt that, by pursuing the line of conduct which he did on this important occasion, he became the means of preserving his country from the infliction of a still further accumulation of evils.
The Cabinet Council continued in discussion; some supporting, and others disapproving, the propositions of Napoleon: who, at length, yielding to the arguments of Fouché and Carnot, declared he would submit himself to the loyalty of the Chambers, and confer with them as to the measures which the critical position of the country might render necessary.
Resolutions of the Chamber of Representatives.
In the meantime, the Representatives had met, early on 21 June 1815, and commenced their deliberations on the existing state of affairs. Marquis de Lafayette, the acknowledged Leader of the Liberal Party, having received intelligence of the subject of discussion in the Council, and aware that not a moment was to be lost in averting the blow with which their liberties were menaced, ascended the tribune, and , amidst the most profound silence, and breathless suspense:
 ;templatestyles src="Template:Blockquote/styles.css" / ;Representatives! For the first time during many years you hear a voice, which the old friends of liberty will yet recognize. I rise to address you concerning the dangers to which the country is exposed. The sinister reports which have been circulated during the last two days, are unhappily confirmed. This is the moment to rally round the national colours—the Tricoloured Standard of 1788—the standard of liberty, equality, and public order. It is you alone who can now protect the country from foreign attacks, and internal dissensions. It is you alone who can secure the independence and the honour of France.
Permit a veteran in the sacred cause of liberty, in all times a stranger to the spirit of faction, to submit to you some resolutions which appear to him to be demanded by a sense of the public danger, and by the love of our country. They are such