The Battle of Serbia was a joint Allied effort with the aim of establishing a strong foothold and mastering the central communication area of the German forces on the Balkans, i.e. Army Group F, during World War II. Actions on the ground were carried out by the NOVJ, and the Allies provided combat assistance, supplies and air support.
The territory of Serbia was, however, of key importance for all actors. All four specific actors: the German Southeast Command, Allied Mediterranean Command, NOVJ and JVuO, they had specific interests in Serbia, and based on them they formulated their strategies. Coalitions were formed based on matching interests.
From the end of 1943. The Allies changed their attitude towards Mihailović's forces, and the priority of their policy in Yugoslavia became helping to strengthen the NOVJ forces in Serbia The Supreme Headquarters of the NOVJ made plans to support the strengthening of partisan forces in Serbia by the penetration of stronger forces from Bosnia and Montenegro. The German command, as well as Mihailović, were determined to prevent it.
Considering the Drina as a natural obstacle suitable for defense, the NOVJ plans consisted in concentrating forces on the left side of the Lim, where units collected and prepared for penetration deep into Serbia. Germany Southeast Command with this in mind decided to defend Serbia with active actions - by preventing the movement of units of the NOVJ through Bosnia across the west, as well as a series of large and ambitious operations in Sandžak and eastern Bosnia calculated to break the NOVJ concentrations and disable them for offensive operations. The forces of the JVuO, for their part, participated with great enthusiasm in these operations, as well as in those organized by the German commander of Serbia against local partisans.
The peak of this collaboration occurred in August 1944, which was also a turning point in which the most intense and massive actions took place. The efforts of the NOVJ ended in success after long, exhausting battles. During the first days of August, a group of NOVJ divisions (2,5) managed to break through from Montenegro Gore and forces Ibar. On August 21, the First Proletarian Division penetrated into western Serbia, soon followed by the Sixth Lička, and in early September the Twelfth Corps. These forces liberated many towns (Gornji Milanovac on September 12, Valjevo on September 18, Arandjelovac on September 20) and established a base for the upcoming attack on Belgrade. In the first half of September, the German defense of Serbia from the west, already compromised by major penetrations of the NOVJ, experienced a breakdown due to the outbreak of the Red Army threat from the east.
At that moment, Allies and NOVJ had a decisive advantage. Operation Ratweek and the fighting in Macedonia prevented the Germans from trying to effectively reinforce the defenses of Serbia, and the battle for Serbia was definitely decided during October, Belgrade operation - the invasion of the well-equipped forces of the Red Army, to which the NOVJ represented a valuable partner, both by covering the territory and communications in depth, as well and as frontline infantry.
The battle for Serbia was thus resolved. Further fighting in the southwestern part was not aimed at regaining control over Serbia, but the breakthrough of German Army Group E from Greece.
During the Battle of Serbia 1944, the partisans, with the support of the allies, led the fight for liberation from the occupiers and the coming to power, while the Chetnik units, left without the support of the allies, entered into full collaboration at all levels in an attempt to prevent the arrival communist competitors for power.
Background.
Tell anyone who tells you that there are still people from Nedić, Dražino, and Ljotić that it is a lie, because from today there are only Serbs, on the one hand, and communists, on the other. Novo vreme' from March 24, 1944.
After the collapse of the uprising at the end of 1941, Serbia was largely a pacified territory. Except for a couple of short-lived episodes, there were no more operational troops on its territory until September 1944. To maintain order and peace, the Germans used a police regiment, various Quisling guards, territorial battalions, and "a bug. Occup. disposition to fight, barely matched the combat value of the German Landeschichen units". November 4, 1944 The focus of war moved west of the Drina and south of the Lim.
When asked by Field Marshal von Weichs where the communists imprisoned in the concentration camp were, the Higher SS and police leader Hermann Behrends replied that they had all been killed. He then drew attention to the fact that he had managed to insert sufficiently strong Security Services groups into the Chetnik ranks, which should remain with the Chetniks in the future. To that, the Commander-in-Chief remarked that this alone was a sufficient reason why the leadership of the Chetniks should be entrusted exclusively to the Senior SS and Police Leader. Notes from the consultation of the German occupation leadership on the Chetnik issue in Serbia, October 8, 1944.
Strategic importance of Serbia.
Of course, Serbia is primarily important to its inhabitants as the homeland and the place where they live. Two military-political movements, Titov National Liberation Movement and Mihailović Ravnogorsk Movement, had conflicting concepts and conflicting intentions regarding the character of society and the organization of the state. Both movements were determined to dominate Serbia. A special reason was that both movements declared themselves as Yugoslav, and Serbia represented a key factor without which Yugoslavia is not possible.
Serbia was important to foreign belligerents for several reasons:
1. It had certain resources important for waging war - primarily agricultural and mining.
2. Serbia is in a particularly important strategic position. Considering the development of the war in the Mediterranean basin, the Germans allocated two large operational formations to the Balkans: the Second Panzer Army in Yugoslavia and the Army Group E in Greece. Considering all possible operational scenarios, good, broadband communications between them were of key importance, both for supply and for eventual deployment of forces. However, due to the configuration of the terrain and underdeveloped infrastructure, there was only one suitable communication channel: the Moravian-Vardar route. As a result, the Balkan, although geographically a wide peninsula, represented a communication strait.
This dependence on one communication was a problem for the Germans on the one hand, and an attractive motive for action for the Allies on the other. From the Allied point of view, given its length, the communication was difficult to defend, and very significant results could be achieved on it with a relatively modest force.
Thus, from the point of view of the Allied Mediterranean Command, Serbia was a platform from which to attack German vital communications.
3. There was also a political motive. Hitler had views on the political future of Europe that are incompatible with the views of the other subjects, but the visions of the Allies differed to a considerable extent. Therefore, establishing some future political influence was not an insignificant motive for either side.
So in the second half of 1943. profiled the intentions and interests of the main contenders for Serbia:
Evolution of the Allies attitude.
In these fateful and great days for Yugoslavia, when the victorious armies of the Soviet Union stand on our border on one side, and the American and British armies on the other, when the day of our freedom is in full dawn, I call on all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to unite and join the People's Liberation Army under Marshal Tito. (...) by our people's army, which is unanimously recognized, supported and helped by our great allies, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.
All those, who rely on the enemy against the interests of their own people and its future, and who would not respond to this call, will not succeed in getting rid of the traitor mark, neither in front of the people nor in front of history. With this message of mine to you, I strongly condemn the abuse of the name of the king and the authority of the crown, which tried to justify cooperation with the enemy and cause discord among the fighting people in the most difficult hours of its history, thus benefiting only the enemy. Invitation of King Peter II to join the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia Invitation of King Peter II to join the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (September 12, 1944)
Great Britain is for reasons of ideological closeness and loyalty to the Yugoslav king and government in November 1941. promised full support to Mihailović, albeit on the condition that he reach an agreement with "other elements of the resistance". However, the actual situation on the ground was quite well known. As early as July 1942, Glenconner wrote to the Southern Department of the Foreign Office:
»As we know, we would actually have to attribute all activity in Yugoslavia to the partisans. However, when it comes to the public use (of that data), I don't see why it would be harmful to credit some of it to Mihailović.«
Many authors explain the genesis of the attitudes of the Allies towards the events in Yugoslavia primarily with political motives. They ended up playing a significant role. However, in this period, from the summer of 1943. until the summer of 1944, there was still a dominant concept that the basic goal was to defeat Germany militarily, that everything possible should be done to inflict as large a state as possible on it, while everything else was of secondary importance. The political theory of the genesis of the allied attitude towards Yugoslavia is also based on an incorrect assumption about the negligibly small importance of events in Yugoslavia to the war as a whole.
Contrary to this conception, it was the army, not politics, that exerted pressure and took steps in this evolution.
Contrary to David Martin's conspiracy theory, the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean depended very little on information gathered through SOE. He had several sources of quality and comprehensive information:
I think that we started receiving intercepts in early January 1943 and that they probably started arriving on my desk already at the beginning of January. It was very clear that these were intercepted telegrams of the "Sicherheitsdienst" in Yugoslavia, so that they were extremely valuable information... They were telegrams with, for example, content like this: "Partisans who were previously in X or Y are in movement towards Z. We are sending Chetniks against them." Another factor of historical significance is that these notifications played a very large role in the Prime Minister's (Churchill's) decision, which occurred when he arrived in Cairo in February 1943, to initiate changes in our policy.
Due to a significantly greater number of sources, the commander of the Mediterranean, General Wilson, who was then in Cairo, had a clearer overall picture of the situation and factors in Yugoslavia than Colonel Bailey, who was in Mihailović headquarters in Lipovo near Kolašina.
"Ibarski telegram".
After the defeat at Neretva, with Mihailović's forces allied with the Italians while the British Army was fighting the Italians in Africa, from the perspective of the Mediterranean Command, the situation in Yugoslavia looked like this:
Partisan forces fight and provide effective resistance to the Axis. However, it seems that the partisans lost their foothold in Serbia after the collapse of the uprising. There are still some Mihailović's forces there who could perhaps be induced to undertake something useful for the Allied cause. Based on this view of the situation, the Commander of the Mediterranean in May 1943, before the SOE mission even reached Tito's Supreme Headquarters, sent Mihailović the famous so-called "Ibar telegram", which was sent to the liaison officer, Colonel Bailey, to deliver it to Mihailović, which he did 29 May 1943:
The war in the Mediterranean has reached a stage when an Allied offensive can be considered imminent. It is absolutely necessary that General Mihailović now begins to fulfill the obligations he accepted earlier and that he cooperates fully at this moment... Mihailović does not represent a fighting force of any significance west of Kopaonik. Its units in Montenegro, Herzegovina and Bosnia have already been destroyed or are closely cooperating with the Axis. It is also difficult to say that his units exist in Croatia, Slovenia and Slavonia... The Partisans represent a good and efficient fighting force in all regions, where only the Quislings represent General Mihailović.
That's why it was decided: you