2014 ferry sinking disaster in South Korea
On the morning of April 16, 2014, the ferry MV "Sewol" sank whilst en route from Incheon towards Jeju City in South Korea. The 6,825-ton vessel sent a distress signal from about north of Byeongpungdo at 08:58 KST (23:58 UTC, April 15, 2014). Out of 476 passengers and crew, 304 died in the disaster, including around 250 students from Danwon High School in Ansan. Around 82% of the Sewol's casualties were children and out of the 172 survivors, more than half were rescued by fishing boats and other commercial vessels that arrived at the scene approximately 40 minutes before the Korea Coast Guard (KCG).
The sinking of "Sewol" resulted in widespread social and political reaction within South Korea. Many people criticized the actions of the ferry's captain and most of the crew. Also criticized were the ferry's operator, Chonghaejin Marine, and the regulators who oversaw its operations, along with the administration of President Park Geun-hye for her response to the disaster and attempts to downplay government culpability, and the Korean Coast Guard for its poor handling of the disaster, and the perceived passivity of the rescue-boat crew on scene. Outrage has also been expressed against the initial false reporting of the disaster by the government and South Korean media, who claimed everyone aboard had been rescued, and against the government for prioritizing public image over the lives of its citizens in refusing help from other countries, and publicly downplaying the severity of the disaster.
On May 15, 2014, the captain and three crew members were charged with murder, while the other eleven members of the crew were indicted for abandoning the ship. As part of a government campaign to manage public sentiment over the official response to the sinking, an arrest warrant was issued for Yoo Byung-eun (described as the owner of Chonghaejin Marine), but he could not be found despite a nationwide manhunt. On July 22, 2014, the police announced that a body found in a field in Suncheon, roughly south of Seoul, was identified as Yoo.
Background.
At the time of its purchase by Chonghaejin Marine on October 8, 2012, the ship that would come to be known as MV "Sewol" was eighteen years old and dilapidated. It was originally named "Ferry Naminoue" and was operated from 1994 to 2012 as a transport ship for cargo and passengers by the Japanese company A-Line Ferry. According to A-Line Ferry, it did not experience any problems during its service in Japan. After it was purchased, the vessel underwent modifications between October 12, 2012, and February 12, 2013, and was registered by Chonghaejin on October 22, 2012. The modifications were originally claimed to be illegal, but the Korean Register of Shipping stated that the "Sewol" had "normally passed" all of the blueprint inspections, ship stability tests, and shipboard inclination tests when the cabin was expanded.
After these modifications, which included the addition of two decks of passenger space and the expansion of the cargo space, "Sewol" had her gross tonnage increased by 239 tons to 6,825 tons and her passenger capacity increased by 116 people for a total of 956 people including the crew. The modifications resulted in its center of gravity being moved upward by as well as a left-right imbalance. After the modifications were completed, "Sewol" underwent investigations by the Korean Register of Shipping (KR) including an inclining test, and received the ship inspection certification and the certification for the prevention of sea pollution on 12 February 2013. During the process of approving the modifications, the KR reduced the maximum amount of cargo that could be carried by 1,450 tons to 987 tons, and increased the amount of ballast needed by 1,333 tons, to 1,703 tons. The cargo limits were not known by the Korea Shipping Association, which has the responsibility to manage ferries, or the Korea Coast Guard (KCG), which were responsible for overseeing the Shipping Association. The Board of Audit and Inspection later revealed that the KR's licensing was based on falsified documents. After the inspections, 37 tons of marble were further added to the gallery room at the bridge deck located on the back of the ship.
"Sewol" began operations on 15 March 2013. She made three round trips per week from Incheon to Jeju, each one-way voyage of taking 13.5 hours to complete. On 19 February 2014, she received an interim inspection and a periodic inspection from the Register. It had made the round trip a total of 241 times until the day of the incident.
On 15 April 2014, "Sewol" was scheduled to leave the port at Incheon at 6:30 p.m. KST. A fog, which restricted visibility to less than , led the Incheon vessel traffic service (VTS) to issue a low visibility warning around 5:30 p.m., leading the Shipping Association to hold "Sewol"'s departure. The VTS retracted the warning around 8:35 p.m., and the Shipping Association removed the restriction on "Sewol"'s departure after checking the weather conditions with the operator of the Palmido lighthouse and consulting with the KCG. She departed around 9 p.m., and was the only ship to leave port that evening.
When "Sewol" departed, she was carrying 476 passengers, 33 crew members, and a total of 2,142.7 tons of cargo, including 185 cars. Among the 476 passengers were 325 students and 14 teachers on a field trip from Danwon High School. Five passengers were of non-Korean nationality. The ship was commanded by 69-year-old Captain Lee Joon-seok, who had been brought in as a replacement for the regular captain. Lee had over forty years of experience at sea and had traveled the route before. He was hired on a one-year contract, with a monthly salary of ₩2.7 million (roughly US$2,500). Lee worked with 33 crew members on the journey, of which nineteen were irregular, part-time workers.
Later investigations discovered problems concerning the state of "Sewol" at the time of departure. Despite her maximum allowance for 987 tons of cargo, "Sewol" was carrying 2,142.7 tons of cargo, which had been improperly secured. Only 761.2 tons of ballast were taken on board, the ballast tanks had not been properly maintained, and the previous voyage had been made without making further adjustments to the ballast during the journey. The regular captain of "Sewol", Captain Shin, had warned Chonghaejin about the decrease in stability and attributed it to the removal of the side ramp, later claiming that the company threatened to fire him if he continued his objections. Shin's warnings were also relayed through an official working for the Incheon Port Authority on 9 April 2014, which an official from Chonghaejin responded to by stating that he would deal with anyone making the claims. Shin had also requested a repair for the malfunctioning steering gear on 1 April 2014, but this was not done. The KR had noted in a stability test report dated 24 January 2014 that "Sewol" had become "too heavy and less stable after modifications were made". 
Chonghaejin's had spent just ₩2.6 thousand (US$2) on safety training for the crew the previous year, which was used to buy a paper certificate.
Wednesday, April 16, 2014.
On 16 April at 7:30 a.m. (KST), third mate Park Han-kyul and helmsman Cho Joon-ki took over the watch from the previous team. At this time, "Sewol" was heading at a course of about 165 degrees at a speed of about and was operating two radar devices. Around 8:20 a.m. when the ship was about from entering the Maenggol Channel, Park ordered Cho to change the steering system from autopilot to manual steering. When "Sewol" arrived at the channel at 8:27 a.m. at a course of around 137 degrees, the wind speed was between , the wave height about , and the visibility good.
The Maenggol Channel has strong currents, which necessitate extreme caution when steering a ship through it. At the time of the incident, conditions were calm and "Sewol" was following a route that was frequently used. While the wider areas of the channel contain rock hazards and shallow waters, they were not in the immediate vicinity of the ship's usual path. While prosecutors and some news organizations labeled Park as being inexperienced based on her unfamiliarity with the channel, the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal's investigation report noted that she had on multiple occasions passed through the channel on another ship.
As "Sewol" approached the fatal turn, breakfast was being served in the cafeteria. CCTV data taken at 8:40 a.m. showed students present and socializing on the deck. One surviving passenger, Choi Eun-seun, recalled having gone up to the deck to smoke right before the incident.
Multiple turns to the right (08:48).
Right before the incident, Park and Cho were standing side by side near the ship's wheel at the bridge. Captain Lee was absent from the bridge at the time. At 8:46 a.m., as "Sewol" was travelling at a speed of at a course of around 136 degrees, Park ordered Cho to change the course from 135 degrees to 140 degrees, which Cho consequently undertook.
The accounts of what happened next are conflicting. According to Park's testimony, after she had used the radar to check that "Sewol"'s course was changed and the new course was set to 140 degrees, she ordered Cho to change the course of the ship further to 145 degrees. The order was given at 8:48 a.m. After realizing that the ship was heavily listing to starboard, which led the bow to turn to the right, she gave an order to turn the wheel to port. Immediately after giving the order, she heard Cho exclaim, "The wheel isn't working" in a flustered voice, after which the ship started listing.
Cho's testimony did not notably differ from that of Park. He testified that the listing began with the order to turn to 140 degrees. According to Cho, he only received the order to change the course to 140 degrees, and not the order to change the course to 145 degrees. As "Sewol" kept turning towards the right even as he was holding onto the wheel, he made two turns to the left amounting to a five-degree turn. As the ship did not stop its rightward turning, it was eventually facing a 145-degree course. Cho testified that Park gave an order to turn "in the opposite direction" at this point, which he followed by turning the ship further to the left by ten degrees, so the total amount of the turn became fifteen degrees to the left.
The court came to the conclusion that Cho's steering led the ship to attempt a fifteen-degree turn for forty seconds. The court concluded that Cho, who was flustered by the ship turning faster than expected while he was following Park's order to turn to 145 degrees, was attempting to turn to the left when he took Park's order to mean a turn in the opposite direction. This led him to make a turn to the right, causing the front of the ship to rapidly turn right.
Effects of the turn.
Later analysis of "Sewol"'s track chart by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries revealed that the ship's Automatic Identification System (AIS) had stopped collecting data from 8:48:37 to 8:49:13; consequently, the Ministry and the Jindo VTS lost thirty-six seconds of data. While earlier reports and investigations believed that there was a power outage, Huh Yong-bum, the head of the expert advisory panel on the police-prosecution joint investigation team, testified that the AIS failure was due to system limitations and that the failure did not affect the steering.
According to the joint investigation team, "Sewol"'s sharp turn was a combined result produced by the steering error and the lessened restoring force caused by overloading; however, investigations did not show any malfunctions with the generator or the battery. From 8:49:26, AIS data showed the ship's angular velocity accelerated from 0.29 degrees per second (dps) to 0.83, 1.00, and 2.00 until 8:49:39; these readings were consistent with previous testing data gained from earlier tests conducted on an empty "Sewol". Consequently, the ship herself listed twenty degrees into the water at 8:49:40, causing cargo to fall to one side of the ship. The impact caused the ship's gyroscope to erroneously record angular velocities of 15 dps at 8:49:40, 14 dps the next second, and minus 11 dps the following second. Given that the shifted cargo effectively compounded the destabilizing effect, the ship tilted ten degrees further into the water. Passengers also reported hearing