War crime committed by the Yugoslav People's Army
The Škabrnja massacre was the killing of 62 Croatian civilians and five prisoners of war by Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina (SAO Krajina) Territorial Defence troops and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in the villages of Škabrnja and Nadin east of Zadar on 18–19 November 1991, during the Croatian War of Independence. The massacre occurred shortly after an agreement to evacuate Zadar's JNA garrison following an increase in fighting between the Croatian National Guard (renamed the Croatian Army in November 1991) and the JNA.
Most of the killings were committed by SAO Krajina troops which followed the leading armoured JNA units fighting their way into Škabrnja on 18 November. During the initial attack, the attacking force employed a human shield of captured civilians forced to walk in front of armoured vehicles. Most of the civilian population fled the village and about 120–130 were captured by the JNA and detained in the village school and kindergarten. However, others who took shelter in basements were killed in or just outside their homes. A portion of those killed in the massacre were buried in a mass grave in Škabrnja, while dozens of bodies were turned over to Croatian authorities.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted Croatian Serb political leaders and later presidents of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, Milan Babić and Milan Martić, for war crimes including the killings committed in Škabrnja and Nadin. Babić was sentenced to 13 years in prison in 2004, and Martić was handed a 35-year prison sentence in 2007. The ICTY also indicted Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in connection with the Škabrnja massacre, but his trial never produced a verdict as he died before one could be rendered. In November 1991, 26 individuals were convicted "in absentia" by Croatian authorities for war crimes committed in Škabrnja and Nadin. Most remain at large, though some have been re-tried and convicted for their involvement in the massacre while several others have returned to Croatia and had their convictions overturned.
Background.
In 1990, ethnic tensions between Serbs and Croats worsened after the electoral defeat of the government of the Socialist Republic of Croatia by the Croatian Democratic Union ( – HDZ). The Yugoslav People's Army ( – JNA) confiscated Croatia's Territorial Defence ( – TO) weapons to minimize resistance. On 17 August, the tensions escalated into an open revolt of the Croatian Serbs, centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin (approximately north-east of Split), parts of the Lika, Kordun, Banovina and eastern Croatia. In January 1991, Serbia, supported by Montenegro and Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, unsuccessfully tried to obtain the Yugoslav Presidency's approval for a JNA operation to disarm Croatian security forces. The request was denied and a bloodless skirmish between Serb insurgents and Croatian special police in March prompted the JNA itself to ask the Federal Presidency to give it wartime authority and declare a state of emergency. Even though the request was backed by Serbia and its allies, the JNA request was refused on 15 March. Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, preferring a campaign to expand Serbia rather than to preserve Yugoslavia with Croatia as a federal unit, publicly threatened to replace the JNA with a Serbian army and declared that he no longer recognized the authority of the federal Presidency. The threat caused the JNA to abandon plans to preserve Yugoslavia in favour of expanding Serbia as the JNA came under Milošević's control. The first casualties of the conflict occurred by the end of March. In early April, leaders of the Serb revolt in Croatia declared their intention to unite the areas under their control, the Serbian Autonomous Oblast Krajina (SAO Krajina), with Serbia. These areas were viewed by the Government of Croatia as breakaway regions.
At the beginning of 1991, Croatia had no regular army. To bolster its defence, Croatia doubled its police numbers to about 20,000. The most effective part of the Croatian police force was a 3,000-strong special police comprising twelve battalions organised along military lines. There were also 9,000–10,000 regionally organised reserve police in 16 battalions and 10 companies, but they lacked weapons. In response to the deteriorating situation, the Croatian government established the Croatian National Guard ( – ZNG) in May by expanding the special police battalions into four all-professional guards brigades. Under the control of the Croatian Ministry of Defence and commanded by retired JNA General Martin Špegelj, the four guards' brigades comprised approximately 8,000 troops. The reserve police, also expanded to 40,000, was attached to the ZNG and reorganised into 19 brigades and 14 independent battalions. The guards brigades were the only units of the ZNG that were fully equipped with small arms; throughout the ZNG there was a lack of heavier weapons and there was poor command and control structure above the brigade level. The shortage of heavy weapons was so severe that the ZNG resorted to using World War II-era arms taken from museums and film studios. At the time, the Croatian weapon stockpile consisted of 30,000 small arms purchased abroad and 15,000 previously owned by the police. To replace the personnel lost to the guards' brigades, a new 10,000-strong special police was established.
Prelude.
Sporadic skirmishes between Croatian forces and the SAO Krajina TO began in the second half of 1990, and mainly consisted of exchanges of gunfire in the Zadar hinterland. These gradually escalated to mortar attacks on Croat-inhabited villages by July 1991. At this time, the JNA 9th (Knin) Corps did not openly support either side in the conflict, and formed buffer zones to separate the SAO Krajina TO and the ZNG. Croatian authorities perceived this action as being intended to protect the territorial gains made by Croatian Serb units from Karin, Bukovica, Benkovac and Obrovac. The 9th Corps began to openly engage the ZNG on 26 August, having been reinforced by the 1st Battalion of the 4th Proletarian Motorised Brigade, which was normally based in Pirot. On 16–23 September, the JNA achieved limited gains in the Battle of Šibenik, before shifting its focus to Zadar.
The JNA advance towards Zadar was supported by the SAO Krajina TO and the town's JNA garrison, the latter being besieged by the ZNG. The main attacking force consisted of the 180th Motorized Brigade supported by corps-level artillery and the Yugoslav Air Force, while the Croatian defence relied on the 4th Guards and the 112th Infantry brigades as well as several independent ZNG battalions. The area around the villages of Škabrnja and Nadin, east of Zadar, represented the tip of a ZNG-held salient. The area boasted an almost exclusively Croat population of about 2,600 people, and was strategically important because of ZNG positions on the hills of Ražovljeva Glavica and Nadinska Kosa, which dominated the area of Ravni Kotari and the Benkovac–Zadar Airport road. The JNA attempted to encircle the two villages in late September, but failed. The fighting around Zadar culminated on 5–6 October, followed by a ceasefire on 8 October, which resulted in the JNA agreeing to withdraw its garrison from the city. By 21 October, the withdrawal was complete.
Despite the ceasefire, the JNA carried out an assault against Škabrnja and Nadin between 4 and 10 October. Its attack on Nadin, led by armoured vehicles and infantry, was repulsed; Škabrnja was targeted by artillery and cluster munitions. The attack resulted in the deaths of four ZNG troops and damage to two dozen houses and a school. Following the attack, the ZNG's Staff of the Zadar Sector Defence established the 750-strong Škabrnja Independent Battalion to improve the defensive capabilities of the two villages. Its area of responsibility encompassed of ZNG positions east of Zadar. The battalion deployed two companies, consisting of 240 soldiers, along of frontline around Škabrnja and a 100-strong company in Nadin. Despite their numbers, the effectiveness of the battalion was diminished due to a shortage of weapons. The unit had sufficient weapons to arm 70 percent of its troops and 30 percent of that stockpile consisted of antiquated firearms or hunting weapons. The civilian population of the two villages was evacuated to the islands of Ugljan and Dugi Otok. Five busloads of refugees returned on 6 November, following a new ceasefire. The ZNG was renamed the Croatian Army ("Hrvatska vojska" – HV) in early November.
Timeline.
Combat.
The JNA attacked Nadin once again at 7:00 and Škabrnja at 7:30 on the morning of 18 November, prompting much of the civilian population to flee. The JNA ground attack commenced at 7:30, supported by SAO Krajina police and TO, as well as volunteers from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The overall commander of the operation was JNA Lieutenant Colonel Momčilo Bogunović of the 180th Motorised Brigade. The attacking force engaged the Škabrnja–Nadin salient using tanks deployed to the northwest near the village of Zemunik Gornji, to the northeast near Smilčić and Gornje Biljane, as well as to the southeast along the road connecting Škabrnja and Benkovac. The initial attack involved 28 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and tanks, organized as one tank company, one mechanised company and two TO infantry companies.
A part of the force successfully advanced south from Smilčić and had captured the hamlet of Ambar located on the western approach to Škabrnja by 11:30. The HV was forced to retreat towards the centre of the village, but several troops and civilians who stayed behind in the hamlet were captured. Those who managed to pull out from Ambar reported killings of civilians by the JNA. The artillery bombardment of Škabrnja ceased at 12:30, but the Yugoslav Air Force targeted it with cluster bombs, and airlifted elements of the 63rd Parachute Brigade, based at the nearby Zadar Airport, to the outskirts of the village. At 13:30, the HV abandoned Ražovljeva Glavica and retreated to Škabrnja. Until 16:30, the attacking force kept advancing from Ambar towards the centre of Škabrnja using captured civilians and prisoners of war as human shields, until the HV salient was cut off from Zadar. The JNA reported that four of its troops were killed and eight were wounded that day, and paused its advance until the morning. Overnight, the commander of the Škabrnja Independent Battalion, Marko Miljanić, sneaked out of the village and went to Zadar to request reinforcements. Failing to receive any, he ordered the battalion to abandon the village by 6:00.
On the morning of 19 November, the JNA pressed on with its advance into the undefended eastern part of Škabrnja and reached Nadin from the west at 14:00. The Croats held out until the JNA captured Nadinska Kosa at 17:30. The SAO Krajina TO reported two wounded that day.
Killings.
As the JNA advanced through Škabrnja, tank rounds and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) were fired into houses by the attacking troops. The church of the Assumption of the Virgin was also fired upon by a tank, and its crew attempted to drive into the church but were stopped by a JNA captain. During the fighting, approximately 1,500 civilians managed to flee the village on foot to nearby Prkos, where they were picked up by buses and taken to Zadar.
A number of civilians who took shelter in house basements were killed. The killings largely took place as the lead elements of the attacking force, composed of regular JNA units, advanced and the SAO Krajina forces came in their wake. The JNA and SAO Krajina TO troops started searching houses in Škabrnja after a JNA tank was destroyed. People were either shot in shelters or were removed from their basements and interrogated, beaten or killed. In one instance, a captured HV soldier was beaten and his ears were cut off before he was shot in front of his family. A large majority of the killed civilians or prisoners of war were shot at point-blank range, and one woman was crushed to death by a tank.
Several JNA officers and regular soldiers intervened on a number of occasions to prevent further killings and saved a number of civilians. The security service of the 180th Motorised Brigade received reports of the killings and Major Branislav Ristić interviewed two members of the brigade's military police (MP) about these murders. The MPs described summary executions, brief interrogations of civilians and their killing. They described how they saw TO troops drag a father and a daughter out of a house, shoot the man in the mouth in front of