October 1917 World War I battle
The Battle of Poelcappelle was fought in Flanders, Belgium, on 9 October 1917 by the British Second Army and Fifth Army against the German 4th Army, during the First World War. The battle marked the end of the string of highly successful British attacks in late September and early October, during the Third Battle of Ypres. Only the supporting attack in the north achieved a substantial advance. On the main front, the German defences withstood the limited amount of artillery fire achieved by the British after the attack of 4 October. The ground along the main ridges had been severely damaged by shelling and rapidly deteriorated in the rains, which began again on 3 October, turning some areas back into swamps.
Dreadful ground conditions had more effect on the British, who needed to move large amounts of artillery and ammunition to support the next attack. The battle was a defensive success for the 4th Army, although costly to both sides. The weather and ground conditions put severe strain on all the infantry involved and led to many wounded being stranded on the battlefield. Early, misleading information and delays in communication led Plumer and Haig to plan the attack of 12 October (the First Battle of Passchendaele) under the impression that a substantial advance had taken place at Passchendaele ridge when most of the captured ground had been lost to German counter-attacks.
Background.
Strategic background.
It was important that the British kept the initiative; an attack was being prepared by the British Third Army at Cambrai for late November. The troubles in the French Army stemming from the Nivelle Offensive in April and the forthcoming attack (the Battle of La Malmaison) on the Aisne, made it desirable that the large number of German divisions drawn from the French front should not return. At Verdun on 20 August, the French achieved a substantial success; there was no German counter-stroke or counter-offensive as the local had been sent to Flanders. By October 1917, many German divisions on the rest of the Western Front had been engaged in Flanders, some more than once; maintaining the pressure also constrained German operations on the Russian and Italian fronts. After the Battle of Broodseinde on 4 October, the first of the "Black Days" of the German Army, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), believed that the 4th Army was close to collapse, due to the large number of Germans taken prisoner and encouraging intelligence gleaned from the battlefield.
Tactical developments.
On 28 September, Haig met General Hubert Gough (Fifth Army) and General Herbert Plumer (Second Army) to explain his intentions. After the victories of 20 and 26 September, the fine weather, the disarray of the German defenders and the limited prospect of German reinforcements from the Russian front, Haig decided that the attack on 4 October would conclude the period of strictly limited advances. The following step would be a deeper advance, with provision made for exploitation. Haig wanted reserve formations of infantry, artillery, cavalry and tanks to be ready to extend a successful attack.
Gough and Plumer replied over the next couple of days, that they felt that Haig's proposals were premature and that exploitation would not be feasible until Passchendaele ridge had been captured from Passchendaele northwards to Westroosebeke. Gough and Plumer thought that this would probably take two more steps at three-day intervals and then another four days to repair roads over the captured ground. Haig considered that although a collapse of the German defence was a condition for exploitation of the attack due on 10 October, which was not guaranteed, he desired that arrangements be made. If the German defences did not collapse, the preparations would be available for a later date.
At another conference on 2 October, Haig announced that operations at Ypres would continue for as long as the weather permitted, that six fresh divisions were being moved from quiet fronts to the Fifth Army and that the Canadian Corps was being moved to the Second Army. Immediate exploitation, should the attack intended for 10 October succeed, was to be accomplished by each attacking division keeping its reserve brigade lightly equipped, accompanied by two 60-pounder batteries, two 6-inch howitzer batteries and four field artillery brigades. If the infantry brigades conducting the morning attack reported a big success, their reserve brigades would continue the advance in the afternoon.
The reserve brigades of the attacking divisions of I and II Anzac corps were to reach Drogenbroodhoek in the south, beyond Broodseinde, Passchendaele station on the Morslede road in the centre and gain touch with the Fifth Army on the Westroosebeke road north of Passchendaele. A reserve division of each corps was to be ready behind the front, which the Director-General of Transportation, Major-General Philip Nash, undertook to have on the battlefield in 3½–4 hours, if given three hours' notice. The divisions in corps reserve would be ready by the following morning to advance beyond the reserve brigades if German resistance crumbled. A cavalry division was given to each army to operate with the reserve divisions, two tank battalions were attached to the Second Army and a tank brigade to the Fifth Army to exploit the firmer going, should the advances take place.
Prelude.
British preparations.
In the early morning of 4 October, news arrived at British Headquarters (HQ) of the great success of the attack. Brigadier-General Charteris, Chief Intelligence Officer at General Headquarters, was sent from Haig's Advanced HQ to the Second Army HQ to discuss exploitation. Plumer did not agree that it was possible because eight more uncommitted German divisions were behind the battlefield and there were another six beyond them; Plumer preferred to wait until the expected German counter-attacks that day had been defeated. German artillery fire was still heavy and the and (defensive positions) behind the attack front could be occupied by the fresh German divisions. An attack on these defensive lines would need close artillery support, which would be impossible because the British artillery was behind a severely battered strip of muddy ground wide. As the magnitude of the victory became apparent, Plumer had second thoughts but by 2:00 p.m., accepted that the moment had passed. Gough ordered the Fifth Army to advance further and then cancelled the instruction, after a local German counter-attack was reported to have pushed the 4th Division off 19 Metre Hill.
Rain fell again on 4 October, continued on 5 and 6 October then became a downpour on 7 October. On 5 October, General William Birdwood, commander of I Anzac Corps, told Plumer that the exploitation would not be possible as the Corps light railway and the Westhoek to Zonnebeke road could not carry forward all the artillery necessary. On 7 October, Haig cancelled the exploitation attack to the second objective (red line), intended for the afternoon of 9 October. The rain stopped that night and the ground began to dry on 8 October, until late afternoon when another downpour began. From 4 to 9 October, over of rain fell, during a month when average rainfall was . According to James Edmonds, the official historian, the Corps Chief Engineers and divisional Commanders Royal Engineers (CRE), considered that the ground conditions did not create serious transport difficulties to the front line until 4 October. In some places the going was good enough up to 12 October, except in some areas where the ground became impassable. The area behind II Anzac Corps, near the Steenbeek and its tributaries, was called "a porridge of mud" (sic). Duck-board tracks were extended to short of the front line, beyond which was a taped row of stakes illuminated with lamps at night; pack animals trampled many of the tracks and stakes into the mud.
Extension of the plank roads behind the two Anzac Corps proved impossible during the rain which began on 4 October, planks sinking or floating away. The field artillery of II Anzac Corps was not able to move forward as planned from west of the Steenbeek to the Zonnebeke–Winnipeg road. Platforms were improvised to keep them out of the mud but the failure to move left them from the morning objective, out of range of the German field artillery beyond Passchendaele. The field batteries for the 66th (2nd East Lancashire) Division were placed beyond Frezenburg, along the Zonnebeke road short of their intended positions. Conditions for the gunners deteriorated rapidly, with dugouts flooding in the rain. A sharp increase in illness led to breakdowns in the system of reliefs, just when the workload was at its highest. Instead of the usual 90 field pieces in the 66th (2nd East Lancashire) Division, one field brigade only got 25 guns into action and the other was unable to fire until after the attack began.
The field guns of the 49th (West Riding) Division were still along the Wieltje–Gravenstafel road, west of the Steenbeek, with only a few forward on the other side behind Hill 35. Transport of ammunition by pack animal was only possible to guns kept within of roads. Journeys previously an hour-long took from 6 to 16 hours and the ammunition arrived coated with slime. The effect of the rain was not uniform and further north, in the area of XIV Corps and the French First Army, the ground had not been damaged as much by shell-fire. Despite considerable difficulty, the field artillery was moved to within of the final objective and ample ammunition and field stores were brought forward. XIV Corps had 49 batteries of three hundred and twelve 18-pounder guns in groups, one for each division, the Guards group having 23 batteries; the medium and heavy artillery being grouped similarly.
Plan.
The arrangements agreed by Haig, Gough and Plumer on 2 October, the effect of the victory of 4 October and the disarray of the German defenders, led to the attack planned for 10 October being advanced to 9 October, with a second attack being arranged for 12 October. Attacking a front of , it was intended to capture Passchendaele ridge in two stages. The first objective (red line) would be captured by a morning attack, which if successful and the cause of a general withdrawal by the Germans, would be followed-up by the reserve brigades of the attacking divisions, which would advance to the second objective (blue line) in the afternoon. On 7 October Haig cancelled the afternoon attack to the blue line due to the wet weather.
On the southern flank of the attack, X Corps was to attack to hold German reserves around Becelaere and Gheluvelt. To the north, I Anzac Corps was to advance on the right flank of the main attack, with the 1st and 2nd Australian divisions, the 4th and 5th Australian divisions being in reserve. Further north, II Anzac Corps with the New Zealand and 3rd Australian divisions in reserve, was to attack two objectives, the 66th (2nd East Lancashire) Division, advancing along the main ridge, north of the Ypres–Roulers railway to just short of Passchendaele village and the 49th (West Riding) Division on either side of the Ravebeek stream, up Wallemolen spur to the Bellevue pillboxes. If the first objectives were reached, the reserve brigades were to attack the second objectives in the afternoon. The second objectives were ahead of the red line, beyond the village and the main ridge, respectively. The reserve divisions were ready to move rapidly forward, by train from west of Ypres to continue the attack the next day.
On the Fifth Army front, XVIII Corps with a brigade each from the 48th (South Midland) Division and 11th (Northern) Division, was to advance up Poelcappelle spur and towards Westroosebeke on the main ridge. XIV Corps was to advance to the south edge of Houthoulst Forest with the 4th, 29th and Guards divisions, as the French First Army conformed on its left. Raids and artillery bombardments were arranged along the rest of the front to deceive the Germans as to the British objectives.
German preparations.
Opposite I Anzac Corps the 233rd Division held the line, with the 220th Division as its counter-attack () division. To the north against II Anzac Corps, were the 195th Division and part of 16th Division, with the 20th Division and 45th Reserve Divisions as divisions; further north was the 227th Division. The 18th Division held near Poelcappelle and the 119th Division held Houthoulst Forest. The Germans