In Sri Lanka, state-sponsored disinformation and suppression of dissent taint COVID-19 response · Global Voices
Image via EngageMedia. Used with permission.
This article is part of Pandemic of Control, a series that aims to further public discourse on the rise of digital authoritarianism in the Asia-Pacific amid COVID-19. Pandemic of Control is an initiative by EngageMedia, in partnership with CommonEdge. This edited version of the article by <PERSON> is republished in Global Voices under a content partnership.
In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report on Sri Lanka’s “alarming path towards the recurrence of grave human rights violations.” The country, even before the onset of the pandemic, saw the militarization of civilian government functions, the reversal of constitutional safeguards, political obstruction of accountability for crimes and human rights violations, majoritarian and exclusionary rhetoric, the surveillance and obstruction of civil society, and shrinking democratic space.
These trends continue today, further fuelled by a 2020 constitutional amendment expanding the powers of Sri Lankan President <PERSON>. In practice, the power to enact COVID-19 mandates was concentrated with the president, with limited checks and balances from other democratic institutions.
This concentration of power, coupled with the government’s highly militarised response to the COVID-19 pandemic and state-sponsored disinformation tactics, reinforced the president’s authoritarian agenda and a climate of fear and censorship that continues amid the 2022 national protests due to the current economic crisis.
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State-sponsored disinformation against the Muslim community
The government's pandemic response has been criticised for its problematic measures, which include the criminalisation and marginalisation of patients and alleged police abuses against citizens. Critics who protested against the illegal, ad-hoc, and discriminatory nature of the pandemic response were silenced through arrests, surveillance, harassment, and intimidation.
Such measures have disproportionately affected Muslims, a minority community in a country where the majority of the population is Sinhalese Buddhist. Pervasive narratives against the minority Muslim community have historically led to online hate speech and physical violence (documented in 2014, 2018, and 2019). These Islamophobic narratives further intensified during the pandemic, with Sri Lankan officials “stoking communal hate” and government policies discriminatory against Muslims.
Even more problematic, such measures were supported through proxies of the state, including private media entities. In April 2020, the government’s chief epidemiologist promoted a false narrative that burials of COVID-19 patients — a common religious practice by Muslims — could contaminate groundwater and spread the virus. 803
The government then mandated cremation for all COVID-19 victims. These measures directly violated Islamic burial practices, and even the best practices stipulated by the World Health Organization that permitted either burials or cremations for those who died from the virus. And yet, private media such as Derana and HiruTV amplified misinformation on this issue.
A highly militarised COVID-19 response
At present, the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka (TRCSL) lacks the independence it needs to protect citizens from unwarranted surveillance. In December 2019, retired Defence Secretary Major General <PERSON> was appointed chairman of the TRCSL; in November 2020, the TRCSL and several other bodies were brought under the Technology Ministry — directly under the purview of the president.
Internet service providers (ISPs), such as Dialog and SLT Mobitel, do not appear to disclose data about government demands for user information or notify their users if their data has been accessed by the government. In 2013, Dialog’s CEO stated that telecommunications companies “have to be compliant with requests from the government.” Furthermore, there are no legal provisions that require ISPs to even disclose such information in the first place.
The appointment of military personnel to key positions in the government normalised military involvement and tactics in civilian affairs, framing the pandemic as a security threat rather than a public health crisis.
General <PERSON> was appointed by the president to head the National Operation Centre for the Prevention of COVID-19 Outbreak. Military personnel were also appointed to coordinate the pandemic response. For instance, military intelligence officers obtained the cellphone numbers of COVID-19 patients from service providers to track down those who had close contact with patients or those who “evaded” quarantine. This was despite the prohibition of extrajudicial surveillance of personal communications under the Telecommunications Act No. 27 of 1996.
There are also claims of intelligence officers using Pegasus software. Opposition MP <PERSON> remarked that the government had begun using Pegasus spyware in March 2021. 892