The question depends on what one's definition of "physical law" is.
Part of the point of <PERSON>'s article is to argue that strict reductionism is not what scientists do in practice.
More explicitly, one caricature of pure reductionism is that only an explanation starting from the very bottom, i.e. involving strings and quarks, etc. counts as physical law, whereas <PERSON> would argue more that any reasonably quantitative workable theory of phenomena based at any scale is a physical law. I really doubt that any working physicists really hold the former position anymore, in part due to one of the great advances of post 1950's theoretical physics, the effective field theory and renormalization group philosophy that <PERSON> so nicely explained in his answer. We don't have to go that deep to see some illustrations of this though.
examples
Let me give some easy examples and raise some discussion questions to help you decide what qualifies as a physical law.
Probably the first emergent insight that one learns in physics is the notion of "center of mass", that is, the idea that in many cases you can treat an object made out of $10^{27}$ atoms as a single point particle! Though it's not pointed out when you're a freshman, what's going on here is exactly the same as happens in all other applications of emergence - you ignore all the internal degrees of freedom of your sliding block, for instance, because they are much higher energy than the stuff that you want to talk about. 682
Does the fact that we ignore all that information make the explanation of the acceleration of a block any less of a "physical law"?
Already we see a generic fact about emergence -- at some point the explanation breaks down. For instance, there's no way from treating a block as a point particle to be able to understand the sound it makes when it hits the ground, though we can get a very good description of its motion (in a vacuum, say)!
Two discoveries at the start of the 20th century showed that the entire edifice of <PERSON>'s laws and Galilean relativity is an emergent phenomenon. Note that this understanding doesn't invalidate most applications of <PERSON>'s laws -- that the limit $c\rightarrow\infty$ and $\hbar\rightarrow0$ simplifies to something that high school students can calculate with is really amazing, isn't it? But, does the fact that they are "just" some limiting case mean that <PERSON>'s laws and Galilean relativity are not "physical laws"?
We can also turn these questions around and imagine ourselves in a universe where QM and SR were discovered first. In that case, if people then discovered the classical limits, would people think of them as less "physical"?
conclusion
One could and should spend some time thinking about what our physical principles are and what "emergent" assumptions and approximations go into them; breaking down the assumption that mechanics ended with <PERSON> was the work of the 1st half of the 20th century. On the other hand, <PERSON> points out that it's also useful to go in the opposite direction, in some ways, this is where the big problems in physics that I'm interested in are; to start with many-body descriptions which are impossible to calculate with and not very illuminating, and pick out the simplifications and insights that emerge! Whether you call it a physical law or not is sort of besides the point, right?
These are some of the things that come up when I think a bit about your question. 855