Même dans les cas où le transfert de leur technologie protégée intéresse les fournisseurs, une protection plus forte consoliderait encore davantage leur pouvoir de négociation et leur permettrait d &apos; imposer des prix plus élevés Voir E.F. Emmert, &quot; Intellectual property in the Uruguay Round: Negotiating strategies of the Western industrialized countries &quot; , Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No 4 (été 1990), p. 1359 à 1362; Primo Braga, &quot; The newly-industrializing economies... &quot; , op. cit., p. 256, et K. Maskus, &quot; Intellectual property &quot; dans J. Schott (directeur de publication), Completing the Uruguay Round: A Result-oriented Approach to the GATT Trade Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 168; voir également Indian Drug Manufacturers Association, &quot; Dunkel draft: A national health disaster &quot; , Bombay; R. Dasgupta, &quot; Subsidies, patents and market access in the Dunkel draft &quot; , Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.
Даже в тех случаях, когда поставщики заинтересованы в передаче своей охраняемой технологии, усиление охраны приведет к еще большему укреплению их позиций и позволит им назначать более высокие цены См. E.F. Emmert, &quot; Intellectual property in the Uruguay Round: Negotiating strategies of the Western industrialized countries &quot; , Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Summer 1990), pp. 1359-1362; Primo Braga, &quot; The newly-industrializing economies... &quot; , op. cit. p. 256; K. Maskus, &quot; Intellectual property &quot; в J. Schott (ed.), Completing the Uruguay Round: A Result-oriented Approach to the GATT Trade Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 168; см. также Indian Drug Manufacturers Association, &quot; Dunkel draft: A national health disaster &quot; , Bombay; R. Dasgupta, &quot; Subsidies, patents and market access in the Dunkel draft &quot; , Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.