Indeed, once the unintended consequences of their actions – more financial duress for the non-rich after the crisis – became clear, Bertrand and Morse show that the legislators in unequal districts moved against the financial sector to protect their constituents, voting to set limits on interest rates charged by “payday” lenders (who lend to over-indebted lower-income borrowers at very high interest rates). Of course, such legislation will have unanticipated consequences, which future studies will unearth, but the intent behind it cannot be doubted.
事实上，一旦其行为的意外后果——危机的爆发让小康之家陷入了重重财务困境——变得清晰，贝特兰和摩尔斯的研究表明，来自不平等地区的立法者会反对金融部门，保护自己的选民，投票限制“发薪日”贷款人所能获得的利率（他们以极高利率向过度负债的低收入借款人发放贷款）。当然，这样的立法也会有不可预知的后果，未来的研究将会有所揭示，但其立法动机是无可置疑的。