If banks are regulated at the national level, but do business internationally, national regulatory authorities have a permanent incentive to set lax standards to avoid driving business to other countries and to lure it from them instead. Regulatory competition thus degenerates into a race to the bottom, since the benefits of lax regulation translate into profits at home, while the losses lie with bank creditors around the world.
银行监管是有意义集体行动的最热门领域。如果银行在国家水平监管而从事国际业务，那么国家监管当局就永远有放松监管标准以防业务外流、吸引业务流入的激励。于是，监管竞争就退化为争相放松的竞争，因为放松监管的好处是将利润留在国内，而损失则由全世界银行债权人承担。