The first argument in favor of central-bank independence is that, without it, politicians can exploit expansionary monetary policy’s positive short-run effects at election time, without regard for its long-run inflationary consequences. (By contrast, fiscal and exchange-rate policies rarely imply comparable temporal trade-offs, and thus are difficult to exploit for political gain.)
支持央行独立的第一个理由是，若非如此，政客可以在选举期间利用扩张性货币政策的积极短期效应而不顾及它的长期通胀性后果。（相反，财政和汇率政策很少意味着类似的暂时性权衡，从而较难为政治利益所利用。）但当确保价格稳定不再是货币决策者的唯一使命时，这一理由便站不住脚了。