Then they realized that their holdings in liquid and low-return assets far exceed what is needed to avoid the type of speculative runs that East Asia experienced in 1997, and Russia in 1998. After all, why hold US T-bills with a meager 5% return, German Bunds with a 4% return, or Japanese government bonds with a 0.5% return when you can acquire foreign firms, invest in real assets, stock markets, or higher-yielding corporate bonds?
最初，这些国家将其外汇储备投资于流动资产之上，也就是短期美国国债以及由其他储备货币国家发行的政府债券。随后，它们发现它们所持有的流动性和低收益资产远远超过避免东亚在1997年和俄国在1998年所经历的那种投机性挤兑所需要的数量。毕竟，如果当你可以投资于房地产、股票市场或者高收益的企业债券时，何必持有5%回报可怜的美国国债、4%回报的德国债券或者0.5%的日本政府债券呢？