Moreover, the central bank needs rapid, sizeable inflation to bring down real debt values quickly – a slow increase in inflation (especially if well signaled by the central bank) would have limited effect, because maturing debt would demand not only higher nominal rates, but also an inflation-risk premium to roll over claims. Significant inflation might be hard to contain, however, especially if the central bank loses credibility: Would the public really believe that the central bank is willing to push interest rates sky high and kill growth in order to contain inflation, after it abandoned its earlier inflation target in order to foster growth?
此外，央行需要快速大规模的通胀才能迅速降低债务的实际价值——通胀的缓慢上升（特别是在央行释放出清晰信号的情况下）的效果有限，因为到期债务不仅会要求更高的利率，而且若要展期，就不得不额外支付通胀溢价。不过，大幅通胀可能难以控制，特别是在央行可信度有所缺失的情况下：公众真的会相信，在抛弃早先的通胀目标来刺激增长后，央行还会愿意把利率大幅提升，不惜牺牲增长来控制通胀？