All of this implies that the crucial problem is not the fiscal cost of rescue, but the macroeconomic volatility induced by precarious credit supply – first provided too easily and at too low a price, and then severely restricted. And it is possible – indeed, I suspect likely – that such credit-supply problems would exist even if the too-big-to-fail problem were effectively addressed.
所有这些都意味着关键的问题并不是救助的财政成本，而是信用市场不稳定所导致的宏观经济萎缩——一开始提供大量太容易或者太廉价的信用，然后却大幅收紧监管和限制。而这类信用供给问题有可能——事实上，我认为很大机会——在那些“不死巨兽”的问题得到解决之后还继续存在。