Indeed, in a new paper, co-authored with Jesse Schreger, we show that eurozone members’ bias in official forecasts can be neatly characterized as responding to the SGP’s 3%-of-GDP limit on budget deficits in 1999-2011: each time governments exceeded the limit, over-optimistic forecasts followed. In other words, governments adjust their forecasts, not their policies.
确实，在笔者与杰西·施雷格（Jesse Schreger）合作撰写的新报告中，我们提出欧元区成员国在官方预测上的偏向性整齐划一地表现为对《稳定与增长公约》中1999-2011年财政赤字低于GDP3%条款的回应：每当政府预算赤字超过限制，就会出台过度乐观的预测。换句话说，各国政府调整的是其预测，而非政策。