But that is not the right place to look nowadays, because regulators are positioning long-term debt to take the hit in a meltdown, while making banks’ extremely profitable – and far more volatile – short-term debt and trading operations more certain to be paid in full. As a result, traders choose too-big-to-fail banks, rather than mid-size institutions, as counter-parties for their short-term trades, causing the large banks’ trading books – and, hence, their profits – to surge.
研究不应该让监管者停止思考的第二个原因是这些研究集中在长期债券。但在眼下这并非正确的着眼点，因为监管者让长期债券在危机中承受冲击，而让银行利润最高——波动性也远远更高——的短期债务和交易操作有更大的足额偿付把握。结果，交易员们选择太大而不能倒的银行而非中等规模机构作为短期交易的对手方，这导致大银行交易规模急剧膨胀，利润也水涨船高。