In John Kenneth Galbraith’s summary: “Either from a shortage of borrowers, an unwillingness to lend, or an overriding desire to be liquid – undoubtedly it was some of all three – the banks accumulated reserves in excess of requirements. Reserves of member banks at Fed were $256 million more than required in 1932; $528 million in 1933, $1.6 billion in 1934, $2.6 billion in 1936.”
另一方面，美联储更加循规蹈矩的量化宽松政策也收获了同样沮丧的结果。正如经济学家约翰·肯尼思·盖尔布莱夫总结的那样：“借贷人不足，贷款意愿低下，以及那种不顾一切增加流动性的渴望——这三种情况果然都出现了——各银行都积累了大大超过需求量的储备。美联储各会员银行超出货币需求量的总储备额在1932年时为2.56亿美元，1933年为5.28亿美元，1934年上升到16亿美元，最后在1936年堆积到26亿。”