By contrast, a more needy Louisiana (with its staggering 24% poverty rate) was denied its request for flood-mitigation funds in 2004. With Louisiana’s ability to protect itself weakened and the center of disaster relief badly undermined, an inadequate government response and unnecessary destruction were almost inevitable – with the poor paying the price.
举例来讲，佛罗里达（比路易斯安娜多16张选举人票，而且由总统的兄弟管辖）拿到了湿地保护所需要的费用。恰恰相反，更需要这笔款项的路易斯安娜（该州贫困率达到了令人惊讶的24%）却没有拿到2004年用于减灾的资金。由于路易斯安娜州自我保护的能力下降、救灾中心的运营也存在严重的隐患，政府反应能力不足和不必要的灾难破坏几乎不可避免¾而最终付出代价的是那些穷人。