This can be done by making raters’ profits depend not on satisfying the issuers that select them, but on performing well for investors. If raters’ profits depend on such performance – on the accuracy of their ratings – the profit motive would turn from a source of perverse incentives to a provider of beneficial incentives.
因此什么也无法替代确保评级机构尽可能提供准确评级结果的动机。 这只有当实现评级机构的利润与选择他们的发行机构脱钩，并与为投资者所提供服务挂钩的时候才可能成为现实。 如果评级机构的利润取决于这样的表现——取决于评级的准确程度——那么逐利动机就会从负面转化为一种正面的激励。