For example, some SWFs faced temporary, but significant, losses after America’s subprime mortgage bubble burst in 2008, and after the European Union’s sovereign-debt crisis erupted a year later, owing to a high level of exposure to these economies’ property, financial, and sovereign-debt markets. Those that have not been hit have been protected by host-country opposition to projects in strategic sectors, and by the fact that SWFs, aware of the sensitivity of their investments, and afraid of potential retaliation, have mostly taken small stakes (1-2%) in their targets.
比如，一些主权财富基金在2008年美国次贷泡沫破裂和2009年欧盟主权债务危机爆发后面临暂时但巨大的损失，这是因为它们在这些经济体的房地产、金融和主权债务市场上有着巨额风险敞口。没有受到冲击的主权财富基金得益于东道国反对在战略部门的引资以及主权财富基金充分明白其投资的敏感性，担心潜在报复，因而对目标项目的所有权占比不大（通常只有1—2%）