As a result, they waited too long. The same is true of the OMT program: elected politicians fear that triggering it would be perceived as a sign of weakness, implying a cost that they have a strong incentive to delay paying.
那么，既然触发OMT干预的好处是如此之大，为何西班牙和意大利政府不愿这样做？主要原因在于政治。20世纪30年代，所有欧洲政府都害怕与金本位脱钩将被视为疲软的信号。结果，它们等待了太长时间。OMT也是如此：当选政客害怕触发OMT被视为示弱，这就构成了一种成本，他们有强烈的激励推迟该成本的发生。