In particular, your value as a lobbyist seems to depend very highly on whom you worked with in the past. Igan and Mishra find “spending an extra dollar is almost twice as effective in switching a legislator’s position if the lobbyist is connected to the legislator compared to the case where the lobbyist is unconnected.”
当然，去监管化正是金融公司之所欲——不管什么类型的规则和监督，越少越好。这完完全全是一件你认识多少人、和他们交情如何的事情。特别是，你作为游说者的价值与你过去的工作背景有着非常紧密的联系。伊甘和米什拉发现“在立法机关有关系的游说者和没有关系的游说者相比，前者花钱让立法者改变立场的效果比后者好一倍。”