Reliance on street mobilization and army intervention to bring down an elected leader who has support on the ground is unlikely to lead to a positive outcome. On the contrary, that pattern – seen in Spain in 1936, Iran in 1953, Chile in 1973, Turkey in 1980, Sudan in 1989, and Algeria and Tajikistan in 1992 – usually leads to military dictatorships, civil wars, or both.
如果穆尔西无法继续掌权，他将以何种方式下台将在很大程度上决定此后的形势。依靠街头动员和军队干预迫使拥有基层支持的当选领袖下台不太可能带来好的结果。相反，曾在1936年西班牙、1953年伊朗、1973年智利、1980年土耳其、1989年苏丹和1992年阿尔及利亚和塔吉克斯坦上演的戏码却往往导致军事独裁、内战或两者兼而有之。