But, in a system with many – often implicit – government guarantees, it is not always the most efficient enterprises that are willing and able to pay more to borrow. Liberalizing lending rates might merely lead those with government guarantees to outbid smaller and more efficient enterprises, resulting in more misallocation of capital.
中国所计划的金融部门改革的关键点——利率自由化或许无法解决这一问题。理论上，贷款利率提高应该有助于减少过度投资。但是，在存在各种（通常是隐性的）政府担保的制度下，愿意和能够以更大代价举债的未必是效率最高的企业。贷款利率自由化可能只会导致有政府担保的企业凌驾于规模更小、效率更高的企业之上，导致更严重的资本错配。这意味着金融自由化可能是危险的，除非国有企业也受到预算硬约束。