If managers are only loosely tied to shareholders, they could more willingly give up a bigger share of the pie to labor. Similarly, where shareholder interests do not come first, say, in a corporatist system, dominant owners have greater reason to keep financial information private, lest labor use it to press for more favorable terms.
如果管理者与股东的联系不那么紧密，他们就可能乐意将更大的蛋糕分给劳动力。与之相似，如果在组织体系中不优先考虑股东的利益，主要所有者就更有理由对财务信息严格保密，唯恐被劳动者利用，成为增加报酬的筹码。这两种考虑都会导致所有权更加集中，对证券市场颇为不利。