What central banks need now is a revised mandate that upholds price stability as the primary, long-term objective, while allowing policymakers to pursue other objectives when appropriate. Specifically, the central bank should be able to move slowly on price stability if it regards the real economy as unacceptably weak, or if an asset-price misalignment threatens financial stability and cannot be defused quickly by the new macro-prudential instruments.
如今，中央银行需要改变权限范围，不再把价格稳定作为首要的长期目标，而允许决策者在合适的时候追求其他目标。具体而言，央行应该能够缓慢采取价格稳定措施，如果它认为实体经济实在太脆弱或资产价格失调已经威胁到金融稳定并且无法通过新的宏观审慎工具快速解决的话。