Friedman and Schwartz are generally seen as reproving the Fed for failing to react swiftly to successive waves of bank failures, first in late 1930 and then again in 1931 and 1933. But a close reading reveals that the authors reserve their most scathing criticism for the Fed’s failure to initiate a concerted program of security purchases in the first half of 1930 in order to prevent those bank failures.
大体上，弗里德曼和施瓦茨被视为在指责美联储没能迅速地对接二连三的银行倒闭潮——第一波在1930年末，接着在1931和1933年两度再次发生——做出反应。但通过更仔细的解读可以发现，两位作者保留了对美联储的最严厉的批评——没能在1930年上半年实施购买证券的联合计划以防止银行倒闭。