Any agreement involving an end to sanctions and diplomatic isolation would need to be accompanied by intrusive monitoring, inspection, and verification arrangements, covering not only all sensitive stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, but also any suspected weapons design or engineering facilities. The international community requires real confidence that there would be enough lead time – 12 months or so – in which to respond to any evidence of real intent to move to weaponization.
上述理由都没有说明伊朗真有发展核武的意图。但人们往往太过着眼于过去的历史，也因此得出太多互相猜忌的理由。任何关于结束制裁和外交孤立的协议都必须伴随着现场监视，监察和验证程序，涵盖核燃料循环的所有敏感阶段，以及所有可疑的武器设计和工程设施。国际社会需要得到真正的信心，相信自己会有足够的提前期（12个月左右）去对任何显示真正核武化意图的证据作出反应。