Provision of liquidity by an international lender of last resort – the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or even a new European Monetary Fund – could prevent an illiquidity problem from turning into an insolvency problem. But if a country is effectively insolvent rather than just illiquid, such “bailouts” cannot prevent eventual default and devaluation (or exit from a monetary union) because the international lender of last resort eventually will stop financing an unsustainable debt dynamic, as occurred Argentina (and in Russia in 1998).
由国际上的最终贷款人，例如欧洲中央银行、国际货币基金组织或者新倡议的欧洲货币基金组织提供资金，可以防止流动性问题进一步恶化为偿债能力问题。但如果一个国家处于事实上的破产状态，而不仅仅是一时周转不灵，这样的“救助”到头来还是不能防止违约和货币贬值（也不能防止退出货币联盟），因为国际上的最终贷款人不会一直为不可持续的债务动态提供融资，就像阿根廷和 1998 年俄罗斯所遭遇的情形一样。