This discrepancy is at the heart of the question with which European policymakers are now grappling: Should taxpayers in debtor countries expect “solidarity” – or, more bluntly, money – from taxpayers in creditor countries? Why should taxpayers in creditor countries have to take responsibility for financing the euro crisis, especially given that high private wealth/GDP ratios may result from low tax revenues over time, while lower ratios may reflect higher tax revenues?
这一差异是目前欧洲决策者正在试图抓住的问题的核心。债务国纳税人应该期待债权国纳税人的“团结”——或者说得更直白一点，债权国纳税人的钱吗？债权国纳税人的钱为什么非得用来担起为欧元危机融资的责任，特别是在高私人财富/GDP的原因可能正是长期以来的低税，而低私人财富/GDP则是高税的反映的情况下？