A more aggressive approach would compensate bankers with the same bonds that guarantee their institutions’ short-term, volatile, and risky debts. As a result, bank managers would have a personal financial stake in ensuring that the risky obligations do not blow up, as they did during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
更激进的办法是用担保本机构的高波动、高风险短期债务的债券作为银行家薪酬。这样一来，确保高风险债务不出篓子（2007—2008年金融危机的原因就在于此）就和银行管理者的个人财务利益绑在了一起。如果债务问题恶化，银行倒闭，管理者将无法获得偿付。由于债务将担保银行的其余业务，人们希望管理者将因此获得很大的动力确保基本业务的安全。