For individual institutions, this was not seen as a problem, because they were protected by the logic of being “too big to fail.” When the crisis erupted – owing to a downturn in the US housing market that was clearly foreseeable but willfully unforeseen – the public sector had to absorb the contingent liabilities built up in the financial system.
第二，扭曲的内部激励制度致使金融机构过度冒险。银行业者以冒险操作获利，这个诱惑非常大，却缺乏相应的机制令其承担亏损的成本。某些机构甚至根本不觉得这里有问题，因为它们有一顶保护伞——“大到倒不得”的逻辑。果然，当危机爆发——美国房地产市场走软是迟早的事，却被人为忽视——公共部门不得不吸收了金融系统的过度负债。