Third, not only is fixed income more illiquid, but now most of these instruments – which have grown enormously in number, owing to the mushrooming issuance of private and public debts before and after the financial crisis – are held in open-ended funds that allow investors to exit overnight. Imagine a bank that invests in illiquid assets but allows depositors to redeem their cash overnight: if a run on these funds occurs, the need to sell the illiquid assets can push their price very low very fast, in what is effectively a fire sale.
第三，固定收益政权不但流动性更差，它们——拜金融危机前后如春笋般茁壮发展的私人和公共债务发行，它们的数量急剧增加——大部分都持有在允许投资者随时退出的开放式基金手中。想象一下，一家银行投资于低流动性资产但允许存款人随时提现：如果这些基金发生挤兑，甩卖低流动性资产的需要将让它们的价格暴跌，马上出现“跳楼价”。