Thus the only plausible case for a way out of the worldwide Great Depression in 1931 lay, as the great economic historian Charles Kindleberger emphasized, with some step from the US. At the time, there were all kinds of convincing reasons why Americans should not want to take on the burden of a worldwide rescue: sending more money to Europe might be seen as pouring money down a drain; had not the Europeans fought a World War that had been the fount and origin of the financial mess?  Economically such action would have made a great deal of sense from a long term perspective; but politically it was a non-starter with no short term payoff at all.
Par conséquent, la seule issue possible à la grande dépression mondiale de 1931 reposait, comme le souligna le grand historien de l’économie Charles Kindleberger, sur des démarches américaines. À l’époque, il existait toutes sortes de raisons très convaincantes pour que les Américains refusent d’assumer le fardeau d’un sauvetage mondial : envoyer davantage d’argent en Europe pouvait être considéré comme jeter de l’argent par les fenêtres.