text: the dissent declares our discussion of the law,the assimilative crime act aca,and mens rea unhelpful on the ground that all three contexts are somehow differ ent.post,at.but what makes them relevantly so the dissent fails to explain.first,the dissent errs in suggesting that the uniform judicial interpretation of the law ignores only jurisdiction elements because,so says the dissent,of the phrase wherever committed post,at.as judge wood analysis indicates,that is a theory of the dissent own creation the actual appellate decisions apply to all jurisdictional elements,not just territorial ones.next,the dissent goes wrong in claiming that the aca is not pertinent because this court adopted a different method for matching substantive elements under that law than under the ina.see post,at.for even as the court made that choice,it unanimously agreed that,however substantive elements should be compared,jurisdictional elements should be disregarded.see lewis united states,at kennedy,dissenting.and finally,the dissent does nothing to undermine our point on mens rea by noting that congress very occasionally dispenses with that requirement for substantive elements.see post,at.as just shown,the default rule respecting mental states flips as between jurisdictional and substantive elements,see supra,at reflecting the view also at play in the and aca contexts that congress generally means to treat the two differently.that leaves the dissent with nothing except its observation that when applying the and requirements,the court does not distinguish between jurisdictional and substantive elements.see post,at.but the dissent forgets that those commands are constitutional in nature a principle of statutory interpretation distinguishing between the two kinds of elements,as best reflecting congress intent,could not bear on those mandates.