text: the issue in this case arises because of the distinctive role interstate commerce elements play in federal criminal law.in our federal system,congress can not punish felonies generally,cohens virginia,wheat,it may enact only those criminal laws that are connected to one of its constitutionally enumerated powers,such as the authority to regulate interstate commerce.as a result,most federal offenses include,in addition to substantive elements,a jurisdictional one,like the interstate commerce requirement of i.the substantive elements primarily define the behavior that the statute calls a violation of federal law,scheidler national organization for women,or,as the model penal code puts the point,they relate to the harm or evil the law seeks to prevent.the jurisdictional element,by contrast,ties the substantive offense here,arson to one of congress constitutional powers here,its authority over interstate commerce,thus spelling out the warrant for congress to legislate.see,at explaining that congress intends such statutory terms as affect commerce or in commerce as terms of art connecting the congressional exercise of legislative authority with the constitutional provision here,the commerce clause that grants congress that authority 