text: operation ironside operation ironside was a second world war military deception undertaken by the allies in 1944 . it formed part of operation bodyguard , a broad strategic deception plan instigated by the allies throughout the year to help cover the june 1944 invasion of normandy . ironside supported the overall deception by suggesting to the germans that the allies would subsequently land along the bay of biscay . it complemented efforts to deceive the germans into believing that the allies would also land in southern france at this time ( operation vendetta ) . bordeaux was an important military port during the war and had already been a target of commando raids two years earlier . ironside intended to play on german fears of an invasion in the region , with the aim of tying down defensive forces following operation overlord in june 1944 . planned by the london controlling section , ironside was communicated to the germans via double agents between may and june 1944 . unlike other bodyguard deceptions , the plan was put across entirely by double agents without support by physical deception . agent bronx took the lead with support from tate , rudloff and garbo . ironside 's story included an initial two - division assault , using overlord formations , staged out of the united kingdom . this would then be followed up with six divisions sailing from the east coast of the united states . historians disagree on the impact of ironside on german plans . there is no indication that the operation was successful in convincing the germans of imminent allied plans to invade the bay of biscay . on the other hand , allied planners attributed the delay of a panzer division moving to normandy in part to the deception . as ironside was a marginal operation , and they were worried about exposing agents as false , the twenty committee for the most part utilised less important agents and added words of caution to the messages they sent , reducing the impact of the story . allied landings around bordeaux may also have seemed implausible because it was beyond air cover from the uk and lacked the normal physical elements ( such as naval activities and dummy landing craft ) associated with an invasion . after the operation closed , at the end of june 1944 , the threat of invasion from the us was informally kept alive . it was revisited as ironside ii in mid - july as support for operation ferdinand . the invasion story was replaced with a supposed allied plan to increase french resistance in the bordeaux region to tie up german forces . most of ironside ii was ignored by the germans , whose interest had turned away from the bordeaux region . background operation ironside formed part of operation bodyguard , a broad strategic military deception intended to confuse the axis high command as to allied intentions during the lead - up to the normandy landings . the overall aim of bodyguard was to tie down german forces away from normandy by threatening other targets . ironside 's specific objective was to tie up the 17th ss and 11th panzer divisions deployed in the south of france . overall planning for bodyguard and ironside rested with john bevan and the london controlling section ( lcs ) . the lcs had been set up in 1942 following successes in deception in the middle east by dudley clarke . after initial attempts at deception planning the department was tasked with bringing bodyguard to fruition . one of their most useful deception channels was through double agents . during the early stages of the war , the abwehr ( german intelligence ) had sent spies to britain , but all of them either surrendered or were captured . some , along with other volunteers , were used as an extensive misinformation network under the control of the twenty committee . bordeaux was an important port for the german war effort , receiving a great deal of cargo , mostly raw materials , from overseas . the gironde estuary and bordeaux had already been a target for the allies . operation frankton was a 1942 commando raid targeting important shipping in the port . in january 1944 , the allies intercepted communications indicating that german commanders were concerned by the possibility of landings in the bay of biscay region of france . the next month , german naval and air units undertook anti - invasion exercises in the area . ironside was intended to amplify these concerns . according to the storyline for ironside , ten days following d - day , allied forces would land in the bordeaux region . this force would spend around twelve days establishing a bridgehead before advancing to meet formations supposedly part of an invasion of the mediterranean coast of france ( in reality these were fictional landings as well , part of another bodyguard deception called operation vendetta ) . the supposed target of ironside was the gironde estuary ( on the river ) with landing sites at royan and accord . at first , bevan suggested that the fictional invasion force should stage from the american east coast . newman smith , based out of new york and responsible for the us elements of the deception , felt this was an unrealistic story and suggested a large force from the us might conceivably reinforce a bridgehead established by units from the uk . formations intended for normandy could be " re - purposed " for the initial invasion . the final plan earmarked two overlord divisions for the assault with the supposed reinforcements consisting of six real divisions ( the 26th , 94th , 95th , and 104th infantry , and the 10th and 11th armored ) under the notional command of lieutenant general lloyd fredendall . operation ironside began on 23 may 1944 with the aim of having the threat established by 29 may and continued until 28 june ( 22 days after the normandy landings ) . it was implemented via double agents , in britain and the united states , under the control of the twenty committee . the operation did not receive any resources from the allied navies or airforce , so the deception had no physical element . this meant that ironside had none of the traditional accompaniments to an invasion , including reconnaissance flights , bombardment , and naval operations . as a result , the twenty committee was cautious about using important agents to pass over the deception . the lead was given to the less important agent bronx , a peruvian socialite named elvira chaudoir , who communicated with her german handlers via letter . from april 1944 , she had also begun sending codes as telegrams , which were faster than letters in the event of an imminent invasion . her code was based on a financial theme , assigning different amounts of money to possible invasion sites . mentioning her doctor ( almost certain ) or dentist ( certain ) showed chaudoir 's confidence in the information . asking for the money " straight away " , " urgently " or " quickly " identified when the invasion would take place ( within a week , a fortnight or a month , respectively ) . agent tate ( a dane sent to england in 1941 and turned double shortly after ) opened the operation , on 23 may , in a message to his german handlers stating that a friend from the us had identified an expeditionary force , consisting of six divisions , preparing to sail . on 29 may , bronx sent a telegram identifying an invasion targeted at the bordeaux region within a month , using the code " dentist " to say she was certain of the information . she also sent a follow - up letter explaining that the information came from a drunken british officer in the four hundred club who had later sworn her to secrecy . according to bronx , the officer had boasted about an airborne assault in the bordeaux region that would be in the papers the following morning . the next day he had told her the operation had been delayed by a month . although many messages were sent by agents , the twenty committee considered that ironside was quite unrealistic and as a result was cautious about promoting it too heavily . most of the information was sent with words of caution or uncertainty to ensure that the agent would not be compromised . one of the most critical bodyguard agents , garbo , did become involved on 5 june , but only in forwarding the message of a fictional sub - agent who he had already identified as unreliable ( mi5 hoped that this would cover for , in their opinion , the implausible nature of the story ) . the agent 's report explained that a us division based in liverpool was preparing to head to bordeaux . messages were also sent from the us . rudloff , an agent based in the new york , sent four reports between 2 and 20 june . he identified the six divisions under fredendall being sidelined for specialist training in bridge building but not amphibious assault and under heavy security . a last - minute deception involved an mi6 transmitter in france . known to be under german control , when the operator asked about routes to send escaped prisoners of war the handlers replied that they should , from 15 june , be sent toward bordeaux . impact german intelligence documents indicate that there was never strong belief that the allies were ready to land in the bordeaux region . intercepted situation reports suggested that the germans believed rumours of landings in the area to be " cover operations of small caliber " and part of the cover for a main allied thrust at calais ( in itself a deception called operation fortitude south ) . axis commanders had considered the idea and conducted exercises in preparation , and training continued in the region after d - day . following the normandy invasion , the allies had expected both german divisions in the bordeaux area to mobilise . in the end , only the 17th ss panzer division moved north , and even they were delayed by several days , whilst the 11th panzer division remained to guard the region . historians are divided over whether the deception played a major role in the german response . most , such as historian ben mcintyre , agree that ironside added to the general picture of confusion for the german commanders . mcintyre quotes senior allied figures , such as john masterman ( chair of the twenty committee ) and hugh astor ( mi5 ) , who attributed the delayed german response in part to ironside . michael howard dismisses the impact of the operation saying that there is " no evidence that anyone took them seriously " . part of the problem was that bordeaux may not have appeared a plausible allied target because it was out of range of fighter aircraft cover from the united kingdom . historian terry crowdy 's analysis is that ironside may have suffered simply from lack of resources . in common with other , higher - impact , bodyguard deceptions it preyed on a concern that the allies knew hitler and the german high command had discussed . crowdy suggests that with physical deception , and more effort , ironside could have succeeded in the same way as deceptions aimed against calais , normandy and the mediterranean . ironside ii john bevan had asked newman smith to retain the threat of a us invasion force beyond 28 june when the initial deception was supposed to have ended . agent rudloff sent messages on 10 , 12 and 18 july referring to the ironside force . in mid - july , the allies began operation ferdinand , a cover deception for operation dragoon , the august 1944 invasion of southern france . the ironside story was considered as an option in support of ferdinand , but noel wild and ops ( b ) , the shaef deception planners were worried about the impact of a theoretical us invasion force on the continuing fortitude deception . it was decided that a new story would be presented to the germans , suggesting that the allies intended to bolster french resistance in the south of the country . the operation went largely unnoticed and german interest in the bordeaux region dissipated .