Input:
Case: 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ As of: 01/31/2019 03:50 PM EST 1 of 24
CLOSED,JURY,TYPE−L
U.S. District Court District of Columbia (Washington, DC) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:13−cv−00134−KBJ

PIERCE v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Assigned to: Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Case in other court: USCA, 16−07078 Cause: 42:12188 Americans With Disabilities Act
Plaintiff

Date Filed: 02/01/2013 Date Terminated: 05/17/2016 Jury Demand: Both Nature of Suit: 446 Civil Rights: Americans with Disabilities − Other Jurisdiction: Federal Question

WILLIAM PIERCE

represented by Arthur B. Spitzer AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 915 15th Street, NW 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20005 (202) 601−4266 Fax: (202) 457−0805 Email: artspitzer@gmail.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Damon J. Kalt STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 429−8085 Fax: (202) 429−3902 Email: dkalt@steptoe.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

James Elmer Rocap , III STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 429−8152 Fax: (202) 429−3902 Email: jrocap@steptoe.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Nina Shishir Thanawala STEPTOE AND JOHNSON LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 429−6490 Email: nthanawala@steptoe.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Bizunesh K. Talbot STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 439−6475 Email: bscott@steptoe.com TERMINATED: 08/13/2014

Deanna P. Cook

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STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP 1330 Connecticut Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 429−1354 Email: dcook@steptoe.com TERMINATED: 08/13/2014
Frederick V. Mulhauser 319 7th Street N.E. Washington, DC 20002 (202) 543−4072 Fax: (202) 457−0805 Email: fmulhauser@aol.com TERMINATED: 09/09/2015
Jennifer A. Wedekind ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT 915 15th St, NW Washington, DC 20005 (202) 548−6610 Email: jwedekind@aclu.org TERMINATED: 01/20/2016
Rachel Tennis KING & SPALDING LLP 1700 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 200 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 626−2919 Email: rtennis@kslaw.com TERMINATED: 08/13/2013

V. Defendant DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

represented by Anne Marie Orcutt STRUCK LOVE BOJANOWSKI & ACEDO, P.L.C. 3100 West Ray Road Suite 300 Chandler, AZ 85226 (480) 420−1600 Fax: (480) 420−1696 Email: aorcutt@swlfirm.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Daniel Patrick Struck STRUCK LOVE BOJANOWSKI & ACEDO, P.L.C. 3100 West Ray Road Suite 300 Chandler, AZ 85226 (480) 420−1600 Fax: (480) 420−1695 Email: dstruck@strucklove.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew D. Berkowitz CARR MALONEY, P.C. 2020 K Street, NW Suite 850 Washington, DC 20006

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(202) 310−5500 Fax: (202) 310−5555 Email: mb@carrmaloney.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Thomas Louis Koger OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Public Interest Division, Equity Section 441 4th Street, NW Suite 630 South Washington, DC 20001 (202) 727−4170 Fax: (202) 715−7762 Email: thomas.koger@dc.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Douglas Stuart Rosenbloom THE LAW OFFICE OF DOUG ROSENBLOOM, LLC #198 7304 Carroll Avenue Takoma Park, MD 20912 (202) 684−8510 Fax: (202) 730−0623 Email: dougrosenbloom@gmail.com TERMINATED: 09/07/2016
Gary Daniel Feldon UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 1100 L Street NW Room 11104 Washington, DC 20005 (202) 514−4686 Fax: (202) 616−8460 Email: Gary.D.Feldon@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 08/27/2015
Grace Graham OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 441 Fourth Street, NW Suite 600S Washington, DC 20001 (202) 442−9784 Fax: (202) 741−8892 Email: grace.graham@dc.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Mariana Del Valle Bravo CARR MALONEY, P.C. 2020 K Street, NW Suite 850 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 310−5500 Fax: (202) 310−5555 Email: mdb@carrmaloney.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Terence Joseph O'Connell

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O'CONNELL & O'CONNELL, LLC 401 East Jefferson Street Suite 204 Rockville, MD 20850 (301) 424−2300 Fax: (202) 424−2394 Email: toconnell@oconnelllaw.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Amicus
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF

represented by Mary C. Vargas STEIN & VARGAS, LLP 840 First Street, NE 3rd Floor Washington, DC 20002 (240) 793−3185 Email: mary.vargas@steinvargas.com LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Debra Joy Patkin NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF 8630 Fenton Street Suite 820 Silver Spring, MD 20910 301−587−7732 Fax: 301−587−1791 Email: debra.patkin@nad.org PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed 02/01/2013 02/01/2013 02/01/2013 02/06/2013
02/08/2013 02/20/2013 02/20/2013 02/22/2013

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ( Filing fee $ 350 receipt number 0090−3205506) filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Summons)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 02/01/2013)
Case Assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg. (sth) (Entered: 02/01/2013)
2 ELECTRONIC SUMMONS Issued as to DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, District of Columbia Attorney General, and the District of Columbia Mayor. (Attachments: # 1 Summons)(sth) (Entered: 02/01/2013)
3 RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed as to the District of Columbia Attorney General. Date of Service Upon District of Columbia Attorney General 2/5/2013. ( Answer due for ALL D.C. DEFENDANTS by 2/26/2013.), RETURN OF SERVICE/AFFIDAVIT of Summons and Complaint Executed on the Mayor of the District of Columbia. Date of Service Upon the Mayor for the District of Columbia on 02/05/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Declaratio of service of process on DC)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 02/06/2013)
4 NOTICE of Appearance by Frederick V. Mulhauser on behalf of WILLIAM PIERCE (Mulhauser, Frederick) (Entered: 02/08/2013)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Gary Daniel Feldon on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 02/20/2013)
6 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer re 1 Complaint by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 02/20/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting Defendant's 6 Consent Motion for Enlargment of Time to File an Answer. The Court ORDERS that Defendant shall file its response to Plaintiff's 1 Complaint by March 20, 2013. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 2/22/2013.

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02/22/2013 03/12/2013 03/20/2013 03/20/2013 03/20/2013
03/20/2013 03/26/2013
03/27/2013
03/27/2013 03/27/2013 04/04/2013 04/05/2013 04/22/2013 04/22/2013 04/25/2013 05/21/2013 05/29/2013 05/30/2013
05/30/2013
06/06/2013

(lcjeb2) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
Set/Reset Deadline: Defendant shall file its response to Plaintiff's 1 Complaint by 3/20/2013. (ad) (Entered: 02/22/2013)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Jennifer A. Wedekind on behalf of WILLIAM PIERCE (Wedekind, Jennifer) (Entered: 03/12/2013)
8 ANSWER to Complaint with Jury Demand by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.(Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
9 DEMAND for Trial by Jury by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
MINUTE ORDER: An Initial Scheduling Conference is set for 4/19/2013 at 10:00 a.m. before Judge James E. Boasberg in Courtroom 19. The parties shall meet, confer, and submit a joint report pursuant to FRCP 26(f) and Local Rule 16.3. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/20/13. (lcjeb4) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
Set/Reset Hearing: An Initial Scheduling Conference is set for 4/19/2013 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 19 before Judge James E. Boasberg. (ad) (Entered: 03/20/2013)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court hereby ORDERS that the Initial Scheduling Conference previously scheduled for April 19, 2013, is VACATED and RESCHEDULED for May 2, 2013, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom #19. Signed by Judge James E. Boasberg on 3/26/2013. (lcjeb3) (Entered: 03/26/2013)
Set/Reset Hearings: The Initial Scheduling Conference set for 4/19/2013 at 10:00 AM is hereby VACATED and RESCHEDULED for 5/02/2013 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 19 before Judge James E. Boasberg. (ad) (Entered: 03/27/2013)
10 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew D. Berkowitz on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Berkowitz, Matthew) (Entered: 03/27/2013)
11 NOTICE of Appearance by Mariana del Valle Bravo on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Bravo, Mariana) (Entered: 03/27/2013)
Case reassigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Judge James E. Boasberg no longer assigned to the case. (ds) (Entered: 04/04/2013)
12 NOTICE of Appearance by Terence Joseph O'Connell on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (O'Connell, Terence) (Entered: 04/05/2013)
13 NOTICE of Appearance by Bizunesh K. Talbot on behalf of WILLIAM PIERCE (Talbot, Bizunesh) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
14 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 04/22/2013)
NOTICE of Hearing: Initial Scheduling Conference reset for 5/30/2013 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (gdf) (Entered: 04/25/2013)
15 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 05/21/2013)
16 Consent MOTION for Protective Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 05/29/2013)
Minute Order. Proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Meet and Confer Hearing held on 5/30/2013. Denying without prejudice 16 Motion for Protective Order. (Court Reporter: Cathryn Jones) (gdf) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of the parties' representations at the Initial Scheduling Conference, the parties are hereby ORDERED to confer and file an amended joint statement by 6/6/2013. The joint statement shall reflect a proposed 6−7 month discovery period with expert disclosures scheduled within that discovery period. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 5/30/2013. (lckbj3) (Entered: 05/30/2013)
17 MEET AND CONFER STATEMENT. (Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 06/06/2013)

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06/07/2013 06/07/2013 06/07/2013 06/10/2013
07/15/2013 07/16/2013 08/13/2013 10/08/2013 10/08/2013 10/08/2013
10/08/2013
10/10/2013 10/15/2013
10/17/2013 10/17/2013

18 SCHEDULING ORDER. See attached order for details. A further status conference is set for 10/15/2013 at 11:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 6/7/2013. (lckbj3) (Entered: 06/07/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines/Hearings: Initial Disclosure due by 7/10/2013. Status Conference set for 10/15/2013 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (gdf) (Entered: 06/07/2013)
19 Consent MOTION for Protective Order (Amended) by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 06/07/2013)
20 PROTECTIVE ORDER. Upon consideration of the 19 Amended Consent Motion and Memorandum, which demonstrate good cause for the issuance of a protective order in this case, the motion is hereby granted and the protective order entered. See attached order for details. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 6/10/2013. (lckbj3) (Entered: 06/10/2013)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by Rachel Tennis on behalf of WILLIAM PIERCE (Tennis, Rachel) (Entered: 07/15/2013)
22 NOTICE of Appearance by Anne Marie Orcutt on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 07/16/2013)
23 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to WILLIAM PIERCE. Attorney Rachel Tennis terminated. (Tennis, Rachel) (Entered: 08/13/2013)
24 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Status Conference by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
25 NOTICE of Appearance by Deanna P. Cook on behalf of WILLIAM PIERCE (Cook, Deanna) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 24 Unopposed Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Status Conference. It is further ORDERED that by no later than Friday, October 11, 2013, Counsel for Defendant seeking to appear by telephone shall contact Judge Jackson's Courtroom Deputy, Ms. Gwen Franklin, at (202) 354−3145. Counsel shall provide to Ms. Franklin the telephone number(s) at which counsel can be reached for their participation in the status conference on Tuesday, October 15, 2013, at 10:00 AM. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/8/2013. (lckbj1) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
MINUTE ORDER. The parties contacted chambers on October 8, 2013, regarding a change to the number of depositions allowed under to the 18 Scheduling Order. The parties orally requested leave to amend the Scheduling Order to reflect the parties' agreement that Plaintiff will be permitted to take two (2) additional depositions. Upon consideration of the parties' joint request and finding good cause, the Court GRANTS leave to amend the Scheduling Order to allow Plaintiff to take a maximum of twelve (12) depositions. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/8/2013. (lckbj3) (Entered: 10/08/2013)
26 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 10/10/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 26 Consent Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The 18 Scheduling Order is hereby AMENDED to reflect the following deadlines: discovery shall be completed by 11/8/2013; the post−discovery status conference previously set for 10/15/2013 is VACATED and RESCHEDULED to 11/13/2013 at 9:45 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/15/2013. (lckbj3) (Entered: 10/15/2013)
27 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Hearing by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 10/17/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting 27 Unopposed Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Status Conference. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/17/2013. (lckbj3) (Entered: 10/17/2013)

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10/18/2013 10/18/2013 10/21/2013 10/31/2013 11/01/2013 11/01/2013 01/14/2014 01/15/2014 01/15/2014 02/28/2014 03/04/2014 03/04/2014 03/05/2014
03/05/2014 08/13/2014

28 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Expert Disclosures and File Dispositive Motions by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING CONSENT MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME)(Cook, Deanna) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
29 ORDER granting 28 Consent Motion for Extension of Time Complete Discovery and File Dispositive Motions. See attached order for details. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/18/2013.(lckbj3) (Entered: 10/18/2013)
Set/Reset Deadlines: Plaintiff Rule 26a2 due by 11/11/2013. Defendant Rule 26a2 due by 12/2/2013. Plaintiff's Rebuttal 26a2 due by 12/13/2013. Dispositive Motions due by 2/13/2014. Response to Dispositive Motions due by 3/14/2014. Reply to Dispositive Motions due by 4/4/2014. (gdf) (Entered: 10/21/2013)
30 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 10/31/2013)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 30 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The 18 Scheduling Order is hereby AMENDED to reflect the following deadline: discovery shall be completed by 1/15/2014. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/1/2013. (lckbj1) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
MINUTE ORDER: The post−discovery status conference previously set for 11/13/2013 is VACATED and RESCHEDULED to 1/22/2014 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/1/2013. (lckbj1) (Entered: 11/01/2013)
31 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 01/14/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 31 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. The 18 Scheduling Order is hereby AMENDED to reflect the following deadline: discovery shall be completed by 2/28/2014. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/1/2013. (lckbj1) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
MINUTE ORDER: The post−discovery status conference previously set for 1/22/2014 is VACATED and RESCHEDULED to 3/5/2014 at 09:45 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 1/15/2014. (lckbj1) (Entered: 01/15/2014)
32 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 02/28/2014)
33 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Status Conference by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 33 Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Status Hearing. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 3/4/2014. (lckbj1) (Entered: 03/04/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Status Conference held on 3/5/2014. ORAL order granting the Discovery extension. Discovery is completed by 8/25/2014. Status Conference (post discovery) is set for 8/28/2014 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Scheduling Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Pat Kaneshiro−Miller). (dr) (Entered: 03/05/2014)
34 ORDER granting 32 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. A further status conference is set for 8/28/2014 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 3/5/2014. (lckbj3) (Entered: 03/05/2014)
35 NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF APPEARANCE as to WILLIAM PIERCE. Attorney Deanna P. Cook and Bizunesh K. Talbot terminated. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 08/13/2014)

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08/13/2014 08/20/2014 08/25/2014 08/26/2014
08/26/2014 08/28/2014
08/28/2014
08/28/2014 09/11/2014 10/01/2014 10/06/2014 10/27/2014 10/28/2014 11/13/2014 11/14/2014
11/17/2014 11/17/2014

36 NOTICE of Appearance by James Elmer Rocap, III on behalf of WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service)(Rocap, James) (Main Document 36 replaced on 8/14/2014) (jf, ). (Entered: 08/13/2014)
37 NOTICE of Appearance by Damon J. Kalt on behalf of WILLIAM PIERCE (Kalt, Damon) (Main Document 37 replaced on 8/20/2014) (jf, ). (Entered: 08/20/2014)
38 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Status Conference by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 08/25/2014)
39 GENERAL ORDER AND GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL CASES BEFORE JUDGE KETANJI BROWN JACKSON. The Court will hold the parties and counsel responsible for following these directives; failure to conform to this Order may, when appropriate, result in the imposition of sanctions. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 08/26/2014.(lckbj3) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 38 Unopposed Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically at Status Conference. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 08/26/2014. (lckbj1) (Entered: 08/26/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Status Conference held on 8/28/2014. Case referred to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay for mediation. Scheduling Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Barbara De Vico) (gdf) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
40 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Kay for mediation and AMENDING the Court's 18 Scheduling Order. Mediation to conclude by 10/27/2014. Dispositive Motions due by 11/17/2014. Response to Dispositive Motions due by 12/4/2014. Reply to Dispositive Motions due by 12/14/2014. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 08/28/14. (lckbj3) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
41 CASE DIRECTLY REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay for Mediation. (md, ) (Entered: 08/28/2014)
42 ORDER setting a Settlement Conference for 10/6/2014, at 10:30 AM in Chambers [room 2333] before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay. Signed by Magistrate Judge Alan Kay on 09/11/14. (DM) (Entered: 09/11/2014)
43 NOTICE of Appearance by Nina Shishir Thanawala on behalf of WILLIAM PIERCE (Thanawala, Nina) (Entered: 10/01/2014)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Alan Kay: Settlement Conference held on 10/6/2014. (DM) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
44 STATUS REPORT Joint Status Report by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Thanawala, Nina) (Entered: 10/27/2014)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 44 Status Report; emailed to nthanawala@steptoe.com, cc'd 20 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Invalid attorney signature, 2. DO NOT REFILE (jf, ) (Entered: 10/28/2014)
45 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 11/13/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting 45 Motion for Extension of Time to File Summary Judgment Oppositions and Replies. The briefing schedule in this matter is modified as follows: Responses to motions for summary judgment are due by 12/18/2014. Replies in further support of motions for summary judgment are due by 1/9/2015. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/14/2014. (lckbj1) (Entered: 11/14/2014)
46 MOTION Preclude Plaintiff's Experts by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−C, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
47 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment As To Claims I and II of the Complaint by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, # 2 Memorandum in Support Memorandum in Support, # 3 Declaration Declaration of James E. Rocap III, # 4 Exhibit Exhibits 1−6, # 5 Exhibit Exhibits 7−15, # 6 Exhibit Exhibits 16−40, # 7 Exhibit Exhibits 41−59, # 8 Text of Proposed

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11/17/2014
11/17/2014 11/17/2014 11/17/2014
11/17/2014
11/18/2014 11/19/2014 11/24/2014 11/24/2014 12/05/2014 12/18/2014 12/18/2014
12/18/2014

Order Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
48 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by WILLIAM PIERCE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, # 2 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, # 3 Declaration of James E. Rocap III, # 4 Exhibit 1−6, # 5 Exhibit 7−15, # 6 Exhibit 16−40, # 7 Exhibit 41−59, # 8 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
49 SEALED MOTION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
50 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − 5, # 2 Exhibit 6 − 12, # 3 Exhibit 13, # 4 Exhibit 14 − 15, # 5 Exhibit 16, # 6 Exhibit 17)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
51 NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED DOCUMENT to 49 SEALED MOTION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (The original PDF Document contained privacy information and was restricted pursuant to the E−Government Act.) (Attachments: # 1 Motion for Summary Judgment)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
52 NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED DOCUMENT to 50 Sealed Document, by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (The original PDF Document contained privacy information and was restricted pursuant to the E−Government Act.) (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts, # 2 Exhibit 1−2, # 3 Exhibit 3−4, # 4 Exhibit 5, # 5 Exhibit 6−11, # 6 Exhibit 12−14, # 7 Exhibit 15, # 8 Exhibit 16, # 9 Exhibit 17, # 10 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 11/17/2014)
53 ORDER granting 49 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Under Seal. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/18/14. (zgdf) (Entered: 11/19/2014)
54 ENTERED IN ERROR.....SEALED MOTION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf, ) Modified on 12/9/2014 (zjf, ). (Entered: 11/19/2014)
55 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 46 MOTION Preclude Plaintiff's Experts by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 55 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply re 46 MOTION Preclude Plaintiff's Experts. Plaintiff's response is due by 12/18/2014. Defendant's reply is due by 1/9/2015. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/24/2014. (lckbj1) (Entered: 11/24/2014)
56 MOTION to Seal by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 12/05/2014)
57 Memorandum in opposition to re 46 MOTION Preclude Plaintiff's Experts filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
58 Memorandum in opposition to re 49 SEALED MOTION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts, # 2 Appendix A, # 3 Declaration of William Pierce, # 4 Declaration of James E. Rocap, III, # 5 Exhibit 1 to 7, # 6 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
59 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by WILLIAM PIERCE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, # 2 Statement of Facts Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts, # 3 Declaration of William Pierce, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 12/18/2014)

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12/18/2014 12/18/2014 12/18/2014
12/18/2014
12/18/2014 01/09/2015 01/09/2015
01/09/2015
01/09/2015 01/09/2015
01/16/2015 01/16/2015
01/21/2015 01/27/2015 02/05/2015

60 SEALED OPPOSITION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. re 47 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment As To Claims I and II of the Complaint (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
61 SEALED DOCUMENT filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA(This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
62 NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED DOCUMENT Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (The original PDF Document contained privacy information and was restricted pursuant to the E−Government Act.) (Attachments: # 1 Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
63 NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED DOCUMENT Controverting Statement of Facts by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (The original PDF Document contained privacy information and was restricted pursuant to the E−Government Act.) (Attachments: # 1 Controverting Statement of Facts, # 2 Exhibit 2 − 9 to Controverting Statement of Facts)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
64 NOTICE of Filing Video by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 12/18/2014)
65 REPLY to opposition to motion re 46 MOTION Preclude Plaintiff's Experts filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
66 REPLY to opposition to motion re 47 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment As To Claims I and II of the Complaint filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts Reply Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, # 2 Declaration of Martina J. Bienvenu, # 3 Declaration of Richard Lorenzo Ray, # 4 Declaration James E. Rocap III, # 5 Exhibit 1, # 6 Exhibit 2)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
67 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by WILLIAM PIERCE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Reply in Further Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Claims I and II of the Complaint, # 2 Statement of Facts Reply Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
68 SEALED REPLY TO OPPOSITION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 49 SEALED MOTION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 2)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
69 NOTICE OF FILING REDACTED DOCUMENT (Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment − Redacted) by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (The original PDF Document contained privacy information and was restricted pursuant to the E−Government Act.) (Attachments: # 1 Reply in Support of MSJ (Redacted), # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 01/09/2015)
70 ORDER granting 56 Motion to Seal. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 1/16/15. (gdf) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
71 SEALED DOCUMENTS re 47 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment As To Claims I and II of the Complaint filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts, # 2 Declaration of James E. Rocap III, # 3 Exhibit 1−6, # 4 Exhibit 7−15, # 5 Exhibit 16−40, # 6 Exhibit 41−59)(zjf, ) (Entered: 01/16/2015)
72 NOTICE of Refiling Statement of Facts and Exhibits Pursuant to Court Order by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Statement of Facts, # 2 Appendix, # 3 Exhibit 1 − 5, # 4 Exhibit 6 − 12, # 5 Exhibit 13 −17)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 01/21/2015)
73 NOTICE of Substitution of Counsel by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 5 Notice of Appearance (Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 01/27/2015)
75 SEALED DOCUMENTS re 47 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment As To Claims I and II of the Complaint filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (see docket entry 48 to view

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02/05/2015 03/19/2015 04/08/2015 04/22/2015 04/23/2015 04/28/2015 04/29/2015
08/27/2015 09/01/2015 09/02/2015 09/02/2015 09/04/2015 09/04/2015

documents)(zjf, ) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
76 SEALED OPPOSITION filed by WILLIAM PIERCE re 49 SEALED MOTION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (see docket entry 59 to view documents)(zjf, ) (Entered: 02/11/2015)
MINUTE ORDER setting Motion Hearing on 46 , 47 and 49 for 4/23/2015 at 10:45 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 03/19/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 03/19/2015)
78 SEALED Memorandum in Support and Attachment(s) re 66 REPLY to opposition to motion re 47 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment As To Claims I and II of the Complaint, filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf, ) (Entered: 04/08/2015)
MINUTE ORDER vacating Motion Hearing previously set for 4/23/2015 at 10:45 AM and resetting Motion Hearing for 4/23/2015 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 04/22/15. (lckbj3) Modified event title on 4/23/2015 (znmw, ). (Entered: 04/22/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Motion Hearing held on 4/23/2015 re 47 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment and 46 MOTION Preclude Plaintiff's Experts. Oral arguments heard and motions taken under advisement. (Court Reporter Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
79 Mail Returned as undeliverable sent to James E. Rocap, III; Type of Document Returned: Order #77. (gdf) (Entered: 04/28/2015)
80 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 4−23−15; Page Numbers: 1−104. Date of Issuance:4−29−15. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number (202)354−3118, Court Reporter Email Address : Barbara_DeVico@dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed or PDF may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 5/20/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 5/30/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 7/28/2015.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 04/29/2015)
81 NOTICE of Withdrawal of Counsel by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA re 5 Notice of Appearance (Feldon, Gary) (Entered: 08/27/2015)
82 SEALED MEMORANDUM OPINION (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 9/1/15.(zgdf) (Entered: 09/02/2015)
83 ORDER denying Defendant's 46 Motion to Preclude Plaintiffs experts ; granting Plaintiff's 47 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; and denying Defendant's 49 Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/02/15. (lckbj3) (Entered: 09/02/2015)
84 DISCHARGED PURSUANT TO MINUTE ORDER FILED ON 09/11/22015.....ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE as to why the Court's 82 Memorandum Opinion should not be made public in its entirety. Show Cause Response due by 9/11/2015. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/02/15. (lckbj3) Modified on 9/13/2015 (jf). (Entered: 09/02/2015)
85 NOTICE of Appearance by Douglas Stuart Rosenbloom on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Rosenbloom, Douglas) (Entered: 09/04/2015)
86 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Frederick V. Mulhauser by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Spitzer, Arthur) (Entered: 09/04/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ As of: 01/31/2019 03:50 PM EST 12 of 24

09/08/2015 09/09/2015 09/09/2015
09/10/2015 09/11/2015 09/11/2015 09/28/2015 09/28/2015 09/28/2015 09/29/2015
09/30/2015 09/30/2015 09/30/2015
10/01/2015
10/01/2015 10/01/2015

87 MOTION to Amend/Correct 83 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, by WILLIAM PIERCE (Rocap, James) (Entered: 09/08/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting 86 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Frederick V. Mulhauser terminated. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/09/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 09/09/2015)
88 ORDER. Upon review of Plaintiff's 87 Motion to Amend/Correct and Plaintiff's cited authorities, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is GRANTED and the Court's 83 Order of September 2, 2015 is amended in the attached document, as requested. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/09/2015. (lckbj2) (Entered: 09/09/2015)
89 RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by WILLIAM PIERCE re 84 Order to Show Cause . (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 09/10/2015)
90 MEMORANDUM OPINION (Public Version of ECF No. 82 ). Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/01/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
MINUTE ORDER DISCHARGING 84 Order to Show Cause. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/11/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 09/11/2015)
91 Unopposed MOTION for Leave to Appear Telephonically by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
92 MOTION for Leave to File Excess Pages by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting 91 Unopposed Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically. The Court will contact counsel at the number provided. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/28/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 09/28/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting 92 Unopposed Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant may file a Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Reconsideration, or, in the Alternative, to Certify for Interlocutory Appeal that does not exceed 19 pages. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 09/29/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 09/29/2015)
93 NOTICE Plaintiff's Submission of Proposed Pretrial Scheduling Order in Advance of October 1, 2015 Scheduling Conference by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
94 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Damon J. Kalt by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
95 MOTION for Reconsideration re 83 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, 82 Sealed Order, 88 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, 90 Memorandum & Opinion by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 09/30/2015)
96 SCHEDULING ORDER: Joint proposed scheduling order due by 10/15/2015. Plaintiff's response to 95 motion for reconsideration due by 10/19/2015. Defendant's reply due by 10/29/2015. Motion Hearing on 95 motion for reconsideration set for 11/18/2015 02:30 PM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Jury Trial set for 5/2/2016 09:30 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Pretrial Conference set for 4/5/2016 10:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson.. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on October 1, 2015. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 10/01/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting 94 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Damon J. Kalt terminated. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/1/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 10/01/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Status Conference held on 10/1/2015. Scheduling Order forthcoming. (Court Reporter Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 10/01/2015)

Case: 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ As of: 01/31/2019 03:50 PM EST 13 of 24

10/15/2015 10/16/2015 10/16/2015
10/22/2015 10/22/2015
10/22/2015 11/02/2015 11/09/2015 11/10/2015
11/10/2015 11/10/2015 11/18/2015 11/25/2015

97 NOTICE Submission of Joint Proposed Pretrial Scheduling Order by WILLIAM PIERCE re 96 Scheduling Order,, (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 10/15/2015)
98 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 95 MOTION for Reconsideration re 83 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, 82 Sealed Order, 88 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, 90 Memorandum & Opinion by WILLIAM PIERCE (Rocap, James) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
MINUTE ORDER granting 98 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response and Reply re 95 MOTION for Reconsideration. It is hereby ORDER that Plaintiff's opposition to 95 is due by 10/22/2015 and that Defendant's reply re 95 is by 11/2/2015. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to file an opposition up to 17 pages in length. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 10/16/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 10/16/2015)
99 MOTION for Leave to File a Memorandum as Amicus Curiae by NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit)(Vargas, Mary) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
100 MOTION for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice :Attorney Name− Debra J. Patkin, :Firm− National Association of the Deaf, :Address− 8630 Fenton Street, Suit 820, Silver Spring, MD 20910. Phone No. − 301−587−1788. Fax No. − 301−587−1791 Filing fee $ 100, receipt number 0090−4288155. Fee Status: Fee Paid. by NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF (Attachments: # 1 Declaration, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Vargas, Mary) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
101 Memorandum in opposition to re 95 MOTION for Reconsideration re 83 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, 82 Sealed Order, 88 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, 90 Memorandum & Opinion filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 10/22/2015)
102 REPLY to opposition to motion re 95 MOTION for Reconsideration re 83 Order on Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,, 82 Sealed Order, 88 Order on Motion to Amend/Correct, 90 Memorandum & Opinion filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 11/02/2015)
103 RESPONSE re 99 MOTION for Leave to File a Memorandum as Amicus Curiae filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 11/09/2015)
MINUTE ORDER. Upon consideration of the parties' filings, it is hereby ORDERED that the National Association of the Deaf's 99 Motion for Leave to File a Memorandum as Amicus Curiae is GRANTED, and it is FURTHER ORDERED that its 100 Motion for Leave to Appear Pro Hac Vice is also GRANTED. If Defendant wishes to respond to the amicus's arguments, it may do so at the forthcoming motion hearing. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on November 10, 2015. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 11/10/2015)
104 AMICUS BRIEF by NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF. (jf) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
105 LCvR 7.1 CERTIFICATE OF DISCLOSURE of Corporate Affiliations and Financial Interests NONE by NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF (jf) (Entered: 11/12/2015)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Motion Hearing held on 11/18/2015, re 95 Motion for Reconsideration. Oral argument heard and motion taken under advisement. ASL Interpreters: Andrea Smith and Jill Sege. (Court Reporter Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 11/19/2015)
106 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 11−18−15; Page Numbers: 1−97. Date of Issuance:11−25−15. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number (202)354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a

Case: 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ As of: 01/31/2019 03:50 PM EST 14 of 24

11/25/2015
12/17/2015
01/14/2016 01/15/2016 01/20/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016 02/12/2016
02/12/2016

href=http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/node/2189>Transcript Order Form.</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 12/16/2015. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 12/26/2015. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 2/23/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 11/25/2015)
107 MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER denying 95 Motion for Reconsideration. See attached document for details. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 11/25/15. (lckbj3, ) (Main Document 107 replaced on 11/25/2015 as title of document changed to Memorandum Opinion and Order.) (Entered: 11/25/2015)
108 ORDER setting pretrial deadlines. Motions in limine due by 2/12/2016; responses to motions in limine due by 2/26/2016; pretrial statement due by 3/26/2016. See attached Order for details. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 12/17/2015. (lckbj1) (Entered: 12/17/2015)
109 NOTICE of Change of Address by Matthew D. Berkowitz (Berkowitz, Matthew) (Entered: 01/14/2016)
110 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Jennifer A. Wedekind by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Wedekind, Jennifer) (Entered: 01/15/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting 110 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jennifer A. Wedekind terminated. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 1/20/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 01/20/2016)
111 MOTION in Limine No. 1 to Exclude Testimony from Richard Ray by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−2)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
112 MOTION in Limine No. 2 to Exclude Martina Bienvenu by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1−2)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
113 STIPULATION of Voluntary Dismissal of Claim III of Plaintiff's Complaint by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
114 MOTION in Limine No. 3 to Exclude Argument Regarding Sending a Message to the District by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
115 MOTION in Limine No. 4 to Preclude Argument, Testimony, or Evidence of a Specific Amount of Damages by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
116 MOTION in Limine No. 5 to Preclude Argument Regarding Causation as to Plaintiff's Alleged Medical Condition by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
117 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Defense Fact Witnesses Who Did Not Interact with Plaintiff by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
118 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 MIL #5 − Unredacted − Sealed)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 02/12/2016)
119 NOTICE of Appearance by Damon J. Kalt on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Kalt, Damon) (Main Document 119 replaced on 2/16/2016) (znmw). (Entered: 02/12/2016)

Case: 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ As of: 01/31/2019 03:50 PM EST 15 of 24

02/19/2016 02/26/2016 02/26/2016 02/26/2016 02/26/2016 02/26/2016
02/26/2016
02/26/2016 02/29/2016 03/01/2016 03/01/2016
03/02/2016 03/09/2016 03/09/2016 03/09/2016

121 SEALED MOTION re 116 MOTION in Limine No. 5 to Preclude Argument Regarding Causation as to Plaintiff's Alleged Medical Condition filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 02/19/2016)
122 Memorandum in opposition to re 111 MOTION in Limine No. 1 to Exclude Testimony from Richard Ray filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
123 Memorandum in opposition to re 112 MOTION in Limine No. 2 to Exclude Martina Bienvenu filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
124 Memorandum in opposition to re 114 MOTION in Limine No. 3 to Exclude Argument Regarding Sending a Message to the District filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
125 Memorandum in opposition to re 115 MOTION in Limine No. 4 to Preclude Argument, Testimony, or Evidence of a Specific Amount of Damages filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
126 Memorandum in opposition to re 116 MOTION in Limine No. 5 to Preclude Argument Regarding Causation as to Plaintiff's Alleged Medical Condition, 121 SEALED MOTION filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
127 SEALED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL filed by WILLIAM PIERCE (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion in Limine No. 5 to Preclude Argument Regarding Causation as to Plaintiff's Alleged Medical Conditions)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
128 RESPONSE re 117 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Defense Fact Witnesses Who Did Not Interact with Plaintiff filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 02/26/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting 127 Sealed Motion for Leave to File Document Under Seal. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 2/29/16. (gdf) (Entered: 03/01/2016)
129 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Replies in Support of Motions in Limine by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 03/01/2016)
130 SEALED DOCUMENT re 126 Memorandum in opposition to re 116 MOTION in Limine No. 5 to Preclude Argument Regarding Causation as to Plaintiff's Alleged Medical Condition, 121 SEALED MOTION, filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (This document is SEALED and only available to authorized persons.)(zjf) (Entered: 03/02/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 129 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Replies in Support of Motions in Limine. Replies re pending Motions in Limine are due by 3/9/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 03/02/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 03/02/2016)
131 REPLY to opposition to motion re 117 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Defense Fact Witnesses Who Did Not Interact with Plaintiff filed by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Declaration of James E. Rocap, III, # 2 Exhibit 1, # 3 Exhibit 2, # 4 Exhibit 3, # 5 Exhibit 4)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
132 REPLY to opposition to motion re 111 MOTION in Limine No. 1 to Exclude Testimony from Richard Ray filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
133 REPLY to opposition to motion re 112 MOTION in Limine No. 2 to Exclude Martina Bienvenu filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 03/09/2016)

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03/09/2016 03/09/2016 03/09/2016 03/10/2016 03/10/2016 03/15/2016 03/15/2016 03/28/2016
04/04/2016 04/05/2016 04/05/2016
04/06/2016 04/07/2016 04/07/2016 04/08/2016

134 REPLY to opposition to motion re 114 MOTION in Limine No. 3 to Exclude Argument Regarding Sending a Message to the District filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
135 REPLY to opposition to motion re 115 MOTION in Limine No. 4 to Preclude Argument, Testimony, or Evidence of a Specific Amount of Damages filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
136 REPLY to opposition to motion re 116 MOTION in Limine No. 5 to Preclude Argument Regarding Causation as to Plaintiff's Alleged Medical Condition filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 03/09/2016)
137 Joint MOTION for Extension of Time to File Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(B) Objections by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting, for good cause shown, 137 Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(B) Objections. The parties' objections are due by 3/15/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 03/10/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 03/10/2016)
138 RULE 26a3 STATEMENT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A − Objections to Defendant's Proposed Exhibits)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
139 RULE 26a3 STATEMENT. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A−B)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 03/15/2016)
140 PRETRIAL STATEMENT by WILLIAM PIERCE. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 − Joint Proposed Voir Dire Questions, # 2 Exhibit 2 − Plaintiff's Proposed Voir Dire Questions (Disputed), # 3 Exhibit 3 − Defendant's Proposed Voir Dire Questions (Disputed), # 4 Exhibit 4 − Joint Proposed Jury Instructions, # 5 Exhibit 5 − Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions (Disputed), # 6 Exhibit 6 − Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions (Disputed), # 7 Exhibit 7 − Plaintiff's Exhibit List, # 8 Exhibit 8 − Defendant's Exhibit List, # 9 Exhibit 9 − Joint Proposed Jury Verdict Form)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 03/28/2016)
141 NOTICE Plaintiff's Suggested Agenda Items for April 5, 2016 Pretrial Conference by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 04/04/2016)
142 MOTION for Leave to File Document 136 Under Seal by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 04/05/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Initial Pretrial Conference held on 4/5/2016. Motion Hearing set for 4/21/2016 at 10:30 AM. Final Pretrial Conference set for 4/29/2016 at 10:30 AM. Jury Trial remain set for 5/2/16 at 9:30 AM. All hearings will take place in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji B. Jackson. (Court Reporter Barbara DeVico) (zgdf) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting 142 Motion for Leave to File Document 136 Under Seal. The Clerk is directed to SEAL 136 . Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 04/06/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 04/06/2016)
143 ORDER REGARDING TRIAL PROCEDURES. See attached Order for details. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on April 7, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
144 REPLY to opposition to motion re 116 MOTION in Limine No. 5 to Preclude Argument Regarding Causation as to Plaintiff's Alleged Medical Condition filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
MINUTE ORDER. Plaintiff has suggested that some of the parties' pending objections with respect to the evidence lists that they have filed in this matter may be ripe for resolution by this Court prior to trial. (See ECF No. 141 at 2 para. 10.) In addition, during the Initial Pretrial Conference of April 5, 2016, Plaintiff's counsel indicated that the parties may be able to confer and resolve some of the stated objections themselves prior to trial. In the interest of judicial economy and overall efficiency, it is hereby ORDERED that, on or before April 8, 2016, the parties shall file a joint notice that

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04/08/2016 04/15/2016 04/18/2016 04/19/2016
04/21/2016
04/27/2016 04/27/2016 04/27/2016 04/27/2016 04/29/2016 05/02/2016 05/02/2016 05/03/2016
05/04/2016 05/04/2016

identifies which of the evidentiary objections listed in the exhibits to the Joint Pretrial Statement remain unresolved and can possibly be addressed and decided by the Court prior to trial. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on April 8, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
MINUTE ORDER amending Minute Order of April 8, 2016: The previous Minute Order misstated the deadline for the parties' joint notice regarding resolvable evidentiary objections. This joint notice is due by April 18, 2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on April 8, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 04/08/2016)
145 NOTICE Joint Report Regarding Voir Dire Questions by WILLIAM PIERCE re 143 Order, Set Deadlines (Rocap, James) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
146 NOTICE Joint Report Regarding Exhibit Objections by WILLIAM PIERCE re Order, Set Deadlines,, Order,,, (Rocap, James) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
147 NOTICE Plaintiff's Notice With Respect to Second Supplement to Initial Disclosures of Plaintiff by WILLIAM PIERCE re 115 MOTION in Limine No. 4 to Preclude Argument, Testimony, or Evidence of a Specific Amount of Damages (Attachments: # 1 Second Supplement to Initial Disclosures of Plaintiff)(Rocap, James) (Entered: 04/19/2016)
Minute Order: Proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Motion Hearing held on 4/21/2016, granting in part 111 Motion in Limine; denying 112 Motion in Limine; granting 114 Motion in Limine; withdrawing 115 Motion in Limine; denying 116 Motion in Limine; granting in part 117 Motion in Limine. Oral ruling stated on the record in opened court. (Court Reporter Janice Dickman) (gdf) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
148 NOTICE of Submitting Defendant's Updated Exhibit List by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
149 NOTICE Plaintiff's Current Witness List by WILLIAM PIERCE (Rocap, James) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
150 NOTICE Plaintiff's Current Exhibit List by WILLIAM PIERCE (Rocap, James) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
151 NOTICE of Submitting Defendant's Updated Witness List by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 04/27/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Final Pretrial Conference held on 4/29/2016. Trial procedures addressed. Jury trial remains scheduled to commence on 5/2/16. (Court Reporter: Barbara Devico.) (Entered: 04/29/2016)
Minute Entry for Jury Trial begun and held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 5/2/16. Civil Voir Dire begun and concluded. 8 Jurors selected and sworn. Jury Trial continued to 5/3/2016 at 9:15 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
MINUTE ORDER: The Court having impaneled the jury in this action, it is hereby ORDERED that during trial and deliberations all meals for said jury shall be paid by the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Approved by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 5/2/16. (gdf) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
Minute Entry for Jury Trial resumed and held on 5/3/2016, before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Same 8 Jurors. Jury Trial continued to 5/4/2016 at 9:15 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Plaintiff's Witnesses: Martina J. Bienvenu and William Pierce); (Interpreters: John Folker and Patricia Moers Patterson) (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 05/03/2016)
MINUTE ORDER authorizing the release to counsel for the parties in this matter of the transcript, in its entirety, of the hearing held on 4/21/2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 05/04/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
Minute Entry for Jury Trial resumed and held on 5/4/16 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Same 8 Jurors. Jury Trial continued to 5/5/2016 at 9:15 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Plaintiff's Witness: William Pierce); (Interpreters: John Folker and Patricia Moers Patterson); (Court Reporter: Barbara

Case: 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ As of: 01/31/2019 03:50 PM EST 18 of 24

05/05/2016
05/05/2016 05/05/2016 05/05/2016 05/05/2016 05/06/2016 05/09/2016 05/10/2016 05/11/2016 05/11/2016 05/11/2016

DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 05/04/2016)
152 TRANSCRIPT OF REDACTED PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on April 21, 2016; Page Numbers: 1−91. Date of Issuance: April 28, 2016. Court Reporter/Transcriber Janice Dickman, Telephone number 202−354−3267, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a href=http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/dcd/node/2189>Transcript Order Form.</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 5/26/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 6/5/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 8/3/2016.(Dickman, Janice) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
153 NOTICE of Intent to Serve Subpoena by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
NOTICE OF ERROR re 153 Notice (Other); emailed to aorcutt@swlfirm.com, cc'd 23 associated attorneys −− The PDF file you docketed contained errors: 1. Do not file Discovery (LcvR 5.2) (jf, ) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
Minute Entry for Jury Trial resumed and held on 5/5/2016, before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Same 8 Jurors. Jury Trial continued to 5/6/2016 at 9:15 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Plaintiff's Witnesses: William Pierce, David Holder and Madeline Davis−Shelton);(Defendant's Witness: Fidelis Doh, MD); (Interpreters: John Folker and Patricia Moers Patterson); (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
MINUTE ORDER authorizing the release to counsel for the parties in this matter of the transcripts, in their entirety, of the trial proceedings held on May 2−5, 2016. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 05/05/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 05/05/2016)
Minute Entry for Jury Trial resumed and held on 5/6/2016, before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Same 8 Jurors. Jury Trial continued to 5/9/2016 at 9:15 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Plaintiff's Witness: Madeline Davis−Shelton); (Defendant's Witness: Barbara Russell); (Interpreters: John Folker and Patricia Moers Patterson); (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 05/06/2016)
Minute Entry for Jury Trial resumed and held on 5/9/2016, before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Same 8 Jurors. Jury Trial continued to 5/10/2016 at 9:00 AM in Courtroom 17 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. (Defendant's Witnesses: Dr. Corry Chapman, Aneika Points, Phillip McNeal, Maggie Mills, Marqueta Edwards and Walter Fulton); (Interpreters: John Folker and Patricia Moers Patterson); (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 05/09/2016)
Minute Entry for Jury Trial resumed and concluded on 5/10/16, before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Same 8 Jurors. Jury Deliberation begun and continued to 5/11/2016 at 9:30 AM in the jury room behind Courtroom 17. (Defendant's Witnesses: Walter Fulton and Brandi Tutwiler); (Interpreters: John Folker and Patricia Moers Patterson); (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 05/10/2016)
155 Plaintiff and Defendant's Exhibit List. (gdf) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
156 ATTORNEYS' ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF TRIAL EXHIBITS. (gdf) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
Minute Entry for Jury Deliberation resumed and concluded on 5/11/2016 before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Same 8 Jurors. JURY VERDICT for the plaintiff on compensatory damages in the amount of $70,000. Jury panel discharged. (Interpreter:

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05/11/2016 05/11/2016 05/11/2016

Patricia Moers Patterson); (Court Reporter: Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
157 Final Jury Instructions. (gdf) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
158 (1) Jury Note. (gdf) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
159 Signature Page of Foreperson

05/11/2016 05/11/2016

in Jury Note. (Access to the PDF Document is restricted pursuant to the E−Government Act. Access is limited to Counsel of Record and the Court.). (gdf) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
160 Verdict Form. (gdf) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
161 Signature Page of Foreperson

05/11/2016 05/12/2016
05/27/2016 05/31/2016 05/31/2016 06/08/2016 06/09/2016 06/27/2016 06/28/2016 06/29/2016

in Jury Verdict. (Access to the PDF Document is restricted pursuant to the E−Government Act. Access is limited to Counsel of Record and the Court.). (gdf) (Entered: 05/11/2016)
162 JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff William Pierce against Defendant District of Columbia. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 5/11/16. (gdf) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
MINUTE ORDER. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 54.2(a) and in light of the judgment that has been entered in this case, it is hereby ORDERED that the parties confer and attempt to reach agreement on any attorney's fee issues. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the time for filing a motion for attorney's fees under Rule 54(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure shall be extended until June 7, 2016, and that a status conference shall be held in this matter on May 31, 2016, at 2:30 PM in Courtroom 17. The parties have leave to appear telephonically at the scheduled status conference, and at that conference, the parties should be prepared to discuss the status and scheduling of all post−trial matters, including fees and costs, post−trial motions, and appeals. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on May 12, 2016. (lckbj3, ) (Entered: 05/12/2016)
163 Consent MOTION to Hold in Abeyance Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs by WILLIAM PIERCE (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Rocap, James) . (Entered: 05/27/2016)
Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson: Status Conference held on 5/31/2016. Order to be entered by the clerk, granting the consent motion. (Court Reporter Barbara DeVico) (gdf) (Entered: 06/02/2016)
164 ORDER granting 163 Order on Motion to Hold in Abeyance Proceedings Regarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 5/31/16. (gdf) (Main Document 164 replaced on 6/3/2016) (zjf). (Entered: 06/02/2016)
165 NOTICE OF APPEAL TO DC CIRCUIT COURT as to 162 Judgment by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0090−4560263. Fee Status: Fee Paid. Parties have been notified. (Struck, Daniel) (Entered: 06/08/2016)
166 Transmission of the Notice of Appeal, Order Appealed, and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals fee was paid this date re 165 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court. (znmw) (Entered: 06/09/2016)
USCA Case Number 16−7078 for 165 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. (zrdj) (Entered: 06/27/2016)
167 Unopposed MOTION Seeking Authorization for Release of Transcripts to Counsel for the Parties − Unopposed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Orcutt, Anne) (Entered: 06/28/2016)
MINUTE ORDER granting 167 Consent Motion for Authorization for Release of Transcripts to Counsel for the Parties. It is hereby ORDERED that the following transcripts may be released to counsel for the parties in this matter: 5/30/2013 Meet and Confer Hearing; 3/05/2014 Status Conference; 8/28/2014 Status Conference; 10/01/2015 Status Conference; 04/05/2016 Initial Pretrial Conference; 04/29/2016

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07/15/2016

Final Pretrial Conference; 05/06/2016 Jury Trial; 05/09/2016 Jury Trial; 05/10/2016 Jury Trial; 05/11/2016 Jury Trial; and 05/31/2016 Status Conference. Signed by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on 06/29/2016. (lckbj1) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
168 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 8−28−14; Page Numbers: 1−10. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced abov e. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
169 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 10−1−15; Page Numbers: 1−24. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 203−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced abov e. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
170 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Page Numbers: 1−60. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered:

Case: 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ As of: 01/31/2019 03:50 PM EST 21 of 24

07/15/2016

07/15/2016)
171 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Page Numbers: 1−104. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days , the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
172 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Page Numbers: 2−256. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days , the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
173 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Page Numbers: 257−490. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 da ys, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)

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07/15/2016

174 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Page Numbers: 491−663. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 da ys, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
175 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 5−5−16; Page Numbers: 664−889. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced ab ove. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
176 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 506−16; Page Numbers: 890−1088. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced a bove. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
177 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 5−9−16; Page Numbers: 1089−1353. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court

Case: 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ As of: 01/31/2019 03:50 PM EST 23 of 24

Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
178 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson Page Numbers: 354−1569. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 d ays, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/15/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
179 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on 5−11−16; Page Numbers: 1570−1575. Date of Issuance:7−15−16. Court Reporter/Transcriber Barbara DeVico, Telephone number 202−354−3118, Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the Transcript Order Form

For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, PDF or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.

NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.

07/21/2016

Redaction Request due 8/5/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/15/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/13/2016.(DeVico, Barbara) (Entered: 07/15/2016)
180 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS before Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson held on May 30, 2013; Page Numbers: 1 − 13. Court Reporter/Transcriber Cathryn Jones, Telephone number 2023543246, Tape Number: jcathryn55@yahoo.com. Transcripts may be ordered by submitting the <a

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09/07/2016 11/29/2016

href="http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/node/110">Transcript Order Form</a><P></P><P></P>For the first 90 days after this filing date, the transcript may be viewed at the courthouse at a public terminal or purchased from the court reporter referenced above. After 90 days, the transcript may be accessed via PACER. Other transcript formats, (multi−page, condensed, CD or ASCII) may be purchased from the court reporter.<P>NOTICE RE REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: The parties have twenty−one days to file with the court and the court reporter any request to redact personal identifiers from this transcript. If no such requests are filed, the transcript will be made available to the public via PACER without redaction after 90 days. The policy, which includes the five personal identifiers specifically covered, is located on our website at www.dcd.uscourts.gov.<P></P> Redaction Request due 8/11/2016. Redacted Transcript Deadline set for 8/21/2016. Release of Transcript Restriction set for 10/19/2016.(Jones, Cathryn) (Entered: 07/21/2016)
181 NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL by Thomas Louis Koger on behalf of DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Substituting for attorney Douglas Rosenbloom (Koger, Thomas) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
182 ORDER of USCA ORDERED that the Clerk note on the docket that this case is dismissed as to 165 Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit Court filed by DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. USCA Case Number 16−7078. (zrdj) (Entered: 11/30/2016)

 Case 1:13-cv-00134-JEB Document 1 Filed 02/01/13 Page 1 of 16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

WILLIAM PIERCE 1313 R Street, NW Washington, DC 20009
Plaintiff,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Office of the Attorney General 441 4th Street, NW Washington, DC 20001
Defendant.

No. ________________ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT (Seeking damages for disability-based discrimination: violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act) INTRODUCTION
1. This is an action for damages and other relief by William Pierce, who was denied equal access to programs, services and activities of the District of Columbia because of the absence of accommodations for deaf inmates at the District of Columbia’s Correctional Treatment Facility, in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Defendant District of Columbia intentionally discriminated against Mr. Pierce on the basis of his disability by denying him adequate and effective means to communicate with individuals both inside the jail and by telephone with individuals outside the jail. The defendant also retaliated against him for seeking accommodation to which he was entitled. Mr. Pierce seeks damages, attorneys’ fees, costs and other appropriate relief.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 2. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question). 3. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim occurred in the District of Columbia.
PARTIES 4. Plaintiff William Pierce is a resident of the District of Columbia and is profoundly deaf. 5. Defendant District of Columbia is a municipal corporation and the local government of Washington, DC. The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) is an agency of the District of Columbia, the functions of which include overseeing the operation of the Correctional Treatment Facility.
FACTS 6. William Pierce is a profoundly deaf individual. He communicates primarily using American Sign Language (“ASL”), which he considers his native language. He relies on sign language interpreters or other auxiliary aids to communicate with people who do not use sign language. Written English is a second language for Mr. Pierce, as it is for many individuals who are born deaf. His proficiency in reading and writing is not at the same level as it would be if he were a hearing person. 7. On February 1, 2012, Mr. Pierce was sentenced in D.C. Superior Court to 60 days in jail for simple assault arising from a domestic dispute. The court also ordered Mr. Pierce to enter and complete domestic violence intervention and to receive mental health and substance abuse assessments. He was admitted to the Correctional Treatment Facility that same day. On

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information and belief, Mr. Pierce was placed at the Correctional Treatment Facility rather than the D.C. Jail because DOC believed that the Correctional Treatment Facility provided those services and had better accommodations for deaf prisoners.
8. The Correctional Treatment Facility is a medium security facility in the District of Columbia that incarcerates male and female inmates. In 1997, the Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), a private prison company, entered into a 20-year contract with the District of Columbia to operate, maintain and manage the Correctional Treatment Facility as an annex to the D.C. Jail. That contract obligates CCA to operate the Correctional Treatment Facility in compliance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States and the District of Columbia. CCA is required to provide for all aspects of incarceration, including, but not limited to, staffing, medical and mental health care, religious services, and vocational, therapeutic and substance abuse programming.
9. The District of Columbia is required to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.
10. The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The U.S. Department of Justice regulations implementing Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act require the District of Columbia to “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1). The District of Columbia is required to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford individuals with

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disabilities … an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program or activity … .” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1). “Auxiliary aids and services” include, but are not limited to, “qualified interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12103(1)(A), such as computer aided transcription services, teletypewriter devices and videophones. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
11. Mr. Pierce is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The District of Columbia is a “public entity” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).
12. The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., provides that no qualified individual with a disability “shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ….” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The Department of Justice implementing regulations require the District of Columbia to “provide appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified handicapped persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills where a refusal to make such provision would discriminatorily impair or exclude the participation of such persons in a program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(f). Appropriate auxiliary aids include, but are not limited to, qualified interpreters and telephonic devices. Id.
13. The District of Columbia receives federal financial assistance within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The operations of the Correctional Treatment Facility are programs or activities within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §

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794(b)(1)(A)-(B). Mr. Pierce is a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 705(20).
14. The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act also require the District of Columbia to ensure that its contractors, including a contractor running a D.C. correctional facility, comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act. The District of Columbia is aware of its obligations under these federal statutes.
15. During his 51-day incarceration at the Correctional Treatment Facility, officials failed to provide Mr. Pierce with even the most basic communication accommodations. The District of Columbia intentionally did not furnish Mr. Pierce with auxiliary aids and services that were necessary to afford him an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, the services, programs or activities of the Correctional Treatment Facility. As a direct result of the District of Columbia’s intentional failure to fulfill its obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, Mr. Pierce was unable to obtain any real benefit from the anger management program offered at the facility or from the mental health and substance abuse assessments the court had ordered him to receive.
16. DOC policies require the Department to terminate the contract of any entity that fails or refuses to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act. However, despite CCA’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, DOC has neither terminated its contract nor taken effective steps to assure compliance.
17. The DOC has failed to uphold its responsibilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, resulting in disability-based discrimination against Mr. Pierce and others at the Correctional Treatment Facility through (1) ineffective access to

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qualified interpreters; (2) ineffective access to telecommunications; (3) lack of access to jail alerts and announcements; and (4) inadequate access to visitation.
Inadequate Access to Qualified Interpreters 18. Qualified sign language interpreters are needed for effective communication between individuals who rely on ASL to communicate and those who do not know the language. ASL is a complex language that utilizes signs made by hand motions, facial expressions and postures of the body. ASL is completely distinct from English and has its own syntax and grammar. 19. For many deaf or hard of hearing individuals writing is not an effective form of communication. Deaf individuals frequently acquire written English as a second language, and their proficiency level is often much lower than that of hearing people. Writing is not an effective form of communication for Mr. Pierce. 20. Lip reading is not an effective form of communication. Only a small percentage of the sounds found in English words are clearly visible on the mouth, and the ability to lip-read can be obstructed by external factors such as lighting or the speaker’s facial structure. Even if a native ASL speaker were able to understand the sounds appearing on a speaker’s lips, he or she would not necessarily understand the English language or the vocabulary being used. 21. DOC policies recognize that an individual “who has only a rudimentary familiarity with sign language or finger spelling is not a ‘qualified interpreter’” for communication with a deaf person. D.C. Department of Corrections Directive 3800.3 § 12(e)(2)(a) (2003). 22. Mr. Pierce made at least twelve written requests and filed three formal grievances seeking the services of a qualified ASL interpreter during his time at the Correctional Treatment

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Facility. Mr. Pierce’s case manager requested an interpreter on numerous occasions. Mr. Pierce’s partner, David Holder, made repeated requests for accommodation on his behalf. Mr. Holder spoke with the Correctional Treatment Facility officials on at least 15 different occasions in addition to exchanging numerous emails with jail officials. However, jail officials did not provide Mr. Pierce with a qualified ASL interpreter, including for critical events during his incarceration, such as intake and orientation, grievance interviews, medical appointments, and most of his rehabilitative and educational classes. In response to Mr. Holder’s requests for accommodation on Mr. Pierce’s behalf, Correctional Treatment Facility officials told Mr. Holder they could not “justify” the expense of an interpreter. Officials also told Mr. Holder that it would take six to eight months to get an interpreter vetted and approved to work in the Correctional Treatment Facility, and that Mr. Pierce would be gone by then. On information and belief, officials at the Correctional Treatment Facility never initiated the process to employ an interpreter for Mr. Pierce.
23. On information and belief, Correctional Treatment Facility officials were aware of Mr. Pierce’s disability immediately on intake. Mr. Pierce alerted corrections officers to his disability through hand gestures and written notes. He informed them that he needed an ASL interpreter to communicate and requested an interpreter for orientation and intake. DOC policies provide that “[w]ritten communication cannot be used as a substitute where the individual has expressed a preference for a sign language interpreter.” D.C. Department of Corrections Directive 3800.3 § 12(a)(2) (2003). In the intake processing center at the Correctional Treatment Facility, a posted sign alerts inmates to their right to an interpreter. An inmate handbook distributed to all inmates on intake affirms every inmate’s “right to be informed of the rules, procedures, programs and schedules concerning the operation of the institution.” The handbook

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continues, “You will have access to institutional programs and services without regard to … physical handicap.” However, Correctional Treatment Facility officials ignored Mr. Pierce’s requests and the requests of others for accommodation of his disability. On information and belief, Correctional Treatment Facility and DOC officials were aware of the risk of significant miscommunication without an interpreter but intentionally chose not to provide one.
24. While Mr. Pierce was at the Correctional Treatment Facility, he had approximately five medical appointments for symptoms including an irregular heartbeat and blood in his stool. DOC and Correctional Treatment Facility officials were aware of the need for an interpreter during medical appointments and the risks inherent in providing medical care without an interpreter. DOC policies regarding inmate health care specifically provide that “Sign language interpreter services shall be made available to deaf and hearing-impaired individuals.” Health Services Program Manual, Ch.1 § 2(f) (2012). Nevertheless, Correctional Treatment Facility officials provided no interpreters for any of Mr. Pierce’s medical appointments.
25. Without the assistance of an interpreter, Mr. Pierce was unable to explain his symptoms and concerns to the medical staff, or to understand their attempts to communicate with him. Mr. Pierce received some medical tests, but his inability to communicate effectively with staff resulted in Mr. Pierce not understanding what the tests were, why the tests were being performed or what the results were. Medical staff provided Mr. Pierce with medication after he reported blood in his stool, but could not adequately explain what the medication was or why they were giving it to him.
26. Mr. Pierce is HIV positive and is on a drug regimen of five different medications each day. Medical staff only gave him four of his five medications, and could not explain why they were not providing the fifth medication without the assistance of an interpreter.

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27. Though he attended some educational and therapeutic programming at the Correctional Treatment Facility, Mr. Pierce was unable to participate meaningfully in that programming without a qualified interpreter. A fellow inmate with a rudimentary knowledge of ASL sat in the classes with him, but Mr. Pierce was mostly unable to understand the inmate’s attempts to sign. Mr. Pierce repeatedly informed (or attempted to inform) the instructor and corrections officers that the inmate was not an interpreter and that he was unable to get any benefit from the classes without an interpreter. They nevertheless failed to make other arrangements. Mr. Pierce stopped attending his graphic design class because of his inability to understand the instructor.
28. In the last two to three weeks of Mr. Pierce’s incarceration, a concerned chaplain recruited Rev. Ron Friedrich, a chaplain at Gallaudet University and a qualified ASL interpreter, to volunteer his time and provide sign language interpretation for Mr. Pierce. Rev. Friedrich provided interpreter services for three of Mr. Pierce’s approximately seven substance abuse classes. For the remainder of the programming, Mr. Pierce sat in the classes, uncomprehending, assisted only by occasional notes from the instructor. Mr. Pierce was completely unable to participate in group discussions, a key component of the programs. Despite his desire for rehabilitation, Mr. Pierce was unable to reap the benefits of the programming as a result of this lack of accommodation.
29. Mr. Pierce frequently tried to get the attention of corrections officers by waving in an attempt to communicate a need, question or concern. However, much of the time the officers deliberately ignored him. When he was able to summon a corrections officer, there were frequent miscommunications due to the lack of an ASL interpreter.

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30. During the time he was at the Correctional Treatment Facility, corrections officers placed Mr. Pierce in solitary confinement for fourteen days. While in solitary confinement, Mr. Pierce was on 23-hour lock down. Through handwritten notes passed from corrections officers, Mr. Pierce was told that he had been placed in segregation on protective custody status, but the officers did not inform Mr. Pierce of what protective custody entailed, that his protective custody status was voluntary, or that he could sign himself out at any time. Without access to a qualified ASL interpreter, they had no effective way in which to do so. When Mr. Pierce refused to sign a form because he could not understand what it said, Correctional Treatment Facility officials moved him to an even smaller, more secluded solitary cell. Mr. Pierce was not finally released from solitary confinement until after Mr. Holder contacted officials about the situation.
Inadequate Access to Telecommunications 31. The Correctional Treatment Facility provides inmates access to a bank of telephones so that they can communicate with family, friends and other individuals in the outside world. On information and belief, hearing inmates have access to these telephones on a first come, first served basis, seven days a week between 7:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. 32. The Correctional Treatment Facility Inmate Handbook imposes a ten-minute time limit on telephone calls. On information and belief, in practice hearing inmates are allowed to have telephone conversations that may last as long as an hour. 33. Access to a telephone is extremely important for inmates at correctional facilities because it fosters family and community ties that are fundamental to an inmate’s motivation to improve himself and fundamental to successfully re-entering the community upon release. Access to telecommunications was especially important for Mr. Pierce, because of his nearly total communicative isolation from other people during his incarceration.

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34. Because of his deafness, Mr. Pierce is unable to use a traditional telephone. In the outside world he uses a videophone to communicate via telephone using ASL.
35. The Correctional Treatment Facility provides teletypewriter (“TTY”) devices to deaf and hard of hearing inmates. A TTY is an outmoded electronic device that enables people with hearing and speech disabilities to communicate via telephone. A TTY consists of a keyboard, a display screen and a telephone, and both parties must have a TTY to have a direct conversation. Typed messages are sent over the telephone lines and appear on the screen of the other party. If one party does not have a TTY, federally mandated relay services are provided by telephone companies. Users can then communicate through the assistance of a third-party relay operator who types spoken words to be read by the deaf party and reads the typed responses to a hearing person. Two deaf individuals cannot communicate via TTY unless both parties have a TTY device. The TTY is an outdated and ineffective communication device.
36. In contrast to the largely unrestricted access to telephones enjoyed by hearing inmates, Mr. Pierce had to make advance requests to use the TTY device. The TTY is kept in an office outside the housing unit, which is only open Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Frequently, it would take one or two days for a corrections officer to grant Mr. Pierce’s request to use the TTY and to provide him access to the device. Just as frequently, corrections officers denied Mr. Pierce’s requests, writing to him: “That’s not my job,” or words to that effect.
37. The DOC is aware of the need to provide additional time for TTY phone calls. Its 2003 Directive on “Communications for Deaf and Hearing Impaired” states, “In light of the fact that telephone calls placed via a TTY unit take three to five times longer than telephone calls placed using standard voice telephone equipment, DOC shall not impose on TTY calls a time

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limit of less than four times the time allowed for voice telephone calls.” D.C. Department of Corrections Directive 3800.3 § 14(e) (2003).
38. When granted access to the TTY, corrections officers deliberately limited Mr. Pierce’s calls to ten minutes. Because of the time it takes to access and coordinate with a TTY relay operator, Mr. Pierce’s calls were effectively limited to three to four minutes each.
39. Mr. Pierce was unable to communicate at all with his deaf friends because no videophone was available at the Correctional Treatment Facility. A videophone also would have enabled Mr. Pierce to communicate more effectively with hearing people, because telephone companies also provide ASL interpreters for videophone conversations, and Mr. Pierce’s ability to communicate by TTY is limited because of his lack of proficiency in written English. Correctional Treatment Facility and DOC officials were or should have been aware that a videophone is a necessary auxiliary aid or service for deaf inmates.
Lack of Access to Visual Notifications 40. DOC policy requires deaf inmates to be provided access to visual emergency alarms as well as visual signals or bed vibrators to alert them to notifications. D.C. Department of Corrections Directive 3800.3 § 15 (2003). On information and belief, DOC is aware of the need for visual and/or tactile notifications and the risks created by the failure to provide these notifications. 41. Mr. Pierce was not provided with access to a visual or tactile alarm for emergencies or any other notifications. Mr. Pierce worried about missing important announcements and notifications. The possibility that an emergency alarm would sound and he would be unaware caused Mr. Pierce emotional distress.

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Inadequate Access to Visitation 42. Like access to telephones, access to visitation is extremely important for inmates at correctional facilities because it fosters family and community ties that are fundamental to an inmate’s motivation to improve himself and fundamental to successfully re-entering the community upon release. Access to visitation was especially important for Mr. Pierce to enable him to have contact with his partner after the domestic altercation that resulted in his incarceration, and because of his nearly total communicative isolation from other people during his incarceration. 43. Mr. Pierce uses American Sign Language to communicate with his mother. He is unable to communicate with her effectively in any other way. During the two weeks Mr. Pierce was in solitary confinement, he was handcuffed during visits from his mother and his partner. Placing Mr. Pierce in wrist restraints during a time when he needs to communicate is effectively the same as placing a gag in the mouth of a hearing prisoner. The restraints on his hands made it impossible for him to communicate effectively with his visitors. Mr. Pierce was forced to attempt to write notes with cuffed hands in the darkened visiting booth and press the note against the tinted glass separating him from his visitor. 44. Both Mr. Pierce’s mother and Mr. Holder explained the problem to corrections officers and requested that the restraints be removed, however corrections officers refused to do so on at least one of the two occasions.
Retaliation 45. On information and belief, Mr. Pierce’s period of solitary confinement was not actually the result of a mistaken belief that he had requested protective custody, but was retaliation against him for having requested accommodation for his disability.

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Harm to Plaintiff 46. Mr. Pierce was unable to benefit from any of the programs and services available at the Correctional Treatment Facility because he could not comprehend the class material and could not participate in group discussions. Without an interpreter, Mr. Pierce was unable to receive the therapeutic and rehabilitative benefits provided by an anger management class or the vocational skills provided by a graphic design course. 47. Mr. Pierce suffered great emotional distress during his time at the Correctional Treatment Facility, caused by the inability to communicate with the people around him and the refusal of staff to accommodate his disability. He felt depressed, humiliated and isolated. Mr. Pierce’s inability to communicate with family and friends in the outside world caused him significant emotional harm and denied him the opportunity to maintain important relationships. Being forced to plead for the opportunity to use a TTY device was humiliating and degrading. Mr. Pierce felt like a second-class citizen when he was unable to communicate with his mother and partner during visitation. The possibility that an important notification or emergency alarm would sound and he would be unaware also caused Mr. Pierce emotional distress. The two weeks that he spent in solitary confinement, on 23-hour lockdown, were especially harmful to him. 48. He continues to suffer from emotional distress and has nightmares about his time in solitary confinement. Mr. Pierce sought the treatment of a mental health specialist when he was released from the jail and continues to receive treatment.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF Claim I: Disability-Based Discrimination in Violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.) 49. Defendant’s failure to provide Mr. Pierce effective means of communication denied him the same access to defendant’s programs, services and activities as the access

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provided to hearing individuals. Defendant intentionally subjected Mr. Pierce to disability-based discrimination, in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, by failing to provide Mr. Pierce adequate access to a qualified ASL interpreter, telecommunication devices, visual alarms and visitation.
Claim II: Disability-Based Discrimination in Violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.) 50. Defendant’s failure to provide Mr. Pierce effective means of communication denied him the same access to Defendant’s programs, services and activities as the access provided to hearing individuals. Defendant intentionally subjected Mr. Pierce to disability-based discrimination, in violation of his rights under the Rehabilitation Act, by failing to provide Mr. Pierce adequate access to a qualified ASL interpreter, telecommunication devices, visual alarms and visitation. Claim III: Retaliation in Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act (42 U.S.C. § 12203; 29 U.S.C. § 794a(2)) 51. Defendant’s retaliation against Mr. Pierce for asserting his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act violated his rights under those Acts.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that this Court: (a) DECLARE that the actions of Defendant District of Columbia, as alleged herein, violated William Pierce’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act; (b) ENTER JUDGMENT awarding Mr. Pierce damages against Defendant in an amount appropriate to the evidence adduced at trial;

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(c) ENTER JUDGMENT awarding Mr. Pierce his costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees in this action;
(d) GRANT Mr. Pierce such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
JURY DEMAND Plaintiff requests a trial by jury.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Arthur B. Spitzer
____________________________________________
Arthur B. Spitzer (D.C. Bar No. 235960) Frederick V. Mulhauser (D.C. Bar No. 455377) Jennifer Wedekind* American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation’s Capital 4301 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 434 Washington, D.C. 20008 Tel. 202-457-0800 Fax 202-457-0805 artspitzer@aclu-nca.org fmulhauser@aol.com Counsel for Plaintiff February 1, 2013

* Ms. Wedekind is a member of the New York Bar; her application for admission to the D.C. Bar is pending. She is practicing under the supervision of Mr. Spitzer and Mr. Mulhauser.

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 Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (2015) 51 NDLR P 154

128 F.Supp.3d 250 United States District Court, District of Columbia.
William PIERCE, Plaintiff, v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
Civ. No. 13–cv–0134 (KBJ) |
Signed September 11, 2015
Synopsis Background: Deaf inmate who communicated with American Sign Language (ASL), but who had been forced to communicate with staff and other inmates only through lip-reading and written notes due to lack of interpreter to assist him, filed suit against District of Columbia alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. Both sides moved for summary judgment.
Holdings: The District Court, Ketanji Brown Jackson, J. held that:
prison had affirmative duty to evaluate newly incarcerated deaf inmate’s accommodation requirements, and its failure to do so denied inmate benefits under Rehabilitation Act and ADA; but
even if prison’s obligation arose only after it received a request for accommodation, inmate specifically requested an ASL interpreter;
prison was deliberately indifferent to deaf inmate’s need for accommodation, as would support award of compensatory damages; but
genuine issue of material fact precluded summary judgment on retaliation claim.
Plaintiff’s motion granted in part, and defendant’s motion denied.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*253 James Elmer Rocap, III, Damon J. Kalt, Nina
1

Shishir Thanawala, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Frederick V. Mulhauser, Jennifer A. Wedekind, Arthur B. Spitzer, American Civil Liberties Union of the Nation’s Capital, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Anne Marie Orcutt, Daniel P. Struck, Struck Wieneke & Love, P.L.C., Chandler, AZ, Matthew D. Berkowitz, Mariana Del Valle Bravo, Carr Maloney PC, Gary Daniel Feldon, Grace Graham, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, Terence Joseph O’Connell, O’Connell & O’Connell, LLC, Rockville, MD, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Public Version of ECF No. 82)
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON, United States District Judge
Incarceration inherently involves the relinquishment of many privileges; however, prisoners still retain certain civil rights, including protections against disability discrimination. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 126 S.Ct. 877, 163 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998). Plaintiff William Pierce—who is profoundly deaf and communicates with American Sign Language—claims that prison officials in the District of Columbia violated his right to be free from unlawful disability discrimination in 2012, when Pierce was incarcerated in the District’s Correctional Treatment Facility following his guilty plea to a simple assault that arose out of a domestic dispute with his then-partner. The District’s prison staff was indisputably aware that Pierce was deaf; however, during the entire 51–day period in which Pierce was held in custody, no staff person ever assessed Pierce’s need for accommodation or otherwise undertook to determine the type of assistance that he would need to communicate effectively with others during his incarceration. Instead, according to Pierce, the District’s employees and contractors merely assumed that lip-reading and exchanging written notes would suffice,

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51 NDLR P 154
and they largely ignored his repeated requests for an interpreter to assist him in interacting with other people. As a result, Pierce asserts that he was forced to serve his *254 prison time in abject isolation, generally unaware of what was going on around him and unable to communicate effectively with prison officials, prison doctors, his counselor, his teacher, or his fellow inmates. Pierce has filed the instant lawsuit against the District under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub.L. No. 93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796, seeking damages for allegedly having been denied an effective means of receiving or imparting information at various critical points during his period of incarceration, including medical appointments, rehabilitative classes, and meetings with prison officials. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 22, 49–50.) Pierce also maintains that he was held in solitary confinement as punishment for his repeated requests for an interpreter, and thus, that the District’s employees and contractors retaliated against him in violation of federal law. (See id. ¶¶ 30, 45, 51.)
Before this Court at present are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. (See Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. as to Claims I and II of the Compl., ECF No. 47; Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 49.) The parties vehemently disagree about many of the facts related to this case–most notably, whether Pierce actually had the ability to communicate effectively through lipreading and written notes, and also whether Pierce actually requested an interpreter as an accommodation for his hearing disability. But in this Court’s view, only one fact is truly material to the question of whether or not Pierce was discriminated against on the basis of his disability and is thus entitled to summary judgment on his discrimination claims (Claims I and II of the complaint), and that fact is entirely undisputed: when Pierce first arrived at the prison facility, the District’s employees and contractors did nothing to evaluate Pierce’s need for accommodation, despite their knowledge that he was disabled. They did not ask Pierce what type of auxiliary aids he needed. They did not hire an expert to assess Pierce’s ability to communicate through written notes or lipreading as opposed to sign language. They did not even consult the Department of Corrections’ own policies to figure out what types of accommodations are ordinarily provided to inmates with hearing disabilities. Instead, they figuratively shrugged and effectively sat on their hands with respect to this plainly hearing-disabled person in their custody, presumably content to rely on their own uninformed beliefs about how best to handle him and certainly failing to engage in any meaningful assessment
2

of his needs. This Court finds that, in so doing, the District denied Pierce meaningful access to prison services and intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Thus, Pierce is entitled to summary judgment and compensatory damages on Claims I and II of his complaint.
With respect to the District’s motion for summary judgment on Pierce’s retaliation claim (Claim III), this Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether or not Pierce’s placement in solitary confinement was an act of unlawful retaliation—Pierce contends that prison employees were responding to his repeated requests for an interpreter and the complaints he had made about the prison’s failure to provide accommodations, while the District claims that Pierce was segregated from the general prison population in order to protect him from the violent threats of other inmates. Pierce’s retaliation claim thus involves a genuine *255 dispute of fact that is not appropriately resolved on summary judgment.
Accordingly, Pierce’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Claims I and II of the complaint will be GRANTED, and the District’s motion for summary judgment as to Claims I, II, and III will be DENIED. A separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will follow.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Basic Facts† William Pierce is a resident of the District of Columbia who is profoundly deaf and has other serious medical conditions. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Material Facts (“Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts”), ECF No. 48–1, ¶ 1; Compl. ¶ 4.) Pierce can make sounds that are audible, but he cannot speak words, and American Sign Language (“ASL”) is his native language. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 2, 3.)1 Pierce relies on ASL to communicate with others–either by interacting directly with other persons who are using ASL themselves, or through the use of a video conferencing device that involves a remote interpreter. (See id. ¶¶ 8–9.) Pierce cannot, and does not, use a traditional telephone; instead, he ordinarily uses ASL via videophone to communicate with hearing individuals. (See id.) Moreover, because Pierce’s proficiency in reading and writing English is far below that of a hearing

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person, he rarely writes notes and only uses cellphone texting to convey simple, short messages. (See id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Also, as with many deaf individuals, Pierce has limited lip-reading ability. (See id. ¶¶ 10–11.)
At some point prior to February of 2012, Pierce was involved in a domestic dispute with his then-partner, David Holder, after which Pierce was arrested and charged with simple assault. (See id. ¶ 46.) On February 1, 2012, a D.C. Superior Court Judge sentenced Pierce to 60 days in jail, and committed him to the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to serve out his sentence in the District’s Correctional Treatment Facility (“CTF”). (See id.; see also Def.’s Stmt. of Facts, ECF No. 50, ¶ 2.)2 Pierce was then incarcerated at CTF from February 2, 2012, until March 22, 2012. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 51; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 6.) He resided in three different units during his incarceration: Medical 96 while he was in general population, and then Medical 82 and the Special Management Unit when he was placed into protective custody. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 50; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 159–165.) Pierce was in protective custody from February 23, 2012, to March 7, 2012. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 102, 112; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 164, 172.)
It is undisputed that the District’s employees and contractors were all fully aware that Pierce is deaf. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 69; Def.’s Controverting Stmt. of Facts (“Def.’s Cont. Facts”), ECF No. 61, ¶ 69.) However, no prison staff member assessed whether, or to what extent, *256 Pierce would need accommodations to ensure that he could communicate effectively with others during his incarceration. (See Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 80, at 52:3–4, 53:1–12.) Furthermore, Pierce was not provided with a qualified ASL interpreter at any point during the entire 51–day period he spent in custody, including the 14–day period that Pierce served in solitary confinementlike conditions.
B. Disputed Issues The parties vigorously disagree about how–and, more specifically, whether– Pierce was actually able to communicate effectively with prison officials, health care providers, teachers, and counselors during his incarceration. Pierce claims that he is not skilled at reading lips when people are speaking English, nor can he skillfully interpret notes that people have written to him in English. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 3, 5, 7, 9, 11.) Accordingly, Pierce asserts that he needs ASL interpretation in order to communicate effectively with
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people who do not know ASL. (See id. ¶ 12.) The District disagrees, asserting that Pierce can communicate effectively in written English and through lip reading, primarily because Pierce appeared to understand what prison officials said and wrote to him during his incarceration. (See Def.’s Cont. Facts ¶¶ 5, 7, 8, 9; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 12–17, 28.) In the District’s view, then, exchanging written notes and lip reading were adequate means of effective communication for Pierce while he was in custody. (See Def.’s Cont. Facts ¶¶ 8, 11, 82, 90.)
The parties also disagree about when–and whether–Pierce actually asked prison officials, health care providers, and class instructors to accommodate his hearing disability by providing an interpreter to translate for him. Pierce claims that he requested an interpreter at his initial medical intake interview, at inmate orientation, in his rehabilitation classes, and at all medical appointments. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 60, 88, 98.) By contrast, the District insists that Pierce only requested a sign language interpreter for certain sessions of his anger management/substance abuse class. (See Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 19–21, 54, 57.) From the District’s perspective, having not requested an interpreter for most of the interactions that he had with prison officials and others, Pierce is not entitled to contend that the District violated the law by failing to provide him with an interpreter for those interactions. (See Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 60, at 1–3.)3
These two issues—Pierce’s ability to communicate effectively in English and the extent to which he requested an ASL interpreter—lie at the heart of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. As explained fully in the analysis section below, this Court ultimately finds that these disputed issues are immaterial to the Court’s conclusion that Pierce was subjected to disability discrimination while he was in DOC custody. (See Part III.A.1, infra.) However, for present purposes, the parties’ opposing views regarding Pierce’s linguistic abilities and requests for accommodation provide important context for understanding the parties’ allegations regarding Pierce’s prison experience. The specific disputes of fact center on whether Pierce had communication difficulties with respect to (1) the prison facility’s medical intake and health services, (2) his inmate rehabilitation classes, (3) the protective custody procedures that were employed in his case, and (4) the prison’s provision of telecommunications, official *257 notifications, and visitation. What follows is a brief summary of the parties’ conflicting descriptions of Pierce’s custodial experience in regard to these matters.

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1. Pierce’s Ability To Communicate Effectively During Medical Intake And Health Processes
Immediately after Pierce was sentenced and taken into DOC custody, he was sent to the District’s Central Detention Facility for a medical screening and examination, in accordance with ordinary inmate intake procedures. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 47, 88; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 8, 9.) This physical was conducted by medical professionals from Unity Healthcare—a private, non-profit entity that contracts with the District of Columbia to provide comprehensive health care services to inmates. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 88; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 8, 9.) The parties disagree about whether Pierce requested, or even needed, an ASL interpreter at this initial intake evaluation and also at the many subsequent interactions that Pierce had with prison medical professionals in order to manage his significant and chronic medical conditions. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 87–90; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 27–31.)4
According to Pierce, during the initial intake process and at his subsequent medical appointments and interventions, prison medical personnel simply assumed they were effectively communicating with him through the exchange of written notes and gestures, despite his request for an ASL interpreter. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 88–89, 97–98, 101; see also Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt. of Facts (“Pl.’s Cont. Facts”), ECF No. 59–2, ¶¶ 28–29.) For example, Pierce claims that, at the initial intake meeting, Pierce wrote to Dr. Fidelis Doh (the doctor who conducted his intake interview) that he needed an ASL interpreter because he had complicated health issues to explain, such as HIV, [* * * * * *], and new medications. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 88.) Dr. Doh wrote back that they could use written communication. (See id.) Pierce continued to write that he needed an interpreter, but the doctor did not arrange for one to be provided. (See id.) Instead, Dr. Doh simply turned his computer screen toward Pierce to show him the questions that were written there. (See id. ¶ 89.) Pierce wrote to Dr. Doh that he could not understand the complicated vocabulary and medical jargon on the screen, but the doctor wrote back that Pierce should not worry about it. (See id.) Dr. Doh continued to point at words on the screen; to ask questions orally under the assumption that Pierce could read lips; and to write notes to Pierce throughout the initial intake process. (See id. ¶ 90.)
Pierce asserts that, as a result of Unity’s failure to provide him with an ASL interpreter at the initial intake, he was
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not able to communicate the fact that, prior to his incarceration, he had been taking five prescription medications and had a history of [* * * * * *]. (See id. ¶¶ 91–93.) Without this information, Unity allegedly failed to give him any [* * * * * *] medication (see id. ¶ 94), and without that medication, Pierce allegedly experienced [* * * * * *] in prison (see id. ¶ 96). Pierce concedes that he ultimately received treatment for this problem; however, he claims that there was no ASL interpreter to help him communicate with the doctors about his symptoms or chronic condition (see id. ¶ 97), nor was he provided with an interpreter to facilitate his conversation *258 with the doctor who treated him for a different medical crisis he subsequently experienced (see id. ¶¶ 100–01 (claiming that Pierce suffered from [* * * * * *] while he was in protective custody and that no interpreter was provided)).
For its part, the District maintains that Pierce never requested an ASL interpreter for his medical intake interview or any of his medical appointments, and this was likely so because, in the District’s view, no interpreter was necessary. (See Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 20, 27, 31, 35, 39.) According to the District, Dr. Doh was able to communicate effectively with Pierce in writing and specifically reported that Pierce could read lips. (See id. ¶¶ 27–28.) The District admits that Dr. Doh showed Pierce the medical intake questions on the computer screen rather than getting an interpreter to translate Dr. Doh’s spoken questions, but the District argues that the fact that Pierce answered the questions through gestures and writing shows that Pierce must have understood the questions that he read off the screen. (See id. ¶ 30.)
The District also contends that, even if Pierce did have trouble communicating with Dr. Doh, Pierce did not suffer any adverse consequences as a result of those alleged miscommunications. For example, the District points out that the medical professionals at Unity were aware of Pierce’s pre-existing conditions because Pierce signed a written release allowing Unity to obtain Pierce’s medical history from former health care providers. (See id. ¶¶ 32–33.) Moreover, although Pierce was not prescribed preventative medication for [* * * * * *], Pierce did receive prescription [* * * * * *] medication after he [* * * * * *]. (See id. ¶ 42.) Similarly, the District notes that although Pierce claims he was not able to communicate with his doctors about the [* * * * * *], the doctor was able to develop a diagnosis ( [* * * * * *] ) and prescribed the appropriate treatment ( [* * * * * *] ). (See id. ¶ 44.)

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2. Pierce’s Access To Rehabilitative Classes
Pierce was enrolled in two inmate programs while at CTF: a class intended to help him with anger management and substance abuse issues, and a class about graphic design. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 49; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 55, 74.) The anger management/substance abuse course consisted of lectures, videos, and group discussion during six or seven class sessions. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 65; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 56.) The graphic arts class involved each inmates’ completion of computerbased modules containing written instructions, written tests, and hands-on projects– assignments that were undertaken by the inmates individually and at their own pace, while a CTF employee monitored their progress and made himself or herself available to answer questions and to provide assistance. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 66; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 77–78.)
The parties disagree about the extent to which Pierce was able to understand, and benefit from, these classes. According to Pierce, in the absence of an interpreter, he had great difficulty following the courses; so much so that, during the first anger management/substance abuse group session that Pierce attended, he allegedly became increasingly agitated and, at one point, even walked out of the session. (Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 64.) Pierce claims that, after this first session, he wrote to the instructor that he was frustrated because he could not understand the lecture without an interpreter. (See id.) And, according to Pierce, this was one of many requests for an interpreter that he made related to his classes; Pierce says that his partner also asked prison officials about *259 securing an interpreter for Pierce for this purpose. (See id. ¶¶ 63, 68.) Pierce also makes allegations regarding prison officials’ responses to these requests—for example, he claims that, in response to the entreaties his partner made on his behalf, Assistant Warden Fulton eventually contacted Gallaudet University—a university for the deaf located in Washington, D.C.—to see if Gallaudet could provide an ASL interpreter for Pierce. (See id. ¶ 71.)5 According to Pierce, when Fulton learned that Gallaudet interpreters would need to be paid for their services, prison officials demurred, and started looking for other potential ways of accommodating Pierce. (See id. ¶¶ 71–72.)
Pierce asserts that, ultimately, the District neither sought, nor found, any outside ASL interpreter for Pierce’s classes. (See id. ¶ 73.) Instead, near the end of his term of incarceration and after some of the sessions had been completed, a chaplain at CTF volunteered to provide interpretive services for Pierce’s last few anger management/substance abuse classes. (See id. ¶ 75.) With respect to the graphics arts course, another inmate (Justin Clary) allegedly was asked to volunteer to sign for Pierce
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in approximately two or three classes (see id. ¶ 79); however, according to Pierce, Clary was not a qualified interpreter–he just happened to be severely hard of hearing and also happened to be enrolled in the class (see id. ¶¶ 79, 81)–and thus, Clary was not able to interpret effectively and accurately the written or oral statements that were being made in the class (see id. ¶ 80).6
The District contests these representations, and maintains that Pierce successfully participated in both the anger management/substance abuse program and the graphic arts course. (See Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 68, 80.) With respect to the anger management/substance abuse program, the District maintains that Pierce was provided with an interpreter for all of the program sessions that took place after he requested one. (See id. ¶ 57.) First, the District says, Assistant Warden Fulton employed Clary to attend program sessions with Pierce and to interpret for him. (See id. ¶¶ 59–60.) Then, after Pierce informed his counselor that Clary was not an adequate interpreter (see id. ¶ 61), the District says that Assistant Warden Fulton contacted Gallaudet University and the ADA Coordinator for DOC in an effort to find an interpreter for Pierce, but ultimately did not have to hire an interpreter because the chaplain volunteered, and interpreted for Pierce in four classes. (See id. ¶¶ 63–65.) The District also asserts that Pierce received three days of good time credit for his participation in the anger management/substance abuse program, and that he ultimately experienced positive behavioral changes, including less drinking and an increased ability to control his anger. (See id. ¶¶ 68–70.)
With respect to the graphic arts vocational programming, the District insists that Pierce did not request an interpreter for the program, and that an interpreter was not necessary for him to participate in that particular program. (See id. ¶¶ 83–84.) In fact, according to the District, Pierce’s instructor reported that he was a *260 quick learner and had performed better than some of the nonhearing impaired students enrolled in the course. (See id. ¶ 82.) The District also emphasizes that Pierce completed six modules of the graphic arts course and received six days of good time credit for his efforts. (See id. ¶¶ 80– 81.)
3. The Circumstances Surrounding Pierce’s Time In Protective Custody
Pierce spent approximately 25% of the total time he was in the custody of the DOC in solitary confinement

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conditions based on his alleged request for “protective custody” after he was assaulted by another inmate. The parties have a stark disagreement about the circumstances surrounding Pierce’s entrance into protective custody, and also how he was eventually released from that status.
Pierce maintains that, on February 23, 2012, he was shoved to the floor by another inmate and that he reached out to Tutwiler, his assigned case manager, to complain about the incident. Tutwiler allegedly wrote a note to Pierce, asking him if he would like to be placed in protective custody. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 102.) Pierce contends that he did not understand what protective custody meant or entailed; he wrote back “If necessary.” (See id. ¶¶ 102, 104.) Pierce was then taken to Medical 82, where a unit manager named Points came to Pierce’s new cell and allegedly wrote to Pierce that Pierce needed to handwrite out “I fear for my safety” on a form Points was providing. (See id. ¶ 105.) Pierce was confused by the request and initially refused, but allegedly at Points’s insistence, Pierce copied that statement onto the form. (See id.)
Pierce was then placed in protective custody for fourteen days. (See id. ¶¶ 105, 112.) Pierce claims that, because there was no ASL interpreter to facilitate his conversations with Tutwiler and Points, Pierce did not understand that protective custody meant 23 hours per day of solitary confinement; that it would last for at least seven days; that it was voluntary; or that there were procedures by which he could promptly end protective custody status. (See id. ¶¶ 103–04.) According to Pierce, four days after he was placed into protective custody, Pierce allegedly notified Allen, the Facilities Grievance Coordinator, that he had not understood what protective custody meant. (See id. ¶ 107.) Pierce also allegedly stated his belief that his case manager should have discussed the meaning of protective custody with him. (See id.) Allen allegedly responded in writing: “You should have read it before you signed it.” (See id.) Pierce allegedly replied in writing, “I had no choice because they told me to sign.” (See id.)
At some point, Pierce told Griffin, another case manager, that he wanted to leave protective custody and return to the general population. (See id. ¶ 108.) Griffin passed Pierce’s request on to other staff, and on March 1, 2012, Assistant Warden Fulton learned that Pierce wanted to leave protective custody. (See id. ¶¶ 108, 109.) Fulton was also allegedly told that Pierce had asked to have a lawyer present before signing the waiver form that was necessary for release back into the general population, and although Fulton apparently thought this was unusual, he purportedly did not ask why Pierce would not sign the
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form despite wanting to leave protective custody. (See id. ¶ 109.) Instead, Pierce alleges that Fulton advised the staff to keep Pierce in protective custody and to review his status in one week. (See id.) Thereafter, according to Pierce, CTF employees moved Pierce to a different segregation cell, this time in the Special Management Unit (“SMU”). (See id. ¶¶ 110–111.) Pierce felt that SMU was much worse than Medical 82; in SMU, Pierce was still on 23–hour lockdown, but he did *261 not have a roommate and could only see out of his cell through a small window in the metal door. (See id. ¶ 111.) Pierce was not released from SMU until March 7, 2012. (See id. ¶ 112.)
The District has an entirely different view of the circumstances preceding Pierce’s confinement in protective custody. First of all, according to the District, Points fully explained to Pierce in writing what “protective custody” meant. (See Def.’s Cont. Facts ¶ 104.) The District claims that Points also told Pierce that, if Pierce wanted to be placed in protective custody, Pierce would need to write on the protective custody request form why Pierce wanted to be placed in protective custody. (See id. ¶ 105.) Pierce then allegedly voluntarily wrote out on the form, “I fear for my safety. HIV +” and signed it. (See id.) Thus, the District maintains that Points did not require Pierce to write on the form at all, much less to make any specific statement. (See id.)
The District also claims that, once Pierce filled out the protective custody request form, Assistant Warden Fulton was prohibited from removing Pierce from protective custody status until Pierce signed a protective custody waiver indicating that Pierce no longer feared for his safety. (See id. ¶ 109.) According to the District, Pierce knew that he needed to sign the waiver if he wanted to be removed from protective custody, but Pierce refused to sign the waiver form anyway. (See id.) Moreover, the District claims that, per CTF policy, inmates in protective custody are subject to review every seven days and thus Fulton’s direction to the staff to review Pierce’s status in seven days was in accordance with facility policy. (See id.) The District also contends that Pierce was confined under the same conditions in both Medical 82 and the Special Management Unit. (See id. ¶ 111.)
4. Deaf Inmates’ Rights To Telecommunications, Official Notifications, And Visitation
Finally, and not surprisingly, the parties tell completely

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different stories regarding certain privileges that inmates ordinarily receive at CTF and the extent to which deaf inmates such as Pierce are afforded equal access to them.
For example, according to Pierce, hearing inmates in the general population in the prison’s medical unit have access to telephones seven days a week, are permitted to use the telephone for 10 minutes at a time, and do not need to request permission in advance to use the telephones. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 114.) Pierce, on the other hand, allegedly had much more limited access to telecommunications, even apart from the fact that CTF provides deaf inmates with an outmoded TTY device instead of a modern videophone.7 Pierce *262 claims that his access to the TTY device varied depending on where he was housed because, in order for him to place a call, DOC officials required him to make an appointment in advance to use the TTY, which was available only in his case manager’s office. (See id. ¶¶ 115, 124.) Moreover, according to Pierce, prison officials demanded the presence of his case manager or another CTF employee while he was using the TTY device. (See id. ¶ 124.) Pierce alleges that his case manager’s hours were typically only Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., which substantially restricted his TTY usage window, and even when his case manager was on duty, she allegedly would only grant Pierce’s requests to use the TTY machine at her convenience. (See id. ¶¶ 124–25.) Pierce also alleges that his calls were strictly limited to 10 minutes, even though communicating using a TTY device takes substantially more time than communicating using a telephone. (See id. ¶ 126.)8
In response to Pierce’s accusations regarding his unequal access to telecommunications, the District maintains that Pierce was provided access to the TTY device when he requested it (see Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 110), and that he did not request use of a videophone while at CTF (id. ¶ 22). Furthermore, the District contends that the TTY device must be kept in the case manager’s office “for security reasons” (id. ¶ 112), and that the practical differences between using a TTY device and using a telephone justify the different access policies that apply to hearing and hearing-disabled inmates. (See, e.g., id. ¶ 115 (“The TTY device cannot be left unsecured in the housing unit, where it could pose a security risk or become contraband.”); id. ¶ 116 (“CTF staff must be present during TTY calls, which are not subject to security monitoring and recording like the regular inmate telephones.”).)
Pierce alleges that inequities also exist with respect to both the visitation processes that are afforded to deaf inmates at CTF and the official notification
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announcements that CTF staff make. Regarding visitation, Pierce claims that he was handcuffed during at least one visit from his partner and his mother (see Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 137), which is problematic because Pierce communicates with his mother using ASL and needs to have his hands free in order to speak. The District responds that Pierce did not request any accommodations with respect to visitation while he was at CTF (see Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 150), and that it is standard CTF policy that all inmates in protective custody be restrained when they are outside their cells. (See id. ¶ 139.)9 Thus, the District claims that it was merely following policy when Pierce was restrained during a visit with his mother and Holder. (See id. ¶ 148.) The District also points out (and Pierce concedes) that an exception was made in Pierce’s case, and that his handcuffs *263 were removed once Pierce’s mother explained the problem to CTF authorities.
Pierce’s alleged concern about official notifications remained unresolved, however. Pierce asserts that, because there was no visual alarm to alert him to announcements or to notify him of an emergency lockdown, fire, or other emergency when his cell door was closed, he was constantly anxious and worried about missing important information. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 134–135.) The District contends that Pierce’s anxiety was unfounded, because each housing unit at CTF has alarms in the hallways consisting of a very loud alarm and strobe lights that are visible from inside each of the cells, including the cells that Pierce occupied during his incarceration at CTF. (Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 123–24.) Furthermore, with respect to Pierce’s claim that he was not provided access to a visual alarm for other notifications, the District claims that CTF does not use a loud speaker or other type of auditory system for making notifications or announcements to inmates (see id. ¶ 129), and that, instead, written notifications and announcements are posted on the bulletin boards in the housing units, which are accessible to all inmates when they are out of their cells. (See id. ¶ 127.)
C. Procedural History On February 1, 2013—exactly one year after Pierce was first committed to the custody of the DOC—Pierce filed the instant three-count complaint against the District. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Claims I and II of Pierce’s complaint allege that the District “intentionally” discriminated against Pierce in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “by failing to provide Mr. Pierce adequate access to a qualified ASL interpreter, telecommunications devices,

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visual alarms[,] and visitation.” (Id. ¶ 49 (Claim I, Title II of the ADA); id. ¶ 50 (Claim II, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).) In Claim III, Pierce alleges that the District also violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act by “retailat[ing] against [him] for asserting his rights” under those statutes. (See id. ¶ 51.) After the parties engaged in discovery and attempted to resolve the case through mediation (see Order Referring Case for Mediation, ECF No. 40), Pierce filed a motion for summary judgment as to Claims I and II of his complaint (see Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. as to Claims I and II of the Compl., ECF No. 47).
Pierce argues that he is entitled to summary *264 judgment on Claims I and II because the District violated Title II and Section 504 by (1) failing to provide Pierce with a qualified ASL interpreter for his rehabilitation classes, medical treatment, and the grievance process (see Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 48–2 at 18–32); (2) providing a TTY machine to Pierce to make phone calls rather than a videophone and limiting the times at which and duration for which Pierce could make phone calls (see id. at 32–35); (3) not providing a visual or tactile alarm to Pierce for both routine and emergency notifications (see id. at 35–36); and (4) handcuffing Pierce during a visit with his mother and partner (see id. at 36). Pierce asserts that he did not move for summary judgment with respect to Claim III of his complaint because there is a material factual dispute regarding whether he was placed in protective custody because he requested accommodations for his disability. (See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 59–1, at 45–48.)
The District has not only opposed Pierce’s motion for summary judgment (see Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 60), it has also filed one of its own (see Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 49). The District contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Claims I and II because, in the District’s view, the only accommodations that Pierce requested during his time at CTF were an interpreter for his anger management/substance abuse class, the use of a TTY device, and to be un-cuffed during his visit with his mother and partner–accommodations that the District says it readily provided. (See Def.’s Mot. at 7–16.) To the extent that Pierce argues that the District should have accommodated him by providing an ASL interpreter at other times, the District contends that it cannot be held liable for its failure to provide accommodations that were not requested. (See id. at 5, 6, 16, 21.) The District also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Pierce’s retaliation claim (Claim III) because, in the District’s view, the prison staff did not take any adverse action
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against Pierce as a result of his requests for accommodation. (See id. at 17–18.)
This Court held a hearing on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on April 23, 2015. (See Minute Entry for Proceedings dated Apr. 23, 2015.)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motions for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56 The parties’ cross motions for summary judgment compel this Court to undertake “the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the “initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, such “evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C.Cir.2011). This is because “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.]” Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 330 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (“If ... there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the [nonmoving party’s] favor may be drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
That being said, the mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is not sufficient to bar summary judgment. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The contested fact must be material and the dispute must be genuine. A fact is only material if it could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law[.]”

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See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (noting that where a nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party’s case ... there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Likewise, a dispute is *265 only genuine if “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” (citations omitted).)
Where—as here—the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, “each must carry its own burden under the applicable legal standard.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F.Supp.2d 61, 67 (D.D.C.2006). Accordingly, “[c]ross-motions for summary judgment are treated separately[,]” Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia, 905 F.Supp.2d 317, 327 (D.D.C.2012), such that “[a] cross-motion for summary judgment does not concede the factual assertions of the opposing motion[,]” CEI Washington Bureau, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 469 F.3d 126, 129 (D.C.Cir.2006). Indeed, “ ‘neither party waives the right to a full trial on the merits by filing its own motion; each side concedes that no material facts are at issue only for the purposes of its own motion.’ ” See Sherwood v. Washington Post, 871 F.2d 1144, 1147 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 68 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1982) abrogated on other grounds by Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, 170 F.3d 1111 (D.C.Cir.1999)).
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act & Title II of the ADA Pierce has filed the instant lawsuit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA. Congress enacted Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) and its companion legislation Title II of the ADA (“Title II”) in 1973 and 1990, respectively, in order to address the “lengthy and tragic history of segregation and discrimination” that people with disabilities have faced in the United States. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 461, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (Marshall, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Statement of Representative Vanik, 117 Cong. Rec. 45974 (1971) (denouncing the disregard for the rights of handicapped citizens in our
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country as a “shameful oversight[ ]” and noting that handicapped people are “often shunted aside, hidden and ignored”); Statement of Senator Humphrey, 118 Cong. Rec. 525 (1972) (stating that “[t]he time has come when we can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped in America”). Section 504 and Title II resulted from years of public protests, marches, acts of civil disobedience, and court filings in the 1960s and 1970s–activities that were part of a movement aimed at securing for disabled people the same rights and privileges afforded to able-bodied people. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of A Second–Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.Rev. 413, 426 (1991). Participants in this civil rights movement insisted that society recognize disabled people not as “unfortunate, afflicted creatures” but as “equal citizens, individually varying across the spectrum of human abilities, whose over-riding needs are freedom from discrimination and a fair chance to participate fully in society.” Id. at 426–27.
With respect to the programs, services, and activities that are provided by, or funded through, government entities, Congress responded by enacting legislation “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” as well as “strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(2) (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(5) (2012) (acknowledging *266 that “individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination in ... critical areas” of life). To this end, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act specifically states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Similarly, Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.10
Significantly for present purposes, because Congress was concerned that “[d]iscrimination against the handicapped was ... most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect[,]” Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985), the express prohibitions against disability-based discrimination in Section 504 and Title II include an affirmative obligation

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to make benefits, services, and programs accessible to disabled people. That is, an entity that provides services to the public cannot stand idly by while people with disabilities attempt to utilize programs and services designed for the able-bodied; instead, to satisfy Section 504 and Title II, such entities may very well need to act affirmatively to modify, supplement, or tailor their programs and services to make them accessible to persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (requiring entities that provide services to the public to (1) make “reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices”; (2) “remov[e] ... architectural, communication, or transportation barriers”; and (3) “provi[de] auxiliary aids and services” so as to enable disabled persons to participate in programs or activities). Moreover, these modifications—called “accommodations” in Section 504 and Title II parlance—must be sufficient to provide a disabled person with an “equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement” as a person who is not disabled. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 305, 105 S.Ct. 712 (quoting regulations implementing Section 504 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(ii) (2014) (stating *267 that a public entity discriminates in violation of Title II if qualified individuals with disabilities are given an “opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others”).
III. ANALYSIS As explained fully below, this Court will grant Pierce’s motion for summary judgment with respect to his Section 504 and Title II discrimination claims (Claims I and II of his complaint) and will deny the District’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The Court reaches this conclusion because it finds that the District violated Section 504 and Title II as a matter of law when it failed to evaluate Pierce’s need for accommodation at the time he was taken into custody. (This legal conclusion is entirely independent of the hotly disputed issues regarding whether or not Pierce was, in fact, able to communicate effectively with prison officials, and whether or not Pierce did, in fact, request an ASL interpreter for his interactions while in custody; however, as discussed below, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could agree with the District on these issues, and thus, the District violated Section 504 and Title II on this basis as well.) The Court also finds that, because the District’s failure to evaluate Pierce’s needs amounted to deliberate indifference to Pierce’s rights and the District’s obligations under Section 504 and Title II, the District’s
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conduct constituted intentional discrimination, and thus, Pierce is entitled to compensatory damages for the mental, emotional, and physical injuries he sustained. However, with respect to Pierce’s retaliation claim, the Court concludes that there are genuine issues of material fact that still need to be resolved; consequently, the District’s motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim must be denied.
A. The District Intentionally And Unlawfully Discriminated Against Pierce When It Eschewed Its Duty To Assess His Need For Accommodation And Denied Him Meaningful Access To Prison Programs And Services To establish disability-based discrimination under Section 504 and Title II, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or is being denied benefits, services, programs, or other activities for which a public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability. See Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806, 119 S.Ct. 1597, 143 L.Ed.2d 966 (1999); Alston v. District of Columbia, 561 F.Supp.2d 29, 37 (D.D.C.2008). Only the second element is at issue here, because the District does not deny that Pierce is a qualified individual with a disability, or that the DOC is a public entity. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 5); see also Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998) (holding that a disabled inmate can state a claim under Title II if, by reason of his disability, he is denied participation in an activity provided in state prison).11
*268 With respect to the question of whether or not Pierce was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, prison services by reason of his disability in violation of Section 504 and Title II, both parties maintain that they are entitled to summary judgment on the record here, and as discussed above, they have highlighted as “material” certain facts that are primarily related to Pierce’s alleged need for an ASL interpreter and other accommodations, and the circumstances under which Pierce may or may not have requested those accommodations. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 26 (“Without a qualified interpreter in any of his graphics arts classes, and without an interpreter in all but his last three or four anger management/substance abuse classes, Mr. Pierce was clearly denied meaningful access to these programs and was unable to derive any of the benefits from them.”); Def.’s Opp’n at 11 (“Pierce did not

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request an interpreter for his medical intake and appointments, [and] his providers were able to communicate with him in writing.”).) However, there is an undisputed threshold fact that, in this Court’s view, so clearly establishes intentional discrimination in violation of Section 504 and Title II that summary judgment must be issued in Pierce’s favor notwithstanding the factual disputes over Pierce’s actual requests and needs: the District took Pierce—an obviously disabled inmate—into custody without undertaking any ex ante evaluation of his accommodation requirements, and when he later requested aid, either rebuffed his inquiries entirely or provided him with whatever auxiliary tools it had on hand. As explained below, this Court holds that the failure of prison staff to conduct an informed assessment of the abilities and accommodation needs of a new inmate who is obviously disabled is intentional discrimination in the form of deliberate indifference and violates Section 504 and Title II as a matter of law. Moreover, the Court concludes that even if the District is correct to contend that the Section 504 and Title II duty to provide accommodations for disabled inmates is triggered only if the inmate requests and ultimately needs accommodation, no reasonable jury could find that Pierce failed to request an ASL interpreter, or that he could communicate effectively without one, on the record presented here.
1. The District Had An Affirmative Duty To Evaluate Pierce’s Accommodation Requirements, And Its Failure
To Do So Constituted Disability Discrimination As A Matter Of Law
It is clear beyond cavil that the core principle that underlies the protections of Section 504 and Title II is equal access. As explained above, Congress has required entities to provide reasonable accommodations that would permit disabled individuals to access programs and services in addition to prohibiting discriminatory animus, see Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985), and the regulatory scheme that undergirds the anti-discrimination statutes reinforces this reasonable accommodations *269 mandate. Thus, without regard to whether persons with disabilities who seek the benefit of public services have requested accommodation, a public entity that is covered by Title II must “operate each service, program, or activity so that the service, program, or activity, when viewed in its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by, people with disabilities[,]” 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2014), and to satisfy Section 504, recipients of federal funding “shall
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provide appropriate auxiliary aids to qualified handicapped persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills where a refusal to make such provision would discriminatorily impair or exclude the participation of such persons in a program or activities receiving Federal financial assistance[,]” 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(f).
Given Congress’s unmistakable intent to create “clear, strong, consistent, [and] enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities” in various aspects of life, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2), and also its recognition that “benign neglect” is a particularly pernicious form of disability discrimination, Alexander, 469 U.S. at 295, 105 S.Ct. 712, the District’s insistence here that prison officials have no legal obligation to provide accommodations for disabled inmates unless the inmate specifically requests such aid—and even then, only if it actually turns out that the inmate really needs the requested accommodation—is untenable and cannot be countenanced. First of all, nothing in the disability discrimination statutes even remotely suggests that covered entities have the option of being passive in their approach to disabled individuals as far as the provision of accommodations is concerned. Quite to the contrary, as explained above, Section 504 and Title II mandate that entities act affirmatively to evaluate the programs and services they offer and to ensure that people with disabilities will have meaningful access to those services. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a); 28 C.F.R. § 35.150. This affirmative duty is seemingly at its apex in the context of a prison facility, in light of the uneven power dynamic between prison officials and inmates that inherently and appropriately exists, and also the fact that departments of corrections have complete control over whether prison inmates (disabled or not) receive any programs or services at all. Cf. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011) (explaining that, “to incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for their own needs” and thus prisons must provide for prisoners); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (referring to “the common-law view that ‘it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself’ ”) (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 191 N.C. 487, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)). Put another way, given that Section 504 and Title II require all entities that provide public services to act affirmatively to ensure that disabled individuals have meaningful access, prisons seemingly have even more responsibility in this regard, because inmates necessarily rely totally upon corrections departments for all of their needs while in custody and do not have the freedom to obtain such services (or the accommodations that permit them to access those

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services) elsewhere.
What is more, the District’s suggestion that a prison facility need not act to accommodate an obviously disabled inmate if the inmate does not ask for accommodations (see Def.’s Mot. at 5) is truly baffling as a matter of law and logic. The District does not explain how inmates with known communications-related difficulties (such as Pierce) are supposed to communicate a need for accommodations, or, for that matter, *270 why the protections of Section 504 and Title II should be construed to be unavailable to such disabled persons unless they somehow manage to overcome their communications-related disability sufficiently enough to convey their need for accommodations effectively. The implications of the District’s analysis are troubling, and they sweep broadly—by the District’s reasoning, it would appear that only a specific request for a wheelchair would trigger any duty to accommodate an inmate who cannot walk, and a blind inmate would need to make a specific request for a cane or a guide if he desired to move about the prison grounds; meanwhile, prison officials could sit idly by, taking no affirmative steps to accommodate such disabled prisoners and expecting to be able to wield the inmate’s failure to request accommodation like some sort of talisman that wards off Section 504 and Title II liability in any future legal action. This imagined state of affairs is unquestionably inconsistent with the text and purpose of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, which means that the District must now face a stark reality: no matter how fervently it holds the belief that a public entity’s duty to provide accommodations arises only by request, there is neither legal nor logical support for that proposition.
To be sure, there are times in which courts have held that a disabled person must request accommodation. See, e.g., Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857, 858, 861–62 (D.C.Cir.1999) (holding that an employer did not violate an employee’s rights under Title I of the ADA by failing to accommodate employee’s vertigo-related disabilities because employee failed to request an accommodation). But it is equally clear that the legal significance of the request requirement is merely to put the entity on notice that the person is disabled; it does not serve as a means of shifting the burden of initiating the accommodations process to the disabled individual. See Paulone v. City of Frederick, 787 F.Supp.2d 360, 403–04 (D.Md.2011) (explaining that the “ ‘request requirement’ ... is a function of the fact that ‘a person’s disability and concomitant need for accommodation are not always known ... until the [person] requests an accommodation’ ”) (quoting Kiman v. N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 283 (1st Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, the request performs a signaling function—
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i.e., it alerts the public entity to the disabled person’s need for an accommodation—and where, as here, the inmate’s disability is obvious and indisputably known to the provider of services, no request is necessary. See Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1197–98 (10th Cir.2007) (“[A] public entity is on notice that an individual needs an accommodation when it knows that an individual requires one, either because that need is obvious or because the individual requests an accommodation.”); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir.2001) (“When the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity is on notice that an accommodation is required....”).
The second overarching reason that the District’s legal position is untenable is that, by reading the antidiscrimination statutes as mandating that public entities provide needed accommodations but not as requiring those entities to take any affirmative steps to ascertain what accommodations might be needed, the District suggests that Section 504 and Title II permit reliance on guesswork and happenstance with respect to the provision of accommodations, when the law clearly requires otherwise. It is well-established (albeit in the employment context) that it violates the ADA if an employer with a duty to provide reasonable accommodations responds to *271 the known disabled condition of an employee by giving that employee whatever aids the employer alone thinks might do the trick, without any actual assessment of the employee’s individual condition or needs in consultation with the employee. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 315 (3d Cir.1999) (reversing grant of summary judgment to employer because notwithstanding fact that employee’s son “requested accommodations [for plaintiff], informed [the employer] about [employee’s] condition, and provided [the employer] with the means to obtain more information if needed[,]” employer “offered no accommodations or assistance in finding them, made [employee’s] job more difficult, and simply sat back and continued to document her failures”). To the contrary, “[o]nce an employer is aware of its responsibility to provide a reasonable accommodation ... it must ‘identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations,’ which is best done through an ‘informal, interactive process’ that involves both the employer and the employee with a disability.” McNair v. District of Columbia, 11 F.Supp.3d 10, 16 (D.D.C.2014) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).
This apparently comes as no news to the District–the DOC’s own regulations mandate something of an

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interactive process with respect to accommodations insofar as they specifically direct prison officials to give preference to the requests of disabled inmates regarding the auxiliary aids to be provided. (See D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Program Statement 3800.3, Ex. 9 to Rocap Decl., ECF No. 48–5, at 92, § 12(a)(2); see also id. § 12(b)(2) (stating that the “DOC shall honor the [inmate’s] expressed choice” regarding accommodations unless, inter alia, “it can show that another equally effective means of communication is available”).) Nevertheless, the District here resists the conclusion that the law required CTF’s employees and contractors to take affirmative steps up front to evaluate Pierce’s needs in order to identify which accommodations would be appropriate for him. Instead, by insisting that the accommodations process that was employed in the instant case is consistent with Section 504 and Title II, the District suggests that the law permits corrections staff to treat the reasonable accommodations mandate much like a game of chance— i.e., on the one hand, prison staff can play it safe by undertaking an ex ante assessment of the actual needs of a disabled inmate in their custody, or on the other, they can opt to forgo that expense, and if accommodations are requested, provide a hodgepodge of whatever aids are in the prison’s possession, thereby betting either that the inmate will remain silent or that he ultimately will be found to have needed no more than the auxiliary aids that the corrections facility randomly provided. There will, of course, be times when corrections staff will take that bet and get it right. Cf. Charles Clay Doyle et al., Dictionary of Modern Proverbs 287 (2012) (noting that even a broken clock gets the time right twice a day). But to the extent that the District contends that Section 504 and Title II permit public entities to engage in this sort of gamble with respect to the accommodation needs of disabled individuals whom they are required to serve, it is sorely mistaken. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2) (indicating that a public entity has a duty to “determin[e] what types of auxiliary aids and services are necessary” for the disabled individuals it serves).
The bottom line is this: this Court squarely rejects the legal position that the District seeks to advance in this action, which is, in essence, that the DOC acts consistently with Section 504 and Title II when it takes custody of an obviously disabled prisoner without undertaking any *272 evaluation of that inmate’s needs and the accommodations that will be necessary to ensure that he or she has meaningful access to prison services, and instead, provides a random assortment of auxiliary aids upon request and at various times based primarily on considerations of its own convenience.12 Quite to the contrary, based on its reading of federal law, this Court holds that prison officials have an affirmative duty to
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assess the potential accommodation needs of inmates with known disabilities who are taken into custody and to provide the accommodations that are necessary for those inmates to access the prison’s programs and services, without regard to whether or not the disabled individual has made a specific request for accommodation and without relying solely on the assumptions of prison officials regarding that individual’s needs. And because it is undisputed that the District’s employees and contractors did no such thing when Pierce arrived at CTF, this Court finds that the District violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act as a matter of law.
2. Even If The District Is Only Legally Required To Provide Inmates With Accommodations That Are Both Requested And Ultimately Needed, There Is No Genuine Dispute That Pierce Requested The Assistance Of An ASL
Interpreter Or That He Needed One
Having already determined that the District committed a violation of Section 504 and Title II as a matter of law when it failed to evaluate Pierce’s accommodation needs at the time he was taken into custody, the Court pauses here (prior to turning to the matter of damages) to address the myriad factual disputes that arise under the District’s view of its legal obligations. The District maintains that its legal obligation to accommodate Pierce depended on three things: (1) whether Pierce requested an accommodation, (2) whether the requested accommodation was necessary, and (3) whether the requested accommodation could be provided. (See Hr’g Tr. at 52:18, 53:7– 12; see also, e.g., Def.’s Mot. at 5 (“An entity cannot be held liable for failure to provide accommodations that were not requested.”); Def.’s Opp’n at 1–2 (“Pierce’s Motion focuses largely on what accommodations may be possible for a hearing impaired inmate in a correctional setting, rather than on what accommodations were actually requested and necessary for Pierce to participate in the available programs and activities while he was incarcerated at [CTF].”) (emphasis in original).) As mentioned, the Court’s legal analysis renders the parties’ various arguments regarding whether and to what extent Pierce actually requested an interpreter and actually could communicate in English immaterial to the Court’s conclusion that Pierce is entitled to summary judgment on Claims I and II. (See supra Part III.A.1.) However, as explained below, this Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude on the record presented here that Pierce failed to request an ASL interpreter to

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assist him while he was detained at CTF, or that Pierce could communicate effectively without an interpreter, and thus Pierce would be entitled to summary judgment on his discrimination claims even if the law is as the District says it is.
*273 a. The Record Establishes That Pierce Requested An Interpreter
The instant record is replete with specific references to Pierce’s multiple requests for an ASL interpreter in various contexts during his time at CTF. (See, e.g., Pierce Dep. 427:12–20, Feb. 25, 2014, Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–4, at 34.) Deposition testimony from the District’s own employees confirms that Pierce repeatedly asked for an interpreter. (See, e.g., Tutwiler Dep. 63:4–19, Sept. 9, 2013, Ex. 16 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–6, at 10 (Case Manager Tutwiler admitting that Pierce requested an ASL interpreter); Allen Dep. 48:16–22, Sept. 10, 2013, Ex. 17 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–6, at 26 (Facilities Grievance Coordinator Allen stating that Pierce requested an ASL interpreter); McNeal Dep. 31:14–32:3, Sept. 11, 2013, Ex. 19 To Pl.’s Mot, ECF No. 48–6, at 47–48 (Counselor McNeal remarking that Pierce requested an ASL interpreter).) And the accounts of various eyewitness are not the only proof: contemporaneous log book entries, handwritten notes, and memoranda all document Pierce’s persistent efforts to seek and obtain an ASL interpreter from the authorities at CTF. (See, e.g., Feb 27, 2012 Informal Resolution Form, Ex. 33 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–6, at 216; Mar. 6, 2012 Memorandum from P. McNeal to W. Fulton, Ex. 34 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–6, at 219; CCA logbook entries, Ex. 35 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48– 6, at 221.)
Most notably in this regard, the record contains a revealing set of handwritten notes between Pierce and his case manager (Tutwiler) in which Pierce writes: “They violate my rights here—Thire [sic] was no interpreter for inmate program, Hall meeting, or orientation process. I feel I[sic] abandoned. ADA law says there’s a must [sic] for everyone to access equal!” (See Ex. 36 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 47–6, at 224 (emphasis in original).) To which Tutwiler replies, “[a]s long as we are able to communicate through writing, your rights have not been violated.” (See id.) And Pierce responds, “My writing is not good[;] I feel our communication is vey[sic] limited. That’s why I want an interpreter so it could [sic] prevent our misunderstand [sic]. I want to fully understand what all of you say.” Pierce continues, “It’s not fair[;] everyone understands
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whats’[sic] going on here, I dont’[sic] understand at all [sic] since I got here.” (See id.)
Given this telling paper trail and the confirmatory statements of witnesses, this Court finds that the District’s suggestion here that Pierce did not, in fact, request an ASL interpreter to assist him while he was incarcerated (see Def.’s Opp’n at 1–2) is preposterous. Perhaps to avoid losing all credibility with respect to this issue, the District has also offered a more limited representation: that Pierce’s repeated requests for an ASL interpreter were limited to his anger management/substance abuse class, and that he did not specifically request an interpreter with respect to any other service or program at CTF. (See Def.’s Reply at 5 (“Pierce only requested an interpreter for one setting—his anger management and substance abuse programming—and failed to put the District (or its contractors) on notice that he believed he needed an interpreter for any other type of program or activity.”) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 24 (“Pierce submitted informal resolutions and grievances requesting an interpreter for anger management and substance abuse programming.”); Def.’s Cont. Facts ¶ 60 (“The District does not dispute that Pierce made multiple requests for an interpreter for the anger management and substance abuse program while he was at CTF.”); Def.’s Reply at 5 (“Corrections staff reasonably believed on the basis of his requests that *274 Pierce felt an interpreter was necessary for him to participate in the anger management and substance abuse program, but not for other programming, activities, or events for which he did not request an interpreter.”).) Contrary to the District’s interpretation of the facts, the record clearly establishes that Pierce made so many requests for an ASL interpreter at so many different times that his case manager actually told him to stop. (See Feb 27, 2012 Informal Resolution Form, Ex. 33 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–6, at 216 (Pierce stating “I already requested Ms Tutwiler to find an interpreter and she said, stop requesting and forwarded to Mr Fulton.”).) And it is also clear from the record evidence that Pierce’s requests were not limited to the anger management/substance abuse class at all, and in fact, Pierce wanted an interpreter to help him understand most (if not all) of the various conversations that he had with the District’s employees and contractors. For example, on an informal resolution form dated February 27, 2012, Pierce writes about how CTF had not yet provided him with an interpreter for his anger management/substance abuse class, and he closes by stating, “[p]lease bring an interpreter for our meeting, because the case is very serious.” (See Feb 27, 2012 Informal Resolution Form, Ex. 33 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–6, at 216.)

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But even if the District was factually correct to assert that Pierce’s request for an interpreter extended only to his anger management/substance abuse class, there is no legal basis for the District’s related suggestion that Pierce needed to request an interpreter with respect to each and every aspect of his prison experience in order to give rise to any duty on the part of prison employees to provide that accommodation for Pierce in regard to other significant aspects of his imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit case of Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir.1999), supports this conclusion. There, an inmate who was deaf alleged that the Missouri Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) had violated Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Missouri state law when it failed to provide him with a sign language interpreter during disciplinary proceedings. Randolph, 170 F.3d at 853–54. The Randolph court found that, while the inmate had not requested an interpreter for his initial disciplinary proceeding, his subsequent request was sufficient to put the MDOC “on notice” of his claim that he could not fully participate in future proceedings without an interpreter, and thus the MDOC could not be heard to contend that the request for an interpreter was limited in scope. Id. at 858. This was especially so because the MDOC had told the inmate that his request for an interpreter “is a separate subject [that] will not be discussed[,]’ ” and thus, it was entirely unsurprising that the prisoner did not request an interpreter for subsequent disciplinary proceedings. Id. The Randolph court concluded that: “While it is true that public entities are not required to guess at what accommodations they should provide, the [request] requirement does not narrow the ADA or [Rehabilitation Act] so much that the [MDOC] may claim that [the inmate] failed to request an accommodation when it declined to discuss the issue with him.” Id. at 858–59.
So it is here. The record shows that Pierce made repeated requests for an ASL interpreter with respect to various aspects of his incarceration experience, and that District’s employees and contractors generally declined to discuss the matter further, preferring to rely on lip reading and handwritten notes. Moreover, as the District concedes, Pierce did request an interpreter for the purpose of his anger management/substance abuse class (see Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 61; see also id. ¶ 62 (Pierce represented on one informal resolution form that he “wrote about 8 request *275 forms” for an interpreter); therefore, even assuming that a specific request for accommodation was legally required in order for prison officials to have any obligation to accommodate Pierce, the undisputed facts establish that Pierce did make such a request, and under Randolph, his request was sufficient to put DOC “on notice” that he might need a similar accommodation to
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communicate effectively in other contexts as well. Thus, this Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude on this record that Pierce had failed to mount the request hurdle (assuming there is one), and as a result, no genuine dispute of material fact remains with respect to whether or not Pierce made an adequate request for an interpreter, even under the District’s view of the applicable discrimination standard.
b. The Record Shows That Pierce Needed An Interpreter
The record here also clearly establishes that Pierce cannot communicate effectively in English, and thus no reasonable jury could find otherwise. It is undisputed that Pierce is profoundly deaf and that he ordinarily communicates through ASL. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 1, 3; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 1.) ASL is not derived from English; ASL has its own syntax and grammar and utilizes signs made by hand motions, facial expressions, eye gazes, and body postures. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 4; Def.’s Cont. Facts ¶ 4.) Therefore, the vast majority of deaf people–Pierce included– lack the ability to communicate effectively in English, whether by writing notes or reading lips. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 5, 7, 10; see also Expert Report of Prof. Bienvenu, Ex. 3 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–4, at 104 (expert in Deaf culture, literacy, and ASL assessment concluding that “[b]oth my personal interaction with Pierce and the case-related documents I reviewed to prepare this report lead me to strongly believe that Pierce, at a minimum, requires both quality ASL interpretation services and videophone telecommunications technology to effectively communicate with others” (emphasis in original)).)13
*276 Despite this evidence, the District asserts that Pierce actually can communicate effectively in English, through both written notes and lip reading. See 28 C.F.R. part 35, App. A (noting that if the public entity does not provide a disabled person with their requested accommodation, the public entity must “demonstrate that another effective means of communication” was provided). The District’s contention regarding Pierce’s writing ability is based on its assertion that Pierce “is college educated, has researched and written term papers for high school and college courses, wrote an autobiography during his anger management and substance abuse [class] at CTF, ... scored above average on a written test administered at CTF to assess his reading and writing abilities[,]” and “communicates with his mother, who lives out of state, through written Facebook messages.” (See Def. Mot. at

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (2015)
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2.) And with respect to lip reading, the District asserts that the prison employees and contractors who dealt with Pierce believed they were effectively communicating with him through lip-reading because Pierce gave appropriate responses to their oral questions. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 10– 11.)
This Court finds that none of these observations is sufficient to create any genuine issue of fact regarding Pierce’s alleged inability to engage in the kinds of complex communications that are required to navigate one’s way through the prison system and to understand official communications regarding medical treatment, rehabilitative classes, and custodial issues, for several reasons. With respect to the college-level courses that Pierce purportedly took, the record indicates that, although Pierce did attempt to take certain classes, he dropped out after a short period of time. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 12; see also Pierce Dep. 32:21–35:2, Oct. 10, 2013, Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 48–4, at 13–16.) Pierce’s high school research papers were only a few pages long, and the record shows that it not only took him two months to write each paper, he also had classmates edit the papers before he submitted final drafts. (See Pl.’s Cont. Facts ¶ 13.) Similarly, Pierce apparently asked another inmate to correct his autobiography for the anger management/substance abuse class, to “edit from, you know quote/unquote, deaf language.” (See Pierce Dep. 245:17–247:21, Feb. 24, 2014, Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 58–5, at 9–11.) And whatever Pierce’s score may have been on the standard inmate reading and writing assessment, Pierce’s “above average” performance in a test situation says little about his overall ability to understand and to communicate effectively in the context of discussions with prison doctors, teachers, and other officials.
Similarly, it goes almost without saying that the District’s argument that Pierce could read lips because the District’s employees believed that he could is a nonstarter; the District has not shown that its employees had any prior knowledge of, or had received any training about, communicating with deaf inmates. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 34, 36.) Furthermore, because the prison staff did not undertake any genuine assessment of Pierce’s limitations and abilities whatsoever, their lay opinions about what worked for Pierce and what Pierce could do amounted to entirely uninformed speculation that provides no support for any motion of summary judgment or opposition thereto. Cf. Lucas v. Ozmint, CIV.A. No. 9:10–0017–CMC–BM, 2011 WL 6979995, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2011) report and recommendation adopted, C/A No. 9:10–17–CMC–BM, 2012 WL 77178 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2012) (noting that “rank speculation is not evidence”).
16

This all means that the expert testimony and evidence that supports Pierce’s claim that he needed an ASL interpreter in order to communicate effectively while he was incarcerated—i.e., in order to give information *277 to, and to receive information from, prison officials and others with whom he interacted—stands unrebutted, and in this Court’s view, that evidence is sufficient to establish Pierce’s need for an interpreter, even under the District’s legal standard.
This Court also finds that the District has failed to show that providing an interpreter for Pierce would have posed an unduly burdensome financial or administrative hardship. See Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1266 (D.C.Cir.2008) (explaining that, once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case for disability discrimination, the defendant may assert that accommodating the plaintiffs’ disabilities would constitute an undue financial or administrative burden or fundamentally alter the nature of the service, as an affirmative defense to liability). While the District maintains that the provision of anything other than a TTY machine for Pierce in order to accommodate his request for telecommunications would have been an undue burden (see Def.’s Opp’n at 13), and implies that permitting deaf inmates who are in protective custody to have visitation without handcuffs would be a fundamental alteration of existing policy (see id. at 17–18), the District makes no such “undue burden” or “fundamental alteration” contention with respect to Pierce’s request for an interpreter, nor could it reasonably have done so, because the DOC apparently has taken the official position that ASL interpreters should be provided as a matter of policy. (See D.C. Dep’t of Corr. Program Statement 3800.3, Ex. 9 to Rocap Decl., ECF No. 485, at 92 § 12(a)(2) (“Written communication cannot be used as a substitute where the individual has expressed a preference for a sign language interpreter.”).)
Finally, with respect to the parties’ disputes of fact regarding the extent to which Pierce was (or was not) denied equal access to accommodations other than an ASL interpreter (e.g., use of the TTY machine, official notifications, and CTF’s visitation procedures), the Court notes that Pierce has alleged that he was treated unequally with respect to these aspects of his prison experience in addition to being denied an interpreter, and these various alleged instances of discrimination are cited as alternative bases for finding that the District violated Section 504 and Title II. Thus, the Court finds that it need go no further than to conclude that Pierce would be entitled to summary judgment on Claims I and II on the basis of Pierce’s unfulfilled request for an ASL interpreter. That is, even if the law is as the District says it is, no reasonable jury

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (2015) 51 NDLR P 154
could find that Pierce failed to request an interpreter, that he needed an interpreter, and that the District could have—but did not—provide an interpreter for Pierce with respect to significant aspects of his incarceration experience. As a result, there is no need for the Court to decide whether any genuine issues of fact exist with respect to the prison’s provision of telecommunications, notifications, or visitation.
3. Because The District Committed Intentional Discrimination, Pierce Is Entitled To Compensatory
Damages On Claims I and II
At this point, the Court has concluded that the District’s failure to evaluate Pierce’s need for accommodation constituted a violation of Section 504 and Title II as a matter of law. (See Part III.A.1 supra.) It has also determined, in the alternative, that even if the District was only legally obligated to accommodate Pierce’s hearing disability if he requested an ASL interpreter and actually needed one, there is no genuine dispute that Pierce cannot communicate effectively in English and thus needed an ASL interpreter in the prison context, or that Pierce actually requested an ASL interpreter, which the District *278 could have provided to him. (See Part III.A.2 supra.) In either case, all that remains of Claims I and II of Pierce’s complaint is the question of damages.
The remedies available for violations of Section 504 and Title II are the remedies that pertain to a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, subject to certain defenses specific to public entities. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2012) (the “remedies, procedures, and rights” available under the Rehabilitation Act are those set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2012) (providing that the “remedies, procedures, and rights” for violations of Title II of the ADA are those set forth in the Rehabilitation Act); see also Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985) (“Although § 504 ultimately was passed as part of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the nondiscrimination principle later codified in § 504 was initially proposed as an amendment to Title VI.”). A plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for violations of Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act if he proves that the defendant’s discriminatory actions were intentional. See Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 344 (11th Cir.2012); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir.2011); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d
17

668, 674 (9th Cir.1998).14
In disability discrimination lawsuits, many courts have authorized plaintiffs to establish intentional conduct by establishing that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference” to the plaintiff’s rights. See Proctor v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 32 F.Supp.2d 820, 829 (D.Md.1998) (“The question of intent in accommodations cases does not require that plaintiff show that defendants harbored an animus towards her or those disabled such as she. Rather, intentional discrimination is shown by an intentional, or willful, violation of the Act itself.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 829 n. 6 (noting that “the level of proof necessary for finding intentional discrimination under [the] Rehabilitation Act means a deliberate indifference to a strong likelihood that a violation of federal rights would result”). Deliberate indifference is “knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139 (citation omitted). The “knowledge” element is satisfied where the public entity has notice of the plaintiff’s accommodation need, and the “failure to act” element is satisfied by conduct that is “more than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.” Id.
Notably, while the D.C. Circuit has not addressed the appropriate legal standard for establishing intentional discrimination in violation of Section 504 and Title II, the majority of circuits that have considered the standards issue have held that the “deliberate indifference” standard is appropriate. See, e.g., S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir.2013) (adopting the deliberate indifference standard); Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 348 (11th Cir.2012) (same); Meagley v. City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir.2011) (same); Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir.2001) (same); Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir.1999) (same); Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir.1998) (same), vacated on other grounds *279 527 U.S. 1031, 119 S.Ct. 2388, 144 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999). Two circuits have suggested that plaintiffs suing under Title II and Section 504 should bear a heavier burden than showing mere deliberate indifference, such as showing actual animus against disabled persons, see, e.g., Nieves–Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 126–27 (1st Cir.2003) (suggesting that discriminatory animus is the level of intent required); Delano–Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., Tex., 302 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir.2002) (explicitly rejecting deliberate indifference standard and instead suggesting that an unnamed, but more demanding, showing is necessary); however, this Court agrees with the vast

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majority of the courts of appeals that the deliberate indifference standard “is better suited to the remedial goals of the [Rehabilitation Act] and the ADA than is the discriminatory animus alternative.” S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729 F.3d at 264. As the Supreme Court has reasoned, Congress was keenly aware of the evils of benign neglect when it enacted the federal antidiscrimination statutes, and “[f]ederal agencies and commentators on the plight of the handicapped similarly have found that discrimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus.” Alexander, 469 U.S. at 296, 105 S.Ct. 712. Thus, the Rehabilitation Act and ADA “are targeted to address ‘more subtle forms of discrimination’ than merely ‘obviously exclusionary conduct[,]’ ” and it is “[c]onsistent with these motivations” to employ “a standard of deliberate indifference, rather than one that targets animus” in this context. S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729 F.3d at 264 (quoting Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir.2011).)15
This Court’s conclusion that the deliberate indifference standard is applicable here makes short work of the damages analysis. It is well established that “[d]eliberate indifference requires [only] knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood[,]” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139, and the District’s knowing failure to evaluate Pierce’s need for accommodation and to provide the auxiliary aids easily satisfies this standard. The District’s employees and contractors knew that Pierce had a hearing disability, and yet they did not undertake an assessment of the accommodations that Pierce might need in order to access prison services, nor did they provide him with an ASL interpreter for all significant interactions. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 60–64, 77, 88–89, 97, 101, 107.) This willful blindness to Pierce’s hearing disability and his need for accommodation plainly amounts to deliberate indifference, and Pierce is therefore entitled to compensatory damages on Claims I and II of his complaint. See, e.g., Bartlett, 970 F.Supp. at 1151 (holding that defendant was deliberately indifferent where it was aware of plaintiff’s disability and refused to accommodate the plaintiff).
B. There Is A Genuine Dispute Of Fact Regarding Whether Or Not Pierce Was Placed In Protective Custody In Retaliation For His Requests For Accommodation Pierce alleges in Claim III of his complaint that the District violated the ADA *280 and the Rehabilitation Act
18

by “retailat[ing] against [him] for asserting his rights” under those statutes. (See Compl. ¶ 51.) Pierce maintains that the District changed his conditions of confinement for the worse by placing him in protective custody and then moving him to the Special Management Unit (“SMU”) within CTF in order to punish him for his repeated requests for an ASL interpreter. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 45– 47.) The District seeks summary judgment on this claim, contending that no adverse action was taken against Pierce—he was placed in protective custody because he stated that another inmate had threatened him, and he was moved to the SMU for administrative convenience. (See Def.’s Mot. at 18.)
Generally speaking, to prevail on a retaliation claim brought under Section 504 and Title II, a plaintiff must satisfy the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny, see, e.g., Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C.Cir.2014). Pursuant to this framework, the plaintiff first makes a prima facie case of retaliation; then, the burden shifts to the defendant to identify “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse action, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; and if the defendant does this, the burden shifts yet again such that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s stated reason for the adverse action was merely a “pretext” for the real, retaliatory purpose, id. at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Because the District—and the District alone—has moved for summary judgment in its favor on Pierce’s retaliation claim, its task under Rule 56 is to demonstrate that no reasonable jury could conclude that retaliatory animus motivated prison officials with respect to Pierce’s placement in protective custody, a task that the District might accomplish by demonstrating that Pierce cannot establish a prima facie case for retaliation, or by showing that there is no genuine issue that District’s proffered explanation was not a pretext. As explained below, the District has done neither in this case.
1. Taking All Facts And Inferences In The Non–Movant’s Favor, A Reasonable Jury Could Find That The Evidence
Establishes A Prima Facie Case For Retaliation
Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case that creates a presumption of retaliation by showing (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant took adverse action against him; and (3) that there was a causal link between the plaintiff’s

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request for an accommodation and the adverse action. See Alston v. District of Columbia, 561 F.Supp.2d 29, 40 (D.D.C.2008); Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 425 F.Supp.2d 121, 126 (D.D.C.2006).16 Here, as noted above, Pierce identifies two alleged instances of retaliation. First, Pierce claims that prison officials placed him in protective custody because he kept asking for an ASL interpreter. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 45–46.) As Pierce tells the story, he repeatedly asked Tutwiler (his case manager) for an interpreter (see Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 61), and he continued to do so even after Tutwiler told him to stop (see id. ¶ 62). Then, on February 23, 2012, less than one week after Tutwiler made a note that Pierce “continues to write request for an interpret [sic] for anger management and drug *281 education” (id. ¶ 61), another inmate shoved Pierce in the TV room and Pierce went to Tutwiler for assistance (see id. ¶ 102). Tutwiler purportedly asked Pierce if he would like to be placed in protective custody—without explaining to him what protective custody was, why it is ordinarily used, how long it would last, or how to request release back into the general population. (See id. ¶¶ 104, 106.) And when Pierce responded “If necessary[,]” he was summarily placed in protective custody in Medical 82, where his freedom of movement was substantially more limited. (See Pierce Dep. at 236:5 (stating that Medical 82 is “complete lockdown”).) Pierce contends that these facts give rise to a plausible inference that Tutwiler placed him in protective custody in retaliation for his requests for an interpreter. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 45.)
Second, Pierce claims that he was retaliated against when he was transferred to the SMU while he was in protective custody status and was kept there longer than necessary. (See id. at 46–47.) Pierce alleges that, after he went into protective custody on February 23, 2012, he filed two informal resolutions (on February 27, 2012 and March 2, 2012) requesting an interpreter and complaining about limitations on his use of the TTY. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 62, 132.) Then, on March 1, 2012, Assistant Warden Fulton was made aware of Pierce’s desire to leave protective custody and to have an attorney, but instead of granting Pierce’s requests, Assistant Warden Fulton allegedly advised the staff to and “review” Pierce’s status again in one week, forcing Pierce to remain in protective custody. (See id. ¶ 109.) Furthermore, in the interim– on March 4, 2012–Pierce was allegedly transferred to the SMU, a unit Pierce describes as “much, much worse” than his prior protective custody circumstances. (See id. ¶ 111; see also Pierce Dep. at 235:20–236:5.) Based on these facts, Pierce alleges that Assistant Warden Fulton both kept Pierce in protective custody and transferred Pierce from Medical 82 to the Special Management Unit in retaliation for Pierce’s requests for an interpreter and
19

greater access to the TTY.
This Court concludes that Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that Pierce’s has failed to make out the elements of a prima facie case because Pierce has made plausible allegations—supported by evidence—that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant took adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal link between the plaintiff’s request for an accommodation and the adverse action. See Alston, 561 F.Supp.2d at 40; see also Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 903 (D.C.Cir.2006) (“At the prima facie stage of a retaliation claim, a plaintiff’s burden ‘is not great; [she] merely needs to establish facts adequate to permit an inference of retaliatory motive.’ ”); see also id. (reversing grant of summary judgment to employer because employee had shown that she engaged in a protected activity and the employer took adverse action against her shortly thereafter). There is no question that Pierce’s request for an interpreter was a protected activity. See Solomon, 763 F.3d at 15 (noting that a good faith request for reasonable accommodation constitutes a protected activity pursuant to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act). Moreover, Pierce alleges that placing him in protective custody in Medical 82 and then transferring him to the SMU were adverse actions because Pierce alleges that the conditions of confinement in both of those units were worse than in the general population. See Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 (D.C.Cir.2002) (noting that a plaintiff suffers an adverse action where there are “materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges” of plaintiff’s status with defendant). And *282 Pierce claims that it is reasonable to infer that the District kept Pierce out of the relative comfort of general population because Tutwiler was fed up with his requests and/or wished to punish him for his requests for accommodation. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 46.)
Although the District concedes that a request for accommodation is a protected activity under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and that Pierce made such a request (see Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 24), it argues that “Pierce’s retaliation claim fails because he cannot show that the District or any of its contractors at CTF took any adverse action against him as a result of his requests for accommodation, much less that any alleged adverse action would not have occurred ‘but for’ his requests for accommodation.” (Def.’s Mot. at 17.) But the District is wrong to contend that the only cognizable “adverse action” in the prison context is a disciplinary infraction (see Def.’s Mot. at 18); indeed, it is well established that any “decision causing a significant change in benefits” can constitute an adverse action for the purpose of a retaliation claim. Cf. Bowie v. Ashcroft, 283 F.Supp.2d

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (2015) 51 NDLR P 154
25, 30 (D.D.C.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (defining “adverse action” in the employment context).17 And when the facts that appear on the record in this case are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant plaintiff this Court finds that a reasonable jury could certainly conclude that the conditions in Medical 82 and the Special Management Unit were such that Pierce’s placement, and continued detention, in those units constituted a change in the conditions of confinement that amounted to an adverse action.18
A reasonable jury could also conclude on this record that the District moved Pierce into protective custody in Medical 82, and later transferred him to the Special Management Unit, because of Pierce’s requests for accommodation. There is a close temporal connection between the protected activity and the alleged adverse actions, and it is clear that such proximity can support an inference of causation. See Alston, 561 F.Supp.2d at 43 (citing Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521, 529 (D.C.Cir.2007)). That is, a reasonable jury could believe Pierce’s assertion that Tutwiler placed him in protective custody without explaining to him what that was less than one week after she wrote in her notes that Pierce was continuously requesting an interpreter in order to end his incessant entreaties. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 61, 102, 104, 106.) Similarly, a reasonable jury might find that Pierce was transferred to the Special Management Unit less than one week after he filed informal resolution forms requesting an interpreter and complaining about the limitations on his use of the TTY (see id. ¶¶ 62, 109, 132), because he had made those requests for accommodation. Indeed, “courts have recognized that proof of causal connection can be established indirectly by showing that protected activity is followed by discriminatory treatment.” *283 Mitchell v. Baldrige, 759 F.2d 80, 86 n. 6 (D.C.Cir.1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Therefore, the District has failed to show that Pierce cannot make out a prima facie case on his retaliation claim in a manner that entitles it to summary judgment.
2. A Reasonable Jury Could Conclude That The District’s Proffered Reasons For Placing Pierce In Protective Custody Are Pretextual
Nor has the District shown that it would be impossible for a reasonable jury to find that its proffered explanation for
20

sending Pierce to protective custody in Medical 82, and then allegedly keeping him there longer than requested while transferring him to the Special Management Unit, was pretext for retaliation. In fulfillment of its obligation to proffer “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, the District argues that it placed Pierce in protective custody because Pierce had stated that he feared for his safety, not because of his repeated requests for an interpreter (see Def.’s Mot. at 18), and it points out that it is standard policy at CTF that inmates who request protective custody must be taken out of general population (see Def.’s Stmt. Of Facts ¶ 157). Thus, far from retaliating against Pierce, the District asserts that Tutwiler was merely following protocol when she placed Pierce—who had just reported that he had been pushed by another inmate and had written out on a protective custody request form that “I fear for my safety”—in protective custody. (See Def.’s Mot. at 17; see also Tutwiler Aff., Ex. 11 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 52–5, ¶¶ 26–31.) But Pierce disputes the District’s assertion that he actually requested protective custody status knowingly and voluntarily, and in fact, he argues that Tutwiler deliberately failed to explain to him what protective custody means. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 45–46.) Similarly, Pierce contends that a reasonable jury could disbelieve the District’s assertion that Pierce was kept in protective custody because he wouldn’t sign the waiver form (Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 167–70), and that he was moved from Medical 82 to the Special Management Unit because bed space was needed in Medical 82 for an inmate who had serious medical needs (see id. ¶¶ 161, 165; see also Fulton Aff., Ex. 2 to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 52–2, ¶ 31), based on the close temporal proximity between the move and his filing of an internal grievance. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 47.)
It is clear to this Court that there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether it was because of his repeated requests for an interpreter and his filing of complaints that prison officials and employees segregated Pierce initially and held him in that allegedly undesirable segregated status longer than was necessary, and that the resolution of these factual disputes depends on the credibility of the testimony of prison staff. Thus, the retaliation claim cannot be decided by this Court as a matter of law. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (noting that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge”). Accordingly, the District’s motion for summary judgment on Pierce’s retaliation claim must be denied.

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (2015) 51 NDLR P 154

IV. CONCLUSION The record in this matter clearly reveals that, when Pierce arrived at CTF to be taken into custody, prison officials took no steps whatsoever to evaluate his need for accommodation so that he would be able to have meaningful access to prison programs and services within the prison facility. The District’s employees and contractors *284 knew that Pierce was profoundly deaf, but instead of engaging in an interactive process designed to ascertain what accommodations would be necessary for Pierce to communicate effectively in prison, they merely assumed that he could read (and understand) the words they mouthed to him and the notes they wrote to him, even after he told them “I dont’[sic] understand at all [sic] since I got here” and specifically requested an ASL interpreter. It is no wonder that Pierce was confused and upset throughout his 51–days in custody, and once even woefully declared, “I feel I[sic] abandoned.”
What is astonishing, however, is the District’s insistence in the context of this lawsuit that its employees’ conduct with respect to accommodating Pierce’s hearing disability was entirely consistent with the law. The text and purpose of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA clearly establish otherwise, and as a result, this Court easily concludes that the District’s willful blindness regarding Pierce’s need for accommodation and its half-hearted attempt to provide Pierce with a random assortment of auxiliary aids—and only after he specifically requested them—fell far short of what the law requires. Perhaps most significantly, this Court holds that the District’s clear violation of Section

504 and Title II was manifest from the start, when prison employees took no steps whatsoever to ascertain what accommodations this new inmate with a known hearing disability would require so that communications with him would be “as effective as communications with others,” for the purpose of ensuring that he had “an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of” the prison’s services, programs, and activities. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.160(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2).
Because this Court finds that the District’s deliberate indifference to Pierce’s accommodation needs violated Section 504 and Title II as a matter of law, Pierce’s motion for summary judgment on Claims I and II of the complaint will be GRANTED. Moreover, the Court finds that the District’s motion for summary judgment must be DENIED in its entirety, because not only does this Court conclude that the District unlawfully failed to provide Pierce with meaningful access to prison services, it also holds that, on the instant record, a reasonable jury could find that CTF employees retaliated against Pierce as well. Thus, in accordance with the accompanying order, all that remains of Pierce’s complaint for trial is the determination of the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded to Pierce with respect to Claims I and II, and the issue of liability (and, if necessary, damages) for Claim III.
All Citations
128 F.Supp.3d 250, 51 NDLR P 154

Footnotes

†

Certain facts have been redacted from this Memorandum Opinion by agreement of the parties. These redactions are represented

herein by the characters “[* * * * * *].”

1

ASL is a language comprised of hand motions, facial expressions, eye gazes, and body postures. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 4.)

Although many deaf people in the United States use ASL to communicate, ASL’s syntax and grammar are not derived from

English. (See id.)

2

The DOC is an agency of the District of Columbia that, among other things, oversees operation of the CTF, which is a minimum

and medium security correctional facility. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 13, 17.) The DOC has contracted a private prison company

(the Corrections Corporation of America) to run CTF. (See id. ¶ 14.)

3

All citations to pages in documents that the parties have filed refer to the page numbers that the Court’s electronic filing system

assigns.

4

Pierce has both HIV and [* * * * * *]. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 87; Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 40.) There is no dispute that, as a result

of these conditions, Pierce had several medical interviews, appointments, and interventions while he was in custody at CTF. (See

Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶¶ 87, 97, Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 40.)

21

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (2015) 51 NDLR P 154

5

The first names of CCA employees have been omitted from this Memorandum Opinion for security and confidentiality purposes.

(See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts at 6 n.1.)

6

Pierce describes the alleged problem with Clary’s skills as an interpreter in this way: “I had to keep asking for clarification because

I couldn’t understand what he was saying. It was not a complete sentence. It was just words here and there scattered about. It

wasn’t anything complete. It wasn’t a complete thought. I could not understand him clearly.” (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 80.)

7

A TTY consists of a keyboard, display screen, and telephone. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 116.) Typed messages from each party are

sent over the telephone lines and appear on the screen of the other (see id. ¶ 116), and thus both parties must have a TTY to

have a direct conversation (see id. ¶ 118). Indirect conversations are also possible, if the telephone company provides relay

services, which involve communicating through the assistance of a third-party telephone operator, who reads aloud words typed

by the deaf party and types out the spoken responses of the hearing person. (See id. ¶ 117) Two deaf individuals cannot

communicate via TTY unless both parties have a TTY device and can type in English effectively. (See id. ¶ 118).

Pierce avers that, like many other deaf individuals, he uses a videophone in the outside world. (See id. ¶ 8.) A videophone uses

high-speed internet to enable real-time video communication so that deaf individuals can communicate with one another in ASL.

(See id. ¶ 57). Videophones also enable communication between deaf and hearing individuals through the use of a video relay

service (“VRS”). VRS is a system by which a deaf individual signs via video monitor to a remote sign language interpreter, and the

interpreter communicates the deaf person’s message to the hearing individual in spoken English and vice versa. (See id. ¶ 58.)

VRS is free to all users and has been widely available since at least the mid–2000s. (See id. ¶ 59.)

8

In this same vein, Pierce contends that hearing inmates who were in protective custody in the Medical 82 unit and the SMU could

ask to have a telephone brought to their cell during the day by asking the officer on the unit. (See id. ¶ 127.) By contrast, deaf and

hard of hearing inmates had to request to use a TTY in the case manager’s office, which allegedly involved writing a request to

use a TTY in the office and giving it to an officer during that officer’s daily walkthrough. (See id. ¶¶ 128, 131.) If the request was

granted, the inmate would be brought to the office in handcuffs and would be permitted to use the TTY device, still in handcuffs.

(See id.)

9

According to Defendants, this policy applies to all “status inmates,” a category that includes inmates in protective custody,

administrative segregation, and disciplinary segregation. (See Def.’s Stmt. of Facts ¶ 140.)

10

Notably, the D.C. Circuit has long held that the “[c]laims and defenses under [Section 504 and Title II] are virtually identical,”

Harrison v. Rubin, 174 F.3d 249, 253, (D.C.Cir.1999), and that “cases interpreting either [statute] are applicable and

interchangeable[,]” Am. Council of the Blind v. Paulson, 525 F.3d 1256, 1260 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.2008). There are only two material

differences between the two provisions. First, the Rehabilitation Act only applies to federal agencies and departments, federal

programs, and recipients of federal funding, whereas the ADA applies to all entities that provide services to the public. See Paul

V. Sullivan, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Analysis of Title III and Applicable Case Law, 29 Suffolk U.L.Rev.

1117, 1120 (1995). Second, the statutes have different causation requirements. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides

that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be

excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance....” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added). By contrast, under Title II of the ADA,

“discrimination need not be the sole reason” for the exclusion of or denial of benefits to the plaintiff. Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of

Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 503–04 (5th Cir.2002); see also Alston v. District of Columbia, 770 F.Supp.2d 289, 298 (D.D.C.2011).

Neither of these differences are relevant to the claims in this case.

11

Under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, an individual has a disability if he or she “[has] a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012);

see also 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (2012). Hearing is a “major life activity,” and deafness is clearly established as a disability. 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2)(A) (hearing is a “major life activity” pursuant to the ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (definition of “individual with a

disability” pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act includes those who have a disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12102); see also Ball v.

AMC Entm’t, Inc., 246 F.Supp.2d 17, 20 (D.D.C.2003) (deafness is a disability recognized by the ADA). Furthermore, the ADA

defines a public entity as “any State or local government” or “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other

instrumentality of the State or States or local government[,]” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1), and prisoners “have the same interest in

access to the programs, services, and activities available to the other inmates of their prison as disabled people on the outside

have to the counterpart programs, services, and activities available to free people[,]” Crawford v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 115 F.3d

481, 486 (7th Cir.1997) abrogated on other grounds by Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges & Universities for Ne. Illinois

Univ., 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.2000).

22

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (2015) 51 NDLR P 154

12

With respect to hearing-disabled inmates in particular, it appears that the District of Columbia’s DOC is not the only prison

system that engages in this sort of practice. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Justice Dept. Looking into Treatment of Deaf Inmates in

Arlington Jail, Washington Post, July 29, 2015, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/justice–dept–looking–

into–treatment–of–deaf–inmates–in–arlington–jail/2015/07/29/ae910412–360a–11e5–b673–1df005a0fb28_ story.html.

13

Pierce has offered the testimony of two experts—Martina Bienvenu and Richard Ray—both of whom the District has moved to

exclude. (See Def.’s Mot. to Preclude Pl.’s Experts, ECF No. 46.) Pierce says that Bienvenu would testify about ASL, deaf culture,

literacy within the deaf community, lipreading, the importance of using qualified ASL interpreters, and Pierce’s own

communicative abilities and needs. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot to Preclude Pl.’s Experts, ECF No. 57, at 5.) Ray would give

expert testimony about the accommodations that would have provided Pierce with the means to communicate effectively and

have meaningful access to prison programs, services, and activities during Pierce’s incarceration in early 2012. (See id. at 6.) The

District argues that neither of these experts will help the trier of fact because their testimony does not speak to what

accommodations were necessary for the Plaintiff in this case, as opposed to the deaf community at large. (See Def.’s Mot. to

Preclude Pl.’s Experts at 4–5.) The District also argues that the proffered testimony is not based on sufficient facts, and is not the

product of reliable scientific methods, because the experts did not evaluate what accommodations were available at CTF, what

accommodations Pierce actually requested, and what accommodations were necessary for Pierce to participate in the programs

and activities at CTF. (See id. at 5–9.) Even assuming arguendo that the District’s objections have a sound legal basis, they clearly

relate to the weight of the proffered expert testimony, not its admissibility. See Fox v. Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th

Cir.1990) (“[I]t is ... for the jury, with the assistance of vigorous cross-examination, to measure the worth of the opinion[s]”)

(citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d

469 (1993) (Rule 702 favors the admission of expert witness testimony over its exclusion). Therefore, the District’s motion to

preclude Bienvenu and Ray’s testimony is DENIED.

14

Punitive damages are not recoverable in private suits under Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See

Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189, 122 S.Ct. 2097, 153 L.Ed.2d 230 (2002).

15

Notably, in the instant case, neither party appears to object to Court’s application of the deliberate indifference standard (see

Pl.’s Mot. at 14 (citing only cases that apply the deliberate indifference standard and none that require animus); Def.’s Mot. at 19

(same)). Furthermore, at least one other court in this district has applied the deliberate indifference standard in a case involving

disability discrimination. See Hunter ex rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia, 64 F.Supp.3d 158, 168 n. 8 (D.D.C.2014) (noting that the

D.C. Circuit has not addressed the appropriate standard for intentional discrimination, and assuming, without deciding, that the

deliberate indifference standard applies).

16

Because the test for retaliation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act was originally developed in the employment

discrimination context, the standards articulated in employment discrimination cases are applicable to disability discrimination

cases. See Alston, 561 F.Supp.2d at 40.

17

Although Bowie v. Ashcroft, 283 F.Supp.2d 25 (D.D.C.2003) discusses the definition of “adverse action” in the employment

context, the test for retaliation under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act was originally developed in the employment discrimination

context. See Alston, 561 F.Supp.2d at 40. Accordingly, the standards articulated in employment discrimination cases are

applicable here. See id.

18

Pierce’s evidence must be credited and all reasonable inferences must be construed in his favor because the motion for summary

judgment on the retaliation claim belongs to the District. See Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118, 123

(D.C.Cir.2011) (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

End of Document

=

23

 Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 1 of 16

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

____________________________________

WILLIAM PIERCE,

Plaintiff, v.

No. 13-CV-0134 (KBJ)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

Defendant. ____________________________________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF WILLIAM PIERCE

Dated: October 22, 2015

Mary C. Vargas Stein & Vargas, LLP 5100 Buckeystown Pike Suite 250 Frederick, MD 21704 Telephone: (240) 793-3185 Facsimile: (888) 778-4620 mary.vargas@steinvargas.com
Howard A. Rosenblum Marc P. Charmatz Debra J. Patkin Caroline E. Jackson NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF LAW AND ADVOCACY CENTER 8630 Fenton Street, Suite 820 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 Telephone: (301) 587-1788 Facsimile: (301) 587-1791 howard.rosenblum@nad.org caroline.jackson@nad.org debra.patkin@nad.org
Amicus Curiae

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 2 of 16
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ ii
   Statement of Amicus....................................................................................................................... 1
   Statement of the Issue ..................................................................................................................... 2
   I.
   Conducting A Needs Assessment Does Not “Resort To Assumptions And Stereotypes Concerning Disabled Persons” ....................................................................................................... 3
   II.
   Conducting A Needs Assessment Supports the Independence, Autonomy, and Dignity of People With Disabilities ................................................................................................................. 6
   III.
   Requiring Public Entities To Automatically Undertake A Needs Assessment Of A Deaf Individual Is Necessary To Give Effect To The ADA ................................................................... 8

A.
   Language of Title II as well as Implementing DOJ Regulations Support the Requirement of Ex Ante Needs Assessment .............................................................................. 8
   B.
   A Needs Assessment Prevents Disability or Ignorance of the Law from Becoming Waiver of Rights ......................................................................................................................... 9
   IV.
   The DOJ’s Enforcement Activity Reflects Support Of Ex Ante Needs Assessments...... 11
   Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 12

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Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 3 of 16
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Pierce v. District of Columbia, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, Civ. No. 13–cv–0134, at *13 (2015)............ 10 Shedlock v. Dep’t of Corr., 818 N.E.2d 1022, 1034 (Mass. 2004) ................................................. 3 Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transportation Authority, 407 F. Supp. 394, 397
(N.D. Ala. 1975) ......................................................................................................................... 4 Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2004).................................. 3 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) ............................................................ 3
Statutes 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.................................................................................................................... 2 29 U.S.C. § 794............................................................................................................................... 4 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq................................................................................................................ 2 42 U.S.C. § 12131(b) ...................................................................................................................... 4
Other Authorities DOJ, ADA Best Practices Tool Kit for State and Local Governments, Chapter 3: General
Effective Communication Requirements Under Title II of the ADA......................................... 5 Heisley v. Inova (No. 1:10-714, E.D. Va., Mar. 30, 2011) ........................................................... 12 Michael Ervin, Independent Living Institute, The 25 Day Siege That Brought Us 504 ................ 4 Michele LaVigne and McCay Vernon, An Interpreter isn't Enough: Deafness, Language, and
Due Process. 2003 WIS. LAW REV. 844 (2003)........................................................................ 10 Settlement Agreement between the United States and the City of Henderson, Nevada, DOJ
Compl. No. 204-46-167 ........................................................................................................... 12 Settlement Agreement between the United States and the City of New Haven, Connecticut, DOJ
Compl. Nos. 204-14-143/204-14-144....................................................................................... 12 Settlement Agreement between the United States and the Rochester Police Department,
Rochester, Michigan ................................................................................................................. 12 Settlement Agreement between the United States and the Wallingford Police Department in
Wallingford, Connecticut, DOJ Compl. No. 204-14-164 ......................................................... 12 Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and the City of Henderson,
Nevada, DOJ No. 204-46-167 .................................................................................................. 11 Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and the County of Alameda
Sheriff’s Office, DOJ Compl. No. 204-11-290......................................................................... 11 Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America, the City of Englewood, Colorado,
and Plaintiffs, DOJ Compl. No. 204-13-311 ............................................................................ 13 Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America, the County of Arpahoe Colorado,
et al., DOJ Compl. No. 204-13-310 .......................................................................................... 11
Regulations 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 ...................................................................................................................... 8, 9 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A ................................................................................................................. 5 42 Fed. Reg. 22677 ......................................................................................................................... 5 45 C.F.R. § 84 ................................................................................................................................. 5 45 C.F.R. § 84.6 .............................................................................................................................. 5
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Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 4 of 16
STATEMENT OF AMICUS The National Association of the Deaf (“NAD”) through its Law and Advocacy Center, by and through its attorney Mary Vargas of Stein & Vargas, LLP, respectfully submits this statement of interest in support of the deaf plaintiff in the above-captioned class action. Founded in 1880, the NAD is the nation’s premier civil rights organization of, by and for deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the United States of America. The NAD was shaped by deaf leaders who believed in the right of the American deaf community to use sign language, to congregate on issues important to them, and to have its interest represented at the national level. The NAD’s mission is to preserve, protect, and promote the civil, human, and linguistic rights of 48 million deaf and hard of hearing individuals in this country. The NAD represents individuals and organizations, and files amicus briefs in support of furthering its mission. The NAD membership includes over 7,000 individuals and over 100 associations from all fifty states and Washington, D.C. The NAD is also the United States member of the World Federation of the Deaf, which has over 120 national associations of deaf people as members. The NAD’s Board of Directors consists exclusively of deaf and hard of hearing individuals. Of the many individuals who work for the NAD as regular contractors or permanent staff, nearly all are deaf or hard of hearing. During each of its biennial conferences, the NAD solicits and prioritizes the civil rights concerns of its members and affiliates, and of the deaf and hard of hearing community at large. The concerns raised during each conference guide the NAD’s work for the next two years. In addition, the NAD receives over 1,000 intakes per year from deaf and hard of hearing individuals reporting possible violations of their own civil rights.
1

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 5 of 16
The NAD’s Law and Advocacy Center has engaged in civil rights litigation on behalf of deaf and hard of hearing Americans since 1977, the year the U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare promulgated Section 504 regulations. The Law and Advocacy Center consists of seven civil rights attorneys, five of whom are deaf. Collectively, these attorneys have over eighty years of experience advocating for the civil rights of deaf and hard of hearing people. As one of its primary missions, the Law and Advocacy Center enforces the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. (“RA”) to protect the civil rights and independence of deaf and hard of hearing Americans. No other organization shares the NAD’s unique position both as a bastion of grassroots advocacy within the deaf community and a leader in civil rights litigation to ensure effective communication for deaf and hard of hearing in all aspects of society.
Based on its decades of experience representing deaf and hard of hearing individuals and litigating pursuant to the ADA and the RA, amicus believe this Court was correct in ruling that the District of Columbia ("Defendant") had an affirmative obligation to assess Mr. Pierce's need for auxiliary aids and services without waiting for a specific request based on the legal mandate of both the ADA and the RA to “take appropriate steps” to ensure effective communication with Mr. Pierce. We believe that such routine assessments do not demean or patronize deaf and hard of hearing individuals, but rather grant autonomy and preserve their civil rights. Amicus hopes that its explanation in support of both conclusions will be helpful to this Court in denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE The National Association of the Deaf writes to refute the following argument from Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider (ECF No. 95-1) on page 11:
2

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 6 of 16
[The Court’s ruling] also presumes that a disabled individual wants the assistance of an accommodation. Such a presumption is counter to the very purpose of the ADA. See Shedlock v. Dep’t of Corr., 818 N.E.2d 1022, 1034 (Mass. 2004) (“[R]esort to assumptions and stereotypes concerning disabled persons is a harmful practice that Congress sought to deter by means of the ADA.”) (citing Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999))). Indeed, disability rights advocates urge independence, autonomy, and dignity of people with disabilities. See http://www.ncil.org/about/ (“people with disabilities are the best experts on their own needs . . . and are deserving of equal opportunity to decide how to live, work, and take part in their communities”) (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). Requiring public entities to automatically undertake a disability assessment of any individual whom they assume may have (or has an obvious) disability, without the individual requesting accommodations, is contrary to these efforts.
Def.’s Br. at 11, ECF No. 95-1. Defendant could not be more wrong. People with disabilities,
including deaf and hard of hearing people, welcome a dialogue on auxiliary aids and services.
Rights are not waived because requests are not made.
I. Conducting A Needs Assessment Does Not “Resort To Assumptions And Stereotypes Concerning Disabled Persons”
Conducting an assessment of the auxiliary aids and services that a person with a disability
may need in no way “resort[s] to assumptions and stereotypes concerning disabled persons” as
Defendant claims. Rather, failing to conduct a needs assessment has that effect.
Title II of the ADA (“Title II”) and Section 504 of the RA (“Section 504”) expressly
contemplate that people with disabilities may need auxiliary aids and services of varying types in
order to be granted meaningful access: Title II defines “qualified individual with a disability” as
“an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies,
or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12131(b). Further, although not every individual with a disability requires
3

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 7 of 16
modifications, auxiliary aids and services, or barrier removal, the overriding purpose of both the ADA and the RA is to ensure that covered entities provide the modifications, aids, services, and barrier removal necessary to afford people with disabilities meaningful access to their programs, services, and activities.
These modifications, aids, services, and removals are so critical to the rights of people with disabilities that the disability community staged a 25-day protest to secure these rights in the first instance. The statutory language of Section 504 prohibits only “discrimination” against people with disabilities, without further elaborating as to what discrimination entails. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. Because of this ambiguity, the first court opinions interpreting Section504 declined to read into the statute any obligation to make modifications, remove barriers, or provide aids and services to ensure access. See, e.g., Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transportation Authority, 407 F. Supp. 394, 397 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (holding that, despite lack of bus lifts, a potential rider using a wheelchair was not excluded because a bus driver would have allowed her on if she could figure out how to get on the bus). Due to a four-year delay in promulgating implementing regulations that would create such an obligation within Section 504, the disability community staged “the longest occupation of a federal office by protectors in U.S. history.” Michael Ervin, Independent Living Institute, The 25 Day Siege That Brought Us 504, available at http://www.independentliving.org/docs4/ervin1986.html (last visited October 21, 2015). The lengths that the disability community underwent to secure the right to modifications, auxiliary aids and services, and barrier removal underscores how essential these provisions are to the antidiscrimination contemplated in Section 504 and Title II.
These regulations require recipients of federal financial assistance not only to make modifications, provide services, and remove barriers, but also to conduct a self-assessment to
4

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 8 of 16
determine ex ante the kind of modifications, services, and barrier removal necessary to achieve compliance with these regulations. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22677, May 4, 1977, implementing 45 C.F.R. § 84; 45 C.F.R. § 84.6 (self-evaluation requirement).
The ADA and its regulations that were implemented by the United States Department of Justice arose from years of advocacy efforts by the disability community, expanding the rights secured by Section 504 to all programs and activities of state and local governments, and to private entities that do not receive federal financial assistance. The regulations implementing Title II of the ADA outline at length public entities’ obligations to modify policy, provide auxiliary aids and services, and remove barriers. In particular, the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the agency responsible for implementing Title II of the ADA, explicitly stated in its explanation supplementing the Subpart E- Communications in its Title II regulations:
Because the appropriateness of particular auxiliary aids and services may vary as a situation changes, the Department strongly encourages public entities to do a communication assessment of the individual with a disability when the need for auxiliary aids and services is first identified, and to reassess communication effectiveness regularly throughout the communication . . . A public entity has a continuing obligation to assess the auxiliary aids and services it is providing, and should consult with individuals with disabilities on a continuing basis to assess what measures are required to ensure effective communication. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A (emphasis added). In other publications, the DOJ has stated that public entities “must provide an opportunity for individuals with disabilities to request the auxiliary aids and services of their choice.” See DOJ, ADA Best Practices Tool Kit for State and Local Governments, Chapter 3: General Effective Communication Requirements Under Title II of the ADA, available at http://www.ada.gov/pcatoolkit/chap3toolkit.htm (last visited October 22, 2015). Thus, like the Court, the DOJ interprets Title II to create opportunities for people with disabilities to make their needs known; an ex ante needs assessment would satisfy this obligation.
5

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 9 of 16
In fact, when a public entity does not assess an individual’s needs, the public entity falls back on “stereotypes and assumptions.” Without an ex ante assessment, a public entity would rely on stereotypes and assumptions on the fly in deciding if it needs to provide a modification, auxiliary aid or service, or barrier removal. On the other hand, ex ante assessments allow a public entity to have impartial procedures in place for employees to make an informed determination of what auxiliary aids and services are necessary.
Indeed, the facts of this case illustrate the consequences of Defendant’s failure to conduct a needs assessment. Defendant’s personnel fell back on the erroneous assumption that Mr. Pierce could read lips and that he could read and write sufficiently to communicate solely through written English regardless of the nature, length, or complexity of the interaction. Defendant was wrong. A needs assessment would have revealed this information at the outset and prevented Mr. Pierce from being discriminated against for 51 days. II. Conducting A Needs Assessment Supports the Independence, Autonomy, and
Dignity of People With Disabilities The NAD’s Law and Advocacy Center receives over 1,000 intakes each year, chronicling a wide variety of ADA violations both great and small. Of the thousands of intakes we have received over the years, not one involved an individual who took offense at being offered an auxiliary aids or service or being assessed for such a need. By contrast, although the majority of these intakes reflect a denial of a request for auxiliary aids and services, some come from individuals who believed that showing that they are deaf and use sign language suffices as an implicit interpreter request. To deaf and hard of hearing individuals, the question “Do you need an interpreter?” is as natural as the question “How can I help you?” or “Would you like fries with that?” Inquiring about auxiliary aids and service needs does not cause offense to deaf and hard of hearing
6

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 10 of 16
individuals. Deaf and hard of hearing individuals are well aware of their communication needs, and do not find such question to be an attack on their dignity. Rather, having hearing individuals with no experience or training in dealing with deaf or hard of hearing make decisions about their communication needs without consulting them is a direct insult to the dignity of deaf and hard of people. It is demeaning and patronizing to deaf and hard of hearing individuals when entities covered by the ADA or RA fail to provide effective communication, and more so when those entities refuse to consult these individuals on how to achieve effective communication. This is especially true when deaf and hard of hearing individuals are unaware of their rights to auxiliary aids and services and do not make a spontaneous request.
An ex ante needs assessment further protects the rights of deaf and hard of hearing inmates by anticipating the contexts in which the individual would need these various services. Even deaf and hard of hearing individuals with the legal knowledge and the confidence to request interpreters in a jail setting cannot possibly be expected to know enough about jails to anticipate every setting in which they may need auxiliary aids and services. Having the assistance of the needs assessment would allow the jail and the inmate to anticipate the inmate’s communication needs in all the various communication settings that arise. Without this assessment, even in jails that provide auxiliary aids and services upon request, deaf and hard of hearing inmates constantly miss out on important interactions due to a failure to anticipate these needs and make requests in advance.1 This assessment would support the independence, autonomy, and dignity of deaf and hard of hearing inmates by taking proactive steps to eliminate communication barriers before they arise.
1 Although not within the scope of this brief, the NAD also disagrees with the District's implicit suggestion in its Motion to Reconsider that a deaf or hard of hearing individual has to make separate requests for every single interaction in jail. Such piecemeal approach defeats the purpose of the ADA by requiring the deaf or hard of hearing inmate to maintain constant vigilance through his incarceration and anticipate his every need ex ante to avoid waiving his rights.
7

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III. Requiring Public Entities To Automatically Undertake A Needs Assessment Of A Deaf Individual Is Necessary To Give Effect To The ADA Especially in a jail setting, a number of barriers stand between a deaf or hard of hearing
individual and an effective request for interpreting services. Barriers include not only the expected communication difficulties, but a lack of understanding of laws and the legal system, or a fear that a request will be met with hostility, retribution or even violence. Allowing such barriers to operate as a waiver of ADA rights frustrates the central purposes of the ADA: it lets the defendant blame the victim for its own misconduct. By contrast, a needs assessment gives effect to the purposes of the ADA.
A. Language of Title II as well as Implementing DOJ Regulations Support the Requirement of Ex Ante Needs Assessment
Title II requires public entities to “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants, members of the public, and companions with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1). Although the regulations do not give examples of “appropriate steps,” they make clear that such steps include furnishing auxiliary aids and services to ensure that the communication needs of the individual with a disability are met. The regulations require public entities to “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford individuals with disabilities . . . an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or activity of a public entity”; to consider “the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place”; and, to “give primary consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b).
These provisions are clear about needing to assess the deaf or hard of hearing person’s communication needs. The converse is not true; these provisions cannot be read to permit public
8

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 12 of 16
entities to stick their heads in the sand and invent facts about what a deaf or hard of hearing individual can and cannot do unless and until that individual successfully communicates otherwise.
B. A Needs Assessment Prevents Disability or Ignorance of the Law from Becoming Waiver of Rights
Under Defendant’s view, failing to request auxiliary aids and services constitutes a tacit waiver of an individual’s right to these aids and services. Such “raise it or waive it” requirement in Title II would frustrate the purpose of the ADA. First, communication barriers impose significant obstacles for deaf and hard of hearing individuals to request auxiliary aids and services. Therefore, placing the duty on the deaf or hard of hearing individual to make the initial request would create the potential for the disability to interfere with the exercise of ADA rights. Second, deaf and hard of hearing individuals may not be aware of their rights, creating the potential for ignorance of the law to constitute a waiver of rights.
Communication barriers may prevent a deaf individual from requesting an interpreter. Although most deaf and hard of hearing individuals can write a simple request for an interpreter, a pen and paper is not always available. Prevented from writing out an interpreter request, the deaf individual would have to speak or sign the request. However, it is likely that a person receiving the request may not understand the deaf individual’s speech or may not recognize the sign for “interpreter.” Therefore, the existence of a communication barrier itself prevents the deaf person from requesting an auxiliary aid or service.
By requiring an ex ante needs assessment, the Court prevents the disability itself from interfering with the exercise of disability rights. Rather than conditioning ADA rights on a deaf person’s ability to sufficiently overcome communication barriers to properly articulate his/her
9

Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 13 of 16
needs, it places the burden on the defendant to identify communication barriers and to address them.
In addition to communication barriers preventing the making of needs-based requests, the intimidation of a correctional setting can effectively act as a gag order on a deaf or hard of hearing person. As this Court accurately stated, “uneven power dynamic between prison officials and inmates [ ] inherently and appropriately exist[], and also . . . departments of corrections have complete control over whether prison inmates (disabled or not) receive any programs or services at all.” Pierce v. District of Columbia, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, Civ. No. 13–cv–0134, at *13 (2015) (citations omitted). Often, inmates, especially those who are deaf and hard of hearing, dread disturbing the very fragile status quo in fear of retaliation, losing certain privileges, or even bodily harm. Deaf and hard of hearing inmates may worry that prison officials ignorant of ADA requirements may treat them worse for making any request. Under such circumstances, deaf and hard of hearing inmates may find it safer to not make requests for auxiliary aids and services.
An ex ante needs assessment is necessary to ensure that ignorance of rights does not constitute a waiver of these rights. Like the general United States population, many deaf and hard of hearing individuals are not civil rights lawyers and are not fully versed in their own rights. Many people are not familiar with the ADA.2 Even well educated Americans may erroneously believe that the ADA does not apply to jails and prisons, and decide not to request an interpreter for that reason. Still others may have been denied interpreters so many times in the past by “friendlier” entities, such as doctors and hospitals, that they may believe requesting an interpreter is futile. Under each of these circumstances, a deaf or hard of hearing individual’s
2 The average deaf person's understanding of his legal rights may in fact be lower than his hearing counterpart. Study after study shows that language deprivation, which is common among pre-lingual deaf people, limits access to general knowledge and information. See, e.g. Michele LaVigne and McCay Vernon, An Interpreter isn't Enough: Deafness, Language, and Due Process. 2003 WIS. LAW REV. 844 (2003).
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Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 14 of 16
ignorance of their own rights, or lack of faith in the enforcement of these rights, would amount to a waiver of these rights unless consequences existed for a public entities failure to take the affirmative steps the Court prescribes.
By requiring a needs assessment in its Order, this Court ensures that deaf and hard of hearing inmates are aware of the opportunity to request an interpreter. Any individual who does not want an interpreter can decline one, knowingly and voluntarily waiving these rights. Rather than conditioning ADA rights on the deaf or hard of hearing individual’s knowledge of the ADA, it conditions ADA rights on the defendant’s compliance with the ADA. IV. The DOJ’s Enforcement Activity Reflects Support Of Ex Ante Needs Assessments.
The Court’s ruling finds considerable support in the enforcement activity of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ's settlements with jails routinely require these entities to conduct an “initial communication assessment . . . at the time the need for auxiliary aids and services is first identified.” See Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and the City of Henderson Nevada, DOJ No. 204-46-167, available at http://www.ada.gov/henderson-nv-sa/henderson-nv-sa.htm (Aug. 5, 2013); see, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America, the City of Englewood Colorado, and Plaintiffs, DOJ Compl. No. 204-13-311, available at http://www.ada.gov/englewood.htm (Mar. 7, 2013); Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America, the County of Arpahoe Colorado, et al., DOJ Compl. No. 204-13-310, available at http://www.ada.gov/lawrencearapahoe.htm (Mar. 21, 2013); Settlement Agreement Between the United States of America and the County of Alameda Sheriff’s Office, DOJ Compl. No. 204-11-290, available at http://www.ada.gov/bonner.htm (Feb. 4, 2010).
Even outside the jail context, the DOJ often requires covered entities to conduct ex ante needs assessments. See e.g., Heisley v. Inova (No. 1:10-714, E.D. Va., Mar. 30, 2011) (Consent
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Case 1:13-cv-00134-KBJ Document 104 Filed 11/10/15 Page 15 of 16
Decree) (hospital required to provide a Communication Request Form to all of its incoming deaf and hard of hearing patients and companions); Settlement Agreement between the United States and the City of Henderson, Nevada, DOJ Compl. No. 204-46-167, available at http://www.ada.gov/henderson-nv-sa/henderson-nv-sa.htm (Aug. 5, 2013) (requires initial and ongoing communication assessment for police interactions with deaf and hard of hearing individuals); Settlement Agreement between the United States and the City of New Haven, Connecticut, DOJ Compl. Nos. 204-14-143/204-14-144, available at http://www.ada.gov/newhaven/new-haven-sa.htm (May 20, 2013) (requires police department to determine appropriate auxiliary aids and services once on notice that a member of the public is deaf or hard of hearing);Settlement Agreement between the United States and the Wallingford Police Department in Wallingford, Connecticut, DOJ Compl. No. 204-14-164, available at http://www.ada.gov/wallingford_sa.html (Aug. 18, 2015) (requires police department to determine appropriate auxiliary aids and services once on notice that a member of the public is deaf or hard of hearing); Settlement Agreement between the United States and the Rochester Police Department, Rochester, Michigan, available at http://www.ada.gov/rochester_pd_sa.html (Aug. 24, 2015) (requires initial and ongoing communication assessment for police interactions with deaf and hard of hearing individuals).
CONCLUSION For the forgoing reasons, this Court should DENY Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider. In its original opinion, the Court properly recognized that the only way for a jail or prison to appropriately meet the communication needs of deaf and hard of hearing inmates is to require the jail or prison authorities to perform an ex ante needs assessment. Such assessments are vital to
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the communication needs and dignity of all deaf and hard of hearing individuals. Anything less would be a perversion of the intent and spirit of the ADA and the RA.
Respectfully submitted, /s/ Mary C. Vargas Mary C. Vargas Stein & Vargas, LLP 5100 Buckeystown Pike Suite 250 Frederick, MD 21704 Telephone: (240) 793-3185 Facsimile: (888) 778-4620 mary.vargas@steinvargas.com Howard A. Rosenblum Marc P. Charmatz Debra J. Patkin Caroline E. Jackson NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF LAW AND ADVOCACY CENTER 8630 Fenton Street, Suite 820 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910 Telephone: (301) 587-1788 Facsimile: (301) 587-1791 howard.rosenblum@nad.org marc.charmatz@nad.org debra.patkin@nad.org caroline.jackson@nad.org Amicus Curiae October 22, 2015
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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

__________________________________

)

WILLIAM PIERCE,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

) Civil Action No. 13-CV-0134 (KBJ)

)

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

_________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendant has filed a motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 95) of the Memorandum Opinion and Order that this Court issued publicly on September 11, 2015 (ECF Nos. 88, 90). Motions for reconsideration of court orders that “do not constitute final judgments in a case” are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr. v. Advantage Healthplan Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and “[r]elief under Rule 54(b) is available as justice requires, which amounts to determining, within the Court’s discretion, whether reconsideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is well established that this standard may be satisfied “where the court has patently misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the adversarial issues presented, made an error in failing to consider controlling decisions or data, or a controlling or significant change in the law has occurred.” Clayton v. District of Columbia, 931 F. Supp. 2d 192, 210 (D.D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Defendant suggests that

two of these circumstances support its motion: that this Court has made a decision that transcends the boundaries of the issues that the parties addressed at summary judgment (see Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Reconsideration (“Def.’s Mem.”), ECF No. 95-1, at 3–5), and that the Court has misunderstood Defendant’s arguments (see, e.g., Transcript of Reconsideration Motion Hearing (“Motion for Reconsideration Transcript”), ECF No. 106, at 10–11, 14, 72, 74). For the reasons explained below, this Court finds that neither of these reasons for reconsidering this Court’s ruling is present in this case.
First of all, this Court’s decision is well within the scope of the issues that were presented in the pleadings and cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s complaint brings claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) that are based on Defendant’s alleged failure to provide accommodations to Plaintiff—who is profoundly deaf—in accordance with the requirements of those statutes. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1, 9, 15, 49, 50.) At summary judgment, Plaintiff repeatedly argued that Defendant had an “affirmative” obligation to provide accommodations for Plaintiff under the ADA and the RA. (See Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 58, at 8, 10 (emphasis in original); see also Pl.’s Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 66, at 5, 17, 19.) Moreover, from the outset, Plaintiff maintained that Defendant’s statutory obligation included the duty to “take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with [inmates] with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.” (Compl. ¶ 10 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1)); see also Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 47-2, at 12, 27; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to
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Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6, 11, 24, 27; Pl.’s Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of Pl.’s
Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 66, at 13.)
These claims and their supporting arguments clearly raised the question of what,
if anything, the ADA and RA and their accompanying regulations require of prisons
regarding the provision of accommodations for deaf inmates. Moreover, at the hearing
this Court held on the parties’ cross-motions, Plaintiff’s counsel specifically described
what, in his view, the law requires prison officials to do when a plainly disabled inmate
such as Plaintiff is taken into custody. (See Transcript of Summary Judgment Motion
Hearing (“Motion for SJ Transcript”), ECF No. 80, at 38 (explaining that “when Mr.
Pierce showed up” prison employees needed to engage with him regarding his
accommodation needs in order to avoid being deliberately indifferent to his rights).)1
The Court also repeatedly asked both parties about Defendant’s statutory duties with
respect to assessing the accommodation needs of disabled inmates. (See, e.g., Motion
for SJ Transcript at 52–53; 62–64; 80–81.)2 Thus, the Court’s legal analysis in the
1 Plaintiff’s counsel first discussed the regulatory scheme that establishes the rights of disabled individuals and the deliberate indifference standard for obtaining damages for violating those rights, and then stated:
If they had been doing business the way they should be doing, if they had not been deliberately indifferent when Mr. Pierce showed up, Dr. Doe, Ms. Tutwiler under the D.C.[] regulations should have sat down with him and said, Okay, we see that you are profoundly deaf. We have to provide you with the following notice. You have a right to an interpreter if you need one. Do you need one? That’s what they were supposed to do. That was never done. None of that was ever done. That’s in the D.C. regulations. (Motion for SJ Transcript at 38.) 2 One such exchange transpired as follows: MS. ORCUTT [Defendant’s counsel]: . . . [W]hat the law requires is that the entity provide accommodations that are necessary for the individual to derive the benefits of the programs. And so, again, you have to go back to whether the accommodation was something that that specific inmate needed for that specific purpose. . . . THE COURT: . . . How is it that the District determines what an inmate needs? If we’re going to go with the needed test, what does this inmate need, that’s what the ADA requires us to
3

Memorandum Opinion in this matter—i.e., that a prison violates the ADA and RA as a matter of law when its personnel fails to engage with an obviously disabled individual regarding his need for accommodation and otherwise neglects to assess such an individual’s need for accommodation when he is taken into custody—was clearly within the scope of the issues that the parties presented at summary judgment, and that legal analysis led inexorably to the Court’s conclusion that Defendant had violated the ADA and RA here because it was an undisputed fact that the District’s prison staff had failed to engage in any such assessment with respect to Pierce. (See Memorandum Opinion, ECF No. 90, at 36–37 (holding that “prison officials have an affirmative duty to assess the potential accommodation needs of inmates with known disabilities who are taken into custody and to provide the accommodations that are necessary for those inmates to access the prison’s programs and services, without regard to whether or not the disabled individual has made a specific request for accommodation and without relying solely on the assumptions of prison officials regarding that individual’s needs[,]” and therefore, that the District had violated the RA and ADA as a matter of law “because it is undisputed that the District’s employees and contractors did no such thing when Pierce arrived” at the prison).
This Court also understood Defendant’s position on this legal issue, which was made entirely plain at the summary judgment hearing. The Court specifically asked Defendant’s counsel numerous times whether the prison had any duty under the ADA and RA to evaluate or assess the needs of obviously disabled inmates for the purpose of
provide, then doesn’t that put the burden on the District to have some sort of comprehensive program of evaluation to determine what an inmate needs? (Motion for SJ Transcript at 62.)
4

determining what accommodations might be necessary for them. (See, e.g., SJ Transcript at 52-53 (“THE COURT: . . . But at the very least even if we go with whether [an interpreter] was necessary, which appears to be the District’s position, I’m trying to understand the District’s responsibility for determining what was necessary. And [Plaintiff’s counsel] says you all didn’t even have some sort of assessment of [Plaintiff’s] needs in regard to accommodation. Do you deny that that’s the case? In other words, did you have—was there some intensive effort made by the District to evaluate what would actually be needed for [Plaintiff] in this environment?”).) In response to this line of inquiry—which clearly concerned the Court—the District’s counsel repeatedly asserted that, unless and until the inmate requested a specific accommodation, the prison did not have any legal duty to evaluate the accommodation needs of disabled inmates such as the Plaintiff. (See SJ Transcript at 81 (“THE COURT: [D]o [you] have an obligation to assess deaf inmates when they come in to determine what is necessary for them[?] And you say no, we only have to do that when they request it. Is that your answer? MS. ORCUTT: Yes.”); see also id. at 53 (“MS. ORCUTT: Well, what was evaluated was when he requested it in accommodation, whether it was necessary for him and whether it could be provided. And in the cases in which he did request the accommodations, such as the interpreter for anger management, he was provided it. When he requested the TTY device, he was provided it.”).) The District appears to have backtracked from that position now—its new counsel stated at the hearing on the motion for reconsideration that a request is not required (see Motion for Reconsideration Transcript at 25); that the District used “common sense” to make “informal assessments” of Pierce’s need for accommodation
5

continuously throughout his time in custody (id. at 28–29, 33); and that, in any event, the District had provided Pierce with equal access to its programs and services (see id. at 24). But counsel’s simultaneous suggestion that the Court misheard or misunderstood the statements that the District previously made about its lack of any obligation to assess and accommodate obviously disabled inmates absent a request (see id. at 10–11, 14, 34, 72, 74) is unfounded, and therefore unavailing.
Nor is Defendant correct on the merits of its (prior) contention that the prison has no duty under the ADA or RA to evaluate the accommodation needs of an obviously disabled inmate, without a specific request for accommodation. As mentioned, the District now appears to concede as much. (See id. at 24–25, 33–34.) And Defendant’s briefs on the motion for reconsideration, which generally cite inapposite cases, do little to persuade this Court that the applicable statutes and regulations permit prison officials to stand idly by and forgo making a concerted and informed effort to evaluate a profoundly deaf inmate’s need for accommodation when such an individual is placed in their custody. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (imposing on public entities an affirmative obligation to “take appropriate steps” in order to ensure that a disabled individual’s communication difficulties are accommodated); see also Memorandum Opinion at 36– 37 (“[T]his Court squarely rejects the legal position that the District seeks to advance in this action, which is, in essence, that the [department of corrections] acts consistently with [the RA and ADA] when it takes custody of an obviously disabled prisoner without undertaking any evaluation of that inmate’s needs and the accommodations that will be necessary to ensure that he or she has meaningful access to prison services, and instead,
6

provides a random assortment of auxiliary aids upon request at various times based primarily on considerations of its own convenience.”).
Finally, with respect to Defendant’s challenge to the Court’s alternative holding (i.e., that no reasonable jury could find on this record that Pierce had failed to request an interpreter or that he did not need one), Defendant maintains that this part of the Court’s order should be reconsidered because the facts are such that a reasonable jury could, indeed, find that Pierce did not request an interpreter and did not need one. (See Def.’s Mem. at 11–18.) This assertion is simply and solely that this Court got it wrong when it concluded otherwise, and it is well established that such assertions of error, standing alone, are insufficient to carry a Rule 54(b) motion. See Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[W]here litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.”).3
Accordingly, and for all of these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s [95] Motion For Reconsideration is DENIED.

Date: November 25, 2015

Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON United States District Judge

3 Defendant has also failed to convince this Court that it needed to go beyond its alternative holding, and thus should have determined specifically whether or not the record supported a violation of the ADA and RA with respect to the provision of a TTY machine, visitation rights, and visual alarms, in addition to the District’s alleged failure to provide an interpreter for Pierce. (See Def.’s Mem. at 17 (“[T]he District respectfully submits that the Court should have made express findings with respect to the other specific accommodations Pierce alleges that he was denied.”).) Even assuming that this claim of error is a valid basis for a motion for reconsideration, Defendant has not pointed to cases or rules that indicate that it was procedurally improper for the Court to grant summary judgment to Plaintiff on Counts I and II of the complaint based on the record evidence related to the interpreter accommodation without addressing each of the other instances of Defendant’s alleged failure to accommodate, and the Court is not aware of any.
7

Output:
On February 1, 2013, a deaf jail inmate filed this lawsuit on behalf of himself in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff claimed that the officials at DC’s Correctional Treatment Facility denied him (1) effective access to qualified interpreters (2) effective access to telecommunications, (3) access to jail alerts and announcements, and (4) adequate access to visitation. This effectively prevented the plaintiff from communicating with staff and inmates inside the jail, and family and friends during visitation hours. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the plaintiff sought damages and attorneys’ fees and costs.

The plaintiff claimed that officers at the D.C. Correctional Treatment Facility denied him adequate accommodations from the moment he arrived. The plaintiff’s native language was American Sign Language. He had relied on interpreters and auxiliary aids when communicating with people who did not know American Sign Language. Although he could communicate via notes in written English, it was his second language and no substitute for the accommodations guaranteed by the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. Yet no interpreter was present for intake, orientation, or at any point during the plaintiff’s fifty-one day sentence. The lack of accommodation prevented the plaintiff from obtaining adequate health care, accessing the facility’s rehabilitative services, and communicating with visitors. During in person visits, the plaintiff wore handcuffs. The plaintiff analogized that this was equivalent to gagging a hearing prisoner.

On April 4, 2013 the case was reassigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. Over a year later on August 2, 2014, Judge Jackson referred the case to a magistrate judge for mediation. But by October, the parties had not reached a settlement. The case proceeded through discovery.

On November 14, 2014 the plaintiff moved for summary judgment with respect to claim (1) that he had been denied access to an interpreter, and claim (2) that he had been denied effective telecommunication technology. On September 2, 2015, the judge granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his claims that the facility had denied him adequate access to interpreters and telecommunications technology. 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015). On September 29, 2015 the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment the court had filed against them. Judge Brown denied this motion on November 25, 2015. 146 F.Supp.3d 197 (D.D.C. 2015).

The case then went to trial with respect to the plaintiff’s remaining Rehabilitation Act claims, and on May 11, 2016 the jury returned a judgment for the plaintiff and awarded $70,000 in damages. The city appealed. The District of Columbia sought and obtained an order to withhold attorneys' fees from the judgment until the appeal had been resolved.

The Defendant appealed on the following issues: the calculation of the plaintiff's damages, whether there was a duty to conduct disability assessment before admitting the plaintiff, whether there was a genuine issue of fact that the jail afforded the plaintiff an interpreter and on the plaintiffs non-interpreter claims, and whether the court erred in allowing opinions from the plaintiff's experts. Before the appeal resolved though, the parties entered a settlement agreement on November 11, 2016. Information regarding this settlement is not available on the docket.

Subsequently, the D.C. appellate court entered a stipulated dismissal, requiring each party to pay their own attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.