U.S. District Court District of Maryland (Baltimore) CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:16-cv-00201-ELH

Savage et al v. Pocomoke City et al Assigned to: Judge Ellen L. Hollander Referred to: Magistrate Judge Beth P. Gesner
Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson (Settlement) Demand: $500,000 Case in other court: USCA, 17-01636
USCA, 17-01779
USCA, 17-01989 Cause: 42:1981cv Civil Rights

Date Filed: 01/20/2016 Jury Demand: Plaintiff Nature of Suit: 442 Civil Rights: Jobs Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Plaintiff Franklin Savage

represented by Andrew G McBride Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 12027197000 Fax: 12027197207 Email: amcbride@wileyrein.com TERMINATED: 11/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Brian Gerard Walsh Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 2027197469 Fax: 2027197049 Email: bwalsh@wileyrein.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Charles C Lemley Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 12027197000 Fax: 12027197049 Email: clemley@wileyrein.com

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christen Lauren B anca Glenn Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 202-719-3753 Fax: 202-719-7049 Email: cglenn@wileyrein.com TERMINATED: 12/09/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Gordon Fansler Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 2027197536 Fax: 2027197049 Email: cfansler@wileyrein.com TERMINATED: 01/10/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Smith Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 12027197297 Fax: 12027197049 Email: csmith@wileyrein.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A Jeon American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland Foundation 3600 Clipper Mill Rd Ste 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 14108898555 Fax: 14103667838 Email: jeon@aclu-md.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dennis A Corkery Washington Lawyers Cmte for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs 700 14th St. NW Ste 400 Washington, DC 20005

12023191000 Fax: 12023191010 Email: dennis_corkery@washlaw.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dwayne D Sam Pierce Bainbridge Beck Price & Hecht 601 Pennsylvania Avenue., NW South Tower Suite 700 Washington, DC 20004 202-843-8342 Email: dsam@piercebainbridge.com TERMINATED: 05/23/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian D Laughna Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 2027197527 Fax: 2027197049 Email: jlaughna@wileyrein.com TERMINATED: 01/18/2017 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kendra Perkins Norwood Wiley Rein LLp 1776 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 2027197069 Email: knorwood@wileyrein.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Madeline Jean Cohen Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 2027197000 Fax: 2027197049 Email: mcohen@wileyrein.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Margaret Elizabeth Matavich Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 1500 K Street NW Washington, DC 20005 202-230-5652 Email: mmatavich@wileyrein.com TERMINATED: 07/10/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Keith Handley Handley Farah & Anderson PLLC 777 6th Street NW Washington, DC 20001 12025592411 Email: mhandley@hfajustice.com TERMINATED: 05/22/2018 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Moshe Benjamin Broder Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K Street NW Washington, DC 20006 (202) 719-4186 Email: Mbroder@wileyrein.com ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Kumar ACLU of Maryland 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 410-889-8555 Fax: 410-366-7838 Email: kumar@aclu-md.org ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore A Howard Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K St NW Washington, DC 20006 2027197120 Fax: 2027197049 Email: thoward@wileyrein.com PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Plaintiff Kelvin Sewell

represented by Andrew G McBride (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Gerard Walsh (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles C Lemley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christen Lauren B anca Glenn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/09/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Gordon Fansler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/10/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A Jeon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dennis A Corkery (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dwayne D Sam (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian D Laughna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017

Plaintiff Lynell Green

PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kendra Perkins Norwood (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Madeline Jean Cohen (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Elizabeth Matavich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Keith Handley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/22/2018 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Moshe Benjamin Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore A Howard (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Andrew G McBride (See above for address) TERMINATED: 11/22/2016 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Brian Gerard Walsh (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Charles C Lemley (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Christen Lauren B anca Glenn (See above for address) TERMINATED: 12/09/2016 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Gordon Fansler (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/10/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Craig Smith (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Deborah A Jeon (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dennis A Corkery (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Dwayne D Sam (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/23/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jillian D Laughna (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/18/2017 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kendra Perkins Norwood (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Madeline Jean Cohen (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE

V. Intervenor Plaintiff United States of America

ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Margaret Elizabeth Matavich (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/10/2017 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Keith Handley (See above for address) TERMINATED: 05/22/2018 PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Moshe Benjamin Broder (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sonia Kumar (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Theodore A Howard (See above for address) PRO HAC VICE ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Barbara Ann Schwabauer United States Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington, DC 20530 2023053034 Fax: 2025141105 Email: barbara.schwabauer@usdoj.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Candyce Phoenix 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW PHB Rm. 4032 Washington, DC 20630 2023053034 Fax: 2025141005

Email: candyce.phoenix@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 03/01/2019 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Emily Given 601 D. St. NW PHB Washington, DC 20579 2023531217 Fax: 2025141005 Email: emily.given@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Hillary K Valderrama United States Department Of Justice Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20530 2025141005 Email: hillary.valderrama@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kali Jones Schellenberg United States Department Of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington, DC 20530 2023053194 Fax: 2025141005 Email: kali.schellenberg@usdoj.gov TERMINATED: 04/12/2019
Karen D Woodard Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW PHB Room 4904 Washington, DC 20530 2025149878 Fax: 2025141005 Email: karen.woodard@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kathleen O'Malley Lawrence US Dept. of Justice 150 M Street NE Room 9-932 Washington, DC 20002

V. Defendant Pocomoke City

2022371690 Email: kathleen.lawrence@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Valerie L Meyer US Department of Jusitice 950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW PHB Room 4916 Washington, DC 20530 2023053179 Fax: 2025141005 Email: valerie.meyer@usdoj.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Karp Karpinski Cornbrooks and Karp PA 120 E Baltimore St Ste 1850 Baltimore, MD 21202 14107275000 Fax: 14107270861 Email: brunokarp@bkcklaw.com TERMINATED: 01/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Douglas Peter Local Government Insurance Trust 7225 Parkway Dr Hanover, MD 21076 14435611700 Email: MPETER@LGIT.ORG ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Brooks Rynd Karpinski Cornbrooks & Karp, P.A. 120 East Baltimore Street Suite 1850 Baltimore, MD 21202-1617 410-727-5000 Fax: 410-727-0861 Email: mrynd@bkcklaw.com TERMINATED: 03/17/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Pocomoke City Police Department TERMINATED: 03/16/2016 Defendant Worcester County Sheriff's Office TERMINATED: 03/16/2016
Defendant Department of Maryland State Police TERMINATED: 03/16/2016
Defendant Russell Blake in his individual capacity only

represented by Jason Lee Levine Local Government Insurance Trust 7225 Parkway Drive Hanover, MD 21076 443-561-1700 Email: jlevine@lgit.org TERMINATED: 07/11/2018
represented by Ephraim R Siff Office of the Attorney General - MD State Police 1201 Reisterstown Road Building A Pikesville, MD 21208 4106534437 Email: ephraim.siff@maryland.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve Goodrow Marshall Anne Arundel County Office of Law 2660 Riva Road Annapolis, MD 21401 4102224206 Email: lwmars99@aacounty.org TERMINATED: 10/31/2018
represented by Daniel Karp (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Douglas Peter (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Brooks Rynd (See above for address)

Defendant Ernie Crofoot individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Manager
Defendant Bruce Morrison individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Mayor
Defendant Beau Oglesby in his individual capacity as the Worcester County State's Attorney TERMINATED: 09/29/2016

TERMINATED: 03/17/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Karp (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Douglas Peter (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Brooks Rynd (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/17/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Karp (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Douglas Peter (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Michael Brooks Rynd (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/17/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Ronald M Levitan Office of the Attorney General 1201 Reisterstown Rd Bldg A Pikesville, MD 21208 4106534224 Fax: 4106534270 Email: ronald.levitan@maryland.gov LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Nathaniel Passwaters in his individual capacity only
Defendant Brooks Phillips individually, and in his official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Corporal
Defendant

Mira Aviv Feldstein Office of the Maryland Attorney General 1201 Reistertown Rd Bldg A Pikesville, MD 21208 14106534228 Fax: 14106534270 Email: mira.feldstein@maryland.gov TERMINATED: 10/05/2018
represented by Carl N Zacarias State Treasurer's Office Office of the Attorney General 80 Calvert Street Annapolis, MD 21401 14105767644 Fax: 14105766437 Email: czacarias@treasurer.state.md.us ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Lee Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2018
represented by Ronald M Levitan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve Goodrow Marshall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/31/2018
Phillip Michael Pickus Maryland Department of State Police Bldg A 1201 Reisterstown Rd Pikesville, MD 21208 14106534293 Fax: 14106534270 Email: phillip.pickus@maryland.gov ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Dale Smack in his individual capacity only
Defendant Dale Trotter TERMINATED: 03/16/2016 Defendant Rodney Wells in his individual capacity only
Defendant Patricia Donaldson individually, and in her official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Sergeant
Defendant County Commissioners of Worcester County

represented by Carl N Zacarias (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Lee Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2018
represented by Carl N Zacarias (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Lee Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2018
represented by Ronald M Levitan (See above for address) LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve Goodrow Marshall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/31/2018
Phillip Michael Pickus (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Daniel Karp (See above for address) TERMINATED: 01/02/2020 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Matthew Douglas Peter (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Defendant Reggie T Mason in his official capacity as Worcester County Sheriff
Defendant State of Maryland

Michael Brooks Rynd (See above for address) TERMINATED: 03/17/2020 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
represented by Carl N Zacarias (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Jason Lee Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2018
represented by Carl N Zacarias (See above for address) ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Genevieve Goodrow Marshall (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/31/2018
Jason Lee Levine (See above for address) TERMINATED: 07/11/2018
Mira Aviv Feldstein (See above for address) TERMINATED: 10/05/2018

Date Filed 01/20/2016

# Docket Text
1 COMPLAINT against Russell Blake, Ernie Crofoot, Department of Maryland State Police, Patricia Donaldson, Bruce Morrison, Beau Oglesby, Nathaniel Passwaters, Brooks Phillips, Pocomoke City Maryland, Pocomoke City Police Department, Dale Smack, Dale Trotter, Rodney Wells, Worcester County Sheriff's Office ( Filing fee $ 400 receipt number 0416-5815529.), filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Attachments: # 1 Civil Cover Sheet, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I, # 11 Summons, # 12 Summons, # 13 Summons, # 14 Summons, # 15 Summons, # 16 Summons, # 17 Summons, # 18 Summons, # 19 Summons, # 20 Summons, # 21 Summons, # 22 Summons, # 23 Summons, # 24 Summons)(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 01/20/2016)

01/20/2016
01/21/2016
01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/21/2016 01/22/2016
01/25/2016 01/27/2016

2 QC NOTICE: 1 Complaint, filed by Kelvin Sewell, Franklin Savage, Lynell Green was filed incorrectly. **Not all Attorneys listed as Counsel have signed the document. Court staff has entered the appearance of only the attorneys who have signed the document. All other attorneys must enter their own entries of appearance. (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
3 Summons Issued 21 days as to Russell Blake, Ernie Crofoot, Department of Maryland State Police, Patricia Donaldson, Bruce Morrison, Beau Oglesby, Nathaniel Passwaters, Brooks Phillips, Pocomoke City, Pocomoke City Police Department, Dale Smack, Dale Trotter, Rodney Wells, Worcester County Sheriff's Office. (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
4 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Brian Walsh ( Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0416-5816652.) by Franklin Savage (Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
5 NOTICE of Appearance by Deborah A Jeon on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Jeon, Deborah) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
6 NOTICE of Appearance by Dwayne D Sam on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Sam, Dwayne) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
7 NOTICE of Appearance by Craig Michael Smith on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Smith, Craig) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
8 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Keith Handley on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Handley, Matthew) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
9 NOTICE of Appearance by Dennis A Corkery on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Corkery, Dennis) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
10 Local Rule 103.3 Disclosure Statement by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 01/21/2016)
11 MOTION Redact Law Enforcement Defendants' Personal Identifying Information by Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells, Worcester County Sheriff's Office Responses due by 2/8/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 01/22/2016)
12 RESPONSE to Motion re 11 MOTION Redact Law Enforcement Defendants' Personal Identifying Information filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Replies due by 2/11/2016. (Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 01/25/2016)
13 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells, Worcester County Sheriff's Office Responses due by 2/16/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Supplement,

01/27/2016 01/27/2016 01/29/2016
01/29/2016 02/05/2016
02/08/2016
02/08/2016 02/08/2016 02/29/2016 03/16/2016

# 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
14 NOTICE of Appearance by Andrew G McBride on behalf of All Plaintiffs (McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
15 Local Rule 103.3 Disclosure. (Levine, Jason) (Entered: 01/27/2016)
16 QC NOTICE: 4 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice filed by Franklin Savage needs to be modified. See attachment for details and corrective actions needed regarding the signature(s) on the motion. (srd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
17 CORRECTED MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Brian Walsh by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. The fee has already been paid.(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 01/29/2016)
18 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 17 Corrected Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Brian Walsh. Directing attorney Brian Walsh to register online for CM/ECF at https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/attyregB/inputProHac.asp. Signed by Clerk on 2/5/2016. (srd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/05/2016)
19 MOTION for Extension of Time to Amend 1 Complaint,,, by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell Responses due by 2/25/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 02/08/2016)
20 Paperless ORDER granting 19 Motion for Extension of Time to Amend. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 2/8/2016. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 02/08/2016)
21 NOTICE of Appearance by Genevieve Goodrow Marshall on behalf of Department of Maryland State Police, Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips (Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 02/08/2016)
22 ORDER granting 11 Motion to Redact Law Enforcement Defendants' Personal Identifying Information. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 2/29/2016. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/29/2016)
23 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Russell Blake, Ernie Crofoot, Patricia Donaldson, Bruce Morrison, Beau Oglesby, Nathaniel Passwaters, Brooks Phillips, Pocomoke City, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Reggie T Mason, filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Summons, # 12 Summons, # 13 Redlined Complaint)(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 03/16/2016)

03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/16/2016 03/22/2016 03/23/2016 03/23/2016
03/23/2016
03/23/2016 03/23/2016 03/23/2016 03/25/2016

24 NOTICE of Appearance by Craig Gordon Fansler on behalf of Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/16/2016)
25 (FILED IN ERROR) AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Complaint served on Ernie Crofoot on 1/22/2016, filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Fansler, Craig) Modified on 3/23/2016 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 03/16/2016)
26 (FILED IN ERROR) AFFIDAVIT of Service for Summons and Complaint served on Patricia Donaldson on 2/4/2016, filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Fansler, Craig) Modified on 3/23/2016 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 03/16/2016)
27 (FILED IN ERROR) NOTICE by Patricia Donaldson, Beau Oglesby, Brooks Phillips Subpoena to Metro DCPD to Produce Documents (Marshall, Genevieve) Modified on 3/23/2016 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 03/22/2016)
28 Summons Issued 21 days as to County Commissioners of Worcester County, Reggie T Mason. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
29 QC NOTICE: 25 Affidavit of Service filed by Kelvin Sewell, Franklin Savage, Lynell Green and 26 Affidavit of Service filed by Kelvin Sewell, Franklin Savage, Lynell Green, was filed incorrectly. **Incorrect event was selected. Please refile using the event under Service of Process: Summons Returned Executed. It has been noted as FILED IN ERROR, and the document link has been disabled. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
30 QC NOTICE: 27 Notice (Other) filed by Patricia Donaldson, Beau Oglesby, Brooks Phillips was filed incorrectly. **Discovery material is not filed with the Court pursuant to Local Rule 104. It has been noted as FILED IN ERROR, and the document link has been disabled. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
31 NOTICE of Appearance by Sonia Kumar on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Kumar, Sonia) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
32 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Patricia Donaldson served on 2/4/2016, answer due 2/25/2016. (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
33 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Ernie Crofoot served on 1/22/2016, answer due 2/12/2016. (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/23/2016)
34 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Beau Oglesby served on 1/24/2016, answer due 2/16/2016. (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/25/2016)

03/25/2016 03/25/2016 03/25/2016 03/25/2016 03/25/2016 04/07/2016 04/12/2016
04/12/2016 04/14/2016 04/15/2016
04/15/2016

35 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Bruce Morrison served on 1/23/2016, answer due 2/16/2016. (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
36 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Dale Smack served on 1/22/2016, answer due 2/12/2016. (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
37 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Nathaniel Passwaters served on 1/22/2016, answer due 2/12/2016. (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
38 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Rodney Wells served on 1/22/2016, answer due 2/12/2016. (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
39 SUMMONS Returned Executed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Russell Blake served on 1/22/2016, answer due 2/12/2016. (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 03/25/2016)
40 Paperless ORDER finding as moot 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 4/7/2016. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 04/07/2016)
41 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative,, MOTION to Bifurcate Certain Claims by Russell Blake, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City Responses due by 4/29/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support thereof)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
42 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, MOTION to Bifurcate by County Commissioners of Worcester County Responses due by 4/29/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support thereof)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 04/12/2016)
43 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim by Reggie T Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells Responses due by 5/2/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Supplement, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 04/14/2016)
44 Supplemental to 41 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, MOTION to Bifurcate Certain Claims filed by Russell Blake, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City. (Karp, Daniel) Modified on 4/18/2016 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 04/15/2016)
45 MOTION to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment by Beau Oglesby Responses due by 5/2/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memorandum of Law, # 2 Exhibit Ex. A: Purnell Case History, # 3 Exhibit Ex. B: Oglesby Decl., # 4 Exhibit Ex. B-1: 7-29-14

04/18/2016
04/21/2016 04/22/2016 06/01/2016 06/01/2016 06/01/2016 06/01/2016

Corresp., # 5 Exhibit Ex. B-2: 8-29-14 Corresp., # 6 Exhibit Ex. B-3: 924-14 Corresp., # 7 Exhibit Ex. B-4: 11-21-14 Corresp., # 8 Exhibit Ex. B-5: Draft Warrant App., # 9 Exhibit Ex. B-6: Signed Warrant App., # 10 Exhibit Ex. B-7: 9-10-14 Lttr, to Pocomoke, # 11 Exhibit Ex. C-C1: Hurley Decl. and Lttr., # 12 Exhibit Ex. D-D-1: Turnbull Decl. and Lttr.)(Levitan, Ronald) (Entered: 04/15/2016)
46 MOTION to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips Responses due by 5/5/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memo of Law, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 1: Phillips Decl., # 3 Exhibit Ex. 2: Donaldson Decl., # 4 Exhibit Ex. 3, pt.1: DonaldsonSavage Texts, # 5 Exhibit Ex. 3, pt.2: Donaldson-Savage Texts, # 6 Exhibit Ex. 3, pt.3: Donaldson-Savage Texts, # 7 Exhibit Ex. 3, pt.4: Donaldson-Savage Texts, # 8 Exhibit Ex. 4-A: Phillips-Savage TextsSavage Work, # 9 Exhibit Ex. 4-B: Phillips-Savage Texts-Savage Cell, # 10 Exhibit Ex. 5: Training Day, # 11 Exhibit Ex. 6: Photos, # 12 Exhibit Ex. 7: Body Count Lyric, # 13 Exhibit Ex. 8: Letter from Sewell to Brown, # 14 Exhibit Ex. 9: Photo of Savage's Cell)(Levitan, Ronald) (Entered: 04/18/2016)
47 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 20 Order on Motion for Extension of Time to Amend by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell Responses due by 5/9/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 04/21/2016)
48 Paperless ORDER granting 47 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 4/22/2016. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 04/22/2016)
49 RESPONSE in Opposition re 42 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the Alternative MOTION to Bifurcate filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Replies due by 6/20/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
50 RESPONSE in Opposition re 41 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, MOTION to Bifurcate Certain Claims filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Replies due by 6/20/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
51 RESPONSE in Opposition re 43 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Replies due by 6/20/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
52 RESPONSE in Opposition re 42 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the Alternative MOTION to Bifurcate , 41 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, MOTION to Bifurcate Certain Claims filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin

06/01/2016
06/01/2016 06/10/2016 06/10/2016 06/13/2016 06/13/2016 06/15/2016
06/21/2016 06/24/2016 06/29/2016

Sewell. Replies due by 6/20/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
53 RESPONSE in Opposition re 45 MOTION to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Replies due by 6/20/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
54 RESPONSE in Opposition re 46 MOTION to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. Replies due by 6/20/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 06/01/2016)
55 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Jillian D. Laughna ( Filing fee $ 50, receipt number 0416-6067000.) by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
56 REPLY to Response to Motion re 43 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Reggie T Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 06/10/2016)
57 QC NOTICE: 55 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice filed by Kelvin Sewell, Franklin Savage, Lynell Green needs to be modified. See attachment for details and corrective actions needed regarding the signature(s) on the motion. (srd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
58 CORRECTED MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Jillian D. Laughna by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. The fee has already been paid.(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 06/13/2016)
59 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 58 Corrected Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Jillian D Laughna. Directing attorney Jillian D Laughna to register online for CM/ECF at https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/attyregB/inputProHac.asp. Signed by Clerk on 6/15/2016. (srd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/15/2016)
60 ORDER granting in part and denying in part 43 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 6/21/2016. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/21/2016)
61 ANSWER to 23 Amended Complaint,, by Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells.(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 06/24/2016)
62 REPLY to Response to Motion re 42 MOTION to Dismiss or, in the Alternative MOTION to Bifurcate filed by County Commissioners of Worcester County. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit a1, # 2 Exhibit a2, # 3 Exhibit a3)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 06/29/2016)

06/29/2016
07/01/2016 07/01/2016 07/01/2016
07/06/2016 07/07/2016 07/19/2016 07/20/2016 08/03/2016 08/19/2016

63 REPLY to Response to Motion re 41 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, MOTION to Bifurcate Certain Claims filed by Russell Blake, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit a)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 06/29/2016)
64 REPLY to Response to Motion re 46 MOTION to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips. (Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
65 NOTICE by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips re 64 Reply to Response to Motion Table of Contents (Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
66 REPLY to Response to Motion re 45 MOTION to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed by Beau Oglesby. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 Supplemental Declaration of Beau Oglesby, # 2 Exhibit 1-A -Assignment Notice, # 3 Exhibit 2 - Declaration of Ernest Crofoot)(Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 07/01/2016)
67 Request for Hearing/Trial (McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 07/06/2016)
68 Correspondence re: Response to Doc 67 (Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 07/07/2016)
69 MOTION to Alter/Amend Judgment by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell Responses due by 8/5/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support Thereof, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 07/19/2016)
70 RESPONSE in Opposition re 69 MOTION to Alter/Amend Judgment filed by Reggie T Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells. Replies due by 8/8/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 07/20/2016)
71 REPLY to Response to Motion re 69 MOTION to Alter/Amend Judgment filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 08/03/2016)
72 ORDER denying 41 Pocomoke City, Russell Blake, Ernest A. Crofoot, and Bruce Morrison's Partial Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, to Bifurcate certain claims; denying 46 Patricia Donaldson's and Brooks Phillips' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; denying 42 the County Commissioners of Worcester County's Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, to Bifurcate; granting 45 Defendant Beau Oglesby's Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment; denying 69 Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment; and scheduling a conference call. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on

08/26/2016 08/29/2016 08/31/2016 08/31/2016
08/31/2016 09/07/2016 09/09/2016 09/29/2016 09/29/2016
09/30/2016 10/03/2016

8/19/2016. (Attachments: # 1 Tentative Scheduling Order, # 2 Letter to Counsel) (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/19/2016)
73 Correspondence re: August 29 Conference Call (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 08/26/2016)
Scheduling Conference held on 8/29/2016 before Judge J. Frederick Motz. (Court Reporter: None) (mds, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/08/2016)
74 NOTICE of Appearance by Phillip Michael Pickus on behalf of Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips (Pickus, Phillip) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
75 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply Answer by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Patricia Donaldson, Bruce Morrison, Brooks Phillips, Pocomoke City, Pocomoke City Police Department. Responses due by 9/19/2016 (Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
76 Paperless ORDER granting 75 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 8/31/2016. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 08/31/2016)
77 Status Report Submitted Joint by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City (Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 09/07/2016)
78 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability by Franklin Savage Responses due by 9/26/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Supporting Memorandum, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 09/09/2016)
79 NOTICE by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell of Second Amended Complaint (McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 09/29/2016)
80 AMENDED COMPLAINT against Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Patricia Donaldson, Reggie T Mason, Bruce Morrison, Nathaniel Passwaters, Brooks Phillips, Pocomoke City, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells, STATE OF MARYLAND, filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Summons, # 13 Redlined Complaint)(McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 09/29/2016)
81 Summons Issued 21 days as to State of Maryland. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/30/2016)
82 RESPONSE in Opposition re 78 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability filed by Beau Oglesby. Replies due by 10/20/2016.

10/14/2016 10/17/2016 10/18/2016 10/18/2016 10/19/2016 10/19/2016
10/20/2016 10/20/2016 10/25/2016 10/25/2016

(Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 10/03/2016)
83 REPLY to Response to Motion re 78 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability filed by Franklin Savage. (McBride, Andrew) (Entered: 10/14/2016)
84 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips, State of Maryland. Responses due by 11/3/2016 (Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 10/17/2016)
85 Paperless ORDER granting 84 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 10/18/2016. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
86 NOTICE of Appearance by Michael Brooks Rynd on behalf of Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City (Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 10/18/2016)
87 NOTICE of Appearance by Barbara Ann Schwabauer on behalf of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
88 MOTION to Intervene by UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Responses due by 11/7/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 - Certificate of Public Importance, # 2 Exhibit Ex. 2 - U.S. Complaint in Intervention, # 3 Exhibit Memorandum in Support, # 4 Exhibit Ex. A to Memorandum - Letters of Determination, # 5 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 10/19/2016)
89 MOTION for Leave to File Sur-Reply by Beau Oglesby Responses due by 11/7/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A: Proposed Sur-Reply, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
90 ORDER denying 78 Motion for Final Judgment. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 10/19/2016. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/20/2016)
91 NOTICE of Appearance by Kathleen O'Malley Lawrence on behalf of United States of America (Lawrence, Kathleen) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
92 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, or for Summary Judgment by Reggie T Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, State of Maryland Responses due by 11/14/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Supplement, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit, # 8 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 10/25/2016)

10/25/2016
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11/03/2016 11/03/2016 11/04/2016 11/04/2016

93 MOTION to Strike Exhibit A to Second Amended Complaint, and All Paragraphs Referencing EEOC Findings by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Department of Maryland State Police, Patricia Donaldson, Reggie T Mason, Bruce Morrison, Nathaniel Passwaters, Brooks Phillips, Pocomoke City, Dale Smack, State of Maryland, Rodney Wells Responses due by 11/14/2016 (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 10/25/2016)
94 NOTICE of Appearance by Karen D Woodard on behalf of United States of America (Woodard, Karen) (Entered: 10/26/2016)
95 RESPONSE to Motion re 88 MOTION to Intervene filed by Reggie T Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, State of Maryland, Rodney Wells.(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
96 Correspondence re: Pending and Expected Motions to Dismiss (Lawrence, Kathleen) (Entered: 11/02/2016)
97 MOTION to Dismiss , Partial, by County Commissioners of Worcester County (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support thereof)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
98 MOTION to Dismiss , Partial, by Pocomoke City (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support thereof, # 2 Exhibit A)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
99 ANSWER to 80 Amended Complaint,, Second Amended Complaint, by Russell Blake, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison.(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
100 MOTION to Strike 80 Amended Complaint,, Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim from Count XII by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Text of proposed order)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
101 RESPONSE in Opposition re 88 MOTION to Intervene filed by Pocomoke City. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
102 ANSWER to 80 Amended Complaint,, by Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, Rodney Wells.(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 11/03/2016)
103 MOTION to Strike 80 Amended Complaint,, by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
104 MOTION to Dismiss or Summary Judgment by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memorandum in Support, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Decl. of Phillips, # 3 Exhibit 2 - Decl. of Donaldson,

11/04/2016 11/14/2016
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11/22/2016 11/22/2016 11/22/2016 11/22/2016
11/22/2016 11/22/2016

# 4 Exhibit 3.1 - Donaldson texts, # 5 Exhibit 3.2 - Donaldson texts, # 6 Exhibit 3.3 - Donaldson texts, # 7 Exhibit 3.4 - Donaldson texts, # 8 Exhibit 4.1 - Phillips Texts, # 9 Exhibit 4.2 - Phillips Texts, # 10 Exhibit 5 - Training Day, # 11 Exhibit 6 - Photos, # 12 Exhibit 7 Body Count Lyrics, # 13 Exhibit 8 - Letter from Sewell to Brown, # 14 Exhibit 9 - Cell Phone Photo, # 15 Exhibit 10 - Supp. Decl. of Phillips, # 16 Exhibit 11 - Supp. Decl. of Donaldson)(Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
105 MOTION to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment by State of Maryland (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memorandum of Law, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit 1: EEOC Charges)(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 11/04/2016)
106 RESPONSE in Opposition re 93 MOTION to Strike Exhibit A to Second Amended Complaint, and All Paragraphs Referencing EEOC Findings filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 11/14/2016)
107 REPLY to Response to Motion re 88 MOTION to Intervene filed by United States of America.(Lawrence, Kathleen) (Entered: 11/16/2016)
108 REPLY to Response to Motion re 93 MOTION to Strike Exhibit A to Second Amended Complaint, and All Paragraphs Referencing EEOC Findings filed by Reggie T Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, State of Maryland, Rodney Wells.(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 11/21/2016)
109 NOTICE by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell McBride Withdrawal (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
110 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Theodore A. Howard (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-6361815.) by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
111 NOTICE by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell Receipt of Right to Sue (Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
112 RESPONSE to Motion re 100 MOTION to Strike 80 Amended Complaint,, Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim from Count XII filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
113 RESPONSE in Opposition re 103 MOTION to Strike 80 Amended Complaint,, filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 11/22/2016)
114 RESPONSE in Opposition re 97 MOTION to Dismiss , Partial, filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 11/22/2016)

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115 RESPONSE in Opposition re 104 MOTION to Dismiss or Summary Judgment filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 11/23/2016)
116 RESPONSE in Opposition re 98 MOTION to Dismiss , Partial, filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 11/23/2016)
117 RESPONSE in Opposition re 105 MOTION to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit T. Howard Declaration)(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 11/23/2016)
118 RESPONSE in Opposition re 92 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, or for Summary Judgment filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit T. Howard Declaration)(Glenn, Christen) (Entered: 11/23/2016)
119 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 110 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Theodore A Howard. Directing attorney Theodore A Howard to register online for CM/ECF at https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/attyregB/inputProHac.asp. Signed by Clerk on 11/28/2016. (srd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/28/2016)
120 ORDER granting 88 the United States' Motion to Intervene. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 11/28/2016. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
121 REPLY to Response to Motion re 92 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, or for Summary Judgment filed by Reggie T Mason, State of Maryland.(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 11/29/2016)
122 Intervenor COMPLAINT , filed by United States of America.(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 12/01/2016)
123 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Lawrence, Kathleen) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
124 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Intervenor Complaint, or for Summary Judgment by Reggie T Mason, State of Maryland (Attachments: # 1 Memo of Law, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 12/06/2016)
125 Paperless ORDER granting 123 Motion for Extension of Time. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 12/7/2016. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 12/07/2016)

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126 (FILED IN ERROR - refiled as ECF 128) Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 80 Amended Complaint,, by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips, State of Maryland(Marshall, Genevieve) Modified on 12/9/2016 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 12/08/2016)
127 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 80 Amended Complaint,, Amended to add additional Defendant by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips, State of Maryland(Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
128 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Fansler, Craig) (Entered: 12/08/2016)
129 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 128 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Christen Lauren B anca Glenn terminated. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 12/9/2016. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 12/9/2016 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 12/09/2016)
130 REPLY to Response to Motion re 100 MOTION to Strike 80 Amended Complaint,, Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim from Count XII filed by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City.(Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 12/09/2016)
131 Paperless ORDER granting 127 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 12/13/2016. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 12/13/2016)
132 REPLY to Response to Motion re 105 MOTION to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment as to Count IX filed by State of Maryland.(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
133 REPLY to Response to Motion re 98 MOTION to Dismiss , Partial, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint filed by Pocomoke City. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit a)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
134 REPLY to Response to Motion re 97 MOTION to Dismiss , Partial, Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint filed by County Commissioners of Worcester County.(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 12/22/2016)
135 REPLY to Response to Motion re 104 MOTION to Dismiss or Summary Judgment filed by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips.(Pickus, Phillip) (Entered: 12/23/2016)
136 REPLY to Response to Motion re 103 MOTION to Strike 80 Amended Complaint,, filed by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips.(Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 12/23/2016)

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137 NOTICE of Appearance by Margaret Elizabeth Matavich on behalf of Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Matavich, Margaret) (Entered: 12/30/2016)
138 NOTICE of Appearance by Kendra Perkins Norwood on behalf of Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Norwood, Kendra) (Entered: 12/30/2016)
139 ANSWER to Complaint (Intervenor's Complaint) by Pocomoke City.(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 01/03/2017)
140 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 01/04/2017)
141 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 140 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Craig Gordon Fansler terminated. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 1/10/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/10/2017)
142 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
143 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 142 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jillian D Laughna terminated. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 1/18/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
144 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Ernie Crofoot (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Support thereof, # 2 Exhibit a)(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 01/20/2017)
145 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 144 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Franklin Savage (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
146 Paperless ORDER granting 145 Motion for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 1/26/2017. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
147 RESPONSE in Opposition re 124 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Intervenor Complaint, or for Summary Judgment filed by United States of America. (Attachments: # 1 Unredacted Exhibit Ex. A EEOC Charge, # 2 Exhibit Ex. B - 7/25/14 Notice of Charge, # 3 Exhibit Ex. C - 8/14/14 Notice of Charge, # 4 Unredacted Exhibit Ex. D Amendment of EEOC Charge, # 5 Exhibit Ex. E - 7/30/15 Notice, # 6 Exhibit Ex. F - Position Statement, # 7 Exhibit Ex. G - Letter of Determination, # 8 Exhibit Ex. H - Letter Regarding Conciliation, # 9 Exhibit Ex. I - Decl. of Barbara Schwabauer, # 10 Exhibit Ex. J Decision Not to Pursue, # 11 Exhibit Ex. K - Performance

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03/28/2017 03/31/2017 03/31/2017

Evaluation)(Schwabauer, Barbara) Modified on 4/25/2017 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). Modified on 4/26/2017 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 02/02/2017)
148 NOTICE of Appearance by Valerie L Meyer on behalf of United States of America (Meyer, Valerie) (Entered: 02/03/2017)
149 RESPONSE to Motion re 144 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit, # 2 Exhibit, # 3 Exhibit, # 4 Exhibit, # 5 Exhibit, # 6 Exhibit, # 7 Exhibit)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 02/10/2017)
150 REPLY to Response to Motion re 124 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Intervenor Complaint, or for Summary Judgment filed by Reggie T Mason, State of Maryland. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 02/14/2017)
151 REPLY to Response to Motion re 144 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Ernie Crofoot.(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 02/23/2017)
152 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum of Law in Support of Leave to File Surreply, # 2 Exhibit 1 - Proposed Surreply, # 3 Text of Proposed Order)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 02/27/2017)
153 RESPONSE in Opposition re 152 MOTION for Leave to File Surreply filed by Reggie T Mason, State of Maryland. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 03/01/2017)
154 ORDER Granting 88 to Intervene by USA; Denying without prejudice 92 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Denying without prejudice 93 Motion to Strike ; Denying without prejudice 97 Motion to Dismiss; Denying without prejudice 98 Motion to Dismiss; Denying without prejudice 100 Motion to Strike ; Denying without prejudice 103 Motion to Strike; Denying without prejudice 104 Motion to Dismiss; denying 105 Motion to Dismiss; Denying without prejudice 124 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; Denying without prejudice 144 Motion for Summary Judgment; Denying without prejudice 152 Motion for Leave to File Surreply. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 3/17/2017. (Attachments: # 1 Tentative Scheduling Order, # 2 Letter re: Call-in Hour Program)(bas, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/20/2017)
155 Settlement Conference - requesting (Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 03/28/2017)
156 ANSWER to 80 Amended Complaint,, by Reggie T Mason.(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
157 RESPONSE re 122 Intervenor Complaint (ANSWER TO) filed by Reggie T Mason.(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 03/31/2017)

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158 Correspondence re: April 3 Conference Call (Attachments: # 1 Proposed Schedule)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
159 Request for Conference (Smith, Craig) (Entered: 03/31/2017)
160 Correspondence re: Scheduling Order (Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
161 ANSWER to 80 Amended Complaint,, "Second Amended Complaint" by Pocomoke City.(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
162 ANSWER to 80 Amended Complaint,, "Second Amended Complaint" by County Commissioners of Worcester County.(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
163 Correspondence re: Scheduling Order (Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
164 MOTION for Reconsideration As to Count IX (Doc. 105) by State of Maryland(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
165 MOTION for Extension of Time to File an Appeal by State of Maryland(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
166 MOTION to Shorten Time For Response to Motion for Extension of Time to File an Appeal by State of Maryland(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
167 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer by State of Maryland(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
168 ANSWER to 80 Amended Complaint,, by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips.(Pickus, Phillip) (Entered: 04/03/2017)
169 MOTION for Reconsideration re 72 Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion to Bifurcate,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment,,, Dismissal of Claims Against Defendant Beau Oglesby by Franklin Savage(Corkery, Dennis) (Entered: 04/04/2017)
Scheduling Conference held on 4/5/2017 before Judge J. Frederick Motz.(Court Reporter: None) (mds, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/02/2017)
170 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson for Settlement. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 4/12/2017 (cags, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/12/2017)
171 MARGINAL ORDER granting 165 MOTION for Extension of Time to File an Appeal. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 4/13/2017. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
172 MARGINAL ORDER denying as moot 166 MOTION to Shorten Time For Response to Motion for Extension of Time to File an Appeal. Signed

04/17/2017 04/17/2017 04/17/2017
04/19/2017 04/25/2017 04/25/2017 05/15/2017 05/15/2017 05/17/2017
05/18/2017

by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 4/13/2017. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/14/2017)
173 RESPONSE in Opposition re 167 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Answer , 164 MOTION for Reconsideration As to Count IX (Doc. 105) filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
174 ORDER Scheduling Settlement Conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson on 4/17/2017. (daws, Chambers) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
175 RESPONSE in Opposition re 169 MOTION for Reconsideration re 72 Order on Motion to Dismiss,,,, Order on Motion to Bifurcate,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Order on Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment,,, Dismissal of Claims Against Defendant Beau Oglesby filed by State of Maryland.(Pickus, Phillip) (Entered: 04/17/2017)
176 REPLY to Response to Motion re 164 MOTION for Reconsideration As to Count IX (Doc. 105) filed by State of Maryland.(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 04/19/2017)
177 REDACTED DOCUMENT to 147 Response in Opposition to Motion,,, Redacted Exhibit A by United States of America(Meyer, Valerie) (Entered: 04/25/2017)
178 REDACTED DOCUMENT to 147 Response in Opposition to Motion,,, Redacted Exhibit D by United States of America(Meyer, Valerie) (Entered: 04/25/2017)
179 MARGINAL ORDER denying 164 State of Maryland's Motion for Reconsideration as to Count IX. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 5/15/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2017)
180 MARGINAL ORDER denying 169 Plaintiff Franklin Savage's Motion for Reconsideration of Dismissal of Claims Against Defendant Beau Oglesby. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 5/15/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/15/2017)
181 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 154 Memorandum and Order,,,, Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,,, Order on Motion to Strike,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,, by State of Maryland. (Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 05/17/2017)
182 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 181 Notice of Appeal,. IMPORTANT NOTICE: To access forms which you are required to file with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit please go to http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov and click on Forms & Notices.(ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/18/2017)

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06/09/2017
06/12/2017 06/20/2017 06/21/2017

USCA Appeal Fees received $ 505 receipt number 14637097991 re 181 Notice of Appeal, filed by State of Maryland (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
183 USCA Case Number 17-1636 for 181 Notice of Appeal, filed by State of Maryland. Case Manager - Emily Musser (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/18/2017)
184 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
185 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 184 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Dwayne D Sam terminated. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 5/23/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/23/2017)
186 MOTION for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Supplement)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 06/05/2017)
187 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability for the March 20, 2017 Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1292(b) by State of Maryland (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 06/08/2017)
188 (FILED IN ERROR) NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL as to 154 Memorandum and Order,,, Order on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim,,, Order on Motion to Strike,,, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,,, Order on Motion for Leave to File,,, by State of Maryland. (For document, see ECF 187)(ko, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 6/9/2017 (kos, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 06/09/2017)
189 (FILED IN ERROR) Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 188 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,. IMPORTANT NOTICE: To access forms which you are required to file with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit please go to http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov and click on Forms & Notices.(ko, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 6/9/2017 (kos, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 06/09/2017)
190 MARGINAL ORDER granting 186 Renewed Motion for Partial Final Judgment under Rule 54(b). Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 6/12/2017. (jnls, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/13/2017)
Settlement Conference held on 6/20/2017 before Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2017)
A settlement conference was held today with Judge Coulson and counsel and representatives from both parties. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson on 6/21/2017. (daws, Chambers) (Entered: 06/21/2017)

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191 RESPONSE in Opposition re 187 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability for the March 20, 2017 Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1292(b) filed by Franklin Savage.(Corkery, Dennis) (Entered: 06/22/2017)
192 REPLY to Response to Motion re 187 MOTION for Certificate of Appealability for the March 20, 2017 Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C §1292(b) filed by State of Maryland.(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 06/26/2017)
193 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 72 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion to Bifurcate Order on Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment, by Franklin Savage. Filing fee $ 505, receipt number 0416-6744371.(Smith, Craig) Modified on 6/29/2017 (cags, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 06/27/2017)
194 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 193 Notice of Appeal,. IMPORTANT NOTICE: To access forms which you are required to file with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit please go to http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov and click on Forms & Notices.(ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/28/2017)
195 USCA Case Number 17-1779 for 193 Notice of Appeal, filed by Kelvin Sewell, Franklin Savage, Lynell Green. Case Manager - Emily Musser (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Additional attachment(s) added on 6/29/2017: # 1 Correct document) (ko, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 06/29/2017)
196 ORDER of USCA consolidating USCA Case Nos. 17-1779 and 171636 181 Notice of Appeal, filed by State of Maryland, 193 Notice of Appeal, filed by Franklin Savage (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/29/2017)
197 MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal (SOM as to the State's Attorney) by State of Maryland (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memorandum of Law, # 2 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 07/05/2017)
198 MOTION to Stay by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 07/05/2017)
199 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 07/07/2017)
200 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 199 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Margaret Elizabeth Matavich terminated. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 7/10/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/10/2017)

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201 NOTICE of Appearance by Moshe Benjamin Broder on behalf of All Plaintiffs (Broder, Moshe) (Entered: 07/11/2017)
202 RESPONSE in Opposition re 197 MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal (SOM as to the State's Attorney) filed by United States of America.(Meyer, Valerie) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
203 RESPONSE in Opposition re 198 MOTION to Stay by County and Pocomoke Defendants filed by United States of America. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Proposed Discovery Schedule, # 2 Exhibit 2 - In re Mutual Funds Docket Sheet)(Meyer, Valerie) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
204 RESPONSE in Opposition re 197 MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal (SOM as to the State's Attorney) filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Unpublished Opinion - Rivera v. Montgomery County)(Jeon, Deborah) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
205 RESPONSE in Opposition re 198 MOTION to Stay filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Unpublished Opinion - Rivero v. Montgomery County)(Jeon, Deborah) (Entered: 07/19/2017)
206 REPLY to Response to Motion re 198 MOTION to Stay (USA's Response 203 ) filed by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City.(Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
207 REPLY to Response to Motion re 198 MOTION to Stay (Plaintiffs' Response 205 ) filed by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City.(Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
208 REPLY to Response to Motion re 197 MOTION to Stay Pending Appeal (SOM as to the State's Attorney) filed by State of Maryland.(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 08/02/2017)
209 ORDER granting 197 State of Maryland's Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 8/3/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
210 ORDER denying 198 Pocomoke City, et al's Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 8/3/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
211 ORDER granting 187 State of Maryland's Motion to Certify Interlocutory Appeal. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 8/3/2017. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/03/2017)
212 NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL (see ECF 211) Order on Motion for Certificate of Appealability by State of Maryland. (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/04/2017)

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213 Transmission of Notice of Appeal and Docket Sheet to US Court of Appeals re 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal. IMPORTANT NOTICE: To access forms which you are required to file with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit please go to http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov and click on Forms & Notices.(ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/04/2017)
214 Request for Conference (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit ECF No. 203-1 U.S. & Plaintiffs' Scheduling Proposal)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 08/21/2017)
215 MOTION to Stay -Temporary by State of Maryland(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
216 RESPONSE in Opposition re 215 MOTION to Stay -Temporary filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 08/23/2017)
217 ORDER of USCA granting petition for permission to appeal as to 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by State of Maryland (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
218 USCA Case Number 17-1989 for 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by State of Maryland. Case Manager - Emily Musser (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
219 ORDER of USCA consolidating USCA nos. 17-1989 and 17-1636 as to 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by State of Maryland, 193 Notice of Appeal, filed by Franklin Savage (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/24/2017)
220 Correspondence setting conference call. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 08/28/2017)
USCA Appeal Fees received $ 505 re 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by State of Maryland (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/06/2017)
221 RESPONSE in Opposition re 215 MOTION to Stay -Temporary filed by United States of America.(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
222 ORDER of USCA granting motion to stay appeal as to 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by State of Maryland (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/30/2017)
223 Correspondence re: Filing Fee Transmittal (Smith, Craig) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
USCA Filing fee: $ 505, receipt number 14637100281 (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/31/2017)
224 PAPERLESS ORDER finding as moot 215 Motion to Stay. Signed by Judge J. Frederick Motz on 9/8/2017. (Motz, J.) (Entered: 09/08/2017)

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07/27/2018 07/30/2018 08/06/2018 08/06/2018 08/13/2018

225 ORDER of USCA granting motion to withdraw Karen L. Federman Henry from further representation on appeal as to 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by State of Maryland (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/14/2017)
226 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Handley, Matthew) (Entered: 05/18/2018)
227 ORDER granting 226 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Matthew Keith Handley terminated. Signed by Chief Judge James K. Bredar on 5/22/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/22/2018)
228 NOTICE of Appearance by Carl N Zacarias on behalf of Reggie T Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, State of Maryland, Rodney Wells (Zacarias, Carl) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
229 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney (Jason L. Levine) by Reggie T Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, State of Maryland, Rodney Wells (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Levine, Jason) (Entered: 07/10/2018)
230 ORDER granting 229 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Jason Lee Levine terminated. Signed by Chief Judge James K. Bredar on 7/10/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/11/2018)
231 JUDGMENT of USCA affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the District Court, and remanding for further proceedings as to 181 Notice of Appeal, filed by State of Maryland, 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by State of Maryland, 193 Notice of Appeal, filed by Franklin Savage (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/16/2018)
Case reassigned to Judge Ellen L. Hollander. Judge J. Frederick Motz no longer assigned to the case. (cags, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/27/2018)
232 ORDER Directing Counsel to submit a joint status report by August 13, 2018 addressing the topics outlined in this order. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 7/30/2018 (cags, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/30/2018)
233 MANDATE of USCA issued as to 181 Notice of Appeal, filed by State of Maryland, 212 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed by State of Maryland, 193 Notice of Appeal, filed by Franklin Savage (ko, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
234 SUGGESTION OF BANKRUPTCY Upon the Record as to Ernest A. Crofoot by Ernie Crofoot(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 08/06/2018)
235 Status Report Submitted JOINTLY, by all parties by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Patricia Donaldson, Reggie T Mason, Bruce Morrison, Nathaniel Passwaters, Brooks Phillips, Pocomoke City, Dale Smack, State of Maryland, United

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States of America, Rodney Wells (Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
236 ORDER dismissing Franklin Savage's Title VII claim against the State of Maryland for retaliation; and directing parties to submit a proposed Scheduling Order to the Court. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 8/13/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/13/2018)
237 RESPONSE re 234 Suggestion of Bankruptcy and Motion to Stay filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 08/20/2018)
238 RESPONSE re 237 Response Reply to Response to Suggestion of Bankruptcy filed by Ernie Crofoot.(Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 08/31/2018)
239 Correspondence re: Discovery Schedule & Depositions (Attachments: # 1 Ex. 1 - Proposed Schedule)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 09/17/2018)
240 ORDER re: Telephone Conference. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 9/20/2018. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/20/2018)
241 PAPERLESS ORDER. At the request of government counsel, the telephone conference scheduled for September 27, 2018, has been rescheduled to September 25, 2018, at 5:00 p.m. Counsel for plaintiffs is to initiate the call to government counsel and to defense counsel and then to chambers. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 9/21/2018. (kw, Chambers) (Entered: 09/21/2018)
Telephone Conference held on 9/25/2018 before Judge Ellen L. Hollander. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/26/2018)
242 Correspondence re: Discovery Schedule (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Ex. 1 - Revised Proposed Schedule)(Meyer, Valerie) (Entered: 09/28/2018)
243 REVISED SCHEDULING ORDER: Status Report due by 5/29/2019. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 9/28/2018. (Attachments: # 1 Standing Memorandum to Counsel Concerning Discovery)(bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/01/2018)
244 ORDER Scheduling Settlement Conference. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson on 10/2/2018. (daws, Chambers) (Entered: 10/02/2018)
245 PAPERLESS ORDER Rescheduling Settlement Conference from April 23, 2019 to May 2, 2019. All guidelines in ECF. 244 will remain in effect with one exception that ex parte letters are now due in Chambers by April 15, 2019. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson on 10/2/2018. (daws, Chambers) (Entered: 10/02/2018)

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246 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney Mira Feldstein by Beau Oglesby, State of Maryland (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order Proposed Order)(Feldstein, Mira) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
247 ORDER granting 246 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Mira Aviv Feldstein terminated. Signed by Judge Richard D. Bennett on 10/5/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/05/2018)
248 Consent MOTION for Extension of Time for Plaintiffs to Consider Pocomoke Defendants' FRCP 68 Offers for Judgement by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 10/17/2018)
249 MARGINAL ORDER approving 248 Consent Motion for Extension of Time for Plaintiffs to Consider Pocomoke Defendants' FRCP 68 Offers for Judgment. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 10/17/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/18/2018)
250 NOTICE of Appearance by Candyce Phoenix on behalf of United States of America (Phoenix, Candyce) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
251 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Patricia Donaldson, Brooks Phillips (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Marshall, Genevieve) (Entered: 10/30/2018)
252 ORDER granting 251 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Genevieve Goodrow Marshall terminated. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 10/31/2018. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/31/2018)
253 Consent MOTION for Protective Order and For Entry of Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 12/11/2018)
254 Stipulated Confidentiality Agreement and Protective Order. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 12/11/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
255 Joint MOTION for Entry of Stipulation on Preservation by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Stipulation, # 2 Text of Proposed Order)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
256 ORDER granting 255 Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulation on Preservation; and directing Parties to comply with the Stipulation. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 12/12/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
257 Stipulation on Preservation. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 12/12/2018. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2018)
258 (FILED IN ERROR) Consent to Magistrate Judge (Karp, Daniel) Modified on 12/21/2018 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 12/21/2018)

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259 Correspondence re: REQUEST for referral to a Magistrate Judge for settlement conference (Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
260 Correspondence re: Proposed Order referring case to United States Magistrate Judge (Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
261 Correspondence re: Propose Order staying discovery pending outcome of Settlement Conference. (Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 12/21/2018)
262 MOTION to Stay re 259 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 261 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 260 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 258 Consent to Magistrate Judge by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Phoenix, Candyce) (Entered: 12/26/2018)
263 ORDER Granting 262 Motion to Stay of Deadline to Respond. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 12/26/2018. (bas, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 1/2/2019 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 12/27/2018)
264 NOTICE by Ernie Crofoot related to Bankruptcy case (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit a)(Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 12/28/2018)
265 RESPONSE re 259 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 261 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 260 Miscellaneous Correspondence Opposing Defendants' Request for Discovery Stay and Mediation Referral filed by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell.(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 01/04/2019)
266 MOTION to Continue All Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 01/14/2019)
267 ORDER granting 266 Motion for a Continuance of All Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 1/14/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/15/2019)
268 Correspondence re: Proposed Post-Shutdown Deadlines (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Phoenix, Candyce) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
269 ORDER granting 268 Correspondence re: Proposed Post-Shutdown Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 1/29/2019. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/30/2019)
Stay Lifted. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
270 RESPONSE re 259 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 261 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 260 Miscellaneous Correspondence filed by United States of America.(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
271 Correspondence re: reply to Plaintiffs and the United States oppositions (ECF 265 & 270) to the request (ECF 259) by the Pocomoke Defendants and Worcester County for referral to a Magistrate Judge for a Settlement

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Conference and stay of discovery pending the outcome of that conference. (Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 02/06/2019)
272 ORDER denying 259 Request of all Defendants in this matter for a stay of discovery pending the outcome of a settlement conference to be held before a Magistrate Judge. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 2/7/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/07/2019)
273 Correspondence re: Proposed Revised Schedule (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 02/08/2019)
274 ORDER revising the schedule. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 2/8/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/08/2019)
275 MOTION to Appear Pro Hac Vice for Madeline Cohen (Filing fee $100, receipt number 0416-7845344.) by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 02/15/2019)
276 PAPERLESS ORDER granting 275 Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice on behalf of Madeline Cohen. Directing attorney Madeline Cohen to register online for CM/ECF at http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/electronic-casefiling-registration. Signed by Clerk on 2/19/2019. (srd, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/19/2019)
277 NOTICE of Appearance by Charles C Lemley on behalf of Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Lemley, Charles) (Entered: 02/19/2019)
278 NOTICE by United States of America Attorney Withdrawal (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Phoenix, Candyce) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
279 ORDER granting 278 Request for Withdrawal of Appearance of Candyce Phoenix. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 3/1/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/01/2019)
280 NOTICE of Appearance by Kali Jones Schellenberg on behalf of United States of America (Schellenberg, Kali) (Entered: 03/05/2019)
281 NOTICE of Acceptance with Offer of Judgment by Lynell Green, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 03/27/2019)
282 MOTION for Protective Order by Department of Maryland State Police (Attachments: # 1 Supplement Memorandum in Support of Motion)(Siff, Ephraim) (Entered: 03/29/2019)
283 NOTICE of Appearance by Hillary K Valderrama on behalf of United States of America (Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 03/29/2019)
284 ORDER REFERRING CASE to Magistrate Judge Beth P. Gesner for all Discovery. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 4/2/2019. (cags, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/02/2019)

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285 MOTION for Leave to File Opposition to MSP Motion for Protective Order by Franklin Savage (Attachments: # 1 Memorandum in Opposition to MSP Motion for Protective Order)(Jeon, Deborah) (Entered: 04/11/2019)
286 (FILED IN ERROR) NOTICE by United States of America Attorney Withdrawal (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schellenberg, Kali) Modified on 4/12/2019 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 04/11/2019)
287 RESPONSE in Opposition re 282 MOTION for Protective Order filed by United States of America. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1 - Letter from B. Foster to K. Sewell (June 23, 2014), # 2 Exhibit 2 - U.S. Subpoena to MSP, # 3 Exhibit 3 - Letter from P. Pickus to B. Schwabauer (March 13, 2019), # 4 Exhibit 4 - Letter from B. Schwabauer to P. Pickus (March 20, 2019), # 5 Exhibit 5 - Letter from P. Pickus to B. Schwabauer (March 25, 2019))(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 04/11/2019)
288 (FILED IN ERROR) NOTICE by United States of America Attorney Withdrawal (corrected) (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Schellenberg, Kali) Modified on 4/12/2019 (bmhs, Deputy Clerk). (Entered: 04/11/2019)
289 QC NOTICE: 286 Notice (Other) filed by United States of America, and 288 Notice (Other) filed by United States of America was filed incorrectly. **The document attached to the entry is titled for a case in another district. It has been noted as FILED IN ERROR, and the document link has been disabled. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
290 NOTICE by United States of America of Request to Withdraw Appearance of Kali Schellenberg (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order re: Withdrawal of Appearance)(Schwabauer, Barbara) (Entered: 04/12/2019)
291 ORDER granting 290 Notice of Request to Withdraw Appearance. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 4/12/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/15/2019)
292 NOTICE of Appearance by Emily Given on behalf of United States of America (Given, Emily) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
293 REPLY to Response to Motion re 282 MOTION for Protective Order filed by Department of Maryland State Police.(Pickus, Phillip) (Entered: 04/25/2019)
Settlement Conference held on 5/2/2019 before Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/03/2019)

05/14/2019 05/14/2019 07/15/2019 07/15/2019 09/13/2019 09/13/2019 09/16/2019
10/10/2019 10/10/2019 10/16/2019
10/24/2019 11/14/2019

294 Joint MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 05/14/2019)
295 ORDER granting 294 Motion for Stay of All Pending Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 5/14/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/14/2019)
296 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 07/15/2019)
297 ORDER granting 296 Consent Motion for Stay of all Pending Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 7/15/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 07/16/2019)
298 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
299 ORDER Granting 298 Motion to Stay of All Pending Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 9/13/2019. (bas, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/13/2019)
300 ORDER Denying 282 Motion for Protective Order; Denying 285 Motion for Leave to File Opposition to MSP Motion for Protective Order. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 9/16/2019. (bas, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 09/16/2019)
301 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
302 ORDER granting 301 Motion to Stay All Pending Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 10/10/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/10/2019)
303 PAPERLESS ORDER scheduling a settlement status call for October 24, 2019 at 9:30 a.m. The parties to join conference with the given call-in number. Signed by Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson on 10/16/2019. (daws, Chambers) (Entered: 10/16/2019)
Telephone Status Conference held on 10/24/2019 before Magistrate Judge J. Mark Coulson. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 10/24/2019)
304 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 11/14/2019)

11/14/2019 12/04/2019
12/04/2019 12/12/2019 12/12/2019 01/02/2020 01/07/2020 01/08/2020 01/10/2020 01/10/2020

305 ORDER granting 304 Motion to Stay all Pending Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 11/14/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 11/14/2019)
306 Joint MOTION for Settlement by Consent Decree by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Proposed Consent Decree Resolving Claims Against Defendants Pocomoke City, Russell Blake, Ernest Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, and the County Commissioners of Worcester County)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 12/04/2019)
307 Consent Decree Between Plaintiffs, Plaintiff-Intervenor United States, and Defendant Pocomoke City. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 12/4/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/05/2019)
308 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 12/12/2019)
309 ORDER granting 308 the United States' Consent Motion for Stay of Pending Deadlines Pertaining to the State Defendants. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 12/12/2019. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 12/12/2019)
310 Correspondence re: Withdrawal of Appearance (Karp, Daniel) (Entered: 01/02/2020)
311 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 01/07/2020)
312 ORDER granting 311 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 1/8/2020. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/08/2020)
313 MOTION for Judgment and Stipulation of Dismissal as to Certain Defendants by Lynell Green, Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell (Attachments: # 1 Attachment 1, # 2 Attachment 2, # 3 Attachment 3, # 4 Text of Proposed Order)(Smith, Craig) (Entered: 01/10/2020)
314 ORDER entering judgment on Plaintiffs Kelvin Sewell and Lynell Green's complaint as to Defendant Pocomoke City; granting the stipulation of dismissal regarding certain defendants; dismissing with prejudice the complaint of Plaintiff Franklin Savage as to Defendants Pocomoke City, Russell Blake, Ernest Crofoot, Bruce Morrison and the County Commissioners of Worcester County; dismissing with prejudice the complaint of Plaintiffs Kelvin Sewell and Lynell Green as to Defendants Russell Blake, Ernest Crofoot, Bruce Morrison and the County Commissioners of Worcester County. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 1/10/2020. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 01/13/2020)

02/10/2020 02/10/2020 03/11/2020 03/11/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020
04/13/2020 04/13/2020 05/11/2020 05/11/2020

315 Consent MOTION to Stay ALL PENDING DEADLINES by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 02/10/2020)
316 ORDER granting 315 Consent Motion for Stay of Pending Deadlines Pertaining to the State Defendants. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 2/10/2020. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 02/11/2020)
317 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 03/11/2020)
318 ORDER granting 317 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 3/11/2020. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/11/2020)
319 NOTICE of Appearance by Matthew Douglas Peter on behalf of Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City (Peter, Matthew) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
320 Consent MOTION to Amend/Correct 307 Order on Motion for Settlement by Pocomoke City(Peter, Matthew) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
321 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Russell Blake, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Ernie Crofoot, Bruce Morrison, Pocomoke City(Rynd, Michael) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
322 MARGINAL ORDER granting 321 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney. Attorney Michael Brooks Rynd terminated. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 3/17/2020. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
323 MARGINAL ORDER granting 320 CONSENT Motion to Modify Consent Decree; Reminding counsel to submit proposed orders with all motions. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 3/17/2020. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 03/17/2020)
324 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
325 MARGINAL ORDER approving 324 Consent Motion to Continue the Stay of All Pending Deadlines. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 4/13/2020. (ols, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 04/13/2020)
326 Consent MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 05/11/2020)
327 ORDER granting 326 Consent Motion for Stay of Pending Deadlines Pertaining to the State Defendants. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 5/11/2020. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 05/12/2020)

06/18/2020 06/18/2020 07/31/2020 07/31/2020 08/14/2020 08/14/2020

328 Joint MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Attachment Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 06/18/2020)
329 ORDER granting 328 Joint Motion for Stay of Pending Deadlines to the State Defendants. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 6/18/2020. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 06/19/2020)
330 Joint MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 07/31/2020)
331 ORDER granting 330 Joint Motion for Stay of Pending Deadlines Pertaining to the State Defendants. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 7/31/2020. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/03/2020)
332 Joint MOTION to Stay All Pending Deadlines by United States of America (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order)(Valderrama, Hillary) (Entered: 08/14/2020)
333 ORDER granting 332 Joint Motion for Stay of Pending Deadlines Pertaining to the State Defendants. Signed by Judge Ellen L. Hollander on 8/14/2020. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk) (Entered: 08/17/2020)

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 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Northern Division

FRANKLIN SAVAGE, 3211 Sheephouse Road Pocomoke City, MD 21851 County of Residence: Worcester
KELVIN SEWELL, 815 Amory Court Severn, MD 21114 County of Residence: Anne Arundel
and LYNELL GREEN, 30011 Greensprings Drive Princess Anne, MD 21853 County of Residence: Somerset
Plaintiffs,
v.
POCOMOKE CITY, 101 Clarke Avenue P.O. Box 29 Pocomoke City, MD 21851 County of Residence: Worcester
Serve on: Bruce Morrison Mayor City Hall 101 Clarke Avenue Pocomoke City, MD 21851
POCOMOKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1500 Market Street Pocomoke City, MD 21851 County of Residence: Worcester
Serve on: William Harden Chief of Police 1500 Market Street Pocomoke City, MD 21851

COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Civil Action No. ________________
Jury Trial Demand

WORCESTER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, Worcester County Government Center 1 West Market Street, Room 1001 Snow Hill, MD 21863 County of Residence: Worcester
Serve on: Reggie T. Mason, Sr. Sheriff 1 West Market Street Snow Hill, MD 21863
DEPARTMENT OF MARYLAND STATE POLICE, 1201 Reistertown Road Pikesville, MD 21208 County of Residence: Baltimore
Serve on: Brian E. Frosh Attorney General 200 St. Paul Place Baltimore, MD 21202
RUSSELL BLAKE, in his individual capacity 7 Winter Quarters Drive Pocomoke City, MD 21851 County of Residence: Worcester
ERNIE CROFOOT, in his individual capacity 1501 Cedar Run Pocomoke City, MD 21851 County of Residence: Worcester
BRUCE MORRISON, in his individual capacity 218 Walnut Street Pocomoke City, MD 21851 County of Residence: Worcester
BEAU OGLESBY, in his individual capacity 50 Capetown Road Ocean Pines, MD 21811 County of Residence: Worcester
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NATHANIEL PASSWATERS, in his individual capacity 12333 Dixie Drive Bishopville, MD 21813 County of Residence: Worcester
BROOKS PHILLIPS, in his individual capacity 4108 Red House Road Snow Hill, MD 21863 County of Residence: Worcester
DALE SMACK, in his individual capacity 5541 Princess Way Snow Hill, MD 21863 County of Residence: Worcester
DALE TROTTER, in his individual capacity 11 Front Street Pocomoke City, MD 21851 County of Residence: Worcester
RODNEY WELLS, in his individual capacity 4415 Brick Kiln Road Snow Hill, MD 21863 County of Residence: Worcester
and PATRICIA DONALDSON, in her individual capacity 3104 Points Reach Ocean Pines, MD 21811 County of Residence: Worcester
Defendants.
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INTRODUCTION 1. This is one of the saddest and most shocking cases this Court is likely to address. Three African American police officers, working for Pocomoke City, Maryland, experienced racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for the exercise of their federal civil rights in a manner that most Americans would have believed unthinkable in the second decade of the 21st Century. While Pocomoke City bills itself as the “Friendliest Town on the Eastern Shore,” its law enforcement community, including the Pocomoke City Police Department, the Department of Maryland State Police, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, and, most disappointingly, the State’s Attorney’s Office, acted more in the vein of “Jim Crow.” 2. Three model police officers, including the first African American chief of police in Pocomoke City and the first and only African American detective assigned to the local narcotics task force, were mocked, threatened, demeaned, demoted, punished, falsely accused of misconduct, ostracized, and humiliated because of their race. Ultimately, two of the Plaintiffs here, Franklin Savage (“Officer Savage”) and Kelvin Sewell (“Chief Sewell”), were fired by Pocomoke City in obvious retaliation for their filing of United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaints. The third officer, Lynell Green (“Lieutenant Green”), remains employed by Pocomoke City, but his terms of employment have been detrimentally altered, and he is ostracized by the entire department. The intervention of this Court is vitally necessary to make clear to some members of the law enforcement community on the Eastern Shore that this blatant disregard of federal constitutional and statutory rights will not be tolerated. 3. The use of the word “nigger” long ago ceased to be tolerated in any American workplace. So, too, did other forms of racial mockery, epithets, threats, humiliation, and discrimination based on race in the terms of employment. Yet, the three Plaintiffs in this
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action—Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lieutenant Green—experienced unlawful conduct of this character, often on a daily basis.
4. Officer Savage endured a hostile work environment and employment discrimination throughout his four-year tenure with the Pocomoke City Police Department. He spent more than half of that time detailed to the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team (“Joint Task Force”), a regional drug-interdiction task force, led by the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. Officer Savage was the first and only African American police officer ever assigned to the Joint Task Force. Over more than two years, members of the Joint Task Force, and at least one other government official, used the word “nigger”—and its variants—in Officer Savage’s presence numerous times. They also subjected Officer Savage to other forms of racial harassment and discrimination, such as taking an on-duty side trip to a so-called “KKK Lane” and placing a fake food stamp in Officer Savage’s desk drawer on which a picture of President Obama had been superimposed. A bloody deer’s tail was placed on Officer Savage’s car windshield on a side street by the Joint Task Force office while he was on duty. One of Officer Savage’s supervisors, Defendant Passwaters, participated actively in the racial discrimination against him. His other supervisor on the Joint Task Force, Defendant Donaldson, knew of the unlawful racially discriminatory acts but did nothing to stop them or discipline the offenders.
5. When Officer Savage finally complained within the Pocomoke City Police Department about this racially-motivated mistreatment, and left the Joint Task Force, he found himself railroaded out of law enforcement in Worcester County. He was demoted without reason. His duties were restricted. He was blackballed from testifying in criminal cases—an integral part of his job—by the county’s State’s Attorney. In a hallmark of retaliation, the same Officer Savage who had received glowing reviews and laudatory letters of recommendation for
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years was suddenly described as an incompetent and untrustworthy officer. Officer Savage was then fired from the Pocomoke City Police Department without just cause and for stated reasons that are obvious pretexts for racial hostility and retaliation.
6. The retaliation against Officer Savage also swept up the other Plaintiffs, Chief Sewell and Lieutenant Green.
7. Chief Sewell served as chief of the Pocomoke City Police Department for almost all of Officer Savage’s employment, and, as noted above, was the first African American police chief of Pocomoke City. He was fired from the Pocomoke City Police Department because he refused to fire Officer Savage in the face of pressure from various Pocomoke City and Worcester County employees and elected officials. Chief Sewell refused to fire Officer Savage both because he saw no basis for his discharge and because Chief Sewell viewed firing Officer Savage as improper retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected conduct in filing EEOC complaints against the very individuals who wanted him fired.
8. Lieutenant Green, for his part, has been and remains a lieutenant in the Pocomoke City Police Department. He attended a mediation hearing regarding a claim that Officer Savage filed with the EEOC as a show of support for Officer Savage. Lieutenant Green then found himself on the wrong side of the law enforcement officialdom in Worcester County. For supporting Officer Savage, Lieutenant Green has experienced repeated acts of retaliation from his fellow officers and the Pocomoke City Council. Lieutenant Green also has had his pay restricted by Pocomoke City and Pocomoke City Police Department policies that may appear facially neutral and broadly applicable but, upon scrutiny, are clearly targeted at Lieutenant Green alone.
9. Plaintiffs are thus suing the individuals and entities responsible for this unchecked
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pattern and practice of virulent racial discrimination and retaliation against Plaintiffs. They are also suing the officers, elected officials, law-enforcement agencies, and governmental entities that condoned or failed to stop this behavior and those that orchestrated retaliation against the Plaintiffs for seeking to remedy a racially hostile work environment and discrimination, and then joined in unlawful retaliation against the three for supporting each other’s protected conduct.
10. Plaintiffs present numerous causes of action because race-based discrimination and retaliation are both clearly prohibited by federal laws as well as the United States Constitution. The asserted causes of action include those arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Plaintiffs expect to add further causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), once those claims are administratively exhausted before the EEOC and become ripe for suit.
11. The damages here are substantial. Officer Savage and Chief Sewell have both been wrongfully fired. Officer Savage has been unable to find new employment as a police officer and has suffered physical and psychological harm directly attributable to his mistreatment. Chief Sewell is currently unemployed and seeks reinstatement to his former position as Pocomoke City’s chief of police. Both Officer Savage and Chief Sewell seek front and back pay and damages for both physical and psychological harms as well as injunctive relief. Lieutenant Green seeks back pay for loss of overtime and injunctive relief to restore his full status and duties on the force. All Plaintiffs seek costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. All Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury.
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NATURE OF THE ACTION 12. Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, 29 U.S.C. § 201, and the United States Constitution to remedy the unlawful discrimination and retaliation engaged in by Defendants Pocomoke City, Pocomoke City Police Department, Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, Department of Maryland State Police, Russell Blake (“Blake”), Ernie Crofoot (“Crofoot”), Bruce Morrison (“Morrison”), Beau Oglesby (“Oglesby”), Nathaniel Passwaters (“Passwaters”), Brooks Phillips (“Phillips”), Dale Smack (“Smack”), Dale Trotter (“Trotter”), Rodney Wells (“Wells”), and Patricia Donaldson (“Donaldson”).
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 13. This Court has original jurisdiction over all Counts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because those claims arise under the United States Constitution and laws of the United States. 14. Jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. 15. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because all of the events, acts, and/or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the State of Maryland. Specifically, most of them occurred in Worcester County, Maryland.
PARTIES PLAINTIFFS 16. Officer Savage joined the Pocomoke City Police Department in April 2011. He began representing the Pocomoke City Police Department as an officer on the Joint Task Force in or around February 2012. Officer Savage was the first African American detailed to the Joint Task Force. He was known as an excellent narcotics officer—particularly in undercover narcotics buys. 17. In or around May 2012, Officer Savage was promoted to detective. He resigned from the Joint Task Force on June 12, 2014, and returned to the Pocomoke City Police
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Department as a detective. After reporting the harassment and retaliatory behavior of which he had been victim while on the Joint Task Force, Officer Savage was demoted from detective to officer on February 9, 2015. He was told he could not make arrests alone or testify in court. Eventually, he was demoted to patrolman, often checking doors on the night shift. Officer Savage was unlawfully terminated from his position as a patrolman in the Pocomoke City Police Department on October 26, 2015.
18. Chief Sewell joined the Pocomoke City Police Department in November 2010, after retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department as a sergeant after twenty-two years of service. He was hired as a lieutenant and served as the Pocomoke City Police Department’s operations manager. Chief Sewell was promoted to captain on October 1, 2011, and to chief of police on December 1, 2011. Chief Sewell was the first African American to hold this position in Pocomoke City. During his tenure as chief, there were no homicides in Pocomoke City. Crime, particularly drug and street crime, dropped significantly during Chief Sewell’s tenure. Chief Sewell instituted community policing principles in Pocomoke City and the relations between the police department and the citizenry, including the African American community, improved significantly. Chief Sewell was respected by his officers and by the community. He enjoyed a reputation as an excellent police chief. Chief Sewell served as chief until he was unlawfully terminated on July 1, 2015.
19. Lieutenant Green joined the Pocomoke City Police Department on or about November 13, 2011, as an officer. He was promoted to first sergeant on December 6, 2011, and was promoted to his current position, lieutenant and operations manager, on February 29, 2012. He was a ten-year veteran of the Baltimore City Police Department before joining the force in Pocomoke City. Since supporting Officer Savage in the latter’s EEOC complaint, Lieutenant
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Green has had his pay and terms of employment adversely altered in retaliation for that support. DEFENDANTS
20. Pocomoke City is a municipality in Worcester County, Maryland, and is incorporated under Maryland law. Pocomoke City has the capacity under Maryland law to sue and be sued. Pocomoke City is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because of racial discrimination in employment. Pocomoke City is also subject to liability for violation of federal civil rights and race discrimination perpetrated under color of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
21. The Pocomoke City Police Department is an instrumentality of Pocomoke City, as authorized and established under Maryland law and the Pocomoke City Charter. The Pocomoke City Police Department is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because of racial discrimination in employment. The Pocomoke City Police Department is also subject to liability for violation of federal civil rights and race discrimination perpetrated under color of law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
22. The Worcester County Sheriff’s Office is an instrumentality of Worcester County, Maryland. The Worcester County Sheriff’s Office is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because of racial discrimination in employment.
23. The Department of Maryland State Police is an instrumentality of the State of Maryland. The Department of Maryland State Police is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because of racial discrimination in employment.
24. Blake is the former city manager of Pocomoke City. Blake served as city manager of Pocomoke City for forty years—from 1975 to 2015. He resigned as city manager the day before Chief Sewell was terminated. At all times relevant to Blake’s acts or commissions as alleged in this Complaint, Blake acted under the color of Maryland law He is
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subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Blake is sued in his individual capacity.
25. Crofoot is the current city manager of Pocomoke City. At all times relevant to Crofoot’s acts and omissions as alleged in this Complaint, Crofoot acted under the color of Maryland law. He is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985. Crofoot is sued in his individual capacity.
26. Morrison is the mayor of Pocomoke City. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Morrison acted under the color of Maryland law. He is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Morrison is sued in his individual capacity.
27. Oglesby is the Maryland State’s Attorney for Worcester County. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Oglesby acted under the color of Maryland law. He is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Oglesby is sued in his individual capacity.
28. Passwaters is a sergeant in the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. He was one of two supervisors of the Joint Task Force, which included direct supervision of Officer Savage. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Passwaters acted under the color of Maryland law. He is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Passwaters is sued in his individual capacity.
29. Phillips is a corporal in the Department of Maryland State Police. He was a member of the Joint Task Force on which Officer Savage served. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Phillips acted under the color of Maryland law. He is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Phillips is sued in his individual capacity.
30. Smack, the only African American named as a Defendant in this Complaint, is the chief deputy sheriff of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. During all times mentioned in
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this Complaint, Smack acted under the color of Maryland law. He is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985. Smack is sued in his individual capacity.
31. Trotter is a corporal in the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. He is also a member of the Pocomoke City Council. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Trotter acted under the color of Maryland law. He is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Trotter is sued in his individual capacity.
32. Wells is a corporal in the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Wells acted under the color of Maryland law. He is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Wells is sued in his individual capacity.
33. Donaldson is a sergeant in the Department of the Maryland State Police. Donaldson was the other supervisor of the Joint Task Force, and thus also supervised Officer Savage. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Donaldson acted under the color of Maryland law. She is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Donaldson knew of and condoned some of the wrongful acts and omissions complained of in this Complaint. Donaldson took no action as a supervisor on the Joint Task Force to end the discrimination or punish the offenders. Donaldson is sued in her individual capacity.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS About Pocomoke City
34. Once a major shipping town along the Pocomoke River, Pocomoke City sits in the southwest corner of Worcester County, Maryland’s easternmost county. The nearest town of any size, Salisbury, is a half-hour to the north; Ocean City is forty-five minutes to the northeast. By car, Pocomoke City is slightly closer to Norfolk than Annapolis. In between these cities and Pocomoke City, and in every other direction, are miles of farm fields and hunting grounds.
35. Pocomoke City and the surrounding area have an unfortunate past with respect to 12

race relations. The area was slaveholding and lies south of the Mason-Dixon Line. The City remains highly residentially segregated. Almost half of the population is African American. Historically, the government of the City has been entirely White.
36. Pocomoke City is governed by its mayor, city manager, and city council. 37. The office of mayor is an elected position. The mayor must be a resident and registered voter of Pocomoke City. The mayor holds his or her office for a three-year term. In this role, the mayor presides over the city council. The Pocomoke City Charter states: “The [m]ayor may take part in all [City Council] discussions, but shall have no vote.” Pocomoke City Charter § C-8. 38. The city council consists of five elected individuals who each must be a resident of Pocomoke City for at least one year prior to their election. Each council member is elected to represent a single geographic district within the city’s borders for a three-year term. 39. The city manager is appointed for an indefinite term by the city council. While serving in this capacity, the city manager must be a resident of Pocomoke City. The city manager “shall have power and shall be required to appoint and, when necessary for the good of service, suspend or remove all officers and employees of the City.” The city manager may hire and fire Pocomoke City employees, including police officers. Ultimately, the city manager is responsible for “the proper administration” of Pocomoke City. Pocomoke City Charter § C-23. 40. According to 2010 Census data, just over 45% of Pocomoke City’s 4,000 residents identify as Black or African American, and just fewer than 50% of its residents identify as White. 41. Despite these demographics, Pocomoke City is managed almost entirely by its White citizens. The mayor, Morrison, is White. Blake, the city manager for forty years, is
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White. Crofoot, Blake’s replacement, is White. All members of the city council are White, except for one, Diane Downing. About the Pocomoke City Police Department
42. The Pocomoke City Police Department consists of up to sixteen law-enforcement officers. The officers are ranked from the entry-level rank of patrolman through chief of police. The chief of police leads the department. Two lieutenants report to the chief; one lieutenant manages the operations of officers while the other manages administrative matters.
43. The chief reports to both the mayor and the city manager. Under this arrangement, Chief Sewell reported to both Morrison and Blake while leading the department.
44. As city manager, however, Blake acted as if it was solely within his power to make personnel decisions for the Pocomoke City Police Department.
45. On several occasions, Chief Sewell would submit his annual budget, which included suggested salaries for the police department employees, to Blake who should have then reviewed the budget and submitted it to the city council. Instead, Blake would completely disregard Chief Sewell’s budget and submit a single sheet of paper setting forth Blake’s own suggested compensation amounts for the police department employees.
46. In October 2011, Blake informed Chief Sewell that his salary would not be adjusted for his promotion to captain.
47. Despite Pocomoke City’s significantly improved crime statistics during his tenure, Chief Sewell did not receive yearly raises, compensatory time, or paid health insurance, as other chiefs have been given in the past.
48. On information and belief, the chief of police prior to Chief Sewell received a raise each year he served as chief. Chief Sewell received his first and only pay raise when he was promoted to chief on December 1, 2011. Pocomoke City also declined to enter into an
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employment contract with Chief Sewell when he assumed his role as chief. On information and belief, past Pocomoke City police chiefs, many of whom were White, received employment contracts defining benefits and terms of severance, including severance pay.
49. Chief Sewell observed that African American officers within the Pocomoke City Police Department are generally underpaid. None of the African American officers received the pay raises he requested. From the time of Chief Sewell’s promotion to chief through his termination, neither Lieutenant Green nor Officer Savage received pay raises. On information and belief, other White police officers of similar rank and tenure to Lieutenant Green and Officer Savage did receive pay raises during the same period. About the Joint Task Force
50. In February 2012, Officer Savage was assigned to the Joint Task Force as a narcotics investigator. The Joint Task Force is a multijurisdictional drug enforcement unit led by the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. Most Joint Task Force members are members of Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, but other Maryland law enforcement agencies, including the Department of Maryland State Police and the Ocean City Police Department, regularly detail officers for set periods of time. At the time Officer Savage began working with the Joint Task Force, it was housed in the same building as the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
51. In or about June 2012, the Joint Task Force moved from the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office to its own separate off-site location within Worcester County. The vehicles and other equipment for surveillance and arrest were provided to Joint Task Force members by the Maryland State Police and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
52. At the time Officer Savage was a member of the Joint Task Force, the other members of the Joint Task Force were all White males, with the exception of Donaldson, a White female. The members of the Joint Task Force included the following defendants:
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Passwaters, Donaldson, Phillips, and Wells. The members also included Jeff Johns and Brian Trader. Passwaters and Donaldson were Officer Savage’s immediate supervisors.
53. As the Joint Task Force’s supervisors, Passwaters and Donaldson were required to report misconduct by any Joint Task Force member to that member’s parent agency. The parent agency has the authority to discipline Joint Task Force members. Passwaters and Donaldson also determined Officer Savage’s duties during his time on the Joint Task Force and were responsible for preparing his employment evaluation and forwarding that report to Chief Sewell. That evaluation could affect Officer Savage’s rank, pay, and future prospects within the Pocomoke City Police Department. The Joint Task Force’s Racially Hostile Work Environment
54. Shortly after his appointment to the Joint Task Force in or around May 2012, the other seven Joint Task Force members began discriminating against Officer Savage.
55. The Joint Task Force members would regularly refer to African Americans as “niggers” in Officer Savage’s presence. They repeatedly used the word in a sarcastic or demeaning tone to Officer Savage both orally and in written communications.
56. Beginning in 2012, on their official work computers and in Officer Savage’s presence, members of the Joint Task Force watched and laughed about racially-charged videos that used the word “nigger.”
57. In or around September 2012, Wells asked Officer Savage why African Americans are offended when a White person uses the word “nigger” and its variants. Wells then asked Officer Savage how he would personally feel if he called him a “nigger.” Officer Savage indicated that he would be offended.
58. On September 16, 2012, Wells and Passwaters arrested an African American man
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for drug possession. The suspect used the word “nigger” and its variants several times during an arrest. After viewing the dash cam footage of the arrest, Passwaters played and replayed the footage in front of the entire Joint Task Force because he thought the video was funny. During this incident, Passwaters informed members of the Joint Task Force that “he [was] about to drop the n-bomb,” referring to the word “nigger.”
59. In December 2012, Joint Task Force members repeatedly spoke to Officer Savage about lynchings and the Ku Klux Klan.
60. On one occasion, Phillips, Trader, Wells, and Donaldson took Officer Savage to “KKK Lane” in Stockton, Maryland in Officer Savage’s official covert vehicle provided by the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
61. At that time, the Joint Task Force had no official duties in Stockton. 62. Wells and Trader told Officer Savage that he might see some Klan members or a noose in Stockton. 63. On or about this same time, Wells told Officer Savage about a chest in his attic in which he kept “white sheets and nooses.” 64. Phillips later informed Passwaters, one of the Joint Task Force’s two sergeants and supervisors, that they had taken Officer Savage to “KKK Lane,” and Passwaters merely responded “OK.” 65. On December 17, 2013, Officer Savage found a bloody deer’s tail on the windshield of his car, which was parked on a side street by the Joint Task Force Office. 66. Officer Savage reported the incident to Passwaters, and Phillips, who overheard Officer Savage, began laughing about the incident. 67. Donaldson later sent Officer Savage a text message acknowledging that Phillips
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placed the bloody deer’s tail on Officer Savage’s car. A true and correct copy of Donaldson’s text message is attached as Exhibit A to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
68. Following the bloody deer’s tail incident, Officer Savage felt that he could not report the harassment to Passwaters and Donaldson, his Joint Task Force supervisors, because Passwaters was actively involved in the harassment and Donaldson had indicated by her previous inaction that she would not do anything to halt the discriminatory behavior.
69. Officer Savage was also hesitant to report the harassment outside of the Joint Task Force because he feared retaliation from City Manager Russell Blake, Councilmember Dale Trotter, and Worcester County State’s Attorney Beau Oglesby—powerful figures in the Eastern Shore community who had authority over his employment conditions and who later would become aligned against him.
70. In April 2014, Officer Savage found in his desk drawer a fake food stamp on which an image of President Obama had been imposed, which Officer Savage took to be ridiculing African Americans. A true and correct copy of the fake food stamp placed in Officer Savage’s desk drawer at the Joint Task Force is attached as Exhibit B to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. On information and belief, only Officer Savage, and none of the other Joint Task Force members, received such a food stamp.
71. Officer Savage verbally reported this incident to Chief Sewell. 72. On May 31, 2014, Phillips sent Officer Savage a text that read: “What’s ya body count nigga? I’m in double digits.” A true and correct copy of Phillips’ text message is attached as Exhibit C to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 73. Chief Sewell wrote a letter to Colonel Marcus L. Brown, the chief of the
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Maryland State Police, regarding this incident. 74. On June 3, 2014, Passwaters accused Officer Savage of repeated tardiness and
alleged that Officer Savage’s debt collectors and “wife” were repeatedly calling the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. Officer Savage has never been married and these calls did not exist. Passwaters had no documents or other support for these allegations.
75. On or about June 3, 2014, at the Joint Task Force’s briefing before an undercover controlled substance purchase, Passwaters asked Officer Savage if he was on drugs.
76. During that purchase, Phillips burned some of the marijuana—one of the substances obtained by the Joint Task Force during the purchase. When an Ocean City Police Department officer with whom the Joint Task Force was working commented on the smell in the police vehicle, Phillips told the officer that Officer Savage had been smoking the marijuana. Photographs of the marijuana and pipe that Phillips used are attached as Exhibit D to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
77. The next day, on June 4, 2014, Officer Savage informed Chief Sewell that Passwaters asked Officer Savage if he was on drugs. Chief Sewell then instructed Officer Savage to undergo a drug screening.
78. On June 6, 2014, Officer Savage underwent the drug test ordered by Chief Sewell. The test results came back negative.
79. The racially-hostile environment and the use of the word “nigger” orally and in written form aimed at Officer Savage or in Officer Savage’s presence continued for the entire two-year plus period he served on the Joint Task Force.
80. Officer Savage was insulted and offended by the racially-hostile environment on the Joint Task Force.
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81. Officer Savage was further offended by the participation of one supervisor in the racially discriminatory conduct and the failure of the other supervisor to intervene to stop the conduct or recommend discipline.
82. Officer Savage was physically and psychologically harmed by the racially-hostile work environment created by the Joint Task Force.
83. As a member of the Joint Task Force, Officer Savage had consistently positive performance reviews from his supervisors.
84. On September 20, 2013, in Officer Savage’s annual employee performance evaluation, Passwaters wrote that Officer Savage is “reliable” and “is very trustworthy with sensitive information.”
85. Officer Savage’s evaluations were forwarded by Donaldson and/or Passwaters to Chief Sewell, the chief of police of the Pocomoke City Police Department, who could use them to alter Officer Savage’s conditions of employment, such as his continued detail to the Joint Task Force, rank promotions, and raises.
86. Irrespective of their overall treatment of Officer Savage, in or around April 2014, Officer Savage’s colleagues and superiors wrote positive letters of recommendation on behalf of Officer Savage for his applications to other police departments. Several true and correct exemplars of these letters of recommendation are attached as Exhibit E to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. Racially Offensive Conduct by the State’s Attorney for Worcester County
87. State’s Attorney Beau Oglesby leads the office that is solely responsible for prosecuting the cases investigated by the Pocomoke City Police Department and the cases brought by the Joint Task Force within its jurisdiction. In this capacity, Oglesby frequently
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interacted with all three of the Plaintiffs and made decisions on which of their cases he would prosecute.
88. On April 7, 2014, during a meeting with Officer Savage, Passwaters, and Assistant State’s Attorneys Kelly Hurley and Ajene Turnbull, Oglesby read a series of letters written by a suspect, placing particular emphasis on and repeatedly saying the word “nigga.”
89. Oglesby read the word “nigga” in the letters to the assembled prosecutors and police officers more than ten times.
90. Mid-way through reading the letters, Oglesby paused and asked whether anyone in the room was offended. At that moment, Assistant State’s Attorney Turnbull, the only African American present other than Officer Savage, left the room.
91. Oglesby then continued reading the letters aloud, and continued saying “nigga.” True and correct copies of the letters Oglesby read from during this incident on April 7, 2014 are attached to this Complaint as Exhibit F and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
92. Oglesby’s reading of the word “nigga” in the letters and his use of the word were unnecessary and irrelevant to the prosecution of the case in connection with which the letters were obtained.
93. Following this incident, Oglesby began treating Officer Savage differently. Upon information and belief, the State’s Attorney’s Office no longer zealously prosecuted cases on which Officer Savage was the lead officer because of his race. Savage Resigns from the Joint Task Force and Complains about His Treatment; Retaliation Begins
94. On June 12, 2014, Officer Savage resigned from the Joint Task Force, citing the repeated use of the word “nigger” and variations thereof by his superiors and colleagues and a
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hostile work environment. 95. Upon Officer Savage’s resignation from the Joint Task Force, Worcester County
Sheriff’s Office members began spreading rumors about Officer Savage’s honor and integrity. 96. On June 23, 2014, Bernard B. Foster, the Chief of Staff for the Office of the
Superintendent in the Maryland State Police, responded to Chief Sewell’s May 31, 2014 letter, stating that the letter was received and that Detective Sergeant Kelly Austin was assigned to this administrative investigation.
97. Later, in a letter addressed to Officer Savage, Lieutenant M. B. Daugherty of the Criminal Enforcement Division of the Maryland State Police wrote that Detective Sergeant Kelly concluded that Phillips “violated the rules and regulations of the Maryland State Police with Unbecoming Conduct.” A true and correct copy of Lieutenant Daugherty’s letter is attached as Exhibit G to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
98. On information and belief, despite acknowledging that Officer Savage’s allegations against Phillips were well-founded, the Department of Maryland State Police has taken no disciplinary action of any kind against Phillips to date.
99. On July 15, 2014, Passwaters spread a false rumor to Morrison and Blake that Officer Savage used the false identification he had been issued for undercover work to secure multiple fraudulent loans. Blake demanded that Chief Sewell investigate this allegation.
100. Officer Savage returned the false identification to Chief Sewell. The allegation that Officer Savage had misused the undercover identification document(s) was false and was designed to injure Officer Savage’s credibility.
101. Around this same time, in mid-July 2014, Officer Savage noticed that he was no
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longer listed as a “detective” in the Pocomoke City employee database, which he took as a form of public humiliation, falsely suggesting that he had been demoted.
102. On July 21, 2014, Officer Savage filed a complaint against the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office with the EEOC.
103. On July 22, 2014, Officer Savage filed a complaint against Oglesby with the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission regarding the April 7, 2014 incidents described in paragraphs 87 through 93. Officer Savage’s complaint explained that he was “very offended” by Oglesby’s repeated and gratuitous use of “the word Nigga so freely and without care in front of ASA Turnbull and [himself].” The letter also noted a subsequent “difference in [Oglesby’s] approach and actions towards” [sic] Officer Savage following the incident. The complaint concluded by stating that Officer Savage “had problems sleeping as a result of constantly thinking of [Oglesby] reading the ‘N’ word over and over again in those letters and not taken [sic] actions in stopping this matter.” A true and correct copy of Officer Savage’s complaint to the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission is attached as Exhibit H to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
104. Upon information and belief, Oglesby learned of the complaint a week after it was filed.
105. In late-July 2014, Passwaters spread a false rumor that Officer Savage sold his off-duty weapon. To disprove this claim, Officer Savage brought the weapon to Chief Sewell, who took photographs of it.
106. The allegation that Officer Savage sold his off-duty weapon was false and designed and intended to injure Officer Savage’s reputation and credibility in his charges of racial discrimination against Oglesby and the Joint Task Force.
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107. On July 29, 2014, Smack drafted a memorandum to Chief Sewell accusing Officer Savage of falsely representing himself to suspects as a member of the Joint Task Force. In the memorandum, Smack wrote to Chief Sewell that the Joint Task Force would “not assist or participate in any investigative efforts set forth by Officer Savage.”
108. The allegation that Officer Savage identified himself as a member of the Joint Task Force after his resignation from the Joint Task Force was false and designed and intended to injure Officer Savage’s reputation and credibility in his charges of racial discrimination against Oglesby and the Joint Task Force.
109. Also on July 29, 2014, Blake told Chief Sewell that Officer Savage would no longer be called on to testify in court against suspects in Officer Savage’s cases—including narcotics cases.
110. In a dangerous violation of his sworn duty, on August 14, 2014, Smack told Chief Sewell that the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office would not respond to any future emergency call or request for backup made by Officer Savage or Lieutenant Green.
111. On at least two occasions, Officer Savage could not secure the assistance of a K9 unit from the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, a regular procedure for the Pocomoke City Police Department.
112. Also on August 14, 2014, Officer Savage went on two weeks sick leave to deal with the stress caused by the aforementioned actions of his colleagues and former colleagues on the Joint Task Force and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and Pocomoke City Police Department officers.
113. On or about August 17, 2014, Blake instructed Chief Sewell to take Officer Savage out of narcotics work altogether and pressured Chief Sewell to assign Officer Savage to
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the undesirable midnight shift. Blake also demanded that Officer Savage be made a patrol officer, allowed only to confirm that downtown doors were locked but forbidden from making any arrest.
114. Throughout this period, Blake instigated heated arguments through email correspondence and verbal conversations with Chief Sewell over the treatment of Officer Savage. On one occasion, Blake referred to Chief Sewell as an “ungrateful ass nigger.”
115. On September 4, 2014, Oglesby refused to acknowledge Officer Savage’s presence in court and talked past him to Lieutenant Green to say that Officer Savage’s presence would not be required, which appeared to denigrate Officer Savage’s service.
116. Less than a week later, Oglesby sent the Pocomoke City mayor and city council a letter confirming that he would not allow Officer Savage to testify in court because he “question[ed] his veracity.”
117. On September 9, 2014, Chief Sewell was instructed by Blake to order Officer Savage to surrender the password to a work cell phone he used while with the Joint Task Force. Officer Savage was told that he would be disciplined by Pocomoke City Police Department if he did not reveal the password.
118. On or about September 11, 2014, Blake again instructed Chief Sewell to take Officer Savage out of narcotics work altogether and pressured Chief Sewell to assign Officer Savage to the midnight shift.
119. On September 11, 2014, Officer Savage requested sick leave “until further notice” due to the “extreme stress and turmoil involving [his] current federal EEOC case and the recent letter from Oglesby, dated September 10, 2014.” As a result of Officer Savage’s request, Blake required Chief Sewell to order Officer Savage to see a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist cleared
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Officer Savage to return to active duty. 120. On October 1, 2014, Officer Savage attended an EEOC mediation with Lieutenant
Green, Smack, and Lieutenant Michael McDermott (“McDermott”). Smack and McDermott attended the mediation on behalf of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. At the mediation, Smack and McDermott expressed hostility toward Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green.
121. At the mediation, Smack told Lieutenant Green that he and Officer Savage were the causes of Pocomoke City’s problems. Smack and McDermott also denied any responsibility or liability, arguing that the Pocomoke City Police Department was responsible for any discrimination, as Officer Savage’s principal employer, rather than the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
122. On October 13, 2014, Chief Sewell again ordered Officer Savage to see a psychiatrist “to be sure [that] the stress of [Officer Savage’s] current situation does not diminish [his] fitness and effectiveness as an officer.”
123. On October 15, 2014, Officer Savage underwent a psychiatric evaluation. The psychiatrist cleared Officer Savage to return to active duty.
124. In mid-January 2015, Trotter directed Chief Sewell to cap the allowable overtime for Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green. Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green regularly worked more than forty hours per week. Neither Officer Savage nor Lieutenant Green had the largest amount overtime for any officer. No White officer had his or her overtime similarly capped.
125. On February 9, 2015, Officer Savage was officially demoted from his position as detective to patrol officer allegedly “due to a shortage of patrol officers.” Blake and Morrison ordered Chief Sewell to take this action. A true and correct copy of the letter demoting Officer
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Savage is attached as Exhibit I to this Complaint and incorporated as if fully set forth herein. 126. But Rudell Brown, an officer trained by Officer Savage, was promoted to
detective immediately following Officer Savage’s demotion. 127. On March 9, 2015, Chief Sewell filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC
against the Pocomoke City Police Department and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. 128. On March 12, 2015, an anonymous letter was left on the windshield of Chief
Sewell’s car saying that the “niggers” Officer Savage, Lieutenant Green, and Chief Sewell will be gotten rid of. The letter also referred to Chief Sewell as a “smart nigger chief.”
129. On April 10, 2015, in a meeting with George Tasker (“Tasker”), a member of the city council, Chief Sewell explained that “Savage is the victim in his EEOC case and if [he] fire[s] him, [Savage] can sue [him], [Tasker], the Mayor and all the Council.”
130. Tasker replied that “Green is becoming a problem in [Sewell’s] department to [sic] and once he and Savage is [sic] gone, that department well [sic] be okay.” Tasker also asked Chief Sewell whether he had heard what happened to Scott Keller, who was Chief of Police in Princess Anne County’s Police Department before the Princess Anne Council voted him out of office on April 9, 2015.
131. On or about May 4, 2015, Officer Savage was informed by a citizen of Pocomoke City that Blake and Morrison were circulating a petition to remove Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green from the Pocomoke City Police Department.
132. On June 15, 2015, Chief Sewell filed his First Amended Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC against the Pocomoke City Police Department and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
133. On June 30, 2015, Blake resigned as City Manager of Pocomoke City.
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134. Before Blake’s resignation, Chief Sewell was asked to resign as chief of police, despite significant reductions in crime during his tenure and no previous complaints about his performance from Pocomoke City officials or citizens. On July 1, 2015, Morrison issued a letter terminating Chief Sewell as chief of police.
135. The city council vote to terminate Chief Sewell was 4-1, with the only African American member of the city council, Diane Downing, dissenting from the decision to terminate Chief Sewell.
136. Councilwoman Downing has repeatedly and publicly stated that the reasons given for the termination of Chief Sewell were entirely pretextual.
137. Different city officials have given several different alleged reasons for the termination of Chief Sewell at different times.
138. The firing of Chief Sewell was protested throughout Pocomoke City by both African American and White citizens because Chief Sewell had an excellent law enforcement record in Pocomoke City.
139. On July 7, 2015, Lieutenant Earl Starner, a member of the Maryland State Police, was appointed interim Chief of the Pocomoke City Police Department.
140. In August 2015, Crofoot became the City Manager and City Attorney of Pocomoke City.
141. On August 17, 2015, Starner gave Officer Savage a letter stating that Officer Savage was being investigated by the Harford County Sheriff’s Office for violating the Pocomoke City Police Department Code of Ethics because “[i]t is alleged that on July 22, 2015 [sic] you used the same language in a letter addressed to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland. This letter also contained the same misstated facts as mentioned above.” Officer
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Savage was required to sign this letter. 142. This letter is in retaliation for Officer Savage’s July 22, 2014 complaint to the
Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission for Oglesby’s use of the word on April 7, 2014. 143. On September 8, 2015, William Harden, Sr. was announced as the new chief of
police of the Pocomoke City Police Department. 144. On October 6, 2015, as required, Officer Savage attended the interrogation
regarding the Harford County investigation. 145. On October 23, 2015, Paul Haskel, a Deputy State’s Attorney in the Worcester
County State’s Attorney’s Office, called the Pocomoke City Police Department advising that Officer Savage was not needed to testify in a trial in the Worcester County District Court.
146. On or about October 16, 2015, Oglesby had a telephone conversation with Crofoot in which Oglesby was adamant that Officer Savage would never be able to testify again and was thus useless to the Pocomoke City Police Department. On information and belief, Oglesby reiterated that Officer Savage should be terminated.
147. On October 26, 2015, Officer Savage was terminated from his position as an officer with the Pocomoke City Police Department. Officer Savage was not afforded a right to a hearing or given any opportunity to appeal the decision. Prior to his termination, Officer Savage’s duties were limited to administrative tasks, such as reviewing and filing police reports. Immediately after Officer Savage was terminated, members of the Joint Task Force began spreading rumors that Officer Savage was fired for using illegal narcotics.
148. In firing both Chief Sewell and Officer Savage, Pocomoke City, the Pocomoke City Police Department, the City Council, and Defendants Blake and Morrison did not follow required procedures, including those of the City Charter and the Maryland Law Enforcement
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Officers’ Bill of Rights. 149. Both Chief Sewell and Officer Savage were fired in retaliation for the exercise of
their federal civil rights to be free from racial discrimination under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
150. As a result of Defendants’ discriminatory conduct, Plaintiffs have suffered, and in the future will continue to suffer, among other things, economic injury, humiliation, embarrassment, and mental and emotional distress. Violations of Fair Labor Standards Act
151. Officer Savage regularly worked more than forty hours per week during his tenure with the Pocomoke City Police Department.
152. Lieutenant Green regularly worked more than forty hours per week during his tenure with Pocomoke City Police Department.
153. Until approximately June 2014, Pocomoke City had a policy of not paying overtime unless the hours exceeded forty-three in one week.
154. Upon learning of this policy, Chief Sewell expressed concern about its legality. 155. In or around June 2014, Pocomoke City completed an audit of missed overtime wages between June 2011 and June 2014. The audit revealed that both Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green were owed overtime wages. 156. Blake told the city council that Pocomoke City had fully compensated its employees for the three years’ worth of missed overtime wages. 157. In fact, neither Officer Savage nor Lieutenant Green received any compensation for their unpaid overtime wages. 158. Defendants’ failure to pay Officer Savage’s and Lieutenant Green’s overtime
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wages, even after the audit had confirmed both the fact that Defendants’ owed Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green overtime wages and the amount of such wages owed, constitutes willful, knowing, and intentional violations of Fair Labor Standards Act.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF1 COUNT I
RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF § 1981 (Hostile Work Environment)
(Savage v. Pocomoke City, Pocomoke City Police Department, Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, Department of Maryland State Police, Passwaters, Wells, and Phillips) 159. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in
paragraphs 1 through 158 above. 160. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees that all persons shall have the right to make and
enforce contracts, including employment contracts free from all forms of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.
161. Section 1981 also prohibits retaliation against individuals who make complaints about racial discrimination in the creation and/or enforcement of contracts, including contracts for terms and condition of employment.
162. The right to be free from racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for assertion of one’s civil rights were both clear and well-established rights, known to each of the Defendants in this action throughout the time period of the allegations of this Complaint.
163. Officer Savage was employed by the Pocomoke City Police Department for a period of approximately four and one half years, from April 2011 to October 2015.
164. Officer Savage was also a joint employee of the Pocomoke City Police Department, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, the Maryland State Police, and the Joint
1As noted above, Plaintiffs expect to amend this Complaint to include Title VII allegations when all of their EEOC charges have matured for suit.
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Task Force for more than two years, from April 2012 to June of 2014. 165. Officer Savage regularly faced offensive comments and adverse treatment on the
basis of his race, from all Defendants. The conduct was so severe and pervasive that it created a working environment so hostile that it negatively changed the terms and conditions of his employment with all of his employers as alleged above.
166. Supervisory personnel, including, but not limited to, Defendants Passwaters and Donaldson, were aware of the racial harassment against Officer Savage and either failed to remedy the harassment or actively participated in creating a hostile work environment.
167. The acts in retaliation for Officer Savage’s complaints against the racially-hostile environment are further detailed above in paragraphs 5, 17, 105-118, 121, 124-125, 131, and 145-149.
168. The behavior by the above listed Defendants occurred when the Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment.
169. Defendants’ discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages.
170. Accordingly, Defendants have violated Officer Savage’s rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
COUNT II RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF § 1981
(Termination) (Savage and Sewell v. Pocomoke City and Pocomoke City Police Department) 171. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 158 above. 172. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees that all persons shall have the right to make and enforce contracts, including employment contracts free from all forms of discrimination on the
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basis of race and national origin. 173. Section 1981 also prohibits retaliation against individuals who make complaints
about racial discrimination in the creation and/or enforcement of contracts, including contracts for terms and conditions of employment.
174. The right to be free from racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for assertion of one’s civil rights were both clear and well-established rights, known to each of the Defendants in this action throughout the time period of the allegations of this Complaint.
175. Officer Savage had a reasonable basis in law and fact and a federally-protected right to file his complaints against Defendants before the EEOC.
176. Although he had a history of positive performance evaluations, Officer Savage was terminated from his position on October 26, 2015. This termination was motivated in whole or in part by Officer Savage’s race and/or in retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected activity.
177. Despite Pocomoke City’s improved crime statistics during Chief Sewell’s tenure as the first African American Chief of Police for the Pocomoke City Police Department, Chief Sewell was terminated from his employment by Defendants and the Pocomoke City Council on July 1, 2015. This termination was motivated in whole or in part by Chief Sewell’s race and/or in retaliation and/or was an act of retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected activity.
178. Retaliation resulting in Officer Savage’s termination is further detailed above in paragraphs 5, 95, 99-101, 105-111, 113-118, 121, 124-125, 131, and 145-149.
179. Retaliation resulting in Chief Sewell’s termination is further detailed above in paragraphs 7, 128, 130, and 134-135.
180. The behavior by the above listed Defendants occurred when the Defendants were
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acting within the scope of their employment. 181. Defendants’ discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage and Chief
Sewell harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages. 182. Accordingly, Defendants have violated Officer Savage’s and Chief Sewell’s
rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. COUNT III
RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF § 1981 (Interference with Duties) (Savage v. Oglesby)
183. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 158 above.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees that all shall have the right to make and enforce contracts, including employment contracts free from all forms of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.
185. Section 1981 also prohibits retaliation against individuals who make complaints about racial discrimination in the creation and/or enforcement of contracts, including contracts for terms and conditions of employment.
186. The right to be free from racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for assertion of one’s civil rights were both clear and well-established rights, known to each of the Defendants in this action throughout the time period of the allegations of this Complaint.
187. Officer Savage had a reasonable basis in law and fact and a federally-protected right to file his complaints against Defendants before the EEOC.
188. Testifying at trial in criminal prosecutions was a vital part of Officer Savage’s duties as a police officer and, in particular, as a member of the Joint Task Force.
189. After learning that Officer Savage had filed a grievance against Defendant
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Oglesby with the Attorney Grievance Commission, Defendant Oglesby prohibited Officer Savage from testifying on any case Officer Savage investigated.
190. Oglesby took the extraordinary step of writing a letter to the mayor, Defendant Morrison, and the members of the city council, accusing Officer Savage of lying in his complaints of racial discrimination to the EEOC and the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission against Defendant Oglesby.
191. This action directly interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to execute his job duties. Oglesby made this decision very soon after or the exact day he was made aware of Officer Savage’s complaint of racial harassment against him.
192. Oglesby’s interference was motivated in whole or in part by Officer Savage’s race and/or was an act of retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected activity.
193. Retaliation for Officer Savage’s complaints resulting in Defendant’s interference with Plaintiff’s duties is further detailed above in paragraphs 109-111, 113, 116-118, 124, and 145.
194. Defendant’s discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages.
195. Accordingly, Defendants have violated Officer Savage’s rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
COUNT IV RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF § 1983
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION (Hostile Work Environment)
(Savage v. Passwaters, Phillips, Wells, and Donaldson) 196. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 158 above. 197. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects against the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by persons acting under the color of law. 198. All Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 199. Defendants created a hostile work environment because of Officer Savage’s race
as detailed above in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 17, 54-86. 200. Defendant Donaldson failed to intervene to stop the racially hostile work
environment. 201. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race
discrimination, constituting protected activity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 202. Moreover, the hostile work environment was caused by or custom of the Joint
Task Force, and/or by final policy making officials of the Joint Task Force. 203. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants and their agents were acting
under color of the laws, customs and usages of the State of Maryland within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
204. The behavior by the above listed Defendants occurred when the Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment and used incidents and tools of their employment.
205. Defendants’ discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage severe emotional distress and ultimately led to his termination.
206. Accordingly, Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT V RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF § 1983
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION (Disparate Treatment: Benefits and Pay)
(All Plaintiffs v. Pocomoke City, Pocomoke City Police Department, Blake) 207. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 158 above.
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208. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects against the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by persons acting under the color of law.
209. All Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 210. Pocomoke City is a municipal corporation. Pocomoke City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the municipality caused the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 211. Pocomoke City Police Department is an instrumentality of Pocomoke City. Pocomoke City Police Department is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the department caused the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 212. Each Plaintiff had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination or to assist the other Plaintiffs in complaints of race discrimination, constituting protected activity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 213. Chief Sewell, Officer Savage, and Lieutenant Green are African American and part of a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. 214. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendants and their agents were acting under color of the laws, customs and usages of the State of Maryland within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 215. Defendants’ behavior occurred when acting within the scope of their employment and used incidents and tools of their employment. 216. As Pocomoke City Manager for nearly forty years, Defendant Blake was the city
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official responsible for determining the benefits and salaries of the Pocomoke City Police Department, including each of the Plaintiffs’ benefits and salaries.
217. Despite satisfactory job performance, Chief Sewell received lower pay and fewer benefits than similarly situated White police chiefs who had previously held the same position. Unlike his predecessor White police chiefs, Chief Sewell did not receive regular salary increases, compensatory time, paid health insurance, or an employment contract.
218. As for Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green, they received lower pay than similarly situated White officers, and Chief Sewell’s requests to raise their salaries were denied, despite similarly situated White officers receiving raises. Subsequently, as a result of engaging in statutorily protected activity, they also experienced retaliation with regards to pay and benefits, resulting in demotion and still more disparate benefits and pay, as detailed above in paragraphs 2, 5, 8, 11, 17, 19, 48-49, and 124-125.
219. Defendants’ disparate treatment and discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lieutenant Green severe emotional distress and ultimately led to Officer Savage’s and Chief Sewell’s termination.
220. Accordingly, Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT VI RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF § 1983
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION (Termination)
(Savage v. Pocomoke City, Pocomoke City Police Department, and Crofoot) (Sewell v. Morrison, Trotter, Pocomoke City, and Pocomoke City Police Department)
221. Officer Savage and Chief Sewell allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 158 above.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects against the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
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immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by persons acting under the color of law. 223. Officer Savage and Chief Sewell are African Americans and part of a protected
class under the Equal Protection Clause. 224. Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 225. Pocomoke City is a municipal corporation. Pocomoke City is liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the municipality caused the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
226. Pocomoke City Police Department is an instrumentality of Pocomoke City. Pocomoke City Police Department is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the department caused the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
227. Although he had a history of positive performance evaluations, Officer Savage was terminated from his position on October 26, 2015. This termination was motivated in whole or in part by Officer Savage’s race and/or in retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected activity.
228. Despite Pocomoke City’s improved crime statistics during Chief Sewell’s tenure as the first African American Chief of Police for the Pocomoke City Police Department, Chief Sewell was terminated from his employment by Defendants and the Pocomoke City Council on July 1, 2015. This termination was motivated in whole or in part by Chief Sewell’s race and/or in retaliation and/or was an act of retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected activity.
229. Retaliation resulting in Officer Savage’s termination is further detailed above in
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paragraphs 5, 95, 99-101, 105-111, 113-118, 121, 124-125, 131, and 145-147. 230. Retaliation resulting in Chief Sewell’s termination is further detailed above in
paragraphs 7, 128, 130, 134-135, and 148. 231. Defendants’ discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage and Chief
Sewell harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages. 232. Accordingly, Defendants have violated Officer Savage’s and Chief Sewell’s
rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. COUNT VII
DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF § 1983 FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH AND RIGHT TO PETITION
(Savage v. Pocomoke City, Pocomoke City Police Department, Blake, Oglesby, Passwaters, and Smack)
233. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 158 above.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects against the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by persons acting under the color of law.
235. Defendants are “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 236. Pocomoke City is a municipal corporation. Pocomoke City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the municipality caused the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 237. Pocomoke City Police Department is an instrumentality of Pocomoke City. Pocomoke City Police Department is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the department caused the violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
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238. Officer Savage engaged in protected activity when he exercised his First Amendment rights to free speech on matters of public concern to the community and to petition the government for grievances as detailed in paragraphs 102 and 103.
239. The above action was not part of Officer Savage’s official duties or within the scope of his employment as a law enforcement officer in the Pocomoke City Police Department.
240. In taking the above action, Officer Savage spoke out as a citizen of the community.
241. The behavior by the above listed Defendants occurred when the Defendants were acting with the scope of their employment.
242. Defendants’ discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, and lost wages.
243. In their creation of a hostile work environment, denial of equal pay and benefits, and in the termination of Officer Savage, Defendants denied Officer Savage his constitutional right to free speech, and retaliated against him for the exercise of his right, as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
COUNT VIII CIVIL CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION OF § 1985 (Savage v. Oglesby, Blake, Crofoot, Passwaters, and Smack) 244. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 158 above. 245. Defendants Oglesby, Blake, Crofoot, Passwaters, and/or Smack engaged in a conspiracy and unlawful agreement to deprive Officer Savage of his constitutional and statutorily protected right to work in an environment free of racial harassment and his right not to suffer adverse employment actions on the basis of his race. 246. This conspiracy was motivated by animus with respect to Officer Savage’s race.
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247. The purpose of the conspiracy was to discredit Officer Savage’s valid complaints of racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of his federal civil rights.
248. The purpose of the conspiracy was also to obtain Officer Savage’s termination from the Pocomoke City Police Department on a pretextual basis, knowing that the true motivation was racial discrimination in violation of federal law.
249. The overt acts of racial discrimination and intimidation in furtherance of the conspiracy undertaken by all three members of the conspiracy are further detailed in paragraphs 4 and 54-87 above.
250. The purpose and effect of the conspiracy was part of the same effort by all Defendants effort to deprive Officer Savage of the substantive rights provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 as alleged above.
251. Accordingly, Defendants have violated Officer Savage’s rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
COUNT IX VIOLATION OF FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
(29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.) (Savage and Green v. Blake, Morrison, Pocomoke City, Pocomoke City Police Department)
252. Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 158 above.
253. Section 7(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), provides that “no employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”
254. Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green were “employees,” and Defendants were
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their “employers” under FLSA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 255. Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green were not paid overtime as detailed in
paragraphs 12, 124, and 151-158 above. 256. Officer Savage is not an exempt employee under Section 13(a)(1) of FLSA, 29
U.S.C. § 213(b)(14). As a “police officer,” the exemption also does not apply to him per 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b). Therefore, he was owed overtime pay of one and one-half times his regular pay for all hours worked above forty in one week. FLSA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207.
257. Lieutenant Green is not an exempt employee under Section 13(a)(1) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C.§ 213(b)(14). As a “police officer,” the exemption also does not apply to him per 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b). Therefore, he was owed overtime pay of one and one-half times his regular pay for all hours worked above forty in one week. FLSA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207.
258. Since at least June 2014, Pocomoke City has known that it owed this money to Plaintiffs.
259. Defendants violated the FLSA by knowingly, willfully, and intentionally failing to compensate Plaintiffs, and all other similarly situated individuals, the rate of time-and-onehalf their regular hourly rate for every hour worked in excess of forty hours in any one workweek.
260. Therefore, Pocomoke City owes Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green back overtime wages, the same amount in addition as liquidated damages, and interest (both pre- and post-judgment) on the combined wages and liquidated damages. FLSA § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216 and 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lieutenant Green respectfully request that the Court:
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1. Enter judgment on their behalf against Defendants on all counts; 2. Declare pursuant to pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202 that the practices described in this Complaint exist and that they are unlawful; 3. Issue a permanent injunction that (i) prohibits Defendants, their officers, agents, employees, and successors from engaging in the discriminatory employment practices complained of herein; (ii) returns Plaintiffs to the employment position they would have held but for Defendants’ wrongful conduct; and (iii) imposes a prohibition of similar conduct in the future; 4. Require three-year monitoring of all law enforcement activity by all Defendants to prevent any further racial discrimination in employment, including the hiring and training of new and current officers; 5. Award Plaintiffs front pay and back pay with interest and other job benefits, including the value of health benefits, sufficient to redress all of the economic harms that they have suffered; 6. Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial sufficient to redress the harms that they have suffered, including physical and emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of income, loss of overtime pay, and mental anguish; 7. Award Plaintiffs appropriate punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial that would punish Defendants for their knowing, intentional, willful, and reckless disregard of clearly established federal constitutional and statutory rights as alleged herein and enter any and all injunctive decrees and relief necessary to effectively prevent all Defendants from engaging in similar unlawful racial discrimination in the future;
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8. Award Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C § 1988 and all taxable costs of this action;
9. Award such other and further relief in any form that this Court deems just and proper under the facts and circumstances as proved at trial.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury.
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Dated: January 20, 2016

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Christen B’anca Glenn_________________ Andrew McBride (D. Md. Bar No. 27858) Christen B’anca Glenn (D. Md. Bar No. 14945) Dwayne Sam (D. Md. Bar No. 29947) Craig Smith (D. Md. Bar No. 17938) WILEY REIN LLP 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20006 TEL: 202.719.7000 FAX: 202.719.7049 EMAIL: cglenn@wileyrein.com
Dennis A. Corkery (D. Md. Bar No. 19076) Matthew Handley (D. Md. Bar No. 18636) WASHINGTON LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS 11 Dupont Circle, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 TEL: 202.319.1000 FAX: 202.319.1010 EMAIL: Dennis_Corkery@washlaw.org
Deborah A. Jeon (D. Md. Bar No. 06905) ACLU of Maryland 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 TEL: 410.889.8555 FAX: 410.366.7838 EMAIL: jeon@aclu-md.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs

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 Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 60 Filed 06/21/16 Page 1 of 1

CHAMBERS OF
J. FREDERICK MOTZ
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
(410) 962-0782 (410) 962-2698 FAX

June 21, 2016
MEMO TO COUNSEL RE: Franklin Savage, et al. v. Pocomoke City, et al. Civil No. JFM-16-201
Dear Counsel:
I have reviewed the memoranda submitted in connection with defendants Mason, Smack, Passwaters, and Wells motion to dismiss first amended complaint.
The motion (document 43) is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted as to plaintiff’s claims against the defendants in their official capacities under Section 1981 and Section 1983. The motion is also granted as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendant Wells.
Otherwise the motion is denied. This denial is without prejudice to defendants rearising the arguments they have made after the conclusion of discovery.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed as an order.
Very truly yours,
/s/
J. Frederick Motz United States District Judge

 Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 72 Filed 08/19/16 Page 1 of 2

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 72 Filed 08/19/16 Page 2 of 2

 Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 80 Filed 09/29/16 Page 1 of 72

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Northern Division

FRANKLIN SAVAGE,
KELVIN SEWELL,
and LYNELL GREEN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
POCOMOKE CITY,
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WORCESTER COUNTY,
REGGIE T. MASON, in his official capacity as Worcester County Sheriff,
STATE OF MARYLAND, Serve on: Brian Frosh Attorney General State of Maryland 200 St. Paul Place Baltimore, MD 21202
RUSSELL BLAKE, in his individual capacity only
ERNIE CROFOOT, individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Manager
BRUCE MORRISON, individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Mayor
NATHANIEL PASSWATERS, in his individual capacity only

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00201-JFM
Jury Trial Demand

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 80 Filed 09/29/16 Page 2 of 72 BROOKS PHILLIPS, individually, and in his official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Corporal DALE SMACK, in his individual capacity only RODNEY WELLS, in his individual capacity only and PATRICIA DONALDSON, individually, and in her official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Sergeant
Defendants.
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Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 80 Filed 09/29/16 Page 3 of 72
INTRODUCTION 1. This is one of the saddest and most shocking cases this Court is likely to address. Three African American police officers, working for Pocomoke City, Maryland, experienced racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for the exercise of their federal civil rights in a manner that most Americans would have believed unthinkable in the second decade of the Twenty-First Century. While Pocomoke City bills itself as the “Friendliest Town on the Eastern Shore,” its law enforcement community, including police officers and elected officials from the Pocomoke City Police Department, the Department of Maryland State Police, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, and, most disappointingly, the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office, acted more in the vein of “Jim Crow.” 2. Three model police officers, including the first African American chief of police in Pocomoke City and the first and only African American detective assigned to the local narcotics task force, were mocked, threatened, demeaned, demoted, punished, falsely accused of misconduct, ostracized, and humiliated because of their race. Ultimately, two of the Plaintiffs here, Franklin Savage (“Officer Savage”) and Kelvin Sewell (“Chief Sewell”), were fired by Pocomoke City in obvious retaliation for their filing of United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaints and other protected activity. The third officer, Lynell Green (“Lieutenant Green”), resigned from the Pocomoke City Police Department due to health concerns arising from his work environment. The intervention of this Court is vitally necessary to make clear to some members of the law enforcement community on the Eastern Shore that this blatant disregard of federal constitutional and statutory rights will not be tolerated. 3. The use of the word “nigger” long ago ceased to be tolerated in any American
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workplace. So, too, did other forms of racial mockery, epithets, threats, humiliation, and discrimination based on race in the terms of employment. Yet, the three Plaintiffs in this action—Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lieutenant Green—experienced unlawful conduct of this character, often on a daily basis.
4. Officer Franklin Savage endured a hostile work environment and employment discrimination throughout his four-year tenure with the Pocomoke City Police Department. He spent more than half of that time detailed to the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team (“CET”), a regional drug-interdiction task force, led by the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. Officer Savage was the first and only African American police officer ever assigned to the CET. For more than two years, members of the CET, and at least one other government official, used the word “nigger”—and its variants—in Officer Savage’s presence numerous times. They also subjected Officer Savage to other forms of racial harassment and discrimination, such as taking an on-duty side trip to a so-called “KKK Lane” and placing an altered food stamp in Officer Savage’s desk drawer on which a picture of President Barack Obama had been superimposed. A bloody deer’s tail was placed on Officer Savage’s car windshield on a side street by unknown members of the CET.
5. One of Officer Savage’s CET supervisors, Defendant Passwaters, participated actively in the racial discrimination against him. His other supervisor on the CET, Defendant Donaldson, knew of the unlawful racially discriminatory acts but did nothing to stop them or discipline the offenders.
6. When Officer Savage finally complained within the Pocomoke City Police Department about this racially-motivated mistreatment, and left the CET, he found himself railroaded out of law enforcement in Worcester County. He was demoted without reason. His
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duties were restricted. He was blackballed from testifying in criminal cases—an integral part of his duties as a police officer—by the county’s State’s Attorney. In a hallmark of retaliation, the same Officer Savage, who had received glowing reviews and laudatory letters of recommendation for years, was suddenly described as an incompetent and untrustworthy officer. Officer Savage was then fired from the Pocomoke City Police Department without just cause and for stated reasons that are obvious pretexts for racial hostility and retaliation.
7. The retaliation against Officer Savage also swept up the other Plaintiffs, Chief Kelvin Sewell and Lieutenant Lynell Green.
8. Chief Sewell served as chief of the Pocomoke City Police Department for almost all of Officer Savage’s employment, and, as noted above, was the first African American police chief of Pocomoke City. He was fired from the Pocomoke City Police Department because he refused to fire Officer Savage in the face of pressure from various Pocomoke City and Worcester County employees and elected officials. Chief Sewell refused to fire Officer Savage both because he saw no basis for his discharge and because Chief Sewell viewed firing Officer Savage as improper retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected conduct in filing EEOC complaints against the very individuals who wanted him fired.
9. Lieutenant Green, for his part, served as a lieutenant in the Pocomoke City Police Department for over four years. As a show of support for Officer Savage, Lieutenant Green attended a mediation hearing regarding a claim that Officer Savage filed with the EEOC. Lieutenant Green then found himself on the wrong side of law enforcement officialdom in Worcester County. For supporting Officer Savage, Lieutenant Green experienced repeated acts of retaliation from his fellow officers and Pocomoke City officials. Lieutenant Green had his pay restricted by Pocomoke City, and was subject to Pocomoke City Police Department policies
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that may appear facially neutral and broadly applicable but, upon scrutiny, were clearly targeted at Lieutenant Green alone.
10. Plaintiffs are thus suing the individuals and entities responsible for this unchecked pattern and practice of virulent racial discrimination and retaliation. They are also suing the officers, elected officials, law-enforcement agencies, and governmental entities that condoned or failed to stop this behavior. Finally, they are suing those that orchestrated retaliation against the Plaintiffs, for seeking to remedy a racially hostile work environment and discrimination, and those who joined in unlawful retaliation against the three for supporting each other’s protected conduct. The acts of race discrimination and retaliation were collective of named Defendants and were mixed and intertwined with each other.
11. Plaintiffs present numerous causes of action because race-based discrimination and retaliation are both clearly prohibited by federal laws, including the United States Constitution. The asserted causes of action include those arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§201-219. This Second Amended Complaint is filed to place the now fully-exhausted Title VII claims before this Court. It is worth noting that the EEOC found “reasonable cause to believe” that the vast majority of the allegations in the Plaintiffs’ Title VII claims had merit. The EEOC findings are attached as Exhibits A-1 to A-7 to this Second Amended Complaint and are incorporated as if fully set forth herein.
12. The damages here are substantial. Officer Savage and Chief Sewell have both been wrongfully fired. Officer Savage has been unable to find new employment as a police officer and has suffered physical and psychological harm directly attributable to his
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Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 80 Filed 09/29/16 Page 7 of 72
mistreatment. Chief Sewell was unemployed for a period of several months following his termination and now works for the Baltimore City State’s Attorney’s Office. Both Officer Savage and Chief Sewell seek front and back pay and damages for both physical and psychological harms as well as injunctive relief. Lieutenant Green was left with resignation as his only option. He seeks back pay for loss of overtime, as well as damages. All Plaintiffs seek appropriate injunctive relief against all Defendants to ensure that the unlawful discrimination and retaliation does not occur in the future in Worcester County. All Plaintiffs also seek costs and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and such other relief as this Court deems just and proper. All Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury.
NATURE OF THE ACTION 13. Plaintiffs bring this action under Title VII; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985; the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201-219; and the United States Constitution to remedy the unlawful discrimination and retaliation engaged in by Defendants Pocomoke City, the County Commissioners of Worcester County (“Worcester County”), Reggie T. Mason (“Mason”), Russell Blake (“Blake”), Ernie Crofoot (“Crofoot”), Bruce Morrison (“Morrison”), Nathaniel Passwaters (“Passwaters”), Brooks Phillips (“Phillips”), Dale Smack (“Smack”), Rodney Wells (“Wells”), Patricia Donaldson (“Donaldson”), and the State of Maryland. As noted above, Plaintiffs file this Second Amended Complaint to bring the Title VII claims before the Court. The legal standards under Title VII are different and, in many cases, more favorable to the Plaintiffs than the claims based on civil war era statutes presented in the First Amended Complaint.
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JURISDICTION AND VENUE 14. This Court has original jurisdiction over all Counts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because those claims arise under the United States Constitution and laws of the United States. 15. Jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment is conferred by 28 U.S.C. §§ 22012202. 16. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because all of the events, acts, and/or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the State of Maryland. Specifically, most of them occurred in Worcester County, Maryland.
PARTIES PLAINTIFFS 17. Officer Savage joined the Pocomoke City Police Department in April 2011. He began representing the Pocomoke City Police Department as an officer on the CET around February 2012. Officer Savage was the first African American detailed to the CET. He was known as an excellent narcotics officer—particularly in undercover narcotics buys—which was why he was detailed to this important position with the CET. 18. In or around May 2012, Officer Savage was promoted to detective. He resigned from the CET on June 12, 2014, and returned to the Pocomoke City Police Department as a detective. After reporting the harassment and retaliatory behavior of which he had been victim while on the CET, Officer Savage was demoted from detective to officer on February 9, 2015. He was told he could not make arrests alone or testify in court. Eventually, he was demoted to patrolman, often relegated to checking doors on the night shift. Officer Savage was unlawfully terminated from his position as a patrolman in the Pocomoke City Police Department on October
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Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 80 Filed 09/29/16 Page 9 of 72
26, 2015. 19. Chief Sewell joined the Pocomoke City Police Department in November 2010,
upon retirement from the Baltimore City Police Department as a sergeant after twenty-two years of distinguished service. He was hired as a lieutenant and served as the Pocomoke City Police Department’s operations manager. Chief Sewell was promoted to captain on October 1, 2011, and to chief of police on December 1, 2011. Chief Sewell was the first African American to hold this position in Pocomoke City. During his tenure as chief, there were no homicides in Pocomoke City. Crime, particularly drug and street crime, dropped significantly during Chief Sewell’s tenure. Chief Sewell instituted community policing principles in Pocomoke City, and the relations between the police department and the citizenry, including the African American community, improved significantly. Chief Sewell was respected by his officers and by the community. He enjoyed a reputation as an excellent police chief. Chief Sewell served as chief until he was unlawfully terminated on July 1, 2015.
20. Lieutenant Green joined the Pocomoke City Police Department on or about November 13, 2011, as an officer, after serving for ten years with the Baltimore City Police Department. He was promoted to first sergeant on December 6, 2011, and was promoted to lieutenant and operations manager on February 29, 2012. After supporting Officer Savage in the latter’s EEOC complaint, Lieutenant Green had his pay and terms of employment adversely altered in retaliation for that support. On March 1, 2016, Lieutenant Green resigned from the Pocomoke City Police Department because of life threatening health conditions caused by the hostile environment and continued retaliation he experienced.
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DEFENDANTS1 21. Pocomoke City is a municipality in Worcester County, Maryland, and is incorporated under Maryland law. Pocomoke City has the capacity under Maryland law to sue and be sued. Pocomoke City controls, and is ultimately responsible for, the actions and omissions of the Pocomoke City Police Department. Pocomoke City is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and a covered employer within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Title VII. Pocomoke City employs at least fifteen employees and is the proper Defendant under Title VII for wrongdoing by and against employees of the Pocomoke City Police Department. 22. The County Commissioners of Worcester County is the governing body for the Worcester County and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. The County Commissioners of Worcester County, on behalf of Worcester County, have the capacity under Maryland law to sue and be sued. The County Commissioners of Worcester County is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, subject to liability for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The County Commissioners of Worcester County, along with the State of Maryland and Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, is one of the proper Defendants for claims brought under Title VII for wrongdoing by employees of the Worcester County’s Sheriff’s Office and by members of the CET. Worcester County employs at least fifteen employees. 23. The State of Maryland is the governmental entity that maintains the Worcester
1 Beau Oglesby was named as a Defendant in the First Amended Complaint but was dismissed on August 19, 2016 solely on the basis of having absolute prosecutorial immunity. See ECF No. 72, memorandum to counsel. As a result, he was removed from the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs are appealing his dismissal, and in the event of a successful appeal, would reinstate previous claims against Oglesby.
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County State’s Attorney’s Office, and is the proper Defendant for claims brought under Title VII for wrongdoing by employees of the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office. The State of Maryland, along with the County Commissioners of Worcester County and Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, is one of the proper Defendants for claims brought under Title VII for wrongdoing by persons assigned to the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and the CET because certain claims against the county sheriffs in Maryland are considered claims against the State. The State of Maryland employs at least fifteen employees.
24. Reggie T. Mason is the current sheriff of Worcester County. Mason, in his official capacity and in conjunction with the County Commissioners of Worcester County, controls, and is ultimately responsible for, the actions and omissions of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and the CET. In his official capacity, he is a proper defendant, along with the County Commissioners of Worcester County and the State of Maryland, for claims brought under Title VII for wrongdoing by persons assigned to the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and the CET. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Mason acted under the color of Maryland law.
25. Russell Blake is the former City Manager of Pocomoke City. Blake served as City Manager of Pocomoke City for 40 years—from 1975 to 2015. He resigned as City Manager the day before Chief Sewell was terminated. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Blake acted under the color of Maryland law. He is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, subject to liability for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the Fair Labor Standards Act. Blake is sued in his individual capacity only.
26. Ernie Crofoot is the current city manager of Pocomoke City. During all times 11

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mentioned in this Complaint, Crofoot acted under the color of Maryland law. He is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, subject to liability for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Crofoot is sued individually and in his official capacity as city manager.
27. Bruce Morrison is the mayor of Pocomoke City. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Morrison acted under the color of Maryland law. He is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 and a covered employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Morrison is sued individually and in his official capacity as mayor.
28. Nathaniel Passwaters is a sergeant in the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. He was one of two supervisors of the CET. Passwaters’ responsibilities included direct supervision of Officer Savage and the other CET members. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Passwaters acted under the color of Maryland law. He is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, subject to liability for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Passwaters is sued in his individual capacity only.
29. Brooks Phillips is a corporal in the Department of Maryland State Police. He was a member of the CET on which Officer Savage served. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Phillips acted under the color of Maryland law. He is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, subject to liability for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions. Phillips is sued individually and in his official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police trooper.
30. Dale Smack, the only African American named as a Defendant in this Complaint, was the Chief Deputy Sheriff of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office during much of the
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period covered in this Complaint. During times pertinent to this Complaint, Smack acted under the color of Maryland law. He is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, subject to liability for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions. Smack is sued in his individual capacity only.
31. Rodney Wells is a Corporal in the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. He was a member of the CET on which Officer Savage served. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Wells acted under the color of Maryland law. He is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, subject to liability for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions. Wells is sued in his individual capacity only.
32. Patricia Donaldson is a Sergeant in the Department of the Maryland State Police. Donaldson was the other supervisor of the CET, and thus also supervised Officer Savage, along with Defendant Passwaters. Donaldson knew of and condoned some of the wrongful acts and omissions described in this Complaint. Donaldson took no action as a supervisor on the CET to end the discrimination against Officer Savage or to discipline or punish the offenders, thus allowing it to continue unabated. During all times mentioned in this Complaint, Donaldson acted under the color of Maryland law. She is a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, subject to liability for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions. Donaldson is sued in her official and individual capacities.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 33. In early June, 2014, Officer Savage attempted to file charges of discrimination against the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and the CET but was turned away by the EEOC. He was told he had to first make a report to the Pocomoke City Police Department.
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34. On July 21, 2014, Officer Savage filed a charge of discrimination against the Worcester County Sherriff’s Office with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights and crossfiled with the EEOC. He filed additional amended charges on October 28, 2014, and June 1, 2015. The EEOC took on investigation of the charges.
35. On October 15, 2014, Officer Savage filed a charge of discrimination against the Pocomoke City Police Department with the EEOC. He filed additional amended charges on October 28, 2014, June 22, 2015, October 19, 2015, and December 14, 2015.
36. On June 22, 2015, Officer Savage filed a charge of discrimination against the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office with the EEOC. He filed additional amended charges on October 19, 2015 and December 14, 2015.
37. On March 9, 2015, Chief Sewell filed a charge of discrimination against the Pocomoke City Police Department with the EEOC. He filed an amended charge on June 15, 2015. On June 14, 2015, Chief Sewell filed a separate charge of discrimination against the Pocomoke City Police Department with the EEOC.
38. On March 30, 2015, Lieutenant Green filed a charge of discrimination against the Pocomoke City Police Department with the EEOC. He filed an amended charge on June 10, 2015.
39. On April 29, 2016, the EEOC issued probable cause findings for each of the Plaintiffs. See Exhibit A.
40. First, the EEOC found that there was reasonable cause that Officer Savage was “subjected to harassment and unequal terms and conditions of employment and discharged in retaliation to protected activity” by the Pocomoke City Police Department.
41. Second, the EEOC found that there was reasonable cause that the Worcester 14

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County Sherriff’s Office “exercised significant control over [his] employment such that it was a joint-employer” and that there was reasonable cause that Officer Savage was “harassed and subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of his race in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.”
42. Third, the EEOC found that there was reasonable cause that the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office subjected Officer Savage to “harassment in retaliation for protected activity when Respondent engaged in third-party interference.”
43. Fourth, the EEOC found that there was reasonable cause that Pocomoke City terminated Chief Sewell in retaliation for his protected activity.
44. Fifth, the EEOC found that there was reasonable cause that Pocomoke City subjected Lieutenant Green to harassment as a result of his protected activity.
45. On August 29, 2016, Plaintiffs requested notices of rights to bring suit from the U.S. Department of Justice.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS About Pocomoke City
46. Once a major shipping town along the Pocomoke River, Pocomoke City sits in the southwest corner of Worcester County, Maryland’s easternmost county. The nearest town of any size, Salisbury, is a half-hour to the north; Ocean City is forty-five minutes to the northeast. By car, Pocomoke City is slightly closer to Norfolk than Annapolis. In between these cities and Pocomoke City, and in every other direction, are miles of farm fields and hunting grounds.
47. Pocomoke City and the surrounding area have an unfortunate past with respect to race relations. The area was slaveholding and lies south of the Mason-Dixon Line. The City remains highly residentially segregated. Almost half of the population is African American.
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Historically, the government of the City has been entirely White. 48. Pocomoke City is governed by its mayor, city manager, and city council. 49. The office of mayor is an elected position. The mayor must be a resident of and
registered voter in Pocomoke City. The mayor holds his or her office for a three-year term. In this role, the mayor presides over the city council. The Pocomoke City Charter states: “The [m]ayor may take part in all [city council] discussions, but shall have no vote.” Pocomoke City Charter § C-8.
50. The city council consists of five elected individuals who each must be a resident of Pocomoke City for at least one year prior to their election. Each council member is elected to represent a single geographic district within the city’s borders for a three-year term.2
51. The city manager is appointed for an indefinite term by the city council. While serving in this capacity, the city manager must be a resident of Pocomoke City. The city manager “shall have power and shall be required to appoint and, when necessary for the good of the service, suspend or remove all officers and employees of the City.” Pocomoke City Charter § C-23. The city manager may hire and fire Pocomoke City employees, including police officers. Ultimately, the city manager is responsible for “the proper administration” of Pocomoke City. Id.
52. According to 2010 Census data, just over 45 percent of Pocomoke City’s 4,000 residents identify as Black or African American, and just fewer than 50 percent of its residents identify as White.
2 The City’s election system was changed from an at-large system to a districted system as a result of successful voting rights litigation brought by African American residents in the mid-1980s, challenging the at-large system and the City’s all-white government as racially discriminatory.
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53. Despite these demographics, Pocomoke City is managed almost entirely by its White citizens. The mayor, Morrison, is White. Blake, the city manager for forty years, is White. Crofoot, Blake’s replacement, is White. All members of the city council are White, except for one, Diane Downing.3 About the Pocomoke City Police Department
54. The Pocomoke City Police Department is an agency of the Pocomoke City government, consisting of up to 16 law-enforcement officers. The officers are ranked from the entry-level rank of patrolman through chief of police. The chief of police leads the department. Two lieutenants report to the chief; one lieutenant manages the operations of officers while the other manages administrative matters.
55. The chief reports to both the mayor and the city manager. Under this arrangement, Chief Sewell reported to both Morrison and Blake while leading the department.
56. As city manager, however, Blake had final authority and acted as if it was solely within his power to make personnel decisions for the Pocomoke City Police Department.
57. On several occasions, Chief Sewell submitted his annual budget, which included suggested salaries for the police department employees, to Blake, who should have then reviewed the budget and submitted it to the city council. Instead, Blake completely disregarded Chief Sewell’s budget and submitted a single, handwritten sheet of paper setting forth Blake’s own suggested compensation amounts for the police department employees.
58. In October 2011, Blake informed Chief Sewell that his salary would not be adjusted for his promotion to captain.
3 In the spring of 2015, the City installed Dale Trotter, a White male, to represent District 4, a majority African American district, through an unlawful cancellation of the election and blocking of Sheila Palmer’s (an African American woman) candidacy for the District 4 Council Seat.
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59. Despite Pocomoke City’s significantly improved crime statistics during Chief Sewell’s tenure, he did not receive annual raises, compensatory time, or paid health insurance, as other White chiefs had in the past.
60. On information and belief, the chief of police prior to Chief Sewell received a raise each year he served as chief. Chief Sewell received his first and only pay raise when he was promoted to chief on December 1, 2011. Pocomoke City, acting through Blake, also declined to enter into an employment contract with Chief Sewell when he assumed his role as chief. On information and belief, past White Pocomoke City police chiefs received employment contracts defining benefits and terms of severance, including severance pay.
61. Chief Sewell observed that African American officers within the Pocomoke City Police Department were generally underpaid. None of the African American officers received the pay raises he requested.
62. From the time of Chief Sewell’s promotion to chief through his termination, neither Lieutenant Green nor Officer Savage received pay raises.
63. On more than one occasion, Chief Sewell recommended pay raises for Lieutenant Green and Officer Savage at the same time as other White officers.
64. On information and belief, other White police officers of similar rank and performance to Lieutenant Green and Officer Savage received pay raises during the same period.
65. Pocomoke City, acting through Blake, provided no explanation for denying Chief Sewell’s recommendation regarding raises for African American officers while simultaneously granting raises to White officers.
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About the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team 66. In February 2012, Officer Savage was assigned to the CET as a narcotics
investigator. The CET is a multijurisdictional drug enforcement unit led by the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. Most CET members are members of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, but other Maryland law enforcement agencies, including the Department of Maryland State Police and the Ocean City Police Department, regularly detail officers for set periods of time.
67. The duties of CET members are akin to the duties of a deputy employed by the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
68. At the time Officer Savage began working with the CET, it was housed in the same building as the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
69. In or about June 2012, the CET moved from the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office to its own separate, off-site location within Worcester County.
70. The vehicles and other equipment for surveillance and arrest were provided to CET members by the Department of Maryland State Police and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
71. The Department of Maryland State Police and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office also each designated one member from each unit to serve as supervisors of the CET.
72. Upon information and belief, these supervisors were delegated policymaking authority to determine the duties and priorities of the CET, set personnel policies within the CET, and supervise the use of technology and use of CET equipment.
73. By both action and omission, the CET supervisors also established customs and practices within the CET.
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74. At the time Officer Savage was a member of the CET, the other six members of the CET were all White males, with the exception of Donaldson, a White female.
75. The members of the CET included the following Defendants: Passwaters, Donaldson, Phillips, and Wells. The members also included Jeff Johns and Brian Trader.
76. The CET was supervised by Passwaters and Donaldson. They were Officer Savage’s immediate supervisors.
77. As the CET’s supervisors, Passwaters and Donaldson were required to report misconduct by any CET member to that member’s parent agency. The parent agency has the authority to discipline its detailed CET members.
78. Passwaters and Donaldson also determined Officer Savage’s duties during his time on the CET and were responsible for preparing his employment evaluation and forwarding that report to Chief Sewell. That evaluation could affect Officer Savage’s rank, pay, and future prospects within the Pocomoke City Police Department. The EEOC found, based on these facts, that Worcester County was a joint employer of Plaintiff Savage during the time he was assigned to the CET. Exhibits A-1. The Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team’s Racially Hostile Work Environment
79. Shortly after Officer Savage’s appointment to the CET in or around May 2012, after the CET relocated to its new office, the other six CET members began discriminating against Officer Savage because of his race.
80. Phillips and Passwaters regularly referred to African Americans as “niggers” in Officer Savage’s presence. They repeatedly used the word in a sarcastic or demeaning tone to Officer Savage both orally and in written communications. Savage would also hear Phillips and Passwaters refer to African American suspects as “niggers” or variations thereof.
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81. Beginning in 2012, once or twice a week, Wells streamed racially-charged videos that used the word “nigger” on his official work computer. Members of the CET crowded around Wells’ computer, watching and laughing about these videos. Officer Savage observed this behavior because his assigned desk was located next to Wells’ assigned desk.
82. In or around September 2012, Wells asked Officer Savage why African Americans are offended when a White person uses the word “nigger” and its variants. Wells then asked Officer Savage how he would personally feel if he called him a “nigger.” Officer Savage indicated that he would be offended.
83. On September 16, 2012, Wells and Passwaters arrested an African American man for drug possession. The suspect used the word “nigger” and its variants several times during the arrest. After viewing the dash camera footage of the arrest, Passwaters played and replayed the footage in front of the entire CET because he thought the footage was funny. During this incident, Passwaters informed members of the CET that “he [was] about to drop the n-bomb,” referring to the word “nigger.” After Passwaters gave this “warning,” he, himself, proceeded to say the word.
84. On occasion, Passwaters also referred to African Americans as “ninjas.” Inside the CET, “ninja” was a known synonym for “nigger” based on a statement made during a previous investigation.
85. In December 2012, Passwaters, Trader, and Wells repeatedly spoke to Officer Savage about lynchings and the Ku Klux Klan.
86. On one occasion, Phillips, Trader, Wells, and Donaldson took Officer Savage to what the Defendants referred to as “KKK Lane” in Stockton, Maryland in Officer Savage’s official covert vehicle provided by the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
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87. At that time, the CET had no official duties in Stockton. 88. Wells and Trader told Officer Savage that he might see some Klan members or a noose in Stockton. 89. On or about this same time, Wells told Officer Savage about a chest in his attic in which he kept “white sheets and nooses.” 90. Phillips later informed Passwaters, one of the CET’s two supervisors, that he and others had taken Officer Savage to “KKK Lane.” 91. Passwaters merely responded with “OK.” Despite his authority to set personnel policies for the CET, Passwaters took no action. 92. The racially discriminatory actions against Officer Savage were not limited to verbal slurs. 93. On more than one occasion, other members of the CET drew a “circle of trust” on a CET bulletin board. 94. On the board, every member of the CET except Officer Savage was placed inside the circle. Officer Savage’s was the only name placed outside the circle. 95. At the outset of Savage’s employment with the CET, Savage’s name was placed just outside the circle of trust. But as time went on, and racial hostility directed at him increased, his name moved further and further outside the circle, until finally it appeared next to an arrow pointing off the bulletin board. 96. Because the “circle of trust” was displayed in a common area, each of the Defendant CET members viewed it, including the CET supervisors, but no one, including the two supervisors, did anything to prevent or remove the offensive display. 97. On another occasion, a member of the CET snapped a photograph of Officer
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Savage eating a slice of watermelon in the CET office. 98. Despite full knowledge of the racially-charged history of caricatures and
stereotypes related to African Americans eating watermelon, members of the CET posted this photograph in various places around the CET workspace and on CET equipment.
99. For instance, the watermelon photograph was placed in CET case files. 100. The watermelon photograph was sent to Officer Savage’s email and to other members of the CET’s email accounts. 101. The watermelon photograph was uploaded by members of the CET to Officer Savage’s workplace computer. 102. In total, the watermelon photograph was posted, transmitted, or placed in case files by members of the CET, including the Defendants, on more than ten occasions. 103. Defendants Donaldson, Passwaters, Phillips, and Wells were aware of the repeated use of the watermelon photograph. 104. On information and belief, Donaldson, Passwaters, Phillips, and Wells participated in the transmittal and posting of the watermelon photograph and took no action to stop further posting. 105. Defendants Donaldson, Passwaters, Phillips, and Wells were or should have been aware of the racially derogatory stereotype of African Americans eating watermelon which dates back to the time of emancipation of slaves. 106. In fact, upon information and belief, at least some members of the CET distributed and transmitted the photograph precisely because of the racial stereotype. 107. On December 17, 2013, Officer Savage found a bloody deer’s tail on the windshield of his car, which was parked on a side street by the CET office.
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108. Officer Savage reported the incident to Passwaters. Passwaters, as a supervisor who is responsible for investigating workplace conditions, went to Officer Savage’s car to see the deer tail.
109. Upon returning to the CET office, Passwaters asked the other CET members if they had any knowledge of the incident. Immediately after Passwaters’ inquiry, Phillips began laughing.
110. Donaldson later sent Officer Savage a text message acknowledging that Phillips placed the bloody deer’s tail on Officer Savage’s car. A true and correct copy of Donaldson’s text message is attached as Exhibit B to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
111. On information and belief, neither Passwaters nor Donaldson took any action to discipline or punish Phillips for his involvement in the bloody deer tail incident.
112. Following the bloody deer’s tail incident, Officer Savage felt that he could not report the ongoing harassment to Passwaters and Donaldson, his CET supervisors, because Passwaters was actively involved in the harassment and both Passwaters and Donaldson had indicated by their previous inaction that they would not do anything to halt the discriminatory behavior.
113. Officer Savage was also hesitant to report the harassment outside of the CET because he feared retaliation from City Manager Blake, Councilmember Dale Trotter, and Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby—powerful figures in the Eastern Shore community who had authority over his employment conditions and who later would become aligned against him.
114. In April 2014, Officer Savage found in his desk drawer a food stamp on which an 24

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image of President Obama had been imposed, which Officer Savage took to be ridiculing African Americans. A true and correct copy of the altered food stamp placed in Officer Savage’s desk drawer is attached as Exhibit C to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. On information and belief, only Officer Savage, and none of the other CET members, received such a food stamp.
115. Officer Savage verbally reported the altered food stamp incident to Chief Sewell at or around the time of its occurrence in April 2014.
116. On May 31, 2014, Phillips sent Officer Savage a text that read: “What’s ya body count nigga? I’m in double digits.” A true and correct copy of Phillips’ text message is attached as Exhibit D to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
117. Chief Sewell wrote a letter to Colonel Marcus L. Brown, the then-Secretary of the Department of Maryland State Police, regarding the May 31 incident.
118. After Savage began reporting the racial harassment outside of the CET’s chain of command, Passwaters and Phillips began to spread false rumors about Officer Savage that made it impossible for Officer Savage to perform his job, first in the CET and then at the Pocomoke City Police Department.
119. On June 3, 2014, Passwaters accused Officer Savage of repeated tardiness and alleged that Officer Savage’s debt collectors and “wife” were repeatedly calling the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. Officer Savage has never been married and these calls never occured. Passwaters had no documents or other support for these allegations.
120. On or about June 3, 2014, at the CET’s briefing prior to an undercover controlled substance purchase, Passwaters asked Officer Savage if he was on drugs.
121. During that purchase, Phillips burned some of the marijuana—one of the 25

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substances obtained by the CET during the purchase. When an Ocean City Police Department officer with whom the CET was working commented on the smell in the police vehicle, Phillips told the officer that Officer Savage had been smoking the marijuana. Photographs of the marijuana and pipe that Phillips used are attached as Exhibit E to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
122. The next day, on June 4, 2014, Officer Savage informed Chief Sewell that Passwaters asked Officer Savage if he was on drugs. Chief Sewell then instructed Officer Savage to undergo a drug screening, in order to disprove this false allegation.
123. On June 6, 2014, Officer Savage underwent the drug screening ordered by Chief Sewell. The test results were negative for any unlawful substance, including marijuana.
124. The racially-hostile environment and the use of the word “nigger” orally and in written form aimed at Officer Savage or in Officer Savage’s presence continued through the remainder of his service on the CET.
125. Officer Savage was insulted and offended by the CET’s racially-hostile work environment.
126. Officer Savage was further offended by the participation of his supervisors, their ratification of the racial epithets and racially discriminatory conduct, and their failure to intervene to stop the conduct or recommend discipline.
127. Officer Savage was also physically and psychologically harmed by the raciallyhostile work environment created by the CET.
128. As a member of the CET, Officer Savage had consistently received positive performance reviews from his supervisors prior to his complaints about the race discrimination he encountered there.
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129. For example, on September 20, 2013, in Officer Savage’s annual employee performance evaluation, Passwaters wrote that Officer Savage is “reliable” and “very trustworthy with sensitive information.”
130. Officer Savage’s evaluations were forwarded by Donaldson and/or Passwaters to Chief Sewell, the Chief of Police of the Pocomoke City Police Department, who could use them to alter Officer Savage’s conditions of employment, such as his continued detail to the CET, rank promotions, and raises.
131. Irrespective of their overall treatment of Officer Savage, in or around April 2014, Officer Savage’s colleagues and superiors wrote positive letters of recommendation on his behalf, supporting his applications to other police departments. True and correct copies of some of these letters of recommendation are attached as Exhibit F to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
132. Comparing this temporal juxtaposition of glowing reviews and recommendation letters in early 2014 with condemnation and derogatory comments against Officer Savage in the fall of 2014 demonstrates the retaliatory and racially discriminatory nature of the negative letters and reviews against Officer Savage.
133. Based on these facts, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that Officer Savage “was harassed and subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of his race and in retaliation for engaging in protected activity.” Exhibit A-1. Racially Offensive Conduct by the State’s Attorney for Worcester County
134. State’s Attorney Beau Oglesby leads the office that is solely responsible for prosecuting the cases investigated by the Pocomoke City Police Department and the cases brought by the CET within its jurisdiction. In this capacity, Oglesby frequently interacted with
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all three of the Plaintiffs and made decisions on which of their cases he would prosecute. 135. On April 7, 2014, during a meeting with Officer Savage, Passwaters, and
Assistant State’s Attorneys Kelly Hurley and Ajene Turnbull, Oglesby read a series of letters written by a suspect, placing particular emphasis on and repeatedly saying the word “nigga.”
136. Mid-way through reading the letters, Oglesby paused and asked whether anyone in the room was offended. At that moment, Assistant State’s Attorney Turnbull, the only African American present other than Officer Savage, left the room.
137. Oglesby then continued reading the letters aloud, and continued saying “nigga.” 138. Ultimately, Oglesby read the word “nigga” in the letters to the assembled prosecutors and police officers more than ten times. True and correct copies of the letters Oglesby read from during this incident on April 7, 2014 are attached to this Complaint as Exhibit G and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein. 139. Oglesby’s reading of the word “nigga” in the letters and his use of the word were unnecessary and irrelevant to the prosecution of the case in connection with which the letters were obtained. Savage Resigns from the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team and Complains about His Treatment; Retaliation Begins 140. On June 12, 2014, Officer Savage resigned from the CET, citing the repeated use of the word “nigger” and variations thereof by his superiors and colleagues and a hostile work environment. 141. Upon Officer Savage’s resignation from the CET, CET members began spreading false and defamatory rumors about Officer Savage’s honor and integrity with increasing frequency, which threatened his ability to perform his job.
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142. CET members, and the officials in Pocomoke City and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office who were the recipients of the rumors, knew or should have known that these rumors were without foundation and a manifestation and perpetuation of the overt racial discrimination to which Officer Savage had been subjected while serving on the CET.
143. On June 23, 2014, Bernard B. Foster, the then-Chief of Staff for the Office of the Superintendent in the Maryland State Police, responded to Chief Sewell’s May 31, 2014 letter concerning the bloody deer tail incident, stating that the letter was received and that Detective Sergeant Kelly Austin was assigned to this administrative investigation.
144. Later, in a letter addressed to Officer Savage, Lieutenant M. B. Daugherty of the Criminal Enforcement Division of the Maryland State Police wrote that Detective Sergeant Kelly concluded that Phillips “violated the rules and regulations of the Maryland State Police with Unbecoming Conduct.” A true and correct copy of Lieutenant Daugherty’s letter is attached as Exhibit H to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
145. On information and belief, despite acknowledging that Officer Savage’s allegations against Phillips were well-founded, the Department of Maryland State Police has taken no disciplinary action of any kind against Phillips to redress the wrong to Officer Savage.
146. On July 15, 2014, Passwaters spread a false rumor to Morrison and Blake that Officer Savage used the false identification that he had been issued for undercover work to secure multiple fraudulent loans.
147. Despite knowledge of past discriminatory conduct on the CET and with no evidence to substantiate Passwaters’ allegations, Blake demanded that Chief Sewell investigate this allegation.
148. Officer Savage returned the false identification to Chief Sewell. The allegation 29

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that Officer Savage had misused the undercover identification document(s) was false and was designed to injure Officer Savage’s credibility and reputation.
149. Around this same time, in mid-July 2014, Officer Savage noticed that he was no longer listed as a “detective” in the Pocomoke City employee database, which he took as a form of public humiliation and as falsely suggesting that he had been demoted.
150. As a result of past overt racial harassment and its perpetuation through false rumors, on July 21, 2014, Officer Savage filed a complaint against the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office with the EEOC.
151. On July 22, 2014, Officer Savage filed a complaint against Oglesby with the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission regarding the April 7, 2014 incident described in paragraphs 135 through 139, supra. Officer Savage’s complaint explained that he was “very offended” by Oglesby’s repeated and gratuitous use of “the word Nigga so freely and without care in front of ASA Turnbull and [himself].” The letter also noted a subsequent “difference in [Oglesby’s] approach and actions towards” [sic] Officer Savage following the incident.
152. Oglesby treated Officer Savage in a markedly different and less respectful manner both in and out of court after Officer Savage complained of Oglesby’s racially discriminatory use of the word “nigga” on April 7, 2014.
153. The complaint concluded by stating that Officer Savage “had problems sleeping as a result of constantly thinking of [Oglesby] reading the ‘N’ word over and over again in those letters and not taken [sic] actions in stopping this matter.” A true and correct copy of Officer Savage’s complaint to the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission is attached as Exhibit I to this Complaint and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.
154. Upon information and belief, Oglesby learned of the complaint a week after it was 30

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filed. 155. Following Officer Savage’s reporting of the April 7, 2014 incident, Oglesby
further treated Officer Savage differently. Upon information and belief, the State’s Attorney’s Office no longer zealously prosecuted cases on which Officer Savage was the lead officer.
156. This differential treatment of cases in which Officer Savage was involved was a mixture of retaliation for Officer Savage’s reporting of racial harassment and continued racial harassment.
157. Upon information and belief, by late July 2014, the highest officials who set policy for the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, the Maryland State Police, and the Pocomoke City Police Department, including Mason, Smack, and Blake, were aware of Officer Savage’s allegations of racial hostility against Oglesby, Passwaters, and other members of the CET.
158. In late July 2014, Passwaters continued his pattern of spreading false rumors about Officer Savage.
159. At that time, Passwaters told Worcester County Sheriff’s Office members that Officer Savage sold his off-duty weapon.
160. To disprove this claim, Officer Savage brought the weapon to Chief Sewell, who took photographs of it.
161. On July 29, 2014, one of Passwaters’ superiors at the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, Smack, drafted a memorandum to Chief Sewell accusing Officer Savage of falsely representing himself to suspects as a member of the CET. In the memorandum, Smack wrote to Chief Sewell that the CET would “not assist or participate in any investigative efforts set forth by Officer Savage.”
162. Chief Sewell spoke with Smack following receipt of the memorandum about its 31

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contents. 163. At the time he issued the memorandum, Smack knew or should have known about
the racial harassment on the CET directed at Officer Savage. Nonetheless, his letter and attitude toward Officer Savage relied upon unsubstantiated and false allegations from Passwaters and perpetuated the racial harassment from the CET by seeking to undermine Officer Savage’s position with the Pocomoke City Police Department.
164. Contrary to Smack’s letter, Officer Savage did not identify himself as a member of the CET after his resignation from the CET. This false allegation was designed and intended to injure Officer Savage’s reputation and credibility in his charges of racial discrimination against Oglesby and the CET.
165. On the very same day as Smack’s letter, Blake also accepted at face value false rumors about Officer Savage—despite actual or constructive knowledge of the past racial discrimination against him on the CET—and told Chief Sewell that Officer Savage would no longer be called on to testify in court against suspects in Officer Savage’s cases, including narcotics cases.
166. Blake offered no performance-based explanation for his dictate. 167. In a dangerous violation of his sworn duty, on August 14, 2014, Smack further told Chief Sewell that the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office would not respond to any future emergency call or request for backup made by Officer Savage or Lieutenant Green. 168. On at least two occasions, Officer Savage could not secure the assistance of a K-9 unit from the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. 169. As a result of the retaliation and racial discrimination he was experiencing, on August 14, 2014, Officer Savage went on two weeks sick leave to deal with the stress caused by
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the aforementioned actions of his colleagues and former colleagues on the CET, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, the Maryland State Police, and the Pocomoke City Police Department.
170. While Officer Savage was on sick leave, on or about August 17, 2014, Blake instructed Chief Sewell to take Officer Savage out of narcotics work altogether. Blake pressured Chief Sewell to assign Officer Savage to the undesirable midnight shift. Blake also demanded that Officer Savage be made a patrol officer, allowed only to confirm that downtown doors were locked but forbidden from making any arrests.
171. Throughout this period, Blake’s actions continued to evidence racial discrimination mixed with retaliation. Blake instigated heated arguments through email correspondence and verbal conversations with Chief Sewell over the treatment of Officer Savage. On one occasion, Blake referred to Chief Sewell as an “ungrateful ass nigger” during the course of the disputes about the treatment of Savage and Green.
172. After Officer Savage returned to work from his medical leave, Oglesby continued to block Officer Savage from testifying because of Officer Savage’s decision to report past racially derogatory language.
173. On September 4, 2014, Oglesby refused to acknowledge Officer Savage’s presence in court and talked past him to Lieutenant Green to say that Officer Savage’s presence would not be required to testify in a case that Officer Savage was handling.
174. Oglesby’s actions on September 4, 2014, were designed and intended to punish and intimidate Officer Savage for his complaints of discrimination against Oglesby and other Defendants.
175. Less than a week later, Oglesby sent the Pocomoke City mayor and city council a letter implying that he would not allow Officer Savage to testify in court because he
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“question[ed] his veracity.” 176. On September 9, 2014, Chief Sewell was instructed by Blake to order Officer
Savage to surrender the password to a work cell phone he used while with the CET. Officer Savage was told that he would be disciplined by the Pocomoke City Police Department if he did not reveal the password.
177. On or about September 11, 2014, Blake again instructed Chief Sewell to take Officer Savage out of narcotics work altogether and pressured Chief Sewell to assign Officer Savage to the midnight shift.
178. On September 11, 2014, Officer Savage requested sick leave “until further notice” due to the “extreme stress and turmoil involving [his] current federal EEOC case and the recent letter from Oglesby, dated September 10, 2014.” As a result of Officer Savage’s request, Blake required Chief Sewell to order Officer Savage to see a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist cleared Officer Savage to return to active duty.
179. On October 1, 2014, Officer Savage attended an EEOC mediation with Lieutenant Green, Smack, and Worcester County Lieutenant Michael McDermott (“McDermott”). Smack and McDermott attended the mediation on behalf of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. At the mediation, Smack and McDermott expressed open hostility toward Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green.
180. At the mediation, Smack told Lieutenant Green that he and Officer Savage were the causes of Pocomoke City’s problems.
181. Smack and McDermott also denied any responsibility or liability, arguing that the Pocomoke City Police Department was responsible for any discrimination, as Officer Savage’s principal employer, rather than the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office (even though no member
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of the CET other than Savage was employed by the Pocomoke City Police Department and the Pocomoke City Police Department had no control over the CET.).
182. On October 13, 2014, Chief Sewell again ordered Officer Savage to see a psychiatrist “to be sure [that] the stress of [Officer Savage’s] current situation does not diminish [his] fitness and effectiveness as an officer.”
183. On October 15, 2014, Officer Savage underwent a psychiatric evaluation. The psychiatrist cleared Officer Savage to return to active duty.
184. Chief Sewell protested many of Blake’s orders to demote and otherwise penalize Officer Savage because he thought they constituted harassment, were the result of racial discrimination and retaliation, and did not have any performance basis. On several occasions, Chief Sewell refused to fire Savage and Green, stating to Morrison, Blake, and other Defendants that Sewell and Green “were the victims” and that firing them would violate the law.
185. On October 14, 2014, Chief Sewell was asked to testify before a meeting of the mayor, city manager, and entire city council.
186. This meeting was a special meeting that included investigation of Blake’s conduct, and no agenda or minutes are publicly available for the meeting. It was not a typical meeting of the city council to discuss city business, where an agenda is posted online prior to the meeting and minutes are posted after the meeting.
187. During that meeting, Chief Sewell raised concerns that Blake was retaliating against Officer Savage because Officer Savage had reported racial discrimination.
188. Because Chief Sewell believed there was no performance-based rationale for penalizing Officer Savage, he testified that Blake was using his position of authority to harass and retaliate against Officer Savage for his EEOC charges. Chief Sewell told the council that
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Blake had ordered Chief Sewell to take disciplinary action against Officer Savage on a near daily basis.
189. Blake became very upset during Chief Sewell’s testimony and engaged in loud verbal arguments with Chief Sewell in front of the council.
190. After the October 14, 2014, meeting, Blake continued to order adverse employment actions against Officer Savage, and Morrison also joined in several of these actions. To prevent this harassment, Chief Sewell had frequent conversations with members of the city council about Blake’s misconduct and the need to refrain from punishing Officer Savage for his EEOC proceedings.
191. These discussions with individual City Council members to prevent Blake from harassing Officer Savage and testimony before the specially convened council meeting investigating Blake’s conduct were not part of Chief Sewell’s daily responsibilities but were outside and beyond those duties.
192. In mid-January 2015, Council member Trotter directed Chief Sewell to cap the allowable overtime for Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green. Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green regularly worked more than forty hours per week. Neither Officer Savage nor Lieutenant Green had the largest amount of overtime for any officer. No White officer had his or her overtime similarly capped.
193. On February 9, 2015, Officer Savage was officially demoted from his position as detective to patrol officer allegedly “due to a shortage of patrol officers.” Blake and Morrison ordered Chief Sewell to take this action. A true and correct copy of the letter demoting Officer Savage is attached as Exhibit J to this Complaint and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.
194. Rudell Brown, a junior officer trained by Officer Savage who had not filed a 36

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complaint of discrimination, was promoted to detective immediately following Officer Savage’s demotion.
195. On March 9, 2015, Chief Sewell filed his own charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging disparate treatment in employment terms against the Pocomoke City Police Department and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
196. Three days later, on March 12, 2015, an anonymous letter was left on the windshield of Chief Sewell’s car saying that the “niggers” Officer Savage, Lieutenant Green, and Chief Sewell will be gotten rid of. The letter also referred to Chief Sewell as a “smart nigger chief.” A true and correct copy of this anonymous letter is attached as Exhibit K to this Complaint and incorporated as if fully set forth herein.
197. On April 10, 2015, in a meeting with George Tasker, a member of the Pocomoke City Council, Chief Sewell explained that “Savage is the victim in his EEOC case and if [he] fire[s] him, [Savage] can sue [him], [Tasker], the Mayor and all the Council.”
198. Tasker replied that “Green is becoming a problem in [Sewell’s] department to [sic] and once he and Savage is [sic] gone, that department well [sic] be okay.” Tasker also asked Chief Sewell whether he had heard what happened to Scott Keller, who was Chief of Police in Princess Anne County’s Police Department before the Princess Anne Council voted him out of office on April 9, 2015. This statement was intended to be a threat that Chief Sewell would be fired if he did not acquiesce to the retaliation against Savage and Green in their employment and employment conditions, including overtime, duties, and pay.
199. On or about May 4, 2015, Officer Savage was informed by a citizen of Pocomoke City that Blake and Morrison were circulating a petition to remove Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green from the Pocomoke City Police Department.
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200. On June 15, 2015, Chief Sewell filed his First Amended Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC against the Pocomoke City Police Department and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
201. Early in the morning on June 26, 2015, Lieutenant Green received an anonymous note in his mailbox warning that drugs had been planted on Green and Sewell, and that Worcester County officials were preparing search warrants to uncover those drugs.
202. In the hostile atmosphere then surrounding the plaintiffs, Green took this threat very seriously and immediately contacted Chief Sewell about it.
203. Like Green, Sewell was concerned about this threat, and took it very seriously. He decided that the best course would be to contact the Maryland State Police and ask that agency to bring a drug-detecting dog to do a preemptive search for any planted drugs.
204. He promptly contacted Lieutenant Earl Starner, Maryland State Police’s local barracks commander, explained the situation, and made this request.
205. Much to Sewell’s dismay, however, Starner informed Sewell that the Maryland State Police would not cooperate with the Pocomoke City Police Department, because Officer Savage had filed a discrimination complaint against one of its officers, referring to the internal affairs complaint, even though that complaint reportedly was sustained by the Maryland State Police.
206. Thinking Starner must be mistaken, Sewell then contacted Maryland State Police Secretary William Pallozzi, again explained the situation, and made the same request. Pallozzi, like Starner, refused to provide assistance, due to ill-will he cited between the two agencies. When Sewell asked Pallozzi what he suggested Sewell do, Pallozzi suggested Sewell contact the State Prosecutor’s Office.
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207. Following the Maryland State Police rejection, Chief Sewell did as Pallozzi recommended and contacted the State Prosecutor’s Office with his request for assistance to investigate the threat. But an investigator at the State Prosecutor’s Office said this was not the type of matter that office could assist with. Ultimately, Chief Sewell was able to connect with another local police department to bring in a drug-detecting dog to search the Pocomoke City Police Department, as well as the homes and vehicles of Sewell and Green. No drugs were found, suggesting that the threat might have been a hoax.
208. On information and belief, Maryland State Police officials at the Berlin barracks subsequently told other local and state law enforcement officials that Chief Sewell had reported the threat to the Maryland State Police and requested assistance, and that MSP had refused to cooperate explicitly on grounds of the discrimination complaints that had been filed by Plaintiffs against Maryland State Police personnel.
209. In so doing, Maryland State Police officials also took it upon themselves to perpetuate false and defamatory scuttlebutt denigrating the integrity of Chief Sewell, Lieutenant Green, and Officer Savage, even though they openly acknowledged that they had no actual evidence of any wrongdoing whatsoever by the three.
210. On June 30, 2015, Blake resigned as city manager of Pocomoke City. 211. Before Blake’s resignation, Chief Sewell was asked to resign as chief of police, despite significant reductions in crime during his tenure and no complaints about his performance from Pocomoke City officials or citizens. On July 1, 2015, Morrison issued a letter terminating Chief Sewell as chief of police. 212. The city council voted 4 to 1 to terminate Chief Sewell, with the only African American member of the city council, Diane Downing, dissenting from the decision to terminate
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Chief Sewell. 213. Councilwoman Downing has repeatedly and publicly stated that the reasons given
for the termination of Chief Sewell were entirely pretextual. 214. Different city officials have given several different alleged reasons for the
termination of Chief Sewell at different times. 215. The firing of Chief Sewell was protested throughout Pocomoke City by both
African American and White citizens because Chief Sewell had an excellent law enforcement record in Pocomoke City.
216. On July 7, 2015, Lieutenant Earl Starner, the Berlin barracks commander and the same MSP official who on June 26 had refused assistance to Chief Sewell in retaliation for Savage’s discrimination complaint, was appointed interim chief of the Pocomoke City Police Department.
217. In August 2015, Crofoot became the City Manager and City Attorney of Pocomoke City.
218. On August 17, 2015, Starner gave Officer Savage a letter stating that Officer Savage was being investigated by the Harford County Sheriff’s Office for violating the Pocomoke City Police Department Code of Ethics because “[i]t is alleged that on July 22, 2015 [sic] you used the same language in a letter addressed to the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland. This letter also contained the same misstated facts as mentioned above.” Officer Savage was required to sign this letter.
219. This letter was in retaliation for Officer Savage’s July 22, 2014 complaint—over a year earlier—to the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission for Oglesby’s use of the word “nigga” on April 7, 2014.
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220. On September 8, 2015, William Harden, Sr. was announced as the new chief of police of the Pocomoke City Police Department.
221. On October 6, 2015, as required, Officer Savage attended an interrogation regarding the Harford County investigation.
222. On or about October 16, 2015, Oglesby had a telephone conversation with Crofoot in which Oglesby was adamant that Officer Savage would never be able to testify again and was thus useless to the Pocomoke City Police Department. On information and belief, Oglesby reiterated his view that Officer Savage should be terminated.
223. On October 23, 2015, Paul Haskel, a Deputy State’s Attorney in the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office, called the Pocomoke City Police Department advising that Officer Savage was not needed to testify in a trial in the Worcester County District Court.
224. On October 26, 2015, Officer Savage was terminated from his position as an officer with the Pocomoke City Police Department. Officer Savage was not afforded a right to a hearing or given any opportunity to appeal the decision. Prior to his termination, Officer Savage’s duties were limited to administrative tasks, such as reviewing and filing police reports. Immediately after Officer Savage was terminated, members of the CET began spreading rumors that Officer Savage was fired for using illegal narcotics.
225. In firing Chief Sewell and Officer Savage, Pocomoke City, the Pocomoke City Police Department, the City Council, and Defendants Blake and Morrison did not follow required procedures, including those of the City Charter and the Maryland Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights.
226. Both Chief Sewell and Officer Savage were fired in retaliation for the exercise of their federal civil rights to be free from racial discrimination and retaliation under the United
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States Constitution and laws of the United States. 227. The retaliation against Chief Sewell did not end with his termination. 228. After Chief Sewell’s termination, Crofoot instructed the Pocomoke City Police
Department to deny Chief Sewell’s request for a letter that he left in good standing that was required by the Maryland State Police before it would authorize him to carry a handgun in future employment.
229. In giving this instruction, Crofoot further retaliated against Chief Sewell for his protected activity. This act of post-termination retaliation not only lacked legal justification, but it made it more difficult for Chief Sewell to find employment, to perform the requirements of his new employment, and to protect his own safety and that of his family. In a law enforcement career spanning nearly 5,000 arrests—mostly in dangerous narcotics or homicide cases—Chief Sewell has received multiple death threats and has had contracts placed on his life from those whom he has arrested. Crofoot’s personal retaliation against Chief Sewell needlessly jeopardizes the safety of Chief Sewell and his family and continues to penalize him for his protected activity.
230. On March 1, 2016, Lieutenant Green resigned from the Pocomoke City Police Department because of severe health conditions that developed as a result of his employment with the police department.
231. Due to the pervasive environment of racial animus, both Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green had to take medical leave on several occasions to get away from the stressful environment.
232. Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lieutenant Green each were aware of and observed discriminatory acts against themselves and other African American police officers.
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the future will continue to suffer, among other things, economic injury, humiliation, embarrassment, and mental and emotional distress.
234. Throughout the time period alleged in this Complaint, the racially discriminatory acts of the Defendants were both collective in nature and intertwined, and were also designed and intended to retaliate against the Plaintiffs for assertion of their civil rights.
235. On information and belief, other African American police officers serving on the Pocomoke City Police Department suffered racially discriminatory acts and a racially hostile work environment.
236. On information and belief, active racial discrimination, a racially hostile work environment, and acts of retaliation for assertion of federal civil rights by African American police officers continue to the date of filing of this Second Amended Complaint.
237. Based on these facts, the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, the Pocomoke City Police Department, Pocomoke City, and the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office had each retaliated against one or more of the Plaintiffs in response to protected activity. Exhibit A-1 to A-7. Violations of Fair Labor Standards Act
238. Officer Savage regularly worked more than forty hours per week during his tenure with the Pocomoke City Police Department.
239. Lieutenant Green regularly worked more than forty hours per week during his tenure with the Pocomoke City Police Department.
240. Until approximately June 2014, Pocomoke City had a policy of not paying overtime unless the hours exceeded forty-three in one week.
241. Upon learning of this policy, Chief Sewell expressed concern about its legality. 43

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242. In or around June 2014, Pocomoke City completed an audit of missed overtime wages between June 2011 and June 2014. The audit revealed that both Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green were owed overtime wages.
243. Blake falsely told the city council that Pocomoke City had fully compensated its employees for the three years’ worth of missed overtime wages.
244. In fact, neither Officer Savage nor Lieutenant Green received any compensation for their unpaid overtime wages.
245. Defendants’ failure to pay Officer Savage’s and Lieutenant Green’s full overtime wages, even after the audit had confirmed both the fact that Pocomoke City owed Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green overtime wages and the amount of such wages owed, constitutes willful, knowing, and intentional violations of Fair Labor Standards Act.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I
RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Hostile Work Environment)
(Savage v. Pocomoke City, Worcester County, Passwaters, Phillips, Wells, and Donaldson) 246. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in
paragraphs 1 through 245 above. 247. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens
equal protection of the laws of the United States, with violations thereof giving rise to claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
248. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects against the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and laws” by persons acting under the color of law. The right to be free from racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for
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assertion of one’s civil rights were both clear and well-established rights, known to each of the Defendants in this action throughout the time period of the allegations of this Complaint.
249. Pocomoke City is a municipal corporation, and Pocomoke City Police Department is an instrumentality of Pocomoke City. Pocomoke City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the municipality caused the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
250. Worcester County controls the practices of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. As such, Worcester County is liable as Officer Savage’s joint-employer. Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2015). Specifically, during Officer Savage’s tenure on the CET, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and Defendant Passwaters, a sergeant with the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and one of the assigned supervisors of the CET, exercised significant control over Officer Savage, supervised his day-to-day activities, and furnished his equipment and place of work.
251. By the acts and omissions described above, Defendants Pocomoke City, Worcester County, Passwaters, Phillips, Wells, and Donaldson, acting under color of state law, have maintained a pattern and practice of race discrimination and retaliation, creating a hostile work environment. Defendants used racial epithets directed toward or in the presence of Officer Savage regularly. The behavior by the above listed Defendants occurred when the Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment and used incidents and tools of their employment.
252. Defendants’ conduct was both severe and pervasive, especially given that the 45

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racial epithets expressed by Passwaters, Phillips, and Wells were either spoken or condoned by Officer Savage’s supervisors, Defendants Donaldson and Passwaters. That is, the hostile work environment was caused or condoned by the CET, and by Defendants Donaldson and Passwaters, the final policy making officials of the CET. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination, constituting protected activity.
253. Pursuant to their practices, Defendants have deprived Plaintiff of his rights to equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, giving rise to his claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
254. Defendants’ discriminatory practice caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT II RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
(Hostile Work Environment) (Savage v. Pocomoke City, Worcester County, Sheriff Mason, & the State of Maryland)
255. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above.
256. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful to alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race or in retaliation for protected activity. 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000e-2(a)(1) & 2000e-3(a).
257. Pocomoke City, Worcester County, Worcester County Sheriff Mason, and the State of Maryland constitute employers for purposes of Title VII.
258. Worcester County and the State of Maryland each control different aspects of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and the CET. As such, Worcester County and the State of Maryland are liable for the unlawful acts of the employees of the Worcester County Sheriff’s
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Office and of the employees who were assigned to the CET. 259. The above acts and omissions were committed by the employees of the Worcester
County Sheriff’s Office and the CET. Because the Sheriff, County, and State (collectively, the “Worcester County Sheriff’s Office” for purposes of this Count) are the legally responsible entities for the acts and/or omissions for the Sheriff’s Office and the CET and constitute employers under Title VII, they are named as defendants in this count.
260. The Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, along with Pocomoke City, is liable under Title VII as Officer Savage’s joint-employer. Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2015). Specifically, during Officer Savage’s tenure on the CET, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office—including Defendant Passwaters, a sergeant with the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and supervisor of the CET—exercised significant control over Officer Savage, supervised his day-to-day activities, created and implemented personnel policies, and furnished his equipment and place of work.
261. Pocomoke City, as Savage’s other joint-employer, had a duty to ensure that Officer Savage worked in an environment free of unlawful racial harassment and retaliation before, during, and after the time he was assigned to the CET.
262. By the acts and omissions described above, employees of Pocomoke City and the Worcester County’s Sheriff’s Office have maintained a pattern and practice of race discrimination and retaliation, creating a hostile work environment.
263. The unlawful behavior of the Pocomoke City officials and the employees of the CET, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office occurred when they were acting within the scope of their employment and used incidents and tools of their employment.
264. Defendants’ harassing conduct was both severe and pervasive such as to alter the 47

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terms, conditions, and privileges of Officer Savage’s employment, especially given, among other things, Defendants’ employees’ use of racial epithets directed toward or in the presence of Officer Savage regularly.
265. Defendants’ employees’ also began a pattern of retaliation against Officer Savage after he opposed unlawful harassment during his time on the CET.
266. This retaliation began while Officer Savage was assigned to the CET and continued after Officer Savage left the CET and returned to the Pocomoke City Police Department. After he left the CET, its members further retaliated against Officer Savage by urging other government officials to join in the discrimination and retaliation. As new leading officials in Pocomoke City’s government and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office became aware of Officer Savage’s decision to report unlawful harassment and retaliation, they joined in and perpetuated the acts of discrimination and retaliation.
267. The harassing conduct was unwanted by Officer Savage. 268. The employees of Pocomoke City, and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office engaged in the harassing conduct because of Officer Savage’s race and protected activity. 269. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination, constituting protected activity 270. Worcester County, the State of Maryland, the Worcester County Sheriff, and Pocomoke City had actual and constructive knowledge of the harassing behavior of their employees because Savage reported it to his superiors, because his superiors, including Passwaters, participated in and witnessed the harassment and did nothing to stop it, and because the highest county, state, and municipal officials were aware of the reports of discrimination. Worcester County, the State of Maryland, the Worcester County Sheriff, and Pocomoke City did
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nothing to stop the harassing behavior. 271. Pursuant to their practices, Pocomoke City, Worcester County, the Worcester
County Sheriff, and the State of Maryland violated Title VII. 272. Defendants’ discriminatory and retaliatory practices caused Officer Savage harm,
including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits. COUNT III
RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Termination) (Savage v. Pocomoke City and Blake) (Sewell v. Pocomoke City and Morrison)
273. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above.
274. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens equal protection of the laws of the United States, with violations thereof giving rise to claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
275. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects against the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and laws” by persons acting under the color of law. The right to be free from racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for assertion of one’s civil rights were both clear and well-established rights, known to each of the Defendants in this action throughout the time period of the allegations of this Complaint.
276. Pocomoke City is a municipal corporation, and Pocomoke City Police Department is an instrumentality of Pocomoke City. Pocomoke City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the municipality caused the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority
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violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
277. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination, constituting protected activity.
278. Although he had a history of positive performance evaluations, Officer Savage was terminated from his position by the named Defendants on October 26, 2015. This termination was motivated in whole or in part by Officer Savage’s race and/or in retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected activity of complaining about race discrimination.
279. Despite Pocomoke City’s improved crime statistics during Chief Sewell’s tenure as the first African American Chief of Police for the Pocomoke City Police Department, Chief Sewell was terminated from his employment by the named Defendants on July 1, 2015. This termination was motivated in whole or in part by Chief Sewell’s race and by retaliation mixed with race-based discrimination and was an act of retaliation for Chief Sewell’s protected activity.
280. In carrying out these wrongful terminations, Defendants have deprived Officer Savage and Chief Sewell of their rights to equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, giving rise to their claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
281. Defendants’ discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage and Chief Sewell harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
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COUNT IV RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
(Termination) (Savage v. Pocomoke City) (Sewell v. Pocomoke City) 282. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above. 283. Title VII makes it unlawful to discharge an employee on the basis of race or in retaliation for protected activity. 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). 284. Pocomoke City constitutes an employer for purposes of Title VII. 285. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination, constituting protected activity. 286. Chief Sewell had a good faith reasonable basis for his belief that the termination of Officer Savage’s employment would violate Title VII. Chief Sewell’s refusal to terminate Officer Savage for impermissible reasons constituted protected activity. 287. Although he had a history of positive performance evaluations, Officer Savage was terminated from his position by Pocomoke City on October 26, 2015. This termination was motivated in whole or in part by Officer Savage’s race and/or in retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected activity of complaining about race discrimination. 288. Officer Savage’s termination was the final act of race discrimination and retaliation by Pocomoke City officials after many intermediate acts, such as demotion, loss of overtime, and loss of work privileges and responsibilities. 289. Despite Pocomoke City’s improved crime statistics during Chief Sewell’s tenure as the first African American Chief of Police for the Pocomoke City Police Department, Chief
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Sewell was terminated from his employment by Pocomoke City on July 1, 2015. This termination was motivated in whole or in part by Chief Sewell’s race and/or in retaliation for his protected activity.
290. Pocomoke City continued to retaliate against Chief Sewell following his termination by denying him a letter that would allow him to continue to engage in police work and protect himself and his family.
291. These unlawfully motivated terminations give cause to claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a).
292. Defendants’ discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage and Chief Sewell harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT V RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
(Disparate Treatment) (Savage v. Pocomoke City, Worcester County, Sheriff Mason, and the State of Maryland)
293. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above.
294. Title VII makes it unlawful to alter the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment on the basis of race or in retaliation for protected activity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a).
295. Pocomoke City, Worcester County, the Worcester County Sheriff, and the State of Maryland constitute employers for purposes of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
296. Worcester County, the Worcester County Sheriff, and the State of Maryland each legally control certain practices and functions within the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and the CET. As such, Worcester County, the Worcester County Sheriff, and the State of Maryland
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are liable for the unlawful acts of the employees of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and of the CET.
297. The acts and omissions were committed by the employees of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and the CET. Because the Sheriff, County, and State (collectively the “Worcester County Sheriff’s Office” for purposes of this Count) are the legally responsible entities for the acts and/or omissions for the Sheriff’s Office and the CET and constitute employers under Title VII, they are named as Defendants in this count.
298. Specifically, during Officer Savage’s tenure on the CET, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and Defendant Passwaters—a sergeant with the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and one of the assigned supervisors of the CET—exercised significant control over Officer Savage, supervised his day-to-day activities, and furnished his equipment and place of work.
299. The Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, along with Pocomoke City, is liable under Title VII as Officer Savage’s joint-employer. Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir. 2015).
300. The Worcester County Sheriff’s Office is liable for violations of Title VII for unlawful actions or omissions that took place during the time that Officer Savage was assigned to the CET, and remains responsible for discriminatory and retaliatory conduct that continued after it no longer employed Officer Savage.
301. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination and file charges of discrimination with the EEOC, each of which constituted protected activity.
302. Officer Savage faced disparate treatment from Pocomoke City and the Worcester 53

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County’s Sherriff’s office. This disparate treatment included, but is not limited to the following: he was demoted from the role of detective; he was investigated by the Harford County Sheriff’s Office; he was prohibited from making arrests or testifying in court; he was assigned the midnight shift on foot patrol; his overtime was cut; false rumors were circulated about his veracity and alleged drug use; and the Worcester County’s Sheriff’s Office made the dangerous decision to stop responding to Officer Savage’s calls for back up. All of these actions were taken in unlawful retaliation for his EEOC complaints against the Defendants.
303. The acts and omissions of Pocomoke City and the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office were motivated in whole or in part by Officer Savage’s race and in retaliation for Officer Savage’s protected activity.
304. These unlawfully motivated actions give rise to claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a).
305. Defendants’ discriminatory practices have caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT VI RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Disparate Treatment: Benefits and Pay) (All Plaintiffs v. Pocomoke City and Blake)
306. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above.
307. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens equal protection of the laws of the United States, with violations thereof giving rise to claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by persons acting under the color of law. The right to be free from racial discrimination in employment and from retaliation for assertion of one’s civil rights were both clear and well-established rights, known to each of the Defendants in this action throughout the time period of the allegations of this Complaint.
309. Pocomoke City is a municipal corporation, and the Pocomoke City Police Department is an instrumentality of Pocomoke City. Pocomoke City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a custom, practice, or policy of the municipality caused the violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and/or because city officials with final policymaking authority violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
310. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination, constituting protected activity.
311. As Pocomoke City Manager for nearly forty years, Defendant Blake was the city official responsible for determining the benefits and salaries of the Pocomoke City Police Department, including each of the Plaintiffs’ benefits and salaries.
312. Despite satisfactory job performance, Chief Sewell received lower pay and fewer benefits than similarly situated White police chiefs who had previously held the same position. Unlike his predecessors, Chief Sewell did not receive regular salary increases, compensatory time, paid health insurance, or an employment contract. As for Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green, they received lower pay than similarly situated White officers, and Chief Sewell’s requests to raise their salaries were denied, despite similarly situated White officers receiving pay raises. Subsequently, as a result of engaging in statutorily protected activity, they also experienced retaliation with regard to pay and benefits, resulting in demotion and still more
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disparate benefits and pay, as detailed above. 313. Pursuant to their practices, Defendants have deprived Plaintiffs of their rights to
equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, giving rise to their claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
314. Defendants’ discriminatory practices caused Plaintiffs harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT VII RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
(Disparate Treatment: Benefits and Pay) (All Plaintiffs v. Pocomoke City)
315. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above.
316. Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, benefits, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race or in retaliation for protected activity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3.
317. Pocomoke City constitutes an employer for purposes of Title VII. 318. Plaintiffs had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination, constituting protected activity. 319. Lieutenant Green’s participation in Officer Savage’s mediation constitutes protected activity. 320. Despite satisfactory job performance, Chief Sewell received lower pay and fewer benefits than similarly situated White police chiefs who had previously held the same position. Unlike his predecessors, Chief Sewell did not receive regular salary increases, compensatory time, paid health insurance, or an employment contract.
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321. As for Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green, they received lower pay than similarly situated White officers, and Chief Sewell’s requests to raise their salaries were denied, despite similarly situated White officers receiving pay raises. As a result of engaging in statutorily protected activity, they also experienced retaliation with regard to pay and benefits, resulting in demotion and still more disparate benefits and pay, as detailed above.
322. Pursuant to their practices, Pocomoke City violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3.
323. Defendants’ discriminatory practices caused Plaintiffs harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT VIII RACE DISCRIMINATION and RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech and Right to Petition)
(Savage v. Blake, Passwaters, and Smack) 324. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above. 325. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of speech on matters of public concern and to petition the government for redress of grievances, with violations thereof giving rise to claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 326. Officer Savage engaged in protected activity when he exercised his First Amendment rights to free speech on matters of public concern to the community and to petition the government for grievances when he complained of the April 7, 2014, incident to the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission as detailed in paragraphs 151 through 153, supra. 327. Officer Savage similarly exercised his First Amendment rights when he identified racial discrimination inside the CET in a July 21, 2014, EEOC complaint filed against the
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Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. 328. In fact, several months prior to either complaint, Officer Savage’s reports of racial
discrimination inside the CET were made known to the highest officials in Pocomoke City and the Worcester County’s Sheriff’s Office and were indisputably a matter of public concern.
329. In April 2014, Officer Savage reported racial discrimination outside the CET after the altered food stamp was left near his desk. On May 31, 2014, he reported a second incident of a racially discriminatory text message, which Chief Sewell then described in a letter to the Department of Maryland State Police. Finally, in his June 12, 2014, resignation letter, Savage raised the racial discrimination and hostility within the CET for a third time.
330. Defendants Blake, Passwaters, and Smack were aware that Officer Savage had raised separate issues of racial discrimination in his April, May, and June 2014 reports. On or before Officer Savage’s June 2014 resignation letter, Defendant Smack was also aware of the racial discrimination Officer Savage had experienced within the CET.
331. In taking the above actions, Officer Savage spoke out as a citizen of the community.
332. Testifying at trial in criminal prosecutions was a vital part of Officer Savage’s duties as a police officer and, in particular, as a member of the CET and of the Pocomoke City Police Department.
333. Oglesby took the extraordinary step of writing a letter to Mayor Morrison, and the members of the City Council, falsely accusing Officer Savage of lying in his complaints of racial discrimination to the EEOC and the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission against Oglesby.
334. This action directly interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to execute his job duties. Oglesby made this decision very soon after or on the exact day he was made aware of Officer
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Savage’s complaint of racial harassment against him. 335. After learning of Officer Savage’s April and May 2014 reports, Passwaters began
to retaliate against Office Savage’s reporting of racial discrimination. Without any factual basis, Passwaters falsely accused Officer Savage of tardiness and using drugs and claimed that Officer Savage’s debt collectors and “wife” were repeatedly calling the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
336. Passwaters acts of retaliation intensified after Officer Savage’s June 2014 resignation letter. Passwaters spread rumors to Defendants Blake and Smack that were untrue and which Blake and Smack knew or should have known were untrue based on Passwaters’ prior participation in racial discrimination against Officer Savage on the CET.
337. Despite the obvious retaliatory motive of Passwaters, Blake and Smack adopted Passwaters’ rumors without investigation and engaged in their own acts of retaliation. These retaliatory acts directly harmed Officer Savage in his employment with the Pocomoke City Police Department.
338. Passwaters, Blake and Smack each retaliated against Officer Savage for reporting the racial discrimination within the CET. Their acts of retaliation made it difficult or impossible for Officer Savage to fulfill his job responsibilities until such acts resulted in demotion and eventually termination.
339. Blake demanded Chief Sewell investigate the meritless rumors of Passwaters. Thereafter, Blake told Chief Sewell that Officer Savage could not testify in criminal cases and ordered Chief Sewell to refer Officer Savage to a psychiatrist, remove Officer Savage from narcotics work and assign him to the midnight shift. Each of these acts occurred as a result of Officer Savage’s reporting of racial discrimination, and would not have happened but for those
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reports. 340. Blake’s various retaliatory actions directly ordered adverse employment actions
against Officer Savage. Such actions will have a chilling effect on other public employees reporting racial harassment.
341. For his part, Smack wrote a letter wrongly accusing Officer Savage of using false identification and stating that the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office would not send any backup for Officer Savage.
342. Smack’s actions of refusing to provide Officer Savage with backup from the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office and its K-9 unit writing a letter containing false allegations interfered with Officer Savage’s duties as a police officer and, in particular, as an officer engaged in narcotics work, and will have a chilling effect on other employees filing grievances. Smack’s actions were in retaliation for Officer Savage’s reporting of racial discrimination within the CET that included members of the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office.
343. Pursuant to their practices, Defendants deprived Officer Savage of his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, giving rise to his claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
344. Defendants’ practices caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
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COUNT IX RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII
(Retaliatory Interference) (Savage v. the State of Maryland) 345. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above. 346. Title VII makes it unlawful to alter the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment in retaliation for protected activity. 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. 347. Pocomoke City constitutes Officer Savage’s employer for purposes of Title VII. The State of Maryland is a covered employee under Title VII, and, therefore, cannot interfere with Officer Savage’s covered employment relationship with Pocomoke City. 348. The State of Maryland controls the practices of the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office. As such, the State of Maryland is liable for the unlawful acts of the employees of the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office. 349. Officer Savage’s complaint of race discrimination to the Attorney Grievance Commission and his charges of discrimination with the EEOC constitute protected activity. 350. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination. 351. Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office’s prohibition of Officer Savage testifying in court, its disparaging letters to members of the Pocomoke City Council about Officer Savage, and its efforts to influence Pocomoke City’s demotion and termination of Officer Savage were because of his protected activity.
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352. Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office interfered with the employment relationship that Officer Savage had with Pocomoke City.
353. The State of Maryland thus committed retaliatory interference in violation of Title VII.
354. Defendant’s retaliatory practices following earlier discrimination and Officer Savage’s reporting of it caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT X RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Free Speech)
(Sewell v. Pocomoke City, Blake, Morrison) 355. Chief Sewell alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above. 356. Defendant Blake repeatedly pressured Chief Sewell to take adverse employment actions and other disciplinary actions against Officer Savage from approximately July 15, 2014, until Chief Sewell was terminated on July 1, 2015. 357. Chief Sewell protested many of these orders because, in his opinion, Blake’s orders were in furtherance of the racial discrimination against Officer Savage and in retaliation for his having reported that discrimination. 358. On October 14, 2014, Chief Sewell was called to testify in a special, closed meeting of the entire Pocomoke City Council, Morrison, and Blake. 359. While testifying before the Pocomoke City Council, Chief Sewell informed members of the Council that Blake unlawfully and without factual basis had ordered Chief Sewell to demote Officer Savage and to take other adverse employment actions, and that
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Blake’s allegations about Sewell were a pretext to increase the pressure on Chief Sewell to take unlawful action against Officer Savage. Chief Sewell encouraged the City Council to investigate and to take action to prevent Blake’s misconduct.
360. Following the October 14, 2014 meeting, Chief Sewell continued to raise concerns about misconduct by Blake to individual members of the city council. Chief Sewell was concerned that Officer Savage had been the victim of racial discrimination and that Blake’s orders were an effort to conceal that discrimination and to retaliate against Officer Savage for filing an EEOC complaint.
361. Testifying before the Pocomoke City Council and expressing concerns to individual Council members who could investigate and prevent misconduct was speech that warrants First Amendment protection and was an act to inform the public of wrongdoing by Blake and others within City government.
362. Chief Sewell’s meetings with individual council members and testimony before the special meeting of the Council were outside and beyond any daily professional duties that Chief Sewell had with respect to the Council and individual Council members.
363. When raising these concerns and urging Council members to prevent Blake’s discrimination and retaliation, Chief Sewell acted in the role of a citizen.
364. Because Sewell raised allegations of misconduct against Blake to individual members of the council and during council meetings, Blake and Morrison made efforts to terminate Chief Sewell.
365. Chief Sewell was asked to resign in late June 2015. 366. On July 1, 2015, Chief Sewell was terminated by a letter from Morrison, who had final policymaking authority for Pocomoke City. This action, taken in retaliation for Sewell’s
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outspoken opposition to race discrimination and his refusal to condone discrimination against his subordinate employees, deprived Chief Sewell of his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
367. Pocomoke City, acting through Crofoot, continued to retaliate against Chief Sewell following his termination by denying him a letter that would allow him to continue to engage in police work and protect himself and his family.
368. Defendants’ practices caused Chief Sewell harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT XI CIVIL CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION of 42 U.S.C. § 1985
(Savage v. Blake, Crofoot, Passwaters, and Smack) 369. Officer Savage alleges and incorporates each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above. 370. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 prohibits conspiracies interfering with civil rights. 371. Defendants Blake, Crofoot, Passwaters, and/or Smack engaged in a conspiracy and unlawful agreement to deprive Officer Savage of his constitutional and statutorily protected right to work in an environment free of racial harassment and his right not to suffer adverse employment actions on the basis of his race. This conspiracy was motivated by animus with respect to Officer Savage’s race. 372. The purpose of the conspiracy was to discredit Officer Savage’s valid complaints of racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of his federal civil rights. The purpose of the conspiracy was also to obtain Officer Savage’s termination from the Pocomoke City Police Department on a pretextual basis, knowing that the true motivation was racial discrimination in violation of federal law.
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373. The purpose and effect of the conspiracy was part of the same effort by all Defendants to deprive Officer Savage of the substantive rights provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as alleged above.
374. Accordingly, Defendants have violated Officer Savage’s rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
375. Defendants’ practices caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT XII RACE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN VIOLATION of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
& 1983 (Hostile Work Environment) (Savage v. Pocomoke City, County Commissioners of Worcester County, Blake, Crofoot, Morrison, Passwaters, Phillips, Smack, Wells, and Donaldson) 376. Plaintiffs allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above. 377. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 guarantees that all persons shall have the right to make and enforce contracts, including employment contracts free from all forms of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. Section 1981 also prohibits retaliation against individuals who make complaints about racial discrimination in the creation and/or enforcement of contracts, including contracts for terms and condition of employment. The right to be free from racial discrimination in employment and from retaliation for assertion of one’s civil rights were both clear and well-established rights, known to each of the Defendants in this action throughout the time period of the allegations of this Complaint. 378. Officer Savage was employed by the Pocomoke City Police Department for a period of approximately four and one half years, from April 2011 to October 2015.
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379. Officer Savage was also a joint employee of the Pocomoke City Police Department, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, the Maryland State Police, and the CET for more than two years, from April 2012 to June of 2014.
380. By the acts and omissions described above, Defendants, acting under color of state law, have maintained a pattern and practice of race discrimination and retaliation creating a hostile work environment. Defendants used racial epithets directed toward, or in the presence of, Officer Savage regularly. The behavior by the above listed Defendants occurred when the Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment and used incidents and tools of their employment.
381. Defendants’ conduct was both severe and pervasive, especially given that the racial epithets were either spoken or condoned by Officer Savage’s supervisors. Moreover, the hostile work environment was caused by policy or custom of the CET, and/or by Defendants Donaldson and Passwaters, the final policy making officials of the CET. Officer Savage had a good faith and reasonable basis to complain about race discrimination, constituting protected activity under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
382. Officer Savage brings this claim through the remedial mechanisms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
383. Defendants’ practices caused Officer Savage harm, including severe emotional distress, medical bills, and lost wages and benefits.
COUNT XIII VIOLATION of the FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (Savage and Green v. Pocomoke City, Blake, and Morrison) 384. Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green allege and incorporate each of the factual allegations stated in paragraphs 1 through 245 above.
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385. Section 7(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1), provides that “no employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.”
386. Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green were “employees,” and Defendants were their “employers” under FLSA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 203.
387. Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green were not paid overtime as detailed above. 388. Officer Savage is not an exempt employee under Section 13(a)(1) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b). As a “police officer,” the exemption also does not apply to him per 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b)(1). Therefore, he was owed overtime pay of one and one-half times his regular pay for all hours worked above forty in one week. FLSA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 389. Lieutenant Green is not an exempt employee under Section 13(a)(1) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C.§ 213(b). As a “police officer,” the exemption also does not apply to him per 29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b)(1). Therefore, he was owed overtime pay of one and one-half times his regular pay for all hours worked above forty in one week. FLSA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 390. Since at least June 2014, Pocomoke City has known that it owed this money to Plaintiffs. 391. Defendants violated the FLSA by knowingly, willfully, and intentionally failing to compensate Plaintiffs, and all other similarly situated individuals, the rate of time-and-onehalf their regular hourly rate for every hour worked in excess of forty hours in any one workweek. 392. Therefore, Pocomoke City owes Officer Savage and Lieutenant Green back
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overtime wages, the same amount in addition as liquidated damages, and interest (both pre- and post-judgment) on the combined wages and liquidated damages. FLSA § 16, 29 U.S.C. § 216 and 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF Wherefore Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lieutenant Green respectfully request that the Court: 1. Enter judgment on their behalf against Defendants on all counts; 2. Declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that through their acts and omissions, Defendants maintained a racially hostile work environment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and a hostile work environment based on race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII; 3. Declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that through their acts and omissions, Defendants unlawfully terminated Plaintiffs based upon their race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and based upon their race and in retaliation for their protected activity in violation of Title VII; 4. Declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that through their acts and omissions, Defendants denied Plaintiffs equal wages and benefits based upon their race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and based upon their race and in retaliation for their protected activity in violation of Title VII; 5. Declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that Defendants improperly retaliated against Plaintiffs based upon their exercise of their rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances, in violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution;
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6. Declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that Defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy against Plaintiffs for exercise of their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985;
7. Declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that Defendants improperly interfered with Plaintiffs’ employment relationship in retaliation for Plaintiffs’ protected activity in violation of Title VII;
8. Declare, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, that by denying Plaintiffs overtime pay, Defendants knowingly, willingly, and intentionally violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207;
9. Issue a permanent injunction that (i) prohibits Defendants, their officers, agents, employees, and successors from engaging in the discriminatory employment practices complained of herein; (ii) returns Plaintiffs to the employment positions they would have held but for Defendants’ wrongful conduct; and (iii) imposes a prohibition of similar conduct in the future;
10. Require three-year monitoring of all law enforcement activity by all Defendants to prevent any further racial discrimination and retaliation in employment, including the hiring, training, and promotion of new and current officers;
11. Award Plaintiffs front pay and back pay with interest and other job benefits, including the value of health benefits, sufficient to redress all of the economic harms that they have suffered;
12. Award liquidated damages in an equal amount to unpaid overtime pay pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216;
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13. Award Plaintiffs compensatory damages in an amount to be proven at trial sufficient to redress the harms that they have suffered, including physical and emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, loss of income, loss of overtime pay, and mental anguish;
14. Award Plaintiffs appropriate punitive damages, against Defendants in their individual capacities, in an amount to be proven at trial that would punish Defendants for their knowing, intentional, willful, and reckless disregard of clearly established federal constitutional and statutory rights as alleged herein and enter any and all injunctive decrees and relief necessary to effectively prevent all Defendants from engaging in similar unlawful racial discrimination in the future;
15. Award Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k) and 29 U.S.C. § 216 and all taxable costs of this action;
16. Award such other and further relief in any form that this Court deems just and proper under the facts and circumstances as proved at trial.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury.
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Dated: September 29, 2016

Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ Andrew McBride_________________ Andrew McBride (D. Md. Bar No. 27858) Christen B’anca Glenn (D. Md. Bar No. 14945) Dwayne Sam (D. Md. Bar No. 29947) Craig Smith (D. Md. Bar No. 17938) Craig Fansler (D. Md. Bar No. 19442) Brian Walsh (pro hac vice) Jillian Laughna (pro hac vice) WILEY REIN LLP 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20006 TEL: 202.719.7000 FAX: 202.719.7049 EMAIL: amcbride@wileyrein.com
Dennis A. Corkery (D. Md. Bar No. 19076) Matthew Handley (D. Md. Bar No. 18636) WASHINGTON LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS 11 Dupont Circle, N.W. Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 TEL: 202.319.1000 FAX: 202.319.1010 EMAIL: Dennis_Corkery@washlaw.org
Deborah A. Jeon (D. Md. Bar No. 06905) Sonia Kumar (D. Md. Bar No. 07196) ACLU of Maryland 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 TEL: 410.889.8555 FAX: 410.366.7838 EMAIL: jeon@aclu-md.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Second Amended Complaint was served on all
defendants through their counsel via the CM/ECF system:
Ronald M. Levitan Genevieve G. Marshall Assistant Attorneys General, Maryland Department of State of Police 1201 Reisterstown Road Pikesville, MD 21208 genevieve.marshall@maryland.gov
Counsel for the State of Maryland, Brooks Phillips, and Patricia Donaldson
Daniel Karp Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp 120 E. Baltimore Street, Suite 1850 Baltimore, MD 21202 brunokarp@bkcklaw.com
Counsel for Pocomoke City, Bruce Morrison, Russell Blake, and Ernie Crofoot
Jason L. Levine Assistant Attorney General, Maryland State Treasurer’s Office 80 Calvert Street, 4th Floor Annapolis, MD 21401 jlevine@treasurer.state.md.us
Counsel for Reggie Mason, Nathaniel Passwaters, Dale Smack, and Rodney Wells
/s/ Andrew McBride____________________ Andrew McBride (D. Md. Bar No. 27858) WILEY REIN LLP 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20006 TEL: 202.719.7000 FAX: 202.719.7049 EMAIL: amcbride@wileyrein.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs
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 Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88 Filed 10/19/16 Page 1 of 4

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE DIVISION

FRANKLIN SAVAGE, et al., Plaintiffs,
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. POCOMOKE CITY, WORCESTER COUNTY SHERIFF, REGGIE T. MASON (in his official capacity), and STATE OF MARYLAND
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Case No. 1:16-cv-00201-JFM ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO INTERVENE Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) and Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“Title VII”), the United States Department of Justice (“United States”) moves to intervene as Plaintiff-Intervenor in the above-titled action. In support of its Motion to Intervene, the United States states as follows: 1. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint in this action on September 29, 2016, asserting claims under Title VII (as well as other claims) against Defendants Pocomoke City, Worcester County Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, in his official capacity, and the State of Maryland, among others.

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88 Filed 10/19/16 Page 2 of 4
2. The Title VII claims are based on several charges of discrimination timely filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC investigated these charges and found reasonable cause to believe that violations of Title VII occurred. The EEOC formally referred this matter to the United States Department of Justice after an unsuccessful attempt to conciliate the charges.
3. Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII permits the United States to seek intervention into a private lawsuit involving a government, government agency, or political subdivision, such as in this lawsuit, upon certification that the case is of general public importance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1).
4. The Attorney General’s designee has certified that this is a case of public importance. A Certificate of Public Importance is attached as Exhibit 1 to this Motion to Intervene.
5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) allows for permissive intervention in an action when a federal statute confers a conditional right to intervene. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A). Title VII confers upon the United States a conditional right to intervene in an action alleging a violation of Title VII by a governmental actor. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
6. With respect to governmental parties, Rule 24(b) also provides that “a court may permit a federal…agency to intervene if a party’s claim or defense is based on…a statute or executive order administered by the…agency.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2)(A). The United States Department of Justice has primary responsibility for enforcing Title VII in actions against state and local government employers.
7. Rule 24(b) also provides for permissive intervention when a potential party “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R.
2

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88 Filed 10/19/16 Page 3 of 4
Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). Both Plaintiffs and the United States claim violations of Title VII, and these
claims are based on substantially the same facts.
8. The United States’ proposed intervention is timely. Discovery has not yet begun
in this case, and thus, intervention by the United States will not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
Wherefore, the United States requests that this Court allow it to intervene in this lawsuit
and file the complaint, attached as Exhibit 2. A proposed Order is attached.
Respectfully submitted,
VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
DELORA L. KENNEBREW (GA Bar No. 414320) Chief Employment Litigation Section Civil Rights Division
KAREN WOODARD (MD Bar) Principal Deputy Chief Employment Litigation Section Civil Rights Division
/s/ Barbara Schwabauer BARBARA SCHWABAUER (OH Bar No. 0086999) KATHLEEN LAWRENCE (NY Reg. No. 4844502) Senior Trial Attorneys Civil Rights Division Employment Litigation Section, PHB 4918 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Telephone: (202) 305-3034 Fax: (202) 514-1005 Barbara.Schwabauer@usdoj.gov Kathleen.Lawrence@usdoj.gov
3

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88 Filed 10/19/16 Page 4 of 4 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that, on October 19, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document – including any attachment(s) to it, exhibit(s) to it, and/or accompanying proposed order(s) – with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will then send a notification of electronic filing to counsel for Defendants Pocomoke City, Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, in his official capacity, and the State of Maryland.
/s/ Barbara Schwabauer BARBARA SCHWABAUER Senior Trial Attorney United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Employment Litigation Section
4

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-1 Filed 10/19/16 Page 1 of 2 EXHIBIT 1

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-1 Filed 10/19/16 Page 2 of 2

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-2 Filed 10/19/16 Page 1 of 26 EXHIBIT 2

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-2 Filed 10/19/16 Page 2 of 26

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

_________________________________

)

FRANKLIN SAVAGE, et al.

)

)

Plaintiffs,

)

)

and

)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

)

)

v.

)

)

)

POCOMOKE CITY, WORCESTER )

COUNTY SHERIFF, REGGIE T.

)

MASON (in his official capacity), and )

STATE OF MARYLAND

)

)

Defendants.

)

_________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-00201-JFM JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff-Intervenor, the United States of America (“United States”), alleges:

1. This complaint in intervention is brought on behalf of the United States to enforce

the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et

seq. (“Title VII”).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This Court has jurisdiction of the action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1345.

1

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3. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because it is where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the cause of action herein occurred.
PARTIES 4. Plaintiff Franklin Savage (“Officer Savage” or “Savage”) is a former employee of the State of Maryland, Worcester County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”), and Pocomoke City. 5. Plaintiff Kelvin Sewell (“Chief Sewell” or “Sewell”) is a former employee of Pocomoke City, where he served as Chief of the Pocomoke City Police Department (“PCPD”). 6. Plaintiff Lynell Green (“Lt. Green” or “Green”) is a former employee of Pocomoke City, where he served as a Lieutenant in the PCPD. 7. Plaintiff-Intervenor is the United States intervening in a suit filed by Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lt. Green against a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. The lawful designee of the Attorney General of the United States has certified that the underlying lawsuit presents a case of general public importance to the United States. 8. Defendant Pocomoke City is a government body created pursuant to the laws of the State of Maryland and is located within this judicial district. The PCPD is an instrumentality of Pocomoke City, as established by Maryland law and the Pocomoke City Charter. 9. Defendant Sheriff Reggie T. Mason (“Sheriff Mason” or “Mason”) is the Sheriff of Worcester County, in charge of overseeing the WCSO, and is being sued in his official capacity. In this capacity, and pursuant to applicable federal and state law, Sheriff Mason, an elected officer, is subject to Title VII.
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10. Defendant State of Maryland is an employer of Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, an elected state officer, pursuant to Article 44 of the Maryland Constitution. Defendant State of Maryland was also an employer of Officer Savage when he was detailed to the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team (“CET”).
11. Defendants Pocomoke City, Sheriff Mason, and the State of Maryland are all “persons” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a).
12. Defendants Pocomoke City, Sheriff Mason, and the State of Maryland are all “employers” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
13. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) received timely charges filed by Officer Savage. In his charge of July 21, 2014 against WCSO (EEOC Charge No. 531-2014-01983), Officer Savage alleged a hostile work environment based on race and retaliation for engaging in protected activity. In an October 15, 2014 charge against PCPD (EEOC Charge No. 531-2015-00092), Officer Savage alleged retaliation for engaging in protected activity. Officer Savage also filed a charge against the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office in June 22, 2015, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected activity. The EEOC investigated the charges and found reasonable cause to believe that Title VII violations occurred. The EEOC attempted unsuccessfully to conciliate the charges, and subsequently referred the matter to the Department of Justice.
14. The EEOC received timely charges filed by Chief Sewell. Chief Sewell filed an EEOC charge against PCPD on March 9, 2015, alleging retaliation for engaging in protected activity (EEOC Charge No. 531-2015-01013). Sewell amended this charge on June 15, 2015 to add Pocomoke City, and filed two additional charges alleging retaliation against Pocomoke City
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and PCPD on August 14, 2015 (EEOC Charges No. 531-2015-02189, 531-2016-02134). The EEOC investigated the charges and found reasonable cause to believe that Title VII violations occurred. The EEOC attempted unsuccessfully to conciliate the charges, and subsequently referred the matter to the Department of Justice.
15. The EEOC received a timely charge filed by Lt. Green. In his charge of March 30, 2015, Lt. Green alleged retaliation for engaging in protected activity (EEOC Charge No. 5312015-01162). He amended this charge to include Pocomoke City on June 10, 2015. The EEOC investigated the charge, and found reasonable cause to believe that Title VII violations occurred. The EEOC attempted unsuccessfully to conciliate the charges, and subsequently referred the matter to the Department of Justice.
16. All conditions precedent to the filing of suit have been performed or have occurred.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. Hostile Work Environment of Officer Savage While Serving on the Worcester County
Criminal Enforcement Team 17. Officer Savage joined the PCPD in or around April 2011. 18. In or around May 2012, Officer Savage was detailed to the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team (“CET”), a multijurisdictional drug enforcement unit operating in Worcester County. 19. Officer Savage joined the CET as its first African-American member working with six other members who were all white.
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20. Sgt. Nathaniel Passwaters of the WCSO and Sgt. Patricia Donaldson of the Maryland State Police (“MSP”) were assigned as supervisors to the CET, and served as Officer Savage’s immediate supervisors.
21. While Officer Savage served on the CET the other members were Corporal Brooks Phillips (MSP), Corporal Rodney Wells (WCSO), Jeff Johns (Ocean City Police Department), and Brian Trader (WCSO).
22. The CET worked closely with the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s Office (“WCSAO”), including Worcester County State’s Attorney Beau Oglesby (“Oglesby”). The WCSAO was charged with prosecuting the cases arising out of the CET’s investigations as well as criminal cases from PCPD.
23. When Officer Savage was first detailed to the CET, it was housed in the same building as the WCSO. For the entire duration of Officer Savage’s time working on the CET, WCSO provided Officer Savage with office space, a vehicle, and equipment (including computer, email address, and log-in) for his use for his work on the CET.
24. Officer Savage was required to follow the policies and procedures of the WCSO with respect to submitting evidence and received training from WCSO.
25. The WCSO directed Officer Savage’s duties and responsibilities on the CET. Sgt. Passwaters set Officer Savage’s daily schedule, directed his day to day activities, approved his overtime requests, and filled out his performance evaluations. Sgt. Passwaters also had the authority to remove Officer Savage from the CET.
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26. During the more than two years that Officer Savage worked on the CET, Officer Savage had no other assignments and rarely had contact with individuals at the PCPD beyond submitting his timecard.
27. Many of the members of the CET, including Cpl. Wells, were WCSO deputy sheriffs, and they performed the same duties that Officer Savage performed—at the direction of Sgt. Passwaters.
28. Throughout Officer Savage’s employment on the CET he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment by members of the CET, including by his supervisors on the CET.
29. During this time, Officer Savage’s supervisor, Sgt. Passwaters, used the word “nigger” and its variants repeatedly both orally and in writing, either aimed at Officer Savage or in his presence. In September 2012, Sgt. Passwaters played and replayed footage of an AfricanAmerican suspect using the word “nigger” for members of the CET indicating that he thought the footage was funny. During this incident, Sgt. Passwaters said he was about to “drop the n-bomb,” and then proceeded to say the word “nigger.” On occasion, Sgt. Passwaters also referred to African-Americans as “ninjas,” which was known to members of the CET as a code word for “nigger” based on an incident from a previous investigation.
30. Officer Savage’s co-workers, too, regularly used racial epithets in the workplace either directed to, or in the presence of, Officer Savage. Officer Savage received a text message from Cpl. Phillips on May 31, 2014 that said “what’s your body count, nigga. I’m in double digits.”
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31. Cpl. Wells regularly screened racially-charged YouTube videos using the word “nigger” on his work computer, while other members of the CET gathered around his desk and laughed. This was done in Officer Savage’s presence.
32. On one occasion in or around September 2012, Cpl. Wells asked Officer Savage why African-Americans are offended when a white person uses the word “nigger” and how Officer Savage would personally feel if Officer Wells called him a “nigger.” Officer Savage indicated that he would be offended.
33. Officer Savage tried to ignore the repeated use of the term in the office by excusing himself from the room, putting on his headphones, shaking his head, or trying to focus on his work.
34. Officer Johns once asked Officer Savage why African-Americans like watermelon and fried chicken so much. After that conversation, copies of a photo of Officer Savage eating watermelon appeared in his case files, on his desk, in his calendar, and in other parts of his workspace.
35. Cpl. Phillips, Officer Trader, and Cpl. Wells repeatedly spoke to Officer Savage about lynchings and the Ku Klux Klan. In December 2012, along with Sgt. Donaldson, Phillips, Trader, and Wells drove Officer Savage to a location they referred to as “KKK Lane” in Stockton, Maryland in Officer Savage’s official covert vehicle provided by the WCSO. They had no official purpose to drive to that location. Cpl. Wells and Officer Trader told Officer Savage that he might see some Klan members or a noose on the trip. Around the same time, Cpl. Wells told Officer Savage about a chest in his attic that contained “white sheets and nooses.” After the trip to Stockton, Cpl. Phillips informed Sgt. Passwaters that they had taken Officer Savage to “KKK
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Lane.” Neither Sgt. Donaldson nor Sgt. Passwaters took corrective action against any of the CET members involved.
36. In December 2013, Officer Savage found a bloody deer’s tail on his windshield while it was parked next to CET’s office space. After Savage reported the incident to his supervisors, he believed this incident was racially motivated. Although CET supervisors determined that a CET member, Cpl. Phillips, had left the bloody dear tail on Officer Savage’s windshield, CET supervisors took no corrective action.
37. Members of the CET also referred to African-Americans, including suspects and President Obama, as Officer Savage’s “boys” in Officer Savage’s presence.
38. In April 2014, Officer Savage found a fake food stamp in his desk drawer with an image of President Obama.
39. Also in April 2014, Officer Savage was present at a case meeting where Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby read aloud a document that repeatedly used the word “nigger.” Oglesby was aware of Officer’s Savage’s presence.
40. Officer Savage was offended by these racially charged comments and actions. Officer Savage complained about some of these incidents, but corrective action was never taken in response to his complaints or when his supervisors otherwise had knowledge of, or participated in, the racially offensive actions.
41. Once the hostile work environment became too unbearable, Officer Savage made complaints outside his chain of command on the CET to PCPD’s Chief Sewell. Chief Sewell reported Savage’s complaints of race discrimination to the MSP for investigation; MSP substantiated at least one of the allegations made by Officer Savage. But, upon information and
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belief, sufficient corrective action was not taken, even against the MSP employee whose conduct was substantiated. WCSO was made aware of Savage’s complaint and refused to cooperate in MSP’s investigation.
42. Officer Savage also filed a complaint with the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission regarding Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby’s use of the word “nigger.”
B. Retaliation Against Officer Savage 43. Shortly after Officer Savage complained to Chief Sewell about the racial
harassment, Sgt. Passwaters and others from the CET and the WCSO began retaliating against Officer Savage by making false accusations against him.
44. On or around June 3, 2014, Sgt. Passwaters knowingly made false allegations in the workplace that debt collectors and Officer Savage’s wife were repeatedly calling the WCSO in an attempt to disparage Officer’s Savage reputation. Officer Savage has never been married and there is no evidence to substantiate that these calls ever occurred.
45. Also on or around June 3, 2014, Sgt. Passwaters asked Officer Savage if he was on drugs, and, during a drug purchase later in the day, Cpl. Phillips accused Officer Savage of smoking marijuana. Officer Savage reported these incidents to Chief Sewell on June 4, 2014, and Chief Sewell advised Officer Savage to take a drug test; Officer Savage took a drug test on June 6, 2014, the results of which were negative.
46. On June 11, 2014, Officer Savage met with Chief Deputy Dale Smack (“Smack”) of the WCSO along with PCPD Lt. Green. Officer Savage indicated his intention to resign from the CET and described the racially hostile work environment and retaliation that he had encountered on the CET that was forcing him to resign.
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47. Upon information and belief, Chief Deputy Smack neither conducted an investigation into Officer Savage’s allegations nor took corrective action in response.
48. The next day Officer Savage resigned from the CET due to the racially hostile work environment and subsequent retaliation for his complaints about the harassment.
49. Retaliation by WCSO of Officer Savage continued after his resignation from the CET.
50. On or around July 15, 2014, WCSO officials falsely accused Officer Savage of misusing his undercover identification to secure fraudulent loans. Sgt. Passwaters also falsely accused Savage of selling his off-duty weapon. To disprove this claim, Savage brought the weapon to Chief Sewell.
51. On or around July 29, 2014, Chief Deputy Smack sent a memorandum to Chief Sewell accusing Officer Savage of falsely representing himself as a member of the CET. In this memorandum, Smack informed the PCPD that it would no longer assist or participate in any investigative efforts by Officer Savage as they had done in the past.
52. On or around August 14, 2014, Chief Deputy Smack informed Chief Sewell that WCSO would not respond to emergency calls or requests for back up assistance made by Officer Savage. On at least two occasions, Savage was not able to secure assistance of a K-9 unit from WCSO, a regular procedure for PCPD.
53. Also in August 2014, WCSO issued a press release stating that Officer Savage’s complaints of discrimination were “Not Sustained.” Upon information and belief, WCSO conducted no investigation to make this determination.
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54. On September 4, 2014, Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby indicated to Lt. Green in Officer Savage’s presence that he no longer required Officer Savage’s testimony in a pending case. Oglesby refused to speak to Officer Savage directly. Later that same week, Oglesby sent a letter to Pocomoke Mayor Bruce Morrison (“Mayor Morrison”) and the Pocomoke City Council (“Council” or “City Council”) indicating that he would not allow Officer Savage to provide testimony in court because of questions about his “veracity.”
55. Over the next several months Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby continued to confirm that his office would not prosecute cases generated as a result of search warrants where Officer Savage was the affiant. Oglesby specified that his office would not prosecute even minor traffic violations if Officer Savage was involved.
56. Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby also threatened to interfere with Officer Savage’s attempts to find a new job.
57. After Officer Savage made complaints of race discrimination against both WCSO and Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby, Pocomoke City also began to retaliate against Officer Savage.
58. City Manager Russell Blake (“Blake”) repeatedly pressured Chief Sewell to remove Officer Savage from narcotics work, to move him to the undesirable midnight shift, and to demote him to patrol duty without the authority to make arrests. Blake also directed Chief Sewell to require Officer Savage to undergo psychological evaluation to assess his fitness for duty and a polygraph examination. On almost a daily basis from September through October 2014, Blake put pressure on Sewell to discipline Officer Savage.
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59. Officer Savage experienced retaliation outside the workplace as well. Since the time of making his complaints of harassment (and subsequent retaliation), he has regularly observed and photographed unmarked police vehicles sitting outside of his house. In December 2014, he also experienced a mysterious break-in at his home where he lives with his son. His house was torn up, his dogs were locked in a bedroom, and the only item stolen was his gun.
60. In January 2015, Pocomoke City Councilman Dale Trotter (“Trotter”), who is also a WCSO deputy, directed Pocomoke City officials to cut Officer Savage’s overtime hours. Officer Savage’s overtime hours were cut around this time.
61. In February 2015, Mayor Morrison directed Chief Sewell to demote Officer Savage. Because he had received a direct order, Chief Sewell demoted Officer Savage from his detective position on February 9, 2015. Officer Savage’s removal from the detective position was accompanied by a loss in status as well as changed responsibilities. Using the reason supplied to him by the mayor, Chief Sewell indicated that the demotion was being taken due to a shortage of patrol officers; yet a more junior patrol officer was immediately promoted to detective.
62. Officer Savage’s duties were later further reduced when he was assigned to the evidence room.
63. Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby sought a meeting with Chief Sewell in May 2015 to discuss the issues between the WCSO, the WCSAO, and Officer Savage. On June 1, 2015, Chief Sewell met with Oglesby, Sgt. Donaldson, Sgt. Passwaters, and two other individuals from the WCSAO. At the meeting, Sgt. Donaldson raised issues about Officer Savage’s attendance on the CET and asked Chief Sewell to reprimand Officer Savage. Sgt.
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Passwaters and Sgt. Donaldson also falsely accused Officer Savage of using his undercover ID to take out fraudulent loans, selling his weapon, and using illegal drugs.
64. On June 26, 2015, Mayor Morrison, City Attorney William Hudson, and members of the City Council visited Chief Sewell’s office and repeatedly pressured him to fire Officer Savage, citing that he was “a problem.”
C. Retaliation Against Chief Sewell 65. Each time Chief Sewell was pressured by WCSO, Pocomoke City officials and
Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby to take retaliatory actions against Officer Savage, including demoting and terminating Savage, Sewell resisted.
66. On October 14, 2014, at a special City Council meeting, Chief Sewell reported to the City Council that he was concerned that City Manager Blake was retaliating against Officer Savage for his complaints of discrimination.
67. On December 27, 2014, Mayor Morrison indicated that the “problems with Savage” were souring the relationship between Pocomoke City and WCSO.
68. When Chief Sewell indicated to Mayor Morrison in March 2015 that he was concerned that the WCSO was upset because he would not fire Officer Savage, Mayor Morrison told him the sooner he got rid of Savage, the better the relationship between WCSO and PCPD would be again. Chief Sewell reminded the Mayor of Officer Savage’s allegations in his EEOC complaint of discrimination.
69. City Manager Blake also continued to put pressure on Chief Sewell by attempting to direct his duties in areas in which the city manager had no control or authority. For example, Blake ordered Chief Sewell to hand over personnel records which the Chief was prohibited by
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law from providing to a civilian; Chief Sewell refused. Angry over Chief Sewell’s refusal to follow his directive and violate the law, Blake yelled at Chief Sewell and called him an “ungrateful ass nigger.” When Sewell told Blake he was going to report him, Blake responded that he did not care and suggested no one would believe Sewell if Sewell reported him.
70. In March 2015, Chief Sewell found an anonymous note on his windshield which said that Councilman Trotter was actively trying to build support against Chief Sewell and that City Manager Blake referred to Chief Sewell as a “smart nigger chief.” The note also said that Blake didn’t like Officer Savage and Lt. Green and before he is done “all nigger police in Pocomoke will be gone.”
71. In April 2015, City Councilman George Tasker (“Tasker”) called Chief Sewell and told him that once Officer Savage is gone, the problems will go away. Sewell reminded Tasker that Officer Savage was a victim of discrimination.
72. In the June 26, 2015 meeting with Mayor Morrison, City Attorney William Hudson, and members of the City Council, Chief Sewell was accused of stealing a computer from his office and of making a false anonymous report—though neither allegation was true.
73. Around this same time, at the behest of members of the City Council, several PCPD officers were pressured into signing a document declaring “no confidence” in Chief Sewell.
74. On June 29, 2015, Mayor Morrison requested that Chief Sewell appear at a City Council meeting where he was asked to resign. When he refused, Chief Sewell was terminated.
75. The day after Chief Sewell’s termination, City Manager Blake resigned his position with Pocomoke City, and was succeeded by Ernie Crofoot.
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76. Chief Sewell subsequently moved to Baltimore, Maryland, but the retaliation has nonetheless continued.
D. The Termination of Officer Savage 77. After Chief Sewell’s removal, on July 7, 2015, MSP Lt. Earl Starner was
appointed interim chief of PCPD. 78. Lt. Starner initiated an investigation of Officer Savage with the Harford County
Sheriff’s Department. Specifically, the Harford County Sheriff’s Department was tasked with investigating whether Savage violated the PCPD’s code of ethics for a representation he made in connection with his July 22, 2014 complaint of discrimination to the Attorney Grievance Commission regarding Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby.
79. Before that Harford County investigation issued a determination, on October 26, 2015, Officer Savage was terminated by City Manager Crofoot. Crofoot informed Savage that he was terminated because he could not provide testimony, in accordance with the limitation set forth by Worcester County State’s Attorney Oglesby.
E. Retaliation Against Lt. Green 80. Pocomoke City also retaliated against Lt. Green who supported Officer Savage
with respect to his complaints to WCSO and the EEOC. 81. In or around June 2014, Lt. Green, at the request of Officer Savage, accompanied
him to a meeting with Chief Deputy Smack where Officer Savage reported his complaints of racial discrimination and harassment by members of the CET.
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82. On or around August 14, 2014, Chief Deputy Smack informed Chief Sewell that WCSO would not respond to emergency calls or requests for back up by Lt. Green as they had done in the past.
83. On or around October 1, 2014, while off duty, Lt. Green joined Officer Savage for mediation at the EEOC regarding Officer Savage’s complaints of race discrimination.
84. On or around October 2, 2014, City Manager Blake ordered Chief Sewell to forbid Lt. Green from attending any such further EEOC meetings with Officer Savage.
85. On or around October 13, 2014, Mayor Morrison and City Council members cut Lt. Green’s overtime by more than half.
86. In or around January 2015, Councilman Trotter and City Manager Blake continued to question Lt. Green’s use of overtime and cut his overtime hours in half again until he was then told that he could not incur any more overtime. During this time other officers at the PCPD continued to accrue large amounts of overtime without limit.
87. In or around April 2015, Councilman Tasker informed Chief Sewell that Lt. Green was “a problem” for PCPD and that once Officer Savage and Green were gone, PCPD’s problems would go away.
88. When Mayor Morrison, City Attorney William Hudson, and members of the City Council visited Chief Sewell’s office on June 26, 2015, they told Sewell that Lt. Green, like Officer Savage, was “a problem.”
89. In or around June 2015, Lt. Green received an anonymous note at his home indicating that the individuals from the WCSO had planted drugs in his car, home, and at the PCPD station, in order to incriminate Lt. Green and Chief Sewell. Lt. Green immediately
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brought the note to the attention of Chief Sewell, who in turn sought to have a K-9 unit come investigate the allegations. When Chief Sewell initially called the MSP for a K-9 unit to assist, they refused because of Officer Savage’s allegations against their employee, Cpl. Phillips. Chief Sewell then called the Maryland State Prosecutor’s office who directed him to contact a local police department to complete the search. Chief Sewell was eventually able to get the Fruitland Police Department’s K-9 unit to investigate the allegations, and no drugs were found.
90. After Chief Sewell was terminated at the end of June 2015, Lt. Green asked Mayor Morrison why, as a lieutenant, he hadn’t been made acting chief when Chief Sewell was terminated. The Mayor told him it was because he had filed an EEOC complaint against Pocomoke.
91. In or around December 2015, Mayor Morrison also worked to discredit Lt. Green, referring to him in a public meeting as a thug and questioning his work ethic.
92. Lt. Green was also ostracized by his department and forced to work alone. Like Officer Savage, at times he called for back-up and no one came.
93. Due to the stress of the events that have occurred, in March 2016, Lt. Green ultimately resigned from his job at the PCPD and moved away from Worcester County.
94. Even after Lt. Green left PCPD and the region, he has continued to be a target for retaliation.
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COUNT I Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
Hostile Work Environment (Against Worcester County Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, in his official capacity, and the State of
Maryland) 95. The United States re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations. 96. At all relevant times, WCSO was charged with running and operating CET. While Officer Savage was on CET, WCSO controlled aspects of Officer Savage’s terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, and as such, was, along with PCPD, Savage’s employer under Title VII. 97. As described in paragraphs 28 through 42, Officer Savage was subjected to repeated racial epithets and other racially-charged acts of harassment, humiliation, and intimidation in the workplace from members of the CET during his time on the CET. 98. Officer Savage made it known that the racial harassment was unwelcome. The harassment described in paragraphs 17 through 42 was both severe and/or pervasive and altered the conditions of Savage’s employment. Savage did find, and a reasonable person would have found, the conduct offensive. 99. Officer Savage suffered racial harassment at the hands of his supervisor, Sgt. Passwaters, as well as his co-workers on the CET. 100. Officer Savage’s supervisors, Sgt. Passwaters and Sgt. Donaldson, both witnessed and were otherwise aware of the racial harassment and did nothing to prevent or correct the behavior.
18

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101. WCSO otherwise failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent or correct harassing behavior on the CET. WCSO did not provide Officer Savage with an anti-discrimination policy. In spite of this, Savage complained of the harassment to WCSO Chief Deputy Smack and his PCPD supervisor, Chief Sewell. WCSO failed to conduct an investigation into Savage’s complaints of harassment to Chief Deputy Smack, and failed to participate in the investigation initiated by the MSP into Savage’s complaint (as relayed by Chief Sewell.)
102. For the foregoing reasons, WCSO discriminated against Officer Savage because of his race in violation of Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), among other ways, by:
a. Subjecting Savage to harassment based on race while he was working on the CET, which created an intimidating, hostile, and/or offensive work environment that adversely affected the terms, conditions, and privileges of Savage’s employment; and
b. Failing or refusing to take reasonable or appropriate steps to prevent or correct promptly the harassment; and
c. Negligently failing after actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment to take prompt and adequate action to stop it. COUNT II Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) Retaliation
(Against Worcester County Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, in his official capacity, and the State of Maryland)
103. The United States re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations.
19

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-2 Filed 10/19/16 Page 21 of 26
104. Officer Savage engaged in protected activity, among other ways, when he complained about the hostile work environment he experienced on the CET to WCSO Chief Deputy Dale Smack and in his EEOC charge against the WCSO filed on July 21, 2014.
105. WCSO and Sheriff Mason knew of Officer Savage’s complaints of discrimination and harassment and, as further detailed in paragraphs 43 through 64, acted adversely against Officer Savage, including, among other ways, by smearing his reputation and pressuring Pocomoke City officials and Chief Sewell to discipline and/or terminate him. WCSO and Sheriff Mason’s actions might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination claim.
106. Defendants took the actions described in paragraphs 43 through 64 because of Officer Savage’s protected activity.
107. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants have discriminated against Officer Savage in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) by retaliating against Savage for engaging in protected activity.
COUNT III Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
Retaliation (Against Pocomoke City) 108. The United States re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing allegations. Pocomoke City’s Retaliation Against Officer Savage 109. Officer Savage engaged in protected activity, among other ways, when he complained about the hostile work environment on the CET and Worcester County State’s
20

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Attorney Oglesby’s discriminatory behavior to numerous individuals and entities, including, but not limited to the oral and written complaints Savage made to Chief Sewell and in his EEOC charge of discrimination against PCPD.
110. Pocomoke City, including City Manager Blake, Mayor Morrison, and members of the Pocomoke City Council, was aware of Officer Savage’s complaints.
111. Shortly after Officer Savage’s complaints were made, Pocomoke City began engaging in a series of materially adverse actions against Officer Savage that would have dissuaded a reasonable person from complaining of discrimination. Among other ways, as outlined in paragraphs 57 through 64 and 77 through 79, Pocomoke City required Savage to undergo psychological evaluations, threatened to move him to the midnight shift, cut his hours, demoted him, subjected him to a disciplinary investigation, and, ultimately, terminated him.
112. Pocomoke City took the aforementioned adverse actions against Officer Savage, including terminating him, because of his protected activity.
113. Pocomoke City’s purported reasons for its retaliatory activity are pretext for discrimination.
114. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants have discriminated against Officer Savage in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Pocomoke City’s Retaliation Against Chief Sewell 115. Chief Sewell engaged in numerous protected activities while employed by Pocomoke City, including by initiating an investigation of the CET in the summer of 2014, verbally opposing retaliation against Officer Savage, and filing a charge of discrimination against Pocomoke City.
21

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-2 Filed 10/19/16 Page 23 of 26
116. Because of his protected activity, Pocomoke City smeared Chief Sewell’s reputation, falsely accused him of stealing and filing a false report, and harassed, threatened, and terminated him, as described in Paragraphs 65 through 76. Pocomoke City’s actions might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination claim.
117. Pocomoke City’s purported reasons for retaliating against Chief Sewell are pretext for unlawful discrimination.
118. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants have discriminated against Chief Sewell in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Pocomoke City’s Retaliation Against Lieutenant Green 119. Lt. Green engaged in protected activity when he accompanied Officer Savage to a meeting with WCSO Chief Deputy Smack regarding Officer Savage’s complaints of race discrimination by the CET, went with Officer Savage to an EEOC mediation, and filed his own EEOC charge against PCPD on March 30, 2015. 120. Pocomoke City knew about each of Lt. Green’s protected activities, as evidenced by, among other things, City Manager Blake’s directive that Lt. Green cease from such support of Officer Savage. 121. As a result of Lt. Green’s protected activity, Pocomoke City targeted Lt. Green by taking materially adverse actions against him that would have dissuaded a reasonable person from complaining of discrimination. Pocomoke City cut his overtime hours, resulting in a loss of pay, ostracized him from others in the PCPD, and failed to select him as Acting Chief when Chief Sewell was terminated.
22

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122. Pocomoke City’s actions might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a discrimination claim.
123. Pocomoke City’s purported reasons for its retaliatory actions are pretext for unlawful discrimination.
124. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants have discriminated against Lt. Green in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the United States prays that the Court grant the following relief:
(a) award all appropriate monetary relief, including back pay where applicable, to Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lt. Green in an amount to be determined at trial to make each whole for any loss suffered as a result of the discrimination and retaliation as alleged in this complaint;
(b) award Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lt. Green any prejudgment interest on the amount of lost wages and benefits determined to be due;
(c) award compensatory damages to Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lt. Green to fully compensate them for the pain and suffering caused by Defendants’ discrimination and retaliation as alleged in this complaint, pursuant to and within the statutory limitations of Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a;
(d) enjoin Defendants from further discrimination and retaliation against Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lt. Green;
(e) order Defendants to develop and implement appropriate and effective measures to prevent discrimination and retaliation, including but not limited to implementing appropriate
23

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-2 Filed 10/19/16 Page 25 of 26
policies and procedures applicable to employees working on CET, and implementing adequate
training to all employees and officials;
(f) order any further relief necessary to make Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lt.
Green whole; and
(g) award such additional relief as justice may require, together with the United
States’ cost and disbursements in this action.
JURY DEMAND
The United States hereby demands a trial by jury of all issues so triable pursuant to Rule
38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a.
Respectfully submitted,
VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
DELORA L. KENNEBREW (GA Bar No. 414320) Chief Employment Litigation Section Civil Rights Division
KAREN WOODARD (MD Bar) Principal Deputy Chief Employment Litigation Section Civil Rights Division
/s/ Barbara Schwabauer /s/ Kathleen Lawrence BARBARA SCHWABAUER (OH Bar No. 0086999) KATHLEEN LAWRENCE (NY Reg. No. 4844502) Senior Trial Attorneys United States Department of Justice Employment Litigation Section, PHB 4918
24

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-2 Filed 10/19/16 Page 26 of 26 Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 305-3034 (202) 514-1005 (fax) Barbara.Schwabauer@usdoj.gov Kathleen.Lawrence@usdoj.gov
25

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-3 Filed 10/19/16 Page 1 of 8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE DIVISION

FRANKLIN SAVAGE, et al., Plaintiffs,
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. POCOMOKE CITY, WORCESTER COUNTY SHERIFF, REGGIE T. MASON (in his official capacity), and STATE OF MARYLAND
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Case No. 1:16-cv-00201-JFM ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO INTERVENE

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-3 Filed 10/19/16 Page 2 of 8
I. Introduction Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 105, the
United States of America (“United States”) respectfully submits this memorandum in support of its motion to intervene as a plaintiff in Savage, et al. v. Pocomoke City, et al. On September 29, 2016, Plaintiffs Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell, and Lynell Green filed their second amended complaint against, among other Defendants, Pocomoke City, Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, in his official capacity, and the State of Maryland, raising violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). The United States should be permitted to intervene in this litigation pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. First, the United States satisfies the requirements of Rule 24(b) because it possesses a conditional right to intervene in this case under Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII. Second, the United States’ motion to intervene is timely filed, and its joining the litigation at this time will not prejudice the existing parties or cause any undue delay. Finally, the United States’ complaint in intervention shares common questions of law and fact with Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint and provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction. For these reasons, the Court, in its discretion, should grant the United States’ motion to intervene. II. Background
In July 2014, former Pocomoke City Police Officer Franklin Savage filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”). In his charge, Officer Savage alleged that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment during his tenure on the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team (“CET”), a regional drug enforcement taskforce. He also alleged that he was subject to retaliation for complaining of racial harassment. Officer Savage filed a
2

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charge of discrimination against the Pocomoke City Police Department in October 2014, which he later amended, making allegations of retaliation for engaging in protected activity. This retaliation included Officer Savage’s termination in October 2015. Former Pocomoke City Chief of Police Kelvin Sewell filed charges of discrimination against the Pocomoke City Police Department and Pocomoke City in March and August of 2015, respectively. Chief Sewell’s charges, which he later amended, allege that he was subject to retaliation for opposing the retaliatory treatment of Officer Savage by Pocomoke City and that Pocomoke City terminated his employment in July 2015 for engaging in protected activity. Former Pocomoke City Police Lt. Lynell Green also filed a charge of discrimination against the Pocomoke City Police Department in March 2015. In his charge, Lt. Green alleges that he was subject to retaliation, including a loss of overtime and the smearing of his reputation, because of his support of Officer Savage in his complaints of discrimination. The EEOC conducted an investigation of these charges and on April 29, 2016, issued findings of reasonable cause that violations of Title VII had occurred. Ex. A, EEOC Letters of Determination. The EEOC attempted conciliation, which failed, and these charges were referred to the Department of Justice.
During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, Plaintiffs filed the instant litigation in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on January 20, 2016, raising claims based on the events in Plaintiffs’ charges of discrimination. Their original and first amended complaints in this action alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 and the Fair Labor Standards Act against multiple entities and individual defendants. ECF Nos. 1, 23. On September 29, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, which added their claims under Title VII against Pocomoke City, Worcester County Sheriff Reggie T. Mason, in his official capacity, and the State of Maryland. ECF No. 80. Defendants’ motions to dismiss the
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second amended complaint are due November 4, with full briefing to be completed by December 14, 2016. ECF No. 85.
The United States’ complaint in intervention alleges that Sheriff Mason, in his official capacity, and the State of Maryland (“CET Defendants”) subjected Officer Savage to a racially hostile work environment on the CET and failed to take action to prevent or correct the harassment. U.S. Mot. to Intervene, Ex. 2. The complaint in intervention further alleges that the CET Defendants retaliated against Officer Savage for his complaints of discrimination by smearing his reputation and pressuring Pocomoke City officials to discipline and/or terminate him. Id. With respect to Defendant Pocomoke City, the United States’ complaint in intervention alleges several retaliatory actions taken by Pocomoke City against Officer Savage, Chief Sewell, and Lt. Green for engaging in protected activity under Title VII. Id. In particular, the United States alleges that Pocomoke City retaliated against Officer Savage by requiring him to undergo psychological evaluations and other tests, threatening to change his shift, cutting his overtime hours, demoting him, subjecting him to a disciplinary investigation, and ultimately terminating his employment as a Pocomoke City Police Officer. Id. The complaint in intervention alleges that Pocomoke City retaliated against Chief Sewell by, among other ways, terminating his employment as Chief of Police. Id. Finally, the complaint in intervention alleges that Pocomoke City retaliated against Lt. Green by, among other ways, smearing his reputation and cutting his overtime hours. Id. Based on these violations alleged in the complaint in intervention, the United States seeks make-whole and compensatory relief for the Plaintiffs as well as injunctive relief to ensure that Defendants comply with the requirements of Title VII through effective policies and procedures and other relief designed to ensure a nondiscriminatory workplace. Id.
4

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III. Argument A. The United States’ Motion to Intervene Should be Granted Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b) 1. The United States Satisfies the Requirements for Permissive Intervention Under Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may permit a party to
intervene in a case when a federal statute provides a conditional right to intervene. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(A). Title VII explicitly confers such a “conditional right to intervene” on the Attorney General in Title VII cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). A district court “may, in its discretion, permit . . . the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, to intervene in a civil action upon certification that the case is of general public importance.” Id. As required by Title VII, the Attorney General’s designee has certified that this lawsuit is a matter of general public importance. U.S. Mot. to Intervene, Ex. 1.
Rule 24(b) also provides another basis for permissive intervention by the United States. A court may permit a governmental officer or agency to intervene “if a party’s claim or defense is based on . . . a statute or executive order administered by the . . . agency.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2)(A). In their amended complaint (ECF No. 80), Plaintiffs allege violations of Title VII by multiple state and local government actors, against whom the Department of Justice has responsibility for enforcing Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“in the case of a government, governmental agency or political subdivision…, the Attorney General…may bring a civil action…”); see also Gen’l Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 325 & n.6 (1980) (general discussion of the Attorney General’s right to enforce Title VII against public employers). As the federal agency with the primary enforcement authority for Title VII against public actors, the
5

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Department of Justice has a substantial interest in the full and effective enforcement of Title VII against the state and local government actors in this litigation.
2. The United States’ Motion to Intervene is Timely In accordance with Rule 24(b), the United States has filed a timely motion to intervene in this litigation. The Fourth Circuit has identified three relevant factors a court should consider in determining whether a motion to intervene is timely: (1) “how far the underlying suit has progressed;” (2) “the prejudice any resulting delay might cause the other parties;” and (3) “why the movant was tardy in filing its motion.” Alt v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 758 F.3d 588, 591 (4th Cir. 2014). All of these factors counsel in favor of finding that the United States’ motion to intervene is timely. The underlying suit has not progressed significantly—no discovery has been taken with respect to the Title VII (or any related) claims and no scheduling order has been entered for discovery. Nor should the United States be considered tardy in filing its motion to intervene. The United States moved for its intervention less than one month after Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint to include their Title VII claims (ECF No. 80). Defendants have not yet filed answers to Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, and motions to dismiss the second amended complaint are currently scheduled to be fully briefed by December 14, 2016. ECF No. 85. For these reasons, permitting the United States to join the litigation at this early stage of the proceedings will not result in any significant delay or prejudice to the other parties.
3. Additional Factors Militate in Favor of Granting the Motion to Intervene Intervention is further favored here where the United States’ complaint in intervention also shares “questions of law or fact in common” with Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint and there is “an independent ground of subject matter jurisdiction.” See e.g., Shanghai Meihao Elec.,
6

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-3 Filed 10/19/16 Page 7 of 8
Inc. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 386, 387 (D. Md. 2004) (citations omitted). Both Plaintiffs and the United States allege violations of Title VII based on the racially hostile work environment on the CET and based on retaliation against the Plaintiffs for engaging in protected activity under Title VII. In general, the Title VII claims of both the Plaintiffs and the United States will be resolved based on the same factual and legal determinations. These common questions include: (1) whether the CET Defendants discriminated against Officer Savage by subjecting him to a racially hostile work environment on the CET and failing to take necessary actions to correct this harassment; (2) whether the CET Defendants retaliated against Officer Savage for his complaints of discrimination through acts directed at terminating his employment as a Pocomoke City Police Officer; (3) whether Pocomoke City retaliated against Officer Savage by subjecting him to numerous adverse actions, including ultimately termination, for engaging in protected activity; (4) whether Pocomoke City retaliated against Chief Sewell by, among other ways, terminating his employment for engaging in protected activity; and (5) whether Pocomoke City retaliated against Lt. Green for engaging in protected activity. Factual and legal determinations regarding damages and remedies are also common to both cases. Finally, as set forth in the complaint in intervention, this Court has independent subject matter jurisdiction over the United States’ complaint in intervention under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Title VII permits the United States to file suit or to seek intervention into a private lawsuit involving a charge against a government, government agency, or political subdivision), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), and 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (United States as plaintiff in a lawsuit). IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the United States’ motion to intervene and order its intervention in this action pursuant to Rule 24(b).
7

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-3 Filed 10/19/16 Page 8 of 8
Respectfully submitted, VANITA GUPTA Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights Division
DELORA L. KENNEBREW (GA Bar No. 414320) Chief Employment Litigation Section Civil Rights Division KAREN WOODARD (MD Bar) Principal Deputy Chief Employment Litigation Section Civil Rights Division /s/ Barbara Schwabauer BARBARA SCHWABAUER (OH Bar No. 0086999) KATHLEEN LAWRENCE (NY Reg. No. 4844502) Senior Trial Attorneys Civil Rights Division Employment Ligation Section, PHB 4918 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530 Telephone: (202) 305-3034 Fax: (202) 514-1005 Barbara.Schwabauer@usdoj.gov Kathleen.Lawrence@usdoj.gov
8

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Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 88-5 Filed 10/19/16 Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE DIVISION

FRANKLIN SAVAGE, et al., Plaintiffs,
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. POCOMOKE CITY, WORCESTER COUNTY SHERIFF, REGGIE T. MASON (in his official capacity), and STATE OF MARYLAND
Defendants.

) ) ) ) Case No. 1:16-cv-00201-JFM ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

ORDER The United States’ Motion to Intervene is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to file the United States’ Complaint in Intervention.

______________________________ J. Frederick Motz United States District Judge

 Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 154 Filed 03/20/17 Page 1 of 2

CHAMBERS OF 1. FREDERICK MOTZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
(410) 962-0782 (410) 962-2698 FAX

March 17,2017

MEMO TO COUNSEL RE: Franklin Savage, et al. v. Pocomoke City,r.e. t al.

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Civil No. JFM-16-201

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Dear Counsel:

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Ihave reviewed the memoranda submitted in connection with the motio\n to @;~~e~ filed by the United States of America (document 88), the motion to dismiss fildfiby ~~gi~.

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Mason et al (document 92), the motion to strike exhibit A to the second amende1compiaintJiled~"~
by Russell Blake et al (document 93), the motion to dismiss filed by the County=€ommissi6tlers ~3

of Worcester County (document 97), the motion to dismiss filed by Pocomoke City (document

98), the motion to strike amended complaint filed by Russell Blake et al (document 100), the

motion to strike the amended complaint filed by Patricia Donaldson (document 103), the motion

to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by Patricia Donaldson et al (document 104), the

motion to dismiss or for summary judgment filed by the State of Maryland (document 105), the

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by Reggie Mason and the State of Maryland

(document 124), the motion for summary judgment filed by Ernest Crofoot (document 144), and

the motion for leave to file surreply filed by the United States (document 152).

The motion to intervene filed by the United States is granted. All of the other motions are denied without prejudice to the issues being re-raised by a motion for summary judgment at the conclusion of discovery.

A conference call will be held on April 3, 2017 at 4:30 p.m. to discuss the appropriate schedule in this case. Iask counsel for plaintiff to initiate the call.

Enclosed is a tentative scheduling order with approximate dates for your information. Please consult with one another before the call and be prepared to discuss whether you would like to participate in a settlement conference either before or after the completion of discovery, any changes to the dates in the form scheduling order, and whether there is unanimous consent to proceed before a U.S. Magistrate Judge for all proceedings.

Also enclosed is a letter regarding a call-in hour program for the resolution of discovery disagreements.

Case 1:16-cv-00201-JFM Document 154 Filed 03/20/17 Page 2 of 2
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed as an order.
Very truly yours,
JL~~~~
United States District Judge

 PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-1636
FRANKLIN SAVAGE,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
and
KEVIN SEWELL; LYNELL GREEN,
Plaintiffs,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor/Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
POCOMOKE CITY; POCOMOKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; WORCESTER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; DEPARTMENT OF MARYLAND STATE POLICE; RUSSELL BLAKE, in his individual capacity only; ERNIE CROFOOT, individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Manager; BRUCE MORRISON, individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Mayor; BEAU OGLESBY, in his individual capacity as the Worcester County State’s Attorney; NATHANIEL PASSWATERS, in his individual capacity only; BROOKS PHILLIPS, individually, and in his official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Corporal; DALE SMACK, in his individual capacity only; DALE TROTTER; RODNEY WELLS, in his

individual capacity only; PATRICIA DONALDSON, individually, and in her official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Sergeant; COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WORCESTER COUNTY; REGGIE T. MASON, in his official capacity as Worcester County Sheriff,
Defendants. -----------------------------------HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC; PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER,
Amicus Supporting Appellee.
No. 17-1779
FRANKLIN SAVAGE, Plaintiff – Appellant,
and KEVIN SEWELL; LYNELL GREEN,
Plaintiffs, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor/Plaintiff, v. BEAU OGLESBY, in his individual capacity as the Worcester County State’s Attorney,
Defendant – Appellee, and
2

POCOMOKE CITY; POCOMOKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; WORCESTER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; DEPARTMENT OF MARYLAND STATE POLICE; RUSSELL BLAKE, in his individual capacity only; ERNIE CROFOOT, individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Manager; BRUCE MORRISON, individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Mayor; NATHANIEL PASSWATERS, in his individual capacity only; BROOKS PHILLIPS, individually, and in his official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Corporal; DALE SMACK, in his individual capacity only; DALE TROTTER; RODNEY WELLS, in his individual capacity only; PATRICIA DONALDSON, individually, and in her official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Sergeant; COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WORCESTER COUNTY; REGGIE T. MASON, in his official capacity as Worcester County Sheriff; STATE OF MARYLAND,
Defendants.
------------------------------
HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC; PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER,
Amici Supporting Appellant.
No. 17-1989
FRANKLIN SAVAGE,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
and
KEVIN SEWELL; LYNELL GREEN,
Plaintiffs,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor/Plaintiff,
3

v.
STATE OF MARYLAND,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
POCOMOKE CITY; POCOMOKE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; WORCESTER COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE; DEPARTMENT OF MARYLAND STATE POLICE; RUSSELL BLAKE, in his individual capacity only; ERNIE CROFOOT, individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Manager; BRUCE MORRISON, individually, and in his official capacity as Pocomoke City Mayor; BEAU OGLESBY, in his individual capacity as the Worcester County State’s Attorney; NATHANIEL PASSWATERS, in his individual capacity only; BROOKS PHILLIPS, individually, and in his official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Corporal; DALE SMACK, in his individual capacity only; DALE TROTTER; RODNEY WELLS, in his individual capacity only; PATRICIA DONALDSON, individually, and in her official capacity as a Department of Maryland State Police Sergeant; COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF WORCESTER COUNTY; REGGIE T. MASON, in his official capacity as Worcester County Sheriff,
Defendants.
-----------------------------
HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC; PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER,
Amici Supporting Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge. (1:16-cv-00201-JFM)

Argued: March 20, 2018

Decided: July 13, 2018

Before WYNN, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

4

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Floyd joined. ARGUED: Jennifer L. Katz, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Dennis A. Corkery, WASHINGTON LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C., for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ON BRIEF: Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General, Karen L. Federman Henry, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Matthew Handley, WASHINGTON LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C.; Deborah A. Jeon, Sonia Kumar, ACLU OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Theodore A. Howard, Brian G. Walsh, Craig Smith, Kendra P. Norwood, WILEY REIN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Ajmel Quereshi, HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Washington, D.C.; Debra Gardner, PUBLIC JUSTICE CENTER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amici Curiae.
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PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge: These appeals are part of broader litigation alleging pervasive race discrimination
and unlawful retaliation against three African-American police officers who worked for Pocomoke City in Worcester County, Maryland. The issues before us today arise from the interactions of one of those plaintiffs, Franklin Savage, with the State’s Attorney for Worcester County, Beau Oglesby. According to Savage, Oglesby created a hostile work environment by reading aloud, at a trial preparation meeting, potential evidence in the form of letters containing racial epithets. And then, Savage alleges, after he complained of the incident, Oglesby retaliated against him by refusing to call him as a witness in criminal cases and notifying Pocomoke City officials of that decision.
On the basis of these allegations, Savage sued State’s Attorney Oglesby for violations of his civil rights. He also sued the State of Maryland under Title VII, asserting that Maryland, as Oglesby’s employer, is vicariously liable for his unlawful acts. The district court dismissed the claims against Oglesby, holding that he is protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity, but allowed the claims against Maryland to proceed.
We agree with the district court that prosecutorial immunity bars Savage’s claims against Oglesby. Reviewing and evaluating evidence in preparation for trial, making judgments about witness credibility, and deciding which witnesses to call and which cases may be prosecuted all are directly connected to the judicial phase of the criminal process, protected by absolute immunity. We disagree, however, with respect to Savage’s retaliation claim against Maryland. Because no reasonable employee could believe that Oglesby violated Title VII at the trial-preparation meeting to which Savage
6

objected, Savage’s allegations fail to state a claim under Title VII, and should be dismissed for that reason.
I. A. Franklin Savage alleges that he was subjected to unlawful discrimination and retaliation while he was employed by the Pocomoke City Police Department and on detail to the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team (“CET”), a multijurisdictional drug interdiction task force led by the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office. He and two co-plaintiffs, all African Americans and former Pocomoke City police officers, filed a suit against multiple state and local agencies and their employees, alleging widespread race-based employment discrimination and retaliation. The interlocutory cross-appeals before us today address just one discrete part of this broader litigation, and are limited to Savage’s allegations against State’s Attorney Oglesby and the State of Maryland as Oglesby’s employer. Savage joined the Pocomoke City Police Department in 2011, and in 2012 was assigned to the CET. In April 2014, Savage attended a meeting with members of the Worcester County State’s Attorney’s office, including State’s Attorney Oglesby. The purpose of the meeting, according to Savage, was to “discuss an upcoming case” on which he had been the arresting officer. J.A. 109. During the meeting, Savage alleges, he “presented some documents” – letters written by the suspects – “that were going to be looked at by the State’s Attorney’s Office to decide if they were going to use them in the 7

upcoming court case.” Id. Then, Savage claims, Oglesby “began to read the letters verbatim line for line,” which meant “us[ing] the word Nigga over and over again.” Id. When Oglesby stopped and asked whether he was “offending anybody by reading these letters,” Assistant State’s Attorney Ajene Turnbull, the only other African American present, left the room. Id. Savage remained, and Oglesby continued reading. After some discussion, Oglesby asked for “copies of the letters so that he could use them for trial.” Id.
In July 2014, after Savage had resigned from the CET and returned to the Pocomoke City Police Department, he filed two written complaints, one with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and one with the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission. Both objected to Oglesby’s repeated reading of the racial slur during the April 2014 meeting. In his complaints, Savage described the word “Nigga” as “highly powerful and hurtful,” and expressed his deep offense that Oglesby would “use the word Nigga so freely and without care in front of ASA Turnbull and me.” J.A. 109. Since the meeting, Savage said, he was “having problems with [his] cases being prosecuted” and also “problems sleeping.” Id.
In September 2014, Oglesby sent a letter to the Pocomoke City Mayor and City Council, “implying that he would not allow Officer Savage to testify in court” because of concerns about his “veracity.” J.A. 54. And indeed, Oglesby’s letter directly stated that
8

the “recent conduct of . . . Savage calls into question his veracity.” J.A. 187.1 Citing his legal obligation to disclose material that could be used to impeach state witnesses, Oglesby went on to conclude that he would be required to “evaluate any case” in which Savage would be a witness “to determine what impact he w[ould] have on our ability to prosecute.” Id. The bottom line appeared to be that Oglesby would not call Savage as a witness without corroboration for his testimony, and would instead decline to prosecute in such cases: “If we are unable to independently corroborate his testimony and therefore must rely solely on his word, the likely outcome will be a dismissal of the case.” Id. According to Savage, because testifying in court was a “vital part” of his duties, that decision “directly interfered” with his ability to do his job. J.A. 69.
Over a year later, in October 2015, Oglesby and the Pocomoke City Manager had a telephone conversation. Savage’s complaint describes it as follows: “Oglesby was adamant that Officer Savage would never be able to testify again and was thus useless to the Pocomoke City Police Department. On information and belief, Oglesby reiterated that Officer Savage should be terminated.” J.A. 59. Savage was fired from his position with the Pocomoke City Police Department ten days later.
1 We quote here from the full text of Oglesby’s September 2014 letter, which, though not an exhibit to Savage’s complaint, was attached by Oglesby to his responsive motion. Because Savage’s complaint refers to (and indeed quotes) the letter, we may consider it in deciding whether Savage has stated a claim. See Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014).
9

B. Savage, along with his co-plaintiffs, filed suit against multiple defendants in federal court, seeking damages and attorney’s fees as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Savage sued Oglesby in his personal capacity, alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. Specifically, Savage claimed that Oglesby created a racially hostile work environment at the April 2014 trial-preparation meeting when he read aloud potential evidence containing numerous references to a racial epithet. Oglesby then violated the First Amendment, Savage claimed, by retaliating against him when he spoke out about the meeting, a matter of public concern. According to Savage’s complaint, that retaliation took the form of Oglesby’s decision to prohibit Savage from testifying and his letter to Pocomoke City (or “City”) officials communicating that decision and impugning his veracity. As a result of those actions, Savage alleged, he was unable to perform critical job duties.2 Oglesby moved to dismiss the claims against him or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted Oglesby’s motion. Without elaborating further, it held that Savage’s claims against Oglesby “are barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity.” J.A. 206.
2 Savage also alleged that Oglesby participated in a civil conspiracy interfering with his civil rights. To the extent that claim incorporates any allegations separate and apart from Savage’s allegations of hostile work environment and retaliation, it is not separately argued in Savage’s appeal, and we need not address it further here. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (declining to address claim abandoned on appeal).
10

In response, Savage amended his complaint to add Title VII claims against the State of Maryland, based on the same factual predicate as his claims against Oglesby. As Oglesby’s employer, Savage alleged, the State was liable for Oglesby’s unlawful acts. Savage acknowledged that Pocomoke City, and not the State of Maryland, “constitutes [his] employer for purposes of Title VII.” J.A. 268. But his retaliation claim against the State could go forward, he claimed, under a third-party interference theory: The State, though not his employer, unlawfully interfered with his employment relationship with Pocomoke City when Oglesby retaliated against him for complaining about race discrimination.
The State moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment with respect to this retaliatory interference claim. According to the State, Oglesby’s absolute immunity should extend to the State in an action based entirely on the same conduct for which Oglesby was immune. And in any event, the State argued, Savage could not state a claim under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, which permits suits only against a plaintiff’s employer – here, Pocomoke City – and not against third parties like the State. The district court denied the State’s motion without discussion.
So that he could seek immediate appeal of Oglesby’s dismissal from the case, Savage sought and was granted partial final judgment as to Oglesby. The State, too, wanted an immediate appeal, and the district court obliged by certifying for interlocutory appeal its order denying the State’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. This court granted the State permission to appeal, and we now have before us timely filed interlocutory appeals by both Savage and the State.
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II.
We begin with the district court order dismissing Oglesby from the case based on
absolute prosecutorial immunity. We review that order de novo, accepting all of
Savage’s factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor.
Singer v. Reali, 883 F.3d 425, 437 (4th Cir. 2018).3
A.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–32 (1976), the Supreme Court held that
prosecutors are absolutely immune from damages liability when they act as advocates for
the State. That decision rests on an “important public policy” justification. Carter v.
Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1994). “The ‘public trust of the prosecutor’s office
would suffer’ were the prosecutor to have in mind his ‘own potential’ damages ‘liability’
when making prosecutorial decisions – as he might well were he subject to § 1983
liability.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341–42 (2009) (quoting Imbler, 424
U.S. at 424). The Supreme Court recognized that this immunity would leave the
3 In granting Oglesby’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, the district court did not specify whether it was granting the motion on the pleadings or in light of evidence attached to Oglesby’s motion and reply. But because Savage had filed an affidavit identifying additional discovery that would be necessary before deciding whether summary judgment was warranted, a grant of summary judgment might have been improper. See Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, we proceed under the standard governing motions to dismiss. Cf. Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Because this case arises from the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, summary judgment, we take the factual allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the [plaintiff’s] favor.”).
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“genuinely wronged” without a remedy against prosecutors acting for malicious or unlawful purposes. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. But the importance of shielding prosecutorial decision-making from the influence of personal liability concerns, the Court concluded, outweighed that harm. See Carter, 34 F.3d at 261 (describing Imbler’s reasoning).
Given these costs, however, the Court has been careful to limit the scope of a prosecutor’s absolute immunity. Because prosecutorial immunity “safeguards the process, not the person,” it applies only to conduct that is “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Nero v. Mosby, 890 F.3d 106, 117–18 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31). In deciding whether an action meets that standard, we apply a “functional approach,” looking to “‘the nature of the function performed,’ without regard to ‘the identity of the actor who performed it.’” Id. at 118 (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)). And we focus on the “conduct for which immunity is claimed, not on the harm that the conduct may have caused or the question whether it was lawful.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 271.
When a prosecutor is functioning as an advocate for the State, it is clear that his or her actions are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” and thus protected by absolute immunity. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31. The Court has distinguished those advocacy functions from administrative or investigative functions that a prosecutor also may perform, and to which absolute immunity may not extend. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342 (“The Court made clear that absolute immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is not acting as ‘an officer of the court’ but is instead engaged in
13

other tasks, say, investigative or administrative tasks.” (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33)); Nero, 890 F.3d at 118 (same). The burden is on the prosecutor claiming immunity to show that the acts in question are “directly connected” with the judicial process, Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344, justifying the protections of absolute immunity. See Nero, 890 F.3d at 118.
B. We apply these principles, first, to Savage’s allegation that Oglesby unlawfully created a hostile work environment during the April 2014 trial-preparation meeting. According to Savage, Oglesby violated his civil rights when he gratuitously read aloud potential trial evidence, in the form of letters from suspects, using the word “Nigga.” We conclude that Oglesby was acting within his role as advocate during the trial-preparation meeting, entitling him to absolute immunity from damages liability on Savage’s claim. The Supreme Court has made clear that “the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33). So even if, as Savage alleges, the April 2014 meeting “was held prior to any charges being filed against the potential defendants who wrote or were referenced in the letters read by Oglesby,” J.A. 48–49, that would not bring it outside the scope of Oglesby’s advocacy role. Instead, the Supreme Court expressly defines that role to encompass “acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial,” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added) – including, specifically, the “professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police and
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appropriate preparation for its presentation at trial,” if and when a case is prosecuted. Id.; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33 (“Preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence.”).
Given this settled understanding, it is clear that Oglesby was functioning as an advocate for the State when he engaged in the conduct alleged by Savage. On Savage’s own account, the purpose of the April 2014 meeting was “preparing for . . . trial,” see Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273: Savage met with prosecutors from the State’s Attorney’s office in order “to discuss an upcoming case” on which he was the arresting officer. J.A. 109. And then (still according to Savage), Savage himself gave Oglesby the letters so that the prosecutors could “decide if they were going to use them in the upcoming court case,” id. – precisely the “professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police” contemplated by Buckley. See 509 U.S. at 273. Finally, after “read[ing] the letters verbatim line for line,” Oglesby asked for “copies of the letters so that he could use them for trial.” J.A. 109 (emphasis added). What Savage is describing, in his own words, is a paradigmatic example of a prosecutor’s evaluation of evidence in preparation for trial, squarely within the zone of prosecutorial immunity.
Savage’s contrary argument rests on his allegation that it was “unnecessary” for Oglesby to read aloud and verbatim the letters he provided in order to assess their potential as trial evidence. J.A. 48. But how evidence should be evaluated is exactly the kind of professional judgment call that prosecutorial immunity is designed to protect. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344 (describing the “exercise of [legal] discretion” protected by prosecutorial immunity). There is no claim in this case that Oglesby used the occasion
15

of a trial-preparation meeting to make statements or engage in conduct divorced from the subject of the meeting; rather, Savage objects to the manner in which Oglesby reviewed potential evidence presented by Savage himself and concededly “connected” to the case at hand. Resp. Br. & Opening Br. of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Savage (“Savage Opening Brief”) at 6. And while we take as a given that Savage, as he alleges, was deeply offended by Oglesby’s actions, the immunity analysis does not turn on “the harm that the [prosecutor’s] conduct may have caused,” but rather on the function the prosecutor was performing at the time. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 271. Because Oglesby was acting in his role as advocate, reviewing potential evidence for use at trial, he is protected by prosecutorial immunity.
C. We turn next to Savage’s allegation that Oglesby violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for speaking out after the April 2014 meeting. According to Savage, after Oglesby learned of his complaint to the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission, he “prohibited [him] from testifying on any case [he] investigated” in “direct retaliation,” and falsely accused Savage of dishonesty in the letter he sent to City officials announcing that decision. J.A. 69. As a result, Savage alleges, he was unable to “execute his job duties.” Id. Again, we find that the actions Savage describes were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, entitling Oglesby to absolute immunity from damages liability.
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1. Decisions regarding witness testimony – which witnesses to call, whether potential witnesses are credible, and how to proceed in the face of credibility questions – are a core prosecutorial function, directly tied to the conduct of a criminal trial. This is clear from Imbler itself, holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from claims that they knowingly presented false testimony at trial: Because “[t]he veracity of witnesses in criminal cases frequently is subject to doubt,” the Court explained, the integrity of the criminal process would suffer if “prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of such witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426. Instead, decisions about “which witnesses to call” are among the “sensitive issues” that prosecutors must address in their capacity as advocates as they prepare for trial, fully shielded by immunity. Id. at 430 n.33. That is especially so when, as here, assessments of witness credibility are tightly intertwined with determinations about which cases to charge. The alleged decision to which Savage objects is not only that Savage would not be called as a witness; it is also that Oglesby would dismiss instead of prosecuting cases in which Savage’s account could not be corroborated. See J.A. 187 (“If we are unable to independently corroborate [Savage’s] testimony and therefore must rely solely on his word, the likely outcome will be a dismissal of the case.”). And whether to “initiat[e] a prosecution,” of course, is in the heartland of the prosecutorial discretion covered by absolute immunity. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431).
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Applying these principles, the Ninth Circuit held in Roe v. City and County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578 (1997), that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from a claim that he unlawfully retaliated against a police officer by prohibiting him from testifying and refusing to prosecute cases in which his account could not be verified. The facts in Roe are strikingly similar to those here: A police officer alleged that after he circulated a legal memorandum criticizing prosecutorial conduct, the prosecutor stopped calling him as a witness, determined that there would be no prosecutions of the officer’s cases without corroborating evidence, and communicated that decision to the officer’s state employer – all of which led to the officer being reassigned because he no longer could “complete [his] duties.” Id. at 580–82. The officer sued, raising the same claim as Savage – retaliation for speaking out, in violation of the First Amendment. But that claim, the Ninth Circuit concluded, was barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity. The prosecutor’s failure to prosecute the officer’s cases, the court reasoned, was fully protected: “There can be no question that the nature of the decision not to prosecute is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Id. at 583 (quoting Burns, 500 U.S. at 486). So, too, for the prosecutor’s assessment of the officer’s credibility, whether “accurate or not.” Id. at 584. “Just as a prosecutor’s professional evaluation of the evidence assembled by the police is entitled to absolute immunity, a prosecutor’s professional evaluation of a witness is entitled to absolute immunity even if that judgment is harsh, unfair or clouded by personal animus, as [the officer] alleges here.” See id. (internal citation omitted).
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We agree with Roe, and with the other cases reaching the same conclusion. See, e.g., Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1992) (absolute immunity applies to prosecutor’s decision not to charge cases initiated by particular officer); Barnett v. Marquis, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1222–23 (D. Or. 2014), aff’d, 662 F. App’x 537 (9th Cir. 2016) (absolute immunity applies to prosecutor’s decision not to use police officer as witness based on credibility concerns); Neri v. Cty. of Stanislaus Dist. Attorney’s Office, No. 1:10-CV-823-AWI-GSA, 2010 WL 3582575, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2010) (absolute immunity applies to prosecutor’s decision to “Brady-list” officer, i.e., refuse to use him as trial witness based on credibility concerns). In each of these cases, the prosecutor’s decision, conveyed to the officer’s employer, meant that the officer no longer could perform the basic functions of the job, leading to predictably negative employment repercussions. Harrington, 977 F.2d at 38–39; Barnett, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 1221; Neri, 2010 WL 3582575, at *2. And in each, the officer alleged that the prosecutor’s decision in fact was driven by retaliatory or malicious motives. But whether or not that was so, the courts concluded, was “immaterial” to the immunity analysis. See Barnett, 662 F. App’x at 539. What mattered is that the prosecutors’ actions involved assessments of witness credibility and judgments about which cases to prosecute, directly connected to the judicial phase of the criminal process and thus protected by absolute immunity. See Harrington, 977 F.2d at 40–41; Neri, 2010 WL 3582575, at *5.
That result is consistent with – indeed, compelled by – the long line of cases holding prosecutors absolutely immune from claims that they have failed to meet their obligations to disclose exculpatory evidence, see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
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or material affecting the credibility of a state witness, see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Because assessments of evidence and witness credibility “require legal knowledge and the exercise of related discretion” that is “directly connected with the conduct of a trial,” prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from claims that they should have identified witness credibility issues and then shared that information with defendants, Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343–44 (failure to disclose Giglio impeachment material protected by prosecutorial immunity), or that they should have identified evidence as exculpatory and then provided it to the defense, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34; see also Neri, 2010 WL 3582575, at *6 (listing court of appeals cases). The same rule must apply when, as here, a prosecutor cites an effort to comply with his disclosure obligations in making an adverse credibility determination about a state witness and declining to put that witness on the stand or to prosecute cases that turn on his testimony. See J.A. 187 (Oglesby’s letter to City officials). Otherwise, we would be left with a lopsided immunity that provides full protection when a prosecutor ignores credibility concerns regarding a state witness, but withholds protection when he does not. That kind of “asymmetrical” prosecutorial immunity would be worse than none at all, creating the risk that prosecutors’ decision-making could be skewed systematically in one direction – against taking steps to address credibility concerns – by fear of damages liability. See Harrington, 977 F.2d at 41 (“The asymmetrical availability of immunity . . . should not be a factor which induces a prosecutor to choose to initiate questionable prosecutions relying upon witnesses the prosecution does not believe credible in order to avoid liability for declining to prosecute.”); cf. Neri, 2010 WL 3582575, at *6 (immunity must
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protect equally prosecutorial decisions to disclose and to withhold potential Brady material).
Savage argues, in effect, that this is the wrong lens through which to see his case. His case, he urges, is not about “the judicial phase of the criminal process,” see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, but about employment: By refusing to call him as a witness or to prosecute his cases, and then describing that decision to City officials as resting on veracity concerns, Oglesby effectively made it impossible for him to do his job. And absolute immunity is not available to prosecutors when they make employment decisions, Savage contends, because those are “administrative” rather than advocacy functions. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 342 (“[A]bsolute immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is not acting as ‘an officer of the court’ but is instead engaged in other tasks, say, investigative or administrative tasks.”); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229–30 (1988) (holding that absolute immunity does not shield judges’ employment decisions and noting that “no one suggests” a prosecutor’s decision to fire an assistant attorney would be entitled to absolute immunity).
We cannot agree. That a judgment about witness credibility or which cases to try has negative employment consequences – even readily foreseeable ones – does not change the underlying nature of that judgment; the immunity analysis focuses on the prosecutorial conduct in question, and “not on the harm that the conduct may have caused.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 271. Nor does the effect on Savage’s career do anything to distinguish this case from all the others, discussed above, in which courts apply absolute immunity when police officers lose their jobs or suffer other adverse actions
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because their employers are informed by prosecutors that they no longer will be used as witnesses. See, e.g., Roe, 109 F.3d at 582; Barnett, 16 F. Supp. 3d at 1221, 1223.
Most important, the Supreme Court has clarified that even if all or some of the conduct complained of by Savage could be categorized as employment-related and hence “administrative,” it still would be protected by absolute immunity. In Van de Kamp, the Court considered whether prosecutors could be sued for non-disclosure of Giglio impeachment material that allegedly resulted from their failure to train and supervise attorneys properly or to collect potential impeachment material about informants. 555 U.S. at 338–39. The Court recognized that the functions in which the defendantprosecutors were engaged – training, supervision, and information-systems management – were “administrative” in nature. Id. at 343–44. But because they also were “directly connected with the conduct of a trial” and required the exercise of legal discretion, the Court concluded, id. at 344, they remained protected by absolute immunity: “The management tasks at issue . . . concern how and when to make impeachment information available at a trial. They are thereby directly connected with the prosecutor’s basic trial advocacy duties.” Id. at 346. The same “direct connection” to the trial process and the prosecutor’s role as advocate is present here. Even if we were to categorize Oglesby’s alleged actions – in particular, his communications with City officials about Savage’s status – as “administrative” or “managerial,” they would remain inextricably linked with the underlying assessment of Savage’s credibility and discretionary judgment about how best to respond. See Neri, 2010 WL 3582575, at *7 (assuming act of putting officer’s
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name on “Brady List” of officers who will not be called to testify is “administrative,” but holding that absolute immunity applies under Van de Kamp).
It remains the general rule, of course, that prosecutors will not be entitled to absolute immunity when acting in their administrative capacities as employers. See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344 (suggesting that “unlawful discrimination in hiring employees” is administrative task outside the scope of absolute immunity). It is only “a certain kind of administrative obligation – a kind that itself is directly connected with the conduct of a trial,” like Oglesby’s communications with the City regarding his assessment of Savage as a potential trial witness – that calls for the protections of absolute immunity. See id. And we agree with Savage that not every action a prosecutor might take against a police officer who has been barred from testifying will be covered by absolute immunity. Even in that context, if a prosecutor’s alleged conduct cannot be connected to discretionary judgments about which witnesses to call and which cases to prosecute, then absolute immunity will not apply. For instance, insisting that a former investigator, even after he has found new employment, be barred from working on any stage of an investigation, regardless of whether he will be a potential witness or his testimony is corroborated, may lack the requisite connection to the judicial process to bring it within the ambit of absolute immunity. See Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that absolute immunity does not extend to “dictating to [new employer] how future criminal investigations should be conducted and staffed”); see also Mikko v. City of Atlanta, 857 F.3d 1136, 1143 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that absolute immunity does not extend to prosecutor’s efforts to “prevent a witness from testifying in a case handled
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by a different prosecutor, from a different office, in a different jurisdiction”). But when, as here, the alleged prosecutorial conduct involves the decision not to call an officer as a witness and communication of that decision to the relevant employer, it is “intimately tied to the judicial process” and thus entitled to absolute immunity. Botello, 413 F.3d at 977 (holding that absolute immunity does extend to prosecutors’ decision not to prosecute cases brought by former police investigator and communication of that decision to new employer).
2. In pressing his contrary arguments, Savage does not differentiate Oglesby’s September 2014 letter to City officeholders from his alleged October 2015 phone conversation with the City Manager, instead treating them together as “ultra vires statements to Pocomoke City officials” that are not entitled to prosecutorial immunity. Savage Opening Brief at 20. For the reasons given above, we disagree. And to the extent Savage can be understood to argue that his case should proceed because the phone conversation, in particular, lacks the required connection to the criminal trial process, we again must disagree. Critically, Savage’s own complaint does not identify the phone conversation – more specifically, the part of the conversation in which Oglesby purportedly recommended that Savage be terminated – as having any independent significance, apart from Oglesby’s protected conduct in prohibiting Savage’s testimony and explaining that decision to City officials. Count IV of the complaint, for First Amendment retaliation, identifies two and only two actions taken by Oglesby in alleged retaliation for Savage’s
24

public statements about the April 2014 trial-preparation meeting: Oglesby “prohibited . . . Savage from testifying,” and Oglesby sent City officials a September 2014 letter announcing that decision and “falsely accusing . . . Savage of lying.” J.A. 69. It was those two actions, Savage alleges, that effectively made it impossible for him to fulfill his job functions, because “[t]estifying at trial in criminal prosecutions was a vital part of [his] duties as a police officer.” Id. Nowhere does Savage allege that the phone conversation of a year later (described in his factual allegations and incorporated into each count of the complaint) was a separate act of retaliation, also caused by his objections to the meeting. Nor does he allege that Oglesby’s purported employment recommendation during that conversation – as opposed to Oglesby’s continued refusal to allow his testimony, which already, on his own telling, had rendered him unable to perform his job duties and relegated to purely administrative tasks, J.A. 60 – played any independent causal role in his termination. Accordingly, Savage’s allegations regarding the purported retaliatory nature of the September 2014 letter and the October 2015 phone conversation rely on the same shielded conduct discussed above, and therefore fail to state a plausible claim for retaliation.
D. Finally, Savage argues that even if Oglesby is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity, the district court erred in dismissing Oglesby from the case entirely. Prosecutorial immunity is an immunity from damages liability only. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431. Thus, Savage contends, the district court should have allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Oglesby to proceed. We disagree.
25

Oglesby, unlike other defendants in this case, was sued only in his personal capacity, not his official capacity, and it is clear from the complaint that the only relief sought against him is money damages arising from past conduct. Savage has not alleged that he faces a “real and immediate threat of future injury” from Oglesby, as would be required for entry of prospective injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983; continuing “emotional consequences” from Oglesby’s prior acts are not enough. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983); Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 454 (4th Cir. 2017) (when “seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief rather than damages, . . . allegations in the [c]omplaint of past injuries do[] not in [themselves] show a present case or controversy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that because Oglesby is immune from Savage’s damages claim, he should be dismissed from this suit altogether.
III. We turn next to the State’s appeal of the district court order denying its motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Again, we review the order de novo, taking Savage’s factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. As noted above, once Oglesby was dismissed from the case, Savage amended his complaint to add the State as a defendant, based on the same factual predicate alleged against Oglesby, on the theory that the State is vicariously liable for Oglesby’s actions. As a general rule, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes the states from vicarious liability for the acts of state employees like Oglesby. But Savage brought his action against
26

Maryland under Title VII, which abrogates that immunity for suits against a state in its capacity “as employer.” See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976). And although Maryland was not Savage’s employer – Savage worked for Pocomoke City – Savage claims that Maryland can be held liable under a “third-party retaliatory interference” theory, for interfering with his employment relationship with the City through Oglesby’s retaliatory actions.
The State resists what it views as an “end run” around its State’s Attorney’s absolute prosecutorial immunity: According to the State, if Oglesby is absolutely immune for his conduct, then so, too, should the State be immune as to claims arising from exactly the same factual allegations. And in any event, the State argues, Savage cannot state a claim for Title VII retaliation. Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision makes it unlawful for “an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added), and according to the State, that plain text precludes a suit by non-employee Savage against the State of Maryland. Indeed, the State argues, because the abrogation of state sovereign immunity must be clear and unequivocal, see Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001), recognizing Savage’s novel third-party retaliatory interference claim in this case would raise substantial Eleventh Amendment concerns.
The parties have focused their briefing on these difficult and broadly consequential questions, but we decline to reach them here. This claim can be resolved on the narrower and more straightforward ground – also pressed by the State – that even assuming the State could be liable to Savage under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision
27

for Oglesby’s conduct, Savage has failed to make out a Title VII retaliation claim based on that conduct. For that reason alone, Savage’s claim should be dismissed. See Strawser v. Atkins, 290 F.3d 720, 730 (4th Cir. 2002) (declining to rule on the Eleventh Amendment issue, which “presents real difficulty,” because “the statutory question here is easy”); Parella v. Ret. Bd. of the R.I. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 54, 56–57 (1st Cir. 1999) (courts may “bypass” difficult immunity issue if the “particular case presents an easy merits issue (favoring the defendant)”).
The elements of a Title VII retaliation claim are familiar. In order to state a prima facie claim of Title VII retaliation, Savage must allege facts establishing that he engaged in protected activity, that his employer took an adverse employment action against him, and that there was a causal link between those events. See Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2015). Our focus here is on the first element, “protected activity,” in which an employee like Savage engages if he opposes either employment actions “actually unlawful under Title VII” or “employment actions [he] reasonably believes to be unlawful.” Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 282 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State argues on appeal, as before the district court, that Savage’s formal complaints about the April 2014 meeting do not meet that standard, because Oglesby’s conduct during the meeting
28

was not unlawful under Title VII, and Savage could not reasonably have believed otherwise. We agree.4
In Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam), the Supreme Court held that “[n]o reasonable person could have believed” that Title VII was violated in a workplace meeting during which a supervisor, in the course of reviewing job candidates’ psychological evaluation reports, read aloud sexually explicit material from one of those reports in front of a female employee. Review of and exposure to the reports – including the offensive portions – was part of the “ordinary terms and conditions” of the plaintiff’s job, the Supreme Court reasoned. Id. Given that context, the Court concluded, the plaintiff’s subsequent complaint about the meeting could not constitute “protected activity,” because no one reasonably could believe that the incident was sufficiently severe to establish a hostile workplace environment in violation of Title VII. Id. at 270–71.
The same reasoning applies to this very similar case. Again, we have the reading aloud of offensive material from a document at a work meeting; the document is germane to the meeting at which it is read; and dealing with such documents is part of the complaining employee’s job. Indeed, Savage’s own factual allegations make clear that “the ordinary terms and conditions” of his employment required at least some exposure to
4 Savage’s retaliation claim against Oglesby in his personal capacity is brought under the First Amendment, not Title VII, and so does not require Savage to establish this form of “protected activity.” Accordingly, this defense to Savage’s Title VII claim against the State does not apply to his claim against Oglesby, which we have resolved instead on absolute immunity grounds.
29

the documents and offensive language at issue, given that it was Savage himself who brought the letters to the meeting and presented them to Oglesby for review. If anything, the conduct alleged here is even more fully a part of the job than the conduct in Breeden: In Breeden, the plaintiff’s supervisor not only read aloud but also commented on and, with another employee, laughed about the sexually explicit material in the report, 532 U.S. at 269–71, whereas Oglesby, according to Savage, read the letters verbatim with no editorial comment, stopping only to ask whether he was offending anyone. In this context, and in light of the holding in Breeden, we think it is clear that the April 2014 meeting did not rise to the level of a hostile work environment under Title VII, and that Savage could not reasonably have believed that his grounds for complaint against Oglesby included a Title VII violation.
In arguing to the contrary, Savage reminds us that the racial slur read by Oglesby is particularly odious, and “pure anathema to African-Americans.” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 185 (4th Cir. 2001). We do not doubt that for a moment. And we have held that even a single incident in which that epithet or one like it is directed at an employee may be “severe enough to engender a hostile work environment” in violation of Title VII. See Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 280 (holding that “single incident” in which employee was called a “porch monkey” gave rise to Title VII claim for hostile work environment). Likewise, an employer’s repeated and continuous use of that slur, among others, to insult African-American employees and customers, even when not directed specifically at the complaining employee, is “sufficiently severe or pervasive (or both)” to create an unlawful hostile work environment. Spriggs, 242 F.3d at 184–85.
30

“Perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as ‘nigger’ by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates.” Id. at 185 (quoting Rodgers v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993)).
But context matters, as Breeden instructs, and the question is whether use of a racial epithet has created a “racially hostile” work environment. Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 184 (“We are, after all, concerned with the ‘environment’ of workplace hostility . . . .”). And while the employer in Spriggs used racial epithets in his own voice and to express his own insults, id. at 182, and the employer in Boyer-Liberto directed epithets at the plaintiff to “cap explicit, angry threats that she was on the verge of utilizing her supervisory powers to terminate [the plaintiff’s] employment,” 786 F.3d at 280, this case is decidedly different. On the facts as alleged by Savage, Oglesby was not aiming racial epithets at Savage, or, for that matter, at anyone else, or using slurs to give voice to his own views. Instead, he was reading the word “Nigga” aloud from letters written by criminal suspects, presented to him by a police officer in the course of a trial-preparation meeting. In that distinct context and without more, no inference of a racially hostile environment can be drawn, and it would not be reasonable to believe that a Title VII violation had occurred. For that reason, we reverse the district court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss Savage’s Title VII retaliation claim against it.5
5 We note that this is not the only occasion on which Savage and his two coplaintiffs allege that they were confronted by racial epithets and other forms of racial harassment during the full course of their employment with Pocomoke City and the (Continued)
31

IV. For the reasons given above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
Criminal Enforcement Team, at the hands of multiple defendants to this action. As we noted at the outset, we deal here only with plaintiff Savage’s claims arising from the conduct of defendant Oglesby – a small part of that broader litigation – and Savage does not allege any other instance in which Oglesby voiced racial epithets or otherwise created a hostile work environment. We of course express no view as to the merits of the plaintiffs’ other claims, which remain pending before the district court.
32

 Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281 Filed 03/27/19 Page 1 of 3

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Northern Division

FRANKLIN SAVAGE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 1:16-cv-00201-ELH-JMC

Intervenor-Plaintiffs, v. POCOMOKE CITY, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE OF ACCEPTANCE OF OFFERS OF JUDGMENT

This filing is to notify the Court that Plaintiffs Kelvin Sewell and Lynell Green have

accepted offers of judgment made to them by Defendant Pocomoke City under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 68. Pocomoke City served the offers on March 8, 2019. Messrs. Sewell and

Green in turn served written notices of their respective acceptances within the 14-day period allotted by Rule 68.1 The offers and acceptances are attached to this filing for the Court’s reference.2 See Exs. A – B. The accepted offers included proposed consent decree terms subject to further negotiation. When negotiations have concluded, the Court will receive requests to

enter judgment, including approval of the finalized consent decree terms.

Dated: March 27, 2019

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Dennis A. Corkery

1 Mr. Sewell initially served a notice on March 13, 2019. After clarifications between counsel, Mr. Sewell served a revised notice on March 17. It is the March 17 acceptance that is attached to this filing and that is being treated by Mr. Sewell and Pocomoke City as the operative notice.
2 Counsel for Pocomoke City agreed to accept service of such notices by email as provided for by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(E).

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281 Filed 03/27/19 Page 2 of 3
Dennis A. Corkery (D. Md. Bar No. 19076) Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs 11 Dupont Circle, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20036 TEL: 202.319.1000 FAX: 202.319.1010 EMAIL: dennis_corkery@washlaw.org
/s/ Craig Smith Craig Smith (D. Md. Bar No. 17938) Theodore A. Howard (pro hac vice) Charles C. Lemley (pro hac vice) Brian G. Walsh (pro hac vice) Kendra P. Norwood (D. Md. Bar No. 18536) Madeline J. Cohen (pro hac vice) Moshe B. Broder (D. Md. Bar No. 19818) Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 TEL: 202.719.7000 FAX: 202.719.7049 EMAIL: csmith@wileyrein.com
/s/ Deborah A. Jeon Deborah A. Jeon (D. Md. Bar No. 06905) Sonia Kumar (D. Md. Bar No. 07196) ACLU of Maryland 3600 Clipper Mill Road, Suite 350 Baltimore, MD 21211 TEL: 410.889.8555 FAX: 410.366.7838 EMAIL: jeon@aclu-md.org
Counsel for Plaintiffs Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell, and Lynell Green
2

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281 Filed 03/27/19 Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 27, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk
of the Court for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland by using the
CM/ECF system. Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by
the CM/ECF system.
/s/ Craig Smith Craig Smith WILEY REIN LLP 1776 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006 TEL: (202) 719-7000 FAX: (202) 719-7049 EMAIL: csmith@wileyrein.com

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 1 of 17
Exhibit A

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 2 of 17

From: Sent: To: Cc:
Subject: Attachments:

Smith, Craig Sunday, March 17, 2019 9:11 PM 'Mike Rynd'; 'Daniel Karp' Barbara Schwabauer; Valerie Meyer; 'Woodard, Karen (CRT)'; Kathleen Lawrence; 'Schellenberg, Kali (CRT)'; 'ronald.levitan@maryland.gov'; 'Phillip M. Pickus -State Police-'; 'Carl Zacarias'; Howard, Theodore; Walsh, Brian; Dennis Corkery; Debbie Jeon; Sonia Kumar; Norwood, Kendra; Broder, Moshe; Lemley, Charlie; Cohen, Madeline Savage et al v. Pocomoke City et al. - K. Sewell acceptance of Rule 68 offer Kelvin Sewell Acceptance of 3-8-19 Rule 68 Offer from Pocomoke City (3-17-19).pdf

Dan, Mike:
I’ve attached notice that Kelvin Sewell accepts the offer that Pocomoke City made to him on March 8, 2019, for judgment under Rule 68.
Best, Craig
Craig Smith | Attorney at Law Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K Street NW | Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.719.7297 | csmith@wileyrein.com www.wileyrein.com | Bio | LinkedIn | Twitter
.

1

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 3 of 17

•

~ !\'ffi!.IJ ~~ W ASHINGTON L AWYERS' CoMMITTEE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ol MARYLAND

FOR CIV IL RIGHTS AND U RBAN AFFA I RS

Via Email

March 17, 2019

Daniel Karp (brunokarp@bkcklaw.com) Michael Rynd (mrynd@bkcklaw.com)

Re: Franklin Savage, et al., and United States v. Pocomoke City et al.; No. 1:16-cv-00201ELH; Kelvin Sewell's Acceptance of Rule 68 Offer

Dear M essrs. Karp and Rynd:
We write to inform you that Kelvin Sewell accepts the offer made to him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 made on March 8, 2019, by Pocomoke City. Mr. Sewell's signature confirming his acceptance is below. We will follow up with your office about any requested changes to the proposed consent decree in due course.
We have attached the March 8 offer to this letter so that all parties have the offer and acceptance in a single pdf package for reference.

Mr. Sewell's ,;gnature confirm;ng accepta~

Theodore A Howard Charles C. Lemley Brian G. Walsh Craig Smith Kendra P. Norwood Madeline J. Cohen Moshe B. Broder

7) y yours. ~
~~ J_bo ·ah A. Jeon Sonia Kumar
Dennis A. Corkery
Counsel for Plaintiffs

Attachment: March 8, 2019 Rule 68 Offer to Kelvin Sewell

cc: Ronald Levitan (ronald.levitan@maryland.gov) Phillip Pickus (phillip.pickus@maryland.gov) Carl Zacarias (czacarias@treasurer.state.md.us) Karen Woodard (karen.woodard@usdoj.gov) Barba ra Schwabauer (bar bara.schwabauer@usdoj.gov) Valerie M eyer (valerie.meyer@usdoj.gov) Kali Schellenberg (kali.schellenberg@usdoj.gov)

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 4 of 17

DANIEL KABP • KEVIN KARPINSKI* VIOTORIA M. SHEARER* E. I. OORNBROOHS, IV
SANDRA D. LEE•• J. MIOHAEL OOLLITON • MIOHELLE L. SEIDLECK ALYSON PAHKERXIERZEWSKI MA.TTHEWT.HEALY
* ADMITrED IN MD AND D,O,
•• ADMI'rtED Dr MD, N.Y. AND D.O.

KARPINSKI, GOLARESI & KARP, P.A.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
SUITE 1850, 120 EAST BALTIMORE STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202-1617
(410) 727-5000 FACSIMILE (410) 727-0861
E-MAIL: bkcklaw@aol.com WEBSITE: www.kcklegal.com
March 8, 2019

filOHAHD T. OOLABESI
HETIBED
MIOHAEL B. RYND OFOOUNSEL

via email and U.S. Mail
Craig M. Smith, Esquire Theodore A. Howard, Esquire Brian G. Walsh, Esquire Kendra P. Norwood, Esquire Moshe Benjamin Broder, Esquire Charles C. Lemley, Esquire Madeline Jean Cohen, Esquire Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006 CSmith{@wileyrein.com TT-Ioward@wileyrein.com BWalsh@wileyrein.com KN orwood(tV,wileyrein. com
b
Mbroder@wileyrein.com c1emley@wi1eyr~iu.com mcohen@wileyrein.com
Dennis A. Corkery, Esquire Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs 11 Dupont Circle, Suite 400 Washington, D.C. 20036 Dennis corkery@wash law.org
Deborah A. Jeon, Esquire Sonia Kumar, Esquire American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland 3600 Clipper Mill Road Suite 350 Baltimore, Maryland 21211 Jeon@aclu-md.org kumar@aclu-md.org Attorneys for Plaintiff.s

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 5 of 17
KARPINSKI. GOLARESI & KARP. P.A.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
March 8, 2019 Page 2
RE: 336-108; 336-129 Civil Action No: l:16-cv-201 Savage et al., v. Pocomoke City, et al.
RULE 68 OFFER OF JUDGMENT CONFIDENTIAL AND PRIVILEGED UNLESS ACCEPTED
Dear Counsel:
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I am hereby submitting a written offer ofjudgment to Plaintiff Kelvin Sewell on behalfof Pocomoke City to allow judgment to be taken against Pocomoke City in this case in the sum certain of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand and One Dollars ($450,001.00), exclusive of any attorneys' fees, and for entry into the attached proposed consent decree, subject to the following:
First, acceptance of the offer of judgment constitutes full satisfaction of all claims for damages and other relief of any description that have been or could have been requested in this case by Mr. Sewell, relating in any manner to alleged acts or omissions arising out of Mr. Sewell's employment and termination of employment by or with Pocomoke City or since, and which were alleged or which could have been alleged in the above-referenced lawsuit.
Second, Pocomoke City agrees that the Court shall assess reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs against it, in an amount to be determined by the Court.
Third, Pocomoke City will agree to enter a consent decree with Mr. Sewell, the proposed terms of which are substantially set forth in the draft consent decree attached hereto as Exhibit A. Pocomoke City agrees to negotiate in good faith if any changes to the consent decree are requested.
Fourth, acceptance of the offer, payment of the offered amount, and entry into the consent decree, constitutes a release, discharge, and relinquishment ofany and all claims against Pocomoke City, Bruce Morrison, Russell Blake, Ernest A. Crofoot, and the County Commissioners of Worcester Comity, and any and all other officials, employees, agency, department, or instrumentality of any description related in any way to them, and those in privity with them, and including any and all insurers of said individuals or entities. It is the express intent of this offer that payment of the Four Hundred Fifty Thousand and One Dollars ($450,001.00), referenced above, assessment of attorneys' fees and other costs, and entry into the consent decree, extinguishes any and all claims that have been, could have been, or could be, made by Mr. Sewell with respect to any liability or potential liability arising out of Mr. Sewell's employment and termination of employment by or with Pocomoke City or since, alleged or which could have been alleged in the above-referenced case against the individuals and/or entities for whose benefit this offer of judgment is being made. This offer is for judgment to be taken against Pocomoke City only, but it is expressly made for the benefit of Bruce Morrison, Russell Blake, Ernest A. Crofoot,

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 6 of 17
KARPINSKI. COLARESI & KARP, P.A.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
March 8, 2019 Page 3
the County Commissioners of Worcester County, and Pocomoke City.
Fifth, it is understood and agreed that this offer ofjudgment is being made for purposes of Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to attempt to resolve disputed claims, and is not and may not be construed as an admission of liability or that Mr. Sewell has suffered any damage.
Sixth, this offer is not contingent upon the acceptance by any other Plaintiff or the Plaintiff/Intervenor in this case of any other offer ofjudgment.
Finally, upon acceptance and payment, the Mr. Sewell agrees to file an order of satisfaction, execute a release and settlement agreement, execute a dismissal with prejudice in favor of all beneficiaries of this offer ofjudgment, and otherwise to formalize Mr. Sewell' s release and discharge of all claims by Mr. Sewell against all beneficiaries of this offer ofjudgment.
Sincerely yours,
KARPINSKI, COLARESI & KARP
Da-d 4/,1A-._
By: Daniel Karp
DK:mr
Enclosure
cc: Barbara Ann Schwabauer, Esquire Karen D Woodard, Esquire Kathleen O'Malley Lawrence, Esquire Valerie L. Meyer, Esquire Kali Jones Schellenberg Carl N. Zacarias, Esquire Ronald M. Levitan, Esquire Phillip Pickus, Esquire

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 7 of 17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND NORTHERN DIVISION

FRANKLIN SAVAGE, et al., Plaintiffs,
and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
V.
POCOMOKE CITY, et al., Defendants.

* * * Case No. 1:16-cv-00201-ELH * * * * * * * * * * * *

CONSENT DECREE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF KELVIN SEWELL AND DEFENDANT POCOMOKE CITY
I. INTRODUCTION 1. This action comes before this Court upon the filing of a Complaint by Plaintiffs
Franklin Savage, Kelvin Sewell and Lynell Green (collectively "Plaintiffs") on January 20, 2016. Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on September 29, 2016, pleading claims against Defendants Pocomoke City, former City Manager Russell Blake, former City Manager and City Attorney Ernest A. Crofoot, Mayor Bruce Morrison (collectively, "the Pocomoke Defendants"), the County Commissioners of Worcester County ("the County"), the State of Maryland ("the State"), Worcester County Sheriff Reggie Mason, Worcester County Sheriffs Office ("WCSO") members (former) Chief Deputy Dale Smack, Sergeant Nathaniel Passwaters, and Corporal Rodney Wells, and Sergeant Patricia Donaldson and Corporal Brooks Phillips of the

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 8 of 17
Maryland State Police ("MSP"). Plaintiffs' claims arise from their employment with the Pocomoke City Police Department and include, inter alia, allegations of race-based employment discrimination and retaliation. The United States of America ("United States" or "PlaintiffIntervenor") moved to intervene in this action, intervention was granted, and the United States' Complaint in Intervention was filed on December 1, 2016. The United States' Complaint in Intervention alleges violations of Title VII against Pocomoke City, the State of Maryland, and Sheriff Mason in his official capacity.
3. This Court has jurisdiction of the action under 42 U.S.C. §§1988 and 2000e-5(f), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3), 1343(4) and 1345.
4. Plaintiff Kelvin Sewell and Defendant Pocomoke City, desiring that certain of Mr. Sewell' s claims be settled by an appropriate Consent Decree ("Decree") and an offer ofjudgment, and without the burden and risks ofprotracted litigation, agree to the jurisdiction of this Court over the parties and the subject matter ofthis action. Mr. Sewell and Pocomoke City also hereby waive, for purposes ofthis Decree only, hearings and findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on all issues, including the liability alleged under Title VII, 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §1981, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and/or 42 U.S.C.§ 1985, and further agree to the entry of this Decree as final and binding between them with regard to the issues raised by Mr. Sewell in the Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs in this case. Mr. Sewell also agrees to dismiss all claims he has pleaded against Pocomoke City, Bruce Morrison, Ernest A. Crofoot, Russell Blake, and the County.
5. This Decree, being entered into with the consent of the parties shall not constitute an adjudication or finding on the merits of the case as to any party.
6. In resolution of this action, Mr. Sewell and Pocomoke City hereby AGREE to, and the Court expressly APPROVES, ENTERS and ORDERS, the following:
2

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 9 of 17
II. PARTIES AND DEFINITIONS 7. "Days" refers to calendar days. If any deadline referenced in this Decree falls on a
weekend or federal holiday, the deadline will be moved to the next business day. 8. "Entry" of the Decree refers to the date that the Clerk of Court enters this Decree. 9. "Defendant" refers only to Pocomoke City, and includes its current, former and
future agents, employees, officials, designees, and successors in interest. 10. "Parties" refers collectively to Plaintiff Kelvin Sewell and Defendant Pocomoke
City. 11. "Pocomoke City Police Department" ("PCPD") refers to the former workplace of
Plaintiff Kelvin Sewell. The PCPD is mentioned as the relevant workplace throughout this decree, but it is not a legally separate entity from Pocomoke City.
12. "Discrimination" includes disparate treatment and unlawful harassment based on race. III. GENERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
13. Defendant, by and through its officials, agents, employees, and all other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant in the performance of employment or personnel functions, shall not engage in any act or practice that discriminates against any employee or applicant because of race in violation of Title VII.
14. Defendant, by and through its officials, agents, employees, and all other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant in the performance of employment or personnel functions, shall not retaliate against or in any way adversely affect the terms or conditions of employment of any person because that person has opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII, filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), or
3

Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 10 of 17
testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII, including this case or this Consent Decree. IV. DEVELOPMENT AND REVISION OF RELEVANT POLICIES
15. Within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of this Decree, Defendant shall review and, to the extent necessary, adopt or amend written policies and procedures in effect for the PCPD related to discrimination to ensure proper handling of complaints, including:
a. defining the manner in which an employee may complain of discrimination, including procedures for officers detailed to the Worcester County Criminal Enforcement Team or other full-time details for PCPD officers to report discrimination or harassment in connection with their detail;
b. establishing a requirement that employees and supervisors promptly report any discrimination;
c. providing for the investigation of complaints of discrimination, including policies relating to the prompt and objective investigation of such complaints, including complaints pertaining to an employee's detail; and
d. providing for an appropriate range of discipline for violations of the policy.
16. Within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of this Decree, Defendant shall review and, to the extent necessary, adopt or amend written policies and procedures in effect for the PCPD to appropriately address Title VII' s prohibition of retaliation against individuals who have made claims of discrimination under Title VII or who have participated in the investigation or litigation of such claims.
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17. Within one hundred and twenty (120) days from the date of this Decree, Defendant shall review and, to the extent necessary, adopt or amend written policies and procedures in effect for the PCPD (and for any decision makers with respect to employment practices of the PCPD) regarding conflicts of interest to ensure the neutral enforcement of the policies described in paragraphs 15-16.
18. Within ten (10) days from the date upon which Defendant adopts or amends the written policies and procedures set forth in Paragraphs 15-17, Defendant shall take the following steps:
(a) Defendant shall distribute copies of any new or revised policies pursuant to paragraphs 15-17 to all individuals, including supervisors, working in the PCPD as well as any Pocomoke City officials or other individuals involved in the decision making for the PCPD or involved in receiving or responding to complaints ofdiscrimination or otherwise provide oversight for the policies in paragraphs 15-17. Each employee, agent, and/or official of the Defendant who receives a copy shall sign an acknowledgment that the copy has been received and read. The signed acknowledgment by each employee shall be placed in the employee's personnel file, and a signed acknowledgement by each supervisor or human resources personnel shall also be maintained by the City's Human Resources office.
(b) Defendant shall publicize such policies and procedures by, inter alia, posting them in all buildings and facilities used for posting EEO information in effect for the PCPD, by ,email to all employees of and/or working in the PCPD, and on any internet or intranet website used for posting notices or policy changes for or concerning policies in effect for the PCPD.
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(c) Defendant shall ensure that each new employee, supervisor, or human resources personnel receives a copy of the written policies and procedures at the time of the new employee's hire or at the time of the supervisor's selection or appointment. Each new employee, supervisor, or human resources personnel shall sign an acknowledgement that she or he has read and understands such policies and procedures. The signed acknowledgment by a new employee shall be placed in the employee's personnel file, and the signed acknowledgment by a new supervisor or human resources personnel also shall be maintained by the County's Department of Human Resources. V. TRAINING
19. Within one-hundred and fifty (150) days after entry of the Consent Decree, Defendant, at its own cost, will provide training as set forth below:
(a) Defendant shall provide training to all non-supervisory employees of and/or working in the PCPD regarding the new policies and procedures adopted or amended pursuant to Paragraphs 15-17. Such training will be provided by Defendant with the understanding that the training is mandatory for all non-supervisory employees of and/or working in the PCPD.
(b) Defendant shall provide training to (1) all supervisory and managerial employees of and/or all supervisors and managers holding positions in the PCPD; and (2) any manager, supervisor, or human resources personnel (without regard to whether they work in the PCPD) involved in receiving or responding to complaints of discrimination, or otherwise involved in providing oversight for the enforcement ofthe policies described in Paragraphs 15-17, regarding the new policies and procedures adopted or amended pursuant to Paragraphs 15-17.
(c) This training also will be administered within sixty (60) days of hire or promotion for newly hired non-supervisory employees (as described in Subparagraph (a)) or newly
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hired, promoted, or elected supervisors, managers, administrators, and human resources officials (as described in Subparagraph (b)) during the life of this Decree.
20. Within forty-five (45) days after the adoption of any written policies or procedures by the PCPD as described in Paragraphs 15-17, Defendant, at its own cost, will provide mandatory training to any City human resources personnel involved in receiving or responding to complaints of discrimination regarding the new policies and procedures adopted by the PCPD. This training also will be administered within sixty (60) days of hire or promotion for newly hired or promoted City human resources personnel involved in receiving or responding to complaints of discrimination during the life of this Decree.
21. All persons who undergo training pursuant to Paragraphs 19-20 will sign an acknowledgment of attendance at the training. Defendant will keep on file all signed acknowledgments for the duration of this Decree and provide it to any other Party within one (1) week upon written request. VI. INDIVIDUAL RELIEF FOR KELVIN SEWELL
22. In settlement of Kelvin Sewell's claims identified in Paragraph 4 supra, Defendant agrees to the following and it is hereby ordered by the Court that within seven (7) days of the date of entry of this Decree that Defendant shall pay Kelvin Sewell a monetary award in the amount of $450,001.00. Payment of the offered amount, and entry into this Decree, constitutes a release, discharge, and relinquishment of any and all claims against Pocomoke City, Bruce Morrison, Russell Blake, Ernest A. Crofoot, and the County, and any and all other officials, employees, agency, department, or instrumentality of any description related in any way to them, and those in privity with them, and including any and all insurers of said individuals or entities. It is the express intent of the parties that payment ofthe $450,001.00 referenced above and entry into this Decree,
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extinguishes any and all claims that have been, could have been, or could be, made with respect to any liability or potential liability arising out of Mr. Sewell's employment as a law enforcement officer with the Pocomoke City Police Department or since, alleged or which could have been alleged in the above-referenced case, excluding any claims for Mr. Sewell's attorneys' fees and other costs. This offer and Decree will result in a judgment to be taken against Pocomoke City only, but it is expressly understood that the agreement is for the benefit of all of those named or referred to above, including without limitation, Bruce Morrison, Russell Blake, Ernest A. Crofoot, and the County. This offer and Decree do not relate to the claims asserted by Kelvin Sewell against any other Defendants in this case.
23. Plaintiff shall submit a motion for attorneys' fees and other costs to the Court as provided by Local Rule 109.
24. Defendant will provide a neutral reference for Kelvin Sewell to any potential employer that contacts the Defendant. The neutral reference will only consist of Kelvin Sewell's dates of employment (November 18, 2010 - July 1, 2015) and salary information. No mention of the EEOC Charge, this action, or a termination for cause will be made part of the reference. VII. RECORDKEEPING AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING
25. While the Decree remains in effect, Defendant shall retain records necessary to document the implementation of this Decree. Defendant shall furnish records and documents relevant to its compliance with the implementation of this Decree to counsel for Kelvin Sewell within thirty (30) days of any written request to Defendant's counsel.
26. While the Decree remains in effect, Defendant will retain all records, including any papers, electronic files or writings of any kind, reports, studies, memoranda, letters, notes, charts, tables, rosters, manuals, guidelines, rules, lists, tabulations, press releases, books, articles, treatises,
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recordings or transcriptions of minutes, electronic files, machine readable format files, computer files, or audio or video recordings, electronic mail, and facsimiles, that come into its possession relating to complaints or charges of employment discrimination based on discrimination or retaliation made by employees of and/or holding positions of employment in the PCPD: (a) internally; (b) with the EEOC; or (c) through or with any other federal or state agency authorized to receive such complaints. VIII. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
27. The parties shall attempt to resolve informally any dispute that may occur under this Decree. The parties shall engage in good faith efforts to resolve the issue before seeking action by the Court. If the parties are unable expeditiously to resolve the issue, any party may move the Court for resolution, provided that written notice is first provided to the other party at least seven (7) days in advance of taking such action. IX. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION
28. The Court will retain jurisdiction over this Decree for the purposes of implementing the relief provided herein, and resolving any disputes or entering any orders that may be necessary to implement the relief provided herein. X. ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS
29. The time limits set forth throughout this Decree may be expanded upon mutual consent of the Parties or upon motion to the Court following written notice to the other parties.
30. All documents required to be delivered under this Decree to Plaintiffs will be sent to the following address:
[DESIGNATED PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL]
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31. All documents required to be delivered under this Decree to Defendant will be sent to the following addresses:
Daniel Karp, Esquire Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp, P.A. 120 East Baltimore Street Suite 1850 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 32. Any party may update mailing or electronic addresses to all other parties without requiring any changes to this Consent Decree. XI. DURATION OF THE DECREE 33. Unless otherwise ordered by this Court, and absent the pendency of any motion related to this Decree, this Decree shall expire without further order of the Court on the latest of the following dates: a. Three years from the date of the entry of the Decree; or b. Upon fulfillment of the Parties' obligations as described in Sections III through VI. 34. Any party may move the Court to extend the duration ofthe Decree upon a showing of good cause. [THE REMAINED OF THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
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Case 1:16-cv-00201-ELH Document 281-1 Filed 03/27/19 Page 17 of 17 It is so ORDERED this _ _day of_ _ _ _ __ ~ 2019.
Hon. Ellen L. Hollander United States District Judge
[DESIGNATED COUNSEL FOR KELVIN SEWELL]
Daniel Karp, Esquire Karpinski, Colaresi & Karp, P.A. 120 East Baltimore Street Suite 1850 Baltimore, Maryland 21202 Attorneys for Defendant Pocomoke City
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Exhibit B

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From: Sent: To: Cc:
Subject: Attachments:

Smith, Craig Thursday, March 21, 2019 9:07 PM 'Mike Rynd'; 'Daniel Karp' Barbara Schwabauer; Valerie Meyer; 'Woodard, Karen (CRT)'; Kathleen Lawrence; 'Schellenberg, Kali (CRT)'; 'ronald.levitan@maryland.gov'; 'Phillip M. Pickus -State Police-'; 'Carl Zacarias'; Howard, Theodore; Walsh, Brian; Dennis Corkery; Debbie Jeon; Sonia Kumar; Norwood, Kendra; Broder, Moshe; Lemley, Charlie; Cohen, Madeline Savage et al v. Pocomoke City et al. - L. Green acceptance of Rule 68 offer Lynell Green Acceptance of 3-8-19 Rule 68 Offer from Pocomoke City.pdf

Dan, Mike:
I’ve attached notice that Lynell Green accepts the offer that Pocomoke City made to him on March 8, 2019, for judgment under Rule 68.
Best, Craig
Craig Smith | Attorney at Law Wiley Rein LLP 1776 K Street NW | Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.719.7297 | csmith@wileyrein.com www.wileyrein.com | Bio | LinkedIn | Twitter

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Via Email

March 21, 2019

Daniel Karp (brunokarp@bkcklaw.com) Michael Rynd (mrynd@bkcklaw.com)

Re: Franklin Savage, et al., and United States v. Pocomoke City et al.; No. 1:16‐cv‐00201‐ ELH; Lynell Green’s Acceptance of Rule 68 Offer

Dear Messrs. Karp and Rynd:
We write to inform you that Lynell Green accepts the offer made to him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 made on March 8, 2019, by Pocomoke City. Mr. Green’s signature confirming his acceptance is below. We will follow up with your office about any requested changes to the proposed consent decree in due course.
We have attached the March 8 offer to this letter so that all parties have the offer and acceptance in a single pdf package for reference.

Mr. Green’s signature confirming acceptance: ________________________

Sincerely yours,

Theodore A. Howard Charles C. Lemley Brian G. Walsh Craig Smith Kendra P. Norwood Madeline J. Cohen Moshe B. Broder

Deborah A. Jeon Sonia Kumar
Dennis A. Corkery
Counsel for Plaintiffs

Attachment: March 8, 2019 Rule 68 Offer to Lynell Green

cc: Ronald Levitan (ronald.levitan@maryland.gov) Phillip Pickus (phillip.pickus@maryland.gov) Carl Zacarias (czacarias@treasurer.state.md.us) Karen Woodard (karen.woodard@usdoj.gov) Barbara Schwabauer (barbara.schwabauer@usdoj.gov) Valerie Meyer (valerie.meyer@usdoj.gov) Kali Schellenberg (kali.schellenberg@usdoj.gov)

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This case is about racial discrimination in employment and retaliation for employees filing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) complaints.  Three Pocomoke City, Maryland police officers brought this lawsuit on January 20, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Pocomoke City, the Pocomoke City Police Department, the Worcester County Sheriff’s Office, the Department of Maryland State Police, and a number of individuals associated with these organizations. Represented by private counsel, the Washington Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and the ACLU of Maryland, the officers sued under 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 201) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as front and back pay, damages for physical and psychological harms, and attorneys’ fees. The officers alleged that they were subjected to a hostile environment because of their race. They also alleged that two of the officers were fired in retaliation for filing EEOC complaints against their employer. The officers asserted that the racial discrimination and retaliation they suffered while employed by the Pocomoke City Police Department violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 

The case was assigned to Judge J. Frederick Motz. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January 27, 2016. On March 16, 2016, the officers filed an amended complaint, changing the named defendants. In mid-April of 2016, the defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint. In June, Judge Motz granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted against the defendants in their official capacities under U.S.C §§ 1981 and 1983 and against defendant Wells as to the plaintiffs’ retaliation claim. Two months later, Judge Motz also dismissed the claims against Worcester County State’s Attorney Beau Oglesby, holding that they were barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity.

On September 29, 2016, the officers filed a final amended complaint, adding the State of Maryland as a defendant. Shortly thereafter, the United States Department of Justice moved to intervene in the case, filing an intervenor complaint against Pocomoke City, the Worcester County Sheriff, and Maryland to enforce the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin. Before and after the intervenor complaint, the defendants again moved for dismissal or summary judgment. Judge Motz granted the United States’ motion to intervene and denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss on March 20, 2017, without clearly explaining his reasoning. On May 15, 2017, Judge Motz denied motions by both the State of Maryland and the plaintiffs for reconsideration of his earlier decisions on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Both parties sought an interlocutory appeal. The State of Maryland filed a motion to stay pending appeal, which was granted by Judge Motz on August 3.

On July 13, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to dismiss the charges against Oglesby on the basis of prosecutorial immunity. 896 F.3d 260. It reversed the decision of the District Court with regard to the State of Maryland, holding that the plaintiff had failed to make a Title VII retaliation claim against the State’s Attorney and could therefore not make a Title VII claim against Oglesby’s employer. On remand, the case was reassigned to Judge Ellen L. Hollander, who promptly dismissed the Title VII complaint against the State of Maryland.

After almost two years of on and off settlement talks, two of the officers notified the court that they had accepted settlement offers from Pocomoke City on March 27, 2019. The judgment included a consent decree enforceable for three years requiring the Pocomoke City Police Department to refrain from engaging in racial discrimination and retaliatory practices, to adopt or amend written policies and procedures to ensure proper handling of discrimination complaints and prohibit retaliation against individuals raising or participating in the investigation or litigation of such claims, and to provide training, at its own cost, to its employees on these policies and procedures. In addition, the settlement awarded monetary damages in the amount of $450,001.00 to one of the plaintiffs and $200,001.00 to the other, in addition to attorneys’ fees. Defendant also agreed to provide neutral references for the officers to any potential employers.

A second settlement conference was held on May 2, 2019. On December 4, 2019, the remaining parties agreed to a settlement by consent decree. The terms of the December 2019 settlement are unknown at this time. As of September 30, 2020, the case is ongoing, but stayed pending consent motions to amend the earlier settlement.
