The Russian Empire gradually entered World War I during the three days before July 28, 1914. This began with Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia, a Russian ally. Russia sent an ultimatum, via Saint Petersburg, to Vienna, warning Austria-Hungary not to attack Serbia. Following the invasion of Serbia, Russia began to mobilize the reserve army on the border of Austria-Hungary. Consequently, on July 31, Germany demanded Russian demobilization. There was no response, which resulted in the German declaration of war on Russia on the same day (August 1, 1914). Per its war plan, Germany disregarded Russia and moved first against France, declaring war on August 3. Germany sent its main armies through Belgium to surround Paris. The threat to Belgium caused Britain to declare war on Germany on August 4. The Ottoman Empire soon joined the Central Powers and fought Russia along their border.

Historians researching the causes of World War I have emphasized the role of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Scholarly consensus has typically minimized Russian involvement in the outbreak of this mass conflict. Key elements were Russia's defense of Orthodox Serbia, its pan-Slavic roles, its treaty obligations with France, and its concern with protecting its status as a world power. However, historian Sean McMeekin emphasizes Russian plans to expand its empire southward and to seize Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) as an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated by Bosnian Serbs on June 28, 1914, due to Austria-Hungary's annexation of the mainly Slavic province. Though Austria-Hungary couldn't find evidence that the Serbian state had sponsored this assassination, it issued an ultimatum to Serbia during the July Crisis one month later, assuming it would be rejected and thus lead to war. Austria-Hungary deemed Serbia deserving of punishment for the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Although Russia had no formal treaty obligation to Serbia, it stressed its desire to control the Balkans, having a long-term perspective toward gaining a military advantage over Germany and Austria-Hungary. Russia was incentivized to delay militarization, and most Russian leaders wanted to avoid war. However, Russia had yielded French support and feared that a failure to defend Serbia would harm Russian credibility, constituting a major political defeat in its goal of controlling the Balkans. Tsar Nicholas II mobilized Russian forces on July 30, 1914, to threaten Austria-Hungary if it invaded Serbia. Historian Christopher Clark believes that the "Russian general mobilization [of July 30] was one of the most momentous decisions of the August crisis". The first general mobilization occurred before the German government declared a state of impending war.

Russia's threats against Germany resulted in military action by German forces, which followed through with its mobilization and a declaration of war on August 1, 1914. At the outset of hostilities, Russian forces led offensives against Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Background

Between 1873 and 1887, Russia was allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the League of the Three Emperors, and then with Germany in the 1887–1890 Reinsurance Treaty. Both collapsed because of the competing interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans. France took advantage of this, agreeing to the 1894 Franco-Russian Alliance, but Britain viewed Russia with deep suspicion because of the Great Game. In 1800, over  separated Russia and British India, but by 1902, it was lessened to  with Russian advances into Central Asia. The proximity threatened to bring the two powers into conflict along with the long-held Russian objective of gaining control of the Bosporus Straits, and with it access to the British-dominated Mediterranean Sea.

Britain's isolation during the 1899–1902 Second Boer War and Russia being defeated in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War led both parties to seek allies. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 settled disputes in Asia and allowed the establishment of the Triple Entente with France, which was largely informal. In 1908, Austria-Hungary annexed the former Ottoman province of Bosnia and Herzegovina, prompting the Russian response of the Balkan League to prevent further Austrian expansion.

In the 1912–1913 First Balkan War, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece captured most of the remaining Ottoman possessions in Europe. Disputes over their division resulted in the Second Balkan War, in which Bulgaria was comprehensively defeated by its former allies. This defeat turned Bulgaria into a revanchist local power, which fueled a second opportunity to fulfill its national aspirations. This left Serbia as the most important Russian ally in the region.

Russia's industrial base and railway network had significantly improved since 1905, but from a relatively low base. In 1913, Nicholas II increased the Russian army of over 500,000 men. Although there was no formal alliance between Russia and Serbia, their close bilateral links provided Russia a route into the crumbling Ottoman Empire, where Germany also had significant interests. Combined with the increase in Russian military strength, Austria-Hungary and Germany felt threatened by Serbia's expansion. When Austria invaded Serbia on July 28, 1914, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov viewed it as an Austro-German conspiracy to end Russian influence in the Balkans.

On July 30, Russia declared a general mobilization in support of Serbia. The next day, on August 1, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia, followed by Austria-Hungary on August 6. Russia and the Entente declared war on the Ottoman Empire in November 1914 after Ottoman warships bombarded the Black Sea port of Odesa in late October.

Major players
Most historians agree that Russia's top military leadership was generally tremendously incompetent. Tsar Nicholas II made all final decisions but was repeatedly given conflicting advice by his peers, resulting in unsound decision-making throughout his time in power. He set up a seriously flawed organizational structure that proved inadequate for the high pressures and wartime's instant demands. The British historian David Stevenson, for example, points to the "disastrous consequences of deficient civil-military liaison," in which civilians and generals were not in contact with each other. The government was unaware of its fatal weaknesses and remained out of touch with public opinion. The Foreign Minister had to warn Nicholas that "unless he yielded to the popular demand and unsheathed the sword on Serbia's behalf, he would run the risk of revolution and the loss of his throne." Nicholas yielded but lost his throne. Stevenson concludes:
 

Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov was not a powerful figure in the events leading up to Russia's entry into World War I, nor did he play a consequential role in Russia's decisions following their entry. According to historian Thomas Otte, "Sazonov felt too insecure to advance his positions against stronger men... Tsar Nicholas II tended to yield rather than press home his views... At the critical stages of the July crisis, Sazonov was inconsistent and showed an uncertain grasp of international realities."

French ambassador Maurice Paléologue quickly became influential by repeatedly promising France would go to war alongside Russia, which reflected the position of President Raymond Poincaré.

Serious planning for a future war was practically impossible because of the complex rivalries and priorities given to royalty. The main criteria for high command were linkage to the royalty rather than expertise. Though the General Staff had the expertise, it was often outweighed by the elite Imperial Guards, a favorite bastion of the aristocracy that prized throwing parades over planning large-scale military maneuvers. This led to the grand dukes inevitably gaining high command.

French alliance
Russia depended heavily on the French alliance since Germany would have greater difficulty fighting a two-front war than one with Russia alone. The French ambassador, Maurice Paléologue, despised Germany and saw that when war broke out, France and Russia had to be close allies against Germany. His approach agreed with French President Raymond Poincaré. Unconditional French support to Russia was promised in the unfolding crisis with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Historians debate whether Paléologue exceeded his instructions but agree that he failed to inform Paris of what was happening exactly, not warning that Russian mobilization might launch a world war.

Beginning of the war
On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated in Sarajevo, and Tsar Nicholas II vacillated as to Russia's course of action. A relatively-new factor influencing Russian policy was the growth of Pan-Slavism, which identified Russia's duty to all Slavs, especially those who practiced [impulse shifted attention away from the Ottoman Empire and toward the threat posed to the Slavic people by Austria-Hungary. Serbia identified itself as the champion of the Pan-Slavic ideal, and Austria-Hungary planned to destroy Serbia for that reason. Nicholas wanted to defend Serbia, but not to fight a war with Germany. In a series of letters exchanged with Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany (the so-called "Willy–Nicky correspondence"), both cousins proclaimed their desire for peace, and each attempted to get the other to back down. Nicholas desired Russia's mobilization to be only against Austria-Hungary to avoid war with Germany. The Kaiser, however, had pledged to support Austria-Hungary.

On July 25, 1914, Nicholas decided to intervene in the Austro-Serbian conflict, a step toward general war. He put the Russian army on "alert" on July 25. Although it was not general mobilization, the German and Austro-Hungarian borders were threatened and looked like military preparation for war. However, the Russian Army had few workable plans and no contingency plans for a partial mobilization. On July 30, 1914, Nicholas took the fateful step of confirming the order for general mobilization, despite being very reluctant.

On July 28, Austria-Hungary formally declared war against Serbia. Count Witte told the French Ambassador Maurice Palaeologus that the Russian point of view considered the war to be madness, Slavic solidarity to be simply nonsense and nothing could be hoped by war.

On July 30, Russia ordered general mobilization but maintained that it would not attack if peace talks began. Reacting to the discovery of Russian partial mobilization ordered on July 25, Germany announced its pre-mobilization posture, the imminent danger of war. Germany told Russia to demobilize within twelve hours. In St. Petersburg, at 7 p.m., the German ultimatum to Russia expired. The German ambassador to Russia met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov, asked three times if Russia would reconsider, and delivered the note accepting Russia's war challenge and declaring war on August 1. On August 6, Franz Joseph I of Austria signed the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Russia.

At the outbreak of war, each of the European powers began to publish selected, and sometimes misleading, compendia of diplomatic correspondence, seeking to establish justification for their own entry into the war and to cast blame on other actors. The first of these color books to appear was the German White Book which appeared on August 4, 1914, the same day as Britain's war declaration. The British Blue Book came out two days later, followed by the Russian Orange Book in mid-August.

Military weaknesses
The outbreak of war on August 1, 1914, found Russia grossly unprepared. The Allies placed their faith in the Russian army. Its pre-war regular strength was 1,400,000, and mobilization added 3,100,000 reserves. In every other aspect, however, Russia was unprepared for war. Germany had ten times as much railway track per km, and Russian soldiers traveled an average of  to reach the front, but German soldiers traveled less than a quarter of that distance to get to the front. Russian heavy industry was not large enough to equip the massive armies that the Tsar could raise, and its reserves of munitions were small. While the German army in 1914 was better equipped than any other man-for-man, the Russian army was severely short on artillery pieces, shells, motorized transports, and boots.

Before the war, Russian planners had neglected the critical logistical issue of how the Allies could ship supplies and munitions to Russia. With the Baltic Sea barred by German U-boats and surface ships and the Dardanelles by the guns of Germany's ally, the Ottoman Empire, Russia initially could receive help only via Arkhangelsk, which was frozen solid in winter, or via Vladivostok, which was over  from the front line. By 1915, a new rail line was begun, which gave access to the ice-free port of Murmansk by 1917.

The Russian High Command was severely weakened by the mutual contempt between War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov and Grand Duke Nicholas, who commanded the armies in the field. However, an immediate attack was ordered against the German province of East Prussia. The Germans efficiently mobilized there, defeating the two Russian armies that invaded. The Battle of Tannenberg, where the entire Russian Second Army was annihilated, cast an ominous shadow over the empire's future. The loyal officers who lost were the very ones that were needed to protect the dynasty. The Russian armies had some success against both the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Armies, but the German Army steadily pushed them back. In September 1914, to relieve pressure on France, the Russians were forced to halt a successful offensive against Austria-Hungary in Galicia to attack German-held Silesia.

The main Russian goal was focused on the Balkans and especially taking control of Constantinople (Istanbul). The Ottoman entry into the war opened up new opportunities, but Russia was too hard-pressed to exploit them. Instead, the government incited Britain and France to the action at Gallipoli, which failed badly. Russia then incited a rebellion by the Armenians, who were massacred in one of the great atrocities of the war, the Armenian genocide. The combination of poor preparation and poor planning destroyed the morale of Russian troops and set the stage for the collapse of the entire regime in early 1917.

Gradually, a war of attrition set in on the vast Eastern Front; the Russians were facing the combined forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary and suffered staggering losses. General Anton Denikin, retreating from Galicia wrote:

Legacy
Historians on the origin of the First World War have emphasized the role of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The consensus of scholars includes scant mention of Russia and only brief mentions of Russia's defense of Serbia, its Pan-Slavic roles, its treaty obligations with France, and its concern for protecting its status as a great power.

However, the historian Sean McMeekin has emphasized Russia's aggressive expansionary goal to the south. He argues that for Russia, the war was ultimately about the Ottoman Empire and that the Foreign Ministry and Army were planning a war of aggression from at least 1908 and perhaps even 1895. He emphasizes that the immediate goal was to seize Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediterranean by control of the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits.  Reviewers have generally been critical of McMeekin's revisionist interpretation.

See also

Foreign policy of the Russian Empire
Allies of World War I
Triple Entente
Causes of World War I
July Crisis
Diplomatic history of World War I
Austro-Hungarian entry into World War I
British entry into World War I
French entry into World War I
German entry into World War I
Ottoman entry into World War I
Historiography of the causes of World War I
International relations of the Great Powers (1814–1919)

References

Further reading

Books

 Volume I Volume II

Journals

Historiography

Primary sources

Major 1914 documents from BYU online

External links

Entry into World War I
 
Entry into World War I
Russian Empire
Entry into World War I by country
1914 in Europe
1914 in international relations
Crisis