Farhad Saffi is saddened as he looks at his Milli Boot Factory in Kabul, where expensive machinery used to produce boots for the police and army, but now sits idle and covered in plastic. Saffi fears that his once successful business, which provided jobs and hope for many in Afghanistan, is coming to an end. Despite promises of long-term contracts from the US government, the Afghan government's decision to buy cheaper boots from China and Pakistan has caused Saffi to lose his contracts and be left with millions of dollars worth of unused materials. When the plant opened, Afghan and US generals were eager to have their photos taken with a local success story. US Navy Rear Admiral Kathleen Dussault visited in 2010 to present Saffi, a 23-year-old, with a quality certificate for the plant. They were set to supply the Afghan National Security Forces with high-quality boots under contracts worth up to $40 million a year. Saffi's leather boots, which went through a strict quality testing process in the United States, were sold for $62 per pair. In comparison, Chinese-made boots with imitation leather cost the Afghan government $22 per pair in a contract for up to 700,000 pairs a year. Saffi explained that the Afghan government was only concerned with getting the lowest price, despite his costs being much higher. Chinese boots made of fake leather are inexpensive but not durable. From 2002 to the end of 2011, the US government spent $85.5 billion on reconstruction in Afghanistan, with $57 billion in international aid also coming into the country. NATO-led forces, responsible for purchasing for Afghan security forces during the war, have been following "Afghan First" rules since 2010, prioritizing purchases from local companies to stimulate the economy and create jobs. This has resulted in contracts for Afghan businesses, including uniforms, boots, textiles, furniture, tents, software, and transformers, creating 15,000 jobs and saving $650 million on combat-related imports. However, this is only a small portion of the estimated $200 million spent on the war each day. The Afghan First Policy aims to prevent locals from joining the Taliban by providing better job opportunities and higher incomes. The policy, known as the '$10-a-day Talib', refers to the payment offered to potential fighters. Some of the 700 workers laid off from Saffi's factory are considering joining the Taliban due to lack of other employment options as Western nations and NGOs prepare to leave the country with the withdrawal of most NATO combat troops in 2014. "If the factory doesn't reopen, we will have no choice but to join the Taliban for employment," said one worker. Ares Khan, 23, expressed concern about how he and his family will survive without the income from the last boots produced by Milli if the government does not change its decision. Workers at the factory earned between $400 and $900 a month, which is well above the average wage in a country where a significant portion of the population lives below the poverty line. Many people in Afghanistan are worried that job opportunities and investment will decrease if Western businesses leave the country, as the moneyed elite have already been doing for years. Khan's friend, Khair Mohammad, who supports a large family, also fears for the future if the Afghan government does not provide jobs. Mohammad stated that when he returns to Ghazni, he will need to join the Taliban due to the high cost of living in Afghanistan, which has been driven up by the more than $12 billion spent annually on the war. US military officials have decided to delegate a significant portion of procurement responsibilities to Afghan authorities as part of the transition to Afghan security and control. Afghan businesses, according to Kakiel, have provided a wide range of goods and services to the country's security forces, including boots, uniforms, sleeping bags, construction, and IT services. The security forces are expected to grow to around 352,000 personnel. Milli is not the only company facing challenges due to the shift towards local procurement, with other suppliers of uniforms and equipment also feeling uncertain about the future of their contracts. Another company executive, who chose to remain anonymous due to concerns about backlash from Afghan military buyers, revealed that their contracts have expired in some areas and it is unclear if they will be renewed or if the government will seek new suppliers from other countries. This has left their business investments in a state of uncertainty. "My company has brought in materials from the US for products that are being manufactured in Kabul. It will be a problem if we do not receive contracts in return, as we will have to let go of employees," explained Lieutenant-General Abdul Basir Asafzari, who is in charge of logistics and procurement at the Ministry of Defence. Currently, only 30 percent of supplies are being sourced from Afghan companies, and President Hamid Karzai has directed the military to prioritize local firms whenever possible. The reason why Milli lost its contracts was due to their practice of importing substandard boots from countries like China and then rebranding them. As a result, the company failed to meet its obligations." Asafzari mentioned that some soldiers had complaints about the quality of the boots. However, Mohammad Akbar Ahmadzai from the NGO Building Markets, which supports entrepreneurs in developing countries, stated that Milli's boots were genuine and passed US quality tests. Other business experts, who chose to remain anonymous, suggested that Milli and other companies may have struggled due to Afghanistan's system of bribery and patronage, with more well-connected competitors trying to eliminate them. NATO's Kakiel added that Milli and others may have also misunderstood the contract provisions, which only guaranteed one year of sales. In 2011, US agencies contracted over $4 billion to Afghan companies out of a total of $17.3 billion through the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. More than 90 percent of the money was spent on purchasing products from Afghan sellers (49 percent), construction (28 percent), support services (11 percent), and transportation (6 percent). However, an audit conducted by the US government's Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in January found that the Afghan First Initiative (AFI) had issues with inadequate contract solicitation and vetting, as well as limited data on claimed employment benefits. Saffi, who returned to Afghanistan in 2002 after fleeing during Taliban rule, expressed disappointment in both the US government and the future promised by Karzai due to his negative experiences. He mentioned that despite efforts to do well in his factory, recent events have made him believe that his company and the country are headed in the same direction. He mentioned that many individuals in Kabul's business community were feeling anxious due to the uncertain investment environment and worsening security situation. This feeling was intensified by a bold Taliban attack on the city center and nearby regions in mid-April. Saffi explained that he had to hire 30 personal bodyguards to ensure his children's safety while attending school, as well as having police snipers stationed on the roof of his home. He drew a parallel between the struggles of his company and the state of the country, likening himself as the president of his company and President Karzai as the president of the country. As his company was facing closure and declining, he noticed his employees were leaving as well. Similar events will occur in the country. It is important for the president to effectively lead and govern the nation.