Benedict De  Spinoza The Ethics (Fiscle Part-I) 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Definitions Pg 1 
 I.  By That Which Is Self-Caused,  I Mean That Of Which The 
 Essence Involves Existence,  Or That Of Which The Nature Is Only 
 Conceivable As Existent. 
   
 Ii.  A Thing Is Called Finite After Its Kind,  When It Can Be 
 Limited By Another Thing Of The Same Nature ; For Instance,  A 
 Body Is Called Finite Because We Always Conceive Another Greater 
 Body.  So,  Also,  A Thought Is Limited By Another Thought,  But A 
 Body Is Not Limited By Thought,  Nor A Thought By Body. 
   
 Iii.  By Substance,  I Mean That Which Is In Itself,  And Is 
 Conceived Through Itself : In Other Words,  That Of Which A 
 Conception Can Be Formed Independently Of Any Other Conception. 
   
 Iv.  By Attribute,  I Mean That Which The Intellect Perceives As 
 Constituting The Essence Of Substance. 
   
 V.  By Mode,  I Mean The Modifications1 Of Substance,  Or That 
 Which Exists In,  And Is Conceived Through,  Something Other Than 
 Itself. 
   
 Vi.  By God,  I Mean A Being Absolutely Infinite-That Is,  A 
 Substance Consisting In Infinite Attributes,  Of Which Each 
 Expresses Eternal And Infinite Essentiality. 
     Explanation-I Say Absolutely Infinite,  Not Infinite After Its 
 Kind : For,  Of A Thing Infinite Only After Its Kind,  Infinite 
 Attributes May Be Denied ; But That Which Is Absolutely Infinite, 
 Contains In Its Essence Whatever Expresses Reality,  And Involves 
 No Negation. 
   
 Vii.  That Thing Is Called Free,  Which Exists Solely By The 
 Necessity Of Its Own Nature,  And Of Which The Action Is 
 Determined By Itself Alone.  On The Other Hand,  That Thing Is 
 Necessary,  Or Rather Constrained,  Which Is Determined By 
 Something External To Itself To A Fixed And Definite Method Of 
 Existence Or Action. 
   
 Viii.  By Eternity,  I Mean Existence Itself,  In So Far As It Is 
 Conceived Necessarily To Follow Solely From The Definition Of 
 That Which Is Eternal. 
     Explanation-Existence Of This Kind Is Conceived As An Eternal 
 Truth,  Like The Essence Of A Thing,  And,  Therefore,  Cannot Be 
 Explained By Means Of Continuance Or Time,  Though Continuance May 
 Be Conceived Without A Beginning Or End. 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Axioms Pg 2 
 I.  Everything Which Exists,  Exists Either In Itself Or In 
 Something Else. 
   
 Ii.  That Which Cannot Be Conceived Through Anything Else Must Be 
 Conceived Through Itself. 
   
 Iii.  From A Given Definite Cause An Effect Necessarily Follows ; 
 And,  On The Other Hand,  If No Definite Cause Be Granted,  It Is 
 Impossible That An Effect Can Follow. 
   
 Iv.  The Knowledge Of An Effect Depends On And Involves The 
 Knowledge Of A Cause. 
   
 V.  Things Which Have Nothing In Common Cannot Be Understood,  The 
 One By Means Of The Other ; The Conception Of One Does Not 
 Involve The Conception Of The Other. 
   
 Vi.  A True Idea Must Correspond With Its Ideate Or Object. 
   
 Vii.  If A Thing Can Be Conceived As Non-Existing,  Its Essence 
 Does Not Involve Existence. 
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 3 
   
   
 Prop. I.  Substance Is By Nature Prior To Its Modifications. 
     Proof.-This Is Clear From Deff. Iii. And V. 
   
 Prop. Ii.  Two Substances,  Whose Attributes Are Different,  Have 
 Nothing In Common. 
     Proof.-Also Evident From Def. Iii.  For Each Must Exist In 
 Itself,  And Be Conceived Through Itself ; In Other Words,  The 
 Conception Of One Does Not Imply The Conception Of The Other. 
   
 Prop. Iii.  Things Which Have Nothing In Common Cannot Be One The 
 Cause Of The Other. 
     Proof.-If They Have Nothing In Common,  It Follows That One 
 Cannot Be Apprehended By Means Of The Other (Ax. V.),  And, 
 Therefore,  One Cannot Be The Cause Of The Other (Ax. Iv.). 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Iv.  Two Or More Distinct Things Are Distinguished One From 
 The Other,  Either By The Difference Of The Attributes Of The 
 Substances,  Or By The Difference Of Their Modifications. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 4 
     Proof.-Everything Which Exists,  Exists Either In Itself Or In 
 Something Else (Ax. I.),-That Is (By Deff. Iii. And V.),  Nothing 
 Is Granted In Addition To The Understanding,  Except Substance And 
 Its Modifications.  Nothing Is,  Therefore,  Given Besides The 
 Understanding,  By Which Several Things May Be Distinguished One 
 From The Other,  Except The Substances,  Or,  In Other Words (See 
 Ax. Iv.),  Their Attributes And Modifications.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. V.  There Cannot Exist In The Universe Two Or More 
 Substances Having The Same Nature Or Attribute. 
     Proof.-If Several Distinct Substances Be Granted,  They Must 
 Be Distinguished One From The Other,  Either By The Difference Of 
 Their Attributes,  Or By The Difference Of Their Modifications 
 (Prop. Iv.).  If Only By The Difference Of Their Attributes,  It 
 Will Be Granted That There Cannot Be More Than One With An 
 Identical Attribute.  If By The Difference Of Their 
 Modifications-As Substance Is Naturally Prior To Its 
 Modifications (Prop. I.),-It Follows That Setting The 
 Modifications Aside,  And Considering Substance In Itself,  That Is 
 Truly,  (Deff. Iii. And Vi.),  There Cannot Be Conceived One 
 Substance Different From Another,-That Is (By Prop. Iv.),  There 
 Cannot Be Granted Several Substances,  But One Substance Only. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Vi.  One Substance Cannot Be Produced By Another Substance. 
     Proof.-It Is Impossible That There Should Be In The Universe 
 Two Substances With An Identical Attribute,  I.E. Which Have 
 Anything Common To Them Both (Prop. Ii.),  And,  Therefore (Prop. 
 Iii.),  One Cannot Be The Cause Of The Other,  Neither Can One Be 
 Produced By The Other.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That A Substance Cannot Be 
 Produced By Anything External To Itself.  For In The Universe 
 Nothing Is Granted,  Save Substances And Their Modifications (As 
 Appears From Ax. I. And Deff. Iii. And V.).  Now (By The Last 
 Prop.) Substance Cannot Be Produced By Another Substance, 
 Therefore It Cannot Be Produced By Anything External To Itself. 
 Q.E.D.  This Is Shown Still More Readily By The Absurdity Of The 
 Contradictory.  For,  If Substance Be Produced By An External 
 Cause,  The Knowledge Of It Would Depend On The Knowledge Of Its 
 Cause (Ax. Iv.),  And (By Def. Iii.) It Would Itself Not Be 
 Substance. 
   
 Prop. Vii.  Existence Belongs To The Nature Of Substances. 
     Proof.-Substance Cannot Be Produced By Anything External 
 (Corollary,  Prop Vi.),  It Must,  Therefore,  Be Its Own Cause-That 
 Is,  Its Essence Necessarily Involves Existence,  Or Existence 
 Belongs To Its Nature. 
   
 Prop. Viii.  Every Substance Is Necessarily Infinite. 
     Proof.-There Can Only Be One Substance With An Identical 
 Attribute,  And Existence Follows From Its Nature (Prop. Vii.) ; 
 Its Nature,  Therefore,  Involves Existence,  Either As Finite Or 
 Infinite.  It Does Not Exist As Finite,  For (By Def. Ii.) It 
 Would Then Be Limited By Something Else Of The Same Kind,  Which 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 5 
 Would Also Necessarily Exist (Prop. Vii.) ; And There Would Be 
 Two Substances With An Identical Attribute,  Which Is Absurd 
 (Prop. V.).  It Therefore Exists As Infinite.  Q.E.D. 
     Note I.-As Finite Existence Involves A Partial Negation,  And 
 Infinite Existence Is The Absolute Affirmation Of The Given 
 Nature,  It Follows (Solely From Prop. Vii.) That Every Substance 
 Is Necessarily Infinite. 
     Note Ii.-No Doubt It Will Be Difficult For Those Who Think 
 About Things Loosely,  And Have Not Been Accustomed To Know Them 
 By Their Primary Causes,  To Comprehend The Demonstration Of Prop. 
 Vii. : For Such Persons Make No Distinction Between The 
 Modifications Of Substances And The Substances Themselves,  And 
 Are Ignorant Of The Manner In Which Things Are Produced ; Hence 
 They May Attribute To Substances The Beginning Which They Observe 
 In Natural Objects.  Those Who Are Ignorant Of True Causes,  Make 
 Complete Confusion-Think That Trees Might Talk Just As Well As 
 Men-That Men Might Be Formed From Stones As Well As From Seed ; 
 And Imagine That Any Form Might Be Changed Into Any Other. So, 
 Also,  Those Who Confuse The Two Natures,  Divine And Human, 
 Readily Attribute Human Passions To The Deity,  Especially So Long 
 As They Do Not Know How Passions Originate In The Mind.  But,  If 
 People Would Consider The Nature Of Substance,  They Would Have No 
 Doubt About The Truth Of Prop. Vii.  In Fact,  This Proposition 
 Would Be A Universal Axiom,  And Accounted A Truism.  For,  By 
 Substance,  Would Be Understood That Which Is In Itself,  And Is 
 Conceived Through Itself-That Is,  Something Of Which The 
 Conception Requires Not The Conception Of Anything Else ; Whereas 
 Modifications Exist In Something External To Themselves,  And A 
 Conception Of Them Is Formed By Means Of A Conception Of The 
 Thing In Which They Exist.  Therefore,  We May Have True Ideas Of 
 Non-Existent Modifications ; For,  Although They May Have No 
 Actual Existence Apart From The Conceiving Intellect,  Yet Their 
 Essence Is So Involved In Something External To Themselves That 
 They May Through It Be Conceived.  Whereas The Only Truth 
 Substances Can Have,  External To The Intellect,  Must Consist In 
 Their Existence,  Because They Are Conceived Through Themselves. 
 Therefore,  For A Person To Say That He Has A Clear And 
 Distinct-That Is,  A True-Idea Of A Substance,  But That He Is Not 
 Sure Whether Such Substance Exists,  Would Be The Same As If He 
 Said That He Had A True Idea,  But Was Not Sure Whether Or No It 
 Was False (A Little Consideration Will Make This Plain) ; Or If 
 Anyone Affirmed That Substance Is Created,  It Would Be The Same 
 As Saying That A False Idea Was True-In Short,  The Height Of 
 Absurdity.  It Must,  Then,  Necessarily Be Admitted That The 
 Existence Of Substance As Its Essence Is An Eternal Truth.  And 
 We Can Hence Conclude By Another Process Of Reasoning-That There 
 Is But One Such Substance.  I Think That This May Profitably Be 
 Done At Once ; And,  In Order To Proceed Regularly With The 
 Demonstration,  We Must Premise :- 
     1.  The True Definition Of A Thing Neither Involves Nor 
 Expresses Anything Beyond The Nature Of The Thing Defined.  From 
 This It Follows That- 
     2.  No Definition Implies Or Expresses A Certain Number Of 
 Individuals,  Inasmuch As It Expresses Nothing Beyond The Nature 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 6 
 Of The Thing Defined.  For Instance,  The Definition Of A Triangle 
 Expresses Nothing Beyond The Actual Nature Of A Triangle : It 
 Does Not Imply Any Fixed Number Of Triangles. 
     3.  There Is Necessarily For Each Individual Existent Thing A 
 Cause Why It Should Exist. 
     4.  This Cause Of Existence Must Either Be Contained In The 
 Nature And Definition Of The Thing Defined,  Or Must Be Postulated 
 Apart From Such Definition. 
     It Therefore Follows That,  If A Given Number Of Individual 
 Things Exist In Nature,  There Must Be Some Cause For The 
 Existence Of Exactly That Number,  Neither More Nor Less.  For 
 Example,  If Twenty Men Exist In The Universe (For Simplicity's 
 Sake,  I Will Suppose Them Existing Simultaneously,  And To Have 
 Had No Predecessors),  And We Want To Account For The Existence Of 
 These Twenty Men,  It Will Not Be Enough To Show The Cause Of 
 Human Existence In General ; We Must Also Show Why There Are 
 Exactly Twenty Men,  Neither More Nor Less : For A Cause Must Be 
 Assigned For The Existence Of Each Individual.  Now This Cause 
 Cannot Be Contained In The Actual Nature Of Man,  For The True 
 Definition Of Man Does Not Involve Any Consideration Of The 
 Number Twenty.  Consequently,  The Cause For The Existence Of 
 These Twenty Men,  And,  Consequently,  Of Each Of Them,  Must 
 Necessarily Be Sought Externally To Each Individual. Hence We May 
 Lay Down The Absolute Rule,  That Everything Which May Consist Of 
 Several Individuals Must Have An External Cause.  And,  As It Has 
 Been Shown Already That Existence Appertains To The Nature Of 
 Substance,  Existence Must Necessarily Be Included In Its 
 Definition ; And From Its Definition Alone Existence Must Be 
 Deducible.  But From Its Definition (As We Have Shown,  Notes Ii., 
 Iii.),  We Cannot Infer The Existence Of Several Substances ; 
 Therefore It Follows That There Is Only One Substance Of The Same 
 Nature.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Ix.  The More Reality Or Being A Thing Has,  The Greater The 
 Number Of Its Attributes (Def. Iv.). 
   
 Prop. X.  Each Particular Attribute Of The One Substance Must Be 
 Conceived Through Itself. 
     Proof.-An Attribute Is That Which The Intellect Perceives Of 
 Substance,  As Constituting Its Essence (Def. Iv.),  And, 
 Therefore,  Must Be Conceived Through Itself (Def. Iii.).  Q.E.D. 
     Note-It Is Thus Evident That,  Though Two Attributes Are,  In 
 Fact,  Conceived As Distinct-That Is,  One Without The Help Of The 
 Other-Yet We Cannot,  Therefore,  Conclude That They Constitute Two 
 Entities,  Or Two Different Substances.  For It Is The Nature Of 
 Substance That Each Of Its Attributes Is Conceived Through 
 Itself,  Inasmuch As All The Attributes It Has Have Always Existed 
 Simultaneously In It,  And None Could Be Produced By Any Other ; 
 But Each Expresses The Reality Or Being Of Substance.  It Is, 
 Then,  Far From An Absurdity To Ascribe Several Attributes To One 
 Substance : For Nothing In Nature Is More Clear Than That Each 
 And Every Entity Must Be Conceived Under Some Attribute,  And That 
 Its Reality Or Being Is In Proportion To The Number Of Its 
 Attributes Expressing Necessity Or Eternity And Infinity.  
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 7 
 Consequently It Is Abundantly Clear,  That An Absolutely Infinite 
 Being Must Necessarily Be Defined As Consisting In Infinite 
 Attributes,  Each Of Which Expresses A Certain Eternal And 
 Infinite Essence. 
     If Anyone Now Ask,  By What Sign Shall He Be Able To 
 Distinguish Different Substances,  Let Him Read The Following 
 Propositions,  Which Show That There Is But One Substance In The 
 Universe,  And That It Is Absolutely Infinite,  Wherefore Such A 
 Sign Would Be Sought In Vain. 
   
 Prop. Xi.  God,  Or Substance,  Consisting Of Infinite Attributes, 
 Of Which Each Expresses Eternal And Infinite Essentiality, 
 Necessarily Exists. 
     Proof.-If This Be Denied,  Conceive,  If Possible,  That God 
 Does Not Exist : Then His Essence Does Not Involve Existence. 
 But This (Prop. Vii.) Is Absurd.  Therefore God Necessarily 
 Exists. 
     Another Proof.-Of Everything Whatsoever A Cause Or Reason 
 Must Be Assigned,  Either For Its Existence,  Or For Its 
 Non-Existence-E.G. If A Triangle Exist,  A Reason Or Cause Must Be 
 Granted For Its Existence ; If,  On The Contrary,  It Does Not 
 Exist,  A Cause Must Also Be Granted,  Which Prevents It From 
 Existing,  Or Annuls Its Existence.  This Reason Or Cause Must 
 Either Be Contained In The Nature Of The Thing In Question,  Or Be 
 External To It.  For Instance,  The Reason For The Non-Existence 
 Of A Square Circle Is Indicated In Its Nature,  Namely,  Because It 
 Would Involve A Contradiction.  On The Other Hand,  The Existence 
 Of Substance Follows Also Solely From Its Nature,  Inasmuch As Its 
 Nature Involves Existence.  (See Prop. Vii.) 
     But The Reason For The Existence Of A Triangle Or A Circle 
 Does Not Follow From The Nature Of Those Figures,  But From The 
 Order Of Universal Nature In Extension.  From The Latter It Must 
 Follow,  Either That A Triangle Necessarily Exists,  Or That It Is 
 Impossible That It Should Exist.  So Much Is Self-Evident.  It 
 Follows Therefrom That A Thing Necessarily Exists,  If No Cause Or 
 Reason Be Granted Which Prevents Its Existence. 
     If,  Then,  No Cause Or Reason Can Be Given,  Which Prevents The 
 Existence Of God,  Or Which Destroys His Existence,  We Must 
 Certainly Conclude That He Necessarily Does Exist.  If Such A 
 Reason Or Cause Should Be Given,  It Must Either Be Drawn From The 
 Very Nature Of God,  Or Be External To Him-That Is,  Drawn From 
 Another Substance Of Another Nature.  For If It Were Of The Same 
 Nature,  God,  By That Very Fact,  Would Be Admitted To Exist.  But 
 Substance Of Another Nature Could Have Nothing In Common With God 
 (By Prop. Ii.),  And Therefore Would Be Unable Either To Cause Or 
 To Destroy His Existence. 
     As,  Then,  A Reason Or Cause Which Would Annul The Divine 
 Existence Cannot Be Drawn From Anything External To The Divine 
 Nature,  Such Cause Must Perforce,  If God Does Not Exist,  Be Drawn 
 From God's Own Nature,  Which Would Involve A Contradiction.  To 
 Make Such An Affirmation About A Being Absolutely Infinite And 
 Supremely Perfect Is Absurd ; Therefore,  Neither In The Nature Of 
 God,  Nor Externally To His Nature,  Can A Cause Or Reason Be 
 Assigned Which Would Annul His Existence.  Therefore,  God 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 8 
 Necessarily Exists.  Q.E.D. 
     Another Proof.-The Potentiality Of Non-Existence Is A 
 Negation Of Power,  And Contrariwise The Potentiality Of Existence 
 Is A Power,  As Is Obvious.  If,  Then,  That Which Necessarily 
 Exists Is Nothing But Finite Beings,  Such Finite Beings Are More 
 Powerful Than A Being Absolutely Infinite,  Which Is Obviously 
 Absurd ; Therefore,  Either Nothing Exists,  Or Else A Being 
 Absolutely Infinite Necessarily Exists Also.  Now We Exist Either 
 In Ourselves,  Or In Something Else Which Necessarily Exists (See 
 Axiom. I. And Prop. Vii.).  Therefore A Being Absolutely 
 Infinite-In Other Words,  God (Def. Vi.)-Necessarily Exists. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-In This Last Proof,  I Have Purposely Shown God's 
 Existence À Posteriori,  So That The Proof Might Be More Easily 
 Followed,  Not Because,  From The Same Premises,  God's Existence 
 Does Not Follow À Priori.  For,  As The Potentiality Of Existence 
 Is A Power,  It Follows That,  In Proportion As Reality Increases 
 In The Nature Of A Thing,  So Also Will It Increase Its Strength 
 For Existence.  Therefore A Being Absolutely Infinite,  Such As 
 God,  Has From Himself An Absolutely Infinite Power Of Existence, 
 And Hence He Does Absolutely Exist.  Perhaps There Will Be Many 
 Who Will Be Unable To See The Force Of This Proof,  Inasmuch As 
 They Are Accustomed Only To Consider Those Things Which Flow From 
 External Causes.  Of Such Things,  They See That Those Which 
 Quickly Come To Pass-That Is,  Quickly Come Into Existence-Quickly 
 Also Disappear ; Whereas They Regard As More Difficult Of 
 Accomplishment-That Is,  Not So Easily Brought Into 
 Existence-Those Things Which They Conceive As More Complicated. 
     However,  To Do Away With This Misconception,  I Need Not Here 
 Show The Measure Of Truth In The Proverb,  "What Comes Quickly, 
 Goes Quickly," Nor Discuss Whether,  From The Point Of View Of 
 Universal Nature,  All Things Are Equally Easy,  Or Otherwise : I 
 Need Only Remark That I Am Not Here Speaking Of Things,  Which 
 Come To Pass Through Causes External To Themselves,  But Only Of 
 Substances Which (By Prop. Vi.) Cannot Be Produced By Any 
 External Cause.  Things Which Are Produced By External Causes, 
 Whether They Consist Of Many Parts Or Few,  Owe Whatsoever 
 Perfection Or Reality They Possess Solely To The Efficacy Of 
 Their External Cause ;  And Therefore Their Existence Arises 
 Solely From The Perfection Of Their External Cause,  Not From 
 Their Own.  Contrrariwise,  Whatsoever Perfection Is Possessed By 
 Substance Is Due To No External Cause ; Wherefore The Existence 
 Of Substance Must Arise Solely From Its Own Nature,  Which Is 
 Nothing Else But Its Essence.  Thus,  The Perfection Of A Thing 
 Does Not Annul Its Existence,  But,  On The Contrary,  Asserts It. 
 Imperfection,  On The Other Hand,  Does Annul It ; Therefore We 
 Cannot Be More Certain Of The Existence Of Anything,  Than Of The 
 Existence Of A Being Absolutely Infinite Or Perfect-That Is,  Of 
 God.  For Inasmuch As His Essence Excludes All Imperfection,  And 
 Involves Absolute Perfection,  All Cause For Doubt Concerning His 
 Existence Is Done Away,  And The Utmost Certainty On The Question 
 Is Given.  This,  I Think,  Will Be Evident To Every Moderately 
 Attentive Reader. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 9 
 Prop. Xii.  No Attribute Of Substance Can Be Conceived From Which 
 It Would Follow That Substance Can Be Divided. 
     Proof.-The Parts Into Which Substance As Thus Conceived Would 
 Be Divided Either Will Retain The Nature Of Substance,  Or They 
 Will Not.  If The Former,  Then (By Prop. Viii.) Each Part Will 
 Necessarily Be Infinite,  And (By Prop. Vi.) Self-Caused,  And (By 
 Prop. V.) Will Perforce Consist Of A Different Attribute,  So 
 That,  In That Case,  Several Substances Could Be Formed Out Of One 
 Substance,  Which (By Prop. Vi.) Is Absurd.  Moreover,  The Parts 
 (By Prop. Ii.) Would Have Nothing In Common With Their Whole,  And 
 The Whole (By Def. Iv. And Prop. X.) Could Both Exist And Be 
 Conceived Without Its Parts,  Which Everyone Will Admit To Be 
 Absurd.  If We Adopt The Second Alternative-Namely,  That The 
 Parts Will Not Retain The Nature Of Substance-Then,  If The Whole 
 Substance Were Divided Into Equal Parts,  It Would Lose The Nature 
 Of Substance,  And Would Cease To Exist,  Which (By Prop. Vii.) Is 
 Absurd. 
   
 Prop. Xiii.  Substance Absolutely Infinite Is Indivisible. 
     Proof.-If It Could Be Divided,  The Parts Into Which It Was 
 Divided Would Either Retain The Nature Of Absolutely Infinite 
 Substance,  Or They Would Not.  If The Former,  We Should Have 
 Several Substances Of The Same Nature,  Which (By Prop. V.) Is 
 Absurd.  If The Latter,  Then (By Prop. Vii.) Substance Absolutely 
 Infinite Could Cease To Exist,  Which (By Prop. Xi.) Is Also 
 Absurd. 
     Corollary.-It Follows,  That No Substance,  And Consequently No 
 Extended Substance,  In So Far As It Is Substance,  Is Divisible. 
     Note.-The Indivisibility Of Substance May Be More Easily 
 Understood As Follows.  The Nature Of Substance Can Only Be 
 Conceived As Infinite,  And By A Part Of Substance,  Nothing Else 
 Can Be Understood Than Finite Substance,  Which (By Prop. Viii) 
 Involves A Manifest Contradiction. 
   
 Prop. Xiv.  Besides God No Substance Can Be Granted Or Conceived. 
     Proof.-As God Is A Being Absolutely Infinite,  Of Whom No 
 Attribute That Expresses The Essence Of Substance Can Be Denied 
 (By Def. Vi.),  And He Necessarily Exists (By Prop. Xi.) ; If Any 
 Substance Besides God Were Granted,  It Would Have To Be Explained 
 By Some Attribute Of God,  And Thus Two Substances With The Same 
 Attribute Would Exist,  Which (By Prop. V.) Is Absurd ; Therefore, 
 Besides God No Substance Can Be Granted,  Or,  Consequently,  Be 
 Conceived.  If It Could Be Conceived,  It Would Necessarily Have 
 To Be Conceived As Existent ; But This (By The First Part Of This 
 Proof) Is Absurd.  Therefore,  Besides God No Substance Can Be 
 Granted Or Conceived.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary I.-Clearly,  Therefore : 1.  God Is One,  That Is (By 
 Def. Vi.) Only One Substance Can Be Granted In The Universe,  And 
 That Substance Is Absolutely Infinite,  As We Have Already 
 Indicated (In The Note To Prop. X.). 
     Corollary Ii.-It Follows :  2.  That Extension And Thought 
 Are Either Attributes Of God Or (By Ax. I.) Accidents 
 (Affectiones) Of The Attributes Of God. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 10 
 Prop. Xv.  Whatsoever Is,  Is In God,  And Without God Nothing Can 
 Be,  Or Be Conceived. 
     Proof.-Besides God,  No Substance Is Granted Or Can Be 
 Conceived (By Prop. Xiv.),  That Is (By Def. Iii.) Nothing Which 
 Is In Itself And Is Conceived Through Itself.  But Modes (By Def. 
 V.) Can Neither Be,  Nor Be Conceived Without Substance ; 
 Wherefore They Can Only Be In The Divine Nature,  And Can Only 
 Through It Be Conceived.  But Substances And Modes Form The Sum 
 Total Of Existence (By Ax. I.),  Therefore,  Without God Nothing 
 Can Be,  Or Be Conceived.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Some Assert That God,  Like A Man,  Consists Of Body And 
 Mind,  And Is Susceptible Of Passions.  How Far Such Persons Have 
 Strayed From The Truth Is Sufficiently Evident From What Has Been 
 Said.  But These I Pass Over.  For All Who Have In Anywise 
 Reflected On The Divine Nature Deny That God Has A Body.  Of This 
 They Find Excellent Proof In The Fact That We Understand By Body 
 A Definite Quantity,  So Long,  So Broad,  So Deep,  Bounded By A 
 Certain Shape,  And It Is The Height Of Absurdity To Predicate 
 Such A Thing Of God,  A Being Absolutely Infinite.  But Meanwhile 
 By Other Reasons With Which They Try To Prove Their Point,  They 
 Show That They Think Corporeal Or Extended Substance Wholly Apart 
 From The Divine Nature,  And Say It Was Created By God.  Wherefrom 
 The Divine Nature Can Have Been Created,  They Are Wholly Ignorant 
 ; Thus They Clearly Show,  That They Do Not Know The Meaning Of 
 Their Own Words.  I Myself Have Proved Sufficiently Clearly,  At 
 Any Rate In My Own Judgment (Coroll. Prop. Vi,  And Note 2,  Prop. 
 Viii.),  That No Substance Can Be Produced Or Created By Anything 
 Other Than Itself.  Further,  I Showed (In Prop. Xiv.),  That 
 Besides God No Substance Can Be Granted Or Conceived.  Hence We 
 Drew The Conclusion That Extended Substance Is One Of The 
 Infinite Attributes Of God.  However,  In Order To Explain More 
 Fully,  I Will Refute The Arguments Of My Adversaries,  Which All 
 Start From The Following Points :- 
     Extended Substance,  In So Far As It Is Substance,  Consists, 
 As They Think,  In Parts,  Wherefore They Deny That It Can Be 
 Infinite,  Or Consequently,  That It Can Appertain To God.  This 
 They Illustrate With Many Examples,  Of Which I Will Take One Or 
 Two.  If Extended Substance,  They Say,  Is Infinite,  Let It Be 
 Conceived To Be Divided Into Two Parts ; Each Part Will Then Be 
 Either Finite Or Infinite.  If The Former,  Then Infinite 
 Substance Is Composed Of Two Finite Parts,  Which Is Absurd.  If 
 The Latter,  Then One Infinite Will Be Twice As Large As Another 
 Infinite,  Which Is Also Absurd. 
     Further,  If An Infinite Line Be Measured Out In Foot Lengths, 
 It Will Consist Of An Infinite Number Of Such Parts ; It Would 
 Equally Consist Of An Infinite Number Of Parts,  If Each Part 
 Measured Only An Inch : Therefore,  One Infinity Would Be Twelve 
 Times As Great As The Other. 
     Lastly,  If From A Single Point There Be Conceived To Be Drawn 
 Two Diverging Lines Which At First Are At A Definite Distance 
 Apart,  But Are Produced To Infinity,  It Is Certain That The 
 Distance Between The Two Lines Will Be Continually Increased, 
 Until At Length It Changes From Definite To Indefinable.  As 
 These Absurdities Follow,  It Is Said,  From Considering Quantity 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 11 
 As Infinite,  The Conclusion Is Drawn,  That Extended Substance 
 Must Necessarily Be Finite,  And,  Consequently,  Cannot Appertain 
 To The Nature Of God. 
     The Second Argument Is Also Drawn From God's Supreme 
 Perfection.  God,  It Is Said,  Inasmuch As He Is A Supremely 
 Perfect Being,  Cannot Be Passive ; But Extended Substance, 
 Insofar As It Is Divisible,  Is Passive.  It Follows,  Therefore, 
 That Extended Substance Does Not Appertain To The Essence Of God. 
     Such Are The Arguments I Find On The Subject In Writers,  Who 
 By Them Try To Prove That Extended Substance Is Unworthy Of The 
 Divine Nature,  And Cannot Possibly Appertain Thereto.  However,  I 
 Think An Attentive Reader Will See That I Have Already Answered 
 Their Propositions ; For All Their Arguments Are Founded On The 
 Hypothesis That Extended Substance Is Composed Of Parts,  And Such 
 A Hypothesis I Have Shown (Prop. Xii.,  And Coroll. Prop. Xiii.) 
 To Be Absurd.  Moreover,  Anyone Who Reflects Will See That All 
 These Absurdities (If Absurdities They Be,  Which I Am Not Now 
 Discussing),  From Which It Is Sought To Extract The Conclusion 
 That Extended Substance Is Finite,  Do Not At All Follow From The 
 Notion Of An Infinite Quantity,  But Merely From The Notion That 
 An Infinite Quantity Is Measurable,  And Composed Of Finite Parts 
 : Therefore,  The Only Fair Conclusion To Be Drawn Is That 
 Infinite Quantity Is Not Measurable,  And Cannot Be Composed Of 
 Finite Parts.  This Is Exactly What We Have Already Proved (In 
 Prop. Xii.).  Wherefore The Weapon Which They Aimed At Us Has In 
 Reality Recoiled Upon Themselves.  If,  From This Absurdity Of 
 Theirs,  They Persist In Drawing The Conclusion That Extended 
 Substance Must Be Finite,  They Will In Good Sooth Be Acting Like 
 A Man Who Asserts That Circles Have The Properties Of Squares, 
 And,  Finding Himself Thereby Landed In Absurdities,  Proceeds To 
 Deny That Circles Have Any Center,  From Which All Lines Drawn To 
 The Circumference Are Equal.  For,  Taking Extended Substance, 
 Which Can Only Be Conceived As Infinite,  One,  And Indivisible 
 (Props. Viii.,  V.,  Xii.) They Assert,  In Order To Prove That It 
 Is Finite,  That It Is Composed Of Finite Parts,  And That It Can 
 Be Multiplied And Divided. 
     So,  Also,  Others,  After Asserting That A Line Is Composed Of 
 Points,  Can Produce Many Arguments To Prove That A Line Cannot Be 
 Infinitely Divided.  Assuredly It Is Not Less Absurd To Assert 
 That Extended Substance Is Made Up Of Bodies Or Parts,  Than It 
 Would Be To Assert That A Solid Is Made Up Of Surfaces,  A Surface 
 Of Lines,  And A Line Of Points.  This Must Be Admitted By All Who 
 Know Clear Reason To Be Infallible,  And Most Of All By Those Who 
 Deny The Possibility Of A Vacuum.  For If Extended Substance 
 Could Be So Divided That Its Parts Were Really Separate,  Why 
 Should Not One Part Admit Of Being Destroyed,  The Others 
 Remaining Joined Together As Before?  And Why Should All Be So 
 Fitted Into One Another As To Leave No Vacuum?  Surely In The 
 Case Of Things,  Which Are Really Distinct One From The Other,  One 
 Can Exist Without The Other,  And Can Remain In Its Original 
 Condition.  As,  Then,   There Does Not Exist A Vacuum In Nature 
 (Of Which Anon),  But All Parts Are Bound To Come Together To 
 Prevent It,  It Follows From This That The Parts Cannot Really Be 
 Distinguished,  And That Extended Substance In So Far As It Is 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 12 
 Substance Cannot Be Divided. 
     If Anyone Asks Me The Further Question,  Why Are We Naturally 
 So Prone To Divide Quantity?  I Answer,  That Quantity Is 
 Conceived By Us In Two Ways ; In The Abstract And Superficially, 
 As We Imagine It ; Or As Substance,  As We Conceive It Solely By 
 The Intellect.  If,  Then,  We Regard Quantity As It Is Represented 
 In Our Imagination,  Which We Often And More Easily Do,  We Shall 
 Find That It Is Finite,  Divisible,  And Compounded Of Parts ; But 
 If We Regard It As It Is Represented In Our Intellect,  And 
 Conceive It As Substance,  Which It Is Very Difficult To Do,  We 
 Shall Then,  As I Have Sufficiently Proved,  Find That It Is 
 Infinite,  One,  And Indivisible.  This Will Be Plain Enough To All 
 Who Make A Distinction Between The Intellect And The Imagination, 
 Especially If It Be Remembered,  That Matter Is Everywhere The 
 Same,  That Its Parts Are Not Distinguishable,  Except In So Far As 
 We Conceive Matter As Diversely Modified,  Whence Its Parts Are 
 Distinguished,  Not Really,  But Modally.  For Instance,  Water,  In 
 So Far As It Is Water,  We Conceive To Be Divided,  And Its Parts 
 To Be Separated One From The Other ; But Not In So Far As It Is 
 Extended Substance ; From This Point Of View It Is Neither 
 Separated Nor Divisible.  Further,  Water,  In So Far As It Is 
 Water,  Is Produced And Corrupted ; But,  In So Far As It Is 
 Substance,  It Is Neither Produced Nor Corrupted. 
     I Think I Have Now Answered The Second Argument ; It Is,  In 
 Fact,  Founded On The Same Assumption As The First-Namely,  That 
 Matter,  In So Far As It Is Substance,  Is Divisible,  And Composed 
 Of Parts.  Even If It Were So,  I Do Not Know Why It Should Be 
 Considered Unworthy Of The Divine Nature,  Inasmuch As Besides God 
 (By Prop. Xiv.) No Substance Can Be Granted,  Wherefrom It Could 
 Receive Its Modifications.  All Things,  I Repeat,  Are In God,  And 
 All Things Which Come To Pass,  Come To Pass Solely Through The 
 Laws Of The Infinite Nature Of God,  And Follow (As I Will Shortly 
 Show) From The Necessity Of His Essence.  Wherefore It Can In 
 Nowise Be Said,  That God Is Passive In Respect To Anything Other 
 Than Himself,  Or That Extended Substance Is Unworthy Of The 
 Divine Nature,  Even If It Be Supposed Divisible,  So Long As It Is 
 Granted To Be Infinite And Eternal.  But Enough Of This For The 
 Present. 
   
 Prop. Xvi.  From The Necessity Of The Divine Nature Must Follow 
 An Infinite Number Of Things In Infinite Ways-That Is,  All Things 
 Which Can Fall Within The Sphere Of Infinite Intellect. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Will Be Clear To Everyone,  Who 
 Remembers That From The Given Definition Of Any Thing The 
 Intellect Infers Several Properties,  Which Really Necessarily 
 Follow Therefrom (That Is,  From The Actual Essence Of The Thing 
 Defined) ; And It Infers More Properties In Proportion As The 
 Definition Of The Thing Expresses More Reality,  That Is,  In 
 Proportion As The Essence Of The Thing Defined Involves More 
 Reality.  Now,  As The Divine Nature Has Absolutely Infinite 
 Attributes (By Def. Vi.),  Of Which Each Expresses Infinite 
 Essence After Its Kind,  It Follows That From The Necessity Of Its 
 Nature An Infinite Number Of Things (That Is,  Everything Which 
 Can Fall Within The Sphere Of An Infinite Intellect) Must 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 13 
 Necessarily Follow.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary I.-Hence It Follows,  That God Is The Efficient 
 Cause Of All That Can Fall Within The Sphere Of An Infinite 
 Intellect. 
     Corollary Ii.-It Also Follows That God Is A Cause In Himself, 
 And Not Through An Accident Of His Nature. 
     Corollary Iii.-It Follows,  Thirdly,  That God Is The 
 Absolutely First Cause. 
   
 Prop. Xvii.  God Acts Solely By The Laws Of His Own Nature,  And 
 Is Not Constrained By Anyone. 
     Proof.-We Have Just Shown (In Prop. Xvi.),  That Solely From 
 The Necessity Of The Divine Nature,  Or,  What Is The Same Thing, 
 Solely From The Laws Of His Nature,  An Infinite Number Of Things 
 Absolutely Follow In An Infinite Number Of Ways ; And We Proved 
 (In Prop. Xv.),  That Without God Nothing Can Be Nor Be Conceived 
 ; But That All Things Are In God.  Wherefore Nothing Can Exist 
 Outside Himself,  Whereby He Can Be Conditioned Or Constrained To 
 Act.  Wherefore God Acts Solely By The Laws Of His Own Nature, 
 And Is Not Constrained By Anyone.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary I.-It Follows : 1.  That There Can Be No Cause 
 Which,  Either Extrinsically Or Intrinsically,  Besides The 
 Perfection Of His Own Nature,  Moves God To Act. 
     Corollary Ii.-It Follows : 2.  That God Is The Sole Free 
 Cause.  For God Alone Exists By The Sole Necessity Of His Nature 
 (By Prop. Xi. And Prop. Xiv.,  Coroll. I.),  And Acts By The Sole 
 Necessity Of His Own Nature,  Wherefore God Is (By Def. Vii.) The 
 Sole Free Cause.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Others Think That God Is A Free Cause,  Because He Can, 
 As They Think,  Bring It About,  That Those Things Which We Have 
 Said Follow From His Nature-That Is,  Which Are In His Power, 
 Should Not Come To Pass,  Or Should Not Be Produced By Him.  But 
 This Is The Same As If They Said,  That God Could Bring It About, 
 That It Should Follow From The Nature Of A Triangle That Its 
 Three Interior Angles Should Not Be Equal To Two Right Angles ; 
 Or That From A Given Cause No Effect Should Follow,  Which Is 
 Absurd. 
     Moreover,  I Will Show Below,  Without The Aid Of This 
 Proposition,  That Neither Intellect Nor Will Appertain To God's 
 Nature.  I Know That There Are Many Who Think That They Can Show, 
 That Supreme Intellect And Free Will Do Appertain To God's Nature 
 ; For They Say They Know Of Nothing More Perfect,  Which They Can 
 Attribute To God,  Than That Which Is The Highest Perfection In 
 Ourselves.  Further,  Although They Conceive God As Actually 
 Supremely Intelligent,  They Yet Do Not Believe That He Can Bring 
 Into Existence Everything Which He Actually Understands,  For They 
 Think That They Would Thus Destroy God's Power.  If,  They 
 Contend,  God Had Created Everything Which Is In His Intellect,  He 
 Would Not Be Able To Create Anything More,  And This,  They Think, 
 Would Clash With God's Omnipotence ; Therefore,  They Prefer To 
 Asset That God Is Indifferent To All Things,  And That He Creates 
 Nothing Except That Which He Has Decided,  By Some Absolute 
 Exercise Of Will,  To Create.  However,  I Think I Have Shown 
 Sufficiently Clearly (By Prop. Xvi.),  That From God's Supreme 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 14 
 Power,  Or Infinite Nature,  An Infinite Number Of Things-That Is, 
 All Things Have Necessarily Flowed Forth In An Infinite Number Of 
 Ways,  Or Always Flow From The Same Necessity ; In The Same Way As 
 From The Nature Of A Triangle It Follows From Eternity And For 
 Eternity,  That Its Three Interior Angles Are Equal To Two Right 
 Angles.  Wherefore The Omnipotence Of God Has Been Displayed From 
 All Eternity,  And Will For All Eternity Remain In The Same State 
 Of Activity.  This Manner Of Treating The Question Attributes To 
 God An Omnipotence,  In My Opinion,  Far More Perfect.  For, 
 Otherwise,  We Are Compelled To Confess That God Understands An 
 Infinite Number Of Creatable Things,  Which He Will Never Be Able 
 To Create,  For,  If He Created All That He Understands,  He Would, 
 According To This Showing,  Exhaust His Omnipotence,  And Render 
 Himself Imperfect.  Wherefore,  In Order To Establish That God Is 
 Perfect,  We Should Be Reduced To Establishing At The Same Time, 
 That He Cannot Bring To Pass Everything Over Which His Power 
 Extends ; This Seems To Be A Hypothesis Most Absurd,  And Most 
 Repugnant To God's Omnipotence. 
     Further (To Say A Word Here Concerning The Intellect And The 
 Will Which We Attribute To God),  If Intellect And Will Appertain 
 To The Eternal Essence Of God,  We Must Take These Words In Some 
 Significance Quite Different From Those They Usually Bear.  For 
 Intellect And Will,  Which Should Constitute The Essence Of God, 
 Would Perforce Be As Far Apart As The Poles From The Human 
 Intellect And Will,  In Fact,  Would Have Nothing In Common With 
 Them But The Name ; There Would Be About As Much Correspondence 
 Between The Two As There Is Between The Dog,  The Heavenly 
 Constellation,  And A Dog,  An Animal That Barks.  This I Will 
 Prove As Follows.  If Intellect Belongs To The Divine Nature,  It 
 Cannot Be In Nature,  As Ours Is Generally Thought To Be, 
 Posterior To,  Or Simultaneous With The Things Understood, 
 Inasmuch As God Is Prior To All Things By Reason Of His Causality 
 (Prop. Xvi.,  Coroll. I.).  On The Contrary,  The Truth And Formal 
 Essence Of Things Is As It Is,  Because It Exists By 
 Representation As Such In The Intellect Of God.  Wherefore The 
 Intellect Of God,  In So Far As It Is Conceived To Constitute 
 God's Essence,  Is,  In Reality,  The Cause Of Things,  Both Of Their 
 Essence And Of Their Existence.  This Seems To Have Been 
 Recognized By Those Who Have Asserted,  That God's Intellect, 
 God's Will,  And God's Power,  Are One And The Same.  As, 
 Therefore,  God's Intellect Is The Sole Cause Of Things,  Namely, 
 Both Of Their Essence And Existence,  It Must Necessarily Differ 
 From Them In Respect To Its Essence,  And In Respect To Its 
 Existence.  For A Cause Differs From A Thing It Causes,  Precisely 
 In The Quality Which The Latter Gains From The Former. 
     For Example,  A Man Is The Cause Of Another Man's Existence, 
 But Not Of His Essence (For The Latter Is An Eternal Truth),  And, 
 Therefore,  The Two Men May Be Entirely Similar In Essence,  But 
 Must Be Different In Existence ; And Hence If The Existence Of 
 One Of Them Cease,  The Existence Of The Other Will Not 
 Necessarily Cease Also ; But If The Essence Of One Could Be 
 Destroyed,  And Be Made False,  The Essence Of The Other Would Be 
 Destroyed Also.  Wherefore,  A Thing Which Is The Cause Both Of 
 The Essence And Of The Existence Of A Given Effect,  Must Differ 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 15 
 From Such Effect Both In Respect To Its Essence,  And Also In 
 Respect To Its Existence.  Now The Intellect Of God Is The Cause 
 Both Of The Essence And The Existence Of Our Intellect ; 
 Therefore,  The Intellect Of God In So Far As It Is Conceived To 
 Constitute The Divine Essence,  Differs From Our Intellect Both In 
 Respect To Essence And In Respect To Existence,  Nor Can It In 
 Anywise Agree Therewith Save In Name,  As We Said Before.  The 
 Reasoning Would Be Identical In The Case Of The Will,  As Anyone 
 Can Easily See. 
   
 Prop. Xviii.  God Is The Indwelling And Not The Transient Cause 
 Of All Things. 
     Proof.-All Things Which Are,  Are In God,  And Must Be 
 Conceived Through God (By Prop. Xv.),  Therefore (By Prop. Xvi., 
 Coroll. I.) God Is The Cause Of Those Things Which Are In Him. 
 This Is Our First Point.  Further,  Besides God There Can Be No 
 Substance (By Prop. Xiv.),  That Is Nothing In Itself External To 
 God.  This Is Our Second Point.  God,  Therefore,  Is The 
 Indwelling And Not The Transient Cause Of All Things.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xix.  God,  And All The Attributes Of God,  Are Eternal. 
     Proof.-God (By Def. Vi.) Is Substance,  Which (By Prop. Xi.) 
 Necessarily Exists,  That Is (By Prop. Vii.) Existence Appertains 
 To Its Nature,  Or (What Is The Same Thing) Follows From Its 
 Definition ; Therefore,  God Is Eternal (By Def. Viii.).  Further, 
 By The Attributes Of God We Must Understand That Which (By Def. 
 Iv.) Expresses The Essence Of The Divine Substance-In Other 
 Words,  That Which Appertains To Substance : That,  I Say,  Should 
 Be Involved In The Attributes Of Substance.  Now Eternity 
 Appertains To The Nature Of Substance (As I Have Already Shown In 
 Prop. Vii.) ; Therefore,  Eternity Must Appertain To Each Of The 
 Attributes,  And Thus All Are Eternal.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Proposition Is Also Evident From The Manner In 
 Which (In Prop. Xi.) I Demonstrated The Existence Of God ; It Is 
 Evident,  I Repeat,  From That Proof,  That The Existence Of God, 
 Like His Essence,  Is An Eternal Truth.  Further (In Prop. Xix. Of 
 My "Principles Of The Cartesian Philosophy"),  I Have Proved The 
 Eternity Of God,  In Another Manner,  Which I Need Not Here Repeat. 
   
 Prop. Xx.  The Existence Of God And His Essence Are One And The 
 Same. 
     Proof.-God (By The Last Prop.) And All His Attributes Are 
 Eternal,  That Is (By Def. Viii.) Each Of His Attributes Expresses 
 Existence.  Therefore The Same 
 Attributes Of God Which Explain His Eternal Essence,  Explain At 
 The Same Time His Eternal Existence-In Other Words,  That Which 
 Constitutes God's Essence Constitutes At The Same Time His 
 Existence.  Wherefore God's Existence And God's Essence Are One 
 And The Same.  Q.E.D. 
     Coroll. I.-Hence It Follows That God's Existence,  Like His 
 Essence,  Is An Eternal Truth. 
     Coroll. Ii-Secondly,  It Follows That God,  And All The 
 Attributes Of God,  Are Unchangeable.  For If They Could Be 
 Changed In Respect To Existence,  They Must Also Be Able To Be 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 16 
 Changed In Respect To Essence-That Is,  Obviously,  Be Changed From 
 True To False,  Which Is Absurd. 
   
 Prop. Xxi.  All Things Which Follow From The Absolute Nature Of 
 Any Attribute Of God Must Always Exist And Be Infinite,  Or,  In 
 Other Words,  Are Eternal And Infinite Through The Said Attribute. 
     Proof.-Conceive,  If It Be Possible (Supposing The Proposition 
 To Be Denied),  That Something In Some Attribute Of God Can Follow 
 From The Absolute Nature Of The Said Attribute,  And That At The 
 Same Time It Is Finite,  And Has A Conditioned Existence Or 
 Duration ; For Instance,  The Idea Of God Expressed In The 
 Attribute Thought.  Now Thought,  In So Far As It Is Supposed To 
 Be An Attribute Of God,  Is Necessarily (By Prop. Xi.) In Its 
 Nature Infinite. But,  In So Far As It Possesses The Idea Of God, 
 It Is Supposed Finite.  It Cannot,  However,  Be Conceived As 
 Finite,  Unless It Be Limited By Thought (By Def. Ii.) ; But It Is 
 Not Limited By Thought Itself,  In So Far As It Has Constituted 
 The Idea Of God (For So Far It Is Supposed To Be Finite) ; 
 Therefore,  It Is Limited By Thought,  In So Far As It Has Not 
 Constituted The Idea Of God,  Which Nevertheless (By Prop. Xi.) 
 Must Necessarily Exist. 
     We Have Now Granted,  Therefore,  Thought Not Constituting The 
 Idea Of God,  And,  Accordingly,  The Idea Of God Does Not Naturally 
 Follow From Its Nature In So Far As It Is Absolute Thought (For 
 It Is Conceived As Constituting,  And Also As Not Constituting, 
 The Idea Of God),  Which Is Against Our Hypothesis.  Wherefore,  If 
 The Idea Of God Expressed In The Attribute Thought,  Or,  Indeed, 
 Anything Else In Any Attribute Of God (For We May Take Any 
 Example,  As The Proof Is Of Universal Application) Follows From 
 The Necessity Of The Absolute Nature Of The Said Attribute,  The 
 Said Thing Must Necessarily Be Infinite,  Which Was Our First 
 Point. 
     Furthermore,  A Thing Which Thus Follows From The Necessity Of 
 The Nature Of Any Attribute Cannot Have A Limited Duration.  For 
 If It Can,  Suppose A Thing,  Which Follows From The Necessity Of 
 The Nature Of Some Attribute,  To Exist In Some Attribute Of God, 
 For Instance,  The Idea Of God Expressed In The Attribute Thought, 
 And Let It Be Supposed At Some Time Not To Have Existed,  Or To Be 
 About Not To Exist. 
     Now Thought Being An Attribute Of God,  Must Necessarily Exist 
 Unchanged (By Prop. Xi.,  And Prop. Xx.,  Coroll. Ii.) ; And Beyond 
 The Limits Of The Duration Of The Idea Of God (Supposing The 
 Latter At Some Time Not To Have Existed,  Or Not To Be Going To 
 Exist) Thought Would Perforce Have Existed Without The Idea Of 
 God,  Which Is Contrary To Our Hypothesis,  For We Supposed That, 
 Thought Being Given,  The Idea Of God Necessarily Flowed 
 Therefrom.  Therefore The Idea Of God Expressed In Thought,  Or 
 Anything Which Necessarily Follows From The Absolute Nature Of 
 Some Attribute Of God,  Cannot Have A Limited Duration,  But 
 Through The Said Attribute Is Eternal,  Which Is Our Second Point. 
 Bear In Mind That The Same Proposition May Be Affirmed Of 
 Anything,  Which In Any Attribute Necessarily Follows From God's 
 Absolute Nature. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 17 
 Prop. Xxii.  Whatsoever Follows From Any Attribute Of God,  In So 
 Far As It Is Modified By A Modification,  Which Exists Necessarily 
 And As Infinite,  Through The Said Attribute,  Must Also Exist 
 Necessarily And As Infinite. 
     Proof.-The Proof Of This Proposition Is Similar To That Of 
 The Preceding One. 
   
 Prop. Xxiii.  Every Mode,  Which Exists Both Necessarily And As 
 Infinite,  Must Necessarily Follow Either From The Absolute Nature 
 Of Some Attribute Of God,  Or From An Attribute Modified By A 
 Modification Which Exists Necessarily,  And As Infinite. 
     Proof.-A Mode Exists In Something Else,  Through Which It Must 
 Be Conceived (Def. V.),  That Is (Prop. Xv.),  It Exists Solely In 
 God,  And Solely Through God Can Be Conceived. If Therefore A Mode 
 Is Conceived As Necessarily Existing And Infinite,  It Must 
 Necessarily Be Inferred Or Perceived Through Some Attribute Of 
 God,  In So Far As Such Attribute Is Conceived As Expressing The 
 Infinity And Necessity Of Existence,  In Other Words (Def. Viii.) 
 Eternity ; That Is,  In So Far As It Is Considered Absolutely.  A 
 Mode,  Therefore,  Which Necessarily Exists As Infinite,  Must 
 Follow From The Absolute Nature Of Some Attribute Of God,  Either 
 Immediately (Prop. Xxi.) Or Through The Means Of Some 
 Modification,  Which Follows From The Absolute Nature Of The Said 
 Attribute ; That Is (By Prop. Xxii.),  Which Exists Necessarily 
 And As Infinite. 
   
 Prop. Xxiv.  The Essence Of Things Produced By God Does Not 
 Involve Existence. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Evident From Def. I.  For That Of 
 Which The Nature (Considered In Itself) Involves Existence Is 
 Self-Caused,  And Exists By The Sole Necessity Of Its Own Nature. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That God Is Not Only The Cause Of 
 Things Coming Into Existence,  But Also Of Their Continuing In 
 Existence,  That Is,  In Scholastic Phraseology,  God Is Cause Of 
 The Being Of Things (Essendi Rerum).  For Whether Things Exist, 
 Or Do Not Exist,  Whenever We Contemplate Their Essence,  We See 
 That It Involves Neither Existence Nor Duration ; Consequently, 
 It Cannot Be The Cause Of Either The One Or The Other.  God Must 
 Be The Sole Cause,  Inasmuch As To Him Alone Does Existence 
 Appertain.  (Prop. Xiv. Coroll. I.) Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxv.  God Is The Efficient Cause Not Only Of The Existence 
 Of Things,  But Also Of Their Essence. 
     Proof.-If This Be Denied,  Then God Is Not The Cause Of The 
 Essence Of Things ; And Therefore The Essence Of Things Can (By 
 Ax. Iv.) Be Conceived Without God.  This (By Prop. Xv.) Is 
 Absurd.  Therefore,  God Is The Cause Of The Essence Of Things. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Proposition Follows More Clearly From Prop. Xvi. 
 For It Is Evident Thereby That,  Given The Divine Nature,  The 
 Essence Of Things Must Be Inferred From It,  No Less Than Their 
 Existence-In A Word,  God Must Be Called The Cause Of All Things, 
 In The Same Sense As He Is Called The Cause Of Himself.  This 
 Will Be Made Still Clearer By The Following Corollary. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 18 
     Corollary.-Individual Things Are Nothing But Modifications Of 
 The Attributes Of God,  Or Modes By Which The Attributes Of God 
 Are Expressed In A Fixed And Definite Manner.  The Proof Appears 
 From Prop. Xv. And Def. V. 
   
 Prop. Xxvi.  A Thing Which Is Conditioned To Act In A Particular 
 Manner,  Has Necessarily Been Thus Conditioned By God ; And That 
 Which Has Not Been Conditioned By God Cannot Condition Itself To 
 Act. 
     Proof.-That By Which Things Are Said To Be Conditioned To Act 
 In A Particular Manner Is Necessarily Something Positive (This Is 
 Obvious) ; Therefore Both Of Its Essence And Of Its Existence God 
 By The Necessity Of His Nature Is The Efficient Cause (Props. 
 Xxv. And Xvi.) ; This Is Our First Point.  Our Second Point Is 
 Plainly To Be Inferred Therefrom.  For If A Thing,  Which Has Not 
 Been Conditioned By God,  Could Condition Itself,  The First Part 
 Of Our Proof Would Be False,  And This,  As We Have Shown Is 
 Absurd. 
   
 Prop. Xxvii.  A Thing,  Which Has Been Conditioned By God To Act 
 In A Particular Way,  Cannot Render Itself Unconditioned. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Evident From The Third Axiom. 
   
 Prop. Xxviii.  Every Individual Thing,  Or Everything Which Is 
 Finite And Has A Conditioned Existence,  Cannot Exist Or Be 
 Conditioned To Act,  Unless It Be Conditioned For Existence And 
 Action By A Cause Other Than Itself,  Which Also Is Finite,  And 
 Has A Conditioned Existence ; And Likewise This Cause Cannot In 
 Its Turn Exist,  Or Be Conditioned To Act,  Unless It Be 
 Conditioned For Existence And Action By Another Cause,  Which Also 
 Is Finite,  And Has A Conditioned Existence,  And So On To 
 Infinity. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever Is Conditioned To Exist And Act,  Has Been 
 Thus Conditioned By God (By Prop. Xxvi. And Prop. Xxiv., 
 Coroll.). 
     But That Which Is Finite,  And Has A Conditioned Existence, 
 Cannot Be Produced By The Absolute Nature Of Any Attribute Of God 
 ; For Whatsoever Follows From The Absolute Nature Of Any 
 Attribute Of God Is Infinite And Eternal (By Prop. Xxi.).  It 
 Must,  Therefore,  Follow From Some Attribute Of God,  In So Far As 
 The Said Attribute Is Considered As In Some Way Modified ; For 
 Substance And Modes Make Up The Sum Total Of Existence (By Ax. I. 
 And Def. Iii.,  V.),  While Modes Are Merely Modifications Of The 
 Attributes Of God.  But From God,  Or From Any Of His Attributes, 
 In So Far As The Latter Is Modified By A Modification Infinite 
 And Eternal,  A Conditioned Thing Cannot Follow.  Wherefore It 
 Must Follow From,  Or Be Conditioned For,  Existence And Action By 
 God Or One Of His Attributes,  In So Far As The Latter Are 
 Modified By Some Modification Which Is Finite,  And Has A 
 Conditioned Existence.  This Is Our First Point.  Again,  This 
 Cause Or This Modification (For The Reason By Which We 
 Established The First Part Of This Proof) Must In Its Turn Be 
 Conditioned By Another Cause,  Which Also Is Finite,  And Has A 
 Conditioned Existence,  And,  Again,  This Last By Another (For The 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 19 
 Same Reason) ; And So On (For The Same Reason) To Infinity. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-As Certain Things Must Be Produced Immediately By God, 
 Namely Those Things Which Necessarily Follow From His Absolute 
 Nature,  Through The Means Of These Primary Attributes,  Which, 
 Nevertheless,  Can Neither Exist Nor Be Conceived Without God,  It 
 Follows :-1. That God Is Absolutely The Proximate Cause Of Those 
 Things Immediately Produced By Him.  I Say Absolutely,  Not After 
 His Kind,  As Is Usually Stated.  For The Effects Of God Cannot 
 Either Exist Or Be Conceived Without A Cause (Prop. Xv. And Prop. 
 Xxiv. Coroll.).  2. That God Cannot Properly Be Styled The Remote 
 Cause Of Individual Things,  Except For The Sake Of Distinguishing 
 These From What He Immediately Produces,  Or Rather From What 
 Follows From His Absolute Nature.  For,  By A Remote Cause,  We 
 Understand A Cause Which Is In No Way Conjoined To The Effect. 
 But All Things Which Are,  Are In God,  And So Depend On God,  That 
 Without Him They Can Neither Be Nor Be Conceived. 
   
 Prop. Xxix.  Nothing In The Universe Is Contingent,  But All 
 Things Are Conditioned To Exist And Operate In A Particular 
 Manner By The Necessity Of The Divine Nature. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever Is,  Is In God (Prop. Xv.).  But God Cannot 
 Be Called A Thing Contingent.  For (By Prop. Xi.) He Exists 
 Necessarily,  And Not Contingently.  Further,  The Modes Of The 
 Divine Nature Follow Therefrom Necessarily,  And Not Contingently 
 (Prop. Xvi.) ; And They Thus Follow,  Whether We Consider The 
 Divine Nature Absolutely,  Or Whether We Consider It As In Any Way 
 Conditioned To Act (Prop. Xxvii.).  Further,  God Is Not Only The 
 Cause Of These Modes,  In So Far As They Simply Exist (By Prop. 
 Xxiv,  Coroll.),  But Also In So Far As They Are Considered As 
 Conditioned For Operating In A Particular Manner (Prop. Xxvi.). 
 If They Be Not Conditioned By God (Prop. Xxvi.),  It Is 
 Impossible,  And Not Contingent,  That They Should Condition 
 Themselves ; Contrariwise,  If They Be Conditioned By God,  It Is 
 Impossible,  And Not Contingent,  That They Should Render 
 Themselves Unconditioned. Wherefore All Things Are Conditioned By 
 The Necessity Of The Divine Nature,  Not Only To Exist,  But Also 
 To Exist And Operate In A Particular Manner,  And There Is Nothing 
 That Is Contingent.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Before Going Any Further,  I Wish Here To Explain,  What 
 We Should Understand By Nature Viewed As Active (Natura 
 Naturans),  And Nature Viewed As Passive (Natura Naturata).  I Say 
 To Explain,  Or Rather Call Attention To It,  For I Think That, 
 From What Has Been Said,  It Is Sufficiently Clear,  That By Nature 
 Viewed As Active We Should Understand That Which Is In Itself, 
 And Is Conceived Through Itself,  Or Those Attributes Of 
 Substance,  Which Express Eternal And Infinite Essence,  In Other 
 Words (Prop. Xiv.,  Coroll. I.,  And Prop. Xvii.,  Coroll. Ii) God, 
 In So Far As He Is Considered As A Free Cause. 
     By Nature Viewed As Passive I Understand All That Which 
 Follows From The Necessity Of The Nature Of God,  Or Of Any Of The 
 Attributes Of God,  That Is,  All The Modes Of The Attributes Of 
 God,  In So Far As They Are Considered As Things Which Are In God, 
 And Which Without God Cannot Exist Or Be Conceived. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 20 
   
 Prop. Xxx.  Intellect,  In Function (Actu) Finite,  Or In Function 
 Infinite,  Must Comprehend The Attributes Of God And The 
 Modifications Of God,  And Nothing Else. 
     Proof.-A True Idea Must Agree With Its Object (Ax. Vi.) ; In 
 Other Words (Obviously),  That Which Is Contained In The Intellect 
 In Representation Must Necessarily Be Granted In Nature.  But In 
 Nature (By Prop. Xiv.,  Coroll. I.) There Is No Substance Save 
 God,  Nor Any Modifications Save Those (Prop. Xv.) Which Are In 
 God,  And Cannot Without God Either Be Or Be Conceived.  Therefore 
 The Intellect,  In Function Finite,  Or In Function Infinite,  Must 
 Comprehend The Attributes Of God And The Modifications Of God, 
 And Nothing Else.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxi.  The Intellect In Function,  Whether Finite Or 
 Infinite,  As Will,  Desire,  Love,  &C.,  Should Be Referred To 
 Passive Nature And Not To Active Nature. 
     Proof.-By The Intellect We Do Not (Obviously) Mean Absolute 
 Thought,  But Only A Certain Mode Of Thinking,  Differing From 
 Other Modes,  Such As Love,  Desire,  &C.,  And Therefore (Def. V.) 
 Requiring To Be Conceived Through Absolute Thought.  It Must (By 
 Prop. Xv. And Def. Vi.),  Through Some Attribute Of God Which 
 Expresses The Eternal And Infinite Essence Of Thought,  Be So 
 Conceived,  That Without Such Attribute It Could Neither Be Nor Be 
 Conceived.  It Must Therefore Be Referred To Nature Passive 
 Rather Than To Nature Active,  As Must Also The Other Modes Of 
 Thinking.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-I Do Not Here,  By Speaking Of Intellect In Function, 
 Admit That There Is Such A Thing As Intellect In Potentiality : 
 But,  Wishing To Avoid All Confusion,  I Desire To Speak Only Of 
 What Is Most Clearly Perceived By Us,  Namely,  Of The Very Act Of 
 Understanding,  Than Which Nothing Is More Clearly Perceived.  For 
 We Cannot Perceive Anything Without Adding To Our Knowledge Of 
 The Act Of Understanding. 
   
 Prop. Xxxii.  Will Cannot Be Called A Free Cause,  But Only A 
 Necessary Cause. 
     Proof.-Will Is Only A Particular Mode Of Thinking,  Like 
 Intellect ; Therefore (By Prop. Xxviii.) No Volition Can Exist, 
 Nor Be Conditioned To Act,  Unless It Be Conditioned By Some Cause 
 Other Than Itself,  Which Cause Is Conditioned By A Third Cause, 
 And So On To Infinity.  But If Will Be Supposed Infinite,  It Must 
 Also Be Conditioned To Exist And Act By God,  Not By Virtue Of His 
 Being Substance Absolutely Infinite,  But By Virtue Of His 
 Possessing An Attribute Which Expresses The Infinite And Eternal 
 Essence Of Thought (By Prop. Xxiii.).  Thus,  However It Be 
 Conceived,  Whether As Finite Or Infinite,  It Requires A Cause By 
 Which It Should Be Conditioned To Exist And Act.  Thus (Def. 
 Vii.) It Cannot Be Called A Free Cause,  But Only A Necessary Or 
 Constrained Cause.  Q.E.D. 
     Coroll. I.-Hence It Follows,  First,  That God Does Not Act 
 According To Freedom Of The Will. 
     Coroll. Ii.-It Follows,  Secondly,  That Will And Intellect 
 Stand In The Same Relation To The Nature Of God As Do Motion,  And 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 21 
 Rest,  And Absolutely All Natural Phenomena,  Which Must Be 
 Conditioned By God (Prop. Xxix.) To Exist And Act In A Particular 
 Manner.  For Will,  Like The Rest,  Stands In Need Of A Cause,  By 
 Which It Is Conditioned To Exist And Act In A Particular Manner. 
 And Although,  When Will Or Intellect Be Granted,  An Infinite 
 Number Of Results May Follow,  Yet God Cannot On That Account Be 
 Said To Act From Freedom Of The Will,  Any More Than The Infinite 
 Number Of Results From Motion And Rest Would Justify Us In Saying 
 That Motion And Rest Act By Free Will.  Wherefore Will No More 
 Appertains To God Than Does Anything Else In Nature,  But Stands 
 In The Same Relation To Him As Motion,  Rest,  And The Like,  Which 
 We Have Shown To Follow From The Necessity Of The Divine Nature, 
 And To Be Conditioned By It To Exist And Act In A Particular 
 Manner. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiii.  Things Could Not Have Been Brought Into Being By 
 God In Any Manner Or In Any Order Different From That Which Has 
 In Fact Obtained. 
     Proof-All Things Necessarily Follow From The Nature Of God 
 (Prop. Xvi.),  And By The Nature Of God Are Conditioned To Exist 
 And Act In A Particular Way (Prop. Xxix.).  If Things,  Therefore, 
 Could Have Been Of A Different Nature,  Or Have Been Conditioned 
 To Act In A Different Way,  So That The Order Of Nature Would Have 
 Been Different,  God's Nature Would Also Have Been Able To Be 
 Different From What It Now Is ; And Therefore (By Prop. Xi.) That 
 Different Nature Also Would Have Perforce Existed,  And 
 Consequently There Would Have Been Able To Be Two Or More Gods. 
 This (By Prop. Xiv.,  Coroll. I.) Is Absurd.  Therefore Things 
 Could Not Have Been Brought Into Being By God In Any Other 
 Manner,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Note I.-As I Have Thus Shown,  More Clearly Than The Sun At 
 Noonday,  That There Is Nothing To Justify Us In Calling Things 
 Contingent,  I Wish To Explain Briefly What Meaning We Shall 
 Attach To The Word Contingent ; But I Will First Explain The 
 Words Necessary And Impossible. 
     A Thing Is Called Necessary Either In Respect To Its Essence 
 Or In Respect To Its Cause ; For The Existence Of A Thing 
 Necessarily Follows,  Either From Its Essence And Definition,  Or 
 From A Given Efficient Cause.  For Similar Reasons A Thing Is 
 Said To Be Impossible ; Namely,  Inasmuch As Its Essence Or 
 Definition Involves A Contradiction,  Or Because No External Cause 
 Is Granted,  Which Is Conditioned To Produce Such An Effect ; But 
 A Thing Can In No Respect Be Called Contingent,  Save In Relation 
 To The Imperfection Of Our Knowledge. 
     A Thing Of Which We Do Not Know Whether The Essence Does Or 
 Does Not Involve A Contradiction,  Or Of Which,  Knowing That It 
 Does Not Involve A Contradiction,  We Are Still In Doubt 
 Concerning The Existence,  Because The Order Of Causes Escapes 
 Us,-Such A Thing,  I Say,  Cannot Appear To Us Either Necessary Or 
 Impossible.  Wherefore We Call It Contingent Or Possible. 
     Note Ii.-It Clearly Follows From What We Have Said,  That 
 Things Have Been Brought Into Being By God In The Highest 
 Perfection,  Inasmuch As They Have Necessarily Followed From A 
 Most Perfect Nature.  Nor Does This Prove Any Imperfection In 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 22 
 God,  For It Has Compelled Us To Affirm His Perfection.  From Its 
 Contrary Proposition,  We Should Clearly Gather (As I Have Just 
 Shown),  That God Is Not Supremely Perfect,  For If Things Had Been 
 Brought Into Being In Any Other Way,  We Should Have To Assign To 
 God A Nature Different From That,  Which We Are Bound To Attribute 
 To Him From The Consideration Of An Absolutely Perfect Being. 
     I Do Not Doubt,  That Many Will Scout This Idea As Absurd,  And 
 Will Refuse To Give Their Minds Up To Contemplating It,  Simply 
 Because They Are Accustomed To Assign To God A Freedom Very 
 Different From That Which We (Def. Vii.) Have Deduced.  They 
 Assign To Him,  In Short,  Absolute Free Will.  However,  I Am Also 
 Convinced That If Such Persons Reflect On The Matter,  And Duly 
 Weigh In Their Minds Our Series Of Propositions,  They Will Reject 
 Such Freedom As They Now Attribute To God,  Not Only As Nugatory, 
 But Also As A Great Impediment To Organized Knowledge.  There Is 
 No Need For Me To Repeat What I Have Said In The Note To Prop. 
 Xvii.  But,  For The Sake Of My Opponents,  I Will Show Further, 
 That Although It Be Granted That Will Pertains To The Essence Of 
 God,  It Nevertheless Follows From His Perfection,  That Things 
 Could Not Have Been By Him Created Other Than They Are,  Or In A 
 Different Order ; This Is Easily Proved,  If We Reflect On What 
 Our Opponents Themselves Concede,  Namely,  That It Depends Solely 
 On The Decree And Will Of God,  That Each Thing Is What It Is.  If 
 It Were Otherwise,  God Would Not Be The Cause Of All Things. 
 Further,  That All The Decrees Of God Have Been Ratified From All 
 Eternity By God Himself.  If It Were Otherwise,  God Would Be 
 Convicted Of Imperfection Or Change.  But In Eternity There Is No 
 Such Thing As When,  Before,  Or After ; Hence It Follows Solely 
 From The Perfection Of God,  That God Never Can Decree,  Or Never 
 Could Have Decreed Anything But What Is ; That God Did Not Exist 
 Before His Decrees,  And Would Not Exist Without Them.  But,  It Is 
 Said,  Supposing That God Had Made A Different Universe,  Or Had 
 Ordained Other Decrees From All Eternity Concerning Nature And 
 Her Order,  We Could Not Therefore Conclude Any Imperfection In 
 God.  But Persons Who Say This Must Admit That God Can Change His 
 Decrees.  For If God Had Ordained Any Decrees Concerning Nature 
 And Her Order,  Different From Those Which He Has Ordained-In 
 Other Words,  If He Had Willed And Conceived Something Different 
 Concerning Nature-He Would Perforce Have Had A Different 
 Intellect From That Which He Has,  And Also A Different Will.  But 
 If It Were Allowable To Assign To God A Different Intellect And A 
 Different Will,  Without Any Change In His Essence Or His 
 Perfection,  What Would There Be To Prevent Him Changing The 
 Decrees Which He Has Made Concerning Created Things,  And 
 Nevertheless Remaining Perfect?  For His Intellect And Will 
 Concerning Things Created And Their Order Are The Same,  In 
 Respect To His Essence And Perfection,  However They Be Conceived. 
     Further,  All The Philosophers Whom I Have Read Admit That 
 God's Intellect Is Entirely Actual,  And Not At All Potential ; As 
 They Also Admit That God's Intellect,  And God's Will,  And God's 
 Essence Are Identical,  It Follows That,  If God Had Had A 
 Different Actual Intellect And A Different Will,  His Essence 
 Would Also Have Been Different ; And Thus,  As I Concluded At 
 First,  If Things Had Been Brought Into Being By God In A 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 23 
 Different Way From That Which Has Obtained,  God's Intellect And 
 Will,  That Is (As Is Admitted) His Essence Would Perforce Have 
 Been Different,  Which Is Absurd. 
     As These Things Could Not Have Been Brought Into Being By God 
 In Any But The Actual Way And Order Which Has Obtained ; And As 
 The Truth Of This Proposition Follows From The Supreme Perfection 
 Of God ; We Can Have No Sound Reason For Persuading Ourselves To 
 Believe That God Did Not Wish To Create All The Things Which Were 
 In His Intellect,  And To Create Them In The Same Perfection As He 
 Had Understood Them. 
     But,  It Will Be Said,  There Is In Things No Perfection Nor 
 Imperfection ; That Which Is In Them,  And Which Causes Them To Be 
 Called Perfect Or Imperfect,  Good Or Bad,  Depends Solely On The 
 Will Of God.  If God Had So Willed,  He Might Have Brought It 
 About That What Is Now Perfection Should Be Extreme Imperfection, 
 And Vice Versâ.  What Is Such An Assertion,  But An Open 
 Declaration That God,  Who Necessarily Understands That Which He 
 Wishes,  Might Bring It About By His Will,  That He Should 
 Understand Things Differently From The Way In Which He Does 
 Understand Them?  This (As We Have Just Shown) Is The Height Of 
 Absurdity.  Wherefore,  I May Turn The Argument Against Its 
 Employers,  As Follows :-All Things Depend On The Power Of God. 
 In Order That Things Should Be Different From What They Are, 
 God's Will Would Necessarily Have To Be Different.  But God's 
 Will Cannot Be Different (As We Have Just Most Clearly 
 Demonstrated) From God's Perfection.  Therefore Neither Can 
 Things Be Different.  I Confess,  That The Theory Which Subjects 
 All Things To The Will Of An Indifferent Deity,  And Asserts That 
 They Are All Dependent On His Fiat,  Is Less Far From The Truth 
 Than The Theory Of Those,  Who Maintain That God Acts In All 
 Things With A View Of Promoting What Is Good.  For These Latter 
 Persons Seem To Set Up Something Beyond God,  Which Does Not 
 Depend On God,  But Which God In Acting Looks To As An Exemplar, 
 Or Which He Aims At As A Definite Goal.  This Is Only Another 
 Name For Subjecting God To The Dominion Of Destiny,  An Utter 
 Absurdity In Respect To God,  Whom We Have Shown To Be The First 
 And Only Free Cause Of The Essence Of All Things And Also Of 
 Their Existence.  I Need,  Therefore,  Spend No Time In Refuting 
 Such Wild Theories. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiv.  God's Power Is Identical With His Essence. 
     Proof.-From The Sole Necessity Of The Essence Of God It 
 Follows That God Is The Cause Of Himself (Prop. Xi.) And Of All 
 Things (Prop. Xvi. And Coroll.).  Wherefore The Power Of God,  By 
 Which He And All Things Are And Act,  Is Identical With His 
 Essence.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxv.  Whatsoever We Conceive To Be In The Power Of God, 
 Necessarily Exists. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever Is In God's Power,  Must (By The Last Prop.) 
 Be Comprehended In His Essence In Such A Manner,  That It 
 Necessarily Follows Therefrom,  And Therefore Necessarily Exists. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Propositions Pg 24 
 Prop. Xxxvi.  There Is No Cause From Whose Nature Some Effect 
 Does Not Follow. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever Exists Expresses God's Nature Or Essence In 
 A Given Conditioned Manner (By Prop. Xxv.,  Coroll.) ; That Is, 
 (By Prop. Xxxiv.),  Whatsoever Exists,  Expresses In A Given 
 Conditioned Manner God's Power,  Which Is The Cause Of All Things, 
 Therefore An Effect Must (By Prop. Xvi.) Necessarily Follow. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Appendix Pg 25 
     In The Foregoing I Have Explained The Nature And Properties 
 Of God.  I Have Shown That He Necessarily Exists,  That He Is One 
 : That He Is,  And Acts Solely By The Necessity Of His Own Nature 
 ; That He Is The Free Cause Of All Things,  And How He Is So ; 
 That All Things Are In God,  And So Depend On Him,  That Without 
 Him They Could Neither Exist Nor Be Conceived ; Lastly,  That All 
 Things Are Predetermined By God,  Not Through His Free Will Or 
 Absolute Fiat,  But From The Very Nature Of God Or Infinite Power. 
 I Have Further,  Where Occasion Afforded,  Taken Care To Remove The 
 Prejudices,  Which Might Impede The Comprehension Of My 
 Demonstrations.  Yet There Still Remain Misconceptions Not A Few, 
 Which Might And May Prove Very Grave Hindrances To The 
 Understanding Of The Concatenation Of Things,  As I Have Explained 
 It Above.  I Have Therefore Thought It Worth While To Bring These 
 Misconceptions Before The Bar Of Reason. 
     All Such Opinions Spring From The Notion Commonly 
 Entertained,  That All Things In Nature Act As Men Themselves Act, 
 Namely,  With An End In View.  It Is Accepted As Certain,  That God 
 Himself Directs All Things To A Definite Goal (For It Is Said 
 That God Made All Things For Man,  And Man That He Might Worship 
 Him).  I Will,  Therefore,  Consider This Opinion,  Asking First, 
 Why It Obtains General Credence,  And Why All Men Are Naturally So 
 Prone To Adopt It? Secondly,  I Will Point Out Its Falsity ; And, 
 Lastly,  I Will Show How It Has Given Rise To Prejudices About 
 Good And Bad,  Right And Wrong,  Praise And Blame,  Order And 
 Confusion,  Beauty And Ugliness,  And The Like.  However,  This Is 
 Not The Place To Deduce These Misconceptions From The Nature Of 
 The Human Mind : It Will Be Sufficient Here,  If I Assume As A 
 Starting Point,  What Ought To Be Universally Admitted,  Namely, 
 That All Men Are Born Ignorant Of The Causes Of Things,  That All 
 Have The Desire To Seek For What Is Useful To Them,  And That They 
 Are Conscious Of Such Desire.  Herefrom It Follows,  First,  That 
 Men Think Themselves Free Inasmuch As They Are Conscious Of Their 
 Volitions And Desires,  And Never Even Dream,  In Their Ignorance, 
 Of The Causes Which Have Disposed Them So To Wish And Desire. 
 Secondly,  That Men Do All Things For An End,  Namely,  For That 
 Which Is Useful To Them,  And Which They Seek.  Thus It Comes To 
 Pass That They Only Look For A Knowledge Of The Final Causes Of 
 Events,  And When These Are Learned,  They Are Content,  As Having 
 No Cause For Further Doubt.  If They Cannot Learn Such Causes 
 From External Sources,  They Are Compelled To Turn To Considering 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Appendix Pg 26 
 Themselves,  And Reflecting What End Would Have Induced Them 
 Personally To Bring About The Given Event,  And Thus They 
 Necessarily Judge Other Natures By Their Own.  Further,  As They 
 Find In Themselves And Outside Themselves Many Means Which Assist 
 Them Not A Little In The Search For What Is Useful,  For Instance, 
 Eyes For Seeing,  Teeth For Chewing,  Herbs And Animals For 
 Yielding Food,  The Sun For Giving Light,  The Sea For Breeding 
 Fish,  &C.,  They Come To Look On The Whole Of Nature As A Means 
 For Obtaining Such Conveniences.  Now As They Are Aware,  That 
 They Found These Conveniences And Did Not Make Them,  They Think 
 They Have Cause For Believing,  That Some Other Being Has Made 
 Them For Their Use.  As They Look Upon Things As Means,  They 
 Cannot Believe Them To Be Self-Created ; But,  Judging From The 
 Means Which They Are Accustomed To Prepare For Themselves,  They 
 Are Bound To Believe In Some Ruler Or Rulers Of The Universe 
 Endowed With Human Freedom,  Who Have Arranged And Adapted 
 Everything For Human Use.  They Are Bound To Estimate The Nature 
 Of Such Rulers (Having No Information On The Subject) In 
 Accordance With Their Own Nature,  And Therefore They Assert That 
 The Gods Ordained Everything For The Use Of Man,  In Order To Bind 
 Man To Themselves And Obtain From Him The Highest Honor.  Hence 
 Also It Follows,  That Everyone Thought Out For Himself,  According 
 To His Abilities,  A Different Way Of Worshipping God,  So That God 
 Might Love Him More Than His Fellows,  And Direct The Whole Course 
 Of Nature For The Satisfaction Of His Blind Cupidity And 
 Insatiable Avarice.  Thus The Prejudice Developed Into 
 Superstition,  And Took Deep Root In The Human Mind ; And For This 
 Reason Everyone Strove Most Zealously To Understand And Explain 
 The Final Causes Of Things ; But In Their Endeavor To Show That 
 Nature Does Nothing In Vain,  I.E. Nothing Which Is Useless To 
 Man,  They Only Seem To Have Demonstrated That Nature,  The Gods, 
 And Men Are All Mad Together.  Consider,  I Pray You,  The Result : 
 Among The Many Helps Of Nature They Were Bound To Find Some 
 Hindrances,  Such As Storms,  Earthquakes,  Diseases,  &C. : So They 
 Declared That Such Things Happen,  Because The Gods Are Angry At 
 Some Wrong Done To Them By Men,  Or At Some Fault Committed In 
 Their Worship.  Experience Day By Day Protested And Showed By 
 Infinite Examples,  That Good And Evil Fortunes Fall To The Lot Of 
 Pious And Impious Alike ; Still They Would Not Abandon Their 
 Inveterate Prejudice,  For It Was More Easy For Them To Class Such 
 Contradictions Among Other Unknown Things Of Whose Use They Were 
 Ignorant,  And Thus To Retain Their Actual And Innate Condition Of 
 Ignorance,  Than To Destroy The Whole Fabric Of Their Reasoning 
 And Start Afresh.  They Therefore Laid Down As An Axiom,  That 
 God's Judgments Far Transcend Human Understanding.  Such A 
 Doctrine Might Well Have Sufficed To Conceal The Truth From The 
 Human Race For All Eternity,  If Mathematics Had Not Furnished 
 Another Standard Of Verity In Considering Solely The Essence And 
 Properties Of Figures Without Regard To Their Final Causes. 
 There Are Other Reasons (Which I Need Not Mention Here) Besides 
 Mathematics,  Which Might Have Caused Men's Minds To Be Directed 
 To These General Prejudices,  And Have Led Them To The Knowledge 
 Of The Truth. 
     I Have Now Sufficiently Explained My First Point.  There Is 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Appendix Pg 27 
 No Need To Show At Length,  That Nature Has No Particular Goal In 
 View,  And That Final Causes Are Mere Human Figments.  This,  I 
 Think,  Is Already Evident Enough,  Both From The Causes And 
 Foundations On Which I Have Shown Such Prejudice To Be Based,  And 
 Also From Prop. Xvi.,  And The Corollary Of Prop. Xxxii.,  And,  In 
 Fact,  All Those Propositions In Which I Have Shown,  That 
 Everything In Nature Proceeds From A Sort Of Necessity,  And With 
 The Utmost Perfection.  However,  I Will Add A Few Remarks,  In 
 Order To Overthrow This Doctrine Of A Final Cause Utterly.  That 
 Which Is Really A Cause It Considers As An Effect,  And Vice Versâ 
 : It Makes That Which Is By Nature First To Be Last,  And That 
 Which Is Highest And Most Perfect To Be Most Imperfect.  Passing 
 Over The Questions Of Cause And Priority As Self-Evident,  It Is 
 Plain From Props. Xxi.,  Xxii.,  Xxiii. That The Effect Is Most 
 Perfect Which Is Produced Immediately By God ; The Effect Which 
 Requires For Its Production Several Intermediate Causes Is,  In 
 That Respect,  More Imperfect.  But If Those Things Which Were 
 Made Immediately By God Were Made To Enable Him To Attain His 
 End,  Then The Things Which Come After,  For The Sake Of Which The 
 First Were Made,  Are Necessarily The Most Excellent Of All. 
     Further,  This Doctrine Does Away With The Perfection Of God : 
 For,  If God Acts For An Object,  He Necessarily Desires Something 
 Which He Lacks.  Certainly,  Theologians And Metaphysicians Draw A 
 Distinction Between The Object Of Want And The Object Of 
 Assimilation ; Still They Confess That God Made All Things For 
 The Sake Of Himself,  Not For The Sake Of Creation.  They Are 
 Unable To Point To Anything Prior To Creation,  Except God 
 Himself,  As An Object For Which God Should Act,  And Are Therefore 
 Driven To Admit (As They Clearly Must),  That God Lacked Those 
 Things For Whose Attainment He Created Means,  And Further That He 
 Desired Them. 
     We Must Not Omit To Notice That The Followers Of This 
 Doctrine,  Anxious To Display Their Talent In Assigning Final 
 Causes,  Have Imported A New Method Of Argument In Proof Of Their 
 Theory-Namely,  A Reduction,  Not To The Impossible,  But To 
 Ignorance ; Thus Showing That They Have No Other Method Of 
 Exhibiting Their Doctrine.  For Example,  If A Stone Falls From A 
 Roof On To Someone's Head,  And Kills Him,  They Will Demonstrate 
 By Their New Method,  That The Stone Fell In Order To Kill The Man 
 ; For,  If It Had Not By God's Will Fallen With That Object,  How 
 Could So Many Circumstances (And There Are Often Many Concurrent 
 Circumstances) Have All Happened Together By Chance?  Perhaps You 
 Will Answer That The Event Is Due To The Facts That The Wind Was 
 Blowing,  And The Man Was Walking That Way.  "But Why," They Will 
 Insist,  "Was The Wind Blowing,  And Why Was The Man At That Very 
 Time Walking That Way?"  If You Again Answer,  That The Wind Had 
 Then Sprung Up Because The Sea Had Begun To Be Agitated The Day 
 Before,  The Weather Being Previously Calm,  And That The Man Had 
 Been Invited By A Friend,  They Will Again Insist : "But Why Was 
 The Sea Agitated,  And Why Was The Man Invited At That Time?"  
 So They Will Pursue Their Questions From Cause To Cause,  Till At 
 Last You Take Refuge In The Will Of God-In Other Words,  The 
 Sanctuary Of Ignorance.  So,  Again,  When They Survey The Frame Of 
 The Human Body,  They Are Amazed ; And Being Ignorant Of The 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Appendix Pg 28 
 Causes Of So Great A Work Of Art,  Conclude That It Has Been 
 Fashioned,  Not Mechanically,  But By Divine And Supernatural 
 Skill,  And Has Been So Put Together That One Part Shall Not Hurt 
 Another. 
     Hence Anyone Who Seeks For The True Causes Of Miracles,  And 
 Strives To Understand Natural Phenomena As An Intelligent Being, 
 And Not To Gaze At Them Like A Fool,  Is Set Down And Denounced As 
 An Impious Heretic By Those,  Whom The Masses Adore As The 
 Interpreters Of Nature And The Gods.  Such Persons Know That, 
 With The Removal Of Ignorance,  The Wonder Which Forms Their Only 
 Available Means For Proving And Preserving Their Authority Would 
 Vanish Also.  But I Now Quit This Subject,  And Pass On To My 
 Third Point. 
     After Men Persuaded Themselves,  That Everything Which Is 
 Created Is Created For Their Sake,  They Were Bound To Consider As 
 The Chief Quality In Everything That Which Is Most Useful To 
 Themselves,  And To Account Those Things The Best Of All Which 
 Have The Most Beneficial Effect On Mankind.  Further,  They Were 
 Bound To Form Abstract Notions For The Explanation Of The Nature 
 Of Things,  Such As Goodness,  Badness,  Order,  Confusion,  Warmth, 
 Cold,  Beauty,  Deformity,  And So On ; And From The Belief That 
 They Are Free Agents Arose The Further Notions Of Praise And 
 Blame,  Sin And Merit. 
     I Will Speak Of These Latter Hereafter,  When I Treat Of Human 
 Nature ; The Former I Will Briefly Explain Here. 
     Everything Which Conduces To Health And The Worship Of God 
 They Have Called Good,  Everything Which Hinders These Objects 
 They Have Styled Bad ; And Inasmuch As Those Who Do Not 
 Understand The Nature Of Things Do Not Verify Phenomena In Any 
 Way,  But Merely Imagine Them After A Fashion,  And Mistake Their 
 Imagination For Understanding,  Such Persons Firmly Believe That 
 There Is An Order In Things,  Being Really Ignorant Both Of Things 
 And Their Own Nature.  When Phenomena Are Of Such A Kind,  That 
 The Impression They Make On Our Senses Requires Little Effort Of 
 Imagination,  And Can Consequently Be Easily Remembered,  We Say 
 That They Are Well-Ordered ; If The Contrary,  That They Are 
 Ill-Ordered Or Confused.  Further,  As Things Which Are Easily 
 Imagined Are More Pleasing To Us,  Men Prefer Order To 
 Confusion-As Though There Were Any Order In Nature,  Except In 
 Relation To Our Imagination-And Say That God Has Created All 
 Things In Order ; Thus,  Without Knowing It,  Attributing 
 Imagination To God,  Unless,  Indeed,  They Would Have It That God 
 Foresaw Human Imagination,  And Arranged Everything,  So That It 
 Should Be Most Easily Imagined.  If This Be Their Theory,  They 
 Would Not,  Perhaps,  Be Daunted By The Fact That We Find An 
 Infinite Number Of Phenomena,  Far Surpassing Our Imagination,  And 
 Very Many Others Which Confound Its Weakness.  But Enough Has 
 Been Said On This Subject.  The Other Abstract Notions Are 
 Nothing But Modes Of Imagining,  In Which The Imagination Is 
 Differently Affected : Though They Are Considered By The Ignorant 
 As The Chief Attributes Of Things,  Inasmuch As They Believe That 
 Everything Was Created For The Sake Of Themselves ; And, 
 According As They Are Affected By It,  Style It Good Or Bad, 
 Healthy Or Rotten And Corrupt.  For Instance,  If The Motion Which 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Appendix Pg 29 
 Objects We See Communicate To Our Nerves Be Conducive To Health, 
 The Objects Causing It Are Styled Beautiful ; If A Contrary 
 Motion Be Excited,  They Are Styled Ugly. 
     Things Which Are Perceived Through Our Sense Of Smell Are 
 Styled Fragrant Or Fetid ; If Through Our Taste,  Sweet Or Bitter, 
 Full-Flavored Or Insipid ; If Through Our Touch,  Hard Or Soft, 
 Rough Or Smooth,  &C. 
     Whatsoever Affects Our Ears Is Said To Give Rise To Noise, 
 Sound,  Or Harmony.  In This Last Case,  There Are Men Lunatic 
 Enough To Believe,  That Even God Himself Takes Pleasure In 
 Harmony ; And Philosophers Are Not Lacking Who Have Persuaded 
 Themselves,  That The Motion Of The Heavenly Bodies Gives Rise To 
 Harmony-All Of Which Instances Sufficiently Show That Everyone 
 Judges Of Things According To The State Of His Brain,  Or Rather 
 Mistakes For Things The Forms Of His Imagination.  We Need No 
 Longer Wonder That There Have Arisen All The Controversies We 
 Have Witnessed,  And Finally Skepticism : For,  Although Human 
 Bodies In Many Respects Agree,  Yet In Very Many Others They 
 Differ ; So That What Seems Good To One Seems Bad To Another ; 
 What Seems Well Ordered To One Seems Confused To Another ; What 
 Is Pleasing To One Displeases Another,  And So On.  I Need Not 
 Further Enumerate,  Because This Is Not The Place To Treat The 
 Subject At Length,  And Also Because The Fact Is Sufficiently Well 
 Known.  It Is Commonly Said : "So Many Men,  So Many Minds ; 
 Everyone Is Wise In His Own Way ; Brains Differ As Completely As 
 Palates."  All Of Which Proverbs Show,  That Men Judge Of Things 
 According To Their Mental Disposition,  And Rather Imagine Than 
 Understand : For,  If They Understood Phenomena,  They Would,  As 
 Mathematicians Attest,  Be Convinced,  If Not Attracted,  By What I 
 Have Urged. 
     We Have Now Perceived,  That All The Explanations Commonly 
 Given Of Nature Are Mere Modes Of Imagining,  And Do Not Indicate 
 The True Nature Of Anything,  But Only The Constitution Of The 
 Imagination ; And,  Although They Have Names,  As Though They Were 
 Entities,  Existing Externally To The Imagination,  I Call Them 
 Entities Imaginary Rather Than Real ; And,  Therefore,  All 
 Arguments Against Us Drawn From Such Abstractions Are Easily 
 Rebutted. 
     Many Argue In This Way.  If All Things Follow From A 
 Necessity Of The Absolutely Perfect Nature Of God,  Why Are There 
 So Many Imperfections In Nature? Such,  For Instance,  As Things 
 Corrupt To The Point Of Putridity,  Loathsome Deformity, 
 Confusion,  Evil,  Sin,  &C.  But These Reasoners Are,  As I Have 
 Said,  Easily Confuted,  For The Perfection Of Things Is To Be 
 Reckoned Only From Their Own Nature And Power ; Things Are Not 
 More Or Less Perfect,  According As They Delight Or Offend Human 
 Senses,  Or According As They Are Serviceable Or Repugnant To 
 Mankind.  To Those Who Ask Why God Did Not So Create All Men, 
 That They Should Be Governed Only By Reason,  I Give No Answer But 
 This : Because Matter Was Not Lacking To Him For The Creation Of 
 Every Degree Of Perfection From Highest To Lowest ; Or,  More 
 Strictly,  Because The Laws Of His Nature Are So Vast,  As To 
 Suffice For The Production Of Everything Conceivable By An 
 Infinite Intelligence,  As I Have Shown In Prop. Xvi. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 1 Concerning God Appendix Pg 30 
     Such Are The Misconceptions I Have Undertaken To Note ; If 
 There Are Any More Of The Same Sort,  Everyone May Easily 
 Dissipate Them For Himself With The Aid Of A Little Reflection. 
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2 On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind Preface Pg 31 
     I Now Pass On To Explaining The Results,  Which Must 
 Necessarily Follow From The Essence Of God,  Or Of The Eternal And 
 Infinite Being ; Not,  Indeed,  All Of Them (For We Proved In Part 
 I.,  Prop. Xvi.,  That An Infinite Number Must Follow In An 
 Infinite Number Of Ways),  But Only Those Which Are Able To Lead 
 Us,  As It Were By The Hand,  To The Knowledge Of The Human Mind 
 And Its Highest Blessedness. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Definitions Pg 31 
 Definition I.  By Body I Mean A Mode Which Expresses In A Certain 
 Determinate Manner The Essence Of God,  In So Far As He Is 
 Considered As An Extended Thing.  (See Pt. I.,  Prop. Xxv., 
 Coroll.) 
   
 Definition Ii.  I Consider As Belonging To The Essence Of A Thing 
 That,  Which Being Given,  The Thing Is Necessarily Given Also, 
 And,  Which Being Removed,  The Thing Is Necessarily Removed Also ; 
 In Other Words,  That Without Which The Thing,  And Which Itself 
 Without The Thing,  Can Neither Be Nor Be Conceived. 
   
 Definition Iii. By Idea,  I Mean The Mental Conception Which Is 
 Formed By The Mind As A Thinking Thing. 
     Explanation.-I Say Conception Rather Than Perception,  Because 
 The Word Perception Seems To Imply That The Mind Is Passive In 
 Respect To The Object ; Whereas Conception Seems To Express An 
 Activity Of The Mind. 
   
 Definition Iv.  By An Adequate Idea,  I Mean An Idea Which,  In So 
 Far As It Is Considered In Itself,  Without Relation To The 
 Object,  Has All The Properties Or Intrinsic Marks Of A True Idea. 
     Explanation.-I Say Intrinsic,  In Order To Exclude That Mark 
 Which Is Extrinsic,  Namely,  The Agreement Between The Idea And 
 Its Object (Ideatum). 
   
 Definition V.  Duration Is The Indefinite Continuance Of 
 Existing. 
     Explanation.-I Say Indefinite,  Because It Cannot Be 
 Determined Through The Existence Itself Of The Existing Thing,  Or 
 By Its Efficient Cause,  Which Necessarily Gives The Existence Of 
 The Thing,  But Does Not Take It Away. 
   
 Definition Vi.  Reality And Perfection I Use As Synonymous Terms. 
   
 Definition Vii.  By Particular Things,  I Mean Things Which Are 
 Finite And Have A Conditioned Existence ; But If Several 
 Individual Things Concur In One Action,  So As To Be All 
 Simultaneously The Effect Of One Cause,  I Consider Them All,  So 
 Far,  As One Particular Thing. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Axioms Pg 32 
 I.  The Essence Of Man Does Not Involve Necessary Existence,  That 
 Is,  It May,  In The Order Of Nature,  Come To Pass That This Or 
 That Man Does Or Does Not Exist. 
   
 Ii.  Man Thinks. 
   
 Iii.  Modes Of Thinking,  Such As Love,  Desire,  Or Any Other Of 
 The Passions,  Do Not Take Place,  Unless There Be In The Same 
 Individual An Idea Of The Thing Loved,  Desired,  &C.  But The Idea 
 Can Exist Without The Presence Of Any Other Mode Of Thinking. 
   
 Iv.  We Perceive That A Certain Body Is Affected In Many Ways. 
   
 V.  We Feel And Perceive No Particular Things,  Save Bodies And 
 Modes Of Thought. 
   
 N.B.  The Postulates Are Given After The Conclusion Of Prop. 
 Xiii. 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 33 
 Prop. I.  Thought Is An Attribute Of God,  Or God Is A Thinking 
 Thing. 
     Proof.-Particular Thoughts,  Or This And That Thought,  Are 
 Modes Which,  In A Certain Conditioned Manner,  Express The Nature 
 Of God (Pt. I.,  Prop. Xxv.,  Coroll.).  God Therefore Possesses 
 The Attribute (Pt. I.,  Def. V.) Of Which The Concept Is Involved 
 In All Particular Thoughts,  Which Latter Are Conceived Thereby. 
 Thought,  Therefore,  Is One Of The Infinite Attributes Of God, 
 Which Express God's Eternal And Infinite Essence (Pt. I.,  Def. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 34 
 Vi.).  In Other Words,  God Is A Thinking Thing.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Proposition Is Also Evident From The Fact,  That We 
 Are Able To Conceive An Infinite Thinking Being.  For,  In 
 Proportion As A Thinking Being Is Conceived As Thinking More 
 Thoughts,  So Is It Conceived As Containing More Reality Or 
 Perfection.  Therefore A Being,  Which Can Think An Infinite 
 Number Of Things In An Infinite Number Of Ways,  Is,  Necessarily, 
 In Respect Of Thinking,  Infinite.  As,  Therefore,  From The 
 Consideration Of Thought Alone,  We Conceive An Infinite Being, 
 Thought Is Necessarily (Pt. I.,  Deff. Iv. And Vi.) One Of The 
 Infinite Attributes Of God,  As We Were Desirous Of Showing. 
   
 Prop. Ii.  Extension Is An Attribute Of God,  Or God Is An 
 Extended Thing. 
     Proof.-The Proof Of This Proposition Is Similar To That Of 
 The Last. 
   
 Prop. Iii.  In God There Is Necessarily The Idea Not Only Of His 
 Essence,  But Also Of All Things Which Necessarily Follow From His 
 Essence. 
     Proof.-God (By The First Prop. Of This Part) Can Think An 
 Infinite Number Of Things In Infinite Ways,  Or (What Is The Same 
 Thing,  By Prop. Xvi.,  Part I.) Can Form The Idea Of His Essence, 
 And Of All Things Which Necessarily Follow Therefrom.  Now All 
 That Is In The Power Of God Necessarily Is (Pt. I.,  Prop. Xxxv.). 
 Therefore,  Such An Idea As We Are Considering Necessarily Is,  And 
 In God Alone.  Q.E.D.  (Part I.,  Prop. Xv.) 
     Note.-The Multitude Understand By The Power Of God The Free 
 Will Of God,  And The Right Over All Things That Exist,  Which 
 Latter Are Accordingly Generally Considered As Contingent.  For 
 It Is Said That God Has The Power To Destroy All Things,  And To 
 Reduce Them To Nothing.  Further,  The Power Of God Is Very Often 
 Likened To The Power Of Kings.  But This Doctrine We Have Refuted 
 (Pt. I.,  Prop. Xxxii.,  Corolls. I. And Ii.),  And We Have Shown 
 (Part I.,  Prop. Xvi.) That God Acts By The Same Necessity,  As 
 That By Which He Understands Himself ; In Other Words,  As It 
 Follows From The Necessity Of The Divine Nature (As All Admit), 
 That God Understands Himself,  So Also Does It Follow By The Same 
 Necessity,  That God Performs Infinite Acts In Infinite Ways.  We 
 Further Showed (Part I.,  Prop. Xxxiv.),  That God's Power Is 
 Identical With God's Essence In Action ; Therefore It Is As 
 Impossible For Us To Conceive God As Not Acting,  As To Conceive 
 Him As Non-Existent.  If We Might Pursue The Subject Further,  I 
 Could Point Out,  That The Power Which Is Commonly Attributed To 
 God Is Not Only Human (As Showing That God Is Conceived By The 
 Multitude As A Man,  Or In The Likeness Of A Man),  But Involves A 
 Negation Of Power.  However,  I Am Unwilling To Go Over The Same 
 Ground So Often.  I Would Only Beg The Reader Again And Again,  To 
 Turn Over Frequently In His Mind What I Have Said In Part I From 
 Prop. Xvi. To The End.  No One Will Be Able To Follow My Meaning, 
 Unless He Is Scrupulously Careful Not To Confound The Power Of 
 God With The Human Power And Right Of Kings. 
   
 Prop. Iv.  The Idea Of God,  From Which An Infinite Number Of 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 35 
 Things Follow In Infinite Ways,  Can Only Be One. 
     Proof.-Infinite Intellect Comprehends Nothing Save The 
 Attributes Of God And His Modifications (Part I.,  Prop. Xxx.). 
 Now God Is One (Part I.,  Prop. Xiv.,  Coroll.).  Therefore The 
 Idea Of God,  Wherefrom An Infinite Number Of Things Follow In 
 Infinite Ways,  Can Only Be One.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. V.  The Actual Being Of Ideas Owns God As Its Cause,  Only 
 In So Far As He Is Considered As A Thinking Thing,  Not In So Far 
 As He Is Unfolded In Any Other Attribute ; That Is,  The Ideas 
 Both Of The Attributes Of God And Of Particular Things Do Not Own 
 As Their Efficient Cause Their Objects (Ideata) Or The Things 
 Perceived,  But God Himself In So Far As He Is A Thinking Thing. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Evident From Prop. Iii. Of This 
 Part.  We There Drew The Conclusion,  That God Can Form The Idea 
 Of His Essence,  And Of All Things Which Follow Necessarily 
 Therefrom,  Solely Because He Is A Thinking Thing,  And Not Because 
 He Is The Object Of His Own Idea.  Wherefore The Actual Being Of 
 Ideas Owns For Cause God,  In So Far As He Is A Thinking Thing. 
 It May Be Differently Proved As Follows : The Actual Being Of 
 Ideas Is (Obviously) A Mode Of Thought,  That Is (Part I.,  Prop. 
 Xxv.,  Coroll.) A Mode Which Expresses In A Certain Manner The 
 Nature Of God,  In So Far As He Is A Thinking Thing,  And Therefore 
 (Part I.,  Prop. X.) Involves The Conception Of No Other Attribute 
 Of God,  And Consequently (By Part I.,  Ax. Iv.) Is Not The Effect 
 Of Any Attribute Save Thought.  Therefore The Actual Being Of 
 Ideas Owns God As Its Cause,  In So Far As He Is Considered As A 
 Thinking Thing,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Vi.  The Modes Of Any Given Attribute Are Caused By God,  In 
 So Far As He Is Considered Through The Attribute Of Which They 
 Are Modes,  And Not In So Far As He Is Considered Through Any 
 Other Attribute. 
     Proof.-Each Attribute Is Conceived Through Itself,  Without 
 Any Other (Part I.,  Prop. X.) ; Wherefore The Modes Of Each 
 Attribute Involve The Conception Of That Attribute,  But Not Of 
 Any Other.  Thus (Part I.,  Ax. Iv.) They Are Caused By God,  Only 
 In So Far As He Is Considered Through The Attribute Whose Modes 
 They Are,  And Not In So Far As He Is Considered Through Any 
 Other.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence The Actual Being Of Things,  Which Are Not 
 Modes Of Thought,  Does Not Follow From The Divine Nature,  Because 
 That Nature Has Prior Knowledge Of The Things.  Things 
 Represented In Ideas Follow,  And Are Derived From Their 
 Particular Attribute,  In The Same Manner,  And With The Same 
 Necessity As Ideas Follow (According To What We Have Shown) From 
 The Attribute Of Thought. 
   
 Prop. Vii.  The Order And Connection Of Ideas Is The Same As The 
 Order And Connection Of Things. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Evident From Part I.,  Ax. Iv.  For 
 The Idea Of Everything That Is Caused Depends On A Knowledge Of 
 The Cause,  Whereof It Is An Effect. 
     Corollary.-Hence God's Power Of Thinking Is Equal To His 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 36 
 Realized Power Of Action-That Is,  Whatsoever Follows From The 
 Infinite Nature Of God In The World Of Extension (Formaliter), 
 Follows Without Exception In The Same Order And Connection From 
 The Idea Of God In The World Of Thought (Objective). 
     Note.-Before Going Any Further,  I Wish To Recall To Mind What 
 Has Been Pointed Out Above-Namely,  That Whatsoever Can Be 
 Perceived By The Infinite Intellect As Constituting The Essence 
 Of Substance,  Belongs Altogether Only To One Substance : 
 Consequently,  Substance Thinking And Substance Extended Are One 
 And The Same Substance,  Comprehended Now Through One Attribute, 
 Now Through The Other.  So,  Also,  A Mode Of Extension And The 
 Idea Of That Mode Are One And The Same Thing,  Though Expressed In 
 Two Ways.  This Truth Seems To Have Been Dimly Recognized By 
 Those Jews Who Maintained That God,  God's Intellect,  And The 
 Things Understood By God Are Identical.  For Instance,  A Circle 
 Existing In Nature,  And The Idea Of A Circle Existing,  Which Is 
 Also In God,  Are One And The Same Thing Displayed Through 
 Different Attributes.  Thus,  Whether We Conceive Nature Under The 
 Attribute Of Extension,  Or Under The Attribute Of Thought,  Or 
 Under Any Other Attribute,  We Shall Find The Same Order,  Or One 
 And The Same Chain Of Causes-That Is,  The Same Things Following 
 In Either Case. 
     I Said That God Is The Cause Of An Idea-For Instance,  Of The 
 Idea Of A Circle,-In So Far As He Is A Thinking Thing ; And Of A 
 Circle,  In So Far As He Is An Extended Thing,  Simply Because The 
 Actual Being Of The Idea Of A Circle Can Only Be Perceived As A 
 Proximate Cause Through Another Mode Of Thinking,  And That Again 
 Through Another,  And So On To Infinity ; So That,  So Long As We 
 Consider Things As Modes Of Thinking,  We Must Explain The Order 
 Of The Whole Of Nature,  Or The Whole Chain Of Causes,  Through The 
 Attribute Of Thought Only.  And,  In So Far As We Consider Things 
 As Modes Of Extension,  We Must Explain The Order Of The Whole Of 
 Nature Through The Attributes Of Extension Only ; And So On,  In 
 The Case Of The Other Attributes.  Wherefore Of Things As They 
 Are In Themselves God Is Really The Cause,  Inasmuch As He 
 Consists Of Infinite Attributes.  I Cannot For The Present 
 Explain My Meaning More Clearly. 
   
 Prop. Viii.  The Ideas Of Particular Things,  Or Of Modes,  That Do 
 Not Exist,  Must Be Comprehended In The Infinite Idea Of God,  In 
 The Same Way As The Formal Essences Of Particular Things Or Modes 
 Are Contained In The Attributes Of God. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Evident From The Last ; It Is 
 Understood More Clearly From The Preceding Note. 
     Corollary.-Hence,  So Long As Particular Things Do Not Exist, 
 Except In So Far As They Are Comprehended In The Attributes Of 
 God,  Their Representations In Thought Or Ideas Do Not Exist, 
 Except In So Far As The Infinite Idea Of God Exists ; And When 
 Particular Things Are Said To Exist,  Not Only In So Far As They 
 Are Involved In The Attributes Of God,  But Also In So Far As They 
 Are Said To Continue,  Their Ideas Will Also Involve Existence, 
 Through Which They Are Said To Continue. 
     Note.-If Anyone Desires An Example To Throw More Light On 
 This Question,  I Shall,  I Fear,  Not Be Able To Give Him Any, 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 37 
 Which Adequately Explains The Thing Of Which I Here Speak, 
 Inasmuch As It Is Unique ; However,  I Will Endeavour To 
 Illustrate It As Far As Possible.  The Nature Of A Circle Is Such 
 That If Any Number Of Straight Lines Intersect Within It,  The 
 Rectangles Formed By Their Segments Will Be Equal To One Another 
 ; Thus,  Infinite Equal Rectangles Are Contained In A Circle.  Yet 
 None Of These Rectangles Can Be Said To Exist,  Except In So Far 
 As The Circle Exists ; Nor Can The Idea Of Any Of These 
 Rectangles Be Said To Exist,  Except In So Far As They Are 
 Comprehended In The Idea Of The Circle.  Let Us Grant That,  From 
 This Infinite Number Of Rectangles,  Two Only Exist.  The Ideas Of 
 These Two Not Only Exist,  In So Far As They Are Contained In The 
 Idea Of The Circle,  But Also As They Involve The Existence Of 
 Those Rectangles ; Wherefore They Are Distinguished From The 
 Remaining Ideas Of The Remaining Rectangles. 
   
 Prop. Ix.  The Idea Of An Individual Thing Actually Existing Is 
 Caused By God,  Not In So Far As He Is Infinite,  But In So Far As 
 He Is Considered As Affected By Another Idea Of A Thing Actually 
 Existing,  Of Which He Is The Cause,  In So Far As He Is Affected 
 By A Third Idea,  And So On To Infinity. 
     Proof.-The Idea Of An Individual Thing Actually Existing Is 
 An Individual Mode Of Thinking,  And Is Distinct From Other Modes 
 (By The Corollary And Note To Prop. Viii. Of This Part) ; Thus 
 (By Prop. Vi. Of This Part) It Is Caused By God,  In So Far Only 
 As He Is A Thinking Thing.  But Not (By Prop. Xxviii. Of Part I.) 
 In So Far As He Is A Thing Thinking Absolutely,  Only In So Far As 
 He Is Considered As Affected By Another Mode Of Thinking ; And He 
 Is The Cause Of This Latter,  As Being Affected By A Third,  And So 
 On To Infinity.  Now,  The Order And Connection Of Ideas Is (By 
 Prop. Vii. Of This Book) The Same As The Order And Connection Of 
 Causes.   Therefore Of A Given Individual Idea Another Individual 
 Idea,  Or God,  In So Far As He Is Considered As Modified By That 
 Idea,  Is The Cause ; And Of This Second Idea God Is The Cause,  In 
 So Far As He Is Affected By Another Idea,  And So On To Infinity. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Whatsoever Takes Place In The Individual Object Of 
 Any Idea,  The Knowledge Thereof Is In God,  In So Far Only As He 
 Has The Idea Of The Object. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever Takes Place In The Object Of Any Idea,  Its 
 Idea Is In God (By Prop. Iii. Of This Part),  Not In So Far As He 
 Is Infinite,  But In So Far As He Is Considered As Affected By 
 Another Idea Of An Individual Thing (By The Last Prop.) ; But (By 
 Prop. Vii. Of This Part) The Order And Connection Of Ideas Is The 
 Same As The Order And Connection Of Things.  The Knowledge, 
 Therefore,  Of That Which Takes Place In Any Individual Object 
 Will Be In God,  In So Far Only As He Has The Idea Of That Object. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. X.  The Being Of Substance Does Not Appertain To The 
 Essence Of Man-In Other Words,  Substance Does Not Constitute The 
 Actual Being2 Of Man. 
     Proof.-The Being Of Substance Involves Necessary Existence 
 (Part I.,  Prop. Vii.).  If,  Therefore,  The Being Of Substance 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 38 
 Appertains To The Essence Of Man,  Substance Being Granted,  Man 
 Would Necessarily Be Granted Also (Ii.Def.Ii.),  And, 
 Consequently,  Man Would Necessarily Exist,  Which Is Absurd 
 (Ii.Ax.I.).  Therefore,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Proposition May Also Be Proved From I.V.,  In Which 
 It Is Shown That There Cannot Be Two Substances Of The Same 
 Nature ; For As There May Be Many Men,  The Being Of Substance Is 
 Not That Which Constitutes The Actual Being Of Man.  Again,  The 
 Proposition Is Evident From The Other Properties Of 
 Substance-Namely,  That Substance Is In Its Nature Infinite, 
 Immutable,  Indivisible,  &C.,  As Anyone May See For Himself. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows,  That The Essence Of Man Is 
 Constituted By Certain Modifications Of The Attributes Of God. 
 For (By The Last Prop.) The Being Of Substance Does Not Belong To 
 The Essence Of Man.  That Essence Therefore (By I.  15) Is 
 Something Which Is In God,  And Which Without God Can Neither Be 
 Nor Be Conceived,  Whether It Be A Modification (I. 25. Coroll.), 
 Or A Mode Which Expresses God's Nature In A Certain Conditioned 
 Manner. 
     Note.-Everyone Must Surely Admit,  That Nothing Can Be Or Be 
 Conceived Without God.  All Men Agree That God Is The One And 
 Only Cause Of All Things,  Both Of Their Essence And Of Their 
 Existence ; That Is,  God Is Not Only The Cause Of Things In 
 Respect To Their Being Made (Secundum Fieri),  But Also In Respect 
 To Their Being (Secundum Esse). 
     At The Same Time Many Assert,  That That,  Without Which A 
 Thing Cannot Be Nor Be Conceived,  Belongs To The Essence Of That 
 Thing ; Wherefore They Believe That Either The Nature Of God 
 Appertains To The Essence Of Created Things,  Or Else That Created 
 Things Can Be Or Be Conceived Without God ; Or Else,  As Is More 
 Probably The Case,  They Hold Inconsistent Doctrines.  I Think The 
 Cause For Such Confusion Is Mainly,  That They Do Not Keep To The 
 Proper Order Of Philosophic Thinking.  The Nature Of God,  Which 
 Should Be Reflected On First,  Inasmuch As It Is Prior Both In The 
 Order Of Knowledge And The Order Of Nature,  They Have Taken To Be 
 Last In The Order Of Knowledge,  And Have Put Into The First Place 
 What They Call The Objects Of Sensation ; Hence,  While They Are 
 Considering Natural Phenomena,  They Give No Attention At All To 
 The Divine Nature,  And,  When Afterwards They Apply Their Mind To 
 The Study Of The Divine Nature,  They Are Quite Unable To Bear In 
 Mind The First Hypotheses,  With Which They Have Overlaid The 
 Knowledge Of Natural Phenomena,  Inasmuch As Such Hypotheses Are 
 No Help Towards Understanding The Divine Nature.  So That It Is 
 Hardly To Be Wondered At,  That These Persons Contradict 
 Themselves Freely. 
     However,  I Pass Over This Point.  My Intention Her Was Only 
 To Give A Reason For Not Saying,  That That,  Without Which A Thing 
 Cannot Be Or Be Conceived,  Belongs To The Essence Of That Thing : 
 Individual Things Cannot Be Or Be Conceived Without God,  Yet God 
 Does Not Appertain To Their Essence.  I Said That "I Considered 
 As Belonging To The Essence Of A Thing That,  Which Being Given, 
 The Thing Is Necessarily Given Also,  And Which Being Removed,  The 
 Thing Is Necessarily Removed Also ; Or That Without Which The 
 Thing,  And Which Itself Without The Thing Can Neither Be Nor Be 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 39 
 Conceived."  (Ii. Def. Ii.) 
   
 Prop. Xi.  The First Element,  Which Constitutes The Actual Being 
 Of The Human Mind,  Is The Idea Of Some Particular Thing Actually 
 Existing. 
     Proof.-The Essence Of Man (By The Coroll. Of The Last Prop.) 
 Is Constituted By Certain Modes Of The Attributes Of God,  Namely 
 (By Ii. Ax. Ii.),  By The Modes Of Thinking,  Of All Which (By Ii. 
 Ax. Iii.) The Idea Is Prior In Nature,  And,  When The Idea Is 
 Given,  The Other Modes (Namely,  Those Of Which The Idea Is Prior 
 In Nature) Must Be In The Same Individual (By The Same Axiom). 
 Therefore An Idea Is The First Element Constituting The Human 
 Mind.  But Not The Idea Of A Non-Existent Thing,  For Then (Ii. 
 Viii. Coroll.) The Idea Itself Cannot Be Said To Exist ; It Must 
 Therefore Be The Idea Of Something Actually Existing.  But Not Of 
 An Infinite Thing.  For An Infinite Thing (I.Xxi.,  Xxii.),  Must 
 Always Necessarily Exist ; This Would (By Ii. Ax. I.) Involve An 
 Absurdity.  Therefore The First Element,  Which Constitutes The 
 Actual Being Of The Human Mind,  Is The Idea Of Something Actually 
 Existing.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows,  That The Human Mind Is Part Of 
 The Infinite Intellect Of God ; Thus When We Say,  That The Human 
 Mind Perceives This Or That,  We Make The Assertion,  That God Has 
 This Or That Idea,  Not In So Far As He Is Infinite,  But In So Far 
 As He Is Displayed Through The Nature Of The Human Mind,  Or In So 
 Far As He Constitutes The Essence Of The Human Mind ; And When We 
 Say That God Has This Or That Idea,  Not Only In So Far As He 
 Constitutes The Essence Of The Human Mind,  But Also In So Far As 
 He,  Simultaneously With The Human Mind,  Has The Further Idea Of 
 Another Thing,  We Assert That The Human Mind Perceives A Thing In 
 Part Or Inadequately. 
     Note.-Here,  I Doubt Not,  Readers Will Come To A Stand,  And 
 Will Call To Mind Many Things Which Will Cause Them To Hesitate ; 
 I Therefore Beg Them To Accompany Me Slowly,  Step By Step,  And 
 Not To Pronounce On My Statements,  Till They Have Read To The 
 End. 
   
 Prop. Xii.  Whatsoever Comes To Pass In The Object Of The Idea, 
 Which Constitutes The Human Mind,  Must Be Perceived By The Human 
 Mind,  Or There Will Necessarily Be An Idea In The Human Mind Of 
 The Said Occurrence.  That Is,  If The Object Of The Idea 
 Constituting The Human Mind Be A Body,  Nothing Can Take Place In 
 That Body Without Being Perceived By The Mind. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever Comes To Pass In The Object Of Any Idea, 
 The Knowledge Thereof Is Necessarily In God (Ii. Ix. Coroll.),  In 
 So Far As He Is Considered As Affected By The Idea Of The Said 
 Object,  That Is (Ii. Xi.),  In So Far As He Constitutes The Mind 
 Of Anything.  Therefore,  Whatsoever Takes Place In The Object 
 Constituting The Idea Of The Human Mind,  The Knowledge Thereof Is 
 Necessarily In God,  In So Far As He Constitutes The Essence Of 
 The Human Mind ; That Is (By Ii. Xi. Coroll.) The Knowledge Of 
 The Said Thing Will Necessarily Be In The Mind,  In Other Words 
 The Mind Perceives It. 
     Note.-This Proposition Is Also Evident,  And Is More Clearly 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 40 
 To Be Understood From Ii. Vii.,  Which See. 
   
 Prop. Xiii.  The Object Of The Idea Constituting The Human Mind 
 Is The Body,  In Other Words A Certain Mode Of Extension Which 
 Actually Exists,  And Nothing Else. 
     Proof.-If Indeed The Body Were Not The Object Of The Human 
 Mind,  The Ideas Of The Modifications Of The Body Would Not Be In 
 God (Ii. Ix. Coroll.) In Virtue Of His Constituting Our Mind,  But 
 In Virtue Of His Constituting The Mind Of Something Else ; That 
 Is (Ii. Xi. Coroll.) The Ideas Of The Modifications Of The Body 
 Would Not Be In Our Mind : Now (By Ii. Ax. Iv.) We Do Possess The 
 Idea Of The Modifications Of The Body.  Therefore The Object Of 
 The Idea Constituting The Human Mind Is The Body,  And The Body As 
 It Actually Exists (Ii. Xi.).  Further,  If There Were Any Other 
 Object Of The Idea Constituting The Mind Besides Body,  Then,  As 
 Nothing Can Exist From Which Some Effect Does Not Follow (I. 
 Xxxvi.) There Would Necessarily Have To Be In Our Mind An Idea, 
 Which Would Be The Effect Of That Other Object (Ii. Xi.) ; But 
 (I. Ax. V.) There Is No Such Idea.  Wherefore The Object Of Our 
 Mind Is The Body As It Exists,  And Nothing Else.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-We Thus Comprehend,  Not Only That The Human Mind Is 
 United To The Body,  But Also The Nature Of The Union Between Mind 
 And Body.  However,  No One Will Be Able To Grasp This Adequately 
 Or Distinctly,  Unless He First Has Adequate Knowledge Of The 
 Nature Of Our Body.  The Propositions We Have Advanced Hitherto 
 Have Been Entirely General,  Applying Not More To Men Than To 
 Other Individual Things,  All Of Which,  Though In Different 
 Degrees,  Are Animated.3  For Of Everything There Is Necessarily 
 An Idea In God,  Of Which God Is The Cause,  In The Same Way As 
 There Is An Idea Of The Human Body ; Thus  Whatever We Have 
 Asserted Of The Idea Of The Human Body Must Necessarily Also Be 
 Asserted Of The Idea Of Everything Else.  Still,  On The Other 
 Hand,  We Cannot Deny That Ideas,  Like Objects,  Differ One From 
 The Other,  One Being More Excellent Than Another And Containing 
 More Reality,  Just As The Object Of One Idea Is More Excellent 
 Than The Object Of Another Idea,  And Contains More Reality. 
     Wherefore,  In Order To Determine,  Wherein The Human Mind 
 Differs From Other Things,  And Wherein It Surpasses Them,  It Is 
 Necessary For Us To Know The Nature Of Its Object,  That Is,  Of 
 The Human Body.  What This Nature Is,  I Am Not Able Here To 
 Explain,  Nor Is It Necessary For The Proof Of What I Advance, 
 That I Should Do So.  I Will Only Say Generally,  That In 
 Proportion As Any Given Body Is More Fitted Than Others For Doing 
 Many Actions Or Receiving Many Impressions At Once,  So Also Is 
 The Mind,  Of Which It Is The Object,  More Fitted Than Others For 
 Forming Many Simultaneous Perceptions ; And The More The Actions 
 Of The Body Depend On Itself Alone,  And The Fewer Other Bodies 
 Concur With It In Action,  The More Fitted Is The Mind Of Which It 
 Is The Object For Distinct Comprehension.  We May Thus Recognize 
 The Superiority Of One Mind Over Others,  And May Further See The 
 Cause,  Why We Have Only A Very Confused Knowledge Of Our Body, 
 And Also Many Kindred Questions,  Which I Will,  In The Following 
 Propositions,  Deduce From What Has Been Advanced.  Wherefore I 
 Have Thought It Worth While To Explain And Prove More Strictly My 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 41 
 Present Statements.  In Order To Do So,  I Must Premise A Few 
 Propositions Concerning The Nature Of Bodies. 
     Axiom I.  All Bodies Are Either In Motion Or At Rest. 
     Axiom Ii.  Every Body Is Moved Sometimes More Slowly, 
 Sometimes More Quickly. 
     Lemma I.  Bodies Are Distinguished From One Another In 
 Respect Of Motion And Rest,  Quickness And Slowness,  And Not In 
 Respect Of Substance. 
     Proof.-The First Part Of This Proposition Is,  I Take It, 
 Self-Evident.  That Bodies Are Not Distinguished In Respect Of 
 Substance,  Is Plain Both From I. V. And I. Viii.  It Is Brought 
 Out Still More Clearly From I. Xv,  Note. 
     Lemma Ii.  All Bodies Agree In Certain Respects. 
     Proof.-All Bodies Agree In The Fact,  That They Involve The 
 Conception Of One And The Same Attribute (Ii.,  Def. I.). 
 Further,  In The Fact That They May Be Moved Less Or More Quickly, 
 And May Be Absolutely In Motion Or At Rest. 
     Lemma Iii.  A Body In Motion Or At Rest Must Be Determined To 
 Motion Or Rest By Another Body,  Which Other Body Has Been 
 Determined To Motion Or Rest By A Third Body,  And That Third 
 Again By A Fourth,  And So On To Infinity. 
     Proof.-Bodies Are Individual Things (Ii.,  Def. I.),  Which 
 (Lemma I.) Are Distinguished One From The Other In Respect To 
 Motion And Rest ; Thus (I. Xxviii.) Each Must Necessarily Be 
 Determined To Motion Or Rest By Another Individual Thing,  Namely 
 (Ii. Vi.),  By Another Body,  Which Other Body Is Also (Ax. I.) In 
 Motion Or At Rest.  And This Body Again Can Only Have Been Set In 
 Motion Or Caused To Rest By Being Determined By A Third Body To 
 Motion Or Rest.   This Third Body Again By A Fourth,  And So On To 
 Infinity.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows,  That A Body In Motion Keeps In 
 Motion,  Until It Is Determined To A State Of Rest By Some Other 
 Body ; And A Body At Rest Remains So,  Until It Is Determined To A 
 State Of Motion By Some Other Body.  This Is Indeed Self-Evident. 
 For When I Suppose,  For Instance,  That A Given Body,  A,  Is At 
 Rest,  And Do Not Take Into Consideration Other Bodies In Motion, 
 I Cannot Affirm Anything Concerning The Body A,  Except That It Is 
 At Rest.  If It Afterwards Comes To Pass That A Is In Motion, 
 This Cannot Have Resulted From Its Having Been At Rest,  For No 
 Other Consequence Could Have Been Involved Than Its Remaining At 
 Rest.  If,  On The Other Hand,  A Be Given In Motion,  We Shall,  So 
 Long As We Only Consider A,  Be Unable To Affirm Anything 
 Concerning It,  Except That It Is In Motion.   If A Is 
 Subsequently Found To Be At Rest,  This Rest Cannot Be The Result 
 Of A's Previous Motion,  For Such Motion Can Only Have Led To 
 Continued Motion ; The State Of Rest Therefore Must Have Resulted 
 From Something,  Which Was Not In A,  Namely,  From An External 
 Cause Determining A To A State Of Rest. 
     Axiom I.-All Modes,  Wherein One Body Is Affected By Another 
 Body,  Follow Simultaneously From The Nature Of The Body Affected 
 And The Body Affecting ; So That One And The Same Body May Be 
 Moved In Different Modes,  According To The Difference In The 
 Nature Of The Bodies Moving It ; On The Other Hand,  Different 
 Bodies May Be Moved In Different Modes By One And The Same Body. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 42 
     Axiom Ii.-When A Body In Motion Impinges On Another Body At 
 Rest,  Which It Is Unable To Move,  It Recoils,  In Order To 
 Continue Its Motion,  And The Angle Made By The Line Of Motion In 
 The Recoil And The Plane Of The Body At Rest,  Whereon The Moving 
 Body Has Impinged,  Will Be Equal To The Angle Formed By The Line 
 Of Motion Of Incidence And The Same Plane. 
     So Far We Have Been Speaking Only Of The Most Simple Bodies, 
 Which Are Only Distinguished One From The Other By Motion And 
 Rest,  Quickness And Slowness.  We Now Pass On To Compound Bodies. 
     Definition.-When Any Given Bodies Of The Same Or Different 
 Magnitude Are Compelled By Other Bodies To Remain In Contact,  Or 
 If They Be Moved At The Same Or Different Rates Of Speed,  So That 
 Their Mutual Movements Should Preserve Among Themselves A Certain 
 Fixed Relation,  We Say That Such Bodies Are In Union,  And That 
 Together They Compose One Body Or Individual,  Which Is 
 Distinguished From Other Bodies By The Fact Of This Union. 
     Axiom Iii.-In Proportion As The Parts Of An Individual,  Or A 
 Compound Body,  Are In Contact Over A Greater Or Less Superficies, 
 They Will With Greater Or Less Difficulty Admit Of Being Moved 
 From Their Position ; Consequently The Individual Will,  With 
 Greater Or Less Difficulty,  Be Brought To Assume Another Form. 
 Those Bodies,  Whose Parts Are In Contact Over Large Superficies, 
 Are Called Hard ; Those,  Whose Parts Are In Contact Over Small 
 Superficies,  Are Called Soft ; Those,  Whose Parts Are In Motion 
 Among One Another,  Are Called Fluid. 
     Lemma Iv.  If From A Body Or Individual,  Compounded Of 
 Several Bodies,  Certain Bodies Be Separated,  And If,  At The Same 
 Time,  An Equal Number Of Other Bodies Of The Same Nature Take 
 Their Place,  The Individual Will Preserve Its Nature As Before, 
 Without Any Change In Its Actuality (Forma). 
     Proof.-Bodies (Lemma I.) Are Not Distinguished In Respect Of 
 Substance : That Which Constitutes The Actuality (Formam) Of An 
 Individual Consists (By The Last Def.) In A Union Of Bodies ; But 
 This Union,  Although There Is A Continual Change Of Bodies,  Will 
 (By Our Hypothesis) Be Maintained ; The Individual,  Therefore, 
 Will Retain Its Nature As Before,  Both In Respect Of Substance 
 And In Respect Of Mode.  Q.E.D. 
     Lemma V.  If The Parts Composing An Individual Become Greater 
 Or Less,  But In Such Proportion,  That They All Preserve The Same 
 Mutual Relations Of Motion And Rest,  The Individual Will Still 
 Preserve Its Original Nature,  And Its Actuality Will Not Be 
 Changed. 
     Proof.-The Same As For The Last Lemma. 
     Lemma Vi.  If Certain Bodies Composing An Individual Be 
 Compelled To Change The Motion,  Which They Have In One Direction, 
 For Motion In Another Direction,  But In Such A Manner,  That They 
 Be Able To Continue Their Motions And Their Mutual Communication 
 In The Same Relations As Before,  The Individual Will Retain Its 
 Own Nature Without Any Change Of Its Actuality. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Self-Evident,  For The Individual 
 Is Supposed To Retain All That,  Which,  In Its Definition,  We 
 Spoke Of As Its Actual Being. 
     Lemma Vii.  Furthermore,  The Individual Thus Composed 
 Preserves Its Nature,  Whether It Be,  As A Whole,  In Motion Or At 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 43 
 Rest,  Whether It Be Moved In This Or That Direction ; So Long As 
 Each Part Retains Its Motion,  And Preserves Its Communication 
 With Other Parts As Before. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Evident From The Definition Of An 
 Individual Prefixed To Lemma Iv. 
     Note.-We Thus See,  How A Composite Individual May Be Affected 
 In Many Different Ways,  And Preserve Its Nature Notwithstanding. 
 Thus Far We Have Conceived An Individual As Composed Of Bodies 
 Only Distinguished One From The Other In Respect Of Motion And 
 Rest,  Speed And Slowness ; That Is,  Of Bodies Of The Most Simple 
 Character.  If,  However,  We Now Conceive Another Individual 
 Composed Of Several Individuals Of Diverse Natures,  We Shall Find 
 That The Number Of Ways In Which It Can Be Affected,  Without 
 Losing Its Nature,  Will Be Greatly Multiplied.  Each Of Its Parts 
 Would Consist Of Several Bodies,  And Therefore (By Lemma Vi.) 
 Each Part Would Admit,  Without Change To Its Nature,  Of Quicker 
 Or Slower Motion,  And Would Consequently Be Able To Transmit Its 
 Motions More Quickly Or More Slowly To The Remaining Parts.  If 
 We Further Conceive A Third Kind Of Individuals Composed Of 
 Individuals Of This Second Kind,  We Shall Find That They May Be 
 Affected In A Still Greater Number Of Ways Without Changing Their 
 Actuality.  We May Easily Proceed Thus To Infinity,  And Conceive 
 The Whole Of Nature As One Individual,  Whose Parts,  That Is,  All 
 Bodies,  Vary In Infinite Ways,  Without Any Change In The 
 Individual As A Whole.  I Should Feel Bound To Explain And 
 Demonstrate This Point At More Length,  If I Were Writing A 
 Special Treatise On Body.  But I Have Already Said That Such Is 
 Not My Object ; I Have Only Touched On The Question,  Because It 
 Enables Me To Prove Easily That Which I Have In View. 
   
 Postulates 
     I.  The Human Body Is Composed Of A Number Of Individual 
 Parts,  Of Diverse Nature,  Each One Of Which Is In Itself 
 Extremely Complex. 
     Ii.  Of The Individual Parts Composing The Human Body Some 
 Are Fluid,  Some Soft,  Some Hard. 
     Iii.  The Individual Parts Composing The Human Body,  And 
 Consequently The Human Body Itself,  Are Affected In A Variety Of 
 Ways By External Bodies. 
     Iv.  The Human Body Stands In Need For Its Preservation Of A 
 Number Of Other Bodies,  By Which It Is Continually,  So To Speak, 
 Regenerated. 
     V.  When The Fluid Part Of The Human Body Is Determined By An 
 External Body To Impinge Often On Another Soft Part,  It Changes 
 The Surface Of The Latter,  And,  As It Were,  Leaves The Impression 
 Thereupon Of The External Body Which Impels It. 
     Vi.  The Human Body Can Move External Bodies,  And Arrange 
 Them In A Variety Of Ways. 
   
 Prop. Xiv.  The Human Mind Is Capable Of Perceiving A Great 
 Number Of Things,  And Is So In Proportion As Its Body Is Capable 
 Of Receiving A Great Number Of Impressions. 
     Proof.-The Human Body (By Post. Iii. And Vi.) Is Affected In 
 Very Many Ways By External Bodies,  And Is Capable In Very Many 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 44 
 Ways Of Affecting External Bodies.  But (Ii. Xii.)  The Human 
 Mind Must Perceive All That Takes Place In The Human Body ; The 
 Human Mind Is,  Therefore,  Capable Of Perceiving A Great Number Of 
 Things,  And Is So In Proportion,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xv.  The Idea,  Which Constitutes The Actual Being Of The 
 Human Mind,  Is Not Simple,  But Compounded Of A Great Number Of 
 Ideas. 
     Proof.-The Idea Constituting The Actual Being Of The Human 
 Mind Is The Idea Of The Body (Ii. Xiii.),  Which (Post. I.) Is 
 Composed Of A Great Number Of Complex Individual Parts.  But 
 There Is Necessarily In God The Idea Of Each Individual Part 
 Whereof The Body Is Composed (Ii. Viii. Coroll.)  ; Therefore 
 (Ii. Vii.),  The Idea Of The Human Body Is Composed Of These 
 Numerous Ideas Of Its Component Parts.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xvi.  The Idea Of Every Mode,  In Which The Human Body Is 
 Affected By External Bodies,  Must Involve The Nature Of The Human 
 Body,  And Also The Nature Of The External Body. 
     Proof.-All The Modes,  In Which Any Given Body Is Affected, 
 Follow From The Nature Of The Body Affected,  And Also From The 
 Nature Of The Affecting Body (By Ax. I.,  After The Coroll. Of 
 Lemma Iii.),  Wherefore Their Idea Also Necessarily (By I. Ax. 
 Iv.) Involves The Nature Of Both Bodies ; Therefore,  The Idea Of 
 Every Mode,  In Which The Human Body Is Affected By External 
 Bodies,  Involves The Nature Of The Human Body And Of The External 
 Body.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary I.-Hence It Follows,  First,  That The Human Mind 
 Perceives The Nature Of A Variety Of Bodies,  Together With The 
 Nature Of Its Own. 
     Corollary Ii.-It Follows,  Secondly,  That The Ideas,  Which We 
 Have Of External Bodies,  Indicate Rather The Constitution Of Our 
 Own Body Than The Nature Of External Bodies.  I Have Amply 
 Illustrated This In The Appendix To Part I. 
   
 Prop. Xvii.  If The Human Body Is Affected In A Manner Which 
 Involves The Nature Of Any External Body,  The Human Mind Will 
 Regard The Said External Body As Actually Existing,  Or As Present 
 To Itself,  Until The Human Body Be Affected In Such A Way,  As To 
 Exclude The Existence Or The Presence Of The Said External Body. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Self-Evident,  For So Long As The 
 Human Body Continues To Be Thus Affected,  So Long Will The Human 
 Mind (Ii. Xii.) Regard This Modification Of The Body-That Is (By 
 The Last Prop.),  It Will Have The Idea Of The Mode As Actually 
 Existing,  And This Idea Involves The Nature Of The External Body. 
 In Other Words,  It Will Have The Idea Which Does Not Exclude,  But 
 Postulates The Existence Or Presence Of The Nature Of The 
 External Body ; Therefore The Mind (By Ii. Xvi.,  Coroll. I.) Will 
 Regard The External Body As Actually Existing,  Until It Is 
 Affected,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-The Mind Is Able To Regard As Present External 
 Bodies,  By Which The Human Body Has Once Been Affected,  Even 
 Though They Be No Longer In Existence Or Present. 
     Proof.-When External Bodies Determine The Fluid Parts Of The 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 45 
 Human Body,  So That They Often Impinge On The Softer Parts,  They 
 Change The Surface Of The Last Named (Post. V.) ; Hence (Ax. Ii., 
 After The Coroll. Of Lemma Iii.) They Are Refracted Therefrom In 
 A Different Manner From That Which They Followed Before Such 
 Change ; And,  Further,  When Afterwards They Impinge On The New 
 Surfaces By Their Own Spontaneous Movement,  They Will Be 
 Refracted In The Same Manner,  As Though They Had Been Impelled 
 Towards Those Surfaces By External Bodies ; Consequently,  They 
 Will,  While They Continue To Be Thus Refracted,  Affect The Human 
 Body In The Same Manner,  Whereof The Mind (Ii. Xii.) Will Again 
 Take Cognizance-That Is (Ii. Xvii.),  The Mind Will Again Regard 
 The External Body As Present,  And Will Do So,  As Often As The 
 Fluid Parts Of The Human Body Impinge On The Aforesaid Surfaces 
 By Their Own Spontaneous Motion.  Wherefore,  Although The 
 External Bodies,  By Which The Human Body Has Once Been Affected, 
 Be No Longer In Existence,  The Mind Will Nevertheless Regard Them 
 As Present,  As Often As This Action Of The Body Is Repeated. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-We Thus See How It Comes About,  As Is Often The Case, 
 That We Regard As Present Many Things Which Are Not.  It Is 
 Possible That The Same Result May Be Brought About By Other 
 Causes ; But I Think It Suffices For Me Here To Have Indicated 
 One Possible Explanation,  Just As Well As If I Had Pointed Out 
 The True Cause.  Indeed,  I Do Not Think I Am Very Far From The 
 Truth,  For All My Assumptions Are Based On Postulates,  Which 
 Rest,  Almost Without Exception,  On Experience,  That Cannot Be 
 Controverted By Those Who Have Shown,  As We Have,  That The Human 
 Body,  As We Feel It,  Exists (Coroll. After Ii. Xiii.). 
 Furthermore (Ii. Vii.  Coroll.,  Ii. Xvi. Coroll. Ii.),  We Clearly 
 Understand What Is The Difference Between The Idea,  Say,  Of 
 Peter,  Which Constitutes The Essence Of Peter's Mind,  And The 
 Idea Of The Said Peter,  Which Is In Another Man,  Say,  Paul.  The 
 Former Directly Answers To The Essence Of Peter's Own Body,  And 
 Only  Implies Existence So Long As Peter Exists ; The Latter 
 Indicates Rather The Disposition Of Paul's Body Than The Nature 
 Of Peter,  And,  Therefore,  While This Disposition Of Paul's Body 
 Lasts,  Paul's Mind Will Regard Peter As Present To Itself,  Even 
 Though He No Longer Exists.  Further,  To Retain The Usual 
 Phraseology,   The Modifications Of The Human Body,  Of Which The 
 Ideas Represent External Bodies As Present To Us,  We Will Call 
 The Images Of Things,  Though They Do Not Recall The Figure Of 
 Things.  When The Mind Regards Bodies In This Fashion,  We Say 
 That It Imagines.  I Will Here Draw Attention To The Fact,  In 
 Order To Indicate Where Error Lies,  That The Imaginations Of The 
 Mind,  Looked At In Themselves,  Do Not Contain Error.  The Mind 
 Does Not Err In The Mere Act Of Imagining,  But Only In So Far As 
 It Is Regarded As Being Without The Idea,  Which Excludes The 
 Existence Of Such Things As It Imagines To Be Present To It.  If 
 The Mind,  While Imagining Non-Existent Things As Present To It, 
 Is At The Same Time Conscious That They Do Not Really Exist,  This 
 Power Of Imagination Must Be Set Down To The Efficacy Of Its 
 Nature,  And Not To A Fault,  Especially If This Faculty Of 
 Imagination Depend Solely On Its Own Nature-That Is (I. Def. 
 Vii.),  If This Faculty Of Imagination Be Free. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 46 
   
 Prop. Xviii.  If The Human Body Has Once Been Affected By Two Or 
 More Bodies At The Same Time,  When The Mind Afterwards Imagines 
 Any Of Them,  It Will Straightway Remember The Others Also. 
     Proof.-The Mind (Ii. Xvii. Coroll.) Imagines Any Given Body, 
 Because The Human Body Is Affected And Disposed By The 
 Impressions From An External Body,  In The Same Manner As It Is 
 Affected When Certain Of Its Parts Are Acted On By The Said 
 External Body ; But (By Our Hypothesis) The Body Was Then So 
 Disposed,  That The Mind Imagined Two Bodies At Once ; Therefore, 
 It Will Also In The Second Case Imagine Two Bodies At Once,  And 
 The Mind,  When It Imagines One,  Will Straightway Remember The 
 Other.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-We Now Clearly See What Memory Is.  It Is Simply A 
 Certain Association Of Ideas Involving The Nature Of Things 
 Outside The Human Body,  Which Association Arises In The Mind 
 According To The Order And Association Of The Modifications 
 (Affectiones) Of The Human Body.  I Say,  First,  It Is An 
 Association Of Those Ideas Only,  Which Involve The Nature Of 
 Things Outside The Human Body : Not Of Ideas Which Answer To The 
 Nature Of The Said Things : Ideas Of The Modifications Of The 
 Human Body Are,  Strictly Speaking (Ii. Xvi.),  Those Which Involve 
 The Nature Both Of The Human Body And Of External Bodies.  I Say, 
 Secondly,  That This Association Arises According To The Order And 
 Association Of The Modifications Of The Human Body,  In Order To 
 Distinguish It From That Association Of Ideas,  Which Arises From 
 The Order Of The Intellect,  Whereby The Mind Perceives Things 
 Through Their Primary Causes,  And Which Is In All Men The Same. 
 And Hence We Can Further Clearly Understand,  Why The Mind From 
 The Thought Of One Thing,  Should Straightway Arrive At The 
 Thought Of Another Thing,  Which Has No Similarity With The First 
 ; For Instance,  From The Thought Of The Word Pomum (An Apple),  A 
 Roman Would Straightway Arrive At The Thought Of The Fruit Apple, 
 Which Has No Similitude With The Articulate Sound In Question, 
 Nor Anything In Common With It,  Except That The Body Of The Man 
 Has Often Been Affected By These Two Things ; That Is,  That The 
 Man Has Often Heard The Word Pomum,  While He Was Looking At The 
 Fruit ; Similarly Every Man Will Go On From One Thought To 
 Another,  According As His Habit Has Ordered The Images Of Things 
 In His Body.  For A Soldier,  For Instance,  When He Sees The 
 Tracks Of A Horse In Sand,  Will At Once Pass From The Thought Of 
 A Horse To The Thought Of A Horseman,  And Thence To The Thought 
 Of War,  &C. ; While A Countryman Will Proceed From The Thought Of 
 A Horse To The Thought Of A Plough,  A Field,  &C.  Thus Every Man 
 Will Follow This Or That Train Of Thought,  According As He Has 
 Been In The Habit Of Conjoining And Associating The Mental Images 
 Of Things In This Or That Manner. 
   
 Prop. Xix.  The Human Mind Has No Knowledge Of The Body,  And Does 
 Not Know It To Exist,  Save Through The Ideas Of The Modifications 
 Whereby The Body Is Affected. 
     Proof.-The Human Mind Is The Very Idea Or Knowledge Of The 
 Human Body (Ii. Xiii.),  Which (Ii. Ix.) Is In God,  In So Far As 
 He Is Regarded As Affected By Another Idea Of A Particular Thing 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 47 
 Actually Existing : Or,  Inasmuch As (Post. Iv.) The Human Body 
 Stands In Need Of Very Many Bodies Whereby It Is,  As It Were, 
 Continually Regenerated ; And The Order And Connection Of Ideas 
 Is The Same As The Order And Connection Of Causes (Ii. Vii.) ; 
 This Idea Will Therefore Be In God,  In So Far As He Is Regarded 
 As Affected By The Ideas Of Very Many Particular Things.  Thus 
 God Has The Idea Of The Human Body,  Or Knows The Human Body,  In 
 So Far As He Is Affected By Very Many Other Ideas,  And Not In So 
 Far As He Constitutes The Nature Of The Human Mind ; That Is (By 
 Ii. Xi. Coroll.),  The Human Mind Does Not Know The Human Body. 
 But The Ideas Of The Modifications Of Body Are In God,  In So Far 
 As  He Constitutes The Nature Of The Human Mind,  Or The Human 
 Mind Perceives Those Modifications (Ii. Xii.),  And Consequently 
 (Ii. Xvi.) The Human Body Itself,  And As Actually Existing ; 
 Therefore The Mind Perceives Thus Far Only The Human Body. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xx.  The Idea Or Knowledge Of The Human Mind Is Also In 
 God,  Following In God In The Same Manner,  And Being Referred To 
 God In The Same Manner,  As The Idea Or Knowledge Of The Human 
 Body. 
     Proof.-Thought Is An Attribute Of God (Ii. I.) ; Therefore 
 (Ii. Iii.) There Must Necessarily Be In God The Idea Both Of 
 Thought Itself And Of All Its Modifications,  Consequently Also Of 
 The Human Mind (Ii. Xi.).  Further,  This Idea Or Knowledge Of The 
 Mind Does Not Follow From God,  In So Far As He Is Infinite,  But 
 In So Far As He Is Affected By Another Idea Of An Individual 
 Thing (Ii. Ix.).  But (Ii. Vii.) The Order And Connection Of 
 Ideas Is The Same As The Order And Connection Of Causes ; 
 Therefore This Idea Or Knowledge Of The Mind Is In God And Is 
 Referred To God,  In The Same Manner As The Idea Or Knowledge Of 
 The Body.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxi.  This Idea Of The Mind Is United To The Mind In The 
 Same Way As The Mind Is United To The Body. 
     Proof.-That The Mind Is United To The Body We Have Shown From 
 The Fact,  That The Body Is The Object Of The Mind (Ii. Xii. And 
 Xiii.) ; And So For The Same Reason The Idea Of The Mind Must Be 
 United With Its Object,  That Is,  With The Mind In The Same Manner 
 As The Mind Is United To The Body.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Proposition Is Comprehended Much More Clearly From 
 What We Have Said In The Note To Ii. Vii.  We There Showed That 
 The Idea Of Body And Body,  That Is,  Mind And Body (Ii. Xiii.), 
 Are One And The Same Individual Conceived Now Under The Attribute 
 Of Thought,  Now Under The Attribute Of Extension ; Wherefore The 
 Idea Of The Mind And The Mind Itself Are One And The Same Thing, 
 Which Is Conceived Under One And The Same Attribute,  Namely, 
 Thought.  The Idea Of The Mind,  I Repeat,  And The Mind Itself Are 
 In God By The Same Necessity And Follow From Him From The Same 
 Power Of Thinking.  Strictly Speaking,  The Idea Of The Mind,  That 
 Is,  The Idea Of An Idea,  Is Nothing But The Distinctive Quality 
 (Forma) Of The Idea In So Far As It Is Conceived As A Mode Of 
 Thought Without Reference To The Object ; If A Man Knows 
 Anything,  He,  By That Very Fact,  Knows That He Knows It,  And At 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 48 
 The Same Time Knows That He Knows That He Knows It,  And So On To 
 Infinity.  But I Will Treat Of This Hereafter. 
   
 Prop. Xxii.  The Human Mind Perceives Not Only The Modifications 
 Of The Body,  But Also The Ideas Of Such Modifications. 
     Proof.-The Ideas Of The Ideas Of Modifications Follow In God 
 In The Same Manner,  And Are Referred To God In The Same Manner, 
 As The Ideas Of The Said Modifications.  This Is Proved In The 
 Same Way As Ii. Xx.  But The Ideas Of The Modifications Of The 
 Body Are In The Human Mind (Ii. Xii.),  That Is,  In God,  In So Far 
 As He Constitutes The Essence Of The Human Mind ; Therefore The 
 Ideas Of These Ideas Will Be In God,  In So Far As He Has The 
 Knowledge Or Idea Of The Human Mind,  That Is (Ii. Xxi.),  They 
 Will Be In The Human Mind Itself,  Which Therefore Perceives Not 
 Only The Modifications Of The Body,  But Also The Ideas Of Such 
 Modifications.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxiii.  The Mind Does Not Know Itself,  Except In So Far As 
 It Perceives The Ideas Of The Modifications Of The Body. 
     Proof.-The Idea Or Knowledge Of The Mind (Ii. Xx.) Follows In 
 God In The Same Manner,  And Is Referred To God In The Same 
 Manner,  As The Idea Or Knowledge Of The Body.  But Since (Ii. 
 Xix.) The Human Mind Does Not Know The Human Body Itself,  That Is 
 (Ii. Xi. Coroll.),  Since The Knowledge Of The Human Body Is Not 
 Referred To God,  In So Far As He Constitutes The Nature Of The 
 Human Mind ; Therefore,  Neither Is The Knowledge Of The Mind 
 Referred To God,  In So Far As He Constitutes The Essence Of The 
 Human Mind ; Therefore (By The Same Coroll. Ii. Xi.),  The Human 
 Mind Thus Far Has No Knowledge Of Itself.  Further The Ideas Of 
 The Modifications,  Whereby The Body Is Affected,  Involve The 
 Nature Of The Human Body Itself (Ii. Xvi.),  That Is (Ii. Xiii.), 
 They Agree With The Nature Of The Mind ; Wherefore The Knowledge 
 Of These Ideas Necessarily Involves Knowledge Of The Mind ; But 
 (By The Last Prop.) The Knowledge Of These Ideas Is In The Human 
 Mind Itself ; Wherefore The Human Mind Thus Far Only Has 
 Knowledge Of Itself.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxiv.  The Human Mind Does Not Involve An Adequate 
 Knowledge Of The Parts Composing The Human Body. 
     Proof.-The Parts Composing The Human Body Do Not Belong To 
 The Essence Of That Body,  Except In So Far As They Communicate 
 Their Motions To One Another In A Certain Fixed Relation (Def. 
 After Lemma Iii.),  Not In So Far As They Can Be Regarded As 
 Individuals Without Relation To The Human Body.  The Parts Of The 
 Human Body Are Highly Complex Individuals  (Post. I.),  Whose 
 Parts (Lemma Iv.) Can Be Separated From The Human Body Without In 
 Any Way Destroying The Nature And Distinctive Quality Of The 
 Latter,  And They Can Communicate Their Motions (Ax. I.,  After 
 Lemma Iii.) To Other Bodies In Another Relation ; Therefore (Ii. 
 Iii.)  The Idea Or Knowledge Of Each Part Will Be In God, 
 Inasmuch (Ii. Ix.) As He Is Regarded As Affected By Another Idea 
 Of A Particular Thing,  Which Particular Thing Is Prior In The 
 Order Of Nature To The Aforesaid Part (Ii. Vii.).  We May Affirm 
 The Same Thing Of Each Part Of Each Individual Composing The 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 49 
 Human Body ; Therefore,  The Knowledge Of Each Part Composing The 
 Human Body Is In God,  In So Far As He Is Affected By Very Many 
 Ideas Of Things,  And Not In So Far As He Has The Idea Of The 
 Human Body Only,  In Other Words,  The Idea Which Constitutes The 
 Nature Of The Human Mind (Ii. Xiii) ; Therefore (Ii. Xi. 
 Coroll.),  The Human Mind Does Not Involve An Adequate Knowledge 
 Of The Human Body.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxv.  The Idea Of Each Modification Of The Human Body Does 
 Not Involve An Adequate Knowledge Of The External Body. 
     Proof.-We Have Shown That The Idea Of A Modification Of The 
 Human Body Involves The Nature Of An External Body,  In So Far As 
 That External Body Conditions The Human Body In A Given Manner. 
 But,  In So Far As The External Body Is An Individual,  Which Has 
 No Reference To The Human Body,  The Knowledge Or Idea Thereof Is 
 In God (Ii. Ix.),  In So Far As God Is Regarded As Affected By The 
 Idea Of A Further Thing,  Which (Ii. Vii.) Is Naturally Prior To 
 The Said External Body.  Wherefore An Adequate Knowledge Of The 
 External Body Is Not In God,  In So Far As He Has The Idea Of The 
 Modification Of The Human Body ; In Other Words,  The Idea Of The 
 Modification Of The Human Body Does Not Involve An Adequate 
 Knowledge Of The External Body.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxvi.  The Human Mind Does Not Perceive Any External Body 
 As Actually Existing,  Except Through The Ideas Of The 
 Modifications Of Its Own Body. 
     Proof.-If The Human Body Is In No Way Affected By A Given 
 External Body,  Then  (Ii. Vii.) Neither Is The Idea Of The Human 
 Body,  In Other Words,  The Human Mind,  Affected In Any Way By The 
 Idea Of The Existence Of The Said External Body,  Nor Does It In 
 Any Manner Perceive Its Existence.  But,  In So Far As The Human 
 Body Is Affected In Any Way By A Given External Body,  Thus Far 
 (Ii. Xvi. And Coroll.) It Perceives That External Body.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-In So Far As The Human Mind Imagines An External 
 Body,  It Has Not An Adequate Knowledge Thereof. 
     Proof.-When The Human Mind Regards External Bodies Through 
 The Ideas Of The Modifications Of Its Own Body,  We Say That It 
 Imagines (See Ii. Xvii. Note) ; Now The Mind Can Only Imagine 
 External Bodies As Actually Existing.  Therefore (By Ii. Xxv.), 
 In So Far As The Mind Imagines External Bodies,  It Has Not An 
 Adequate Knowledge Of Them.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxvii.  The Idea Of Each Modification Of The Human Body 
 Does Not Involve An Adequate Knowledge Of The Human Body Itself. 
     Proof.-Every Idea Of A Modification Of The Human Body 
 Involves The Nature Of The Human Body,  In So Far As The Human 
 Body Is Regarded As Affected In A Given Manner (Ii. Xvi.).  But, 
 Inasmuch As The Human Body Is An Individual Which May Be Affected 
 In Many Other Ways,  The Idea Of The Said Modification,  &C. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxviii.  The Ideas Of The Modifications Of The Human Body, 
 In So Far As They Have Reference Only To The Human Mind,  Are Not 
 Clear And Distinct,  But Confused. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 50 
     Proof.-The Ideas Of The Modifications Of The Human Body 
 Involve The Nature Both Of The Human Body And Of External Bodies 
 (Ii. Xvi.) ; They Must Involve The Nature Not Only Of The Human 
 Body But Also Of Its Parts ; For The Modifications Are Modes 
 (Post. Iii.),  Whereby The Parts Of The Human Body,  And, 
 Consequently,  The Human Body As A Whole Are Affected.   But (By 
 Ii. Xxiv.,  Xxv.) The Adequate Knowledge Of External Bodies,  As 
 Also Of The Parts Composing The Human Body,  Is Not In God,  In So 
 Far As He Is Regarded As Affected By The Human Mind,  But In So 
 Far As He Is Regarded As Affected By Other Ideas.  These Ideas Of 
 Modifications,  In So Far As They Are Referred To The Human Mind 
 Alone,  Are As Consequences Without Premisses,  In Other Words, 
 Confused Ideas.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-The Idea Which Constitutes The Nature Of The Human Mind 
 Is,  In The Same Manner,  Proved Not To Be,  When Considered In 
 Itself Alone,  Clear And Distinct ; As Also Is The Case With The 
 Idea Of The Human Mind,  And The Ideas Of The Ideas Of The 
 Modifications Of The Human Body,  In So Far As They Are Referred 
 To The Mind Only,  As Everyone May Easily See. 
   
 Prop. Xxix.  The Idea Of The Idea Of Each Modification Of The 
 Human Body Does Not Involve An Adequate Knowledge Of The Human 
 Mind. 
     Proof.-The Idea Of A Modification Of The Human Body (Ii. 
 Xxvii.) Does Not Involve An Adequate Knowledge Of The Said Body, 
 In Other Words,  Does Not Adequately Express Its Nature ; That Is 
 (Ii. Xiii.) It Does Not Agree With The Nature Of The Mind 
 Adequately ; Therefore (I. Ax. Vi) The Idea Of This Idea Does Not 
 Adequately Express The Nature Of The Human Mind,  Or Does Not 
 Involve An Adequate Knowledge Thereof. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That The Human Mind,  When It 
 Perceives Things After The Common Order Of Nature,  Has Not An 
 Adequate But Only A Confused And Fragmentary Knowledge Of Itself, 
 Of Its Own Body,  And Of External Bodies.  For The Mind Does Not 
 Know Itself,  Except In So Far As It Perceives The Ideas Of The 
 Modifications Of Body (Ii. Xxiii.).  It Only Perceives Its Own 
 Body (Ii. Xix.) Through The Ideas Of The Modifications,  And Only 
 Perceives External Bodies Through The Same Means ; Thus,  In So 
 Far As It Has Such Ideas Of Modification,  It Has Not An Adequate 
 Knowledge Of Itself (Ii. Xxix.),  Nor Of Its Own Body (Ii. 
 Xxvii.),  Nor Of External Bodies (Ii. Xxv.),  But Only A 
 Fragmentary And Confused Knowledge Thereof (Ii. Xxviii. And 
 Note).  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-I Say Expressly,  That The Mind Has Not An Adequate But 
 Only A Confused Knowledge Of Itself,  Its Own Body,  And Of 
 External Bodies,  Whenever It Perceives Things After The Common 
 Order Of Nature ; That Is,  Whenever It Is Determined From 
 Without,  Namely,  By The Fortuitous Play Of Circumstance,  To 
 Regard This Or That ; Not At Such Times As It Is Determined From 
 Within,  That Is,  By The Fact Of Regarding Several Things At Once, 
 To Understand Their Points Of Agreement,  Difference,  And 
 Contrast.  Whenever It Is Determined In Anywise From Within,  It 
 Regards Things Clearly And Distinctly,  As I Will Show Below. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 51 
 Prop. Xxx.  We Can Only Have A Very Inadequate Knowledge Of The 
 Duration Of Our Body. 
     Proof.-The Duration Of Our Body Does Not Depend On Its 
 Essence (Ii. Ax. I.),  Nor On The Absolute Nature Of God (I. 
 Xxi.).  But (I. Xxviii.) It Is Conditioned To Exist And Operate 
 By Causes,  Which In Their Turn Are Conditioned To Exist And 
 Operate In A Fixed And Definite Relation By Other Causes,  These 
 Last Again Being Conditioned By Others,  And So On To Infinity. 
 The Duration Of Our Body Therefore Depends On The Common Order Of 
 Nature,  Or The Constitution Of Things.  Now,  However A Thing May 
 Be Constituted,  The Adequate Knowledge Of That Thing Is In God, 
 In So Far As He Has The Ideas Of All Things,  And Not In So Far As 
 He Has The Idea Of The Human Body Only.  (Ii. Ix. Coroll.) 
 Wherefore The Knowledge Of The Duration Of Our Body Is In God 
 Very Inadequate,  In So Far As He Is Only Regarded As Constituting 
 The Nature Of The Human Mind ; That Is (Ii. Xi. Coroll.),  This 
 Knowledge Is Very Inadequate To Our Mind.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxi.  We Can Only Have A Very Inadequate Knowledge Of The 
 Duration Of Particular Things External To Ourselves. 
     Proof.-Every Particular Thing,  Like The Human Body,  Must Be 
 Conditioned By Another Particular Thing To Exist And Operate In A 
 Fixed And Definite Relation ; This Other Particular Thing Must 
 Likewise Be Conditioned By A Third,  And So On To Infinity.  (I. 
 Xxviii.)  As We Have Shown In The Foregoing Proposition,  From 
 This Common Property Of Particular Things,  We Have Only A Very 
 Inadequate Knowledge Of The Duration Of Our Body ; We Must Draw A 
 Similar Conclusion With Regard To The Duration Of Particular 
 Things,  Namely,  That We Can Only Have A Very Inadequate Knowledge 
 Of The Duration Thereof.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That All Particular Things Are 
 Contingent And Perishable.  For We Can Have No Adequate Idea Of 
 Their Duration (By The Last Prop.),  And This Is What We Must 
 Understand By The Contingency And Perishableness Of Things.  (I. 
 Xxxiii.,  Note I.)  For (I. Xxix.),  Except In This Sense,  Nothing 
 Is Contingent. 
   
 Prop. Xxxii.  All Ideas,  In So Far As They Are Referred To God, 
 Are True. 
     Proof.-All Ideas Which Are In God Agree In Every Respect With 
 Their Objects (Ii. Vii. Coroll.),  Therefore (I. Ax. Vi.) They Are 
 All True.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiii.  There Is Nothing Positive In Ideas,  Which Causes 
 Them To Be Called False. 
     Proof.-If This Be Denied,  Conceive,  If Possible,  A Positive 
 Mode Of Thinking,  Which Should Constitute The Distinctive Quality 
 Of Falsehood.  Such A Mode Of Thinking Cannot Be In God (Ii. 
 Xxxii.) ; External To God It Cannot Be Or Be Conceived (I. Xv.). 
 Therefore There Is Nothing Positive In Ideas Which Causes Them To 
 Be Called False.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiv.  Every Idea,  Which In Us Is Absolute Or Adequate And 
 Perfect,  Is True. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 52 
     Proof.-When We Say That An Idea In Us Is Adequate And 
 Perfect,  We Say,  In Other Words (Ii. Xi. Coroll.),  That The Idea 
 Is Adequate And Perfect In God,  In So Far As He Constitutes The 
 Essence Of Our Mind ; Consequently (Ii. Xxxii.),  We Say That Such 
 An Idea Is True.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxv.  Falsity Consists In The Privation Of Knowledge, 
 Which Inadequate,  Fragmentary,  Or Confused Ideas Involve. 
     Proof.-There Is Nothing Positive In Ideas,  Which Causes Them 
 To Be Called False (Ii. Xxxiii.) ; But Falsity Cannot Consist In 
 Simple Privation (For Minds,  Not Bodies,  Are Said To Err And To 
 Be Mistaken),  Neither Can It Consist In Absolute Ignorance,  For 
 Ignorance And Error Are Not Identical ; Wherefore It Consists In 
 The Privation Of Knowledge,  Which Inadequate,  Fragmentary,  Or 
 Confused Ideas Involve.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-In The Note To Ii. Xvii. I Explained How Error Consists 
 In The Privation Of Knowledge,  But In Order To Throw More Light 
 On The Subject I Will Give An Example.  For Instance,  Men Are 
 Mistaken In Thinking Themselves Free ; Their Opinion Is Made Up 
 Of Consciousness Of Their Own Actions,  And Ignorance Of The 
 Causes By Which They Are Conditioned.  Their Idea Of Freedom, 
 Therefore,  Is Simply Their Ignorance Of Any Cause For Their 
 Actions.  As For Their Saying That Human Actions Depend On The 
 Will,  This Is A Mere Phrase Without Any Idea To Correspond 
 Thereto.  What The Will Is,  And How It Moves The Body,  They None 
 Of Them Know ; Those Who Boast Of Such Knowledge,  And Feign 
 Dwellings And Habitations For The Soul,  Are Wont To Provoke 
 Either Laughter Or Disgust.  So,  Again,  When We Look At The Sun, 
 We Imagine That It Is Distant From Us About Two Hundred Feet ; 
 This Error Does Not Lie Solely In This Fancy,  But In The Fact 
 That,  While We Thus Imagine,  We Do Not Know The Sun's True 
 Distance Or The Cause Of The Fancy.  For Although We Afterwards 
 Learn,  That The Sun Is Distant From Us More Than Six Hundred Of 
 The Earth's Diameters,  We None The Less Shall Fancy It To Be Near 
 ; For We Do Not Imagine The Sun As Near Us,  Because We Are 
 Ignorant Of Its True Distance,  But Because The Modification Of 
 Our Body Involves The Essence Of The Sun,  In So Far As Our Said 
 Body Is Affected Thereby. 
   
 Prop. Xxxvi.  Inadequate And Confused Ideas Follow By The Same 
 Necessity,  As Adequate Or Clear And Distinct Ideas. 
     Proof.-All Ideas Are In God (I. Xv.),  And In So Far As They 
 Are Referred To God Are True (Ii. Xxxii.) And (Ii. Vii. Coroll.) 
 Adequate ; Therefore There Are No Ideas Confused Or Inadequate, 
 Except In Respect To A Particular Mind (Cf. Ii. Xxiv. And 
 Xxviii.) ; Therefore All Ideas,  Whether Adequate Or Inadequate, 
 Follow By The Same Necessity (Ii. Vi.).  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxvii.  That Which Is Common To All (Cf. Lemma Ii., 
 Above),  And Which Is Equally In A Part And In The Whole,  Does Not 
 Constitute The Essence Of Any Particular Thing. 
     Proof.-If This Be Denied,  Conceive,  If Possible,  That It 
 Constitutes The Essence Of Some Particular Thing ; For Instance, 
 The Essence Of B.  Then (Ii. Def. Ii.) It Cannot Without B Either 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 53 
 Exist Or Be Conceived ; But This Is Against Our Hypothesis. 
 Therefore It Does Not Appertain To B's Essence,  Nor Does It 
 Constitute The Essence Of Any Particular Thing.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxviii.  Those Things,  Which Are Common To All,  And Which 
 Are Equally In A Part And In The Whole,  Cannot Be Conceived 
 Except Adequately. 
     Proof.-Let A Be Something,  Which Is Common To All Bodies,  And 
 Which Is Equally Present In The Part Of Any Given Body And In The 
 Whole.  I Say A Cannot Be Conceived Except Adequately.  For The 
 Idea Thereof In God Will Necessarily Be Adequate (Ii. Vii. 
 Coroll.),  Both In So Far As God Has The Idea Of The Human Body, 
 And Also In So Far As He Has The Idea Of The Modifications Of The 
 Human Body,  Which (Ii. Xvi.,  Xxv.,  Xxvii.) Involve In Part The 
 Nature Of The Human Body And The Nature Of External Bodies ; That 
 Is (Ii. Xii.,  Xiii.),  The Idea In God Will Necessarily Be 
 Adequate,  Both In So Far As He Constitutes The Human Mind,  And In 
 So Far As He Has The Ideas,  Which Are In The Human Mind. 
 Therefore The Mind (Ii. Xi. Coroll.) Necessarily Perceives A 
 Adequately,  And Has This Adequate Perception,  Both In So Far As 
 It Perceives Itself,  And In So Far As It Perceives Its Own Or Any 
 External Body,  Nor Can A Be Conceived In Any Other Manner. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Corollary-Hence It Follows That There Are Certain Ideas Or 
 Notions Common To All Men ; For (By Lemma Ii.) All Bodies Agree 
 In Certain Respects,  Which (By The Foregoing Prop.) Must Be 
 Adequately Or Clearly And Distinctly Perceived By All. 
   
 Prop. Xxxix.  That,  Which Is Common To And A Property Of The 
 Human Body And Such Other Bodies As Are Wont To Affect The Human 
 Body,  And Which Is Present Equally In Each Part Of Either,  Or In 
 The Whole,  Will Be Represented By An Adequate Idea In The Mind. 
     Proof.-If A Be That,  Which Is Common To And A Property Of The 
 Human Body And External Bodies,  And Equally Present In The Human 
 Body And In The Said External Bodies,  In Each Part Of Each 
 External Body And In The Whole,  There Will Be An Adequate Idea Of 
 A In God (Ii. Vii. Coroll.),  Both In So Far As He Has The Idea Of 
 The Human Body,  And In So Far As He Has The Ideas Of The Given 
 External Bodies.  Let It Now Be Granted,  That The Human Body Is 
 Affected By An External Body Through That,  Which It Has In Common 
 Therewith,  Namely,  A ; The Idea Of This Modification Will Involve 
 The Property A (Ii. Xvi.),  And Therefore (Ii. Vii. Coroll.) The 
 Idea Of This Modification,  In So Far As It Involves The Property 
 A,  Will Be Adequate In God,  In So Far As God Is Affected By The 
 Idea Of The Human Body ; That Is (Ii. Xiii.),  In So Far As He 
 Constitutes The Nature Of The Human Mind ; Therefore (Ii. Xi. 
 Coroll.) This Idea Is Also Adequate In The Human Mind.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That The Mind Is Fitted To 
 Perceive Adequately More Things,  In Proportion As Its Body Has 
 More In Common With Other Bodies. 
   
 Prop. Xl.  Whatsoever Ideas In The Mind Follow From Ideas Which 
 Are Therein Adequate,  Are Also Themselves Adequate. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Self-Evident.  For When We Say 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 54 
 That An Idea In The Human Mind Follows From Ideas Which Are 
 Therein Adequate,  We Say,  In Other Words (Ii. Xi. Coroll.),  That 
 An Idea Is In The Divine Intellect,  Whereof God Is The Cause,  Not 
 In So Far As He Is Infinite,  Nor In So Far As He Is Affected By 
 The Ideas Of Very Many Particular Things,  But Only In So Far As 
 He Constitutes The Essence Of The Human Mind. 
     Note I.-I Have Thus Set Forth The Cause Of Those Notions, 
 Which Are Common To All Men,  And Which Form The Basis Of Our 
 Ratiocination.  But There Are Other Causes Of Certain Axioms Or 
 Notions,  Which It Would Be To The Purpose To Set Forth By This 
 Method Of Ours ; For It Would Thus Appear What Notions Are More 
 Useful Than Others,  And What Notions Have Scarcely Any Use At 
 All.  Furthermore,  We Should See What Notions Are Common To All 
 Men,  And What Notions Are Only Clear And Distinct To Those Who 
 Are Unshackled By Prejudice,  And We Should Detect Those Which Are 
 Ill-Founded.  Again We Should Discern Whence The Notions Called 
 Secondary Derived Their Origin,  And Consequently The Axioms On 
 Which They Are Founded,  And Other Points Of Interest Connected 
 With These Questions.  But I Have Decided To Pass Over The 
 Subject Here,  Partly Because I Have Set It Aside For Another 
 Treatise,  Partly Because I Am Afraid Of Wearying The Reader By 
 Too Great Prolixity.  Nevertheless,  In Order Not To Omit Anything 
 Necessary To Be Known,  I Will Briefly Set Down The Causes,  Whence 
 Are Derived The Terms Styled Transcendental,  Such As Being, 
 Thing,  Something.  These Terms Arose From The Fact,  That The 
 Human Body,  Being Limited,  Is Only Capable Of Distinctly Forming 
 A Certain Number Of Images (What An Image Is I Explained In The 
 Ii. Xvii. Note) Within Itself At The Same Time ; If This Number 
 Be Exceeded,  The Images Will Begin To Be Confused ; If This 
 Number Of Images,  Of Which The Body Is Capable Of Forming 
 Distinctly Within Itself,  Be Largely Exceeded,  All Will Become 
 Entirely Confused One With Another.  This Being So,  It Is Evident 
 (From Ii. Prop. Xvii. Coroll.,  And Xviii.) That The Human Mind 
 Can Distinctly Imagine As Many Things Simultaneously,  As Its Body 
 Can Form Images Simultaneously.  When The Images Become Quite 
 Confused In The Body,  The Mind Also Imagines All Bodies 
 Confusedly Without Any Distinction,  And Will Comprehend Them,  As 
 It Were,  Under One Attribute,  Namely,  Under The Attribute Of 
 Being,  Thing,  &C.  The Same Conclusion Can Be Drawn From The Fact 
 That Images Are Not Always Equally Vivid,  And From Other 
 Analogous Causes,  Which There Is No Need To Explain Here ; For 
 The Purpose Which We Have In View It Is Sufficient For Us To 
 Consider One Only.  All May Be Reduced To This,  That These Terms 
 Represent Ideas In The Highest Degree Confused.  From Similar 
 Causes Arise Those Notions,  Which We Call General,  Such As Man, 
 Horse,  Dog,  &C.  They Arise,  To Wit,  From The Fact That So Many 
 Images,  For Instance,  Of Men,  Are Formed Simultaneously In The 
 Human Mind,  That The Powers Of Imagination Break Down,  Not Indeed 
 Utterly,  But To The Extent Of The Mind Losing Count Of Small 
 Differences Between Individuals (E.G. Colour,  Size,  &C.) And 
 Their Definite Number,  And Only Distinctly Imagining That,  In 
 Which All The Individuals,  In So Far As The Body Is Affected By 
 Them,  Agree ; For That Is The Point,  In Which Each Of The Said 
 Individuals Chiefly Affected The Body ; This The Mind Expresses 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 55 
 By The Name Man,  And This It Predicates Of An Infinite Number Of 
 Particular Individuals.  For,  As We Have Said,  It Is Unable To 
 Imagine The Definite Number Of Individuals.  We Must,  However, 
 Bear In Mind,  That These General Notions Are Not Formed By All 
 Men In The Same Way,  But Vary In Each Individual According As The 
 Point Varies,  Whereby The Body Has Been Most Often Affected And 
 Which The Mind Most Easily Imagines Or Remembers.  For Instance, 
 Those Who Have Most Often Regarded With Admiration The Stature Of 
 Man,  Will By The Name Of Man Understand An Animal Of Erect 
 Stature ; Those Who Have Been Accustomed To Regard Some Other 
 Attribute,  Will Form A Different General Image Of Man,  For 
 Instance,  That Man Is A Laughing Animal,  A Two-Footed Animal 
 Without Feathers,  A Rational Animal,  And Thus,  In Other Cases, 
 Everyone Will Form General Images Of Things According To The 
 Habit Of His Body. 
     It Is Thus Not To Be Wondered At,  That Among Philosophers, 
 Who Seek To Explain Things In Nature Merely By The Images Formed 
 Of Them,  So Many Controversies Should Have Arisen. 
     Note Ii.-From All That Has Been Said Above It Is Clear,  That 
 We,  In Many Cases,  Perceive And Form Our General Notions :-(1.) 
 From Particular Things Represented To Our Intellect 
 Fragmentarily,  Confusedly,  And Without Order Through Our Senses 
 (Ii. Xxix. Coroll.) ; I Have Settled To Call Such Perceptions By 
 The Name Of Knowledge From The Mere Suggestions Of Experience.4 
 (2.) From Symbols,  E.G.,  From The Fact Of Having Read Or Heard 
 Certain Words We Remember Things And Form Certain Ideas 
 Concerning Them,  Similar To Those Through Which We Imagine Things 
 (Ii. Xviii. Note).  I Shall Call Both These Ways Of Regarding 
 Things Knowledge Of The First Kind,  Opinion,  Or Imagination. 
 (3.) From The Fact That We Have Notions Common To All Men,  And 
 Adequate Ideas Of The Properties Of Things (Ii. Xxxviii. Coroll., 
 Xxxix. And Coroll. And Xl.) ; This I Call Reason And Knowledge Of 
 The Second Kind.  Besides These Two Kinds Of Knowledge,  There Is, 
 As I Will Hereafter Show,  A Third Kind Of Knowledge,  Which We 
 Will Call Intuition.  This Kind Of Knowledge Proceeds From An 
 Adequate Idea Of The Absolute Essence Of Certain Attributes Of 
 God To The Adequate Knowledge Of The Essence Of Things.  I Will 
 Illustrate All Three Kinds Of Knowledge By A Single Example. 
 Three Numbers Are Given For Finding A Fourth,  Which Shall Be To 
 The Third As The Second Is To The First.  Tradesmen Without 
 Hesitation Multiply The Second By The Third,  And Divide The 
 Product By The First ; Either Because They Have Not Forgotten The 
 Rule Which They Received From A Master Without Any Proof,  Or 
 Because They Have Often Made Trial Of It With Simple Numbers,  Or 
 By Virtue Of The Proof Of The Nineteenth Proposition Of The 
 Seventh Book Of Euclid,  Namely,  In Virtue Of The General Property 
 Of Proportionals. 
     But With Very Simple Numbers There Is No Need Of This.  For 
 Instance,  One,  Two,  Three,  Being Given,  Everyone Can See That The 
 Fourth Proportional Is Six ; And This Is Much Clearer,  Because We 
 Infer The Fourth Number From An Intuitive Grasping Of The Ratio, 
 Which The First Bears To The Second. 
   
 Prop. Xli.  Knowledge Of The First Kind Is The Only Source Of 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 56 
 Falsity,  Knowledge Of The Second And Third Kinds Is Necessarily 
 True. 
     Proof.-To Knowledge Of The First Kind We Have (In The 
 Foregoing Note) Assigned All Those Ideas,  Which Are Inadequate 
 And Confused ; Therefore This Kind Of Knowledge Is The Only 
 Source Of Falsity (Ii. Xxxv.).  Furthermore,  We Assigned To The 
 Second And Third Kinds Of Knowledge Those Ideas Which Are 
 Adequate ; Therefore These Kinds Are Necessarily True (Ii. 
 Xxxiv.).  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xlii.  Knowledge Of The Second And Third Kinds,  Not 
 Knowledge Of The First Kind,  Teaches Us To Distinguish The True 
 From The False. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Self-Evident.  He,  Who Knows How 
 To Distinguish Between True And False,  Must Have An Adequate Idea 
 Of True And False.  That Is (Ii. Xl.,  Note Ii.),  He Must Know The 
 True And The False By The Second Or Third Kind Of Knowledge. 
   
 Prop. Xliii.  He,  Who Has A True Idea,  Simultaneously Knows That 
 He Has A True Idea,  And Cannot Doubt Of The Truth Of The Thing 
 Perceived. 
     Proof.-A True Idea In Us Is An Idea Which Is Adequate In God, 
 In So Far As He Is Displayed Through The Nature Of The Human Mind 
 (Ii. Xi. Coroll.).  Let Us Suppose That There Is In God,  In So 
 Far As He Is Displayed Through The Human Mind,  An Adequate Idea, 
 A.  The Idea Of This Idea Must Also Necessarily Be In God,  And Be 
 Referred To Him In The Same Way As The Idea A (By Ii. Xx., 
 Whereof The Proof Is Of Universal Application).  But The Idea A 
 Is Supposed To Be Referred To God,  In So Far As He Is Displayed 
 Through The Human Mind ; Therefore,  The Idea Of The Idea A Must 
 Be Referred To God In The Same Manner ; That Is (By Ii. Xi. 
 Coroll.),  The Adequate Idea Of The Idea A Will Be In The Mind, 
 Which Has The Adequate Idea A ; Therefore He,  Who Has An Adequate 
 Idea Or Knows A Thing Truly (Ii. Xxxiv.),  Must At The Same Time 
 Have An Adequate Idea Or True Knowledge Of His Knowledge ; That 
 Is,  Obviously,  He Must Be Assured.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-I Explained In The Note To Ii. Xxi. What Is Meant By 
 The Idea Of An Idea ; But We May Remark That The Foregoing 
 Proposition Is In Itself Sufficiently Plain.  No One,  Who Has A 
 True Idea,  Is Ignorant That A True Idea Involves The Highest 
 Certainty.  For To Have A True Idea Is Only Another Expression 
 For Knowing A Thing Perfectly,  Or As Well As Possible.  No One, 
 Indeed,  Can Doubt Of This,  Unless He Thinks That An Idea Is 
 Something Lifeless,  Like A Picture On A Panel,  And Not A Mode Of 
 Thinking-Namely,  The Very Act Of Understanding.  And Who,  I Ask, 
 Can Know That He Understands Anything,  Unless He Do First 
 Understand It?  In Other Words,  Who Can Know That He Is Sure Of A 
 Thing,  Unless He Be First Sure Of That Thing?  Further,  What Can 
 There Be More Clear,  And More Certain,  Than A True Idea As A 
 Standard Of Truth?  Even As Light Displays Both Itself And 
 Darkness,  So Is Truth A Standard Both Of Itself And Of Falsity. 
     I Think I Have Thus Sufficiently Answered These 
 Questions-Namely,  If A True Idea Is Distinguished From A False 
 Idea,  Only In So Far As It Is Said To Agree With Its Object,  A 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 57 
 True Idea Has No More Reality Or Perfection Than A False Idea 
 (Since The Two Are Only Distinguished By An Extrinsic Mark) ; 
 Consequently,  Neither Will A Man Who Has A True Idea Have Any 
 Advantage Over Him Who Has Only False Ideas.  Further,  How Comes 
 It That Men Have False Ideas?  Lastly,  How Can Anyone Be Sure, 
 That He Has Ideas Which Agree With Their Objects?  These 
 Questions,  I Repeat,  I Have,  In My Opinion,  Sufficiently 
 Answered.  The Difference Between A True Idea And A False Idea Is 
 Plain : From What Was Said In Ii. Xxxv.,  The Former Is Related To 
 The Latter As Being Is To Not-Being.  The Causes Of Falsity I 
 Have Set Forth Very Clearly In Ii. Xix. And Ii. Xxxv. With The 
 Note.  From What Is There Stated,  The Difference Between A Man 
 Who Has True Ideas,  And A Man Who Has Only False Ideas,  Is Made 
 Apparent.  As For The Last Question-As To How A Man Can Be Sure 
 That He Has Ideas That Agree With Their Objects,  I Have Just 
 Pointed Out,  With Abundant Clearness,  That His Knowledge Arises 
 From The Simple Fact,  That He Has An Idea Which Corresponds With 
 Its Object-In Other Words,  That Truth Is Its Own Standard.  We 
 May Add That Our Mind,  In So Far As It Perceives Things Truly,  Is 
 Part Of The Infinite Intellect Of God (Ii. Xi. Coroll.) ; 
 Therefore,  The Clear And Distinct Ideas Of The Mind Are As 
 Necessarily True As The Ideas Of God. 
   
 Prop. Xliv.  It Is Not In The Nature Of Reason To Regard Things 
 As Contingent,  But As Necessary. 
     Proof.-It Is In The Nature Of Reason To Perceive Things Truly 
 (Ii. Xli.),  Namely (I. Ax. Vi.),  As They Are In Themselves-That 
 Is (I. Xxix.),  Not As Contingent,  But As Necessary.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary I.-Hence It Follows,  That It Is Only Through Our 
 Imagination That We Consider Things,  Whether In Respect To The 
 Future Or The Past,  As Contingent. 
     Note.-How This Way Of Looking At Things Arises,  I Will 
 Briefly Explain.  We Have Shown Above (Ii. Xvii. And Coroll.) 
 That The Mind Always Regards Things As Present To Itself,  Even 
 Though They Be Not In Existence,  Until Some Causes Arise Which 
 Exclude Their Existence And Presence.  Further (Ii. Xviii.),  We 
 Showed That,  If The Human Body Has Once Been Affected By Two 
 External Bodies Simultaneously,  The Mind,  When It Afterwards 
 Imagines One Of The Said External Bodies,  Will Straightway 
 Remember The Other-That Is,  It Will Regard Both As Present To 
 Itself,  Unless There Arise Causes Which Exclude Their Existence 
 And Presence.  Further,  No One Doubts That We Imagine Time,  From 
 The Fact That We Imagine Bodies To Be Moved Some More Slowly Than 
 Others,  Some More Quickly,  Some At Equal Speed.  Thus,  Let Us 
 Suppose That A Child Yesterday Saw Peter For The First Time In 
 The Morning,  Paul At Noon,  And Simon In The Evening ; Then,  That 
 Today He Again Sees Peter In The Morning.  It Is Evident,  From 
 Ii. Prop. Xviii.,  That,  As Soon As He Sees The Morning Light,  He 
 Will Imagine That The Sun Will Traverse The Same Parts Of The 
 Sky,  As It Did When He Saw It On The Preceding Day ; In Other 
 Words,  He Will Imagine A Complete Day,  And,  Together With His 
 Imagination Of The Morning,  He Will Imagine Peter ; With Noon,  He 
 Will Imagine Paul ; And With Evening,  He Will Imagine Simon-That 
 Is,  He Will Imagine The Existence Of Paul And Simon In Relation 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 58 
 To A Future Time ; On The Other Hand,  If He Sees Simon In The 
 Evening,  He Will Refer Peter And Paul To A Past Time,  By 
 Imagining Them Simultaneously With The Imagination Of A Past 
 Time.  If It Should At Any Time Happen,  That On Some Other 
 Evening The Child Should See James Instead Of Simon,  He Will,  On 
 The Following Morning,  Associate With His Imagination Of Evening 
 Sometimes Simon,  Sometimes James,  Not Both Together : For The 
 Child Is Supposed To Have Seen,  At Evening,  One Or Other Of Them, 
 Not Both Together.  His Imagination Will Therefore Waver ; And, 
 With The Imagination Of Future Evenings,  He Will Associate First 
 One,  Then The Other-That Is,  He Will Imagine Them In The Future, 
 Neither Of Them As Certain,  But Both As Contingent.  This 
 Wavering Of The Imagination Will Be The Same,  If The Imagination 
 Be Concerned With Things Which We Thus Contemplate,  Standing In 
 Relation To Time Past Or Time Present : Consequently,  We May 
 Imagine Things As Contingent,  Whether They Be Referred To Time 
 Present,  Past,  Or Future. 
     Corollary Ii.-It Is In The Nature Of Reason To Perceive 
 Things Under A Certain Form Of Eternity (Sub Quâdam Æternitatis 
 Specie). 
     Proof.-It Is In The Nature Of Reason To Regard Things,  Not As 
 Contingent,  But As Necessary (Ii. Xliv.).  Reason Perceives This 
 Necessity Of Things (Ii. Xli.) Truly-That Is (I. Ax. Vi.),  As It 
 Is In Itself.  But (I. Xvi.) This Necessity Of Things Is The Very 
 Necessity Of The Eternal Nature Of God ; Therefore,  It Is In The 
 Nature Of Reason To Regard Things Under This Form Of Eternity. 
 We May Add That The Bases Of Reason Are The Notions (Ii. 
 Xxxviii.),  Which Answer To Things Common To All,  And Which (Ii. 
 Xxxvii.) Do Not Answer To The Essence Of Any Particular Thing : 
 Which Must Therefore Be Conceived Without Any Relation To Time, 
 Under A Certain Form Of Eternity. 
   
 Prop. Xlv.  Every Idea Of Every Body,  Or Of Every Particular 
 Thing Actually Existing,  Necessarily Involves The Eternal And 
 Infinite Essence Of God. 
     Proof.-The Idea Of A Particular Thing Actually Existing 
 Necessarily Involves Both The Existence And The Essence Of The 
 Said Thing (Ii. Viii.).  Now Particular Things Cannot Be 
 Conceived Without God (I. Xv.) ; But,  Inasmuch As (Ii. Vi.) They 
 Have God For Their Cause,  In So Far As He Is Regarded Under The 
 Attribute Of Which The Things In Question Are Modes,  Their Ideas 
 Must Necessarily Involve (I. Ax. Iv.) The Conception Of The 
 Attributes Of Those Ideas-That Is (I. Vi.),  The Eternal And 
 Infinite Essence Of God.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-By Existence I Do Not Here Mean Duration-That Is, 
 Existence In So Far As It Is Conceived Abstractedly,  And As A 
 Certain Form Of Quantity.  I Am Speaking Of The Very Nature Of 
 Existence,  Which Is Assigned To Particular Things,  Because They 
 Follow In Infinite Numbers And In Infinite Ways From The Eternal 
 Necessity Of God's Nature (I. Xvi.).  I Am Speaking,  I Repeat,  Of 
 The Very Existence Of Particular Things,  In So Far As They Are In 
 God.  For Although Each Particular Thing Be Conditioned By 
 Another Particular Thing To Exist In A Given Way,  Yet The Force 
 Whereby Each Particular Thing Perseveres In Existing Follows From 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 59 
 The Eternal Necessity Of God's Nature (Cf. I. Xxiv. Coroll.). 
   
 Prop. Xlvi.  The Knowledge Of The Eternal And Infinite Essence Of 
 God Which Every Idea Involves Is Adequate And Perfect. 
     Proof.-The Proof Of The Last Proposition Is Universal ; And 
 Whether A Thing Be Considered As A Part Or A Whole,  The Idea 
 Thereof,  Whether Of The Whole Or Of A Part (By The Last Prop.), 
 Will Involve God's Eternal And Infinite Essence.  Wherefore, 
 That,  Which Gives Knowledge Of The Eternal And Infinite Essence 
 Of God,  Is Common To All,  And Is Equally In The Part And In The 
 Whole ; Therefore (Ii. Xxxviii.) This Knowledge Will Be Adequate. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xlvii.  The Human Mind Has An Adequate Knowledge Of The 
 Eternal And Infinite Essence Of God. 
     Proof.-The Human Mind Has Ideas (Ii. Xxii.),  From Which (Ii. 
 Xxiii.) It Perceives Itself And Its Own Body (Ii. Xix.) And 
 External Bodies (Ii. Xvi. Coroll. I. And Ii. Xvii.) As Actually 
 Existing ; Therefore (Ii. Xlv. And Xlvi.) It Has An Adequate 
 Knowledge Of The Eternal And Infinite Essence Of God.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Hence We See,  That The Infinite Essence And The 
 Eternity Of God Are Known To All.  Now As All Things Are In God, 
 And Are Conceived Through God,  We Can From This Knowledge Infer 
 Many Things,  Which We May Adequately Know,  And We May Form That 
 Third Kind Of Knowledge Of Which We Spoke In The Note To Ii. Xl., 
 And Of The Excellence And Use Of Which We Shall Have Occasion To 
 Speak In Part V.  Men Have Not So Clear A Knowledge Of God As 
 They Have Of General Notions,  Because They Are Unable To Imagine 
 God As They Do Bodies,  And Also Because They Have Associated The 
 Name God With Images Of Things That They Are In The Habit Of 
 Seeing,  As Indeed They Can Hardly Avoid Doing,  Being,  As They 
 Are,  Men,  And Continually Affected By External Bodies.  Many 
 Errors,  In Truth,  Can Be Traced To This Head,  Namely,  That We Do 
 Not Apply Names To Things Rightly.  For Instance,  When A Man Says 
 That The Lines Drawn From The Centre Of A Circle To Its 
 Circumference Are Not Equal,  He Then,  At All Events,  Assuredly 
 Attaches A Meaning To The Word Circle Different From That 
 Assigned By Mathematicians.  So Again,  When Men Make Mistakes In 
 Calculation,  They Have One Set Of Figures In Their Mind,  And 
 Another On The Paper.  If We Could See Into Their Minds,  They Do 
 Not Make A Mistake ; They Seem To Do So,  Because We Think,  That 
 They Have The Same Numbers In Their Mind As They Have On The 
 Paper.  If This Were Not So,  We Should Not Believe Them To Be In 
 Error,  Any More Than I Thought That A Man Was In Error,  Whom I 
 Lately Heard Exclaiming That His Entrance Hall Had Flown Into A 
 Neighbour's Hen,  For His Meaning Seemed To Me Sufficiently Clear. 
 Very Many Controversies Have Arisen From The Fact,  That Men Do 
 Not Rightly Explain Their Meaning,  Or Do Not Rightly Interpret 
 The Meaning Of Others.  For,  As A Matter Of Fact,  As They Flatly 
 Contradict Themselves,  They Assume Now One Side,  Now Another,  Of 
 The Argument,  So As To Oppose The Opinions,  Which They Consider 
 Mistaken And Absurd In Their Opponents. 
   
 Prop. Xlviii.  In The Mind There Is No Absolute Or Free Will ; 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 60 
 But The Mind Is Determined To Wish This Or That By A Cause,  Which 
 Has Also Been Determined By Another Cause,  And This Last By 
 Another Cause,  And So On To Infinity. 
     Proof.-The Mind Is A Fixed And Definite Mode Of Thought (Ii. 
 Xi.),  Therefore It Cannot Be The Free Cause Of Its Actions (I. 
 Xvii. Coroll. Ii.) ; In Other Words,  It Cannot Have An Absolute 
 Faculty Of Positive Or Negative Volition ; But (By I. Xxviii.) It 
 Must Be Determined By A Cause,  Which Has Also Been Determined By 
 Another Cause,  And This Last By Another,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-In The Same Way It Is Proved,  That There Is In The Mind 
 No Absolute Faculty Of Understanding,  Desiring,  Loving,  &C. 
 Whence It Follows,  That These And Similar Faculties Are Either 
 Entirely Fictitious,  Or Are Merely Abstract And General Terms, 
 Such As We Are Accustomed To Put Together From Particular Things. 
 Thus The Intellect And The Will Stand In The Same Relation To 
 This Or That Idea,  Or This Or That Volition,  As "Lapidity" To 
 This Or That Stone,  Or As "Man" To Peter And Paul.  The Cause 
 Which Leads Men To Consider Themselves Free Has Been Set Forth In 
 The Appendix To Part I.  But,  Before I Proceed Further,  I Would 
 Here Remark That,  By The Will To Affirm And Decide,  I Mean The 
 Faculty,  Not The Desire.  I Mean,  I Repeat,  The Faculty,  Whereby 
 The Mind Affirms Or Denies What Is True Or False,  Not The Desire, 
 Wherewith The Mind Wishes For Or Turns Away From Any Given Thing. 
 After We Have Proved,  That These Faculties Of Ours Are General 
 Notions,  Which Cannot Be Distinguished From The Particular 
 Instances On Which They Are Based,  We Must Inquire Whether 
 Volitions Themselves Are Anything Besides The Ideas Of Things. 
 We Must Inquire,  I Say,  Whether There Is In The Mind Any 
 Affirmation Or Negation Beyond That,  Which The Idea,  In So Far As 
 It Is An Idea,  Involves.  On Which Subject See The Following 
 Proposition,  And Ii. Def. Iii.,  Lest The Idea Of Pictures Should 
 Suggest Itself.  For By Ideas I Do Not Mean Images Such As Are 
 Formed At The Back Of The Eye,  Or In The Midst Of The Brain,  But 
 The Conceptions Of Thought. 
   
 Prop. Xlix.  There Is In The Mind No Volition Or Affirmation And 
 Negation,  Save That Which An Idea,  Inasmuch As It Is An Idea, 
 Involves. 
     Proof.-There Is In The Mind No Absolute Faculty Of Positive 
 Or Negative Volition,  But Only Particular Volitions,  Namely,  This 
 Or That Affirmation,  And This Or That Negation.  Now Let Us 
 Conceive A Particular Volition,  Namely,  The Mode Of Thinking 
 Whereby The Mind Affirms,  That The Three Interior Angles Of A 
 Triangle Are Equal To Two Right Angles.  This Affirmation 
 Involves The Conception Or Idea Of A Triangle,  That Is,  Without 
 The Idea Of A Triangle It Cannot Be Conceived.  It Is The Same 
 Thing To Say,  That The Concept A Must Involve The Concept B,  As 
 It Is To Say,  That A Cannot Be Conceived Without B.  Further, 
 This Affirmation Cannot Be Made (Ii. Ax. Iii.) Without The Idea 
 Of A Triangle.  Therefore,  This Affirmation Can Neither Be Nor Be 
 Conceived,  Without The Idea Of A Triangle.  Again,  This Idea Of A 
 Triangle Must Involve This Same Affirmation,  Namely,  That Its 
 Three Interior Angles Are Equal To Two Right Angles.  Wherefore, 
 And Vice Versâ,  This Idea Of A Triangle Can Neither Be Nor Be 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 61 
   
 Conceived Without This Affirmation,  Therefore,  This Affirmation 
 Belongs To The Essence Of The Idea Of A Triangle,  And Is Nothing 
 Besides.  What We Have Said Of This Volition (Inasmuch As We Have 
 Selected It At Random) May Be Said Of Any Other Volition,  Namely, 
 That It Is Nothing But An Idea.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Will And Understanding Are One And The Same. 
     Proof.-Will And Understanding Are Nothing Beyond The 
 Individual Volitions And Ideas (Ii. Xlviii. And Note).  But A 
 Particular Volition And A Particular Idea Are One And The Same 
 (By The Foregoing Prop.) ; Therefore,  Will And Understanding Are 
 One And The Same.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-We Have Thus Removed The Cause Which Is Commonly 
 Assigned For Error.  For We Have Shown Above,  That Falsity 
 Consists Solely In The Privation Of Knowledge Involved In Ideas 
 Which Are Fragmentary And Confused.  Wherefore,  A False Idea, 
 Inasmuch As It Is False,  Does Not Involve Certainty.  When We 
 Say,  Then,  That A Man Acquiesces In What Is False,  And That He 
 Has No Doubts On The Subject,  We Do Not Say That He Is Certain, 
 But Only That He Does Not Doubt,  Or That He Acquiesces In What Is 
 False,  Inasmuch As There Are No Reasons,  Which Should Cause His 
 Imagination To Waver (See Ii. Xliv. Note).  Thus,  Although The 
 Man Be Assumed To Acquiesce In What Is False,  We Shall Never Say 
 That He Is Certain.  For By Certainty We Mean Something Positive 
 (Ii. Xliii. And Note),  Not Merely The Absence Of Doubt. 
     However,  In Order That The Foregoing Proposition May Be Fully 
 Explained,  I Will Draw Attention To A Few Additional Points,  And 
 I Will Furthermore Answer The Objections Which May Be Advanced 
 Against Our Doctrine.  Lastly,  In Order To Remove Every Scruple, 
 I Have Thought It Worth While To Point Out Some Of The 
 Advantages,  Which Follow Therefrom.  I Say "Some," For They Will 
 Be Better Appreciated From What We Shall Set Forth In The Fifth 
 Part. 
     I Begin,  Then,  With The First Point,  And Warn My Readers To 
 Make An Accurate Distinction Between An Idea,  Or Conception Of 
 The Mind,  And The Images Of Things Which We Imagine.  It Is 
 Further Necessary That They Should Distinguish Between Idea And 
 Words,  Whereby We Signify Things.  These Three-Namely,  Images, 
 Words,  And Ideas-Are By Many Persons Either Entirely Confused 
 Together,  Or Not Distinguished With Sufficient Accuracy Or Care, 
 And Hence People Are Generally In Ignorance,  How Absolutely 
 Necessary Is A Knowledge Of This Doctrine Of The Will,  Both For 
 Philosophic Purposes And For The Wise Ordering Of Life.  Those 
 Who Think That Ideas Consist In Images Which Are Formed In Us By 
 Contact With External Bodies,  Persuade Themselves That The Ideas 
 Of Those Things,  Whereof We Can Form No Mental Picture,  Are Not 
 Ideas,  But Only Figments,  Which We Invent By The Free Decree Of 
 Our Will ; They Thus Regard Ideas As Though They Were Inanimate 
 Pictures On A Panel,  And,  Filled With This Misconception,  Do Not 
 See That An Idea,  Inasmuch As It Is An Idea,  Involves An 
 Affirmation Or Negation.  Again,  Those Who Confuse Words With 
 Ideas,  Or With The Affirmation Which An Idea Involves,  Think That 
 They Can Wish Something Contrary To What They Feel,  Affirm,  Or 
 Deny.  This Misconception Will Easily Be Laid Aside By One,  Who 
 Reflects On The Nature Of Knowledge,  And Seeing That It In No 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 62 
 Wise Involves The Conception Of Extension,  Will Therefore Clearly 
 Understand,  That An Idea (Being A Mode Of Thinking) Does Not 
 Consist In The Image Of Anything,  Nor In Words.  The Essence Of 
 Words And Images Is Put Together By Bodily Motions,  Which In No 
 Wise Involve The Conception Of Thought. 
   
     These Few Words On This Subject Will Suffice : I Will 
 Therefore Pass On To Consider The Objections,  Which May Be Raised 
 Against Our Doctrine.  Of These,  The First Is Advanced By Those, 
 Who Think That The Will Has A Wider Scope Than The Understanding, 
 And That Therefore It Is Different Therefrom.  The Reason For 
 Their Holding The Belief,  That The Will Has Wider Scope Than The 
 Understanding,  Is That They Assert,  That They Have No Need Of An 
 Increase In Their Faculty Of Assent,  That Is Of Affirmation Or 
 Negation,  In Order To Assent To An Infinity Of Things Which We Do 
 Not Perceive,  But That They Have Need Of An Increase In Their 
 Faculty Of Understanding.  The Will Is Thus Distinguished From 
 The Intellect,  The Latter Being Finite And The Former Infinite. 
 Secondly,  It May Be Objected That Experience Seems To Teach Us 
 Especially Clearly,  That We Are Able To Suspend Our Judgment 
 Before Assenting To Things Which We Perceive ; This Is Confirmed 
 By The Fact That No One Is Said To Be Deceived,  In So Far As He 
 Perceives Anything,  But Only In So Far As He Assents Or Dissents. 
     For Instance,  He Who Feigns A Winged Horse,  Does Not 
 Therefore Admit That A Winged Horse Exists ; That Is,  He Is Not 
 Deceived,  Unless He Admits In Addition That A Winged Horse Does 
 Exist.  Nothing Therefore Seems To Be Taught More Clearly By 
 Experience,  Than That The Will Or Faculty Of Assent Is Free And 
 Different From The Faculty Of Understanding.  Thirdly,  It May Be 
 Objected That One Affirmation Does Not Apparently Contain More 
 Reality Than Another ; In Other Words,  That We Do Not Seem To 
 Need For Affirming,  That What Is True Is True,  Any Greater Power 
 Than For Affirming,  That What Is False Is True.  We Have, 
 However,  Seen That One Idea Has More Reality Or Perfection Than 
 Another,  For As Objects Are Some More Excellent Than Others,  So 
 Also Are The Ideas Of Them Some More Excellent Than Others ; This 
 Also Seems To Point To A Difference Between The Understanding And 
 The Will.  Fourthly,  It May Be Objected,  If Man Does Not Act From 
 Free Will,  What Will Happen If The Incentives To Action Are 
 Equally Balanced,  As In The Case Of Buridan's Ass?  Will He 
 Perish Of Hunger And Thirst?  If I Say That He Would,  I Shall 
 Seem To Have In My Thoughts An Ass Or The Statue Of A Man Rather 
 Than An Actual Man.  If I Say That He Would Not,  He Would Then 
 Determine His Own Action,  And Would Consequently Possess The 
 Faculty Of Going And Doing Whatever He Liked.  Other Objections 
 Might Also Be Raised,  But,  As I Am Not Bound To Put In Evidence 
 Everything That Anyone May Dream,  I Will Only Set Myself To The 
 Task Of Refuting Those I Have Mentioned,  And That As Briefly As 
 Possible. 
     To The First Objection I Answer,  That I Admit That The Will 
 Has A Wider Scope Than The Understanding,  If By The Understanding 
 Be Meant Only Clear And Distinct Ideas ; But I Deny That The Will 
 Has A Wider Scope Than The Perceptions,  And The Faculty Of 
 Forming Conceptions ; Nor Do I See Why The Faculty Of Volition 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 63 
 Should Be Called Infinite,  Any More Than The Faculty Of Feeling : 
 For,  As We Are Able By The Same Faculty Of Volition To Affirm An 
 Infinite Number Of Things (One After The Other,  For We Cannot 
 Affirm An Infinite Number Simultaneously),  So Also Can We,  By The 
 Same Faculty Of Feeling,  Feel Or Perceive (In Succession) An 
 Infinite Number Of Bodies.  If It Be Said That There Is An 
 Infinite Number Of Things Which We Cannot Perceive,  I Answer, 
 That We Cannot Attain To Such Things By Any Thinking,  Nor, 
 Consequently,  By Any Faculty Of Volition.  But,  It May Still Be 
 Urged,  If God Wished To Bring It About That We Should Perceive 
 Them,  He Would Be Obliged To Endow Us With A Greater Faculty Of 
 Perception,  But Not A Greater Faculty Of Volition Than We Have 
 Already.  This Is The Same As To Say That,  If God Wished To Bring 
 It About That We Should Understand An Infinite Number Of Other 
 Entities,  It Would Be Necessary For Him To Give Us A Greater 
 Understanding,  But Not A More Universal Idea Of Entity Than That 
 Which We Have Already,  In Order To Grasp Such Infinite Entities. 
 We Have Shown That Will Is A Universal Entity Or Idea,  Whereby We 
 Explain All Particular Volitions-In Other Words,  That Which Is 
 Common To All Such Volitions. 
     As,  Then,  Our Opponents Maintain That This Idea,  Common Or 
 Universal To All Volitions,  Is A Faculty,  It Is Little To Be 
 Wondered At That They Assert,  That Such A Faculty Extends Itself 
 Into The Infinite,  Beyond The Limits Of The Understanding : For 
 What Is Universal Is Predicated Alike Of One,  Of Many,  And Of An 
 Infinite Number Of Individuals. 
     To The Second Objection I Reply By Denying,  That We Have A 
 Free Power Of Suspending Our Judgment : For,  When We Say That 
 Anyone Suspends His Judgment,  We Merely Mean That He Sees,  That 
 He Does Not Perceive The Matter In Question Adequately. 
 Suspension Of Judgment Is,  Therefore,  Strictly Speaking,  A 
 Perception,  And Not Free Will.  In Order To Illustrate The Point, 
 Let Us Suppose A Boy Imagining A Horse,  And Perceive Nothing 
 Else.  Inasmuch As This Imagination Involves The Existence Of The 
 Horse (Ii. Xvii. Coroll.),  And The Boy Does Not Perceive Anything 
 Which Would Exclude The Existence Of The Horse,  He Will 
 Necessarily Regard The Horse As Present : He Will Not Be Able To 
 Doubt Of Its Existence,  Although He Be Not Certain Thereof.  We 
 Have Daily Experience Of Such A State Of Things In Dreams ; And I 
 Do Not Suppose That There Is Anyone,  Who Would Maintain That, 
 While He Is Dreaming,  He Has The Free Power Of Suspending His 
 Judgment Concerning The Things In His Dream,  And Bringing It 
 About That He Should Not Dream Those Things,  Which He Dreams That 
 He Sees ; Yet It Happens,  Notwithstanding,  That Even In Dreams We 
 Suspend Our Judgment,  Namely,  When We Dream That We Are Dreaming. 
     Further,  I Grant That No One Can Be Deceived,  So Far As 
 Actual Perception Extends-That Is,  I Grant That The Mind's 
 Imaginations,  Regarded In Themselves,  Do Not Involve Error (Ii. 
 Xvii. Note) ; But I Deny,  That A Man Does Not,  In The Act Of 
 Perception,  Make Any Affirmation.  For What Is The Perception Of 
 A Winged Horse,  Save Affirming That A Horse Has Wings?  If The 
 Mind Could Perceive Nothing Else But The Winged Horse,  It Would 
 Regard The Same As Present To Itself : It Would Have No Reasons 
 For Doubting Its Existence,  Nor Any Faculty Of Dissent,  Unless 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 64 
 The Imagination Of A Winged Horse Be Joined To An Idea Which 
 Precludes The Existence Of The Said Horse,  Or Unless The Mind 
 Perceives That The Idea Which It Possess Of A Winged Horse Is 
 Inadequate,  In Which Case It Will Either Necessarily Deny The 
 Existence Of Such A Horse,  Or Will Necessarily Be In Doubt On The 
 Subject. 
     I Think That I Have Anticipated My Answer To The Third 
 Objection,  Namely,  That The Will Is Something Universal Which Is 
 Predicated Of All Ideas,  And That It Only Signifies That Which Is 
 Common To All Ideas,  Namely,  An Affirmation,  Whose Adequate 
 Essence Must,  Therefore,  In So Far As It Is Thus Conceived In The 
 Abstract,  Be In Every Idea,  And Be,  In This Respect Alone,  The 
 Same In All,  Not In So Far As It Is Considered As Constituting 
 The Idea's Essence : For,  In This Respect,  Particular 
 Affirmations Differ One From The Other,  As Much As Do Ideas.  For 
 Instance,  The Affirmation Which Involves The Idea Of A Circle, 
 Differs From That Which Involves The Idea Of A Triangle,  As Much 
 As The Idea Of A Circle Differs From The Idea Of A Triangle. 
     Further,  I Absolutely Deny,  That We Are In Need Of An Equal 
 Power Of Thinking,  To Affirm That That Which Is True Is True,  And 
 To Affirm That That Which Is False Is True.  These Two 
 Affirmations,  If We Regard The Mind,  Are In The Same Relation To 
 One Another As Being And Not-Being ; For There Is Nothing 
 Positive In Ideas,  Which Constitutes The Actual Reality Of 
 Falsehood (Ii. Xxxv. Note,  And Xlvii. Note). 
     We Must Therefore Conclude,  That We Are Easily Deceived,  When 
 We Confuse Universals With Singulars,  And The Entities Of Reason 
 And Abstractions With Realities.  As For The Fourth Objection,  I 
 Am Quite Ready To Admit,  That A Man Placed In The Equilibrium 
 Described  (Namely,  As Perceiving Nothing But Hunger And Thirst, 
 A Certain Food And A Certain Drink,  Each Equally Distant From 
 Him) Would Die Of Hunger And Thirst.  If I Am Asked,  Whether Such 
 An One Should Not Rather Be Considered An Ass Than A Man ; I 
 Answer,  That I Do Not Know,  Neither Do I Know How A Man Should Be 
 Considered,  Who Hangs Himself,  Or How We Should Consider 
 Children,  Fools,  Madmen,  &C. 
     It Remains To Point Out The Advantages Of A Knowledge Of This 
 Doctrine As Bearing On Conduct,  And This May Be Easily Gathered 
 From What Has Been Said.  The Doctrine Is Good, 
     1. Inasmuch As It Teaches Us To Act Solely According To The 
 Decree Of God,  And To Be Partakers In The Divine Nature,  And So 
 Much The More,  As We Perform More Perfect Actions And More And 
 More Understand God.  Such A Doctrine Not Only Completely 
 Tranquilizes Our Spirit,  But Also Shows Us Where Our Highest 
 Happiness Or Blessedness Is,  Namely,  Solely In The Knowledge Of 
 God,  Whereby We Are Led To Act Only As Love And Piety Shall Bid 
 Us.  We May Thus Clearly Understand,  How Far Astray From A True 
 Estimate Of Virtue Are Those Who Expect To Be Decorated By God 
 With High Rewards For Their Virtue,  And Their Best Actions,  As 
 For Having Endured The Direst Slavery ; As If Virtue And The 
 Service Of God Were Not In Itself Happiness And Perfect Freedom. 
     2. Inasmuch As It Teaches Us,  How We Ought To Conduct 
 Ourselves With Respect To The Gifts Of Fortune,  Or Matters Which 
 Are Not In Our Power,  And Do Not Follow From Our Nature.  For It 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 2  (On The Nature And Origin Of The Mind) Propositions Pg 65 
 Shows Us,  That We Should Await And Endure Fortune's Smiles Or 
 Frowns With An Equal Mind,  Seeing That All Things Follow From The 
 Eternal Decree Of God By The Same Necessity,  As It Follows From 
 The Essence Of A Triangle,  That The Three Angles Are Equal To Two 
 Right Angles. 
     3. This Doctrine Raises Social Life,  Inasmuch As It Teaches 
 Us To Hate No Man,  Neither To Despise,  To Deride,  To Envy,  Or To 
 Be Angry With Any.  Further,  As It Tells Us That Each Should Be 
 Content With His Own,  And Helpful To His Neighbour,  Not From Any 
 Womanish Pity,  Favour,  Or Superstition,  But Solely By The 
 Guidance Of Reason,  According As The Time And Occasion Demand,  As 
 I Will Show In Part Iii. 
     4. Lastly,  This Doctrine Confers No Small Advantage On The 
 Commonwealth ; For It Teaches How Citizens Should Be Governed And 
 Led,  Not So As To Become Slaves,  But So That They May Freely Do 
 Whatsoever Things Are Best. 
     I Have Thus Fulfilled The Promise Made At The Beginning Of 
 This Note,  And I Thus Bring The Second Part Of My Treatise To A 
 Close.  I Think I Have Therein Explained The Nature And 
 Properties Of The Human Mind At Sufficient Length,  And, 
 Considering The Difficulty Of The Subject,  With Sufficient 
 Clearness.  I Have Laid A Foundation,  Whereon May Be Raised Many 
 Excellent Conclusions Of The Highest Utility And Most Necessary 
 To Be Known,  As Will,  In What Follows,  Be Partly Made Plain. 
   
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Pg 65 
   
     Most Writers On The Emotions And On Human Conduct Seem To Be 
 Treating Rather Of Matters Outside Nature Than Of Natural 
 Phenomena Following Nature's General Laws.  They Appear To 
 Conceive Man To Be Situated In Nature As A Kingdom Within A 
 Kingdom : For They Believe That He Disturbs Rather Than Follows 
 Nature's Order,  That He Has Absolute Control Over His Actions, 
 And That He Is Determined Solely By Himself.  They Attribute 
 Human Infirmities And Fickleness,  Not To The Power Of Nature In 
 General,  But To Some Mysterious Flaw In The Nature Of Man,  Which 
 Accordingly They Bemoan,  Deride,  Despise,  Or,  As Usually Happens, 
 Abuse : He,  Who Succeeds In Hitting Off The Weakness Of The Human 
 Mind More Eloquently Or More Acutely Than His Fellows,  Is Looked 
 Upon As A Seer.  Still There Has Been No Lack Of Very Excellent 
 Men (To Whose Toil And Industry I Confess Myself Much Indebted), 
 Who Have Written Many Noteworthy Things Concerning The Right Way 
 Of Life,  And Have Given Much Sage Advice To Mankind.  But No One, 
 So Far As I Know,  Has Defined The Nature And Strength Of The 
 Emotions,  And The Power Of The Mind Against Them For Their 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Pg 66 
 Restraint. 
     I Do Not Forget,  That The Illustrious Descartes,  Though He 
 Believed,  That The Mind Has Absolute Power Over Its Actions, 
 Strove To Explain Human Emotions By Their Primary Causes,  And,  At 
 The Same Time,  To Point Out A Way,  By Which The Mind Might Attain 
 To Absolute Dominion Over Them.  However,  In My Opinion,  He 
 Accomplishes Nothing Beyond A Display Of The Acuteness Of His Own 
 Great Intellect,  As I Will Show In The Proper Place.  For The 
 Present I Wish To Revert To Those,  Who Would Rather Abuse Or 
 Deride Human Emotions Than Understand Them.  Such Persons Will, 
 Doubtless Think It Strange That I Should Attempt To Treat Of 
 Human Vice And Folly Geometrically,  And Should Wish To Set Forth 
 With Rigid Reasoning Those Matters Which They Cry Out Against As 
 Repugnant To Reason,  Frivolous,  Absurd,  And Dreadful.  However, 
 Such Is My Plan.  Nothing Comes To Pass In Nature,  Which Can Be 
 Set Down To A Flaw Therein ; For Nature Is Always The Same,  And 
 Everywhere One And The Same In Her Efficacy And Power Of Action ; 
 That Is,  Nature's Laws And Ordinances,  Whereby All Things Come To 
 Pass And Change From One Form To Another,  Are Everywhere And 
 Always The Same ; So That There Should Be One And The Same Method 
 Of Understanding The Nature Of All Things Whatsoever,  Namely, 
 Through Nature's Universal Laws And Rules.  Thus The Passions Of 
 Hatred,  Anger,  Envy,  And So On,  Considered In Themselves,  Follow 
 From This Same Necessity And Efficacy Of Nature ; They Answer To 
 Certain Definite Causes,  Through Which They Are Understood,  And 
 Possess Certain Properties As Worthy Of Being Known As The 
 Properties Of Anything Else,  Whereof The Contemplation In Itself 
 Affords Us Delight.  I Shall,  Therefore,  Treat Of The Nature And 
 Strength Of The Emotions According To The Same Method,  As I 
 Employed Heretofore In My Investigations Concerning God And The 
 Mind.  I Shall Consider Human Actions And Desires In Exactly The 
 Same Manner,  As Though I Were Concerned With Lines,  Planes,  And 
 Solids. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Pg 66 
   
 I.  By An Adequate Cause,  I Mean A Cause Through Which Its Effect 
 Can Be Clearly And Distinctly Perceived.  By An Inadequate Or 
 Partial Cause,  I Mean A Cause Through Which,  By Itself,  Its 
 Effect Cannot Be Understood. 
   
 Ii.  I Say That We Act When Anything Takes Place,  Either Within 
 Us Or Externally To Us,  Whereof We Are The Adequate Cause ; That 
 Is (By The Foregoing Definition) When Through Our Nature 
 Something Takes Place Within Us Or Externally To Us,  Which Can 
 Through Our Nature Alone Be Clearly And Distinctly Understood. 
 On The Other Hand,  I Say That We Are Passive As Regards Something 
 When That Something Takes Place Within Us,  Or Follows From Our 
 Nature Externally,  We Being Only The Partial Cause. 
   
 Iii.  By Emotion I Mean The Modifications Of The Body,  Whereby 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Pg 67 
 The Active Power Of The Said Body Is Increased Or Diminished, 
 Aided Or Constrained,  And Also The Ideas Of Such Modifications. 
   
 N.B.  If We Can Be The Adequate Cause Of Any Of These 
 Modifications,  I Then Call The Emotion An Activity,  Otherwise I 
 Call It A Passion,  Or State Wherein The Mind Is Passive. 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 68 
   
 I.  The Human Body Can Be Affected In Many Ways,  Whereby Its 
 Power Of Activity Is Increased Or Diminished,  And Also In Other 
 Ways Which Do Not Render Its Power Of Activity Either Greater Or 
 Less. 
     N.B.  This Postulate Or Axiom Rests On Postulate I. And 
 Lemmas V. And Vii.,  Which See After Ii. Xiii. 
   
 Ii.  The Human Body Can Undergo Many Changes,  And,  Nevertheless, 
 Retain The Impressions Or Traces Of Objects (Cf. Ii. Post. V.), 
 And,  Consequently,  The Same Images Of Things (See Note Ii. 
 Xvii.). 
   
 Prop. I.  Our Mind Is In Certain Cases Active,  And In Certain 
 Cases Passive.  In So Far As It Has Adequate Ideas It Is 
 Necessarily Active,  And In So Far As It Has Inadequate Ideas,  It 
 Is Necessarily Passive. 
     Proof.-In Every Human Mind There Are Some Adequate Ideas,  And 
 Some Ideas That Are Fragmentary And Confused (Ii. Xl. Note). 
 Those Ideas Which Are Adequate In The Mind Are Adequate Also In 
 God,  Inasmuch As He Constitutes The Essence Of The Mind (Ii. Xl. 
 Coroll.),  And Those Which Are Inadequate In The Mind Are Likewise 
 (By The Same Coroll.) Adequate In God,  Not Inasmuch As He 
 Contains In Himself The Essence Of The Given Mind Alone,  But As 
 He,  At The Same Time,  Contains The Minds Of Other Things.  Again, 
 From Any Given Idea Some Effect Must Necessarily Follow (I. 36) ; 
 Of This Effect God Is The Adequate Cause (Iii. Def. I.),  Not 
 Inasmuch As He Is Infinite,  But Inasmuch As He Is Conceived As 
 Affected By The Given Idea (Ii. Ix.).  But Of That Effect Whereof 
 God Is The Cause,  Inasmuch As He Is Affected By An Idea Which Is 
 Adequate In A Given Mind,  Of That Effect,  I Repeat,  The Mind In 
 Question Is The Adequate Cause (Ii. Xi. Coroll.).  Therefore Our 
 Mind,  In So Far As It Has Adequate Ideas (Iii. Def. Ii.),  Is In 
 Certain Cases Necessarily Active ; This Was Our First Point. 
 Again,  Whatsoever Necessarily Follows From The Idea Which Is 
 Adequate In God,  Not By Virtue Of His Possessing In Himself The 
 Mind Of One Man Only,  But By Virtue Of His Containing,  Together 
 With The Mind Of That One Man,  The Minds Of Other Things Also,  Of 
 Such An Effect (Ii. Xi. Coroll.) The Mind Of The Given Man Is Not 
 An Adequate,  But Only A Partial Cause ; Thus (Iii. Def. Ii.) The 
 Mind,  Inasmuch As It Has Inadequate Ideas,  Is In Certain Cases 
 Necessarily Passive ; This Was Our Second Point.  Therefore Our 
 Mind,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 69 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That The Mind Is More Or Less 
 Liable To Be Acted Upon,  In Proportion As It Possesses Inadequate 
 Ideas,  And,  Contrariwise,  Is More Or Less Active In Proportion As 
 It Possesses Adequate Ideas. 
   
 Prop. Ii.  Body Cannot Determine Mind To Think,  Neither Can Mind 
 Determine Body To Motion Or Rest Or Any State Different From 
 These,  If Such There Be. 
     Proof.-All Modes Of Thinking Have For Their Cause God,  By 
 Virtue Of His Being A Thinking Thing,  And Not By Virtue Of His 
 Being Displayed Under Any Other Attribute (Ii. Vi.).  That, 
 Therefore,  Which Determines The Mind To Thought Is A Mode Of 
 Thought,  And Not A Mode Of Extension ; That Is (Ii. Def. I.),  It 
 Is Not Body.  This Was Our First Point.  Again,  The Motion And 
 Rest Of A Body Must Arise From Another Body,  Which Has Also Been 
 Determined To A State Of Motion Or Rest By A Third Body,  And 
 Absolutely Everything Which Takes Place In A Body Must Spring 
 From God,  In So Far As He Is Regarded As Affected By Some Mode Of 
 Extension,  And Not By Some Mode Of Thought (Ii. Vi.) ; That Is, 
 It Cannot Spring From The Mind,  Which Is A Mode Of Thought.  This 
 Was Our Second Point.  Therefore Body Cannot Determine Mind,  &C. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Is Made More Clear By What Was Said In The Note To 
 Ii. Vii.,  Namely,  That Mind And Body Are One And The Same Thing, 
 Conceived First Under The Attribute Of Thought,  Secondly,  Under 
 The Attribute Of Extension.  Thus It Follows That The Order Or 
 Concatenation Of Things Is Identical,  Whether Nature Be Conceived 
 Under The One Attribute Or The Other ; Consequently The Order Of 
 States Of Activity And Passivity In Our Body Is Simultaneous In 
 Nature With The Order Of States Of Activity And Passivity In The 
 Mind. The Same Conclusion Is Evident From The Manner In Which We 
 Proved Ii. Xii. 
     Nevertheless,  Though Such Is The Case,  And Though There Be No 
 Further Room For Doubt,  I Can Scarcely Believe,  Until The Fact Is 
 Proved By Experience,  That Men Can Be Induced To Consider The 
 Question Calmly And Fairly,  So Firmly Are They Convinced That It 
 Is Merely At The Bidding Of The Mind,  That The Body Is Set In 
 Motion Or At Rest,  Or Performs A Variety Of Actions Depending 
 Solely On The Mind's Will Or The Exercise Of Thought.  However, 
 No One Has Hitherto Laid Down The Limits To The Powers Of The 
 Body,  That Is,  No One Has As Yet Been Taught By Experience What 
 The Body Can Accomplish Solely By The Laws Of Nature,  In So Far 
 As She Is Regarded As Extension.  No One Hitherto Has Gained Such 
 An Accurate Knowledge Of The Bodily Mechanism,  That He Can 
 Explain All Its Functions ; Nor Need I Call Attention To The Fact 
 That Many Actions Are Observed In The Lower Animals,  Which Far 
 Transcend Human Sagacity,  And That Somnambulists Do Many Things 
 In Their Sleep,  Which They Would Not Venture To Do When Awake : 
 These Instances Are Enough To Show,  That The Body Can By The Sole 
 Laws Of Its Nature Do Many Things Which The Mind Wonders At. 
     Again,  No One Knows How Or By What Means The Mind Moves The 
 Body,  Nor How Many Various Degrees Of Motion It Can Impart To The 
 Body,  Nor How Quickly It Can Move It.  Thus,  When Men Say That 
 This Or That Physical Action Has Its Origin In The Mind,  Which 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 70 
 Latter Has Dominion Over The Body,  They Are Using Words Without 
 Meaning,  Or Are Confessing In Specious Phraseology That They Are 
 Ignorant Of The Cause Of The Said Action,  And Do Not Wonder At 
 It. 
     But,  They Will Say,  Whether We Know Or Do Not Know The Means 
 Whereby The Mind Acts On The Body,  We Have,  At Any Rate, 
 Experience Of The Fact That Unless The Human Mind Is In A Fit 
 State To Think,  The Body Remains Inert.  Moreover,  We Have 
 Experience,  That The Mind Alone Can Determine Whether We Speak Or 
 Are Silent,  And A Variety Of Similar States Which,  Accordingly, 
 We Say Depend On The Mind's Decree.  But,  As To The First Point, 
 I Ask Such Objectors,  Whether Experience Does Not Also Teach, 
 That If The Body Be Inactive The Mind Is Simultaneously Unfitted 
 For Thinking?  For When The Body Is At Rest In Sleep,  The Mind 
 Simultaneously Is In A State Of Torpor Also,  And Has No Power Of 
 Thinking,  Such As It Possesses When The Body Is Awake.  Again,  I 
 Think Everyone's Experience Will Confirm The Statement,  That The 
 Mind Is Not At All Times Equally Fit For Thinking On A Given 
 Subject,  But According As The Body Is More Or Less Fitted For 
 Being Stimulated By The Image Of This Or That Object,  So Also Is 
 The Mind More Or Less Fitted For Contemplating The Said Object. 
     But,  It Will Be Urged,  It Is Impossible That Solely From The 
 Laws Of Nature Considered As Extended Substance,  We Should Be 
 Able To Deduce The Causes Of Buildings,  Pictures,  And Things Of 
 That Kind,  Which Are Produced Only By Human Art ; Nor Would The 
 Human Body,  Unless It Were Determined And Led By The Mind,  Be 
 Capable Of Building A Single Temple.  However,  I Have Just 
 Pointed Out That The Objectors Cannot Fix The Limits Of The 
 Body's Power,  Or Say What Can Be Concluded From A Consideration 
 Of Its Sole Nature,  Whereas They Have Experience Of Many Things 
 Being Accomplished Solely By The Laws Of Nature,  Which They Would 
 Never Have Believed Possible Except Under The Direction Of Mind : 
 Such Are The Actions Performed By Somnambulists While Asleep,  And 
 Wondered At By Their Performers When Awake.  I Would Further Call 
 Attention To The Mechanism Of The Human Body,  Which Far Surpasses 
 In Complexity All That Has Been Put Together By Human Art,  Not To 
 Repeat What I Have Already Shown,  Namely,  That From Nature,  Under 
 Whatever Attribute She Be Considered,  Infinite Results Follow. 
 As For The Second Objection,  I Submit That The World Would Be 
 Much Happier,  If Men Were As Fully Able To Keep Silence As They 
 Are To Speak.  Experience Abundantly Shows That Men Can Govern 
 Anything More Easily Than Their Tongues,  And Restrain Anything 
 More Easily Than Their Appetites ; When It Comes About That Many 
 Believe,  That We Are Only Free In Respect To Objects Which We 
 Moderately Desire,  Because Our Desire For Such Can Easily Be 
 Controlled By The Thought Of Something Else Frequently 
 Remembered,  But That We Are By No Means Free In Respect To What 
 We Seek With Violent Emotion,  For Our Desire Cannot Then Be 
 Allayed With The Remembrance Of Anything Else.  However,  Unless 
 Such Persons Had Proved By Experience That We Do Many Things 
 Which We Afterwards Repent Of,  And Again That We Often,  When 
 Assailed By Contrary Emotions,  See The Better And Follow The 
 Worse,  There Would Be Nothing To Prevent Their Believing That We 
 Are Free In All Things.  Thus An Infant Believes That Of Its Own 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 71 
 Free Will It Desires Milk,  An Angry Child Believes That It Freely 
 Desires Vengeance,  A Timid Child Believes That It Freely Desires 
 To Run Away ; Further,  A Drunken Man Believes That He Utters From 
 The Free Decision Of His Mind Words Which,  When He Is Sober,  He 
 Would Willingly Have Withheld : Thus,  Too,  A Delirious Man,  A 
 Garrulous Woman,  A Child,  And Others Of Like Complexion,  Believe 
 That They Speak From The Free Decision Of Their Mind,  When They 
 Are In Reality Unable To Restrain Their Impulse To Talk. 
 Experience Teaches Us No Less Clearly Than Reason,  That Men 
 Believe Themselves To Be Free,  Simply Because They Are Conscious 
 Of Their Actions,  And Unconscious Of The Causes Whereby Those 
 Actions Are Determined ; And,  Further,  It Is Plain That The 
 Dictates Of The Mind Are But Another Name For The Appetites,  And 
 Therefore Vary According To The Varying State Of The Body. 
 Everyone Shapes His Actions According To His Emotion,  Those Who 
 Are Assailed By Conflicting Emotions Know Not What They Wish ; 
 Those Who Are Not Attacked By Any Emotion Are Readily Swayed This 
 Way Or That.  All These Considerations Clearly Show That A Mental 
 Decision And A Bodily Appetite,  Or Determined State,  Are 
 Simultaneous,  Or Rather Are One And The Same Thing,  Which We Call 
 Decision,  When It Is Regarded Under And Explained Through The 
 Attribute Of Thought,  And A Conditioned State,  When It Is 
 Regarded Under The Attribute Of Extension,  And Deduced From The 
 Laws Of Motion And Rest.  This Will Appear Yet More Plainly In 
 The Sequel.  For The Present I Wish To Call Attention To Another 
 Point,  Namely,  That We Cannot Act By The Decision Of The Mind, 
 Unless We Have A Remembrance Of Having Done So.  For Instance,  We 
 Cannot Say A Word Without Remembering That We Have Done So. 
 Again,  It Is Not Within The Free Power Of The Mind To Remember Or 
 Forget A Thing At Will.  Therefore The Freedom Of The Mind Must 
 In Any Case Be Limited To The Power Of Uttering Or Not Uttering 
 Something Which It Remembers.  But When We Dream That We Speak, 
 We Believe That We Speak From A Free Decision Of The Mind,  Yet We 
 Do Not Speak,  Or,  If We Do,  It Is By A Spontaneous Motion Of The 
 Body.  Again,  We Dream That We Are Concealing Something,  And We 
 Seem To Act From The Same Decision Of The Mind As That,  Whereby 
 We Keep Silence When Awake Concerning Something We Know.  Lastly, 
 We Dream That From The Free Decision Of Our Mind We Do Something, 
 Which We Should Not Dare To Do When Awake. 
     Now I Should Like To Know Whether There Be In The Mind Two 
 Sorts Of Decisions,  One Sort Illusive,  And The Other Sort Free? 
 If Our Folly Does Not Carry Us So Far As This,  We Must 
 Necessarily Admit,  That The Decision Of The Mind,  Which Is 
 Believed To Be Free,  Is Not Distinguishable From The Imagination 
 Or Memory,  And Is Nothing More Than The Affirmation,  Which An 
 Idea,  By Virtue Of Being An Idea,  Necessarily Involves (Ii. 
 Xlix.).  Wherefore These Decisions Of The Mind Arise In The Mind 
 By The Same Necessity,  As The Ideas Of Things Actually Existing. 
 Therefore Those Who Believe,  That They Speak Or Keep Silence Or 
 Act In Any Way From The Free Decision Of Their Mind,  Do But Dream 
 With Their Eyes Open. 
   
 Prop. Iii.  The Activities Of The Mind Arise Solely From Adequate 
 Ideas ; The Passive States Of The Mind Depend Solely On 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 72 
 Inadequate Ideas. 
     Proof.-The First Element,  Which Constitutes The Essence Of 
 The Mind,  Is Nothing Else But The Idea Of The Actually Existent 
 Body (Ii. Xi. And Xiii.),  Which (Ii. Xv.) Is Compounded Of Many 
 Other Ideas,  Whereof Some Are Adequate And Some Inadequate (Ii. 
 Xxix. Coroll.,  Ii. Xxxviii. Coroll.).  Whatsoever Therefore 
 Follows From The Nature Of Mind,  And Has Mind For Its Proximate 
 Cause,  Through Which It Must Be Understood,  Must Necessarily 
 Follow Either From An Adequate Or From An Inadequate Idea.  But 
 In So Far As The Mind (Iii. I.) Has Inadequate Ideas,  It Is 
 Necessarily Passive : Wherefore The Activities Of The Mind Follow 
 Solely From Adequate Ideas,  And Accordingly The Mind Is Only 
 Passive In So Far As It Has Inadequate Ideas.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Thus We See,  That Passive States Are Not Attributed To 
 The Mind,  Except In So Far As It Contains Something Involving 
 Negation,  Or In So Far As It Is Regarded As A Part Of Nature, 
 Which Cannot Be Clearly And Distinctly Perceived Through Itself 
 Without Other Parts : I Could Thus Show,  That Passive States Are 
 Attributed To Individual Things In The Same Way That They Are 
 Attributed To The Mind,  And That They Cannot Otherwise Be 
 Perceived,  But My Purpose Is Solely To Treat Of The Human Mind. 
   
 Prop. Iv.  Nothing Can Be Destroyed,  Except By A Cause External 
 To Itself. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Self-Evident,  For The Definition 
 Of Anything Affirms The Essence Of That Thing,  But Does Not 
 Negative It ; In Other Words,  It Postulates The Essence Of The 
 Thing,  But Does Not Take It Away.  So Long Therefore As We Regard 
 Only The Thing Itself,  Without Taking Into Account External 
 Causes,  We Shall Not Be Able To Find In It Anything Which Could 
 Destroy It.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. V.  Things Are Naturally Contrary,  That Is,  Cannot Exist In 
 The Same Object,  In So Far As One Is Capable Of Destroying The 
 Other. 
     Proof.-If They Could Agree Together Or Co-Exist In The Same 
 Object,  There Would Then Be In The Said Object Something Which 
 Could Destroy It ; But This,  By The Foregoing Proposition,  Is 
 Absurd,  Therefore Things,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Vi.  Everything,  In So Far As It Is In Itself,  Endeavours 
 To Persist In Its Own Being. 
     Proof.-Individual Things Are Modes Whereby The Attributes Of 
 God Are Expressed In A Given Determinate Manner (I. Xxv. Coroll.) 
 ; That Is,  (I. Xxxiv.),  They Are Things Which Express In A Given 
 Determinate Manner The Power Of God,  Whereby God Is And Acts ; 
 Now No Thing Contains In Itself Anything Whereby It Can Be 
 Destroyed,  Or Which Can Take Away Its Existence (Iii. Iv.) ; But 
 Contrariwise It Is Opposed To All That Could Take Away Its 
 Existence (Iii. V.).  Therefore,  In So Far As It Can,  And In So 
 Far As It Is In Itself,  It Endeavours To Persist In Its Own 
 Being.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Vii.  The Endeavour,  Wherewith Everything Endeavours To 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 73 
 Persist In Its Own Being,  Is Nothing Else But The Actual Essence 
 Of The Thing In Question. 
     Proof.-From The Given Essence Of Any Thing Certain 
 Consequences Necessarily Follow (I. Xxxvi.),  Nor Have Things Any 
 Power Save Such As Necessarily Follows From Their Nature As 
 Determined (I. Xxix.) ; Wherefore The Power Of Any Given Thing, 
 Or The Endeavour Whereby,  Either Alone Or With Other Things,  It 
 Acts,  Or Endeavours To Act,  That Is (Iii. Vi.),  The Power Or 
 Endeavour,  Wherewith It Endeavours To Persist In Its Own Being, 
 Is Nothing Else But The Given Or Actual Essence Of The Thing In 
 Question.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Viii.  The Endeavour,  Whereby A Thing Endeavours To Persist 
 In Its Own Being,  Involves No Finite Time,  But An Indefinite 
 Time. 
     Proof.-If It Involved A Limited Time,  Which Should Determine 
 The Duration Of The Thing,  It Would Then Follow Solely From That 
 Power Whereby The Thing Exists,  That The Thing Could Not Exist 
 Beyond The Limits Of That Time,  But That It Must Be Destroyed ; 
 But This (Iii. Iv.) Is Absurd.  Wherefore The Endeavour Wherewith 
 A Thing Exists Involves No Definite Time ; But,  Contrariwise, 
 Since (Iii. Iv.) It Will By The Same Power Whereby It Already 
 Exists Always Continue To Exist,  Unless It Be Destroyed By Some 
 External Cause,  This Endeavour Involves An Indefinite Time. 
   
 Prop. Ix.  The Mind,  Both In So Far As It Has Clear And Distinct 
 Ideas,  And Also In So Far As It Has Confused Ideas,  Endeavours To 
 Persist In Its Being For An Indefinite Period,  And Of This 
 Endeavour It Is Conscious. 
     Proof.-The Essence Of The Mind Is Constituted By Adequate And 
 Inadequate Ideas (Iii. Iii.),  Therefore (Iii. Vii.),  Both In So 
 Far As It Possesses The Former,  And In So Far As It Possesses The 
 Latter,  It Endeavours To Persist In Its Own Being,  And That For 
 An Indefinite Time (Iii. Viii.).  Now As The Mind (Ii. Xxiii.) Is 
 Necessarily Conscious Of Itself Through The Ideas Of The 
 Modifications Of The Body,  The Mind Is Therefore (Iii. Vii.) 
 Conscious Of Its Own Endeavour. 
     Note.-This Endeavour,  When Referred Solely To The Mind,  Is 
 Called Will,  When Referred To The Mind And Body In Conjunction It 
 Is Called Appetite ; It Is,  In Fact,  Nothing Else But Man's 
 Essence,  From The Nature Of Which Necessarily Follow All Those 
 Results Which Tend To Its Preservation ; And Which Man Has Thus 
 Been Determined To Perform. 
     Further,  Between Appetite And Desire There Is No Difference, 
 Except That The Term Desire Is Generally Applied To Men,  In So 
 Far As They Are Conscious Of Their Appetite,  And May Accordingly 
 Be Thus Defined : Desire Is Appetite With Consciousness Thereof. 
 It Is Thus Plain From What Has Been Said,  That In No Case Do We 
 Strive For,  Wish For,  Long For,  Or Desire Anything,  Because We 
 Deem It To Be Good,  But On The Other Hand We Deem A Thing To Be 
 Good,  Because We Strive For It,  Wish For It,  Long For It,  Or 
 Desire It. 
   
 Prop. X.  An Idea,  Which Excludes The Existence Of Our Body, 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 74 
 Cannot Be Postulated In Our Mind,  But Is Contrary Thereto. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever Can Destroy Our Body,  Cannot Be Postulated 
 Therein (Iii. V.).  Therefore Neither Can The Idea Of Such A 
 Thing Occur In God,  In So Far As He Has The Idea Of Our Body (Ii. 
 Ix. Coroll.) ; That Is (Ii.Xi.,  Xiii.),  The Idea Of That Thing 
 Cannot Be Postulated As In Our Mind,  But Contrariwise,  Since (Ii. 
 Xi.,  Xiii.) The First Element,  That Constitutes The Essence Of 
 The Mind,  Is The Idea Of The Human Body As Actually Existing,  It 
 Follows That The First And Chief Endeavour Of Our Mind Is The 
 Endeavour To Affirm The Existence Of Our Body : Thus,  An Idea, 
 Which Negatives The Existence Of Our Body,  Is Contrary To Our 
 Mind,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xi.  Whatsoever Increases Or Diminishes,  Helps Or Hinders 
 The Power Of Activity In Our Body,  The Idea Thereof Increases Or 
 Diminishes,  Helps Or Hinders The Power Of Thought In Our Mind. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Evident From Ii. Vii. Or From Ii. 
 Xiv. 
     Note.-Thus We See,  That The Mind Can Undergo Many Changes, 
 And Can Pass Sometimes To A State Of Greater Perfection, 
 Sometimes To A State Of Lesser Perfection.  These Passive States 
 Of Transition Explain To Us The Emotions Of Pleasure And Pain. 
 By Pleasure Therefore In The Following Propositions I Shall 
 Signify A Passive State Wherein The Mind Passes To A Greater 
 Perfection.  By Pain I Shall Signify A Passive State Wherein The 
 Mind Passes To A Lesser Perfection.  Further,  The Emotion Of 
 Pleasure In Reference To The Body And Mind Together I Shall Call 
 Stimulation (Titillatio) Or Merriment (Hilaritas),  The Emotion Of 
 Pain In The Same Relation I Shall Call Suffering Or Melancholy. 
 But We Must Bear In Mind,  That Stimulation And Suffering Are 
 Attributed To Man,  When One Part Of His Nature Is More Affected 
 Than The Rest,  Merriment And Melancholy,  When All Parts Are Alike 
 Affected.  What I Mean By Desire I Have Explained In The Note To 
 Prop. Ix. Of This Part ; Beyond These Three I Recognize No Other 
 Primary Emotion ; I Will Show As I Proceed,  That All Other 
 Emotions Arise From These Three.  But,  Before I Go Further,  I 
 Should Like Here To Explain At Greater Length Prop. X Of This 
 Part,  In Order That We May Clearly Understand How One Idea Is 
 Contrary To Another.  In The Note To Ii. Xvii. We Showed That The 
 Idea,  Which Constitutes The Essence Of Mind,  Involves The 
 Existence Of Body,  So Long As The Body Itself Exists.  Again,  It 
 Follows From What We Pointed Out In The Corollary To Ii. Viii., 
 That The Present Existence Of Our Mind Depends Solely On The 
 Fact,  That The Mind Involves The Actual Existence Of The Body. 
 Lastly,  We Showed (Ii. Xvii.,  Xviii. And Note) That The Power Of 
 The Mind,  Whereby It Imagines And Remembers Things,  Also Depends 
 On The Fact,  That It Involves The Actual Existence Of The Body. 
 Whence It Follows,  That The Present Existence Of The Mind And Its 
 Power Of Imagining Are Removed,  As Soon As The Mind Ceases To 
 Affirm The Present Existence Of The Body.  Now The Cause,  Why The 
 Mind Ceases To Affirm This Existence Of The Body,  Cannot Be The 
 Mind Itself (Iii. Iv.),  Nor Again The Fact That The Body Ceases 
 To Exist.  For (By Ii. Vi.) The Cause,  Why The Mind Affirms The 
 Existence Of The Body,  Is Not That The Body Began To Exist ; 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 75 
 Therefore,  For The Same Reason,  It Does Not Cease To Affirm The 
 Existence Of The Body,  Because The Body Ceases To Exist ; But 
 (Ii. Xvii.) This Result Follows From Another Idea,  Which Excludes 
 The Present Existence Of Our Body And,  Consequently,  Of Our Mind, 
 And Which Is Therefore Contrary To The Idea Constituting The 
 Essence Of Our Mind. 
   
 Prop. Xii.  The Mind,  As Far As It Can,  Endeavours To Conceive 
 Those Things,  Which Increase Or Help The Power Of Activity In The 
 Body. 
     Proof.-So Long As The Human Body Is Affected In A Mode,  Which 
 Involves The Nature Of Any External Body,  The Human Mind Will 
 Regard That External Body As Present (Ii. Xvii.),  And 
 Consequently (Ii. Vii.),  So Long As The Human Mind Regards An 
 External Body As Present,  That Is (Ii. Xvii. Note),  Conceives It, 
 The Human Body Is Affected In A Mode,  Which Involves The Nature 
 Of The Said External Body ; Thus So Long As The Mind Conceives 
 Things,  Which Increase Or Help The Power Of Activity In Our Body, 
 The Body Is Affected In Modes Which Increase Or Help Its Power Of 
 Activity (Iii. Post. I.) ; Consequently (Iii. Xi.) The Mind's 
 Power Of Thinking Is For That Period Increased Or Helped.  Thus 
 (Iii. Vi.,  Ix.) The Mind,  As Far As It Can,  Endeavours To Imagine 
 Such Things.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xiii.  When The Mind Conceives Things Which Diminish Or 
 Hinder The Body's Power Of Activity,  It Endeavours,  As Far As 
 Possible,  To Remember Things Which Exclude The Existence Of The 
 First-Named Things. 
     Proof.-So Long As The Mind Conceives Anything Of The Kind 
 Alluded To,  The Power Of The Mind And Body Is Diminished Or 
 Constrained (Cf. Iii. Xii. Proof) ; Nevertheless It Will Continue 
 To Conceive It,  Until The Mind Conceives Something Else,  Which 
 Excludes The Present Existence Thereof (Ii. Xvii.) ; That Is (As 
 I Have Just Shown),  The Power Of The Mind And Of The Body Is 
 Diminished,  Or Constrained,  Until The Mind Conceives Something 
 Else,  Which Excludes The Existence Of The Former Thing Conceived 
 : Therefore The Mind (Iii. Ix.),  As Far As It Can,  Will Endeavour 
 To Conceive Or Remember The Latter.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That The Mind Shrinks From 
 Conceiving Those Things,  Which Diminish Or Constrain The Power Of 
 Itself And Of The Body. 
     Note.-From What Has Been Said We May Clearly Understand The 
 Nature Of Love And Hate.  Love Is Nothing Else But Pleasure 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of An External Cause : Hate Is Nothing 
 Else But Pain Accompanied By The Idea Of An External Cause.  We 
 Further See,  That He Who Loves Necessarily Endeavours To Have, 
 And To Keep Present To Him,  The Object Of His Love ; While He Who 
 Hates Endeavours To Remove And Destroy The Object Of His Hatred. 
 But I Will Treat Of These Matters At More Length Hereafter. 
   
 Prop. Xiv.  If The Mind Has Once Been Affected By Two Emotions At 
 The Same Time,  It Will,  Whenever It Is Afterwards Affected By One 
 Of These Two,  Be Also Affected By The Other. 
     Proof.-If The Human Body Has Once Been Affected By Two Bodies 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 76 
 At Once,  Whenever Afterwards The Mind Conceives One Of Them,  It 
 Will Straightway Remember The Other Also (Ii. Xviii.).  But The 
 Mind's Conceptions Indicate Rather The Emotions Of Our Body Than 
 The Nature Of External Bodies (Ii. Xvi. Coroll. Ii.) ; Therefore, 
 If The Body,  And Consequently The Mind (Iii. Def. Iii.) Has Been 
 Once Affected By Two Emotions At The Same Time,  It Will,  Whenever 
 It Is Afterwards Affected By One Of The Two,  Be Also Affected By 
 The Other. 
   
 Prop. Xv.  Anything Can,  Accidentally,  Be The Cause Of Pleasure, 
 Pain,  Or Desire. 
     Proof.-Let It Be Granted That The Mind Is Simultaneously 
 Affected By Two Emotions,  Of Which One Neither Increases Nor 
 Diminishes Its Power Of Activity,  And The Other Does Either 
 Increase Or Diminish The Said Power (Iii. Post. I.).  From The 
 Foregoing Proposition It Is Evident That,  Whenever The Mind Is 
 Afterwards Affected By The Former,  Through Its True Cause,  Which 
 (By Hypothesis) Neither Increases Nor Diminishes Its Power Of 
 Action,  It Will Be At The Same Time Affected By The Latter,  Which 
 Does Increase Or Diminish Its Power Of Activity,  That Is (Iii. 
 Xi. Note) It Will Be Affected With Pleasure Or Pain.  Thus The 
 Former Of The Two Emotions Will,  Not Through Itself,  But 
 Accidentally,  Be The Cause Of Pleasure Or Pain.  In The Same Way 
 Also It Can Be Easily Shown,  That A Thing May Be Accidentally The 
 Cause Of Desire.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Simply From The Fact That We Have Regarded A Thing 
 With The Emotion Of Pleasure Or Pain,  Though That Thing Be Not 
 The Efficient Cause Of The Emotion,  We Can Either Love Or Hate 
 It. 
     Proof.-For From This Fact Alone It Arises (Iii. Xiv.),  That 
 The Mind Afterwards Conceiving The Said Thing Is Affected With 
 The Emotion Of Pleasure Or Pain,  That Is (Iii. Xi. Note), 
 According As The Power Of The Mind And Body May Be Increased Or 
 Diminished,  &C. ; And Consequently (Iii. Xii.),  According As The 
 Mind May Desire Or Shrink From The Conception Of It (Iii. Xiii. 
 Coroll.),  In Other Words (Iii. Xiii. Note),  According As It May 
 Love Or Hate The Same.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Hence We Understand How It May Happen,  That We Love Or 
 Hate A Thing Without Any Cause For Our Emotion Being Known To Us 
 ; Merely,  As A Phrase Is,  From Sympathy Or Antipathy.  We Should 
 Refer To The Same Category Those Objects,  Which Affect Us 
 Pleasurably Or Painfully,  Simply Because They Resemble Other 
 Objects Which Affect Us In The Same Way.  This I Will Show In The 
 Next Prop.  I Am Aware That Certain Authors,  Who Were The First 
 To Introduce These Terms "Sympathy" And "Antipathy," Wished To 
 Signify Thereby Some Occult Qualities In Things ; Nevertheless I 
 Think We May Be Permitted To Use The Same Terms To Indicate Known 
 Or Manifest Qualities. 
   
 Prop. Xvi.  Simply From The Fact That We Conceive,  That A Given 
 Object Has Some Point Of Resemblance With Another Object Which Is 
 Wont To Affect The Mind Pleasurably Or Painfully,  Although The 
 Point Of Resemblance Be Not The Efficient Cause Of The Said 
 Emotions,  We Shall Still Regard The First-Named Object With Love 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 77 
 Or Hate. 
     Proof.-The Point Of Resemblance Was In The Object (By 
 Hypothesis),  When We Regarded It With Pleasure Or Pain,  Thus 
 (Iii. Xiv.),  When The Mind Is Affected By The Image Thereof,  It 
 Will Straightway Be Affected By One Or The Other Emotion,  And 
 Consequently The Thing,  Which We Perceive To Have The Same Point 
 Of Resemblance,  Will Be Accidentally (Iii. Xv.) A Cause Of 
 Pleasure Or Pain.  Thus (By The Foregoing Corollary),  Although 
 The Point In Which The Two Objects Resemble One Another Be Not 
 The Efficient Cause Of The Emotion,  We Shall Still Regard The 
 First-Named Object With Love Or Hate.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xvii.  If We Conceive That A Thing,  Which Is Wont To Affect 
 Us Painfully,  Has Any Point Of Resemblance With Another Thing 
 Which Is Wont To Affect Us With An Equally Strong Emotion Of 
 Pleasure,  We Shall Hate The First-Named Thing,  And At The Same 
 Time We Shall Love It. 
     Proof.-The Given Thing Is (By Hypothesis) In Itself A Cause 
 Of Pain,  And (Iii. Xiii. Note),  In So Far As We Imagine It With 
 This Emotion,  We Shall Hate It : Further,  Inasmuch As We Conceive 
 That It Has Some Point Of Resemblance To Something Else,  Which Is 
 Wont To Affect Us With An Equally Strong Emotion Of Pleasure,  We 
 Shall With An Equally Strong Impulse Of Pleasure Love It 
 (Iii.Xvi.) ; Thus We Shall Both Hate And Love The Same Thing. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Disposition Of The Mind,  Which Arises From Two 
 Contrary Emotions,  Is Called Vacillation ; It Stands To The 
 Emotions In The Same Relation As Doubt Does To The Imagination 
 (Ii. Xliv. Note) ; Vacillation And Doubt Do Not Differ One From 
 The Other,  Except As Greater Differs From Less.  But We Must Bear 
 In Mind That I Have Deduced This Vacillation From Causes,  Which 
 Give Rise Through Themselves To One Of The Emotions,  And To The 
 Other Accidentally.  I Have Done This,  In Order That They Might 
 Be More Easily Deduced From What Went Before ; But I Do Not Deny 
 That Vacillation Of The Disposition Generally Arises From An 
 Object,  Which Is The Efficient Cause Of Both Emotions.  The Human 
 Body Is Composed (Ii. Post. I.) Of A Variety Of Individual Parts 
 Of Different Nature,  And May Therefore (Ax.I. After Lemma Iii. 
 After Ii. Xiii.) Be Affected In A Variety Of Different Ways By 
 One And The Same Body ; And Contrariwise,  As One And The Same 
 Thing Can Be Affected In Many Ways,  It Can Also In Many Different 
 Ways Affect One And The Same Part Of The Body.  Hence We Can 
 Easily Conceive,  That One And The Same Object May Be The Cause Of 
 Many And Conflicting Emotions. 
   
 Prop. Xviii. A Man Is As Much Affected Pleasurably Or Painfully 
 By The Image Of A Thing Past Or Future As By The Image Of A Thing 
 Present. 
     Proof.-So Long As A Man Is Affected By The Image Of Anything, 
 He Will Regard That Thing As Present,  Even Though It Be 
 Non-Existent (Ii. Xvii. And Coroll.),  He Will Not Conceive It As 
 Past Or Future,  Except In So Far As Its Image Is Joined To The 
 Image Of Time Past Or Future (Ii. Xliv. Note).  Wherefore The 
 Image Of A Thing,  Regarded In Itself Alone,  Is Identical,  Whether 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 78 
 It Be Referred To Time Past,  Time Future,  Or Time Present ; That 
 Is (Ii. Xvi. Coroll.),  The Disposition Or Emotion Of The Body Is 
 Identical,  Whether The Image Be Of A Thing Past,  Future,  Or 
 Present.  Thus The Emotion Of Pleasure Or Pain Is The Ssame, 
 Whether The Image Be Of A Thing Past Or Future.  Q.E.D. 
     Note I.-I Call A Thing Past Or Future,  According As We Either 
 Have Been Or Shall Be Affected Thereby.  For Instance,  According 
 As We Have Seen It,  Or Are About To See It,  According As It Has 
 Recreated Us,  Or Will Recreate Us,  According As It Has Harmed Us, 
 Or Will Harm Us.  For,  As We Thus Conceive It,  We Affirm Its 
 Existence ; That Is,  The Body Is Affected By No Emotion Which 
 Excludes The Existence Of The Thing,  And Therefore (Ii. Xvii.) 
 The Body Is Affected By The Image Of The Thing,  In The Same Way 
 As If The Thing Were Actually Present.  However,  As It Generally 
 Happens That Those,  Who Have Had Many Experiences,  Vacillate,  So 
 Long As They Regard A Thing As Future Or Past,  And Are Usually In 
 Doubt About Its Issue (Ii. Xliv. Note) ; It Follows That The 
 Emotions Which Arise From Similar Images Of Things Are Not So 
 Constant,  But Are Generally Disturbed By The Images Of Other 
 Things,  Until Men Become Assured Of The Issue. 
     Note Ii.-From What Has Just Been Said,  We Understand What Is 
 Meant By The Terms Hope,  Fear,  Confidence,  Despair,  Joy,  And 
 Disappointment.5  Hope Is Nothing Else But An Inconstant 
 Pleasure,  Arising From The Image Of Something Future Or Past, 
 Whereof We Do Not Yet Know The Issue.  Fear,  On The Other Hand, 
 Is An Inconstant Pain Also Arising From The Image Of Something 
 Concerning Which We Are In Doubt.  If The Element Of Doubt Be 
 Removed From These Emotions,  Hope Becomes Confidence And Fear 
 Becomes Despair.  In Other Words,  Pleasure Or Pain Arising From 
 The Image Of Something Concerning Which We Have Hoped Or Feared. 
 Again,  Joy Is Pleasure Arising From The Image Of Something Past 
 Whereof We Have Doubted The Issue.  Disappointment Is The Pain 
 Opposed To Joy. 
   
 Prop. Xix.  He Who Conceives That The Object Of His Love Is 
 Destroyed Will Feel Pain ; If He Conceives That It Is Preserved 
 He Will Feel Pleasure. 
     Proof.-The Mind,  As Far As Possible,  Endeavours To Conceive 
 Those Things Which Increase Or Help The Body's Power Of Activity 
 (Iii. Xii.) ; In Other Words (Iii. Xii. Note),  Those Things Which 
 It Loves.  But Conception Is Helped By Those Things Which 
 Postulate The Existence Of A Thing,  And Contrariwise Is Hindered 
 By Those Which Exclude The Existence Of A Thing (Ii. Xvii.) ; 
 Therefore The Images Of Things,  Which Postulate The Existence Of 
 An Object Of Love,  Help The Mind's Endeavour To Conceive The 
 Object Of Love,  In Other Words (Iii. Xi. Note),  Affect The Mind 
 Pleasurably ; Contrariwise Those Things,  Which Exclude The 
 Existence Of An Object Of Love,  Hinder The Aforesaid Mental 
 Endeavour ; In Other Words,  Affect The Mind Painfully.  He, 
 Therefore,  Who Conceives That The Object Of His Love Is Destroyed 
 Will Feel Pain,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xx.  He Who Conceives That The Object Of His Hate Is 
 Destroyed Will Also Feel Pleasure. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 79 
     Proof.-The Mind (Iii. Xiii.) Endeavours To Conceive Those 
 Things,  Which Exclude The Existence Of Things Whereby The Body's 
 Power Of Activity Is Diminished Or Constrained ; That Is (Iii. 
 Xiii. Note),  It Endeavours To Conceive Such Things As Exclude The 
 Existence Of What It Hates ; Therefore The Image Of A Thing, 
 Which Excludes The Existence Of What The Mind Hates,  Helps The 
 Aforesaid Mental Effort,  In Other Words (Iii. Xi. Note),  Affects 
 The Mind Pleasurably.  Thus He Who Conceives That The Object Of 
 His Hate Is Destroyed Will Feel Pleasure.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxi.  He Who Conceives,  That The Object Of His Love Is 
 Affected Pleasurably Or Painfully,  Will Himself Be Affected 
 Pleasurably Or Painfully ; And The One Or The Other Emotion Will 
 Be Greater Or Less In The Lover According As It Is Greater Or 
 Less In The Thing Loved. 
     Proof.-The Images Of Things (As We Showed In Iii. Xix.) Which 
 Postulate The Existence Of The Object Of Love,  Help The Mind's 
 Endeavour To Conceive The Said Object.  But Pleasure Postulates 
 The Existence Of Something Feeling Pleasure,  So Much The More In 
 Proportion As The Emotion Of Pleasure Is Greater ; For It Is 
 (Iii. Xi. Note) A Transition To A Greater Perfection ; Therefore 
 The Image Of Pleasure In The Object Of Love Helps The Mental 
 Endeavour Of The Lover ; That Is,  It Affects The Lover 
 Pleasurably,  And So Much The More,  In Proportion As This Emotion 
 May Have Been Greater In The Object Of Love.  This Was Our First 
 Point.  Further,  In So Far As A Thing Is Affected With Pain,  It 
 Is To That Extent Destroyed,  The Extent Being In Proportion To 
 The Amount Of Pain (Iii. Xi. Note) ; Therefore (Iii. Xix.) He Who 
 Conceives,  That The Object Of His Love Is Affected Painfully, 
 Will Himself Be Affected Painfully,  In Proportion As The Said 
 Emotion Is Greater Or Less In The Object Of Love.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxii.  If We Conceive That Anything Pleasurably Affects 
 Some Object Of Our Love,  We Shall Be Affected With Love Towards 
 That Thing.  Contrariwise,  If We Conceive That It Affects An 
 Object Of Our Love Painfully,  We Shall Be Affected With Hatred 
 Towards It. 
     Proof.-He,  Who Affects Pleasurably Or Painfully The Object Of 
 Our Love,  Affects Us Also Pleasurably Or Painfully-That Is,  If We 
 Conceive The Loved Object As Affected With The Said Pleasure Or 
 Pain (Iii. Xxi.). But This Pleasure Or Pain Is Postulated To Come 
 To Us Accompanied By The Idea Of An External Cause ; Therefore 
 (Iii. Xiii. Note),  If We Conceive That Anyone Affects An Object 
 Of Our Love Pleasurably Or Painfully,  We Shall Be Affected With 
 Love Or Hatred Towards Him.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Prop. Xxi. Explains To Us The Nature Of Pity,  Which We 
 May Define As Pain Arising From Another's Hurt.  What Term We Can 
 Use For Pleasure Arising From Another's Gain,  I Know Not. 
     We Will Call The Love Towards Him Who Confers A Benefit On 
 Another,  Approval ; And The Hatred Towards Him Who Injures 
 Another,  We Will Call Indignation.  We Must Further Remark,  That 
 We Not Only Feel Pity For A Thing Which We Have Loved (As Shown 
 In Iii. Xxi.),  But Also For A Thing Which We Have Hitherto 
 Regarded Without Emotion,  Provided That We Deem That It Resembles 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 80 
 Ourselves (As I Will Show Presently).  Thus,  We Bestow Approval 
 On One Who Has Benefited Anything Resembling Ourselves,  And, 
 Contrariwise,  Are Indignant With Him Who Has Done It An Injury. 
   
 Prop. Xxiii.  He Who Conceives,  That An Object Of His Hatred Is 
 Painfully Affected,  Will Feel Pleasure.  Contrariwise,  If He 
 Thinks That The Said Object Is Pleasurably Affected,  He Will Feel 
 Pain.  Each Of These Emotions Will Be Greater Or Less,  According 
 As Its Contrary Is Greater Or Less In The Object Of Hatred. 
     Proof.-In So Far As An Object Of Hatred Is Painfully 
 Affected,  It Is Destroyed,  To An Extent Proportioned To The 
 Strength Of The Pain (Iii. Xi. Note).  Therefore,  He (Iii. Xx.) 
 Who Conceives,  That Some Object Of His Hatred Is Painfully 
 Affected,  Will Feel Pleasure,  To An Extent Proportioned To The 
 Amount Of Pain He Conceives In The Object Of His Hatred.  This 
 Was Our First Point.  Again,  Pleasure Postulates The Existence Of 
 The Pleasurably Affected Thing (Iii. Xi. Note),  In Proportion As 
 The Pleasure Is Greater Or Less.  If Anyone Imagines That An 
 Object Of His Hatred Is Pleasurably Affected,  This Conception 
 (Iii. Xiii.) Will Hinder His Own Endeavour To Persist ; In Other 
 Words (Iii. Xi. Note),  He Who Hates Will Be Painfully Affected. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Pleasure Can Scarcely Be Felt Unalloyed,  And 
 Without Any Mental Conflict.  For (As I Am About To Show In Prop. 
 Xxvii.),  In So Far As A Man Conceives That Something Similar To 
 Himself Is Affected By Pain,  He Will Himself Be Affected In Like 
 Manner ; And He Will Have The Contrary Emotion In Contrary 
 Circumstances.  But Here We Are Regarding Hatred Only. 
   
 Prop. Xxiv.  If We Conceive That Anyone Pleasurably Affects An 
 Object Of Our Hate,  We Shall Feel Hatred Towards Him Also.  If We 
 Conceive That He Painfully Affects That Said Object,  We Shall 
 Feel Love Towards Him. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Proved In The Same Way As Iii. 
 Xxii.,  Which See. 
     Note.-These And Similar Emotions Of Hatred Are Attributable 
 To Envy,  Which,  Accordingly,  Is Nothing Else But Hatred,  In So 
 Far As It Is Regarded As Disposing A Man To Rejoice In Another's 
 Hurt,  And To Grieve At Another's Advantage. 
   
 Prop. Xxv.  We Endeavour To Affirm,  Concerning Ourselves,  And 
 Concerning What We Love,  Everything That We Can Conceive To 
 Affect Pleasurably Ourselves,  Or The Loved Object.  Contrariwise, 
 We Endeavour To Negative Everything,  Which We Conceive To Affect 
 Painfully Ourselves Or The Loved Object. 
     Proof.-That,  Which We Conceive To Affect An Object Of Our 
 Love Pleasurably Or Painfully,  Affects Us Also Pleasurably Or 
 Painfully (Iii. Xxi.).  But The Mind (Iii. Xii.) Endeavours,  As 
 Far As Possible,  To Conceive Those Things Which Affect Us 
 Pleasurably ; In Other Words (Ii. Xvii. And Coroll.),  It 
 Endeavours To Regard Them As Present.  And,  Contrariwise (Iii. 
 Xiii.),  It Endeavours To Exclude The Existence Of Such Things As 
 Affect Us Painfully ; Therefore,  We Endeavour To Affirm 
 Concerning Ourselves,  And Concerning The Loved Object,  Whatever 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 81 
 We Conceive To Affect Ourselves,  Or The Love Object Pleasurably. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxvi.  We Endeavour To Affirm,  Concerning That Which We 
 Hate,  Everything Which We Conceive To Affect It Painfully ; And, 
 Contrariwise,  We Endeavour To Deny,  Concerning It,  Everything 
 Which We Conceive To Affect It Pleasurably. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Follows From Iii. Xxiii.,  As The 
 Foregoing Proposition Followed From Iii. Xxi. 
     Note.-Thus We See That It May Readily Happen,  That A Man May 
 Easily Think Too Highly Of Himself,  Or A Loved Object,  And, 
 Contrariwise,  Too Meanly Of A Hated Object.  This Feeling Is 
 Called Pride,  In Reference To The Man Who Thinks Too Highly Of 
 Himself,  And Is A Species Of Madness,  Wherein A Man Dreams With 
 His Eyes Open,  Thinking That He Can Accomplish All Things That 
 Fall Within The Scope Of His Conception,  And Thereupon Accounting 
 Them Real,  And Exulting In Them,  So Long As He Is Unable To 
 Conceive Anything Which Excludes Their Existence,  And Determines 
 His Own Power Of Action.  Pride,  Therefore,  Is Pleasure Springing 
 From A Man Thinking Too Highly Of Himself.  Again,  The Pleasure 
 Which Arises From A Man Thinking Too Highly Of Another Is Called 
 Over-Esteem.  Whereas The Pleasure Which Arises From Thinking Too 
 Little Of A Man Is Called Disdain. 
   
 Prop. Xxvii.  By The Very Fact That We Conceive A Thing,  Which Is 
 Like Ourselves,  And Which We Have Not Regarded With Any Emotion, 
 To Be Affected With Any Emotion,  We Are Ourselves Affected With A 
 Like Emotion (Affectus). 
     Proof.-The Images Of Things Are Modifications Of The Human 
 Body,  Whereof The Ideas Represent External Bodies As Present To 
 Us (Ii. Xvii.) ; In Other Words (Ii. X.),  Whereof The Ideas 
 Involve The Nature Of Our Body,  And,  At The Same Time,  The Nature 
 Of The External Bodies As Present.  If,  Therefore,  The Nature Of 
 The External Body Be Similar To The Nature Of Our Body,  Then The 
 Idea Which We Form Of The External Body Will Involve A 
 Modification Of Our Own Body Similar To The Modification Of The 
 External Body.  Consequently,  If We Conceive Anyone Similar To 
 Ourselves As Affected By Any Emotion,  This Conception Will 
 Express A Modification Of Our Body Similar To That Emotion. 
 Thus,  From The Fact Of Conceiving A Thing Like Ourselves To Be 
 Affected With Any Emotion,  We Are Ourselves Affected With A Like 
 Emotion.  If,  However,  We Hate The Said Thing Like Ourselves,  We 
 Shall,  To That Extent,  Be Affected By A Contrary,  And Not 
 Similar,  Emotion.  Q.E.D. 
     Note I.-This Imitation Of Emotions,  When It Is Referred To 
 Pain,  Is Called Compassion (Cf. Iii. Xxii. Note) ; When It Is 
 Referred To Desire,  It Is Called Emulation,  Which Is Nothing Else 
 But The Desire Of Anything,  Engendered In Us By The Fact That We 
 Conceive That Others Have The Like Desire. 
     Corollary I.-If We Conceive That Anyone,  Whom We Have 
 Hitherto Regarded With No Emotion,  Pleasurably Affects Something 
 Similar To Ourselves,  We Shall Be Affected With Love Towards Him. 
 If,  On The Other Hand,  We Conceive That He Painfully Affects The 
 Same,  We Shall Be Affected With Hatred Towards Him. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 82 
     Proof.-This Is Proved From The Last Proposition In The Same 
 Manner As Iii. Xxii. Is Proved From Iii. Xxi. 
     Corollary Ii.-We Cannot Hate A Thing Which We Pity,  Because 
 Its Misery Affects Us Painfully. 
     Proof.-If We Could Hate It For This Reason,  We Should Rejoice 
 In Its Pain,  Which Is Contrary To The Hypothesis. 
     Corollary Iii.-We Seek To Free From Misery,  As Far As We Can, 
 A Thing Which We Pity. 
     Proof.-That,  Which Painfully Affects The Object Of Our Pity, 
 Affects Us Also With Similar Pain (By The Foregoing Proposition) 
 ; Therefore,  We Shall Endeavour To Recall Everything Which 
 Removes Its Existence,  Or Which Destroys It (Cf. Iii. Xiii.) ; In 
 Other Words (Iii. Ix. Note),  We Shall Desire To Destroy It,  Or We 
 Shall Be Determined For Its Destruction ; Thus,  We Shall 
 Endeavour To Free From Misery A Thing Which We Pity.  Q.E.D. 
     Note Ii.-This Will Or Appetite For Doing Good,  Which Arises 
 From Pity Of The Thing Whereon We Would Confer A Benefit,  Is 
 Called Benevolence,  And Is Nothing Else But Desire Arising From 
 Compassion.  Concerning Love Or Hate Towards Him Who Has Done 
 Good Or Harm To Something,  Which We Conceive To Be Like 
 Ourselves,  See Iii. Xxii. Note. 
   
 Prop. Xxviii.  We Endeavour To Bring About Whatsoever We Conceive 
 To Conduce To Pleasure ; But We Endeavour To Remove Or Destroy 
 Whatsoever We Conceive To Be Truly Repugnant Thereto,  Or To 
 Conduce To Pain. 
     Proof.-We Endeavour,  As Far As Possible,  To Conceive That 
 Which We Imagine To Conduce To Pleasure (Iii. Xii.) ; In Other 
 Words (Ii. Xvii.) We Shall Endeavour To Conceive It As Far As 
 Possible As Present Or Actually Existing.  But The Endeavour Of 
 The Mind,  Or The Mind's Power Of Thought,  Is Equal To,  And 
 Simultaneous With,  The Endeavour Of The Body,  Or The Body's Power 
 Of Action.  (This Is Clear From Ii. Vii. Coroll. And Ii. Xi. 
 Coroll.).  Therefore We Make An Absolute Endeavour For Its 
 Existence,  In Other Words (Which By Iii. Ix. Note,  Come To The 
 Same Thing) We Desire And Strive For It ; This Was Our First 
 Point.  Again,  If We Conceive That Something,  Which We Believed 
 To Be The Cause Of Pain,  That Is (Iii. Xiii. Note),  Which We 
 Hate,  Is Destroyed,  We Shall Rejoice (Iii. Xx.).  We Shall, 
 Therefore (By The First Part Of This Proof),  Endeavour To Destroy 
 The Same,  Or (Iii. Xiii.) To Remove It From Us,  So That We May 
 Not Regard It As Present ; This Was Our Second Point.  Wherefore 
 Whatsoever Conduces To Pleasure,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxix.  We Shall Also Endeavour To Do Whatsoever We Conceive 
 Men6 To Regard With Pleasure,  And Contrariwise We Shall Shrink 
 From Doing That Which We Conceive Men To Shrink From. 
     Proof.-From The Fact Of Imagining,  That Men Love Or Hate 
 Anything,  We Shall Love Or Hate The Same Thing (Iii. Xxvii.). 
 That Is (Iii. Xiii. Note),  From This Mere Fact We Shall Feel 
 Pleasure Or Pain At The Thing's Presence.  And So We Shall 
 Endeavour To Do Whatsoever We Conceive Men To Love Or Regard With 
 Pleasure,  Etc.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Endeavour To Do A Thing Or Leave It Undone,  Solely 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 83 
 In Order To Please Men,  We Call Ambition,  Especially When We So 
 Eagerly Endeavour To Please The Vulgar,  That We Do Or Omit 
 Certain Things To Our Own Or Another's Hurt : In Other Cases It 
 Is Generally Called Kindliness.  Furthermore I Give The Name Of 
 Praise To The Pleasure,  With Which We Conceive The Action Of 
 Another,  Whereby He Has Endeavoured To Please Us ; But Of Blame 
 To The Pain Wherewith We Feel Aversion To His Action. 
   
 Prop. Xxx.  If Anyone Has Done Something Which He Conceives As 
 Affecting Other Men Pleasurably,  He Will Be Affected By Pleasure, 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of Himself As Cause ; In Other Words,  He 
 Will Regard Himself With Pleasure.  On The Other Hand,  If He Has 
 Done Anything Which He Conceives As Affecting Others Painfully, 
 He Will Regard Himself With Pain. 
     Proof.-He Who Conceives,  That He Affects Others With Pleasure 
 Or Pain,  Will,  By That Very Fact,  Himself Be Affected With 
 Pleasure Or Pain (Iii. Xxvii.),  But,  As A Man (Ii. Xix. And 
 Xxiii.) Is Conscious Of Himself Through The Modifications Whereby 
 He Is Determined To Action,  It Follows That He Who Conceives, 
 That He Affects Others Pleasurably,  Will Be Affected With 
 Pleasure Accompanied By The Idea Of Himself As Cause ; In Other 
 Words,  He Will Regard Himself With Pleasure.  And So Mutatis 
 Mutandis In The Case Of Pain.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-As Love (Iii. Xiii.) Is Pleasure Accompanied By The 
 Idea Of An External Cause,  And Hatred Is Pain Accompanied By The 
 Idea Of An External Cause ; The Pleasure And Pain In Question 
 Will Be A Species Of Love And Hatred.  But,  As The Terms Love And 
 Hatred Are Used In Reference To External Objects,  We Will Employ 
 Other Names For The Emotions Now Under Discussion : Pleasure 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of An External Cause7 We Will Style 
 Honour,  And The Emotion Contrary Thereto We Will Style Shame : I 
 Mean In Such Cases As Where Pleasure Or Pain Arises From A Man's 
 Belief,  That He Is Being Praised Or Blamed : Otherwise Pleasure 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of An External Cause8 Is Called 
 Self-Complacency,  And Its Contrary Pain Is Called Repentance. 
 Again,  As It May Happen (Ii. Xvii. Coroll.) That The Pleasure, 
 Wherewith A Man Conceives That He Affects Others,  May Exist 
 Solely In His Own Imagination,  And As (Iii. Xxv.) Everyone 
 Endeavours To Conceive Concerning Himself That Which He Conceives 
 Will Affect Him With Pleasure,  It May Easily Come To Pass That A 
 Vain Man May Be Proud And May Imagine That He Is Pleasing To All, 
 When In Reality He May Be An Annoyance To All. 
   
 Prop. Xxxi.  If We Conceive That Anyone Loves,  Desires,  Or Hates 
 Anything Which We Ourselves Love,  Desire,  Or Hate,  We Shall 
 Thereupon Regard The Thing In Question With More Steadfast Love, 
 &C.  On The Contrary,  If We Think That Anyone Shrinks From 
 Something That We Love,  We Shall Undergo Vacillations Of Soul. 
     Proof.-From The Mere Fact Of Conceiving That Anyone Loves 
 Anything We Shall Ourselves Love That Thing (Iii. Xxvii.) : But 
 We Are Assumed To Love It Already ; There Is,  Therefore,  A New 
 Cause Of Love,  Whereby Our Former Emotion Is Fostered ; Hence We 
 Shall Thereupon Love It More Steadfastly.  Again,  From The Mere 
 Fact Of Conceiving That Anyone Shrinks From Anything,  We Shall 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 84 
 Ourselves Shrink From That Thing (Iii. Xxvii.).  If We Assume 
 That We At The Same Time Love It,  We Shall Then Simultaneously 
 Love It And Shrink From It ; In Other Words,  We Shall Be Subject 
 To Vacillation (Iii. Xvii. Note).  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-From The Foregoing,  And Also From Iii. Xxviii. It 
 Follows That Everyone Endeavours,  As Far As Possible,  To Cause 
 Others To Love What He Himself Loves,  And To Hate What He Himself 
 Hates : As The Poet Says :  "As Lovers Let Us Share Every Hope 
 And Every Fear : Ironhearted Were He Who Should Love What The 
 Other Leaves."9 
     Note.-This Endeavour To Bring It About,  That Our Own Likes 
 And Dislikes Should Meet With Universal Approval,  Is Really 
 Ambition (See Iii. Xxix. Note) ; Wherefore We See That Everyone 
 By Nature Desires (Appetere),  That The Rest Of Mankind Should 
 Live According To His Own Individual Disposition : When Such A 
 Desire Is Equally Present In All,  Everyone Stands In Everyone 
 Else's Way,  And In Wishing To Be Loved Or Praised By All,  All 
 Become Mutually Hateful. 
   
 Prop. Xxxii.  If We Conceive That Anyone Takes Delight In 
 Something,  Which Only One Person Can Possess,  We Shall Endeavour 
 To Bring It About That The Man In Question Shall Not Gain 
 Possession Thereof. 
     Proof.-From The Mere Fact Of Our Conceiving That Another 
 Person Takes Delight In A Thing (Iii. Xxvii. And Coroll.) We 
 Shall Ourselves Love That Thing And Desire To Take Delight 
 Therein.  But We Assumed That The Pleasure In Question Would Be 
 Prevented By Another's Delight In Its Object ; We Shall, 
 Therefore,  Endeavour To Prevent His Possession Thereof (Iii. 
 Xxviii.).  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-We Thus See That Man's Nature Is Generally So 
 Constituted,  That He Takes Pity On Those Who Fare Ill,  And Envies 
 Those Who Fare Well With An Amount Of Hatred Proportioned To His 
 Own Love For The Goods In Their Possession.  Further,  We See That 
 From The Same Property Of Human Nature,  Whence It Follows That 
 Men Are Merciful,  It Follows Also That They Are Envious And 
 Ambitious.  Lastly,  If We Make Appeal To Experience,  We Shall 
 Find That She Entirely Confirms What We Have Said ; More 
 Especially If We Turn Our Attention To The First Years Of Our 
 Life.  We Find That Children,  Whose Body Is Continually,  As It 
 Were,  In Equilibrium,  Laugh Or Cry Simply Because They See Others 
 Laughing Or Crying ; Moreover,  They Desire Forthwith To Imitate 
 Whatever They See Others Doing,  And To Possess Themselves Of 
 Whatever They Conceive As Delighting Others : Inasmuch As The 
 Images Of Things Are,  As We Have Said,  Modifications Of The Human 
 Body,  Or Modes Wherein The Human Body Is Affected And Disposed By 
 External Causes To Act In This Or That Manner. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiii.  When We Love A Thing Similar To Ourselves We 
 Endeavour,  As Far As We Can,  To Bring About That It Should Love 
 Us In Return. 
     Proof.-That Which We Love We Endeavour,  As Far As We Can,  To 
 Conceive In Preference To Anything Else (Iii. Xii.).  If The 
 Thing Be Similar To Ourselves,  We Shall Endeavour To Affect It 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 85 
 Pleasurably In Preference To Anything Else (Iii. Xxix.).  In 
 Other Words,  We Shall Endeavour,  As Far As We Can,  To Bring It 
 About,  That The Thing Should Be Affected With Pleasure 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of Ourselves,  That Is (Iii. Xiii. Note), 
 That It Should Love Us In Return.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiv.  The Greater The Emotion With Which We Conceive A 
 Loved Object To Be Affected Towards Us,  The Greater Will Be Our 
 Complacency. 
     Proof.-We Endeavour (Iii. Xxxiii.),  As Far As We Can,  To 
 Bring About,  That What We Love Should Love Us In Return : In 
 Other Words,  That What We Love Should Be Affected With Pleasure 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of Ourself As Cause.  Therefore,  In 
 Proportion As The Loved Object Is More Pleasurably Affected 
 Because Of Us,  Our Endeavour Will Be Assisted.-That Is (Iii. Xi. 
 And Note) The Greater Will Be Our Pleasure.  But When We Take 
 Pleasure In The Fact,  That We Pleasurably Affect Something 
 Similar To Ourselves,  We Regard Ourselves With Pleasure (Iii. 30) 
 ; Therefore The Greater The Emotion With Which We Conceive A 
 Loved Object To Be Affected,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxv.  If Anyone Conceives,  That An Object Of His Love 
 Joins Itself To Another With Closer Bonds Of Friendship Than He 
 Himself Has Attained To,  He Will Be Affected With Hatred Towards 
 The Loved Object And With Envy Towards His Rival. 
     Proof.-In Proportion As A Man Thinks,  That A Loved Object Is 
 Well Affected Towards Him,  Will Be The Strength Of His 
 Self-Approval (By The Last Prop.),  That Is (Iii. Xxx. Note),  Of 
 His Pleasure ; He Will,  Therefore (Iii. Xxviii.),  Endeavour,  As 
 Far As He Can,  To Imagine The Loved Object As Most Closely Bound 
 To Him : This Endeavour Or Desire Will Be Increased,  If He Thinks 
 That Someone Else Has A Similar Desire (Iii. Xxxi.).  But This 
 Endeavour Or Desire Is Assumed To Be Checked By The Image Of The 
 Loved Object In Conjunction With The Image Of Him Whom The Loved 
 Object Has Joined To Itself ; Therefore (Iii. Xi. Note) He Will 
 For That Reason Be Affected With Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea Of 
 The Loved Object As A Cause In Conjunction With The Image Of His 
 Rival ; That Is,  He Will Be (Iii. Xiii.) Affected With Hatred 
 Towards The Loved Object And Also Towards His Rival (Iii. Xv. 
 Coroll.),  Which Latter He Will Envy As Enjoying The Beloved 
 Object.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Hatred Towards An Object Of Love Joined With Envy 
 Is Called Jealousy,  Which Accordingly Is Nothing Else But A 
 Wavering Of The Disposition Arising From Combined Love And 
 Hatred,  Accompanied By The Idea Of Some Rival Who Is Envied. 
 Further,  This Hatred Towards The Object Of Love Will Be Greater, 
 In Proportion To The Pleasure Which The Jealous Man Had Been Wont 
 To Derive From The Reciprocated Love Of The Said Object ; And 
 Also In Proportion To The Feelings He Had Previously Entertained 
 Towards His Rival.  If He Had Hated Him,  He Will Forthwith Hate 
 The Object Of His Love,  Because He Conceives It Is Pleasurably 
 Affected By One Whom He Himself Hates : And Also Because He Is 
 Compelled To Associate The Image Of His Loved One With The Image 
 Of Him Whom He Hates.  This Condition Generally Comes Into Play 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 86 
 In The Case Of Love For A Woman : For He Who Thinks,  That A Woman 
 Whom He Loves Prostitutes Herself To Another,  Will Feel Pain,  Not 
 Only Because His Own Desire Is Restrained,  But Also Because, 
 Being Compelled To Associate The Image Of Her He Loves With The 
 Parts Of Shame And The Excreta Of Another,  He Therefore Shrinks 
 From Her. 
     We Must Add,  That A Jealous Man Is Not Greeted By His Beloved 
 With The Same Joyful Countenance As Before,  And This Also Gives 
 Him Pain As A Lover,  As I Will Now Show. 
   
 Prop. Xxxvi.  He Who Remembers A Thing,  In Which He Has Once 
 Taken Delight,  Desires To Possess It Under The Same Circumstances 
 As When He First Took Delight Therein. 
     Proof.-Everything,  Which A Man Has Seen In Conjunction With 
 The Object Of His Love,  Will Be To Him Accidentally A Cause Of 
 Pleasure (Iii. Xv.) ; He Will,  Therefore,  Desire To Possess It, 
 In Conjunction With That Wherein He Has Taken Delight ; In Other 
 Words,  He Will Desire To Possess The Object Of His Love Under The 
 Same Circumstances As When He First Took Delight Therein.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-A Lover Will,  Therefore,  Feel Pain If One Of The 
 Aforesaid Attendant Circumstances Be Missing. 
     Proof.-For,  In So Far As He Finds Some Circumstance To Be 
 Missing,  He Conceives Something Which Excludes Its Existence.  As 
 He Is Assumed To Be Desirous For Love's Sake Of That Thing Or 
 Circumstance (By The Last Prop.),  He Will,  In So Far As He 
 Conceives It To Be Missing,  Feel Pain (Iii. Xix.).  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Pain,  In So Far As It Has Reference To The Absence 
 Of The Object Of Love,  Is Called Regret. 
   
 Prop. Xxxvii.  Desire Arising Through Pain Or Pleasure,  Hatred Or 
 Love,  Is Greater In Proportion As The Emotion Is Greater. 
     Proof.-Pain Diminishes Or Constrains A Man's Power Of 
 Activity (Iii. Xi. Note),  In Other Words (Iii. Vii.),  Diminishes 
 Or Constrains The Effort,  Wherewith He Endeavours To Persist In 
 His Own Being ; Therefore (Iii. V.) It Is Contrary To The Said 
 Endeavour : Thus All The Endeavours Of A Man Affected By Pain Are 
 Directed To Removing That Pain.  But (By The Definition Of Pain), 
 In Proportion As The Pain Is Greater,  So Also Is It Necessarily 
 Opposed To A Greater Part Of Man's Power Of Activity ; Therefore 
 The Greater The Pain,  The Greater The Power Of Activity Employed 
 To Remove It ; That Is,  The Greater Will Be The Desire Or 
 Appetite In Endeavouring To Remove It.  Again,  Since Pleasure 
 (Iii. Xi. Note) Increases Or Aids A Man's Power Of Activity,  It 
 May Easily Be Shown In Like Manner,  That A Man Affected By 
 Pleasure Has No Desire Further Than To Preserve It,  And His 
 Desire Will Be In Proportion To The Magnitude Of The Pleasure. 
     Lastly,  Since Hatred And Love Are Themselves Emotions Of Pain 
 And Pleasure,  It Follows In Like Manner That The Endeavour, 
 Appetite,  Or Desire,  Which Arises Through Hatred Or Love,  Will Be 
 Greater In Proportion To The Hatred Or Love.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxviii.  If A Man Has Begun To Hate An Object Of His Love, 
 So That Love Is Thoroughly Destroyed,  He Will,  Causes Being 
 Equal,  Regard It With More Hatred Than If He Had Never Loved It, 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 87 
 And His Hatred Will Be In Proportion To The Strength Of His 
 Former Love. 
     Proof.-If A Man Begins To Hate That Which He Had Loved,  More 
 Of His Appetites Are Put Under Restraint Than If He Had Never 
 Loved It.  For Love Is A Pleasure (Iii. Xiii. Note) Which A Man 
 Endeavours As Far As He Can To Render Permanent (Iii. Xxviii.) ; 
 He Does So By Regarding The Object Of His Love As Present,  And By 
 Affecting It As Far As He Can Pleasurably ; This Endeavour Is 
 Greater In Proportion As The Love Is Greater,  And So Also Is The 
 Endeavour To Bring About That The Beloved Should Return His 
 Affection (Iii. Xxxiii.).  Now These Endeavours Are Constrained 
 By Hatred Towards The Object Of Love (Iii. Xiii. Coroll. And Iii. 
 Xxiii.) ; Wherefore The Lover (Iii. Xi. Note) Will For This Cause 
 Also Be Affected With Pain,  The More So In Proportion As His Love 
 Has Been Greater ; That Is,  In Addition To The Pain Caused By 
 Hatred,  There Is A Pain Caused By The Fact That He Has Loved The 
 Object ; Wherefore The Lover Will Regard The Beloved With Greater 
 Pain,  Or In Other Words,  Will Hate It More Than If He Had Never 
 Loved It,  And With The More Intensity In Proportion As His Former 
 Love Was Greater.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxix.  He Who Hates Anyone Will Endeavour To Do Him An 
 Injury,  Unless He Fears That A Greater Injury Will Thereby Accrue 
 To Himself ; On The Other Hand,  He Who Loves Anyone Will,  By The 
 Same Law,  Seek To Benefit Him. 
     Proof.-To Hate A Man Is (Iii. Xiii. Note) To Conceive Him As 
 A Cause Of Pain ; Therefore He Who Hates A Man Will Endeavour To 
 Remove Or Destroy Him.  But If Anything More Painful,  Or,  In 
 Other Words,  A Greater Evil,  Should Accrue To The Hater 
 Thereby-And If The Hater Thinks He Can Avoid Such Evil By Not 
 Carrying Out The Injury,  Which He Planned Against The Object Of 
 His Hate-He Will Desire To Abstain From Inflicting That Injury 
 (Iii. Xxviii.),  And The Strength Of His Endeavour (Iii. Xxxvii.) 
 Will Be Greater Than His Former Endeavour To Do Injury,  And Will 
 Therefore Prevail Over It,  As We Asserted.  The Second Part Of 
 This Proof Proceeds In The Same Manner.  Wherefore He Who Hates 
 Another,  Etc.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-By Good I Here Mean Every Kind Of Pleasure,  And All 
 That Conduces Thereto,  Especially That Which Satisfies Our 
 Longings,  Whatsoever They May Be.  By Evil,  I Mean Every Kind Of 
 Pain,  Especially That Which Frustrates Our Longings.  For I Have 
 Shown (Iii. Ix. Note) That We In No Case Desire A Thing Because 
 We Deem It Good,  But,  Contrariwise,  We Deem A Thing Good Because 
 We Desire It : Consequently We Deem Evil That Which We Shrink 
 From ; Everyone,  Therefore,  According To His Particular Emotions, 
 Judges Or Estimates What Is Good,  What Is Bad,  What Is Better, 
 What Is Worse,  Lastly,  What Is Best,  And What Is Worst.  Thus A 
 Miser Thinks That Abundance Of Money Is The Best,  And Want Of 
 Money The Worst ; An Ambitious Man Desires Nothing So Much As 
 Glory,  And Fears Nothing So Much As Shame.  To An Envious Man 
 Nothing Is More Delightful Than Another's Misfortune,  And Nothing 
 More Painful Than Another's Success.  So Every Man,  According To 
 His Emotions,  Judges A Thing To Be Good Or Bad,  Useful Or 
 Useless.  The Emotion,  Which Induces A Man To Turn From That 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 88 
 Which He Wishes,  Or To Wish For That Which He Turns From,  Is 
 Called Timidity,  Which May Accordingly Be Defined As The Fear 
 Whereby A Man Is Induced To Avoid An Evil Which He Regards As 
 Future By Encountering A Lesser Evil (Iii. Xxviii.).  But If The 
 Evil Which He Fears Be Shame,  Timidity Becomes Bashfulness. 
 Lastly,  If The Desire To Avoid A Future Evil Be Checked By The 
 Fear Of Another Evil,  So That The Man Knows Not Which To Choose, 
 Fear Becomes Consternation,  Especially If Both The Evils Feared 
 Be Very Great. 
   
 Prop. Xl.  He,  Who Conceives Himself To Be Hated By Another,  And 
 Believes That He Has Given Him No Cause For Hatred,  Will Hate 
 That Other In Return. 
     Proof.-He Who Conceives Another As Affected With Hatred,  Will 
 Thereupon Be Affected Himself With Hatred (Iii. Xxvii.),  That Is, 
 With Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea Of An External Cause.  But,  By 
 The Hypothesis,  He Conceives No Cause For This Pain Except Him 
 Who Is His Enemy ; Therefore,  From Conceiving That He Is Hated By 
 Some One,  He Will Be Affected With Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea 
 Of His Enemy ; In Other Words,  He Will Hate His Enemy In Return. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-He Who Thinks That He Has Given Just Cause For Hatred 
 Will (Iii. Xxx. And Note) Be Affected With Shame ; But This Case 
 (Iii. Xxv.) Rarely Happens.  This Reciprocation Of Hatred May 
 Also Arise From The Hatred,  Which Follows An Endeavour To Injure 
 The Object Of Our Hate (Iii. Xxxix.).  He Therefore Who Conceives 
 That He Is Hated By Another Will Conceive His Enemy As The Cause 
 Of Some Evil Or Pain ; Thus He Will Be Affected With Pain Or 
 Fear,  Accompanied By The Idea Of His Enemy As Cause ; In Other 
 Words,  He Will Be Affected With Hatred Towards His Enemy,  As I 
 Said Above. 
     Corollary I.-He Who Conceives,  That One Whom He Loves Hates 
 Him,  Will Be A Prey To Conflicting Hatred And Love.  For,  In So 
 Far As He Conceives That He Is An Object Of Hatred,  He Is 
 Determined To Hate His Enemy In Return.  But,  By The Hypothesis, 
 He Nevertheless Loves Him : Wherefore He Will Be A Prey To 
 Conflicting Hatred And Love. 
     Corollary Ii.-If A Man Conceives That One,  Whom He Has 
 Hitherto Regarded Without Emotion,  Has Done Him Any Injury From 
 Motives Of Hatred,  He Will Forthwith Seek To Repay The Injury In 
 Kind. 
     Proof.-He Who Conceives,  That Another Hates Him,  Will (By The 
 Last Proposition) Hate His Enemy In Return,  And (Iii. Xxvi.) Will 
 Endeavour To Recall Everything Which Can Affect Him Painfully ; 
 He Will Moreover Endeavour To Do Him An Injury (Iii. Xxxix.). 
 Now The First Thing Of This Sort Which He Conceives Is The Injury 
 Done To Himself ; He Will,  Therefore,  Forthwith Endeavour To 
 Repay It In Kind.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-The Endeavour To Injure One Whom We Hate Is Called 
 Anger ; The Endeavour To Repay In Kind Injury Done To Ourselves 
 Is Called Revenge. 
   
 Prop. Xli.  If Anyone Conceives That He Is Loved By Another,  And 
 Believes That He Has Given No Cause For Such Love,  He Will Love 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 89 
 That Other In Return.  (Cf. Iii. Xv. Coroll.,  And Iii. Xvi.) 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Proved In The Same Way As The 
 Preceding One.  See Also The Note Appended Thereto. 
     Note.-If He Believes That He Has Given Just Cause For The 
 Love,  He Will Take Pride Therein (Iii. Xxx. And Note) ; This Is 
 What Most Often Happens (Iii. Xxv.),  And We Said That Its 
 Contrary Took Place Whenever A Man Conceives Himself To Be Hated 
 By Another.  (See Note To Preceding Proposition.)  This 
 Reciprocal Love,  And Consequently The Desire Of Benefiting Him 
 Who Loves Us (Iii. Xxxix.),  And Who Endeavours To Benefit Us,  Is 
 Called Gratitude Or Thankfulness.  It Thus Appears That Men Are 
 Much More Prone To Take Vengeance Than To Return Benefits. 
     Corollary.-He Who Imagines That He Is Loved By One Whom He 
 Hates,  Will Be A Prey To Conflicting Hatred And Love.  This Is 
 Proved In The Same Way As The First Corollary Of The Preceding 
 Proposition. 
     Note.-If Hatred Be The Prevailing Emotion,  He Will Endeavour 
 To Injure Him Who Loves Him ; This Emotion Is Called Cruelty, 
 Especially If The Victim Be Believed To Have Given No Ordinary 
 Cause For Hatred. 
   
 Prop. Xlii.  He Who Has Conferred A Benefit On Anyone From 
 Motives Of Love Or Honour Will Feel Pain,  If He Sees That The 
 Benefit Is Received Without Gratitude. 
     Proof.-When A Man Loves Something Similar To Himself,  He 
 Endeavours,  As Far As He Can,  To Bring It About That He Should Be 
 Loved Thereby In Return (Iii. Xxxiii.).  Therefore He Who Has 
 Conferred A Benefit Confers It In Obedience To The Desire,  Which 
 He Feels Of Being Loved In Return ; That Is (Iii. Xxxiv.) From 
 The Hope Of Honour Or (Iii. Xxx. Note) Pleasure ; Hence He Will 
 Endeavour,  As Far As He Can,  To Conceive This Cause Of Honour,  Or 
 To Regard It As Actually Existing.  But,  By The Hypothesis,  He 
 Conceives Something Else,  Which Excludes The Existence Of The 
 Said Cause Of Honour : Wherefore He Will Thereat Feel Pain (Iii. 
 Xix.).  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xliii.  Hatred Is Increased By Being Reciprocated,  And Can 
 On The Other Hand Be Destroyed By Love. 
     Proof.-He Who Conceives,  That An Object Of His Hatred Hates 
 Him In Return,  Will Thereupon Feel A New Hatred,  While The Former 
 Hatred (By Hypothesis) Still Remains (Iii. Xl.).  But If,  On The 
 Other Hand,  He Conceives That The Object Of Hate Loves Him,  He 
 Will To This Extent (Iii. Xxxviii.) Regard Himself With Pleasure, 
 And (Iii. Xxix.) Will Endeavour To Please The Cause Of His 
 Emotion.  In Other Words,  He Will Endeavour Not To Hate Him (Iii. 
 Xli.),  And Not To Affect Him Painfully ; This Endeavour (Iii. 
 Xxxvii.) Will Be Greater Or Less In Proportion To The Emotion 
 From Which It Arises.  Therefore,  If It Be Greater Than That 
 Which Arises From Hatred,  And Through Which The Man Endeavours To 
 Affect Painfully The Thing Which He Hates,  It Will Get The Better 
 Of It And Banish The Hatred From His Mind.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xliv.  Hatred Which Is Completely Vanquished By Love Passes 
 Into Love : And Love Is Thereupon Greater Than If Hatred Had Not 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 90 
 Preceded It. 
     Proof.-The Proof Proceeds In The Same Way As Prop. Xxxviii. 
 Of This Part : For He Who Begins To Love A Thing,  Which He Was 
 Wont To Hate Or Regard With Pain,  From The Very Fact Of Loving 
 Feels Pleasure.  To This Pleasure Involved In Love Is Added The 
 Pleasure Arising From Aid Given To The Endeavour To Remove The 
 Pain Involved In Hatred (Iii. Xxxvii.),  Accompanied By The Idea 
 Of The Former Object Of Hatred As Cause. 
     Note.-Though This Be So,  No One Will Endeavour To Hate 
 Anything,  Or To Be Affected With Pain,  For The Sake Of Enjoying 
 This Greater Pleasure ; That Is,  No One Will Desire That He 
 Should Be Injured,  In The Hope Of Recovering From The Injury,  Nor 
 Long To Be Ill For The Sake Of Getting Well.  For Everyone Will 
 Always Endeavour To Persist In His Being,  And To Ward Off Pain As 
 Far As He Can.  If The Contrary Is Conceivable,  Namely,  That A 
 Man Should Desire To Hate Someone,  In Order That He Might Love 
 Him The More Thereafter,  He Will Always Desire To Hate Him.  For 
 The Strength Of Love Is In Proportion To The Strength Of The 
 Hatred,  Wherefore The Man Would Desire,  That The Hatred Be 
 Continually Increased More And More,  And,  For A Similar Reason, 
 He Would Desire To Become More And More Ill,  In Order That He 
 Might Take A Greater Pleasure In Being Restored To Health : In 
 Such A Case He Would Always Endeavour To Be Ill,  Which (Iii. Vi.) 
 Is Absurd. 
   
 Prop. Xlv.  If A Man Conceives,  That Anyone Similar To Himself 
 Hates Anything Also Similar To Himself,  Which He Loves,  He Will 
 Hate That Person. 
     Proof.-The Beloved Object Feels Reciprocal Hatred Towards Him 
 Who Hates It (Iii. Xl.) ; Therefore The Lover,  In Conceiving That 
 Anyone Hates The Beloved Object,  Conceives The Beloved Thing As 
 Affected By Hatred,  In Other Words (Iii. Xiii.),  By Pain ; 
 Consequently He Is Himself Affected By Pain Accompanied By The 
 Idea Of The Hater Of The Beloved Thing As Cause ; That Is,  He 
 Will Hate Him Who Hates Anything Which He Himself Loves (Iii. 
 Xiii. Note).  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xlvi.  If A Man Has Been Affected Pleasurably Or Painfully 
 By Anyone,  Of A Class Or Nation Different From His Own,  And If 
 The Pleasure Or Pain Has Been Accompanied By The Idea Of The Said 
 Stranger As Cause,  Under The General Category Of The Class Or 
 Nation : The Man Will Feel Love Or Hatred,  Not Only To The 
 Individual Stranger,  But Also To The Whole Class Or Nation 
 Whereto He Belongs. 
     Proof.-This Is Evident From Iii. Xvi. 
   
 Prop. Xlvii.  Joy Arising From The Fact,  That Anything We Hate Is 
 Destroyed,  Or Suffers Other Injury,  Is Never Unaccompanied By A 
 Certain Pain In Us. 
     Proof.-This Is Evident From Iii. Xxvii.  For In So Far As We 
 Conceive A Thing Similar To Ourselves To Be Affected With Pain, 
 We Ourselves Feel Pain. 
     Note.-This Proposition Can Also Be Proved From The Corollary 
 To Ii. Xvii.  Whenever We Remember Anything,  Even If It Does Not 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 91 
 Actually Exist,  We Regard It Only As Present,  And The Body Is 
 Affected In The Same Manner ; Wherefore,  In So Far As The 
 Remembrance Of The Thing Is Strong,  A Man Is Determined To Regard 
 It With Pain ; This Determination,  While The Image Of The Thing 
 In Question Lasts,  Is Indeed Checked By The Remembrance Of Other 
 Things Excluding The Existence Of The Aforesaid Thing,  But Is Not 
 Destroyed : Hence,  A Man Only Feels Pleasure In So Far As The 
 Said Determination Is Checked : For This Reason The Joy Arising 
 From The Injury Done To What We Hate Is Repeated,  Every Time We 
 Remember That Object Of Hatred.  For,  As We Have Said,  When The 
 Image Of The Thing In Question,  Is Aroused,  Inasmuch As It 
 Involves The Thing's Existence,  It Determines The Man To Regard 
 The Thing With The Same Pain As He Was Wont To Do,  When It 
 Actually Did Exist.  However,  Since He Has Joined To The Image Of 
 The Thing Other Images,  Which Exclude Its Existence,  This 
 Determination To Pain Is Forthwith Checked,  And The Man Rejoices 
 Afresh As Often As The Repetition Takes Place.  This Is The Cause 
 Of Men's Pleasure In Recalling Past Evils,  And Delight In 
 Narrating Dangers From Which They Have Escaped.  For When Men 
 Conceive A Danger,  They Conceive It As Still Future,  And Are 
 Determined To Fear It ; This Determination Is Checked Afresh By 
 The Idea Of Freedom,  Which Became Associated With The Idea Of The 
 Danger When They Escaped Therefrom : This Renders Them Secure 
 Afresh : Therefore They Rejoice Afresh. 
   
 Prop. Xlviii.  Love Or Hatred Towards,  For Instance,  Peter Is 
 Destroyed,  If The Pleasure Involved In The Former,  Or The Pain 
 Involved In The Latter Emotion,  Be Associated With The Idea Of 
 Another Cause : And Will Be Diminished In Proportion As We 
 Conceive Peter Not To Have Been The Sole Cause Of Either Emotion. 
     Proof.-This Prop. Is Evident From The Mere Definition Of Love 
 And Hatred (Iii. Xiii. Note).  For Pleasure Is Called Love 
 Towards Peter,  And Pain Is Called Hatred Towards Peter,  Simply In 
 So Far As Peter Is Regarded As The Cause Of One Emotion Or The 
 Other.  When This Condition Of Causality Is Either Wholly Or 
 Partly Removed,  The Emotion Towards Peter Also Wholly Or In Part 
 Vanishes.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xlix.  Love Or Hatred Towards A Thing,  Which We Conceive To 
 Be Free,  Must,  Other Conditions Being Similar,  Be Greater Than If 
 It Were Felt Towards A Thing Acting By Necessity. 
     Proof.-A Thing Which We Conceive As Free Must (I. Def. Vii.) 
 Be Perceived Through Itself Without Anything Else.  If, 
 Therefore,  We Conceive It As The Cause Of Pleasure Or Pain,  We 
 Shall Therefore (Iii. Xiii. Note) Love It Or Hate It,  And Shall 
 Do So With The Utmost Love Or Hatred That Can Arise From The 
 Given Emotion.  But If The Thing Which Causes The Emotion Be 
 Conceived As Acting By Necessity,  We Shall Then (By The Same Def. 
 Vii. Part I.) Conceive It Not As The Sole Cause,  But As One Of 
 The Causes Of The Emotion,  And Therefore Our Love Or Hatred 
 Towards It Will Be Less.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Hence It Follows,  That Men,  Thinking Themselves To Be 
 Free,  Feel More Love Or Hatred Towards One Another Than Towards 
 Anything Else : To This Consideration We Must Add The Imitation 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 92 
 Of Emotions Treated Of In Iii. Xxvii.,  Xxxiv.,  Xl. And Xliii. 
   
 Prop. L.  Anything Whatever Can Be,  Accidentally,  A Cause Of Hope 
 Or Fear. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Proved In The Same Way As Iii. 
 Xv.,  Which See,  Together With The Note To Iii. Xviii. 
     Note.-Things Which Are Accidentally The Causes Of Hope Or 
 Fear Are Called Good Or Evil Omens.  Now,  In So Far As Such Omens 
 Are The Cause Of Hope Or Fear,  They Are (By The Definitions Of 
 Hope And Fear Given In Iii. Xviii. Note) The Causes Also Of 
 Pleasure And Pain ; Consequently We,  To This Extent,  Regard Them 
 With Love Or Hatred,  And Endeavour Either To Invoke Them As Means 
 Towards That Which We Hope For,  Or To Remove Them As Obstacles, 
 Or Causes Of That Which We Fear.  It Follows,  Further,  From Iii. 
 Xxv.,  That We Are Naturally So Constituted As To Believe Readily 
 In That Which We Hope For,  And With Difficulty In That Which We 
 Fear ; Moreover,  We Are Apt To Estimate Such Objects Above Or 
 Below Their True Value.  Hence There Have Arisen Superstitions, 
 Whereby Men Are Everywhere Assailed.  However,  I Do Not Think It 
 Worth While To Point Out Here The Vacillations Springing From 
 Hope And Fear ; It Follows From The Definition Of These Emotions, 
 That There Can Be No Hope Without Fear,  And No Fear Without Hope, 
 As I Will Duly Explain In The Proper Place.  Further,  In So Far 
 As We Hope For Or Fear Anything,  We Regard It With Love Or Hatred 
 ; Thus Everyone Can Apply By Himself To Hope And Fear What We 
 Have Said Concerning Love And Hatred. 
   
 Prop. Li.  Different Men May Be Differently Affected By The Same 
 Object,  And The Same Man May Be Differently Affected At Different 
 Times By The Same Object. 
     Proof.-The Human Body Is Affected By External Bodies In A 
 Variety Of Ways (Ii. Post. Iii.).  Two Men May Therefore Be 
 Differently Affected At The Same Time,  And Therefore (By Ax. I. 
 After Lemma Iii. After Ii. Xiii.) May Be Differently Affected By 
 One And The Same Object.  Further (By The Same Post.) The Human 
 Body Can Be Affected Sometimes In One Way,  Sometimes In Another ; 
 Consequently (By The Same Axiom) It May Be Differently Affected 
 At Different Times By One And The Same Object.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-We Thus See That It Is Possible,  That What One Man 
 Loves Another May Hate,  And That What One Man Fears Another May 
 Not Fear ; Or,  Again,  That One And The Same Man May Love What He 
 Once Hated,  Or May Be Bold Where He Once Was Timid,  And So On. 
 Again,  As Everyone Judges According To His Emotions What Is Good, 
 What Bad,  What Better,  And What Worse (Iii. Xxxix. Note),  It 
 Follows That Men's Judgments May Vary No Less Than Their 
 Emotions10,  Hence When We Compare Some With Others,  We 
 Distinguish Them Solely By The Diversity Of Their Emotions,  And 
 Style Some Intrepid,  Others Timid,  Others By Some Other Epithet. 
 For Instance,  I Shall Call A Man Intrepid,  If He Despises An Evil 
 Which I Am Accustomed To Fear ; If I Further Take Into 
 Consideration,  That,  In His Desire To Injure His Enemies And To 
 Benefit Those Whom He Loves,  He Is Not Restrained By The Fear Of 
 An Evil Which Is Sufficient To Restrain Me,  I Shall Call Him 
 Daring.  Again,  A Man Will Appear Timid To Me,  If He Fears An 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 93 
 Evil Which I Am Accustomed To Despise ; And If I Further Take 
 Into Consideration That His Desire Is Restrained By The Fear Of 
 An Evil,  Which Is Not Sufficient To Restrain Me,  I Shall Say That 
 He Is Cowardly ; And In Like Manner Will Everyone Pass Judgment. 
     Lastly,  From This Inconstancy In The Nature Of Human 
 Judgment,  Inasmuch As A Man Often Judges Things Solely By His 
 Emotions,  And Inasmuch As The Things Which He Believes Cause 
 Pleasure Or Pain,  And Therefore Endeavours To Promote Or Prevent, 
 Are Often Purely Imaginary,  Not To Speak Of The Uncertainty Of 
 Things Alluded To In Iii. Xxviii. ; We May Readily Conceive That 
 A Man May Be At One Time Affected With Pleasure,  And At Another 
 With Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea Of Himself As Cause.  Thus We 
 Can Easily Understand What Are Repentance And Self-Complacency. 
 Repentance Is Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea Of One's Self As 
 Cause ; Self-Complacency Is Pleasure,  Accompanied By The Idea Of 
 One's Self As Cause,  And These Emotions Are Most Intense Because 
 Men Believe Themselves To Be Free (Iii. Xlix.). 
   
 Prop. Lii.  An Object Which We Have Formerly Seen In Conjunction 
 With Others,  And Which We Do Not Conceive To Have Any Property 
 That Is Not Common To Many,  Will Not Be Regarded By Us For So 
 Long,  As An Object Which We Conceive To Have Some Property 
 Peculiar To Itself. 
     Proof.-As Soon As We Conceive An Object Which We Have Seen In 
 Conjunction With Others,  We At Once Remember Those Others (Ii. 
 Xviii. And Note),  And Thus We Pass Forthwith From The 
 Contemplation Of One Object To The Contemplation Of Another 
 Object.  And This Is The Case With The Object,  Which We Conceive 
 To Have No Property That Is Not Common To Many.  For We Thereupon 
 Assume That We Are Regarding Therein Nothing,  Which We Have Not 
 Before Seen In Conjunction With Other Objects.  But When We 
 Suppose That We Conceive An Object Something Special,  Which We 
 Have Never Seen Before,  We Must Needs Say That The Mind,  While 
 Regarding That Object,  Has In Itself Nothing Which It Can Fall To 
 Regarding Instead Thereof ; Therefore It Is Determined To The 
 Contemplation Of That Object Only.  Therefore An Object,  &C. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Mental Modification,  Or Imagination Of A 
 Particular Thing,  In So Far As It Is Alone In The Mind,  Is Called 
 Wonder ; But If It Be Excited By An Object Of Fear,  It Is Called 
 Consternation,  Because Wonder At An Evil Keeps A Man So Engrossed 
 In The Simple Contemplation Thereof,  That He Has No Power To 
 Think Of Anything Else Whereby He Might Avoid The Evil.  If, 
 However,  The Object Of Wonder Be A Man's Prudence,  Industry,  Or 
 Anything Of That Sort,  Inasmuch As The Said Man,  Is Thereby 
 Regarded As Far Surpassing Ourselves,  Wonder Is Called Veneration 
 ; Otherwise,  If A Man's Anger,  Envy,  &C.,  Be What We Wonder At, 
 The Emotion Is Called Horror.  Again,  If It Be The Prudence, 
 Industry,  Or What Not,  Of A Man We Love,  That We Wonder At,  Our 
 Love Will On This Account Be The Greater (Iii. Xii.),  And When 
 Joined To Wonder Or Veneration Is Called Devotion.  We May In 
 Like Manner Conceive Hatred,  Hope,  Confidence,  And The Other 
 Emotions,  As Associated With Wonder ; And We Should Thus Be Able 
 To Deduce More Emotions Than Those Which Have Obtained Names In 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 94 
 Ordinary Speech.  Whence It Is Evident,  That The Names Of The 
 Emotions Have Been Applied In Accordance Rather With Their 
 Ordinary Manifestations Than With An Accurate Knowledge Of Their 
 Nature. 
     To Wonder Is Opposed Contempt,  Which Generally Arises From 
 The Fact That,  Because We See Someone Wondering At,  Loving,  Or 
 Fearing Something,  Or Because Something,  At First Sight,  Appears 
 To Be Like Things,  Which We Ourselves Wonder At,  Love,  Fear,  &C., 
 We Are,  In Consequence (Iii. Xv. Coroll. And Iii. Xxvii.), 
 Determined To Wonder At,  Love,  Or Fear That Thing.  But If From 
 The Presence,  Or More Accurate Contemplation Of The Said Thing, 
 We Are Compelled To Deny Concerning It All That Can Be The Cause 
 Of Wonder,  Love,  Fear,  &C.,  The Mind Then,  By The Presence Of The 
 Thing,  Remains Determined To Think Rather Of Those Qualities 
 Which Are Not In It,  Than Of Those Which Are In It ; Whereas,  On 
 The Other Hand,  The Presence Of The Object Would Cause It More 
 Particularly To Regard That Which Is Therein.  As Devotion 
 Springs From Wonder At A Thing Which We Love,  So Does Derision 
 Spring From Contempt Of A Thing Which We Hate Or Fear,  And Scorn 
 From Contempt Of Folly,  As Veneration From Wonder At Prudence. 
 Lastly,  We Can Conceive The Emotions Of Love,  Hope,  Honour,  &C., 
 In Association With Contempt,  And Can Thence Deduce Other 
 Emotions,  Which Are Not Distinguished One From Another By Any 
 Recognized Name. 
   
 Prop. Liii.  When The Mind Regards Itself And Its Own Power Of 
 Activity,  It Feels Pleasure : And That Pleasure Is Greater In 
 Proportion To The Distinctness Wherewith It Conceives Itself And 
 Its Own Power Of Activity. 
     Proof.-A Man Does Not Know Himself Except Through The 
 Modifications Of His Body,  And The Ideas Thereof (Ii. Xix. And 
 Xxiii.).  When,  Therefore,  The Mind Is Able To Contemplate 
 Itself,  It Is Thereby Assumed To Pass To A Greater Perfection,  Or 
 (Iii. Xi. Note) To Feel Pleasure ; And The Pleasure Will Be 
 Greater In Proportion To The Distinctness,  Wherewith It Is Able 
 To Conceive Itself And Its Own Power Of Activity.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-This Pleasure Is Fostered More And More,  In 
 Proportion As A Man Conceives Himself To Be Praised By Others. 
 For The More He Conceives Himself As Praised By Others,  The More 
 He Will Imagine Them To Be Affected With Pleasure,  Accompanied By 
 The Idea Of Himself (Iii. Xxix. Note) ; Thus He Is (Iii. Xxvii.) 
 Himself Affected With Greater Pleasure,  Accompanied By The Idea 
 Of Himself.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Liv. The Mind Endeavours To Conceive Only Such Things As 
 Assert Its Power Of Activity. 
     Proof.-The Endeavour Or Power Of The Mind Is The Actual 
 Essence Thereof (Iii. Vii.) ; But The Essence Of The Mind 
 Obviously Only Affirms That Which The Mind Is And Can Do ; Not 
 That Which It Neither Is Nor Can Do ; Therefore The Mind 
 Endeavours To Conceive Only Such Things As Assert Or Affirm Its 
 Power Of Activity.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Lv.  When The Mind Contemplates Its Own Weakness,  It Feels 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 95 
 Pain Thereat. 
     Proof.-The Essence Of The Mind Only Affirms That Which The 
 Mind Is,  Or Can Do ; In Other Words,  It Is The Mind's Nature To 
 Conceive Only Such Things As Assert Its Power Of Activity (Last 
 Prop.).  Thus,  When We Say That The Mind Contemplates Its Own 
 Weakness,  We Are Merely Saying That While The Mind Is Attempting 
 To Conceive Something Which Asserts Its Power Of Activity,  It Is 
 Checked In Its Endeavour - In Other Words (Iii. Xi. Note),  It 
 Feels Pain.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-This Pain Is More And More Fostered,  If A Man 
 Conceives That He Is Blamed By Others ; This May Be Proved In The 
 Same Way As The Corollary To Iii. Liii. 
     Note.-This Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea Of Our Own Weakness, 
 Is Called Humility ; The Pleasure,  Which Springs From The 
 Contemplation Of Ourselves,  Is Called Self-Love Or 
 Self-Complacency.  And Inasmuch As This Feeling Is Renewed As 
 Often As A Man Contemplates His Own Virtues,  Or His Own Power Of 
 Activity,  It Follows That Everyone Is Fond Of Narrating His Own 
 Exploits,  And Displaying The Force Both Of His Body And Mind,  And 
 Also That,  For This Reason,  Men Are Troublesome To One Another. 
 Again,  It Follows That Men Are Naturally Envious (Iii. Xxiv. 
 Note,  And Iii. Xxxii. Note),  Rejoicing In The Shortcomings Of 
 Their Equals,  And Feeling Pain At Their Virtues.  For Whenever A 
 Man Conceives His Own Actions,  He Is Affected With Pleasure (Iii. 
 Liii.),  In Proportion As His Actions Display More Perfection,  And 
 He Conceives Them More Distinctly-That Is (Ii. Xl. Note),  In 
 Proportion As He Can Distinguish Them From Others,  And Regard 
 Them As Something Special.  Therefore,  A Man Will Take Most 
 Pleasure In Contemplating Himself,  When He Contemplates Some 
 Quality Which He Denies To Others.  But,  If That Which He Affirms 
 Of Himself Be Attributable To The Idea Of Man Or Animals In 
 General,  He Will Not Be So Greatly Pleased : He Will,  On The 
 Contrary,  Feel Pain,  If He Conceives That His Own Actions Fall 
 Short When Compared With Those Of Others.  This Pain (Iii. 
 Xxviii.) He Will Endeavour To Remove,  By Putting A Wrong 
 Construction On The Actions Of His Equals,  Or By,  As Far As He 
 Can,  Embellishing His Own. 
     It Is Thus Apparent That Men Are Naturally Prone To Hatred 
 And Envy,  Which Latter Is Fostered By Their Education.  For 
 Parents Are Accustomed To Incite Their Children To Virtue Solely 
 By The Spur Of Honour And Envy.  But,  Perhaps,  Some Will Scruple 
 To Assent To What I Have Said,  Because We Not Seldom Admire Men's 
 Virtues,  And Venerate Their Possessors.  In Order To Remove Such 
 Doubts,  I Append The Following Corollary. 
     Corollary.-No One Envies The Virtue Of Anyone Who Is Not His 
 Equal. 
     Proof.-Envy Is A Species Of Hatred (Iii. Xxiv. Note) Or (Iii. 
 Xiii. Note) Pain,  That Is (Iii. Xi. Note),  A Modification Whereby 
 A Man's Power Of Activity,  Or Endeavour Towards Activity,  Is 
 Checked.  But A Man Does Not Endeavour Or Desire To Do Anything, 
 Which Cannot Follow From His Nature As It Is Given ; Therefore A 
 Man Will Not Desire Any Power Of Activity Or Virtue (Which Is The 
 Same Thing) To Be Attributed To Him,  That Is Appropriate To 
 Another's Nature And Foreign To His Own ; Hence His Desire Cannot 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 96 
 Be Checked,  Nor He Himself Pained By The Contemplation Of Virtue 
 In Some One Unlike Himself,  Consequently He Cannot Envy Such An 
 One.  But He Can Envy His Equal,  Who Is Assumed To Have The Same 
 Nature As Himself.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-When,  Therefore,  As We Said In The Note To Iii. Lii., 
 We Venerate A Man,  Through Wonder At His Prudence,  Fortitude, 
 &C.,  We Do So,  Because We Conceive Those Qualities To Be Peculiar 
 To Him,  And Not As Common To Our Nature ; We,  Therefore,  No More 
 Envy Their Possessor,  Than We Envy Trees For Being Tall,  Or Lions 
 For Being Courageous. 
   
 Prop. Lvi.  There Are As Many Kinds Of Pleasure,  Of Pain,  Of 
 Desire,  And Of Every Emotion Compounded Of These,  Such As 
 Vacillations Of Spirit,  Or Derived From These,  Such As Love, 
 Hatred,  Hope,  Fear,  &C.,  As There Are Kinds Of Objects Whereby We 
 Are Affected. 
     Proof.-Pleasure And Pain,  And Consequently The Emotions 
 Compounded Thereof,  Or Derived Therefrom,  Are Passions,  Or 
 Passive States (Iii. Xi. Note) ; Now We Are Necessarily Passive 
 (Iii. I.),  In So Far As We Have Inadequate Ideas ; And Only In So 
 Far As We Have Such Ideas Are We Passive (Iii. Iii.) ; That Is, 
 We Are Only Necessarily Passive (Ii. Xl. Note),  In So Far As We 
 Conceive,  Or (Ii. Xvii. And Note) In So Far As We Are Affected By 
 An Emotion,  Which Involves The Nature Of Our Own Body,  And The 
 Nature Of An External Body.  Wherefore The Nature Of Every 
 Passive State Must Necessarily Be So Explained,  That The Nature 
 Of The Object Whereby We Are Affected Be Expressed.  Namely,  The 
 Pleasure,  Which Arises From,  Say,  The Object A,  Involves The 
 Nature Of That Object A,  And The Pleasure,  Which Arises From The 
 Object B,  Involves The Nature Of The Object B ; Wherefore These 
 Two Pleasurable Emotions Are By Nature Different,  Inasmuch As The 
 Causes Whence They Arise Are By Nature Different.  So Again The 
 Emotion Of Pain,  Which Arises From One Object,  Is By Nature 
 Different From The Pain Arising From Another Object,  And, 
 Similarly,  In The Case Of Love,  Hatred,  Hope,  Fear,  Vacillation, 
 &C. 
     Thus,  There Are Necessarily As Many Kinds Of Pleasure,  Pain, 
 Love,  Hatred,  &C.,  As There Are Kinds Of Objects Whereby We Are 
 Affected.  Now Desire Is Each Man's Essence Or Nature,  In So Far 
 As It Is Conceived As Determined To A Particular Action By Any 
 Given Modification Of Itself (Iii. Ix. Note) ; Therefore, 
 According As A Man Is Affected Through External Causes By This Or 
 That Kind Of Pleasure,  Pain,  Love,  Hatred,  &C.,  In Other Words, 
 According As His Nature Is Disposed In This Or That Manner,  So 
 Will His Desire Be Of One Kind Or Another,  And The Nature Of One 
 Desire Must Necessarily Differ From The Nature Of Another Desire, 
 As Widely As The Emotions Differ,  Wherefrom Each Desire Arose. 
 Thus There Are As Many Kinds Of Desire,  As There Are Kinds Of 
 Pleasure,  Pain,  Love,  &C.,  Consequently (By What Has Been Shown) 
 There Are As Many Kinds Of Desire,  As There Are Kinds Of Objects 
 Whereby We Are Affected.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Among The Kinds Of Emotions,  Which,  By The Last 
 Proposition,  Must Be Very Numerous,  The Chief Are Luxury, 
 Drunkenness,  Lust,  Avarice,  And Ambition,  Being Merely Species Of 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 97 
 Love Or Desire,  Displaying The Nature Of Those Emotions In A 
 Manner Varying According To The Object,  With Which They Are 
 Concerned.  For By Luxury,  Drunkenness,  Lust,  Avarice,  Ambition, 
 &C.,  We Simply Mean The Immoderate Love Of Feasting,  Drinking, 
 Venery,  Riches,  And Fame.  Furthermore,  These Emotions,  In So Far 
 As We Distinguish Them From Others Merely By The Objects 
 Wherewith They Are Concerned,  Have No Contraries.  For 
 Temperance,  Sobriety,  And Chastity,  Which We Are Wont To Oppose 
 To Luxury,  Drunkenness,  And Lust,  Are Not Emotions Or Passive 
 States,  But Indicate A Power Of The Mind Which Moderates The 
 Last-Named Emotions.  However,  I Cannot Here Explain The 
 Remaining Kinds Of Emotions (Seeing That They Are As Numerous As 
 The Kinds Of Objects),  Nor,  If I Could,  Would It Be Necessary. 
 It Is Sufficient For Our Purpose,  Namely,  To Determine The 
 Strength Of The Emotions,  And The Mind's Power Over Them,  To Have 
 A General Definition Of Each Emotion.  It Is Sufficient,  I 
 Repeat,  To Understand The General Properties Of The Emotions And 
 The Mind,  To Enable Us To Determine The Quality And Extent Of The 
 Mind's Power In Moderating And Checking The Emotions.  Thus, 
 Though There Is A Great Difference Between Various Emotions Of 
 Love,  Hatred,  Or Desire,  For Instance Between Love Felt Towards 
 Children,  And Love Felt Towards A Wife,  There Is No Need For Us 
 To Take Cognizance Of Such Differences,  Or To Track Out Further 
 The Nature And Origin Of The Emotions. 
   
 Prop. Lvii.  Any Emotion Of A Given Individual Differs From The 
 Emotion Of Another Individual,  Only In So Far As The Essence Of 
 The One Individual Differs From The Essence Of The Other. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Evident From Ax. I. (Which See 
 After Lemma Iii. Prop. Xiii.,  Part Ii.).  Nevertheless,  We Will 
 Prove It From The Nature Of The Three Primary Emotions. 
     All Emotions Are Attributable To Desire,  Pleasure,  Or Pain, 
 As Their Definitions Above Given Show.  But Desire Is Each Man's 
 Nature Or Essence (Iii. Ix. Note) ; Therefore Desire In One 
 Individual Differs From Desire In Another Individual,  Only In So 
 Far As The Nature Or Essence Of The One Differs From The Nature 
 Or Essence Of The Other.  Again,  Pleasure And Pain Are Passive 
 States Or Passions,  Whereby Every Man's Power Or Endeavour To 
 Persist In His Being Is Increased Or Diminished,  Helped Or 
 Hindered (Iii. Xi. And Note).  But By The Endeavour To Persist In 
 Its Being,  In So Far As It Is Attributable To Mind And Body In 
 Conjunction,  We Mean Appetite And Desire (Iii. Ix. Note) ; 
 Therefore Pleasure And Pain Are Identical With Desire Or 
 Appetite,  In So Far As By External Causes They Are Increased Or 
 Diminished,  Helped Or Hindered,  In Other Words,  They Are Every 
 Man's Nature ; Wherefore The Pleasure And Pain Felt By One Man 
 Differ From The Pleasure And Pain Felt By Another Man,  Only In So 
 Far As The Nature Or Essence Of The One Man Differs From The 
 Essence Of The Other ; Consequently,  Any Emotion Of One 
 Individual Only Differs,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Hence It Follows,  That The Emotions Of The Animals 
 Which Are Called Irrational (For After Learning The Origin Of 
 Mind We Cannot Doubt That Brutes Feel) Only Differ From Man's 
 Emotions,  To The Extent That Brute Nature Differs From Human 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 98 
 Nature.  Horse And Man Are Alike Carried Away By The Desire Of 
 Procreation ; But The Desire Of The Former Is Equine,  The Desire 
 Of The Latter Is Human.  So Also The Lusts And Appetites Of 
 Insects,  Fishes,  And Birds Must Needs Vary According To The 
 Several Natures.  Thus,  Although Each Individual Lives Content 
 And Rejoices In That Nature Belonging To Him Wherein He Has His 
 Being,  Yet The Life,  Wherein Each Is Content And Rejoices,  Is 
 Nothing Else But The Idea,  Or Soul,  Of The Said Individual,  And 
 Hence The Joy Of One Only Differs In Nature From The Joy Of 
 Another,  To The Extent That The Essence Of One Differs From The 
 Essence Of Another.  Lastly,  It Follows From The Foregoing 
 Proposition,  That There Is No Small Difference Between The Joy 
 Which Actuates,  Say,  A Drunkard,  And The Joy Possessed By A 
 Philosopher,  As I Just Mention Here By The Way.  Thus Far I Have 
 Treated Of The Emotions Attributable To Man,  In So Far As He Is 
 Passive.  It Remains To Add A Few Words On Those Attributable To 
 Him In So Far As He Is Active. 
   
 Prop. Lviii.  Besides Pleasure And Desire,  Which Are Passivities 
 Or Passions,  There Are Other Emotions Derived From Pleasure And 
 Desire,  Which Are Attributable To Us In So Far As We Are Active. 
     Proof.-When The Mind Conceives Itself And Its Power Of 
 Activity,  It Feels Pleasure (Iii. Liii.) : Now The Mind 
 Necessarily Contemplates Itself,  When It Conceives A True Or 
 Adequate Idea (Ii. Xliii.).  But The Mind Does Conceive Certain 
 Adequate Ideas (Ii. Xl. Note 2.).  Therefore It Feels Pleasure In 
 So Far As It Conceives Adequate Ideas ; That Is,  In So Far As It 
 Is Active (Iii. I.).  Again,  The Mind,  Both In So Far As It Has 
 Clear And Distinct Ideas,  And In So Far As It Has Confused Ideas, 
 Endeavours To Persist In Its Own Being (Iii. Ix.) ; But By Such 
 An Endeavour We Mean Desire (By The Note To The Same Prop.) ; 
 Therefore,  Desire Is Also Attributable To Us,  In So Far As We 
 Understand,  Or (Iii. I.) In So Far As We Are Active.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Lix.  Among All The Emotions Attributable To The Mind As 
 Active,  There Are None Which Cannot Be Referred To Pleasure Or 
 Desire. 
     Proof.-All Emotions Can Be Referred To Desire,  Pleasure,  Or 
 Pain,  As Their Definitions,  Already Given,  Show.  Now By Pain We 
 Mean That The Mind's Power Of Thinking Is Diminished Or Checked 
 (Iii. Xi. And Note) ; Therefore,  In So Far As The Mind Feels 
 Pain,  Its Power Of Understanding,  That Is,  Of Activity,  Is 
 Diminished Or Checked (Iii. I.) ; Therefore,  No Painful Emotions 
 Can Be Attributed To The Mind In Virtue Of Its Being Active,  But 
 Only Emotions Of Pleasure And Desire,  Which (By The Last Prop.) 
 Are Attributable To The Mind In That Condition.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-All Actions Following From Emotion,  Which Are 
 Attributable To The Mind In Virtue Of Its Understanding,  I Set 
 Down To Strength Of Character (Fortitudo),  Which I Divide Into 
 Courage (Animositas) And Highmindedness (Generositas).  By 
 Courage I Mean The Desire Whereby Every Man Strives To Preserve 
 His Own Being In Accordance Solely With The Dictates Of Reason. 
 By Highmindedness I Mean The Desire Whereby Every Man Endeavours, 
 Solely Under The Dictates Of Reason,  To Aid Other Men And To 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Postulates Pg 99 
 Unite Them To Himself In Friendship.  Those Actions,  Therefore, 
 Which Have Regard Solely To The Good Of The Agent I Set Down To 
 Courage,  Those Which Aim At The Good Of Others I Set Down To 
 Highmindedness.  Thus Temperance,  Sobriety,  And Presence Of Mind 
 In Danger,  &C.,  Are Varieties Of Courage ; Courtesy,  Mercy,  &C., 
 Are Varieties Of Highmindedness. 
     I Think I Have Thus Explained,  And Displayed Through Their 
 Primary Causes The Principal Emotions And Vacillations Of Spirit, 
 Which Arise From The Combination Of The Three Primary Emotions, 
 To Wit,  Desire,  Pleasure,  And Pain.  It Is Evident From What I 
 Have Said,  That We Are In Many Ways Driven About By External 
 Causes,  And That Like Waves Of The Sea Driven By Contrary Winds 
 We Toss To And Fro Unwitting Of The Issue And Of Our Fate.  But I 
 Have Said,  That I Have Only Set Forth The Chief Conflicting 
 Emotions,  Not All That Might Be Given.  For,  By Proceeding In The 
 Same Way As Above,  We Can Easily Show That Love Is United To 
 Repentance,  Scorn,  Shame,  &C.  I Think Everyone Will Agree From 
 What Has Been Said,  That The Emotions May Be Compounded One With 
 Another In So Many Ways,  And So Many Variations May Arise 
 Therefrom,  As To Exceed All Possibility Of Computation.  However, 
 For My Purpose,  It Is Enough To Have Enumerated The Most 
 Important ; To Reckon Up The Rest Which I Have Omitted Would Be 
 More Curious Than Profitable.  It Remains To Remark Concerning 
 Love,  That It Very Often Happens That While We Are Enjoying A 
 Thing Which We Longed For,  The Body,  From The Act Of Enjoyment, 
 Acquires A New Disposition,  Whereby It Is Determined In Another 
 Way,  Other Images Of Things Are Aroused In It,  And The Mind 
 Begins To Conceive And Desire Something Fresh.  For Example,  When 
 We Conceive Something Which Generally Delights Us With Its 
 Flavour,  We Desire To Enjoy,  That Is,  To Eat It.  But Whilst We 
 Are Thus Enjoying It,  The Stomach Is Filled And The Body Is 
 Otherwise Disposed.  If,  Therefore,  When The Body Is Thus 
 Otherwise Disposed,  The Image Of The Food Which Is Present Be 
 Stimulated,  And Consequently The Endeavour Or Desire To Eat It Be 
 Stimulated Also,  The New Disposition Of The Body Will Feel 
 Repugnance To The Desire Or Attempt,  And Consequently The 
 Presence Of The Food Which We Formerly Longed For Will Become 
 Odious.  This Revulsion Of Feeling Is Called Satiety Or 
 Weariness.  For The Rest,  I Have Neglected The Outward 
 Modifications Of The Body Observable In Emotions,  Such,  For 
 Instance,  As Trembling,  Pallor,  Sobbing,  Laughter,  &C.,  For These 
 Are Attributable To The Body Only,  Without Any Reference To The 
 Mind.  Lastly,  The Definitions Of The Emotions Require To Be 
 Supplemented In A Few Points ; I Will Therefore Repeat Them, 
 Interpolating Such Observations As I Think Should Here And There 
 Be Added. 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Of The EmotionsPg 100 
 I.  Desire Is The Actual Essence Of Man,  In So Far As It Is 
 Conceived,  As Determined To A Particular Activity By Some Given 
 Modification Of Itself. 
     Explanation.-We Have Said Above,  In The Note To Prop. Ix. Of 
 This Part,  That Desire Is Appetite,  With Consciousness Thereof ; 
 Further,  That Appetite Is The Essence Of Man,  In So Far As It Is 
 Determined To Act In A Way Tending To Promote Its Own 
 Persistence.  But,  In The Same Note,  I Also Remarked That, 
 Strictly Speaking,  I Recognize No Distinction Between Appetite 
 And Desire.  For Whether A Man Be Conscious Of His Appetite Or 
 Not,  It Remains One And The Same Appetite.  Thus,  In Order To 
 Avoid The Appearance Of Tautology,  I Have Refrained From 
 Explaining Desire By Appetite ; But I Have Take Care To Define It 
 In Such A Manner,  As To Comprehend,  Under One Head,  All Those 
 Endeavours Of Human Nature,  Which We Distinguish By The Terms 
 Appetite,  Will,  Desire,  Or Impulse.  I Might,  Indeed,  Have Said, 
 That Desire Is The Essence Of Man,  In So Far As It Is Conceived 
 As Determined To A Particular Activity ; But From Such A 
 Definition (Cf. Ii. Xxiii.) It Would Not Follow That The Mind Can 
 Be Conscious Of Its Desire Or Appetite.  Therefore,  In Order To 
 Imply The Cause Of Such Consciousness,  It Was Necessary To Add, 
 In So Far As It Is Determined By Some Given Modification,  &C. 
 For,  By A Modification Of Man's Essence,  We Understand Every 
 Disposition Of The Said Essence,  Whether Such Disposition Be 
 Innate,  Or Whether It Be Conceived Solely Under The Attribute Of 
 Thought,  Or Solely Under The Attribute Of Extension,  Or Whether, 
 Lastly,  It Be Referred Simultaneously To Both These Attributes. 
 By The Term Desire,  Then,  I Here Mean All Man's Endeavours, 
 Impulses,  Appetites,  And Volitions,  Which Vary According To Each 
 Man's Disposition,  And Are,  Therefore,  Not Seldom Opposed One To 
 Another,  According As A Man Is Drawn In Different Directions,  And 
 Knows Not Where To Turn. 
   
 Ii.  Pleasure Is The Transition Of A Man From A Less To A Greater 
 Perfection. 
   
 Iii.  Pain Is The Transition Of A Man From A Greater To A Less 
 Perfection. 
     Explanation-I Say Transition : For Pleasure Is Not Perfection 
 Itself.  For,  If Man Were Born With The Perfection To Which He 
 Passes,  He Would Possess The Same,  Without The Emotion Of 
 Pleasure.  This Appears More Clearly From The Consideration Of 
 The Contrary Emotion,  Pain.  No One Can Deny,  That Pain Consists 
 In The Transition To A Less Perfection,  And Not In The Less 
 Perfection Itself : For A Man Cannot Be Pained,  In So Far As He 
 Partakes Of Perfection Of Any Degree.  Neither Can We Say,  That 
 Pain Consists In The Absence Of A Greater Perfection.  For 
 Absence Is Nothing,  Whereas The Emotion Of Pain Is An Activity ; 
 Wherefore This Activity Can Only Be The Activity Of Transition 
 From A Greater To A Less Perfection-In Other Words,  It Is An 
 Activity Whereby A Man's Power Of Action Is Lessened Or 
 Constrained (Cf. Iii. Xi. Note).  I Pass Over The Definitions Of 
 Merriment,  Stimulation,  Melancholy,  And Grief,  Because These 
 Terms Are Generally Used In Reference To The Body,  And Are Merely 
 Kinds Of Pleasure Or Pain. 
   
 
 
 
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 Iv.  Wonder Is The Conception (Imaginatio) Of Anything,  Wherein 
 The Mind Comes To A Stand,  Because The Particular Concept In 
 Question Has No Connection With Other Concepts (Cf. Iii. Lii. And 
 Note). 
     Explanation-In The Note To Ii. Xviii. We Showed The Reason, 
 Why The Mind,  From The Contemplation Of One Thing,  Straightway 
 Falls To The Contemplation Of Another Thing,  Namely,  Because The 
 Images Of The Two Things Are So Associated And Arranged,  That One 
 Follows The Other.  This State Of Association Is Impossible,  If 
 The Image Of The Thing Be New ; The Mind Will Then Be At A Stand 
 In The Contemplation Thereof,  Until It Is Determined By Other 
 Causes To Think Of Something Else. 
     Thus The Conception Of A New Object,  Considered In Itself,  Is 
 Of The Same Nature As Other Conceptions ; Hence,  I Do Not Include 
 Wonder Among The Emotions,  Nor Do I See Why I Should So Include 
 It,  Inasmuch As This Distraction Of The Mind Arises From No 
 Positive Cause Drawing Away The Mind From Other Objects,  But 
 Merely From The Absence Of A Cause,  Which Should Determine The 
 Mind To Pass From The Contemplation Of One Object To The 
 Contemplation Of Another. 
     I,  Therefore,  Recognize Only Three Primitive Or Primary 
 Emotions (As I Said In The Note To Iii. Xi.),  Namely,  Pleasure, 
 Pain,  And Desire.  I Have Spoken Of Wonder Simply Because It Is 
 Customary To Speak Of Certain Emotions Springing From The Three 
 Primitive Ones By Different Names,  When They Are Referred To The 
 Objects Of Our Wonder.  I Am Led By The Same Motive To Add A 
 Definition Of Contempt. 
   
 V.  Contempt Is The Conception Of Anything Which Touches The Mind 
 So Little,  That Its Presence Leads The Mind To Imagine Those 
 Qualities Which Are Not In It Rather Than Such As Are In It (Cf. 
 Iii. Lii. Note). 
     The Definitions Of Veneration And Scorn I Here Pass Over,  For 
 I Am Not Aware That Any Emotions Are Named After Them. 
   
 Vi.  Love Is Pleasure,  Accompanied By The Idea Of An External 
 Cause. 
     Explanation-This Definition Explains Sufficiently Clearly The 
 Essence Of Love ; The Definition Given By Those Authors Who Say 
 That Love Is The Lover's Wish To Unite Himself To The Loved 
 Object Expresses A Property,  But Not The Essence Of Love ; And, 
 As Such Authors Have Not Sufficiently Discerned Love's Essence, 
 They Have Been Unable To Acquire A True Conception Of Its 
 Properties,  Accordingly Their Definition Is On All Hands Admitted 
 To Be Very Obscure.  It Must,  However,  Be Noted,  That When I Say 
 That It Is A Property Of Love,  That The Lover Should Wish To 
 Unite Himself To The Beloved Object,  I Do Not Here Mean By Wish 
 Consent,  Or Conclusion,  Or A Free Decision Of The Mind (For I 
 Have Shown Such,  In Ii. Xlviii.,  To Be Fictitious) ; Neither Do I 
 Mean A Desire Of Being United To The Loved Object When It Is 
 Absent,  Or Of Continuing In Its Presence When It Is At Hand ; For 
 Love Can Be Conceived Without Either Of These Desires ; But By 
 Wish I Mean The Contentment,  Which Is In The Lover,  On Account Of 
 The Presence Of The Beloved Object,  Whereby The Pleasure Of The 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Of The EmotionsPg 102 
 Lover Is Strengthened,  Or At Least Maintained. 
   
 Vii.  Hatred Is Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea Of An External 
 Cause. 
     Explanation-These Observations Are Easily Grasped After What 
 Has Been Said In The Explanation Of The Preceding Definition (Cf. 
 Also Iii. Xiii. Note). 
   
 Viii.  Inclination Is Pleasure,  Accompanied By The Idea Of 
 Something Which Is Accidentally A Cause Of Pleasure. 
   
 Ix.  Aversion Is Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea Of Something Which 
 Is Accidentally The Cause Of Pain (Cf. Iii. Xv. Note). 
   
 X.  Devotion Is Love Towards One Whom We Admire. 
     Explanation-Wonder (Admiratio) Arises (As We Have Shown,  Iii. 
 Lii.) From The Novelty Of A Thing.  If,  Therefore,  It Happens 
 That The Object Of Our Wonder Is Often Conceived By Us,  We Shall 
 Cease To Wonder At It ; Thus We See,  That The Emotion Of Devotion 
 Readily Degenerates Into Simple Love. 
   
 Xi.  Derision Is Pleasure Arising From Our Conceiving The 
 Presence Of A Quality,  Which We Despise,  In An Object Which We 
 Hate. 
     Explanation-In So Far As We Despise A Thing Which We Hate,  We 
 Deny Existence Thereof (Iii. Lii. Note),  And To That Extent 
 Rejoice (Iii. Xx.).  But Since We Assume That Man Hates That 
 Which He Derides,  It Follows That The Pleasure In Question Is Not 
 Without Alloy (Cf. Iii. Xlvii. Note). 
   
 Xii.  Hope Is An Inconstant Pleasure,  Arising From The Idea Of 
 Something Past Or Future,  Whereof We To A Certain Extent Doubt 
 The Issue. 
   
 Xiii.  Fear Is An Inconstant Pain Arising From The Idea Of 
 Something Past Or Future,  Whereof We To A Certain Extent Doubt 
 The Issue (Cf. Iii. Xviii. Note). 
     Explanation-From These Definitions It Follows,  That There Is 
 No Hope Unmingled With Fear,  And No Fear Unmingled With Hope. 
 For He,  Who Depends On Hope And Doubts Concerning The Issue Of 
 Anything,  Is Assumed To Conceive Something,  Which Excludes The 
 Existence Of The Said Thing In The Future ; Therefore He,  To This 
 Extent,  Feels Pain (Cf. Iii. Xix.) ; Consequently,  While 
 Dependent On Hope,  He Fears For The Issue.  Contrariwise He,  Who 
 Fears,  In Other Words Doubts,  Concerning The Issue Of Something 
 Which He Hates,  Also Conceives Something Which Excludes The 
 Existence Of The Thing In Question ; To This Extent He Feels 
 Pleasure,  And Consequently To This Extent He Hopes That It Will 
 Turn Out As He Desires (Iii. Xx.). 
   
 Xiv.  Confidence Is Pleasure Arising From The Idea Of Something 
 Past Or Future,  Wherefrom All Cause Of Doubt Has Been Removed. 
   
 Xv.  Despair Is Pain Arising From The Idea Of Something Past Or 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Of The EmotionsPg 103 
 Future,  Wherefrom All Cause Of Doubt Has Been Removed. 
     Explanation-Thus Confidence Springs From Hope,  And Despair 
 From Fear,  When All Cause For Doubt As To The Issue Of An Event 
 Has Been Removed : This Comes To Pass,  Because Man Conceives 
 Something Past Or Future As Present And Regards It As Such,  Or 
 Else Because He Conceives Other Things,  Which Exclude The 
 Existence Of The Causes Of His Doubt.  For,  Although We Can Never 
 Be Absolutely Certain Of The Issue Of Any Particular Event (Ii. 
 Xxxi. Coroll.),  It May Nevertheless Happen That We Feel No Doubt 
 Concerning It.  For We Have Shown,  That To Feel No Doubt 
 Concerning A Thing Is Not The Same As To Be Quite Certain Of It 
 (Ii. Xlix. Note).  Thus It May Happen That We Are Affected By The 
 Same Emotion Of Pleasure Or Pain Concerning A Thing Past Or 
 Future,  As Concerning The Conception Of A Thing Present ; This I 
 Have Already Shown In Iii. Xviii.,  To Which,  With Its Note,  I 
 Refer The Reader. 
   
 Xvi.  Joy Is Pleasure Accompanied By The Idea Of Something Past, 
 Which Has Had An Issue Beyond Our Hope. 
   
 Xvii.  Disappointment Is Pain Accompanied By The Idea Of 
 Something Past,  Which Has Had An Issue Contrary To Our Hope. 
   
 Xviii.  Pity Is Pain Accompanied By The Idea Of Evil,  Which Has 
 Befallen Someone Else Whom We Conceive To Be Like Ourselves (Cf. 
 Iii. Xxii. Note,  And Iii. Xxvii. Note). 
     Explanation-Between Pity And Sympathy (Misericordia) There 
 Seems To Be No Difference,  Unless Perhaps That The Former Term Is 
 Used In Reference To A Particular Action,  And The Latter In 
 Reference To A Disposition. 
   
 Xix.  Approval Is Love Towards One Who Has Done Good To Another. 
   
 Xx.  Indignation Is Hatred Towards One Who Has Done Evil To 
 Another. 
     Explanation-I Am Aware That These Terms Are Employed In 
 Senses Somewhat Different From Those Usually Assigned.  But My 
 Purpose Is To Explain,  Not The Meaning Of Words,  But The Nature 
 Of Things.  I Therefore Make Use Of Such Terms,  As May Convey My 
 Meaning Without Any Violent Departure From Their Ordinary 
 Signification.  One Statement Of My Method Will Suffice. As For 
 The Cause Of The Above-Named Emotions See Iii. Xxvii. Coroll. I., 
 And Iii. Xxii. Note. 
   
 Xxi.  Partiality Is Thinking Too Highly Of Anyone Because Of The 
 Love We Bear Him. 
   
 Xxii.  Disparagement Is Thinking Too Meanly Of Anyone Because We 
 Hate Him. 
     Explanation-Thus Partiality Is An Effect Of Love,  And 
 Disparagement An Effect Of Hatred : So That Partiality May Also 
 Be Defined As Love,  In So Far As It Induces A Man To Think Too 
 Highly Of A Beloved Object.  Contrariwise,  Disparagement May Be 
 Defined As Hatred,  In So Far As It Induces A Man To Think Too 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Of The EmotionsPg 104 
 Meanly Of A Hated Object.  Cf. Iii. Xxvi. Note. 
   
 Xxiii.  Envy Is Hatred,  In So Far As It Induces A Man To Be 
 Pained By Another's Good Fortune,  And To Rejoice In Another's 
 Evil Fortune. 
     Explanation-Envy Is Generally Opposed To Sympathy,  Which,  By 
 Doing Some Violence To The Meaning Of The Word,  May Therefore Be 
 Thus Defined : 
   
 Xxiv.  Sympathy (Misericordia) Is Love,  In So Far As It Induces A 
 Man To Feel Pleasure At Another's Good Fortune,  And Pain At 
 Another's Evil Fortune. 
     Explanation-Concerning Envy See The Notes To Iii. Xxiv. And 
 Xxxii.  These Emotions Also Arise From Pleasure Or Pain 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of Something External,  As Cause Either In 
 Itself Or Accidentally.  I Now Pass On To Other Emotions,  Which 
 Are Accompanied By The Idea Of Something Within As A Cause. 
   
 Xxv.  Self-Approval Is Pleasure Arising From A Man's 
 Contemplation Of Himself And His Own Power Of Action. 
   
 Xxvi.  Humility Is Pain Arising From A Man's Contemplation Of His 
 Own Weakness Of Body Or Mind. 
     Explanation-Self-Complacency Is Opposed To Humility,  In So 
 Far As We Thereby Mean Pleasure Arising From A Contemplation Of 
 Our Own Power Of Action ; But,  In So Far As We Mean Thereby 
 Pleasure Accompanied By The Idea Of Any Action Which We Believe 
 We Have Performed By The Free Decision Of Our Mind,  It Is Opposed 
 To Repentance,  Which We May Thus Define : 
   
 Xxvii.  Repentance Is Pain Accompanied By The Idea Of Some 
 Action,  Which We Believe We Have Performed By The Free Decision 
 Of Our Mind. 
     Explanation-The Causes Of These Emotions We Have Set Forth In 
 Iii. Li. Note,  And In Iii. Liii.,  Liv.,  Lv. And Note.  Concerning 
 The Free Decision Of The Mind See Ii. Xxxv. Note.  This Is 
 Perhaps The Place To Call Attention To The Fact,  That It Is 
 Nothing Wonderful That All Those Actions,  Which Are Commonly 
 Called Wrong,  Are Followed By Pain,  And All Those,  Which Are 
 Called Right,  Are Followed By Pleasure.  We Can Easily Gather 
 From What Has Been Said,  That This Depends In Great Measure On 
 Education.  Parents,  By Reprobating The Former Class Of Actions, 
 And By Frequently Chiding Their Children Because Of Them,  And 
 Also By Persuading To And Praising The Latter Class,  Have Brought 
 It About,  That The Former Should Be Associated With Pain And The 
 Latter With Pleasure.  This Is Confirmed By Experience.  For 
 Custom And Religion Are Not The Same Among All Men,  But That 
 Which Some Consider Sacred Others Consider Profane,  And What Some 
 Consider Honourable Others Consider Disgraceful.  According As 
 Each Man Has Been Educated,  He Feels Repentance For A Given 
 Action Or Glories Therein. 
   
 Xxviii.  Pride Is Thinking Too Highly Of One's Self From 
 Self-Love. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Of The EmotionsPg 105 
     Explanation-Thus Pride Is Different From Partiality,  For The 
 Latter Term Is Used In Reference To An External Object,  But Pride 
 Is Used Of A Man Thinking Too Highly Of Himself.  However,  As 
 Partiality Is The Effect Of Love,  So Is Pride The Effect Or 
 Property Of Self-Love,  Which May Therefore Be Thus Defined,  Love 
 Of Self Or Self-Approval,  In So Far As It Leads A Man To Think 
 Too Highly Of Himself.  To This Emotion There Is No Contrary. 
 For No One Thinks Too Meanly Of Himself Because Of Self-Hatred ; 
 I Say That No One Thinks Too Meanly Of Himself,  In So Far As He 
 Conceives That He Is Incapable Of Doing This Or That.  For 
 Whatsoever A Man Imagines That He Is Incapable Of Doing,  He 
 Imagines This Of Necessity,  And By That Notion He Is So Disposed, 
 That He Really Cannot Do That Which He Conceives That He Cannot 
 Do.  For,  So Long As He Conceives That He Cannot Do It,  So Long 
 Is He Not Determined To Do It,  And Consequently So Long Is It 
 Impossible For Him To Do It.  However,  If We Consider Such 
 Matters As Only Depend On Opinion,  We Shall Find It Conceivable 
 That A Man May Think Too Meanly Of Himself ; For It May Happen, 
 That A Man,  Sorrowfully Regarding His Own Weakness,  Should 
 Imagine That He Is Despised By All Men,  While The Rest Of The 
 World Are Thinking Of Nothing Less Than Of Despising Him.  Again, 
 A Man May Think Too Meanly Of Himself,  If He Deny Of Himself In 
 The Present Something In Relation To A Future Time Of Which He Is 
 Uncertain.  As,  For Instance,  If He Should Say That He Is Unable 
 To Form Any Clear Conceptions,  Or That He Can Desire And Do 
 Nothing But What Is Wicked And Base,  &C.  We May Also Say,  That A 
 Man Thinks Too Meanly Of Himself,  When We See Him From Excessive 
 Fear Of Shame Refusing To Do Things Which Others,  His Equals, 
 Venture.  We Can,  Therefore,  Set Down As A Contrary To Pride An 
 Emotion Which I Will Call Self-Abasement,  For As From 
 Self-Complacency Springs Pride,  So From Humility Springs 
 Self-Abasement,  Which I Will Accordingly Thus Define : 
   
 Xxix.  Self-Abasement Is Thinking Too Meanly Of One's Self By 
 Reason Of Pain. 
     Explanation-We Are Nevertheless Generally Accustomed To 
 Oppose Pride To Humility,  But In That Case We Pay More Attention 
 To The Effect Of Either Emotion Than To Its Nature.  We Are Wont 
 To Call Proud The Man Who Boasts Too Much (Iii. Xxx. Note),  Who 
 Talks Of Nothing But His Own Virtues And Other People's Faults, 
 Who Wishes To Be First ; And Lastly Who Goes Through Life With A 
 Style And Pomp Suitable To Those Far Above Him In Station.  On 
 The Other Hand,  We Call Humble The Man Who Too Often Blushes,  Who 
 Confesses His Faults,  Who Sets Forth Other Men's Virtues,  And 
 Who,  Lastly,  Walks With Bent Head And Is Negligent Of His Attire. 
 However,  These Emotions,  Humility And Self-Abasement,  Are 
 Extremely Rare.  For Human Nature,  Considered In Itself,  Strives 
 Against Them As Much As It Can (See Iii. Xiii.,  Liv.) ; Hence 
 Those,  Who Are Believed To Be Most Self-Abased And Humble,  Are 
 Generally In Reality The Most Ambitious And Envious. 
   
 Xxx.  Honour11 Is Pleasure Accompanied By The Idea Of Some Action 
 Of Our Own,  Which We Believe To Be Praised By Others. 
   
 
 
 
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 Xxxi.  Shame Is Pain Accompanied By The Idea Of Some Action Of 
 Our Own,  Which We Believe To Be Blamed By Others. 
     Explanation-On This Subject See The Note To Iii. Xxx.  But We 
 Should Here Remark The Difference Which Exists Between Shame And 
 Modesty.  Shame Is The Pain Following The Deed Whereof We Are 
 Ashamed.  Modesty Is The Fear Or Dread Of Shame,  Which Restrains 
 A Man From Committing A Base Action.  Modesty Is Usually Opposed 
 To Shamelessness,  But The Latter Is Not An Emotion,  As I Will 
 Duly Show ; However,  The Names Of The Emotions (As I Have 
 Remarked Already) Have Regard Rather To Their Exercise Than To 
 Their Nature. 
     I Have Now Fulfilled The Task Of Explaining The Emotions 
 Arising From Pleasure And Pain.  I Therefore Proceed To Treat Of 
 Those Which I Refer To Desire. 
   
 Xxxii.  Regret Is The Desire Or Appetite To Possess Something, 
 Kept Alive By The Remembrance Of The Said Thing,  And At The Same 
 Time Constrained By The Remembrance Of Other Things Which Exclude 
 The Existence Of It. 
     Explanation-When We Remember A Thing,  We Are By That Very 
 Fact,  As I Have Already Said More Than Once,  Disposed To 
 Contemplate It With The Same Emotion As If It Were Something 
 Present ; But This Disposition Or Endeavour,  While We Are Awake, 
 Is Generally Checked By The Images Of Things Which Exclude The 
 Existence Of That Which We Remember.  Thus When We Remember 
 Something Which Affected Us With A Certain Pleasure,  We By That 
 Very Fact Endeavour To Regard It With The Same Emotion Of 
 Pleasure As Though It Were Present,  But This Endeavour Is At Once 
 Checked By The Remembrance Of Things Which Exclude The Existence 
 Of The Thing In Question.  Wherefore Regret Is,  Strictly 
 Speaking,  A Pain Opposed To That Of Pleasure,  Which Arises From 
 The Absence Of Something We Hate (Cf. Iii. Xlvii. Note).  But,  As 
 The Name Regret Seems To Refer To Desire,  I Set This Emotion 
 Down,  Among The Emotions Springing From Desire. 
   
 Xxxiii.  Emulation Is The Desire Of Something,  Engendered In Us 
 By Our Conception That Others Have The Same Desire. 
     Explanation-He Who Runs Away,  Because He Sees Others Running 
 Away,  Or He Who Fears,  Because He Sees Others In Fear ; Or Again, 
 He Who,  On Seeing That Another Man Has Burnt His Hand,  Draws 
 Towards Him His Own Hand,  And Moves His Body As Though His Own 
 Were Burnt ; Such An One Can Be Said To Imitate Another's 
 Emotion,  But Not To Emulate Him ; Not Because The Causes Of 
 Emulation And Imitation Are Different,  But Because It Has Become 
 Customary To Speak Of Emulation Only In Him,  Who Imitates That 
 Which We Deem To Be Honourable,  Useful,  Or Pleasant.  As To The 
 Cause Of Emulation,  Cf. Iii. Xxvii. And Note.  The Reason Why 
 This Emotion Is Generally Coupled With Envy May Be Seen From Iii. 
 Xxxii. And Note. 
   
 Xxxiv.  Thankfulness Or Gratitude Is The Desire Or Zeal Springing 
 From Love,  Whereby We Endeavour To Benefit Him,  Who With Similar 
 Feelings Of Love Has Conferred A Benefit On Us.  Cf. Iii. Xxxix. 
 Note And Xl. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Of The EmotionsPg 107 
   
 Xxxv.  Benevolence Is The Desire Of Benefiting One Whom We Pity. 
 Cf. Iii. Xxvii. Note. 
   
 Xxxvi.  Anger Is The Desire,  Whereby Through Hatred We Are 
 Induced To Injure One Whom We Hate,  Iii. Xxxix. 
   
 Xxxvii.  Revenge Is The Desire Whereby We Are Induced,  Through 
 Mutual Hatred,  To Injure One Who,  With Similar Feelings,  Has 
 Injured Us.  (See Iii. Xl. Coroll. Ii And Note.) 
   
 Xxxviii.  Cruelty Or Savageness Is The Desire,  Whereby A Man Is 
 Impelled To Injure One Whom We Love Or Pity. 
     Explanation-To Cruelty Is Opposed Clemency,  Which Is Not A 
 Passive State Of The Mind,  But A Power Whereby Man Restrains His 
 Anger And Revenge. 
   
 Xxxix.  Timidity Is The Desire To Avoid A Greater Evil,  Which We 
 Dread,  By Undergoing A Lesser Evil.  Cf. Iii. Xxxix. Note. 
   
 Xl.  Daring Is The Desire,  Whereby A Man Is Set On To Do 
 Something Dangerous Which His Equals Fear To Attempt. 
   
 Xli.  Cowardice Is Attributed To One,  Whose Desire Is Checked By 
 The Fear Of Some Danger Which His Equals Dare To Encounter. 
     Explanation-Cowardice Is,  Therefore,  Nothing Else But The 
 Fear Of Some Evil,  Which Most Men Are Wont Not To Fear ; Hence I 
 Do Not Reckon It Among The Emotions Springing From Desire. 
 Nevertheless,  I Have Chosen To Explain It Here,  Because,  In So 
 Far As We Look To The Desire,  It Is Truly Opposed To The Emotion 
 Of Daring. 
   
 Xlii.  Consternation Is Attributed To One,  Whose Desire Of 
 Avoiding Evil Is Checked By Amazement At The Evil Which He Fears. 
     Explanation-Consternation Is,  Therefore,  A Species Of 
 Cowardice.  But,  Inasmuch As Consternation Arises From A Double 
 Fear,  It May Be More Conveniently Defined As A Fear Which Keeps A 
 Man So Bewildered And Wavering,  That He Is Not Able To Remove The 
 Evil.  I Say Bewildered,  In So Far As We Understand His Desire Of 
 Removing The Evil To Be Constrained By His Amazement.  I Say 
 Wavering,  In So Far As We Understand The Said Desire To Be 
 Constrained By The Fear Of Another Evil,  Which Equally Torments 
 Him : Whence It Comes To Pass That He Knows Not,  Which He May 
 Avert Of The Two.  On This Subject,  See Iii. Xxxix. Note,  And 
 Iii. Lii. Note.  Concerning Cowardice And Daring,  See Iii. Li. 
 Note. 
   
 Xliii.  Courtesy,  Or Deference (Humanitas Seu Modestia),  Is The 
 Desire Of Acting In A Way That Should Please Men,  And Refraining 
 From That Which Should Displease Them. 
   
 Xliv.  Ambition Is The Immoderate Desire Of Power. 
     Explanation-Ambition Is The Desire,  Whereby All The Emotions 
 (Cf. Iii. Xxvii. And Xxxi.) Are Fostered And Strengthened ; 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Of The EmotionsPg 108 
 Therefore This Emotion Can With Difficulty Be Overcome.  For,  So 
 Long As A Man Is Bound By Any Desire,  He Is At The Same Time 
 Necessarily Bound By This.  "The Best Men," Says Cicero,  "Are 
 Especially Led By Honour.  Even Philosophers,  When They Write A 
 Book Contemning Honour,  Sign Their Names Thereto," And So On. 
   
 Xlv.  Luxury Is Excessive Desire,  Or Even Love Of Living 
 Sumptuously. 
   
 Xlvi.  Intemperance Is The Excessive Desire And Love Of Drinking. 
   
 Xlvii.  Avarice Is The Excessive Desire And Love Of Riches. 
   
 Xlviii.  Lust Is Desire And Love In The Matter Of Sexual 
 Intercourse. 
     Explanation-Whether This Desire Be Excessive Or Not,  It Is 
 Still Called Lust.  These Last Five Emotions (As I Have Shown In 
 Iii. Lvi.) Have On Contraries.  For Deference Is A Species Of 
 Ambition.  Cf. Iii. Xxix. Note. 
     Again,  I Have Already Pointed Out,  That Temperance,  Sobriety, 
 And Chastity Indicate Rather A Power Than A Passivity Of The 
 Mind.  It May,  Nevertheless,  Happen,  That An Avaricious,  An 
 Ambitious,  Or A Timid Man May Abstain From Excess In Eating, 
 Drinking,  Or Sexual Indulgence,  Yet Avarice,  Ambition,  And Fear 
 Are Not Contraries To Luxury,  Drunkenness,  And Debauchery.  For 
 An Avaricious Man Often Is Glad To Gorge Himself With Food And 
 Drink At Another Man's Expense.  An Ambitious Man Will Restrain 
 Himself In Nothing,  So Long As He Thinks His Indulgences Are 
 Secret ; And If He Lives Among Drunkards And Debauchees,  He Will, 
 From The Mere Fact Of Being Ambitious,  Be More Prone To Those 
 Vices.  Lastly,  A Timid Man Does That Which He Would Not.  For 
 Though An Avaricious Man Should,  For The Sake Of Avoiding Death, 
 Cast His Riches Into The Sea,  He Will None The Less Remain 
 Avaricious ; So,  Also,  If A Lustful Man Is Downcast,  Because He 
 Cannot Follow His Bent,  He Does Not,  On The Ground Of Abstention, 
 Cease To Be Lustful.  In Fact,  These Emotions Are Not So Much 
 Concerned With The Actual Feasting,  Drinking,  &C.,  As With The 
 Appetite And Love Of Such.  Nothing,  Therefore,  Can Be Opposed To 
 These Emotions,  But High-Mindedness And Valour,  Whereof I Will 
 Speak Presently. 
     The Definitions Of Jealousy And Other Waverings Of The Mind I 
 Pass Over In Silence,  First,  Because They Arise From The 
 Compounding Of The Emotions Already Described ; Secondly,  Because 
 Many Of Them Have No Distinctive Names,  Which Shows That It Is 
 Sufficient For Practical Purposes To Have Merely A General 
 Knowledge Of Them.  However,  It Is Established From The 
 Definitions Of The Emotions,  Which We Have Set Forth,  That They 
 All Spring From Desire,  Pleasure,  Or Pain,  Or,  Rather,  That There 
 Is Nothing Besides These Three ; Wherefore Each Is Wont To Be 
 Called By A Variety Of Names In Accordance With Its Various 
 Relations And Extrinsic Tokens.  If We Now Direct Our Attention 
 To These Primitive Emotions,  And To What Has Been Said Concerning 
 The Nature Of The Mind,  We Shall Be Able Thus To Define The 
 Emotions,  In So Far As They Are Referred To The Mind Only. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 3  (On The Origin And Nature Of The Emotion) Definitions Of The EmotionsPg 109 
 General Definition Of The Emotions 
   
     Emotion,  Which Is Called A Passivity Of The Soul,  Is A 
 Confused Idea,  Whereby The Mind Affirms Concerning Its Body,  Or 
 Any Part Thereof,  A Force For Existence (Existendi Vis) Greater 
 Or Less Than Before,  And By The Presence Of Which The Mind Is 
 Determined To Think Of One Thing Rather Than Another. 
     Explanation-I Say,  First,  That Emotion Or Passion Of The Soul 
 Is A Confused Idea.  For We Have Shown That The Mind Is Only 
 Passive,  In So Far As It Has Inadequate Or Confused Ideas.  (Iii. 
 Iii.)  I Say,  Further,  Whereby The Mind Affirms Concerning Its 
 Body Or Any Part Thereof A Force For Existence Greater Than 
 Before.  For All The Ideas Of Bodies,  Which We Possess,  Denote 
 Rather The Actual Disposition Of Our Own Body (Ii. Xvi. Coroll. 
 Ii.) Than The Nature Of An External Body.  But The Idea Which 
 Constitutes The Reality Of An Emotion Must Denote Or Express The 
 Disposition Of The Body,  Or Of Some Part Thereof,  Because Its 
 Power Of Action Or Force For Existence Is Increased Or 
 Diminished,  Helped Or Hindered.  But It Must Be Noted That,  When 
 I Say A Greater Or Less Force For Existence Than Before,  I Do Not 
 Mean That The Mind Compares The Present With The Past Disposition 
 Of The Body,  But That The Idea Which Constitutes The Reality Of 
 An Emotion Affirms Something Of The Body,  Which,  In Fact, 
 Involves More Or Less Of Reality Than Before. 
     And Inasmuch As The Essence Of Mind Consists In The Fact (Ii. 
 Xi.,  Xiii.),  That It Affirms The Actual Existence Of Its Own 
 Body,  And Inasmuch As We Understand By Perfection The Very 
 Essence Of A Thing,  It Follows That The Mind Passes To Greater Or 
 Less Perfection,  When It Happens To Affirm Concerning Its Own 
 Body,  Or Any Part Thereof,  Something Involving More Or Less 
 Reality Than Before. 
     When,  Therefore,  I Said Above That The Power Of The Mind Is 
 Increased Or Diminished,  I Merely Meant That The Mind Had Formed 
 Of Its Own Body,  Or Of Some Part Thereof,  An Idea Involving More 
 Or Less Of Reality,  Than It Had Already Affirmed Concerning Its 
 Own Body.  For The Excellence Of Ideas,  And The Actual Power Of 
 Thinking Are Measured By The Excellence Of The Object.  Lastly,  I 
 Have Added By The Presence Of Which The Mind Is Determined To 
 Think Of One Thing Rather Than Another,  So That,  Besides The 
 Nature Of Pleasure And Pain,  Which The First Part Of The 
 Definition Explains,  I Might Also Express The Nature Of Desire. 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Preface Pg 110 
   
     Human Infirmity In Moderating And Checking The Emotions I 
 Name Bondage : For,  When A Man Is A Prey To His Emotions,  He Is 
 Not His Own Master,  But Lies At The Mercy Of Fortune : So Much 
 So,  That He Is Often Compelled,  While Seeing That Which Is Better 
 For Him,  To Follow That Which Is Worse.  Why This Is So,  And What 
 Is Good Or Evil In The Emotions,  I Propose To Show In This Part 
 Of My Treatise.  But,  Before I Begin,  It Would Be Well To Make A 
 Few Prefatory Observations On Perfection And Imperfection,  Good 
 And Evil. 
     When A Man Has Purposed To Make A Given Thing,  And Has 
 Brought It To Perfection,  His Work Will Be Pronounced Perfect, 
 Not Only By Himself,  But By Everyone Who Rightly Knows,  Or Thinks 
 That He Knows,  The Intention And Aim Of Its Author.  For 
 Instance,  Suppose Anyone Sees A Work (Which I Assume To Be Not 
 Yet Completed),  And Knows That The Aim Of The Author Of That Work 
 Is To Build A House,  He Will Call The Work Imperfect ; He Will, 
 On The Other Hand,  Call It Perfect,  As Soon As He Sees That It Is 
 Carried Through To The End,  Which Its Author Had Purposed For It. 
 But If A Man Sees A Work,  The Like Whereof He Has Never Seen 
 Before,  And If He Knows Not The Intention Of The Artificer,  He 
 Plainly Cannot Know,  Whether That Work Be Perfect Or Imperfect. 
 Such Seems To Be The Primary Meaning Of These Terms. 
     But,  After Men Began To Form General Ideas,  To Think Out 
 Types Of Houses,  Buildings,  Towers,  &C.,  And To Prefer Certain 
 Types To Others,  It Came About,  That Each Man Called Perfect That 
 Which He Saw Agree With The General Idea He Had Formed Of The 
 Thing In Question,  And Called Imperfect That Which He Saw Agree 
 Less With His Own Preconceived Type,  Even Though It Had Evidently 
 Been Completed In Accordance With The Idea Of Its Artificer. 
 This Seems To Be The Only Reason For Calling Natural Phenomena, 
 Which,  Indeed,  Are Not Made With Human Hands,  Perfect Or 
 Imperfect : For Men Are Wont To Form General Ideas Of Things 
 Natural,  No Less Than Of Things Artificial,  And Such Ideas They 
 Hold As Types,  Believing That Nature (Who They Think Does Nothing 
 Without An Object) Has Them In View,  And Has Set Them As Types 
 Before Herself.  Therefore,  When They Behold Something In Nature, 
 Which Does Not Wholly Conform To The Preconceived Type Which They 
 Have Formed Of The Thing In Question,  They Say That Nature Has 
 Fallen Short Or Has Blundered,  And Has Left Her Work Incomplete. 
 Thus We See That Men Are Wont To Style Natural Phenomena Perfect 
 Or Imperfect Rather From Their Own Prejudices,  Than From True 
 Knowledge Of What They Pronounce Upon. 
     Now We Showed In The Appendix To Part I.,  That Nature Does 
 Not Work With An End In View.  For The Eternal And Infinite 
 Being,  Which We Call God Or Nature,  Acts By The Same Necessity As 
 That Whereby It Exists.  For We Have Shown,  That By The Same 
 Necessity Of Its Nature,  Whereby It Exists,  It Likewise Works (I. 
 Xvi.).  The Reason Or Cause Why God Or Nature Exists,  And The 
 Reason Why He Acts,  Are One And The Same.  Therefore,  As He Does 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Preface Pg 111 
 Not Exist For The Sake Of An End,  So Neither Does He Act For The 
 Sake Of An End ; Of His Existence And Of His Action There Is 
 Neither Origin Nor End.  Wherefore,  A Cause Which Is Called Final 
 Is Nothing Else But Human Desire,  In So Far As It Is Considered 
 As The Origin Or Cause Of Anything.  For Example,  When We Say 
 That To Be Inhabited Is The Final Cause Of This Or That House,  We 
 Mean Nothing More Than That A Man,  Conceiving The Conveniences Of 
 Household Life,  Had A Desire To Build A House.  Wherefore,  The 
 Being Inhabited,  In So Far As It Is Regarded As A Final Cause,  Is 
 Nothing Else But This Particular Desire,  Which Is Really The 
 Efficient Cause ; It Is Regarded As The Primary Cause,  Because 
 Men Are Generally Ignorant Of The Causes Of Their Desires.  They 
 Are,  As I Have Often Said Already,  Conscious Of Their Own Actions 
 And Appetites,  But Ignorant Of The Causes Whereby They Are 
 Determined To Any Particular Desire.  Therefore,  The Common 
 Saying That Nature Sometimes Falls Short,  Or Blunders,  And 
 Produces Things Which Are Imperfect,  I Set Down Among The Glosses 
 Treated Of In The Appendix To Part I.  Perfection And 
 Imperfection,  Then,  Are In Reality Merely Modes Of Thinking,  Or 
 Notions Which We Form From A Comparison Among One Another Of 
 Individuals Of The Same Species ; Hence I Said Above (Ii. Def. 
 Vi.),  That By Reality And Perfection I Mean The Same Thing.  For 
 We Are Wont To Refer All The Individual Things In Nature To One 
 Genus,  Which Is Called The Highest Genus,  Namely,  To The Category 
 Of Being,  Whereto Absolutely All Individuals In Nature Belong. 
 Thus,  In So Far As We Refer The Individuals In Nature To This 
 Category,  And Comparing Them One With Another,  Find That Some 
 Possess More Of Being Or Reality Than Others,  We,  To This Extent, 
 Say That Some Are More Perfect Than Others.  Again,  In So Far As 
 We Attribute To Them Anything Implying Negation-As Term,  End, 
 Infirmity,  Etc.,  We,  To This Extent,  Call Them Imperfect,  Because 
 They Do Not Affect Our Mind So Much As The Things Which We Call 
 Perfect,  Not Because They Have Any Intrinsic Deficiency,  Or 
 Because Nature Has Blundered.  For Nothing Lies Within The Scope 
 Of A Thing's Nature,  Save That Which Follows From The Necessity 
 Of The Nature Of Its Efficient Cause,  And Whatsoever Follows From 
 The Necessity Of The Nature Of Its Efficient Cause Necessarily 
 Comes To Pass. 
     As For The Terms Good And Bad,  They Indicate No Positive 
 Quality In Things Regarded In Themselves,  But Are Merely Modes Of 
 Thinking,  Or Notions Which We Form From The Comparison Of Things 
 One With Another.  Thus One And The Same Thing Can Be At The Same 
 Time Good,  Bad,  And Indifferent.  For Instance,  Music Is Good For 
 Him That Is Melancholy,  Bad For Him That Mourns ; For Him That Is 
 Deaf,  It Is Neither Good Nor Bad. 
     Nevertheless,  Though This Be So,  The Terms Should Still Be 
 Retained.  For,  Inasmuch As We Desire To Form An Idea Of Man As A 
 Type Of Human Nature Which We May Hold In View,  It Will Be Useful 
 For Us To Retain The Terms In Question,  In The Sense I Have 
 Indicated. 
     In What Follows,  Then,  I Shall Mean By,  "Good" That,  Which We 
 Certainly Know To Be A Means Of Approaching More Nearly To The 
 Type Of Human Nature,  Which We Have Set Before Ourselves ; By 
 "Bad," That Which We Certainly Know To Be A Hindrance To Us In 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Preface Pg 112 
 Approaching The Said Type.  Again,  We Shall That Men Are More 
 Perfect,  Or More Imperfect,  In Proportion As They Approach More 
 Or Less Nearly To The Said Type.  For It Must Be Specially 
 Remarked That,  When I Say That A Man Passes From A Lesser To A 
 Greater Perfection,  Or Vice Versâ,  I Do Not Mean That He Is 
 Changed From One Essence Or Reality To Another ; For Instance,  A 
 Horse Would Be As Completely Destroyed By Being Changed Into A 
 Man,  As By Being Changed Into An Insect.  What I Mean Is,  That We 
 Conceive The Thing's Power Of Action,  In So Far As This Is 
 Understood By Its Nature,  To Be Increased Or Diminished.  Lastly, 
 By Perfection In General I Shall,  As I Have Said,  Mean Reality-In 
 Other Words,  Each Thing's Essence,  In So Far As It Exists,  And 
 Operates In A Particular Manner,  And Without Paying Any Regard To 
 Its Duration.  For No Given Thing Can Be Said To Be More Perfect, 
 Because It Has Passed A Longer Time In Existence.  The Duration 
 Of Things Cannot Be Determined By Their Essence,  For The Essence 
 Of Things Involves No Fixed And Definite Period Of Existence ; 
 But Everything,  Whether It Be More Perfect Or Less Perfect,  Will 
 Always Be Able To Persist In Existence With The Same Force 
 Wherewith It Began To Exist ; Wherefore,  In This Respect,  All 
 Things Are Equal. 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Definitions Pg 113 
   
 I.  By Good I Mean That Which We Certainly Know To Be Useful To 
 Us. 
   
 Ii.  By Evil I Mean That Which We Certainly Know To Be A 
 Hindrance 
 To Us In The Attainment Of Any Good. 
     (Concerning These Terms See The Foregoing Preface Towards The 
 End.) 
   
 Iii.  Particular Things I Call Contingent In So Far As,  While 
 Regarding Their Essence Only,  We Find Nothing Therein,  Which 
 Necessarily Asserts Their Existence Or Excludes It. 
   
 Iv.  Particular Things I Call Possible In So Far As,  While 
 Regarding The Causes Whereby They Must Be Produced,  We Know Not, 
 Whether Such Causes Be Determined For Producing Them. 
     (In I. Xxxiii. Note. I.,  I Drew No Distinction Between 
 Possible And Contingent,  Because There Was In That Place No Need 
 To Distinguish Them Accurately.) 
   
 V.  By Conflicting Emotions I Mean Those Which Draw A Man In 
 Different Directions,  Though They Are Of The Same Kind,  Such As 
 Luxury And Avarice,  Which Are Both Species Of Love,  And Are 
 Contraries,  Not By Nature,  But By Accident. 
   
 Vi.  What I Mean By Emotion Felt Towards A Thing,  Future, 
 Present,  And Past,  I Explained In Iii. Xviii.,  Notes. I. And Ii., 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Definitions Pg 114 
 Which See. 
     (But I Should Here Also Remark,  That We Can Only Distinctly 
 Conceive Distance Of Space Or Time Up To A Certain Definite Limit 
 ; That Is,  All Objects Distant From Us More Than Two Hundred 
 Feet,  Or Whose Distance From The Place Where We Are Exceeds That 
 Which We Can Distinctly Conceive,  Seem To Be An Equal Distance 
 From Us,  And All In The Same Plane ; So Also Objects,  Whose Time 
 Of Existing Is Conceived As Removed From The Present By A Longer 
 Interval Than We Can Distinctly Conceive,  Seem To Be All Equally 
 Distant From The Present,  And Are Set Down,  As It Were,  To The 
 Same Moment Of Time.) 
   
 Vii.  By An End,  For The Sake Of Which We Do Something,  I Mean A 
 Desire. 
   
 Viii.  By Virtue (Virtus) And Power I Mean The Same Thing ; That 
 Is (Iii. Vii),  Virtue,  In So Far As It Is Referred To Man,  Is A 
 Man's Nature Or Essence,  In So Far As It Has The Power Of 
 Effecting What Can Only Be Understood By The Laws Of That Nature. 
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Axiom Pg 114 
     There Is No Individual Thing In Nature,  Than Which There Is 
 Not Another More Powerful And Strong.  Whatsoever Thing Be Given, 
 There Is Something Stronger Whereby It Can Be Destroyed. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 115 
 Prop. I.  No Positive Quality Possessed By A False Idea Is 
 Removed By The Presence Of What Is True,  In Virtue Of Its Being 
 True. 
     Proof.-Falsity Consists Solely In The Privation Of Knowledge 
 Which Inadequate Ideas Involve (Ii. Xxxv.),  Nor Have They Any 
 Positive Quality On Account Of Which They Are Called False (Ii. 
 Xxxiii.) ; Contrariwise,  In So Far As They Are Referred To God, 
 They Are True (Ii. Xxxii.).  Wherefore,  If The Positive Quality 
 Possessed By A False Idea Were Removed By The Presence Of What Is 
 True,  In Virtue Of Its Being True,  A True Idea Would Then Be 
 Removed By Itself,  Which (Iv. Iii.) Is Absurd.  Therefore,  No 
 Positive Quality Possessed By A False Idea,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Proposition Is More Clearly Understood From Ii. 
 Xvi. Coroll. Ii.  For Imagination Is An Idea,  Which Indicates 
 Rather The Present Disposition Of The Human Body Than The Nature 
 Of The External Body ; Not Indeed Distinctly,  But Confusedly ; 
 Whence It Comes To Pass,  That The Mind Is Said To Err.  For 
 Instance,  When We Look At The Sun,  We Conceive That It Is Distant 
 From Us About Two Hundred Feet ; In This Judgment We Err,  So Long 
 As We Are In Ignorance Of Its True Distance ; When Its True 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 116 
 Distance Is Known,  The Error Is Removed,  But Not The Imagination 
 ; Or,  In Other Words,  The Idea Of The Sun,  Which Only Explains 
 Tho Nature Of That Luminary,  In So Far As The Body Is Affected 
 Thereby : Wherefore,  Though We Know The Real Distance,  We Shall 
 Still Nevertheless Imagine The Sun To Be Near Us.  For,  As We 
 Said In Ii. Xxxv. Note,  We Do Not Imagine The Sun To Be So Near 
 Us,  Because We Are Ignorant Of Its True Distance,  But Because The 
 Mind Conceives The Magnitude Of The Sun To The Extent That The 
 Body Is Affected Thereby.  Thus,  When The Rays Of The Sun Falling 
 On The Surface Of Water Are Reflected Into Our Eyes,  We Imagine 
 The Sun As If It Were In The Water,  Though We Are Aware Of Its 
 Real Position ; And Similarly Other Imaginations,  Wherein The 
 Mind Is Deceived,  Whether They Indicate The Natural Disposition 
 Of The Body,  Or That Its Power Of Activity Is Increased Or 
 Diminished,  Are Not Contrary To The Truth,  And Do Not Vanish At 
 Its Presence.  It Happens Indeed That,  When We Mistakenly Fear An 
 Evil,  The Fear Vanishes When We Hear The True Tidings ; But The 
 Contrary Also Happens,  Namely,  That We Fear An Evil Which Will 
 Certainly Come,  And Our Fear Vanishes When We Hear False Tidings 
 ; Thus Imaginations Do Not Vanish At The Presence Of The Truth, 
 In Virtue Of Its Being True,  But Because Other Imaginations, 
 Stronger Than The First,  Supervene And Exclude The Present 
 Existence Of That Which We Imagined,  As I Have Shown In Ii. Xvii. 
   
 Prop. Ii.  We Are Only Passive,  In So Far As We Are Apart Of 
 Nature,  Which Cannot Be Conceived By Itself Without Other Parts. 
     Proof.-We Are Said To Be Passive,  When Something Arises In 
 Us,  Whereof We Are Only A Partial Cause (Iii. Def. Ii.),  That Is 
 (Iii. Def. I.),  Something Which Cannot Be Deduced Solely From The 
 Laws Of Our Nature.  We Are Passive Therefore,  In So Far As We 
 Are A Part Of Nature,  Which Cannot Be Conceived By Itself Without 
 Other Parts.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Iii.  The Force Whereby A Man Persists In Existing Is 
 Limited,  And Is Infinitely Surpassed By The Power Of External 
 Causes. 
     Proof.-This Is Evident From The Axiom Of This Part.  For, 
 When Man Is Given,  There Is Something Else-Say A-More Powerful ; 
 When A Is Given,  There Is Something Else-Say B-More Powerful Than 
 A,  And So On To Infinity ; Thus The Power Of Man Is Limited By 
 The Power Of Some Other Thing,  And Is Infinitely Surpassed By The 
 Power Of External Causes.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Iv.  It Is Impossible,  That Man Should Not Be A Part Of 
 Nature,  Or That He Should Be Capable Of Undergoing No Changes, 
 Save Such As Can Be Understood Through His Nature Only As Their 
 Adequate Cause. 
     Proof.-The Power,  Whereby Each Particular Thing,  And 
 Consequently Man,  Preserves His Being,  Is The Power Of God Or Of 
 Nature (I. Xxiv. Coroll.) ; Not In So Far As It Is Infinite,  But 
 In So Far As It Can Be Explained By The Actual Human Essence 
 (Iii. Vii.).  Thus The Power Of Man,  In So Far As It Is Explained 
 Through His Own Actual Essence,  Is A Part Of The Infinite Power 
 Of God Or Nature,  In Other Words,  Of The Essence Thereof (I. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 117 
 Xxxiv.).  This Was Our First Point.  Again,  If It Were Possible, 
 That Man Should Undergo No Changes Save Such As Can Be Understood 
 Solely Through The Nature Of Man,  It Would Follow That He Would 
 Not Be Able To Die,  But Would Always Necessarily Exist ; This 
 Would Be The Necessary Consequence Of A Cause Whose Power Was 
 Either Finite Or Infinite ; Namely,  Either Of Man's Power Only, 
 Inasmuch As He Would Be Capable Of Removing From Himself All 
 Changes Which Could Spring From External Causes ; Or Of The 
 Infinite Power Of Nature,  Whereby All Individual Things Would Be 
 So Ordered,  That Man Should Be Incapable Of Undergoing Any 
 Changes Save Such As Tended Towards His Own Preservation.  But 
 The First Alternative Is Absurd (By The Last Prop.,  The Proof Of 
 Which Is Universal,  And Can Be Applied To All Individual Things). 
 Therefore,  If It Be Possible,  That Man Should Not Be Capable Of 
 Undergoing Any Changes,  Save Such As Can Be Explained Solely 
 Through His Own Nature,  And Consequently That He Must Always (As 
 We Have Shown) Necessarily Exist ; Such A Result Must Follow From 
 The Infinite Power Of God,  And Consequently (I. Xvi.) From The 
 Necessity Of The Divine Nature,  In So Far As It Is Regarded As 
 Affected By The Idea Of Any Given Man,  The Whole Order Of Nature 
 As Conceived Under The Attributes Of Extension And Thought Must 
 Be Deducible.  It Would Therefore Follow (I. Xxi.) That Man Is 
 Infinite,  Which (By The First Part Of This Proof) Is Absurd.  It 
 Is,  Therefore,  Impossible,  That Man Should Not Undergo Any 
 Changes Save Those Whereof He Is The Adequate Cause.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows,  That Man Is Necessarily Always A 
 Prey To His Passions,  That He Follows And Obeys The General Order 
 Of Nature,  And That He Accommodates Himself Thereto,  As Much As 
 The Nature Of Things Demands. 
   
 Prop. V.  The Power And Increase Of Every Passion,  And Its 
 Persistence In Existing Are Not Defined By The Power,  Whereby We 
 Ourselves Endeavour To Persist In Existing,  But By The Power Of 
 An External Cause Compared With Our Own. 
     Proof.-The Essence Of A Passion Cannot Be Explained Through 
 Our Essence Alone (Iii. Deff. I. And Ii.),  That Is (Iii. Vii.), 
 The Power Of A Passion Cannot Be Defined By The Power,  Whereby We 
 Ourselves Endeavour To Persist In Existing,  But (As Is Shown In 
 Ii. Xvi.) Must Necessarily Be Defined By The Power Of An External 
 Cause Compared With Our Own.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Vi.  The Force Of Any Passion Or Emotion Can Overcome The 
 Rest Of A Man's Activities Or Power,  So That The Emotion Becomes 
 Obstinately Fixed To Him. 
     Proof.-The Force And Increase Of Any Passion And Its 
 Persistence In Existing Are Defined By The Power Of An External 
 Cause Compared With Our Own (By The Foregoing Prop.) ; Therefore 
 (Iv. Iii.) It Can Overcome A Man's Power,  &E.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Vii.  An Emotion Can Only Be Controlled Or Destroyed By 
 Another Emotion Contrary Thereto,  And With More Power For 
 Controlling Emotion. 
     Proof.-Emotion,  In So Far As It Is Referred To The Mind,  Is 
 An Idea,  Whereby The Mind Affirms Of Its Body A Greater Or Less 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 118 
 Force Of Existence Than Before (Cf. The General Definition Of The 
 Emotions At The End Of Part Iii.).  When,  Therefore,  The Mind Is 
 Assailed By Any Emotion,  The Body Is At The Same Time Affected 
 With A Modification Whereby Its Power Of Activity Is Increased Or 
 Diminished.  Now This Modification Of The Body (Iv. V.) Receives 
 From Its Cause The Force For Persistence In Its Being ; Which 
 Force Can Only Be Checked Or Destroyed By A Bodily Cause (Ii. 
 Vi.),  In Virtue Of The Body Being Affected With A Modification 
 Contrary To (Iii. V.) And Stronger Than Itself (Iv. Ax.) ; 
 Wherefore (Ii. Xii.) The Mind Is Affected By The Idea Of A 
 Modification Contrary To,  And Stronger Than The Former 
 Modification,  In Other Words,  (By The General Definition Of The 
 Emotions) The Mind Will Be Affected By An Emotion Contrary To And 
 Stronger Than The Former Emotion,  Which Will Exclude Or Destroy 
 The Existence Of The Former Emotion ; Thus An Emotion Cannot Be 
 Destroyed Nor Controlled Except By A Contrary And Stronger 
 Emotion.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-An Emotion,  In So Far As It Is Referred To The 
 Mind,  Can Only Be Controlled Or Destroyed Through An Idea Of A 
 Modification Of The Body Contrary To,  And Stronger Than,  That 
 Which We Are Undergoing.  For The Emotion Which We Undergo Can 
 Only Be Checked Or Destroyed By An Emotion Contrary To,  And 
 Stronger Than,  Itself,  In Other Words,  (By The General Definition 
 Of The Emotions) Only By An Idea Of A Modification Of The Body 
 Contrary To,  And Stronger Than,  The Modification Which We 
 Undergo. 
   
 Prop. Viii.  The Knowledge Of Good And Evil Is Nothing Else But 
 The Emotions Of Pleasure Or Pain,  In So Far As We Are Conscious 
 Thereof. 
     Proof.-We Call A Thing Good Or Evil,  When It Is Of Service Or 
 The Reverse In Preserving Our Being (Iv. Deff. I. And Ii.),  That 
 Is (Iii. Vii.),  When It Increases Or Diminishes,  Helps Or 
 Hinders,  Our Power Of Activity.  Thus,  In So Far As We Perceive 
 That A Thing Affects Us With Pleasure Or Pain,  We Call It Good Or 
 Evil ; Wherefore The Knowledge Of Good And Evil Is Nothing Else 
 But The Idea Of The Pleasure Or Pain,  Which Necessarily Follows 
 From That Pleasurable Or Painful Emotion (Ii. Xxii.).  But This 
 Idea Is United To The Emotion In The Same Way As Mind Is United 
 To Body (Ii. Xxi.) ; That Is,  There Is No Real Distinction 
 Between This Idea And The Emotion Or Idea Of The Modification Of 
 The Body,  Save In Conception Only.  Therefore The Knowledge Of 
 Good And Evil Is Nothing Else But The Emotion,  In So Far As We 
 Are Conscious Thereof.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Ix.  An Emotion,  Whereof We Conceive The Cause To Be With 
 Us At The Present Time,  Is Stronger Than If We Did Not Conceive 
 The Cause To Be With Us. 
     Proof.-Imagination Or Conception Is The Idea,  By Which The 
 Mind Regards A Thing As Present (Ii. Xvii. Note),  But Which 
 Indicates The Disposition Of The Mind Rather Than The Nature Of 
 The External Thing (Ii. Xvi. Coroll. Ii.).  An Emotion Is 
 Therefore A Conception,  In So Far As It Indicates The Disposition 
 Of The Body.  But A Conception (By Ii. Xvii.) Is Stronger,  So 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 119 
 Long As We Conceive Nothing Which Excludes The Present Existence 
 Of The External Object ; Wherefore An Emotion Is Also Stronger Or 
 More Intense,  When We Conceive The Cause To Be With Us At The 
 Present Time,  Than When We Do Not Conceive The Cause To Be With 
 Us.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-When I Said Above In Iii. Xviii. That We Are Affected 
 By The Image Of What Is Past Or Future With The Same Emotion As 
 If The Thing Conceived Were Present,  I Expressly Stated,  That 
 This Is Only True In So Far As We Look Solely To The Image Of The 
 Thing In Question Itself  ; For The Thing's Nature Is Unchanged, 
 Whether We Have Conceived It Or Not ; I Did Not Deny That The 
 Image Becomes Weaker,  When We Regard As Present To Us Other 
 Things Which Exclude The Present Existence Of The Future Object : 
 I Did Not Expressly Call Attention To The Fact,  Because I 
 Purposed To Treat Of The Strength Of The Emotions In This Part Of 
 My Work. 
     Corollary.-The Image Of Something Past Or Future,  That Is,  Of 
 A Thing Which We Regard As In Relation To Time Past Or Time 
 Future,  To The Exclusion Of Time Present,  Is,  When Other 
 Conditions Are Equal,  Weaker Than The Image Of Something Present 
 ; Consequently An Emotion Felt Towards What Is Past Or Future Is 
 Less Intense,  Other Conditions Being Equal,  Than An Emotion Felt 
 Towards Something Present. 
   
 Prop. X.  Towards Something Future,  Which We Conceive As Close At 
 Hand,  We Are Affected More Intensely,  Than If We Conceive That 
 Its Time For Existence Is Separated From The Present By A Longer 
 Interval ; So Too By The Remembrance Of What We Conceive To Have 
 Not Long Passed Away We Are Affected More Intensely,  Than If We 
 Conceive That It Has Long Passed Away. 
     Proof.-In So Far As We Conceive A Thing As Close At Hand,  Or 
 Not Long Passed Away,  We Conceive That Which Excludes The 
 Presence Of The Object Less,  Than If Its Period Of Future 
 Existence Were More Distant From The Present,  Or If It Had Long 
 Passed Away (This Is Obvious) Therefore (By The Foregoing Prop.) 
 We Are,  So Far,  More Intensely Affected Towards It.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-From The Remarks Made In Def. Vi. Of This Part It 
 Follows That,  If Objects Are Separated From The Present By A 
 Longer Period Than We Can Define In Conception,  Though Their 
 Dates Of Occurrence Be Widely Separated One From The Other,  They 
 All Affect Us Equally Faintly. 
   
 Prop. Xi.  An Emotion Towards That Which We Conceive As Necessary 
 Is,  When Other Conditions Are Equal,  More Intense Than An Emotion 
 Towards That Which Possible,  Or Contingent,  Or Non-Necessary. 
     Proof.-In So Far As We Conceive A Thing To Be Necessary,  We, 
 To That Extent,  Affirm Its Existence ; On The Other Hand We Deny 
 A Thing's Existence,  In So Far As We Conceive It Not To Be 
 Necessary I. Xxxiii. Note. I.) ; Wherefore (Iv. Ix.) An Emotion 
 Towards That Which Is Necessary Is,  Other Conditions Being Equal, 
 More Intense Than An Emotion That Which Is Non-Necessary.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xii.  An Emotion Towards A Thing,  Which We Know Not To 
 Exist At The Present Time,  And Which We Conceive As Possible,  Is 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 120 
 More Intense,  Other Conditions Being Equal,  Than An Emotion 
 Towards A Thing Contingent. 
     Proof.-In So Far As We Conceive A Thing As Contingent,  We Are 
 Affected By The Conception Of Some Further Thing,  Which Would 
 Assert The Existence Of The Former (Iv. Def. Iii.) ; But,  On The 
 Other Hand,  We (By Hypothesis) Conceive Certain Things,  Which 
 Exclude Its Present Existence.  But,  In So Far As We Conceive A 
 Thing To Be Possible In The Future,  We There By Conceive Things 
 Which Assert Its Existence (Iv. Iv.),  That Is (Iii. Xviii.), 
 Things Which Promote Hope Or Fear : Wherefore An Emotion Towards 
 Something Possible Is More Vehement.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-An Emotion Towards A Thing,  Which We Know Not To 
 Exist In The Present,  And Which We Conceive As Contingent,  Is Far 
 Fainter,  Than If We Conceive The Thing To Be Present With Us. 
     Proof.-Emotion Towards A Thing,  Which We Conceive To Exist, 
 Is More Intense Than It Would Be,  If We Conceived The Thing As 
 Future (Iv. Ix. Coroll.),  And Is Much More Vehement,  Than If The 
 Future Time Be Conceived As Far Distant From The Present (Iv. 
 X.).  Therefore An Emotion Towards A Thing,  Whose Period Of 
 Existence We Conceive To Be Far Distant From The Present,  Is Far 
 Fainter,  Than If We Conceive The Thing As Present ; It Is, 
 Nevertheless,  More Intense,  Than If We Conceived The Thing As 
 Contingent,  Wherefore An Emotion Towards A Thing,  Which We Regard 
 As Contingent,  Will Be Far Fainter,  Than If We Conceived The 
 Thing To Be Present With Us.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xiii.  Emotion Towards A Thing Contingent,  Which We Know 
 Not To Exist In The Present,  Is,  Other Conditions Being Equal, 
 Fainter Than An Emotion Towards A Thing Past. 
     Proof.-In So Far As We Conceive A Thing As Contingent,  We Are 
 Not Affected By The Image Of Any Other Thing,  Which Asserts The 
 Existence Of The Said Thing (Iv. Def. Iii.),  But,  On The Other 
 Hand (By Hypothesis),  We Conceive Certain Things Excluding Its 
 Present Existence.  But,  In So Far As We Conceive It In Relation 
 To Time Past,  We Are Assumed To Conceive Something,  Which Recalls 
 The Thing To Memory,  Or Excites The Image Thereof (Ii. Xviii. And 
 Note),  Which Is So Far The Same As Regarding It As Present (Ii. 
 Xvii. Coroll.).  Therefore (Iv. Ix.) An Emotion Towards A Thing 
 Contingent,  Which We Know Does Not Exist In The Present,  Is 
 Fainter,  Other Conditions Being Equal,  Than An Emotion Towards A 
 Thing Past.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xiv.  A True Knowledge Of Good And Evil Cannot Check Any 
 Emotion By Virtue Of Being True,  But Only In So Far As It Is 
 Considered As An Emotion. 
     Proof.-An Emotion Is An Idea,  Whereby The Mind Affirms Of Its 
 Body A Greater Or Less Force Of Existing Than Before (By The 
 General Definition Of The Emotions) ; Therefore It Has No 
 Positive Quality,  Which Can Be Destroyed By The Presence Of What 
 Is True ; Consequently The Knowledge Of Good And Evil Cannot,  By 
 Virtue Of Being True,  Restrain Any Emotion.  But,  In So Far As 
 Such Knowledge Is An Emotion (Iv. Viii.) If It Have More Strength 
 For Restraining Emotion,  It Will To That Extent Be Able To 
 Restrain The Given Emotion.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 121 
   
 Prop. Xv.  Desire Arising From The Knowledge Of Good And Bad Can 
 Be Quenched Or Checked By Many Of The Other Desires Arising From 
 The Emotions Whereby We Are Assailed. 
     Proof.-From The True Knowledge Of Good And Evil,  In So Far As 
 It Is An Emotion,  Necessarily Arises Desire (Def. Of The 
 Emotions,  I.),  The Strength Of Which Is Proportioned To The 
 Strength Of The Emotion Wherefrom It Arises (Iii. Xxxvii.).  But, 
 Inasmuch As This Desire Arises (By Hypothesis) From The Fact Of 
 Our Truly Understanding Anything,  It Follows That It Is Also 
 Present With Us,  In So Far As We Are Active (Iii. I.),  And Must 
 Therefore Be Understood Through Our Essence Only (Iii. Def. Ii.) 
 ; Consequently (Iii. Vii.) Its Force And Increase Can Be Defined 
 Solely By Human Power.  Again,  The Desires Arising From The 
 Emotions Whereby We Are Assailed Are Stronger,  In Proportion As 
 The Said Emotions Are More Vehement ; Wherefore Their Force And 
 Increase Must Be Defined Solely By The Power Of External Causes, 
 Which,  When Compared With Our Own Power,  Indefinitely Surpass It 
 (Iv. Iii.) ; Hence The Desires Arising From Like Emotions May Be 
 More Vehement,  Than The Desire Which Arises From A True Knowledge 
 Of Good And Evil,  And May,  Consequently,  Control Or Quench It. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xvi.  Desire Arising From The Knowledge Of Good And Evil, 
 In So Far As Such Knowledge Regards What Is Future,  May Be More 
 Easily Controlled Or Quenched,  Than The Desire For What Is 
 Agreeable At The Present Moment. 
     Proof.-Emotion Towards A Thing,  Which We Conceive As Future, 
 Is Fainter Than Emotion Towards A Thing That Is Present (Iv. Ix. 
 Coroll.).  But Desire,  Which Arises From The True Knowledge Of 
 Good And Evil,  Though It Be Concerned With Things Which Are Good 
 At The Moment,  Can Be Quenched Or Controlled By Any Headstrong 
 Desire (By The Last Prop.,  The Proof Whereof Is Of Universal 
 Application).  Wherefore Desire Arising From Such Knowledge,  When 
 Concerned With The Future,  Can Be More Easily Controlled Or 
 Quenched,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xvii.  Desire Arising From The True Knowledge Of Good And 
 Evil,  In So Far As Such Knowledge Is Concerned With What Is 
 Contingent,  Can Be Controlled Far More Easily Still,  Than Desire 
 For Things That Are Present. 
     Proof.-This Prop. Is Proved In The Same Way As The Last Prop. 
 From Iv. Xii. Coroll. 
     Note.-I Think I Have Now Shown The Reason,  Why Men Are Moved 
 By Opinion More Readily Than By True Reason,  Why It Is That The 
 True Knowledge Of Good And Evil Stirs Up Conflicts In The Soul, 
 And Often Yields To Every Kind Of Passion.  This State Of Things 
 Gave Rise To The Exclamation Of The Poet :12- 
 "The Better Path I Gaze At And Approve,  
 The Worse-I Follow." 
     Ecclesiastes Seems To Have Had The Same Thought In His Mind, 
 When He Says,  "He Who Increaseth Knowledge Increaseth Sorrow."  I 
 Have Not Written The Above With The Object Of Drawing The 
 Conclusion,  That Ignorance Is More Excellent Than Knowledge,  Or 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 122 
 That A Wise Man Is On A Par With A Fool In Controlling His 
 Emotions,  But Because It Is Necessary To Know The Power And The 
 Infirmity Of Our Nature,  Before We Can Determine What Reason Can 
 Do In Restraining The Emotions,  And What Is Beyond Her Power.  I 
 Have Said,  That In The Present Part I Shall Merely Treat Of Human 
 Infirmity.  The Power Of Reason Over The Emotions I Have Settled 
 To Treat Separately. 
   
 Prop. Xviii.  Desire Arising From Pleasure Is,  Other Conditions 
 Being Equal,  Stronger Than Desire Arising From Pain. 
     Proof.-Desire Is The Essence Of A Man (Def. Of The Emotions, 
 I.),  That Is,  The Endeavour Whereby A Man Endeavours To Persist 
 In His Own Being.  Wherefore Desire Arising From Pleasure Is,  By 
 The Fact Of Pleasure Being Felt,  Increased Or Helped ; On The 
 Contrary,  Desire Arising From Pain Is,  By The Fact Of Pain Being 
 Felt,  Diminished Or Hindered ; Hence The Force Of Desire Arising 
 From Pleasure Must Be Defined By Human Power Together With The 
 Power Of An External Cause,  Whereas Desire Arising From Pain Must 
 Be Defined By Human Power Only.  Thus The Former Is The Stronger 
 Of The Two.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-In These Few Remarks I Have Explained The Causes Of 
 Human Infirmity And Inconstancy,  And Shown Why Men Do Not Abide 
 By The Precepts Of Reason.  It Now Remains For Me To Show What 
 Course Is Marked Out For Us By Reason,  Which Of The Emotions Are 
 In Harmony With The Rules Of Human Reason,  And Which Of Them Are 
 Contrary Thereto.  But,  Before I Begin To Prove My Propositions 
 In Detailed Geometrical Fashion,  It Is Advisable To Sketch Them 
 Briefly In Advance,  So That Everyone May More Readily Grasp My 
 Meaning. 
     As Reason Makes No Demands Contrary To Nature,  It Demands, 
 That Every Man Should Love Himself,  Should Seek That Which Is 
 Useful To Him-I Mean,  That Which Is Really Useful To Him,  Should 
 Desire Everything Which Really Brings Man To Greater Perfection, 
 And Should,  Each For Himself,  Endeavour As Far As He Can To 
 Preserve His Own Being.  This Is As Necessarily True,  As That A 
 Whole Is Greater Than Its Part.  (Cf. Iii. Iv.) 
     Again,  As Virtue Is Nothing Else But Action In Accordance 
 With The Laws Of One's Own Nature (Iv. Def. Viii.),  And As No One 
 Endeavours To Preserve His Own Being,  Except In Accordance With 
 The Laws Of His Own Nature,  It Follows,  First,  That The 
 Foundation Of Virtue Is The Endeavour To Preserve One's Own 
 Being,  And That Happiness Consists In Man's Power Of Preserving 
 His Own Being ; Secondly,  That Virtue Is To Be Desired For Its 
 Own Sake,  And That There Is Nothing More Excellent Or More Useful 
 To Us,  For The Sake Of Which We Should Desire It ; Thirdly And 
 Lastly,  That Suicides Are Weak-Minded,  And Are Overcome By 
 External Causes Repugnant To Their Nature.  Further,  It Follows 
 From Postulate Iv.,  Part Ii.,  That We Can Never Arrive At Doing 
 Without All External Things For The Preservation Of Our Being Or 
 Living,  So As To Have No Relations With Things Which Are Outside 
 Ourselves.  Again,  If We Consider Our Mind,  We See That Our 
 Intellect Would Be More Imperfect,  If Mind Were Alone,  And Could 
 Understand Nothing Besides Itself.  There Are,  Then,  Many Things 
 Outside Ourselves,  Which Are Useful To Us,  And Are,  Therefore,  To 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 123 
 Be Desired.  Of Such None Can Be Discerned More Excellent,  Than 
 Those Which Are In Entire Agreement With Our Nature.  For If,  For 
 Example,  Two Individuals Of Entirely The Same Nature Are United, 
 They Form A Combination Twice As Powerful As Either Of Them 
 Singly. 
     Therefore,  To Man There Is Nothing More Useful Than 
 Man-Nothing,  I Repeat,  More Excellent For Preserving Their Being 
 Can Be Wished For By Men,  Than That All Should So In All Points 
 Agree,  That The Minds And Bodies Of All Should Form,  As It Were, 
 One Single Mind And One Single Body,  And That All Should,  With 
 One Consent,  As Far As They Are Able,  Endeavour To Preserve Their 
 Being,  And All With One Consent Seek What Is Useful To Them All. 
 Hence,  Men Who Are Governed By Reason-That Is,  Who Seek What Is 
 Useful To Them In Accordance With Reason,  Desire For Themselves 
 Nothing,  Which They Do Not Also Desire For The Rest Of Mankind, 
 And,  Consequently,  Are Just,  Faithful,  And Honourable In Their 
 Conduct. 
     Such Are The Dictates Of Reason,  Which I Purposed Thus 
 Briefly To Indicate,  Before Beginning To Prove Them In Greater 
 Detail.  I Have Taken This Course,  In Order,  If Possible,  To Gain 
 The Attention Of Those Who Believe,  That The Principle That Every 
 Man Is Bound To Seek What Is Useful For Himself Is The Foundation 
 Of Impiety,  Rather Than Of Piety And Virtue. 
     Therefore,  After Briefly Showing That The Contrary Is The 
 Case,  I Go On To Prove It By The Same Method,  As That Whereby I 
 Have Hitherto Proceeded. 
   
 Prop. Xix.  Every Man,  By The Laws Of His Nature,  Necessarily 
 Desires Or Shrinks From That Which He Deems To Be Good Or Bad. 
     Proof.-The Knowledge Of Good And Evil Is (Iv. Viii.) The 
 Emotion Of Pleasure Or Pain,  In So Far As We Are Conscious 
 Thereof ; Therefore,  Every Man Necessarily Desires What He Thinks 
 Good,  And Shrinks From What He Thinks Bad.  Now This Appetite Is 
 Nothing Else But Man's Nature Or Essence (Cf. The Definition Of 
 Appetite,  Iii. Ix. Note,  And Def. Of The Emotions,  I.). 
 Therefore,  Every Man,  Solely By The Laws Of His Nature,  Desires 
 The One,  And Shrinks From The Other,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xx.  The More Every Man Endeavours,  And Is Able To Seek 
 What Is Useful To Him-In Other Words,  To Preserve His Own 
 Being-The More Is He Endowed With Virtue ; On The Contrary,  In 
 Proportion As A Man Neglects To Seek What Is Useful To Him,  That 
 Is,  To Preserve His Own Being,  He Is Wanting In Power. 
     Proof.-Virtue Is Human Power,  Which Is Defined Solely By 
 Man's Essence (Iv. Def. Viii.),  That Is,  Which Is Defined Solely 
 By The Endeavour Made By Man To Persist In His Own Being. 
 Wherefore,  The More A Man Endeavours,  And Is Able To Preserve His 
 Own Being,  The More Is He Endowed With Virtue,  And,  Consequently 
 (Iii.Iv. And Vi.),  In So Far As A Man Neglects To Preserve His 
 Own Being,  He Is Wanting In Power.  Q.E.D.  
     Note.-No One,  Therefore,  Neglects Seeking His Own Good,  Or 
 Preserving His Own Being,  Unless He Be Overcome By Causes 
 External And Foreign To His Nature.  No One,  I Say,  From The 
 Necessity Of His Own Nature,  Or Otherwise Than Under Compulsion 
 
 
 
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 From External Causes,  Shrinks From Food,  Or Kills Himself : Which 
 Latter May Be Done In A Variety Of Ways.  A Man,  For Instance, 
 Kills Himself Under The Compulsion Of Another Man,  Who Twists 
 Round His Right Hand,  Wherewith He Happened To Have Taken Up A 
 Sword,  And Forces Him To Turn The Blade Against His Own Heart ; 
 Or,  Again,  He May Be Compelled,  Like Seneca,  By A Tyrant's 
 Command,  To Open His Own Veins-That Is,  To Escape A Greater Evil 
 By Incurring,  A Lesser ; Or,  Lastly,  Latent External Causes May 
 So Disorder His Imagination,  And So Affect His Body,  That It May 
 Assume A Nature Contrary To Its Former One,  And Whereof The Idea 
 Cannot Exist In The Mind (Iii. X.) But That A Man,  From The 
 Necessity Of His Own Nature,  Should Endeavour To Become 
 Non-Existent,  Is As Impossible As That Something Should Be Made 
 Out Of Nothing,  As Everyone Will See For Himself,  After A Little 
 Reflection. 
   
 Prop. Xxi.  No One Can Desire To Be Blessed,  To Act Rightly,  And 
 To Live Rightly,  Without At The Same Time Wishing To Be,  Act,  And 
 To Live-In Other Words,  To Actually Exist. 
     Proof.-The Proof Of This Proposition,  Or Rather The 
 Proposition Itself,  Is Self-Evident,  And Is Also Plain From The 
 Definition Of Desire.  For The Desire Of Living,  Acting,  &C., 
 Blessedly Or Rightly,  Is (Def. Of The Emotions,  I.) The Essence 
 Of Man-That Is (Iii. Vii.),  The Endeavour Made By Everyone To 
 Preserve His Own Being.  Therefore,  No One Can Desire,  &C. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxii.  No Virtue Can Be Conceived As Prior To This 
 Endeavour To Preserve One's Own Being. 
     Proof.-The Effort For Self-Preservation Is The Essence Of A 
 Thing (Iii. Vii.) ; Therefore,  If Any Virtue Could Be Conceived 
 As Prior Thereto,  The Essence Of A Thing Would Have To Be 
 Conceived As Prior To Itself,  Which Is Obviously Absurd. 
 Therefore No Virtue,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-The Effort For Self-Preservation Is The First And 
 Only Foundation Of Virtue.  For Prior To This Principle Nothing 
 Can Be Conceived,  And Without It No Virtue Can Be Conceived. 
   
 Prop. Xxiii.  Man,  In So Far As He Is Determined To A Particular 
 Action Because He Has Inadequate Ideas,  Cannot Be Absolutely Said 
 To Act In Obedience To Virtue ; He Can Only Be So Described,  In 
 So Far As He Is Determined For The Action Because He Understands. 
     Proof.-In So Far As A Man Is Determined To An Action Through 
 Having Inadequate Ideas,  He Is Passive (Iii. I.),  That Is (Iii. 
 Deff. I.,  And Iii.),  He Does Something,  Which Cannot Be Perceived 
 Solely Through His Essence,  That Is (By Iv. Def. Viii.),  Which 
 Does Not Follow From His Virtue.  But,  In So Far As He Is 
 Determined For An Action Because He Understands,  He Is Active ; 
 That Is,  He Does Something,  Which Is Perceived Through His 
 Essence Alone,  Or Which Adequately Follows From His Virtue. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxiv.  To Act Absolutely In Obedience To Virtue Is In Us 
 The Same Thing As To Act,  To Live,  Or To Preserve One's Being 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 125 
 (These Three Terms Are Identical In Meaning) In Accordance With 
 The Dictates Of Reason On The Basis Of Seeking What Is Useful To 
 One's Self. 
     Proof.-To Act Absolutely In Obedience To Virtue Is Nothing 
 Else But To Act According To The Laws Of One's Own Nature.  But 
 We Only Act,  In So Far As We Understand (Iii. Iii.) : Therefore 
 To Act In Obedience To Virtue Is In Us Nothing Else But To Act, 
 To Live,  Or To Preserve One's Being In Obedience To Reason,  And 
 That On The Basis Of Seeking What Is Useful For Us (Iv. Xxii. 
 Coroll.).  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxv.  No One Wishes To Preserve His Being For The Sake Of 
 Anything Else. 
     Proof.-The Endeavour,  Wherewith Everything Endeavours To 
 Persist In Its Being,  Is Defined Solely By The Essence Of The 
 Thing Itself (Iii. Vii.) ; From This Alone,  And Not From The 
 Essence Of Anything Else,  It Necessarily Follows (Iii. Vi.) That 
 Everyone Endeavours To Preserve His Being.  Moreover,  This 
 Proposition Is Plain From Iv. Xxii. Coroll.,  For If A Man Should 
 Endeavour To Preserve His Being For The Sake Of Anything Else, 
 The Last-Named Thing Would Obviously Be The Basis Of Virtue, 
 Which,  By The Foregoing Corollary,  Is Absurd.  Therefore No One, 
 &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxvi.  Whatsoever We Endeavour In Obedience To Reason Is 
 Nothing Further Than To Understand ; Neither Does The Mind,  In So 
 Far As It Makes Use Of Reason,  Judge Anything To Be Useful To It, 
 Save Such Things As Are Conducive To Understanding. 
     Proof.-The Effort For Self-Preservation Is Nothing Else But 
 The Essence Of The Thing In Question (Iii. Vii.),  Which,  In So 
 Far As It Exists Such As It Is,  Is Conceived To Have Force For 
 Continuing In Existence (Iii. Vi.) And Doing Such Things As 
 Necessarily Follow From Its Given Nature (See The Def. Of 
 Appetite,  Iii. Ix. Note).  But The Essence Of Reason Is Nought 
 Else But Our Mind,  In So Far As It Clearly And Distinctly 
 Understands (See The Definition In Ii. Xl. Note. Ii.) ; Therefore 
 (Ii. Xl.) Whatsoever We Endeavour In Obedience To Reason Is 
 Nothing Else But To Understand.  Again,  Since This Effort Of The 
 Mind Wherewith The Mind Endeavours,  In So Far As It Reasons,  To 
 Preserve Its Own Being Is Nothing Else But Understanding ; This 
 Effort At Understanding Is (Iv. Xxii. Coroll.) The First And 
 Single Basis Of Virtue,  Nor Shall We Endeavour To Understand 
 Things For The Sake Of Any Ulterior Object (Iv. Xxv.) ; On The 
 Other Hand,  The Mind,  In So Far As It Reasons,  Will Not Be Able 
 To Conceive Any Good For Itself,  Save Such Things As Are 
 Conducive To Understanding. 
   
 Prop. Xxvii.  We Know Nothing To Be Certainly Good Or Evil,  Save 
 Such Things As Really Conduce To Understanding,  Or Such As Are 
 Able To Hinder Us From Understanding. 
     Proof.-The Mind,  In So Far As It Reasons,  Desires Nothing 
 Beyond Understanding,  And Judges Nothing To Be Useful To Itself, 
 Save Such Things As Conduce To Understanding (By The Foregoing 
 Prop.).  But The Mind (Ii. Xli.,  Xliii. And Note) Cannot Possess 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 126 
 Certainty Concerning Anything,  Except In So Far As It Has 
 Adequate Ideas,  Or (What By Ii. Xl. Note,  Is The Same Thing) In 
 So Far As It Reasons.  Therefore We Know Nothing To Be Good Or 
 Evil Save Such Things As Really Conduce,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxviii.  The Mind's Highest Good Is The Knowledge Of God, 
 And The Mind's Highest Virtue Is To Know God. 
     Proof.-The Mind Is Not Capable Of Understanding Anything 
 Higher Than God,  That Is (I. Def. Vi.),  Than A Being Absolutely 
 Infinite,  And Without Which (I. Xv.) Nothing Can Either Be Or Be 
 Conceived ; Therefore (Iv. Xxvi. And Xxvii.),  The Mind's Highest 
 Utility Or (Iv. Def. I.) Good Is The Knowledge Of God.  Again, 
 The Mind Is Active,  Only In So Far As It Understands,  And Only To 
 The Same Extent Can It Be Said Absolutely To Act Virtuously.  The 
 Mind's Absolute Virtue Is Therefore To Understand.  Now,  As We 
 Have Already Shown,  The Highest That The Mind Can Understand Is 
 God ; Therefore The Highest Virtue Of The Mind Is To Understand 
 Or To Know God.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxix.  No Individual Thing,  Which Is Entirely Different 
 From Our Own Nature,  Can Help Or Check Our Power Of Activity,  And 
 Absolutely Nothing Can Do Us Good Or Harm,  Unless It Has 
 Something In Common With Our Nature. 
     Proof.-The Power Of Every Individual Thing,  And Consequently 
 The Power Of Man,  Whereby He Exists And Operates,  Can Only Be 
 Determined By An Individual Thing (I. Xxviii.),  Whose Nature (Ii. 
 Vi.) Must Be Understood Through The Same Nature As That,  Through 
 Which Human Nature Is Conceived.  Therefore Our Power Of 
 Activity,  However It Be Conceived,  Can Be Determined And 
 Consequently Helped Or Hindered By The Power Of Any Other 
 Individual Thing,  Which Has Something In Common With Us,  But Not 
 By The Power Of Anything,  Of Which The Nature Is Entirely 
 Different From Our Own ; And Since We Call Good Or Evil That 
 Which Is The Cause Of Pleasure Or Pain (Iv. Viii.),  That Is (Iii. 
 Xi. Note),  Which Increases Or Diminishes,  Helps Or Hinders,  Our 
 Power Of Activity ; Therefore,  That Which Is Entirely Different 
 From Our Nature Can Neither Be To Us Good Nor Bad.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxx.  A Thing Cannot Be Bad For Us Through The Quality 
 Which It Has In Common With Our Nature,  But It Is Bad For Us In 
 So Far As It Is Contrary To Our Nature. 
     Proof.-We Call A Thing Bad When It Is The Cause Of Pain (Iv. 
 Viii.),  That Is (By The Def.,  Which See In Iii. Xi. Note),  When 
 It Diminishes Or Checks Our Power Of Action.  Therefore,  If 
 Anything Were Bad For Us Through That Quality Which It Has In 
 Common With Our Nature,  It Would Be Able Itself To Diminish Or 
 Check That Which It Has In Common With Our Nature,  Which (Iii. 
 Iv.) Is Absurd.  Wherefore Nothing Can Be Bad For Us Through That 
 Quality Which It Has In Common With Us,  But,  On The Other Hand, 
 In So Far As It Is Bad For Us,  That Is (As We Have Just Shown), 
 In So Far As It Can Diminish Or Check Our Power Of Action,  It Is 
 Contrary To Our Nature. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 127 
 Prop. Xxxi.  In So Far As A Thing Is In Harmony With Our Nature, 
 It Is Necessarily Good. 
     Proof.-In So Far As A Thing Is In Harmony With Our Nature,  It 
 Cannot Be Bad For It.  It Will Therefore Necessarily Be Either 
 Good Or Indifferent.  If It Be Assumed That It Be Neither Good 
 Nor Bad,  Nothing Will Follow From Its Nature (Iv. Def. I.),  Which 
 Tends To The Preservation Of Our Nature,  That Is (By The 
 Hypothesis),  Which Tends To The Preservation Of The Thing Itself 
 ; But This (Iii. Vi.) Is Absurd ; Therefore,  In So Far As A Thing 
 Is In Harmony With Our Nature,  It Is Necessarily Good.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows,  That,  In Proportion As A Thing 
 Is In Harmony With Our Nature,  So Is It More Useful Or Better For 
 Us,  And Vice Versâ,  In Proportion As A Thing Is More Useful For 
 Us,  So Is It More In Harmony With Our Nature.  For,  In So Far As 
 It Is Not In Harmony With Our Nature,  It Will Necessarily Be 
 Different Therefrom Or Contrary Thereto.  If Different,  It Can 
 Neither Be Good Nor Bad (Iv. Xxix.) ; If Contrary,  It Will Be 
 Contrary To That Which Is In Harmony With Our Nature,  That Is, 
 Contrary To What Is Good-In Short,  Bad.  Nothing,  Therefore,  Can 
 Be Good,  Except In So Far As It Is In Harmony With Our Nature ; 
 And Hence A Thing Is Useful,  In Proportion As It Is In Harmony 
 With Our Nature,  And Vice Versâ.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxii.  In So Far As Men Are A Prey To Passion,  They 
 Cannot,  In That Respect,  Be Said To Be Naturally In Harmony. 
     Proof.-Things,  Which Are Said To Be In Harmony Naturally,  Are 
 Understood To Agree In Power (Iii. Vii.),  Not In Want Of Power Or 
 Negation,  And Consequently Not In Passion (Iii. Iii. Note) ; 
 Wherefore Men,  In So Far As They Are A Prey To Their Passions, 
 Cannot Be Said To Be Naturally In Harmony.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Is Also Self-Evident ; For,  If We Say That White 
 And Black Only Agree In The Fact That Neither Is Red,  We 
 Absolutely Affirm That The Do Not Agree In Any Respect.  So,  If 
 We Say That A Man And A Stone Only Agree In The Fact That Both 
 Are Finite-Wanting In Power,  Not Existing By The Necessity Of 
 Their Own Nature,  Or,  Lastly,  Indefinitely Surpassed By The Power 
 Of External Causes-We Should Certainly Affirm That A Man And A 
 Stone Are In No Respect Alike ; Therefore,  Things Which Agree 
 Only In Negation,  Or In Qualities Which Neither Possess,  Really 
 Agree In No Respect. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiii.  Men Can Differ In Nature,  In So Far As They Are 
 Assailed By Those Emotions,  Which Are Passions,  Or Passive States 
 ; And To This Extent One And The Same Man Is Variable And 
 Inconstant. 
     Proof.-The Nature Or Essence Of The Emotions Cannot Be 
 Explained Solely Through Our Essence Or Nature (Iii. Deff. I., 
 Ii.),  But It Must Be Defined By 
 The Power,  That Is (Iii. Vii.),  By The Nature Of External Causes 
 In 
 Comparison With Our Own ; Hence It Follows,  That There Are As 
 Many Kinds Of 
 Each Emotion As There Are External Objects Whereby We Are 
 Affected  
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 128 
 (Iii. Lvi.),  And That Men May Be Differently Affected By One And 
 The Same 
 Object (Iii. Li.),  And To This Extent Differ In Nature ; Lastly, 
 That One And 
 The Same Man May Be Differently Affected Towards The Same Object, 
 And May 
 Therefore Be Variable And Inconstant.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiv.  In So Far As Men Are Assailed By Emotions Which Are 
 Passions,  They Can Be Contrary One To Another. 
     Proof.-A Man,  For Instance Peter,  Can Be The Cause Of Paul's 
 Feeling Pain,  Because He (Peter) Possesses Something Similar To 
 That Which Paul Hates (Iii. Xvi.),  Or Because Peter Has Sole 
 Possession Of A Thing Which Paul Also Loves (Iii. Xxxii. And 
 Note),  Or For Other Causes (Of Which The Chief Are Enumerated In 
 Iii. Lv. Note) ; It May Therefore Happen That Paul Should Hate 
 Peter (Def. Of Emotions,  Vii.),  Consequently It May Easily Happen 
 Also,  That Peter Should Hate Paul In Return,  And That Each Should 
 Endeavour To Do The Other An Injury,  (Iii. Xxxix.),  That Is (Iv. 
 Xxx.),  That They Should Be Contrary One To Another.  But The 
 Emotion Of Pain Is Always A Passion Or Passive State (Iii. Lix.) 
 ; Hence Men,  In So Far As They Are Assailed By Emotions Which Are 
 Passions,  Can Be Contrary One To Another.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-I Said That Paul May Hate Peter,  Because He Conceives 
 That Peter Possesses Something Which He (Paul) Also Loves ; From 
 This It Seems,  At First Sight,  To Follow,  That These Two Men, 
 Through Both Loving The Same Thing,  And,  Consequently,  Through 
 Agreement Of Their Respective Natures,  Stand In One Another's Way 
 ; If This Were So,  Props. Xxx. And Xxxi. Of This Part Would Be 
 Untrue.  But If We Give The Matter Our Unbiased Attention,  We 
 Shall See That The Discrepancy Vanishes.  For The Two Men Are Not 
 In One Another's Way In Virtue Of The Agreement Of Their Natures, 
 That Is,  Through Both Loving The Same Thing,  But In Virtue Of One 
 Differing From The Other.  For,  In So Far As Each Loves The Same 
 Thing,  The Love Of Each Is Fostered Thereby (Iii. Xxxi.),  That Is 
 (Def. Of The Emotions,  Vi.) The Pleasure Of Each Is Fostered 
 Thereby.  Wherefore It Is Far From Being The Case,  That They Are 
 At Variance Through Both Loving The Same Thing,  And Through The 
 Agreement In Their Natures.  The Cause For Their Opposition Lies, 
 As I Have Said,  Solely In The Fact That They Are Assumed To 
 Differ.  For We Assume That Peter Has The Idea Of The Loved 
 Object As Already In His Possession,  While Paul Has The Idea Of 
 The Loved Object As Lost.  Hence The One Man Will Be Affected 
 With Pleasure,  The Other Will Be Affected With Pain,  And Thus 
 They Will Be At Variance One With Another.  We Can Easily Show In 
 Like Manner,  That All Other Causes Of Hatred Depend Solely On 
 Differences,  And Not On The Agreement Between Men's Natures. 
   
 Prop. Xxxv.  In So Far Only As Men Live In Obedience To Reason, 
 Do They Always Necessarily Agree In Nature. 
     Proof.-In So Far As Men Are Assailed By Emotions That Are 
 Passions,  They Can Be Different In Nature (Iv. Xxxiii.),  And At 
 Variance One With Another.  But Men Are Only Said To Be Active, 
 In So Far As They Act In Obedience To Reason (Iii. Iii.) ; 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 129 
 Therefore,  What So Ever Follows From Human Nature In So Far As It 
 Is Defined By Reason Must (Iii. Def. Ii.) Be Understood Solely 
 Through Human Nature As Its Proximate Cause.  But,  Since Every 
 Man By The Laws Of His Nature Desires That Which He Deems Good, 
 And Endeavours To Remove That Which He Deems Bad (Iv. Xix.) ; And 
 Further,  Since That Which We,  In Accordance With Reason,  Deem 
 Good Or Bad,  Necessarily Is Good Or Bad (Ii. Xli.) ; It Follows 
 That Men,  In So Far As They Live In Obedience To Reason, 
 Necessarily Do Only Such Things As Are Necessarily Good For Human 
 Nature,  And Consequently For Each Individual Man (Iv. Xxxi. 
 Coroll.) ; In Other Words,  Such Things As Are In Harmony With 
 Each Man's Nature.  Therefore,  Men In So Far As They Live In 
 Obedience To Reason,  Necessarily Live Always In Harmony One With 
 Another.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary I.-There Is No Individual Thing In Nature,  Which Is 
 More Useful To Man,  Than A Man Who Lives In Obedience To Reason. 
 For That Thing Is To Man Most Useful,  Which Is Most In Harmony 
 With His Nature (Iv. Xxxi. Coroll.) ; That Is,  Obviously,  Man. 
 But Man Acts Absolutely According To The Laws Of His Nature,  When 
 He Lives In Obedience To Reason (Iii. Def. Ii.),  And To This 
 Extent Only Is Always Necessarily In Harmony With The Nature Of 
 Another Man (By The Last Prop.) ; Wherefore Among Individual 
 Things Nothing Is More Useful To Man,  Than A Man Who Lives In 
 Obedience To Reason.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary Ii.-As Every Man Seeks Most That Which Is Useful To 
 Him,  So Are Men Most Useful One To Another.  For The More A Man 
 Seeks What Is Useful To Him And Endeavours To Preserve Himself, 
 The More Is He Endowed With Virtue (Iv. Xx.),  Or,  What Is The 
 Same Thing (Iv. Def. Viii.),  The More Is He Endowed With Power To 
 Act According To The Laws Of His Own Nature,  That Is To Live In 
 Obedience To Reason.  But Men Are Most In Natural Harmony,  When 
 They Live In Obedience To Reason (By The Last Prop.) ; Therefore 
 (By The Foregoing Coroll.) Men Will Be Most Useful One To 
 Another,  When Each Seeks Most That Which Is Useful To Him. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-What We Have Just Shown Is Attested By Experience So 
 Conspicuously,  That It Is In The Mouth Of Nearly Everyone : "Man 
 Is To Man A God."  Yet It Rarely Happens That Men Live In 
 Obedience To Reason,  For Things Are So Ordered Among Them,  That 
 They Are Generally Envious And Troublesome One To Another. 
 Nevertheless They Are Scarcely Able To Lead A Solitary Life,  So 
 That The Definition Of Man As A Social Animal Has Met With 
 General Assent ; In Fact,  Men Do Derive From Social Life Much 
 More Convenience Than Injury.  Let Satirists Then Laugh Their 
 Fill At Human Affairs,  Let Theologians Rail,  And Let Misanthropes 
 Praise To Their Utmost The Life Of Untutored Rusticity,  Let Them 
 Heap Contempt On Men And Praises On Beasts ; When All Is Said, 
 They Will Find That Men Can Provide For Their Wants Much More 
 Easily By Mutual Help,  And That Only By Uniting Their Forces Can 
 They Escape From The Dangers That On Every Side Beset Them : Not 
 To Say How Much More Excellent And Worthy Of Our Knowledge It Is, 
 To Study The Actions Of Men Than The Actions Of Beasts.  But I 
 Will Treat Of This More At Length Elsewhere. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 130 
 Prop. Xxxvi.  The Highest Good Of Those Who Follow Virtue Is 
 Common To All,  And Therefore All Can Equally Rejoice Therein. 
     Proof.-To Act Virtuously Is To Act In Obedience With Reason 
 (Iv. Xxiv.),  And Whatsoever We Endeavour To Do In Obedience To 
 Reason Is To Understand (Iv. Xxvi.) ; Therefore (Iv. Xxviii.) The 
 Highest Good For Those Who Follow After Virtue Is To Know God ; 
 That Is (Ii. Xlvii. And Note) A Good Which Is Common To All And 
 Can Be Possessed.  By All Men Equally,  In So Far As They Are Of 
 The Same Nature.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Someone May Ask How It Would Be,  If The Highest Good Of 
 Those Who Follow After Virtue Were Not Common To All?  Would It 
 Not Then Follow,  As Above (Iv. Xxxiv.),  That Men Living In 
 Obedience To Reason,  That Is (Iv. Xxxv.),  Men In So Far As They 
 Agree In Nature,  Would Be At Variance One With Another?  To Such 
 An Inquiry,  I Make Answer,  That It Follows Not Accidentally But 
 From The Very Nature Of Reason,  That Main's Highest Good Is 
 Common To All,  Inasmuch As It Is Deduced From The Very Essence Of 
 Man,  In So Far As Defined By Reason ; And That A Man Could 
 Neither Be,  Nor Be Conceived Without The Power Of Taking Pleasure 
 In This Highest Good.  For It Belongs To The Essence Of The Human 
 Mind (Ii. Xlvii.),  To Have An Adequate Knowledge Of The Eternal 
 And Infinite Essence Of God. 
   
 Prop. Xxxvii.  The Good Which Every Man,  Who Follows After 
 Virtue,  Desires For Himself He Will Also Desire For Other Men, 
 And So Much The More,  In Proportion As He Has A Greater Knowledge 
 Of God. 
     Proof.-Men,  In So Far As They Live In Obedience To Reason, 
 Are Most Useful To Their Fellow Men (Iv. Xxxv ; Coroll. I.) ; 
 Therefore (Iv. Xix.),  We Shall In Obedience To Reason Necessarily 
 Endeavour To Bring About That Men Should Live In Obedience To 
 Reason.  But The Good Which Every Man,  In So Far As He Is Guided 
 By Reason,  Or,  In Other Words,  Follows After Virtue,  Desires For 
 Himself,  Is To Understand (Iv. Xxvi.) ; Wherefore The Good,  Which 
 Each Follower Of Virtue Seeks For Himself,  He Will Desire Also 
 For Others.  Again,  Desire,  In So Far As It Is Referred To The 
 Mind,  Is The Very Essence Of The Mind (Def. Of The Emotions,  I.) 
 ; Now The Essence Of The Mind Consists In Knowledge (Ii. Xi.), 
 Which Involves The Knowledge Of God (Ii. Xlvii.),  And Without It 
 (I. Xv.),  Can Neither Be,  Nor Be Conceived ; Therefore,  In 
 Proportion As The Mind's Essence Involves A Greater Knowledge Of 
 God,  So Also Will Be Greater The Desire Of The Follower Of 
 Virtue,  That Other Men Should Possess That Which He Seeks As Good 
 For Himself.  Q.E.D. 
     Another Proof.-The Good,  Which A Man Desires For Himself And 
 Loves,  He Will Love More Constantly,  If He Sees That Others Love 
 It Also (Iii. Xxxi.) ; He Will Therefore Endeavour That Others 
 Should Love It Also ; And As The Good In Question Is Common To 
 All,  And Therefore All Can Rejoice Therein,  He Will Endeavour, 
 For The Same Reason,  To Bring About That All Should Rejoice 
 Therein,  And This He Will Do The More (Iii. Xxxvii.),  In 
 Proportion As His Own Enjoyment Of The Good Is Greater. 
     Note I.-He Who,  Guided By Emotion Only,  Endeavours To Cause 
 Others To Love What He Loves Himself,  And To Make The Rest Of The 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 131 
 World Live According To His Own Fancy,  Acts Solely By Impulse, 
 And Is,  Therefore,  Hateful,  Especially,  To Those Who Take Delight 
 In Something Different,  And Accordingly Study And,  By Similar 
 Impulse,  Endeavour,  To Make Men Live In Accordance With What 
 Pleases Themselves.  Again,  As The Highest Good Sought By Men 
 Under The Guidance Of Emotion Is Often Such,  That It Can Only Be 
 Possessed By A Single Individual,  It Follows That Those Who Love 
 It Are Not Consistent In Their Intentions,  But,  While They 
 Delight To Sing Its Praises,  Fear To Be Believed.  But He,  Who 
 Endeavours To Lead Men By Reason,  Does Not Act By Impulse But 
 Courteously And Kindly,  And His Intention Is Always Consistent. 
 Again,  Whatsoever We Desire And Do,  Whereof We Are The Cause In 
 So Far As We Possess The Idea Of God,  Or Know God,  I Set Down To 
 Religion.  The Desire Of Well-Doing,  Which Is Engendered By A 
 Life According To Reason,  I Call Piety.  Further,  The Desire, 
 Whereby A Man Living According To Reason Is Bound To Associate 
 Others With Himself In Friendship,  I Call Honour13 ; By 
 Honourable I Mean That Which Is Praised By Men Living According 
 To Reason,  And By Base I Mean That Which Is Repugnant To The 
 Gaining Of Friendship.  I Have Also Shown In Addition What Are 
 The Foundations Of A State ; And The Difference Between True 
 Virtue And Infirmity May Be Readily Gathered From What I Have 
 Said ; Namely,  That True Virtue Is Nothing Else But Living In 
 Accordance With Reason ; While Infirmity Is Nothing Else But 
 Man's Allowing Himself To Be Led By Things Which Are External To 
 Himself,  And To Be By Them Determined To Act In A Manner Demanded 
 By The General Disposition Of Things Rather Than By His Own 
 Nature Considered Solely In Itself. 
     Such Are The Matters Which I Engaged To Prove In Prop. Xviii. 
 Of This Part,  Whereby It Is Plain That The Law Against The 
 Slaughtering Of Animals Is Founded Rather On Vain Superstition 
 And Womanish Pity Than On Sound Reason.  The Rational Quest Of 
 What Is Useful To Us Further Teaches Us The Necessity Of 
 Associating Ourselves With Our Fellow Men,  But Not With Beasts, 
 Or Things,  Whose Nature Is Different From Our Own ; We Have The 
 Same Rights In Respect To Them As They Have In Respect To Us. 
 Nay,  As Everyone's Right Is Defined By His Virtue,  Or Power,  Men 
 Have Far Greater Rights Over Beasts Than Beasts Have Over Men. 
 Still I Do Not Deny That Beasts Feel : What I Deny Is,  That We 
 May Not Consult Our Own Advantage And Use Them As We Please, 
 Treating Them In The Way Which Best Suits Us ; For Their Nature 
 Is Not Like Ours,  And Their Emotions Are Naturally Different From 
 Human Emotions (Iii. Lvii. Note).  It Remains For Me To Explain 
 What I Mean By Just And Unjust,  Sin And Merit.  On These Points 
 See The Following Note. 
     Note Ii.-In The Appendix To Part I. I Undertook To Explain 
 Praise And Blame,  Merit And Sin,  Justice And Injustice. 
     Concerning Praise And Blame I Have Spoken In Iii. Xxix. Note 
 : The Time Has Now Come To Treat Of The Remaining Terms.  But I 
 Must First Say A Few Words Concerning Man In The State Of Nature 
 And In Society. 
     Every Man Exists By Sovereign Natural Right,  And, 
 Consequently,  By Sovereign Natural Right Performs Those Actions 
 Which Follow From The Necessity Of His Own Nature ; Therefore By 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 132 
 Sovereign Natural Right Every Man Judges What Is Good And What Is 
 Bad,  Takes Care Of His Own Advantage According To His Own 
 Disposition (Iv. Xix. And Iv. Xx.),  Avenges The Wrongs Done To 
 Him (Iii. Xl. Coroll. Ii.),  And Endeavours To Preserve That Which 
 He Loves And To Destroy That Which He Hates (Iii. Xxviii.).  Now, 
 If Men Lived Under The Guidance Of Reason,  Everyone Would Remain 
 In Possession Of This His Right,  Without Any Injury Being Done To 
 His Neighbour (Iv. Xxxv. Coroll. I.).  But Seeing That They Are A 
 Prey To Their Emotions,  Which Far Surpass Human Power Or Virtue 
 (Iv. Vi.),  They Are Often Drawn In Different Directions,  And 
 Being At Variance One With Another (Iv. Xxxiii. Xxxiv.),  Stand In 
 Need Of Mutual Help (Iv. Xxxv. Note).  Wherefore,  In Order That 
 Men May Live Together In Harmony,  And May Aid One Another,  It Is 
 Necessary That They Should Forego Their Natural Right,  And,  For 
 The Sake Of Security,  Refrain From All Actions Which Can Injure 
 Their Fellow-Men.  The Way In Which This End Can Be Obtained,  So 
 That Men Who Are Necessarily A Prey To Their Emotions (Iv. Iv. 
 Coroll.),  Inconstant,  And Diverse,  Should Be Able To Render Each 
 Other Mutually Secure,  And Feel Mutual Trust,  Is Evident From Iv. 
 Vii. And Iii. Xxxix.  It Is There Shown,  That An Emotion Can Only 
 Be Restrained By An Emotion Stronger Than,  And Contrary To 
 Itself,  And That Men Avoid Inflicting Injury Through Fear Of 
 Incurring A Greater Injury Themselves. 
     On This Law Society Can Be Established,  So Long As It Keeps 
 In Its Own Hand The Right,  Possessed By Everyone,  Of Avenging 
 Injury,  And Pronouncing On Good And Evil ; And Provided It Also 
 Possesses The Power To Lay Down A General Rule Of Conduct,  And To 
 Pass Laws Sanctioned,  Not By Reason,  Which Is Powerless In 
 Restraining Emotion,  But By Threats (Iv. Xvii. Note).  Such A 
 Society Established With Laws And The Power Of Preserving Itself 
 Is Called A State,  While Those Who Live Under Its Protection Are 
 Called Citizens.  We May Readily Understand That There Is In The 
 State Of Nature Nothing,  Which By Universal Consent Is Pronounced 
 Good Or Bad ; For In The State Of Nature Everyone Thinks Solely 
 Of His Own Advantage,  And According To His Disposition,  With 
 Reference Only To His Individual Advantage,  Decides What Is Good 
 Or Bad,  Being Bound By No Law To Anyone Besides Himself. 
     In The State Of Nature,  Therefore,  Sin Is Inconceivable ; It 
 Can Only Exist In A State,  Where Good And Evil Are Pronounced On 
 By Common Consent,  And Where Everyone Is Bound To Obey The State 
 Authority.  Sin,  Then,  Is Nothing Else But Disobedience,  Which Is 
 Therefore Punished By The Right Of The State Only.  Obedience,  On 
 The Other Hand,  Is Set Down As Merit,  Inasmuch As A Man Is 
 Thought Worthy Of Merit,  If He Takes Delight In The Advantages 
 Which A State Provides. 
     Again,  In The State Of Nature,  No One Is By Common Consent 
 Master Of Anything,  Nor Is There Anything In Nature,  Which Can Be 
 Said To Belong To One Man Rather Than Another : All Things Are 
 Common To All.  Hence,  In The State Of Nature,  We Can Conceive No 
 Wish To Render To Every Man His Own,  Or To Deprive A Man Of That 
 Which Belongs To Him ; In Other Words,  There Is Nothing In The 
 State Of Nature Answering To Justice And Injustice.  Such Ideas 
 Are Only Possible In A Social State,  When It Is Decreed By Common 
 Consent What Belongs To One Man And What To Another. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 133 
     From All These Considerations It Is Evident,  That Justice And 
 Injustice,  Sin And Merit,  Are Extrinsic Ideas,  And Not Attributes 
 Which Display The Nature Of The Mind.  But I Have Said Enough. 
   
 Prop. Xxxviii.  Whatsoever Disposes The Human Body,  So As To 
 Render It Capable Of Being Affected In An Increased Number Of 
 Ways,  Or Of Affecting External Bodies In An Increased Number Of 
 Ways,  Is Useful To Man  ; And Is So,  In Proportion As The Body Is 
 Thereby Rendered More Capable Of Being Affected Or Affecting 
 Other Bodies In An Increased Number Of Ways ; Contrariwise, 
 Whatsoever Renders The Body Less Capable In This Respect Is 
 Hurtful To Man. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever Thus Increases The Capabilities Of The Body 
 Increases Also The Mind's Capability Of Perception (Ii. Xiv.) ; 
 Therefore,  Whatsoever Thus Disposes The Body And Thus Renders It 
 Capable,  Is Necessarily Good Or Useful (Iv. Xxvi. Xxvii.) ; And 
 Is So In Proportion To The Extent To Which It Can Render The Body 
 Capable ; Contrariwise (Ii. Xiv.,  Iv. Xxvi. Xxvii.),  It Is 
 Hurtful,  If It Renders The Body In This Respect Less Capable. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxix.  Whatsoever Brings About The Preservation Of The 
 Proportion Of Motion And Rest,  Which The Parts Of The Human Body 
 Mutually Possess,  Is Good ; Contrariwise,  Whatsoever Causes A 
 Change In Such Proportion Is Bad. 
     Proof.-The Human Body Needs Many Other Bodies For Its 
 Preservation (Ii. Post. Iv.).  But That Which Constitutes The 
 Specific Reality (Forma) Of A Human Body Is,  That Its Parts 
 Communicate Their Several Motions One To Another In A Certain 
 Fixed Proportion (Def. Before Lemma Iv. After Ii. Xiii.). 
 Therefore,  Whatsoever Brings About The Preservation Of The 
 Proportion Between Motion And Rest,  Which The Parts Of The Human 
 Body Mutually Possess,  Preserves The Specific Reality Of The 
 Human Body,  And Consequently Renders The Human Body Capable Of 
 Being Affected In Many Ways And Of Affecting External Bodies In 
 Many Ways ; Consequently It Is Good (By The Last Prop.).  Again, 
 Whatsoever Brings About A Change In The Aforesaid Proportion 
 Causes The Human Body To Assume Another Specific Character,  In 
 Other Words (See Preface To This Part Towards The End,  Though The 
 Point Is Indeed Self-Evident),  To Be Destroyed,  And Consequently 
 Totally Incapable Of Being Affected In An Increased Numbers Of 
 Ways ; Therefore It Is Bad.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-The Extent To Which Such Causes Can Injure Or Be Of 
 Service To The Mind Will Be Explained In The Fifth Part.  But I 
 Would Here Remark That I Consider That A Body Undergoes Death, 
 When The Proportion Of Motion And Rest Which Obtained Mutually 
 Among Its Several Parts Is Changed.  For I Do Not Venture To Deny 
 That A Human Body,  While Keeping The Circulation Of The Blood And 
 Other Properties,  Wherein The Life Of A Body Is Thought To 
 Consist,  May None The Less Be Changed Into Another Nature Totally 
 Different From Its Own.  There Is No Reason,  Which Compels Me To 
 Maintain That A Body Does Not Die,  Unless It Becomes A Corpse ; 
 Nay,  Experience Would Seem To Point To The Opposite Conclusion. 
 It Sometimes Happens,  That A Man Undergoes Such Changes,  That I 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 134 
 Should Hardly Call Him The Same.  As I Have Heard Tell Of A 
 Certain Spanish Poet,  Who Had Been Seized With Sickness,  And 
 Though He Recovered Therefrom Yet Remained So Oblivious Of His 
 Past Life,  That He Would Not Believe The Plays And Tragedies He 
 Had Written To Be His Own : Indeed,  He Might Have Been Taken For 
 A Grown-Up Child,  If He Had Also Forgotten His Native Tongue.  If 
 This Instance Seems Incredible,  What Shall We Say Of Infants? A 
 Man Of Ripe Age Deems Their Nature So Unlike His Own,  That He Can 
 Only Be Persuaded That He Too Has Been An Infant By The Analogy 
 Of Other Men.  However,  I Prefer To Leave Such Questions 
 Undiscussed,  Lest I Should Give Ground To The Superstitious For 
 Raising New Issues. 
   
 Prop. Xl.  Whatsoever Conduces To Man's Social Life,  Or Causes 
 Men To Live Together In Harmony,  Is Useful,  Whereas Whatsoever 
 Brings Discord Into A State Is Bad. 
     Proof.-For Whatsoever Causes Men To Live Together In Harmony 
 Also Causes Them To Live According To Reason (Iv. Xxxv.),  And Is 
 Therefore (Iv. Xxvi. Xxvii.) Good,  And (For The Same Reason) 
 Whatsoever Brings About Discord Is Bad.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xli.  Pleasure In Itself Is Not Bad But Good : 
 Contrariwise,  Pain In Itself Is Bad. 
     Proof.-Pleasure (Iii. Xi. And Note) Is Emotion,  Whereby The 
 Body's Power Of Activity Is Increased Or Helped ; Pain Is 
 Emotion,  Whereby The Body's Power Of Activity Is Diminished Or 
 Checked ; Therefore (Iv. Xxxviii.) Pleasure In Itself Is Good, 
 &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xlii.  Mirth Cannot Be Excessive,  But Is Always Good ; 
 Contrariwise,  Melancholy Is Always Bad. 
     Proof.-Mirth (See Its Def. In Iii. Xi. Note) Is Pleasure, 
 Which,  In So Far As It Is Referred To The Body,  Consists In All 
 Parts Of The Body Being Affected Equally : That Is (Iii. Xi.), 
 The Body's Power Of Activity Is Increased Or Aided In Such A 
 Manner,  That The Several Parts Maintain Their Former Proportion 
 Of Motion And Rest ; Therefore Mirth Is Always Good (Iv. Xxxix.), 
 And Cannot Be Excessive.  But Melancholy (See Its Def. In The 
 Same Note To Iii. Xi.) Is Pain,  Which,  In So Far As It Is 
 Referred To The Body,  Consists In The Absolute Decrease Or 
 Hindrance Of The Body's Power Of Activity ; Therefore (Iv. 
 Xxxviii.) It Is Always Bad.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xliii.  Stimulation May Be Excessive And Bad ; On The Other 
 Hand,  Grief May Be Good,  In So Far As Stimulation Or Pleasure Is 
 Bad. 
     Proof.-Localized Pleasure Or Stimulation (Titillatio) Is 
 Pleasure,  Which,  In So Far As It Is Referred To The Body, 
 Consists In One Or Some Of Its Parts Being Affected More Than The 
 Rest (See Its Definition,  Iii. Xi. Note) ; The Power Of This 
 Emotion May Be Sufficient To Overcome Other Actions Of The Body 
 (Iv. Vi.),  And May Remain Obstinately Fixed Therein,  Thus 
 Rendering It Incapable Of Being Affected In A Variety Of Other 
 Ways : Therefore (Iv. Xxxviii.) It May Be Bad.  Again,  Grief, 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 135 
 Which Is Pain,  Cannot As Such Be Good (Iv. Xli.).  But,  As Its 
 Force And Increase Is Defined By The Power Of An External Cause 
 Compared With Our Own (Iv. V.),  We Can Conceive Infinite Degrees 
 And Modes Of Strength In This Emotion (Iv. Iii.) ; We Can, 
 Therefore,  Conceive It As Capable Of Restraining Stimulation,  And 
 Preventing Its Becoming Excessive,  And Hindering The Body's 
 Capabilities ; Thus,  To This Extent,  It Will Be Good.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xliv.  Love And Desire May Be Excessive. 
     Proof.-Love Is Pleasure,  Accompanied By The Idea Of An 
 External Cause (Def. Of Emotions,  Vi.) ; Therefore Stimulation, 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of An External Cause Is Love (Iii. Xi. 
 Note) ; Hence Love Maybe Excessive.  Again,  The Strength Of 
 Desire Varies In Proportion To The Emotion From Which It Arises 
 (Iii. Xxxvii.).  Now Emotion May Overcome All The Rest Of Men's 
 Actions (Iv. Vi.) ; So,  Therefore,  Can Desire,  Which Arises From 
 The Same Emotion,  Overcome All Other Desires,  And Become 
 Excessive,  As We Showed In The Last Proposition Concerning 
 Stimulation. 
     Note.-Mirth,  Which I Have Stated To Be Good,  Can Be Conceived 
 More Easily Than It Can Be Observed.  For The Emotions,  Whereby 
 We Are Daily Assailed,  Are Generally Referred To Some Part Of The 
 Body Which Is Affected More Than The Rest ; Hence The Emotions 
 Are Generally Excessive,  And So Fix The Mind In The Contemplation 
 Of One Object,  That It Is Unable To Think Of Others ; And 
 Although Men,  As A Rule,  Are A Prey To Many Emotions-And Very Few 
 Are Found Who Are Always Assailed By One And The Same-Yet There 
 Are Cases,  Where One And The Same Emotion Remains Obstinately 
 Fixed.  We Sometimes See Men So Absorbed In One Object,  That, 
 Although It Be Not Present,  They Think They Have It Before Them ; 
 When This Is The Case With A Man Who Is Not Asleep,  We Say He Is 
 Delirious Or Mad ; Nor Are Those Persons Who Are Inflamed With 
 Love,  And Who Dream All Night And All Day About Nothing But Their 
 Mistress,  Or Some Woman,  Considered As Less Mad,  For They Are 
 Made Objects Of Ridicule.  But When A Miser Thinks Of Nothing But 
 Gain Or Money,  Or When An Ambitious Man Thinks Of Nothing But 
 Glory,  They Are Not Reckoned To Be Mad,  Because They Are 
 Generally Harmful,  And Are Thought Worthy Of Being Hated.  But, 
 In Reality,  Avarice,  Ambition,  Lust,  &C.,  Are Species Of Madness, 
 Though They May Not Be Reckoned Among Diseases. 
   
 Prop. Xlv.  Hatred Can Never Be Good. 
     Proof.-When We Hate A Man,  We Endeavour To Destroy Him (Iii. 
 Xxxix.),  That Is (Iv. Xxxvii.),  We Endeavour To Do Something That 
 Is Bad.  Therefore,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     N.B.  Here,  And In What Follows,  I Mean By Hatred Only Hatred 
 Towards Men. 
     Corollary I.-Envy,  Derision,  Contempt,  Anger,  Revenge,  And 
 Other Emotions Attributable To Hatred,  Or Arising Therefrom,  Are 
 Bad ; This Is Evident From Iii. Xxxix. And Iv. Xxxvii. 
     Corollary Ii.-Whatsoever We Desire From Motives Of Hatred Is 
 Base,  And In A State Unjust.  This Also Is Evident From Iii. 
 Xxxix.,  And From The Definitions Of Baseness And Injustice In Iv. 
 Xxxvii. Note. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 136 
     Note.-Between Derision (Which I Have In Coroll. I. Stated To 
 Be Bad) And Laughter I Recognize A Great Difference.  For 
 Laughter,  As Also Jocularity,  Is Merely Pleasure ; Therefore,  So 
 Long As It Be Not Excessive,  It Is In Itself Good (Iv. Xli.). 
 Assuredly Nothing Forbids Man To Enjoy Himself,  Save Grim And 
 Gloomy Superstition.  For Why Is It More Lawful To Satiate One's 
 Hunger And Thirst Than To Drive Away One's Melancholy? I Reason, 
 And Have Convinced Myself As Follows : No Deity,  Nor Anyone Else, 
 Save The Envious,  Takes Pleasure In My Infirmity And Discomfort, 
 Nor Sets Down To My Virtue The Tears,  Sobs,  Fear,  And The Like, 
 Which Axe Signs Of Infirmity Of Spirit ; On The Contrary,  The 
 Greater The Pleasure Wherewith We Are Affected,  The Greater The 
 Perfection Whereto We Pass ; In Other Words,  The More Must We 
 Necessarily Partake Of The Divine Nature.  Therefore,  To Make Use 
 Of What Comes In Our Way,  And To Enjoy It As Much As Possible 
 (Not To The Point Of Satiety,  For That Would Not Be Enjoyment) Is 
 The Part Of A Wise Man.  I Say It Is The Part Of A Wise Man To 
 Refresh And Recreate Himself With Moderate And Pleasant Food And 
 Drink,  And Also With Perfumes,  With The Soft Beauty Of Growing 
 Plants,  With Dress,  With Music,  With Many Sports,  With Theatres, 
 And The Like,  Such As Every Man May Make Use Of Without Injury To 
 His Neighbour.  For The Human Body Is Composed Of Very Numerous 
 Parts,  Of Diverse Nature,  Which Continually Stand In Need Of 
 Fresh And Varied Nourishment,  So That The Whole Body May Be 
 Equally Capable Of Performing All The Actions,  Which Follow From 
 The Necessity Of Its Own Nature ; And,  Consequently,  So That The 
 Mind May Also Be Equally Capable Of Understanding Many Things 
 Simultaneously.  This Way Of Life,  Then,  Agrees Best With Our 
 Principles,  And Also With General Practice ; Therefore,  If There 
 Be Any Question Of Another Plan,  The Plan We Have Mentioned Is 
 The Best,  And In Every Way To Be Commended.  There Is No Need For 
 Me To Set Forth The Matter More Clearly Or In More Detail. 
   
 Prop. Xlvi.  He,  Who Lives Under The Guidance Of Reason, 
 Endeavours,  As Far As Possible,  To Render Back Love,  Or Kindness, 
 For Other Men's Hatred,  Anger,  Contempt,  &C.,  Towards Him. 
     Proof.-All Emotions Of Hatred Are Bad (Iv. Xlv. Coroll. I.) ; 
 Therefore He Who Lives Under The Guidance Of Reason Will 
 Endeavour,  As Far As Possible,  To Avoid Being Assailed By Such 
 Emotions (Iv. Xix.) ; Consequently,  He Will Also Endeavour To 
 Prevent Others Being So Assailed (Iv. Xxxvii.).  But Hatred Is 
 Increased By Being Reciprocated,  And Can Be Quenched By Love 
 (Iii. Xliii.),  So That Hatred May Pass Into Love (Iii. Xliv.) ; 
 Therefore He Who Lives Under The Guidance Of Reason Will 
 Endeavour To Repay Hatred With Love,  That Is,  With Kindness. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-He Who Chooses To Avenge Wrongs With Hatred Is 
 Assuredly Wretched.  But He,  Who Strives To Conquer Hatred With 
 Love,  Fights His Battle In Joy And Confidence ; He Withstands 
 Many As Easily As One,  And Has Very Little Need Of Fortune's Aid. 
 Those Whom He Vanquishes Yield Joyfully,  Not Through Failure,  But 
 Through Increase In Their Powers ; All These Consequences Follow 
 So Plainly From The Mere Definitions Of Love And Understanding, 
 That I Have No Need To Prove Them In Detail. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 137 
   
 Prop. Xlvii.  Emotions Of Hope And Fear Cannot Be In Themselves 
 Good. 
     Proof.-Emotions Of Hope And Fear Cannot Exist Without Pain. 
 For Fear Is Pain (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xiii.),  And Hope (Def. Of 
 The Emotions,  Explanation Xii. And Xiii.) Cannot Exist Without 
 Fear ; Therefore (Iv. Xli.) These Emotions Cannot Be Good In 
 Themselves,  But Only In So Far As They Can Restrain Excessive 
 Pleasure (Iv. Xliii.).  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-We May Add,  That These Emotions Show Defective 
 Knowledge And An Absence Of Power In The Mind ; For The Same 
 Reason Confidence,  Despair,  Joy,  And Disappointment Are Signs Of 
 A Want Of Mental Power.  For Although Confidence And Joy Are 
 Pleasurable Emotions,  They Nevertheless Imply A Preceding Pain, 
 Namely,  Hope And Fear.  Wherefore The More We Endeavour To Be 
 Guided By Reason,  The Less Do We Depend On Hope ; We Endeavour To 
 Free Ourselves From Fear,  And,  As Far As We Can,  To Dominate 
 Fortune,  Directing Our Actions By The Sure Counsels Of Wisdom. 
   
 Prop. Xlviii.  The Emotions Of Over-Esteem And Disparagement Are 
 Always Bad. 
     Proof.-These Emotions (See Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxi. Xxii.) 
 Are Repugnant To Reason ; And Are Therefore (Iv. Xxvi. Xxvii.) 
 Bad.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xlix.  Over-Esteem Is Apt To Render Its Object Proud. 
     Proof.-If We See That Any One Rates Us Too Highly,  For Love's 
 Sake,  We Are Apt To Become Elated (Iii. Xli.),  Or To Be 
 Pleasurably Affected (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxx.) ; The Good 
 Which We Hear Of Ourselves We Readily Believe (Iii. Xxv.) ; And 
 Therefore,  For Love's Sake,  Rate Ourselves Too Highly ; In Other 
 Words,  We Are Apt To Become Proud.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. L.  Pity,  In A Man Who Lives Under The Guidance Of Reason, 
 Is In Itself Bad And Useless. 
     Proof.-Pity (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xviii.) Is A Pain,  And 
 Therefore (Iv. Xli.) Is In Itself Bad.  The Good Effect Which 
 Follows,  Namely,  Our Endeavour To Free The Object Of Our Pity 
 From Misery,  Is An Action Which We Desire To Do Solely At The 
 Dictation Of Reason (Iv. Xxxvii.) ; Only At The Dictation Of 
 Reason Are We Able To Perform Any Action,  Which We Know For 
 Certain To Be Good (Iv. Xxvii.) ; Thus,  In A Man Who Lives Under 
 The Guidance Of Reason,  Pity In Itself Is Useless And Bad. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-He Who Rightly Realizes,  That All Things Follow From 
 The Necessity Of The Divine Nature,  And Come To Pass In 
 Accordance With The Eternal Laws And Rules Of Nature,  Will Not 
 Find Anything Worthy Of Hatred,  Derision,  Or Contempt,  Nor Will 
 He Bestow Pity On Anything,  But To The Utmost Extent Of Human 
 Virtue He Will Endeavour To Do Well,  As The Saying Is,  And To 
 Rejoice.  We May Add,  That He,  Who Is Easily Touched With 
 Compassion,  And Is Moved By Another's Sorrow Or Tears,  Often Does 
 Something Which He Afterwards Regrets ; Partly Because We Can 
 Never Be Sure That An Action Caused By Emotion Is Good,  Partly 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 138 
 Because We Are Easily Deceived By False Tears.  I Am In This 
 Place Expressly Speaking Of A Man Living Under The Guidance Of 
 Reason.  He Who Is Moved To Help Others Neither By Reason Nor By 
 Compassion,  Is Rightly Styled Inhuman,  For (Iii. Xxvii.) He Seems 
 Unlike A Man. 
   
 Prop. Li.  Approval Is Not Repugnant To Reason,  But Can Agree 
 Therewith And Arise Therefrom. 
     Proof.-Approval Is Love Towards One Who Has Done Good To 
 Another (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xix.) ; Therefore It May Be 
 Referred To The Mind,  In So Far As The Latter Is Active (Iii. 
 Lix.),  That Is (Iii. Iii.),  In So Far As It Understands ; 
 Therefore,  It Is In Agreement With Reason,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Another Proof.-He,  Who Lives Under The Guidance Of Reason, 
 Desires For Others The Good Which He Seeks For Himself (Iv. 
 Xxxvii.) ; Wherefore From Seeing Someone Doing Good To His Fellow 
 His Own Endeavour To Do Good Is Aided ; In Other Words,  He Will 
 Feel Pleasure (Iii. Xi. Note) Accompanied By The Idea Of The 
 Benefactor.  Therefore He Approves Of Him.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Indignation As We Defined It (Def. Of The Emotions, 
 Xx.) Is Necessarily Evil (Iv. Xlv.) ; We May,  However,  Remark 
 That,  When The Sovereign Power For The Sake Of Preserving Peace 
 Punishes A Citizen Who Has Injured Another,  It Should Not Be Said 
 To Be Indignant With The Criminal,  For It Is Not Incited By 
 Hatred To Ruin Him,  It Is Led By A Sense Of Duty To Punish Him. 
   
 Prop. Lii.  Self-Approval May Arise From Reason,  And That Which 
 Arises From Reason Is The Highest Possible. 
     Proof.-Self-Approval Is Pleasure Arising From A Man's 
 Contemplation Of Himself And His Own Power Of Action (Def. Of The 
 Emotions,  Xxv.).  But A Man's True Power Of Action Or Virtue Is 
 Reason Herself (Iii. Iii.),  As The Said Man Clearly And 
 Distinctly Contemplates Her (Ii. Xl. Xliii.) ; Therefore 
 Self-Approval Arises From Reason.  Again,  When A Man Is 
 Contemplating Himself,  He Only Perceived Clearly And Distinctly 
 Or Adequately,  Such Things As Follow From His Power Of Action 
 (Iii. Def. Ii.),  That Is (Iii. Iii.),  From His Power Of 
 Understanding ; Therefore In Such Contemplation Alone Does The 
 Highest Possible Self-Approval Arise.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Self-Approval Is In Reality The Highest Object For 
 Which We Can Hope.  For (As We Showed In Iv. Xxv.) No One 
 Endeavours To Preserve His Being For The Sake Of Any Ulterior 
 Object,  And,  As This Approval Is More And More Fostered And 
 Strengthened By Praise (Iii. Liii. Coroll.),  And On The Contrary 
 (Iii. Lv. Coroll.) Is More And More Disturbed By Blame,  Fame 
 Becomes The Most Powerful Of Incitements To Action,  And Life 
 Under Disgrace Is Almost Unendurable. 
   
 Prop. Liii.  Humility Is Not A Virtue,  Or Does Not Arise From 
 Reason. 
     Proof.-Humility Is Pain Arising From A Man's Contemplation Of 
 His Own Infirmities (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxvi.).  But,  In So 
 Far As A Man Knows Himself By True Reason,  He Is Assumed To 
 Understand His Essence,  That Is,  His Power (Iii. Vii.).  
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 139 
 Wherefore,  If A Man In Self-Contemplation Perceives Any Infirmity 
 In Himself,  It Is Not By Virtue Of His Understanding Himself,  But 
 (Iii. Lv.) By Virtue Of His Power Of Activity Being Checked. 
 But,  If We Assume That A Man Perceives His Own Infirmity By 
 Virtue Of Understanding Something Stronger Than Himself,  By The 
 Knowledge Of Which He Determines His Own Power Of Activity,  This 
 Is The Same As Saying That We Conceive That A Man Understands 
 Himself Distinctly (Iv. Xxvi.),  Because14 His Power Of Activity 
 Is Aided.  Wherefore Humility,  Or The Pain Which Arises From A 
 Man's Contemplation Of His Own Infirmity,  Does Not Arise From The 
 Contemplation Or Reason,  And Is Not A Virtue But A Passion. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Liv.  Repentance Is Not A Virtue,  Or Does Not Arise From 
 Reason  ; But He Who Repents Of An Action Is Doubly Wretched Or 
 Infirm. 
     Proof.-The First Part Of This Proposition Is Proved Like The 
 Foregoing One.  The Second Part Is Proved From The Mere 
 Definition Of The Emotion In Question (Def. Of The Emotions, 
 Xxvii.).  For The Man Allows Himself To Be Overcome,  First,  By 
 Evil Desires ; Secondly,  By Pain. 
     Note.-As Men Seldom Live Under The Guidance Of Reason,  These 
 Two Emotions,  Namely,  Humility And Repentance,  As Also Hope And 
 Fear,  Bring More Good Than Harm ; Hence,  As We Must Sin,  We Had 
 Better Sin In That Direction.  For,  If All Men Who Are A Prey To 
 Emotion Were All Equally Proud,  They Would Shrink From Nothing, 
 And Would Fear Nothing ; How Then Could They Be Joined And Linked 
 Together In Bonds Of Union?  The Crowd Plays The Tyrant,  When It 
 Is Not In Fear ; Hence We Need Not Wonder That The Prophets,  Who 
 Consulted The Good,  Not Of A Few,  But Of All,  So Strenuously 
 Commended Humility,  Repentance,  And Reverence.  Indeed Those Who 
 Are A Prey To These Emotions May Be Led Much More Easily Than 
 Others To Live Under The Guidance Of Reason,  That Is,  To Become 
 Free And To Enjoy The Life Of The Blessed. 
   
 Prop. Lv.  Extreme Pride Or Dejection Indicates Extreme Ignorance 
 Of Self. 
     Proof.-This Is Evident From Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxviii. And 
 Xxix. 
   
 Prop. Lvi.  Extreme Pride Or Dejection Indicates Extreme 
 Infirmity Of Spirit. 
     Proof.-The First Foundation Of Virtue Is Self-Preservation 
 (Iv. Xxii. Coroll.) Under The Guidance Of Reason (Iv. Xxiv.). 
 He,  Therefore,  Who Is Ignorant Of Himself,  Is Ignorant Of The 
 Foundation Of All Virtues,  And Consequently Of All Virtues. 
 Again,  To Act Virtuously Is Merely To Act Under The Guidance Of 
 Reason (Iv. Xxiv.) : Now He,  That Acts Under The Guidance Of 
 Reason,  Must Necessarily Know That He So Acts (Ii. Xliii.). 
 Therefore He Who Is In Extreme Ignorance Of Himself,  And 
 Consequently Of All Virtues,  Acts Least In Obedience To Virtue ; 
 In Other Words (Iv. Def. Viii.),  Is Most Infirm Of Spirit.  Thus 
 Extreme Pride Or Dejection Indicates Extreme Infirmity Of Spirit. 
 Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 140 
     Corollary.-Hence It Most Clearly Follows,  That The Proud And 
 The Dejected Specially Fall A Prey To The Emotions. 
     Note.-Yet Dejection Can Be More Easily Corrected Than Pride ; 
 For The Latter Being A Pleasurable Emotion,  And The Former A 
 Painful Emotion,  The Pleasurable Is Stronger Than The Painful 
 (Iv. Xviii.). 
   
 Prop. Lvii.  The Proud Man Delights In The Company Of Flatterers 
 And Parasites,  But Hates The Company Of The High-Minded. 
     Proof.-Pride Is Pleasure Arising From A Man's Over Estimation 
 Of Himself (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxviii. And Vi.) ; This 
 Estimation The Proud Man Will Endeavour To Foster By All The 
 Means In His Power (Iii. Xiii. Note) ; He Will Therefore Delight 
 In The Company Of Flatterers And Parasites (Whose Character Is 
 Too Well Known To Need Definition Here),  And Will Avoid The 
 Company Of High-Minded Men,  Who Value Him According To His 
 Deserts.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-It Would Be Too Long A Task To Enumerate Here All The 
 Evil Results Of Pride,  Inasmuch As The Proud Are A Prey To All 
 The Emotions,  Though To None Of Them Less Than To Love And Pity. 
 I Cannot,  However,  Pass Over In Silence The Fact,  That A Man May 
 Be Called Proud From His Underestimation Of Other People ; And, 
 Therefore,  Pride In This Sense May Be Defined As Pleasure Arising 
 From The False Opinion,  Whereby A Man May Consider Himself 
 Superior To His Fellows.  The Dejection,  Which Is The Opposite 
 Quality To This Sort Of Pride,  May Be Defined As Pain Arising 
 From The False Opinion,  Whereby A Man May Think Himself Inferior 
 To His Fellows.  Such Being The Ease,  We Can Easily See That A 
 Proud Man Is Necessarily Envious (Iii. Xli. Note),  And Only Takes 
 Pleasure In The Company,  Who Fool His Weak Mind To The Top Of His 
 Bent,  And Make Him Insane Instead Of Merely Foolish. 
     Though Dejection Is The Emotion Contrary To Pride,  Yet Is The 
 Dejected Man Very Near Akin To The Proud Man.  For,  Inasmuch As 
 His Pain Arises From A Comparison Between His Own Infirmity And 
 Other Men's Power Or Virtue,  It Will Be Removed,  Or,  In Other 
 Words,  He Will Feel Pleasure,  If His Imagination Be Occupied In 
 Contemplating Other Men's Faults ; Whence Arises The Proverb, 
 "The Unhappy Are Comforted By Finding Fellow-Sufferers." 
 Contrariwise,  He Will Be The More Pained In Proportion As He 
 Thinks Himself Inferior To Others ; Hence None Are So Prone To 
 Envy As The Dejected,  They Are Specially Keen In Observing Men's 
 Actions,  With A View To Fault-Finding Rather Than Correction,  In 
 Order To Reserve Their Praises For Dejection,  And To Glory 
 Therein,  Though All The Time With A Dejected Air.  These Effects 
 Follow As Necessarily From The Said Emotion,  As It Follows From 
 The Nature Of A Triangle,  That The Three Angles Are Equal To Two 
 Right Angles.  I Have Already Said That I Call These And Similar 
 Emotions Bad,  Solely In Respect To What Is Useful To Man.  The 
 Laws Of Nature Have Regard To Nature's General Order,  Whereof Man 
 Is But A Part.  I Mention This,  In Passing,  Lest Any Should Think 
 That I Have Wished To Set Forth The Faults And Irrational Deeds 
 Of Men Rather Than The Nature And Properties Of Things.  For,  As 
 I Said In The Preface To The Third Part,  I Regard Human Emotions 
 And Their Properties As On The Same Footing With Other Natural 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 141 
 Phenomena.  Assuredly Human Emotions Indicate The Power And 
 Ingenuity,  Of Nature,  If Not Of Human Nature,  Quite As Fully As 
 Other Things Which We Admire,  And Which We Delight To 
 Contemplate.  But I Pass On To Note Those Qualities In The 
 Emotions,  Which Bring Advantage To Man,  Or Inflict Injury Upon 
 Him. 
   
 Prop. Lviii.  Honour (Gloria) Is Not Repugnant To Reason,  But May 
 Arise Therefrom. 
     Proof.-This Is Evident From Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxx.,  And 
 Also From The Definition Of An Honourable Man (Iv. Xxxvii. Note. 
 I.). 
     Note-Empty Honour,  As It Is Styled,  Is Self- Approval, 
 Fostered Only By The Good Opinion Of The Populace ; When This 
 Good Opinion Ceases There Ceases Also The Self-Approval,  In Other 
 Words,  The Highest Object Of Each Man's Love (Iv. Lii. Note) ; 
 Consequently,  He Whose Honour Is Rooted In Popular Approval Must, 
 Day By Day,  Anxiously Strive,  Act,  And Scheme In Order To Retain 
 His Reputation.  For The Populace Is Variable And Inconstant,  So 
 That,  If A Reputation Be Not Kept Up,  It Quickly Withers Away. 
 Everyone Wishes To Catch Popular Applause For Himself,  And 
 Readily Represses The Fame Of Others.  The Object Of The Strife 
 Being Estimated As The Greatest Of All Goods,  Each Combatant Is 
 Seized With A Fierce Desire To Put Down His Rivals In Every 
 Possible Way,  Till He Who At Last Comes Out Victorious Is More 
 Proud Of Having Done Harm To Others Than Of Having Done Good To 
 Himself.  This Sort Of Honour,  Then,  Is Really Empty,  Being 
 Nothing. 
     The Points To Note Concerning Shame May Easily Be Inferred 
 From What Was Said On The Subject Of Mercy And Repentance.  I 
 Will Only Add That Shame,  Like Compassion,  Though Not A Virtue, 
 Is Yet Good,  In So Far As It Shows,  That The Feeler Of Shame Is 
 Really Imbued With The Desire To Live Honourably ; In The Same 
 Way As Suffering Is Good,  As Showing That The Injured Part Is Not 
 Mortified.  Therefore,  Though A Man Who Feels Shame Is Sorrowful, 
 He Is Yet More Perfect Than He,  Who Is Shameless,  And Has No 
 Desire To Live Honourably. 
     Such Are The Points Which I Undertook To Remark Upon 
 Concerning The Emotions Of Pleasure And Pain ; As For The 
 Desires,  They Are Good Or Bad According As They Spring From Good 
 Or Evil Emotions.  But All,  In So Far As They Are Engendered In 
 Us By Emotions Wherein The Mind Is Passive,  Are Blind (As Is 
 Evident From What Was Said In Iv. Xliv. Note),  And Would Be 
 Useless,  If Men Could Easily,  Be Induced To Live By The Guidance 
 Of Reason Only,  As I Will Now Briefly,  Show. 
   
 Prop. Lix.  To All The Actions,  Whereto We Are Determined By 
 Emotion Wherein The Mind Is Passive ; We Can Be Determined 
 Without Emotion By Reason. 
     Proof.-To Act Rationally,  Is Nothing Else (Iii. Iii. And Def. 
 Ii.) But To Perform Those Actions,  Which Follow From The 
 Necessity,  Of Our Nature Considered In Itself Alone.  But Pain Is 
 Bad,  In So Far As It Diminishes Or Checks The Power Of Action 
 (Iv. Xli.) ; Wherefore We Cannot By Pain Be Determined To Any 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 142 
 Action,  Which We Should Be Unable To Perform Under The Guidance 
 Of Reason.  Again,  Pleasure Is Bad Only In So Far As It Hinders A 
 Man's Capability For Action (Iv. Xli. Xliii.) ; Therefore To This 
 Extent We Could Not Be Determined By It To Any Action,  Which We 
 Could Not Perform Under The Guidance Of Reason.  Lastly, 
 Pleasure,  In So Far As It Is Good,  Is In Harmony With Reason (For 
 It Consists In The Fact That A Man's Capability For Action Is 
 Increased Or Aided) ; Nor Is The Mind Passive Therein,  Except In 
 So Far As A Man's Power Of Action Is Not Increased To The Extent 
 Of Affording Him An Adequate Conception Of Himself And His 
 Actions (Iii. Iii.,  And Note). 
     Wherefore,  If A Man Who Is Pleasurably Affected Be Brought To 
 Such A State Of Perfection,  That He Gains An Adequate Conception 
 Of Himself And His Own Actions,  He Will Be Equally,  Nay More, 
 Capable Of Those Actions,  To Which He Is Determined By Emotion 
 Wherein The Mind Is Passive.  But All Emotions Are Attributable 
 To Pleasure,  To Pain,  Or To Desire (Def. Of The Emotions,  Iv. 
 Explanation) ; And Desire (Def. Of The Emotions,  I.) Is Nothing 
 Else But The Attempt To Act ; Therefore,  To All Actions,  &C. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Another Proof.-A Given Action Is Called Bad,  In So Far As It 
 Arises From One Being Affected By Hatred Or Any Evil Emotion. 
 But No Action,  Considered In Itself Alone,  Is Either Good Or Bad 
 (As We Pointed Out In The Preface To Pt. Iv.),  One And The Same 
 Action Being Sometimes Good,  Sometimes Bad ; Wherefore To The 
 Action Which Is Sometimes Bad,  Or Arises From Some Evil Emotion, 
 We May Be Led By Reason (Iv. Xix.).  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-An Example Will Put This Point In A Clearer Light.  The 
 Action Of Striking,  In So Far As It Is Considered Physically,  And 
 In So Far As We Merely Look To The Fact That A Man Raises His 
 Arm,  Clenches His Fist,  And Moves His Whole Arm Violently 
 Downwards,  Is A Virtue Or Excellence Which Is Conceived As Proper 
 To The Structure Of The Human Body.  If,  Then,  A Man,  Moved By 
 Anger Or Hatred,  Is Led To Clench His Fist Or To Move His Arm, 
 This Result Takes Place (As We Showed In Pt. Ii.),  Because One 
 And The Same Action Can Be Associated With Various Mental Images 
 Of Things ; Therefore We May Be Determined To The Performance Of 
 One And The Same Action By Confused Ideas,  Or By Clear And 
 Distinct Ideas.  Hence It Is Evident That Every Desire Which 
 Springs From Emotion,  Wherein The Mind Is Passive,  Would Become 
 Useless,  If Men Could Be Guided By Reason.  Let Us Now See Why 
 Desire Which Arises From Emotion,  Wherein The Mind Is Passive,  Is 
 Called By Us Blind. 
   
 Prop. Lx.  Desire Arising From A Pleasure Or Pain,  That Is Not 
 Attributable To The Whole Body,  But Only To One Or Certain Parts 
 Thereof,  Is Without Utility In Respect To A Man As A Whole. 
     Proof.-Let It Be Assumed,  For Instance,  That A,  A Part Of A 
 Body,  Is So Strengthened By Some External Cause,  That It Prevails 
 Over The Remaining Parts (Iv. Vi.).  This Part Will Not Endeavour 
 To Do Away With Its Own Powers,  In Order That The Other Parts Of 
 The Body May Perform Its Office ; For This It Would Be Necessary 
 For It To Have A Force Or Power Of Doing Away With Its Own 
 Powers,  Which (Iii. Vi.) Is Absurd.  The Said Part,  And, 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 143 
 Consequently,  The Mind Also,  Will Endeavour To Preserve Its 
 Condition.  Wherefore Desire Arising From A Pleasure Of The Kind 
 Aforesaid Has No Utility In Reference To A Man As A Whole.  If It 
 Be Assumed,  On The Other Hand,  That The Part,  A,  Be Checked So 
 That The Remaining Parts Prevail,  It May Be Proved In The Same 
 Manner That Desire Arising From Pain Has No Utility In Respect To 
 A Man As A Whole.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-As Pleasure Is Generally (Iv. Xliv. Note) Attributed To 
 One Part Of The Body,  We Generally Desire To Preserve Our Being 
 With Out Taking Into Consideration Our Health As A Whole : To 
 Which It May Be Added,  That The Desires Which Have Most Hold Over 
 Us (Iv. Ix.) Take Account Of The Present And Not Of The Future. 
   
 Prop. Lxi.  Desire Which Springs From Reason Cannot Be Excessive. 
     Proof.-Desire (Def. Of The Emotions,  I.) Considered 
 Absolutely Is The Actual Essence Of Man,  In So Far As It Is 
 Conceived As In Any Way Determined To A Particular Activity By 
 Some Given Modification Of Itself.  Hence Desire,  Which Arises 
 From Reason,  That Is (Iii. Iii.),  Which Is Engendered In Us In So 
 Far As We Act,  Is The Actual Essence Or Nature Of Man,  In So Far 
 As It Is Conceived As Determined To Such Activities As Are 
 Adequately Conceived Through Man's Essence Only (Iii. Def. Ii.). 
 Now,  If Such Desire Could Be Excessive,  Human Nature Considered 
 In Itself Alone Would Be Able To Exceed Itself,  Or Would Be Able 
 To Do More Than It Can,  A Manifest Contradiction.  Therefore, 
 Such Desire Cannot Be Excessive.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Lxii.  In So Far As The Mind Conceives A Thing Under The 
 Dictates Of Reason,  It Is Affected Equally,  Whether The Idea Be 
 Of A Thing Future,  Past,  Or Present. 
     Proof.-Whatsoever The Mind Conceives Under The Guidance Of 
 Reason,  It Conceives Under The Form Of Eternity Or Necessity (Ii. 
 Xliv. Coroll. Ii.),  And Is Therefore Affected With The Same 
 Certitude (Ii. Xliii. And Note).  Wherefore,  Whether The Thing Be 
 Present,  Past,  Or Future,  The Mind Conceives It Under The Same 
 Necessity And Is Affected With The Same Certitude ; And Whether 
 The Idea Be Of Something Present,  Past,  Or Future,  It Will In All 
 Cases Be Equally True (Ii. Xli.) ; That Is,  It Will Always 
 Possess The Same Properties Of An Adequate Idea (Ii. Def. Iv.) ; 
 Therefore,  In So Far As The Mind Conceives Things Under The 
 Dictates Of Reason,  It Is Affected In The Same Manner,  Whether 
 The Idea Be Of A Thing Future,  Past,  Or Present.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-If We Could Possess An Adequate Knowledge Of The 
 Duration Of Things,  And Could Determine By Reason Their Periods 
 Of Existence,  We Should Contemplate Things Future With The Same 
 Emotion As Things Present ; And The Mind Would Desire As Though 
 It Were Present The Good Which It Conceived As Future ; 
 Consequently It Would Necessarily Neglect A Lesser Good In The 
 Present For The Sake Of A Greater Good In The Future,  And Would 
 In No Wise Desire That Which Is Good In The Present But A Source 
 Of Evil In The Future,  As We Shall Presently Show.  However,  We 
 Can Have But A Very Inadequate Knowledge Of The Duration Of 
 Things (Ii. Xxxi.) ; And The Periods Of Their Existence (Ii. 
 Xliv. Note.) We Can Only Determine By Imagination,  Which Is Not 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 144 
   
 So Powerfully Affected By The Future As By The Present.  Hence 
 Such True Knowledge Of Good And Evil As We Possess Is Merely 
 Abstract Or General,  And The Judgment Which We Pass On The Order 
 Of Things And The Connection Of Causes,  With A View To 
 Determining What Is Good Or Bad For Us In The Present,  Is Rather 
 Imaginary Than Real.  Therefore It Is Nothing Wonderful,  If The 
 Desire Arising From Such Knowledge Of Good And Evil,  In So Far As 
 It Looks On Into The Future,  Be More Readily Checked Than The 
 Desire Of Things Which Are Agreeable At The Present Time.  (Cf. 
 Iv. Xvi.) 
   
 Prop. Lxiii.  He Who Is Led By Fear,  And Does Good In Order To 
 Escape Evil,  Is Not Led By Reason. 
     Proof.-All The Emotions Which Are Attributable To The Mind As 
 Active,  Or In Other Words To Reason,  Are Emotions Of Pleasure And 
 Desire (Iii. Lix.) ; Therefore,  He Who Is Led By Fear,  And Does 
 Good In Order To Escape Evil,  Is Not Led By Reason. 
     Note.-Superstitions Persons,  Who Know Better How To Rail At 
 Vice Than How To Teach Virtue,  And Who Strive Not To Guide Men By 
 Reason,  But So To Restrain Them That They Would Rather Escape 
 Evil Than Love Virtue,  Have No Other Aim But To Make Others As 
 Wretched As Themselves ; Wherefore It Is Nothing Wonderful,  If 
 They Be Generally Troublesome And Odious To Their Fellow-Men. 
     Corollary.-Under Desire Which Springs From Reason,  We Seek 
 Good Directly,  And Shun Evil Indirectly. 
     Proof.-Desire Which Springs From Reason Can Only Spring From 
 A Pleasurable Emotion,  Wherein The Mind Is Not Passive (Iii. 
 Lix.),  In Other Words,  From A Pleasure Which Cannot Be Excessive 
 (Iv. Lxi.),  And Not From Pain ; Wherefore This Desire Springs 
 From The Knowledge Of Good,  Not Of Evil (Iv. Viii.) ; Hence Under 
 The Guidance Of Reason We Seek Good Directly And Only By 
 Implication Shun Evil.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Corollary May Be Illustrated By The Example Of A 
 Sick And A Healthy Man.  The Sick Man Through Fear Of Death Eats 
 What He Naturally Shrinks From,  But The Healthy Man Takes 
 Pleasure In His Food,  And Thus Gets A Better Enjoyment Out Of 
 Life,  Than If He Were In Fear Of Death,  And Desired Directly To 
 Avoid It.  So A Judge,  Who Condemns A Criminal To Death,  Not From 
 Hatred Or Anger But From Love Of The Public Well-Being,  Is Guided 
 Solely By Reason. 
   
 Prop. Lxiv.  The Knowledge Of Evil Is An Inadequate Knowledge. 
     Proof.-The Knowledge Of Evil (Iv. Viii.) Is Pain,  In So Far 
 As We Are Conscious Thereof.  Now Pain Is The Transition To A 
 Lesser Perfection (Def. Of The Emotions,  Iii.) And Therefore 
 Cannot Be Understood Through Man's Nature (Iii. Vi.,  And Vii.) ; 
 Therefore It Is A Passive State (Iii. Def. Ii.) Which (Iii. Iii.) 
 Depends On Inadequate Ideas ; Consequently The Knowledge Thereof 
 (Ii. Xxix.),  Namely,  The Knowledge Of Evil,  Is Inadequate. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That,  If The Human Mind Possessed 
 Only Adequate Ideas,  It Would Form No Conception Of Evil. 
   
 Prop. Lxv.  Under The Guidance Of Reason We Should Pursue The 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 145 
 Greater Of Two Goods And The Lesser Of Two Evils. 
     Proof.-A Good Which Prevents Our Enjoyment Of A Greater Good 
 Is In Reality An Evil ; For We Apply The Terms Good And Bad To 
 Things,  In So Far As We Compare Them One With Another (See 
 Preface To This Part) ; Therefore,  Evil Is In Reality A Lesser 
 Good ; Hence Under The Guidance Of Reason We Seek Or Pursue Only 
 The Greater Good And The Lesser Evil.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-We May,  Under The Guidance Of Reason,  Pursue The 
 Lesser Evil As Though It Were The Greater Good,  And We May Shun 
 The Lesser Good,  Which Would Be The Cause Of The Greater Evil. 
 For The Evil,  Which Is Here Called The Lesser,  Is Really Good, 
 And The Lesser Good Is Really Evil,  Wherefore We May Seek The 
 Former And Shun The Latter.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Lxvi.  We May,  Under The Guidance Of Reason,  Seek A Greater 
 Good In The Future In Preference To A Lesser Good In The Present, 
 And We May Seek A Lesser Evil In The Present In Preference To A 
 Greater Evil In The Future.15 
     Proof.-If The Mind Could Have An Adequate Knowledge Of Things 
 Future,  It Would Be Affected Towards What Is Future In The Same 
 Way As Towards What Is Present (Iv. Lxii.) ; Wherefore,  Looking 
 Merely To Reason,  As In This Proposition We Are Assumed To Do, 
 There Is No Difference,  Whether The Greater Good Or Evil Be 
 Assumed As Present,  Or Assumed As Future ; Hence (Iv. Lxv.) We 
 May Seek A Greater Good In The Future In Preference To A Lesser 
 Good In The Present,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-We May,  Under The Guidance Of Reason,  Seek A 
 Lesser Evil In The Present,  Because It Is The Cause Of A Greater 
 Good In The Future,  And We May Shun A Lesser Good In The Present, 
 Because It Is The Cause Of A Greater Evil In The Future.  This 
 Corollary Is Related To The Foregoing Proposition As The 
 Corollary To Iv. Lxv. Is Related To The Said Iv. Lxv. 
     Note.-If These Statements Be Compared With What We Have 
 Pointed Out Concerning The Strength Of The Emotions In This Part 
 Up To Prop. Xviii.,  We Shall Readily See The Difference Between A 
 Man,  Who Is Led Solely By Emotion Or Opinion,  And A Man,  Who Is 
 Led By Reason.  The Former,  Whether Will Or No,  Performs Actions 
 Whereof He Is Utterly Ignorant ; The Latter Is His Own Master And 
 Only Performs Such Actions,  As He Knows Are Of Primary Importance 
 In Life,  And Therefore Chiefly Desires ; Wherefore I Call The 
 Former A Slave,  And The Latter A Free Man,  Concerning Whose 
 Disposition And Manner Of Life It Will Be Well To Make A Few 
 Observations. 
   
 Prop. Lxvii.  A Free Man Thinks Of Death Least Of All Things ; 
 And His Wisdom Is A Meditation Not Of Death But Of Life. 
     Proof.-A Free Man Is One Who Lives Under The Guidance Of 
 Reason,  Who Is Not Led By Fear (Iv. Lxiii.),  But Who Directly 
 Desires That Which Is Good (Iv. Lxiii. Coroll.),  In Other Words 
 (Iv. Xxiv.),  Who Strives To Act,  To Live,  And To Preserve His 
 Being On The Basis Of Seeking His Own True Advantage ; Wherefore 
 Such An One Thinks Of Nothing Less Than Of Death,  But His Wisdom 
 Is A Meditation Of Life.  Q.E.D. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 146 
 Prop. Lxviii.  If Men Were Born Free,  They Would,  So Long As They 
 Remained Free,  Form No Conception Of Good And Evil. 
     Proof.-I Call Free Him Who Is Led Solely By Reason ; He, 
 Therefore,  Who Is Born Free,  And Who Remains Free,  Has Only 
 Adequate Ideas ; Therefore (Iv. Lxiv. Coroll.) He Has No 
 Conception Of Evil,  Or Consequently (Good And Evil Being 
 Correlative) Of Good.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-It Is Evident,  From Iv. Iv.,  That The Hypothesis Of 
 This Proposition Is False And Inconceivable,  Except In So Far As 
 We Look Solely To The Nature Of Man,  Or Rather To God ; Not In So 
 Far As The Latter Is Infinite,  But Only In So Far As He Is The 
 Cause Of Man's Existence. 
     This,  And Other Matters Which We Have Already Proved,  Seem To 
 Have Been Signifieded By Moses In The History Of The First Man. 
 For In That Narrative No Other Power Of God Is Conceived,  Save 
 That Whereby He Created Man,  That Is The Power Wherewith He 
 Provided Solely For Man's Advantage ; It Is Stated That God 
 Forbade Man,  Being Free,  To Eat Of The Tree Of The Knowledge Of 
 Good And Evil,  And That,  As Soon As Man Should Have Eaten Of It, 
 He Would Straightway Fear Death Rather Than Desire To Live. 
 Further,  It Is Written That When Man Had Found A Wife,  Who Was In 
 Entire Harmony With His Nature,  He Knew That There Could Be 
 Nothing In Nature Which Could Be More Useful To Him ; But That 
 After He Believed The Beasts To Be Like Himself,  He Straightway 
 Began To Imitate Their Emotions (Iii. Xxvii.),  And To Lose His 
 Freedom ; This Freedom Was Afterwards Recovered By The 
 Patriarchs,  Led By The Spirit Of Christ ; That Is,  By The Idea Of 
 God,  Whereon Alone It Depends,  That Man May Be Free,  And Desire 
 For Others The Good Which He Desires For Himself,  As We Have 
 Shown Above (Iv. Xxxvii.). 
   
 Prop. Lxix.  The Virtue Of A Free Man Is Seen To Be As Great, 
 When It Declines Dangers,  As When It Overcomes Them. 
     Proof.-Emotion Can Only Be Checked Or Removed By An Emotion 
 Contrary To Itself,  And Possessing More Power In Restraining 
 Emotion (Iv. Vii.).  But Blind Daring And Fear Are Emotions, 
 Which Can Be Conceived As Equally Great (Iv. V. And Iii.) : 
 Hence,  No Less Virtue Or Firmness Is Required In Checking Daring 
 Than In Checking Fear (Iii. Lix. Note) ; In Other Words (Def. Of 
 The Emotions,  Xl. And Xli.),  The Free Man Shows As Much Virtue, 
 When He Declines Dangers,  As When He Strives To Overcome Them. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-The Free Man Is As Courageous In Timely Retreat As 
 In Combat ; Or,  A Free Man Shows Equal Courage Or Presence Of 
 Mind,  Whether He Elect To Give Battle Or To Retreat. 
     Note.-What Courage (Animositas) Is,  And What I Mean Thereby, 
 I Explained In Iii. Lix. Note.  By Danger I Mean Everything, 
 Which Can Give Rise To Any Evil,  Such As Pain,  Hatred,  Discord, 
 &C. 
   
 Prop. Lxx.  The Free Man,  Who Lives Among The Ignorant,  Strives, 
 As Far As He Can,  To Avoid Receiving Favours From Them. 
     Proof.-Everyone Judges What Is Good According To His 
 Disposition (Iii. Xxxix. Note) ; Wherefore An Ignorant Man,  Who 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 147 
 Has Conferred A Benefit On Another,  Puts His Own Estimate Upon 
 It,  And,  If It Appears To Be Estimated Less Highly By The 
 Receiver,  Will Feel Pain (Iii. Xlii.).  But The Free Man Only 
 Desires To Join Other Men To Him In Friendship (Iv. Xxxvii.),  Not 
 Repaying Their Benefits With Others Reckoned As Of Like Value, 
 But Guiding Himself And Others By The Free Decision Of Reason, 
 And Doing Only Such Things As He Knows To Be Of Primary 
 Importance.  Therefore The Free Man,  Lest Be Should Become 
 Hateful To The Ignorant,  Or Follow Their Desires Rather Than 
 Reason,  Will Endeavour,  As Far As He Can,  To Avoid Receiving 
 Their Favours. 
     Note.-I Say,  As Far As He Can.  For Though Men Be Ignorant, 
 Yet Are They Men,  And In Cases Of Necessity Could Afford Us Human 
 Aid,  The Most Excellent Of All Things : Therefore It Is Often 
 Necessary To Accept Favours From Them,  And Consequently To Repay 
 Such Favours In Kind ; We Must,  Therefore,  Exercise Caution In 
 Declining Favours,  Lest We Should Have The Appearance Of 
 Despising Those Who Bestow Them,  Or Of Being,  From Avaricious 
 Motives,  Unwilling To Requite Them,  And So Give Ground For 
 Offence By The Very Fact Of Striving To Avoid It.  Thus,  In 
 Declining Favours,  We Must Look To The Requirements Of Utility 
 And Courtesy. 
   
 Prop. Lxxi.  Only Free Men Are Thoroughly Grateful One To 
 Another. 
     Proof.-Only Free Men Are Thoroughly Useful One To Another, 
 And Associated Among Themselves By The Closest Necessity Of 
 Friendship (Iv. Xxxv.,  And Coroll. I.),  Only Such Men Endeavour, 
 With Mutual Zeal Of Love,  To Confer Benefits On Each Other (Iv. 
 Xxxvii.),  And,  Therefore,  Only They Are Thoroughly Grateful One 
 To Another.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-The Goodwill,  Which Men Who Are Led By Blind Desire 
 Have For One Another,  Is Generally A Bargaining Or Enticement, 
 Rather Than Pure Goodwill.  Moreover,  Ingratitude Is Not An 
 Emotion.  Yet It Is Base,  Inasmuch As It Generally Shows,  That A 
 Man Is Affected By Excessive Hatred,  Anger,  Pride,  Avarice,  &C. 
 He Who,  By Reason Of His Folly,  Knows Not How To Return Benefits, 
 Is Not Ungrateful,  Much Less He Who Is Not Gained Over By The 
 Gifts Of A Courtesan To Serve Her Lust,  Or By A Thief To Conceal 
 His Thefts,  Or By Any Similar Persons.  Contrariwise,  Such An One 
 Shows A Constant Mind,  Inasmuch As He Cannot By Any Gifts Be 
 Corrupted,  To His Own Or The General Hurt. 
   
 Prop. Lxxii.  The Free Man Never Acts Fraudulently,  But Always In 
 Good Faith. 
     Proof.-If It Be Asked : What Should A Man's Conduct Be In A 
 Case Where He Could By Breaking Faith Free Himself From The 
 Danger Of Present Death? Would Not His Plan Of Self-Preservation 
 Completely Persuade Him To Deceive? This May Be Answered By 
 Pointing Out That,  If Reason Persuaded Him To Act Thus,  It Would 
 Persuade All Men To Act In A Similar Manner,  In Which Case Reason 
 Would Persuade Men Not To Agree In Good Faith To Unite Their 
 Forces,  Or To Have Laws In Common,  That Is,  Not To Have Any 
 General Laws,  Which Is Absurd. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Propositions  Pg 148 
   
 Prop. Lxxiii.  The Man,  Who Is Guided By Reason,  Is More Free In 
 A State,  Where He Lives Under A General System Of Law,  Than In 
 Solitude,  Where He Is Independent. 
     Proof.-The Man,  Who Is Guided By Reason,  Does Not Obey 
 Through Fear (Iv. Lxiii.) : But,  In So Far As He Endeavours To 
 Preserve His Being According To The Dictates Of Reason,  That Is 
 (Iv. Lxvi. Note),  In So Far As He Endeavours To Live In Freedom, 
 He Desires To Order His Life According To The General Good (Iv. 
 Xxxvii.),  And,  Consequently (As We Showed In Iv. Xxxvii. Note. 
 Ii.),  To Live According To The Laws Of His Country.  Therefore 
 The Free Man,  In Order To Enjoy Greater Freedom,  Desires To 
 Possess The General Rights Of Citizenship.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-These And Similar Observations,  Which We Have Made On 
 Man's True Freedom,  May Be Referred To Strength,  That Is,  To 
 Courage And Nobility Of Character (Iii. Lix. Note).  I Do Not 
 Think It Worth While To Prove Separately All The Properties Of 
 Strength ; Much Less Need I Show,  That He That Is Strong Hates No 
 Man,  Is Angry With No Man,  Envies No Man,  Is Indignant With No 
 Man,  Despises No Man,  And Least Of All Things Is Proud.  These 
 Propositions,  And All That Relate To The True Way Of Life And 
 Religion,  Are Easily Proved From Iv. Xxxvii. And Iv. Xlvi. ; 
 Namely,  That Hatred Should Be Overcome With Love,  And That Every 
 Man Should Desire For Others The Good Which He Seeks For Himself. 
 We May Also Repeat What We Drew Attention To In The Note To Iv. 
 L.,  And In Other Places ; Namely,  That The Strong Man Has Ever 
 First In His Thoughts,  That All Things Follow From The Necessity 
 Of The Divine Nature ; So That Whatsoever He Deems To Be Hurtful 
 And Evil,  And Whatsoever,  Accordingly,  Seems To Him Impious, 
 Horrible,  Unjust,  And Base,  Assumes That Appearance Owing To His 
 Own Disordered,  Fragmentary,  And Confused View Of The Universe. 
 Wherefore He Strives Before All Things To Conceive Things As They 
 Really Are,  And To Remove The Hindrances To True Knowledge,  Such 
 As Are Hatred,  Anger,  Envy,  Derision,  Pride,  And Similar 
 Emotions,  Which I Have Mentioned Above.  Thus He Endeavours,  As 
 We Said Before,  As Far As In Him Lies,  To Do Good,  And To Go On 
 His Way Rejoicing.  How Far Human Virtue Is Capable Of Attaining 
 To Such A Condition,  And What Its Powers May Be,  I Will Prove In 
 The Following Part. 
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Appendix  Pg 149 
     What Have Said In This Part Concerning The Right Way Of Life 
 Has Not Been Arranged,  So As To Admit Of Being Seen At One View, 
 But Has Been Set Forth Piece-Meal,  According As I Thought Each 
 Proposition Could Most Readily Be Deduced From What Preceded It. 
 I Propose,  Therefore,  To Rearrange My Remarks And To Bring Them 
 Under Leading Heads. 
     I.  All Our Endeavours Or Desires So Follow From The 
 Necessity Of Our Nature,  That They Can Be Understood Either 
 Through It Alone,  As Their Proximate Cause,  Or By Virtue Of Our 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Appendix  Pg 150 
 Being A Part Of Nature,  Which Cannot Be Adequately Conceived 
 Through Itself Without Other Individuals. 
     Ii.  Desires,  Which Follow From Our Nature In Such A Manner, 
 That They Can Be Understood Through It Alone,  Are Those Which Are 
 Referred To The Mind,  In So Far As The Latter Is Conceived To 
 Consist Of Adequate Ideas : The Remaining Desires Are Only 
 Referred To The Mind,  In So Far As It Conceives Things 
 Inadequately,  And Their Force And Increase Are Generally Defined 
 Not By The Power Of Man,  But By The Power Of Things External To 
 Us : Wherefore The Former Are Rightly Called Actions,  The Latter 
 Passions,  For The Former Always Indicate Our Power,  The Latter, 
 On The Other Hand,  Show Our Infirmity And Fragmentary Knowledge. 
     Iii.  Our Actions,  That Is,  Those Desires Which Are Defined 
 By Man's Power Or Reason,  Are Always Good.  The Rest May Be 
 Either Good Or Bad. 
     Iv.  Thus In Life It Is Before All Things Useful To Perfect 
 The Understanding,  Or Reason,  As Far As We Can,  And In This Alone 
 Man's Highest Happiness Or Blessedness Consists,  Indeed 
 Blessedness Is Nothing Else But The Contentment Of Spirit,  Which 
 Arises From The Intuitive Knowledge Of God : Now,  To Perfect The 
 Understanding Is Nothing Else But To Understand God,  God's 
 Attributes,  And The Actions Which Follow From The Necessity Of 
 His Nature.  Wherefore Of A Man,  Who Is Led By Reason,  The 
 Ultimate Aim Or Highest Desire,  Whereby He Seeks To Govern All 
 His Fellows,  Is That Whereby He Is Brought To The Adequate 
 Conception Of Himself And Of All Things Within The Scope Of His 
 Intelligence. 
     V.  Therefore,  Without Intelligence There Is Not Rational 
 Life : And Things Are Only Good,  In So Far As They Aid Man In His 
 Enjoyment Of The Intellectual Life,  Which Is Defined By 
 Intelligence.  Contrariwise,  Whatsoever Things Hinder Man's 
 Perfecting Of His Reason,  And Capability To Enjoy The Rational 
 Life,  Are Alone Called Evil. 
     Vi.  As All Things Whereof Man Is The Efficient Cause Are 
 Necessarily Good,  No Evil Can Befall Man Except Through External 
 Causes ; Namely,  By Virtue Of Man Being A Part Of Universal 
 Nature,  Whose Laws Human Nature Is Compelled To Obey,  And To 
 Conform To In Almost Infinite Ways. 
     Vii.  It Is Impossible,  That Man Should Not Be A Part Of 
 Nature,  Or That He Should Not Follow Her General Order ; But If 
 He Be Thrown Among Individuals Whose Nature Is In Harmony With 
 His Own,  His Power Of Action Will Thereby Be Aided And Fostered, 
 Whereas,  If He Be Thrown Among Such As Are But Very Little In 
 Harmony With His Nature,  He Will Hardly Be Able To Accommodate 
 Himself To Them Without Undergoing A Great Change Himself. 
     Viii.  Whatsoever In Nature We Deem To Be Evil,  Or To Be 
 Capable Of Injuring Our Faculty For Existing And Enjoying The 
 Rational Life,  We May Endeavour To Remove In Whatever Way Seems 
 Safest To Us ; On The Other Hand,  Whatsoever We Deem To Be Good 
 Or Useful For Preserving Our Being,  And Enabling Us To Enjoy The 
 Rational Life,  We May Appropriate To Our Use And Employ As We 
 Think Best.  Everyone Without Exception May,  By Sovereign Right 
 Of Nature,  Do Whatsoever He Thinks Will Advance His Own Interest. 
     Ix.  Nothing Can Be In More Harmony With The Nature Of Any 
 
 
 
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 Given Thing Than Other Individuals Of The Same Species ; 
 Therefore (Cf. Vii.) For Man In The Preservation Of His Being And 
 The Enjoyment Of The Rational Life There Is Nothing More Useful 
 Than His Fellow-Man Who Is Led By Reason.  Further,  As We Know 
 Not Anything Among Individual Things Which Is More Excellent Than 
 A Man Led By Reason,  No Man Can Better Display The Power Of His 
 Skill And Disposition,  Than In So Training Men,  That They Come At 
 Last To Live Under The Dominion Of Their Own Reason. 
     X.  In So Far As Men Are Influenced By Envy Or Any Kind Of 
 Hatred,  One Towards Another,  They Are At Variance,  And Are 
 Therefore To Be Feared In Proportion,  As They Are More Powerful 
 Than Their Fellows. 
     Xi.  Yet Minds Are Not Conquered By Force,  But By Love And 
 High-Mindedness. 
     Xii.  It Is Before All Things Useful To Men To Associate 
 Their Ways Of Life,  To Bind Themselves Together With Such Bonds 
 As They Think Most Fitted To Gather Them All Into Unity,  And 
 Generally To Do Whatsoever Serves To Strengthen Friendship. 
     Xiii.  But For This There Is Need Of Skill And Watchfulness. 
 For Men Are Diverse (Seeing That Those Who Live Under The 
 Guidance Of Reason Are Few),  Yet Are They Generally Envious And 
 More Prone To Revenge Than To Sympathy.  No Small Force Of 
 Character Is Therefore Required To Take Everyone As He Is,  And To 
 Restrain One's Self From Imitating The Emotions Of Others.  But 
 Those Who Carp At Mankind,  And Are More Skilled In Railing At 
 Vice Than In Instilling Virtue,  And Who Break Rather Than 
 Strengthen Men's Dispositions,  Are Hurtful Both To Themselves And 
 Others.  Thus Many From Too Great Impatience Of Spirit,  Or From 
 Misguided Religious Zeal,  Have Preferred To Live Among Brutes 
 Rather Than Among Men ; As Boys Or Youths,  Who Cannot Peaceably 
 Endure The Chidings Of Their Parents,  Will Enlist As Soldiers And 
 Choose The Hardships Of War And The Despotic Discipline In 
 Preference To The Comforts Of Home And The Admonitions Of Their 
 Father : Suffering Any Burden To Be Put Upon Them,  So Long As 
 They May Spite Their Parents. 
     Xiv.  Therefore,  Although Men Are Generally Governed In 
 Everything By Their Own Lusts,  Yet Their Association In Common 
 Brings Many More Advantages Than Drawbacks.  Wherefore It Is 
 Better To Bear Patiently The Wrongs They May Do Us,  And To Strive 
 To Promote Whatsoever Serves To Bring About Harmony And 
 Friendship. 
     Xv.  Those Things,  Which Beget Harmony,  Are Such As Are 
 Attributable To Justice,  Equity,  And Honourable Living.  For Men 
 Brook Ill Not Only What Is Unjust Or Iniquitous,  But Also What Is 
 Reckoned Disgraceful,  Or That A Man Should Slight The Received 
 Customs Of Their Society.  For Winning Love Those Qualities Are 
 Especially Necessary Which Have Regard To Religion And Piety (Cf. 
 Iv. Xxxvii. Notes. I. Ii. ; Xlvi. Note ; And Lxxiii. Note). 
     Xvi.  Further,  Harmony Is Often The Result Of Fear : But Such 
 Harmony Is Insecure.  Further,  Fear Arises From Infirmity Of 
 Spirit,  And Moreover Belongs Not To The Exercise Of Reason : The 
 Same Is True Of Compassion,  Though This Latter Seems To Bear A 
 Certain Resemblance To Piety. 
     Xvii.  Men Are Also Gained Over By Liberality,  Especially 
 
 
 
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 Such As Have Not The Means To Buy What Is Necessary To Sustain 
 Life.  However,  To Give Aid To Every Poor Man Is Far Beyond The 
 Power And The Advantage Of Any Private Person.  For The Riches Of 
 Any Private Person Are Wholly Inadequate To Meet Such A Call. 
 Again,  An Individual Man's Resources Of Character Are Too Limited 
 For Him To Be Able To Make All Men His Friends.  Hence Providing 
 For The Poor Is A Duty,  Which Falls On The State As A Whole,  And 
 Has Regard Only To The General Advantage. 
     Xviii.  In Accepting Favours,  And In Returning Gratitude Our 
 Duty Must Be Wholly Different (Cf. Iv. Lxx. Note ; Lxxi. Note). 
     Xix.  Again,  Meretricious Love,  That Is,  The Lust Of 
 Generation Arising From Bodily Beauty,  And Generally Every Sort 
 Of Love,  Which Owns Anything Save Freedom Of Soul As Its Cause, 
 Readily Passes Into Hate ; Unless Indeed,  What Is Worse,  It Is A 
 Species Of Madness ; And Then It Promotes Discord Rather Than 
 Harmony (Cf. Iii. Xxxi. Coroll.). 
     Xx.  As Concerning Marriage,  It Is Certain That This Is In 
 Harmony With Reason,  If The Desire For Physical Union Be Not 
 Engendered Solely By Bodily Beauty,  But Also By The Desire To 
 Beget Children And To Train Them Up Wisely ; And Moreover,  If The 
 Love Of Both,  To Wit,  Of The Man And Of The Woman,  Is Not Caused 
 By Bodily Beauty Only,  But Also By Freedom Of Soul. 
     Xxi.  Furthermore,  Flattery Begets Harmony ; But Only By 
 Means Of The Vile Offence Of Slavishness Or Treachery.  None Are 
 More Readily Taken With Flattery Than The Proud,  Who Wish To Be 
 First,  But Are Not. 
     Xxii.  There Is In Abasement A Spurious Appearance Of Piety 
 And Religion.  Although Abasement Is The Opposite To Pride,  Yet 
 Is He That Abases Himself Most Akin To The Proud (Iv. Lvii. 
 Note). 
     Xxiii.  Shame Also Brings About Harmony,  But Only In Such 
 Matters As Cannot Be Hid.  Further,  As Shame Is A Species Of 
 Pain,  It Does Not Concern The Exercise Of Reason. 
     Xxiv.  The Remaining Emotions Of Pain Towards Men Are 
 Directly Opposed To Justice,  Equity,  Honour,  Piety,  And Religion 
 ; And,  Although Indignation Seems To Bear A Certain Resemblance 
 To Equity,  Yet Is Life But Lawless,  Where Every Man May Pass 
 Judgment On Another's Deeds,  And Vindicate His Own Or Other Men's 
 Rights. 
     Xxv.  Correctness Of Conduct (Modestia),  That Is,  The Desire 
 Of Pleasing Men Which Is Determined By Reason,  Is Attributable To 
 Piety (As We Said In Iv. Xxxvii. Note. I.).  But,  If It Spring 
 From Emotion,  It Is Ambition,  Or The Desire Whereby,  Men,  Under 
 The False Cloak Of Piety,  Generally Stir Up Discords And 
 Seditions.  For He Who Desires To Aid His Fellows Either In Word 
 Or In Deed,  So That They May Together Enjoy The Highest Good,  He, 
 I Say,  Will Before All Things Strive To Win Them Over With Love : 
 Not To Draw Them Into Admiration,  So That A System May Be Called 
 After His Name,  Nor To Give Any Cause For Envy.  Further,  In His 
 Conversation He Will Shrink From Talking Of Men's Faults,  And 
 Will Be Careful To Speak But Sparingly Of Human Infirmity : But 
 He Will Dwell At Length On Human Virtue Or Power,  And The Way 
 Whereby It May Be Perfected.  Thus Will Men Be Stirred Not By 
 Fear,  Nor By Aversion,  But Only By The Emotion Of Joy,  To 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Appendix  Pg 153 
 Endeavour,  So Far As In Them Lies,  To Live In Obedience To 
 Reason. 
     Xxvi.  Besides Men,  We Know Of No Particular Thing In Nature 
 In Whose Mind We May Rejoice,  And Whom We Can Associate With 
 Ourselves In Friendship Or Any Sort Of Fellowship ; Therefore, 
 Whatsoever There Be In Nature Besides Man,  A Regard For Our 
 Advantage Does Not Call On Us To Preserve,  But To Preserve Or 
 Destroy According To Its Various Capabilities,  And To Adapt To 
 Our Use As Best We May. 
     Xxvii.  The Advantage Which We Derive From Things External To 
 Us,  Besides The Experience And Knowledge Which We Acquire From 
 Observing Them,  And From Recombining Their Elements In Different 
 Forms,  Is Principally The Preservation Of The Body ; From This 
 Point Of View,  Those Things Are Most Useful Which Can So Feed And 
 Nourish The Body,  That All Its Parts May Rightly Fulfil Their 
 Functions.  For,  In Proportion As The Body Is Capable Of Being 
 Affected In A Greater Variety Of Ways,  And Of Affecting External 
 Bodies In A Great Number Of Ways,  So Much The More Is The Mind 
 Capable Of Thinking (Iv. Xxxviii.,  Xxxix.).  But There Seem To Be 
 Very Few Things Of This Kind In Nature ; Wherefore For The Due 
 Nourishment Of The Body We Must Use Many Foods Of Diverse Nature. 
 For The Human Body Is Composed Of Very Many Parts Of Different 
 Nature,  Which Stand In Continual Need Of Varied Nourishment,  So 
 That The Whole Body May Be Equally Capable Of Doing Everything 
 That Can Follow From Its Own Nature,  And Consequently That The 
 Mind Also May Be Equally Capable Of Forming Many Perceptions. 
     Xxviii.  Now For Providing These Nourishments The Strength Of 
 Each Individual Would Hardly Suffice,  If Men Did Not Lend One 
 Another Mutual Aid.  But Money Has Furnished Us With A Token For 
 Everything : Hence It Is With The Notion Of Money,  That The Mind 
 Of The Multitude Is Chiefly Engrossed : Nay,  It Can Hardly 
 Conceive Any Kind Of Pleasure,  Which Is Not Accompanied With The 
 Idea Of Money As Cause. 
     Xxix.  This Result Is The Fault Only Of Those,  Who Seek 
 Money,  Not From Poverty Or To Supply Their Necessary Wants,  But 
 Because They Have Learned The Arts Of Gain,  Wherewith They Bring 
 Themselves To Great Splendour.  Certainly They Nourish Their 
 Bodies,  According To Custom,  But Scantily,  Believing That They 
 Lose As Much Of Their Wealth As They Spend On The Preservation Of 
 Their Body.  But They Who Know The True Use Of Money,  And Who Fix 
 The Measure Of Wealth Solely With Regard To Their Actual Needs, 
 Live Content With Little. 
     Xxx.  As,  Therefore,  Those Things Are Good Which Assist The 
 Various Parts Of The Body,  And Enable Them To Perform Their 
 Functions ; And As Pleasure Consists In An Increase Of,  Or Aid 
 To,  Man's Power,  In So Far As He Is Composed Of Mind And Body ; 
 It Follows That All Those Things Which Bring Pleasure Are Good. 
 But Seeing That Things Do Not Work With The Object Of Giving Us 
 Pleasure,  And That Their Power Of Action Is Not Tempered To Suit 
 Our Advantage,  And,  Lastly,  That Pleasure Is Generally Referred 
 To One Part Of The Body More Than To The Other Parts ; Therefore 
 Most Emotions Of Pleasure (Unless Reason And Watchfulness Be At 
 Hand),  And Consequently The Desires Arising Therefrom,  May Become 
 Excessive.  Moreover We May Add That Emotion Leads Us To Pay Most 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 4  (Of Human Bondage   Or The Strength Of The Emotions Appendix  Pg 154 
 Regard To What Is Agreeable In The Present,  Nor Can We Estimate 
 What Is Future With Emotions Equally Vivid.  (Iv. Xliv. Note,  And 
 Lx. Note.) 
     Xxxi.  Superstition,  On The Other Hand,  Seems To Account As 
 Good All That Brings Pain,  And As Bad All That Brings Pleasure. 
 However,  As We Said Above (Iv. Xlv. Note),  None But The Envious 
 Take Delight In My Infirmity And Trouble.  For The Greater The 
 Pleasure Whereby We Are Affected,  The Greater Is The Perfection 
 Whereto We Pass,  And Consequently The More Do We Partake Of The 
 Divine Nature : No Pleasure Can Ever Be Evil,  Which Is Regulated 
 By A True Regard For Our Advantage.  But Contrariwise He,  Who Is 
 Led By Fear And Does Good Only To Avoid Evil,  Is Not Guided By 
 Reason. 
     Xxxii.  But Human Power Is Extremely Limited,  And Is 
 Infinitely Surpassed By The Power Of External Causes ; We Have 
 Not,  Therefore,  An Absolute Power Of Shaping To Our Use Those 
 Things Which Are Without Us.  Nevertheless,  We Shall Bear With An 
 Equal Mind All That Happens To Us In Contravention To The Claims 
 Of Our Own Advantage,  So Long As We Are Conscious,  That We Have 
 Done Our Duty,  And That The Power Which We Possess Is Not 
 Sufficient To Enable Us To Protect Ourselves Completely ; 
 Remembering That We Are A Part Of Universal Nature,  And That We 
 Follow Her Order.  If We Have A Clear And Distinct Understanding 
 Of This,  That Part Of Our Nature Which Is Defined By 
 Intelligence,  In Other Words The Better Part Of Ourselves,  Will 
 Assuredly Acquiesce In What Befalls Us,  And In Such Acquiescence 
 Will Endeavour To Persist.  For,  In So Far As We Are Intelligent 
 Beings,  We Cannot Desire Anything Save That Which Is Necessary, 
 Nor Yield Absolute Acquiescence To Anything,  Save To That Which 
 Is True : Wherefore,  In So Far As We Have A Right Understanding 
 Of These Things,  The Endeavour Of The Better Part Of Ourselves Is 
 In Harmony With The Order Of Nature As A Whole. 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Preface  Pg 155 
   
     At Length I Pass To The Remaining Portion Of My Ethics,  Which 
 Is Concerned With The Way Leading To Freedom.  I Shall Therefore 
 Treat Therein Of The Power Of The Reason,  Showing How Far The 
 Reason Can Control The Emotions,  And What Is The Nature Of Mental 
 Freedom Or Blessedness ; We Shall Then Be Able To See,  How Much 
 More Powerful The Wise Man Is Than The Ignorant.  It Is No Part 
 Of My Design To Point Out The Method And Means Whereby The 
 Understanding May Be Perfected,  Nor To Show The Skill Whereby The 
 Body May Be So Tended,  As To Be Capable Of The Due Performance Of 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Preface  Pg 155 
 Its Functions.  The Latter Question Lies In The Province Of 
 Medicine,  The Former In The Province Of Logic.  Here,  Therefore, 
 I Repeat,  I Shall Treat Only Of The Power Of The Mind,  Or Of 
 Reason ; And I Shall Mainly Show The Extent And Nature Of Its 
 Dominion Over The Emotions,  For Their Control And Moderation. 
 That We Do Not Possess Absolute Dominion Over Them,  I Have 
 Already Shown.  Yet The Stoics Have Thought,  That The Emotions 
 Depended Absolutely On Our Will,  And That We Could Absolutely 
 Govern Them.  But These Philosophers Were Compelled,  By The 
 Protest Of Experience,  Not From Their Own Principles,  To Confess, 
 That No Slight Practice And Zeal Is Needed To Control And 
 Moderate Them : And This Someone Endeavoured To Illustrate By The 
 Example (If I Remember Rightly) Of Two Dogs,  The One A House-Dog 
 And The Other A Hunting-Dog.  For By Long Training It Could Be 
 Brought About,  That The House-Dog Should Become Accustomed To 
 Hunt,  And The Hunting-Dog To Cease From Running After Hares.  To 
 This Opinion Descartes Not A Little Inclines.  For He Maintained, 
 That The Soul Or Mind Is Specially United To A Particular Part Of 
 The Brain,  Namely,  To That Part Called The Pineal Gland,  By The 
 Aid Of Which The Mind Is Enabled To Feel All The Movements Which 
 Are Set Going In The Body,  And Also External Objects,  And Which 
 The Mind By A Simple Act Of Volition Can Put In Motion In Various 
 Ways.  He Asserted,  That This Gland Is So Suspended In The Midst 
 Of The Brain,  That It Could Be Moved By The Slightest Motion Of 
 The Animal Spirits : Further,  That This Gland Is Suspended In The 
 Midst Of The Brain In As Many Different Manners,  As The Animal 
 Spirits Can Impinge Thereon ; And,  Again,  That As Many Different 
 Marks Are Impressed On The Said Gland,  As There Are Different 
 External Objects Which Impel The Animal Spirits Towards It ; 
 Whence It Follows,  That If The Will Of The Soul Suspends The 
 Gland In A Position,  Wherein It Has Already Been Suspended Once 
 Before By The Animal Spirits Driven In One Way Or Another,  The 
 Gland In Its Turn Reacts On The Said Spirits,  Driving And 
 Determining Them To The Condition Wherein They Were,  When 
 Repulsed Before By A Similar Position Of The Gland.  He Further 
 Asserted,  That Every Act Of Mental Volition Is United In Nature 
 To A Certain Given Motion Of The Gland.  For Instance,  Whenever 
 Anyone Desires To Look At A Remote Object,  The Act Of Volition 
 Causes The Pupil Of The Eye To Dilate,  Whereas,  If The Person In 
 Question Had Only Thought Of The Dilatation Of The Pupil,  The 
 Mere Wish To Dilate It Would Not Have Brought About The Result, 
 Inasmuch As The Motion Of The Gland,  Which Serves To Impel The 
 Animal Spirits Towards The Optic Nerve In A Way Which Would 
 Dilate Or Contract The Pupil,  Is Not Associated In Nature With 
 The Wish To Dilate Or Contract The Pupil,  But With The Wish To 
 Look At Remote Or Very Near Objects.  Lastly,  He Maintained That, 
 Although Every Motion Of The Aforesaid Gland Seems To Have Been 
 United By Nature To One Particular Thought Out Of The Whole 
 Number Of Our Thoughts From The Very Beginning Of Our Life,  Yet 
 It Can Nevertheless Become Through Habituation Associated With 
 Other Thoughts ; This He Endeavours To Prove In The Passions De 
 L'âme,  I.50.  He Thence Concludes,  That There Is No Soul So Weak, 
 That It Cannot,  Under Proper Direction,  Acquire Absolute Power 
 Over Its Passions.  For Passions As Defined By Him Are 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Preface  Pg 156 
 "Perceptions,  Or Feelings,  Or Disturbances Of The Soul,  Which Are 
 Referred To The Soul As Species,  And Which (Mark The Expression) 
 Are Produced,  Preserved,  And Strengthened Through Some Movement 
 Of The Spirits." (Passions De L'âme,  I.27).  But,  Seeing That We 
 Can Join Any Motion Of The Gland,  Or Consequently Of The Spirits, 
 To Any Volition,  The Determination Of The Will Depends Entirely 
 On Our Own Powers ; If,  Therefore,  We Determine Our Will With 
 Sure And Firm Decisions In The Direction To Which We Wish Our 
 Actions To Tend,  And Associate The Motions Of The Passions Which 
 We Wish To Acquire With The Said Decisions,  We Shall Acquire An 
 Absolute Dominion Over Our Passions.  Such Is The Doctrine Of 
 This Illustrious Philosopher (In So Far As I Gather It From His 
 Own Words) ; It Is One Which,  Had It Been Less Ingenious,  I Could 
 Hardly Believe To Have Proceeded From So Great A Man.  Indeed,  I 
 Am Lost In Wonder,  That A Philosopher,  Who Had Stoutly Asserted, 
 That He Would Draw No Conclusions Which Do Not Follow From 
 Self-Evident Premisses,  And Would Affirm Nothing Which He Did Not 
 Clearly And Distinctly Perceive,  And Who Had So Often Taken To 
 Task The Scholastics For Wishing To Explain Obscurities Through 
 Occult Qualities,  Could Maintain A Hypothesis,  Beside Which 
 Occult Qualities Are Commonplace.  What Does He Understand,  I 
 Ask,  By The Union Of The Mind And The Body? What Clear And 
 Distinct Conception Has He Got Of Thought In Most Intimate Union 
 With A Certain Particle Of Extended Matter? Truly I Should Like 
 Him To Explain This Union Through Its Proximate Cause.  But He 
 Had So Distinct A Conception Of Mind Being Distinct From Body, 
 That He Could Not Assign Any Particular Cause Of The Union 
 Between The Two,  Or Of The Mind Itself,  But Was Obliged To Have 
 Recourse To The Cause Of The Whole Universe,  That Is To God. 
 Further,  I Should Much Like To Know,  What Degree Of Motion The 
 Mind Can Impart To This Pineal Gland,  And With What Force Can It 
 Hold It Suspended? For I Am In Ignorance,  Whether This Gland Can 
 Be Agitated More Slowly Or More Quickly By The Mind Than By The 
 Animal Spirits,  And Whether The Motions Of The Passions,  Which We 
 Have Closely United With Firm Decisions,  Cannot Be Again 
 Disjoined Therefrom By Physical Causes ; In Which Case It Would 
 Follow That,  Although The Mind Firmly Intended To Face A Given 
 Danger,  And Had United To This Decision The Motions Of Boldness, 
 Yet At The Sight Of The Danger The Gland Might Become Suspended 
 In A Way,  Which Would Preclude The Mind Thinking Of Anything 
 Except Running Away.  In Truth,  As There Is No Common Standard Of 
 Volition And Motion,  So Is There No Comparison Possible Between 
 The Powers Of The Mind And The Power Or Strength Of The Body ; 
 Consequently The Strength Of One Cannot In Any Wise Be Determined 
 By The Strength Of The Other.  We May Also Add,  That There Is No 
 Gland Discoverable In The Midst Of The Brain,  So Placed That It 
 Can Thus Easily Be Set In Motion In So Many Ways,  And Also That 
 All The Nerves Are Not Prolonged So Far As The Cavities Of The 
 Brain.  Lastly,  I Omit All The Assertions Which He Makes 
 Concerning The Will And Its Freedom,  Inasmuch As I Have 
 Abundantly Proved That His Premisses Are False.  Therefore,  Since 
 The Power Of The Mind,  As I Have Shown Above,  Is Defined By The 
 Understanding Only,  We Shall Determine Solely By The Knowledge Of 
 The Mind The Remedies Against The Emotions,  Which I Believe All 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Preface  Pg 157 
 Have Had Experience Of,  But Do Not Accurately Observe Or 
 Distinctly See,  And From The Same Basis We Shall Deduce All Those 
 Conclusions,  Which Have Regard To The Mind's Blessedness. 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Axioms Pg 158 
 I.  If Two Contrary Actions Be Started In The Same Subject,  A 
 Change Must Necessarily Take Place,  Either In Both,  Or In One Of 
 The Two,  And Continue Until They Cease To Be Contrary. 
   
 Ii.  The Power Of An Effect Is Defined By The Power Of Its Cause, 
 In So Far As Its Essence Is Explained Or Defined By The Essence 
 Of Its Cause.  
     (This Axiom Is Evident From Iii. Vii.) 
   
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 159 
 Prop. I.  Even As Thoughts And The Ideas Of Things Are Arranged 
 And Associated In The Mind,  So Are The Modifications Of Body Or 
 The Images Of Things Precisely In The Same Way Arranged And 
 Associated In The Body. 
     Proof.-The Order And Connection Of Ideas Is The Same (Ii. 
 Vii.) As The Order And Connection Of Things,  And Vice Versâ The 
 Order And Connection Of Things Is The Same (Ii. Vi. Coroll. And 
 Vii.) As The Order And Connection Of Ideas.  Wherefore,  Even As 
 The Order And Connection Of Ideas In The Mind Takes Place 
 According To The Order And Association Of Modifications Of The 
 Body (Ii. Xviii.),  So Vice Versâ (Iii. Ii.) The Order And 
 Connection Of Modifications Of The Body Takes Place In Accordance 
 With The Manner,  In Which Thoughts And The Ideas Of Things Are 
 Arranged And Associated In The Mind.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Ii.  If We Remove A Disturbance Of The Spirit,  Or Emotion, 
 From The Thought Of An External Cause,  And Unite It To Other 
 Thoughts,  Then Will The Love Or Hatred Towards That External 
 Cause,  And Also The Vacillations Of Spirit Which Arise From These 
 Emotions,  Be Destroyed. 
     Proof.-That,  Which Constitutes The Reality Of Love Or Hatred, 
 Is Pleasure Or Pain,  Accompanied By The Idea Of An External Cause 
 (Def. Of The Emotions,  Vi. Vii.) ; Wherefore,  When This Cause Is 
 Removed,  The Reality Of Love Or Hatred Is Removed With It ; 
 Therefore These Emotions And Those Which Arise Therefrom Are 
 Destroyed.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Iii.  An Emotion,  Which Is A Passion,  Ceases To Be A 
 Passion,  As Soon As We Form A Clear And Distinct Idea Thereof. 
     Proof.-An Emotion,  Which Is A Passion,  Is A Confused Idea (By 
 The General Def. Of The Emotions).  If,  Therefore,  We Form A 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 160 
 Clear And Distinct Idea Of A Given Emotion,  That Idea Will Only 
 Be Distinguished From The Emotion,  In So Far As It Is Referred To 
 The Mind Only,  By Reason (Ii. Xxi.,  And Note) ; Therefore (Iii. 
 Iii.),  The Emotion Will Cease To Be A Passion.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary-An Emotion Therefore Becomes More Under Our 
 Control,  And The Mind Is Less Passive In Respect To It,  In 
 Proportion As It Is More Known To Us. 
   
 Prop. Iv.  There Is No Modification Of The Body,  Whereof We 
 Cannot Form Some Clear And Distinct Conception. 
     Proof.-Properties Which Are Common To All Things Can Only Be 
 Conceived Adequately (Ii. Xxxviii.) ; Therefore (Ii. Xii. And 
 Lemma Ii. After Ii. Xiii.) There Is No Modification Of The Body, 
 Whereof We Cannot Form Some Clear And Distinct Conception. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That There Is No Emotion,  Whereof 
 We Cannot Form Some Clear And Distinct Conception.  For An 
 Emotion Is The Idea Of A Modification Of The Body (By The General 
 Def. Of The Emotions),  And Must Therefore (By The Preceding 
 Prop.) Involve Some Clear And Distinct Conception. 
     Note.-Seeing That There Is Nothing Which Is Not Followed By 
 An Effect (I. Xxxvi.),  And That We Clearly And Distinctly 
 Understand Whatever Follows From An Idea,  Which In Us Is Adequate 
 (Ii. Xl.),  It Follows That Everyone Has The Power Of Clearly And 
 Distinctly Understanding Himself And His Emotions,  If Not 
 Absolutely,  At Any Rate In Part,  And Consequently Of Bringing It 
 About,  That He Should Become Less Subject To Them.  To Attain 
 This Result,  Therefore,  We Must Chiefly Direct Our Efforts To 
 Acquiring,  As Far As Possible,  A Clear And Distinct Knowledge Of 
 Every Emotion,  In Order That The Mind May Thus,  Through Emotion, 
 Be Determined To Think Of Those Things Which It Clearly And 
 Distinctly Perceives,  And Wherein It Fully Acquiesces : And Thus 
 That The Emotion Itself May Be Separated From The Thought Of An 
 External Cause,  And May Be Associated With True Thoughts ; Whence 
 It Will Come To Pass,  Not Only That Love,  Hatred,  &C. Will Be 
 Destroyed (V. Ii.),  But Also That The Appetites Or Desires,  Which 
 Are Wont To Arise From Such Emotion,  Will Become Incapable Of 
 Being Excessive (Iv. Lxi.).  For It Must Be Especially Remarked, 
 That The Appetite Through Which A Man Is Said To Be Active,  And 
 That Through Which He Is Said To Be Passive Is One And The Same. 
 For Instance,  We Have Shown That Human Nature Is So Constituted, 
 That Everyone Desires His Fellow-Men To Live After His Own 
 Fashion (Iii. Xxxi. Note) ; In A Man,  Who Is Not Guided By 
 Reason,  This Appetite Is A Passion Which Is Called Ambition,  And 
 Does Not Greatly Differ From Pride ; Whereas In A Man,  Who Lives 
 By The Dictates Of Reason,  It Is An Activity Or Virtue Which Is 
 Called Piety (Iv. Xxxvii. Note. I. And Second Proof).  In Like 
 Manner All Appetites Or Desires Are Only Passions,  In So Far As 
 They Spring From Inadequate Ideas ; The Same Results Are 
 Accredited To Virtue,  When They Are Aroused Or Generated By 
 Adequate Ideas.  For All Desires,  Whereby We Are Determined To 
 Any Given Action,  May Arise As Much From Adequate As From 
 Inadequate Ideas (Iv. Lix.).  Than This Remedy For The Emotions 
 (To Return To The Point From Which I Started),  Which Consists In 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 161 
 A True Knowledge Thereof,  Nothing More Excellent,  Being Within 
 Our Power,  Can Be Devised.  For The Mind Has No Other Power Save 
 That Of Thinking And Of Forming Adequate Ideas,  As We Have Shown 
 Above (Iii. Iii.). 
   
 Prop. V.  An Emotion Towards A Thing,  Which We Conceive Simply, 
 And Not As Necessary,  Or As Contingent,  Or As Possible,  Is,  Other 
 Conditions Being Equal,  Greater Than Any Other Emotion. 
     Proof.-An Emotion Towards A Thing,  Which We Conceive To Be 
 Free,  Is Greater Than One Towards What We Conceive To Be 
 Necessary (Iii. Xlix.),  And,  Consequently,  Still Greater Than One 
 Towards What We Conceive As Possible,  Or Contingent (Iv. Xi.). 
 But To Conceive A Thing As Free Can Be Nothing Else Than To 
 Conceive It Simply,  While We Are In Ignorance Of The Causes 
 Whereby It Has Been Determined To Action (Ii. Xxxv. Note) ; 
 Therefore,  An Emotion Towards A Thing Which We Conceive Simply 
 Is,  Other Conditions Being Equal,  Greater Than One,  Which We Feel 
 Towards What Is Necessary,  Possible,  Or Contingent,  And, 
 Consequently,  It Is The Greatest Of All.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Vi.  The Mind Has Greater Power Over The Emotions And Is 
 Less Subject Thereto,  In So Far As It Understands All Things As 
 Necessary. 
     Proof.-The Mind Understands All Things To Be Necessary (I. 
 Xxix.) And To Be Determined To Existence And Operation By An 
 Infinite Chain Of Causes ; Therefore (By The Foregoing 
 Proposition),  It Thus Far Brings It About,  That It Is Less 
 Subject To The Emotions Arising Therefrom,  And (Iii. Xlviii.) 
 Feels Less Emotion Towards The Things Themselves.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-The More This Knowledge,  That Things Are Necessary,  Is 
 Applied To Particular Things,  Which We Conceive More Distinctly 
 And Vividly,  The Greater Is The Power Of The Mind Over The 
 Emotions,  As Experience Also Testifies.  For We See,  That The 
 Pain Arising From The Loss Of Any Good Is Mitigated,  As Soon As 
 The Man Who Has Lost It Perceives,  That It Could Not By Any Means 
 Have Been Preserved.  So Also We See That No One Pities An 
 Infant,  Because It Cannot Speak,  Walk,  Or Reason,  Or Lastly, 
 Because It Passes So Many Years,  As It Were,  In Unconsciousness. 
 Whereas,  If Most People Were Born Full-Grown And Only One Here 
 And There As An Infant,  Everyone Would Pity The Infants ; Because 
 Infancy Would Not Then Be Looked On As A State Natural And 
 Necessary,  But As A Fault Or Delinquency In Nature ; And We May 
 Note Several Other Instances Of The Same Sort. 
   
 Prop. Vii.  Emotions Which Are Aroused Or Spring From Reason,  If 
 We Take Account Of Time,  Are Stronger Than Those,  Which Are 
 Attributable To Particular Objects That We Regard As Absent. 
     Proof.-We Do Not Regard A Thing As Absent,  By Reason Of The 
 Emotion Wherewith We Conceive It,  But By Reason Of The Body, 
 Being Affected By Another Emotion Excluding The Existence Of The 
 Said Thing (Ii. Xvii.).  Wherefore,  The Emotion,  Which Is 
 Referred To The Thing Which We Regard As Absent,  Is Not Of A 
 Nature To Overcome The Rest Of A Man's Activities And Power (Iv. 
 Vi.),  But Is,  On The Contrary,  Of A Nature To Be In Some Sort 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 162 
 Controlled By The Emotions,  Which Exclude The Existence Of Its 
 External Cause (Iv. Ix.).  But An Emotion Which Springs From 
 Reason Is Necessarily Referred To The Common Properties Of Things 
 (See The Def. Of Reason In Ii. Xl. Note. Ii.),  Which We Always 
 Regard As Present (For There Can Be Nothing To Exclude Their 
 Present Existence),  And Which We Always Conceive In The Same 
 Manner (Ii. Xxxviii.).  Wherefore An Emotion Of This Kind Always 
 Remains The Same ; And Consequently (V. Ax. I.) Emotions,  Which 
 Are Contrary Thereto And Are Not Kept Going By Their External 
 Causes,  Will Be Obliged To Adapt Themselves To It More And More, 
 Until They Are No Longer Contrary To It ; To This Extent The 
 Emotion Which Springs From Reason Is More Powerful.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Viii.  An Emotion Is Stronger In Proportion To The Number 
 Of Simultaneous Concurrent Causes Whereby It Is Aroused. 
     Proof.-Many Simultaneous Causes Are More Powerful Than A Few 
 (Iii. Vii.) : Therefore (Iv. V.),  In Proportion To The Increased 
 Number Of Simultaneous Causes Whereby It Is Aroused,  An Emotion 
 Becomes Stronger.  Q.E.D. 
     Note-This Proposition Is Also Evident From V. Ax. Ii. 
   
 Prop. Ix.  An Emotion,  Which Is Attributable To Many And Diverse 
 Causes Which The Mind Regards As Simultaneous With The Emotion 
 Itself,  Is Less Hurtful,  And We Are Less Subject Thereto And Less 
 Affected Towards Each Of Its Causes,  Than If It Were A Different 
 And Equally Powerful Emotion Attributable To Fewer Causes Or To A 
 Single Cause. 
     Proof.-An Emotion Is Only Bad Or Hurtful,  In So Far As It 
 Hinders The Mind From Being Able To Think (Iv. Xxvi. Xxvii.) ; 
 Therefore,  An Emotion,  Whereby The Mind Is Determined To The 
 Contemplation Of Several Things At Once,  Is Less Hurtful Than 
 Another Equally Powerful Emotion,  Which So Engrosses The Mind In 
 The Single Contemplation Of A Few Objects Or Of One,  That It Is 
 Unable To Think Of Anything Else ; This Was Our First Point. 
 Again,  As The Mind's Essence,  In Other Words,  Its Power (Iii. 
 Vii.),  Consists Solely In Thought (Ii. Xi.),  The Mind Is Less 
 Passive In Respect To An Emotion,  Which Causes It To Think Of 
 Several Things At Once,  Than In Regard To An Equally Strong 
 Emotion,  Which Keeps It Engrossed In The Contemplation Of A Few 
 Or Of A Single Object : This Was Our Second Point.  Lastly,  This 
 Emotion (Iii. Xlviii.),  In So Far As It Is Attributable To 
 Several Causes,  Is Less Powerful In Regard To Each Of Them. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. X.  So Long As We Are Not Assailed By Emotions Contrary To 
 Our Nature,  We Have The Power Of Arranging And Associating The 
 Modifications Of Our Body According To The Intellectual Order. 
     Proof.-The Emotions,  Which Are Contrary To Our Nature,  That 
 Is (Iv. Xxx.),  Which Are Bad,  Are Bad In So Far As They Impede 
 The Mind From Understanding (Iv. Xxvii.).  So Long,  Therefore,  As 
 We Are Not Assailed By Emotions Contrary To Our Nature,  The 
 Mind's Power,  Whereby It Endeavours To Understand Things (Iv. 
 Xxvi.),  Is Not Impeded,  And Therefore It Is Able To Form Clear 
 And Distinct Ideas And To Deduce Them One From Another (Ii. Xl. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 163 
 Note. Ii. And Ii. Xlvii. Note) ; Consequently We Have In Such 
 Cases The Power Of Arranging And Associating The Modifications Of 
 The Body According To The Intellectual Order.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-By This Power Of Rightly Arranging And Associating The 
 Bodily Modifications We Can Guard Ourselves From Being Easily 
 Affected By Evil Emotions.  For (V. Vii.) A Greater Force Is 
 Needed For Controlling The Emotions,  When They Are Arranged And 
 Associated According To The Intellectual Order,  Than When They, 
 Are Uncertain And Unsettled.  The Best We Can Do,  Therefore,  So 
 Long As We Do Not Possess A Perfect Knowledge Of Our Emotions,  Is 
 To Frame A System Of Right Conduct,  Or Fixed Practical Precepts, 
 To Commit It To Memory,  And To Apply It Forthwith16 To The 
 Particular Circumstances Which Now And Again Meet Us In Life,  So 
 That Our Imagination May Become Fully Imbued Therewith,  And That 
 It May Be Always Ready To Our Hand.  For Instance,  We Have Laid 
 Down Among The Rules Of Life (Iv. Xlvi. And Note),  That Hatred 
 Should Be Overcome With Love Or High-Mindedness,  And Not Required 
 With Hatred In Return.  Now,  That This Precept Of Reason May Be 
 Always Ready To Our Hand In Time Of Need,  We Should Often Think 
 Over And Reflect Upon The Wrongs Generally Committed By Men,  And 
 In What Manner And Way They May Be Best Warded Off By 
 High-Mindedness : We Shall Thus Associate The Idea Of Wrong With 
 The Idea Of This Precept,  Which Accordingly Will Always Be Ready 
 For Use When A Wrong Is Done To Us (Ii. Xviii.).  If We Keep Also 
 In Readiness The Notion Of Our True Advantage,  And Of The Good 
 Which Follows From Mutual Friendships,  And Common Fellowships ; 
 Further,  If We Remember That Complete Acquiescence Is The Result 
 Of The Right Way Of Life ( Iv. Lii.),  And That Men,  No Less Than 
 Everything Else,  Act By The Necessity Of Their Nature : In Such 
 Case I Say The Wrong,  Or The Hatred,  Which Commonly Arises 
 Therefrom,  Will Engross A Very Small Part Of Our Imagination And 
 Will Be Easily Overcome ; Or,  If The Anger Which Springs From A 
 Grievous Wrong Be Not Overcome Easily,  It Will Nevertheless Be 
 Overcome,  Though Not Without A Spiritual Conflict,  Far Sooner 
 Than If We Had Not Thus Reflected On The Subject Beforehand.  As 
 Is Indeed Evident From V. Vi. Vii. Viii.  We Should,  In The Same 
 Way,  Reflect On Courage As A Means Of Overcoming Fear ; The 
 Ordinary Dangers Of Life Should Frequently Be Brought To Mind And 
 Imagined,  Together With The Means Whereby Through Readiness Of 
 Resource And Strength Of Mind We Can Avoid And Overcome Them. 
 But We Must Note,  That In Arranging Our Thoughts And Conceptions 
 We Should Always Bear In Mind That Which Is Good In Every 
 Individual Thing (Iv. Lxiii. Coroll. And Iii. Lix.),  In Order 
 That We May Always Be Determined To Action By An Emotion Of 
 Pleasure.  For Instance,  If A Man Sees That He Is Too Keen In The 
 Pursuit Of Honour,  Let Him Think Over Its Right Use,  The End For 
 Which It Should Be Pursued,  And The Means Whereby He May Attain 
 It.  Let Him Not Think Of Its Misuse,  And Its Emptiness,  And The 
 Fickleness Of Mankind,  And The Like,  Whereof No Man Thinks Except 
 Through A Morbidness Of Disposition ; With Thoughts Like These Do 
 The Most Ambitious Most Torment Themselves,  When They Despair Of 
 Gaining The Distinctions They Hanker After,  And In Thus Giving 
 Vent To Their Anger Would Fain Appear Wise.  Wherefore It Is 
 Certain That Those,  Who Cry Out The Loudest Against The Misuse Of 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 164 
 Honour And The Vanity Of The World,  Are Those Who Most Greedily 
 Covet It.  This Is Not Peculiar To The Ambitious,  But Is Common 
 To All Who Are Ill-Used By Fortune,  And Who Are Infirm In Spirit. 
 For A Poor Man Also,  Who Is Miserly,  Will Talk Incessantly Of The 
 Misuse Of Wealth And Of The Vices Of The Rich ; Whereby He Merely 
 Torments Himself,  And Shows The World That He Is Intolerant,  Not 
 Only Of His Own Poverty,  But Also Of Other People's Riches.  So, 
 Again,  Those Who Have Been Ill Received By A Woman They Love 
 Think Of Nothing But The Inconstancy,  Treachery,  And Other Stock 
 Faults Of The Fair Sex ; All Of Which They Consign To Oblivion, 
 Directly They Are Again Taken Into Favour By Their Sweetheart. 
 Thus He Who Would Govern His Emotions And Appetite Solely By The 
 Love Of Freedom Strives,  As Far As He Can,  To Gain A Knowledge Of 
 The Virtues And Their Causes,  And To Fill His Spirit With The Joy 
 Which Arises From The True Knowledge Of Them : He Will In No Wise 
 Desire To Dwell On Men's Faults,  Or To Carp At His Fellows,  Or To 
 Revel In A False Show Of Freedom.  Whosoever Will Diligently 
 Observe And Practise These Precepts (Which Indeed Are Not 
 Difficult) Will Verily,  In A Short Space Of Time,  Be Able,  For 
 The Most Part,  To Direct His Actions According To The 
 Commandments Of Reason. 
   
 Prop. Xi.  In Proportion As A Mental Image Is Referred To More 
 Objects,  So Is It More Frequent,  Or More Often Vivid,  And 
 Occupies The Mind More. 
     Proof.-In Proportion As A Mental Image Or An Emotion Is 
 Referred To More Objects,  So Are There More Causes Whereby It Can 
 Be Aroused And Fostered,  All Of Which (By Hypothesis) The Mind 
 Contemplates Simultaneously In Association With The Given Emotion 
 ; Therefore The Emotion Is More Frequent,  Or Is More Often In 
 Full Vigour,  And (V. Viii.) Occupies The Mind More.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xii.  The Mental Images Of Things Are More Easily 
 Associated With The Images Referred To Things Which We Clearly 
 And Distinctly Understand,  Than With Others. 
     Proof.-Things,  Which We Clearly And Distinctly Understand, 
 Are Either The Common Properties Of Things Or Deductions 
 Therefrom (See Definition Of Reason,  Ii. Xl. Note Ii.),  And Are 
 Consequently (By The Last Prop.) More Often Aroused In Us. 
 Wherefore It May More Readily Happen,  That We Should Contemplate 
 Other Things In Conjunction With These Than In Conjunction With 
 Something Else,  And Consequently (Ii. Xviii.) That The Images Of 
 The Said Things Should Be More Often Associated With The Images 
 Of These Than With The Images Of Something Else.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xiii.  A Mental Image Is More Often Vivid,  In Proportion As 
 It Is Associated With A Greater Number Of Other Images. 
     Proof.-In Proportion As An Image Is Associated With A Greater 
 Number Of Other Images,  So (Ii. Xviii.) Are There More Causes 
 Whereby It Can Be Aroused.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xiv.  The Mind Can Bring It About,  That All Bodily 
 Modifications Or Images Of Things May Be Referred To The Idea Of 
 God. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 165 
     Proof.-There Is No Modification Of The Body,  Whereof The Mind 
 May Not Form Some Clear And Distinct Conception (V. Iv.) ; 
 Wherefore It Can Bring It About,  That They Should All Be Referred 
 To The Idea Of God (I. Xv.).  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xv.  He Who Clearly And Distinctly Understands Himself And 
 His Emotions Loves God,  And So Much The More In Proportion As He 
 More Understands Himself And His Emotions. 
     Proof.-He Who Clearly And Distinctly Understands Himself And 
 His Emotions Feels Pleasure (Iii. Liii.),  And This Pleasure Is 
 (By The Last Prop.) Accompanied By The Idea Of God ; Therefore 
 (Def. Of The Emotions,  Vi.) Such An One Loves God,  And (For The 
 Same Reason) So Much The More In Proportion As He More 
 Understands Himself And His Emotions.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xvi.  This Love Towards God Must Hold The Chief Place In 
 The Mind. 
     Proof.-For This Love Is Associated With All The Modifications 
 Of The Body (V. Xiv.) And Is Fostered By Them All (V. Xv.) ; 
 Therefore (V. Xi.),  It Must Hold The Chief Place In The Mind. 
 Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xvii.  God Is Without Passions,  Neither Is He Affected By 
 Any Emotion Of Pleasure Or Pain. 
     Proof.-All Ideas,  In So Far As They Are Referred To God,  Are 
 True (Ii. Xxxii.),  That Is (Ii. Def. Iv.) Adequate ; And 
 Therefore (By The General Def. Of The Emotions) God Is Without 
 Passions.  Again,  God Cannot Pass Either To A Greater Or To A 
 Lesser Perfection (I. Xx. Coroll. Ii.) ; Therefore (By Def. Of 
 The Emotions,  Ii. Iii.) He Is Not Affected By Any Emotion Of 
 Pleasure Or Pain. 
     Corollary.-Strictly Speaking,  God Does Not Love Or Hate 
 Anyone.  For God (By The Foregoing Prop.) Is Not Affected By Any 
 Emotion Of Pleasure Or Pain,  Consequently (Def. Of The Emotions, 
 Vi. Vii.) He Does Not Love Or Hate Anyone. 
   
 Prop. Xviii.  No One Can Hate God. 
     Proof.-The Idea Of God Which Is In Us Is Adequate And Perfect 
 (Ii. Xlvi. Xlvii.) ; Wherefore,  In So Far As We Contemplate God, 
 We Are Active (Iii. Iii.) ; Consequently (Iii. Lix.) There Can Be 
 No Pain Accompanied By The Idea Of God,  In Other Words (Def. Of 
 The Emotions,  Vii.),  No One Can Hate God.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Love Towards God Cannot Be Turned Into Hate. 
     Note.-It May Be Objected That,  As We Understand God As The 
 Cause Of All Things,  We By That Very Fact Regard God As The Cause 
 Of Pain.  But I Make Answer,  That,  In So Far As We Understand The 
 Causes Of Pain,  It To That Extent (V. Iii.) Ceases To Be A 
 Passion,  That Is,  It Ceases To Be Pain (Iii. Lix.) ; Therefore, 
 In So Far As We Understand God To Be The Cause Of Pain,  We To 
 That Extent Feel Pleasure. 
   
 Prop. Xix.  He,  Who Loves God,  Cannot Endeavour That God Should 
 Love Him In Return. 
     Proof.-For,  If A Man Should So Endeavour,  He Would Desire (V. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 166 
 Xvii. Coroll.) That God,  Whom He Loves,  Should Not Be God,  And 
 Consequently He Would Desire To Feel Pain (Iii. Xix.) ; Which Is 
 Absurd (Iii. Xxviii.).  Therefore,  He Who Loves God,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xx.  This Love Towards God Cannot Be Stained By The Emotion 
 Of Envy Or Jealousy : Contrariwise,  It Is The More Fostered,  In 
 Proportion As We Conceive A Greater Number Of Men To Be Joined To 
 God By The Same Bond Of Love. 
     Proof.-This Love Towards God Is The Highest Good Which We Can 
 Seek For Under The Guidance Of Reason (Iv. Xxviii.),  It Is Common 
 To All Men (Iv. Xxxvi.),  And We Desire That All Should Rejoice 
 Therein (Iv. Xxxvii.) ; Therefore (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxiii.), 
 It Cannot Be Stained By The Emotion Envy,  Nor By The Emotion Of 
 Jealousy (V. Xviii. See Definition Of Jealousy,  Iii. Xxxv. Note) 
 ; But,  Contrariwise,  It Must Needs Be The More Fostered,  In 
 Proportion As We Conceive A Greater Number Of Men To Rejoice 
 Therein.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-We Can In The Same Way Show,  That There Is No Emotion 
 Directly Contrary To This Love,  Whereby This Love Can Be 
 Destroyed ; Therefore We May Conclude,  That This Love Towards God 
 Is The Most Constant Of All The Emotions,  And That,  In So Far As 
 It Is Referred To The Body,  It Cannot Be Destroyed,  Unless The 
 Body Be Destroyed Also.  As To Its Nature,  In So Far As It Is 
 Referred To The Mind Only,  We Shall Presently Inquire. 
     I Have Now Gone Through All The Remedies Against The 
 Emotions,  Or All That The Mind,  Considered In Itself Alone,  Can 
 Do Against Them.  Whence It Appears That The Mind's Power Over 
 The Emotions Consists :- 
     I.  In The Actual Knowledge Of The Emotions (V. Iv. Note). 
     Ii. In The Fact That It Separates The Emotions From The 
 Thought Of An External Cause,  Which We Conceive Confusedly (V. 
 Ii. And V. Iv. Note). 
     Iii.  In The Fact,  That,  In Respect To Time,  The Emotions 
 Referred To Things,  Which We Distinctly Understand,  Surpass Those 
 Referred To What We Conceive In A Confused And Fragmentary Manner 
 (V. Vii.). 
     Iv.  In The Number Of Causes Whereby Those Modifications17 
 Are Fostered,  Which Have Regard To The Common Properties Of 
 Things Or To God (V. Ix. Xi.). 
     V.  Lastly,  In The Order Wherein The Mind Can Arrange And 
 Associate,  One With Another,  Its Own Emotions (V. X. Note And 
 Xii. Xiii. Xiv.). 
     But,  In Order That This Power Of The Mind Over The Emotions 
 May Be Better Understood,  It Should Be Specially Observed That 
 The Emotions Are Called By Us Strong,  When We Compare The Emotion 
 Of One Man With The Emotion Of Another,  And See That One Man Is 
 More Troubled Than Another By The Same Emotion ; Or When We Are 
 Comparing The Various Emotions Of The Same Man One With Another, 
 And Find That He Is More Affected Or Stirred By One Emotion Than 
 By Another.  For The Strength Of Every Emotion Is Defined By A 
 Comparison Of Our Own Power With The Power Of An External Cause. 
 Now The Power Of The Mind Is Defined By Knowledge Only,  And Its 
 Infirmity Or Passion Is Defined By The Privation Of Knowledge 
 Only : It Therefore Follows,  That That Mind Is Most Passive, 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 167 
 Whose Greatest Part Is Made Up Of Inadequate Ideas,  So That It 
 May Be Characterized More Readily By Its Passive States Than By 
 Its Activities : On The Other Hand,  That Mind Is Most Active, 
 Whose Greatest Part Is Made Up Of Adequate Ideas,  So That, 
 Although It May Contain As Many Inadequate Ideas As The Former 
 Mind,  It May Yet Be More Easily Characterized By Ideas 
 Attributable To Human Virtue,  Than By Ideas Which Tell Of Human 
 Infirmity.  Again,  It Must Be Observed,  That Spiritual 
 Unhealthiness And Misfortunes Can Generally Be Traced To 
 Excessive Love For Something Which Is Subject To Many Variations, 
 And Which We Can Never Become Masters Of.  For No One Is 
 Solicitous Or Anxious About Anything,  Unless He Loves It ; 
 Neither Do Wrongs,  Suspicions,  Enmities,  &C. Arise,  Except In 
 Regard To Things Whereof No One Can Be Really Master. 
     We May Thus Readily Conceive The Power Which Clear And 
 Distinct Knowledge,  And Especially That Third Kind Of Knowledge 
 (Ii. Xlvii. Note),  Founded On The Actual Knowledge Of God, 
 Possesses Over The Emotions : If It Does Not Absolutely Destroy 
 Them,  In So Far As They Are Passions (V. Iii. And Iv. Note) ; At 
 Any Rate,  It Causes Them To Occupy A Very Small Part Of The Mind 
 (V. Xiv.).  Further,  It Begets A Love Towards A Thing Immutable 
 And Eternal (V. Xv.),  Whereof We May Really Enter Into Possession 
 (Ii. Xlv.) ; Neither Can It Be Defiled With Those Faults Which 
 Are Inherent In Ordinary Love ; But It May Grow From Strength To 
 Strength,  And May Engross The Greater Part Of The Mind,  And 
 Deeply Penetrate It. 
     And Now I Have Finished With All That Concerns This Present 
 Life : For,  As I Said In The Beginning Of This Note,  I Have 
 Briefly Described All The Remedies Against The Emotions.  And 
 This Everyone May Readily Have Seen For Himself,  If He Has 
 Attended To What Is Advanced In The Present Note,  And Also To The 
 Definitions Of The Mind And Its Emotions,  And,  Lastly,  To 
 Propositions I. And Iii. Of Part Iii.  It Is Now,  Therefore,  Time 
 To Pass On To Those Matters,  Which Appertain To The Duration Of 
 The Mind,  Without Relation To The Body. 
   
 Prop. Xxi.  The Mind Can Only Imagine Anything,  Or Remember What 
 Is Past,  While The Body Endures. 
     Proof.-The Mind Does Not Express The Actual Existence Of Its 
 Body,  Nor Does It Imagine The Modifications Of The Body As 
 Actual,  Except While The Body Endures (Ii. Viii. Coroll.) ; And, 
 Consequently (Ii. Xxvi.),  It Does Not Imagine 
 Any Body As Actually Existing,  Except While Its Own Body Endures. 
 Thus It 
 Cannot Imagine Anything (For Definition Of Imagination,  See Ii. 
 Xvii. Note), 
 Or Remember Things Past,  Except While The Body Endures (See 
 Definition Of Memory,  Ii. Xviii. Note).  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxii.  Nevertheless In God There Is Necessarily An Idea, 
 Which Expresses The Essence Of This Or That Human Body Under The 
 Form Of Eternity. 
     Proof.-God Is The Cause,  Not Only Of The Existence Of This Or 
 That Human Body,  But Also Of Its Essence (I. Xxv.).  This 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 168 
 Essence,  Therefore,  Must Necessarily Be Conceived Through The 
 Very Essence Of God (I. Ax. Iv.),  And Be Thus Conceived By A 
 Certain Eternal Necessity (I. Xvi.) ; And This Conception Must 
 Necessarily Exist In God (Ii. Iii.).  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxiii.  The Human Mind Cannot Be Absolutely Destroyed With 
 The Body,  But There Remains Of It Something Which Is Eternal. 
     Proof.-There Is Necessarily In God A Concept Or Idea,  Which 
 Expresses The Essence Of The Human Body (Last Prop.),  Which, 
 Therefore,  Is Necessarily Something Appertaining To The Essence 
 Of The Human Mind (Ii. Xiii.).  But We Have Not Assigned To The 
 Human Mind Any Duration,  Definable By Time,  Except In So Far As 
 It Expresses The Actual Existence Of The Body,  Which Is Explained 
 Through Duration,  And May Be Defined By Time-That Is (Ii. Viii. 
 Coroll.),  We Do Not Assign To It Duration,  Except While The Body 
 Endures.  Yet,  As There Is Something,  Notwithstanding,  Which Is 
 Conceived By A Certain Eternal Necessity Through The Very Essence 
 Of God (Last Prop.) ; This Something,  Which Appertains To The 
 Essence Of The Mind,  Will Necessarily Be Eternal.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-This Idea,  Which Expresses The Essence Of The Body 
 Under The Form Of Eternity,  Is,  As We Have Said,  A Certain Mode 
 Of Thinking,  Which Belongs To The Essence Of The Mind,  And Is 
 Necessarily Eternal.  Yet It Is Not Possible That We Should 
 Remember That We Existed Before Our Body,  For Our Body Can Bear 
 No Trace Of Such Existence,  Neither Can Eternity Be Defined In 
 Terms Of Time,  Or Have Any Relation To Time.  But, 
 Notwithstanding,  We Feel And Know That We Are Eternal.  For The 
 Mind Feels Those Things That It Conceives By Understanding,  No 
 Less Than Those Things That It Remembers.  For The Eyes Of The 
 Mind,  Whereby It Sees And Observes Things,  Are None Other Than 
 Proofs.  Thus,  Although We Do Not Remember That We Existed Before 
 The Body,  Yet We Feel That Our Mind,  In So Far As It Involves The 
 Essence Of The Body,  Under The Form Of Eternity,  Is Eternal,  And 
 That Thus Its Existence Cannot Be Defined In Terms Of Time,  Or 
 Explained Through Duration.  Thus Our Mind Can Only Be Said To 
 Endure,  And Its Existence Can Only Be Defined By A Fixed Time,  In 
 So Far As It Involves The Actual Existence Of The Body.  Thus Far 
 Only Has It The Power Of Determining The Existence Of Things By 
 Time,  And Conceiving Them Under The Category Of Duration. 
   
 Prop. Xxiv.  The More We Understand Particular Things,  The More 
 Do We Understand God. 
     Proof.-This Is Evident From I. Xxv. Coroll. 
   
 Prop. Xxv.  The Highest Endeavour Of The Mind,  And The Highest 
 Virtue Is To Understand Things By The Third Kind Of Knowledge. 
     Proof.-The Third Kind Of Knowledge Proceeds From An Adequate 
 Idea Of Certain Attributes Of God To An Adequate Knowledge Of The 
 Essence Of Things (See Its Definition Ii. Xl. Note. Ii.) ; And, 
 In Proportion As We Understand Things More In This Way,  We Better 
 Understand God (By The Last Prop.) ; Therefore (Iv. Xxviii.) The 
 Highest Virtue Of The Mind,  That Is Iv. Def. Viii.) The Power,  Or 
 Nature,  Or (Iii. Vii.) Highest Endeavour Of The Mind,  Is To 
 Understand Things By The Third Kind Of Knowledge.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 169 
   
 Prop. Xxvi.  In Proportion As The Mind Is More Capable Of 
 Understanding Things By The Third Kind Of Knowledge,  It Desires 
 More To Understand Things By That Kind. 
     Proof-This Is Evident.  For,  In So Far As We Conceive The 
 Mind To Be Capable Of Conceiving Things By This Kind Of 
 Knowledge,  We,  To That Extent,  Conceive It As Determined Thus To 
 Conceive Things ; And Consequently (Def. Of The Emotions,  I.), 
 The Mind Desires So To Do,  In Proportion As It Is More Capable 
 Thereof.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxvii.  From This Third Kind Of Knowledge Arises The 
 Highest Possible Mental Acquiescence. 
     Proof.-The Highest Virtue Of The Mind Is To Know God (Iv. 
 Xxviii.),  Or To Understand Things By The Third Kind Of Knowledge 
 (V. Xxv.),  And This Virtue Is Greater In Proportion As The Mind 
 Knows Things More By The Said Kind Of Knowledge (V. Xxiv.) : 
 Consequently,  He Who Knows Things By This Kind Of Knowledge 
 Passes To The Summit Of Human Perfection,  And Is Therefore (Def. 
 Of The Emotions,  Ii.) Affected By The Highest Pleasure,  Such 
 Pleasure Being Accompanied By The Idea Of Himself And His Own 
 Virtue ; Thus (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxv.),  From This Kind Of 
 Knowledge Arises The Highest Possible Acquiescence.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxviii.  The Endeavour Or Desire To Know Things By The 
 Third Kind Of Knowledge Cannot Arise From The First,  But From The 
 Second Kind Of Knowledge. 
     Proof.-This Proposition Is Self-Evident.  For Whatsoever We 
 Understand Clearly And Distinctly,  We Understand Either Through 
 Itself,  Or Through That Which Is Conceived Through Itself ; That 
 Is,  Ideas Which Are Clear And Distinct In Us,  Or Which Are 
 Referred To The Third Kind Of Knowledge (Ii. Xl. Note. Ii.) 
 Cannot Follow From Ideas That Are Fragmentary And Confused,  And 
 Are Referred To Knowledge Of The First Kind,  But Must Follow From 
 Adequate Ideas,  Or Ideas Of The Second And Third Kind Of 
 Knowledge ; Therefore (Def. Of The Emotions,  I.),  The Desire Of 
 Knowing Things By The Third Kind Of Knowledge Cannot Arise From 
 The First,  But From The Second Kind.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxix.  Whatsoever The Mind Understands Under The Form Of 
 Eternity,  It Does Not Understand By Virtue Of Conceiving The 
 Present Actual Existence Of The Body,  But By Virtue Of Conceiving 
 The Essence Of The Body Under The Form Of Eternity. 
     Proof.-In So Far As The Mind Conceives The Present Existence 
 Of Its Body,  It To That Extent Conceives Duration Which Can Be 
 Determined By Time,  And To That Extent Only Has It The Power Of 
 Conceiving Things In Relation To Time (V. Xxi. Ii. Xxvi.).  But 
 Eternity Cannot Be Explained In Terms Of Duration (I. Def. Viii. 
 And Explanation).  Therefore To This Extent The Mind Has Not The 
 Power Of Conceiving Things Under The Form Of Eternity,  But It 
 Possesses Such Power,  Because It Is Of The Nature Of Reason To 
 Conceive Things Under The Form Of Eternity (Ii. Xliv. Coroll. 
 Ii.),  And Also Because It Is Of The Nature Of The Mind To 
 Conceive The Essence Of The Body Under The Form Of Eternity (V. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 170 
 Xxiii.),  For Besides These Two There Is Nothing Which Belongs To 
 The Essence Of Mind (Ii. Xiii.).  Therefore This Power Of 
 Conceiving Things Under The Form Of Eternity Only Belongs To The 
 Mind In Virtue Of The Mind's Conceiving The Essence Of The Body 
 Under The Form Of Eternity.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Things Are Conceived By Us As Actual In Two Ways ; 
 Either As Existing 
 In Relation To A Given Time And Place,  Or As Contained In God And 
 Following 
 From The Necessity Of The Divine Nature.  Whatsoever We Conceive 
 In This 
 Second Way As True Or Real,  We Conceive Under The Form Of 
 Eternity,  And 
 Their Ideas Involve The Eternal And Infinite Essence Of God,  As 
 We Showed 
 In Ii. Xlv. And Note,  Which See. 
   
 Prop. Xxx.  Our Mind,  In So Far As It Knows Itself And The Body 
 Under The Form Of Eternity,  Has To That Extent Necessarily A 
 Knowledge Of God,  And Knows That It Is In God,  And Is Conceived 
 Through God. 
     Proof.-Eternity Is The Very Essence Of God,  In So Far As This 
 Involves Necessary Existence (I. Def. Viii.).  Therefore To 
 Conceive Things Under The Form Of Eternity,  Is To Conceive Things 
 In So Far As They Are Conceived Through The Essence Of God As 
 Real Entities,  Or In So Far As They Involve Existence Through The 
 Essence Of God ; Wherefore Our Mind,  In So Far As It Conceives 
 Itself And The Body Under The Form Of Eternity,  Has To That 
 Extent Necessarily A Knowledge Of God,  And Knows,  &C.  Q.E.D. 
   
 Prop. Xxxi.  The Third Kind Of Knowledge Depends On The Mind,  As 
 Its Formal Cause,  In So Far As The Mind Itself Is Eternal. 
     Proof.-The Mind Does Not Conceive Anything Under The Form Of 
 Eternity,  Except In So Far As It Conceives Its Own Body Under The 
 Form Of Eternity (V. Xxix.) ; That Is,  Except In So Far As It Is 
 Eternal (V. Xxi. Xxiii.) ; Therefore (By The Last Prop.),  In So 
 Far As It Is Eternal,  It Possesses The Knowledge Of God,  Which 
 Knowledge Is Necessarily Adequate (Ii. Xlvi.) ; Hence The Mind, 
 In So Far As It Is Eternal,  Is Capable Of Knowing Everything 
 Which Can Follow From This Given Knowledge Of God (Ii. Xl.),  In 
 Other Words,  Of Knowing Things By The Third Kind Of Knowledge 
 (See Def. In Ii. Xl. Note. Ii.),  Whereof Accordingly The Mind 
 (Iii. Def. I.),  In So Far As It Is Eternal,  Is The Adequate Or 
 Formal Cause Of Such Knowledge.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-In Proportion,  Therefore,  As A Man Is More Potent In 
 This Kind Of Knowledge,  He Will Be More Completely Conscious Of 
 Himself And Of God ; In Other Words,  He Will Be More Perfect And 
 Blessed,  As Will Appear More Clearly In The Sequel.  But We Must 
 Here Observe That,  Although We Are Already Certain That The Mind 
 Is Eternal,  In So Far As It Conceives Things Under The Form Of 
 Eternity,  Yet,  In Order That What We Wish To Show May Be More 
 Readily Explained And Better Understood,  We Will Consider The 
 Mind Itself,  As Though It Had Just Begun To Exist And To 
 Understand Things Under The Form Of Eternity,  As Indeed We Have 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 171 
 Done Hitherto ; This We May Do Without Any Danger Of Error,  So 
 Long As We Are Careful Not To Draw Any Conclusion,  Unless Our 
 Premisses Are Plain. 
   
 Prop. Xxxii.  Whatsoever We Understand By The Third Kind Of 
 Knowledge,  We Take Delight In,  And Our Delight Is Accompanied By 
 The Idea Of God As Cause. 
     Proof.-From This Kind Of Knowledge Arises The Highest 
 Possible Mental Acquiescence,  That Is (Def Of The Emotions, 
 Xxv.),  Pleasure,  And This Acquiescence Is Accompanied By The Idea 
 Of The Mind Itself (V. Xxvii.),  And Consequently (V. Xxx.) The 
 Idea Also Of God As Cause.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-From The Third Kind Of Knowledge Necessarily 
 Arises The Intellectual Love Of God.  From This Kind Of Knowledge 
 Arises Pleasure Accompanied By The Idea Of God As Cause,  That Is 
 (Def. Of The Emotions,  Vi.),  The Love Of God ; Not In So Far As 
 We Imagine Him As Present (V. Xxix.),  But In So Far As We 
 Understand Him To Be Eternal ; This Is What I Call The 
 Intellectual Love Of God. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiii.  The Intellectual Love Of God,  Which Arises From 
 The Third Kind Of Knowledge,  Is Eternal. 
     Proof.-The Third Kind Of Knowledge Is Eternal (V. Xxxi. I. 
 Ax. Iii.) ; Therefore (By The Same Axiom) The Love Which Arises 
 Therefrom Is Also Necessarily Eternal.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Although This Love Towards God Has (By The Foregoing 
 Prop.) No Beginning,  It Yet Possesses All The Perfections Of 
 Love,  Just As Though It Had Arisen As We Feigned In The Coroll. 
 Of The Last Prop.  Nor Is There Here Any Difference,  Except That 
 The Mind Possesses As Eternal Those Same Perfections Which We 
 Feigned To Accrue To It,  And They Are Accompanied By The Idea Of 
 God As Eternal Cause.  If Pleasure Consists In The Transition To 
 A Greater Perfection,  Assuredly Blessedness Must Consist In The 
 Mind Being Endowed With Perfection Itself. 
   
 Prop. Xxxiv.  The Mind Is,  Only While The Body Endures,  Subject 
 To Those Emotions Which Are Attributable To Passions. 
     Proof.-Imagination Is The Idea Wherewith The Mind 
 Contemplates A Thing As Present (Ii. Xvii. Note) ; Yet This Idea 
 Indicates Rather The Present Disposition Of The Human Body Than 
 The Nature Of The External Thing (Ii. Xvi. Coroll. Ii.). 
 Therefore Emotion (See General Def. Of Emotions) Is Imagination, 
 In So Far As It Indicates The Present Disposition Of The Body ; 
 Therefore (V. Xxi.) The Mind Is,  Only While The Body Endures, 
 Subject To Emotions Which Are Attributable To Passions.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That No Love Save Intellectual 
 Love Is Eternal. 
     Note.-If We Look To Men's General Opinion,  We Shall See That 
 They Are Indeed Conscious Of The Eternity Of Their Mind,  But That 
 They Confuse Eternity With Duration,  And Ascribe It To The 
 Imagination Or The Memory Which They Believe To Remain After 
 Death. 
   
 Prop. Xxxv.  God Loves Himself With An Infinite Intellectual 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 172 
 Love. 
     Proof.-God Is Absolutely Infinite (I. Def. Vi.),  That Is (Ii. 
 Def. Vi.),  The Nature Of God Rejoices In Infinite Perfection ; 
 And Such Rejoicing Is (Ii. Iii.) Accompanied By The Idea Of 
 Himself,  That Is (I. Xi. And Def. I.),  The Idea Of His Own Cause 
 : Now This Is What We Have (In V. Xxxii. Coroll.) Described As 
 Intellectual Love. 
   
 Prop. Xxxvi.  The Intellectual Love Of The Mind Towards God Is 
 That Very Love Of God Whereby God Loves Himself,  Not In So Far As 
 He Is Infinite,  But In So Far As He Can Be Explained Through The 
 Essence Of The Human Mind Regarded Under The Form Of Eternity ; 
 In Other Words,  The Intellectual Love Of The Mind Towards God Is 
 Part Of The Infinite Love Wherewith God Loves Himself. 
     Proof.-This Love Of The Mind Must Be Referred To The 
 Activities Of The Mind (V. Xxxii. Coroll. And Iii. Iii.) ; It Is 
 Itself,  Indeed,  An Activity Whereby The Mind Regards Itself 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of God As Cause (V. Xxxii. And Coroll.) ; 
 That Is (I. Xxv. Coroll. And Ii. Xi. Coroll.),  An Activity 
 Whereby God,  In So Far As He Can Be Explained Through The Human 
 Mind,  Regards Himself Accompanied By The Idea Of Himself ; 
 Therefore (By The Last Prop.),  This Love Of The Mind Is Part Of 
 The Infinite Love Wherewith God Loves Himself.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That God,  In So Far As He Loves 
 Himself,  Loves Man,  And,  Consequently,  That The Love Of God 
 Towards Men,  And The Intellectual Love Of The Mind Towards God 
 Are Identical. 
     Note.-From What Has Been Said We Clearly Understand,  Wherein 
 Our Salvation,  Or Blessedness,  Or Freedom,  Consists : Namely,  In 
 The Constant And Eternal Love Towards God,  Or In God's Love 
 Towards Men.  This Love Or Blessedness Is,  In The Bible,  Called 
 Glory,  And Not Undeservedly.  For Whether This Love Be Referred 
 To God Or To The Mind,  It May Rightly Be Called Acquiescence Of 
 Spirit,  Which (Def. Of The Emotions,  Xxv. Xxx.) Is Not Really 
 Distinguished From Glory.  In So Far As It Is Referred To God,  It 
 Is (V. Xxxv.) Pleasure,  If We May Still Use That Term, 
 Accompanied By The Idea Of Itself,  And,  In So Far As It Is 
 Referred To The Mind,  It Is The Same (V. Xxvii.). 
     Again,  Since The Essence Of Our Mind Consists Solely In 
 Knowledge,  Whereof The Beginning And The Foundation Is God (I. 
 Xv.,  And Ii. Xlvii. Note),  It Becomes Clear To Us,  In What Manner 
 And Way Our Mind,  As To Its Essence And Existence,  Follows From 
 The Divine Nature And Constantly Depends On God.  I Have Thought 
 It Worth While Here To Call Attention To This,  In Order To Show 
 By This Example How The Knowledge Of Particular Things,  Which I 
 Have Called Intuitive Or Of The Third Kind (Ii. Xl. Note. Ii.), 
 Is Potent,  And More Powerful Than The Universal Knowledge,  Which 
 I Have Styled Knowledge Of The Second Kind.  For,  Although In 
 Part I. I Showed In General Terms,  That All Things (And 
 Consequently,  Also,  The Human Mind) Depend As To Their Essence 
 And Existence On God,  Yet That Demonstration,  Though Legitimate 
 And Placed Beyond The Chances Of Doubt,  Does Not Affect Our Mind 
 So Much,  As When The Same Conclusion Is Derived From The Actual 
 Essence Of Some Particular Thing,  Which We Say Depends On God. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 173 
   
 Prop. Xxxvii.  There Is Nothing In Nature,  Which Is Contrary To 
 This Intellectual Love,  Or Which Can Take It Away. 
     Proof.-This Intellectual Love Follows Necessarily From The 
 Nature Of The Mind,  In So Far As The Latter Is Regarded Through 
 The Nature Of God As An Eternal Truth (V. Xxxiii. And Xxix.). 
 If,  Therefore,  There Should Be Anything Which Would Be Contrary 
 To This Love,  That Thing Would Be Contrary To That Which Is True 
 ; Consequently,  That,  Which Should Be Able To Take Away This 
 Love,  Would Cause That Which Is True To Be False ; An Obvious 
 Absurdity.  Therefore There Is Nothing In Nature Which,  &C. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-The Axiom Of Part Iv. Has Reference To Particular 
 Things,  In So Far As They Are Regarded In Relation To A Given 
 Time And Place : Of This,  I Think,  No One Can Doubt. 
   
 Prop. Xxxviii.  In Proportion As The Mind Understands More Things 
 By The Second And Third Kind Of Knowledge,  It Is Less Subject To 
 Those Emotions Which Are Evil,  And Stands In Less Fear Of Death. 
     Proof.-The Mind's Essence Consists In Knowledge (Ii. Xi.) ; 
 Therefore,  In Proportion As The Mind Understands More Things By 
 The Second And Third Kinds Of Knowledge,  The Greater Will Be The 
 Part Of It That Endures (V. Xxix. And Xxiii.),  And,  Consequently 
 (By The Last Prop.),  The Greater Will Be The Part That Is Not 
 Touched By The Emotions,  Which Are Contrary To Our Nature,  Or In 
 Other Words,  Evil (Iv. Xxx.).  Thus,  In Proportion As The Mind 
 Understands More Things By The Second And Third Kinds Of 
 Knowledge,  The Greater Will Be The Part Of It,  That Remains 
 Unimpaired,  And,  Consequently,  Less Subject To Emotions,  &C. 
 Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Hence We Understand That Point Which I Touched On In 
 Iv. Xxxix. Note,  And Which I Promised To Explain In This Part ; 
 Namely,  That Death Becomes Less Hurtful,  In Proportion As The 
 Mind's Clear And Distinct Knowledge Is Greater,  And, 
 Consequently,  In Proportion As The Mind Loves God More.  Again, 
 Since From The Third Kind Of Knowledge Arises The Highest 
 Possible Acquiescence (V. Xxvii.),  It Follows That The Human Mind 
 Can Attain To Being Of Such A Nature,  That The Part Thereof Which 
 We Have Shown To Perish With The Body (V. Xxi.) Should Be Of 
 Little Importance When Compared With The Part Which Endures.  But 
 I Will Soon Treat Of The Subject At Greater Length. 
   
 Prop. Xxxix.  He,  Who Possesses A Body Capable Of The Greatest 
 Number Of Activities,  Possesses A Mind Whereof The Greatest Part 
 Is Eternal. 
     Proof.-He,  Who Possesses A Body Capable Of The Greatest 
 Number Of Activities,  Is Least Agitated By Those Emotions Which 
 Are Evil (Iv. Xxxviii.)-That Is (Iv. Xxx.),  By Those Emotions 
 Which Are Contrary To Our Nature ; Therefore (V. X.),  He 
 Possesses The Power Of Arranging And Associating The 
 Modifications Of The Body According To The Intellectual Order, 
 And,  Consequently,  Of Bringing It About,  That All The 
 Modifications Of The Body Should Be Referred To The Idea Of God ; 
 Whence It Will Come To Pass That (V. Xv.) He Will Be Affected 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 174 
 With Love Towards God,  Which (V. Xvi.) Must Occupy Or Constitute 
 The Chief Part Of The Mind ; Therefore (V. Xxxiii.),  Such A Man 
 Will Possess A Mind Whereof The Chief Part Is Eternal.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Since Human Bodies Are Capable Of The Greatest Number 
 Of Activities,  There Is No Doubt But That They May Be Of Such A 
 Nature,  That They May Be Referred To Minds Possessing A Great 
 Knowledge Of Themselves And Of God,  And Whereof The Greatest Or 
 Chief Part Is Eternal,  And,  Therefore,  That They Should Scarcely 
 Fear Death.  But,  In Order That This May Be Understood More 
 Clearly,  We Must Here Call To Mind,  That We Live In A State Of 
 Perpetual Variation,  And,  According As We Are Changed For The 
 Better Or The Worse,  We Are Called Happy Or Unhappy. 
     For He,  Who,  From Being An Infant Or A Child,  Becomes A 
 Corpse,  Is Called Unhappy ; Whereas It Is Set Down To Happiness, 
 If We Have Been Able To Live Through The Whole Period Of Life 
 With A Sound Mind In A Sound Body.  And,  In Reality,  He,  Who,  As 
 In The Case Of An Infant Or A Child,  Has A Body Capable Of Very 
 Few Activities,  And Depending,  For The Most Part,  On External 
 Causes,  Has A Mind Which,  Considered In Itself Alone,  Is Scarcely 
 Conscious Of Itself,  Or Of God,  Or Of Things ; Whereas,  He,  Who 
 Has A Body Capable Of Very Many Activities,  Has A Mind Which, 
 Considered In Itself Alone,  Is Highly Conscious Of Itself,  Of 
 God,  And Of Things.  In This Life,  Therefore,  We Primarily 
 Endeavour To Bring It About,  That The Body Of A Child,  In So Far 
 As Its Nature Allows And Conduces Thereto,  May Be Changed Into 
 Something Else Capable Of Very Many Activities,  And Referable To 
 A Mind Which Is Highly Conscious Of Itself,  Of God,  And Of Things 
 ; And We Desire So To Change It,  That What Is Referred To Its 
 Imagination And Memory May Become Insignificant,  In Comparison 
 With Its Intellect,  As I Have Already Said In The Note To The 
 Last Proposition. 
   
 Prop. Xl.  In Proportion As Each Thing Possesses More Of 
 Perfection,  So Is It More Active,  And Less Passive ; And,  Vice 
 Versâ,  In Proportion As It Is More Active,  So Is It More Perfect. 
     Proof.-In Proportion As Each Thing Is More Perfect,  It 
 Possesses More Of Reality (Ii. Def. Vi.),  And,  Consequently (Iii. 
 Iii. And Note),  It Is To That Extent More Active And Less 
 Passive.  This Demonstration May Be Reversed,  And Thus Prove 
 That,  In Proportion As A Thing Is More Active,  So Is It More 
 Perfect.  Q.E.D. 
     Corollary.-Hence It Follows That The Part Of The Mind Which 
 Endures,  Be It Great Or Small,  Is More Perfect Than The Rest. 
 For The Eternal Part Of The Mind (V. Xxiii. Xxix.) Is The 
 Understanding,  Through Which Alone We Are Said To Act (Iii. Iii.) 
 ; The Part Which We Have Shown To Perish Is The Imagination (V. 
 Xxi.),  Through Which Only We Are Said To Be Passive (Iii. Iii. 
 And General Def. Of The Emotions) ; Therefore,  The Former,  Be It 
 Great Or Small,  Is More Perfect Than The Latter.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-Such Are The Doctrines Which I Had Purposed To Set 
 Forth Concerning The Mind,  In So Far As It Is Regarded Without 
 Relation To The Body ; Whence,  As Also From I. Xxi. And Other 
 Places,  It Is Plain That Our Mind,  In So Far As It Understands, 
 Is An Eternal Mode Of Thinking,  Which Is Determined By Another 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 175 
 Eternal Mode Of Thinking,  And This Other By A Third,  And So On To 
 Infinity ; So That All Taken Together At Once Constitute The 
 Eternal And Infinite Intellect Of God. 
   
 Prop. Xli.  Even If We Did Not Know That Our Mind Is Eternal,  We 
 Should Still Consider As Of Primary Importance Piety And 
 Religion,  And Generally All Things Which,  In Part Iv.,  We Showed 
 To Be Attributable To Courage And High-Mindedness. 
     Proof.-The First And Only Foundation Of Virtue,  Or The Rule 
 Of Right Living Is (Iv. Xxii. Coroll. And Xxiv.) Seeking One's 
 Own True Interest.  Now,  While We Determined What Reason 
 Prescribes As Useful,  We Took No Account Of The Mind's Eternity, 
 Which Has Only Become Known To Us In This Fifth Part.  Although 
 We Were Ignorant At That Time That The Mind Is Eternal,  We 
 Nevertheless Stated That The Qualities Attributable To Courage 
 And High-Mindedness Are Of Primary Importance.  Therefore,  Even 
 If We Were Still Ignorant Of This Doctrine,  We Should Yet Put The 
 Aforesaid Precepts Of Reason In The First Place.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-The General Belief Of The Multitude Seems To Be 
 Different.  Most People Seem To Believe That They Are Free,  In So 
 Far As They May Obey Their Lusts,  And That They Cede Their 
 Rights,  In So Far As They Are Bound To Live According To The 
 Commandments Of The Divine Law.  They Therefore Believe That 
 Piety,  Religion,  And,  Generally,  All Things Attributable To 
 Firmness Of Mind,  Are Burdens,  Which,  After Death,  They Hope To 
 Lay Aside,  And To Receive The Reward For Their Bondage,  That Is, 
 For Their Piety And Religion ; It Is Not Only By This Hope,  But 
 Also,  And Chiefly,  By The Fear Of Being Horribly Punished After 
 Death,  That They Are Induced To Live According To The Divine 
 Commandments,  So Far As Their Feeble And Infirm Spirit Will Carry 
 Them. 
     If Men Had Not This Hope And This Fear,  But Believed That The 
 Mind Perishes With The Body,  And That No Hope Of Prolonged Life 
 Remains For The Wretches Who Are Broken Down With The Burden Of 
 Piety,  They Would Return To Their Own Inclinations,  Controlling 
 Everything In Accordance With Their Lusts,  And Desiring To Obey 
 Fortune Rather Than Themselves.  Such A Course Appears To Me Not 
 Less Absurd Than If A Man,  Because He Does Not Believe That He 
 Can By Wholesome Food Sustain His Body For Ever,  Should Wish To 
 Cram Himself With Poisons And Deadly Fare ; Or If,  Because He 
 Sees That The Mind Is Not Eternal Or Immortal,  He Should Prefer 
 To Be Out Of His Mind Altogether,  And To Live Without The Use Of 
 Reason ; These Ideas Are So Absurd As To Be Scarcely Worth 
 Refuting. 
   
 Prop. Xlii.  Blessedness Is Not The Reward Of Virtue,  But Virtue 
 Itself  ; Neither Do We Rejoice Therein,  Because We Control Our 
 Lusts,  But,  Contrariwise,  Because We Rejoice Therein,  We Are Able 
 To Control Our Lusts. 
     Proof.-Blessedness Consists In Love Towards God (V. Xxxvi And 
 Note),  Which Love Springs From The Third Kind Of Knowledge (V. 
 Xxxii. Coroll.) ; Therefore This Love (Iii. Iii. Lix.) Must Be 
 Referred To The Mind,  In So Far As The Latter Is Active ; 
 Therefore (Iv. Def. Viii.) It Is Virtue Itself.  This Was Our 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 176 
 First Point.  Again,  In Proportion As The Mind Rejoices More In 
 This Divine Love Or Blessedness,  So Does It The More Understand 
 (V. Xxxii.) ; That Is (V. Iii. Coroll.),  So Much The More Power 
 Has It Over The Emotions,  And (V. Xxxviii.) So Much The Less Is 
 It Subject To Those Emotions Which Are Evil ; Therefore,  In 
 Proportion As The Mind Rejoices In This Divine Love Or 
 Blessedness,  So Has It The Power Of Controlling Lusts.  And, 
 Since Human Power In Controlling The Emotions Consists Solely In 
 The Understanding,  It Follows That No One Rejoices In 
 Blessedness,  Because He Has Controlled His Lusts,  But, 
 Contrariwise,  His Power Of Controlling His Lusts Arises From This 
 Blessedness Itself.  Q.E.D. 
     Note.-I Have Thus Completed All I Wished To Set Forth 
 Touching The Mind's Power Over The Emotions And The Mind's 
 Freedom.  Whence It Appears,  How Potent Is The Wise Man,  And How 
 Much He Surpasses The Ignorant Man,  Who Is Driven Only By His 
 Lusts.  For The Ignorant Man Is Not Only Distracted In Various 
 Ways By External Causes Without Ever Gaining The True 
 Acquiescence Of His Spirit,  But Moreover Lives,  As It Were 
 Unwitting Of Himself,  And Of God,  And Of Things,  And As Soon As 
 He Ceases To Suffer,  Ceases Also To Be. 
     Whereas The Wise Man,  In So Far As He Is Regarded As Such,  Is 
 Scarcely At All Disturbed In Spirit,  But,  Being Conscious Of 
 Himself,  And Of God,  And Of Things,  By A Certain Eternal 
 Necessity,  Never Ceases To Be,  But Always Possesses True 
 Acquiescence Of His Spirit. 
     If The Way Which I Have Pointed Out As Leading To This Result 
 Seems Exceedingly Hard,  It May Nevertheless Be Discovered.  Needs 
 Must It Be Hard,  Since It Is So Seldom Found.  How Would It Be 
 Possible,  If Salvation Were Ready To Our Hand,  And Could Without 
 Great Labour Be Found,  That It Should Be By Almost All Men 
 Neglected? But All Things Excellent Are As Difficult As They Are 
 Rare. 
   
   
   
   
 End Of The Ethics By Benedict De Spinoza 
   
 1 "Affectiones" 
 2 "Forma" 
 3 "Animata" 
 4 A Baconian Phrase.  Nov. Org. Aph. 100.  [Pollock,  P. 126,  N.] 
 5 Conscientiæ Morsus-Thus Rendered By Mr. Pollock. 
 6 By "Men" In This And The Following Propositions,  I Mean Men 
 Whom We Regard Without Any Particular Emotion. 
 7 So Van Vloten And Bruder.  The Dutch Version And Camerer Read, 
 "An Internal Cause."  "Honor" = Gloria. 
 8 See Previous Endnote. 
 9 Ovid,  "Amores," Ii. Xix. 4,5.  Spinoza Transposes The Verses. 
     "Speremus Pariter,  Pariter Metuamus Amantes ; 
       Ferreus Est,  Si Quis,  Quod Sinit Alter,  Amat." 
 10 This Is Possible,  Though The Human Mind Is Part Of The Divine 
 Intellect,  As I Have Shown In Ii.Xiii.Note. 
 
 
 
 Book Name (The Ethics ) Part 5 ( Of The Power Of The Understanding,  Or Of Human Freedom) Propositions Pg 177 
 11 Gloria. 
 12 Ov. Met. Vii.20,  "Video Meliora Proboque,  Deteriora Sequor." 
 13 Honestas 
 14 Land Reads : "Quod Ipsius Agendi Potentia Juvatur"-Which I 
 Have Translated Above.  He Suggests As Alternative Readings To 
 `Quod',  'Quo' (= Whereby) And 'Quodque' (= And That). 
 15 "Maltim Praesens Minus Prae Majori Futuro." (Van Vloten).  
 Bruder Reads : "Malum Praesens Minus,  Quod Causa Est Faturi 
 Alicujus Mali." The Last Word Of The Latter Is An Obvious 
 Misprint,  And Is Corrected By The Dutch Translator Into "Majoris 
 Boni." (Pollock,  P. 268,  Note.) 
 16 Continuo.  Rendered "Constantly" By Mr. Pollock On The Ground 
 That The Classical Meaning Of The Word Does Not Suit The Context. 
 I Venture To Think,  However,  That A Tolerable Sense May Be 
 Obtained Without Doing Violence To Spinoza's Scholarship. 
 17 Affectiones.  Camerer Reads Affectus - Emotions. 
   
   
 
 
 Publication Date: May 29th 2014 https://www.bookrix.com/-whdbd538e463635