 Weber, by contrast, is famous for assigning the decisive role in the explanation of social facts to the intentional attitudes of individuals. He claims that many social situations are situations of strategic interdependence between individual decisions. In such situations, fully rational agents choose their preferred course of action on the basis of what they cognitively expect other agents to do. However, Weber is well aware of the fact that where dependence of each participant’s choice on his or her expectation concerning the other’s behavior is out in the open, the situation becomes unstable. In addressing this issue, Weber discusses the case in which people act on the assumption of being in agreement with other agents, which then enables them to have normative expectations concerning each other’s behavior. This is a decisive step beyond what has later become known as rational choice theory. Such agents do not choose according to what they think to be best given what they think others are likely to do; rather, they rely on others to do what they ought to do. This need not, Weber claims, be a matter of explicit agreement, but may be grounded in a sense of the agent’s shared aims (and thus, we would now say, in collective intentionality). However, such action orientation appears as not fully rational in Weber’s conception (Weber 1922). Weber’s conception thus foreshadows the neglect of collective intentions and actions in later rational choice and game theory. 