 In contrast, whatever the merit of the correspondence theory of truth, it could not ground a theory of knowledge that could explain why why the attainment of truth should make a difference in human affairs. In such theories, as truth is a matter of statements “mirroring” or “copying” reality, knowledge is not connected with the human ability to experimentally alter the environment. Here Hook remained faithful to the early pragmatism of Peirce and James, which featured a standard criticism of the correspondence theory as presupposing human beings as “passive spectators” whose role in knowledge is that of mirroring the objects and events of the environment in which the knower finds himself. The pragmatist indictment was that the correspondence theory of truth relegated the knower to the role of “passive spectator” in a completed universe, an image that is at odds with the success of experimental scientific inquiry. Picking up on themes in Dewey’s work on experimental method, Hook argued that knowledge is best conceived as an instrument for human prediction and control of the environment. This remained a significant pragmatist insight to be recognized even in the context of later and more sophisticated interpretations of the correspondence theory, like Alfred Tarski’s “semantic theory of truth.” Despite the pragmatic criticism of the correspondence theory, Dewey, Hook and other pragmatists like C.I. Lewis recognized the legitimacy of the goal of this theory in its aspiration to realize a connection between human language about the world and the facts of the world, or between linguistic assertions and what actually “is the case” in the world.