 It is hard to believe we could ever be certain we have Ross’s prima facie duties. Ross himself gives reasons for doubt. As noted, in RG he says in his original discussion of prima facie duties we have a prima facie duty of justice (pleasure apportioned to virtue) (RG 21). A duty of this sort would in some way constrain our duty of beneficence. A few pages later he revises his view and says justice is not a duty, but a good that ought to be promoted as a part of our obligation of beneficence in which case it would not constrain our duty of beneficence (RG 27). But Ross is less than clear about exactly what he thinks. After it seems he has settled on the idea justice is a good he seems to suggest he is not fully convinced saying again justice is a duty (RG 35; for the same view, see FE 71–72). This suggests uncertainty about a prima facie duty justice. And we may have similar uncertainties about the status of other duties, including the prima facie duty of fidelity to promises. We may be uncertain whether or not the duty to keep one’s promises constrains the duty of beneficence (for discussion, see Phillips 2019, 186–87).