 If there is an intentional condition, even guidance by implicit rules would seem to require prior mental states with intentional content. A much-discussed question is whether this leads back into vicious regress. This question would seem to arise not only for those who think that thought depends on language, or that thought and language are interdependent, but also for any kind of guidance normativism about mental content (cf. Boghossian 1989a; 2008). For instance, if having a contentful intentional state is itself a matter of being guided by a content determining rule, then another intentional state is required for having the first one, and so on ad  infinitum.[35]  It has therefore been argued that according to Wittgenstein there must be a basic form of rule following that is not subject to any intentional condition, but “blind” (Wright 2007; see also García-Carpintero 2012). Alternatively, it has been argued that therefore the late Wittgenstein did not conceive of meaningful use of language as rule guided anymore (Glüer &amp; Wikforss 2010a). Boghossian (2008: 493f) provides an independent, general argument against an intentional condition on rule guidance. He argues that the relevant intentional state would be a state with general (prescriptive) content, and that acting under particular circumstances on an intentional state with general content always involves some sort of inference. Inference itself, however, essentially involves following a rule, and thus a regress—reminiscent of that familiar from Lewis Carroll (1895)—ensues. In response, the assumption that inference is essentially rule guided has been questioned (cf. Glüer &amp; Wikforss 2010a). Miller (2015) offers a different response; he contends that Wittgensteinian “blindness” does not amount to giving up on the intentional condition, but to denying that application of a general rule to a particular case involves inference. Blind rule-following, Miller suggests, is to be construed in terms of a causal connection between rule-acceptance and application, where the former causes the latter “in the right kind of way” (2015:  411ff).[36]