 Katz (1987) claimed that this approach was superior in both transparency and richness to the analysis of word meaning that could be provided via meaning postulates. For example, in Katzian semantics the validation of conditionals such as \(\forall x\forall y (\textrm{chase}(x, y) \to \textrm{follow}(x,y))\) could be reduced to a matter of inspection: one had simply to check whether the semantic marker of ‘follow’ was a subtree of the semantic marker of ‘chase’. Furthermore, the method incorporated syntagmatic relations in the representation of word meanings (witness the grammatical tags ‘NP’, ‘VP’ and ‘S’ attached to the conceptual components above). Katzian semantics was favorably received by the Generative Semantics movement (Fodor 1977; Newmeyer 1980) and boosted an interest in the formal representation of word meaning that would dominate the linguistic scene for decades to come (Harris 1993). Nonetheless, it was eventually abandoned. As subsequent commentators noted, Katzian semantics suffered from three important drawbacks. First, the theory did not provide any clear model of how the complex conceptual information represented by semantic markers contributed to the truth conditions of sentences (Lewis 1972). Second, some aspects of word meaning that could be easily represented with meaning postulates could not be expressed through semantic markers, such as the symmetry and the transitivity of predicates    (e.g., \(\forall x\forall y (\textrm{sibling}(x, y) \to \textrm{sibling}(y, x))\) or \(\forall x\forall y\forall z (\textrm{louder}(x, y) \mathbin{\&amp;} \textrm{louder}(y, z) \to \textrm{louder}(x, z))\); see Dowty 1979).   Third, Katz’s arguments for the view that word meanings are intrinsically structured turned out to be vulnerable to objections from proponents of atomistic views of word meaning (see, most notably, Fodor &amp; Lepore 1992).