 The first is largely due to Wegner’s work on the “model of apparent mental causation” (Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Wegner 2002). According to this view, the sense of agency (or the “experience of conscious will”, as Wegner called it) arises when we interpret a conscious intention to perform a certain action as its cause. It says, in particular, that an agent interprets an intention as the cause of an action when the following conditions obtain: the intention proximately precedes the action, the action is consistent with the intention, and the agent is not aware of any factors that could provide an alternative explanation. Wegner’s argument for the model of apparent mental causation is based on various experiments, studies, and observations concerning illusions of control and failures in the ascription of agency. This work initiated the empirical study of the sense of agency, but Wegner’s model is now widely rejected. Philosophers have criticized the view for various conceptual ambiguities and flaws in the interpretation and use of the evidence (Nahmias 2002; Bayne 2006; Dennett 2008; and Mele 2009a, for instance). Moreover, there is now plenty of empirical evidence to suggest that the sense of agency is not merely a matter of self-interpretation (Haggard 2005; Bayne and Pacherie 2007; Gallagher 2007; and Synofzik et al. 2008).