 Jones thus solves a problem that must be faced by anyone espousing the view that predication is, at root, identity. If assertively uttering a sentence exemplifying ‘S is P’ is construed as asserting a proposition that A is A, then we fail to capture the point of the assertion. The assertion appears significant and informative; yet the content is trifling—something about which we can hardly be “informed”. If we take the general form of assertion to be an informative identity—to be “an identity of denotation in diversity of intension”—then the problem disappears. The solution, of course, applies to the cases that interested Frege—sentences that are explicitly of the form A = A. Indeed, Jones’s proposal here is in rough outline that of Frege (1892). (See the entry on  Frege—in  particular, the section  Frege’s Philosophy of Language.)  