 This entry suggests that evaluating the merits of consequentializing is similarly complex. First, there’s no consequentializing tout court, but only three different types of consequentializing. Objections that apply to one don’t necessarily apply to the others. Second, each type of consequentializing has a different motivation. So, there’s no way to assess whether consequentializing is, in general, unmotivated. We can assess only whether a particular type of consequentializing is unmotivated. And, in the case of earnest consequentializing, this is further complicated by the fact that earnest consequentializers offer different motivations for different moves—e.g., the idea that we have a special responsibility for our own agency as a motivation for why agents should prefer that others rather than themselves violate agent-centered restrictions. Third, there are two different procedures for consequentializing a non-consequentialist theory. And this means that we can’t just assess whether, in general, consequentializing produces a gimmicky theory. We must instead look at whether either of these two procedures produces a gimmicky theory.