 Instead, Tarski proposed that the truth predicate for a language is to be found only in an expanded metalanguage. For instance, one starts with an interpreted language \(\mathcal{L}_0\) that contains no truth predicate. One then ‘steps up’ to an expanded language \(\mathcal{L}_1\), which contains a truth predicate, but one that only applies to sentences of \(\mathcal{L}_0\). With this restriction, it is easy enough to define a truth predicate which completely accurately states the truth values of every sentence in \(\mathcal{L}_0\), obeys capture and release, and yields no paradox. Of course, this process does not stop. If we want to describe truth in \(\mathcal{L}_1\), we need to step up to \(\mathcal{L}_2\) to get a truth predicate for \(\mathcal{L}_1\). And so on. The process goes on indefinitely. At each stage, a new classical interpreted language is produced, which expresses truth for languages below it. (For more on the mathematics of this sort of hierarchy of languages, see Halbach (1997).)