 You might think that, if \([P]\), \([P'],\) … grounds \([Q],\) then part of what it is to \([Q]\) is that if \([P],\) \([P'],\) … obtains then \([Q]\) obtains. As Fine (2012a) notes, however, there are potential counterexamples. While [Socrates is a philosopher] grounds [Someone is a philosopher], on the face of it no essential truth about the latter encodes information about Socrates in particular. One possibility is to weaken the proposal so that the essential truths may characterize either \([P],\) \([P'],\) … or \([Q]\). (A further consideration is whether we should understand this principle as allowing for the relevant essential truths to be irreducibly collective.) Fine (2012a) takes a different route, claiming that, whenever some facts ground another fact, there will be some true generalization of this grounding connection that