 Kant’s view that we have an intuition, rather than a concept, of space can be seen to raise a difficult problem: space is not an object, and yet intuition seems to provide us with something akin to a perception of something. As Lucy Allais puts it, intuition involves “presence to consciousness of an object” (Allais 2015, 197ff), and yet space is not an object. It is difficult to see why we should think of ourselves as perceiving space at all. It is easy enough to understand the idea that some ordinary thing, like a tomato, is an object that is present to my consciousness, say when I look at the tomato on a farm stand. There are, of course, many philosophical theories of perception, and these theories will differ in their discussions even of simple cases of perception such as this one. But it seems uncontroversial to suppose that the tomato is present to my consciousness as an object at least in the sense that the tomato is one of the things that I’m looking at. And it also seems uncontroversial to think that there are many other things, besides tomatoes, that might be present to my consciousness in a similar way, from clouds to fog to rainbows, even though they are not “objects” in the simple sense in which a tomato is an object. However, it certainly seems like a stretch to say that space itself might be one of those things. That is not merely because space is not an object in any clear sense; it is also because space itself, in this historical and philosophical context, is not something that has a causal impact on me. So it remains doubly difficult to see how I might conclude, with Kant, that I have something akin to a perception of space. Kant assures us, of course, that we have an a priori intuition of space, so although he is discussing something akin to perception in one sense, in another sense what he is discussing is supposed to be quite distinct from ordinary perception. Whether that assurance helps to clarify this issue for his readers is a matter of debate. What is clear, however, is that this aspect of Kant’s conception of space remains one of the most controversial, and most difficult, aspects of his theoretical philosophy.