 As moral dilemmas are typically described, they involve a single agent. The agent ought, all things considered, to do \(A\), ought, all things considered, to do \(B\), and she cannot do both \(A\) and \(B\). But we can distinguish multi-person dilemmas from single agent ones. The two-person case is representative of multi-person dilemmas. The situation is such that one agent, P1, ought to do \(A\), a second agent, P2, ought to do \(B\), and though each agent can do what he ought to do, it is not possible both for P1 to do \(A\) and P2 to do \(B\). (See Marcus 1980, 122 and McConnell 1988.) Multi-person dilemmas have been called “interpersonal moral conflicts.” Such conflicts are most theoretically worrisome if the same moral system (or theory) generates the conflicting obligations for P1 and P2. A theory that precludes single-agent moral dilemmas remains uniquely action-guiding for each agent. But if that same theory does not preclude the possibility of interpersonal moral conflicts, not all agents will be able to succeed in discharging their obligations, no matter how well-motivated or how hard they try. For supporters of moral dilemmas, this distinction is not all that important. They no doubt welcome (theoretically) more types of dilemmas, since that may make their case more persuasive. But if they establish the reality of single-agent dilemmas, in one sense their work is done. For opponents of dilemmas, however, the distinction may be important. This is because at least some opponents believe that the conceptual argument against dilemmas applies principally to single-agent cases. It does so because the ought-to-do operator of deontic logic and the accompanying principles are properly understood to apply to entities who can make decisions. To be clear, this position does not preclude that collectives (such as businesses or nations) can have obligations. But a necessary condition for this being the case is that there is (or should be) a central deliberative standpoint from which decisions are made. This condition is not satisfied when two otherwise unrelated agents happen to have obligations both of which cannot be discharged. Put simply, while an individual act involving one agent can be the object of choice, a compound act involving multiple agents is difficult so to conceive. (See Smith 1986 and Thomason 1981.) Alexander Dietz (2022) has recently shown, however, that matters can be even more complicated. He describes a case where a small group of people have an obligation to save two strangers, but one of the members of the group has an obligation to save her own child at the same time. The small group and the individual can both make choices, and the group’s obligation conflicts with that of the individual member (assuming that the group can succeed only if all members act in concert). This is an odd multi-agent dilemma, “one in which one of the agents is part of the other” (Dietz 2022, p. 66). Erin Taylor (2011) has argued that neither universalizability nor the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ ensure that there will be no interpersonal moral conflicts (what she calls “irreconcilable differences”). These conflicts would raise no difficulties if morality required trying rather than acting, but such a view is not plausible. Still, moral theories should minimize cases of interpersonal conflict (Taylor 2011, pp. 189–190).To the extent that the possibility of interpersonal moral conflicts raises an intramural dispute among opponents of dilemmas, that dispute concerns how to understand the principles of deontic logic and what can reasonably be demanded of moral theories.