 We saw right at the outset that objects exemplify, or instantiate, properties. More generally, items of all sorts, including properties themselves, exemplify properties, or, in different terminology, bear, have or possess properties. Reversing order, we can also say that properties characterize, or inhere in, the items that exemplify them. There is then a very general phenomenon of exemplification to investigate, which has been labeled in various ways, as the variety of terms of art just displayed testifies. All such terms have often been given special technical senses in the rich array of different explorations of this territory since Ancient and Medieval times up to the present age (see, e.g., Lowe 2006: 77). These explorations can hardly be disentangled from the task of providing a general ontological picture with its own categorial distinctions. In line with what most philosophers do nowadays, we choose “exemplification”, or, equivalently, “instantiation” (and their cognates), to discuss this phenomenon in general and to approach some different accounts that have been given of it in recent times. This sweeping use of these terms is to be kept distinct from the more specialized uses of them that will surface below (and to some extent have already surfaced above) in describing specific approaches by different philosophers with their own terminologies.