 That predication is not the essence of every judgement emerges quite clearly from the fact that all perceptions are judgements. For it [perception] is either knowledge [Erkenntnis] or at least a mistaken taking to be true [Fürwahrnehmen]. And this is not denied by those thinkers who hold that every judgement consists in a conjunction of subject and predicate. […] [I]t is hard to think of anything more obvious and unmistakable than the fact that a perception is not a [connection] of a concept of the subject and a concept of a predicate, nor does it refer to such a connection. Rather, the object of an inner perception is simply a mental phenomenon, and the object of an external perception is simply a physical phenomenon, a sound, odor, or the like. We have here, then, a quite obvious justification of the truth of our assertion. (PES 209 [II 50–51; SVS 1, 232], translation changed.)