   Another set of considerations pushing Russell towards the rejection of his former view of propositions is more straightforwardly metaphysical.  According to his earlier view, and that of Moore, a proposition was understood as a mind independent complex. The constituents of the complex are the actual entities involved, and hence, as we have seen, when a proposition is true, it is the same entity as a fact or state of affairs. However, because some propositions are false, this view of propositions posits objective falsehoods. The false proposition that Venus orbits Neptune is thought to be a complex containing Venus and Neptune the planets, as well as the relation of orbiting, with the relation occurring as a relation, i.e., as relating Venus to Neptune. However, it seems natural to suppose that the relation of orbiting could only unite Venus and Neptune into a complex, if in fact, Venus orbits Neptune. Hence, the presence of such objective falsehoods is itself out of sorts with common sense. Worse, as Russell explained, positing the existence of objective falsehoods in addition to objective truths makes the difference between “truth” and “falsehood” inexplicable, as both become irreducible properties of propositions, and we are left without an explanation for the privileged metaphysical status of truth over falsehood (see, e.g., NTF, 152).