 More recently, Chaturvedi (2020) analyses counter-arguments against Gaṅgeśa’s defense of non-conceptual perception offered by the sixteenth century Dvāita Vedanta scholar Vyāsatīrtha. Chaturvedi argues that Vyāsatīrtha’s objection undermine Gaṅgeśa’s main inferential proof of non-conceptual perception to show that it has a necessary role to play in generating concept-laden determinate perception. In addition, Vyāsatīrtha’s questions the internal consistency of Gaṅgeśa’s that the contents of indeterminate perception is not available for introspection. Despite all the problems pointed out by the Vedantin, Chaturvedi argues that there is still hope to reconstruct Gaṅgeśa’s account of indeterminate perception with some help from recent empirical science can help to restore the overall plausibility of the view.