  Following an Epicurean, physicalist model, Gassendi recommends that Skeptical worries are satisfied by truth-criteria and elements of epistemic warrant rooted in the regularity and reliability of our sensory perception and formation of ideas. Trustworthy evidence from the senses yields warrant for empirical beliefs, albeit without certainty and just in case the evidence for them does not conflict with accepted evidentiary experiences. These claims are built upon the proposals that sensory information has a material form (in the case of vision, Gassendi promotes an atomist theory of effluxions bearing images or light from the viewed object to the viewer), that the mind receives sensory information through a wholly physical process, and that some cognitive faculties dependably allow us to detect truth properties of the objects of knowledge. The physical process underlying this perceptual account is inspired by Epicurus but the physiological details, optics of light transmission, and epistemological lessons are strictly Gassendi's own. Indeed, this account of justification marks him not merely as a proponent of a causal theory (as may be said of Descartes, relative to the divine epistemic guarantor) but as an early champion of a reliabilist approach to the causal processes, claiming them as the source of epistemic warrant.