 A number of commentators have taken Kant’s views on the principle of nature’s purposiveness for our cognitive faculties to be fundamental for understanding Kant’s views on the possibility of empirical knowledge. Floyd (1998) and Allison (2001: ch. 1) claim that the principle represents Kant’s answer to Hume’s problem of induction; Ginsborg (1990a: ch. 4; 1990b) takes it to be a condition of empirical conceptualization and hence of all empirical judgment, not just of judgments based on inductive inference; Patricia Kitcher (1990: ch. 8; 1992) also argues for a close connection between Kant’s views on the systematicity of nature and empirical concept-formation. An even stronger view is suggested by Abela (2006), who takes it to be required as a condition for empirical truth, which he sees as required in turn for the possibility of any object-directed representation. Geiger (2009) also holds that the principle is required for all empirical cognition (see also Geiger 2003), but argues that it is in the “Critique of Teleological Judgment”, and not in the Introductions to the Critique of Judgment (nor in the Appendix to the Dialectic of the first Critique), that Kant offers his fullest argument for its necessity. Other commentators who take the principle of nature’s purposiveness to be a condition of empirical cognition in general include Teufel (2017).