 Finally, moral thought pluralism, according to which different moral thoughts are constituted by different kinds of psychological state, is a very new approach, although Elizabeth Radcliffe (2006) argues that already Hume distinguished between two kinds of moral thought. Linda Zagzebski (2003) and Uriah Kriegel (2012) argue in different ways that there are two kinds of moral judgment, one of which contains an affective element. Kriegel’s suggestion is that moral judgments that result from automatic, non-conscious Type I processes consist in what Tamar Gendler (2008) labeled “aliefs”, cognitive states that affect our behavior even if they go against our conscious judgments. Moral judgments that result from conscious, effortful Type II thought are for Kriegel ordinary beliefs with an objectivist phenomenology. Since Kriegel accepts that ordinary beliefs don’t motivate on their own, on his view internalism is true only of moral aliefs. (For skepticism about aliefs, see Sinhababu 2017: 129–134.)