 An issue that has recently come to the fore concerns the distinction between first-order evidence and higher-order evidence (Christensen 2010, Feldman 2005, Kelly 2005, 2010, Lasonen-Aarnio 2014). Intuitively, first-order evidence E is evidence that bears directly on some target proposition or hypothesis H. Higher-order evidence is evidence about the character of E itself, or about subjects' capacities and dispositions for responding rationally to E. Suppose that a trained meteorologist carefully surveys the available meteorological data and concludes that it will rain tomorrow. Here, the meteorological data (E) is first-order evidence that bears on the hypothesis (H), that it will rain tomorrow.  Now consider the fact that the meteorologist arrived at the view that it will rain tomorrow on the basis of E. This fact is higher-order evidence, inasmuch as it is evidence about the content and import of the original meteorological data E. In particular, given that the meteorologist is generally competent when it comes to assessing the relevant kind of evidence, the fact that she arrived at the view that H on the basis of E is evidence for the epistemic propositions that E supports H. Moreover, at least in many contexts, the fact that the meteorologist arrived at the view that H on the basis of E will count as evidence, not only for the epistemic proposition that E supports H, but also for the hypothesis itself, i.e., it will rain tomorrow. This seems especially clear in cases in which a third party lacks access to the original meteorological evidence E (or is incompetent to assess that evidence) but does know that the meteorologist arrived at the verdict that it will rain tomorrow on its basis. In these circumstances, it makes sense for the third party to increase his credence in rain tomorrow, once he learns what the meteorologist has concluded. In effect, in these circumstances, one treats the fact that the meteorologist arrived at the belief that it will rain tomorrow as a kind of proxy for the meteorological evidence to which one lacks access, or which one is incompetent to assess (Kelly 2005). Here evidence of evidence (for H) is itself evidence for H (Feldman 2005). The general lesson is that higher-order evidence sometimes serves as evidence that should make a difference not only to what one believes about the first-order evidence, but also to one's beliefs about the world itself.