 Rephrasing Dennett’s example, we can identify an ambiguity in Conrad’s argument. Imagine that a baseball is going to hit you in the face—but you dodge it: a clear case of real human avoidance. In what sense was the baseball “going to” hit you in the face? (Dennett 2003: 59) One might say that it was never really going to hit you, precisely because it triggered the reaction of whatever “avoidance system” you have. What is the difference between this avoidance and Life-avoidance? For Dennett, this is not a difference in kind, but in complexity: gliders and humans both have avoidance systems, but human systems are much more sophisticated. The choice of a universal CA as a toy universe allows us to draw a stronger conclusion: since we know that Life is equivalent to a universal Turing machine, as explained above, some patterns in that universe may display avoidance systems at least as complex as ours. Dennett claims that compatibilism has thus won the first round: 