 It is important to distinguish probabilistically qualified counterfactual statements of the form \((S \amp A) \rightarrow(h)E\) from a priori probability statements of the form \(“\text{Prob}(E, \text{ on } S \text{ and } A) \gt .5”.\) Both express conditional probabilities. However, the former express ‘real’ connections knowable by induction from past experience (Lewis 1946, 250). They constitute the analytically entailed consequences of an objective material objective statement \(P\), but can’t themselves be analytic truths. The latter, on the other hand, if true, are analytically true, knowable a priori, with zero intension, and entailed by any statement whatsoever, and so can hardly constitute the empirical meaning of contingently true material object statements. Yet, apart from denying that “\(\rightarrow\)” can be understood either as material implication or strict implication, Lewis had little to say in print about what the truth conditions of subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals are. Murphey (2005, 332) quotes correspondence from Lewis complaining that Goodman and Chisholm in their writings miss the obvious interpretation of “If \(A\) were the case, then \(B\) would be the case”, namely that \(A\) plus other premises of the (actual or hypothetical) case inductively justify the conclusion \(B\). Lewis needs to say more then about what, if anything, distinguishes \((S \amp A) \rightarrow E\) from \((S \amp A) \rightarrow  (h)E\). Is it the degree of probability of \(E\) on the premises, practically certain in the former case, only somewhat probable in the latter? Another problem is to interpret the remark so as to avoid turning counterfactuals into a priori analytic truths, albeit ones concerning probabilities. Nonetheless, Lewis emphasized their importance, and the importance of the real connections they express, for the possibility of realism about the material world and the rejection of any sort of idealism or view that physical objects are simply mind-dependent collections of experiences (Lewis 1946, 226, Lewis 1955, in Lewis 1970). The sensory conditionals \((S \amp A) \rightarrow E\) and \((S \amp A) \rightarrow(h)E\) can be true, as can the material object statement \(P\) that entails them, quite apart from the truth of the expressive statements \(S\) and \(A\). 