 This is a rhetorically powerful move, but it is nonetheless open to four objections. First, it presupposes that one can infer the propriety of the third-person reaction of blame and punishment from the first-person reaction of guilt and self-punishment. But there are things a person should do to herself that others should not feel equally free to do to her (Duff 2007: 383; Zaibert 2018: 94–95). Second, it may reflect only the imagination of a person who has committed no such serious crimes, rather than the insight of a person who knows what it is like to have committed a serious crime and then tried to come to terms with himself. Third, it equates the propriety of feeling or inflicting guilt with the propriety of adding punishment to guilt. But why is guilt itself not enough (see Husak 2016: 59–60)? Fourth, one can question whether even the reaction of guilt is a morally sound one. Might it not be a sort of sickness, as Nietzsche (1887 [2006: 60]) put it, “bad conscience, … the will to self-violation”.