 Anderson rejects Mill’s view that universal statements are generalisations from experience. Universal propositions cannot be derived by generalisation from particular experiences, because there simply are no such immediate experiences. Such truths are derived from other universal propositions and tested in experience. In discussing the functions of subjects, predicates and the copula in propositions and the logical relations between propositions, logic is already discussing universals, individuals, identity, space-time and causality. And, contra Mill’s inductivism, because we have direct experience of generality and of relations, a single instance is sufficient to establish the universal proposition (say, that all glass is brittle). Further investigation may challenge such assertions since all our beliefs are fallible but wholesale doubt is simply not an option. The logical gap between particulars and universals that inductive reasoning proposes is a gap that no amount of human reasoning could hope to span. Hume was right in this, but instead of embracing skepticism he should have concluded as did William James that generality and relations are as much a part of our experience as are particulars.