 If this is right, the term “assertion” does not designate a single illocutionary act, but rather a class of them: it denotes every speech act that is normatively stronger than (or equal to) assertion. This seems to lose track of a narrower meaning of the term “assertion”, one that sets plain assertions apart from stronger assertives. A strategy to rescue this narrow meaning while acknowledging assertion’s close ties with other assertives is found in Green (2013, 2017, 2020b: 8). Green, (like Brandom) understands commitment as a responsibility to defend your claim, and argues that an assertion commits you to a greater justificatory burden than weaker assertives, and lesser than stronger assertives (for an alternative, like-minded solution, Marsili 2015: 123–127). Labinaz (2018) outlines some difficulties for extending the Brandomian framework to assertive speech acts, and proposes to adopt an alternative approach to degrees of commitment that rather owes to the work of Austin (cf. also Labinaz &amp; Sbisà 2014: §3).