 Rawls, however, immediately adds what Hayek would call a non sequitur: “What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts” (Rawls, 1971, 102), where resigning ourselves to the facts is the paradigmatically unjust way of dealing with them (ibid). If Rawls is right to deem the natural distribution neither just nor unjust, then when institutions “deal with natural facts,” they are, to Hayek, not undoing wrongs. Hayek would never deny that cleft palates are bad or that fixing them is good, but would insist that fixing what is not unjust cannot count as rectifying injustice. If we feel called upon to help children with cleft palates, it will be because having a cleft palate is bad, not because having it is unjust. When we help, we are not fixing an improper distribution of cleft plates. We are simply fixing cleft palates. When we respond to the problem, we take a stand not against injustice but against suffering (Hayek 1976, 87). As Hayek knew, he was profoundly at odds with much thinking about social justice. He expected to be vilified (1944, vii), and he was. Although he was as responsive to misfortune as anyone, and seemed to embrace the same package of duties to children as any social justice theorist would, he also saw the free world at a crossroads between a defeasible presumption that normal adults have agreed to share each other’s fate (Rawls, 1971, 102) and a defeasible presumption that normal adults have the right and the responsibility to play the cards that nature has dealt. 