 The philosophy of statistics is but one area among many where philosophical arguments contribute to work in phylogenetics. Though phylogenetics is a subfield of biology (and, arguably, of statistics and computer science), phylogenetic inference is a topic on which both philosophers and biologists work, often in overlapping ways. Indeed, the boundary between science and philosophy here is blurry in a way reminiscent of some of the natural philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An upshot of this is that phylogenetic inference is an enormously rich area for philosophers to explore. Biologists are actively debating the conceptual foundations of phylogenetic methodology, justification, goals, explanatory models, etc. It is not uncommon to see philosophers playing a central role in these debates (e.g., Hull 1988; Sober 1988b). It also means that many biologists are eager to engage with philosophers in meaningful and deeply informed ways (e.g., Sterner &amp; Lidgard 2018; Havstad &amp; Smith 2019).