 Ross’s appeal to self-evidence and his defence of the synthetic a priori may seem problematic to many, though recent defences of these views suggest their fortunes are improving (Audi 1996, 2004; Crisp 2002; Parfit 2011; Stratton-Lake 2002a, 2002b). To defend himself, Ross might simply eschew appeal to self-evidence and certainty with respect to intuitions about general principles and replace them with appeal to moral beliefs of high reliability or to considered convictions about moral claims (Griffin 1996; Hooker 2000; Rawls 1971). This seems to give him what he needs methodologically (for discussion, see Irwin 2009, 686–90). The appeal to considered convictions allows him the ability to say, for example, we know directly pain is bad and it is prima facie wrong to break your promises; in addition, he can avoid the defects of coherence theories of justification by holding there are at least some propositions not justified exclusively by coherence (FE 141; Ross 1931, 61–62).