 There may be reason, moreover, to believe introspection of affective, as opposed to, for example, sensory, experience, to be especially prone to errors of omission. Focal awareness of specific information content and the experience of affect have long been thought to compete with each other – and not merely as different sensory or cognitive contents do. Competitive alternation between the two modes of experience was a commonplace of past psychology and is receiving increasing  confirmation.[12]  Ongoing research initiated by Marcus Raichle and his collaborators indicates default, resting state, or monitoring modes of brain activity, perhaps including representations of one’s current hedonic state, that are typically turned down by attention-demanding tasks (Gusnard et al 2001, Gusnard and Raichle 2004, Fox et al 2005), perhaps even by some ways of attempting to introspect one’s current affective state. If so, the very focusing of introspective scrutiny on pleasure provoked by the demand to accurately report it, may, thus, sometimes turn down the gain on systems involved in representing it. If this is so, it may explain some of the inconsistency of views mentioned in the previous paragraph and those of the 1930s introspectionist psychological laboratories (n. 3) as well. However that may be, pleasure seems generally to attach attention and motivation to salient stimuli and especially toward ends it is pleasant to envision, rather than to itself (e.g., Schlick 1930/1939, Ch. II, §§4–10, pp. 36–55). Such a perspective may answer the objection to experiential views of pleasure that if pleasure were felt, it would divert our attention from what we are enjoying, such as music, to itself (Ryle 1954a, Madell (2002, pp. 90–93). Pleasure may typically be easier to notice sideways than straight on. And as task demands increase, these may degrade our ability to even cognitively notice our affective state, so that the pleasure we phenomenally experience is out of (the limited-capacity cognitive awareness of our) mind (cf. §2.3.4, ¶2).