 “Heaven (tian)” is a difficult term. It once clearly referred to a religious entity, but eventually comes to be understood in more naturalistic terms. Which it means in this chapter is a matter of scholarly disagreement. For the most part, Warring States philosophers of governance do not appeal to supernatural standards to justify their claims. Even in the Mozi, if one takes evidence from other chapters into account, the interpretive dispute over “tian” may be moot. These other chapters record that just as carpenters can use a compass to determine what is circular, so an understanding of the “will of Heaven” leads one to reliably judge what is right. The striking thing about a compass is that no special knowledge is needed to use it: it is a public, objective standard for circles. If the “will of Heaven” is to be analogous, then there must be a public, objective standard for right. Mysterious knowledge of the will of a deity does not sound like a good candidate for such a public, objective standard. The text offers an alternative, though: it regularly speaks of maximally “benefitting (li)” the people as a standard. A neat way of resolving all these loose ends, then, is to conclude that the “will of Heaven” is a metaphorical reference to the standard of “benefit”. Proper Mohist governance thus would ultimately be a matter of utilitarian judgment. 