 Can we be clearer on the core idea of metaphysical foundationalism? If we can, then perhaps potential arguments for the view would also be more easily available. One interesting attempt to do so is  Raven’s.[23]  Raven’s version of metaphysical foundationalism relies on the notions of “eliminability” and “ineliminability” whereby an entity is eliminable if reality is described no worse without mentioning it and ineliminable if reality cannot be completely described without mentioning it. This seems to come close to fundamentality characterized in terms of a complete minimal basis  (CMB),  discussed in  section 1.3.  To demonstrate this, let us take advantage of Raven’s own terminology (2016: 614–5). Ineliminable entities “persist” in some fact about them, whereas eliminables “disappear” from all facts about them. For an entity to “disappear” is for there to be a bound in the grounds of some fact about it, a last occurrence of it after which the entity never recurs. So, for an entity to persist is for some facts about it to be unbounded. Importantly, there are two ways to be unbounded: being ungrounded or having grounds but forever recurring. The first type of persistence is the familiar sense of relative independence  (RI)  as defined in  section 1.2.  But the second type of persistence, where an entity forever recurs in the chain of dependence, is  novel.[24]