 Philosophical analyses of exploitation are broad and varied. As is often the case with such analyses, there is no widespread agreement about what, precisely, exploitation is. However, consensus has emerged around some of the domain conditions for exploitation. Most— though not all—philosophers agree that exploitation involves taking unfair advantage, though, of course, they disagree about what exactly this involves. And most, but not all, philosophers also agree that in order to be an exploiter, \(A\) must benefit and this benefit must come at \(B\)’s expense. We think few philosophers would deny that exploitations can be all- things-considered harmful. However, much more philosophical attention has been given to mutually beneficial exploitations, in which the exploited benefits from the interaction, albeit in a morally problematic way. The reason for this focus is that harmful exploitations are less ethically puzzling than mutually beneficial exploitations. The wrongs of harmful exploitation are more familiar, often over determined, and usually coextensive with fraud and coercion. Harmful exploitations are also likely to be non-consensual and, of course, the harm itself may also be sufficient to explain the wrongfulness of these cases.