 Some transaction-focused accounts of corrective justice deploy the Kantian distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue to develop a positive account of the specific norms enforced by tort law (Kant 1797). On this view, the moral vocabulary to which Holmes draws attention is not the general moral vocabulary of virtue or the courts of heaven. The relational ideas of what one person does to another apply to separate persons, each with the purposes of their own. They thereby reconcile the ability of separate persons to pursue those purposes with the means that they have, centrally their body and their property. Kantian accounts conceive of rights relationally, rather than focusing on one side of the relation, such as the choices or interests of the rightholder. The violation of rights to person and property does not extinguish the plaintiff’s entitlement to be independent of the defendant’s choice. Instead, the plaintiff’s right to constrain the defendant’s conduct survives in the form of a claim to a remedy from the defendant in particular (Weinrib 1995; Ripstein 2016). The person who wrongfully injures another or damages the other person’s property can be compelled to return things to their prior condition, that is, to pay the costs of repairing or replacing the property or of enabling the injured party to get on with their life in light of the injuries. In addition, people who wrongfully use another person’s body (the tort of battery) or property (the torts of trespass and conversion) are required to repair any damage that they do because once again there is a wrongful transaction. This Kantian account also has a direct and straightforward explanation of the rules regarding economic loss: if the defendant damages something on which the plaintiff depends but does not own, the wrongful transaction is between the defendant and the owner of the damaged thing; if the plaintiff does not have a right to the damaged object, then although the plaintiff has suffered a loss, no right has been violated. As such, the plaintiff is not a party to the wrongful transaction, so there is no wrong between the person who damaged the object and the plaintiff to be corrected. In the example of the damaged bridge, whether the plaintiff’s right has been violated depends on whether the plaintiff owns the bridge. The economic loss rule is thus treated as an instance of a more general focus on rights to person and property; those who benefit from property lack the relevant form of right in it, and the law of negligence does require a person to protect others from natural perils or the acts of third parties (Ripstein 2016).