Quine, of course, identifies quantifier and ontological commitments, at least in the crucial case of the objects that are indispensable to our best theories of the world. Such objects are those that cannot be eliminated through paraphrase and over which we have to quantify when we regiment the relevant theories (using first-order logic). According to Quine's criterion, these are precisely the objects we are ontologically committed to. Azzouni insists that we should resist this identification. Even if the objects in our best theories are indispensable, even if we quantify over them, this is not sufficient for us to be ontologically committed to them. After all, the objects we quantify over might be ontologically dependent on us—on our linguistic practices or psychological processes—and thus we might have just made them up. But, in this case, clearly there is no reason to be committed to their existence. However, for those objects that are ontologically independent of us, we are committed to their existence.