 According to Anderson, David Hume’s skepticism was a direct result of his inability to work out a logic, to create a coherent account of existence. But his mentor at Edinburgh, Norman Kemp Smith, had long argued that Hume’s importance was in demonstrating the factual limits of all logic. If Hume had failed to work out a logic to Anderson’s satisfaction this was because in his view philosophers should resist the temptation of this kind of “systematic working out” altogether (Davie 1977). Hume’s reservations about a “systematic working out” have emerged in another form with the “linguistic return” proposed by Huw Price, who became the first appointment to the Challis Chair of Philosophy within a united department at Sydney since the split of 1974. Price describes the project as a “linguistic retooling of metaphysics” (Price 2011, p. 18) and the attempt specifically to avoid Mackie’s “placement” issue which arises from an obsession with the representational aspect of language (although Mackie himself regarded this with Anderson as an ontological issue – see section 5.4 below). On Price’s view plurality exists in the world of an entirely familiar kind: a plurality of ways of talking and ways of behaviour which don’t need to be mirrored in an ontology of any kind.