 As we close the discussion of analytic feminists’ responses to critiques of analytic philosophy, it is important to restate the obvious: not every analytic feminist would agree with the responses articulated in the few examples chosen here. Indeed, in spite of the desire that analytic feminist philosophy be sufficiently normative, there is disagreement over issues such as the attitude to take toward concepts that have typically embodied that normativity. Consider traditional ideals of objectivity: views range from the claim that although the ideals of rationality and objectivity are “both unattainable and undesirable”, we nevertheless ought to embrace them as “regulative norms” or “heuristics” (Antony 1995: 87) to a number of different understandings of objectivity that would make them not so subject to distortion or misuse (for example, E. Lloyd 1995a, 1995b; Haslanger 1993 [2002]; Scheman 2001a; Heldke 2001; Janack 2002).