 Perhaps the best way to individuate the ethics of care is as a strand of ethics concerned with the meeting of the needs of others within personal relationships (Tronto 1993). But “care” is used in feminist ethics to refer to slightly different things (Collins 2015). The reference to needs is the common link between different accounts of the proper subject-matter of the ethics of care. (In this entry, “needs” and “important interests” are used interchangeably). The ethics of care is, first, about a type of work, or labor, as when someone is said to “take care of” someone else in situations like nursing a baby or looking after an ill person. Some care ethicists ascribe special, if not exclusive, moral value to caring for those individuals who cannot meet the needs in question themselves (Bubeck 1995). This meaning often extends to a wider range of activities such as education or physical and mental health care. According to a second view, the ethics of care is about close relationships between persons, based on a special emotional bond and including a commitment to each other’s wellbeing (Ruddick 1998). Much of the ethics of care—at least in early stages—has focused on close personal relationships such as mothering or friendship; the assumption here is that caring meets the need for bonding, or attachment (Gheaus 2009: 64). In a third way, “care” is understood as a disposition to behave in certain ways: to be attentive and sensitive to other people’s needs and willing to help them. In this sense, “care” is a virtue, and the ethics of care a form of virtue ethics. As a virtue, care is a general attitude, opposed to callousness and indifference to the needs of others.