 Finally, the revisionary principles at the heart of the reformed decision theory strategy proposed by Gauthier and McClennen rest upon an agent’s ability to adopt a disposition to conditionally follow certain pro-social strategies regardless of whether doing so is in an agent’s best interest at the moment of action. Critics of this strategy, however, have questioned what it means to bind oneself to her past commitments in this way, and they have also identified numerous cases where doing so would be in neither an agent’s short nor long-run interest. Furthermore, while Gauthier’s analysis of the benefits of constrained maximization is analogous in some ways to Bicchieri’s analysis of how social norms can transform mixed-motive social dilemmas into coordination games, the latter depend on sanctions (or expectations of sanctions) in a way that the former do not. As a result, even if agents could credibly adopt dispositions to constrain their future behavior, for a rule like constrained maximization to do its practical work, agents must be able to recognize who has and has not adopted the dispositions in question. However, some critics doubt that we can reliably recognize who adopts such dispositions. Of course, proponents of the reformed decision theory strategy are well aware of these criticisms and have developed careful responses in their works. So far, though, its critics have not been assuaged and the reformed decision theory strategy has been the least influential of the approaches described here.