 A contrasting approach is that of Ibn Bājja, who, we are told, followed al-Fārābī; this position would also be the one that Averroes in general would adopt, albeit with certain reservations and modifications (Lettinck 1984, 297–302; Averroes 1962, 141E–144I). Ibn Bājja begins by slightly modifying Aristotle’s definition of place; instead of being the first containing limit, place is now identified with ‘the proximate surrounding surface.’ The shift in language is slight, but it allows Ibn Bājja the opportunity to distinguish between two senses of ‘surrounding surface.’ Things can either be surrounded by a concave or convex surface, maintained Ibn Bājja. A Rectilinear body, that is, a body that undergoes rectilinear motion, has as its place a concave surface that is outside of it, whereas a truly spherical body, that is, a body that undergoes circular motion or rotation, has as its place a convex surface, which is inside of the rotating body and is in fact the surface of the center around which the body rotates. Since the universe rotates around the earth, at least according to ancient and medieval cosmology, the universe is ‘surrounded’ by the earth at the earth’s convex surface, and thus the universe as a whole has a place, namely, the surface of the earth. Averroes’ modifications make the surface of the earth only the accidental place of the universe rather than the essential place, but since Aristotle had spoken of the universe’s having a place only accidentally, the Commentator was satisfied.