 Granting a bounded doubt interpretation, why – in the first place – does the Evil Genius Doubt’s potency not extend to propositions in the special class? How is it that the doubt does undermine the proposition “that two and three added together make five,” but not the proposition “that there must be at least as much [reality] in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause”? The first proposition is included in the list of examples that are undermined by the Evil Genius Doubt (see the fourth paragraph of the Third Meditation). The second proposition is a premise in a Third Meditation argument for God – a proposition immune to doubt, according to bounded doubt interpretations. What is supposed to be the relevant difference between these propositions? Given the indirect manner in which Evil Genius Doubt operates, there seems no clear explanation of why the doubt succeeds in undermining the first proposition but is somehow resisted by the second. Further awkward for this interpretation is that the cogito is included in the list of examples that that same fourth paragraph passage implies is vulnerable to doubt.