 Here it is useful to recall Brandt’s admonition that “bare information about intercultural differences” will not suffice to settle the debate. Because the argument from disagreement turns, in part, on both the existence of moral disagreement and the best explanation for it, evaluating the prospects for the argument requires attention to the empirical details of actual moral disagreements, rather than conjecture about the outcomes of possible moral disagreements. For example, Doris and Plakias (2008) discuss several instances of cross-cultural moral disagreement, and assess the prospects for applying what they call ‘defusing explanations’ to these cases. A defusing explanation is one that accounts for the disagreement in terms of a non-moral difference or an epistemic shortcoming on the part of one or more disputant, thereby showing that it is not, in fact, a moral disagreement. Their argument and the experiments they cite are discussed in detail in the entry on empirical moral psychology, so we will not discuss them in detail here; for now, we will note that such explanations are difficult to assess via survey methods alone. This is why it is especially helpful to look to the anthropological record, as Oliver Curry et al. (2019) do in a recent publication. Curry hypothesizes that morality comprises stable, cooperative solutions to recurrent problems that can be modeled as non-zero-sum games. There are a variety of such recurrent problems, and game theory has established a suite of analytical tools for diagnosing and solving them. Curry and his colleagues show that such solutions are always seen as either morally good or morally neutral in societies at various stages of development, from small-band hunter gatherers to industrialized democracies. This research suggests that philosophers may have greatly exaggerated the extent of moral disagreement that actually exists.