 Several contemporary commentators on Mead assert that within his theory of the origin and development of the self lies an opportunity (or a missed opportunity, depending on the degree of criticism) to account for a pre-reflective bodily self-awareness in humans that permits a non-linguist, auto-affective, naturalized account of unified bodily agency, which precedes the development of the social self (Geniusas 2006; Madzia 2015). Madzia (2015, 82) argues that for a unifying self (capable of self-reflection) to emerge, we must presuppose body ownership, that is, a “primal self-awareness” emanating from a body-mindedness. Similarly, while invoking Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology, Geniusas (2006, 258) contends that acknowledging a “primordial self-givenness” generated by auto-affection accounts for the “mineness of experience” and aids in individuation. Further, he maintains that the concept of auto-affection dissolves the problem of delineating a sharp distinction between Mead’s “I” and “Me,” because the self would be able to know the “I” directly (Geniusas 2006). These accounts are not meant to undermine Mead’s social self but to supplement it as a precondition of human role-taking. Such accounts may be viewed as addressing the relationship between animal and human intelligence. Moreover, Madzia (2013; 2015, 83) argues, incorporating a “primal self-awareness” as a stage in the genesis and evolution of the self affords Mead the added benefit of making his theory compatible with pragmatism’s principle of continuity. Nonetheless, Mead might disagree with these approaches and respond to such commentaries by restating his commitment to the social constitution of the self: “I do not want to discuss metaphysical problems, but I want to insist that the self has a sort of structure that arises in social conduct that is entirely distinguishable from this so-called subjective experience” (MSS, 166).