 There are some controversies over exactly what is to be termed radical feminism. As used here the term refers to feminists who stress essential or very deep rooted differences between men and women, and who celebrate the distinctive modes of embodiment and experiential capacities that women have. Radical feminists were/ are centrally involved in highlighting sexual violence against women globally, which they sometimes see as rooted in male nature, or deep processes of socialization. Despite Shulamith Firestone’s (1970 [1979]; Merck and Sandford 2010), early visions of liberating women from reproductive tasks; within most Anglo-American radical feminism, both female sexuality and the female capacity to give birth are seen as grounds for affirming the power and the value of the female body. Female sexuality is celebrated for its power and its supposed capacity to escape from structures of dominance and submission, (Rich 1979). Women’s maternal bodies are seen as a source of positive values to set against male norms, stressing care and inter-subjectivity, as opposed to autonomy and duty (Rich 1979, Ruddick 1989). Women’s engagement with the reproductive process is also regarded as anchoring both anti-militarism and a respect for the natural world, which puts them at the forefront of peace and ecological movements (Griffin 1978). Reproduction and their caring roles also sets them against the widespread violence of men. These approaches are very significant for giving women’s bodies a positive value which induces pride rather than shame. However, such approaches also suffer from the dangers of homogenizing what are very variable experiences both of sexuality and maternity. As Grimshaw points out, for women childbearing has been seen “both as the source of … greatest joy and as the root of their worst suffering” (1986: 73). Moreover woman themselves engage in military professions, and can themselves be violent in private and public space. Claims celebrating female embodiment therefore need to heed Beauvoir’s insistence that the experience of embodiment is a product of situation.