 Ross is often unclear about the value and status of justice. He frequently states there are only three intrinsic goods (FE 19, 180, 262, 278; KT 11–12; OJ 119, 120, 121). In early writings, he claims justice is a duty not a value (OJ 123). In RG, he is unclear, sometimes claiming justice is a good (RG 27) and sometimes that it is a prima facie duty (RG 35). However, in FE he is relatively clear justice is good in the same sense the pleasure of others is good, so it seems reasonable to conclude he thinks justice is a non-instrumental good (FE 288–289). He also suggests at one point promise keeping is good in the same way justice and pleasure are good (FE 289). But he more often rejects the claim that promise keeping is good (FE 141, 142), suggesting not all objects worthy of satisfaction are  valuable.[8]