 A second view requires only weak consensus. On this view, it is not necessary that each person shares the very same justification for accepting X, but it is necessary that each person’s justification for accepting X should depend only on shared or public reasons, that is, reasons that all other members of the justificatory constituency could accept as valid considerations that provide a plausible basis for accepting X, even if there is disagreement among the members as to which set of shared reasons in fact provides the appropriate justification for endorsing X. To illustrate, Albert might believe X is justified because it follows from a commitment to equality of opportunity, whereas Betty might believe X is justified because it is a necessary means of protecting individuals’ rights to freedom of religion, but so long as both these considerations—equality of opportunity and the right to freedom of religion—are accepted as valid normative considerations by all members of the constituency and provide a plausible or reasonable basis of support for X, then X can meet the test of public reason despite the fact that different members believe X to be justified for different reasons. The weak consensus view of public reason’s structure seems to reflect Rawls’s position, and has been explicitly defended by others (Macedo 2010 (Other Internet Resources); Quong 2011, 261–273; Watson and Hartley 2018, 40–61).