  The real problem raised by the objection is this: how can Socrates  justify the claim that people with just souls are practically just?  First, he must be able to show that the psychologically just refrain  from injustice, and second, he must be able to show that the  psychologically just do what is required by justice. The first point  receives a gesture when Socrates is trying to secure the claim that  harmonious functioning of the whole soul really deserves to be called justice (442e–443a), but he offers no real argument. Perhaps the best we can do on his behalf is to insist that the first point is not a  thesis for argument but a bold empirical hypothesis. On this view, it is simply an empirical question whether all those who have the  motivations to do unjust things happen to have souls that are out of  balance, and an army of psychologists would be needed to answer the  question.