 Whereas Cuneo’s and Boghossian’s respective cases for metaepistemological realism are negative in that they rest principally on challenging the credentials of various forms of anti-realism, at least two other strategies do not. One such envisioned metanormative strategy would be to (rather than as Cuneo has done) aim to establish metaethical realism on independent grounds and then argue from here to metaepistemological realism via a parity premise (for an instance of such a strategy, see Kyriacou 2018). Fourthly, we can envision a kind of pragmatic justification of metaepistemological realism, as a precondition for doing first-order epistemology. For example, as such a line of thought goes, paradigmatic first-order debates in epistemology—take for instance the decades-long debate between Richard Feldman and Alvin Goldman about whether epistemic internalism or externalism is correct in epistemology—tend to make sense only against a background presumption of metaepistemological realism. If this is right, then, as Carter (2016: Ch. 1, Ch. 9) has suggested, the presumption of metaepistemological realism is plausibly essential to pursuing typical projects that are characteristic of mainstream analytic epistemology.