 As we saw earlier, the basic case for the inconsistency of change turns on the following premisses: (i) \(Fa\), (ii) \(Gb\), (iii) \(Fx \rightarrow {\sim}Gx\), (iv) \(a=b\). Up to the last premiss all is consistent, but the identification of the entities a and b from different times gives one and the same thing incompatible properties. It was suggested in Section 5, taking a lead from Hegel, that even if we say that change is a consistent process, the perception of change might well involve inconsistent representations. It is time to take a closer look at what cognitive science can tell us about this. It turns out that the argument is inconclusive, but suggestive. It is useful to concentrate on the example of the perception of motion. A thorough survey can be found in Palmer (1999), Chapter 10.