 However, the conclusion that the racist’s judgments are universalizable presupposes a very minimal account of what universalizability requires. On this account, it requires only that an agent be sincerely committed to the objectivity of his judgments, in the sense that he views them (from his current perspective) as correct from all perspectives, and thus as calling for everyone’s assent (whether or not that assent is actually given.) (Cf. Parfit 2011, I, 323–24) There are two ways of making the universalizability requirement more demanding. The first is to appeal to certain counterfactual claims about what the agent would endorse if he actually did occupy various perspectives. On this view, a particular judgment by A is universalizable if and only if A endorses that judgment from his current perspective, and would endorse the same judgment from any other perspective. Given this understanding of universalizability, it is much less likely – indeed, extraordinarily unlikely – that racist views will turn out to be universalizable; for it is not generally true of individuals that they would endorse the view “The well-being of members of race R matters less than the well-being of members of other races” if they themselves were members of race R. However, such a view may well require too much, for there are few if any moral judgments or principles that would be endorsed from every perspective any given agent might occupy.