 The most vivid sign of this reconnection consists in the fact that several authors have recently defended a friendly amendment of David Lewis’s best system account of laws of nature. While Lewis’s (1973, 73) original version primarily focuses on fundamental laws, the amended versions are intended to capture also non-fundamental laws of the special sciences. Schrenk (2007a, 2014), Callender and Cohen (2009, 2010), and Frisch (2014a) defend a so-called “better best system” account of special science laws. Unterhuber (2014) develops a version of the “better best system” account utilizing generics. Jaag and Loew (forthcoming) argue for a pragmatic version of the best systems account that captures also central insights of the “better best system” theory. On their view, the universality of laws is not an end in itself. If a generalization’s invariance is, e.g., limited to our cosmic epoch only, this limited invariance arguably would be enough to make it useful for us and thus a law according to this account. Reutlinger (2009) and Backmann and Reutlinger (2014) provide a critical discussion of “better best system” accounts. Braddon-Mitchell (2001) and Wheeler (2018) present versions of a best systems account deploying the idea of algorithmic compression from data science. Albert (2000, 2015) and Loewer (2009) advocate a “statistical mechanical” version of the best systems approach to special science laws which is, unlike the “better best system” account, committed to a particular Boltzmann-inspired interpretation of statistical mechanics (including assumptions about the early history of the universe). Weslake (2014) and Frisch (2014b) provide critical responses, while Fenton-Glynn (2016) constructively uses examples by Albert and Loewer for an analysis of cp-laws. Finally, Albert and Loewer’s account also connects the debate on cp-laws with the on-going discussion on whether causation has a place in fundamental physics or whether causation is an ‘emergent’ phenomenon captured by the cp-law statements of the special sciences (Price and Corry 2007 and Frisch 2014b are representative of the opposing views in the debate on causation in physics).