 Consider again causal determinism, a thesis often thought to rule out alternatives. Determinism is a substantive empirical claim, and no one, certainly no ordinary person, knows whether it’s true (see entry on  causal determinism).  It appears, then, that if we presuppose PAP in ordinary life, we should for the time being withhold judgment on whether any person is responsible for her actions, cautiously awaiting a verdict from scientists on the question of determinism. But, the argument goes, it would be absurd to think we have to wait for scientific progress to decide whether, say, Kevin should be grateful to Denise for picking up his mail when he was on vacation, or a victim of fraud should blame the con artist. These and similar reactions are justified however things turn out in the recherché domain of micro-physics. Determinism’s threatened block of alternatives is irrelevant to whether someone should be praised or blamed (P. F. Strawson 1962; Dennett 1984b: ch. 6; Fischer 2006: 5).