  Godfrey was surely familiar with the controversy concerning whether one should with Avicenna stress the nonparticular and therefore the universal character of being as being and hence make this the subject of metaphysics or rather with Averroes emphasize it as the science which has the highest kind of being, the divine, as its subject. On this Godfrey clearly agrees with Avicenna, even though he devotes little explicit attention to the controversy itself. Thus in Quodlibet X, q. 11 he holds that being as being is the object (or subject) of metaphysics (PB 4.349), and in Quodlibet VI, q. 6 that the concept of being is first and simplest because it enters into every other concept (PB 3.137). Therefore it is also the most general concept or, one may say, transcendental. At times Godfrey also describes the object of the intellect as being as being (Quodlibet II, q. 8). He denies that God is the subject of metaphysics, even though God is the first and primary being and must be studied within metaphysics (Quodlibet I, q. 5). He distinguishes a metaphysical study of God, which he says may be described as a kind of theology, from the theology that is based on Sacred Scripture. This does not have being as being as its subject, but God himself (Quodlibet IX, q. 20; Wippel, 1981, 3–15).