We now turn, in brief, to some further issues in the metaphysics of agency. The first concerns the individuation of actions. You flick the switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and you thereby also alert the burglar. How many actions do you perform? According to coarse-grained (or minimizing) views on the individuation of actions, you perform one action under different descriptions (Anscombe 1957; Davidson 1963). According to fine-grained (or maximizing) views, how many actions you perform depends on how many act-properties are instantiated. If you instantiate four act-properties, then you perform four distinct actions (Goldman 1970; see also Ginet 1990). According to a third alternative, actions can have other actions as their components or parts (Thalberg 1977; Ginet 1990). According to all three views, actions are events, and the individuation of actions derives from different views on the individuation of events (see the entry on events). Not much work has been done on this recently (see, however, Enç 2003: Ch. 3). This is partly because it is now widely agreed that the individuation of actions has little or no bearing on other issues. To illustrate, the question of whether agency is to be explained within an event-causal or an agent-causal framework bears directly on various issues in the debate on free will and moral responsibility (see the entry on free will). But event-causal and agent-causal theories are both compatible with coarse-grained and fine-grained views on the individuation of actions. Similarly, it seems that the views on the individuation of actions have no substantial bearing on the question of whether or not reason explanations are causal explanations.