 If artifacts do not exist, then the kinds into which we classify them—pillow, book, painting, flowerpot—are not real kinds on a par with natural kinds, such as oak, owl or anole. But questions about the reality and nature of artifact kinds also arise for those who do take artifacts to exist. As we have seen, these theorists resist the objection that the mind-dependence of artifacts compromises their ontological status. But this objection resurfaces with regard to artifact kinds. The mind-dependence of artifacts implies, at a minimum, that an account of artifact kinds will be very different from an account of natural kinds. This implication is resisted by Crawford Elder (2004; 2007), who seeks to establish the existence of artifacts on the basis of a realist account of kinds. On Elder’s view, artifact kinds and many natural kinds are equally copied kinds, and equally mind-independent. A copied kind is defined by a set of properties that naturally cluster together—a distinctive shape or make-up, a proper function established by a mechanism that copies things of that shape on the basis of successful performance, and a historically proper placement. For example, cats’ whiskers are distinctively shaped organs that are copied from cat to cat by a biologically based reproductive mechanism because they help cats get around in the dark by performing successfully as touch receptors strategically located with respect to the cat’s other bodily parts. Similarly, floor lamps are distinctively shaped artifacts that are copied from household to household by a socially based reproductive mechanism because they help humans get around in the dark by performing successfully as light sources strategically located with respect to other household furniture. Human intentional states do, of course, figure in the copying process for artifacts. However, Elder argues: