 One problem with this account is that the mere receipt of a benefit doesn’t seem enough to warrant a duty of gratitude. Perhaps I enjoy listening to your trombone practice, but if you provide this benefit to me unwittingly (perhaps you think that I’m away on holiday, while you practice next door) do I owe you a duty of gratitude? And do I owe you a duty if your intention is to harm me, rather than benefit me? (Perhaps you know I’m next door, and you practice loudly in order to bother me, unaware that there’s nothing I enjoy more than listening to your trombone.) This seems implausible. The mere provision of a benefit doesn’t seem to generate duties of gratitude, unless the benefit in question is provided with the right intention. But can states have intentions to begin with (if not in a metaphorical sense)? Those who deny that conclude that, for this reason, no duties of gratitude can be owed to them (Simmons 1979: ch. 7; but see Knowles 2002).