 In an effort to explicate the notion of desert that he has in mind, Scanlon points out some principles concerning it that he means to endorse. First he distinguishes between desert and entitlement and reminds the reader that the mere fact that someone is entitled to a certain form of treatment by the rules of some institution is not sufficient by itself to show that he or she deserves that treatment. This would be evident in cases in which the entitlement-generating institution is itself seriously unjust. Next, Scanlon reminds the reader that the fact that some treatment would have good consequences is not, in itself, a basis for saying that the person deserves that treatment. Scanlon also accepts the notion that there is a distinction between basic and derived desert. If a person deserves a form of treatment, then this desert must be related to a more fundamental form of desert involving reactive attitudes. The deserved treatment must be a standard way of expressing the deeper fact that the person deserves the attitude. In general, Scanlon accepts the idea that if a person deserves some treatment, the basis on which he or she deserves it must involve his or her own behavior or character. In virtue of the fact that Scanlon endorses all these familiar doctrines about desert, it seems fair to say that his concept of desert is entirely within the mainstream.