 Just as the cases of Norman and Truetemp are designed to show that reliabilism makes getting foundational justification too easy, other, similar cases seem to show that reliabilism make getting nonfoundational justification too easy. Suppose, for example, that while you are asleep a group of logician-neuroscientists implant a device in your head that takes some of your highly reliable foundational beliefs (say, introspective or perceptual beliefs) as input and responds by selecting at random from a list of complex theorems of logic and producing a belief in that theorem. Intuitively, such beliefs are not justified despite their high degree of reliability. (This example is taken from Lyons 2009: 126). One intuitive diagnosis is that the relation between the output beliefs and input beliefs is not evidential or inferential, or the process by which the output beliefs are generated is not an evidential or inferential one. The challenge for the reliabilist who wants to avoid saying that such beliefs are justified, and avoid adding internalist constraints, is to provide a better account of inferential processes. To retain its externalism, the account must not have good inference depend on awareness of or access to the connection between propositions believed.