 But in fact Prichard held, or at least came to hold, that obligatoriness is not a property of acts at all. An act that ought to be done is one that is obligatory for some agent, one that that agent ought to do, or that is his duty. These notions of duty, obligation, and ought really denote properties of agents. It is not so much the action that is obligatory as the agent that has the obligation to do it, or to act in that way. There is no obligatoriness out there, belonging to the act that we are considering. A sense of obligation is not a recognition of a property that the act has got, in addition to all its more normal properties. It is really a sense that one is obliged, or ought, to act in that way. One might think of this as a relation, except that there is no act there yet for one to be related to in the obligated way. It is not a relation, then. But if one is obliged to act in this way, that will (as I said at the beginning) be because of – be constituted by – facts about the act and about relations in which one stands to others or to oneself.