  Those who hold a disjunctive theory of perception do not deny that it is possible to have a hallucination of an F that is subjectively indistinguishible from a veridical perception of an F. That is, they do not deny that it is possible for one to have a hallucination such that one cannot tell through introspection alone that it is not a veridical perception of an F. So associated with the disjunctivist’s metaphysical stance, namely the rejection of the common kind claim, is an epistemological proposal that emphasises limitations on a subject’s capacity to tell what kind of experience she is undergoing on the basis of introspection alone. For example, J.M. Hinton, an early proponent of the disjunctive theory, acknowledges that both a hallucination of an F and a veridical perception of an F can appear, from the inside, to be a veridical perception of an F. However, he holds that it is a mistake to assume that this appearance is to be explained by the thesis that these experiences share a common nature that is manifest to one when has the experiences.