 Causal eliminativists argue that there is no metaphysical account of causation compatible with physics or compatible with the completeness of physics and, hence, that causal notions should, as Bertrand Russell (1912) urged, be expunged from the philosophical vocabulary. Causal non-eliminativists who are also causal non-fundamentalists can come in various stripes. Some non-fundamentalists allow that non-fundamental causal concepts can be a legitimate part of at least some domains of physics. Other non-fundamentalists deny the latter claim and reject that causal notions and causal judgements can play a legitimate role within physics. John Norton is a non-fundamentalist who appears to be endorsing the former view, arguing that while causal fundamentalism is false “in appropriately restricted circumstances our science entails that nature will conform to one or other form of our causal expectations” (Norton 2003: 13). Yet Norton also seems to have some sympathies for causal eliminativism, since he likens causal concepts to the concept of caloric—a concept that no longer is accepted as playing a legitimate role in science.