 One topic of debate regarding Sanches’ scepticism revolves around the question of whether he was an Academic sceptic like Carneades with whom he identified himself in his letter to Clavius (§2.2) or whether his scepticism was of the Pyrrhonian variety as Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) claimed it to be in his Dictionary entry on Sanches (1697 [1820: 76]). However, the distinction between Pyrrhonian and Academic scepticism has not always been clear (cf.  Striker 1996: 140–141, 148–149). For Popkin (1964), Sanches’ scepticism unlike  Pyrrho’s   (c. 360 BCE–c. 270 BCE) or  Sextus Empiricus’ (c. 160  CE–c. 210 CE), does not call for the suspension of judgment  “but rather the more full-fledged negative dogmatism of the  Academics” (Popkin 1964: 41). Popkin continues: 