  Price claims that self-evident truths are “incapable of  proof” (1758/1969,  160).[4]  Most classical intuitionists endorse this view, although Ross is arguably an exception. This is easily missed, for he states at one point that self-evident moral propositions  “cannot be proved, but … just as certainly need no proof”  (1930/2002, 30). But elsewhere in The Right and the Good he  makes only the more restricted claim that such propositions do not  need any  proof,[5]  and despite the fact that he sometimes makes the further claim that they cannot receive any proof by means of argument, this further  claim does not seem to reflect his considered  view.[6]  Evidence that it does not can be found in an article written three years before the publication of The Right and the Good where he explicitly states that  “the fact that something can be inferred does not prove that it cannot be seen intuitively” (1927, 121). If he thinks that some proposition can be inferred from (justified by) other propositions and be self-evident, he clearly thinks that its being self-evident does not rule out the possibility of a proof. In any case there is nothing in the notion of a self-evident proposition that rules out justification or argument for that proposition. A self-evident proposition is one that we can be justified in believing without an argument, but this does not rule out the possibility that there may be such an argument, or justification,  or that the proposition may be believed on that  basis.[7]  Since such arguments are not needed for us to be justified in believing a self-evident proposition, they are what may be called ’epistemically supererogatory’.