 A variation of the above scenario—that likely originated from Aristotle’s De Caelo (I.5, 272a8–20)—was proposed by Abū Sahl al-Qūhī (d. 1000) to reject the Aristotelian dogma that an infinite distance cannot be traversed in a finite time. This is because the above argument shows that \(L\) can traverse \(L'\) in a finite period of time equal to half the time of the rotation of \(L\) around O for one round (R. Rashed 1999; McGinnis 2010: sec. 3). By contrast, Avicenna employs the Collimation Argument in certain places (Avicenna Al-Najāt [1985: 233–44]; [Ph1]: chap. II.8, [8]) to reject the possibility of circular motion in an infinite void and in other places (Avicenna ʿUyūn al-ḥikma, chap. 3, 20) to reject the actual infinitude of magnitudes (Zarepour 2020b: sec. 3.1; R. Rashed 2016: 302–6; 2018: sec. 11.2). The Collimation Argument is criticized by, among others, Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī (d. 1165) in his Al-Muʿtabar (vol. 2, 83–84 and 86), al-Ṭūsī in his Talkhīṣ al-Muḥassal ([1985: 217]), and al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) in his Nihāya al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām (vol. 1, 256–258). The argument is also defended by, among others, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209) in his Al-Mabāḥith al-mashriqīya (vol. 1, 196) and Mullā Ṣadrā in his Asfār (vol. 4, 21–23).