 First, even if what one ought to do is just to make one’s responses globally coherent, what it takes to make one’s responses locally coherent might differ from what it takes to make them globally coherent.  According to the Subjective Desire-Based Theory, for example, what agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend is just what, given what they believe their circumstances to be, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole.  Suppose that the agent’s strongest, present intrinsic desire is for health.  Nevertheless, out of habit, he intends to have a smoke, believing that lighting up is a necessary means.  According to the Subjective Desire-Based Theory, it is not the case that he ought to intend to light up.  And it might be said that if he were globally coherent, the agent would not intend to light up. But if he does form an intention to light up, he at least achieves a kind of local coherence.