 The idea has a certain appeal. A conditional, if \(A, B\), involves the supposition that \(A\). It tells us nothing about what happens if \(A\) is false. But there are costs. On this account, to believe/assert a conditional is not to believe/assert that it is true. It is no fault in a conditional that it is not true, for it is no fault in a conditional that it has a false antecedent. I say “If you press that button there will be an explosion”. A disaster is avoided, because, fortunately, my remark was not true. One might say the normative dimension of truth has been lost. We have to give up the equivalence between “If \(A, B\)” and “It is true that if \(A, B\)”. Even a necessary conditional such as “If \(A \amp B\), then \(A\)” can fail to be true. Validity cannot be preservation of truth, for if it were, “If \(A, B\); so \(A \amp B\)” would be a valid argument.