 But Dworkin would presumably have extended his ‘semantic sting’ argument into an argument that the communication model suffers from a ‘semantic-and-pragmatic sting’—i.e., the misconception that the content of the law is determined by agreement both as to the semantics of words, and also as to the pragmatics of communication. He would no doubt have said that the only antidote to this sting is his theory of ‘constructive interpretation’, holding that the ‘pragmatic’ aspects of the use of language in law include the attitude that law must justify the use of state coercion, which requires the interpreter to construct the theory of rights and duties that best fits and justifies the whole pattern of legal practice. That was Dworkin’s essential claim. His semantic sting argument cannot in itself undermine the communication model, because his argument was based on an impoverished view of the controversy that can result from communication.