 For instance, Kim (2009) adopts a recentering approach, on which an agent’s Thursday credence that it rained yesterday is coordinated with her Wednesday credence that it rains today. Other credences of the later self (e.g., credence that it rains on Wednesday) may be worked out from that one. (Further recentering approaches are offered by Meacham 2010; Schulz 2010; and Schwarz 2012.) Halpern (2005) and Meacham (2008), on the other hand, adopt decentering approaches on which the crucial updating step coordinates credences in uncentered propositions (that it rains on Wednesday). Stalnaker (2008) and Moss (2012) offer decentered variants in which the crucial uncentered propositions are de re (it rains on that day). Titelbaum (2013a) develops a restriction model, focused on the transfer of “epistemically context-insensitive” doxastic states—states that both the earlier and later selves are certain do not change truth-values between the two times. (The category of “epistemically context-sensitive” may also include states beyond the explicitly self-locating. For instance, an epistemologist who’s a contextualist about knowledge attributions may anticipate that the truth-value of “Bob knows he has hands” will change across contexts.) Titelbaum articulates conditions under which epistemically context-insensitive states can be trusted to convey all the relevant information from earlier to later self, and discusses how to update when these conditions aren’t met.