 What about the multifarious contents within any one of these neither-same-nor-different moments then, the long list of very diverse experienced components of any given moment? These too are neither-same-nor-different from one another, within that very moment. We have seen that these single moments of experience are to be viewed as indivisible wholes, and that they have no external limits dividing them from other moments that can be observed in a neutral substratum, from outside the moments themselves. It should be noted that neither can such limits between moments be observed from within any moment, for whatever is observed in a moment is ipso facto within its limits. But what is more surprising is that there are no definite limits even between the various contents that constitute these moments. They have what might initially be described as diverse manifold contents—first, the multiple objects of sensory observation that are included (chairs and tables, sky and earth, cups and plates, people and trees), but, observing more closely, also “subject” and “object,” “actual” and “possible,” as well as “center and periphery, (possible) hope and (actual) fear, (possible) pleasure and (actual) pain, water and mountain” and so on. But properly speaking, these elements are only genuinely “diverse” if they are viewed through the categorial obligations that apply to durational objects, whether physical or mental. These durational things, however, are now to be understood as abstract derivatives of moments of experience, rather than the ultimate constituents of reality of which moments of experience are partial apprehensions, as we usually tend to believe. When viewed on their own terms as moments, the manifold contents are indivisibly present as the moment they constitute, not losing their specific experiential qualities, but not separable into distinct elements that are merely limited “parts” or even “aspects” of the momentary experience. For we are able to identify distinct “parts” or “aspects” in an experienced object only if those parts or aspects can be experienced as “the same” object apart from the whole in which they appear, either as isolated entities or as parts or aspects of other wholes. This cannot happen with any putative part or aspect of a given moment, for any subsequent appearance of the part or aspect in question would have to be compared with the part or aspect as it appeared in the original moment; but this can only happen in yet another moment, of which both of these instances would in fact be parts or aspects. Both moment 1 and moment 2 are now experienced only as parts or aspects of moment 3, and the constituent parts or aspects of moments 1 and 2 are thus actually component parts or aspects of moment 3. If “part A” of 1 appears unchanged as “part A” also in moment 2, this tells us only about two aspects of the indivisible totality of moment 3, nothing about the relation of part A to other parts of moments 1 and 2. For again, there is no neutral medium of comparison between two moments.