  It appears that every Argument of D1 other than D1A9 is logically valid. (However, see Gill (1996, 81, n. 134), who contends that D1A12 and D1A13 are fallacious.)) D1A9 seems to commit the fallacy of equivocation (see Rickless (2007, 121–123). It also appears that almost all the independent premises of D1 are, at least from Plato’s point of view, either definitionally true or self-evident. There are three exceptions to this claim. D1A10 depends on the questionable premise that if X is not different by itself, then X itself is not different in any way (see Rickless (2007, 123–124)), and D1A11 depends on the questionable premise that if the nature of the F is not identical to the nature of the G, then if X is G relative to itself, X is not F relative to itself (see Rickless (2007, 124–126)).