 How best to understand the content-independence of political obligation, and indeed, whether we ought to conceive of a duty to obey the law in this way, remain live questions. For example, Stefan Sciaraffa argues that in introducing the idea of content-independence, H.L.A. Hart relies on Paul Grice’s distinction between natural and non-natural meaning. Statements with a non-natural meaning provide those to whom they are addressed with a particular kind of reason to form some belief or perform some act A, namely the intention of the agent who uttered the statement that they form that belief or perform that act. The phrase ‘content-independent reason’ is a (misleading) label for this particular kind of reason. Or as Sciaraffa puts the point, “an agent has a content-independent reason to phi if and only if someone’s intent that she phi is a reason for her to phi” (2009, p. 234). N.P. Adams counters that a reason is content-independent if and only if “it has a container as a constituent part and changing the content of that container does not determine whether the agent has that reason and does not determine the weight of that reason” (2017, p. 149). Speech-acts such as commands and promises are paradigmatic examples of containers. It is the status of an agent as morally entitled to direct another to perform some act, apart from any other considerations that count in favor of performing it, that provide the person so directed with a reason to perform that act. Sciaraffa and Adams draw on their respective accounts of content-independence to offer rejoinders to Peter Markwick’s criticisms of (a common interpretation of) content-independence (Markwick 2000). Laura Valentini maintains that “if property P, invoked to justify the authority of law, is not displayed by legal commands robustly across variations in their content, then P cannot justify an obligation to obey the law because it is the law” (2018, p. 141). She then argues that while certain common approaches to justifying political obligation, such as consent, can satisfy this understanding of content-independence, others, such as fair play, cannot. Finally, George Klosko contends that we ought to reject altogether the claim that political obligation is content-independent (Klosko 2011; see Adams, Valentini, for responses).