 We have already seen how reasons for action are understood as explanations of fact; facts explain facts; so the move further requires construing decisions as factual conclusions of some kind, and the live candidate is that they are predictions of one’s own actions (Velleman 2015, ch. 3). They differ from other predictions in being self-fulfilling. (Though obviously not just any self-fulfilling prediction will serve: as Anscombe observed, ‘I’m going to be sick’ does not normally express an intention – and it doesn’t even if the thought of being sick is what brings on the nausea, and even if you can predict the nausea on the basis of what you have just eaten.)  Thus, and returning to our theme, an action proper will be the process of such a prediction fulfilling itself. And so practical reasoning will be the explanation of future behavior that underwrites the self-fulfilling prediction of that behavior. 