 Brito’s logic of intentions also allows him to explain away a concern that had troubled earlier commentators of Aristotle’s logic, such as Nicholas of Paris and Robert Kilwardby, namely the fact that simple words, such as ‘man’, are discussed in the Categories, De interpretatione and Prior Analytics (see Mora-Márquez 2015b: 71). If, they thought, a discussion of simple words belongs in logic at all, then at least it ought to be found in precisely one treatise. However, since logic, for Brito, deals with man as a concrete second intention rather than as a word or a thing, the problem does not arise. In fact, the Categories discusses man insofar as it is a substance; the De interpretatione insofar as it is a subject of predication; and the Prior Analytics insofar as it is a term, i.e., the major, minor or middle term of a syllogism (QsP; see Ebbesen &amp; Pinborg 1981–1982: 313).