 The interest in how personal relationships and the goods they produce generate reasons has given rise to a large and growing body of literature outside the ethics of care (Scheffler 2001; Kolodny 2003; Keller 2013; Seglow 2013). Our reasons to be partial towards our close associates often take the form of prima facie duties. Unlike some of the care ethicists (Noddings 2002), its authors do not assume that (close) personal relationships are the paradigm of the rest of morality. Rather, they start from the observation that people have special permissions towards, and owe special duties to, those with whom they are in personal relationships, such as friends, spouses, or family members. Often such duties are called associative duties. (Although it is also possible that the reasons generated by personal relationships are not moral reasons, in which case they do not generate moral duties; for an argument why not all good reasons are moral reasons see Susan Wolf 1992).