 Other philosophers have been inspired by the chimpanzee theory of mind controversy to rethink social cognition. Andrews (2012), for instance, argued that the chimpanzee theory of mind debate presupposes a view of social understanding according to which predicting and explaining behavior are two symmetrical activities that depend on the attribution of propositional attitudes (beliefs and desires) to others. Instead, she argues that in many cases humans and nonhumans alike can predict behavior without appealing to someone’s beliefs and desires, predicting instead from the situation in which the other is in, from what they themselves would do, based on stereotypes or personality traits, from what that individual did in the past, from social norms, by perceiving the individual’s emotional state, and so on. In contrast, the attribution of mental states is more commonly found in the practice of explaining the behavior of others, especially in the case of anomalous behavior. Though chimpanzees and other apes have been found to pass a false belief task (Buttelmann et al. 2017; Krupenye et al. 2016), the chimpanzee theory of mind experiments have been designed to test for their capacity to predict behavior, not to explain it, so they may not actually be probing into chimpanzees’ theory of mind (Andrews 2018). Stephen Butterfill and Ian Apperly (2013) also argued that theory of mind tests that have been performed on children, apes, and other animals can be passed without attributing full-blown propositional attitudes to others. The individuals can rely instead on what they call a “minimal theory of mind,” an ability to register objects and their relations to agents that allows one to track propositional attitudes without representing them as such. While much of the current discussion of ape theory of mind is methodological, raising worries about the nonverbal implicit methods used in these tests (Horschler, MacLean, &amp; Santos 2020), there are also philosophical questions to be asked about a construct that has arisen from the nonverbal tests, namely, implicit belief representation. Implicit knowledge is often taken to be nonrepresentational, as seen in the philosophical literature on knowledge how. To address the questions of what it means to say a nonverbal infant or nonhuman animal has a theory of mind requires some conceptual clarifications (Rakoczy 2012).