 What Kolodny assumes here is that there are, in Broome’s words, “no optional pairs of beliefs” (Broome 2013: 85). That is, it is never the case that belief in \(A\) and belief in \(\neg A\) is equally permissible in light of the evidence. As Broome points out, Kolodny’s assumption is founded on a commitment to evidentialism, which may cause some to get off the bus. Notice, though, that even if we accept Kolodny’s argument along with its evidentialist presuppositions, there may still be room for logical norms. Such norms would not constrain beliefs directly, since only evidence constrains our beliefs on Kolodny’s view. Yet, the evidence itself would be structured by logic. For instance, if \(A\) entails \(B\), then since \(A\) cannot be true without \(B\) being true, any evidence that counts in favor of \(A\) should also count in favor of \(B\). Logic would then still exert normative force. However, its normative force would get only an indirect grip on the agent’s doxastic attitudes by constraining the evidence. It is not clear how robust the distinction is, especially against the background of conceptions that take evidence to be constituted largely (or entirely) by one's beliefs. Moreover, Alex Worsnip 2015 has argued that in cases of misleading higher-order evidence, failures of coherence cannot ultimately be explained in terms of failures to respond adequately to the evidence.