 But there have been many external criticisms whose intention is to reject neo-Pyrrhonism. Roberto Bolzani Filho developed an incisive criticism of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism. Bolzani (1996, 2003) identified a sort of “naturalized reason” or some dogmatic presuppositions in the idea of a “healthy philosophy” in Porchat’s thinking. One could apply to skepticism the same kind of argument that the skeptic uses against other philosophies. In the end, skepticism would be part of the conflict among philosophies it tries to avoid. Bolzani also attempted to show that, despite Porchat’s intention, neo-Pyrrhonism is an outdated way of philosophizing. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (2003) presented a Kantian answer to Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism. He raised a number of difficulties to understand Porchat’s conception of phenomena, and argued that an acceptable solution would come only from a transcendental philosophy. These two criticisms, if sound, should make one reconsider neo-Pyrrhonism. More recently, Pereira (2015) came to defend naive realism against Pyrrhonism.