 First, some have criticized these studies on philosophical and methodological grounds (see, e.g., Miles 2013; Caruso, forthcoming-b; Morris, forthcoming). The “cheating” study, for instance, has failed to replicate on a number of occasions (Carey &amp; Roston 2015; Open Science Collaboration 2015; Zwaan 2013 [see Other Internet Resources]) and the passages used to prompt anti-free will belief have been criticized for not being representative of what most free will and moral responsibility skeptics claim (Morris, forthcoming). There is also the question of whether the negative effects tested in these studies indicate anything about the long-term consequences of moral responsibility skepticism. Most of these effects are short-lived and temporary. But as people become more acquainted with the skeptical perspective, and as they come to understand what it does and does not maintain, it remains possible that these effects would fade over time.  Lastly, there is also a growing body of evidence in the opposite direction suggesting that certain positive effects may follow from free will and moral responsibility skepticism (Carey &amp; Paulhus 2013; Nadelhoffer &amp; Tocchetto 2013; Krueger et al. 2014; Shariff et al. 2014; Caspar et al.  2017).