 According to Adolf Reinach (1911: 374, Fn.),  Edmund Husserl, a student of Brentano, was the first to clarify the significance and distinctive nature of states of affairs. Husserl (1901: V §17, § 18) took the object and not the content of a judgement to be a state of affairs. Every judgement has a content, in Husserl terminology “matter” (Materie) in virtue of which it is directed on a state of affairs, its object. Different kinds of mental act can be directed on the same state of affairs.  For instance, when I wonder whether Rome was built in a day and when I judge that Rome was built in a day, I am directed on the same state of affairs, but once in the questioning, once in the assertoric mode. Can judgements that differ in their matter be directed on the same state of affairs? An answer to this question would help us to fix the distinction between matter and content for judgements. But Husserl’s answer to this question is difficult to reconstruct. Husserl 1900 connected states of affairs further to correct judgement, probability and the laws of logic. For instance, a judgement is supposed to be correct if, and only if, the state of affairs it is directed on obtains (Husserl 1900: 13).