 The first objection to sufficiency is not so much a critique of the criterion, but of the logic to which it is applied. For Quine first-order predicate logic excludes the empty domain: its valid formulas are those that come out true under all interpretations of the non-logical symbols over all non-empty domains. It follows from this that, on the quantifier account, universal sentences carry the exact same ontological commitments as their existential counterparts. It follows because, in classical first-order predicate logic, universal sentences have existential import: ‘∀x φ(x)’ logically entails ‘∃x φ(x)’. If we want to allow ‘∀x φ(x)’ to be true even when there are no φs (because there is nothing at all), then we do not want it to carry any ontological commitment. Ontological commitments should reside entirely with the existential quantifier. Implementing this is easy. We simply do logic so as to include interpretations with an empty domain—so-called, inclusive logic.  According to the truth conditions for quantifiers in inclusive logic, all universal sentences are true in an empty domain, and all existential sentences are false. Once we have made the shift to inclusive logic, we can also say, what seems right, that conditional existential sentences—such as, ‘∃x φ(x) ⊃ ∃x y(x)’—carry no ontological commitment.