  Let us assume that there are significant innate priors that operate in perceptual processing. Does this score points for the Nativist position in general? In one way it does, because it is in line with the basic Nativist theme that humans are tailored for their natural environment. But in another sense, the Empiricist might downplay the importance of this kind of Perceptual Nativism for the larger debate. Empiricists have always taken it for granted that we perceive as we do, in large part, because of our biological-psychological nature. The traditional Empiricist focus has usually been on that part of our understanding that goes beyond what we actually perceive. Its main claim is that anything that goes beyond what we perceive is constructed out of what we’ve perceived by domain-general principles. So even if (some of) the priors involved in Bayesian models of perceptual processing are innate, the more critical arena for the Nativist is domain-specific cognitive processing, to which we now turn. Nativists would expect that the best Bayesian models of cognitive processing would have to incorporate innate priors that reflect domain-specific knowledge. Empiricists would expect that domain-specific priors are themselves learnable by Bayesian methods from experience plus domain-general constraints on learning.