 In practice, Xunzi’s philosophical method follows much the same course as the Mohists’. He takes it upon himself to analyze the “purpose of having names”, the “evidence for assimilating and differentiating”, and the “basic requirements for instituting names” (Xunzi, Book 22). However, for Xunzi, reason must stop short of justifying what actions may serve as models for ethical conduct. The Mohists held that an action is admissible if it accords with general considerations of utility. This makes the justification of the action contingent on the circumstances surrounding the action’s consequences, whether they lead to the enrichment of society, and whether they contribute to the realization of the principle of universal love. Determining whether the action is justified thus prescribes the use of reason independently of judgments of authority. In Xunzi’s view, this appeal to utility implies a use of reason that his own ethics would forbid, because the actions of a sage are not to be justified by anything independently of their intrinsic moral authority. Since the customs instituted by the sage are essentially stipulated as models of appropriate conduct, reason plays no role in their identification as such to the common individual.