 According to Wright, “it is an important methodological precept that we do not despair of giving answers to constitutive questions too soon” (2001: 191). He goes on to propose a non-reductionist view that is sensitive to the difficulty of accounting for our knowledge of what we mean. (As we noted in  section 2,  Wright takes Kripke’s sceptic to impose a legitimate epistemological constraint on answers to the skeptical challenge.) He offers a “judgment-dependent” account of intention, according to which what one intends is determined by one’s best judgment about what one intends. Insofar as the concepts of intention and meaning are “relevantly similar” (2001: 206), this account can also claim to shed light on the nature of meaning. Thus, we might say, on Wright’s behalf, that what one means by an expression is determined by one’s best judgment about what one means. The notion of judgment is taken by Wright as primitive. Still, the authoritative nature of first-personal avowals is allegedly vindicated. See especially essays 5–7 in Wright  2001.[16]