 Some early criticisms of counterpart theory seem to rest on misunderstandings. For example, Plantinga (1974, 115f.) and Salmon (1981, 232–38) complain that according to Lewis, all things have all their properties essentially, since there is no world in which these very things exist and have different properties. Kripke (1980) similarly complains that according to Lewis, when we say that Humphrey might have won the election, we are “not talking about something that might have happened to Humphrey, but to someone else” (45, fn. 13). In response, Lewis points out that on his view it is indeed Humphrey himself who might have won, in virtue of having a winning counterpart, cf. Lewis (1986e, 194–6, 246; 1983d, 41–2). Properly understood, Lewis’s analysis does not even deny that there are worlds at which Humphrey (himself) won the election. What the analysis denies is only that there are other worlds that contain Humphrey himself as a (winning) part. (See also Hazen 1979, 320–4.)