 Certain types of information may be judged inconclusive or not fully reliable. While unsuitable for advancing knowledge, such information may prompt agents to alter some of their beliefs. Such inconclusive evidence often concerns expectations concerning opponents’ player types. Leaving aside the possibility of mere mistakes, all moves can be assumed to result from intentional, strategic considerations. By interpreting opponents’ past moves, agents may hence infer about their beliefs, preferences, risk attitudes or reasoning types. Naturally, most such observations are not fully conclusive. The corresponding updates hence cannot delete any alternatives. Rather, they merely change the agent’s plausibility ordering \(\leq_i\) among different options. Formally, this can be handled with the plausibility updates introduced for Backward Induction. However, the interpretation differs. Here, these updates do not represent steps in pregame deliberation, but result from actual moves during the game. Besides the radical upgrade introduced above, a number of further updating policies reflecting different attitudes to the information acquired are defined in Baltag and Smets (2008). The epistemic-plausibility patterns that can arise from systematic plausibility update in games have been identified in Dégremont (2010), using two counterparts of the earlier perfect recall and no miracles properties: ‘Plausibility Revelation’ and ‘Plausibility Propagation’.