 But even on a thin interpretation of the rule of law, there are problems about its applicability to international law. Jeremy Waldron has highlighted two major disanalogies between domestic and international law that bear on the applicability of the rule of law ideal in the case of the latter (Waldron 2011). The first is that, unlike ordinary citizens in domestic legal systems who are contrasted with officials, states in the international legal order are both the subjects of international law and its officials (its creators, e.g., via treaty-making and processes of customary international law, and its enforcers, e.g., via countermeasures). The second disanalogy is that, unlike individual human beings, states do not have inherent moral value; in particular, their freedom seems to be valuable only insofar as it serves the interests of individual human beings. One practical upshot of both of these disanalogies is that we cannot readily proceed on the assumption, which is justified in the domestic case in relation to the conduct of individuals, that state conduct should be free of official interference unless clearly circumscribed by law. One response to Waldron’s first disanalogy is to say that it is a matter of degree; even in a domestic legal order, compliance with the rule of law will depend upon the attitudes and habits of ordinary citizens in sustaining a rule of law respecting culture. Meanwhile, one response to the second disanalogy is to argue that although state autonomy is not inherently valuable, it acquires value derivatively, as a means of protecting the autonomy of individuals and groups within states (Pavel 2021: 346).