 It would seem, then, that synderesis is a potentiality, albeit an unusual one. Is it connected to the cognitive side of the soul or to the appetitive? According to Philip, it is related to the appetitive, and specifically to the rational appetite, that is, to the will, rather than to the sense appetite. However, as we saw, Philip divides the rational appetite into what he calls “natural will” and “deliberative will”. The natural will signifies the general inclination that humans have to the good or happiness as such. Such an object is beyond the scope of choice. Having said that, happiness can be achieved in any number of ways and by the acquisition of any number of legitimate, though contingent goods. Indeed, it is fair to say that rational agents never choose happiness as such, given that it is a mere abstraction. Rather, what they choose are particular goods which, taken together, comprise the good life if pursued in an orderly way. Such contingent goods are the means to happiness and are the objects of the deliberative will, and therefore choice. Synderesis, according to Philip, pertains to the natural will. It is the remnant of original rectitude or justice which, although damaged during the fall, remains in the soul in diminished form. As Philip puts it, synderesis is that which “murmurs back against sin and correctly contemplates and wants what is good without qualification” (Summa de bono: Treatise on Conscience; Potts trans. 1980: 100).