 Buridan’s account appears to commit him to the view that the addition or subtraction of even tiny and seemingly inconsequential parts can bring about substantial change: strictly speaking we do not have one horse, but rather a succession of horses unified by three facts, namely, (1) these successive beings have some of the same parts, (2) this line of succession is continuous, and (3) each member in the line of succession is a horse. The picture we get has many similarities to the accounts of identity that we get in early modern thinkers like Hobbes and Locke. Thus, it is tempting to think that we are witnessing in Buridan’s work one more way in which the Aristotelian scholastic edifice is being eroded to the point that it will quickly crumble in the seventeenth century (see Pasnau 2011, 703 f., and Lagerlund 2012, esp. pp. 481–2).