 Some particularly simple and suggestive variations of on this theme have been studied under the labels “investor game” or “trust game” (See, for example, Kreps (1990), Berg (1995) and Bicchieri and Suntuoso (2015) and note that the game nomenclature is not consistent accross these references.) Player One is given \(s\) units of utility. He may choose to pass any number \(s\prime \lt s\) to a “trustee”, who triples that number and passes it to Player Two. Player Two may then either keep the units that she has or return some of them to Player One. So formulated, the game has the advantage that one can take the proportion of her utility that a player surrenders as her degree of cooperativeness. If one restricts the moves so that Player One may give none or \(s\), and Player Two may give none or \(2s\) one gets exactly the farmer's dilemma). 