  Socrates needs further argument in any case if he wants to convince  those of us in imperfect circumstances (like Glaucon and Adeimantus)  to pursue the philosophical life of perfect justice. The first  argument tries to show that anyone who wants to satisfy her desires  perfectly should cultivate certain kinds of desires rather than  others. We can reject this argument in either of two ways, by taking  issue with his analysis of which desires are regularly satisfiable  and which are not, or by explaining why a person should not want to  satisfy her desires perfectly. The first response calls for a  quasi-empirical investigation of a difficult sort, but the second  seems easy. We can just argue that a good human life must be subject  to regret and loss. Of course, it is not enough to say that the human condition is in fact marked by regret and loss. There is no  inconsistency in maintaining that one should aim at a secure life in  order to live the best possible human life while also realizing that  the best possible human life will be marked by insecurity. In fact,  one might even think that the proper experience of fragility requires attachment to security as one’s end. Instead, to reject Socrates’ argument, we must show that it is wrong to aim at a life that is free of regret and loss: we must show that the pursuit of security leads one to  reject certain desires that one should not reject. In this way, we  move beyond a discussion of which desires are satisfiable, and we  tackle the question about the value of what is desired and the value  of the desiring itself. To address this possible objection, Socrates  needs to give us a different argument.