  Finally, a more recent reply to such objections form motivation is that they misunderstand the role of the relevant non-natural properties in the motivational economy of a virtuous agent.  On this view (defended in Chappell 2019), the virtuous agent is not motivated by some simple non-natural property like goodness.  That, on this view, would be a sort of fetishism.  Rather, the virtuous agent is motivated by the purely natural facts that make the action morally right, e.g. that it spares someone emotional distress.  The role of the relevant non-natural property, here the property of being a reason for a given action, is to mark  the relevant properties as the ones it is correct to be motivated by.  One reply to this argument is suggested by Max Hayward (Hayward 2019). Hayward argues that our commitment to e.g. the value of our partner should not be conditional on the existence and distribution of non-natural properties.  Yet non-naturalist moral realism is committed to the view that all value is contingent on the existence of such properties.  Transposed to Chappell’s emphasis on normative properties as markers of our reasons, Hayward’s argument would imply the correctness of treating the relevant facts as reasons should not depend on the sort of obscure metaphysics posited by non-naturalist moral realists.