 Of course, there remain questions about this account, and three are broached here. First, one might doubt whether the contrast between essentialist accounts of human nature, on the one hand, and a thinner kind of self-governing agency, on the other, can either be sustained or play the role intended. Second, one might wonder about the ground(s) of normativity; after all, that the kind of subjectivity or self-determination which appropriation embodies is recognised and valued in modern culture does not in itself establish its ethical worth. (More generally, it can seem easier to dismiss Hegelian teleology, or Marxist perfectionism, than it is to find wholly satisfactory replacements for them.) Third, one might be sceptical about the degree of social criticism here, since both the sources of, and solutions to, Jaeggi’s paradigmatic examples of unsuccessful appropriation (‘powerless’, ‘loss of authenticity’, ‘internal division’, and ‘indifference’) seem to focus on the ‘thoughts and dispositions’ of individuals rather than the structures of particular societies (Haverkamp 2016, 69). Of course, there might be plausible responses to these critical worries, some of which could draw on Jaeggi’s own subsequent work (see espcially 2018). 