 Not all of those who have written on the non-identity problem accept that Marie does wrong in deciding to have Amy rather than Sophie, or that Sri does wrong in reproducing. Indeed, some find the suggestion that it is wrong to (knowingly) bring disabled children into the world abhorrent due to the implications of such views for individuals with disabilities. Asch holds that a woman has a right to an abortion, but also that it would be wrong to have an abortion to prevent the birth of a disabled child. Abortion on such grounds is immoral, she argues, because it communicates that “disability is so terrible it warrants not being alive” (Asch 1999, 387). The argument could easily be extended to decisions about whether to conceive a certain type of child. Does prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion, or preimplantation genetic diagnosis, communicate that disability is so terrible it warrants not being alive? On its face this claim is contestable; the associated decisions are highly specific to each case. And even if such acts did communicate something, it is unclear that it would be a thesis about relative qualities of life (see also Buchanan et al. 2000, chap. 7). For more discussion of the ethics of creating people with disabilities see encyclopedia article on  disability: health, well-being, and personal relationships.