 Before leaving the topic of evolutionary debunking arguments, it should be noted that in addition to the general arguments considered above, which are aimed at debunking morality (or in Street’s case, debunking a realist construal of morality) as a whole, there are also evolutionary debunking arguments meant instead just to target a selected range of moral beliefs as epistemically suspect. Such selective debunking arguments may be deployed by moral realists who reject general debunking arguments in this domain but nonetheless wish to use similar tactics to discredit certain kinds of moral belief as part of advancing their own normative ethical project. They might argue, for example, that while the deontological beliefs held by their opponents can be successfully debunked by appeal to evolutionary considerations, their own utilitarian ethical beliefs are immune from such debunking, stemming from autonomous rational reflection rather than from evolved psychological modules shaped by the distorting influences of natural selection.