 The focus on matters of ontology is evidenced in other portions of Peter’s logic as well. For Peter, as for Henry of Ghent (who also wrote a Syncategoreumata) the expression homo (man) in homo est animal (‘Man is an animal’) has simple supposition: it stands for the universal nature of humanity. Accordingly, the expression is necessarily true, even if no man should exist. The term ‘necessarily’ thus has ampliative force: it enables the subject term ‘man’ to refer to individuals not only existing in the present ( which is the normal case when a present-tense verb is used), but also to those of the past and the future. This analysis runs contrary to what is found in some other Syncategoreumata authors, like Johannes Pagus and Nicholas of Paris, who maintain that the term ‘necessarily’ does not have ampliative force. Hence the expression homo necessario est animal (‘A man is necessarily an animal’) is only true on the condition that a man exists.