 Cook Wilson thought it misleading to base logic on ‘judgement’ instead of ‘proposition’ or ‘statement’ (SI, 94) and he questioned the traditional analysis of proposition under the form ‘S is P’, which he saw has having various meanings (Joseph (1916a, 6), see also section 9 for a related point). In his polemics against idealism, Cook Wilson’s main target was the traditional theory of judgement that one finds, e.g., in Bradley’s Principles of Logic (Bradley 1928), where the topic is simply divided into ‘judgement’ and ‘inference’. There would thus be a common form of thinking called the ‘judgement’ that ‘S is P’, which would include non-inferred knowledge, opinion, and belief, but would exclude inferred knowledge. One would be misled, he argued, by the common verbal form ‘S is P’ that knowledge, belief, and opinion are species of the same genre called ‘judgement’ (SI, 86–7). He claimed instead to follow ‘ordinary usage’ in adopting a ‘judicial’ account of ‘judgement’: