 This suggests, contrary to Dreier’s assertions, that the notion of an act whose outcome outranks every available alternative can come apart from the notion of an act that ought to be performed. For these two types of theorists agree that the outcome of my raising my left arm at t (the outcome in which dreadful things happen) is outranked by that of my raising neither arm at t (the outcome in which OK things happen). And they agree that the outcome of my raising both my arms at t (the outcome in which wonderful things happen) outranks those of every available alternative. But despite their agreeing on how all the outcomes rank, they disagree on whether I ought to perform the option of raising my left arm at t. In other words, the two theories agree on how to rank all the available outcomes but disagree on whether the act whose outcome outranks every available alternative must always be the one that ought to be performed—see Nair 2020. Thus, the two theories disagree on what the active ingredients are and not just on how to label them. For whereas omnists (and actualists) hold that the active ingredient in making an act one that ought to be performed is that its outcome outranks every available alternative (as Dreier assertions entail), maximalists (and possibilists) hold that it is instead that the outcome of the best option in which the agent performs it outranks every available alternative. Of course, Dreier could try to argue that these two types of theories are somehow equivalent, but, as Shyam Nair points out, doing so would involve uncharitably insisting that one of them accepts a very implausible claim about how to rank outcomes—see his 2020. Unfortunately, Nair’s argument is too long and complex to summarize here. But the reader should at least have a sense of this objection and how it might be rebutted.