 Some have thought that Carnap’s view offers a deflationist view of objects, since it appears that the existence of objects is not language independent. After Carnap’s seminal article, several other deflationist approaches were put forward (Putnam 1987, 1990; Hirsch 2002, 2011; Sider 2007, 2009; Thomasson 2015), many of them claiming to be a vindication of Carnap’s view. However, there are deflationist proposals that run counter to Carnap’s approach, among them, deflationary nominalism (Azzouni 2010) or agnosticism about abstract objects (Bueno 2008a, 2008b, 2020). Additionally, philosophers inspired by Frege’s work have argued for a minimal notion of an object (Rayo 2013, Rayo 2020 [Other Internet Resources]; and Linnebo 2018). We’ll discuss some of these in greater detail below, in subsection 3.7.2.  A final agnostic position that has emerged is one that rejects a strict version of platonism, but suggests that neither a careful analysis of mathematical practice (Maddy 2011), nor the enhanced version of the indispensability argument (Leng 2020) suffice to decide between nominalism and moderate versions of platonism. Along these lines, Balaguer (1998) concluded that the question doesn’t have an answer, since the arguments for ‘full-blooded’ platonism can be matched one-for-one by equally good arguments by the anti-platonist.