 Hence, Goodman appears to analyze pictorial representation as an ambiguous concept, ambiguous, that is, between a denotational sense (“is a picture of a so-and-so”) and a non-denotational sense (“is a so-and-so-picture”). This may be seen as a disadvantage vis-à-vis “perceptual” theories of depiction such as those proposed, for instance, by Richard Wollheim (1987) and Kendall Walton (1990) (cf. Robinson 2000). Yet concerns on Goodman’s treating the concept of depiction as ambiguous are misplaced, for the phrase “picture of” and its cognates can be easily shown to admit two different interpretations. What can be called the phrase’s relational sense has to do with what, if anything, a picture refers to; the non-relational sense, instead, has to do with, as Goodman would say, the sort of picture it is, or better with the picture’s depictive content (see, e.g., Budd 1993). Indeed, Goodman is right in claiming that, with any picture, there are always two questions: one, what the picture represents, if anything; two, what kind of picture it is (1976, 31). Rather, a much more real problem with Goodman’s theory derives from his not addressing some of the most fundamental questions regarding depiction. Goodman articulates his account of relational depiction in some detail: pictures are symbols in symbol systems that are devoted to denotation (although their members may have individual, multiple, or null denotation) and that have certain (primarily) syntactic characteristics. Yet, Goodman has nothing to say on why certain pictures denote what they do. Lacking a theory of pictorial reference is no oversight on the part of the philosopher however. The fact is that Goodman is interested in investigating the “routes” of reference (1981a)—how symbols can denote or exemplify or refer in more complex and indirect ways. He is not interested in the origins, or “roots,” of reference—hence, with regard to pictures, in how certain marks and not others have become commonly correlated with certain kinds of items in the world. This is as much true of what pictures are labels for as of which labels apply to pictures, that is, of how they are classified. Hence, it turns out, Goodman also has not much to say on the non-relational sense of depiction, i.e., with what makes a picture the sort of picture it is (e.g., a man-picture or a unicorn-picture or a so-and-so-picture). Why pictures are classified in certain ways—as unicorn-pictures, man-pictures, and so on—ultimately, is a matter of entrenchment of certain predicates out of the many predicates available. Given the actual history of the use of our symbols, certain pictorial labels (i.e., pictures) are projected rather than others, and certain verbal labels are projected over those pictorial labels. Accordingly, for the most part, Goodman’s theory of depiction is better seen for what it has to tell us on its own terms—in general, on what distinguishes pictorial symbols from symbols of other sorts.