 Contra Hobbes, Pufendorf allows that supreme sovereignty (summum imperium) may be either absolute or limited (DJN VII.6.7). The former obtains where a sovereign accepts his (her, or its) authority with no conditions attached, the latter where citizens’ submission depends on the sovereign’s initial acceptance of certain terms, such as an existing state’s fundamental laws. These can be violated by the eventual sovereign, making his actions injurious or illegitimate (DJN VII.8.2–4, 6.10), even though subjects are not typically – except in extremis – in a position to deny him obedience for this reason because it would undermine the important end of sovereignty altogether (DJN VII.8.5–6). Given human imperfections, Pufendorf clearly favors limited sovereignty; however, and for the same reasons, while he criticizes the abuse of absolute sovereignty he also criticizes irrational fear thereof (DJN VII.6.8–13). Again, there is no universal recommendation but all depends on what is needed in particular historical circumstances where such choices present themselves.