 Temporal reasoning is an important aspect of reasoning about agents and their actions. The probably most influential family of logics of agency in philosophical studies is the family of so-called stit logics, originating from the work of Belnap and Perloff (1988). These logics contain formulae of the form stit\(\varphi\), reading “The agent sees to it that \(\varphi\)”, which allow one to reason about how an agent’s choices to act bear on the world. The original versions of stit logic do not involve temporal operators. Nevertheless, their semantics is based on Ockhamist branching time models, where an agent’s set of choices at a given time instant is represented by a partition of the set of histories passing through that instant. Intuitively, the formula stit\(\varphi\) is true at a given time instant \(t\) with respect to a given history \(h\) iff the agent’s choice at the instant \(t\) with respect to the history \(h\) guarantees that \(\varphi\), i.e. if \(\varphi\) is true at \(t\) relative to all histories in the respective choice cell. For a detailed discussion of varieties of stit logic and their historical development, see Belnap et al. (2001) and the entry on  the logic of action.  Temporal extensions of stit logics have been proposed in Broersen (2011) and Lorini (2013): in Broersen (2011) the stit operator is combined with the Next Time operator \(X\) into a single operator which requires that the objective be met in the next step, whereas in Lorini (2013) the stit operator and the temporal operators are treated separately.