 As this figure illustrates most initial distributions of claimant types eventually converge to an equilibrium where all agents follow M and press claims of 1/2. To use a technical term, we can say that \(\be_2\) has the largest basin of  attraction.[16]  To see why this is the case, we can consider how different pure strategy types fare when agents of a population meet at random and engage in the Nash Demand Game. Agents who press claims of D always arrive at feasible bargains, but in particular interactions they never do as well as partners who press claims of M or H. On the other hand, agents who press claims of H only arrive at feasible bargains when matched with agents who press minimal claims of D and can thus be exploited. Meanwhile, agents who press claims of M arrive at feasible bargains when matched against either D-following partners or other M-following partners. On average, then, M-followers do better than both D-followers and H-followers unless there are so many H-followers and so few M-followers in the population that in an individual encounter an M-follower is more likely to meet an H-follower than either another M-follower or a  D-follower.[17]  Indeed, M is an evolutionarily stable strategy (Maynard Smith 1982) of this game. What this means is that, if \(\be_2\) is the current population state so that M is the sole incumbent strategy, then \(\be_2\) can repel any limited invasion of some different mutant  strategy.[18]