 Gaṅgeśa also objects to the notion ‘sensory connection’ in the classical Nyāyasutra definition of perception, arguing that this makes the definition too wide and too narrow at the same time: too wide because it implies that every awareness is perceptual being produced by virtue of a connection with the ‘inner’ sense faculty or mind (manas); too narrow because it fails to include divine perception, which involves no sensory connection. Gaṅgeśa offers a simpler definition of perception as an awareness which has no other awareness as its chief instrumental cause. Being concerned that his definition may be interpreted as ruling out conceptualized or determinate perception that may have non-conceptual or indeterminate perception as one of it causes, he argues that indeterminate perception can never be the chief instrumental cause of determinate perception, although it is a cause, since it supplies the qualifier or the concept for determinate perception. This simpler definition has other problems. Perception is a source of knowledge so Gaṅgeśa must explain how this definition rules out non-veridical perceptions. So, he spends the longest Section in the Chapter on Perception in his Tattvacintāmaṇi Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology on giving a general account of illusion as “appearance of something other than it is”.