 One suggestion is that, if we accept that the traditional presentism-eternalism debate is flawed because of definitional worries, then the traditional debate should “give way” to the new transientism-permanentism debate (e.g., Williamson 2013: 25; Deasy 2019a: 284). A related suggestion is that, since mainstream characterisations of presentism, eternalism, etc., should be rejected (again, because of definitional worries), we should accept new characterisations of these views, given in terms of transientism or permanentism (e.g., Deasy 2017). On this approach, we might characterise presentism as the conjunction of transientism and a minimal conception of the A theory, i.e., that there is an absolute, objective present moment (see Deasy 2017: 391; cf. Correia &amp; Rosenkranz 2015, 2020; Viebahn 2020).