  The irrationality which is held necessarily to attach to akratic  action derives from the discrepancy between what the agent judges to  be the best (or better) thing to do, and what she does. That is, her  action is faulted as irrational in virtue of not conforming to her  better judgment. But—ask these critics—what if her better judgment is itself faulty? There is nothing magical about an agent’s  better judgment that ensures that it is correct, or even warranted;  like any other judgment, it can be in error, or even unjustified.  (Recall that by “better judgment” we meant, all along,  only “a judgment as to which course of action is better,” not “a superior judgment.”) Where the agent’s  better judgment is itself defective, in doing what she deems herself  to have insufficient reason to do, the agent may actually be doing  what she has most reason to do. “Even though the akratic agent  does not believe that she is doing what she has most reason to do, it may nevertheless be the case that the course of action that she is  pursuing is the one that she has … most reason to  pursue” (McIntyre 1990, p. 385). In that sense the  akratic agent may be wiser than her own better judgment.