 The answer, as some see it, is that exclusivists can no longer justifiably maintain that their exclusivistic beliefs are true. J.L. Schellenberg, for example, argues that because no more than one among a set of incompatible truth claims can be true, disputants in a debate over such claims are justified in continuing to maintain that their claim is true only if they possess nonquestion-begging justification — justification based on assumptions and lines of reasoning acceptable to both parties — for believing the incompatible claim of any competitor to be false. However, since disputants in no religious conflicts possess such justification, disputants cannot be justified “in holding their own claim to be true.” Or, As Schellenberg states this conclusion in another context, we must conclude that in the absence of objective, nonquestion-begging justification, none of the disputants in religious conflicts “has justification for supposing the others’ claims false” (Schellenberg 2000, 213). David Silver comes to a similar conclusion: “[Exclusivists] should provide independent evidence for the claim that they have a special source of religious knowledge ... or they should relinquish their exclusivist religious beliefs” (Silver 2001, 11).