 In the literature, especially in the part of it that contains objections to paraconsistent logic, there has been some tendency to confuse paraconsistency with dialetheism, the view that there are true contradictions (see the entry on  dialetheism).  The view that a consequence relation should be paraconsistent does not entail the view that there are true contradictions. Paraconsistency is a property of a consequence relation whereas dialetheism is a view about truth. The fact that one can define a non-explosive consequence relation does not mean that some sentences are true. The fact that one can construct a model where a contradiction holds but not every sentence of the language holds (or where this is the case at some world) does not mean that the contradiction is true per se. Hence paraconsistency must be distinguished from dialetheism. This has been argued recently by Barrio and Da Ré (2018), and an explicitly non-dialetheic interpretation of paraconsistency is given by Carnielli and Rodrigues (2021). For reasons that paraconsistency may lead to dialetheism after all, see Asmus 2012.