 The intelligibility of delusions remains contested. Delusions are expressed using unexceptional syntax, and some involve content that, while inaccurate or implausible, is entirely comprehensible. These, Jaspers insisted, are secondary delusions; primary delusions, in contrast, are distinguished by their meaninglessness: attributing meaning to them is a misapplication of the hermeneutic approach (Jaspers 1913 [1963]; Gorski 2012). Influenced by Wittgenstein, others have adopted the position that all delusions are meaningless utterances (Berrios 1991). Findings in brain science have been employed to confirm the latter view. Delusions are hypothesized to reflect thought and narrative fragments trapped in the off-line, default cognitive mode, due to brain activity that prevents processes of critical evaluation (Gerrans 2014). In contrast, and following Freud, others have stressed that delusions are always comprehensible, but able to be understood only within a context that includes the person’s whole life, ideas and values (Bentall 2004; Wickham &amp; Bentall 2016, Mullen &amp; Gillett 2014)