 The requirement of propriety requires that no credal state be self-defeating. No credal state demands that you shift to another credal state without new information. One feature of the quadratic family of proper scoring rules is that they guarantee propriety, and propriety is an extremely attractive feature of cognitive value. From propriety alone, one can construct arguments for the various elements of probabilism. For example, propriety effectively guarantees that the credence function must obey the standard axioms governing additivity (Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010); propriety guarantees a version of the value-of-learning theorem in purely cognitive terms (Oddie, 1997); propriety provides an argument that conditionalization is the only method of updating compatible with the maximization of expected cognitive value (Oddie 1997, Greaves and Wallace 2005, and Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010). Not only does propriety deliver these goods for probabilism, but any account of cognitive value that doesn’t obey propriety entails that self-defeating probability distributions should be eschewed a priori. (And that might appear to violate a fundamental commitment of empiricism.)