 Either premise (i)–(ii) in this argument could be challenged. So, one could distinguish the (compositional) semantic value of a sentence from its truth condition. It would then be possible to say that a name that does not refer makes no contribution to the semantic value of a sentence, and even that a sentence containing an empty name does not have a semantic value, while still maintaining that (9b) gives the correct truth condition for “Moses does not exist”. This is the approach of Donnellan (1974: 25), for whom the compositional semantic value of an uttered sentence is the proposition that it expresses—not quite its truth condition. While the utterance is true if that proposition holds and false if it fails to hold, Donnellan also thinks it may be true or false even if no proposition is generated. In particular, he proposes a rule that would make a nonexistence statement true if generation fails in particular way: specifically, if the historical explanation of its singular subject’s use does not serve to identify any appropriate individual.