 With this account of truth Grosseteste thinks he can accommodate within one schema the divergent conceptions of truth present in his day. As to the initial question he drew from Anselm, whether there is just one truth or many, diverging from Anselm, who posits a single truth, he holds that there are many truths (veritates), for otherwise the term “truth” could not admit a plural or be distributed (by which he means we could not speak of “every truth”) (for the relation between Anselm’s and Grosseteste’s accounts of truth, see Noone 2010).  Nevertheless, he concludes that “there is a single truth that the name ‘truth’ everywhere signifies and predicates—namely, the supreme truth—though this one truth is called many truths in the many truths of things” (Baur 1912, 139).  Thus, for Grosseteste any use of the term “truth” involves in some way a reference to the supreme truth, God.