 The so-called “ecological” perspective offers still another model of cognition, where the immune system does not employ representations of the world, but rather “sees” the world directly (Tauber 2017: 151–156, 219–228). In this ‘presentational’ schema, the capacity to extract information about the environment depends on pre-programmed systems of perception, whose organizational structures “resonate” with environmental inputs (Gibson 1966; 1979). Accordingly, the environment’s informational content results from the stimulation of the system that already has the ability to acknowledge inputs of a recognizable character. Simply, information is only that which is already meaningful (Ben-Ze’ev 1993: 70–71; Gibson 1979). This scheme would reconfigure the subject-object epistemology dominating current immune theory with an information-processing faculty that dispenses with some knowing entity, who sits in a “Cartesian theater” to observe the world (Dennett 1991). Drawing an analogy from collective colony behaviors of insects (Gordon 2001; Bonabeau 2001) and bacteria (Ben Jacob, Becker, Shapira, and Levine 2004; Ben Jacob, Shapira, and Tauber 2005), the immune system may then be modeled without centralized control or directives by simply following its “rules” of regulation. Such a model of “embedded” cognition holds that perception may be explained independently of computational processes or representations altogether (L. Shapiro 2011). Simply, presentational cognition substitutes an agent, who employs representations, for a process in which the immediacy of perception removes any such intermediary. Accordingly, cognition is not of something, for perception is entirely within the system itself; the agent has disappeared, and with that vacancy, representations are discarded.