 There has also been a robust debate about whether workers in sweatshops are paid too little. Some say ‘no’ (Powell &amp; Zwolinski 2012; Zwolinski 2007). They say that sweatshops wages, while low by standards in developed countries, are not low by the standards of the countries in which the sweatshops are located. This explains why people choose to work in a sweatshop; it is the best offer they have. Efforts to increase artificially the wages of sweatshop workers, according to these writers, is misguided on two counts. First, it is an interference with the autonomous choices of employers and workers. Second, it is likely to make workers worse off, since employers will respond by either moving operations to a new location or employing fewer workers in that location (cf. Kates 2015). These writers sometimes appeal to a principle of “nonworseness,” according to which a consensual, mutually beneficial interaction (of the sort sweatshop owners and workers engage in) cannot be worse than its absence. Other writers challenge these claims. While granting that workers choose to work in sweatshops, they deny that their choices are truly voluntary (Arnold &amp; Bowie 2003; Kates 2015). Given their low wages, this suggests that sweatshop workers are wrongfully exploited (Faraci 2019). Moreover, some argue, firms can and should do more for sweatshop workers, on grounds on fairness or beneficence (Snyder 2010). These writers invoke a principle of “interaction,” according to which people involved in a certain relationship (of the sort sweatshop owners and workers are engaged in) must live up to certain standards of conduct (which exploitation is alleged to fall below). In response to the claim that firms put themselves at a competitive disadvantage if they do, writers have pointed to actual cases where firms have been able to secure better treatment for sweatshop workers without suffering serious financial penalties (Hartman, Arnold, &amp; Wokutch 2003). (For further discussion, see the entry on  exploitation.)