 For much of the history of western philosophy the body has been conceptualized as simply one biological object among others, part of a biological nature, which our rational faculties set us apart from, as well as an instrument to be directed, and a possible source of disruption to be controlled. Problematically, for feminists, the opposition between mind and body has also been correlated with an opposition between male and female, with the female regarded as enmeshed in her bodily existence in a way that makes attainment of rationality questionable. “Women are somehow more biological, more corporeal, and more natural than men” (Grosz 1994: 14). Such enmeshment in corporeality was also attributed to colonized bodies and those attributed to the lower classes (McClintock 1995, Alcoff 2006). Challenging such assumptions requires feminists to confront corporeality in order to elucidate and confront constructions of sexed difference. The accounts of the relationship between subjectivity, corporeality and identity which have thereby been developed have implications for other aspects of our corporeal existence. Feminist theorists are therefore in active conversation with critical race theorists (Alcoff, Ahmed, Crenshaw, Fanon, hooks, Hill Collins, Gilman, Gooding-Williams, Tate), theorists of (dis)ability (Clare, Inahara, Garland-Thomson, Mairs, McRuer, Shildrick, Thomas, Toombs Wendell), and theorists exploring gender diversity (Bettcher, Lane, More and Whittle, Prosser, Salamon, S. Stone).