 Hegel’s reception of Luther contrasts with Kant’s in various ways. First, Kant never offers any significant discussion of Luther in his writings, and is implicitly critical of him in important respects, while Hegel is more explicit in his engagement with Luther, and frequently lavish in his praise of the Reformer—though Hegel quickly dropped his youthful plans to be a Lutheran pastor, and was critical of aspects of the Lutheran education he received as a student at the seminary (or Stift) in Tübingen. Secondly, Kant’s relation to Luther is made more complex by his Pietistic upbringing; but while Hegel’s upbringing may also have involved some Pietistic aspects (see Macgee 2001: 71–72), in later life Hegel avowed his Lutheran orthodoxy, writing to the Pietistic theologian Friedrich August Tholuck in 1826: “I am a Lutheran, and through philosophy have been at once completely confirmed in Lutheranism” (Hegel 1984: 520). Thirdly, the two philosophers are almost diametrically opposed in what they accepted and what they rejected in Luther: while Kant followed Luther’s doubts concerning reason and our capacities for moral goodness, Hegel was more optimistic on both scores; but while Kant rejected Luther’s scepticism regarding free choice, Hegel used it to draw his dialectical connection between freedom and necessity. However, both Kant and Hegel agree in standing against any attempt to prioritise theology over philosophy on Lutheran grounds. After briefly outlining the key texts for understanding Hegel’s engagement with Luther, this third point will then be developed further.