 Many critics have focused on an unacknowledged commitment to externalism that they think is implicit in Chomsky’s terminology. The charge can be made using any of the different phrasings he has used to express his internalism, including competence, knowledge, and representation. For the first: competence implies competence in something. For that something to be defined in terms of the language faculty itself, there would be no such thing as incompetence, making a nonsense of talk of competence. Error would be impossible (see Barber 2001). For the second: knowledge implies something known—an external language or some subset of its properties. Chomsky has described these criticisms as arising from a misinterpretation of his view, and said that he was using competence and knowledge in a technical sense rather than in full accordance with ordinary usage. He has occasionally suggested “cognize” as an alternative term of art to prevent confusion, where to cognize an I-language is for it to be represented in one’s language  faculty.[5]  Recent iterations of the criticism have thus tended to focus on representation. It seems that there can be no representing without something’s being represented—something external to the thing doing the representating, and so external to the language faculty or even the individual. Chomsky’s response has been to say that he is not using representation in a relation sense, representation of (1995a: 53 and in Antony and Hornstein 2003: 276–7).