 If externalism about empty concepts fails, then EXT may well entail (1) apriori, per the incompatibilist’s reductio. But a compatibilist could try a different line of resistance. She might simply grant that (1) and (2) are apriori, but still try to block apriori knowledge of (3). (Here too, E is assumed to be just the condition where water exists, though it is believed that similar points hold if (4) is true instead.) The most prominent strategy of this type is to deny the “transmission of warrant” that supposedly occurs in the deduction of (3) from (1) and (2) (hereafter, “the deduction”). The idea is that, even if the externalist agrees that (1) and (2) are warranted, none of this warrant “transmits” to (3) in the deduction (Davies 1998; 2000; 2003a; 2003b, Wright 2000a; 2000b; 2003; 2011; 2102; 2015; see also Wright 1985). If so, the deduction cannot furnish apriori knowledge of (3), pace the incompatibilist.