 Ockham followed Scotus in believing that God’s choice could be other than it is and that future contingent propositions are true or false just as Scotus explicated, but he was dissatisfied with Scotus’s instants explanation, admitting that he did not have any of his own (Ordinatio d. 38, 578, 581, 584–5; Adams 1987: 1130–1136. Ockham also criticized the view that God knows future free acts through his own acts of the will as their partial cause, which he, like many of his contemporaries and later commentators, treated as Scotus’s position (Ordinatio d. 38, 582–583). This was Henry of Ghent’s view to which Scotus first subscribed but then qualified his acceptance. (See Hoenen 1993: 177–179; Söder 1999: 177–183; Schabel 2000: 43–46.) Scotus thought that there are many contingent propositions known by God that are not simply chosen but rather permitted such as those about creaturely sins and other acts of free will (see Frost 2010).