 A second objection to civil recourse theory charges that it is nothing more than a notational variant on corrective justice theory, sharing its focus on wrongdoing, as well as its accounts of the objective standard in negligence and its explanation of the lack of recovery for pure economic loss (Benson 1995; Zipursky 2003). One of the difficulties in assessing this objection is that, as we saw above, there are different formulations of corrective justice theory. Discussions of corrective justice in the civil recourse literature often associate it with the idea that the plaintiff must be made whole, that is, with a purely compensatory idea, which some civil recourse writers describe as moving from a less just state of affairs to a more just one. The idea that tort liability always leads to a net improvement in justice is difficult to fit to the world in which tort law actually operates (Goldberg &amp; Zipursky 2020). Yet prominent writers about corrective justice, including Weinrib and Ripstein, do not claim that the point of corrective justice is to increase justice globally; instead, they characterize remedies in terms of the specific transaction. Aristotle explicitly rejects the suggestion the point of corrective justice is to produce greater justice along any further dimension when he states that duties of corrective justice apply even in cases in which a “decent” person is required pay damages to a “base” one (Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Ch. 4). For Aristotle, the basis of liability is the past transaction between them, rather than the comparative magnitude of their holdings along any other dimension. Since civil recourse theory also begins with a focus on the wrongful transaction, corrective justice writers suggest that it adds nothing to corrective justice analysis and does not contrast with it.