 First, notice that Gracia’s account doesn’t specify what Latinx philosophy actually is, here and now. Rather, it gives us a kind of formula for defining it: we are to look to the ethnic group’s conception of Latinx philosophy. Second, putting aside the various empirical and conceptual puzzles about how we would determine the ethnic group’s views (surveys? conceptual analysis? patterns of linguistic usage?), it simply unclear there is anything in the views of the ethnos that would settle the question. That is, it is entirely unclear that the ethnos has a conception of philosophy—much less Latinx philosophy—that would settle the reference of “Latinx philosophy”. Perhaps Gracia would regard this as an adequate result. Nevertheless, it is easy enough to see why it might be attractive to others to have a more practicable account of Latinx philosophy, one that tells us something about what the term does (or ought to) pick out.