 Further issues that seem to call for treatment in connection with the phenomenal character of thought include the following. How should we align a view of this with an understanding of what concepts are (and what it is to possess them)? (See, e.g., Peter Forrest’s 2017 argument that the notion that phenomenal character “determines thought content” aligns poorly with the best theories of concepts, given certain assumptioins about the relation between concepts and contents.) In this connection too we may ask—how, if at all, subjects’ concepts could vary, even if the totality of facts (including dispositional facts) regarding the subjective character of their experience is held constant? How should a sense of agency (and thought “authorship”), and differences among mental actions (e.g., judging, doubting, merely considering) figure in our understanding of the experience of thinking? And how is that experience related to the idea of a “fringe of consciousness”?