 However, a third interpretive strategy seeks to avoid this dichotomy, by avoiding both the claim that Cohen’s Religion is a decisive “break” with his systematic ethics and the claim that his religion “completes” those ethics. Michael Zank (1996 and especially 2000) has emphasized that Cohen did not intend his philosophy of religion to be part of the System of Philosophy, but nor can the philosophy of religion be in any sense a “break” from the Ethics of Pure Will in his System, since he started working on both projects at roughly the same time around the turn of the century. Cohen’s systematic philosophy and his philosophy of religion thus stand as complements to each other: whereas one conceives the human as an ideal agent constituted by universal ethical laws, the other treats the human as a concrete individual, constituted by the particularities of his own moral failings and attempts to atone for them. Similarly, Weiss (2012) argues that the religious and ethical conception of the individual are different “voices” in Cohen that cannot be reduced to a simple, theoretical unity (in the System of Philosophy), but that both voices are necessary.