 Now let us look at the attitudes of agent b. First, we see that b has two connected components, one consisting of the p-worlds and the other consisting of the \(\lnot p\)-worlds, and these two components are not informationally equivalent. That is, no p-world is informationally equivalent to a \(\lnot p\)-world in the eyes of agent b. This tells us that b conclusively knows whether p is true. Further, a knows this is so (since each of a’s informationally equivalent worlds is one in which b knows whether p is true). Since the actual world is a \(\lnot p\)-world, agent b in fact knows p is false. Finally, we see that b knows that a mistakenly believes that p is true: at each of b’s informationally equivalent worlds \(w_1\) and \(w_2\), agent a believes that p is true (since a’s most plausible worlds overall, \(w_3\) and \(w_4\), both satisfy p). 