 Throughout the history of philosophy imagistic mental representations have been routinely contrasted with abstract, linguistic representations (see Yolton 1996 for a summary). So the assumption here is that there is a sharp contrast between two different kinds of mental representations: imagistic ones, like mental imagery and abstract, linguistic ones. And when we talk about the importance of mental imagery in human cognition, the reach of mental imagery is limited as there is an extra layer of mental representations, abstract, linguistic ones, which have nothing to do with mental imagery. This, in fact, may be one of the reasons why the obsessive emphasis on language at the middle of the 20th century sidelined the philosophical study of mental imagery. Either way, the overall picture then is that there is imagistic cognition and there is linguistic cognition and the two have nothing to do with each other. There have been important debates about where to draw the line between these two domains of the mind: almost all imagistic cognition (a broadly Humean picture) vs almost all linguistic cognition (a broadly Wittgensteinian picture).