 In moral choice we struggle to find, not any answer that we can bring ourselves to accept, nor any answer that we can accept in consistency with previous answers, but the right answer. We present our search to ourselves as one governed by a criterion which does not lie in ourselves; our fear is that we may make the wrong choice, a fear not allayed by the thought that we might make that choice quite happily and/or consistently with previous choices. Why otherwise should moral choice be so dodgy? Why otherwise should I agonize about what is the right thing to do in the circumstances? Non-cognitivism leaves moral life too easy, and is inconsistent with the phenomenology. It distorts our sense of the authority that the action which we choose as right has over us. That authority is one to which our choice must conform, and cannot itself depend on our choice; our choice is a recognition of an authority which it could not itself create. (Dancy 1986: 172–173; see also Nagel 1986: 149 and Enoch 2011: 73–75 for a similar argument)