The second move works given an A-theory, but has a consequence A-theorists may not like. Suppose that time really passes: indeed, suppose presentism, on which only the fleeting present is real.  Then first &lt;it is now t&gt; is true at those temporal perspectives that include t (on presentism, there are no others) and then it is false at all perspectives (on presentism, since t is now past, there are only temporal perspectives in which it is false).  But at an atemporal perspective, it is never true that it is now t, for any t.  There is no time it is in eternity; if there were, eternality would not be an atemporal mode of being.  So at an atemporal perspective, time simply does not pass, there is nothing about passage to know, and this is why passage poses no problem for immutable omniscience. Passage is real in time, then, but not at an atemporal perspective.  Requiring an atemporal being to know that it is now noon to count as omniscient is like requiring someone at midnight to know that it is now noon to count as omniscient: what is not true at one's perspective is not knowable then either.