 Riggs (2009: 209) responds that it isn’t clear that Morris does know where the tower is. We aren’t compelled to count as knowledge every “casual, unreflective acceptance of testimony” (Riggs 2009: 214). And notice that if we continue the story by having someone soon afterward ask Morris where the tower is, he’d be out of line to simply assert, “It’s two blocks that way”, which suggests that he doesn’t really know after all (Riggs 2009: 210–11). Beyond that, Riggs distinguishes two senses of credit: praiseworthiness and attributability. Knowledge requires that your true belief be attributable to you as an agent, but not that you be praiseworthy for it. Riggs claims that Lackey’s objections wrongly suppose that defenders of the credit thesis think that knowledge requires praiseworthiness, are too closely tied to Greco’s particular account of credit (with its emphasis on explanatory salience), and also overlook the possibility of “group effort” in achievements.