 Scotus’s longer list of the factors which are sufficient to cause distress as a passion of the will involves the apprehension that what takes place is (1) what one actually wills against, (2) against the natural inclination to happiness (affectio commodi) even though no particular act of will is actual, (3) against sensory desire, and (4) in accordance to what is reluctantly willed in circumstances in which the opposite is preferred but cannot be achieved (velleitas). There are corresponding factors which are sufficient to cause pleasure, the other passion of the will (Ordinatio III.15, 60, p. 505). The intellectual soul is consequently regarded as very emotional—its feelings are changed by the influence of actual volitions or nolitions as well as by the inclinations of the will and the sensory part of the soul. Since these states considerably influence people’s activities as motivations or hindrances, moral education should give strength to the natural inclination to justice (affectio iustitiae) and good moral habits. New habits of will change the condition for feeling pleasure and distress (cf. Boulnois 2003; Knuuttila 2012; Drummond 2012). Scotus treated liking and dislike (complacentia and displicentia), the unpremeditated first orientations of the will as analogous to sensory emotional reactions except that they were free acts. These not yet efficacious acts could be directly controlled, as distinct from the passions of the will. John Buridan, who otherwise followed Scotus’s analysis, stated that liking and dislike were not free acts and in this respect were similar to sensory emotions (Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum, X.2; Zupko 1995). Buridan’s revision increased the number of non-free emotional phenomena of the will, but the tendency to apply emotion terminology to the will took other forms as well. Ockham followed Scotus’s view of pleasure and distress as the passions of the will, though he restricted their conditions to the first and fourth case in Scotus’s list. But he also explained that “a passion is a form distinct from a cognition, which exists in the appetitive power as its subject and requires a cognition for its existence” (Quodlibet II.17, p. 186).