 From the point of view of the history of modal thought, interesting things took place in theology in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Augustine had already criticized the application of the frequency model of possibility to divine power; for him, God has freely chosen the actual world and its providential plan from alternatives which he could have realized but did not will to do (potuit sed noluit). This way of thinking differs from ancient philosophical modal paradigms because the metaphysical basis is now the eternal domain of simultaneous alternatives instead of the idea of one necessary world order. In Augustine, God’s eternal ideas of finite beings represent the possibilities of how the highest being can be imitated, the possibilities thus having an ontological foundation in God’s essence. This was the dominating conception of theological modal metaphysics until Duns Scotus departed from it. (See Knuuttila 2014, 86–89). The discrepancy between the Catholic doctrine of God’s freedom and power and the philosophical modal conceptions was brought into the scope of discussion in the eleventh century. Peter Damian argued for the sovereignty of divine omnipotence in a way that is sometimes mistakenly taken to include the power to change the past (Holopainen 1996). Anselm of Canterbury tried to develop a general modal semantics based on the notions of power and potentiality, with various conceptual distinctions (Knuuttila 2004). Modal questions in philosophy and theology were developed in a more sophisticated way in twelfth-century considerations of God’s power and providence and historical contingencies with the idea of simultaneous alternatives. The idea of divine choice between alternatives was absent in Avicenna and Averroes, but it was defended by al-Ghazali, who criticized Avicenna’s necessitarian metaphysics. (See Kukkonen 2000; for metaphysical necessitarianism in Arabic philosophy, see Belo 2007; De Haan 2020.) 