 So for the Perfect City, as in the Political Regime, the Second, like the First, essentially cognizes itself, and there is no distinction between its act of cognizing itself, the existence by which it is substantially constituted, and that through which it gives rise to the existence of the heavenly sphere it governs. But the Perfect City can say that there is a distinction between this intelligence’s cognition of itself, which is essential to it, and its cognition of the First, through which it attains a perfection, by relation to something else, exceeding what it has just by itself. Or perhaps it would be better to say that its essence includes a relation to the First, and that its essence is therefore compound, in something like the way that a species-essence composed of genus and differentia is compound. Fârâbî does not want to say that an immaterial intelligence is composed of two beings [mawjûdât], such as substance and accident or matter and form, but he wants to say that it has two existences [wujûdât], that it is in two ways or in a compound way. His wager in the Perfect City is that he can explain this plurality of existences in immaterial substances by the way in which they are caused by the First, and that this plurality of existences will in turn explain how these immaterial substances can give rise to the many complex beings ultimately arise from the First.