 Some think that supervenience--at least when accompanied by grounding; see  sect. 3.5 below--is  indeed ontologically innocent in this sense. After all, if the A-properties supervene with metaphysical necessity on the B-properties, then they come along automatically given the B-properties. To borrow Kripke’s metaphor (1972, 153-154), once God fixes the B-properties, she is all done; she does not need to do anything further to get the A-properties going. Indeed, she cannot block them. Given the distribution of B-properties, there is no further question about which A-properties are instantiated. So, it is claimed, the latter are nothing over and above the former. However, other people vigorously resist this idea. How can the A-properties not count as a further ontological commitment, if they are numerically distinct from the B-properties? (Both Jonathan Schaffer (2015) and Karen Bennett (2017, chapter 8.2) have recently argued that the best way to make sense of this is as follows. Grounded entities are nonfundamental, and nonfundamental entities do not count against the simplicity of a theory, although they do count towards the total number of things there are.) 