 While some commentators have shared Guyer’s view that the pleasure is “opaque”, and hence that having a feeling of pleasure does not enable us to know what kind of pleasure we are feeling (see, e.g., Matherne 2019: 9–10), others have argued for the intentionality of the pleasure, holding that the pleasure is intentionally directed towards the object, or towards its formal structure (Aquila 1982) or that it makes us aware of the free play (Allison 2001, in particular 53–54 and 122–123). Hughes (2017) argues that it is intentionally directed both to the object perceived as beautiful, and to the activity of the faculties in their free play. Zuckert (2002) argues that, for Kant, pleasure in general, and not just pleasure in the beautiful, is intentional, in that it makes us aware of our wanting to continue in our mental state (that of feeling of the pleasure); Zuckert develops the argument further in her 2007a, ch. 6. Cvejić (2021) agrees with Zuckert that pleasure is intentional, but argues that the intentionality is of a distinctive kind, characteristic only of feelings, and unlike the intentionality of cognitive representations. A. Cohen (2020) also argues that pleasure in the beautiful, and feelings more generally for Kant, are intentional, but she denies that the intentionality is intrinsic, taking it, rather, to be derived from our reflective interpretation of those feelings. Cohen’s view is discussed in Merritt 2021 and Eran 2021.