 Ancient Greek philosophers considered when we are rightly held accountable for our actions, and these discussions overlap considerably with contemporary debates about free will and determinism. But we should be cautious about framing these debates in terms of their views on free will and determinism. First of all, there is no phrase in the ancient texts that should obviously be translated as “free will”. (The later Epicurean Lucretius uses the Latin phrase libera voluntas, which is often translated as “free will”, but whether libera voluntas is the same as “free will” is far from obvious—see section  2.4.1  below.) Instead of talking about whether humans possess a faculty of will, and what the conditions are for that will to be free, they talk about when actions are voluntary, and what must obtain in order for our actions or states of character to be “up to us” (eph’ hemin) or to “depend on us” (par’ hemas). Secondly, the ancient discussions do not have at their center the question of whether causal determinism is compatible with our having control over our actions—in particular, whether it is compatible with the ability to do otherwise—although they do raise this issue.