 Michael Slote, one of the main contemporary proponents of the claim that empathy plays a constitutive role for moral judgments, does not follow Hume in thinking that empathy plays a moral role in allowing us to pick up on a subject’s pleasure and pain. Rather Slote, who also has been influenced by a feminist ethics of care (Slote 2007, 2010), suggests that empathy is central for moral approval in that we as spectators empathically pick up on whether or not an agent acted out of empathic concern for another subject. Moral approval of an action consists then in the subsequent reflective feeling of warmth when empathizing with an agent’s empathic concern, while moral disapproval is equivalent with a reflective feeling of chill due to our recognition that the agent acted without any empathic concern. Actions are then judged to be morally right or wrong in terms of whether they can be conceived of the actions of an agent we would morally approve of in that they are actions done out of empathic concern. Notice also that while Slote does regard empathy in the above sense to be constitutive of moral approval only if it is fully or well–developed, he does not follow Hume in thinking that empathy needs to be regulated in order to correct for some of its natural partiality. Indeed Slote thinks that this is a virtue of his account since he regards such partiality reflected in our moral intuitions. For example, he thinks that we have a greater moral obligation to help the child in front of us or members of our family rather than people who are more removed from us. Slote certainly deserves credit for reviving the debate about the role of empathy for morality in contemporary metaethics. Yet his conception of the relation between empathy and morality has also encountered some skepticism. First of all, it is questionable that only motivations of empathic concern, rather than the thought that one is doing the right thing, constitute proper moral motivations. Second, in light of the above research on empathy’s bias and natural shortcomings, it is rather questionable to maintain that all aspects of empathy’s partiality are sanctioned by our our moral intuitions. It is therefore hard to see how empathy’s moral role can be justified without appeal to some form of corrective mechanism. Third, phenomenologically speaking, moral disapproval is not necessarily based on a “chilly” feeling. At times we are rather upset and angry in encountering violations of moral norms. Finally, Slote’s proposed empathic mechanism underlying moral approval seems to lack a certain psychological plausibility. For Slote, we approve of an action because we recreate the empathic concern that the agent feels towards his or her subjects and that causes us to feel warmly towards the agent. Yet if a positive moral judgment of an actions is tied to providing us with the motivation or with a reason for doing a specific action, it is hard to see how moral approval, consisting in us feeling warmly towards the agent, should help us accomplish this. If Slote is right, it would rather provide us with a reason for merely praising or being nice towards the agent (See D’Arms 2011, Kauppinen 2014 and 2017a, Prinz 2001a,b, and Stueber 2011c).