 Having followed the Gricean line this far, now we need to ask: can the Gricean thesis regarding the complexity of referential intentions somehow cut off the threat of a collapse into Humpty Dumpty-ism? The answer, according to the Gricean, is “Yes.” More precisely, the Gricean will claim that the speaker lacks a genuinely referential intention in a case like (9), since she should have no expectation that her listener will be in a position to recover her intended referent. In a case like (10), however, she does look to have an intention for her listener to recover the picture of Carnap as the referent. So how is the Gricean in any position to help here? As Bach (1992) helpfully clarifies, the Gricean line really ought to run as follows: while genuinely referential, the speaker’s intention to refer to the picture of Carnap runs via an intention to refer to whatever picture happens to be behind her. That latter intention is meant to be recognized directly, whereas the former can only be recognized indirectly, via the recognition of both this latter intention and (in the good case) the fact that the picture behind the speaker actually is the picture of Carnap. So a better way of formulating the Gricean thesis when it comes to reference is in terms of a primary/secondary distinction that reflects this sort of asymmetry: when there is a conflict between a primary and secondary referential intention, and both are genuinely referential, it is the primary one that serves to fix  reference.[11]