 Similar issues are approached from a somewhat different direction by Peter Goldie (Goldie, 2004), and Michael Brady (Brady, 2010), both of who relate attention and virtue to the epistemic significance of a person’s emotional life. Both Goldie and Brady suggest that the attention-modulating profile of an emotion is essential to it, and both claim that this modulation of attention by emotion plays an ineliminable role in our having a full appreciation of the evaluative properties that we encounter in the world around us. Goldie and Brady disagree as to how this epistemic role should be characterized, with Goldie taking the experience of one’s own emotion to itself be a reason-giving experience, with an epistemic authority analogous to one’s experiences of the things in one’s visual field, whereas Brady takes the emotional subject’s experience of items in the world to have an epistemic authority that is not shared by the subject’s experience of their own emotional state, so that that state’s epistemic significance must instead be exhausted by its influence on our outwardly-directed attention (Brady, 2013).