 One possible line of response to this sort of objection is to note that an important motive for the theory is a fundamental fact about human thinking, and not merely the desire to avoid superstitious-lawyer style counter-examples. Intuitively, a belief’s being based on a reason involves taking into account the epistemic import of the reason, and such a mental operation may be of two sorts: either directly causal (where a reason non-deviantly causes a belief) or intentional (where one has a meta-belief to the effect that a reason is a good reason to hold a belief). The ability to reflect on our beliefs and thereby evaluate them is often thought to be an ability which distinguishes human cognition from that of many other non-human animals. And to properly evaluate a belief is simply to take into proper account its evidential import. Thus, it would be highly implausible if such reflective evaluations were absent from an account of a belief’s being based on a reason. Yet on causal theories of the basing relation, such reflective evaluations are superfluous. On the other hand, such reflective evaluations do not appear necessary for a belief to be based on a reason, as previously argued. There seem to be situations in which non-deviant causes are sufficient to establish basing relations, again as previously argued. Therefore, the disjunctive analysis of (CD) appears to be essential if we are to do justice to the various ways the human mind may take into account the evidential import of reasons.