  Malament’s reasoning has come under attack in Fleming &amp; Butterfield (1999) and Busch (1999). Both argue to the effect that there are alternatives to Malament’s conclusion. The main line of thought in both criticisms is that Malament’s ‘mathematical result’ might just as well be interpreted as evidence that the assumed concept of a sharp localization operator is flawed and has to be modified either by allowing for unsharp localization (Busch 1999) or for so-called “hyperplane dependent localization” (Fleming &amp; Butterfield 1999). In Saunders (1995) a different conclusion from Malament’s (as well as from similar) results is drawn. Rather than granting Malament’s four conditions and deriving a problem for a particle interpretation Saunders takes Malament’s proof as further evidence that one can not hold on to all four conditions. According to Saunders it is the localizability condition which might not be a natural and necessary requirement on second thought. Stressing that “relativity requires the language of events, not of things” Saunders argues that the localizability condition loses its plausibility when it is applied to events: It makes no sense to postulate that the same event can not occur at two disjoint spatial sets at the same time. One can only require for the same kind of event not to occur at both places. For Saunders the particle interpretation as such is not at stake in Malament’s argument. The question is rather whether QFT speaks about things at all. Saunders considers Malament’s result to give a negative answer to this question. A kind of meta paper on Malament’s theorem is Halvorson &amp; Clifton (2002). Various objections to the choice of Malament’s assumptions and his conclusion are considered and rebutted. Moreover, Halvorson and Clifton establish two further no-go theorems which preserve Malament’s theorem by weakening tacit assumptions and showing that the general conclusion still holds. One thing seems to be clear. Since Malament’s ‘mathematical result’ appears to allow for various different conclusions it cannot be taken as conclusive evidence against the tenability of a particle interpretation of QFT and the same applies to Redhead’s interpretation of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem. For a more detailed exposition and comparison of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem and Malament’s theorem see Kuhlmann (2010a: sec. 8.3).