 As in the ethics and epistemology, one of the main features of Hartmann’s aesthetics is its close interplay with ontology. Hartmann intentionally focuses his aesthetics on the problem of the aesthetic object, and sets aside investigation of the correlated acts. Hartmann distinguishes two “strata” in the aesthetic object, which he calls the foreground and the background. In his words, “the aesthetics of today still concentrates mainly on analysis of the act, and this is why the stratification relationship [in the object], although it has often been noted, is not yet familiar to it” (P47a). The foreground is comprised of the real, concrete and sensible dimensions of the object, everything that is independent of the presence of a subject who beholds the object and seeks to understand it. The background strata vary with the kinds of content the foreground lets appear, and the background exists only for the subject who grasps it. This level is typically organized into many distinct sub-levels. A theory of this kind obviously raises two questions: first, how do we articulate the relationship between the two levels? Second, how do we articulate the relationship among the sublevels of the background stratum? In response to the first question, Hartmann describes a “relationship of appearance” on the basis of which—as has been pointed out on innumerable occasions—the foreground (i.e., the matter of the object) imposes constraints on the background. Most important for the definition of aesthetic values is to realize that these values attach to the “relation of appearance” itself. In other words, the aesthetic values that fall under the general heading of “beauty” are defined as values that are carried by the “appearance relation” that emerges between some materially existing “foreground” of the object and some unreal “background” that exists only for the beholder. The skill of the artist consists in manipulating this relation of appearance. Aesthetic values are different from moral or vital values in that they do not attach to an existing thing, but exist only for a subject who appreciates aesthetically; they are values of the object as (intentional) object, independently of reality or unreality; they are tied to the relation of appearance itself; and they are values specific to each object and unique to it (AE4c). In all cases, values like beauty, the sublime, the graceful, charming, idyllic, or sweet, as well as all species of the comical, such as farce, the ridiculous, funny, and humorous, are tied to the relation of appearance and specific to each object. Notably, Hartmann completely revises Kant’s definition of the sublime, detaching it from the transcendental, the realm of the quantitative, and the oppressive, and implants it into the natural and human, terrestrial and nearby, fixing it in the object and a “psychic need of the human heart” (AE31b). It is rooted in the “attraction of the human heart to what is magnificent” (AE31c), and our human desire to bring meaning into life. The sublime is a form of beauty that responds to the human need for greatness. “It is that specific appearing of an unsensed background in a real sensed foreground of the object, which accommodates the needs of man for greatness, and, with the greatest ease, overcomes any resistance opposed to it” (AE31c). It is also noteworthy that Hartmann treats both comedy and music at far greater length in the Aesthetics than most other authors of comparable works in the history of philosophy.