 The role of attention, however, was almost entirely unacknowledged, as pointed out by Wu (2011, 2016). Whenever we pursue a goal, we must not only select appropriate means. We must also select which features of the situation to attend to in the guidance of action. Wu conceptualizes this in terms of a “many-many problem”: in the pursuit of a goal we face typically too many perceptual inputs and too many possible behavioral outputs. The formation of an intention provides only a partial solution. The content of an intention usually includes the selection of the appropriate means. One intends, for instance, to open the window in order to let in some fresh air. This constrains the range of behavioral outputs and the range of perceptual inputs that one needs to attend to. But it does not determine a specific enough input-output mapping. Generally, the content of intentions is not fine-grained enough in order to properly guide the execution of movements and the direction of attention. Wu suggests that the many-many problems at those finer-grained levels are solved by attention. Following William James, Wu proposes that attention is the missing selection for action: the selection of perceptual inputs for the implementation of motor control. On this view, intention-mediated attention is an essential component of embodied agency. This raises the question of whether the selection of attention can itself be a genuine exercise of agency, and whether the proposed account can be extended so as to account for the intentional direction and control of attention.