 It is in the context of his solution to this problem that Locke introduces the famous thought experiment involving the prince and the cobbler—not as a puzzle in need of explanation, but as a case whose apparent plausibility vindicates the human/person distinction (and thereby, his solution to the problem of the resurrection). If  “the soul of the prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past Life, [were to] enter and inform the Body of a Cobler as soon as deserted by his own Soul”, Locke enjoins his reader, “every one sees, he would be the same Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince’s Actions: But who would say it was the same Man?” (II.xxvii.15, emphasis added).  This thought experiment is often taken to support a psychological criterion of personal identity. The precise form of such a criterion has been the subject of much dispute, both in Locke’s time and subsequently. Locke himself is sometimes said (probably incorrectly) to have advocated a memory criterion, according to which a person, x, existing at one time, \(t_1\), and a person, y, existing at a later time, \(t_2\), y is identical with x if and only if y remembers experiences had by x. Whether or not this was Locke’s view, generally speaking, psychological criteria of personal identity assert that a psychological relation of some sort (i.e. a relation involving memory, characteristics and dispositions, beliefs, desires, rationality, etc.) is necessary and/or sufficient for each of us to persist through time.