 It may seem, then, that RI is simply incoherent. These arguments, however, are a bit too quick. On analysis, they show only that the following three conditions form an inconsistent triad: (1) RI is true (for some fixed predicates \(F\) and \(G)\). (2) Identity relations are equivalence relations. (3) The relation x and y are the same F figuring in (1) satisfies LL. For suppose that the relation x and y are the same G, figuring in (1), is reflexive and that \(x\) is a \(G\). Then \(x\) is the same \(G\) as \(x\). But according to (1), \(x\) and \(y\) are not the same \(G\)s; hence, according to (3), it is not the case that \(x\) and \(y\) are the same \(F\); yet (1) asserts otherwise. Now, most relative identity theorists maintain that while identity relations are equivalence relations, they do not in general satisfy LL. However, according to at least one analysis of the passenger/person case (and others), the same person relation satisfies LL but the same passenger relation is not straightforwardly an equivalence relation (Gupta 1980). It should be clear though that this view is incompatible with the principle of the identity of indiscernibles: If \(x\) and \(y\) are different passengers, there must be, by the latter principle, some property \(x\) possesses that \(y\) does not. Hence if the same person relation satisfies LL, it follows that \(x\) and \(y\) are not the same person. For the remainder we will assume that identity relations are equivalence relations. Given this assumption, (and assuming that the underlying propositional logic is classical — cf. Parsons 2000) RI and LL are incompatible in the sense that within the framework of a single fixed language for which LL is defined, RI and LL are incompatible.