  Suppose that values such as the delicious are most readily identified by way of human tendencies to respond. This seems a significant difference between pleasure and deliciousness, which might make buck passing about the good—at least on certain conceptions of goodness—more promising than it is for the delicious. For the hedonist, there is a reasonably satisfying explanation of the goodness of things that simply adverts to a (putatively) natural property: pleasure. No such explanation is likely to be available about the delicious, because it's so implausible to think we can always pick out the natural properties in virtue of which something is delicious. (The same point holds of the beautiful and other aesthetic properties.) Talk about deliciousness usefully groups things together—usefully for us humans, that is—by explaining what they have in common, at a level that can be widely understood despite our ignorance of the ultimate delicious-making properties. This motivates the claim of FA theory that for something to be delicious is for it to merit gustatory pleasure. Despite the fact that the deliciousness of food is in some way a matter of its (and our) natural properties, this does not imply that deliciousness fails to be reason-giving or that we must take lower-order properties to provide our reasons to enjoy some taste. In other words, the buck stops here: at what merits gustatory pleasure. 