 The starting point of Carnap’s new inductive logic was, first of all, precisely Reichenbach’s “disparity conception”—i.e., to distinguish very clearly between two different explicata of the ordinary-language word “probability”. One was relative frequency, which is an empirical matter, and was held up as the only acceptable interpretation of the Kolmogorov probability calculus by frequentists such as von Mises, Reichenbach, and (classically) Ronald Fisher. The other was epistemic probability, which Keynes and Harold Jeffreys held to be the only acceptable interpretation. Carnap called them “probability2” and “probability1” respectively, and set about clearing the ground for an explication of the latter, without casting any doubt on the legitimacy of “probability2” as an empirical tool. This distinction was the main focus of Carnap’s first article on inductive logic (Carnap 1945a). 