 There is a worry that the best system account of laws is infected by epistemic considerations. Of course, what truths a best system entails is an objective matter, it does not depend on our knowledge of it. Whether a truth is objectively implied by a best system, however, depends on the way this system is organized. And there may be considerable leeway in choosing the axioms to obtain a simple system. The worry is that the notion of simplicity is not fully objective, and even if it were, striking a balance between simplicity and strength is not. Hence, which regularities are laws depends on epistemic criteria, our desiderata to organize our knowledge as simple as possible in a deductive system. This is not to say that the lawlike regularities are mind-dependent. Laws and regularities are still patterns in the world independent of our knowledge of them. What makes some of the regularities laws and some others not, however, is not only determined by the world. The law-making feature, striking a proper balance between simplicity and strength, seems to have an epistemic component. This is presumably the cost for being free of substantive metaphysical commitments. (For details on the best system account of laws, see the entry on  laws of nature.)