 Tied to this lack of definitiveness is the third charge leveled against extended mind: the coupling-constitution confusion. A simple charge of confusion is difficult to sustain. Proponents of extended mind are, in general well aware of the distinction between causal coupling and constitution. In the case of Otto, for example, Clark and Chalmers argue that a sentence should be identified with a belief—rather than the latter being merely coupled with the former—precisely because the sentence has the functional role of a belief. A more plausible form of the objection might be that the arguments provided by proponents of extended mind—whether state- or process-oriented—do not establish what these proponents have taken them to establish. Specifically, they do not establish anything more than the claim that cognitive processes are coupled with external processes rather than that they are constituted by them. Answering both the original intentionality objection and the coupling-constitution objection, therefore, seems to require the ability to identity when a process is, and is not, a cognitive process.