 A problem persists even if we reject the primary/secondary distinction. As noted, everyone agrees that assertions are governed by various norms: moral, prudential, conversational, rules of etiquette. When does an intuition track the intended notion of a proper assertion, and when something else altogether? Kvanvig (2011: 235) and Engel (2008: 52–54) have drawn attention to this. According to Kvanvig, intuitions typically concern whether assertions are all-things-considered appropriate. But an assertion may be “all-things-considered appropriate” without being “epistemic appropriate” (or the other way around). Since we do not have a reliable method for telling apart intuitions about “overall appropriateness” from intuitions about “epistemic appropriateness”, it is often unclear to which extent a given set of intuitions supports or undermines a given theory (cf. Hawthorne &amp; Stanley 2008: 585–6). To address this problem, Greenberg (forthcoming) proposes to reframe the debate in terms of epistemic norms constraining action, rather than assertion.