 The early Naiyāyikas held that perception is determinate, but under pressure from the the Buddhists opponents Vācaspati Miśra (in about the 10century AD) conceeds that there is also concept-free indeterminate perception. In his commenatry on the Nyāyasutra 1.1.4, Vācaspati interprets the qualifiers non-verbal (avyapadeśyam) and well-ascertained or free from doubt (vyavasāyātmaka) as indicating two types of perception: indeterminate and determinate. Indeterminate perception is thus conceived as the first stage of sensory processing without any mental shaping. The indeterminate sensory percept generated at this stage is then classified by the mind resulting in a determinate perception of a whole object qualified by its parts (or features). This idea is later taken up by the Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa, according to whom, indeterminate perception is indispensable for explaining how our concepts originate in reality. Determinate perception of a thing as qualified by its features, e.g., That’s a cow, requires a prior grasp of the qualifier ‘cowness’. The usual explanation will turn to memory dispositions acquired by previous encounters with cow. This explanation however cannot be extended to a child’s perception of a cow for the first time. In the first instance, Gaṅgeśa claims, the ‘cowness’ is grasped indeterminately in that cowness is grasped but not as related to a particular cow.