If it really is ‘successive’ selection which is relied on, then it seems that one must be assuming a subset of instants of time which is well-ordered and which forms a base ordering from which the ‘successive’ selections are made. In short, what is really presupposed is a well-ordered subset of temporal instants which acts as the basis for a recursive definition. Even in the case of countable subsets, if the ‘process’ is actually to come to a conclusion, the ‘being’ presupposed would presumably have to be able to distinguish a (countably) infinite, discrete sequence of instants within a finite time, and this assumption is, as is well-known, a notoriously controversial one. In the general case, the position is actually worse, for here the question of the well-orderability of the given set depends at the very least on the existence of a well-ordered subset of temporal instants of arbitrarily high infinite cardinality. This appears to go against the assumption that time is an ordinary continuum, i.e., of cardinality 2ℵ0, unless of course the power set of the natural numbers itself is too ‘big’ to be counted by any ordinal, in which case much of the point of the argument would be lost, for one of its aims is presumably to show that the power of the continuum is somewhere in the aleph-sequence.[20]