But this wouldn’t help the cognitivist if she aims to account for the  application of instrumental coherence to all intentions, including  those we don’t believe we have (Bratman 2009b, §2).  Additionally, both  Strong and Variant of Strong seem vulnerable to counterexamples.   Suppose I intend, and believe I intend, to carry out a difficult task.   Knowing the difficulty involved, I could intend to carry out the task  but remain agnostic about whether I will do so.  Here’s another  counterexample: suppose I intend to stop by a bookstore on the way home,  but know that once I’m riding on my bicycle, I tend to go on  “autopilot.”  Aware of my absentminded tendencies, I might intend to  stop by the bookstore without believing I will (Bratman 1987, 38–39;  also discussed in Holton 2008, §2). Since such intentions make applicable  a requirement of instrumental coherence, but don’t involve a belief in  success, the cognitivist cannot explain why requirements of instrumental  coherence apply to these intentions. 