 But from an interpretive viewpoint, this was clearly an unsatisfactory position, since Carnap had in fact from his earliest days used reasoning to argue for normative positions, and continued to do so all his life. So there seemed to be a tension, at such a basic level that one would surely think Carnap must or should have been aware of it. In fact, there is no tension, as it turns out that Carnap (at least in his later years and probably for much of his career) held a quasi-Kantian view whereby the logical reasoning we employ in mathematics, logic, and science (including inductive logic and decision theory) is conceived as subordinate to (and narrower in scope than) a purely normative form of reasoning—in Kantian terms, Verstand (understanding) is subordinate to (and narrower than) Vernunft (reason). So at least it appears from a recently published fragmentary draft Carnap wrote in 1958 of a continuation of or sequel to the reply to Kaplan about values that had appeared in the Schilpp volume (Carnap 2017); see the supplement  Tolerance, Metaphysics, and Meta-Ontology  for further discussion.