  Similarly, God could hardly be the kind of being who knows particular people, actions, intentions, or events, since these things change with the passage of time. Were God to have knowledge of mutable things, he, too, would be ever changing and always in need of being informed of each new development. Far from being the exemplar of perfect being and knowledge, lacking nothing worth knowing, the God of the Khazar king's dream turns out to be at all times the most epistemically needful and mutable of beings. This outcome also explains why God cannot be conceived in any literal sense as the Creator of the universe or humankind through some act of will meant to realize a divine intention. For even if one were to assume that God's intention had always been to create the world at a particular time, t, and that this remained as true at t + 1 as it was at t – 1, God would have had to will the appropriate change at time t or to have performed some act resulting in the world's creation at that time, lest there be no grounds whatsoever for claiming that God actually caused the world to exist. However, once God is understood to be capable of changing in accordance with an intention, volition, action, or relation, so as to become the Creator of the universe, it becomes problematic to think of God as a perfect being. Once again, the suggestion that God changes by exercising his will in different ways at different times also suggests that there is privation or potentiality within God, both before the act of creation, when God's intention was as yet unrealized, and even more so afterwards, because of all the new and variable relationships established with the creation of the world. For these and similar reasons, the philosopher concludes that God is better conceived of as the cause of all causes involved in the creation of every created thing, not through any intention or aim, but rather through an eternal and essentially changeless process of emanation.