 Two negative theses comprise the central common non-cognitivist claims, although current theories often endorse them only in qualified form.  One thesis might be called semantic nonfactualism. Simply put this thesis denies that predicative moral sentences express propositions or have substantial truth conditions. Thus semantic nonfactualism suggests that their contents are not apt for robust truth or falsity. (The terms ‘substantial’ and ‘robust’ are inserted here to make room for minimalist theories which offer deflationary accounts of truth, truth-aptness and propositions. Such theories will be discussed in more detail in section 4.1 below.) Moral predicates do not denote or express properties and predicative moral sentences do not therefore predicate properties of their subjects. The second negative thesis can be called psychological non-cognitivism. This thesis denies that the states of mind conventionally expressed by moral utterances are beliefs or mental states which fall on the cognitive side of the cognitive/non-cognitive divide. Typically non-cognitivists accept both negative theses, though there are views which accept one and not the other.