 Secondly, the structuralist view is a rational reconstruction of scientific modelling, and as such it has some distance from the actual practice. Some philosophers have worried that this distance is too large and that the view is too far removed from the actual practice of science to be able to capture what matters to the practice of modelling (this is the thrust of many contributions to Morgan and Morrison 1999; see also Cartwright 1999). Although some models used by scientists may be best thought of as set theoretic structures, there are many where this seems to contradict how scientists actually talk about, and reason with, their models. Obvious examples include physical models like the San Francisco Bay model (Weisberg 2013), but also systems such as the idealized pendulum or imaginary populations of interbreeding animals. Such models have the strange property of being concrete-if-real and scientists talk about them as if they were real systems, despite the fact that they are obviously not (Godfrey-Smith 2006). Thomson-Jones (2010) dubs this “face value practice”, and there is a question whether structuralism can account for that practice.