  For their part, Horgan and colleagues propose a twist on the correspondence theorist’s claim that truth consists in a correspondence relation \(R\) obtaining between a given truth-bearer and a fact. They propose that there are exactly two species of the relation \(R\): ‘direct’ (\(R_{dir}\)) and ‘indirect correspondence’ (\(R_{ind}\)), and thus exactly two ways of being true. For Horgan and colleagues, which species of \(R\)—and thus which way of being true—obtains will depend on the austerity of ontological commitments involved in assessing sentences; in turn, which commitments are involved depends on discursive context and operative semantic standards. For example, an austere ontology commits to only a single extant object: namely, the world (affectionally termed the ‘blobject’). Truths about the blobject, such as