 Popper (1965, 1968) championed falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation that is more appropriate than verifiability as a criterion of meaningfulness, on the ground that what we need is a basis for distinguishing scientific from nonscientific statements, where the latter can still be meaningful, even when they are not scientific. He suggested that laws should be understood as having the force of prohibitions, which are empirically testable by attempts to falsify them. And he observed there are no “paradoxes of falsification” to parallel the “paradoxes of confirmation”. Even in the case of material conditionals, the only falsifying instances are those that combine the truth of their antecedents with the falsity of their consequents. Relative to “\((x)(Rx \supset Bx)\)”, for example, the only potential falsifiers are instances of “\(Rx\)” that are instances of “\(\neg Bx\)”, and similarly for “\((x)(\neg Bx \supset \neg Rx)\)” and for “\((x)(\neg Rx \vee Bx)\)”, not to mention its subjunctive counterpart, “\((x)(Rx \rightarrow Bx)\)”. The absence of paradox suggested that Popper’s approach to problems of demarcation and of cognitive significance might possess substantial advantages over the alternatives.