 But there cannot be a valid derivation of a universal generalization from a set of particular propositions unless that set is inconsistent. Since, according to Horwich (1998a), every instance of (E) that is part of his theory of truth is consistent, it follows that there cannot be a derivation of \(\beta\) from the instances of (E). This is a purely logical point. As such, considerations of pure logic dictate that our acceptance of \(\beta\) cannot be explained by Horwich’s account of truth. Since Horwich takes all instances of the propositional version of (T) (i.e., (ES-prop)) as axioms, he can prove each of those instances. But, as we have seen, restricted to the instances of the equivalence schema, he cannot prove the generalization, \(\beta\), i.e., \(\langle\)Every proposition of the form \(\langle\)if \(p\) then \(p\rangle\) is true\(\rangle\).