 This impression is buttressed by another concern about his account. For what is the status and basis of liberty and privacy, for example, in Devlin’s account? As we have seen he took them to be powerful enough to override certain immoralities in determining what should be criminalized. But what if the ordinary jury member or person on the Clapham omnibus just does not care that much about privacy or liberty? What if, say, they take the view that adultery should be criminalized never mind the very high cost to privacy? Should privacy and liberty be simply downgraded as a result? There is no indication that Devlin would accept such a conclusion or even that the possibility occurred to him. Similarly, Devlin took it that the law should be “perfectly impartial in matters of religion” and this seems in no way sensitive to whether or not the ordinary member of society endorses such impartiality (Devlin 1965: 62). He appears to take liberty and privacy and other defeaters as safeguards applicable independently of whether ordinary people would accept their validity. In this he appears to have been simply inconsistent.