 The need for such an entity reflects a conundrum unique to Buddhist morality, premised as it is upon the lawlike, causal regularity of karma operating in the absence of any divine intervention. The issue at hand is not in itself the question of karmic continuity in the absence of a self, but rather a particular aspect of that larger problem. (See the sections concerning disproof of the self and momentariness and continuity.) For this argument, then, let us agree that the continuum of consciousness carries on after death, and that one’s future rebirth is therefore determined by the shape and character of one’s consciousness at death. Given that, we can see how a mental action—say, holding a wrong view, or slandering the Buddha in one’s thoughts—can have consequences for one’s future, by directly affecting the shape of one’s consciousness. But how do actions of speech and body—such as insulting, or hitting someone—bear their karmic fruit in the mental continuum? Surely forming the intention to hit someone is a consequential mental act. We might think that Buddhists would simply say that it is karmically equivalent, then, to intend to do something (which is a mental act) and to actually do it. Although there is some blurring of the line here (the Buddha does give great moral weight to merely intending to act), intentions and the bodily (or vocal) acts that follow from them are understood as distinct types of actions with distinct karmic results. Furthermore, the Buddha is said to have indicated that the karmic effect—and so the moral significance—of doing something is additionally dependent upon the success of the action. Attempted murder is not punished to the same degree as murder, even karmically.