 In a review of experimental results assessing human statistical reasoning published in the late 1960s that took stock of research conducted after psychology’s full embrace of statistical research methods  (section 2.3),  Petersen and Beach argued that the normative standard of probability theory and statistical optimization methods were “a good first approximation for a psychological theory of inference” (Peterson &amp; Beach 1967: 42). Petersen and Beach’s view that humans were intuitive statisticians that closely approximate the ideal standards of homo statisticus fit into a broader consensus at that time about the close fit between the normative standards of logic and intelligent behavior (Newell &amp; Simon 1956, 1976). The assumption that human judgment and decision-making closely approximates normative theories of probability and logic would later be challenged by experimental results by Kahneman and Tversky, and the biases and heuristics program more generally  (section 7.1).