 In contrast with the metaphysical project, the descriptive project aims to describe our causal reasoning practices. Traditionally philosophers have tended to conceive of this project as having as its core aim to provide conceptual analyses of our everyday concept or concepts of cause. A conceptual analysis offers necessary and sufficient conditions for claims of the form “c causes e”. Regularity accounts, Mackie’s INUS condition account, or David Lewis’s counterfactual analysis are all examples of the descriptive project. In principle, the project could appeal to a broad range of data, including empirical work by psychologists and cognitive scientists. Generally, however, the descriptive project has focused almost exclusively on probing what philosophers upon reflection take to be commonsense intuitions concerning causal judgements (often involving Billy and Suzy throwing rocks or assassins pouring poison in drinks). Those developing conceptual analyses tend to focus their analyses on commonsense causal claims rather than on the use of causal notions in physics or in the sciences more generally.