 In broad brushstrokes, we could say that there are two clusters of philosophical concerns at work in much Confucian discussion of the relation between heartmind and Pattern in this era. First, many Confucians worried about developing systems of ethical norms too far removed from our actual psychological dispositions. So, for example, they criticized Mohists for their view that one should treat the welfare of all people as having an equal claim on them, no matter their relationship to oneself (e.g., whether a parent or a stranger), arguing that the ideal was so far removed from our natural tendencies as to be impossible (JSL 2.89, 13.2; CXL 93). Our ethical norms, they suggested, should be ones that we have a certain natural capacity to understand and embrace. A major reason for this is what has been called the “wholeheartedness criterion” for virtue: if someone has fully instantiated a particular virtue, it must be the case that the person embraces it completely and without any reluctance or countervailing desires (Tiwald 2018b: 179–183). Someone who cares for others grudgingly or with some reluctance cannot be fully humane or benevolent (ren 仁), for example. Many Confucians in the Song through Ming thought that the virtues worthy of our esteem were only those that we could potentially embrace in a wholehearted fashion, achieving a state sometimes called “sincerity” (cheng 誠) by the Cheng brothers and those who followed them (JSL 1.3; HNCSYS 6:92). By making the possibility of wholeheartedness a condition for esteeming something as a virtue, they tied their ethics even more closely to the heartmind that we happen to have. It is difficult enough to adopt practices that go against the grain of our natural dispositions. It is even more difficult to embrace them and enact them without reservation or regret.