 International law may fare better on “thin” accounts of the rule of law, as these are limited to a familiar set of formal-procedural desiderata that are not intended to be exhaustive of the desiderata applicable to the assessment of law (Franck 1995; Chesterman 2008). These desiderata include the following: that legal norms be expressed in general, prospective, and clear terms, that they are relatively stable over time and do not issue in conflicting demands or demands that cannot be feasibly complied with, that officials (judges, bureaucrats, police etc) charged with applying them do so consistently and in accordance with their meaning, and so on (Raz 1979: 214–8; Fuller, 1964: 33–41). These formal-procedural requirements are usually thought to require certain institutional arrangements for their effective realization, such as an independent judiciary and access to professional legal advice.