 Norms are relevant to areas of research across philosophy, the humanities, and the behavioral sciences, and the kinds of cognitive-evolutionary accounts of norm psychology described here have the potential to inform and enrich many of them. The most immediate implications would seem to fall within the domain of moral theory. However, the relationship of norms and norm psychology to morality and moral psychology is not straightforward, and is itself a subject of debate (Machery 2012). The quest to delimit the boundaries of the moral domain, and to distinguish the genuinely moral from non-moral norms, has a long history, but has yet to produce a view that is widely accepted (Stich 2018). For example, some researchers argue that there are proximate psychological differences that can be used to distinguish a set of moral rules from others (conventional rules, etiquette rules, pragmatic rules). According to one prominent account rooted in developmental psychology, moral rules are marked by the fact that individuals judge them to hold generally rather than only locally, and to apply independently of the pronouncement of any authority figure, and to govern matters concerning harm, welfare, justice, and rights (Turiel 1983; Nucci 2001). Some have drawn inspiration from the sentimentalist tradition in moral theory to build on this account, explaining the features posited as distinctive of moral rules by appeal to their connection to emotions like anger or disgust (Nichols 2004; cf. Haidt 2001). Others have contested the initial characterization of moral norms, marshalling arguments and evidence that it is not psychologically universal, but is rather parochial to certain cultures (Kelly et al. 2007; Kelly &amp; Stich 2007, also see Berniūnas, Dranseika, &amp; Sousa, 2016; Berniūnas, Silius, &amp; Dranseika, 2020; cf. Kumar 2015; Heath 2017).