 Novalis follows Kant in claiming that thought and feeling make up two irreducible sources of experience. Given this dual source of experience, philosophy cannot, as Fichte would have it, be rooted in one single principle. To be sure, the idea of such a principle is attractive to the extent that it would aid in undermining the Kantian dualism of concept and intuition, and ultimately also guarantee the self-determination of rational subjectivity. Yet such a principle cannot be given. Instead of adhering to the completely autonomous subjectivity of Fichtean philosophy, Novalis argues that the subject is inwardly split, not just between thought and feeling, but ultimately also between the hubris of believing that thought can in fact grasp the basic self-feeling, and the realization that this feeling cannot be conceptually processed as such. The latter point not only involves a modification of the scope of reflexive subjectivity, but also of philosophy itself. As Novalis emphatically puts it, “[t]he borders of feeling are the borders of philosophy” (FS #15, emphasis added).