 The most powerful reason for rejecting epiphenomenalism is the view that it is incompatible with knowledge of our own minds — and thus, incompatible with knowing that epiphenomenalism is true. (A variant has it that we cannot even succeed in referring to our own minds, if epiphenomenalism is true. See Bailey (2006) for this objection and Robinson (2012) for discussion.) If these destructive claims can be substantiated, then epiphenomenalists are, at the very least, caught in a practical contradiction, in which they must claim to know, or at least believe, a view which implies that they can have no reason to believe it. Moreover, unless epiphenomenalists can consistently claim to know their own minds, they cannot offer the response to the other minds objection given in 2.3 above. (See Walton, 1989.) (Many authors give some version of this objection. For a full statement of this argument, and several others concerning epiphenomenalism, see Chalmers, 1996. For strong recent versions, see DeBrigard, 2014; Moore, 2012 (responded to by Robinson, 2013); and Moore, 2014.) 