 Finally, for both Frege and Husserl, Benno Erdmann is the chief culprit, that is, the main advocate of a form of psychologism that leads to species relativism. Interestingly enough, over the last thirty years, the critical re-evaluation of antipsychologism has even led to a partial rehabilitation of Erdmann’s ‘psychologistic’ view of logic. As Jack Meiland (1976) construes Erdmann’s philosophy of logic, the psychological interpretation of logical principles is meant to explain why we cannot conceive of radically different logical systems. The explanation is that ‘logical laws express the conditions which govern our thinking in the sense of describing the limits of what we can think’ (1976, 329). One of Husserl’s central objections to this view is that logical principles like the Principle of Non-Contradiction can be denied by human individuals, and indeed have been denied, for example by Hegel. And thus Husserl concludes that logical laws do not describe the limits of what is psychologically thinkable. However, Meiland suggests that Erdmann’s position is not refuted by this argument. All Erdmann needs to reply is that while all human beings are able to utter the words ‘The Principle of Non-Contradiction is false’, they do not thereby think contrary to the principle or understand what they are saying (1976, 331). 