 How are these three views ultimately related? A standard philosophical move is to generalize and abstract, understanding a situation from a higher level. One “meta” hypothesis is that a given philosophical analysis of theory structure tends to be associated with a perceived relationship among the three views here discussed. The Syntactic View is inclined to interpret the Semantic View’s formal machinery as continuous with its own generalizing axiomatic strategy, and hence diagnoses many standard Semantic View critiques (Section 3) as missing their mark (the strategy of identity; e.g., Friedman 1982; Worrall 1984; Halvorson 2012, 2013, 2019; Lutz 2012, 2017; cf. Chakravartty 2001). The Semantic View explicitly contrasts its characterization of theory structure with the “linguistic” or “metamathematical” apparatus of the Syntactic View (the strategy of combat; e.g., Suppe 1977; van Fraassen 1980, 1989; Lloyd 1994 [1988]). Finally, the Pragmatic View, which did not exist as a perspective until relatively recently, imagines theory as pluralistic and can thus ground a holistic philosophical investigation. It envisions a meta-pluralism in which reconstructive axiomatization and mathematical modeling remain important, though not necessary for all theories. This third view endorses a panoply of theoretical structures and theorizing styles, negotiating continuity both between theorizing and “the experimental life,” and among philosophical analyses of the structure of scientific theories (the strategy of complementarity; e.g., Hacking 1983, 2009; Galison 1988, 1997; Craver 2002; Suárez and Cartwright 2008; Griesemer 2013). Interestingly, Suárez and Pero (2019) explicitly concur with the Pragmatic View as described in this article, but believe that “the semantic conception in its bare minimal expression” is compatible with, if not sufficient for, capturing “pragmatic elements and themes involved in a more flexible and open-ended approach to scientific theory” (Suárez and Pero 2019, 348). By design, the ecumenical meta-pluralism sanctioned by the Pragmatic View does not completely offset identity and combat strategies. Moreover, only “partial acceptance” of the respective views may ultimately be possible. Even so, the complementarity strategy might be worth developing further. Compared to identity and combat meta-perspectives, it provides broader—or at least different—insights into the structure of scientific theories. More generally, exploring the relations among these views is itself a rich topic for future philosophical work, as is investigating their role in, and interpretation of, active scientific fields ripe for further philosophical analysis such as climate change (e.g., Winsberg 2018), model organisms (e.g., Ankeny and Leonelli 2020), and cartography and GIS (e.g., Winther 2020).