 There are two main branches to this tradition. The more obvious and commonsensical one originates with Reid (1764, 1785) who denies that only mental items can be directly present to the mind, arguing that physical objects and their properties can be directly present as well. This is the direct realist option. A somewhat older tradition, however, tracing back to George Berkeley (1710, 1713), agrees with Descartes that only mental items are directly present to the mind but insists that the objects of perception—tables, rocks, cats, etc.—are really mental items after all. This is the idealist/phenomenalist option. Despite the manifest differences between realist and idealist metaphysics, both branches of the “direct presence” tradition are united in rejecting the Indirectness Principle, insisting that tables and such are indeed directly present to the mind in perception. If perception is thus direct, the Indirectness Principle is false, and support for the Metaevidential Principle is undercut, and PEW ceases to pose a threat to knowledge.