 Punishment theorists should also attend to various other kinds of burdensome consequences of criminal convictions, often called ‘collateral consequences’. Most centrally, those convicted of crimes are subject to a range of coercive state policies: measures restricting offenders’ access to jobs, housing, public assistance, the vote, and a host of others goods; subjecting them to continued detention; making their criminal records publicly available, and so on — often long after they have completed their formal criminal sentences (see, e.g., von Hirsch and Wasik 1997; LaFollette 2005; de Keijser 2012; Hoskins 2014a, 2016, 2019; Sigler 2014; Bennett 2016; Brown 2021). Legal practice has tended to treat these sorts of measures not as part of an offender’s punishment, but as civil or administrative measures (one effect of which is that they often escape the constraints of justice and proportionality to which punishment is subject). Many coercive measures are imposed even on those who have not been convicted, such as the many kinds of restriction that may be imposed on people suspected of involvement in terrorism, or housing or job restrictions tied merely to arrests rather than convictions.