 But now we see that move \(\bD\) does not dominate \(\bC\), as it does in the 2-player prisoner's dilemma. When we are at the threshold of adequate cooperation, where exactly \(n\) others choose \(\bC\), I am better off cooperating. Similarly, whereas mutual defection is the only nash equilibrium in the original PD, this game has two equilibria. One is universal defection, since any player unilaterally departing from that outcome will move from payoff 0 to \(C\). But a second is the state of minimally effective cooperation, where the number of cooperators is just sufficient to obtain the benefit. A defector who unilaterally departs from that outcome will move from \(B\) to \(B+C\) and a cooperator who unilaterally departs will move from \(B+C\) to 0. Finally, in the orginal PD, every outcome except universal defecton is pareto optimal--i.e., as long as at least one of the players cooperates, there is no outcome in which in which each player is at least as well off and one is better off. In the voting game, on the other hand, only the states of minimally effective cooperation are pareto optimal. If the number of cooperators exceeds the threshold by one or more, a new defector will benefit himself while hurting no others. 