 Along with ontology, musical expressiveness is probably the most frequently discussed issue in analytic philosophy of music (for an introduction to the debate, see Matravers 2007). An important advance in this area is represented by the distinction between the emotions music expresses and those it is expressive of (Kivy 1989, elaborating on Tormey 1971). The saggy features of a Saint Bernard dog make it look sad, but they do not stand in a causal relation with a psychological state of sadness. The dog’s face is expressive of sadness, but does not express sadness. Likewise, sadness is attributed to music regardless of whether it is the expression of sadness or of any other emotion—that Mozart’s Requiem Mass in D minor is expressive of anguish is something we can determine independently from the anguished state its author may have found himself in when composing it. The emotions the music is expressive of are also conceptually distinct from those it may arouse in the listener—the Requiem may arouse anguish in me, but it would be an anguished work even if it didn’t. As intuitive as these distinctions may appear, previous accounts of the relationship between music and emotions did not trace them explicitly, and at times seem to move from one notion to the other.