  The fact that “Gödel has left us little hope that a  formalism wide enough to encompass classical mathematics will be  supported by a proof of consistency” seems to have led Weyl to  take a renewed interest in “axiomatic systems developed before  Hilbert without such ambitious dreams”, for example Zermelo’s  set theory, Russell’s and Whitehead’s ramified type theory and  Hilbert’s own axiom systems for geometry (as well, possibly, as  Weyl’s own system in Das Kontinuum, which he modestly fails  to mention). In one of his last papers, Axiomatic Versus  Constructive Procedures in Mathematics, written sometime after  1953, he saw the battle between Hilbertian formalism and Brouwerian  intuitionism in which he had participated in the 1920s as having  given way to a “dextrous blending” of the axiomatic  approach to mathematics championed by Bourbaki and the algebraists  (themselves mathematical descendants of Hilbert) with constructive  procedures associated with geometry and topology.