 This claim can be made in ways that are more or less committed to 4E machinery. It is possible, for example, to argue, as Levy (2007) does for addiction, that a condition cannot be seen as a brain disorder because its symptoms only arise in specific social environments. Davies (2016) asserts that many psychiatric categories are committed to ‘constitutive externalism’, by which he means that one cannot be diagnosed with those conditions unless one stands in certain relations to features of the environment, including the social environment. This position could be adopted even if one has only very weak commitments in the 4E vein; it is based on claims about the relations between subjects and environments rather than theories about the nature of the mind. Furthermore, although Davies asserts that these features distinguish psychiatry from somatic medicine, they plainly do not. As Glackin notes (2017) each of Davies’ examples has parallels in somatic medicine. In a similar vein, Fuchs (2018) argues that the tendency of contemporary psychiatry is to isolate the patient from their surroundings and study disorder independently of the environment.