 A parallel solution has been delineated by DeRose, who draws a distinction between primary and secondary propriety. Primary propriety is just what a rule says: when a rule prescribes to f only if C, it is primarily proper to f if C, and primarily improper to f if not C. Secondary propriety is dictated by whether you have reasons to think you are following the rule. If you f because you reasonably believe that C, but C is accidentally false, your action is primarily improper but secondarily proper, and doesn’t deserve blame. If you f although you reasonably believe that C is false, but C is accidentally true, your assertion is primarily proper but secondarily improper, and doesn’t deserve praise. This strategy helps defend  (TNA)  and  (KNA)  against the devised counterexamples. Unlucky and Gettiered assertions are primarily improper but secondarily proper, and that’s why they don’t deserve blame. Lucky assertions are primarily proper but secondarily improper, and that’s why they don’t deserve praise.