 However, the explanatory differences between the parties to the debate run deeper than merely whether they think the capacity of relations to differentially apply is open to informative explanation. Whilst Fine takes the capacity of relations to differentially apply as primitive, Fine also holds that it is necessary to provide an account of wherein the difference consists between two states which arise from the same constituents: “Yet clearly the state of Anthony’s loving Cleopatra and the state of Cleopatra’s loving Anthony are distinguishable; they are not merely two indiscernible ”atoms“ within the space of states. But if these states are not to be distinguished by how they derive from the given relation and its relata, then how are they to be distinguished?”(Fine 2000: 20). Fine’s answer, as we have seen, is spelled out in terms of substitution. But Leo’s version of anti-positionalism has different explanatory settings again. He doesn’t engage with metaphysical questions about wherein the difference between states consists and instead provides principles of substitution intended to explicate rather than explain the differential application of relations (Leo 2013: 361–8). And primitivism, we have seen, takes the fact that relations admit of differential application as unanalysable too but also takes the difference between states arising from the same constituents as primitive (MacBride 2014: 8, cf. van Fraassen 1982). The dispute about relations and differential application continues because it remains to be established which questions about relations are genuine and which are pseudo-problems.