 Second, and importantly, Ryle is not a philosophical behaviourist—at least he does not subscribe to any of the main tenets associated with that doctrine as it is known today. One may be confused by this if one is also confused about Ryle’s conception of philosophy. Although there is some truth in identifying him as an analytic philosopher—he announces (1932, 61) that “the sole and whole function of philosophy” is philosophical analysis—this is likely to be misunderstood today if one thinks that the proper goal of philosophy (attainable if not in practice at least in ideals) is definitional analysis. It is this that encourages the association with behaviourism (in at least one of its many senses) But Ryle was not an analytical philosopher in this sense. True, Ryle acknowledges the influence of Moore’s emphasis on common sense (and thus on ordinary language); true, he takes himself to be pursuing the type of philosophical investigation (exemplified by Russell’s Theory of Descriptions) that involves uncovering the logical form of grammatically misleading expressions. But it is important to take account of the differences that separate Ryle from the early Moore and Russell for it is their conception of philosophy that has been inherited by many of us working within the “analytic” tradition in philosophy today. That is the third point. For Ryle does not believe in meanings (concepts or propositions) as these have been traditionally construed (as stable objects or rules, the grasp of which is logically prior to, and thus may be used to explain, the use of expressions). Indeed, Ryle’s conception of philosophy was not fundamentally different from that of Wittgenstein. Ryle sets out in print as early as 1932 a philosophical agenda that prefigures the published work of the later Wittgenstein; the “elasticity of significance” and “inflections of meaning” Ryle finds in most expressions appear to be the family of structures, more or less related, noticed by Wittgenstein; and Ryle’s attack on the “intellectualist legend” shares Wittgenstein’s concern to understand a proper—non-exalted—place for rules in an explanation of various philosophically interesting achievements. In spite of the fact that some of Wittgenstein’s protégés were dismissive of Ryle’s  work,[1]  the best way to understand Ryle is to see him, if not as following in Wittgenstein’s footsteps, then as walking some stretches of philosophical terrain down a parallel path.