 We turn now to the second of the positions that takes authorship to be the essential feature of action. Like Korsgaard, Velleman takes action – “human action par excellence,” as contrasted with mere activity – to be owned (Velleman 2015, 101 and ch. 5, passim). Like Korsgaard, he takes ownership to require a definite structure in an agent, and again like her, he takes the forms of practical reasoning (and what practical reasons substantively will turn out to be) to be determined by the agent’s structure. However, he disagrees with Korsgaard as to what the structure of an agent is, as to what its practical reasons are, and incidentally with Korsgaard’s insistence that being authored by the agent as a whole means not being authored by a proper part of the agent. Velleman’s position will make more sense if we bear in mind that it has more than one agenda; accordingly we will juxtapose two complementary entry points, and subsequently suggest that what looks like a third and independent motivation for the view is reachable from those.