 Turning to grounding-to-essence principles, some, such as Correia (2013), O’Conaill (2018), and Trogdon (2013b), focus in this context on putative essential truths that themselves don’t directly concern grounding (e.g., part of what it is to be the property of being maroon is that, for any x, if x is maroon, then x is red). Others, such as Audi (2012a), focus on corresponding essential truths that encode information about what grounds what (e.g., part of what it is to be the property of being maroon is that, for any x, if x is maroon, then [x is maroon] grounds [x is red]). Let’s focus on putative essential truths of the former, grounding-free variety, where these truths are understood to characterize facts rather than entities they concern.