 Since they deny that the goodness of health is part of its definition, value-neutral accounts stress the enormous, but contingent, instrumental value of health. The leading attempt to explain the importance of health in these terms is Daniels’ account of health-care as maintaining or restoring fair equality of opportunity (Daniels 1985). Daniels’ account gives a priority to the maintenance of typical functioning and the correction of disabilities that many critics find excessive (Wasserman 1998: 152–58). Still, the core intuition, concerning the enormous practical value of species-typical functioning, can be accepted without accepting medical normalization as the preferred or default response to atypicality; indeed, without accepting the claim that species have functions with species- typical levels defined in biological terms (see Amundson 2000). Further, the claim that species-typical functioning is instrumentally valuable leaves open the question of why departures from species-typical functioning are instrumentally disvaluable: is it because they render one vulnerable to discrimination, subject one to an unaccommodating environment, cause medical problems, or all of the above?