 According to Meinong, all experiences [Erlebnisse], even the most elementary ones, are complex mental phenomena, because they contain at least three constituents: (1) the act, (2) the (psychological) content, and (3) the object of the experience. The first two components are intrinsically mental and, therefore, must exist if the experience exists, whereas the third one need not exist, and it is usually extrinsic to the mental. If somebody entertains a strong hope for universal peace, for instance, then (1) the act of hope (and not of hate) exists, (2) the psychological content exists, but (3) no universal peace may occur (there is only the non-existent object the universal peace). Meinong believes that experiences can have different objects [Gegenstände] for two reasons: (i) Different kinds of acts correspond to different kinds of objects (for example, “objecta” correspond to representations, and “objectives” to thoughts; see below 4.3.1). (ii) But inside an act, so to speak, any variation on the side of the objects is correlated with a variation of some mental component which is the psychological content of the experience. (See the supplement on  Presentation of Objects via Psychological Content.)