 Non-trivial treatments of counterpossibles require the failure of several logical principles which hold in the standard Lewis-Stalnaker approach to counterfactuals (Williamson 2007 chapter 5, Brogaard &amp; Salerno 2013). (Williamson uses these failures to argue that counterpossibles are always trivially true.) One important principle that fails is the entailment from a strict conditional, “if \(A\) then-strictly \(B\)”, to the corresponding counterfactual, “if it were the case that \(A\) then it would be the case that \(B\)”. Normally, the former entails the latter. A strict conditional is true when all the (accessible) possible worlds where the antecedent is true also make the consequent true. If all the possible \(A\)-worlds are \(B\)-worlds, then in particular all the closest possible \(A\)-worlds are \(B\)-worlds. In an account which admits impossible worlds, however, we can have closest impossible worlds where \(A\) obtains and \(B\) fails, making the counterpossible false even though the corresponding strict conditional is true.