Confusingly, within the literature the term ‘the capability approach’ has also often been used to refer not to this overall framework, but rather to a more specific capability theory, namely Nussbaum’s (2000; 2011a) partial capability theory of justice, Sen’s (2006; 2008; 2009) theory of transitional justice, or Sen’s (1999) theory of development as freedom. Many capability theorists have long believed that the capability approach has a normative commitment to expand certain doings and beings that people have reason to value, as Sen has proposed. However, it is possible to develop capability theories that differ significantly from Nussbaum’s and Sen’s capability theories. For example, empirical applications of the capability framework do not necessarily have to be committed to the political liberalism of Nussbaum’s approach or the expansion of valuable capabilities, while a theory of educational justice, such as the one developed by Walker and Unterhalter (2007), will differ quite drastically from a theory of health justice, like the ones developed by Venkatapuram (2011) or Prah Ruger (2009; 2010). Moreover, the capability framework can and has been used for non-normative purposes, including the conceptualization of various phenomena, such as sharing of urban space, and the measurement of capabilities through both qualitative and quantitative research. These non-normative applications differ widely in their methodological approaches and are not (necessarily) committed to the expansion of capabilities.