 What is this perfect goodness, a particular perfection exhibited by any absolutely perfect being? In recent work in philosophical theology – understandably, primarily in contexts in which the problem of evil is at issue – perfect goodness is understood as a practical excellence, an excellence concerned with desire, character traits, and action. A perfectly good being has the best desires that a being can have, and exhibits the best traits of character, and acts in an unsurpassably excellent way. This practical excellence is, furthermore, typically understood as moral excellence (Morris 1989b, p. 26; Wierenga 1989, p. 202). So when one says that any being who counts as God must be perfectly good, the claim is that any such being would have desires and traits of character and perform actions that are those of a being that exhibits moral perfection. The idea, then, is this. We may call all of these practically-oriented features of a being – that being’s desires, character traits, actions, etc. – its ‘agency’. A being’s agency might be morally better or morally worse. A morally perfect being, though, has morally unsurpassable agency. 