 The contextualist response to the argument for Cartesian Skepticism rests on the claim that which propositions the sentences used in that argument express is also a context-sensitive matter. Different contextualists would fill in the details in different ways—here we follow most closely the contextualism of Cohen 1987, 1988, 2000, 2005, 2014a,b, but see also Lewis 1996, DeRose 1992, 1995, 2002, 2004, 2005 and Stine 1976. Notice, to begin with, that justification comes in degrees: one can be more justified in believing one proposition than another. But there is also such a thing as being justified tout court. In this respect, it can be argued that “justified” is like “tall”, in that we can make sense both of comparative uses, such as when we say that Tomás is taller than his mother, and of non-comparative ones, such as when we say that Jordan is tall. Notice also that which proposition is expressed by a non-comparative use of “tall” does not float free from what would be appropriate comparative uses. Thus, when I say “Jordan is tall”, what I say is true provided that Jordan is taller than the average subject in the relevant contrast class. Thus, if Jordan is a fifth-grader, then what I said would be true if Jordan is taller than the average fifth-grader, whereas if Jordan is an NBA player, then what I said would be true if Jordan is taller than the average NBA player (who plays in Jordan’s position, perhaps). Similarly, the contextualist claims that when I say that I am justified in believing a proposition, what I say is true if and only if my degree of justification for believing the proposition is higher than a contextually set threshold. That threshold, moreover, can vary with the conversational context. Thus, if we are doing epistemology and thinking about the requirements for justification, the threshold required for an utterance of “I am justified in believing I have hands” goes up to the point where few (if any) of us would count as having said something true, whereas in an everyday context the threshold goes down to the point where most of us would count as having said something true.