 To illustrate the conflict between minimal liberalism and the weak Pareto principle, Sen asked us to imagine a society that consists of two individuals, Lewd and Prude, faced with the decision of who among them (if any) should read a controversial book, Lady Chatterley’s Lover. In Sen’s story, Lewd most prefers that Prude read the book (alternative \(x)\), second-most prefers that he (Lewd) read the book himself (alternative \(y)\), and least prefers that neither of the two read the book \((z)\). Prude most prefers that neither read the book \((z)\), second-most prefers that he (Prude) read the book himself \((x)\), and least prefers that Lewd read the book \((y)\). Assuming Lewd is decisive over the pair \(y\) and \(z\), society should prefer \(y\) to \(z\). Assuming Prude is decisive over the pair \(x\) and \(z\), society should prefer \(z\) to \(x\). But since Lewd and Prude both prefer \(x\) to \(y\), the weak Pareto principle (applied to \(N = \{\)Lewd, Prude\(\})\) implies that society should prefer \(x\) to \(y\). So, we are faced with a social preference cycle: \(x\) is socially preferred to \(y, y\) is socially preferred to \(z\), and \(z\) socially preferred to \(x\). Sen generalized this problem—now known as the ‘liberal paradox’—as follows.