Notice moreover the difference between the Sidgwickian argument, as illustrated by these two examples, and another utilitarian argument that would justify “self-effacement”, i.e., the idea that to remain able to reach its goals, utilitarianism should go totally undercover. In other words, even enlightened utilitarians should not be motivated by their doctrine. The argument is as follows: being motivated by a utilitarian goal may impede our ability actually to reach this very goal. For instance, truly believing in the value of an artistic project independently of its ability to bring about happiness is more likely to maximize welfare than being motivated towards this project out of a commitment to utilitarianism. The upshot, then, is that a society committed to utilitarian principles may turn out to be a less happy one than a society relying on a given set of commonsense principles. If this is true, we would not only have an argument, for “Government House utilitarianism” (i.e., for utilitarian principles being relied on only by the enlightened few), or for its stronger “meta-secrecy” version (of which a few enlightened would still be aware). Rather, we would have a case for something even more radical: the full self-effacement of utilitarianism for utilitarian reasons, i.e., even enlightened utilitarians would have to forget about it if they are really committed utilitarians.[13]