 So far I’ve been presenting the implicature-based view of metaphor Sperber and Wilson expounded in the first (1986) edition of Relevance, a view on which metaphor involves literally saying or expressing one thing while figuratively communicating something else. Thereafter Sperber and Wilson moved to a “direct expression” view of metaphor and loose talk more generally, on which they involve pragmatically induced changes in what is said, resulting from pragmatically induced adjustments in the properties and relations the certain particular focal expressions contribute to the truth conditions of an uttered sentence. In Bezuidenhout (2001), Wilson and Sperber (2002), and Sperber and  Wilson (2008), metaphor ceases to be a matter of conversational implicature and becomes a matter of conversational explicature instead. This blurs the previously sharp line between semantic twist and pragmatic twist approaches to metaphor and commits relevance theory to a form of truth-conditional pragmatics. An especially full defense and development of this new approach comes in Robyn Carston’s (2002).