 What makes the Repugnant Conclusion so perplexing is that strong arguments can be given which apparently force one into accepting the conclusion. In fact, several arguments to this effect—with affinity to the mere addition reasoning outlined above—have been presented (see e.g. Parfit 1986; Arrhenius 2000b; Kitcher 2000; Tännsjö 2002; Rachels 2004). Roughly, the arguments share the following structure: in comparison between three population scenarios the second scenario is considered better than the first and the third better than the second, leading to the conclusion that the third scenario is better than the first. By iterated application of this line of reasoning one ends up with the Repugnant Conclusion (that Z is better than A). One of the more radical approaches to such arguments has been to reject the transitivity of the relation “better than” (or “equally as good as”). According to transitivity, if p is better than q, and q is better than r, then p is better than r. However, if transitivity of “better than” is denied then the reasoning leading the Repugnant Conclusion is blocked (Temkin 1987, 2012; Persson 2004; Rachels 2004).