 A second problem is with drawing boundaries. A label like “metaphysics” refers to certain human practices at the same time that it draws boundaries around those practices. While Chinese philosophers engaged in the kinds of practices that metaphysics refers to, they did not draw the same boundaries. Isolating metaphysical inquiry from practices of self-cultivation, for example, would have struck almost any Chinese philosopher as odd, if not dangerous. There is no native Chinese term marking the same boundaries as “metaphysics” in European philosophy. When Chinese encountered the term, it was translated by way of Japanese as xing er shang xue 形而上學, literally, “the study of what is above forms.” “What is above forms” had long been a central concept in Chinese philosophy, originating in a passage from the “Xici” commentary on the Yi Jing 易經, the Classic of Changes, which says: “What is above forms refers to the way [dao 道]; what is below forms refers to utensils [qi 器]” (Gao Heng 1998:  407).[2]  The distinction between what is above forms and what is below forms has a vague resemblance to the distinction between metaphysics and physics, but it is more specific (Zheng 2017; Wang 2015). The contrast is between the formed and the formless. Both were taken to be immanent in the world. They are two aspects of the processes of nature and would not be taken as distinct areas of inquiry. The implications of this view will appear across a range of metaphysical issues.