 However, there are also limits on how far Kant is prepared to follow these Lutheran themes. Firstly, while he is willing to accept that theoretical reason may both lead itself astray and find itself cognitively impoverished in some respects, in a way that leaves room for faith, he is not willing to allow that this means that theology can eclipse philosophy, or that revelation or scripture can simply replace the latter, as he took it that religion must remain compatible with morality and thus stay within practical reason, out of which a philosophical theology can arise (see Religion, Preface, and The Conflict of the Faculties, Part 1). Secondly, Kant offers a distinctive conception of the idea of free choice (Willkür) as involving the choice or adoption of our maxims (see Metaphysics of Morals 6: 213–4, 226; Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason 6:23–4), while he also argues for our freedom on the basis that “ought implies can”, which puts him at odds with Luther’s position as articulated in The Bondage of the Will (see, e.g., Religion 6:45, and White 1990 for more general discussion). Finally, in Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, Kant rejects the Lutheran conception of grace, again on moral grounds, arguing that we will be discouraged in our moral efforts unless we believe that we can do something to make ourselves deserving of grace and hence of divine assistance to be good, while again Kant appeals to the principle that “ought implies can” to argue that we must have some capacity in this direction, however limited (see Religion Part 1). Thus, while there are some affinities between Kant and Luther, there are important divergences too.