  Additional complications arise for pluralists who commit to facts being what make sentences true (e.g., Lynch 2001: 730), or other such truth-maker or -making theses. Prima facie, we would reasonably expect there to be different kinds of facts that make the conjuncts of (43) true, and which subsequently account for the differences in their different ways of being true. However, what fact or facts makes true the mixed compound? Regarding (43), is it the mathematical fact, the moral fact, or some further kind of fact? On one hand, the claims that mathematical or moral facts, respectively, make \(p\) true seem to betray the thought that both facts contribute equally to the truth of the mixed compound. On the other hand, the claim that some third ‘mixed’ kind of fact makes \(p\) true leaves the pluralist with the uneasy task of telling a rather alchemist story about fact-mixtures.