 In light of such considerations, no small number of authors have come to reject the consistency norm (see inter alia Kyburg 1970 and Christensen 2004). A particularly interesting positive alternative proposal was recently made by Branden Fitelson and Kenny Easwaran (Fitelson and Easwaran 2015, Easwaran 2015). They advance a range of sub-consistency coherence norms for full belief inspired by Joyce-style accuracy-dominance arguments for probabilism as a norm for credences (see Joyce 1998, 2009 and also the entry on  epistemic utility arguments for probabilism).  One important such norm is based on the following conception of coherence. Roughly, a belief set is coherent just in case there is no alternative belief set that outperforms it in terms of its lower measure of inaccuracy across all possible worlds, i.e., just in case it is not weakly dominated with respect to accuracy.