 Several philosophers have taken up the challenge from Parfit and have engaged in considerations as to what would constitute a satisfactory population ethics. Some theorists have done so by accepting the framework Parfit has set for the investigation; that is, they have carried on the work of developing an ethical theory that succeeds in meeting Parfit’s minimal requirements for adequacy. Other theorists have been less willing to accept the scenery as set by Parfit and have more or less radically challenged his requirements for a plausible theory. The Repugnant Conclusion has been placed at the centre of this discussion. The suggestions in the literature on how to deal with the Repugnant Conclusion can roughly be divided into eight categories: (1) introducing new ways of aggregating welfare into a measure of value; (2) questioning the way we can compare and measure welfare; (3) counting welfare differently depending on temporal or modal features; (4) revising the notion of a life worth living; (5) rejecting transitivity; (6) appeal to other values; (7) accepting the impossibility of a satisfactory population ethics; (8) accepting the Repugnant Conclusion.