  One advantage of thinking of implicit biases as traits is that it is consistent with the way in which personality attributions readily admit of vague cases. Just as we might say that Frank is partly agreeable if he extols the virtues of compassion yet sometimes treats strangers rudely, we might say that Frank is partly prejudiced. Dispositional theories capture this intuition. On the other hand, trait-based theories of implicit bias face long-standing challenges to dispositionalism in the philosophy of mind. One such challenge is that traits are explanatory as generalizations, not as token causes of judgment and behavior (Carruthers 2013). Another is the specter of circularity arising from the simultaneous use of an agent’s behavior to both define her disposition and to point to what her disposition predicts (Bandura, 1971; Cervone et al. 2015; Mischel 1968; Payne et al. 2017). In both cases, the question for dispositionalism is whether it truly helps to explain the data, or merely repackages outwardly observed patterns in new terms.