 As for the first mover, it could not itself be a body, since if it were, it would have to have motion of itself (for as first mover, where else would it get it?), and this has been shown to be impossible for bodies. Thus we may also conclude that the first mover is not a body. But there being only two kinds of substances (Cordemoy’s third axiom), bodies and minds, only a mind remains as a candidate for the first mover. Further, it is clear that our (finite) minds are not the source of motion in bodies. In the first place, our minds cannot effect our bodies in certain ways, either because they are immune to such influence (e.g., I cannot will the cells in my liver to cease dividing) or because of old age or injury (e.g., a crippled man cannot will himself to walk). Second—and noteworthy in that it anticipates both Malebranche and Hume—if we restrict ourselves to what we observe, we never experience a causal connection but only temporal succession between our volitions at one moment and our body’s actions the next. Third, if we could produce motion in bodies at will, it would, says Cordemoy, upset God’s plan for the quantity of motion which God conserves in the world. Thus he concludes that an infinite will must be the first mover.