 As Stencil points out Moreau and Nadler agree that Arnauld subscribes to what Stencil calls “the identity thesis,” that God, God’s action, and God’s attributes are identical. According to Nadler, however, Arnauld goes farther, and denies that God’s wisdom and His will are distinct even by a “distinction of reason.” Stencil disagrees. Against the background of the treatment of abstraction in the Port Royal Logic, Stencil maintains that Arnauld holds “the distinctness thesis,” that “God, God’s actions, and God’s attributes are conceptually distinct” (Stencil, 2019, p. 24–5). Reflection on the clear idea of God. and on the clear ideas of His attributes, which we form by abstraction, allows us to establish various truths about God and His attributes. But that reflection reequires that we distinguish conceptually among the various attributes. Arnauld also subscribes to “the nonpriority thesis,” the thesis “that there are no conceptual priorities among God, God’s actions, and God’s attributes” (Stencil, 2019, p. 21). To deny the nonpriority thesis is, in Arnauld’s view, to “anthropomorphize” God, to make him “operate like a finite being.” Stencil concludes, “So, contra Nadler, I suggest that we treat Arnauld as allowing for conceptual distinctions – but not conceptual priorities – among God’s various attributes” (Stencil, 2019, p. 26–7).