Marrone 1983, ch. 6, suggests he is not: the light Grosseteste mentions is a light, he thinks, that the mind itself sheds on items to render them intelligible and the notions of light and vision play no essential role in Grosseteste’s understanding of Aristotelian science: the commentary displays a movement away from the conception of knowledge in On Truth in terms of divine illumination towards a purely naturalistic conception of knowledge. But this view presupposes the implausible chronology according to which On Truth was written before the commentary and, as van Dyke 2009 points out, fits poorly with Grosseteste’s analogy between the light involved in scientific knowledge and the light shed by the sun in bodily vision, which comes from a source apart from the senses. So too, it seems, the light involved in scientific knowledge is a light that a source apart from the mind, namely God (or possibly an intelligence), sheds on objects of scientific knowledge so as to render them actually intelligible, in the way the light the sun sheds on bodies makes them actually visible. 