 Ricoeur (1950 [2007: 137ff.]) speaks of decision as having a “history” and points to what he calls “hesitation” as central to this history. From one point of view, the capacity for choice manifests itself in hesitation, the wavering between different possibilities for projects or for actions. From another point of view, hesitation is an “in-decision”, as a “falling short of choice”, as a being-on-the-way to a choice, which, as of yet, is absent or deferred. “Hesitation”, Ricoeur says, “is a perplexed willing seeking to orient itself” (1950 [2007: 138]). The decision identifies one of these possibilities as my project, as the possibility I will pursue in my voluntary, self-motivated action that executes the decision. The decision articulates a project, but the project is different from the voluntary bodily action that realizes it. Although a decision can be separated in time from the action, in which case it is the capability of acting in conformity with the project that makes it an authentic decision, an action can also be spontaneous. The spontaneous action, however, is genuinely a voluntary action only insofar as the agent could have projected it in a situation to which the action is suitable or with which it is compatible. Put another way, the action is voluntary only when the agent can recognize an implicit decision in it, a decision with its history of hesitation that could be affirmed as the potential project of the action in question.