 Epistemologists commonly distinguish between doxastic and propositional justification. Very roughly, one has propositional justification when one has justification (e.g., some reason or evidence) for belief in a proposition. One has doxastic justification when one not only has justification to believe a proposition but also believes the proposition and believes it on the basis of the justification one has. This distinction applies to foundational and non-foundational beliefs: being foundationally/non-foundationally justified in believing that P requires having some foundational/non-foundational justification for P, and believing that P on the basis of this justification. (While this is to understand doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification, some prefer to go the other way round, and understand having justification in terms of being in a position to acquire doxastic justification. For a helpful discussion, see Turri 2010.) For ease of exposition, much of our discussion is put in terms that most naturally refer to doxastic justification—e.g., “justified belief”, “being justified in believing”. However, even when we use such terms, we focus on propositional justification (which is required for doxastic justification) and assume that the other conditions involved in believing on a proper basis are satisfied. (For more on the basing requirement, see the entry on  the epistemic basing relation.)