  The ideal of a just modern society as a democratic society in which citizens relate as equals appears in writings by Michael Walzer on social justice (Walzer, 1983). Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler both affirm versions of relational equality and from this standpoint criticize the family of views that Anderson calls “luck egalitarian,” whose foremost exponents are perhaps G. A. Cohen and Ronald Dworkin (Cohen 1989, Anderson 1999, Scheffler 2010, chapters 7 and 8, Dworkin 2000, and for responses to criticisms, Dworkin 2003 and 2010 and Arneson 2004). According to Anderson, the luck egalitarian holds that unchosen and uncourted inequalities ought to be eliminated and that chosen and courted inequalities should be left standing). She criticizes these views on several grounds. One is that the luck egalitarian wrongly takes the aim of egalitarian justice to be achieving an equal distribution of stuff rather than egalitarian solidarity and respect among members of society. Another is that the policy recommendations implied by luck egalitarian principles are too harsh in their dealings with people who fare badly but are deemed personally responsible for their plight (see also Fleurbaey 1995). A third is that the luck egalitarian, in order to establish that people who are badly off are owed equalizing compensation, must involve distributive agencies in intrusive and disrespectful inquiries that issue in public negative assessments of people's traits as grounding the conclusion that these unfortunate individuals are not properly held personally responsible for their misfortune (see also Wolff 1998). A related criticism is that luck egalitarianism adopts a moralizing posture toward individual wayward choice that would make sense only if free will libertarianism were correct (Scheffler 2010).