 Gendler (2000) develops the first contemporary version of a wontian theory in response to what she perceives as intractable difficulties facing cantian accounts. Focusing on dependency-violation cantian theories, she conceives of these accounts as premised on the unimaginability of impossibilities. The reason we cannot imagine a proposition such as G is that it represents a conceptually impossible state of affairs and the conceptual impossibility of that state of affairs renders G unimaginable (Gendler 2000: 66 calls this “the impossibility hypothesis”; see Walton 2006: 145 for his rejection of Gendler’s characterization of his account). Gendler then argues that impossibilities are indeed imaginable because imagination does not require possibility but rather only conceivability. To demonstrate this, she concocts a story, The Tower of Goldbach, where twelve turns out to both be and not be the sum of five and seven (2000: 68, cf. Graham Priest’s (1997) Sylvan’s Box, where Sylvan finds an empty box that contains a statue). Even if we are asked to imagine something that is conceptually impossible, we can do so according to Gendler by exploiting our capacity for selective attention. By paying attention to different parts of the story at different times and ignoring others we can ultimately succeed in imagining a conceptual impossibility. Given that we can imagine what is conceptually impossible, some further explanation is required as to why we resist imagining Giselda or Death on the Freeway. 