 How exactly does linguistic communication produce these properly aligned doxastic states? Multiple proposals are available; we’ll pause for a moment to discuss multicentering accounts. In multicentering models, self-locating communication is characterized by means of multicentered contents—sets of n-tuples, each of which contains a world, a time, and a series of individuals. We can characterize the content of Andy’s communication to Mike with a set of triples \(\langle w,t,\langle i_1,i_2\rangle \rangle\) such that, in \(w\) at \(t\), \(i_1\) is addressing \(i_2\), and \(i_1\)’s pants are on fire. If Andy had instead said, “you are better at basketball than me”, we could model the content with the set of \(\langle w,t,\langle i_1,i_2\rangle \rangle\)s such that, at \(t\) in \(w\), \(i_2\) is better at basketball than \(i_1\). The intuitive idea is that we characterize communicated content (and conversational common ground) using sets of set-theoretic objects whose role is to represent, not a single individual, but an entire conversational group. They do this by containing, for each participant in the conversation, an element representing that particular conversational participant. These objects characterize the state of the whole conversation, and the effects that utterances have on the state of the conversation. They don’t directly characterize the cognitive attitudes of particular parties to the conversation—a set of multicentered worlds is not a good candidate to be an object of belief for an individual (though see Ninan 2012b for a different application of the multicentering apparatus to represent de re attitudes). Instead there is a translation from the single set of multicentered worlds characterizing the state of the conversation to the various different sets of singly-centered worlds characterizing the doxastic states of particular parties to the conversation. (When the conversation is properly characterized by a set of \(\langle w,t,\langle i_1,i_2\rangle \rangle\)s such that, in \(w\) at \(t\), \(i_2\) is better at basketball than \(i_1\), and we’re using the first individual position to represent Andy and the second to represent Mike, that will mean that Andy self-attributes being the worse basketball player in a two-person conversation, and Mike self-attributes being the better basketball player in a two-person conversation.)