 Now that we have definitions of “mental simulation of” and cognate notions, it is time to consider which mental states and processes satisfy them, if any. Are there really simulated mental states? That is, are there mental states generated by the reuse of cognitive mechanisms? And do these mental states resemble the mental states generated by the use of such mechanisms? For example, is it truly the case that visual images are mental simulations of visual experiences? What about decisions, emotions, beliefs, desires, and bodily sensations? Can our minds generate simulated counterparts of all these types of mental states? In this section, we consider how Simulation Theorists have tackled these problems. We will do so by focusing on the following question: are there really simulation processes (as defined by  PROC)?  If the answer to this question is positive, it follows that there are mental states standing in the relation of mental simulation (as defined by  RES+REU),  and thus simulated mental states.