 These faculties, listed in order from the anterior to the posterior of the brain’s supposed three chambers (ParaParv II.26 {42}), account for much of human cognition. Most basically (for details see LongAnima II.63, III.6; Blaustein 1984; Hansberger 2019), imagination allows us to form sensory images taken from sensation even when we are not presently sensing an object. The cogitative power refines these images so as to allow a distinct grasp of the “individual contents” (al-maʿānī al-shakhṣiya, known in the Latin tradition as “intentions”) that are confusedly contained within sensory experience. Memory stores and recalls these images. Ibn Rushd explicitly argues (Incoherence II.2 {546-7}) that the cogitative power can do all the work that Ibn Sīnā had split between a cogitative power and a further estimative power (al-quwwa al-wahmiyya). The overall process is compared to the gradual “abstracting and cleansing” of the rind, eventually leaving just the fruit itself (ParaParv II.26 {43}), these fruits being the “substantial differences” between individuals (LongAnima II.65). Nonhuman animals, because they lack a cogitative power entirely, are incapable of moving beyond superficial sensory appearances (LongAnima III.57).