 As noted above, conceptions of health, like conceptions of disease, tend to go beyond the simple condition that one is biologically in some state. In the case of health, one view is that a healthy individual is just someone whose biology works as our theories say it should. This is the counterpart, in theories of health, to simple objectivism about disease. It is defended at length by Hausman (2015) who calls it “functional efficiency”. As with disease, however, most scholars who write about health add further conditions having to do with quality of life. For instance, Hausman argues that what we are concerned to measure is the contribution that functional efficiency makes to overall well-being. We track not health but the things that make health important. Hausman thus distinguishes disease, health and the value of health. Other scholars draw a similar threefold distinction in different ways. One might have a partly evaluative view of health, like a hybrid view of disease, while also thinking that health should be distinguished from a broader concept like well-being or flourishing. Such views dispute the line we find in Boorse and Hausman that a non-evaluative conception of health is viable. Alexandrova (2018), for instance, argues that health is one of many partly normative concepts that give rise to what she calls “mixed claims“ in the social sciences, that relate, empirical variables to normatively derived variables. The definition and measurement of health, she insists, must depend on normative judgments about what it takes to be healthy.