 Unified consciousness of self has been argued to have some very special properties, for example that the reference to oneself as oneself by which one achieves consciousness of oneself as subject must be indexical and cannot make use of ‘identification’ (Castañeda 1966; Shoemaker 1968; Perry 1979). Generalizing the latter notion, it has been claimed that reference to self does not proceed by way of attribution of properties or features to oneself at all (Brook 2001). One argument for this view is that one is or could be conscious of oneself in the same way as the subject of each and every one of one’s conscious experiences. If so, one would not be conscious of oneself as one kind of thing rather than another. As Bennett (1974: 80) once put it, consciousness of self would not be ‘experience-dividing’—statements expressing it would have “no direct implications of the form ‘I shall experience C rather than D’”. And if that is so, one’s consciousness of self might not be gained via being conscious of features of oneself at all