 A common objection to both the claim that certainty is the norm of assertion and the claim that certainty is the norm of practical action is that certainty is scarce (see Unger 1975). If so, this will mean that we rarely make proper assertions or behave in a practically rational way. Defenders of these norms typically respond by offering a contextualist account of certainty (Stanley 2008, p. 54; Beddor 2020a, p. 722). On such a view, the epistemic standards governing attributions of certainty can vary from one context to another. (Variations in conversational context will yield a contextualist view of the sort DeRose 1995 defends for knowledge attributions; variations in practical context will yield a subjective-sensitive or interest-relative view like those Hawthorne 2004 and Stanley 2005 defend with respect to knowledge.) So, what is certain in one context may fail to be in another, if the relevant standards have risen in the latter context. Although some contexts will have relatively stringent standards for what counts as certain, others may have standards that are relatively lax. In the latter contexts, then, attaining certainty shouldn’t be overly challenging.