 Within the ontology of music, the claim for which the score fully, and solely, individuates the work has received the most attention. Separating ontological from evaluative claims, as seen above, Goodman could not state his stance on the matter more clearly: “the most miserable performance without actual mistakes” counts as an instance of a work, “while the most brilliant performance with one wrong note does not” (1976, 186). Of the two claims, that compliance with a score is necessary for a performance to be considered a bona fide instance of a musical work has been received with way more controversy than the one for which full compliance is sufficient to declare a performance a legitimate work instance. The former claim may seem naturally problematic. First of all, it clearly conflicts with actual practice. Of course, as mentioned, Goodman does not aim at reforming ordinary usage. Hence, his view is a form of what in art ontological discussions has become known as “revisionism” (versus “descriptivism”; cf. Dodd 2012) only in the sense that it separates ontological claims from actual artistic and art critical practices, thus allowing for even radical departures from such practices—yet, again, without advocating their modification. Even if all that is granted, to many, including thinkers who are sympathetic to the approach, Goodman’s leaving no wiggle-room, so as to allow the inclusion of performances that defer from the score for just minor mistakes (when not welcome changes), is problematic. Indeed, and further, there seems to be a conceptual problem in making sense of the claim on brilliant and yet wrong performances. For, of course, if a performance is wrong, hence fails to be an instance of a work, how can it then be referred to as “brilliant,” i.e., a brilliant performance, ultimately, of such work (Ridley 2013)? The more general and interesting question, here, may be whether Goodman’s theory has the resources to account for the kinship an incorrect performance of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony has to the Fifth, which other musical pieces (performances of Three Blind Mice to use Goodman’s example) lack. Again, on Goodman’s behalf, dividing, here, might be the only way to conquer. The ontological claim on what individuates an artwork—hence, on what counts as a bona fide instance or performance of a work—is in itself independent of claims, in themselves not even philosophical, on what makes a musical piece recognizably similar (or virtually identical) to another. None of Goodman’s ontological claims need to deny such empirical facts. Further, recognizability, here, may interestingly intersect with symbolization. After all, Goodman is keenly interested in the symbolic relations between works of art (including, e.g., works that count as variations on the same theme; see 1976, 260–261, and Goodman, Elgin 1988, Chap. 4). A performance that aims, say, at an especially intense and driven rendering of a piece and, as a consequence of that, includes, perhaps unavoidably, departures from the prescribed notes, may be considered a (brilliant) rendering of such a piece by virtue of reference to, including exemplication of, the piece as individuated by the original score, although, ontologically, be considered—as it should be, Goodman would insist—an instance of a distinct work.