 If McLear and Gomes are correct much of the contemporary debate concerning Kant’s conception of the content of intuition has presupposed a notion of “content” that Kant rejects. Recall that Conceptualist readings of Kant claim that there is a relevant sense in which (i) intuitions have content; (ii) the content of the intuition is conceptual; (iii) it is this conceptual content that constitutes or determines the cognitive relation of the intuition (as a mental state or act) to a mind-independent object (or in the case of inner sense, to the object that is oneself). It was seen above that (ii) is problematic because intuition plausibly lacks conceptual content in Kant’s sense of the term “content” (Inhalt). With regard to (iii) the standard conception of an intuition’s cognitive relation to an object as requiring judgment is also problematic. This might seem to indicate that Conceptualism is false and Nonconceptualism true. However, if Kant also rejects (i), and so the idea that intuitions have content in the sense required by the Content View, then even Nonconceptualist readings of Kant that construe Kant’s nonconceptualism in terms of an intuition’s having a nonconceptual representational content (e.g., Hanna 2005) are going to be problematic, because that content is still understood in terms of a version of the rejected Content View.