 Prima facie, it is plausible to take such passages to entail that if if I seem to be having an idea of blue, or an idea of a noise, or of warmth, etc., then I am. Indeed, one might take such passages to convey that judgments to this effect “cannot be false” because introspective judgments are infallible. But note the continuation of the second passage: “Thus the only remaining thoughts where I must be on my guard against making a mistake are judgements.” That is, these passages can be read in a very different. Accordingly, a mere seeming “cannot be false” because it is not the kind of mental state that could be false; on Descartes’ view, falsity arises not simply from the mind’s awareness of its ideas, but from judgments – i.e., from acts of will assenting to those items of awareness. Read in this way, these passages anticipate the Fourth Meditation theory of judgment: