 One believes that \(B\) to the extent that one thinks \(B\) more likely than not \(B\); according to Supp, one believes that \(B\) if \(A\) to the extent that one believes that \(B\) under the supposition that \(A\), i.e. to the extent that one thinks \(A \amp B\) more likely than \(A \amp{\sim}B\); and there is no proposition \(X\) such that one must believe \(X\) more likely than \({\sim}X\), just to the extent that one believes \(A \amp B\) more likely than \(A \amp{\sim}B\). Conditional desires appear to be like conditional beliefs: to desire that \(B\) is to prefer \(B\) to \({\sim}B\); to desire that \(B\) if \(A\) is to prefer \(A \amp B\) to \(A \amp{\sim}B\); there is no proposition \(X\) such that one prefers \(X\) to \({\sim}X\) just to the extent that one prefers \(A \amp B\) to \(A \amp{\sim}B\). I have entered a competition and have a very small chance of winning. I express the desire that if I win the prize \((W)\), you tell Fred straight away \((T)\). I prefer \(W \amp T\) to \(W \amp{\sim}T\). I do not necessarily prefer \((W \supset T)\) to \({\sim}(W \supset T)\), i.e. \(({\sim}W\) or \(W \amp T)\) to \(W \amp{\sim}T\). For I also want to win the prize, and much the most likely way for \(({\sim}W\) or \(W \amp T)\) to be true is that I don’t win the prize. Nor is my conditional desire satisfied if I don’t win but in the nearest possible world in which I win, you tell Fred straight away.