 The question is, what alternatives are there? Consider, for example, the proposal to replace moral desert with something like institutional desert, i.e., desert based on what the institution prescribes without appeal to a prior notion of moral desert. According to this proposal, a wrongdoer cannot reasonably complain that institutions that threaten punishment if she does wrong, and then follow through on the threat if she is duly convicted of wrongdoing, treat her unjustly (Quinn 1985; Hill 1999; Finkelstein 2004; Bedau &amp; Kelly 2010 [2019: §4]). Surely there is utility in having such institutions, and a person would normally have a fair chance to avoid punishment—with the rare exception of false convictions—simply by avoiding wrongdoing. Nevertheless, this sort of justification of legal or institutional desert cannot straightforwardly explain the proportionality limit that forms such a core part of the intuitive appeal of retributive justice. To explain why the law may not assign whatever punishments the lawmakers reasonably conclude will produce the best effects overall, the idea of retributive justice may be essential.