 Some commentators take the normativity condition to amount to an agential requirement, one that primarily concerns the applications or uses of expressions. The thought is that meaningful uses of expressions are not arbitrary—they are not unjustified leaps in the dark. An adequate conception of meaning must be able to account for this. This view of the normativity condition claims to shed light on Kripke’s numerous appeals to the metaphor of blindness (1982: 10, 15, 17, 23, 87). Kusch thinks that the requirement of non-blindness is best understood as falling under the purview of semantic normativity (which, contra the normativist interpreters, he does not take to involve categorical obligations), and that it is best understood as indicating that the speaker’s “meaning-constituting mental state guides and instructs” her on how to apply the expression, that the speaker “can refer to this mental state in order to justify her use” of the expression, and that this state 