  But it has been suggested that in addition to the obvious cases, there are interestingly wrong kinds of reason as well (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000a). These are considerations in favor (or against) some attitude that fail to bear on the relevant evaluative judgment of something despite focusing on its properties. To use an example from Berys Gaut (2007: 241): “Imagine a comedy full of hilarious jokes, all of which were so vicious and cruel that audiences watched in stony silence, without being amused at all, since they correctly thought that it would be wrong to feel amusement.” Although viciousness and cruelty are properties of these jokes, they are supposed to make it the case that amusement at them is contrary to virtue. While some philosophers, such as Gaut himself, take the viciousness of a joke always to detract from its humor, others hold that it merely makes appreciating its humor morally problematic (Jacobson 2008). After all, the jokes are stipulated to be hilarious. As McDowell (1987: 161, fn. 18) notes: “Much of what is ordinarily appealed to in ranking objects for amusement is…not obviously relevant to this issue [of comic evaluation]; for instance jokes that one may deplore as being ‘in bad taste’ (usually on moralistic grounds) are not thereby shown not to be extremely funny.” Such interesting WKRs can be taken as reasons of the right kind and conflated with them, thus creating a form of spurious evaluative disagreement, analogous to the spurious evaluative disagreement created when a seemingly moral dispute rests on a factual disagreement.