 It is not a new observation that interlocutors can have collective, or joint, intentions in communication. Joint construction of meaning has been attended to in approaches as different as game theory (Lewis 1979; Parikh 2010), action theory (Searle 1990) and conversation analysis (Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson 1974). But it is only more recently that the joint construction (or co-construction) of meaning has begun to come to the forefront of pragmatics tout court. For example, Arundale’s so-called Conjoint Co-constituting Model of Communication focuses on the interactive construction of implicatures (Arundale 1999, 2010; Haugh 2007, 2008; Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012). Next, Elder and Haugh (2018) propose a model of complex inferential work, continuing for several conversational turns, that can account for mismatches between the expected and the actual inferences, as well as for the fact that speakers may not have precise intentions while issuing an utterance and be open to negotiating meaning. These aspects of communication had often been neglected, or even denied, in post-Gricean research.