 One concern with metacognitive approaches is that they also rely on introspection (Rosenthal 2018; see also Sandberg et al. 2010; Dienes &amp; Seth 2010). If metacognition relies on introspection, does it not accrue all the disadvantages of the latter? One advantage of metacognition is that it allows for psychophysical analysis. There has also been work done on metacognition and its neural basis. Studies with non-human primates and rodents have begun to shed light on neural processing for metacognition (for a review, see Grimaldi, Lau, &amp; Basso 2015; Pouget, Drugowitsch, &amp; Kepecs 2016). From animal studies, one theory is that metacognitive information regarding perception is already present in perceptual areas that guide observational judgments, and these studies implicate parietal cortex (Kiani &amp; Shadlen 2009; Fetsch et al. 2014) or the superior colliculus (Kim &amp; Basso 2008; but see Odegaard et al. 2018). Alternatively, information about confidence might be read out by other structures, say prefrontal cortex (see  section 3.3  on Higher-Order Theory; also the entry on  higher order theories of consciousness).