 Finally, let us return to the second of the objections to special obligations, what Scheffler calls ‘the distributive objection.’ Special obligations are owed to those that we can think of as ‘insiders’: those to whom promises have been made, members of a given family, citizens of a certain nation, etc. If I owe more to my intimates, then, it seems, I am justified in doing more for them than for other persons, even if the latter are more needy than my intimates. This sort of worry is, of course, in part what motivates a consequentialist theory: no person’s well-being is more valuable than that of any other person, and so we are unjustified in failing to be impartial between intimates and strangers. Whereas there may be good consequentialist reasons for acting as though we have special obligations, as we have seen, the consequentialist (and any other defender of the distributive objection) will insist that a commitment to genuinely special obligations gives weight to morally insignificant contingent features of persons.