To date, much of the work on mechanistic explanation has been driven by the goal of providing a descriptively and normatively adequate theory of mechanistic explanation. Some claim there are kinds of explanation that rely very little on a precise understanding of the mechanistic details of a system (Woodward 2014; Weiskopf 2011) or that work fundamentally by removing all such details from one’s model (Batterman and Rice 2014). Resolving such debates will require being very clear about precisely what one expects out of a philosophical theory of scientific explanation and what one takes a scientific explanation to be (Strevens 2008; Craver 2014). Research is required to understand the diverse representational forms that scientists use to represent mechanisms (Burnston et al. forthcoming), and to understand the role of idealization in mechanistic explanation (Levy and Bechtel 2012; Huneman 2010). Further work is also required to limn the boundaries between mechanistic explanation and other putative varieties of explanation and to say, as perspicuously as Hempel or the causal-mechanical theory, what a model must do to count as explanatory and precisely how good explanations are to be distinguished from bad.