 Stevenson replies that this worry is mistaken both in what it expects for ethics and in what it expects for science. In the case of beliefs, too, we don’t first look directly at the facts and then to our beliefs (as we might compare our model with a portrait that we have painted), but rather “accumulate as many reasons as [we] can that bear on the question” (1968, 213). In both science and in ethics, what we worry about, in acknowledging our fallibility, is the possibility of there being reasons for beliefs or attitudes that we haven’t taken into consideration in forming our views. And in both cases, our acknowledgments of fallibility serve the important functions of encouraging further discussion and inquiry. Given the account of fallibility judgments provided by the emotive theory, there is no reason to think that our expressions of fallibility in ethics would have to be in any way half-hearted or capricious, and so our acknowledgments of fallibility in attitude make perfectly good sense (1968, 212–215). Or this is, in any case, Stevenson’s reply to the worry about fallibility, as he construes it.