 At this point, we might want to consider the possibility of overdetermination. Could we not think that some creaturely effects are overdetermined in conservation? That is, might we not grant that God is the total and direct cause of a creature’s modes but also hold that the creature causes its modes as well such that certain effects are causally overdetermined? Moreover, if it is only the modes of the creature that are overdetermined, then it seems as though there is no violation of the central tenet that God is the unique causal source of the esse that creatures have. As we have discussed earlier, divine causal power importantly involves that of keeping the being or esse of the creature in existence, and even the conservationist grants that the role of a conserving cause—that is, the causal power of keeping the being of creatures in existence—is the unique prerogative of God as the causa secundum esse. That is, all parties in this dispute concerning the issue of secondary causation in nature agree, regardless of their views about the reality of creaturely causal powers, that the being or esse of a creature when the creature is conserved is just as dependent on God as when the creature is created ex nihilo. God is the unique creative and conserving cause of any being or esse in this world.