 Even when theorists such as Hume and Rosenthal deny that consciousness is unified, sometimes unity of some sort still seems to be at work in their models. Rosenthal says, for example, “A mental state is conscious just in case it is accompanied by a … thought to the effect that one is in the state in question” (2003: 325, our emphasis). If so, in addition to a HOT being about another psychological state, it is also about oneself, the thing that has the state (‘that one is in the state in question’). Now, this consciousness of oneself is not consciousness of any old object, it is consciousness of oneself, oneself as the bearer of conscious states. But this is consciousness of oneself as, to use Kant’s phrase, the single common subject of one’s experience (1781/7, A350). If so, Rosenthal allows that one kind of unified consciousness exists despite himself. 