 Ultimately, however, there are difficulties in assessing whether Kant’s philosophy of mathematics can be decisive for the debate concerning the dependence of intuition on the intellect. One issue is that the sense in which intuition must be nonconceptual in accounting for mathematical knowledge is not obviously incompatible with claiming that intuitions themselves (including pure intuition; see  §5.6  below) are dependent upon a conceptually guided synthesis (e.g., Land 2014). A second issue is that one might agree that intuitions are in some sense “nonconceptual” while holding that the pure forms of intuition (as discussed in the relevant Metaphysical Expositions in the Transcendental Aesthetic) are themselves generated by a non- or pre-conceptual synthesis by the intellect, or the imagination as a function thereof (e.g., Waxman 1991; Longuenesse 1998: ch. 8; Friedman 2012, 2015, 2019). Such views are forms of Intellectualism even if they reject the claim that intuition, in making synthetic a priori knowledge in mathematics possible, possesses conceptual content or is otherwise conceptually dependent.