  Just like Frege and Russell, Husserl's initial concern was with the foundations of mathematics, and in this shared concern we can see the continued influence of the regressive conception of analysis.  According to Husserl, the aim of ‘eidetic reduction’, as  he called it, was to isolate the ‘essences’ that underlie our various forms of thinking, and to apprehend them by  ‘essential intuition’  (‘Wesenserschauung’). The terminology may be  different, but this resembles Russell's early project to  identify the ‘indefinables’ of philosophical logic, as he described it, and to apprehend them by ‘acquaintance’  (cf. POM, xx). Furthermore, in Husserl's later  discussion of ‘explication’ (cf. EJ,  §§ 22-4   [Quotations]),  we find appreciation of the ‘transformative’ dimension of analysis, which can be fruitfully compared with Carnap's  account of explication (see the supplementary section on   Carnap and Logical Positivism).  Carnap himself describes Husserl's idea here as one of  “the synthesis of identification between a confused,  nonarticulated sense and a subsequently intended distinct,  articulated sense” (1950, 3   [Quotation]).  