 A prominent tradition in epistemology takes belief to be an all-or-nothing matter. According to this view, there are three doxastic attitudes an agent can take toward a sentence or proposition: either she believes \(\alpha\) but not \(\neg \alpha\); she believes \(\neg \alpha\) but not \(\alpha\); or she believes neither \(\alpha\) nor \(\neg \alpha\). In the first case we say simply that she fully believes \(\alpha\); in the second case we say she fully disbelieves \(\alpha\) and in the third we say she suspends judgement with respect to \(\alpha\) and \(\neg \alpha\). Perhaps it is also psychologically possible for an agent to fully believe both \(\alpha\) and \(\neg \alpha\). Since most theorists agree that she ought not, we introduce no special terminology for this case. Any belief representation that allows for finer gradations of belief attitude we will call a graded representation of belief. 