 How best to understand the relevant counterfactual is an intricate problem (cf. Sher 1979, 1981). Let us take note of two issues. First, the legitimacy of people’s claims to compensation arguably can depend upon their actions (and inactions) and the impact these have on their well-being. Of course, these actions (and inactions) can normatively be attributed to people only insofar as they make the decision to act (or not act) under certain conditions, for example, specified in terms of rational and autonomous agency. If so, then the strength of later generations’ claim to compensation—owing to the failure of providing sufficient compensation to the first generation that suffered the initial harm—may wane over time. The more the descendants’ well-being can be attributed to actions or inactions for which they themselves or members of the intermediate generations are responsible, the less the hypothetical state of affairs that would obtain had the direct victims received adequate compensation is relevant for the determination of the claims of the indirect victims (assuming we could know what that state would be) (Sher 1981). This insight is likely to be of little practical significance for the claims to compensation of the first couple of generations of descendants for the direct victims. The harm done to their ancestors is not ancient. Thus, the descendants’ claim to compensation—based on the harm inflicted on them due to the failure of providing adequate compensation for the initial harm—is likely to be strong.