 Rawls’s focus on stability raises another complex issue. The present entry addressed idealizing persons as reasonable or not (2.4.3). Some idealizations attribute reasons to citizens based on what they would reasonably endorse. Stability is also sometimes moralized. It is valuable only when based on “the right reasons.” Rawls resists merely prescriptive stability, however. He does not want to stabilize a society based only on what ought to make it stable. Instead, stability has content apart from its basis in moral reasons. A community can be unstable even if its institutions rest on reasonable grounds. Stability has an ethical ideal and a descriptive ideal of real stability. Public justification then can have both moral and descriptive parts. Publicly justified rules are both real and justified. Gaus has criticized Rawls (1996, 130–6) for his populist conception of stability. He has developed an alternative (2011, 389–408). So, many public justification theorists feel the pull of descriptive and moral stability. But some, like Quong (2011), adopt a purely normative notion.