 Conceiving of gratitude within Strawson’s framework of reactive attitudes fruitfully highlights certain distinctions and parallels that are easily overlooked. For example, it nicely highlights the distinction between gratitude proper (a response to the agency of another person) and appreciation or joy (the objective counterpart to the reactive attitude of gratitude), emphasizing that the former is a response to goodwill (see  section 1  above). It also highlights the fact that gratitude can sometimes, like blame and resentment, play a complex communicative role: just as blame can both 1) recognize a person’s conduct as blameworthy and 2) call for that person to hold herself accountable, gratitude can 1) recognize a person’s conduct as benevolent and 2) call for the benefactor to recognize her benevolent act as worthy of approbation (Macnamara 2013). Treating gratitude within the Strawsonian framework also presents several theoretical challenges and pitfalls. For instance, it may tempt us to overstate the similarities and overlook the asymmetries between gratitude and resentment, several prominent examples of which are pointed out by Justin Coates (2019). In this vein, some philosophers have suggested that the traditional Strawsonian picture of gratitude is problematic insofar as it implies that gratitude, like resentment, is an attitude through which we hold others responsible (Bennett 1980: 42; Wallace 1994: 27). Strawson (1974) suggests that gratitude is a reactive attitude, and that the reactive attitudes have an essential connection to the practice of holding others to normative expectations. Resentment, indignation and guilt, for instance, are proper reactions when someone has fallen short of such expectations. Pride, approval and gratitude, on this view, would be the proper reactions to an exceeded expectation (Martin 2014: 120). Gratitude, however, may not always be called for in response to an exceeded expectation, and sometimes gratitude seems called for when no expectation has been exceeded (see  section 2).  If this is true, then gratitude is fundamentally different from resentment, indignation and guilt, in that gratitude is not conceptually tied to normative expectations. Instead, it may be conceptually tied to another form of interpersonal engagement, like “normative hope” (Martin 2014).