  It is generally agreed that the main argument for reflexive awareness is offered by Dignāga. As we saw above, Dignāga, following  Vasubandhu, adopts a dual-aspect theory of cognition. Ultimately,  the adoption of this theory reflects his commitment to an internalist epistemology, which he develops at length in his Investigation of Cognitive Support. But unlike his Brahmanical opponents  (chiefly the Naiyāyikas and the  Mīmāṃsākas), Dignāga is also committed to  the view that the instruments or sources of knowledge themselves (the pramāṇas) are not different from the ensuing cognitions (pramāṇa-phala). This view is motivated, at least in part, by a radical and essential separation of perception from conception. For Dignāga, as for all Buddhist epistemologists, only perception can provide an empirical foundation and a neutral ground for ascertaining the nature of particulars (svalakṣaṇas).