   In conducting an analysis of mathematics, or indeed, of any other domain of thought, Russell was clear that although the results of analysis can be regarded as logical premises from which the original body of knowledge can in principle be derived, epistemologically speaking, the pre-analyzed beliefs are more fundamental. For example, in mathematics, a belief such as “2 + 2 = 4” is epistemologically more certain, and psychologically easier to understand and accept, than many of the logical premises from which it is derived. Indeed, Russell believed that the results obtained through the process of analysis obtain their epistemic warrant inductively from the evident truth of their logical consequences (see, e.g., TK, 158–59). As Russell put it, “[t]he reason for accepting an axiom, as for accepting any other proposition, is always largely inductive, namely that many propositions which are nearly indubitable can be deduced from it, and that no equally plausible way is known by which these propositions could be true if the axiom were false, and nothing which is plausibly false can be deduced from it” (PM, 59; cf. RMDP, 282). It is perhaps for these reasons that Russell believed that the process of philosophical analysis should always begin with beliefs the truth of which are not in question, i.e., which are “nearly indubitable”. 