 Taking the relationship between traces and retrieved representations into account also complicates the distinction between content invariantism and content variantism. De Brigard applies the distinction to the relationship between the contents of perceptual representations and the contents of traces. It may also be applied to the relationship between the contents of traces and the contents of retrieved representations. But what ultimately matters here is the relationship between the contents of perceptual representations and the contents of retrieved representations. One is a content invariantist with respect to this relationship if one holds that the content of the retrieved representation is the same as the content of the perceptual representation, and one is a content variantist if one holds that the content of the retrieved representation may differ from the content of the perceptual representation. Any view on which both perception and retrieval involve representations—including semidirect representationalism, indirect representationalism, and something like Vosgerau’s view—may be combined with either content invariantism or content variantism.