 In relation to moral testimony in particular, understanding has been invoked to explain why it often seems odd or “fishy” to defer to others about moral issues, such as whether eating meat is morally wrong (for an overview, see Callahan 2020; cf. Riaz 2015). One explanation of the fishiness is that the epistemic good we really want with respect to moral questions is not mere knowledge but rather understanding. It is then said, for reasons tied to those just mentioned, that understanding cannot be easily (if at all) transmitted by testimony—either because it is an ability, and abilities cannot easily be transmitted (Hills 2009, 2013, 2016) or because genuine understanding in moral matters involves a suite of emotional and affective responses that cannot easily be transmitted by testimony (Callahan 2018). Deferring to moral testimony is therefore fishy, it is argued, because it does not get us the epistemic good we really want—moral understanding.