 Reasoning is an inferential process that takes as input some attitudes of a subject, and yields as output the formation or modification of other attitudes. Inferential processes of this kind are involved in the paradigmatic cases in which we exercise our capacities for both theoretical and practical reason. In the practical case, however, there is an interesting question about how exactly to understand the new or modified attitudes that are the outputs of our reasoning about what to do. On a broad understanding of practical reasoning, it is an inferential process through which new intentions are formed or old ones modified. According to this view, we resolve through reasoning the question of what we are going to do (Broome 2013, McHugh and Way 2016). A narrower understanding has it that reasoning should be understood as an inferential process whereby we modify our beliefs, including our normative beliefs about what we ought to do. On this interpretation, practical reasoning, strictly speaking, is an inferential process through which we adjust our beliefs about action, including our beliefs about what we have reason to do; but the adjustments in our intentions that result from such reflection are not themselves conclusions of reasoning (Raz 2011, chap. 7). Agents who have resolved the question of what they ought to do still have a question to settle, about what they are going to do. But proponents of the narrower view would note that this further question is not one that is to be resolved through reasoning: once one has figured out what one ought to do, there is no practical reasoning left to be done. 