 Finally, to interpret Moore as holding that we are a priori justified in accepting fundamental moral principles, one must adopt the modified standard view. And his position nicely illustrates the problem that forces the modification of the standard view. Moore held that what justifies one in believing a fundamental moral principle is that the principle is self-evident and that it appears to be true, i.e., that one has an intuition of it. But this intuition, as an appearance of truth, is clearly a kind of experience, so it seems that one’s justification for an intuitive belief in a fundamental moral principle will not be independent of experience. Hence, to regard this justification as a priori, one must make an exception for this specific kind of experience. While Moore famously denied hedonism, this was because he denied that pleasure is the only good. He accepted that pleasure is good, and this proposition nicely illustrates the tension inherent in the modified standard view of a priori justification, and indeed the standard view, as well as Moore’s a priori moral epistemology. Presumably one must experience pleasure to acquire the concept of pleasure. But then how exactly is it that one is justified in believing that pleasure is good? Is it that once one has the concepts of pleasure and goodness, one believes that pleasure is good simply on the basis of understanding this proposition? Or is it that once one understands this proposition, one has a rational intuition of its truth? Or is it instead that when one experiences pleasure one also experiences its goodness? If something like the latter, the justification for our belief that pleasure is good seems more empirical than a priori.