  It is clear that Rosmini’s view of rights in human society depends to a great extent on his views about the nature of society as such. In fact, his earliest work as a philosopher (1818–1826) was almost totally taken up with a study of society, and was only abandoned when he saw that his ideas would lack a solid foundation unless the problem of knowledge had first been confronted. Eventually (1837), he published his ideas on society in The Philosophy of Politics in which he deals with the principle according to which societies stand or fall, and the end to which societies are directed. . However, despite the universality of the principles examined in this work, their application is restricted to civil society. According to Rosmini, the first rule and criterion for governing any society whatsoever is this: That which constitutes the existence or substance of a society is to be preserved and strengthened even at the cost of neglect to accidental refinement. This is also the first rule of politics. It follows that the greatest errors of government are those by which the government of a society, because of its excessive concern for the society’s accidental progress, loses sight of that which constitutes the substance of the society. The steps taken towards decline, that is, towards the substitution of essential matters by accidental, can be considered on four levels: the periods of founders of societies and basic legislation; of genuine development; of external splendour; of frivolity. Beginning from the first stage, when attention is inevitably fixed on the nature itself of a society, there is a gradual diminution of interest in underlying societal values until weakness, manifested in attention to frivolities and inability to concentrate on weightier matters, undermines the society’s inner cohesion and its ability to withstand external inimical pressures. This would explain the profound truth lying behind Machiavelli’s observation: ‘If a sect or republic is to survive for any length of time, it must return frequently to its beginning’ (quoted in PP, vol. 1, 41)