  Rather than giving a substantive account of well-being (they argue that their account is compatible with several theories of wellbeing such as hedonism, desire-fulfillment accounts, and objective list theories), Savulescu and Kahane simply assert confidence that we will be able to find an agreeable one. They offer simple examples to illustrate their view. Mild asthma, though only a minor impediment to well-being, is nonetheless not acceptable to choose if we have the information and an alternative embryo without the mild asthma. Deafness is clearly a detriment to well-being – at least in this society – and so should not be selected. They are careful to add that their view can appreciate deafness and recognize that it is clearly compatible with a good, even flourishing life. But a life without asthma or deafness, they submit, would clearly be better. Our obligation is to produce the best, not just a life compatible with flourishing. They thus see the need for two steps: finding a reasonable theoretical model of well-being, and then investigating whether a particular trait or condition is, on balance, a detriment to overall well-being on that view.