  The Steadfast View has also been motivated by denying Equal Weight. If your peer’s opinion about \(P\) does not count for as much as your own opinion, then you may not need to make any doxastic conciliation. While most find it implausible that your own opinion can count for more merely because it is your own, a related and more plausible defense comes from appealing to self-trust. Enoch (2010), Foley (2001), Pasnau (2015), Schafer (2015), Wedgwood (2007; 2010), and Zagzebski (2012) have all appealed to self-trust in responding to peer disagreements. Foley emphasizes the essential and ineliminable role of first-personal reasoning. Applied to cases of disagreement, Foley claims, “I am entitled to make what I can of the conflict using the faculties, procedures, and opinions I have confidence in, even if these faculties, procedures, and opinions are the very ones being challenged by others” (2001, 79). Similarly, Wedgwood asserts that it is rational to have a kind of egocentric bias—a fundamental trust in one’s own faculties and mental states. On this account, while peer disagreements have a kind of symmetry from the third-person perspective, neither party occupies that perspective.  Rather, each party to the disagreement has a first-person perspective from which it is rational to privilege itself. Self-trust is fundamental and the trust that one must place in one’s own faculties and states simply cannot be given to another.