 In light of this, the aim of logic for Thomasius is to cultivate the powers of the mind, and the faculty of reason in particular, so that we are capable of discerning what the natural light of the mind reveals to be true or false in any field to which it is applied. This involves not just supplying positive guidance with respect to how truth might be recognized and attained, but also negatively identifying and dispelling prejudices that obscure the natural light. Thomasius’ logic, therefore, is not primarily intended to offer a theory of demonstration (as with scholastic logics) nor an organon for specifically scientific discovery (as with Cartesian logics or, later, with Wolff’s logic). This distinctive aim does not, however, prevent him from weighing in on matters of traditional logical and epistemological import; for instance, he contends that thought has to do with images ultimately derived from the external senses (thereby rejecting innate ideas—Thomasius 1691a: ch. 3, §22), and he outlines a theory of demonstration that focuses on preserving conviction in truths through their connection to incontrovertible first principles.