 Some have pointed out that attempting to capture the phenomenal character of seemings by saying they are “assertive” is potentially misleading given that judgments and beliefs are assertive and seemings are supposed to be non-doxastic experiential states (Smithies 2019, p. 93, McAllister 2018, p. 3082), and something similar might be said of the claim that seemings “recommend” or “assure” us of their truth. Some find the appeal to phenomenal force obscure (Conee 2013 and Tooley 2013), while many others take something like phenomenal force to be an important and familiar, if difficult to describe, feature of mental states (e.g., Pryor 2000, Makie 2013, McGrath 2013, Skene 2013, McAllister 2018, Moretti and McCain 2021). 