  Evidence for such claims is often indirect, and underdetermination is rife. In tests of carcinogenicity, there is a choice of levels of significance, and even optimally done epidemiological studies, or toxicological studies, for instance, at best lend high probability to claims about health risk. In such contexts, there is “inductive risk”, or the risk of error either in over- or under-estimation of actual risk of cancer, and thus, room for values to play a role. Several philosophers of science have weighed in on this matter of when and whether values ought to play a role in such contexts, as well as which values, in particular precautionary judgments that may have import for policy or law (see, e.g., Mayo 1988; Douglas 2000, 2009; Brown 2013; Steel 2007, 2010, 2015; Elliott 2011; Shrader-Frechette 1993, 1994, 2002, 2004; and Mitchell 2009). As one might imagine, there is also a substantive history of debate among epidemiologists, public health scientists, scholars of the law, around when we have good reason to claim that X or Y is carcinogenic, or what counts as good or “good enough” evidence, going back to the dispute between Doll and Hill and their detractors, regarding the causal link between smoking and lung cancer (Hill, 1965). For a compelling history of this literature, see, e.g., Proctor (1995), or more recently, Oreskes, et al. (2011). Problems of underdetermination are no less rife in the context of assessments of “effectiveness” of cancer screening and prevention (see, e.g., Solomon 2015; Stegenga 2017; Plutynski 2017. (For a discussion, see the entry on   philosophy of medicine.)