 A closer reading of the textual evidence suggests that Ockham very much made use of the traditional concept of conscience. Indeed, much of how he employed the concept was consistent with the tradition, especially as articulated by Aquinas. Ockham associates the dictates of practical reason, for example, with judgements of conscience. He is also emphatic in his belief that rational agents have an absolute obligation to follow their consciences, which can be correct or erroneous (Quaestiones variae, q. 8, a. 1, OTh 8: 411). A conscience is correct when it is in accord with right reason; it is erroneous when it is not. Finally, an erroneous conscience, for Ockham, as with Aquinas, is either in a state of vincible—voluntary and therefore culpable—ignorance, or in a state of invincible—or involuntary—ignorance. Where conscience is in a state of vincible ignorance, we must do our best to set it aside. In all these cases Ockham follows the tradition, with one exception: that of the invincibly erroneous conscience (Eardley 2013: 94–98), the state in which the agent finds himself with the correct universal principles, but non-culpably errs with respect to his grasp of the circumstances in which he finds himself.