 The upshot is that, to put a fine point on it, there’s no intentional fallacy, but that a fine point shouldn’t be put on it. As far as everyday discourse is concerned, proper interpretive practice directs us to ignore speakers’ intentions. For considered in and of itself, in the context of a living, fully developed language, a speaker’s intention has vanishingly small weight, noticeable at all, if ever, only in a very small number of circumstances. An additional merit of this view is that it helps to explain the facts that (1) in the vast majority of cases, questions of speaker intention needn’t and don’t arise in interpreting a person’s remarks; (2) hard cases are possible—conventions are of necessity open-ended, somewhat indefinite, and possibly in tension with other conventions; (3) it’s natural, and not entirely unreasonable, to evoke speaker intention to resolve such hard cases; (4) the gnawing feeling that the meaning of an utterance isn’t altogether divorced from the meaning intention of its speaker has some basis; (5) despite (3), proponents of the intentional fallacy can always find ways of resolving hard cases without invoking the intentions of the speaker.