Ānandavardhana argues for a new linguistic capacity, suggestion (dhvani or vyañjanā), which he believes accounts for important phenomena not included within existing theories of secondary meaning. His commentator, Abhinavagupta, elaborates on this theory, though in a way which goes beyond Ānandavardhana’s original text, and he also writes his own independent treatise on the topic. As a result of these two thinkers (authoring the Light on Suggestion and The Eye, respectively), a new debate opens. It centers on whether existing theories of language can account for the subtleties of meaning found in literature, such as courtly poetry, drama, and great epics. Those who agree that suggestion must be accepted discuss what kinds of suggested meaning ought to be adduced; those who reject suggestion generally try to show that for each putative category of suggested meaning, an equivalent explanation can be given, through already-accepted processes such as indication or inferential reasoning. This discussion is not much taken up in philosophical circles in the Classical period. For instance, the Nyāya philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (ca ninth century CE) has a stray remark disparaging suggestion in his Flower Garland of Logic (Nyāyamañjarī), but he does not engage substantively with arguments against it.