 No single one of these experiments can establish the claim that attention is always necessary for consciousness. That claim is a universally quantified one, and is not entailed by any one of its instances. Nor is it clear that what we see in these experiments really are instances in which unattended objects drop out of consciousness altogether. The participants’ ignorance of the gorilla’s appearance, for example, is compatible with it being the case that the presence of the gorilla does make a phenomenal difference to their inattentive experience. To explain those participants’ ignorance we need only say that any phenomenal difference that the unattended gorilla makes is a difference that the participants are unable to use in answering the experimenter’s question about whether anything strange happened in the scene. It may be a phenomenal difference that is epistemically unusable because it is immediately forgotten (see Wolfe, 1998) or it may, alternatively, be a difference that is unusable because it is too unstructured and inchoate to be epistemically mobilizable. In that case the effect of inattention would be inattentional agnosia, rather than inattentional blindness (see Simons, 2000).