 Irigaray herself considers how philosophical and psychoanalytic thinking would be different if we took a re-imagined female or maternal body as its starting point instead of the male body, imagined in phallic terms. Such work has been continued in the writings of, for example, Battersby (1998), Cavarero (1995) and Alison Stone (2011). Battersby explores “what happens to the notion of identity if we treat the embodied female as the norm for models of the self” (1998: 38). Natality challenges a fixed conception of identity, makes evident that self and non-self are not in opposition, and that identity “erupts from the flesh” (1998: 39). For Cavarero the lack of attention paid to the fact that we are born from woman has given western metaphysics a preoccupation with death rather than birth. Stone (2011) explores the maternal body to suggest models of subjectivity of a new kind, immersed in relations of intimacy and dependence. Stone “analyses this form of subjectivity in terms of how the mother typically reproduces with her child her history of bodily relations with her own mother, leading to a distinctive maternal and cyclical form of lived time” (2011: Jacket).