 Not only without relations are qualities nothing, “[u]nfortunately, taken together with them, they are equally unintelligible” (1893: 30 [1897: 25]). The reason is that one cannot account for their distinctiveness if their distinctiveness is based on their being different: “In short, qualities in a relation have turned out as unintelligible as were qualities without one” (1893: 31–32 [1897: 27]). The same holds, according to Bradley, from the side of relations. “They are nothing intelligible, either with or without their qualities” (1893: 32 [1897: 27]). They are nothing intelligible without qualities because “a relation without terms seems mere verbiage” (ibid.). They are nothing intelligible with qualities either for in order for a relation to relate it must stand in a relation to what it relates which makes it into a quality that requires “a new connecting relation” (ibid.) if it is to relate to that quality. Bradley summarizes as the result: 