 In relation to land Grotius argued that all individuals have a natural right to use objects that are held in common, but this right lacks some of the incidents that we associate with ownership proper. There is no right to exclude or to have a thing when it was no longer in one’s possession. He then elaborates a genealogical argument, according to which, in the early period of human existence, we lived in a simpler state where “the great extent of land was sufficient for the use of all occupants, as yet but few in number, without their incommoding each other” (Grotius RWP: II, 2, ii). However, as people became more ambitious and more acquisitive in meeting their needs, they began to interact more extensively with resources, and so came to possess moveable things and to cultivate and occupy immoveable resources, like land. As population increased in number and spread throughout the world, it didn’t make sense to have a common right in objects many miles distant from where people live (Grotius RWP: II, 2, ii). Grotius appealed to the idea of consent, capaciously understood to include the gradual establishment of rules of acquisition, use and transfer. He also argued that possession would be converted to jurisdiction through a public act which allows all to recognize who possesses what, which is important to ensure peaceful possession and reconcile the division of the world with human sociability. 