 In response, several strategies are available to the proponent of public reason. First, the proponent might aim for a Goldilocks solutions; locate a degree of idealization that is substantial enough to avoid the first horn of the dilemma, without being so substantial as to generate the problems associated with the second horn (Vallier 2014, 145–180). Second, proponents of public reason might embrace either horn of the dilemma. On the one hand, they might argue that accounts of public reason cannot be judged by independent moral standards. We have to follow the process of public justification wherever it goes, even if this entails only a minimal set of rules are publicly justifiable. On the other hand, proponents of public reason might embrace the consequences of a great deal of idealization. In particular, if we bear in mind that the category of the “unreasonable” (those excluded from the constituency of public reason) is a technical term with no necessary implications regarding moral and political rights, there may be nothing so counterintuitive about declaring many persons to be unreasonable. Finally, proponents of public reason might resist the assumption, on which the dilemma appears to rest, that one of public reason’s central aims is to mimic the normative role that actual consent can play in legitimating authority. If public reason is not intended to be some pale form of consent, then it’s no longer an objection to point out that substantial idealization might yield conclusions that depart dramatically from what many real persons would accept.