 One important issue relating to moral motivation that feminists have said only a bit about is the internalism/externalism debate (see the entry on  moral motivation).  Generally stated, internalism is the view that there is a logical or necessary connection between two concepts, typically reasons, motives, and obligations. According to one version of internalism, which David Brink calls “agent internalism,” in virtue of the concept of morality, moral obligations (or moral reasons, on a two-step internalism linking obligations, reasons, and motives) necessarily motivate the agent to act morally (see Brink 1986, 28). The agent’s having a reason to act morally, whether or not the agent recognizes it, entails having a motive to act morally. Externalism is the denial of the necessity condition. According to another version of internalism, if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to φ, or she is irrational (Smith, 1994, 61; Korsgaard 1996). Motivation is necessarily present in the rational agent who recognizes a reason to act morally; having a reason to act morally entails having a motivation, at least in the rational agent. The corresponding externalist view is that judging that an act is right either need not motivate the rational agent (weak externalism) or does not motivate the rational agent (strong externalism).