 By the time of Holcot, the analysis of future contingency in terms of a possible counterfactual past, and the identification of such an analysis with a multi-valued logic, had attained the status of an identifiable tradition. Ockham had not adopted the terminology of “indeterminately true or false” and “contingently true or false” to speak of the truth status of future contingent propositions. He had insisted on a two-valued system in which all propositions are determinately true or false. But Holkot departed from him in this. Holkot’s position reflects a view of modality as primary. Necessity and contingency are fundamental, and judgments of truth mean something different in each modal context, rather than truth being primary, and necessity and contingency providing a different valence to otherwise true propositions. The efforts to grapple with the implications of contingency had come a long way (Slotemaker and Witt 2015, 87–94).