 Yet another objection, anticipated by hedonists, holds hedonism to imply the heresy of the separable experience (Budd 1985, 125). It is a commonplace that for any object bearing aesthetic value nothing other than it can have just the particular value it has, excepting the improbable case in which something other than it has just its particular aesthetic character. The worry is that hedonism, given that it regards aesthetic value as instrumental to the value of experience, implies that for any object bearing aesthetic value something wholly other from it, such as a drug, might induce the same experience and so serve up the same value. The hedonist’s usual reply is to assert that aesthetic experience is inseparable from its object, such that for any aesthetic experience, that experience is just the particular experience it is because it has just the particular aesthetic object it has (Levinson 1996, 22–23; Budd 1985, 123–124; S. Davies 1994: 315–16; Stang 2012, 271–272).