Whether the primary word-function results in a particular or universal, philosophers understand its resultant cognition as a basis for unhesitating action. Word meaning is treated in the context of epistemology and the topic of verbal testimony. The two sets of philosophers above, Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, both agree that verbal testimony is a way of knowing. However, for Nyāya philosophers, testimony is authoritative because of the speaker’s characteristics while Mīmāṃsakas emphasize the innately authoritative nature of statements, regardless of speaker, at at least when it comes to Vedic sentences. While they believe that sentences (vākya) are truth-bearers, and not individual words, since sentences are composed of words, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā philosophers focus on the invariable contributions of words to sentences—their primary meanings. This emphasis, we will see, is not shared by everyone, as the grammarian Bhartṛhari rejects any ultimate metaphysical distinction between words and sentences, arguing that such divisions are provisional and arbitrary, even if useful in some contexts.