 (Fârâbî adds that since the existence [wujûd] of something which is a being in the sense of falling under a category is the category or highest genus under which it falls, this will also be its existence as a part of its quiddity, so that being in the sense of falling under a category reduces to being in the sense of having a quiddity, and the initial three senses of being reduce to two, I,89 p.117,5–8 and I,90 p.117,14–19.) By contrast, “everything whose quiddity is indivisible either is a being which does not exist [yakûna mawjûdan lâ yûjadu]”—because the finite verb “exists” is paronymous and would imply that existence belongs to it as an accident—“or else the meaning of its existence and that it exists [maʿna wujûdihi wa-annahu mawjûdun] are one and the same, and that it is an existence [wujûd] and that it is a being [mawjûd] are one and the same meaning”, since its existence [wujûd] is not a further entity explaining the fact that it is a being [mawjûd], but is just that being, which is simple and not explained by any further cause to explain it (I,89 p.117,8–10). This will be true both of each of the categories or highest genera (each category is an undefinable highest genus, and not a composite of being as a genus and some differentia added to being), and of “whatever is not in a subject and is not a subject of anything at all, for it is forever simple in its quiddity” (I,89  p.117,10–13).[27]