 The most serious drawback for Frankfurt’s view, however, is that it is self-contradictory in postulating that, according to Descartes, we cannot make claims about what reality is like absolutely. On Frankfurt’s view, Descartes holds that God is omnipotent in the sense that He can do anything at all and has authority over even the eternal truths. That is to say, Descartes holds that it is true that God is omnipotent in this sense. Descartes then concludes that the eternal truths could have been other than they are and hence are not necessary; they just appear to be necessary to finite human minds. Indeed, to a finite human mind it is obvious that eternal truths like that 2+2=4 are necessary, even though we are mistaken and 2+2=4 is just as contingent as any other truth. Frankfurt then concludes that for Descartes what is maximally obvious to a clear-thinking finite mind is no more than that – it is what is maximally obvious to a finite mind, and it is not a guarantee of actual truth. However, Frankfurt cannot generate the result that for Descartes it is false that the eternal truths are necessary, or the result that eternal truths are as contingent as any other truths, unless he supposes on Descartes’s behalf that it is actually true that God is omnipotent in the sense that he [Frankfurt] specifies. 