It should be emphasized that Bayesian statistics is not the sole user of an epistemic notion of probability. Indeed, a frequentists understanding of probabilities assigned to statistical hypotheses seems nonsensical. But it is perfectly possible to read the probabilities of events, or elements in sample space, as epistemic, quite independently of the statistical method that is being used. As further explained in the next section, several philosophical developments of classical statistics employ epistemic probability, most notably fiducial probability (Fisher 1955 and 1956; see also Seidenfeld 1992 and Zabell 1992), likelihoodism (Hacking 1965, Edwards 1972, Royall 1997), and evidential probability (Kyburg 1961), or connect the procedures of classical statistics to inference and support in some other way. In all these developments, probabilities and functions over sample space are read epistemically, i.e., as expressions of the strength of evidence, the degree of support, or similar.