 Ordinary things, including humans, are compounds of matter and a form. The human form, the soul, has several functions, but it is not a compound of several forms—one like that of inorganic things, one like that of plants, one like that of irrational animals and, finally, an intellect:—it is one and the same formal entity that takes care of the different functions that some of Boethius’ contemporaries assigned to semi-independent parts of the whole soul. On this point he agrees with Thomas Aquinas. He also holds that the intellect is an eternal substance and can be separated from the body, but, he says, then it ceases to be a form and a soul. Hence, in whichever sense somebody’s intellect continues to exist as a substance after the person’s death, it would seem that it ceases to be human. Boethius does not, in his preserved writings, expand on how to understand the continued existence of the human intellect after death, but whatever he thought about this matter, his theory can hardly have made room for a bodily resurrection of human individuals, which, by his own lights, was all right (see  §3.3.2,  below). That had to be left to faith. (For the questions treated in this paragraph, see in particular Wielockx 2009: 50–55. The unity of the human form is strongly defended in the sophisma Omnis homo &amp;c.).