 This was not the first time that the definition of a collective outcome by majority rule resulted in a paradoxical result. Already in 1785, the Marquis de Condorcet discovered what is now known as the Condorcet paradox. Given a set of individual preferences, if we compare each of the alternatives in pairs and apply majority voting, we may obtain an intransitive preference (or cycle) in the collective outcome, of the type that alternative x is preferred to y, y is preferred to z, and z to x, making it impossible to declare an alternative the winner. The similarities between the Condorcet paradox and the judgment aggregation paradox were promptly noticed by Kornhauser and Sager (1986) and List and Pettit (2004). The study of the aggregation of individual preferences into a social preference ordering is the focus of social choice theory (List 2013). The Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow proved the landmark result by showing that the problem which Condorcet stumbled upon is more general and not limited to majority rule. Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Arrow 1951/1963; Morreau 2014) states that, given a finite set of individual preferences over three or more alternatives, there exists no aggregation function that satisfies a few plausible axioms. There are a number of results similar to Arrow’s theorem that demonstrate the “impossibility” of judgment aggregation. The first impossibility theorem of judgment aggregation (List and Pettit 2002) was followed by further generalizations (Pauly and van Hees 2006; Dietrich 2006; Mongin 2008).