 This assessment of the current situation is very rough and speculative, though certainly not implausible. Of course, there are challenges to such a vision of a greater synthesis of the many different takes on thought experiments. For example, some see additional support arising for the argument–view from computer simulations (see Beisbart 2012). Others find that “computational modeling is largely replacing thought experimenting, and the latter will play only a limited role in future practice of science, especially in the sciences of complex nonlinear, dynamical phenomena” (see Chandrasekharan et al. 2012, p. 239). But, there are also proposals such as that by Marcus Schulzke (2014) to think of video games philosophically as executable thought experiments. Whatever the merits of this particular proposal, future explorations of the relationship between computer simulations and thought experiments can build on outcomes of closer inquiries into it (see Behmel 2001, pp. 98–108; Di Paolo et al. 2000; El Skaf and Imbert 2013; Lenhard 2011; Stäudner 1998; Lenhard 2018). The work on the nature of the importance of scientific understanding (see, e.g., Stuart 2018) will inform that exploration as much as the fruits of continuing efforts to clarify the role of the imagination in thought experiments (see, e.g., Meynell 2014; Stuart 2017 and forthcoming (b)).