 How one sees the relationship of consciousness to intentionality will also shape what account one can give of “introspective” self-knowledge. That is, it will bear on our accounts of how we know or have warrant for judgments about our own states of mind. One will likely think the difference between what is conscious and what isn’t makes some difference to what one can know of one’s own mind in a distinctively first-person way. Roughly, what’s conscious would seem to be more directly knowable introspectively. But holding either a separatist or strongly restrictivist view would appear to limit the role consciousness can play in one’s account of self-knowledge. For example, Carruthers’ view of phenomenal consciousness restricts it almost entirely to nonconceptual sensory states and patterns of imagery, and correspondingly limits distinctively first-personal self-knowledge: beyond these confines of consciousness, your epistemic relation to your mental life—to how and what you are thinking, for example—is held to be basically the same as it is to another’s (Carruthers 2011). Alternatively, one might think that your knowledge of your own thoughts is also fundamentally and distinctively first-personal—but in a very different (perhaps “rationalist”) way than knowledge of your own sense experience and imagery: knowing one’s own mind comes in two quite different varieties (Moran 2001; Boyle 2009). However, assuming an inclusive conception of experience, it will be more open to maintain that consciousness accounts in a partly similar way for self-knowledge, regardless of whether it is one’s own sensing or thinking that is known.