 Why are actual subjects of experience supposed to be necessary? Husserl’s answer refers to the notion of full epistemic justification, or full degree of real possibility (with regard to empirical knowledge): “In order for [a thing of nature] to really exist, and thus in order for the assumption that it exists to be reasonable or justified not merely in a restricted but rather in an unrestricted way, i.e. to the fullest extent, there must be an actual ego in whose experiences [...] the being of the thing manifests itself [...].” (Husserliana, vol. XXXVI, pp. 76f). Husserl takes this notion to be applicable (as far as empirical consciousness is concerned) in case of truth only. Thus, in sec. 16 of Formal and Transcendental Logic he first equates “truth” with “genuine knowledge” which is “repeatable by any [...] rational being” (Husserliana, vol. XVII, p. 46) and then makes the (somewhat weaker) claim that truth and such knowledge are “correlated” (Husserliana, vol. XVII, p. 47). This conception of (empirical) truth, which is already to be found in Logical Investigations, has been compared to ideal verificationism (cf. Soldati 1994, p. 119) and to Putnam’s internal realism (cf. Beyer 2020, p. 69).