 According to cognitive imagination theories, imaginative resistance reactions reflect either our inability or unwillingness to take on belief-like imaginings. We might not be able to take on the imaginings because cognitive imaginings are processed by the same system that is in charge of processing similar beliefs (see Nichols 2004, 2006a; Weinberg &amp; Meskin 2006). Or we might not be able to cognitively imagine higher-level claims in the absence of support from lower-level facts because such belief-like imaginings are possible only when they receive adequate lower-level support as ordinary beliefs do (see Walton 1994, 2006; Weatherson 2004; Stear 2015). Or we might be unable or unwilling to take on the belief-like imaginings because we do not want to export them or believe them given a conflicting belief we hold or our lack of trust for the narrator (Gendler 2000, 2006; Matravers 2003; Stock 2017). 