 Against the account, a couple of things can and have been said. First, just as there are important analogies between grounding and causation (of the ordinary, run-of-the mill sort:  §1),  there are disanalogies as well. This is accepted by both friends and foes of the view. The question then is whether those differences are serious enough to undermine the work the analogy does in the account (proponents of the account, not surprisingly don’t think so; for some who do: see, e.g., Bernstein 2016, Janssen 2018, and Roski 2021; see Ylikoski 2013 for a related view). Another argument (due to Janssen 2018) against understanding grounding, and hence metaphysical explanation, in terms of structural equation models points to the representational status of models generally. Deciding whether or not a causal model includes the right variables (both in number and kind) to be able to represent the causal structure of interest sometimes involves reference to what is considered the theory that best captures the actual features of particular (local) causal processes or mechanisms. These are typically theories for which we have a posteriori evidence. Yet in the case of grounding, these sorts of “evidence” for model-aptness are not available. In fact, it is not even enough for the grounding theorist to include all possible scenarios, it seems the grounding theorist must countenance counterpossibles as well. That this is so, is admitted and defended in A. Wilson (2018). For those who think this is unacceptable, however, this is a serious problem with the account.