  As if this weren’t bad enough, Parmenides goes on to derive a further absurdity from the result of combining the proposal that forms are thoughts with the Pie Model conception of partaking. Assuming that thoughts do not have parts, the only way for an object to partake of a thought in accordance with the Pie Model is for the object to get the thought as a whole. So if forms are thoughts, then according to the Pie Model everything is composed of thoughts, and hence all things think. But, Parmenides assumes, this panpsychist thesis is absurd. Parmenides considers a way of avoiding this absurdity that depends on assuming that something’s having a thought as a part does not entail that it is a thinking thing. But, argues Parmenides, the only way to make sense of this proposal is to assume that thoughts are unthinking, an assumption that is also absurd in itself.