 Another possible reading (or additional commitment) of  (CMB)  could require that the fundamentalia must “actively” determine something in order to count among the fundamentalia. So, while (CMB) would seem to be vacuously true in a flat world, the proponent of this more “active” reading might disagree. Driven by the flat world example, one might then think that  (AI)  and  (RI)  are prior to (CMB). But remember that not all philosophers intend to use (CMB) as a definition of fundamentality. (CMB) just expresses a consequence of being fundamental. To address this worry, one might appeal to the fact that (CMB) is compatible with the idea that reality has an irreducibly plural underpinning. That is, we should think of (CMB) as defining the plurality of the fundamental entities. On this view, a flat world—rather than being a world where everything is fundamental—would be a world where nothing is fundamental (or derivative), since nothing is “actively” determining anything. A world which contains no such structure would then turn out to be a world which contains no priority, hence no fundamentality (cf. Wilson 2016: 199).