 But, at the same time, he is critical of those “morality-intoxicated” philosophers who take morality to crowd out the sphere of practical reason entirely—who treat the moral dimension of questions about how we should act “as if it were the sole one” (Auguste Comte, X: 336; Bentham, X: 112). “Practical Reason”—or, as Mill also terms it, “the Art of Life”—has as its proper object, bringing into existence the greatest possible  happiness.[6]  It is divided into three domains: “Morality, Prudence or Policy, and Aesthetics; the Right, the Expedient, and the Beautiful or Noble” (System, VIII: 949; cf. Bentham, X: 112). An action is prudent simply to the extent that it maximizes a person’s individual utility, which can of course be in part a function of others’ utility; an action is beautiful to the extent that it is admirable, and excites aesthetic pleasure in its contemplation (cf. Loizides 2013: 133–40).