 Deterrence theories are typically classified as a subspecies of consequentialist theories of punishment. Consequentialist theories attempt to justify punishment as the best means to achieving certain independently identifiable goods (see, e.g., Bentham 1823; J. Wilson 1983; Walker 1991; see also entry on Legal Punishment). While different consequentialist theories explain the final good or goods at which all our actions aim differently, the most plausible immediate good that a system of punishment can bring about is the reduction of crime. For this reason, consequentialist theories generally suggest that punishment can help to reduce crime by deterring, incapacitating, or reforming potential offenders. Deterrence theories, in particular, hold that punishment can serve the dual purposes of deterring future bad or illegal behavior in the individual (him or herself) who is punished, as well as deter others from similar acts (Ellis 2003, 2005; Hoskins 2011). Such theories are perfectly consistent with moral responsibility skepticism since they are forward-looking and make no appeal to notions of just deserts and blameworthiness.