 In this passage, ideas are cast as modes of thinking that represent (or present or exhibit) objects to the mind—objects such as a man, or Pegasus, or the sky, or an angel, or God (and given what Descartes says in the First Meditation, among the list of things exhibited to the mind by way of its ideas, one could add colors, sounds, feels, and so on (AT VII 20; CSM II 13–14)). On Descartes’ view, an idea is the only kind of (simple) mode that does this. When considering one of the more complex modes of thought—for instance, fearing a lion or affirming the Pythagorean Theorem, where the lion and the theorem are the objects presented—it is the idea that is doing the presenting; it is the vehicle of representation. As Descartes will note in the Fourth Meditation, he takes there to be two basic faculties (capacities or abilities) of the mind: the intellect (or understanding) and the will. Ideas are “produced” by the intellect. So, the idea of the Pythagorean Theorem has its origin in the faculty of the intellect or understanding. The act of affirming, the other component of the more complex thought of affirming this theorem, has its origin in the faculty of the will. Contributions from both faculties, then, give rise to the more complex kinds of thought.