 Here is a thought experiment that may help to decide the dispute between these two camps. For it to be possible for one to give another a command to φ, there must be a linguistic practice available to the addressee in terms of which the speaker can formulate a command. This is not just for the sake of having the means to communicate a command: rather, commands are essentially linguistic items, and cannot be defined except in such terms. Imagine, though, that a certain created rational being, Mary, inhabits a linguistic community in which there is no practice of commanding. One can successfully make assertions to Mary, and among these assertions can be assertions about one’s own psychological states, but one cannot successfully command Mary to do anything. Here is the question: so long as Mary’s linguistic resources are confined to those afforded by this practice, can God impose obligations on her? The defender of (1) will have to say No: for Mary cannot be commanded to do anything. The defender of (2) will have to say Yes: God could have an antecedent intention that Mary perform some action and (to sidestep worries about being under an obligation that one cannot know about) could inform Mary that God has that intention with respect to her conduct.