 In everyday discourse, respect most commonly refers to one of two attitudes or modes of conduct. The first is the kind of respect individuals show (or should show) others because of the latter’s social role or position. For example, children should respect their parents by listening and courtroom spectators should respect the judge. by rising upon her entrance. This is a social form of recognition respect that is, typically, structured by social institutions whose norms are authoritative for participants in the institutions and that need not involve any positive valuing of the object. “Respect” is also commonly used, second, in a valuing sense, to mean thinking highly of someone: having a lot of respect for someone who has overcome adversity or losing all respect for a betrayer. This is evaluative respect. However, philosophical attention to respect has tended to focus on recognition respect that acknowledges or values the object from a moral point of view, which we can call “moral recognition respect.” These discussions tend to relate such respect to the concepts of moral standing or moral worth. Moral standing, or moral considerability, is the idea that certain things matter morally in their own right and so are appropriate objects of direct fundamental moral consideration or concern (Birch 1993; P. Taylor 1986). Alternatively, it is argued that certain things have a distinctive kind of intrinsic moral worth, often called “dignity,” in virtue of which evoke reverential respect or ought to be accorded some valuing form of moral recognition respect. In modern philosophical discussions, humans are universally regarded as the paradigm objects of moral respect. Although some theorists argue that nature (or, all living beings, species, ecosystems) or societies (or, cultures, traditions) also warrant the moral consideration and valuing of moral recognition respect, most philosophical discussion of respect has focused on moral recognition respect for persons.