 The second dimension concerns the view that the mind is, to some degree, made up of modules: psychological mechanisms that are informationally encapsulated, fairly autonomous, automatic, and domain-specific (Fodor 1983; Carruthers 2006; Robbins 2009 [2017]). Modules are informationally encapsulated in the sense that they are insensitive to information present in the mind but not contained within the mechanism itself, leaving their internal processes unaffected by, for example, what the person reflectively believes or prefers. A related property is cognitive impenetrability. This captures the fact that the information and processes inside a module are themselves inaccessible to central systems, such as those involved in introspection or deliberation. Although it is often possible to consciously consider the output of a modular mechanism, the endogenous processes responsible for producing that output will remain opaque to direct introspection (Carruthers 2011).