 The foregoing responses seek to accommodate the claim that the person in the demon world has justified beliefs (call this the “New Evil Demon Claim”). Another response is to reject this claim. One way of motivating the New Evil Demon Claim is by appealing to the premise that the person in the new evil demon scenario has the very same evidence that we do at the actual world. However, some philosophers reject this premise in favor of an externalist conception of evidence. For example, Williamson (2000: ch. 9) suggests that an agent’s evidence is just their knowledge. Since the victim of an evil demon knows less than we do, it follows that they have less evidence than we do. As Schellenberg (2016) emphasizes, this sort of view is compatible with claiming that there is some evidence that both we and the demon victim have in common. It’s just that there is further body of evidence that we possess but the demon victim lacks. This sort of responses raises larger questions about what reliabilists should say about the nature of evidence; for further discussion, see  §4.2  below.