  The problem of reference to dead men was also discussed by logicians. There were three issues. First, there was the problem of words used of a living man and of a corpse. Following Aristotle (Meteorology 389b31), and also Augustine’s On Dialectic, logicians were content to accept that if I point to a corpse and say “This is a man” or “This is Peter,” then ‘man’ and ‘Peter’ are being used equivocally, in some different or extended sense.  Second, there was the problem of establishing a referent for such claims as “Adam was in Paradise” or “Adam is dead.” Here supposition theory came into play, for it allowed reference to past objects as well as present objects, future objects, and possible objects. Third, there was the problem which was the focus of special attention in the second half of the thirteenth century, namely whether the proposition “Caesar is a man” can be true when Caesar is dead. This question had to do in large part with the interpretation of ‘is’, but what concerns us here is the related issue of whether proper names lost their signification when their bearer died. If they do, it seems that any discussion of the past will be senseless. The answers given show the particular importance of the place of the mind in signification.  For instance, Boethius of Dacia wrote “after Socrates’s destruction ‘Socrates’ signifies such a being as Socrates once was…when the real thing has been destroyed, conceiving of that thing is possible for the intellect as it was earlier; for it is possible to think the thing after its destruction. Therefore, it is also possible to signify the thing by means of an utterance as it was earlier.” An opposing view was presented by Roger Bacon, who held that proper names were radically equivocal because they were subject to constant reimposition. The person who cries out “John is dead,” intending to refer either to a thing of the past or to a corpse, has given a new imposition to the word ‘John’, even if his grief prevents him from realizing this.