 Beliefs are a member of the family of doxastic attitudes, together with assumptions, conjectures, convictions, etc. Beliefs are states: they endure in time and, in their dispositional form, they can endure for a very long period of time (your belief, say, that Rome is the capital of Italy lasts for years). Also, they are polar attitudes: a belief is either positive or negative. For instance, the positive belief that the segments are of the same length in the Müller-Lyer illusion has, as its counterpart, the negative belief (or disbelief) that they are of the same length. And that disbelief should be distinguished from the positive belief that they are not equal in length. Finally, beliefs come in degree: your belief that p is the case can be more or less firm. These properties show why beliefs, even when true and justified, ought to be distinguished from “apprehension” (or the act of “coming to know something”, Erkennen, Mulligan 2014: 381). For instance, suppose that you perceive a moving object from afar and that, at some point, you realize that it is a cyclist: in this case, you have come to know a certain fact. Coming to know that p does not endure, it is temporally punctual. Also, coming to know that p does not have a polar opposite. And finally, this act does not come in degree: you either know that p or do not. It also merits attention that, while cognitions can found belief and apprehension, and while apprehension can found beliefs, beliefs can found neither apprehension nor cognitions: this makes apprehension more fundamental than beliefs in our psychological architecture (Reinach 1911a [1989: 118]; von Hildebrand 1950: 5–11; Scheler 1915: 222f). Partly also because of these considerations, some commentators have identified the epistemology developed by early phenomenologists as a precursor of the “knowledge first view” (Mulligan 2014).