 Since these initial critical reactions, feminist philosophers have attempted to rehabilitate autonomy (e.g., Meyers 1987 and 1989; Benson 1990; Friedman 1997 and 2003; Mackenzie &amp; Stoljar 2000a). Some feminist philosophers have argued that articulating the conditions of autonomous choice is vital to attempts to understand gender oppression. The challenge facing feminist theorists is to reconceptualize autonomy in ways that are compatible with the feminist critiques (Mackenzie &amp; Stoljar 2000b, 3–4). “Relational autonomy” is the name that has been given to feminist reconceptualizations of the notion of autonomy. The term “relational” here may serve simply to deny that autonomy requires self-sufficiency. If relationships of care and interdependence are valuable and morally significant (cf. Mackenzie &amp; Stoljar 2000b, 8–10), then any theory of autonomy must be “relational” in the sense that it must acknowledge that autonomy is compatible with the agent standing in and valuing significant family and other social relationships. “Relational” may also deny the metaphysical notion of atomistic personhood, emphasizing instead that persons are socially and historically embedded, not metaphysically isolated, and shaped by factors such as race and class. It is this latter sense of “relational” that will be employed in the following sketch of relational accounts.