 Clifton and Halvorson (2001b) argue, contra Teller, that it is inapproriate to give priority to either the Minkowski or the Rindler perspective. Both are needed for a complete picture. The Minkowski as well as the Rindler representation are true descriptions of the world, namely in terms of objective propensities. Arageorgis, Earman and Ruetsche (2003) argue that Minkowski and Rindler (or Fulling) quantization do not constitute a satisfactory case of physically relevant UIRs. First, there are good reasons to doubt that the Rindler vacuum is a physically realizable state. Second, the authors argue, the unitary inequivalence in question merely stems from the fact that one representation is reducible and the other one irreducible: The restriction of the Minkowski vacuum to a Rindler wedge, i.e. what the Minkowski observer says about the Rindler wedge, leads to a mixed state (a thermodynamic KMS state) and therefore a reducible representation, whereas the Rindler vacuum is a pure state and thus corresponds to an irreducible representation. Therefore, the Unruh effect does not cause distress for the particle interpretation—which the authors see to be fighting a losing battle anyhow—because Rindler quanta are not real and the unitary inequivalence of the representations in question has nothing specific to do with conflicting particle ascriptions.