 So far our focus has been on type causal claims of various kinds. There are also a number of proposals in the literature that provide interventionist treatments of token or actual cause claims (these have to do with the event of \(X\)’s taking on a particular value being an actual cause of \(Y\)’s taking on a particular value, as when it is claimed that Jones’ smoking caused his lung cancer), including those that involve various forms of pre-emption and over-determination (e.g., Halpern and Pearl 2005 a, b; ; Hitchcock 2001a; Woodward 2003; Hitchcock 2007a; Hall 2007; Glymour and Wimberly 2007; Halpern and Hitchcock 2015; Halpern 2016; Weslake forthcoming). Considerations of space preclude detailed description, but one strategy that has been explored is to appeal to what will happen to the effect under combinations of interventions that both affect the cause and that fix certain other variables to specific values. As an illustration, consider a standard case of causal pre-emption: Gunman one shoots \((s_1)\) victim, causing his death \(d\), while gunman two does not shoot but would have shot \((s_2)\) also causing \(d\), if \(s_1\) had not occurred.  If we fix (via an intervention) the behavior of the gunman two at its actual value (he does not shoot), then an independent intervention that alters whether gunman one shoots will alter whether victim dies, thus identifying \(s_1\) as the actual cause of \(d\), despite the absence of counterfactual dependence (of the usual sort) between \(d\) and \(s_1\). Accounts along these lines are able to deal with a number (although admittedly not all; see Hitchcock 2007a for details) of the standard counterexamples to other counterfactual treatments of token causation.