While this three-fold set of conditions is commonly accepted, given different analyses of primary word-meaning, the boundary between primary and secondary meaning will be drawn differently. For instance, Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, who take the primary word-meaning to be a universal, find cases of secondary meaning more pervasive than Nyāya philosophers, for whom word-meaning in the primary sense is more flexible. Given the command, “A cow is to be tied up,” the correct thing to do is to find some single cow to fasten to a post. However, Mīmāṃsakas such as Kumārila argue that the primary meaning of “cow” in the command is cowhood, which cannot be fastened to a post. Thus there is an obstacle to the semantic fit of the sentence. To resolve this difficulty, Kumārila invokes the secondary meaning function known as indication (lakṣaṇā), on which see McCrea 2020. In TV 1.3.10, he argues that indication causes hearers to understand that an individual cow is meant. Hearers understand this from the knowledge that “cow” means cowhood, that individual cows are qualified by cowhood, and yet that the sentence is uttered for the purpose of fulfilling sacrificial aims. Thus the relationship between the primary and secondary meanings here is inherence (a universal inheres in an individual), and the speaker aims to pick out a particular cow.