 Carnap had embraced semantics in 1935 because Tarski had convinced him that designation and truth could be described and discussed in an entirely schematic and objective way, free from any psychological, subjective, or epistemological entanglements or commitments (Carnap 1936). As we have seen, the return to a schematic form of “meaning” led many to regard Logical Syntax as outdated. Carnap himself (e.g., 1942: §39) was careful to deny this, but probably didn’t emphasize enough that the return of “meaning” did not mean a return to an explanatory conception of meaning like Russell’s multiple relation theory of belief or Wittgenstein’s picture theory. This abstract and schematic approach to meaning disturbed many empiricists, giving them the impression that Carnap had no interest in what actually underlay meaning, i.e., wherein the relation between predicate and property (cf. Wilson 1982) actually consists. As B. Russell (1940: 314) complained, for instance, Carnap ignored “certain prior questions to be considered” before “the relation of empirical knowledge to non-linguistic occurrences” could be “properly understood”. But these “prior questions” were just the ones Carnap had put aside in 1931 (Pincock 2007). In this respect there is a seamless continuity in Carnap’s “minimalism” with respect to language; even with the embrace of semantics in 1935, these questions remained absent, and only began to make a rather shadowy reappearance with Carnap’s (1939) addition of pragmatics (the study of language in use) to his conception of language. Semantics abstracts from use and focuses only on the expressions themselves and their designata, while syntax abstracts from designata as well (1939: 3–4; 1942: 9).