 As pointed out in 3.1 above, Arnauld identifies an idea with a perception (in the broad sense of the term characteristic of seventeenth-century philosophy). Kenneth L. Pearce employs the notion of an extrinsic denomination to throw new light on that position. In Pearce’s words, “Arnauld does not intend a straightforward identification of ideas with perceptions, for he draws a semantic distinction between ‘perception’ and ‘idea;’.” “Careful examination of this semantic distinction,” he says, “will help us … achieve a proper understanding of the relationship between perceptions and ideas” (Pearce 2016, p. 380). To that end, he makes use of the notion of an “extrinsic denomination,” a notion which occurs in Arnauld’s Ideas, in the statement, “Being conceived, in regard to the sun that is in the sky, is only an extrinsic denomination, i.e., only a relation to the perception which I have of it” (quoted by Pearce on p. 382). Pearce adds that: