Now one might think the Biological Criterion could easily handle such cases, but it can't.  That's again because it's not in virtue of her being the same human animal that we continue to treat someone in a PVS or in the end stages of dementia, say, as identical to her pre-PVS self.  Rather, it's in virtue of her being the same human animal that we do so.  This is the core of what we may call the Anthropological View, recently advanced and defended by Marya Schechtman (Schechtman 2014).  (Schechtman herself calls this the “person-life view,” but this label is misleading for our purposes, as what she means by “person” isn't Lockean; for instance, she assigns personhood even to fetuses and those in a PVS.  It is preferable, therefore, to stick with the anthropological label for the sake of clarity and distinction from the other views on the table.)