 In philosophy, there tends not to be a distinction between a view being inconsistent and being incoherent. Both are unacceptable. Since dialetheism claims that some inconsistency can be maintained without incoherence, these two concepts must be disentangled. For a start, dialetheism should be distinguished from so-called trivialism, that claim that all sentences are true, and hence all contradictions are true too (Kabay 2010). Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. A trivialist must be a dialetheist, since a trivialist accepts every claim. But since ‘some’ does not imply ‘all’, the converse is not the case: a dialetheist typically claims that only some (and, usually, very specific) sentences are dialetheias, not that all of them are. Trivialism is by all accounts incoherent, and so is minimally what counts as unacceptable even for someone who thinks that some contradictions are true.