 Why have we spared \(A \vDash A\) so far? Well, it seems that in order to break this, an impossible world would simultaneously have to represent that \(A\) and not represent that \(A\). Such a world would itself be an impossible object, one with inconsistent features. Since most impossible worlds theorists maintain that impossible worlds (actually) exist and that actuality is not inconsistent, this position is ruled out. It is available to dialethists and others who allow reality to have inconsistent features. There seems to be no theoretical cost in requiring \(A \vDash A\) to hold at all worlds (impossible or otherwise). Going back to epistemic states, for example, we want to represent inconsistent beliefs, such as someone’s believing both that \(A\) and that \(\neg A\) at the same time; but it would be a mistake to infer that she both believes and does not believe that \(A\).