 It is often argued that there is a whole family of speech acts (“assertives” or “representatives”) that “commit the speaker (to varying degrees) to something’s being the case” (Searle 1979: 12): illocutionary acts such as warning, denying, reminding, arguing, deducing, and so forth. These speech acts differ in the strength of the commitments they generate (e.g., swearing that p involves a stronger commitment than plain assertion), and in the conditions required for their felicitous performance (e.g., warning about p is only appropriate if p involves a risk or danger for the interlocutor). If a speech act involves a stronger commitment than assertion and/or extra felicity conditions, we can say that it is “stronger” than assertion. Searle and Vanderveken (1985) note that whenever you perform the stronger speech act, you have also made an assertion. For example, it would not be incorrect to report  (34)  or  (35)  by saying that the speaker has claimed, asserted, or affirmed that she is a certified forklift operator: