 Firstly, similarity, even restricted to relevant similarities, is too inclusive a concept to account for representation. In many cases neither one of a pair of similar objects represents the other. This point has been brought home in Putnam’s now-classical thought experiment due to Putnam (1981: 1–3). An ant is crawling on a patch of sand and leaves a trace that happens to resemble Winston Churchill. Has the ant produced a picture, a representation, of Churchill? Putnam’s answer is that it didn’t because the ant has never seen Churchill, had no intention to produce an image of him, was not causally connected to Churchill, and so on. Although someone else might see the trace as a depiction of Churchill, the trace itself does not represent Churchill. The fact that the trace is similar to Churchill does not suffice to establish that the trace represents him. And what is true of the trace and Churchill is true of every other pair of similar items: even relevant similarity on its own does not establish representation.