 Third and finally, it has been doubted whether capacitarians have a convincing story about what it takes to have the relevant unexercised cognitive capacities (Levy 2014: 124–5; Moore &amp; Hurd 2011: 160–1). Sher, for instance, relies on a counterfactual account of capacities, according to which saying that someone was capable of noticing, remembering, thinking of something, etc., “is only to say that he would have remembered [noticed, thought of] in an appropriate range of alternative situations” (2009: 114, italics added). The crucial task is of course to define what the appropriate range is, since, intuitively, one doesn’t have a capacity to X if one would only very rarely successfully X in a range of relevant scenarios. For instance, it might be argued that Alessandra can’t be credited with the possession of the relevant cognitive capacity if we assume, plausibly, that she would only very rarely remember the dog in a range of similar situations to the one she actually confronted. If one were to respond that it suffices for attributing the relevant unexercised capacity that there is a counterfactual scenario in which Alessandra does remember the dog, this would objectionably lower the bar for attributing unexercised capacities, with the consequence that many intuitively blameless unwitting wrongdoers would turn out to be blameworthy after all (Levy 2014: 125). (See Vargas 2013 [ch. 7] and Vargas 2018 [Other Internet Resources] for a version of the counterfactual account that attempts to give more precision to the ‘appropriate range’ criterion for attributing unexercised capacities.)