 The second possibility considered by Nicod (“the absence of \(G\) in a case of \(F\,\)”) can be accounted for by Hempelian disconfirmation. For the evidence statement \(e\) that \(a\) is a non-white swan—\(swan(a) \wedge \neg white(a)\)—entails (in fact, is identical to) the \(e\)-development of the hypothesis that there exist non-white swans—\(\exists x(swan(x) \wedge \neg white(x))\)—which in turn is just the negation of \(\forall x(swan(x) \rightarrow white(x))\). So the latter is disconfirmed by the evidence in this case. And finally, \(e = swan(a) \wedge \neg white(a)\) also Hempel-disconfirms that a particular further object \(b\) will be white, if it’s a swan, i.e., \(swan(b) \rightarrow white(b)\), because the negation of the latter, \(swan(b) \wedge \neg white(b)\), is entailed by \(s = \forall x(swan(x) \wedge \neg white(x))\) and \(e \vDash dev_{e}(s)\).