 So far we have pursued the intuitive idea that responsibility requires awareness and reviewed several positions concerning the content and kind of awareness that is in question. We’ll now see that this intuitive idea, coupled with a particular interpretation of the content and kind of the requisite awareness, leads to a regress that threatens to undermine attributions of responsibility quite generally. The following argument is originally due to Zimmerman (1997), who offered slight variations in his 2008 and 2017. Rosen (2004) and Levy (2011: ch. 5) have also advanced versions of it, as well as Ginet (2000), although the latter fails to note its revisionist implications. We’ll call the proponents of this argument ‘volitionists’, and the position they espouse concerning the EC ‘revisionism’. The volitionists’ argument sparked a big debate in which the three central questions concerning the EC mentioned at the outset—about the content, kind, and necessity of awareness—have been thoroughly explored. This section presents a reconstruction of the regress argument and the next one presents the main responses to it.