 But even those contemporary philosophers who grant that our epistemic position with respect to external world propositions is the same in the normal case as in the skeptical scenario can object to the symmetry thesis. For even granting (as we must) that in the skeptical scenario we do not know that we are not in the skeptical scenario, it doesn’t follow that in the ordinary case we do not know that we are not in the skeptical scenario, not even assuming that we have the same evidence in both cases. To begin with, an obvious difference between the normal case and the skeptical scenario is that in the skeptical scenario the proposition in question (that we are not in the skeptical scenario) is false, whereas in the normal case it is true. Given that knowledge requires truth, we can explain why we lack knowledge in the skeptical scenario by appealing to this truth condition on knowledge, rather than to the paucity of our evidence. In other words, our evidence for thinking that we are not in the skeptical scenario, this reply holds, is good enough to know that proposition, if only it were true. Now, the skeptic can then reply that not all skeptical scenarios are such that external worlds propositions are false in them. For instance, if I am right now dreaming that I have hands I do not thereby know that I have hands, even though I do have hands while dreaming. We noted above that the introduction of skeptical hypotheses which do not entail the falsity of external world propositions complicates the CP argument, but let us here bracket that issue. For, in addition to truth, knowledge plausibly requires other non-evidential conditions. In the wake of the Gettier problem, for instance, many philosophers have accepted that besides belief, justification and truth, the right kind of relation between the truth of the proposition and the belief must hold, and arguably it is this that fails in the dreaming scenario, rather than (again) the paucity of our evidence (see entry on  the analysis of knowledge).  Therefore, it can be held that there is an asymmetry between the good case and the skeptical scenario even if we grant that we have the same evidence in both cases.