 Gratitude seems to call not only for the presence of certain affective elements, but the diminution or absence of certain affective elements as well. In particular, one affective disposition thought to be inconsistent or incompatible with gratitude is resentment: an affective disposition to feel pleasure when a benefactor suffers, and displeasure when she fares well (Camenisch 1981: 24; McConnell 1993: 83; Fitzgerald 1998: 131, fn 143; Bruton 2003: 3; Roberts 2004: 69; Costello 2006: 270). Insofar as there was resentment between a benefactor and beneficiary before an act of benevolence, a grateful beneficiary will be inclined to experience less resentment after the fact. A beneficiary who, in response to an act of benevolence, forms proper grateful beliefs but experiences increased resentment toward his benefactor (perhaps out of envy for her virtuously benevolent disposition) is guilty of an especially vicious kind of ingratitude (see  section 3.5).  The fact that a beneficiary could form appropriate grateful beliefs but still instantiate ingratitude (by consequently resenting his benefactor) undermines the claim that grateful beliefs are sufficient for a beneficiary to count as grateful in any meaningful sense—a claim Naar (2019) has tried to argue regarding what he calls “generic gratitude”.