 The previous subsections described attempts to revise the scientific concept of innateness in order to avoid the semantic confusion that has obscured the real issues in nearly a century and a half of controversy about the innate/acquired distinction. To briefly recap, there are three general problems that critics associate with this concept. One problem is that the concept is deeply muddled. Mameli and Bateson (2006) identified as many as 26 distinct ‘i-properties’ associated with innateness. This alone is a source of confusion, potentially leading scientists to misunderstand one another, especially when it comes to communication across different disciplines. A related worry is that researchers will be inclined to draw fallacious inferences, where evidence for the presence of one i-property is taken as sufficient grounds for inferring the existence of other i-properties. The fact that psychologists since C.L. Morgan (1896) have warned against this tendency (see also Dunlap 1919; Bernard 1924; Lehrman 1953; Bateson 1991) indicates that it is a genuine concern among practitioners, and not merely hypothetical (see Section 2). A second recurring complaint is that innateness claims draw scientific attention away from the multifarious and often subtle ways in which environmental factors contribute to development. Again, this objection has a long history that extends back to A.R. Wallace (1892) and has been raised on numerous occasions by psychologists (e.g. Kuo 1921; Lehrman 1970), biologists (e.g. Hinde 1968; Bateson 1991) and philosophers (e.g. Cowie 1998; Griffiths 2002). A third objection is that the scientific concept of innateness is psychologically anchored in an essentialist folk biology that is scientifically untenable.