 Different theories of pretense disagree fundamentally about what it is to pretend (see Liao &amp; Gendler 2011 for an overview). Consequently, they also disagree about the mental states that enable one to pretend. Metarepresentational theories hold that engaging in pretend play requires the innate mental-state concept pretend (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, &amp; Frith 1985; Friedman 2013; Friedman &amp; Leslie 2007; Leslie 1987, 1994). To pretend is to represent one’s own representations under the concept pretend. Behaviorist theories hold that engaging in pretend play requires a process of behaving-as-if (Harris 1994, 2000; Harris &amp; Kavanaugh 1993; Jarrold et al. 1994; Lillard &amp; Flavell 1992; Nichols &amp; Stich 2003; Perner 1991; Rakoczy, Tomasello, &amp; Striano 2004; Stich &amp; Tarzia 2015). Different behaviorist theories explicate behaving-as-if in different ways, but all aim to provide an account of pretense without recourse to the innate mental-state concept pretend.