 Despite Nagel’s wide-ranging analysis, most subsequent philosophical discussion has concentrated on his account of theory reduction (see  Section 3.1),  and whether it serves as an adequate general characterization of reductionism for all areas of scientific  inquiry.[5]  The biological case that has received the most scrutiny is the relationship between classical and molecular genetics, in part because the molecularization of genetics was palpable in this historical period. The manifold difficulties encountered in applying Nagelian theory reduction to genetics (see  Section 4)  encouraged the growth of  philosophy of biology  as an independent disciplinary specialty, in part because these difficulties seemed to fit a recurring pattern—misconstruing biological reasoning with philosophical accounts of science forged on physical science examples (Hüttemann and Love 2011, Love and Hüttemann 2011). Philosophical issues in biology seemed to require distinct analyses that are more sensitive to empirical research in biology (Brigandt 2011). Additionally, the rise of  sociobiology  and  gene-centered  evolutionary explanations provoked anti-reductionist stances among biologists on the basis of social and political commitments (e.g., Levins and Lewontin 1985).