 In metaphysics too, Cook Wilson had first to cope with idealism, thus with the looming threat of Bradley’s regress about relations (Bradley 1897, chaps. II–III). Given a relation R between a and b, a regress arises when one asks what relates the relation to its relata, e.g., what relates a to R (and R to b), and one assumes as an answer that a further relation, say, R*, is needed to tie a and R, a bit like a string that ties two objects together that needs a further string to both of its ends to tie it to the objects. Since a need to explain the tie between a and R* arises by the same token, one needs to introduce yet another relation R**, and so forth. In a brief chapter (SI, 692–695), Cook Wilson argued that the first move here—supposing that R* is needed to tie a to R—is simply ‘unreal’, because there could not be a new relation that relates a relation to one of its terms. Thus, the regress would not be generated. One problem with Cook Wilson’s objections is that they admittedly aim at the regress concerning ‘external relations’ (SI, 692), but they are not fully developed against ‘internal relations’ that Bradley also entertains (Bradley 1897, 17–18). Cook Wilson may not have a full and appropriate answer to Bradley, but he thought he was thus free to entertain the relation of a subject to its attributes.