 Gaṅgeśa’s response is to deny that the putative upādhi, an-agent’s-having-a-perceptible-body, pervades the probandum of the target inference, having-an-agent-as-an-instrumental-cause, and several rounds of objection and response centering on Nyāya’s conception of the Lord as an agent without a body are aired. The Lord’s creative activity requires, like that of any agent, familiarity with the material to be shaped, like the potter’s knowledge of clay and of what to do to make a pot. The Lord’s knowledge is to be conceived as appropriate to the tasks to be undertaken, such as originally combining atoms, and if the Lord, like us, had to have a body to have knowledge, including the knowledge required to combine atoms, then, since bodies are combinations of atoms, there would have to be some earlier Creator to make the necessary combinations—ad infinitum. Simpler than this conception is that of a bodiless Creator whose knowledge is appropriate to the material forming earth and the like but, unlike our knowledge, is not generated. This seems to be the core of Gaṅgeśa’s reasoning, which is complex tarka targeting simplicity and following Vācaspati in particular.