Moreover, as is typical in the application of mathematics, there are also mixed statements, which involve both terms referring to concrete objects and terms referring to abstract ones. The platonist has no trouble providing a unified semantics for such statements either—particularly if mathematical platonism is associated with realism about science. In this case, the platonist can provide a referential semantics throughout. Of course, the platonist about mathematics need not be a realist about science—although it's common to combine platonism and realism in this way. In principle, the platonist could adopt some form of anti-realism about science, such as constructive empiricism (van Fraassen 1980; Bueno 2009). As long as the form of anti-realism regarding science allows for a referential semantics (and many do), the platonist would have no trouble providing a unified semantics for both mathematics and science (Benacerraf 1973).