 Gregory’s position relies on interesting uses of common logical devices and distinctions developed at Paris and Oxford over the preceding century, such as the distinction between the composite and divided senses of propositions, and that between conditional and absolute necessity. The purpose of these distinctions was to offer a way of explaining the contingency of events, but in doing so they assumed the ultimate contingency of everything except God. However, far from being an affirmation of the “radical contingency” of the world, as some historians have claimed, it was in fact the only way for most theologians to save at least some contingency from the threat of absolute logical and divine determinism. In fact, Gregory and others admitted that, assuming God’s knowledge of the future, the future was necessary ex suppositione, although not absolutely, because it is logically possible for immutable God to know otherwise. Peter Auriol, and later Peter de Rivo, Pietro Pomponazzi, and Martin Luther, would consider these efforts feeble and deluded. The three Peters resorted to alternative theories that others considered equally feeble and deluded, whereas Luther simply accepted the conclusion that all attempts to save meaningful contingency governed by human free will were doomed to failure.