  On the first view, the regress arises as follows. Consider a plurality of F things, A, B, and C. By One-over-Many, each of A, B, C is F by virtue of partaking of a form of F-ness (say, F1).  By Self-Predication, F1 is F. Hence A, B, C and F1 are all F, and each is like the others in being F. Now consider the new plurality of F things, A, B, C, and F1. By One-over-Many, each of A, B, C, and F1 is F by virtue of partaking of a form of F-ness (say, F2). By Non-Identity, F2 is numerically distinct from F1.  By Self-Predication, F2 is F. Hence A, B, C, F1, and F2 are all F, and each is like the others in being F. Now consider the new plurality of F things, A, B, C, F1, and F2. By One-over-Many, each of A, B, C, F1, and F2 is F by virtue of partaking of a form of F-ness (say, F3). By Non-Identity, F3 is numerically distinct from both F1 and F2. We therefore have three distinct forms of F-ness. Repetition of the same pattern of reasoning then establishes the existence of an infinite regress of forms of F-ness. This reasoning is homologous to the Third Man argument inasmuch as both arguments rely in the very same way on One-over-Many, Self-Predication, and Non-Identity.