Yet the case is not as clear-cut as it may seem. For one, the peckish researcher is arguably testing two hypotheses in tandem, one about the ability of the tea tasting lady and another about her own peckishness. Together the combined hypotheses have a different likelihood for the actual sample than the simple hypothesis considered by the diligent researcher. The likelihood principle given above dictates that this difference does not affect the evidential impact of the actual sample, but some retain the intuition that it should. Moreover, in some cases this intuition is shared by those who uphold the likelihood principle, namely when the stopping rule depends on the process being recorded in a way not already expressed by the hypotheses at issue (cf. Robbins 1952, Howson and Urbach 2006, p. 365). In terms of our example, if the lady is merely guessing, then it may be more probable that the researcher gets peckish out of sheer boredom, than if the lady performs far below or above chance level. In such a case the act of stopping itself reveals something about the hypotheses at issue, and this should be reflected in the likelihoods of the hypotheses. This would make the evidential impact that the data have on the hypothesis dependent on the stopping rule after all.