 But what about the fact that justice is an intrinsic value? It is not a state of consciousness; it is a relation between states of consciousness (RG 140). If Ross is willing to accept justice as a good, why not accept (the act of) promise keeping, and so on, are good? Ross might insist justice is different from promise keeping, reparation, and gratitude because it is compounded from states of consciousness and that is why it and not these other things are good. However, perhaps the better reply is to stop treating justice as a value. He repeatedly contends it is only states of mind that have value (OJ 118; RG 122, 106–107, 140; FE 259, 270; KT 21), and justice is not a state of mind. He can insist only states of mind have value and block the ideal utilitarian response. Ross is open to characterising justice as a requirement of duty rather than a value (FE 319), and he losses little by not listing it as a value. Further, it might be more acceptable and capture more of what we think about justice to construe justice (in his sense and others) as a  duty.[9]  Many think justice constrains what we are permitted to do to promote general good and Ross sometimes agrees (FE 71).