 But after what manner is it internal then? Hutcheson simply never says in An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, though he wastes no time supplying this deficiency in the immediately subsequent An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections (first published in 1727). An internal sense, he there clarifies, is one whose ideas arise only if certain other ideas have already arisen. Sight is not an internal sense since the arising of the idea of blue, for example, does not depend upon the previous arising of any other idea. But the sense of beauty is internal because the arising of the pleasurable idea of beauty depends “upon the previous Reception and Comparison of various sensible Perceptions … or intellectual ideas, when we find Uniformity … among them” (Hutcheson 1742 [2002, 16]). Another way of putting the point is to say that internal senses depend for their objects on the operation of other powers while external senses do not. Hence in point of internality internal senses are apparently on a par with the powers of reason and memory, for example: unless some other power or powers has operated to place an object before the mind, there is nothing about which to reason, nothing to remember, and nothing internally to sense. This use of “internal” and “external” may be thought misleading, given that it allows both external and internal powers to operate on objects both bodily and intellectual, both from within and from without. Hutcheson came to agree with this criticism apparently. In later works, he replaces “internal” with “reflex” or “subsequent” to refer to powers that depend on others for their objects, and “external” with “direct” or “antecedent” to refer to powers that do not. (Hutcheson 1747, 12–13 and 1744, 48).