 According to Roskies, the “motive-internalist” faces a dilemma: either her internalist thesis is too weak and so is philosophically uninteresting, or it is strong enough to be philosophically interesting but also “demonstrably false” (51). On the first horn of the dilemma, the internalist thesis is too weak and so is philosophically uninteresting. Roskies illustrates this horn of the dilemma with Smith’s view that there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation, except when an agent fails to be practically rational. This thesis requires a specification of what it is to be practically rational, but if being practically rational amounts to desiring to act as one judges best, she contends, then the thesis is trivial. It is not a strong claim about a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation but a mere definitional claim about practical rationality. What’s more, it lacks specificity, because it applies as well to what an agent judges to be nonmorally best. Other version of motive-internalism likewise render the thesis trivial (53–55).