  What should we say about an agent who does this? Returning to the  three features of prima facie or PF judgments which we noted earlier, features (a) and (b) hold even of the special  subclass of PF judgments which are ATC judgments. Such judgments  neither are equivalent to, nor logically imply, any AO judgment. So  the incontinent agent who fails to draw the AO conclusion which  corresponds to his ATC conclusion, and to perform the corresponding  action, is not committing “a simple logical blunder”  (p. 40). Notably, he does not contradict himself. He does,  however, exhibit a defect in rationality, on Davidson’s account. For  feature (c) of PF judgments in general does not hold of the  special subclass of such judgments which are ATC judgments. Drawing  an ATC conclusion in favor of a does give  one sufficient grounds to conclude that a is better sans phrase and, indeed, to do  a. For Davidson proposes that the transition from an ATC  judgment in favor of a to the corresponding AO judgment, and to doing a, is enjoined by a substantive principle of  rationality which he dubs “the principle of continence.”  That principle tells us to “perform the action judged best on  the basis of all available relevant reasons” (p. 41); and  the incontinent agent violates this injunction. The principle of  continence thus substantiates the idea that “what is wrong is  that the incontinent man acts, and judges, irrationally, for this is  surely what we must say of a man who goes against his own best  judgement” (p. 41). He acts irrationally in virtue of  violating this substantive principle, obedience to which is a  necessary condition for rationality.