 It may be quite unintuitive to see memory in this way, and we shall attend to objections shortly. But it is worth noting that the view allows an externalist to resist the memory argument. A compatibilist might first grant that Oscar does not forget strictly speaking—after all, we can assume no neurological impairment has occurred in him. Yet she can add that Oscar loses some memory content regardless, thanks to the slow switch. Even though Oscar does not truly “forget,” he has still lost knowledge by a different route; premise (a) of the memory argument is thus false. (The “shifty” view of memory has waned in recent years; Bernecker 2004; 2010 relinquishes it in favor of something like Burge’s 1998 view, described below. Ludlow 2004 trades it for a view where a memory is a temporally extended object, one which has “stages” that hosts different contents at different times. Yet see Burge 1998 n. 2 for remarks against such a view.)