 Because of the allure of philosophy of language, and partly as a result of the influence of Hart, the use of philosophy of language in philosophy of law became the focus of much jurisprudential thought and debate in the 20th century. One notable example is the work of Jerzy Wróblewski, a Polish legal theorist who developed a ‘semantic conception of a legal norm’ (Wróblewski 1983), and offered a theory of legal language as a sub-type of natural language with multiple ‘fuzzy’ characteristics (Wróblewski 1985). In Italian analytical legal philosophy, the influential theorist Norberto Bobbio began in the 1950s ‘to consider law as a language and legal science as a meta-language’ (Pintore and Jori 1997, 3), in service of a theory of law based on a non-cognitivist moral theory. Two succeeding generations of Italian legal theorists have engaged in ‘dispute on semiotic ground, rather than directly by arguments of general legal philosophical positions’ (Pintore and Jori, 17).