 Finally, it is interesting to note that many philosophers and other intellectuals in Königsberg in the late 1750s and early 1760s seem to have attributed to Hume a view of religion that has significant parallels with Kant’s mature view. Hamann and others saw Hume’s skepticism as necessary for purging religion of its traditional arguments and clearing the way for true religion. One source for this view of Hume is the conclusion of book I of the Treatise, which Hamann translated into German (with some alterations and excisions to hide its origin) and published anonymously in 1771 under the title “Night Thoughts of a Sceptic” (Kuehn 2001: 198–201). Another source is the end of the Dialogues, where Philo says, “To be a philosophical skeptic is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing Christian” (DR 89). This statement is out of line with Philo’s previous assertions and arguments, and it comes as a surprise at this point in the the text. But, some, including Hamman, take Philo’s remark as an expression of Hume’s fideism. Whether the interpretation of Hume is correct, Philo’s remark finds deep resonance in Kant. He is no fideist, but Kant does hold that purging the traditional “proofs” from philosophical theology helps us recognize that morality itself offers a better argument for God’s existence –– one which provides the moral certainty sought by finite rational beings such as ourselves.