  Between Bergmannian skeptical theism and van Inwagenian skeptical theism, there are many degrees. One way in which skeptical theism can be expanded is as follows. In the van Inwagen case, the way skepticism plays into the defense is this.  He says, “Here's a story containing both God and the pattern of evil we observe, and, because we know so little, we don't know it's not true.” But this claim seems weak. Suppose that the probability threshold for knowledge is approximately .95. That puts these stories – the most that is said for which is that it is not the case that we know they are false – at between just greater than zero and perhaps 5%. There is room for this strategy to be expanded to the broad category between this and the truly credible, i.e. between 5% and whatever probability is sufficient for belief, which some say is greater than 50% (Swinburne, 2001) and others think as high as that for knowledge (Williamson 2000). For example, one might have a story one takes very seriously, one might even be somewhat tempted to believe it, which one advocates as what we might call a “serious” possibility to implicate its greater weight over “real” possibilities. van Inwagen is explicit that “real” possibilities do not have to be plausible (1996, 160–1). There might be many such stories which due to some kind of cognitive limitation, we can't support with great strength, not quite enough to believe, but which are very plausible (start at 50/50 and go in either direction – stories that are 30% likely, say, or 60% likely). These kinds of stories place significant limits on how much probability evil drains from theism. These stories would be more like the “just so” stories scientists tell to cover anomalies. They range from the merely not-known-not-to-be-false to the not-quite-believable-but-quite-credible. Our ignorance often puts possibilities in the neighborhood of 50%, and such stories can have significant effects on the final probability of theism.  For if p entails ~q, and p is 50% likely, q has serious problems stemming from our evidence for p, even though we are far from knowing whether p is true or false.