 Although this theory is able to explain how there might be legitimate jurisdictional authority over various chunks of land, it also seems likely that these would be perforated by land held by dissenters, or at the least non-continuous boundaries. This means that the theory is of limited usefulness in justifying the contiguous jurisdictional authority of territorial states, where the writ of the law applies to all those contained within the external boundaries but there is no un-owned or un-consented interior land. In other words, this argument does not justify territorial right as we know it, where territorial rights and especially jurisdictional authority are consistently or evenly applied across the territory. This is not a flaw in itself. We shouldn’t think of normative theory as intent on justifying contemporary practices. However, it is a problem in so far as that does not seem compatible with the performance of functions relating to the exercise of jurisdictional authority, and functionality was also an important element in Locke’s argument for why individuals would seek to create a political order that has authority over them in the first place and can adequately protect their natural rights.