  How does Sextus’ treatment of the criterion contribute to the debate between scholars over the question of whether the Skeptic has any beliefs? The answer is that both Jonathan Barnes and Myles Burnyeat have used Sextus’ discussion of the criterion as a means of securing the conclusion that the Skeptic has no beliefs at all. Recall that in PH I 13, Sextus says there are two meanings of the word dogma, according to the first of which the Skeptic does have dogmata, and according to the second of which, the Skeptic does not have dogmata. All commentators are in agreement that the second kind of dogma is roughly to be understood as a ‘philosophico-scientific’ opinion or tenet (Barnes 1982: 67), even if the parties to the debate have a slightly different understanding of what a ‘philosophico-scientific tenet’ is (Morison 2011: 265–7). The question is what kind of belief (if any kind at all) the first kind of dogma is. According to Barnes and Burnyeat, this first kind of dogma is something like the Skeptic’s acknowledgment of his occurrent state of being appeared to in a certain way. Clearly, according to Barnes and Burnyeat, this leaves a gap in Sextus’ presentation: 