 It has been argued (a) that conservative truth theories are inadequate and (b) that deflationists are committed to conservative truth theories. (See Shapiro 1998 and Ketland 1999; Horsten 1995 provides an earlier version of this argument.) We will explain the arguments for (a) below but to get a flavor of the arguments for (b), consider Shapiro’s rhetorical question: “How thin can the notion of arithmetic truth be, if by invoking it we can learn more about the natural numbers?” Shapiro is surely right to press deflationists on their frequent claims that truth is “thin” or “insubstantial”. It might also be a worry for deflationists if any adequate truth theory allowed us to derive non-logical truths, if they endorse the thesis that truth is merely a “logical property”. On the other hand, deflationists themselves insist that truth is an expressively useful device, and so they cannot be faulted for promoting a theory of truth that allows us to say more about matters not involving truth.