Jan E.F. Houben, in his translation of the “Exposition on (Semantic) Relationship” (Sambandhasamuddeśa) chapter of the Treatise, which treats figurative language extensively, argues that Bhartṛhari does distinguish between primary and secondary meaning, but on pragmatic grounds (Houben 1995). Houben thinks that Bhartṛhari is a linguistic perspectivist, in the sense that his concern is not to argue against any particular philosophical position, but to show the limits of formal analysis itself. On this view, when Bhartṛhari appeals to the analogy with perceptual illusion, it is merely to dismantle the commitment to a certain theory of reference: that which presupposes words refer to external reality. Recently, Tzohar has argued that Bhartṛhari holds a “pan-figurative” account, on which all words “figuratively signify” (Tzohar 2018: 70). On this view, word reference does not require a relationship with external referents. In contrast, all language use is “figurative” in the sense that it does not require correspondence. This interpretation incorporates but goes beyond Houben’s perspectivism, drawing out implications for the limits of language in connecting with reality.