 Scotus’ main concern in his arguments against the intellectualism of Albert’s and Thomas’ ethics is his doctrine of the supremacy and freedom of the human will. He claims that there could be no basis for judging an action right or wrong if the will were not free to choose against the dictates of the intellect. The will, even if it should act ‘with reason’ still is able to choose between opposite courses of action that lie within its power; the intellect however, has no power of self-determination, since it must assent to what it recognizes as true. Only the will acts freely, for it has the power of self-determination. Scotus argues that a theory of practical reason in which judgments about actions were restricted to the type of reasoning characteristic of speculation not only restricts freedom, but also removes any basis for merit or blame. If the moral agent must act in accordance with intellectual deduction, then he can only be praised for his intellectual prowess, and not for his moral goodness.