 In their apparent failure to recognize the difference between moral and merely conventional transgressions, it has been questioned whether so-called psychopaths (those diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder) are appropriately held responsible for their attitudes and actions (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008; Adshead 2013); whether, in seeming to hold normal moral beliefs without being motivated by them, they provide a counterexample to motivational internalism; and whether their observed amygdala dysfunction serves to excuse (Levy 2007). Patients with damage to the ventromedial frontal lobe exhibit symptoms similar to those of the psychopath (Roskies 2003): how similar, is questioned, as is what these patients with “acquired sociopathy” show about whether natural psychopaths should be exempt from responsibility (Kennett &amp; Fine 2008; Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). The deficits apparently exhibited by psychopaths (in empathy, rationality, and volition, for example) have also been explored for the light they throw on the ingredients of the “moral point of view” (Schramme 2014). Treatment approaches critically rest on how these traits are understood (Maibom 2014). For further discussion of psychopathy, see entry on Philosophy of Psychiatry.