 What one should make of the relationship between the single univocal concept of being and the being common to finite and infinite being (as substance and accidents) has proved to be a dividing point for the Scotist tradition. Dumont has described how even the earliest followers of Duns Scotus struggled to bring together the seemingly competing claims of Scotus himself that, on the one hand, (a) there is one univocal concept of being that is common to God and creatures, and, on the other hand, (b) God and creatures are entirely diverse realities with no real commonality. Different Scotists have emphasized one point or the other, with some Scotists taking the position that there is a real community in being between God and creatures in order to preserve the unity of the univocal concept of being, and other Scotists taking the position that the univocal concept of being is purely logical in order to preserve the real diversity between God and creatures. In developing these positions, Scotists distinguish between different orders or kinds of univocity and analogy, including between logical and metaphysical univocity and logical and metaphysical analogy. In the seventeenth century, the great Scotist philosopher Bartolmaeus Mastrius proposed that, in reality, being is analogous to God and creatures, but analogy is not a medium between equivocation and univocation. Instead, every analogy reduces logically to equivocation or to univocation. In the case of being as common to God and creatures, the analogy reduces to univocation. In recent scholarship, Cross has defended a similar interpretation of Scotus’s doctrine, affirming that the semantics of analogy reduce to or depend upon a more fundamental core of univocity.  