Ought Pattern 2 speaks of “oughts” for patterns of intention, rather than for single intentions.  The reason for this is that one’s having an intention to X can affect one’s reason for having an intention to Y.  This can happen in the following way.  First, one’s reason to intend to Y plausibly depends, among other things, on how likely one is to succeed in it.  Second, how likely one is to succeed in it in turn depends on how the future is likely to be.  I am more likely to succeed in drying the laundry if there is no rain.  Third, how the future is likely to be can depend on how some person is likely to act.  I am more likely to succeed in drying the laundry if the children are unlikely to be playing with the hose at the same time.  Fourth, the relevant person may be the agent himself.  I am more likely to succeed in drying the laundry if I am unlikely to be at the same time watering the garden.  Finally, the fact that an agent intends to X can make it more likely that the agent will X in the future.  The fact that I intend to water the garden can make it more likely that I will be watering the garden.  Thus, the fact that an agent intends to X can make it more likely that the agent will not succeed in an intention to Y, and so that the agent has less reason to intend to Y.  Given that one’s intending to X can affect one’s reason to Y and vice versa, the questions, “What reason do I have to intend to Y?  What reason do I have to intend to X?” may be insufficiently determinate.  Better questions may instead be “What reason do I have (to intend to X and to intend to Y)?  What reason do I have (to intend to X and not to intend to Y)?  What reason do I have (not to intend to X and to intend to Y)?  What reason do I have (not to intend to X and not to intend to Y)?”