 Pufendorf’s ethical voluntarism is articulated through the notion of “moral entities” (entia moralia, derived from Weigel), to which most of EJU Book I is devoted (Röd 1969, Kobusch 1996, Lutterbeck 2009, Hunter 2019). Moral entities specify the basic terms, concepts, categories, distinctions, and classifications – in a sense, the metaethical grammar and vocabulary – out of which shared moral discourse is constituted. Conversely, they designate the ontological correlates or referents of this discourse, which are reliant on and yet distinct from the merely physical beings or settings in which they actually inhere. (See Statu #1, 1990, pp. 83–84, 109–10), for the compositional metaphor.) Much of the machinery of moral entities was carried forward from the EJU to DJN where, after being formally elaborated in the early chapters, it clearly structures the whole work.