 On rationality as socially emergent, we may jump ahead here to note that feminist philosophers of science such as Helen Longino and Miriam Solomon have defended scientific rationality as a socially emergent norm (Longino 1990, 2001; Solomon 2001). They thereby address the question of how a naturalistic, science-as-practiced approach to scientific knowledge can nonetheless have normative implications. However, they do not shy away from making policy proposals for changing (improving) scientific practices and their supporting institutions. On their accounts, some other factors, such as political/ideological ones, also socially emerge and can have top-down causal efficacy on individual practitioners but without negating the agency and autonomy of those individuals. Here familiar issues of “methodological individualism” come into play. (See the entries on  feminist epistemology and philosophy of science,  feminist perspectives on science,  feminist social epistemology,  and  feminist political philosophy.)