 In an integrated perspective, preferences, beliefs and reasoning styles can all be subsumed under the game-theoretic notion of a player type. For reasoning about the future course of a game, players will hence often entertain beliefs about each others’ types. A simple example is Backward Induction, where players assume all opponents fully rational throughout. In more complex settings, individual actors may attempt to rationalize various moves observed and derive predictions about their opponents’ future behavior by taking a broader range of options into account. Such players may start by assuming the counter-player to be a simple machine, and only move up to more complex views when required by evidence. In particular, there is no reason to assume uniformity of players or views. Within a given scenario, a diversity of player types might be present (Liu 2009; Liu &amp; Wang 2013; Paul &amp; Ramanujam 2011; Ghosh &amp; Verbrugge 2018; Bergwerff et al. 2014). For some game-theoretic proposals concerning most frequently occurring player types, see Camerer (2003).