 As anticipated, other philosophers contend that Moore’s proof does transmit justification and that its ineffectiveness has a different explanation. An important conception of the architecture of perceptual justification, called dogmatism in Pryor (2000 and 2004), embraces a generalised form of liberalism about perceptual justification. This form of liberalism is opposed to Wright’s conservatism, and claims that in order to have prima facie perceptual justification for believing p from an apparent perception that p, s doesn’t need independent justification for believing the negation of skeptical conjectures or of other non-perceiving hypotheses like Not-Q8. This is so, for the dogmatist, because our experiences give us immediate and prima facie justification for believing their contents. Saying that our perceptual justification is immediate is saying that it does not presuppose—not even in part—justification for anything else. Saying that our justification is prima facie is saying that it can be defeated by additional evidence. Our perceptual justification would be defeated, for example, by evidence that a relevant non-perceiving hypothesis is true or just as probable as its negation. For instance, s’s perceptual justification for believing P8 in Moore’s proof would be defeated by evidence that Not-Q8 is true, or evidence that Q8 and Not-Q8 are equally probable. On this point the dogmatist and Wright do agree. They disagree on whether s’s perceptual justification for P8 requires independent justification for believing or accepting Q8. The dogmatist denies that s needs that independent justification. Thus, according to the dogmatist, Moore’s proof transmits the perceptual justification available for its premise to its  conclusion.[12] 