 Feminists have weighed in on these debates. One main charge made by some feminists is that emotion has been associated historically with women, and for this reason moral philosophers, most of whom have been men, have either ignored it, denigrated it, or included it in moral theory but only as construed in a typically masculine way (Baier, 1987b; Gilligan 1982 and 1987; Held 1987; Tuana 1992, 1–12 and 113–121). Further, since reason has been associated with men, it has been valorized by the same theories. These feminists imply that traditional moral theory is sexist. Kant, by insisting that reason should master desire, denigrates emotion, and by insisting that reason alone can prompt action, ultimately leaves out emotion from morality. Hobbes, by appealing to the motive of self-interest in his description of persons in a State of Nature from which morality must be derived, construes emotion in a typically masculine way, as the motive appropriate for prompting actions with strangers in the so-called public sphere with which men have traditionally been associated (Calhoun 1988). Some of the feminists at issue favor Hume’s view that benevolence or sympathy is necessary for prompting moral action (Baier 1987a). Some of them believe that one step in the direction of ending women’s oppression, a goal they share with all feminists, is to incorporate into our philosophical theories those things that have been heretofore excluded precisely because of their association with women (Baier 1987b; Held, 1987). Such feminists reject both Kant’s view, that reason should master desire, and Hobbes’s view, that self-interest is the motive that prompts moral action, and favor including in moral theory those motives that have traditionally been associated with women. These are motives appropriate to prompting action with intimates in the so-called private sphere to which (at least white, middle class) women have historically been relegated. Foremost among them is the motive of care, exhibited by women who have been charged with the role of raising children. But feminists are not univocal in their views about the role of emotion in moral theory. Other feminists caution that incorporating “feminine” emotions into moral theory risks perpetuating women’s oppression by leaving unchallenged the view that women are essentially emotional beings, and men essentially rational beings (Tronto 1993, 241–247; Tuana 1992, 115–116).