We then ask: Why do so many examples of noninferential J-principles (justification principles) center on perceptual experience...? Because these are cases in which beliefs formed in accordance with these experiences are usually true (Goldman 2009, 335). This perception-based principle is just one among many, such as those we might adduce concerning memory, for example. In all of these cases, Goldman says, “I claim that the underlying appeal of these J-principles is a tacit recognition that they are truth conducive …” (ibid.).  If this is correct, we are tacitly recognizing a close connection between justification and truth conduciveness, which is a central tenet of the reliable process theory of justified belief. That theory thus provides a good explanation of why we regard such J-principles as correct, and this fact amounts to a positive argument in favor of the reliable process theory. That, in turn, is a positive argument in favor of externalism regarding justification.  This line of argument, especially when extended to cases of inferentially justified beliefs, is of special significance, then, because it is independent of arguments that criticize either access internalism or mentalism. Externalism regarding justification, thus, need not be thought of as a perspective one “backs into” once one recognizes the shortcomings of internalist positions, but can be seen to stand on its own.