 In one respect, setting things up in this way is fairly harmless. Views classified as “neo-Lockean” share a common commitment to a psychological criterion of personal identity (whether that criterion requires direct psychological connectedness or merely overlapping chains of psychological continuity) that animalists universally oppose. But ultimately, the simple “animalism vs. neo-Lockeanism” dichotomy is too coarse-grained and exclusionary to provide a particularly informative taxonomy of the contemporary debate. For example, whilst all animalists resist a psychological criterion of persistence, the distinction between organic and somatic animalisms  (section 1.2)  shows us that the source of this resistance varies significantly. And, as the list given above indicates  (section 1.1),  animalism’s answer to the fundamental nature question is opposed by a wide range of views, not all of which are properly classified as neo-Lockean. Moreover, as we shall see in what follows, the “neo-Lockeanism” label both obscures importantly different varieties of neo-Lockeanism and ignores different rationales given for those views.