 Grounding theorists also normally claim that grounding is non-monotonic (Audi 2012a; Guigon 2018; Rosen 2010). Logical entailment is monotonic in the following sense: if one sentence logically entails another, then the first sentence together with any other sentence logically entails the second. Returning to grounding, suppose that \([P],\) \([P'],\) … grounds \([Q]\). And suppose that \([R],\) \([R'],\) … obtain. Grounding is non-monotonic just in case these suppositions are compatible with it not being the case that \([P],\) \([P'],\) … together with \([R],\) \([R'],\) … grounds \([Q]\). To take an example, consider again [Beijing exists] grounds [{Beijing} exists]. Rather than replacing [Beijing exists] in this sentence with something else as we did above, let’s add some other nominalized true sentence to it such as [Gomer is a good dog]. The resulting sentence (i.e., [Beijing exists], [Gomer is a good dog] grounds [{Beijing} exists]) is clearly false, while our original grounding claim (we’re supposing, anyway) is true.