 One advantage of this solution is that it squares with our standard ways of dealing with the lack of artistic value of forgeries. For, despite the fact forgeries may provide more “appreciative experiences worth having” than even the originals may, they may still be objectively less valuable, in the same way that a piece of property may be less valuable, from a realtor’s point of view, than some potential homeowners think it is because they feel a preference to own it (Carroll 2016). Another advantage is that it also squares with everyday kinds of remark about the aesthetic value of some works of art being “merely opinions”, because those comments are explicitly about what we like, and are not really about what is better or worse. Claims that are genuinely about what is better or worse in a work of art rest on considerations of the achievements in them, not on our varying preferences for or against them. Moreover, this solution is better positioned to explain why some works of art do not even aim to provide high-quality aesthetic experiences. And, finally, it results in no contradiction between either finding that a work is good but not to one’s liking or finding that a work is bad but is something one really likes, for example a so-called “guilty pleasure” (Carroll 2016).