 Sanford Goldberg (2010) advances a distinctive view of testimonial belief that abandons the first individualistic assumption. Goldberg invites us to imagine that an informant (A) forms a perceptual belief that p, which they convey via testimony to an audience (B), who then comes to believe p. However, A’s perceptual belief that p was formed in a way that falls just shy of the threshold for justification. Goldberg contends that B’s testimony-based belief that p does not amount to knowledge. What’s more, the reason why it does not amount to knowledge is that it is not justified. After all, the belief could well be true, and free from Gettierization. But if B’s belief that p is not justified, this justificatory failing is not due to any unreliability in B’s mental processing of A’s testimony. Rather, it’s due to the fact that A’s original belief that p was insufficiently justified. Goldberg concludes that the justificatory status of testimonial beliefs depends—in part—on the reliability of the testifier’s cognitive processes.