 In defense of presentism, we might insist that what exists now is sufficient to account for the difference in character of successive present moments. Some of the strategies used in reply to the truth-maker objection are useful here. Consider, e.g., ersatz presentists who posit abstract times that represent how things were, are, and will be, when a given time is present (when it’s “true”) (see Markosian 2004; Bourne 2006; Crisp 2007). Ersatz presentism has the resources to assert that things really change (and so time really passes); there’s a difference between the character of successive moments, given the manifold of ersatz times. How things are at the present time is different from how things were (represented by an abstract time). Indeed, it seems that any version of presentism that posits presently existing entities to address worries about cross-time relations, for instance, or as putative “ontological grounds” for truths about the past, can use such entities to establish that there’s a difference between successive moments without reifying any non-present things.