 Lastly, the third type of response is to accept the experimental results but challenge the claim that they are generalizable. In a controlled replication of Kahneman and Tversky’s lawyer-engineer example (Tversky &amp; Kahneman 1977), for example, a crucial assumption is whether the descriptions of the individuals were drawn at random, which was tested by having subjects draw blindly from an urn (Gigerenzer, Hell, &amp; Blank 1988). Under these conditions, base-rate neglect disappeared. In response to the Linda example (Tversky &amp; Kahneman 1983), rephrasing the example in terms of which alternative is more frequent rather than which alternative is more probable reduces occurrences of the conjunction fallacy among subjects from 77% to 27% (Fiedler 1988). More generally, a majority of people presented with the Linda example appear to interpret ‘probability’ non-mathematically but switch to a mathematical interpretation when asked for frequency judgments (Hertwig &amp; Gigerenzer 1999). Ralph Hertwig and colleagues have since noted a variety of other effects involving probability judgments to diminish or disappear when subjects are permitted to learn the probabilities through sampling, suggesting that people are better adapted to making a decision by experience of the relevant probabilities as opposed to making a decision by their description (Hertwig, Barron et al. 2004).