 Feminist philosophy of science has played an important role in the development of scientific pluralism by broadening its agenda towards debates about the relation between epistemic and social diversity in science. Much of the earlier pluralist literature (e.g., Suppes 1978; Fodor 1974; Kitcher 1984b) argued for the irreducible plurality of theories, methods, or concepts without relating to the social organization of science. While post-positivist philosophies of the relation between science and society emerged in different academic communities (Canguilhem 1977 [1990]; Feyerabend 1978; Freire 1968 [1970]; Habermas 1968 [1972]; Janich, Kambartel, &amp; Mittelstrass 1974; Klimovsky 1975), they remained largely outside of the mainstream of North American philosophy of science. Feminist philosophers of the 1980s (Harding 1988; Haraway 1988; Longino 1987) challenged this mainstream by exploring how diverse theories, methods, or concepts relate to diverse social positions and values of scientists. Standpoint theory (Harding 1992; Wylie 2012) and feminist empiricism (Longino 2002a; Anderson 2004) emerged as two major theoretical strands with lasting influence on scientific pluralism.