 One interesting objection to the non-naturalist’s deployment of intuitionism is that this combination of views makes it a “cosmic coincidence” that our intuitions would reliably track the moral facts (see Bedke 2009).  The force of the worry derives from the fact that non-natural properties, on some construals, are causally inert, whereas our intuitions are psychological states and hence part of the natural world.  It is simply not clear how our intuitions could reliably track such facts, given that they are causally isolated from them.  An obvious contrast is with the way in which our knowledge of the empirical world plausibly does depend on reliability secured through suitable causal connections.  This is obviously related to other worries about the way in which the origins of our moral intuitions does not cohere well with their reliability, given non-naturalism – e.g. worries which focus more on the Darwinian influences on human moral judgment (see also Street 2006; for a reply to such worries, see Vavova forthcoming).  Interestingly, some non-naturalists have tried to give a Darwinian argument for a kind of non-theological pre-established harmony between our moral intuitions and the moral facts (see especially Enoch 2011).