 Mill’s argument for impartiality—that that each person’s happiness is equally desirable—passes quickly, and many have found it problematic. Mill claims that “each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons” (Utilitarianism, X: 234). The argument is, in one sense, merely a reflection of Mill’s individualism (cf. System, VIII: 879). The underlying thought is that the good of a group of people can be no other than the sum of the good of its members. But the argument goes deeper than this plausible claim, relying on stronger premises. The supposition that “equal amounts of happiness are equally desirable, whether felt by the same or by different persons” (Utilitarianism, X: 258n) is in fact contentious. One might well argue, for instance, that to add to the happiness of the already content or the undeserving is not to add to the general good at the same level as adding to the happiness of the discontent or deserving: that the value of happiness is in part determined by where it occurs. Mill does not, however, consider these objections.