 A particular novelty of the thirteenth century, however, was to conceive of the concept itself as a sign. We find this in Lambert of Auxerre: “The signification of a term is the concept of a thing, for which concept of a thing (intellectus rei) a vocal sound is imposed at the will of the one instituting it, for, as Aristotle proposes in Book One of On Interpretation vocal sounds are signs of affections (passiones) that are in a soul, that is, in an intellect, whereas concepts are signs of things” (tr. Maloney, p.  253).[12]  Hence by transitivity, utterances which are signs of concepts which are signs of things are themselves signs of things: “A vocal sign that is a sign of a sign … [will be directly] a sign of the concept and indirectly a sign of the thing” (tr. Maloney, p.  254).[13]  For example, ‘man’ immediately signifies the concept man, but by mediation of the concept it signifies the second substance or form of man. Accordingly, it can supposit for what fall under man, e.g., Plato and Socrates. But it does not signify Plato or Socrates.