 Another fear concerns the power that a group may wield over its own members (e.g. Macdonald 1989; Offe 1998, 131–5; Waldron 1993, 363–6). When we allow that a group has rights, those may be rights that enable it to regiment the lives of its members. Thus, once again, group rights may function to the detriment of those who fall within the group. In one respect, that seems an unnecessarily invidious way of representing the relationship between groups and their members. There is nothing unusual about a group’s organising itself so that it can make decisions collectively, either directly or through appointees, that bind its members severally. That describes the normal state of affairs for tennis clubs, anglers’ associations, political parties, churches and any number of quite unremarkable groups. The right of a group collectively to make decisions that bind its members severally is a simple description of democracy.