 With regard to philosophical anarchism in general, critics have responded in various ways, including the disparate complaints that it is a kind of false or hypocritical radicalism (Gans) and that it is all too genuine a threat to political order (Senor). The latter complaint has both an ontological and a conceptual aspect. That is, the critics argue that philosophical anarchists fail to appreciate the social or embedded nature of human beings, which leads the anarchists to conceive of obligation in excessively individualistic or voluntaristic terms – and that leads, in turn, to their denial of a general obligation to obey the law. The problem, however, is that it is a mistake to think “that political life can be left more or less unchanged by dispensing with some conception of political obligation and adopting the perspective of philosophical anarchism. Unless it can be shown that we can continue to talk intelligibly and credibly of our government or our state, then a root and branch reimagining of our political relations would appear to be a necessary consequence” (Horton 2010, p. 133; emphasis in original). Whether the philosophical anarchists should welcome that consequence, or whether they can find a way to stop short of it, thus becomes a major point of contention.