 Aquinas’s attempt to combine the Avicennian view of emotions as the act of the sensory moving power with Aristotle’s doctrine of movement involves some theoretical problems. In distinguishing between love, desire and pleasure as the incipient movement, actual movement, and rest, Aquinas treats emotions as the behavioral changes that the moving power is supposed to cause rather than the moving acts themselves (Summa theologiae II-1. 25.2; for moving acts, see 30.2; 23.4.) This is confusing, but he apparently assumes that the various acts of the moving power could be distinguished as causing various behavioral movements if these are not prevented. Aquinas also distinguishes between the formal constituent of emotion, which is the generic content of emotional evaluation, and the material constituent, which is the particular intentional object, and further between the movements of the moving power that constitute the form of emotions with respect to their material constituents such as the movements of the heart, the spirits and the humors (Summa theologiae II-1. 28.5, 30.2, 43.1, 44.1). The behavioral movements to which Aristotle’s physics is applied are not mentioned in these contexts. Emotions are essentially psychosomatic in Aquinas, and thus not possible for bodiless beings such as God and angels (Summa theologiae II-1.22.3). 