  We said above that Quine seeks ‘to cast doubt’ on the idea of meaning, and on the use of that idea to explain the distinction between those changes of doctrine which involve a change of meaning and those which do not, and thus also to explain analyticity. One might read (Quine 1951) and get the impression that he is not merely casting doubt but wholly rejecting these ideas. In later works, however, he himself suggests a definition of analyticity. A sentence is analytic for a given native speaker ‘if he learned the truth of the sentence by learning to use one or more of its words’ (Quine, 1991, 270; see also Quine 1974, 78–80.) It is analytic without qualification if it is analytic for all native speakers. By this criterion, some obvious truths, such as ‘Bachelors are unmarried’, will presumably count as analytic. If we think of the set of analytic sentences as closed under logical consequence, as Quine suggests, then, he says, all first-order logical truths ‘would then perhaps qualify as analytic’ (Quine, 1991, 270). Along with this, he comes to accept that certain revisions of belief do involve a change of meaning, presumably in a sufficiently clear sense of meaning (Quine, 1991, 270).