  What are the appearance properties \(AP_{G}\) and \(AP_{R}\)? Since Shoemaker thinks that it is implausible that Invert is systematically misperceiving the colors, it is not surprising that he also thinks that neither Nonvert nor Invert is systematically misperceiving the appearance properties. The tomato, then, has both \(AP_{G}\) and \(AP_{R}\). In Shoemaker 1994b, \(AP_{R}\) is said to be (where \(Q_{R}\) “is the quale that characterizes [Nonvert’s] experience of red things”) the property of “currently producing [a \(Q_{R}\)] experience in someone related to it in a certain way, namely someone viewing it under normal lighting conditions” (254), and similarly for \(AP_{G}\) (see also Shoemaker 1994a). This secures the result that the tomato has \(AP_{R}\) when Nonvert is looking at it; as Shoemaker notes, it implies that the tomato lacks \(AP_{R}\) when it is not being perceived. This account of appearance properties has been substantially revised and developed in Shoemaker’s later work. According to Shoemaker 2002, appearance properties include dispositions to produce certain experiences in certain perceivers (a suggestion that was considered but rejected in Shoemaker 1994a, b). Shoemaker 2006a revises the account further; for discussion, see Egan 2006 and Speaks 2015, ch. 22.