  Religious disagreement is a long-standing problem in philosophy of religion, but in this century there has been great interest in disagreements between theists and atheists as well as the disagreements between followers of various religions. (See Kelly 2005, Christensen 2007, Feldman 2007, Kraft 2007, Feldman and Warfield 2011, Christensen and Lackey 2013) The problem here is obvious: how can sincere intelligent people disagree?  Should not both disputants suspend judgement? To be sure, sometimes those who disagree with you are your intellectual inferiors in some respect. Consider, for instance, someone who insisted that π was precisely 22/7. Those who know of and can follow a proof that π is an irrational number may justifiably dismiss that person as a mathematical ignoramus.  The case of interest, however, is that in which no such inferiority is on public display. This is referred to as a situation of public epistemic parity.  Richard Feldman criticizes the relativist solution to the problem, namely that there is not always a unique reasonable doxastic attitude to a given proposition in a given epistemic situation. He also rejects unargued dismissal, and reaches the conclusion that in situations of epistemic parity disputants should suspend judgement. Many, however, agree with Peter van Inwagen who, in his autobiographical ‘Quam Delicta’ (1994), implies that it is justified for both parties in a dispute to appeal to what is privately available to them. Such private assertions of epistemic superiority are often expressed by saying that someone “just does not get the point”. Typically, not getting the point requires a cognitive blind-spot. It is not that you know there is a point you cannot grasp, which reasonably requires some deference to those who claim to grasp it.  You fail to see there is a point. A somewhat different response to Feldman is that of Forrest (2019), who argues that when the cases for and against a thesis are of different kinds we may sometimes commit to the thesis, because non-comparability is not the same as epistemic parity.