 When the notions of “liking” and “dislike” were moved from the context of sensory experience to that of the will in Scotus, Ockham, and others, they continued to refer to subjectively accessible first-person matters. Their being free acts of a person prevented Scotus from calling them emotions (passions), but some others such as Ockham and Peter Auriol did not stress this difference. In fact, they were treated as some kind of quasi-emotions even in Scotus. Because free will was the center of personality in voluntarist theory, attending to its non-efficacious likings and dislike was an aspect of morally relevant self-awareness; one should not merely control the intentions to act but also non-efficacious likings and dislikes in general. These were directly voluntary and the passions of the will were indirectly so; both had a motivational role in moral behavior. (See the discussion of wrong pleasure in Ordinatio II.42 and the evaluation of the history of the text in Barnwell 2010; Cross 2014).