 Further, since presentism marks a difference between the present, on one hand, and the past and future, on the other, it’s typical (although, again, not universal) to see presentism described as a version of the “A theory” of time (e.g., Craig 2000; Zimmerman 2008; Deasy 2017). Here we understand the “A theory” as something like the union of the following two theses: there are genuine, fundamental or “irreducible” properties of at least some of past, present and future (i.e., so-called “A qualities” or “A properties”); and, time passes (see the entry on   time:  §5). For recent explorations of presentism without the A theory (or, without A qualities), see Rasmussen (2012, 2015) and Correia &amp; Rosenkranz (2015).