 Raimo Tuomela gives a more detailed account of the internal structure of what he calls ‘we-groups,’ which he takes to come in different varieties, depending on the strength of their members’ endorsement of and identification with the respective group’s goals (Tuomela 2007, 2013). He draws an analogy between single agents and collective agents (cf. 2007: 85–86), thus setting the stage for the study of the intentionality specific to group phenomena. Tuomela acknowledges that the most familiar collective agents, organizations and corporations, require a more detailed internal structure that encompasses the relationships between their members, relationships between the members and the respective collective agents, and a number of organizational characteristics. In summary, these features comprise members’ collective acceptance of and collective commitment to the group’s goals, a distinction between operative and non-operative group members, the definition of roles and positions within the group, and the institution (or even codification) of a group-internal authority system (see also French 1984 for a similar view of the structure of groups).—It would not pay out at this point to reiterate the reflections on Tuomela’s individualism and we-mode analysis mentioned above; instead, we do well to focus on his specification of the status of such groups.