 On a different epistemic interpretation, the evidence is sufficient to meet a legal standard of proof, and a finding of legal liability is permissible, only if the factfinder can gain knowledge of the defendant’s liability—to be precise, of the material facts establishing such liability—from the evidence (Duff et al. 2007: 87–91; Pardo 2010; for a critical overview of knowledge-centered accounts, see Gardiner forthcoming). High probability of liability alone will not suffice. On more subtle knowledge-centered theories, the standards of proof are met only if, on the available evidence, there is a sufficiently high probability that the fact finder knows that the defendant is liable (Littlejohn 2020 and 2021; Blome-Tillmann 2017), or only if the fact finder’s credence in the defendant’s liability exceeds the relevant legal threshold and the credence constitutes knowledge (Moss 2018). It is further claimed that the relevant knowledge necessary for a finding of liability cannot be obtained from statistical evidence alone (Littlejohn 2020 and 2021; Blome-Tillmann 2017; Moss 2018 and forthcoming). According to Thomson, this is because the statistical evidence (to take our first example, the 75% ownership of blue buses) is not causally connected with the fact sought to be proved and cannot guarantee the truth of the relevant belief (that the bus which caused the accident was blue) (Thomson 1986). An alternative argument is that knowledge requires the ruling out of all relevant alternatives and, to take our prison scenario, there is no evidence that addresses the possibility that the defendant was the one who refrained from joining in the attack or the possibility that the defendant is less likely to be guilty than an arbitrary prisoner in the yard. (See Moss forthcoming; Moss 2018: 213. Gardiner 2019a adapts the relevant alternatives framework to model legal standards of proof in a non-mathematical way while eschewing a knowledge account of those standards.) Another possible explanation for the failure to know relies on the notion of sensitivity. The belief that the defendant is liable is not sensitive to the truth where it is based on bare statistical evidence; in the bus example, evidence of the market share of buses remain the same whether it is true or not that a blue bus caused the accident (cf. Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher 2012; Enoch and Fisher 2015; Enoch and Spectre 2019 – while suggesting that the lack of knowledge has generally to do with the insensitivity of the belief, the authors deny that knowledge should matter to the imposition of legal liability). Yet another explanation is that it is unsafe to find a person liable on bare statistical evidence. Though safety is sometimes treated as a condition of knowledge (in that knowledge requires a true belief that is safe), one can treat safety as a condition for finding the defendant liable without also taking the position that the finding must be based on knowledge of liability. Safety is commonly understood in terms of whether a belief formed on the same basis would be true in close possible worlds. Roughly, a finding of liability is unsafe where it can easily be wrong in the sense that little in the actual world needs to change for it to be wrong. Whether the requirement of safety can explain why judgment should not entered against the defendant in our two hypothetical cases would depend on whether it can easily happen that the accident-causing bus was red or that the accused is innocent. (See Pritchard 2015 and 2018; Pardo 2018; cf. Gardiner 2020.) While theorizing of standards of proof in epistemic terms has gathered pace in recent years, it is criticised for relying on unrealistic hypotheticals that fail to attend to the actual operation of legal systems and for making impossible epistemological demands (Allen 2020).