  The moral permissibility of research in which an animal’s moral status is enhanced can be evaluated both from the perspective of the research subject and from the perspective of others. From the perspective of the subject, there would seem to be the following main possibilities. First, an enhancement in moral status might always be an unequivocal good. Any deleterious effects an enhancement might have on other factors that are relevant from the subject’s perspective are always outweighed by the enhancement itself. This can be labeled the Millian View, since it echoes Mill’s remark that it is better to be Socrates unsatisfied than a pig satisfied. (If one links moral status to the Kantian good will, it also echoes Kant’s remark that the good will, “regarded in itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclination” (Groundwork, AK 4: 394). 