 More simply, sceptics often suppose that crediting groups with rights entails ascribing groups irreducible moral standing as groups, a standing that the sceptics reject. They do not deny the reality of groups or their significance for human life but insist that, insofar as these give rise to rights, those rights can be adequately conceived as rights held individually by the members of groups. Indeed, that must be so, since only individual humans can possess moral standing and only they therefore can possess moral rights. Michael Hartney (1991), for example, asserts “value-individualism”, the view that “only lives of individual human beings have ultimate value”; collective entities derive whatever value they have from their contribution to the lives of individual human beings (297). Value-individualism, Hartney argues, precludes the possibility of moral group rights (see also Ellis 2005; Kukathis 1991; Narveson 1991).