 For Ibn Rushd, the center of logic and its very purpose is demonstration, for it is the only procedure that leads to certainty in philosophy: it is “the most perfect kind of reflection (naẓar), using the most perfect kind of inference (qiyās)” (Decisive Treatise 3). Accordingly, even in the context of Plato’s Republic, he begins his commentary by announcing that his goal is “to abstract such scientific arguments attributable to Plato as are contained in the Republic by removing from it its dialectical arguments.” However, this does not mean that non-demonstrative arguments are useless. Generally, where one kind of argument is not effective, other kinds of arguments should be used. Dialectic offers a path toward demonstration and to science, which, although it does not obtain certainty, is close to it. Rhetoric contributes, through its paradigms and enthymemes, to reinforcing and promoting demonstrative evidence. The study of sophistical reasoning is useful in assessing the faulty argumentative methods of the theologians (the mutakallimūn, that is, practitioners of kalām).