 Though Rilkean memory clearly bears some relationship to recognized forms of memory, it is, as Rowlands himself acknowledges, not entirely clear whether it ultimately merits the name “memory”. The concept of Rilkean memory does, however, foreground the role of affect, including emotion, in autobiographical remembering. The relationship between memory and emotion is complex and multifaceted (see de Sousa 2017), but two issues in particular stand out. First, we routinely experience emotions when we remember. These emotions may be understood as themselves being memories, namely, memories of past emotions, or they may be understood as being present emotions directed at past events. Debus (2007a) argues for the latter possibility, but, even if she is right, we do presumably sometimes have memories of past emotions. This, in turn, raises the question of whether remembered emotions are themselves emotions, as well as the question of how we are to understand present emotions directed at remembered past emotions.