 Fifth, other critics have suggested that the idea of public reason entails that individuals must doubt, or be skeptical about, their religious or otherwise nonpublic beliefs (Barry 1995, 901–914; McCabe 2000, 316–324; Wall 1998, 91–94; Wenar 1995, 41–48), or at least must accept that their nonpublic beliefs can be disputed by fully competent reasoners (Leland and van Wietmarschen 2012). Some argue this is entailed by the Rawlsian appeal to the burdens of judgment or the fact of reasonable pluralism (see sect. 3). Others claim that only if we were skeptical about the truth of our nonpublic beliefs would it make sense to bracket those beliefs when deliberating about moral and political matters. If skepticism is entailed for either of these reasons, this poses two potential problems. One is that this looks to be the sort of controversial epistemological view that Rawls and others want to avoid in constructing an account of public reason. The other is that many otherwise apparently reasonable and well-motivated people are not skeptical about their religious or nonpublic beliefs, but then does this mean such people cannot endorse the idea of public reason? These worries lead some to conclude that there is no coherent way to explain how reasonable persons can (a) accept something like the fact of reasonable pluralism, (b) believe her own non-public doctrine is true, and (c) be suitably motivated to endorse a principle of public reason (Enoch 2017).