 Enoch claims that there is no real alternative rationale that is not ad hoc or that doesn’t tacitly rely on response-independent realism. For example, appealing to our actual justificatory practice, in which we may privilege responses under full imaginative acquaintance, for example, is not an option, since that practice is itself best explained by the underlying assumption that there are mind-independent moral facts (Enoch 2005: 774). However, Hume might object that the rationale for stepping back from our actual sentimental responses is avoiding “continual contradictions in society and conversation” and other practical problems  (see Section 2.2).  If this is right, our actual justificatory practice and the privileged place it gives to reflectively corrected responses thus has an explanation and rationale that do not presuppose mind-independent evaluative facts. In this vein, Kauppinen (2014b, 580) holds that “An evaluative perspective is ideal or optimal when adopting it most reliably avoids the practical problems caused by the uncorrected attitudes”. (See also Sobel 2009.)