 Leaving aside the possibility of exceptionalism, the Razian theory faces the challenge of how to integrate a proper respect for state sovereignty. To what extent, for example, does a due regard for sovereignty entail that there are certain matters that fall within the jurisdiction of states and regarding which international law cannot invalidate or override their decisions? The question is broadly analogous to that which arises in the domestic context: to what extent is the authority of the state limited by a due respect for the autonomy of its citizens, such that the state should not seek to impose obligations with respect to certain matters, e.g., selection of occupation or spouse, even if its directives would lead to greater compliance by citizens with reasons applicable to them? Of course, the state is an institution, one lacking the basic moral status of individual human beings, but the question arises because of the value of collective identity and self-determination that is protected by sovereignty. In this connection, Raz has controversially proposed a mutually exclusive relationship between state sovereignty and a sound international human rights law (Raz 2010). Over and above state sovereignty as a constraint on the legitimacy of international law, there is a more general question of how such authority is constrained by a proper principle of subsidiarity that favours the resolution of political questions at the most local level possible (Føllesdal 1998; Finnis 2016). Finally, a special challenge arises regarding international law’s claim to legitimate authority in the absence of its creation through democratic means, especially in relation to states that are themselves democracies (see section 4.5).