 In this entry, I will employ elements of both approaches. Like Khawaja, I take existentialism to be a usefully broad term of intellectual history that can illuminate the work of philosophers and others who preceded the rise of the “movement” or rejected the label. In this sense, “existentialism” picks out a distinctive cluster of philosophical problems and a relatively distinct current of twentieth- and now twenty-first-century philosophical inquiry, one that has had significant impact on fields such as theology (through Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, Karl Barth, and others) and psychology (from Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss to Otto Rank, R. D. Laing, and Viktor Frankl). On the other hand, I do not think that the “tradition” of existential thought should be approached exclusively in terms of the (very real) struggle with religion that gives some of the works of existential philosophy a religious “feel” (but see Westphal 2012). I agree with Webber that there is a core of philosophical (categorial) content to existential thought that can be understood independently of the sort of religious “rhetoric” (Khawaja 2016: 16) characteristic of many of the classics of existentialism. Unlike Webber, however, I think that this categorial content is quite widely shared—beyond Sartre, Beauvoir, and Fanon—and must be understood as grounded in the phenomenological approach that so excited Sartre (see Crowell 2012b). The phenomenological approach gave philosophical shape to the basic existential insight that thinking about human existence requires new categories not found in the conceptual repertoire of ancient or modern thought; human beings can be understood neither as substances with fixed properties, nor as subjects interacting with a world of objects.