 One way of developing the case would involve a sufficiently large number of cases in which one has an intuition-independent justification for thinking \({\sim}p\) while intuition testifies that p (intrapersonal intersource inconsistency). Another would involve a sufficiently large number of cases in which one has the intuition that p and either oneself or some other person has the intuition that \({\sim}p\). In the intrapersonal case, this might involve our finding a given proposition intuitive and, at some other time, our finding its explicit negation intuitive (intrapersonal intrasource inconsistency). More likely is a less direct inconsistency, as when we have two intuitions which, though not the explicit propositional negations of each other, can be shown to contradict with the aid of some other justified principle. Many contemporary skeptics, however, wish to appeal to interpersonal disagreement as justification for their skepticism. Here we should distinguish between cases in which some other person has intuition-independent justification for believing the negation of the content of one of one’s own intuitions (interpersonal intersource inconsistency) and cases in which the other person has an intuition with a content contradicting one’s own intuition or, perhaps, fails to have any intuition regarding p (interpersonal intrasource inconsistency).