 Zalta endorses the claim that some objects are non-actual possible objects, so he appears to side with possibilists. But he defines a non-actual possible object as an object which could have a spatial location but does not (Zalta 1988: 67). So the claim means for Zalta that some objects could have a spatial location but do not. This is compatible with actualism, provided that all such objects are actual in the sense of actually existing (Linsky &amp; Zalta 1994, also Williamson 1998, 2002, 2013; it is noteworthy that Timothy Williamson independently argues for what he calls necessitism, which says [in a nutshell] that every possible object is a necessary object). If we understand Zalta’s theory this way, we have the following actualist picture: all objects are actual and existing, some objects are necessarily non-spatial, and other objects are possibly spatial and possibly non-spatial. (For an alternative interpretation of Zalta’s formal theory, according to which some objects do not exist, see Zalta 1983: 50–52, 1988: 102–04, Linsky &amp; Zalta 1996: note 8.) Among the latter type of objects are those which are actually spatial but possibly not, like you and me, and those which are possibly spatial but actually not, like the golden mountain in the appropriate sense. The distinction between the golden mountain in this (exemplification) sense and the golden mountain in the other (encoding) sense is key to overcoming some objections (Linsky &amp; Zalta 1996). See Bennett 2006 for the claim that the Linsky-Zalta view is not actualist, and Nelson &amp; Zalta 2009 for a response. Hayaki 2006 critiques both Linsky-Zalta and Williamson.