 On other hand, the formal fundamental language might be taken to be essential for overcoming shortcomings or inherent features of our natural language as the one alluded to above. If the subject-predicate structure of our natural languages brings with it a object-property way of representing the world, and if that way of representing the world is unsuitable for representing how reality is in itself, then a completely different language might be required, and not simply be useful, to describe fundamental reality. Alternatively, if the formal language is needed to articulate real existence, as we might be tempted to put it, something which we can’t express in English or other natural languages, then, too, it would be essential for the project of ontology. But if the formal language is needed to do something that our natural language can’t do, then what do the sentences in the formal language mean? Since they do something our natural language can’t do, we won’t be able to translate their meanings into our natural language. If we could then our natural language would be able to say what these sentences say, which by assumption it can’t do. But then what do sentences in the fundamental language mean? If we can’t say or think what these sentences say, what is the point for us to use it to try to describe reality as it is in itself with them? Can we even make sense of the project of finding out which sentences in such a language are correct? And why should we care, given that we can’t understand what these sentences mean?