 While a critic might resist the rationale for accepting Boghossian’s absolutist position by challenging his critical assessments of the viability of the constructivist and relativist positions that he associates with “Equal Validity” (see, e.g., MacFarlane 2008a; Wright 2008; Sosa 2008; Carter 2016: Ch. 6; Kusch 2009), a separate space for critical engagement concerns Boghossian’s characterization of the metaepistemological option space. For example, even if Equal Validity is false, Boghossian’s strong version of absolutism described should be accepted only if it also compares favorably with forms of anti-realism that (unlike constructivism and relativism) reject epistemic facts wholesale (e.g., metaepistemic error theory—see  §1.2),  as well as, importantly, with weaker forms of metaepistemological realism that do not sign up to Boghossian’s full package. On this latter point, for example, it has been argued that one can agree with Boghossian in rejecting constructivism and relativism (as well as other forms of anti-realism) while subscribing to a version of metaepistemological realism that maintains that epistemic principles are objective and knowable, but relative to worlds, and thus, that there is not a unique set of epistemic principles applicable across all worlds (for discussion of this kind of view, see Carter &amp; McKenna 2021).