  This interpretation has been challenged in a number of ways. One argument against the view is that in the opening passages of TTP 17 Spinoza, in contrast to Hobbes, claims that individuals always retain a “considerable part” of their own natural right; in other words, human beings are never fully integrated into the super-individual, or state (Den Uyl 1983, 70). The problem with this objection is that there is no reason to suppose that all individuals are characterized by complete integration of parts. Matheron, for instance, describes the state as complex individual whose parts are only integrated to a limited degree (1969, 58). Balibar, too, claims that the “autonomy” of individuals is maintained even when one is a part of a larger collective whole (1997, 21). It is perfectly consistent to recognize the discrete individuality of humans while allowing that, under certain conditions of association, individuals can simultaneously be members of larger units. One can be both a collectivist and an individualist. The real anti-individualists are the idealists, who read Spinoza as maintaining that “human individuality is illusory and untrue” (Joachim 1901, 130).