 The Acquisition Challenge is a vexed one for realists because Dummett shares little common ground with the many (realist) philosophers, linguists and cognitive scientists who believe language acquisition is effected by a dedicated language module [Fodor 1975, 1983, 2008; Chomsky 1986, 2006; Crain 2012; Pinker 1994] or even with those who disavow modularity but agree that semantic knowledge is partly unconscious. Thus, Dummett rejected Chomsky’s thesis that speakers have unconscious knowledge of the rules of Universal Grammar on the Wittgensteinian grounds that it was, at best “an explanatory hypothesis, not a systematisation of facts open to view.” [Dummett 1981]. Dummett apparently took this “systemisation of facts” to be satisfied by an account that pairs knowledge of meaning with recognitional  abilities.[4]