 A consistentist about the phenomenology of motion might support (iii) and challenge (iv), borrowing from Dharmakirti, or from Lewis’ perdurance/counterpart account. An alternative consistentist position would be to challenge (iii) and support (iv). In favour of (iii), it might be said that if the moving black dot is slowed down sufficiently, and particularly if its positions are discrete, or it jumps about, then (iii) finds intuitive assent: \(a\) and \(b\) just are the sorts of things (events) that occupy distinct places at distinct times. This may be what happens. Again, imagine perception cut off after \(t_{1}\) but before \(t_{2}\) (close the eyes, or otherwise vanish the dot). Then (iii) holds, the phenomenal dot at \(t_{1}\) is a distinct existence from a dot at \(t_{2}\). Our cognitive system responds to stimuli both as events, where (iii) holds; and as enduring objects, where (iv) holds. If nothing moves, then there is no contradiction, but when we see motion, the object-recognition mechanism identifies distinct things at different times and so a contradictory content is born. That, I suspect, is the phenomenological content of motion. 