 The natural response to this objection is to appeal to differences in kind (Wiggins 1980). Lump can survive being squashed or rolled into a ball, for example, since Lump is a mere lump of clay. David, however, is a statue, and statues cannot survive changes of these kinds. This response, however, pushes back the explanatory challenge: how could intrinsic duplicates like Lump and David differ in kind? One option would be to appeal to relational differences. For example, Lynne Rudder Baker suggests that David—unlike Lump—is a statue because it is essentially related to an artworld—it is the sort of thing that is admired, reviewed, and discussed (Baker 2000, pp. 35–46). The problem is that this seems to get things backwards, for it is natural to say that David is admired, reviewed, and discussed because it is a statue (rather than a mere lump of clay). A related idea is to explain the difference in kind by appealing to differences in historical facts (Burke 1992, p. 15). For example, one might say that Lump is a mere lump of clay because it was created by a claymaker whose intent was to create a lump, whereas David was created by a sculptor whose intent was to create a statue. One worry for this line of response is that it cannot be extended to every case of constitution. For example, Alan Gibbard (1975) asks us to imagine a case in which an artist sculpts a statue of the biblical giant Goliath in two pieces—bottom and top—and then brings those pieces together, simultaneously creating a statue (‘Goliath’) and a new piece of clay (‘Lumpl’). The next day, the artist smashes the statue to bits, simultaneously destroying both the statue and the lump. The crucial feature of this case is that Lumpl and Goliath share all of their historical properties and appear to stand in the same relations to everything else around them. For example, both are created at the same time, by the same person, with a single set of intentions. Both are put on display in the same galleries and gazed upon by the same patrons. Both are destroyed at the same time, in exactly the same way. In short, Lumpl and Goliath seem to share all their relational properties while still differing in kind, in which case the explanatory challenge remains unanswered. (For recent discussions of this issue, see DeRosset 2011, Einheuser 2011, Sutton 2012, Saenz 2015, and Koslicki 2018.)