 When considering future individuals as possible individuals both the diachronic and the subjunctive-historical notions of harm will exclude the possibility of present people harming future people, for the (future) people whose interests and rights they are required to respect are not in a particular state of well-being at the time they take their decision—they do not, at that time, exist. But according to  (I)  unless we can claim that the person is in a particular state of well-being at the time of our decision, that is, at \(t_1\), we cannot say that the person is worse off at \(t_2\) owing to our decision at \(t_1\). And likewise with  (II):  unless we can claim that there is a specific person who would have been better off at \(t_2\) than this person actually is at \(t_2\) had we not acted with respect to this person at all, this notion of harm makes no sense.