  Imagine a one person preference satisfaction account of value that says simply that what is valuable is what P desires. Apparently this view is foundationally monist: there is only one thing that confers value (being desired by P), yet at the non-foundational level there are many values (whatever P desires). Let us say that P desires hot baths, donuts and knowledge. The structure of P’s desires is such that there is a complicated ranking of these things, which will vary from circumstance to circumstance. The ranking is not explained by the value of the objects,rather, her desire explains the ranking and determines the value of the objects. So it might be that P sometimes desires a hot bath and a donut equally, and cannot choose between them; it might be that sometimes she would choose knowledge over a hot bath and a donut, but sometimes she would choose a hot bath over knowledge. On James Griffin’s slightly more complex view, well-being consist in the fulfillment of informed desire, and Griffin points out that his view can explain discontinuities in value without having to appeal to diminishing marginal utility: