 The analysis of the example above applies to general networks with \(n\) agents. Consider for example the three person network \(1 \rightarrow 2, 2 \rightarrow 1, 2 \rightarrow 3\), represented in figure 3.5a (notice that symmetric links are represented by a line without arrowheads) and assume that each player has threshold 2. The network between players 1 and 2 is the same as the one above, hence if they have threshold 2, they both revolt regardless of the threshold of player 3. Player 3, on the other hand, knows her own threshold and player 2’s. Hence, if they all have threshold 2, she cannot distinguish between the possibilities in the set \(\{122, 222, 322, 422\}\). At 422, in particular, neither player 1 nor player 2 revolt, hence player 3 cannot take the risk and does not revolt, even if, in fact, she has a neighbor who revolts. Adding the link \(1 \rightarrow 3\) to the network (cf. figure 3.5b) we provide player 3 with knowledge about player 1’s action, hence in this case, if they all have threshold 2, they all revolt. Notice that if we break the link between players 1 and 2 (so that the network is \(1 \rightarrow 3\) and \(2 \rightarrow 3)\), player 3 knows that 1 and 2 cannot communicate and hence do not revolt at 222, therefore she chooses \(s\) as well. Knowledge of what other players know about other players is crucial.