 In Book II Green picks up the theme from Book I about the role of self-consciousness in epistemic responsibility and explicitly makes the parallel argument about the role of self-consciousness in practical and moral personality. Responsibility neither is threatened by determinism nor requires indeterminism; it requires self-consciousness (PE §§87, 90, 106, 109–110). Moral responsibility requires capacities for practical deliberation, and practical deliberation requires self-consciousness. Non-responsible agents, such as brutes and small children, appear to act on their strongest desires or, if they deliberate, to deliberate only about the instrumental means to the satisfaction of their desires (PE §§86, 92, 96, 122, 125). By contrast, responsible agents must be able to distinguish between the intensity and authority of their desires, to deliberate about the appropriateness of their desires and aims, and to regulate their actions in accord with these deliberations (PE §§85–86, 92, 96, 103, 107, 220). Responsibility requires moral personality. Here, Green shows the influence of Butler, Reid, and Kant (see, e.g., Irwin 1984).