Even if the dispute is partly terminological, however, sometimes the choice of terminology matters. It is important to be clear on what the different notions of ontological commitment are, and how they fit in to the general project of ontology. Given a distinction between existence and real existence, the notion of ontological commitment bifurcates into two distinct notions, one shallow and one deep. On the shallow notion, entities that exist but do not really exist are to be counted among the ontological commitments of a theory: it is trivial or analytic that ‘Socrates exists’ is committed to Socrates, and that ‘elephants exist’ is committed to elephants, whether or not Socrates or elephants have real existence. On the deep notion, only entities that really exist count towards the theory's ontological commitments. Ontological commitment, arguably, has traditionally been given the shallow interpretation; but that is because, within the orthodox Quinean setting, there simply is no ontologically relevant distinction between existence and real existence. Once the distinction is accepted, however, and the project of ontology is construed to be the project of discovering not what there is, but what there really is, then it is only the deep notion of ontological commitment that resonates with the ontological  enterprise.[33]  It is an analysis of this deep notion, as given by the truthmaker  account, that matters for ontology.