 There is a parallel move by John McDowell in ‘Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge’ against the notion of ‘criteria’, deployed by some commentators of Wittgenstein as a sort of ‘highest common factor’ between evidence and proof (McDowell 1998, 369–394). Here, a ‘highest common factor’ would be a state of mind that would count as knowing, depending on one or more added factors, but would count in their absence as something else such as believing (McDowell 1998, 386). McDowell is now seen as having thus put forward a form of ‘disjunctivism’ about knowledge and belief (more on disjunctivism in section 6). Although McDowell does not mention these authors, Travis (2005) has shown that this move has roots in both Cook Wilson and Austin. The fact that there is no highest common factor to knowledge and belief entails for Cook Wilson a rejection of ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts of knowledge. Any ‘hybrid’ account would factor knowledge into an internal part, possibly a copy of the object known, and a relation of that copy to the object itself (see immediately below and section 6). Since there is no such highest common factor, this view, integral to ‘externalist’ accounts of knowledge, had to be rejected (Travis 2005, 287).