 At this point, however, a new question arises. So understood, presentism has the resources to ground time’s passing at only the present time. That is, everything required to establish that things change from one moment to the next must be contained within a single moment, the present. But within such a version of presentism, what guarantees that things really change? Or, to approach the same point differently, what in the metaphysics guarantees that the present resources accurately reflect how things were—e.g., why think that the ersatz manifold accurately represents the past—when there’s no connection to the past? Why can’t reality consist of a single “frozen” slice of concrete time, along with the various ersatz times? If reality is that way (what’s concrete never changes and we have nothing more than a frozen concrete instant against the backdrop of many ersatz times), then we still have no temporal passage. What the presentist must do is find some way of insisting that reality cannot be such; reality cannot include but a single concrete slice coupled to truth-makers for talk about the past and future, where those truthmakers cannot be said to guarantee that things really change (cf. the discussion of how truth-makers get the “right results” from  §6).