 Weisberg (2012) criticizes \(\eqref{alternative1}\)—and takes his criticism to undermine \(\eqref{alternative}\)—arguing that it is implausible by the design theorist’s own standards. The design theorist holds a combination of views according to which, on the one hand, life is more probable if there is a designer than if there is no designer and life is less probable if the laws are stringent rather than lax. If one adds to this combination of views the assumption that none of the possible life-friendly conditions has higher probability than the others, both if there is a designer and if there is no designer, it dictates that—bracketing knowledge that life exists—stringent laws speak against the existence of a designer, i.e., it dictates \(P(D\mid S) &lt; P(D\mid \neg S)\), contrary to \(\eqref{alternative1}\). Absent any evidence that life exists, evidence that the laws are stringent speaks against the existence of life in that stringent laws make life unexpected.