 Aleta Quinn (2017) argues that the term “cladist” remains one claimed by multiple overlapping (yet importantly distinct) camps. She tackles the ambiguity head on, providing a useful “foreign language dictionary” of ways that “cladist” gets used in systematics. Quinn argues that the term is in need of disambiguation, drawing seven different senses from the literature. This includes systematists that advocate adherence to particular phylogenetic methods (e.g., parsimony, as in the case of the Cladistics editorial) or philosophical justifications (especially to a version of Popperian falsificationism), though the various distinctions of competing senses of “cladist” go well beyond this. In response to Quinn, Williams and Ebach (2018) propose an eighth (and their preferred) sense of cladist, and Brower (2018a) offers a focused commentary on Quinn’s article, as well as other attempts to clarify the philosophical foundations and commitments of pattern cladism. For example, a distinguishing feature of pattern cladism is the rejection of a priori assumptions about evolutionary theory in phylogenetic methods. This has been interpreted as a claim of theory-neutrality or minimality by some philosophers and biologists (e.g., Pearson 2010). Brower (2019) contests this interpretation, arguing that the claim of theory neutrality is specific to evolutionary assumptions, as opposed to a more general claim.