 On the other hand, while the analysis of logical form might not have been the Mohists’ primary theoretical concern, we should not take this to imply that their philosophical pursuits did not involve ample deductive reasoning. Lucas 2020 provides several examples of argumentative passages from Mohist texts that appear “almost ready made” for formalization and which are easily regimented in a way that demonstrates either their deductive validity or inductive soundness. Indeed, the Mohists seem to have presupposed as a paradigm of good reasoning a form of inference that is purely deductive. Note that the Mohists assert “x is G” as a consequence of x’s resemblance with the model m for G, but this only follows logically with the addition of a further general principle, something like “Anything x that resembles the model m for G is G”. This principle might not have been rendered explicit in their logical investigations, but their assertion that x is G does not follow without its presupposition or something logically equivalent to it, and they did make a distinguished place for quantifiers among their basic logical notions. So assuming that the model for G is m, the Mohists appear to have taken the following (or something equivalent to it) as a paradigmatic form of reasoning formally justifying the application of names to objects: