 Finally, some have sought to circumvent the non-identity-problem by suggesting an alternative notion of harm that is unaffected by the non-identity-problem, the so-called “Threshold Conception of Harm” (Hanser 1990, 2009; McMahan 1998; Shiffrin 1999; Meyer 2003, 2009a; Harman 2004, 2009; Rivera-López 2009). The response to the “Non-Identity-Problem” based on the threshold conception is relevantly different from other responses (such as those criticized by Heyd in 2009b). The threshold response can be understood to be person-affecting in the weak sense (see  §1  above): While the person being harmed according to the threshold notion does not imply that the same person is worse off than she would have otherwise been at that time, it does imply that this person is worse off than she ought to be. We owe it to the person when she will have come to existence that she is not in a harmed state (see  §2.2  above). Such an understanding is relevantly different from an impersonal understanding according to which the universe is a better place when it does not include people in a harmed state as judged by the threshold Notion (but see Wrigley 2012: 178).