 As it stands, this argument is inconclusive. For a Moorean might simply hang tough, insisting that his own views about goodness are best explained by close encounters of the Platonic kind, involving an intimate acquaintance with both goodness itself and the properties on which it supervenes. Of course, it is difficult to make naturalistic sense of such cognitions, but it is difficult to make naturalistic sense of our knowledge of logic, mathematics and modality. This is the “companions in guilt” strategy that is often deployed in arguing for moral objectivity (for more on which, see Lillehammer 2007). However the Argument from Explanatory Impotence gets a little stronger if we combine it with the Argument from Relativity. For the fact is that people often disagree about what is intrinsically good or bad, about how good or bad the good things and the bad things really are, and about the relations between goodness and badness and what we ought to do. We have already seen that Russell disagreed with Moore about whether we ought to do that action that will actually bring about the best consequences or the action that it is reasonable to believe will bring about the best consequences, which means that they had different intuitions about the relations between goodness and obligation. Moore disagreed with Sidgwick about whether anything besides pleasure is good as an end: