 Like Alxatib &amp; Pelletier, Ripley (2011: §2) conducts his own survey of reactions to apparent contradictions involving vague predications (e.g., “The circle is both is and isn’t near the square”; “The circle neither is nor isn’t near the square”). He leverages the results of his study to argue against error (or epistemic) theories on which borderline contradictions are always false even when believed true; he also refutes fuzzy theories of vagueness, which fail to predict why subjects are so willing to accept the truth of borderline contradictions rather than assigning them an intermediate acceptability ranking.  Ripley also finds pragmatic or contextualist theories not insufficiently fleshed out to yield the correct predictions. He adopts a dialetheist account that enables him to line up with a majority of his subjects in finding both “a is F and a is not F” and “a is neither F nor not F” true for borderline applications of F.  Supporting this view, he notes (2011: 186–7) that there may be variation with respect to the “cultural aversion to contradictions”; there is evidence tending to suggest that Asian subjects are less likely than Westerners (specifically, as it happens, Canadians) to object to contradictions like “It’s raining and it’s not raining.” But as Ripley concedes, more research is needed on this point.