 What is needed to render DDS coherent is a particular version of constituent ontology according to which a thing’s nature is a unitary concrete item and a constituent of the thing. In the case of material beings, the nature will be together with some individuating constituent such as signate or designated matter (materia signata). Material beings are individuated and diversified by their signate matter. Thus Socrates and Plato, though the same in nature, differ numerically in virtue of their different portions of materia signata. Matter makes them individuals, and matter makes them numerically diverse individuals. God, however, being immaterial, is not individuated by anything distinct from his nature, and so can be said to be a self-individuating nature. As self-individuating, there is no real distinction between God and his nature. In Thomist terms, in God nature and suppositum are identical.(ST I, q. 3, art. 3) The divine nature is not an abstract object related across an ontological chasm to a concrete individual;the divine nature is a self-individuating concrete unitary nature. For Plantinga, the nature of a thing is a conjunctive property the conjuncts of which are those properties the thing exemplifies in every possible world in which it exists. On this approach, the divine nature is ‘cobbled together’ or constructed out of God’s essential properties. But then the divine nature is logically and ontologically posterior to those properties. Clearly, no defender of DDS will think of natures in this way. He will think of the divine nature as logically and ontologically prior to the properties, and of the properties as manifestations of that unitary nature, a nature the radical unity of which cannot be made sense of on Plantinga’s approach. None of this is spectacularly clear, and plenty of questions remain; but it is not obviously incoherent as DDS would be on the approach of Plantinga. And our question, you will recall, is concerned solely with coherence.