 Philosophical theories that commit type-trespasses (such as Plato’s early theory of Forms and Russell’s introduction of Classes and his theory of Types) require demonstrations of the regresses and contradictions that ensue (as demonstrated, respectively, by Plato’s own criticism of his early work in Parmenides and Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus). Untangling may also be necessary for individual sentences that commit a breach of logical syntax (for example, “’Heterological’ is heterological” or “This sentence is false”). Some type-mistakes are obvious: such as (adapting an example from The Concept of Mind) the inference from “She came home in a Chevrolet and a flood of tears” to “She came home in two things”. As we shall see below, the category mistake Ryle identifies in “There is a mind and a body” or “there is a mind or a body” is less obvious. For it takes a fair bit of untangling to show that “mind” and “body” are different logical or grammatical types; a fact which renders the assertion of either the conjunction or the disjunction nonsensical. 