 Bell inequalities follow from a number of assumptions that have intuitive plausibility and which, arguably, are rooted in the sort of world-view that results from reflection on classical physics and relativity theory. If one accepts that the experimental evidence gives us strong reason to believe that Bell inequality-violating correlations are features of physical reality, then one or more of these assumptions must be given up. Some of these assumptions are of the sort that have traditionally been regarded as metaphysical assumptions. The fact that a conjunction of theses of the sort usually regarded as metaphysical has consequences that can be subjected to experimental test has led Shimony to speak of the enterprise of experimental testing for violations of Bell inequalities as “experimental metaphysics” (Shimony 1984a, 35; 1993, 115). As may be expected, the conclusions of experimental metaphysics are not unambiguous. Some prima facie plausible options are excluded, leaving a number of options open. In this section these are briefly outlined, with no attempt made to adjudicate between them.