 In a Tarskian language hierarchy, the sentence \(N\) would have to be on a higher level than all of Jones’ utterances, and, conversely, the sentence \(J\) would have to be on a higher level than all of Nixon’s utterances. Since \(N\) is an utterance of Nixon, and \(J\) is an utterance of Jones, \(N\) would have to be on a higher level than \(J\), and \(J\) on a higher lever than \(N\). This is obviously not possible, so in a hierarchy like the Tarskian, these sentences cannot even be formulated. The sentences \(N\) and \(J\) are indeed both indirectly self-referential, since \(N\) makes reference to a totality including \(J\), and \(J\) makes reference to a totality including \(N\). Nevertheless, in most cases \(N\) and \(J\) are harmless, and do not produce a paradox. A paradox is only produced in the special case where all of Jones’ utterances except possibly \(J\) are true, and exactly half of Nixon’s utterances are false, disregarding \(N\). Kripke uses the fact that \(N\) and \(J\) are only problematic in a certain special case as an argument against an approach that altogether excludes the possibility of formulating \(N\) and \(J\). 