 Goodman’s semiotic analysis also accounts for musical expression. In his nominalist framework, for an object to possess a property is for it to be denoted by a predicate. If the object refers back to that predicate, it exemplifies it—a red swatch of cloth is denoted by the predicate “red”, but it also exemplifies it when it is used as a sample by a tailor. But properties may also be possessed metaphorically—a cloth is literally red, but a work of music is only metaphorically sad. When an object exemplifies a property it possesses metaphorically, it expresses it. Expression is metaphorical exemplification (Goodman 1968: 95). Note that this view explains the logical structure of the description of music in emotional terms, but it does not attempt an explanation of why emotion terms are applied to music in the first place. In the philosophy of music, as in the philosophy of art more generally, Goodman was a pivotal figure in setting the methodological tone of the subsequent inquiry in the English-speaking world, although his preferred solutions have been largely disputed.