 Put in terms of guise theory, the cases of ignorance, similarity, and difference seem to show that there exists a distinctive category of attitudes whose propositional contents are not believed under de re or descriptive guises. When Perry realizes that he is the one making a mess, he does not come to believe the proposition that Perry is making a mess under the guise that John Perry is making a mess, nor does he come to believe that proposition under the de re guise that that guy is making a mess. To account for Perry’s new doxastic state, we need to recognize a distinctive type of belief that is not a state of believing a proposition under a descriptive or de re guise. We can concede that self-locating beliefs are still beliefs in propositions under guises, understood as guise theory wants to understand them in its proposed response to Frege puzzles. But that does not keep them from being a distinctive category of beliefs.