 A second view—a “strong” or response-independent value realism—holds that intentional feelings directly apprehend a priori values ontologically and epistemologically prior to experiencing any particular object as a bearer of value (Scheler 1913/1916; Hartmann 1926; Mulligan 2010; Steinbock 2014, von Hildebrand 1916). On this view, intentional feelings and emotions separate. Intentional feelings apprehend the a priori value itself; they provide access to the domain of values and to their hierarchy, which—to use Scheler’s example (1913/1916 [1973: 86–100])—ascends from sensory values (the agreeable and the disagreeable) to vital values (e.g., the noble and the vulgar), spiritual values (e.g., the beautiful and the ugly, the true and the false), and, at the apex, the holy and the unholy. Values and this hierarchy “flash before us” (Scheler 1913/1916 [1973: 68]) in loving and hating (the two basic feelings) and in preferring and placing behind or after. Emotions, by contrast, do not reveal value in the way intentional feelings do. They are the subject’s responses to the felt value. Von Hildebrand makes the point clearly: