 Although this view accommodates some perversions, such as zoophilia, pedophilia, and “intercourse with … inanimate objects” because they “seem to be stuck at some primitive version of the first stage of sexual feeling” (Nagel 1969: 14), it yields counter-intuitive results: masturbation does not fare well on this view, depending on whether it insists on the perception of the actual (not imaginative) embodiment of desire in another person (Soble 2013a: 85–87). It also misunderstands how perversions usually work: a coprophiliac does not normally desire sex with feces, but to incorporate feces in his sexual act with another, which could involve multi-levels of perception. Moreover, the account does not capture common intuitions about natural and perverted sex: it goes beyond the plausible idea that the arousal of one partner increases the other’s, to that of multi-layered arousal—an unintuitive idea. Similar views rely on the idea that natural sexual desire is interpersonal, such as that it culminates in love (Scruton 1986: ch. 10) and that it communicates attitudes and feelings (Solomon 1974; see Halwani 2018b: ch. 9 for discussion).