 However, Hegel does foreshadow his later and more substantive discussion of punishment with a non-retributivist character at this point (Brooks 2017a). He highlights how determinations of crimes “such as danger to public security” have relevance in determining what punishment is ultimately justified (PR §96 Remark). While he says crimes “more dangerous in itself” are a more serious infringement of right, Hegel is clear from the start that consequentialist factors are relevant to the determination of punishment related to crime’s impact on society although he says little more at this point (PR §96 Remark). Hegel also rejects the view he is offering a full theory of punishment at this point claiming – in the absence of laws and courtrooms – any action taken by an individual against another to punish takes the form of “revenge” which “becomes a new infringement” creating new problems (PR §102). It is important to note at this point that these sections discussing commonly used concepts like property and contract as well as crime and punishment in uncommon ways all reappear when Hegel turns his attention to the final part of Ethical Life.