 Despite its natural law foundation, a state’s positive laws will only partially overlap with natural law. That is, since its purpose is not to make humans perfect but secure, only those natural laws without which peace among citizens would be impossible should also become civil laws (DJN VIII.1.1, III.4.6). In fact, by focusing on the requirements of human association rather than on personal formation, the sociality principle makes Pufendorf a legal minimalist more generally, so that even where the natural law is silent or indifferent “civil laws should not sanction more things than conduce to the good of the citizens [as such] and the state” (DJN VII.9.5; Pufendorf 1994a, p. 242). Besides, and within this narrow focal area, it also grants legislators considerable discretion or flexibility of application. Thus, even though civil laws should not explicitly contravene natural law, it is sometimes excusable if they redefine or “overlook” (dissimulare) certain practices – like theft, dueling, and tacitly accepted cuckoldry – for which “the condition of the times and the genius of a people” do not provide a current remedy (DJN VIII.1.3). Such practical adjustments are evident throughout Pufendorf’s detailed discussions of state laws in DJN VIII – regarding punishment, social status (esteem), property, and war – which are strongly prudentialist, consequentialist, and realist in character. They evince not a substantive moralism but the same flexible ‘reason-of-state’ approach that also guides his thinking about inter-state relations. Indeed, through their common grounding in the sociality principle, natural, civil, and international law are in continuity and in dialogue with one another – though in a complex and sometimes untidy way (DJN II.3.23). That is, though as a broad divine injunction natural law is presumed to be ultimately consistent, in practice (as specifically interpreted by particular humans) it often appears less so; for its demands must always be articulated in full view of not only human psychology but also the concrete settings in which human action occurs. (Thus, as in the case of immigration [section 3.5 above], Pufendorf could condemn the 1640s English revolution, while approving that in 1688. See Seidler 2001.)