  Soul is related to Intellect analogously to the way Intellect is related to the One.  As the One is virtually what Intellect is, so Intellect is paradigmatically what Soul is.  The activity of Intellect, or its cognitive identity with all Forms, is the paradigm for all embodied cognitive states of any soul as well as any of its affective states.  In the first case, a mode of cognition, such as belief, images Intellect’s eternal state by being a representational state.  It represents the cognitive identity of Intellect with Forms because the embodied believer is cognitively identical with a concept which itself represents or images Forms.  In the second case, an affective state such as feeling tired represents or images Intellect (in a derived way) owing to the cognitive component of that state which consists in the recognition of its own presence.  Here, x’s being-in-the-state is the intentional object of x’s cognition.  Where the affective state is that of a non-cognitive agent, the imitation is even more remote, though present nevertheless.  It is, says Plotinus, like the state of being asleep in comparison with the state of being awake (see III 8. 4).  In other words, it is a state that produces desire that is in potency a state that recognizes the presence of the desire, a state which represents the state of Intellect. In reply to the possible objection that a potency is not an image of actuality, Plotinus will want to insist that potencies are functionally related to actualities, not the other way around, and that therefore the affective states of non-cognitive agents can only be understood as derived versions of the affective and cognitive states of souls closer to the ideal of both, namely, the state of Intellect.