 This is Iamblichus’ notion of the “changing self”, as first expounded by Steel 1978. Such a conception of the human soul represents a major break in the Platonic tradition, which until then had been prone to emphasize the soul’s inner dignity and divinity: on the other hand, it is a very convenient way to account for human fallibility. One could interpret it as a literal exegesis of Timaeus 35a: the Demiurge creates the soul’s essence as a mix of indivisible and divisible Being, so that—one might think—it is no more indivisible than it is divisible. By the same reasoning, Iamblichus concludes that the soul is at the same time changing and unchanging, dying and undying. This, at least, is what characterizes “particular” souls (merikai or en merei: a terminology propagated by Iamblichus—see Reply to Porphyry V, 2 [SS-2013: 149.26]—before it became usual in later authors). The case of divine souls is less clear-cut, since they are able to mend the gap between essence and activity (De anima sect. 20–21; see also 18). It is unclear whether—and how—this picture can be reconciled with Iamblichus’ allusions to “two souls”, one originating in the intelligible, the other given to us by celestial influences (Reply to Porphyry VIII, 6 [SS-2013: 199.1–12]).