 The indifference principle says: “The object is by nature indifferent to being, although in any case one of the object’s two objectives of being, its being or its non-being, subsists” (1904b: 13 [86]). This formulation is supposed to be less misleading than the claim that “the pure object stands ‘beyond being and non-being’ ” [“der reine Gegenstand stehe ‘jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein’ ”]. The latter catchphrase means that neither being nor non-being belongs to the make-up of an object’s nature (its so-being [Sosein]), but it should not be taken to mean that an object is beyond being and non-being in the sense that it neither has being nor does not have being — the second clause of the indifference principle makes this clear. Although the non-being of an object may be guaranteed by the object’s nature — as in the case of the round square, for example —, the non-being does not belong to its nature. In other words: Being (or non-being) is not part of an object’s nature, but nevertheless “the law of excluded middle lays it down that every object necessarily stands in a fact of being or in a fact of non-being” (Findlay 1963: 49). It is worth noticing that there are two interpretations of negation (narrower, internal, predicate, or ontological negation versus wider, external, sentence, logical negation), and accordingly there are two versions of the law of excluded middle. Meinong seems to accept the law of excluded middle only with respect to sentence negation.