 Wright went on to claim that Hume’s Principle can be regarded as a truth of logic. If that is so, then at least second-order Peano arithmetic is reducible to logic alone. Thus a new form of logicism was born; today this view is known as neo-logicism (Hale &amp; Wright 2001). Most philosophers of mathematics today doubt that Hume’s Principle is a principle of logic. Indeed, even Wright later sought to qualify this claim. Nonetheless, many philosophers of mathematics feel that the introduction of natural numbers through Hume’s Principle is attractive from an ontological and from an epistemological point of view. Linnebo argues that because the left-hand-side of Hume’s Principle merely re-carves the content of its right-hand-side, not much is needed from the world to make Hume’s Principle true. For this reason, he calls natural numbers and mathematical objects that can be introduced in a similar way light mathematical objects (Linnebo 2018).