  In some collective provisions, each contribution makes the overall provision larger; in some, there is a tipping point at which one or a few more contributions secure the provision—as is true, for example, in elections, in which a difference of two more votes out of a very large number can change defeat into victory. Even in the latter case, however, the expected value of each voter’s contribution is the same ex ante; there is no particular voter whose vote tips the outcome. Let us, however, neglect the tipping cases and consider only those cases in which provision is, if not an exactly linear function of the number of individual contributions or of the amount of resources contributed, at least a generally increasing function and not a tipping or step function at any point. In such cases, if n is very large and you do not contribute to our collective effort, the rest of us might still benefit from providing our collective good, so that you benefit without contributing. You are then a free rider on the efforts of the rest of us.