 Another approach that discounts the role of intuitions in philosophy, especially in epistemology, is pragmatic. The idea is to first determine what epistemic goals we want principles to serve, and then to discover empirically which epistemic principles, if adhered to, will best serve those goals (Weinberg 2006). For instance, your goal might be to have lots of true beliefs or, alternatively, to have few false ones. Or your goal might be to have beliefs that make you happy. Probably the best set of rules to follow to obtain lots of true beliefs will be different from, and more lenient than, the best set of rules to follow to avoid having false beliefs. Probably those sets of rules will be different from the set of rules you should adopt if you are interested in having beliefs that make you happy. It’s reasonable to think that intuitions will have to be appealed to in determining what makes a goal an epistemic goal rather than some other sort of goal, and what precisely that epistemic goal is. Lehrer (1986: 6–7) holds that the epistemic goal is not to maximize true beliefs or minimize false ones. For him, it is the following: for any proposition, P, that a person is considering, believe P if and only if it is true. Intuition must be relied on to determine what the epistemic goal is. Intuitively, Pascal’s Wager is about whether belief in God pays, not about whether there is good evidence to believe that God exists or does not exist. The goal of the argument is not epistemic but pragmatic in a narrow sense, namely, to believe what will make your life, including your afterlife, go best for you. Intuitively, the goal of having beliefs that will make your life go well is not an epistemic goal. Epistemic goals have to do with truth, fitting your beliefs to the evidence, having evidentially justified beliefs, etc.