 This string contains two types of numerals (1 and 2), but three tokens of the two types (two tokens of the numeral type 1 and one token of the numeral type 2). Mental states are similarly ambiguous. When you and I both entertain the belief that Fodor advocated a Language of Thought, one type of mental state is entertained, but two tokens of that type occur (your belief state and my belief state). Type-type physicalism insists that each mental state type is identical to some physical state type, i.e., some specific brain state type on the mind-brain identity theory. This view runs afoul of multiple realizability. But token physicalism only insists that each token occurrence of each type of mental state is identical to some token occurrence of some physical state type—not necessarily a token occurrence of the same physical state type on each occasion, e.g., when you and I, with our brains differentiated by our separate life histories, entertain the same belief about Fodor’s favorite philosophy of mind.