 Pufendorf begins DJN by noting the relative inattention to moral entities as such in comparison to the much-studied objects of the physical sciences, even though “it greatly behooves man to know the nature of such entities, which he has received the faculty to produce, and whose power deeply suffuses itself throughout his life” (I.1.1; Pufendorf 1994a, p. 99). He calls them “modes” – in accord with their dependence on self-subsistent entities (cf. Forde 2011, on Lockean “mixed modes”) – and says that they are invented (inventis) by reflective beings who, by comparing things, form certain notions “superadded” to or “imposed” on the world in order to direct or temper free and voluntary human acts. (DJN I.1.2–3) Some moral entities are said to “flow naturally from things themselves, as it were, while others are superadded to physical things … by an intelligent power” (DJN I.1.3; Pufendorf 1994a, p. 100). This is a relative distinction within Pufendorf’s general voluntarist framework, where God is thought to impose a basic normative dimension on the world (conjointly and compatibly with its creation), but where humans in fact devise the (further) distinctions that regulate their lives together – both in philosophizing about these and by enacting concrete practices and institutions to regulate them. Accordingly, one might describe the former as foundational or structural categories, and the latter as subsidiary, instrumental, or discretionary tools of analysis. All moral entities, however, of whatever type, depend for their existence on the will of intelligent beings who externally assign normative, action-directing significance to things intrinsically lacking this, but nonetheless somehow compatible with or receptive to it.