  A second, closely related conception is that platitudes are expressions, which—in virtue of being banal, vacuous, elementary, or otherwise trivial—are acceptable by anyone who understands them (Horwich 1990). The interaction of banality or triviality with acceptance does rule out a wide variety of candidate expressions, however. For instance, claims that are acceptable by anyone who understands them may still be too substantive or informative to count as platitudinous, depending on what they countenance. Similarly, claims that are too ‘thin’ or neutral to vindicate any particular theory \(T\) may still be too substantive or informative to count as genuinely platitudinous on this conception (Wright 1999). This is particularly so given that nothing about a conception of platitudes as ‘pretheoretical claims’ strictly entails that they reduce to mere banalities (Vision 2004). Nevertheless, criteria like banality or triviality plus acceptance might also screen in too few expressions (perhaps as few as one, such as a particular instance of the \(T\)-schema). Indeed, it is an open question whether any of the principles in (11)–(28) would count as platitudes on this conception.