 Mencius, of course, attributes a much more extensive set of positive tendencies such as natural compassion for the suffering of others that can be shaped into virtues such as ren or humanity, and the debate between Xunzi and Mencius is how much the development of virtue is set up by inborn affective and cognitive impulses and intuitions, and how much is shaped by cultural processes and the influence of norms. This brings out another reason why Confucians were set up to produce a rich moral psychology. They took emotions as a potentially positive base for virtue, a base that could be made receptive to the insights of reflection and reasoning. Modern Western philosophy is often more inclined to see emotion as an impediment to morality, as in Kant (except for the feeling of respect for the moral law) or as a competitor to reasoning and its potential master, as in Hume. Rarely is there an exploration of reasoning and emotion as partners that develop as they interact with each other (for a comparison see Wong, 2015b, 2017). 