 One theme to emerge from the rational analysis literature that has influenced bounded rationality is the study of memory (Anderson &amp; Schooler 1991). For instance, given the statistical features of our environment, and the sorts of goals we typically pursue, forgetting is an advantage rather than a liability (Schooler &amp; Hertwig 2005). Memory traces vary in their likelihood of being used, so the memory system will try to make readily available those memories which are most likely to be useful. This is a rational analysis style argument, which is a common feature of the Bayesian turn in cognitive psychology (Oaksford &amp; Chater 2007; Friston 2010). More generally, spacial arrangements of objects in the environment can simplify perception, choice, and the internal computation necessary for producing an effective solution (Kirsch 1995). Compare this view to the discussion of recency or availability effects distorting subjective probability estimates in  section 2.4.