 A different problem for the dispositional theory is: What are those individuals that we hear when the object sounds? The main problem a dispositional account of sounds has to face is that even if we accept that sounds are sound dispositions, there appear prima facie to exist, on top of those dispositions, the individual, occurrent sounds—those that last when the disposition is realized. (A similar problem plagued Chisholm’s account of events as repeatable entities: as Davidson pointed out, any such account should accommodate the problem of assigning a status to the single occurrences of the repetitions, which cannot be themselves repeatable items.) Indeed, as Kulvicki notes,“now and again one encounters objects making sounds they do not have” (2008: 8); he dismisses these encounters as rather exceptional, but no matter their frequency—and radio listening provides a very common example—the “sound made”, as distinct from the “sound had”, must be accommodated by any theory of sounds. Kulvicki addresses the problem in a general way, by distinguishing between sounds as dispositions and the hearings of sounds. There are no individual sounds, only episodes of hearing the dispositional sounds. We do hear sounds, these are the dispositions, but the impression that sounds last depends on the fact that our hearing episodes last.