 Meinong’s epistemology turned out to be relevant to analytic theory of knowledge. Some of Chisholm’s (1966: 38–55) rules of evidence, for example, are a kind of application of Meinong’s conception of direct evidence for conjecture. Further, Meinong’s treatment of epistemic concepts like truth or entitlement as value concepts anticipates the epistemic normativity of some internalist positions. It is also worth mentioning, that Meinong (1915, §54) linked the “principle of the self-validity of all knowing” (Selbstgültigkeitprinzip), a kind of prima facie justification principle, with the fallibilistic methodological-epistemological “principle of the critical openness of all knowing” (Unabgeschlossenheitsprinzip), which says that critical examination is always possible, since there is always an unverified judgement left at the end of a justification process.