 The answer depends on what one takes these introspective beliefs to involve. Broadly speaking, there are two dominant views of the matter (but see Peacocke 1999, Ch. 5 for further alternatives). One popular account of introspection — the “inner sense” model on which introspection is taken to be a kind of “internal scanning” of the contents of one's mind (Armstrong 1968) — has been taken to be unfriendly to functionalism, on the grounds that it's hard to see how the objects of such scanning could be second-order relational properties of one's neural states (Goldman 1993). Some theorists, however, have maintained that functionalism can accommodate the special features of introspective belief on the “inner sense” model, since it would be only one of many domains in which it's plausible to think that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of causal or dispositional properties (Armstrong 1993; Kobes 1993; Sterelney 1993). A full discussion of these questions goes beyond the scope of this entry, but the articles cited above are just three among many helpful pieces in the Open Peer Commentary following Goldman (1993), which provides a good introduction to the debate about this issue.