 Dillon agrees with Lisa Tessman that oppression fosters certain vices in the privileged, including arrogance, self-centeredness, callousness, indifference, and social irresponsibility, and adds that it damages the characters of those who perpetrate or are complicit in oppression, and it does so in ways that the benefits of privilege do not outweigh (96). Tessman argues that under oppression, the self can be damaged in such a way that it cannot flourish (Tessman 2005, 4). She develops the notion of “burdened virtues,” virtues one has that are cultivated in an oppressive context. The privileged, particularly ones who culpably passively accept their privilege, if not positively endorse it, exhibit the “ordinary vices of domination” which prevent them from flourishing in spite of benefiting. Aside from the vices already mentioned, the privileged often exhibit a lack of certain moral virtues, including compassion for others not in their group, generosity, cooperativeness, and openness to appreciating others (55). While the privileged can flourish among the privileged, and in this way meet Aristotle’s criteria for eudaimonia, they cannot flourish on a conception of eudaimonia that reflects the fact of social inequality. Tessman argues that moral goodness requires not only a pursuit of one’s own well-being and the well-being of others on whom one depends, as Aristotle believes, but also the well-being of others whose lack of well-being may have been a condition of one’s privilege (76). Tessman’s attention to vice in the context of oppression is exactly the kind of work that Dillon believes might be essential in ending oppression, and Dillon’s own work on arrogance is likely to be followed by feminist progress in this area (Dillon 2004).