 Recall that, as mentioned earlier, the relevant functional norms are understood by proponents of teleological theories of mental content to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. Some prefer to reserve the term “normative” for prescriptive contexts. On that way of speaking, a statement would count as normative only if it entailed an ought-claim without the addition of further premises. Proponents of teleological theories of mental content may all agree that no ought-claim follows from a function ascription without the addition of further premises (for discussion, see Jacob 2001), and thus that the relevant function ascriptions are not prescriptive and hence are not genuinely “normative” if that is what normativity requires. Different terminological practices dominate different discourses, but it is worth remembering that talk of purely descriptive “norms” is well established in some contexts (e.g., in talk of statistical norms). If either psycho-semantic or functional norms were prescriptive, the attempt to naturalize them would seem to ignore Hume’s warning to beware trying to derive ought-statements from is-statements, but those who offer teleological theories of mental content claim that the norms of both functions and content fall on the is side of any is/ought divide.