 As regards fallibilism, it is safe to say that nearly all present-day epistemologists are fallibilists: we sometimes make mistakes—occasionally even about those things we deem to be most evident—despite having good justification for our beliefs. More precisely, S fallibly knows that p in case, despite the good justification underlying one’s knowledge, S’s belief that p might have been false or might have been accidentally true (cf. Reed 2002). Hurtado (2000) rejects such a virtually unanimous position—which he defines as “the doctrine that any of our beliefs might turn out to be false”—on the grounds both that it is revisionist and that we lack good reasons to accept it. Fallibilism is revisionist because, he argues, it runs counter to common sense both by erasing the ordinary distinction between those beliefs that cannot be false and those that can, and by claiming that no evidence or no reasons can guarantee the truth of a given belief. And there are no good reasons to accept fallibilism because Hurtado claims to be able to refute what he describes as the historico-pragmatic, epistemological, and ethical arguments in its favor, and because he believes that fallibilism is dialectically weak against both skepticism and dogmatism.