 The point of the discussion is not to critique the orthodox view of contracts as promissory (or chosen) obligation (for general criticisms, see  §1.1),  but to suggest that the standard picture needs an account of prospective intention. Not just any view of what an intention is fits both the standard picture and modern legal practice. It may be that an agent’s intention, in the relevant contractual sense, is revealed not by her articulable beliefs or action-guiding attitudes in the moment, but her unconscious dispositions. Given that most consumers comply with standard forms without contesting their validity, this general fact about consumer behavior might make it reasonable to impute a disposition to be bound. On the other hand, behavioral research suggests that people “are more likely to comply with contracts they participated in negotiating” (Eigen 2012: 67). At the same time, a consumer’s reasons for complying in subsequent disputes may be entirely disconnected from her original intentions. The view risks conflating the fact that a person’s compliance is predictable ex ante with the fact that she intends to comply. If these and other challenges can be overcome, however, then a dispositional theory of contractual intention may offer a better fit with orthodox contract theory and modern practice than the available alternatives.