 Given the way that Gray et al. think of templates, even if their hypothesis is correct, it would not mean that our psychology requires us to think of the moral as always involving intentional agents and perceiving patients. In line with this, and despite some lapses in which they suggest that “moral acts can be defined in terms of intention and suffering”, (2012: 109) their considered view seems to be only that the dyadic template fits the majority of moral situations, as we conceive them. Moreover, the link between immoral behavior and suffering to which they appeal in defending their general view is sometimes so indirect as to undermine its significance. For example, they fit authority violations into their suffering-based template by noting that “authority structures provide a way of peacefully resolving conflict” and that “violence results when social structures are threatened”. In a similar stretch, they account for judgments that promiscuity is wrong by gesturing at the suffering involved in sexually transmitted diseases (2012: 107).