 The Open Question Argument proper does not terminate in a conditional but a categorical. It starts with the assumption that “Are X things good?” is a significant or open question for any naturalistic or metaphysical predicate “X”. It is not a tautology, barren or otherwise, that what we desire to desire is good, and the proof of this is that competent speakers can sensibly wonder whether or not it is true. Indeed, according to Moore, “any one can easily convince himself by inspection” that the predicate “good” “is positively different from the notion of ‘desiring to desire’”. If we grant Moore’s first implicit assumption—that if two expressions are synonymous this is evident on reflection to every competent speaker—we can derive the consequence that “good” does not mean “what we desire to desire”. And if we grant his second implicit assumption—that if two predicates or property words have distinct meanings they name distinct properties—then we can derive the conclusion that he really wants, namely that goodness is not identical with what we desire to desire. And by parity or reasoning we can do the same for any naturalistic property whatsoever.