 In The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick appealed to the considerations mentioned in the previous paragraph in an attempt “to show that the commonly received view of special claims and duties arising out of special relations, though prima facie opposed to the impartial universality of the Utilitarian principle, is really maintained by a well-considered application of that principle” (439). Our ‘natural benevolent affections’ guide us to do good toward some small sector of humankind (a small sector composed of our friends, promisees, colleagues, family, etc.), and stifling such natural tendencies would leave only “a very feeble counterpoise to self-love” and thus little from which to develop a more extended and generalized benevolence (434). Also, given the naturalness of certain affections, we come to expect others to act on them, and so pain is caused by deviations from these expectations (439). Thus, consequentialists have for a long time been aware of the apparently counterintuitive implications of their theory with respect to special obligations and been at pains to show that such implications are merely apparent.