 There are many other arguments (apart from the empirical evidence) supporting the Probability Postulate. Gleason’s 1957 theorem about the uniqueness of the probability measure uses a natural principle that the probability of an outcome is independent of splitting into parallel worlds. Tappenden 2000, 2017 adopts a different semantics according to which “I” live in all branches and have “distinct experiences” in different “superslices”. He uses “weight of a superslice” instead of “measure of existence” and argues that it is intelligible to associate probabilities according to the Probability Postulate. Exploiting a variety of ideas in decoherence theory such as the relational theory of tense and theories of identity over time, Saunders 1998 argues for the “identification of probability with the Hilbert Space norm” (which equals the measure of existence). Page 2003 promotes an approach named Mindless Sensationalism. The basic concept in this approach is a conscious experience. He assigns weights to different experiences depending on the quantum state of the universe, as the expectation values of presently-unknown positive operators corresponding to the experiences (similar to the measures of existence of the corresponding worlds). Page writes “… experiences with greater weights exist in some sense more …” (2003, 479). In all of these approaches, the postulate is introduced through an analogy with treatments of time, e.g., the measure of existence of a world is analogous to the duration of a time interval. Note also Greaves 2004 who advocates the “Behavior Principle” on the basis of the decision-theoretic reflection principle related to the next section.