 It is increasingly well-appreciated that one suitable metaphysical program to which the dynamical approach can appeal here is Huggett’s (2006) regularity relationism: see (Huggett 2009; Pooley 2013; Stevens 2020). The idea is to consider the dynamical laws as regularities that systematize and describe the patterns of events concerning an underlying ontology/ideology that involves or presupposes only very limited spatiotemporal features. To illustrate how this approach might go, consider Pooley’s (2013, §6.3) proposal that the dynamical approach to STR might postulate only R4 topological spatiotemporal structure, which could be (for example) attributed to a massive scalar field. Suppose we are given a full 4D field description of such a field, in terms of some arbitrary coordinate system. This would describe a simple ‘Humean mosaic’, to use David Lewis’ term for one’s basic spatiotemporal and material commitments (see article  David Lewis  for further discussion). Now, smooth coordinate changes applied to such a description will generate distinct mathematical representations of that Humean mosaic, given using distinct coordinatizations of the field-stuff. It might happen that, among all such representations, there is a subclass of coordinate systems which are such that (i) when the scalar field is described using a member of the class, it turns out that its values at spacetime points satisfy some simple/elegant mathematical equation; and moreover, (ii) the members of the class are related by a nicely-specifiable symmetry group. If this is so, then the simple/elegant equation can be taken as expressing a dynamical law for the world of this mosaic (understood as a statement: “There are frames in which …”), and the symmetry group of the law can be seen as capturing the derivative, not intrinsic, spacetime structure of the world. If the symmetry group is the Poincaré group, for example, then the field behaves ‘as if’ it were embedded in a spacetime with Minkowski geometry. But all this means is that the dynamics is representationally equivalent to a theory with an autonomous Minkowski geometry. From the point of view of the dynamical approach, such a theory is merely an interesting, and perhaps useful, representation of the real facts: and it’s a mistake to take every feature of a representation to correspond to something in reality (Brown &amp; Read 2020, §5).