 Leplin clarifies that a ‘minimally adequate reconstruction’ of such reasoning will be a valid deduction D of the ‘basic identifying hypotheses’ of T from independently warranted background assumptions—the premises of D cannot be weakened or simplified while preserving D’s validity. Thus for Leplin what establishes whether O is a novel consequence of T is not whether O was actually used in the construction of T, but rather whether it was ‘needed’ for T’s construction. As with Worrall’s mature ‘essential use’ conception of novelty, what matters is whether there is a heuristic path to T that does not appeal to O, whether or not O was used in constructing T. The Uniqueness Condition helps bolster the argument for the truth of theories with true novel consequences, for if there were another theory \(T'\) (incompatible with T) that also provides a viable explanation of O, the imputation of truth could not explain the novel success of both T and \(T'\). The success of at least one would have to be due to chance, but if chance could explain one such success it could explain the other as well. 