 Indeed, in most scientific arenas, singular behavior is viewed as an indication that the theory being used is deficient, at least in the sense that it is not adequate for modeling systems in the regime where such behavior is predicted (Berry 1992). It is therefore common to claim that general relativity, in predicting that spacetime is singular, is predicting its own demise, and that classical descriptions of space and time break down at black hole singularities and the Big Bang, and all the rest (Hawking and Ellis 1973; Hawking and Penrose 1996). Such a view denies that singularities are real features of the actual world, and rather asserts that they are merely artifacts of our current, inevitably limited, physical theories, marking the regime where the representational capacities of the theory at issue breaks down. This attitude is widely adopted with regard to many important cases, e.g., the divergence of the Newtonian gravitational potential for point particles, the singularities in the equations of motion of classical electromagnetism for point electrons, the singular caustics in geometrical optics, and so on. No one seriously believes that singular behavior in such models in those classical theories represents truly singular behavior in the physical world. We should, the thought goes, treat singularities in general relativity in the same way. 