 How might epistemic perceptualists respond? One possibility is to emphasize a salient difference between emotions and sense perceptions: emotions have cognitive bases in the subject’s perceptions or beliefs (Deonna and Teroni 2012: 24–25). For example, I’m not afraid of the dog in front of me unless I think there’s a dog in front of me, and believe that it may well hurt me. My fear is grounded in part in those beliefs or perceptions. One consequence is that the emotion itself is justified only if the cognitive bases are justified (even if not necessarily true) (Greenspan 1988). If so, emotional justification is dependent (Pelser 2014, Cowan 2018). Initially, this might look like bad news for EEP, since it appears to conflict with the thesis that emotions provide immediate justification for evaluative propositions. But note that while emotional justification may presuppose justification for belief in non-evaluative propositions (such as those concerning a dog’s proneness to attack), there is a gap between these inputs and the evaluative proposition that is the content of the emotional experience itself according to perceptualism (see Etcheverri 2019). I might be angry with you because I believe you told somebody about my peculiar hobby, but the anger itself doesn’t present you as having talked about my hobby, but rather your having wronged me. Even if it is as a matter of fact the case that my being wronged in this situation consists in your having revealed an embarrassing fact about me, it doesn’t follow that what justifies belief in the factual proposition suffices to justify the belief in the moral proposition. For all that’s been said about epistemic dependence on cognitive bases, my anger might provide additional, immediate justification for belief in the wrongness of your act. As Robert Cowan puts it, “when the cognitive base of an emotion is justified then emotions can justify beliefs with evaluative content, independently of having further justification for believing supporting evaluative propositions” (2018: 229).