 Social psychologist Luther Lee Bernard (1921; 1924) also thought that ambiguity in psychologists’ use of “instinct” promoted faulty inferences. As he explained, the typical instinct theorist, “often confuses both himself and the reader by such vagueness of speaking, for he may at one time mean only to emphasize the automatic character of the act and at another he may fall back upon the recognized or approved meaning of the term, implying that automatism is an inherited phenomenon” (1921, 101). In other places, Bernard observed, instinct theorists would take developmental fixity as a sufficient condition for instinct, with “any relatively fixed or definite action pattern being pronounced an instinct whether it is acquired or inherited” (1921, 101). In addition to such inconsistencies, Bernard accused instinct theorists of remaining “untouched by the biological foundations of these sciences… [since] they have failed to grasp the true significance of Mendelian theory for the social and mental sciences” (1921, 103). To illustrate, Bernard cited examples in which instinct theorists would posit the evolution of a species-typical instinct in just a few generations. Such rapid fixation violated basic principles of Mendelian inheritance as Bernard understood them. Bernard envisioned a future for social psychology “the practitioners of which fully recognized that nature and culture could not be separated” (Cravens and Burnham 1971, 654–55).