 Avicenna refers to the first type as the real (or genuine) disjunction (munfaṣila ḥaqīqiyya) and to the other two types as unreal (ġayr ḥaqīqī) disjunctions. The second and third type were canonically referred to by Post-Avicennan logicians as the māniʿat al-ğamʿ disjunction (preventing the joint affirmation of the two disjuncts, i.e., compatible with their both being false together but incompatible with their both being true together) and the māniʿat al-ḫuluww disjunction (preventing the joint negation of the two disjuncts, i.e., compatible with their both being true together but incompatible with their both being false together) (El-Rouayheb 2010).