  1. Transcendental arguments are anti-skeptical, so that (as Strawson puts it) it is widely assumed that ‘the point of transcendental arguments in general is an anti-sceptical point’ (Strawson 1985: 10). Moreover, in the ambitious form in which we have considered them so far, they refute the skeptic in a direct manner, by purporting to prove what she doubts or questions, and they do so on their own, without bringing in any wider epistemological theories or considerations. And these arguments are what is sometimes called world-directed or ­truth-directed (cf. Peacocke 1989: 4; Cassam 1997: 33; Cassam 1999: 83): that is, they set out to establish the truth of some claim about how reality is and what it contains (such as subject-independent objects in space and time, or other minds, or causal laws).