 Yet other versions of FP pluralism directly threaten TT by assuming FP has a primary function and basis that is non-theoretical. Such accounts reject TT by holding that FP’s primary function is not that of making third-personal predictions and explanations about minds. For example, it has been proposed that FP’s primary work is to achieve regulative mind-shaping by means of imitation, pedagogy, and other social conformity mechanisms. So understood, the main work of FP is that of normatively molding, not descriptively reading, minds (McGeer 2007, 2015, forthcoming; Zawidzki 2008, 2013; Castro 2020). It is assumed that as a result of such mindshaping minds become more predictable, enabling—amongst other things—successful cooperation and the successful predicting and explaining of minds by attributing contents to them. Importantly, on these mindshaping accounts, anything we might call theorizing about minds is a parasitic and peripheral capacity that only comes into play in special contexts.