 In thinking about these issues, we will adopt a familiar “robust” or “realist” view about the nature of properties, concepts, truths, propositions, and facts. We take it that properties are worldly characteristics of things that explain objective worldly similarities among things. So, for example, the property redness is the characteristic shared by things that are similar in being red. We also assume that we have concepts of properties, which are our way of representing properties in thought, and we assume there are propositions, which are the objects of belief, and which are structured entities at least partly constituted by concepts. We take beliefs to be cognitive states, the objects of which are propositions, which can be evaluated as true or false. Further, we take it that, at least in the case of synthetic truths, if a sentence or proposition is true, it is true in virtue of the obtaining of a relevant fact or worldly state of affairs. We take it that facts are worldly states of affairs. A simple example is the instantiation of redness by a fire truck. Our concern, then, is whether there are normative facts and properties.