Most philosophers who have addressed Libet’s work have argued that the conclusions about the role of conscious intentions and about free will do not follow, even if it is granted that the experimental methods and results are sound. They have argued that there are alternative interpretations of the evidence that preserve a causal role for conscious intentions and that are as plausible and probable as Libet’s own interpretation of the evidence (Flanagan 1992: 136–138; Zhu 2003; Mele 2009a; Schlosser 2012b). Further, it has been argued that the experiment creates a very unusual and artificial context in which participants are instructed to decide spontaneously. Due to this, it is questionable that the results of the experiment can be generalized (Keller and Heckhausen 1990; Roskies 2011; Waller 2012; Schlosser 2014). Schurger et al. (2012) have proposed and tested a model that addresses this issue. According to this model, the timing of the movement in the Libet experiment is determined by random threshold crossings in spontaneous fluctuations in neural activity. In particular, the model says that a decision when to move is determined by random threshold crossings only when it is not constrained by any evidence or reasons for action. The fact that this model has been tested successfully supports the claim that the results from the Libet experiment and from similar follow-up studies do not generalize, because most of our everyday decisions clearly are constrained by evidence and by reasons for action.