 Technology can be said to have two ‘cores’ or ‘dimensions’, which can be referred to as instrumentality and productivity. Instrumentality covers the totality of human endeavours to control their lives and their environments by interfering with the world in an instrumental way, by using things in a purposeful and clever way. Productivity covers the totality of human endeavours to brings new things into existence that can do certain things in a controlled and clever way. For the study of instrumentality, however, it is in principle irrelevant whether or not the things that are made use of in controlling our lives and environments have been made by us first; if we somehow could rely on natural objects to always be available to serve our purposes, the analysis of instrumentality and its consequences for how we live our lives would not necessarily be affected. Likewise, for the analysis of what is involved in the making of artifacts, and how the notion of artifact and of something new being brought into existence are to be understood, it is to a large extent irrelevant how human life, culture and society are changed as a result of the artifacts that are in fact produced. Clearly, humanities philosophy of technology has until now been more attracted by the instrumentality core whereas analytic philosophy of technology has mainly gone for the productivity core. But technology as one of the basic phenomena of modern society, if not the most basic one, clearly is constituted by the processes centering on and involving both cores. It has proved difficult, however, to come to an overarching approach in which the interaction between these two dimensions of technology are adequately dealt with—no doubt partly due to the great differences in philosophical orientation and methodology associated with the two traditions and their separate foci. To improve this situation is arguably the most urgent challenge that the field of philosophy of technology as a whole is facing, since the continuation of the two orientations leading their separate lives threatens its unity and coherence as a discipline in the first place. Notwithstanding its centrality and urgency, the ambiguity noted here seems hardly to be confronted directly in the literature. It is addressed by Lawson (2008, 2017) and by Franssen and Koller (2016).