 In any case, the earnest consequentializer adopts a different procedure for consequentializing: what’s known as the Coherentist Procedure (Portmore 2011: 113). On this procedure, we don’t just adopt whatever ranking of outcomes is necessary to ensure that the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory will be perfectly co-extensive with the target non-consequentialist theory. Instead, we hold constant the idea that one act is morally better than another if and only if its outcome outranks that of the other while revising, in light of each other and in light of our various background beliefs, both our pre-theoretical judgments about whether one outcome outranks another and our pre-theoretical judgments about whether the act that produces the one is morally better than the act that produces the other. And we do this until we reach wide reflective equilibrium—a state in which we have arrived at an acceptable coherence among our entire set of beliefs (see Daniels 2003 [2020]). And it may be that, to reach wide reflective equilibrium, we must reject some of the target non-consequentialist theory’s deontic verdicts rather than adopt the ranking of outcomes needed to consequentialize them.