 Many have continued to defend a criterial approach here. Crispin Wright and John McDowell have written extensively on this topic, each offering a very different interpretation of the notion of a criterion. While the debate here is complex and interwoven with issues such as realist vs anti-realist semantics, there is one thread in this debate that is particularly relevant to the epistemological problem of other minds: the question of whether criteria should be thought of as defeasible or indefeasible. Wright rightly sees this question as connected with the question of whether appeal to criteria can provide one with an anti-sceptical stance. Wright’s own understanding of criteria turns on an important distinction between constituting knowledge that P and an entitlement to a knowledge-claim that P. While a sceptic can always challenge the truth of any claim to know that which lies beyond the cognitive reach of the subject (examples here include the past and other minds), Wright suggests that the sceptic can make no inroads when one pulls in one’s horns and simply makes a statement about the reasonableness of one’s belief or claim to know in such cases. He then argues that reasonableness is secured if one can show that the criteria for the claim that, for example, another is in pain are satisfied and one knows of no consideration that would defeat the claim—in other words, just so long as one is using a word, e.g., “pain”, in accordance with the conventions in play in one’s linguistic community. It is a consequence of this understanding of criteria that, while one may be in the best position to make a claim to know that Tom is in pain by observing his behavior, one’s claim is defeasible—that is, it is open to being shown to be mistaken in the light of further evidence. Importantly, to hold that behavioral criteria are defeasible is not, according to Wright, to be committed to understanding behavior as ‘outer’ evidence (a symptom) of the other’s ‘inner’ mental states. Wright admits, however, that his position leaves room for scepticism: “a form of scepticism that is endemic in the very practice of assertion” (1984: [1993:  389–390]).[1]