 Śrīharṣa offers several arguments against distinctness, the first and the most important of which appears in the first chapter of the Sweets of Refutation (for a more elaborate treatment discussion, see Phillips 1995: 103–110). Śrīharṣa claims that distinctness of one object from another must either be (a) the very nature of the object (svarūpa), (b) mutual absence (anyonyābhāva), (c) difference in properties (vaidharmya), and (d) something else, like separateness (pṛthaktva). Proposals (a), (b) and (c) are accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers such as Udayana (Śāstrī 1940: 255), and (d) is accepted by Bhāsarvajña (Yogīndrānanda 1968: 160) and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas (Kunhan Raja &amp; Sastri 1933: 242). Śrīharṣa’s contention is this: Irrespective of how we define distinctness, no awareness—perceptual or otherwise—can present one object as distinct from another, without also presenting them as non-distinct (KKh 96–110). This, in turn, shows that even perceptual awareness of distinctness cannot contradict the Upanisadic testimony about non-distinctness of all objects.