 First, the current use of the term excludes some otherwise plausible candidates from being motivating reasons. For instance, someone’s goal or intention in acting, which is something the agent desires (to grow vegetables; to kill Desdemona) seem to be motivating factors in acting. But because these are not considerations in light of which one acts, they do not fall under the category “motivating reasons” as currently understood (but see Audi 1993). Similarly, a state of desiring (wanting to have one’s revenge), or a motive or emotion (for instance, jealousy) can be states “that encompass motivation”, to use Mele’s phrase, 2003: if one is in any such a mental state, one is thereby motivated to act. But again, these are not motivating reasons in the sense at issue because they are not considerations that the agent takes to favour acting. Moreover, many hold that states of desiring are often grounded in considerations about the goodness or value of what is desired—a view defended by Anscombe 1957, Nagel 1970, Quinn 1993, Raz 1999, and Schueler 2003, among others. When this is so, the motivating reasons both for wanting and for acting accordingly are the considerations about the goodness or rightness of what is desired. To continue with our example, Othello’s desire to kill Desdemona is grounded in the thoughts that she is unfaithful to him and that killing her is a fitting way to restore his reputation (even if the desire is intensified by his jealousy). These considerations are his reason for wanting to kill her and his reason for doing so. In short, what Othello desires (to kill Desdemona), his goal (to redress her betrayal), his state of desiring those things, or his motive (jealousy) are things that motivate him to kill Desdemona but they are not his motivating reasons in the semi-technical sense of the phrase stipulated above. His motivating reasons, if we agree he has any, are, rather, the putative facts that she is unfaithful to him and that killing her is a fitting way to restore his reputation.