 This definition of metaphysical foundationalism is somewhat vague since it attempts to capture the idea for all the different varieties of fundamentality that we have discussed, but it may be supplemented with an appropriate restriction on the type of entities it concerns (e.g., facts) and the subscripts \(D_{1}\), \(D_{2}\) … \(D_{N}\) may be replaced with one’s preferred kind or kinds of dependence, exactly as with the schemas proposed in  (AI)  and  (RI)  in  section 1.  Furthermore, we need to understand “fully account for” correspondingly, for instance, in the case of grounding it should be parsed as “fully grounds” and in the case of compositional dependence it should be parsed as “fully composes” (albeit in some cases it may not be entirely clear that a full/partial distinction properly applies). Now that we have a working notion of metaphysical foundationalism, we may proceed to discuss arguments in favor and against this view.