 In any case, a more serious problem is that many virtue epistemologists—among them Sosa (1988, 1991, 2007), Zagzebski (e.g., 1996, 1999) and Greco (2003, 2007, 2008, 2009)—hereafter, ‘robust virtue epistemologists’—think that their view can deal with Gettier problems without needing to add an additional anti-Gettier condition on knowledge. The way this is achieved is by making the move noted above of treating knowledge as a state that includes both the truly believing and the virtuous source by which that true belief was acquired. However, crucially, for robust virtue epistemologists, there is an important difference between (i) a belief’s being true and virtuously formed, and (ii) a belief’s being true because virtuously formed. Formulating knowledge along the latter lines, they insist, ensures that the target belief is not Gettiered. Even more, robust virtue epistemologists think the latter kind of formulation offers the resources to account for why knowledge is distinctively valuable.