 The claim that something is a normative reason for action is generally thought to be a “relational” claim: it establishes a relation between a fact, an agent, and an action kind. The relation is that of “being a reason for” (see Raz 1975 and 1998, Dancy 2004, Cuneo 2007). For example, the fact that a person has ingested a lethal poison may be a reason for the paramedics to give the person an antidote. According to some, the relation involves not just a person, a reason and an action, but more aspects: a time, circumstances, etc. (Skorupski 2010 and Scanlon 2014). This relational view of reasons gives a minimal sense in which claims about normative reasons are “agent-relative”: they relate agents to reasons (a more substantial sense is developed in Nagel 1970 and 1986 and discussed in the entry  reasons for action: agent-neutral vs. agent-relative).  But even in the minimal sense, the agent-relativity of reasons raises questions about the conditions that determine when a reason for acting applies to a particular agent. One such question, mentioned in the previous paragraph, is whether the reasons that apply to you depend on your desires and motivations. Another question is whether they depend on your knowledge and beliefs. To go back to the example of Othello: on the one hand it seems clear that Othello has no reason to kill Desdemona, and the reason he thinks he has—that she is unfaithful—is no reason at all. On the other hand, it might seem that Othello does have a reason, for he believes that Desdemona is unfaithful and believes, moreover, that his reputation has been damaged and needs to be restored with her death. And those beliefs appear to give him a reason to do what he does, at least from his perspective.