 Despite his remark about the “Epimenides paradox”, a form of the Liar paradox, Curry’s second method is a variant of a related semantic paradox, Grelling’s  paradox.[9]  In its original form, Grelling’s paradox considers a property possessed by many words, namely the property a word has when it fails to exemplify the property it stands for (Grelling &amp; Nelson 1908). For example, the word “offensiveness” has that property: it fails to exemplify the property it stands for, since it isn’t offensive (see entry on  paradoxes and contemporary logic).  In effect, Curry considers instead the property a word has provided it exemplifies the property it stands for only if time is infinite. Now suppose that our theory introduces a name \(u\) for this property. Curry then shows how to construct a sentence that (speaking informally) says that the name \(u\) exemplifies the property it stands for. He shows that this sentence will serve as a Curry sentence for a theory of properties and the denotation of  names.[10] 