 One interesting parallel between Western accounts of the emotions and Patañjali is the use of the “colouring” (uparāga) or “coloured” (uparaktam) metaphor with regard to the mind [e.g., in YS 4.23]. Patañjali claims that the mind is “coloured” by all of the objects it knows, including cognitions and emotions. This means that in order to understand the difference between itself and pure consciousness (puruṣa), it has to free itself from these colourings and become pure. Only then can it recognize that it is different from the puruṣa which cannot be known in itself because it cannot become an object of the mind. Vyāsa, in his commentary on YS 4.23, explains that the mind itself is an object that appears as a conscious subject which is why many philosophers mistake it for the subject. However, once the mind becomes empty of all objects the difference between the mind and puruṣa reveals itself. Vyāsa makes the argument that a mind which is empty of all objects can still know itself and thus it would have to become an object in the mind, i.e., itself. In other words, cognition would have to be cognized by itself. This, however, is impossible, according to him. Instead, puruṣa shows itself as that which makes cognition possible. In this sense, puruṣa can be compared to Husserl’s idea of the “transcendental ego”. So, puruṣa can only reveal itself indirectly by emptying the mind of all cognitions, including emotions. This means that emotions are regarded as an obstacle to liberation but at the same time, they share this designation with other cognitions of the world.