Here too it becomes apparent that Hegel, taking up themes from the Phenomenology, follows Fichte in treating property in terms of a recognitive analysis of the nature of such a right. A contractual exchange of commodities between two individuals itself involves an implicit act of recognition in as much as each, in giving something to the other in exchange for what they want, is thereby recognizing that other as a proprietor of that thing, or, more properly, of the inalienable value attaching to it (PR: §§72–81). By contrast, such proprietorship would be denied rather than recognised in fraud or theft—forms of wrong (Unrecht) in which right is negated rather than acknowledged or posited (§§82–93). Thus what differentiates property from mere possession is that it is grounded in a relation of reciprocal recognition between two willing subjects (§71 and remark). Moreover, it is in the exchange relation that we can see what it means for Hegel for individual subjects to share a common will—an idea which will have important implications with respect to the difference of Hegel’s conception of the state from that of Rousseau. Such an interactive constitution of the common will means that for Hegel that the identity among wills is achieved because of not in spite of co-existing differences between the particular wills of the subjects involved: while contracting individuals both will the same exchange, at a more concrete level, they do so with different ends in mind. Each wants something different from the exchange. Without this difference, the type of absorption of individual subjects into collective substance of the type of Hegel worries about in relation to Spinoza would occur (§258 remark).