 What is primarily judged as obligatory or forbidden is not the act, but a willing or decision, as Bolzano emphasizes. An action that is willed must thus be assessed according to those consequences which the agent thereby intends or wills to achieve: For an action to be morally good it is not enough, as we have already seen (at the end of section 5.2), that it is in accordance with the moral law, but it must be undertaken also with the intention for it to be so (RW IV, 266), i.e., due to the moral law (RW IV, 269). In this manner Bolzano abandons the scope of the purely consequentialist position which claims that the moral assessment of an action or of the willing-an-action as being obligatory, permissible or forbidden depends solely on its consequences. Bolzano’s utilitarianism is consequently not a purely consequentialist normative theory, but rather a mixed theory. In presenting such a mixed ethical theory, Bolzano came already close to a modern conception of ethics (such as, e.g., that outlined in William K. Frankena’s Ethics, 2nd edition, 1973, 43 ff.) which is very common within today’s applied ethics.