  In philosophy, “trait” is used more often in the context of anti-representationalist, dispositional theories of mind. While representationalists define concepts like “belief” in terms of internal, representational structures of the mind, dispositionalists define concepts like “belief” in terms of tendencies to behave in certain ways (and perhaps also to feel and think in certain ways). Building upon Ryle (1949/2009), Schwitzgebel (2006/2010, 2010, 2013) advances a dispositional theory of attitudes (in the philosophical sense, that is, a theory that claims that beliefs, desires, hopes, etc. are dispositions). On his view, attitudes have a broad (or “multitrack”) profile, including dispositions to feel, think, and speak in specific ways. The dispositional profile of a given attitude is determined by the folk-psychological stereotype for having that attitude, not by what’s inside the agent’s metaphoric “belief box.” For example, to establish that Jordan believes that women make good philosophers, one would look to what Jordan says about women philosophers, to her judgments about which philosophers are good and which aren’t, to her hiring practices, her gut feelings around men and women philosophers, etc. Agents with implicit biases pose an interesting challenge to dispositionalists, since these agents often match only part of the relevant folk-psychological stereotypes. For example, Jordan might say that she believes that women make good philosophers but fail to read any women philosophers (or, recall Frank;  §1). On Schwitzgebel’s “gradualist dispositionalism,” Jordan and Frank would be “in-between believers,” agents who partly match the relevant folk-psychological stereotypes for the attitudes in question.