 On this approach epistemic self-doubt is a state where one is confident and more or less correct that one believes q to degree x, that is, \(P(q) = x\), but also has an uncomfortably high level of confidence, say \(≥ .5\), that one is unreliable about q at that confidence. That is, one has confidence \(≥ .5\) that the objective probability of q when one has x-level of confidence in q is different from x, which we would write \(P(\PR(q\mid P(q)=x) \ne x) ≥ .5\). Let us say that the different value is y, so \(P(\PR(q\mid P(q)=x) = y) ≥ .5\), \(y \ne x\). Whether or not the reason for this unreliability is that one tends to mistake evidential support relations and whether one does or does not think a given evidential support relation obtains, make no general difference to this evaluation which is simply about whether one tends to get things right when doing the sort of thing one did in coming to be confident in q to level  x;[5]  it is about the relation between one’s confidence and the way things are.