 However, another refutation refined by Buddhist philosophers over the centuries is not dismissed so easily (Mokṣākāragupta 1998: 98; Patil 2009). The Nyāya argument falls to an upādhi, in this case the property, having-a-perceptible-body. As we have seen, an upādhi is defined as a property that pervades the probandum while failing to pervade the prover, that is to say, that is entailed by the presence of the probandum while not being instanced in at least one case of the prover. Having-an-agent-as-an-instrumental-cause, which is the \(S\) or probandum property of the target inference, is pervaded by the agent’s-having-a-perceptible-body, which is the \(U\) or upādhi property: all agents have bodies. But there is something that is an \(H\) but not a \(U\); something that is an effect but does not have within its causal complex an agent with a perceptible body, e.g., growing grass. The two conditions being met, it would follow that there is something that is an \(H\) but not an \(S\), something that is an effect but does not have an agent as an instrumental cause. Thus the upādhi defeats the apparent inference by showing that the required pervasion and entailment do not hold.