 Hume’s answer to these challenges is that we correct our initial responses for bias and the influence of moral luck, as well as our present disposition – not because we aim for some standard that is independent of our responses, but because of “many contradictions to our sentiments in society and conversation” (T 583) that result from relying on “momentary appearances” (T 582). After all, when someone uses moral language and calls someone “vicious”, “odious”, or “depraved”, she “expresses sentiments, in which, he expects, all his audience are to concur with him” (Hume 1751: 75). It is this expectation of concurrence characteristic of moral sentiments that pushes us towards a “common point of view” (ibid.) in moral judging, a point of view that abstracts from our particular interests, current disposition, and relation to the agent, and focuses on the effects of the person’s character traits on people around them (T 602–3) (see Sayre-McCord 1994).