The central claim of alethic relativism is that “is true”, despite appearances to the contrary, is (at least, in some relevant domains of discourse) not a one-place but a two-place predicate such that “P is true” should correctly be understood as (modulo differences in particular ways of developing this idea) shorthand for “P is true for X”, where X is a culture, conceptual scheme, belief framework, etc. And within the broad camp of alethic relativists, the matter of how it is that which we should opt for “P-is-true-for-X”, rather than “P is true”, simpliciter, is developed in different ways (e.g., see Meiland 1977; MacFarlane 2014: ch. 5; Egan 2007; Ferrari &amp; Moruzzi 2018). One shared commitment of relativizing the truth predicate is that claims such as “misfortune is caused by witchcraft” could be true according to the Azande cultural framework and false in the Western scientific framework. One major difficulty facing alethic relativists is to explain what “true for” actually means, and how “true for” should be understood as related to the more familiar absolutist truth predicate. For instance, should relative truth be understood as a modification on an already familiar strategy for thinking about truth (e.g., the correspondence, pragmatic or epistemic model) or in some different way, entirely? (MacFarlane 2014: ch. 2). Much of the work of New Relativists such as John MacFarlane (see §5) can be see as an attempt to clarify this thorny issue.