 J. L. Mackie regarded Anderson’s positive conception of goods as being “hopeless as an account of moral talk and reasoning” (Mackie 1985). However, despite being one of the current standard bearers for anti-realism in ethics the manner in which Mackie posed the question of the subjectivity of values owes much to Anderson’s ontological standpoint. Mackie seemed at pains to explain that his subjectivist view of ethical terms complied with Anderson’s main concern. Subjectivism in ethics is for Mackie the doctrine that objective facts in this field do not include any descriptive assignment of goodness or rightness of actions. It is “precisely because we want to distinguish what is simply and absolutely the case that we say values/obligations are relative.” (Mackie 1985). Mackie suggested that linguistic philosophy had made the realist-antirealist opposition a philosophical pseudo-question, and that with renewed interest in ontological issues this opposition returned in a pressing form in the “placement” issue regarding various “queer” entities in the world.