 On the account of moral judgment that I’ve proposed, the moral/conventional  task[19]  really taps a distinction between a set of norms that are backed by an affective system and a set of norms that are not backed by an affective system. On this theory, affect-backed normative claims will be treated differently than affect-neutral normative claims. Thus, the account predicts that transgressions of other (non-harm-based) rules that are backed by affective systems should also be treated as non-conventional. As a result, if we find that other affect-backed norms are also distinguished from conventional norms along the dimensions of permissibility, seriousness, authority contingency, and justification type, then this will provide an independent source of evidence for the account of moral judgment that I’ve proposed…. To test the prediction we need to exploit a body of (non-harm based) rules that are backed by an affective system. (2002: 227–228)