 This is were considerations of equilibrium refinements and/or alternative solution concepts come in. Parikh (1988, 1991, 1992) observes that of the two equilibria mentioned above, the first one Pareto-dominates the second—being the unique Pareto-Nash equilibrium—and that for this reason the former should be preferred. Van Rooij (2004) suggests that because Horn’s division of pragmatic labor involves not only language use but also language organization, one should look at signaling games from an evolutionary point of view, and make use of those variants of evolutionary game theory that explain the emergence of Pareto-optimal solutions. As a third alternative, following some ideas of De Jaegher (2008), van Rooij (2008) proposes that one could also make use of forward induction (a particular game-theoretic way of reasoning about surprising moves of the opponent) to single out the desired equilibrium. As an example of an approach that draws on detailed modelling of the epistemic states of interlocutors, Franke (2014a) suggests that we should distinguish cases of M-implicature that involve rather clear ad hoc reasoning, such as (5) and (6), from cases with a possibly more grammaticalized contrast, such as between (3) and (4).