 Bradley’s own account of judgment is that it is ‘the act which refers an ideal content ... to a reality beyond the act’, so that the logical form of every judgment is ‘Reality is such that, if anything is S then it is P’. This formulation makes intelligible what is superficially paradoxical in Bradley, when he says: ‘All judgments are categorical, for they all do affirm about the reality, and assert their content of that. Again, all are hypothetical, for not one of them can ascribe to reality its content unconditionally’ (Principles, Bk I, Ch. II, sec. 79, modified according to Bradley’s notes to the Second Edition). It is not hard to see in this an informal anticipation of the representation of sentences in terms of a combination of universal quantifier and object- and predicate-variables. Consider also Bradley’s treatment of sentences about fictional entities, such as ‘There are no ghosts’. On Bradley’s analysis, this turns out to be a condensed form for ‘Reality is no place where ghosts exist’. One sees here the close similarity with Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, where a negative existential like ‘Pegasus does not exist’ is not a statement about a non-existent Pegasus, but simply asserts that the universe of discourse (now playing the logical function of Bradley’s ‘Reality’) does not contain any individuals that possess all features ascribed to Pegasus in books of mythology. (Here as elsewhere the book looks forward as well as back.)