  The most interesting issues arise in the context of equivocal terms. These were divided into two kinds, chance equivocals, and deliberate equivocals. In the first case, the occurrences of the equivocal term were totally unconnected, but in the second case, some intention on the part of the speakers was involved, and the occurrences of the equivocal term could be related in various ways. From classical times onward, proper names such as ‘Ajax’ and ‘Alexander’ provided standard examples of equivocal terms. However, it was obvious that there were reasons for giving one proper name rather than another, and Aquinas, for instance, gave an elaborate list of such reasons. This suggested to at least some authors that proper names need not be regarded as chance equivocals. In his commentary on the Categories, Paul of Venice claimed that some names were purely equivocal, and he instanced ‘Aristotle’ and ‘Plato’. However, if several men were called John because they were born on the Feast of St. John, the name ‘John’ should be regarded as a univocal term. He overlooked the distinction made by his contemporary, John Dorp, between a common reason for giving the same name to two children, and the different singular concepts which that name signified. Dorp argued that a common reason was not enough for univocity. In the sixteenth century, Domingo de Soto used the newly-rediscovered commentary on the Categories by Philoponus (attributed wrongly to Ammonius) to introduce a new type of deliberate equivocal, ‘from hope and memory’. One might call one’s son Plato in the hope of his becoming a philosopher, or Nicomachus in memory of one’s father or Charles in honour of the Emperor.