 Four main sorts of answers to the persistence question have been proposed. The most popular are psychological-continuity views. They say that our persistence consists in some psychological relation. You are that future being that in some sense inherits its mental features from you—beliefs, memories, preferences, the capacity for rational thought, and so on—and you are that past being whose mental features you have inherited in this way. There is dispute over what sort of inheritance this has to be—whether it must be underpinned by some kind of physical continuity, for instance, and whether it requires a “non-branching” restriction. There is also disagreement about what mental features need to be inherited. (We will return to some of these points.) But most philosophers writing on personal identity since the early 20th century have endorsed some version of this view. The memory criterion mentioned earlier is an example. Advocates of psychological-continuity views include Garrett (1998), Hudson (2001, 2007), Johnston (1987, 2016), Lewis (1976), Nagel (1986: 40), Noonan (2003), Parfit (1971; 1984: 207; 2012), Perry (1972), Shoemaker (1970; 1984: 90; 1997; 1999, 2008, 2011), and Unger (1990: ch. 5; 2000). 