 Recent scholarship has continued to probe these issues. Davis (2014) closely examines Locke’s terminology and argues that we must distinguish between political society and legitimate government. Only those who have expressly consented are members of political society, while the government exercises legitimate authority over various types of people who have not so consented. The government is supreme in some respects, but there is no sovereign. He also argues (2017) that one could give actual consent in Locke’s day by declaring one’s intent to cast a vote, rather than by voting for a particular candidate. The former is more plausibly interpreted as an act of affirmative consent to be a member of a political society. Registering to vote, as opposed to actually voting, would be a contemporary analogue. Van der Vossen (2015) makes a related argument, claiming that the initial consent of property owners is not the mechanism by which governments come to rule over a particular territory. Rather, Locke thinks that people (probably fathers initially) simply begin exercising political authority and people tacitly consent. This tacit consent is sufficient to justify a rudimentary state that rules over the consenters. Treaties between these governments would then fix the territorial borders. Hoff (2015) goes still further, arguing that we need not even think of specific acts of tacit consent (such as deciding not to emigrate) as necessary for generating political obligation. Instead, consent is implied if the government itself functions in ways that show it is answerable to the people.