 In pure quantificational logic, one may, for example, derive the conditional \(\forall xPx \rightarrow \exists xPx\) as an immediate consequence of the axioms. But the derivability of this sentence—and others like \(\exists x (Px \rightarrow Px)\)—may give one pause. To the extent to which logic should remain neutral in ontological matters, the axioms of pure quantificational logic should not by themselves be able to prove that there is something rather than nothing. From a model-theoretic perspective, the exclusion of the empty domain as an eligible domain for a model may likewise seem artificial. Since the validity of formulas like \(\forall xPx \rightarrow \exists xPx\) or \(\exists x(Px \rightarrow Px)\) is largely a byproduct of what may seem an ad hoc stipulation, one may be motivated to expand the range of models in order to allow for a model with an empty domain of discourse. Quine (1954) used the label “inclusive” to refer to alternatives to quantificational logic that make allowance for such a model.