 Ross seems also to think we have no reason to avoid our own pain. This comes out clearly in his characterisations of the duty of non-maleficence. It comprises a duty not to injure ‘others’ (RG 21); the duty rests on the fact that ‘if there are things that are bad in themselves we ought, prima facie, not to bring them upon others’ (RG 26). He seems, then, to think while I have a prima facie duty not to harm others, I have no such duty not to harm myself. It seems to follow, then, it would not be morally wrong for me to impose a very large pain on myself to avoid only a trivial pain for another. It would not be wrong, then, for me to make myself a mere ‘means to the giving of pleasure to others’ (FE 75). This is hard to accept even if we accept Ross’s view there exist only moral duties. It seems morally wrong to use oneself in this way. And even if we are convinced we lack a moral duty to prevent our own pain we are very unlikely to be convinced we lack strong non-moral reason to prevent it. Ross may have to modify his duty of non-maleficence to accommodate this.