 Now \(p \lor {\sim}p\) and \(q \lor {\sim}q\) (“John is either a bachelor or not”, “Either 44 is the sum of two primes or not”) will express distinct thick propositions insofar as they are about different things (how things stand John-wise is a different issue from how things stand 44-wise). When, with distinct \(p\) and \(q\), the truthmakers of \(p \lor {\sim}p\) are \(\{p^+\}\) and \(\{p^-\}\), those of \(q \lor {\sim}q\) are \(\{q^+\}\) and \(\{q^-\}, s(p \lor {\sim}p)\) will differ from \(s(q \lor {\sim}q)\) and so the two thick propositions [\(p \lor {\sim}p\)] and [\(q \lor {\sim}q\)] will differ although \(|p \lor {\sim}p| = |q \lor {\sim}q| = W\). Also, [\(p\)] will differ from [\(p \land (q \lor {\sim}q)\)] as \(p\) is truthmade by \(\{p^+\}, p \land (q \lor {\sim}q)\) by \(\{p^+, q^+\}\) and \(\{p^+, q^-\}\), not by \(\{p^+\}\). So one can capture the idea that “You see that Mary is eating an ice cream” and “You see that Mary is eating an ice cream and John is either eating chips or not” don’t say the same, in the face of the logical equivalence of \(A\) and \(A \land (B \lor {\sim}B\)).