 There are numerous ways the idea of a prima facie duty might be further clarified. One way, suggested by Ross, is to think of a prima facie duty as constituting a tendency to be morally right or wrong (RG 28; FE 86). An act promoting general good has, for example, a tendency to be morally right and to contribute to determining our actual obligation (Hurka 2014, 72). A second way, also suggested by Ross, is to think of a prima facie duty as comprising a responsibility (FE 85). Repairing one’s past wrongs is something for which one has a responsibility, for instance, and this contributes to determining one’s actual obligation or responsibility. A third (controversial) way of explicating the idea is to think of a prima facie duty as constituting a moral reason for or against an act (Cowan 2017, 825; Olsen 2014, 64–65, 2015: 8; Shaver 2014, 314n24; Stratton-Lake 2002a, xxxiii–xxxviii, 2011a, 147–48, though cf. 2019). If my act will harm or injure another person, I have a moral reason not to do it given the duty of non-maleficence, and this reason contributes to determining my actual obligation. A fourth (more controversial still) way of clarifying the idea of a prima facie duty is to think of it as constituting a reason (sans phrase) in favour of or against an act (Phillips 2019, 26–37; Shaver 2011, 144). Ross himself used the language of reasons to explicate the idea of a prima facie duty. He says, for example, ‘the fact that a promise has been made itself constitutes a reason why it should be fulfilled’ (KT 21). These reasons contribute to determining my actual obligation or what I have actual reason to do.