On closer inspection, however, Quine is in no position to claim that theories couched in ordinary language never carry ontological commitment. In giving the truth conditions for the quantifiers of first-order logic, Quine explicitly makes use of ordinary language quantifiers (see, for example, Quine 1970). Thus, his claim that the first-order quantifiers are objectual, and carry ontological commitment, can't help but carry over to the ordinary language quantifiers from which they derive their meaning. There must, then, be some portion of ordinary language that can do all the work, vis-à-vis ontological commitment, that the first-order language was introduced to  do.[39]  This doesn't eliminate the need to seek paraphrases of ordinary language theories (see §4.2 below). But such theories need not be paraphrased into the language of first-order predicate logic; it is enough if they are paraphrased into that regimented portion of ordinary language that can be counted on, in appropriate contexts, to be ontologically serious. The problem that needs to be addressed by the Quinean is then: how to recognize which quantifiers, or which uses of quantifiers, make up this ontologically serious portion of ordinary language. Those who reject the Quinean approach to ontological commitment, on the other hand, need to argue that there is no principled way to separate out those quantifiers, or uses of quantifiers, that carry ontological commitment in ordinary language; or, more radically, that quantification in ordinary language is never ontologically committing.