 These four ideas remain central to current day expressivists, such as Blackburn (1984, 1993) and Gibbard (1990, 2003), whose work arises especially from ideas 1–3. Indeed, the title of Gibbard 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, suggests all three ideas. Current day hybrid theorists and relational expressivists, such as David Copp (2001, 2009), Stephen Barker (2002), Michael Ridge (2006, 2014), Daniel Boisvert (2008), and Teemu Toppinen (2013) hold that moral language is used conventionally to express both beliefs and attitudes—or states of being in some suitably related belief- and attitude states—and, thereby, continue to develop in different ways Stevenson’s idea that moral sentences have both emotive and descriptive meaning (see also Schroeder 2009; 2013; Fletcher and Ridge 2014; Toppinen 2018).