There is another type of problem with the suggestion about collective intention. Suppose that a philosopher develops an account of what constitutes the collective intention of a large, diverse group whose members’ attitudes conflict with each other. According to this account, let’s further suppose, the collective intention of such a group depends in a complex way on how the group would behave in various counterfactual circumstances. (One complication is that it might be that what constitutes the collective intention of a group is relative to the purposes for which the question is asked. But let’s set this complication aside for the sake of argument.) Even if the philosopher’s account is a correct account of the nature of group minds, it is a further question whether and to what extent legal interpretation should care about the intentions specified by such an account. That question cannot be resolved by the philosophy of mind, for the answer depends on distinctively legal concerns, and the details of the putative account of collective intentions would obviously matter.