 How then would Berkeley account for the apparent interaction between physical objects we common experience, such as the stove in my kitchen boiling a pot of water? According to Berkeley, this phenomenon is to be understood as God causing the relevant sensations in us in a regular fashion, and this regularity underwrites what we typically take to be the laws of nature (PHK  30).[9]  Thus, within the domain of physical objects, Berkeley appears to think that God is the unique genuine cause, consistent with our characterization of occasionalism. There has been, however, some controversy in recent secondary literature as to whether one’s own body is to be included in this domain of physical objects. Some (such as McDonough 2008) have argued against this inclusion, while others (such as Lee 2012) have argued that we, as finite spirits, have no genuine causal input in the movement of our own bodies, and such movement is directly caused by God like any other physical object for  Berkeley.[10] 