 Many are attracted to the claim that contextual supplementation of what’s said is always traceable to some syntactic element; that is, the information semantically encoded by an utterance must have the same structure as the syntactic form of the sentence uttered. Call this the the principle of linguistic constraint. (See, for example, Stanley 2000, 2002 for a defense of this constraint. Recanati 2002 and Carston 1998, 2002, 2016 offer very sensitive defenses of unarticulated constituents.) One reason to accept this principle is that it helps to demarcate information that is conveyed by an utterance but not part of what is said by the sentence uttered. And it does this in a way that solves an overgeneration problem that threatens theories violating this constraint. Perhaps one can, given the correct conversational setting, using the sentence ‘2+2=4’ to communicate that one is going to the store. Even still, it seems plausible that the sentence itself does not say that, as nothing in the sentence contributes the relevant components of that communicated piece of information. Crimmins and Perry’s view is inconsistent with this principle, as they argue that ‘believes’ is syntactically two-place even though it expresses a three-place relation. So, anyone convinced that our semantic theories should be syntactically constrained will reject Crimmins and Perry’s view.