 Two sorts of reason are worth examining. On the one hand, it is sometimes argued that sameness of proper parts is not sufficient for identity. For example, it is argued that: (i) two words can be made up of the same letters (Hempel 1953: 110; Rescher 1955: 10), two tunes of the same notes (Rosen and Dorr 2002: 154), and so on; or (ii) the same flowers can compose a nice bunch or a scattered bundle, depending on the arrangements of the individual flowers (Eberle 1970: §2.10); or (iii) two groups can have co-extensive memberships, say, the Library Committee and the Philosophy Department football team (Simons 1987: 114; Gilbert 1989: 273); or (iv) a cat must be distinguished from the corresponding amount of feline tissue, for the former can survive the annihilation of certain parts (the tail, for instance) whereas the latter cannot by definition (Wiggins 1968; see also Doepke 1982, Lowe 1989, Johnston 1992, Baker 1997, Meirav 2003, Sanford 2003, and Crane 2012, inter alia, for similar or related arguments). On the other hand, it is sometimes argued that sameness of parts is not necessary for identity, as some entities may survive mereological change. If a cat survives the annihilation of its tail, then the tailed cat (before the accident) and the tailless cat (after the accident) are numerically the same in spite of their having different proper parts (Wiggins 1980). If any of these arguments is accepted, then clearly (27) is too strong a principle to be imposed on the parthood relation. And since (27) follows from (P.5), it might be concluded that EM is on the wrong track.