 Second, the requirement of awareness of moral significance. For John to be blameworthy, he has to be aware of the action’s moral significance or moral valence. In other words, he must have a belief about the action’s being wrong or, alternatively, a belief about the presence of whatever features make the action wrong (its wrong-making features). The first kind of belief amounts to de dicto awareness of moral significance, because it involves awareness of the action’s wrongness so conceived (Haji 1997: 543; Zimmerman 2002a; 2008: 191–2; 2017: 85; Rosen 2004: 307; Levy 2011: 141; Sliwa 2017: 131–2). The second kind of belief amounts to de re awareness of moral significance, because it involves awareness of those features of the action that are in fact morally significant, regardless of whether the agent is also aware of the moral significance they actually have (Harman 2011: 465; 2015: 59–60, 67; Talbert 2013: 242; Littlejohn 2014: 144; Levy 2014: 37). If when John presses the button he entertains the belief that what he is doing is overall morally wrong, he has de dicto awareness of the action’s moral significance. (If, alternatively, he believes that his action is merely pro tanto morally wrong but not wrong all-things-considered, he lacks that awareness.) If, on the other hand, John lacks the belief about overall wrongness but has other beliefs about the action’s wrong-making features, e.g., that it will harm Mary, he has de re awareness of the action’s moral significance. The position according to which the relevant awareness is de dicto awareness entails that moral knowledge (or at least moral beliefs) is necessary for responsibility (Sliwa 2017), whereas the position according to which the relevant awareness is de re awareness denies the necessity of moral knowledge (Harman 2011 &amp; 2015; Talbert 2013; Weatherson 2019: ch. 5). We’ll see below  (sect. 3.3)  that this is a key dispute concerning the epistemic requirements on praise-/blameworthiness.