 Despite their insistence upon volitional freedom, which in some aspects anticipates Kant’s thought, Scotus and Ockham argue that the true measure of morality lies in the conformity of the human will with the commands of God. Such precepts may change if God so desires and so Scotus and Ockham produce an ethics quite different in spirit from that of Kant’s theory of universal imperatives. Ockham in his rejection of the intellectual basis for morality argues that an act in total conformity with right reason may not be virtuous, since God could possibly create such an act without human volitional consent. The act would be completely rational and in conformity with divine commands, but would lack any merit or virtue. For Ockham the goodness of any action lies completely in the will’s desire to obey divine commands (De connexione virtutum, III, 11). When Kant describes practical reason as a necessary law for all rational beings, whose actions are always to be judged according to maxims completely bound to the concept of the will of a rational being, one may see parallels to the Franciscan doctrine of the autonomy of the will. As Thomas and Albert describe the genesis of moral action as a process in which practical reason has the ability to accept, understand and obey the principles of a universal law consonant with human nature, they approach Kant’s description of the dignity of the will more closely than those who insist upon the necessity for adherence to the possibly arbitrary precepts of God. Practical reason as the desire for the good as good, as expressed in the first principle of natural law or obedience to divine commands, and the conformity of the will through free choice to the universally binding principles of practical reason indicate that in some important elements of their moral theories medieval philosophers approach the spirit of Kant as they move away from the legacy of Aristotle.