 Power is not only exercised within and through the formal political process, however, but within and through a wide range of other social relationships. For example, employers can exercise power over their employees. Historically, husbands have often wielded great power over wives. These power relations can emerge in part because of inequalities in the economic positions between the parties (for very helpful discussions, to which we are here indebted, see Goodin 1986, 1988; Okin 1989: chapter 7). One party—the employer, the husband—might be able to do perfectly well financially without the other party. By contrast, the second party—the individual worker, the wife—might be financially reliant on the first party. Were the first party to exit from the relationship, this party would suffer little harm, but the second party would suffer a severe fall in living standards. Precisely because of this inequality in the costs of exiting from the relationship, the first party has the power to shape the relationship on their terms. The worker or wife is not in a position to argue with the employer’s or husband’s commands because the employer’s or husband’s threat to leave the relationship unless obedience is forthcoming will be at once credible (since they stand to lose little financially from exiting it) and compelling (because the worker or wife stand to lose so much financially if the employer or husband do go ahead and exit). Power inequalities of this kind are objectionable for a number of reasons. It can be argued that they directly reduce the freedom of the less powerful parties by subjecting them to ‘domination’ (Pettit 1997). They also put the less powerful parties at risk of exploitation and abuse by the more powerful parties (Goodin 1986, 1988; Okin 1989).