  We have already encountered one of the most powerful sources of extensional opposition to nontrivial versions of reasons internalism in the form of the Central Problem. The Central Problem is that it seems that some actions are wrong for everyone no matter what they are like, and that their wrongness for someone requires that that person have a reason not to do them. But many kinds of internalism—in particular Actual State views—say that an agent has a reason only if she satisfies a certain condition, and hence that her reason depends on what she is like. We can even frame the Central Problem by divorcing it from Moral Rationalism and Moral Absolutism, and simply insisting that for at least some actions (perhaps paradigmatic wrong actions among them), there is a reason for anyone not to do those actions, no matter what she is like. This leads to a direct argument against many forms of internalism: that they undergenerate reasons, by providing negative verdicts in cases in which intuitively there really are reasons.