 In the literature on causal explanation, the most famous proponent of pragmatic explanation is van Fraassen (1980) who argues that explanations are answers to why-questions. A fairly straightforward analogue for metaphysical explanation would be to hold that metaphysical explanations are answers to what-makes-it-the-case-that questions. There are then various different ways in which aspects of context become salient. First, the context might focus the question. When we ask “What makes it the case that the ball is red?”, we will expect different answers depending on the contrast class we had in mind (e.g., red rather than some other color, or red rather than merely appearing to be red). Second, the context also determines the kinds of answers that are acceptable, which might differ based on (for example) the background knowledge of the explanation-seeker and explanation-receiver. An artist will typically have a far more finely-grained conception of what particular shade makes a certain Rothko painting red than your average schoolchild would, and so a particular answer might count as explanatory for the artist but not for a child (who may not even possess the relevant color concept).