 The above account invites a worry from the perspective of rational choice theory. According to the standard construal of Bayesian decision theory, the kind of doxastic state that ought to enter decision-making is unconditional credence rather than conditional credence. So Earman (1992: sec. 7.3) is led to think that what we really need is an epistemology for unconditional credence, which the above account fails to provide. A possible reply is anticipated by some Bayesian decision theorists, such as Savage (1972: sec. 5.5) and Harsanyi (1985). They argue that, when making a decision, we often only have conditional credences—conditional on a simplifying assumption that makes the decision problem in question manageable. For other Bayesian decision theorists who follow Savage and Harsanyi, see the references in Joyce (1999: sec. 2.6, 4.2, 5.5 and 7.1). For more on rational choice theory, see the entry on  decision theory  and the entry on  normative theories of rational choice: expected utility.