   Expressivism represents one line of response to this skeptical worry about practical reason. Accounts of this kind offer interpretations of the normative and evaluative language that distinctively figures in practical reflection. As was seen in section 1, such reflection addresses an agent’s reasons for acting in one way or another; conclusions about such reasons are characteristically couched in evaluative terms, as claims about what it would be good to do, or as normative conclusions about the actions that one ought to perform. According to the expressivist, however, evaluative and normative claims of these kinds do not represent genuine cognitive achievements, judgments that are literally capable of being true or false.  Rather they give expression to desires, sentiments, plans, and other pro-attitudes, the sorts of goal-directed noncognitive state that move people to action. The expressivist contends that we can make sense of the capacity of practical reason to generate states with the peculiar structure and function of intentions only if evaluative and normative assertions are understood along these lines.