 Failure to recognise that knowledge rests on presuppositions encourages the belief that pure being is a possible object of knowledge. Traditionally it was metaphysics that was deemed to be the science of pure being. In the aftermath of the scientific revolution this role was increasingly claimed by the most fundamental of the sciences: physics. If Collingwood’s claim that metaphysics should take the form of a logical enquiry into presuppositions is right, then there is no contest between metaphysics and physics or more generally between philosophy and (natural) science because no form of knowledge can claim the title of science of pure being. Philosophy does not conflict with natural science because it does not advance claims about the nature of reality but about the presuppositions under which all sciences, including natural science, operate. Nor is there conflict between (natural) science and other forms of knowledge because different forms of knowledge answer different kinds of questions, questions which arise from different presuppositions. In reminding philosophers that all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, rests on presuppositions, Collingwood rehabilitates the older, Latin sense of the term scientia which is not synonymous with natural science but with “a body of systematic or orderly thinking about a determinate subject-matter” (EM 1998: 4). The use of “science” to mean “natural science” is a slang use of the term (EM 1998: 4) that has that is symptomatic of the prevalence of scientism, the belief that only scientific knowledge is a form of knowledge and that science can answer all questions.