  Lewis (1983, 1984) suggested the way out here is to posit a notion of ‘naturalness’. Sometimes a term t denotes the concept C1 rather than C2 not because we are disposed to use t as if it meant C1 rather than C2, but simply because C1 is a more natural concept. ‘Plus’ means plus rather than quus simply because plus is more natural than quus. Something like the same story applies to names and demonstratives. Imagine I point in the direction of Tibbles the cat and say, “That is Edgar's favourite cat.” There is a way of systematically (mis)interpreting all my utterances so ‘that’ denotes the Tibbles-shaped region of spacetime exactly one metre behind Tibbles. (We have to reinterpret what ‘cat’ means to make this work, but the discussions of semantic indeterminacy in Quine and Kripke make it clear how to do this.) So there's nothing in my usage dispositions that makes ‘that’ mean Tibbles, rather than the region of space time that ‘follows’ him around. But because Tibbles is more natural than that region of space time, ‘that’ does pick out Tibbles. It is the very same naturalness that makes ‘cat’ denote a property that Tibbles (and not the trailing region of space time) satisfies that makes ‘that’ denote Tibbles, a fact that will become important below.