 Suppose we take a group of speakers who use, or think they use, the name, “Socrates”, with the same reference. Suppose we then ask each member of the group to write down what he considers to be the salient facts about Socrates, and then form from these lists of facts a composite description incorporating the most frequently mentioned facts. Now it would be too much to say that the success of term-introduction within the group by means of the name requires that there should exist just one person of whom all the propositions in the composite description are true. But it would not be too much to say that it requires that there should exist one and only one person of whom some reasonable proportion of these propositions is true. If, for example, it should be found that there was just one person of whom half the propositions were jointly true, and just one person, a different one, of whom the other half of the propositions were jointly true, then, unless some indication were given of which Socrates was meant, it would become impossible to give a straightforward answer to the question, whether any particular “proposition about Socrates” was true or false. It is true, perhaps, of Socrates\(_1\), and not of Socrates\(_2\). It is neither true nor false of Socrates simpliciter, for, it turns out, there is no such person. (Strawson 1959: 191–192)