 Spinoza contrasts confused and falsehood-inviting imagination with “intellect”, which he subdivides further into “reason” and “intuition”. Given Spinoza’s bundle-theoretic approach to minds (2.1.1), talk of “intellect” is not intended to conjure up here some sort of mental “faculty” over and above particular ideas. “Intellect” is instead Spinoza’s name for a certain type of cognition, namely cognition that is “necessarily true” (E2p41). That is, intellectual ideas necessarily “agree” with, or correspond to, represented objects (E1ax6; see 3.1). This “agreement” with how things really are in the world allows intellectual ideas to both be “the same in all men” (E2p18s), and to reflect the actual causal order of things in nature. Hence Spinoza can also describe intellect as cognition of things “through their first causes” (E2p18s, cf. E2p7), that is, ultimately through the all-necessitating divine essence that determines the causal order of things (E1p15, E1p16). Intellectual ideas are also “adequate” (E2p41d), that is, manifestly true and fully explained by the mind they help constitute (3.1). Because intellectual ideas of truth and falsity in particular are manifestly true, intellectual cognition enables us to “distinguish the true from the false” with certainty (E2p42).