  Let us consider the respects in which the details of Scanlon's account do and do not resemble FA theory, and then turn to what I take as the leading thought of the buck-passing metaphor. Because Scanlon refers to reasons to respond, and elsewhere to various attitudes one can take toward value, he can seem to be focusing on the evaluative attitudes at the heart of FA theories. But Scanlon's notion of response focuses primarily on action, and secondarily on such practical attitudes as respect, contemplation, and enjoyment, as opposed to emotions. While his discussion raises questions about evaluative attitudes that are left unanswered, two points are clear. First, Scanlon rejects what he calls the teleological conception of value, according to which value only provides reasons to promote the valuable (and minimize the disvaluable). Second, Scanlon (1998: 99) rejects any account of value as systematic as generic FA theory: