Stewart Shapiro (2014) is probably the most vocal defender of this approach. His argument for relativism about logic is similar to defences of relativism in other areas where intractable differences in a particular domain and an inability to reconcile them are used as the motivators for relativism. Shapiro advocates what, following Crispin Wright, he calls “folk-relativism” and its slogan that “There is no such thing as simply being Φ” (Shapiro, 2014: 7; Wright 2008a: 158) and applies it to validity and logical consequence. The claim is that there are different conceptions of logical consequence. in classical and non-classical logic, which although not compatible can still capture correct accounts of the idea of logical consequence. Therefore, it does not make sense to think that there is a uniquely correct conception of validity and logical consequence. Different conceptions can be legitimate in so far as each is (internally) consistent and also non-trivial in the sense that it is the basis a workable mathematical systems, i.e., the means of making sense of “the practice of pursuing and applying mathematics” (Shapiro 2014: 81). Intuitionism and fuzzy logic are notable examples. Choices between different logical vocabularies also can lead to a relativized conception of logic in so far a these vocabularies play a decisive role in generating different relations of logical consequence.