 We turn to one of the most discussed challenges to presentism in the contemporary debate: the truth-maker objection to presentism. At first pass, this objection is another instance of the general problem of cross-temporal relations  (§4),  but there are reasons for thinking that concerns about truth-makers underwrite a special problem for presentists. This objection is treated as a significant problem for presentism by many, including but not limited to: Sider (2001: 35–42), Armstrong (2004: 145–50), Keller (2004), Crisp (2007), Cameron (2011), Sanson &amp; Caplan (2010), Markosian (2013), Tallant &amp; Ingram (2015), and Emery (2020). For one general discussion of the problem, see Caplan &amp; Sanson (2011). [See the entry on  truthmakers  for background.]