  Skeptics about representation, such as Chemero (2009) and Hutto and Myin (2013) focus on the continuous contact that Brooks’s Creatures bear to their environments as a reason to deny a role for representation. Because a Creature is in constant contact with the world, it does not need to represent the world. But constant contact does not always obviate a need for representation. Consider, for instance, that an organism might be in constant contact with many features of its environment—sunlight, humidity, oxygen, the gravitational pull of the moon, and so on. Yet, surely it will be sensitive to only some of these features—only some of these features will shape the organism’s behavior. A natural way to describe how some features make a difference to an organism while others do not might appeal to representation—an organism detects some features, represents them, and not others. Whether detection of this sort must involve representation will depend on the theory of representation that one adopts. One might therefore see the success of Brooks’s challenge to representation, and the enactivists’ embrace of the challenge, as hostage to a theory of representation, the details of which will no doubt themselves be controversial.