Another question that arises about God’s knowledge is whether it is all occurrent knowledge or whether some of his knowledge is dispositional. Knowledge of a proposition is occurrent if the knower has that proposition in mind. And knowledge of a proposition is dispositional, roughly, if the person knows the proposition but is not currently thinking about it or entertaining it, that is, if the person has a dispositional belief (see Section 2.1 of the entry on belief) in that proposition. Philosophers have answered this question differently. Thomas Aquinas claimed that God’s knowledge was not “discursive” (Summa Theologiae, I, 14, 7), by which he meant, in the first place, that God does not first think of one thing and then think of another, for “God sees all things together and not successively”. On the other hand, Hunt (1995) has argued that taking God’s knowledge of the future to be dispositional can provide a way of reconciling divine foreknowledge with human free action (see next section). It seems hard to understand, however, how someone with the vast ability to be omniscient could fail to be aware of any part of what they know.