 The question of the section, “What is the relation between thinking and being?”, is thus answered by way of an extensive phenomenology, aporetics, and theory of cognition that clings to the basic aspect of transcendence and grasping, debunking rationalist pretensions to transparently cognize everything. It is not the case that “being is immanent to thinking,” but that “thinking is immanent to being.” “This ontological immanence has the simple meaning of total embeddedness of the rational in a larger sphere of the nonrational, in whose thoroughgoing relations it is completely interwoven and in whose existing determinations it remains interwoven even where a consciousness of these relations does not extend. It is the total embeddedness of thinking and of cognition as a whole in being” (ME35d). It should be noted that Heidegger also demoted cognition to secondary ontological status in Being and Time (§13, 1962 [1927]), and refers there to Hartmann’s book.