 Here Luke’s payoffs are depicted on the horizontal axis, while Matthew’s are on the vertical axis. As we can see, although the solutions differ, each leaves Matthew with a higher payoff than Luke receives. This is because each solution allocates Matthew a larger share of the  good,[5]  and is due to the asymmetry in the nonagreement point that characterizes the Braithwaite Problem. Specifically, (H, H) is Luke’s worst possible outcome, but not Matthew’s, so Matthew has a threat advantage. In less technical terms, because failing to agree is less bad for Matthew he can use the threat of nonagreement to press for an agreement that is more favorable to him. And this asymmetry distinguishes the Braithwaite Bargaining Problem from the Wine Division Problem depicted in  Figure 9  where the three solutions coincide with the point \(\bu^{*} = \left(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}\right)\) in which the agents involved each receive equal shares.