This first way of arguing for rule-consequentialism might be seen as drawing on the idea that a theory is better justified to us to the extent that it increases coherence within our beliefs (Rawls 1951, 1971: 19–21, 46–51; DePaul 1987; Ebertz 1993; Sayre-McCord 1986, 1996). [See the entry on coherentist theories of epistemic justification.]  But the approach might also be seen as moderately foundationalist in that it begins with a set of beliefs (in various moral rules) to which it assigns independent credibility though not infallibility (Audi 1996, 2004; Crisp 2000). [See the entry on foundationalist theories of epistemic justification.]  Admittedly, coherence with our moral beliefs does not make a moral theory true, since our moral beliefs might of course be mistaken. Nevertheless, if a moral theory fails significantly to cohere with our moral beliefs, this undermines the theory’s ability to be justified to us.