 The recursive principles are clearly relevant to personal love, whose core involves positive concern for another’s good. But Moore’s particular application of the principles led to a curiously restricted picture of what love is. First, as in the aesthetic case, he took the main valuable attitude to be contemplative, involving the admiration of another’s already existing good qualities rather than any active engagement with them. This applied even to the love of another’s physical beauty. Though he thought this a central part of love (1903: 203–04/1993: 252), he took it to involve mere passive admiration of another’s beauty, as it were from the other side of the room. There was no desire to possess or interact physically with the other’s beauty, that is, no active eroticism; he actually held that sexual arousal, and especially arousal by another’s arousal, involves love of the ugly or evil and so is evil (1903: 209–10/1993: 257–58). The same point applied more generally: the loving attitude was one of appreciating goods in another’s life rather than of acting to produce or to help her achieve them. One did not do anything for or with a loved one; one simply admired her. (In an 1899 paper presented to the Apostles society at Cambridge he had said, “Love of others is a thing of very great value, and it may be very strong although it does not lead to any action. There is, indeed, no reason why it should” (quoted in Levy 1979: 203).Though he presented personal love as an additional good to aesthetic appreciation, he characterized it in an essentially aesthetic way. Moreover, his list of the goods one is to appreciate or comment in a loved one was also truncated. It did not include pleasure or happiness, since that was not a significant good, nor even knowledge or achievement. Instead, it centered on the other’s admiring contemplation of beauty (1903: 204/1993: 252–53), as if the supreme expression of love were “What excellent taste in pictures you have.” Finally, he took the qualities one appreciates in a loved one to be simply and therefore impartially good. This meant his account had no room for the special attachment to or heightened concern for an individual that many take to be central to personal love. If I love a friend for qualities x, y, and z, and a new person comes along with the same qualities to a slightly higher degree, then, on Moore’s theory, I should admire the new person’s qualities more and therefore love them more; I should trade up to a better beloved. This is at odds with the loyalty, or attachment to individuals, that many think essential to love. This is not to say that a more adequate account of love cannot be constructed with the same basic structure as Moore’s; it can. It will hold that personal love involves a wider range of positive attitudes, including actively promoting as well as contemplating, to a wider range of goods, including happiness, knowledge, and achievement, where those goods in a loved one’s life have greater value from a lover’s point of view than do the similar states of strangers, which makes loving them more appropriate and therefore intrinsically better. But Moore was prevented from giving this account by other features of his view, such as his general emphasis on contemplative forms of love, his restricted list of initial goods, and his strict impartialism about value.