 Due to the emphasis on the freedom of the will and the internal intention, the individual moral agent is at the center of Olivi’s ethics. In particular, his notions of person and personhood are ethically significant, as they comprise two properties that make human beings moral agents: awareness of oneself as the subject and origin of one’s actions and choices, and freedom of the will. The moral agent, for Olivi, is first and foremost a free person, an autonomous individual, who is aware of her own actions as something that originates in her and who must judge the moral worth of her choices by herself (Bobillier 2020, 27–137). In order to make this judgement, the agent must be able to reflect her own (past, present, future) choices against the objective normative order that is the natural law/will of God, which they know via innate conscience and “experiential taste” that explains the affective aspect of moral knowledge (Bobillier 2020, 144–67; Summa II qq. 81–82).