 In Meditations an idea is said to be a mental act that is “like an image” (CSM 2.25; AT 7.37). Most scholars take this to mean that ideas are presentational and intentional: we are acquainted with them and they direct thought to something else (M. Wilson 1978: 102–103; 1992: 69–83;). To apprehend anything at all (actual or possible) is to have an idea of it (CSM 2.2.25–26; AT 7.37). Meditations explicates intentionality in terms of objective being: the idea of the sun is the sun “existing in the intellect in the way its objects are normally there” (CSM 2.75 and 27–8; AT 7.103 and 40; CSM 1.198, note 1). As Descartes also puts it, ideas represent things (e.g., CSM 2.28; AT 7.40): an idea represents an object that is F just in case it represents the object as F (CSM 2.145–6, 163; AT 7.207, 234). The representation may be sensory or intellectual (CSM 2.126, 127–8; AT 7.179, 181): its cognitive value may range from clear and distinct to confused or obscure (e.g., CSM 2.29–30; AT 7.43; CSM 1.207, 317; AT 8.22–3, 33–34).