 While the figure of the Craftsman seems to be an anthropomorphic representation of  Intellect,[19]  it remains to ask what the ontological status of Intellect is, in relation to the division between being and becoming—a distinction that appears to be exhaustive. Some interpreters, relying on Timaeus’ claim (at 30b3) that intellect cannot become present to anything apart from soul, have argued that Intellect is (part of) the world’s  soul.[20]  This cannot be correct: like the rest of becoming, the world’s soul is a product of the Craftsman, and hence neither it nor anything else on the side of becoming can be identified with Intellect. Alternatively, either Intellect is a form, or the distinction between being and becoming is not exhaustive. Some have argued that Intellect is to be identified with the entire realm of  forms,[21]  or the form of the  Good,[22]  while others, understanding “nous” to name a virtue, have opted for the form of Intelligence (a substance in virtue of its status as a  form).[23]  More recently, it has been suggested that the figure of the Craftsman is a personification of  craftsmanship.[24]  None of these accounts seem adequate either: if Intellect were a form of any kind, it would be an intelligible object, not a subject that possesses cognition and efficient causal  agency.[25]  Intellect, then, cannot be placed either on the side of being or on that of becoming, and that dichotomy is thus not  exhaustive.[26]  It is reasonable to conclude that Intellect is a sui generis substance that transcends the metaphysical dichotomy of being and becoming—possibly not unlike the Abrahamic conception of  God.[27]