 Consider Bradley’s regress. (Bradley 1893 [1968], (21–29). Note, however, that Bradley is very hard to interpret, and there is much debate concerning how to reconstruct his argument. See the entry on  Bradley’s regress  for discussion.) We start with the demand to give an account of predication: what is it for \(A\) to be \(F\)? One answer is that it is for the particular \(A\) to be bound to the property of \(F\)-ness. But this answer yields a new predication: \(A\) is bound to \(F\)-ness. If the original monadic predication of \(A\) demands an account, this relational predication of \(A\) and \(F\)-ness also demands an account. Since before we posited a property corresponding to the monadic predicate and said that the property was bound to the object that was the subject of predication, we should follow suit here and posit a relation corresponding to the dyadic predicate and say that it is bound to the two things that are the subjects of that predication. So we should posit a relation—let’s call it instantiation—that binds together \(A\) and \(F\)-ness. But this yields another new predication: Instantiation binds \(A\) to \(F\)-ness. Now this triadic predication needs to be accounted for, and so we need a relation corresponding to the triadic predicate—let’s call it the instantiation\(_2\) relation—that binds together the instantiation relation, \(A\), and \(F\)-ness. But this yields yet another predication, this time a tetradic one: Instantiation\(_2\) binds Instantiation to \(A\) and \(F\)-ness… And so on. Each predicational fact tells us that some particulars, properties, and relations are bound together, which forces us to posit a relation corresponding to that binding, which generates the next predicational fact, and so on ad infinitum.