However, as we saw above, contextualists are committed to a certain error theory. After all, that EC is correct is supposed to be a quite recent discovery. Further, in those cases in which speakers’ claims about who does/doesn’t “know” are said by the contextualist not to conflict, there persists the sense that they are cannot both be speaking truly. For instance, our ordinary claims to “know” various things seem to be what the skeptic is denying—that is why skepticism has seemed to pose a problem to which EC is said to constitute a novel solution. The contextualist seeks to explain why we might think this—more generally, why we might think that what is said in a given ‘high stakes’ case is incompatible with what is said in its ‘low stakes’ counterpart—by suggesting that we fail to fully appreciate the contextualist semantics and/or to faithfully track shifts in context (see, e.g.: Cohen 1999, 77; 2001, 89; 2014, 73; cf. DeRose 1999, 194; 1995, 40–41; 2004b, 37).