 Fechner’s new metaphysics did not avoid the problems or the concepts of the old metaphysics; it simply cast them in a quasi-empirical dress. Though Fechner adamantly insists that his atoms be defined empirically, he goes on to attribute to them the classic properties of the monad, all of which transcend the empirically given. Thus he writes that his atoms are utterly simple beings, having no characteristics (Atom: 133); that they are extensionless points (Atom: 120); and that they are completely independent of one another, so that they cannot be connected to one another (Atom: 142). Now Fechner confronts the old conundrum which caused so much trouble for Leibniz: How do unextended points give rise to the extended entities of experience? Fechner breezily dismisses the problem. Extension does not arise from the atoms themselves but the relationships between them; it is their aggregation which gives rise to their spatial appearance (Atom: 156–157). But this quick solution still did not explain how spatial relationships could arise from spaceless beings. 