 Avicenna and Averroes, who followed Aristotle in holding that God does not know particulars, but only universals, do not face the Problem of Prescience. Rather, both thinkers felt the need to explain how, in some indirectway, God’s knowledge is not strictly limited to  universals.[29]  Maimonides tried to reconcile both the tension between Aristotle’s God and a providential one, and divine prescience and contingency, through his radically negative theology, according to which everything about God’s essence, as opposed to his effects, is unknowable for us. “Know” as applied to God, he explains, is used equivocally from “know” as we usually employ the word, about humans. We cannot understand what it means for God to know (although we can gain some glimmer of understanding by thinking of the special grasp a maker has of what he makes), but we can be sure that he knows everything, including future contingents (Maimonides, Guide III, 20 [1963: 480–484]).