 It is also worth keeping in mind that Pasadena-like scenarios can arise in non-probabilistic contexts (see Peterson 2013). Imagine, for instance, an infinite population in which the utility of individual number j is \(\frac{(-1)^{j-1}}{j}\). What is the total utility of this population? Or imagine that you are the proud owner of a Jackson Pollock painting. An art dealer tells you the overall aesthetic value of the painting is the sum of some of its parts. You number the points in the painting with arbitrary numbers 1, 2, 3, … (perhaps by writing down the numbers on cards and then dropping all cards on the floor); the aesthetic value of each point j is \(\frac{(-1)^{j-1}}{j}\). What is the total aesthetic value of the painting? These examples are non-probabilistic versions of the Pasadena problem, to which the expected utility principle is inapplicable. There is no uncertainty about any state of nature; the decision maker knows for sure what the world is like. This means that Easwaran’s distinction between weak and strong expectations is not applicable.