 The list of additional variants of structuralism does not end here either. Let us mention five further examples very briefly, without going into any details (and there may undoubtedly be more).  First, Uri Nodelman and Edward Zalta have introduced a form of non-eliminative structuralism, parallel to Shapiro’s, which uses an “object theory” inspired by Meinong to account for the abstract structures (Nodelman &amp; Zalta 2014). Parallel to that, one can use other fundamental theories for the introduction of abstract structures, leading to further forms of non-eliminative structuralism. As a second example, Hannes Leitgeb has described how to adapt graph theory for this purpose (Leitgeb forthcoming). Third, Leon Horsten has built on Kit Fine’s theory of “arbitrary objects” to construct a parallel form of “generic structuralism” (Horsten forthcoming).  Fourth, above we already mentioned Charles Chihara’s “eliminative” form of structuralism, which is not identical with Hellman’s (see Chihara 2004).  And fifth, there is a whole family of “categorical forms of structuralism”, based on a variety of axiom systems from category theory, that has become prominent recently. 