Attempts at a philosophical analysis of the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction often take the connection between non-qualitative properties and specific individuals as a starting point. For example, Hawthorne (2006: 8) says: “haecceitistic properties—such as being identical to John or being the daughter of Jim—are those which, in some intuitive way, make direct reference to a particular individual(s).” But, while rough characterizations of this sort leave the (non-)qualitative status of other kinds of properties indeterminate or unclear, reductive analyses have been proposed with the aim of providing a comprehensive account of the distinction. Adams (1979: 7–9) considers an account of the distinction that ties non-qualitative properties to certain kinds of linguistic items. Lewis (1986, 2002) endorses views on which qualitative properties supervene upon or are appropriately definable in terms of a distinctive class of “perfectly natural properties.” Still other views—e.g., Rosenkrantz (1979)—aim to analyze the dependence of non-qualitative properties on individuals and distinguish non-qualitative properties in terms of this dependence. In contrast, Diekemper (2009) and Cowling (2015) endorse primitivism about the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties, taking it instead as irreducible or metaphysically fundamental. But, regardless of one’s preferred view of the distinction, some account is owed of the qualitative status of non-paradigmatic cases including modal properties like being possibly a statue, broadly logical properties like being self-identical, and, for those impressed by the analogies between individuals and species, certain kind properties like being a tiger.