 On the little evidence available it is impossible to establish her early philosophical views with any certainty. Her published writings contain clear echoes of Locke, which led to their being attributed by some to Locke. Nonetheless her Cambridge Platonist background remains evident, especially in the religious and ethical views which connect both her books which are both concerned with practical ethics. While these show that she became closer to Locke in epistemology, on ethics, she is closer to Cudworth, especially with regard to moral accountability, her acceptance that moral principles exist independently as part of the nature of things, and her anti-voluntarism. In fact her receptivity to Locke may be attributed to her Cambridge Platonist background, reflecting the fact that there is more common ground between Locke and the Cambridge Platonists than is normally assumed. Areas where she is most in agreement with Locke entail no sacrifice of Cudworthian principles, in particular her holding that morality is founded in reason and the freedom to act, that that the end of ethics is human happiness, and that the exercise of virtue requires a right disposition of mind. Like both Locke and the Cambridge Platonists she was a strong advocate of religious toleration.