However, consequentialists nearly never defend this act-consequentialist decision procedure as a general and typical way of making moral decisions (Mill 1861: ch 2; Sidgwick 1907: 405–6, 413, 489–90; Moore 1903: 162–4; Smart 1956: 346; 1973: 43, 71; Bales 1971: 257–65; Hare 1981; Parfit 1984: 24–9, 31–43; Railton 1984: 140–6, 152–3; Brink 1989: 216–7, 256–62, 274–6; Pettit and Brennan 1986; Pettit 1991, 1994, 1997: 156–61; de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2014: ch. 10). There are a number of compelling consequentialist reasons why the act-consequentialist decision procedure would be counter-productive.