 The identification of a belief with a sentence has proved controversial. One objection takes the form of an alleged reductio ad absurdum: the identification of a belief with a sentence leads to cognitive bloat (see Ludwig 2015). If the sentences in Otto’s notebook can qualify as his beliefs, why not the sentences in an encyclopedia or the sentences found on the internet—both of which Otto might also access with relative ease? Clark and Chalmers responded to this worry via two stipulations: (1) the subject must, at some time, have consciously endorsed this information, and (2) the subject must have entered the information in the book him- or herself. It is unclear whether these will work. Subliminal beliefs provide a problem for the first stipulation, for these are beliefs that have not been consciously endorsed by their possessors. If such beliefs exist, then conscious endorsement of a belief does not seem to be a necessary condition of its possession. With regard to the second stipulation, it is not clear if this is compatible with Clark and Chalmers’s underlying functionalism. According to functionalism, roughly, if something functions as belief then it is a belief. From a functionalist perspective, how a belief came to be acquired—entered into a person’s collection of beliefs—is not directly relevant. It would be relevant only if it could be shown that having personally entered the belief into one’s collection of beliefs it essential to it having the functional role of a belief. It is not clear what such an argument would look like.