 What are the central features of grounding? Grounding theorists routinely claim that grounding is fully objective. But, given that objectivity and related notions are used in a variety of ways in philosophy, it comes as no surprise that there are different ways of understanding precisely what is being claimed here. On one approach, the issue chiefly concerns the regimentation of grounding discourse. If grounding claims are to be formulated with a parameter for facts concerning human mental activity, then grounding isn’t fully objective (Dasgupta 2017). On a more “metaphysical” approach, the issue instead chiefly concerns the essence or nature of grounding, specifically whether grounding is essentially connected to subjects. Suppose, for example, that part of what it is to be grounding is that \([P],\) \([P'],\) … grounds \([Q]\) only if certain epistemic conditions obtain (e.g., actual subjects are in a position to understand certain propositions concerning \([P],\) \([P'],\) … and \([Q]\)). In this case, grounding isn’t objective.