 The liberty with which Avicenna reports the text of the Metaphysics is paramount to his effort of adapting it to a new context. With respect to Aristoteles’ work, The Science of Divine Things exhibits three radical aspects of modification. Avicenna changes, first of all, the “form”, i.e., the scientific profile, of Aristotle’s work. Accordingly, he also modifies its “content”, namely the disposition and doctrinal purport of the individual treatises of the work. These two modifications are concomitant with a third, more general, change, regarding the position and role of the science of metaphysics in the system of the sciences. The change regarding the “form” affects all the fundamental aspects of a science singled out by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics: the theme of metaphysics, its structure, and its method. The content of the Metaphysics, on the other hand, is reworked by means of a different arrangement of its parts, the integration of Aristotle’s thought with subsequent metaphysical speculation, both Greek and Arabic, the introduction of some original key doctrines, and a treatment of the divine realm very attentive to the concerns of Islamic religion and theology. The change regarding the systemic function of metaphysics, finally, involves a precise view of its relationship with the other sciences as both foundational and crowning discipline, thus overcoming Aristotle’s veto in the Posterior Analytics on the subalternation under a single science of all other disciplines. Cumulatively, in these three ways one observes on Avicenna’s part a thorough and radical revision of the authoritative text on metaphysics, which can be rightly regarded as a sort of second “edition” of the Metaphysics, or second “beginning” of the Western metaphysical speculation.