 Perhaps the most important epistemological principle standardly ascribed to Spinoza is that to conceive of or cognize x, one must conceive of or cognize its causes. The text cited most frequently in support of this causal interpretation of Spinozistic cognition is E1ax4: “Cognition of an effect depends on, and involves, cognition of its cause” (transl. altered). The interpretation finds further support in what has come to be known as Spinoza’s “parallelism doctrine”, the proposition stating that “The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things” (E2p7). Spinoza’s appeal to E1ax4 in the demonstration of this proposition makes clear that the “order and connection of things” he has in mind in E2p7 is a causal order and connection (cf. E2p9d). The idea that at least for the omniscient “infinite intellect” the connections between ideas perfectly mirror the causal connections between things in nature further supports the thought that for Spinoza cognizing something requires tracking its causes.