 The definition of morality proposed by Turiel and his associates is an empirical hypothesis about the sorts of transgressions that will evoke moral criterion judgments. And while the hypothesis has evolved over the last four decades, a core feature of work in the Turiel tradition is that harm plays a central role. Most of the experiments designed to explore the boundaries of the moral domain include transgressions that cause obvious harm, and it is predicted, almost always correctly, that these will lead participants to make moral criterion judgments. It is also predicted that transgressions that do not cause obvious harm, and that are not obvious examples of injustice or the violation of rights—or, more recently, of unfairness or of treating people unequally—will not evoke moral criterion judgments, and thus that people do not treat them as moral transgressions. But this second prediction has been the focus of a widely discussed empirical critique of Turiel’s definition of morality. The critics’ central contention, in Jonathan Haidt’s memorable phrase, is that Turiel’s definition of morality “does not travel well” (Haidt 2012: 22).