Next, ‘Abd al-Latif points out that Avicenna has produced numerous works, which have been copied from one another, as in the case of the Kitab al-Shifa’ and the Kitab al-Najat. He observes that Avicenna decided to introduce all his treatises with the discourse presented by Aristotle at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics (ll, 71a1–3) on every form of knowledge. But this is all that Avicenna knows of the Posterior Analytics. In fact, he has not dealt with what constitutes the end of logic, that is to say, the five logical arts which are the object of the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, the Sophistical Refutations, the Rhetoric, and the Poetics, and he has dwelt on an analysis of the contents of the Isagoge, Categories, De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics which, according to ‘Abd al-Latif, constitute a preparatory introduction to true logic. Even the Kitab al-Shifa’, which deals with logic at greater length, presents a confused discourse. ‘Abd al-Latif provides examples which strengthen his strong criticism. In the first place it is surprising to him that Avicenna has not clarified the category of “having” (ἔχειν; for its Arabic translations see Afnan 1964: 89–90). But, in fact, in the section on the categories (al-Maqulat) of the Kitab al-Shifa’, Avicenna devotes few words to his explanation of the meaning and the value of this category. He maintains that it is not a clear category and recognizes that he has not managed to understand it because he does not see how it can contain species. Moreover, ‘Abd al-Latif is amazed by the fact that Avicenna places the movement of the sky in the category of “Being-in-a-position” (κεῖσθαι), even though he himself has written a book on the De Caelo et mundo and on the Physics. The category of κεῖσθαι is explained by Avicenna both in the Kitab al-Shifa’ and the Kitab al-Najat as the manner of being of the body in as far as the fact that its parts constitute, one with another, a relation of inclination and parallelism in relation to the directions and the parts of the place, if the body is in a place, such as, for example standing up and sitting down. ‘Abd al-Latif’s third criticism is of Avicenna’s claim that he can define one of two relative terms without having recourse to the other. ‘Abd al-Latif stresses that in the Isagoge Avicenna defines genus separately and species separately and father separately and son separately. Then in his definition of father as a “living thing which creates from his sperm another living thing similar to him” Avicenna finds himself obliged to seek recourse to four distinct relations.