  Other formulations of views that emphasize the moral importance of the sufficiency line are possible. One says that one should bring it about that, as far as is possible, over the history of the universe, the total sum of the gaps between the level of lifetime well-being each person achieves and the sufficiency level, for all persons whose lifetime well-being is below sufficiency, is as small as possible. This implausibly recommends preventing any future persons from being born and having any life at all, if unavoidably some will fall below sufficiency. We might try the idea that we should seek to make the aggregate sum of the gaps just described per person as small as possible for the entire history of the world. If the sufficiency line is deemed to be above the line of a life worth living, then if unavoidably at some point in the future people can only have lives worth living not good enough lives, the minimization of gaps-per-person again yields a recommendation to bring it about that no future persons live, even though they would have lives worth living. Or consider an Adam and Eve scenario—Adam and Eve lead nice lives above the sufficiency line, but begetting any children and bringing it about that any further persons exist would be wrong to do, according to the view under consideration, if it is the case that bringing about the existence of future persons will unavoidably make things worse from the standpoint of minimizing total gaps-per-person.