 Goldman (1978: 205–208) holds that there are exactly two orders of obligations, one primary and one secondary, and that it is better to fulfill one’s secondary obligation rather than to violate both obligations. Primary obligations are governed by Goldman’s  (G+),  and secondary obligations are governed by principles such as Goldman’s (1976)  (G*1)  which, as we have seen in  section 4,  does not take into account an agent’s moral character that determines the truth-value of certain synchronic counterfactuals. For example, in the case of Professor Procrastinate*, Procrastinate’s primary obligation is to ⟨agree to review the paper &amp; review the paper⟩ because there is an immediately performable, fully specific simultaneous act-set such that, if performed, would result in ⟨agreeing &amp; reviewing the paper⟩. By contrast, Procrastinate’s secondary obligation is to ⟨decline to review the paper &amp; not review the paper⟩ because Procrastinate’s moral character is such that if Procrastinate were to ⟨agree to review⟩ at \(t_1\), then Procrastinate would harm the student by falsely promising to review at \(t_2\). Procrastinate’s moral character is taken into account by her secondary obligation, but not her primary obligation. As Goldman (1986: 205) notes, it is sometimes useful to reason in a way that holds fixed our actual moral character, and positing secondary obligations allows us to reason in this way. Zimmerman (1986: 70) also subscribes to non-primary obligations and motivates this position in part on the basis of considerations about detachment and conditional obligations.