 (a)–(d), again, are some of the central features of TE, as it is usually understood. Obviously, there are natural connections among them. For instance, to the extent that the autonomy of epistemology  (b)  is thought to amount to its priority—insofar as it approaches the status of “first philosophy”, in the manner Descartes supposed—a concern with  (d)  will be natural, even obligatory. So too, one might think that the autonomy of epistemology  (b)  is owing to its (partly) normative subject matter  (c),  and/or its distinctive methodology  (a),  as compared with the (purportedly) purely descriptive concerns and a posteriori methods of science. And so on. However, the theories falling within TE are, once again, a varied lot; and those sympathetic to TE at times pull these features apart, emphasizing commitment to them to varying degrees and in different ways.