 A potential problem with Okasha’s relational essentialism is that if the relations that serve as the identity conditions for a species are not central in explaining the typical traits among a species’ members, then such relations are not essences. Okasha jettisons a core feature of essentialism: that the essence of a kind plays a central role in explaining the typical features of a kind’s members. Essentialists, from Aristotle to Locke, from Kripke to Devitt, believe that essences figure centrally in explaining the traits typically found among the members of a kind. If we give up that explanatory component of essentialism we give up a core feature of essentialism, a feature that distinguishes real essences from nominal essences. Nominal essences demarcate membership in a kind, but they do not explain the typical traits of a kind. Arguably, any approach to natural kinds that aims to capture the kinds of science should preserve this explanatory feature of kinds. So in the end, relational essentialism may not be essentialism because it fails to satisfy a core aim of essentialism. (For a detailed response to Okasha’s relational essentialism see Pedroso 2014.)