 It is sometimes suggested, therefore, that existentialism just is this bygone cultural movement rather than an identifiable philosophical position; or, alternatively, that the term should be restricted to Sartre’s philosophy  alone.[2]  Two recent books, both of them sustained attempts to engage critically and constructively with existentialism in the context of contemporary philosophical debates, adopt versions of these stances.  Jonathan Webber argues that “as originally defined by Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, existentialism is the ethical theory that we ought to treat the freedom at the core of human existence as intrinsically valuable and the foundation of all other values” (2018: 2). If we stick to this definition, we can both recognize the fissures within what is called “existentialism” in the expansive sense and also see how existentialism can “ground sophisticated contributions to social psychology, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, cultural theory, and psychotherapy” (2018: 19). Taking up the other stance, Noreen Khawaja notes the perennial difficulty in specifying just who is supposed to belong to the “movement” of existentialism, given that the term itself was either unknown to some who are conscripted or outright rejected by others. But, she argues, this is a problem only if existentialism is taken to be a movement. Though aspects of such a movement can be found in the historical record, existentialism itself “is a tradition, not a movement”; that is, “a pattern of intergenerational influence, in which later figures read and appropriated the work of earlier figures” (Khawaja 2016: 4). What animates this tradition—exemplified here by Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre—is its struggle with religion and the fact that the writing of even so-called “atheist” existentialists “feels religious to its readers” (2016: 16). Interestingly, taking either stance leads to the same place: For Khawaja, “the idea of personal authenticity [is] at the center of existential thought” (2016: 24), while for Webber, the existentialism of Sartre, Beauvoir, and Franz Fanon begins with “eudaimonist arguments for the virtue of authenticity” and finally affirms “a categorial moral imperative of authenticity” (2018: 19).