 What options does a first-order theorist have to resist this conclusion? One is to deny that the data are as problematic as they appear (as does Dretske 1995). It can be said that the unconscious states in question lack the kind of fineness of grain and richness of content necessary to count as genuinely perceptual states. On this view, the contrast discussed above isn’t really a difference between conscious and unconscious perceptions, but rather between conscious perceptions, on the one hand, and unconscious belief-like states, on the other. Another option is to accept the distinction between conscious and unconscious perceptions, and then to explain that distinction in first-order terms. It might be said, for example, that conscious perceptions are those that are available to belief and thought, whereas unconscious ones are those that are available to guide movement (Kirk 1994). A final option is to bite the bullet, and insist that blindsight and sensorimotor perceptual states are indeed phenomenally conscious while not being access-conscious. (See Block 1995; Tye 1995; and Nelkin 1996; all of whom defend versions of this view.) On this account, blindsight percepts are phenomenally conscious states to which the subjects of those states are blind. Higher-order theorists will argue, of course, that none of these alternatives is acceptable (see, e.g., Carruthers 2000; Rosenthal 2005).