 Searle and Vanderveken (1985) develop a logic of speech acts which they call illocutionary logic. This was refined in Vanderveken 1990 and Vanderveken 1991. Already, Frege used in his Begriffsschrift the notation “\(\vdash \phi\)”, where \(\phi\) denotes a proposition and “\(\vdash\)” the judgment sign. So, “\(\vdash \phi\)” says that \(\phi\) is provable, but other interpretations of \(\vdash\) are possible (accompanied by different notation; for example, “\(\models \phi\)” says that \(\phi\) is true (in the model), “\(\dashv \phi\)” says that \(\phi\) is refutable, and so on). An elementary speech act is of the form \(F(\phi)\), where \(F\) denotes an illocutionary point and \(\phi\) a proposition. In turn, an illocutionary force is identified by exactly seven elements: