 The parallel also suggests that an account of determination needn’t impose conditions on conceptual entailment relations (as Searle’s did): just as Kripke’s (1980) results undermine the need for a conceptual entailment requirement on identity (e.g., water might be identical with H\(_2\)O even if ‘water’ and ‘H\(_2\)O’ don’t conceptually entail each other), “we should discount the traditional doctrine’s conceptual component and reconceive determination in wholly metaphysical terms” (Yablo 1992: 253). That said, as Yablo admits, asymmetric necessitation alone is insufficient to characterize determination (since, e.g., allowing conjunctions to determine their conjuncts). We will later consider various ways of filling in the modal conditions, including Yablo’s own essence-based approach  (§3.5.1).