 Each of these basic notions corresponds to a branch of any complete ethical theory: theory of right conduct (or obligation), theory of value, and theory of moral worth (or virtue). A common way to distinguish different ethical theories by their structure is in terms of which of these three notions (and corresponding theories) is most basic in relation to a theory of right conduct. Consequentialist theories explain right conduct in terms of the value of consequences associated with an action or with rules for action guidance; they represent value-based theories (see the entry on  consequentialism).  Deontological theories are united in rejecting consequentialism and, for instance, appealing to respect for persons as a basis for explaining right conduct (see the entry on  deontology).  Virtue ethical theories take considerations of virtue (e.g., the activities of a virtuous agent) as a basis for explaining right conduct (see the entry on  virtue ethics).  Because virtue ethical theories of obligation have emerged relatively recently, twentieth century debates in ethical theory were dominated by debates between consequentialists (sometimes referred to as teleological theories) and deontologists. How might phenomenological inquiry be brought to bear on the dispute between these two types of theory?