 In RepublicIX, Socrates offers a sketch of one way to bring these two dimensions together. Toward the end of the book, Socrates conducts a three-part contest to show the philosophical, or aristocratic, man is the happiest. In the second of these contests, he claims that each part of the soul has its peculiar desire and corresponding pleasure. Reason, for instance, desires to learn; satisfying that desire is a pleasure distinct from the pleasure, e.g., of eating (580d–e). One can now see that the functions of each of the parts has a new, affective dimension. Then, in the last of the contests, Socrates makes an ontological distinction between true pleasure of the soul and less true pleasure of the body. The former is the pleasure of knowing being, i.e., the forms, and the latter is the pleasure of filling bodily appetite. The less true pleasures also give rise to illusions and phantoms of pleasure; these illusions and phantoms recall the images and shadows in the allegory of the cave (583b–586c). Clearly, then, distinctions from the metaphysics and epistemology of the central books are being made relevant to the divisions within the soul. Pleasures of reason are on a higher ontological level than those of the bodily appetites; this difference calls for a modification of the definitions of the virtues from Book IV. For instance, in Book IV, justice is each part fulfilling its own function; in Book IX, that function is specified in terms of the kinds of pleasure each part pursues. Reason pursues the true pleasure of knowing and the appetites the less true pleasure of the body. Appetite commits injustice if it pursues pleasure not proper to it, i.e., if it pursues bodily pleasures as though they were true pleasures (586d–587a). The result is an account of virtue which discriminates among pleasures, as any virtue ethics should; but the criterion of discrimination reflects the distinction between being and becoming. Rational pleasures are more real than bodily pleasures, although bodily pleasures are not negligible. Happiness, in turn, integrates the virtue of managing bodily appetites and pleasures with the pleasures of learning, but definitely gives greater weight to the latter.