 As this entry is focused on the private language considerations found primarily in the Philosophical Investigations, we will not go into further detail regarding Diamond’s argument. However, as noted above, the issues she raises are of increasing interest both directly and indirectly. Directly, they are engaged by William Child’s recent ’Does the Tractatus contain a private language argument?’ in which he argues that Diamond is more or less wrong across the board in her main contentions regarding there being a private language argument in the Tractatus and her assessment of the Tractatus as anti-realist. His central contention is that Diamond projects views attributable to the later Wittgenstein into the Tractatus, particularly those concerning naming and use. However, he also argues that Wittgenstein’s 1929 views on sensation language ‘challenge’ ‘new’ readings of the Tractatus, such as Diamond’s, where by ‘new readings’ he means ones that, “find in the Tractatus an absence of positive philosophical doctrines, a kind of quietism, and an explicitly therapeutic approach that have traditionally been associated with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy” (p. 143). 