 There are different ways to define a fair agreement situation depending on the purpose of the agreement and the description of the parties to it. For example, certain facts are relevant to entering into a fair employment contract – a prospective employee’s talents, skills, prior training, experience, motivation, and reliability, for example – that may not be relevant to other fair agreements. What is a fair agreement situation among free and equal persons when the purpose of the agreement is fundamental principles of justice for the basic structure of society? What sort of facts should the parties to such a fundamental social contract know, and what sort of facts are irrelevant or even prejudicial to a fair agreement? Here it is helpful to compare Rawls’s and Locke’s social contracts. A feature of Locke’s social contract is that it transpires in a state of nature among free and equal persons who know everything about themselves that you and I know about ourselves and each other. Thus Locke’s parties know their natural talents, skills, education, and other personal characteristics; their racial and ethnic group, gender, social class, and occupations; their level of wealth and income, their religious and moral beliefs, an so on. Given this knowledge, Locke assumes that, while starting from a position of equal political right, the great majority of free and equal persons in a state of nature – including all women and racial minorities, and all other men who do not meet a rigid property qualification – could and most likely would rationally agree to alienate their natural rights of equal political jurisdiction in order to gain the benefits of political society. Thus Locke envisions as legitimate a constitutional monarchy that is in effect a gender-and-racially biased class state, a state wherein a small class of amply propertied white males exercise political rights to vote, hold office, exercise political and social influence, and enjoy other important benefits and responsibilities to the exclusion of everyone else (see Rawls, LHPP, 138–139).