 Thus the ‘fudging explanation’ defends predictivism by pointing out that the process of accommodation lends itself to the proposal of hypotheses that do not cohere naturally with operative constraints on theory choice, while successful predictions are immune from this worry (Lipton 1990, 1991: Ch. 8). Of course, it is an important question whether scientists actually rely on the fact that evidence was predicted (or accommodated) in their assessment of theories—if a theory was fudged to accommodate some datum, couldn’t the scientist simply note that the fudged theory suffers a defect of coherence and pay no attention to whether the data was accommodated or predicted? Some argue, however that scientists are imperfect judges of such coherence—a scientist who accommodates some datum may think his accommodation is fully coherent, while his peers may have a more accurate and objective view that it is not. The scientist’s ‘assessed support’ of his proposed accommodation may thus fail to coincide with its ‘objective support’, and the scientist might rely on the fact that his evidence was accommodated as evidence that it was fudged (or conversely, that his evidence was predicted as evidence that it was not fudged; Lipton 1991: 150f).