 To appreciate how the regress is generated, consider the variation of our initial example in which John falsely believes that the wall button is a light switch. Since John isn’t aware that by pressing the button he is activating the treadmill, he fails to satisfy the requirement of awareness of action under an appropriate description and, a fortiori, he also fails to satisfy the requirements concerning awareness of moral significance and of consequences. Therefore, since John is unaware that pressing the button is wrong (or, alternatively, unaware of the action’s wrong-making features) and is also unaware of the potential consequences of doing so, we may think that, at least in principle, he is blameworthy neither for his action nor for Mary’s injuries. John’s unawareness or, as it’s often put, John’s ignorance would play the role of an excuse for his wrongdoing, where an excuse is a consideration that blocks the attribution of blame to an agent who has performed a wrong action (Austin 1957 [1962]; Kelly 2012; Franklin 2013. For detailed discussions of the ignorance excuse see Rosen 2008; Peels 2014; Baron 2017). As it was noted above, however, John’s ignorance can itself be blameworthy or culpable, and it’s widely—although not universally (cf. Holly Smith 2017; Ross 1939: 163–4)—accepted that culpable ignorance fails to exculpate (at least completely). Thus, it if turns out that John is culpable for his ignorance of the button’s true function, he might well be blameworthy for unwittingly activating the treadmill and for unwittingly causing Mary’s injuries. Notice that if this were the case, John’s blameworthiness for his unwitting action and its consequences would be derivative (or indirect) rather than original (or direct): it would derive from a prior instance of blameworthiness, namely his blameworthiness for his ignorant state (Zimmerman 1997: 414–5; Rosen 2004: 300). (See King 2017 for criticism of the idea that blameworthiness for unwitting wrongdoing must be explained in terms of the original/derivative distinction, and see Wieland and Robichaud 2017 for a thorough discussion of different ways of cashing out the idea that there is a “transfer” of blame in these cases.)