CTM+FSC comes under attack from various directions. One criticism targets the causal relevance of representational content (Block 1990; Figdor 2009; Kazez 1995). Intuitively speaking, the contents of mental states are causally relevant to mental activity and behavior. For example, my desire to drink water rather than orange juice causes me to walk to the sink rather than the refrigerator. The content of my desire (that I drink water) seems to play an important causal role in shaping my behavior. According to Fodor (1990: 137–159), CCTM+RTM+FSC accommodates such intuitions. Formal syntactic activity implements intentional mental activity, thereby ensuring that intentional mental states causally interact in accord with their contents. However, it is not so clear that this analysis secures the causal relevance of content. FSC says that computation is “sensitive” to syntax but not semantics.  Depending on how one glosses the key term “sensitive”, it can look like representational content is causally irrelevant, with formal syntax doing all the causal work. Here is an analogy to illustrate the worry. When a car drives along a road, there are stable patterns involving the car’s shadow. Nevertheless, shadow position at one time does not influence shadow position at a later time. Similarly, CCTM+RTM+FSC may explain how mental activity instantiates stable patterns described in intentional terms, but this is not enough to ensure the causal relevance of content. If the mind is a syntax-driven machine, then causal efficacy seems to reside at the syntactic rather the semantic level. Semantics is just “along for the ride”. Apparently, then, CTM+FSC encourages the conclusion that representational properties are causally inert. The conclusion may not trouble eliminativists, but intentional realists usually want to avoid it.