  Paul Ricoeur has distinguished as many as 23 different usages of the notion “to recognize” (Ricoeur 2005, 5–16) grouping them under three main categories, namely recognition as identification, recognizing oneself and mutual recognition. Many authors have challenged Ricoeur’s view by proposing a distinction between recognition (of oneself as well as of others) and “identification”: Whereas we identify an X as an X without necessarily affirming it as (and because of) X, recognition requires a positive evaluation of X. The term “acknowledgment” which some authors use interchangeably with recognition (Appiah 1992, 149) is also contested. Whereas some have argued that we acknowledge the validity of certain insights, values and norms (Ikäheimo/Laitinen 2007, 34–37), others continue to use the term “acknowledgment” with regard to persons but intend it to denote something less ambitious than the wholesale affirmation of their specific identity (Cavell 1969; Markell 2003). However, it is the meaning of mutual recognition that lies at the heart of the contemporary discussion.