 This way of understanding God’s presence by reference to his power and his knowledge treats the predicate ‘is present’ as applied to God as analogical with its application to ordinary physical things. (For a fuller explanation of analogical predication, see  Medieval Theories of Analogy.)  As applied to God, ‘is present’ is neither univocal (used with the same meaning as in ordinary contexts) nor equivocal (used with an unrelated meaning). Rather, its meaning can be explained by reference to its ordinary sense: God is present at a place just in case there is a physical object that is at that place and God has power over that object, knows what is going on in that object, and God is the cause of that object’s existence. Nicholas Everitt (2010, p. 86) objects to this analogical approach, stating that “if this is how omnipresence is interpreted, one might well think that it would be clearer to say straightforwardly that God is not omnipresent at all,” and he cites Joshua Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz (2002, p. 41)) as agreeing with him. But Hoffman and Rosenkrantz in the cited passage merely say that “there is no literal sense in which [God] could be omnipresent,” which leaves it open that there is an analogical sense in which God is omnipresent. Hud Hudson (2009) also denies that God’s presence is analogical, but that is because he thinks that there is a literal way in which God is present everywhere. We will consider Hudson’s proposal in Section 5. 