 Efforts to make forgiveness central to reconciliation also run into questions about who has the standing to forgive. To forgive on behalf of a living victim is morally unacceptable, if not simply impossible (Govier and Verwoerd 2002b). Some theorists also hold that it is impossible to forgive on behalf of deceased victims, from which it follows that wrongs such as murder will be unforgivable (Jankélévitch 2005). In these cases, the possibility of a reconciliation that is distinct from forgiveness offers a way to conceive of a positive resolution of the past. Theorists debate whether states or other groups might have the standing to forgive on their own behalf, independent of the choices of individual victims. Those who think of forgiveness as primarily a change in attitudes must make sense of attributing such mental states to groups, perhaps by explaining how attitude changes in representative persons (such as leaders or spokespeople) qualify as group forgiveness (cf. Griswold 2007). The claim that groups can forgive is easier to make for those who think of forgiveness as the waiving of a set of rights (Wolterstorff 2013).