 “Apperception,” anuvyavasāya, is defined as a perception taking a preceding cognition or another psychological property as its object, typically a scoping cognition in relation to another scoped (Phillips 2012: 48–50). Efforts and desires can be similarly targeted. Through apperception, Gaṅgeśa claims, one knows infallibly the intentionality, the “objecthood,” viṣayatā, of the cognition scoped, in its qualificandum, qualifier, and relational portions. One knows, in other words, what the scoped purports to be about, and one knows this independently of a determination of the target’s being knowledge or not. Gaṅgeśa argues that since the sensory connection in this case is not mediated by a material organ, apperception is infallible about the contents of the scoped, but not of course about its truth. He devotes a long section of his perception chapter to defending this and other views about apperception in the face of opponents claiming he is giving up central planks of his theory.