 Both Richard’s account and the modified neo-Russellian version of that account sketched above face a serious problem: The problem of conflicting restrictions. (See Sider 1995 and Soames 1995.) To build up to the objection, consider cases in which a speaker is ascribing beliefs to different agents. It may be common ground that those agents conceive of matters differently. In such a case, the speaker may intend the same complement clause to represent different types of belief states for different agents. Consider the following case as an example. Suppose that Bob and Susan are looking at a picture of Bill Clinton. Bob might then use the complement clause ‘that he [pointing at the picture] was president’ to represent a first-person belief state when ascribing beliefs to Bill Clinton and a different type of belief state, certainly not a first-person belief state, when ascribing beliefs to George Bush. After all, we can imagine Frege-style cases in which the type of belief state Bob intends to specify might be essential to the point of his speech.