 Legal theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw has provided another cornerstone for ongoing contemporary reflection on gender and sexuality, but has important (and underappreciated) implications well beyond these areas. In two germinal articles from 1989 and 1991, she introduced an account of intersectionality that inspired “the kind of interdisciplinary and global engagement” that “[v]ery few theories have generated” (Carbado et al. 2013, 303). She says in the second of these articles that she began using the notion of intersectionality “to denote the various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black women’s employment experiences” (Crenshaw 1991,  1244).[7]  A cottage industry of commentary and analysis has grown up from this simple beginning, with scholars, artists, critics, and activists debating the meanings and proper uses of “intersectionality” nearly as much as they employ it. Intersectionality remains a hotly contested notion in part because it raises a variety of deeply philosophical questions. Scholars have asked, for example, what intersectionality means for theories of personal identity, whether it adequately captures the complexity of human experience, how it bears on the prospects for coalition politics, why this notion stands out from a family of related, older notions in social theory that do similar work, whether standard approaches to intersectionality take Black masculinity seriously enough, and much more besides.