 The plausibility of these conclusions depends to a large extent on whether the notion of “the agent’s real reason” that these studies claim to uncover is the same as the notion of a motivating reason that has been examined in this entry. One suggestion might be that these so-called “real reasons” are explanatory but not motivating reasons. And, it has been argued that, while these explanatory reasons might make important contributions to explaining our actions, in a variety of ways, this fact is compatible with our ordinary psychological explanations in terms of agents’ motivating reasons. For instance, it may be that the sorts of reasons uncovered by these experiments help explain why agents are motivated by the reasons that they avow are their reasons for acting: the prevalence of a right-hand bias in most humans may explain why the item on the right seems more appealing to an agent. But this is consistent with the truth of the agent’s claim that her reason for choosing the item is the (putative) fact that it is better than the other items (see Sandis 2015 for suggestions along these lines).