  A final notable Quinean argument centers on the role of “conventional stipulation” in scientific theorizing. Consider a scientist introducing a new theoretical term by definitional stipulation. The new term is embroiled in an evolving body of scientific doctrine. As this body of doctrine develops, the original legislated definition occupies no privileged status. We may reject it in light of new empirical developments. Thus, “conventionality is a passing trait, significant at the moving front of science but useless in classifying the sentences behind the lines” (1954, p. 119). Hilary Putnam (1962) further develops this argument, offering the example of “kinetic energy \(= \bfrac{1}{2} mv^{2}\)”. Although that identity began as a stipulative definition in Newtonian mechanics, Einsteinian mechanics deems it false. Inspired by such examples, Quine rejects as untenable any distinction between statements “true by convention” or otherwise.