 A quick and dirty reply on behalf of presentism is to suggest that metaphysics and science are, in some sense, demarcated disciplines. That is, the findings of physics are of no relevance to our best metaphysics (and vice versa). But this doesn’t seem to be a move that we should make. Both metaphysicians and physicists are, surely, trying to uncover the structure of the world and to theorize about the nature of reality (fundamental or otherwise). To ignore one another is no way for protagonists to carry on when both aim at the same basic goal. Of course, this means that we must say something in reply to Saunders and others, who raise the same sort of objection (e.g., Putnam 1967; Stein 1968, 1970; Savitt 1994, 2000; Sider 2001: 42–52; Wüthrich 2013; cf. Emery 2019, 2021). But what can be said?