  In examining Dharmakīrti’s causal model of perception,  Dunne (2004, 100) singles out numerical correspondence as the main  issue in establishing how perceptual images come to correspond to the material objects they represent: the perceptual image of the object  is singular, but the object, as an extended entity, is made of an  infinitesimal number of particles in accord with the atomistic  ontology to which Dharmakīrti subscribes. Thus, identifying the  precise causal mechanism by which percepts relate to their  corresponding empirical objects is further complicated by  Dharmakīrti’s view of particulars. In maintaining that  particulars (svalakṣaṇa) are partless,  Dharmakīrti is forced to admit that in perception we apprehend a particular in its entirely, something that of course is not borne by  empirical data: ordinarily, in perceving a given object, say a  dragonfly, we only perceive its visible parts from our unique vantage point; we do not perceive it in its entirety. 