 The idea that the existence of such a strategy shows that agents should satisfy Reflection has been widely disputed, even by many who take the Dutch Book arguments for probabilism and conditionalization as having force. Much of the discussion stems from a variety of counterexamples to Reflection in which it appears irrational not to violate the principle. One example, due to Talbott, turns on the fact that real agents lack perfect recall (Talbott 1991). He considers a person who had spaghetti \((S)\) the previous night, say November 16, and contemplates the probability that she will give to her having eaten spaghetti on that day in year’s time. Since she eats spaghetti on average one out of every ten days, she thinks it likely that \(\pr_{t}(S) = 0\).1. But surely she should not assign a probability of 0.1 to her having had spaghetti the previous night conditional on the claim that \(\pr_{t}(S) = 0\).1, since she is nearly certain (say \(\pr_{t}(S) = 0\).99) of what she had for dinner the previous night.