 In response to Egan, Frank Arntzenius (2008) and Joyce (2012) argue that in some decision problems an agent’s rational deliberations using freely available information do not settle on a single option but instead settle on a probability distribution over options. They acknowledge that the agent may regret the option issuing from these deliberations but differ about the regret’s significance. Arntzenius holds that the regret counts against the option’s rationality, whereas Joyce denies this. Ahmed (2012) and Ralph Wedgwood (2013) reject Arntzenius’s and Joyce’s responses to Egan because they hold that deliberations should settle on an option. Wedgwood introduces a novel decision principle to accommodate Egan’s decision problems. Ahmed contends that Egan’s analysis of these decision problems has a flaw because when it is extended to some other decision problems, it declares every option irrational.