 These problems, so far, can be regarded as relatively technical, for which further technical moves within the program might be made. For example, one might make further distinctions within the theory of sense between an expression’s “content” and the specific “linguistic vehicle” used for its expression, as in Fodor (1990a) and Horty (1993, 2007); and perhaps distinguish between the truth-conditional “content” of an expression and its idiosyncratic role, or “character,” in a language system, along the lines of the distinction David Kaplan (1989) introduced to deal with indexical and demonstrative expressions (such as I, now, and that; see Demonstratives, and Narrow Mental Content, as well as Stephen White, 1982). Perhaps analyses could be regarded as providing a particular “vehicle,” having a specific “character,” that could account for why one could entertain a certain concept without entertaining its analysis (cf. Gillian Russell 2008, and Paul Pietroski 2002, 2005 and 2018 for related suggestions).