 Epistemological disjunctivists like McDowell and Pritchard have argued that in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge, what is meant to give s justification for believing P8 is, not E8, but s’s factive state of seeing that P8. This — it might be contended — is not without consequences with respect to the question whether Moore* transmits propositional justification. Pritchard explicitly defends the claim that when s sees that P8, thereby learning that P8, s can come to know by inference from P8 the negation of any sceptical hypothesis inconsistent with P8, like Q8* (cf. Pritchard 2012, 129–30). This might encourage the belief that, for Pritchard, the inference in Moore* can transmit the justification for P8 based on s’s seeing that P8 across the entailment from P8 to Q8* (see Lockhart 2018 for an explicit argument to this effect). The latter claim must however be handled with some care.