  Another objection concerns these accounts’ presumption that self-knowledge need not meet epistemically internalist conditions on knowledge. Boyle (2011) targets Byrne’s view on this point, arguing that even if the inference from p to I believe that p reliably yields true (and safe) self-ascriptions, this inference cannot explain self-knowledge since it will not appear reasonable to the thinker: after all, in general the fact that p doesn’t imply that I believe that p. Fernández addresses this worry, in arguing that beliefs formed through the bypass method will seem reasonable to the subject. Other critics argue that the transition from p to I believe that p is not a genuine inference. Valaris (2011) argues that, unlike genuine inferences, this transition cannot be used in hypothetical contexts—e.g., when one reasons from a premise one doesn’t believe, to see what follows from it. Barnett (2016) argues that this transition violates plausible, broadly evidentialist restrictions on inferences.