  Such an individual, with full or near-full moral status, should not be used in research unless (a) the research is more or less compatible with the individual’s best interests, (b) poses no more than minimal risk, except where greater risks are justified by therapeutic potential to the individual, and (c) the individual has not meaningfully dissented, unless participation is of pressing therapeutic urgency for the individual (ibid., 323). But neural chimeric research does not come close to satisfying those standards. The research is more than minimal risk, is not intended for any therapeutic benefit for the animal, and at this experimental stage, could not reasonably be intended as such. To take an extreme, albeit hypothetical, example, the idea of a human/chimp neural chimera in which the human and chimp phenotypic traits are thoroughly mixed is a chilling one. All great apes are social creatures, and such an individual might well be rejected by both species, evoking the tragic plight of Frankenstein’s monster. DeGrazia’s argument, however, does not only apply to such science fiction scenarios. Although he does not draw this conclusion, if great apes have full or near-full moral status, then it is probably impermissible to use them in any kind of chimeric research in which scientists are currently interested.