 where one is guilty if she has offensively violated a covenant by anticipating or aggressing against an innocent partner at some point in the past, otherwise she is innocent. If Claudia expects all of her partners in the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma to follow \(h^{*}\), then \(h^{*}\) can be Claudia’s best response. For example, if Claudia and Laura are both innocent when they meet in their prisoner’s dilemma, then if Claudia follows \(h^{*}\), she will perform and remain innocent, and so she can expect her partners in future iterations to perform with her since they also follow \(h^{*}\). If, on the other hand, Claudia anticipates against Laura, then Claudia becomes guilty and she should expect future partners to anticipate against her in future iterations as \(h^{*}\) requires. In other words, if Claudia has sufficiently high expectation that the sequence of iterated prisoner’s dilemmas will continue, then the short-run benefit from offensively violating her covenant with Laura will be swamped by the long-run payoff from future mutually beneficial interactions that \(h^{*}\) enables and anticipating precludes. Furthermore, the long-run benefit of keeping her reputation intact means that as long as Claudia’s discount rate isn’t too high, then this is likely to be true even if she misread things with Laura and gets exploited by her. Finally, because their situations are symmetrical, \(h^{*}\) can be a best response for Laura and all the other community members, provided that they all expect most other community members to follow \(h^{*}\).