 What exactly is it that Russell feels? That those who think bull-fighting is good (and therefore desire it) are making some kind of mistake and conversely that those think that bull-fighting is bad (and are therefore opposed to it) are in some sense getting it right. Thus the “something more” that Russell could not help feeling was that his views about the badness of bullfighting were true and the views of the imaginary bull-fighting aficionados false. But how can that be if “bull-fighting is bad,” really is in the optative? For a sentence to be true or false it must be semantically capable of truth and falsity or, as the current jargon has it, truth-apt. Thus in admitting that he could not help feeling that he would be right (that is, correct) to oppose bull-fighting in America, Russell, was admitting to feelings which suggest that his meta-ethic is false. Moreover the very fact that he had these feelings provides evidence for his theory’s falsehood. Consider “Oh to be in England, now that April’s here!”, a sentence that is clearly in the optative (except for the bit about April’s being here). It is hard to see how anybody who understood this sentence could coherently feel or think it to be true or false. Its optative character is obvious (to those who understand English) and the fact that it is in the optative excludes the possibility of truth and falsehood. Since Russell was inclined to feel that “Bull-fighting is bad” is true, and since this is not an incoherent thing to feel or think, this strongly suggests that “bull-fighting is bad”, unlike “Oh to be in England!”, is not in the optative mood.