  Both versions of the argument presume that the decision to discard spare embryos prior to the decision to donate them to research entails that donated embryos are doomed to destruction when researchers receive them. There are two arguments one might marshal against this presumption. First, one who wants to donate embryos to research might first elect to discard them only because doing so is a precondition for donating them. There could be cases in which one who chooses the discard option would have donated the embryos to other couples were the research donation option not available. The fact that a decision to discard embryos is made prior to the decision to donate the embryos thus does not establish that the embryos were doomed to destruction before the decision to donate them to research was made. Second, a researcher who receives embryos could choose to rescue them, whether by continuing to store them or by donating them to infertile couples. While this would violate the law, the fact that it is within a researcher’s power to prevent the destruction of the embryos he or she receives poses problems for the claim that the decision to discard the embryos dooms them or causes their destruction.