 A third argument for mind-dependence relies on claims about the nature of reasons. Bernard Williams (1979) famously argued that in order to have a normative reason to act, I must have some motive that will be furthered by my so acting. This has been called “reasons internalism”. Humean theories of reasons claim that in order to have a reason to act, I must have some desire that is furthered by so acting. Such claims are mere necessitation claims, but could be leveraged as an argument for mind-dependence. For, one might claim, the fact that having a relevant desire is a necessary condition of having a reason could be easily explained on the basis that reasons – or the relevant domain of normative facts – are grounded in or explained by the relevant motives or desires, as in Schroeder (2007). (Of course, this superficial reading would have to be more nuanced based on our reading of the nature of the mind-dependence debate.) Mind-independence theories of reasons, it could be argued, have a harder time explaining reasons internalism, or Humean theories of reasons.