 A second argument for the impossibility of epistemic akrasia (discussed in Adler 2002) turns on what is seen as an important disanalogy between epistemic and practical reasoning. Conflict between two incompatible beliefs weakens one or both beliefs (since both can’t be true), whereas conflict between two desires that can’t both be satisfied need not weaken either desire. A practically akratic agent who has formed an all things considered judgment about what to do may thus still be in the grip of a desire to do something else. But this, Adler says, has no analogue in the epistemic realm: one can’t remain in the grip of a belief if one views the evidence for an opposing belief as decisive. Thus, practical akrasia is “motivationally intelligible” in a way that epistemic akrasia is not (Adler 2002, p. 8). Neil Levy responds to this concern by arguing that while beliefs in some domains fit this model, the disanalogy Adler points to does not hold in domains where there is room for “ongoing, rational controversy,” including philosophy (Levy 2004, p. 156). One may form a belief in favor of a philosophical view while nonetheless feeling the pull of incompatible views, just as one may retain a desire that one judges all things considered one shouldn’t satisfy. Though Levy only claims that Adler’s impossibility argument fails, Ribeiro (2011) uses similar considerations to motivate the claim that epistemic akrasia is not only possible, but actual.