 The argument set out in the previous section suggests that “moral judgment” can be viewed as a psychological natural kind term, and the essential features of moral judgments are that the person making them takes them to be authority independent and generalizable to other times and other places. On the view urged by Putnam, Devitt, and Kornblith, these three features enable us to provide a scientifically justified definition of “moral judgment”. But while Turiel and his collaborators employ these features as “criterion judgments” used to determine whether a participant’s normative judgment is a moral judgment, they do not treat them as providing a definition of “moral judgment”. This is not because the social domain theorists are uninterested in definitions. Quite the opposite! Many of their publications include discussions of “the definition of morality” (or of “the moral domain”). Those discussions often acknowledge the influence of philosophical accounts of morality, and some of them discuss philosophical literature in considerable detail. Indeed, according to Turiel and Davidson,