 As for liberty, “there must be”, says Devlin, “toleration of the maximum individual freedom that is consistent with the integrity of society” (Devlin 1965: 16). “Toleration” only arises in relation to conduct of which one disapproves: toleration is not approval (Devlin 1965: 18; cf. Oberdiek 2001; Green 2008). He gives two examples—cruelty to animals and –the issue with which his view is most famously associated—homosexual sex and, as he puts it, the “general abhorrence of homosexuality” in the UK in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Devlin 1965: 17). As regards both, his question is: are they beyond toleration by the criminal law? Devlin’s answer is yes to the first and—although there is a widespread erroneous view on this in the  literature[5]—no  to the second. In other words, liberty or freedom of human choice cannot defeat the prima facie right of society to criminalize cruelty to animals on grounds of its wrongfulness, but, in the case of consensual homosexual sex in private, it can (Devlin, Birmingham et al. 1965; cf. Devlin 1965: ix). On the latter issue, one might certainly disagree (to put it mildly) with the claim that the reason gay sex ought not to be criminalized is that it is within the bounds of toleration, for that implies that such conduct is morally wrongful in the first place. And one might also strongly doubt the plausibility of Devlin’s means of discerning where the boundary of maximum individual freedom lies—turning both on how widespread a moral belief is and on how intensely it is felt and  believed.[6]  We will return below to these points when we consider how “morality” should be best understood in legal moralism  (section 3).  The point for now is to illustrate the structure of a legal moralism such as that of Devlin. In short Devlin took both animal cruelty and homosexuality to be prima facie morally wrong, but took the former all things considered to hold firm against liberty as a potential defeating condition, and the latter to be defeated by liberty (and other factors) when all things are considered. Moore in his brand of legal moralism also stresses the place of liberty. In his view, “there is always some reason not to legally coerce behaviour, namely, that to do so diminishes the opportunities of those coerced, diminishes the likelihood of autonomously chosen rightful behaviour etc.” (Moore 1997: 749; 2014).