 (1a) to (2b) are all true. Hence, in Fregean terms, they all refer to the True. Each of these sentences expresses a thought different from all others. However, the members of each pair have the same modal status that differs from the modal status of the members of the other pair. (1a) and (1b) are contingently true; (2a) and (2b) necessarily true. If one lets sentences stand for or describe states of affairs whose constituents are the referents of the semantically relevant sentence parts, one can capture this similarity: (1a) and (1b) ((2a) and (2b)) have the same modal status because these sentences stand for the same state of affairs (Forbes 1989: 131). In general, sentences that stand for the same state of affairs have the same modal value. It is then a short step to take states of affairs to be the primary or fundamental bearers of modal status (1989: 131–2). A sentence is contingently (necessarily) true if, and only if, it stands for a state of affairs that contingently (necessarily)  obtains.[2]