 Here is another interpretative problem that seems to plague Spinoza’s account of the human mind. How should we understand the relation between 1) the intentional or representational relation that human minds essentially bear to bodies, and 2) Spinoza’s claim that minds and bodies are “one and the same thing” (E2p7s)? The doctrine of mind-body identity seems to follow directly for Spinoza from substance’s identity under different attributes: since thinking substance and extended substance are in fact just a single substance considered or described in two different ways, so also all of substance’s modifications will be subject to that same sort of multiplicity of descriptions. Accordingly, the human mind and the human body are numerically “one and the same thing” (namely, a certain finite mode) but this mode can be veridically described as a mind or as a body. But when we pair this doctrine of mind-body identity with the thesis of an essential representational relation between the mind and the body, we are faced with the question, Why should a mind represent what it is numerically identical with, or be identical with what it represents? How do we make this twofold nature of the mind-body relation intelligible?