 It is often thought that there is something paradoxical about deontological propositions like the assertion that everyone is bound to abstain from the (unprovoked) killing of  others.[9]  This thought rests on two standard consequentialist ideas. The first is that the wrongness of a given sort of action—e.g., (unprovoked) killing—must derive from the badness of the (typical) consequences of actions of that sort. The second is that the badness of the consequences of multiple actions of a given sort can be aggregated so that (typically) the total badness of the results of a bunch of wrongful actions of that sort will be greater than the badness of the results of one action of that sort. For example, the total badness associated with W’s (unprovoked) killings of X, Y, and Z will (typically) be greater than the badness associated with A’s (unprovoked) killing of B. It follows that it will (typically) be wrong for A to abstain from killing B if that is the only way to prevent W’s (unprovoked) killings of X, Y, and Z. The supposed paradox is that the wrongfulness of (unprovoked) killing must rest on the badness of the (typical) results of such killings; but recourse to the badness of results in the assessment of actions (typically) leads to the endorsement of (unprovoked) killings in precisely those cases in which the advocate of deontic constraints wants to insist upon their wrongfulness. However, the construction of this paradox of deontology rests firmly upon ideas that, as we have seen, Nozick has rejected on his way to asserting deontic side constraints.