At the other extreme are those who support a libertarian position, eschewing any blanket public regulation of enhancement in favor of free markets involving those who would develop enhancement interventions and individuals who would use them (Engelhardt 1990; Flanigan 2017). But this extreme position suffers the familiar drawbacks of unregulated market economies: a toleration of severely harmful transactions (e.g., purchasing tickets to a match of gladiatorial combat), the exacerbation of economic inequalities, and a permissive stance to transactions with long-term adverse consequences, which lead to “tragedies of the commons” and environmental devastation. As a result, even the more permissive authors qualify their “utopian eugenics” proposals with the sorts of regulatory protections that surround other consumer products in free-market societies, in terms of safety, fraud, fair pricing and environmental protection (Bostrom 2003), and argue that the political justifications for those policies should support equivalent social controls for enhancement interventions (Kitcher 1997; Harris 2007). Even with minimal legal regulations in place to ensure that markets for biomedical enhancement technologies will be “free”, the libertarian emphasis on the legal permissibility of these transactions is a blunt instrument for dealing with the subtle ethical complexities involved in deciding whether to use a particular enhancement technology.