 We can make this proposal more precise by articulating a metaphysics of belief encapsulated in John Perry’s distinction between what an agent believes and how she believes it. (See Perry 1977 for an early presentation of the distinction, where he characterized the distinction as one between thoughts and senses, and his 1979, where he characterized the distinction as one between belief contents and belief states, 1980, 1990, 1997, and 1998 for a fuller presentation. It should be noted that Perry himself is not a Naive Russellian, although he is a neo-Russellian. In his early papers, he simply left it undetermined whether or not sentences like (4) and (1) say the same thing, although Stalnaker claims that Perry claimed in personal communication that he intended his proposal to be equivalent to the Naive Russellian proposal; see note 11 of Stalnaker 1981. In later work, in particular his 1989, co-authored with Crimmins, Perry explicitly says that (1) and (4) have different truth values. We discuss Crimmins and Perry’s later view below in  Section 6.)  Perry argued against Frege’s solution to Frege’s puzzle by considering indexicals in propositional attitude reporting sentences. His attack is based upon the Fregean’s identification of belief contents with belief states. Perry argued that we can adequately account for indexicals in attitudes only when we distinguish these two aspect of acts of thinking and recognize that they can vary independently. Perry claimed that what one believes is a function of the belief states and environment one is in. We can believe different contents in different environments by being in the same belief state and we can believe the same content in different environments by being in the different belief states. So, for example, you and I are in the same belief states when we utter ‘I am hungry’ and yet, because of differences in our environments – namely, because I am me and you are you – our belief contents would be different. These differences in environment do not need to be conceptualized by the agent to make a difference to her cognitive states. You can think what I think when I say to myself ‘I am hungry’ by pointing to me and saying to yourself ‘He is hungry’. In his 1977 Perry identified belief states (what he there called senses) with what he called roles and what Kaplan called character. In later work (see in particular his 1980), Perry gives this identification up and individuates belief states in terms of their narrow functional role.