 Criticisms of Nishida’s thought were a significant part of its development during his lifetime, and continue to this day to inform debates about its meaning and relevance. Insofar as Nishida aimed at a comprehensive “system of self-awareness” (Nishida 1987b, 70)––ultimately the system of absolute nothingness determining itself as the historical world––his philosophy seems to preclude the possibility of radical internal critique. Nishida did not envision his system as closed to development or to an open future. But several key notions that he never abandoned leave scant room for acknowledging gaps: the notions of a universal that reflects itself clearly if not completely in its particulars, of a world that mirrors itself in its individuals, of more inclusive topoi that fully envelop less inclusive topoi, or of an absolute that is immanent in all relative selves. How does such a system account for fallibility, unpredictability, distortion or violence? And where does the author Nishida stand in relation to the system that he describes. Is the author too merely a reflection of the system?