 Instead of asking scientists to agree to use a revised conception of innateness, which would then have to be consistently distinguished from the vernacular conception, a simpler and potentially more effective strategy is to eliminate the innate/acquired distinction from scientific discourse. This recommendation has been advocated by a number of philosophers and some scientists (Mameli and Bateson 2006; Bateson and Mameli 2007; Griffiths 2002; Griffiths, et al. 2009; Griffiths and Machery 2008; Linquist et al. 2011; Linquist 2018; Machery 2017; Machery et al. 2019). This does not mean forbidding the use of the word ‘innate’, even if such a thing were possible or ethical. It merely means reducing its status to that of phrases like ‘in the blood’ which are no longer seen as the names of serious scientific constructs worthy of detailed investigation.