 Recall that in the de dicto sense (see §2.3 above) it seemed plausible to say that Lois Lane, who does not know that Clark Kent is Superman, believes that Superman is strong but does not believe that Clark Kent is strong. Despite the intuitive appeal of this view, some widely accepted “Russellian” views in the philosophy of language appear committed to attributing to Lois exactly the same beliefs about Clark Kent as she has about Superman. On such views, the semantic content of a name, or the contribution it makes to the meaning or truth conditions of a sentence, depends only on the individual picked out by that name. Since the names “Superman” and “Clark Kent” pick out the same individual, it follows that the sentence “Lois believes Superman is strong” could not have a different meaning or truth value from the sentence “Lois believes Clark Kent is strong”. Philosophers of language have discussed this issue, known as “Frege’s Puzzle”, extensively since the 1970s. Although the issues here arise for all the propositional attitudes (at least), generally the puzzle is framed and discussed in terms of belief. See the entry on  propositional attitude reports.