 A third motivation for DDS lies in the fact that it provides a solution to the ancient Euthyphro dilemma first presented by Plato in his eponymous dialog. Does God command the good because it is good, and forbid the bad because it is bad, or is the good good and the bad bad because God commands/forbids it? If the former, God’s willing would be subject to an external standard logically antecedent to God to the detriment of the divine sovereignty. If the latter, the content of morality would be arbitrary because subject to God’s free will. On DDS, however, the dilemma is a false alternative. If God is goodness itself in its prime instance, then he is not subject to a standard; he is the standard. And if God, being simple, just is his willing, then he cannot will anything other than the good and the appearance of arbitrarity vanishes. See Feser (2009, 129) who draws on Stump (2003).