 Interestingly, in addition to giving more weight to present satisfaction than to future satisfaction, human beings also seem to give more weight to future satisfaction than to past satisfaction. Relatedly, human beings seem to discount past pain more than future pain. Suppose, to appeal to a variation on Derek Parfit’s famous thought experiment (1984, 165–6), your situation is such that either you’ve already suffered a perfectly safe but terribly painful ten-hour medical procedure yesterday or else you will suffer a perfectly safe but terribly painful nine-hour medical procedure tomorrow. (You don’t know which situation you’re in because amnesia is administered right after the procedure and you’ve just woken up in the hospital confused about whether you’re recovering from the procedure or being prepped for it.) Wouldn’t you prefer to be in the former situation? Intuitively, it seems like the prevailing and rational response would be “most definitely!” But there is some concern that this form of future bias, in which past rewards or costs are discounted more than future rewards or costs, can lead to trouble (Dougherty 2011; Greene and Sullivan 2015). For example, Preston Greene and Meghan Sullivan (2015) argue that it can be a recipe for a life of “meager returns” and/or regret. Their reasoning is quite elaborate, but the following simple illustration and somewhat extemporized analysis, will hopefully provide a glimpse into some of the interesting philosophical issues at stake. Consider Massimo, who thoroughly enjoys massages and who can choose between a longer massage early on or a shorter massage later. If Massimo is future biased, then, with some variation on the length and timing of the massages, he can easily find himself faced with the following dilemma: if he opts for getting a longer massage early on, he will, sometime after getting the longer massage and before the shorter massage would have been available, regret accepting a pleasure, now past, that could have still been in the future (even if diminished); if, alternatively, he opts for getting a shorter massage later on (thus avoiding regret of the preceding sort), he will face a life of “meager returns,” in which less pleasure later is, potentially routinely, chosen over more pleasure earlier (a scenario that can itself generate regret and/or concern, particularly once both massage times are past, or if one recognizes, even as one is gladly awaiting a lesser pleasure after giving up a greater pleasure that would now have been in the past, that, insofar as the same sort of choice has arisen repeatedly and will continue to arise repeatedly, repeated choices for less pleasure later make for a life that is both retrospectively and prospectively much less appealing than repeated choices for more pleasure early on).