 On the other hand there are partisans of full belief that are deeply skeptical about partial beliefs. See Harman (1986), Pollock (2006), Moon (2017), Horgan (2017) and the “bad cop” in Hájek and Lin (2017). Many of these object that partial beliefs have no psychological reality and would be too difficult to reason with if they did. Horgan (2017) goes so far as to say that typically “there is no such psychological state as the agent’s credence in \(p\)” and that Bayesian epistemology is “like alchemy and phlogiston theory: it is not about any real phenomena, and thus it also is not about any genuine norms that govern real phenomena.” Harman (1986) argues that we have very few explicit partial beliefs. A theory of reasoning, according to Harman, can concern only explicit attitudes, since these are the only ones that can figure in a reasoning process. Therefore, Bayesian epistemology, while perhaps an account of dispositions to act, is not a guide to reasoning. Nevertheless, partial beliefs may be implicit in our system of full beliefs in that they can be reconstructed from our dispositions to revise them: