 Polger and Shapiro then extend their discussion of evidence to consider two “indirect” kinds for mental-to-physical multiple realizability. This evidence seeks to show that, in light of various observations, the multiple realizability hypothesis is more likely to be true than the mind-brain identity hypothesis. They begin by offering a canonical form for indirect evidence arguments, which compares the likelihood of multiple realizability versus the unlikelihood of mind-brain identities in light of the evidence. They then recast Block and Fodor’s (1972) appeal to neural plasticity (see discussion in  §1.3  above), an appeal to evolutionary convergence of psychological states and processes, and an appeal to the “conceptual possibility” of artificial minds into this canonical form, and argue that all three arguments fail. Finally they consider an appeal to the prevalence of the “computational theory of mind” within current cognitive science and psychology as an indirect argument for multiple realizability. In agreement with some recent mechanists (e.g., Kaplan and Craver 2011), Polger and Shapiro insist that many “computational explanations” are better understood “as precise descriptions of the task or behavior to be explained” rather than as explanations (2016: 154). And while they admit that the “representationalist” variety of computationalism (of which Fodor’s 1975 Language of Thought is a paradigmatic example) does rule out the possibility of mind-brain identities, they point out that this kind of computationalism is “not the only game in town” anymore (2016: 158). Numerous viable competing alternatives to it exist—Polger and Shapiro mention connectionism, strong and “ruthless” reductionism, and mechanism explicitly in this context—and all those make room for mind-brain identities.