 A common form of comparativism is optimization. According to optimization, the fact that an alternative is at least as good as the other alternatives is what justifies its choice. Consequently, if two alternatives are incomparable no justified choice can be made between them. Another line of response, one from within the economics literature, has been to distinguish between “optimization” and “maximization” as theories of justified choice (Sen 1997, 746; Sen 2000, 486). The theory of maximization as justified choice only requires the choice of an alternative that is not worse than other alternatives. Because incomparable alternatives are not worse than one another, the choice of either is justified according to the theory of maximization as justified choice. Maximization is thus a rejection of comparativism. However, Hsieh (2007) argues that proponents of comparativism have no reason to reject maximization as an account of justified choice and consequently incomparability need not pose a problem for the possibility of justified choice.