  Henry here adduces one of the most characteristic and original aspects of his metaphysical system: the distinction between potentia subiective and potentia obiective (Hödl 1963, Porro 1996). Something can be in potency with regard to a given act, either as the subject (subiectum) from which something else can or must be produced (as in the case of matter with regard to form), or as the object (obiectum) that constitutes the result itself of production (as in the case of generation, the form, or more precisely, the combination of matter and form). In the first case, the agent intervenes, impressing itself, or something else (as form), on the already available potential substratum. In the second case, there is no effective potency with regard to the acquisition of another form, but only with regard to the agent. Hence, essence is placed in act through creation, not because a form educed from its potency is impressed on it, but because it constitutes the result itself of the agent's action. Essence is not in potency in relation to being, but in relation to itself, as a totality constituted in being.