 Many of us assume obligations when we assume professional roles. As a philosophy professor at a state university, I have obligations to my colleagues, my students, and the taxpayers of the state of Iowa. Physicians and therapists have obligations to their patients, police officers to the citizens of their jurisdictions, ministers and priests to their flocks, etc. Are these obligations mere obligations of role without moral implications, or are they genuinely moral special obligations? These questions are particularly pressing, given how often our professions can force us to make morally charged decisions: any study of history shows how dangerous it can be for people to bow unreflectively to what they take to be the duties of their roles. As Joel Feinberg points out, conflicts between perceived special obligations of position and more general duties created great tension and conflict for American abolitionist judges prior to the Civil War. In an era of increased concern about professional ethics, we need to have some account of which professional roles, if any, generate genuinely moral special duties. (See Almond.)