 One subsequent writer who picked up on Benacerraf’s ideas in the early 1980s and tried to spell them out further, while still refraining from treating structures as full-fledged objects, is Michael Resnik (cf. Resnik 1981, 1982, 1988, and, most systematically, 1997). For him too, modern mathematics involves a “structuralist perspective”.  This includes a kind of pattern recognition; and one of Resnik’s main goals is to spell out the corresponding epistemology further. Along Benacerraf’s lines, mathematical objects are viewed as “positions” in corresponding patterns; and this is meant to allow us to take mathematical statements “at face value”, in the sense of seeing ‘0’, ‘1’, ‘2’, etc. as singular terms referring to such positions.  At the same time, doing so is not supposed to require reifying the underlying structures, which would mean specifying precise criteria of identity for them, something Resnik avoids intentionally. (He presents himself as a Quinean on this point, in the sense of adopting Quine’s slogan: “No entity without identity!”)