 Actualism is quite clearly the preferred common sense position here: on a first hearing, the idea that the Pope’s unborn children dwell in some shadowy corner of reality is to most ears ludicrous on its face—and defending against this common sense intuition remains arguably the central challenge facing the possibilist. But the motivations for possibilism are surprisingly strong. We have already noted what is perhaps the strongest of these: possibilism yields a straightforward, unified semantics for our modal discourse. By appealing to possibilia, the possibilist can provide satisfying truth conditions for otherwise semantically problematic modal statements like  (2)  along the lines of those for  (1)  that ground their intuitive truth in the modal properties of individuals. As we might also put it: possibilism provides  truthmakers  for such statements as  (2)  that actualism is apparently unable to supply. But a powerful second motivation is that possibilism falls out as a consequence of the most natural quantified modal logic. In particular, in that logic,  (4)  is an immediate logical consequence of  (2).  (We will spell out these motivations further in the following two sections.) These motivations in turn present a twofold  challenge for the actualist: