 Whether thick terms help undermine the is-ought gap depends on the way in which thick terms are evaluative. If at least some thick terms are such that the sentences in which they figure are entailed by non-evaluative sentences and the evaluations they convey belong to their meanings or truth-conditions, then thick terms would constitute counterexamples to the is-ought gap. It couldn’t be that O is true but R is false. If thick terms like rude have truth-conditional equivalents such as O that are evaluatively neutral, the evaluation might attach to rude only as a matter of linguistic convention and not be entailed by the propositions that rude is used to express. If the evaluative contents of thick terms were in this way “detachable” from the propositions they are used to express, they would undermine at most a linguistic is-ought gap at the level of thick terms and sentences, but not a conceptual is-ought gap at the level of thick concepts and propositions. Another possible view is that thick terms aren’t evaluative even by linguistic convention, but are merely commonly used evaluatively. Then thick terms couldn’t be invoked to undermine even a linguistic is-ought gap. (Here note a terminological matter. Some who think that evaluation is only pragmatically associated with terms like courageous or rude take this to mean that there are no thick concepts, but only loaded words; see Blackburn 1992 and, on the general phenomenon, Stevenson 1938. This is what we should say if a thick concept must be both evaluative and descriptive as a matter of meaning. Others who accept a pragmatic view are happy to talk about terms or concepts such as courageous or rude as thick, using “thick” to refer to terms and concepts that characteristically involve both evaluation and non-evaluative description in some way or other; see Väyrynen 2013. This entry adopts the latter usage.) This “location question” concerning how thick terms are related to the evaluations they normally convey is the topic of  section 4.