 Discussions in the literature generally assume a broad understanding of culture that is often not explicitly defined (e.g., Thompson 2003; Young 2007), but those definitions that do appear typically take the form of open-ended lists: culture is the product of human activity, particularly those things that are socially transmitted, including beliefs, practices, objects, etc. (Appiah 1994: 111–112; Scheffler 2007: 107). Culture is thus generally taken to be a descriptive term that does not carry with it the evaluative and often elitist connotations of culture as implying a certain kind of “civilization” (Appiah 1994: 111–114). This “anthropological” definition of culture is sometimes criticized as overly broad, failing to discriminate between those practices (e.g.) that are worthwhile and those that are not (Logan 2007: 37), but it remains the general touchstone in the literature. Indeed, culture is often treated as a “good” thing in the context of the cultural heritage literature, despite the fact that some cultural practices are subject to serious moral objections (Okin 1997; Brown 2005: 50–51). In any event, though this anodyne definition of culture in general may be readily accepted, defining any particular culture tends to be difficult and contentious (Scheffler 2007; Appiah 2006; Narayan 1998). Proponents of cultural preservation or integrity are often accused of making misguided assumptions about cultures as static, bounded wholes that are empirically and normatively flawed (e.g., Benhabib 2002; Mezey 2007). Indeed, these criticisms surface in many arguments concerning heritage ethics, as will be discussed in subsequent sections (see in particular  4.2.3).