  If this kind of general justification is not too restrictive, is it nonetheless too expansive? This was the first of the three objections raised above. Let us grant that some moral wrongs are not the criminal law’s business. We need not infer that criminal law is unconcerned with moral wrongness. We need only accept that there are facts about criminalization which give law-makers a duty not to criminalize some moral wrongs. There are many such facts, and their force varies depending on the wrong (Simester and von Hirsch 2011, 189–211; Moore 2014). In some cases, criminalizing a wrong will inevitably result in selective enforcement, raising concerns about selection being made on discriminatory grounds. In others, enforcement would necessitate gross invasions of privacy, and require the law to take sides in conflicts better resolved by the parties themselves. There is often value in freely choosing not to act wrongly, and in so choosing for the right reasons, rather than because one was coerced: criminalizing a wrong may result in this value disappearing from the world. It will almost inevitably divert scarce resources from other valuable priorities. And there is often reason to think that criminalization will not result in there being less wrongdoing in the world. Criminal conduct may be driven underground rather than made less common. Institutions of punishment may house unseen abuse and victimization. Ex-offenders may be driven towards crime by their reduced prospects in life. Where reasons like these generate a duty not to criminalize a wrong, the conduct in question is no business of the criminal law. There is nothing here to cast doubt on the thought that criminal law’s general justification consists in preventing, and holding people responsible for, moral wrongs.