 The topic of epistemic luck is an important one in this theory. For, although a defective process usually generates a false belief and a meritorious process generates a true belief, yet some beliefs may be true by fluke, in spite of being produced by a defective process. Suppose someone wrongly perceives mist as smoke and argues, ‘The hill has fire, as it has smoke on it’. Unbeknownst to him, the hill actually possesses fire. So this argument yields a veridical conclusion though the ground is defective. Or consider the following example (Chakrabarti, 1994): ‘Suppose that on a Tuesday a cheat mistakenly believing it to be Monday says, “Today is Tuesday”. If the listener does not suspect him to be a cheat, he would “understand” that today is a Tuesday. What he would understand surely would agree with facts.’ Here also the resultant cognition is veridical even though it is produced by a defective process. That is why the Naiyāyikas hold the following principle: if there is a false belief then there must be a defect in the generating process, but not its converse, i.e., if there is a defect in the generating process, then it produces a false belief (defects are necessary but not sufficient for error). The problem of epistemic luck has led scholars like Sibajiban Bhattacharyya to declare that the Naiyāyikas did not mean by veridical cognition (pramā) a justified true belief. Others, including J.N. Mohanty (Mohanty 1992, 2001) contest this view. They rather reconstruct the notion of pramā as a justified true belief and include the two examples mentioned above in the list of the Gettier-type counter-examples, thereby attempting to accommodate pramāṇa theories within the framework of traditional epistemology.