 Our first distinctions pertain to three varieties of cognitive rationality for emotions: rationality as fittingness, rationality as warrant and rationality as coherence. The dominant view on emotions is that they are representations of core relational themes or formal objects. Therefore, a first dimension of assessment for rationality concerns whether or not such core relational themes/formal objects are instantiated. We may for instance say that fear is rational in terms of fittingness just in case it is directed towards things that are truly dangerous, because this is what fear represents. Being afraid of a shark swimming alongside you is fitting, because the shark is dangerous. As D’Arms and Jacobson (2000) have emphasized, fittingness is importantly different from forms of appropriateness that are moral or strategic. For example, amusement at a funny joke may be fitting even if being amused by it is both morally inappropriate due to the sexist content of the joke, and costly in terms of self-interest, because those who witness the amusement may form a bad opinion of the amused agent.