 The basic idea of Burley’s theory of meaning is that the simple expressions in our language (i.e., names) are distinct from complex expressions (i.e., sentences) by virtue of their own significata, that is, by virtue of the different kinds of objects they signify. In fact, the objects signified by complex expressions are composites of those signified by simple expressions, together with a relation of identity (or non-identity, in the case of a true negative sentence) holding between them. A simple object is any item in a category: a particular substance, substantial form, or accidental form (De sup., p. 31; TsP, ch. de subiecto et praedicato, ed. Conti, pp. 18–19; EPhys., prol., fol. 5vb; EP, ch. de subiecto et praedicato, fol. 20ra). Furthermore, only complex expressions can be literally true or false, whereas simple expressions are true or false only metaphorically (TsP, ch. de substantia, ed. Conti, pp. 41–42; QP, q. 3, p. 248; EP, ch, de oppositione, fol. 45va; Eph, prol. fol. 66rb). As a result, Burley assumes that every simple expression in our language is like a label naming just one object in the world, and that semantic distinctions are derived from ontological differences between signified objects. He recognizes that general terms such as ‘man’ name a set of objects, whereas proper names such as ‘Socrates’ and expressions such as ‘a certain man’ (‘aliquis homo’), name just one object belonging to a set. This difference is explained not by appealing to some semantic distinction between terms, but by means of the different modes of existence of their significata. Proper names and individual expressions name individuals (i.e., object tokens), but general terms name common natures (i.e., object types), which are the metaphysical constituents of the set of individuals instantiating them. For instance, the general name ‘man’ names and can stand for each and every man only because it primarily signifies the universal form of humanity that is present in each and every man and constitutive of his essence (TsP, ch. de substantia, ed. Conti, pp. 37–38; EP, ch. de substantia, fols. 25vb–26ra). In his middle commentary on De interpretatione, Burley remarks in connection with the opening lines of the chapter seven of Aristotle’s text (17a38–b7) that a linguistic expression is a general name (nomen appellativum) if and only if it signifies a universal, that is, a thing (res) common to many individuals (p. 85). The same idea is expressed in his final commentary on De interpretatione (ch. de oppositione enuntiationum, fol. 74rb–va; see also EP, ch. de substantia, fol. 26ra).