 The idea that our everyday ToM abilities depend on the use of a set of adjustable subpersonal models, as opposed to a fixed set of propositions describing FP laws, fits well with predictive processing accounts of cognition (Gopnik &amp; Glymour 2002). Predictive processing accounts of perception hold that—at its core—such cognitive activity always takes the form of making inferences concerning the hidden causes of sensory phenomena (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016). Advocates of the predictive processing variants of TT hold that the processes used in FP are of the same basic kind used elsewhere in every other variety of cognition, including acts of basic perception; the only difference is that in the case of FP the target of the activity is to infer how other minds cause actions (see, e.g., Gopnik &amp; Wellman 2012; Bowers &amp; Davis 2012; Koster-Hale &amp; Saxe 2013; Hohwy &amp; Palmer 2014; Palmer, Seth, &amp; Hohwy 2015; Pezzulo 2017; Zednik &amp; Jäkel 2016; Jara-Ettinger et al. 2016; Jara-Ettinger 2019).