 Another looming question is whether one would be able to perceive moral properties were they non-natural properties. Robert Audi (2013), for example, defends a non-naturalist view of moral properties as being (in his terminology) “perceptible”. (See Crow 2016 for a critical discussion of Audi and related views of moral perception.) Finally, another question, fundamental to the debate over the thesis of moral perception, is whether it is possible to determine by introspectionist methodology alone (including the method of contrast) whether at least some perceptual experiences include as part of their content the presentation of moral properties—whether as Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons put it, such experiences have “realist purport”. In a series of articles (2008b, 2010b, 2017, 2018a,b, 2019), they defend a “neutrality thesis” according to which for a variety of types of moral experience it is not possible to determine by introspectionist methodology alone whether such experiences have realist purport. Their point, if cogent, arguably generalizes to all types of moral experience, including perceptual experience of the sort featured in Harman’s cat example, even if such experiences do have realist purport.