 One of the most interesting criticisms that Taurellus levels against Cesalpino concerns exactly this issue. As Taurellus argues, the claim that reflexive acts are due to parts of the active intellect could be construed in two ways. The first way would be to understand the relation between the activities of the parts of the active intellect and the activities of the active intellect as a whole as analogous to the relation between the activities of the parts of a stone in motion and the activity of the whole stone in motion. Here, the activities of the parts of the moving stone are of the same kind as the activities of the moving stone as a whole: self-motion with the same direction and speed. If this were the relevant analogy, Taurellus argues, the activities of the parts of the active intellect would be of the same nature as the activities of the active intellect as a whole (AC: 270–271). Evidently, this is contrary to the assumption that Cesalpino makes, namely, that one part of the active intellect does not have reflexive access to the activities of any other part of the active intellect.