 In a section of her 1988 book, Computer Models of the Mind, Margaret Boden notes that intentionality is not well-understood – reason to not put too much weight on arguments that turn on intentionality. Furthermore, insofar as we understand the brain, we focus on informational functions, not unspecified causal powers of the brain: “…from the psychological point of view, it is not the biochemistry as such which matters but the information-bearing functions grounded in it.” (241) Searle sees intentionality as a causal power of the brain, uniquely produced by biological processes. Dale Jacquette 1989 argues against a reduction of intentionality – intentionality, he says, is an “ineliminable, irreducible primitive concept.” However most AI sympathizers have seen intentionality, aboutness, as bound up with information, and non-biological states can bear information as well as can brain states. Hence many responders to Searle have argued that he displays substance chauvinism, in holding that brains understand but systems made of silicon with comparable information processing capabilities cannot, even in principle. Papers on both sides of the issue appeared, such as J. Maloney’s 1987 paper “The Right Stuff”, defending Searle, and R. Sharvy’s 1983 critique, “It Ain’t the Meat, it’s the Motion”. AI proponents such as Kurzweil (1999, see also Richards 2002) have continued to hold that AI systems can potentially have such mental properties as understanding, intelligence, consciousness and intentionality, and will exceed human abilities in these areas.