 The drive to generality moves us from favoring personal good to impersonal goods. Rules about the right, or the “moral ought” concern the production, distribution, or destruction of impersonal goods. Oddly, justice in impersonal goods requires the recognition of persons, subjective selves. These are introduced in Values and Intentions via discussions of the problem of other minds, which for Findlay is no pseudo-problem. The solution is found by applying the ubiquitous phenomenological relation of “seeing as” to social interactions. The argument involves the idea that mental states are psycho-physical complexes with poignant concentrated feelings on one side and spread out behavior on the other. We perceive some patterns of behavior as intentional, some as mechanical. When we perceive the behavior as intentional, we infer the psychical side. (Findlay’s discussion of reactive perceptions anticipates by several years Peter Strawson’s work on reactive attitudes.) The bottom line, however, is familiar: justice requires placing oneself in the shoes of the other.