 Given the timing and contexts of the publication of Bridgman’s ideas, the philosophical debates surrounding them were to a large extent framed in relation to logical positivism, which was just making its big impact on the American philosophical scene. The young Herbert Feigl (1902–1988), with a personal introduction by no less than Moritz Schlick, came to Harvard in 1930 with the express purpose of learning from Bridgman, despite the latter’s warning that he did not have much to teach (Walter 1990, 164–165; Moyer 1991, 391). Bridgman’s insistence on operational meaningfulness had at least a surface resemblance to the logical positivists’ verification theory of meaning. Bergmann thought Bridgman had given a “scientist’s version” of the latter (Bergmann in Frank 1956, 55), and Carl Hempel regarded operationalism and logical positivism as “closely akin” to each other (Hempel in Frank 1956, 56). And it is not difficult to see how a kindred philosophical doctrine coming from a world-class scientist would have captured the logical positivists’ imagination.