 This initiating validation of the principle of induction is directly parallel to Mill’s argument for the principle of utility (Macleod 2014). We are naturally inclined to desire pleasure, and such desires, when we attend to them, strike us as reasonable—as being desire-worthy. Similarly, we are naturally disposed to believe in inductive generalisations, and such beliefs, when we attend to them, strike us as reasonable—being belief-worthy. In each case, there is no further initial justification of our natural reasoning propensities beyond the fact that, upon critical inspection, they strike us as sound. Indeed, that valid principles of reason—practical and theoretical—are established by casting a critical eye upon how we in fact do reason should be of no surprise: such an anthropological approach to the normative is forced by Mill’s naturalism. We cannot know what constitutes good reasoning a priori, and as such “[t]he laws of our rational faculty, like those of every other natural agency, are only learnt by seeing the agent at work” (System, VII: 833).