 Turning to irreflexivity, Bliss (2018) critically assesses the general theoretical motivations for thinking that grounding is irreflexive. Lowe (1998: 145) suggests that self-explanatory states of affairs are epistemically possible, so perhaps a characterization of grounding shouldn’t rule this out. Historically, certain influential thinkers have thought that the fact that God exists, for example, is a self-explanatory state of affairs. Fine (2010) and Krämer (2013) also discuss various cases that seem to involve violations of irreflexivity. Here is a case along the lines of those they discuss—consider the following fact: [Some fact or other obtains]. Some facts do indeed obtain, so of course [Some fact or other obtains] itself obtains. And it seems that any fact that obtains is something that grounds this fact. Since [Some fact or other obtains] is itself a fact that obtains, it follows that this fact grounds itself!