 For theories that reject the Sure-thing Principle or the Independence Axiom, several potential worries arise, including the worry that these axioms are intuitively correct (Harsanyi 1977, Savage 1954, Samuelson 1952; see discussion in McClennen 1983, 1990); that decision-makers will evaluate consequences inconsistently (Samuelson 1952, Broome 1991); and that decision-makers will reject cost-free information (Good 1967, Wakker 1988, Buchak 2013, Ahmed &amp; Salow 2019, Campbell-Moore &amp; Salow 2020). The most widely discussed worry is that these theories will leave decision-makers open to diachronic inconsistency (Raiffa 1968; Machina 1989; Hammond 1988; McClennen 1988, 1990; Seidenfeld 1988a,b; Maher 1993; Rabinowicz 1995, 1997; Buchak 2013, 2015, 2017; Briggs 2015; Joyce 2017; Thoma 2019).