 Centered accounts also face the problem of enhanced control. Note that the simple centered account we are considering differs from typical compatibilist accounts only by requiring that the agent’s mental states nondeterministically cause her decision. How does this difference in the nature of the causal relationship do anything to enhance the agent’s control over her act?   A popular response to this question says that indeterminism enhances control because it is necessary for the agent to possess the ability or opportunity to do otherwise. And having the ability or opportunity to do otherwise increases control. Franklin (2011a and 2018) and Ekstrom (2019) offer responses along these lines. Kane makes a similar point. On the indeterministic picture: an agent exercises dual control, a control that can be exercised in either of two different ways, whereas on the deterministic picture the agent’s control can be exercised in only one way (Kane 1996: 109–11).