 Although this characterization is appealing, it has its limitations. Clearly, contemporary philosophers are interested in questions of grounding in addition to questions about grounding. What might be less clear, however, is that, on the face it, the historical literature is by no means short of attempts at engaging with questions about grounding in addition to questions of grounding. Consider, for example, cosmological arguments. In broad strokes, the thought is that the totality of contingent entities, the cosmos, stands in need of explanation, and only considerations involving God understood as a necessary existent are up to the task. Central to such arguments is an assumption according to which we can’t explain why there are contingent entities by appealing to the existence of a contingent entity. Debate has raged for centuries over how exactly we ought to understand this assumption and whether or not we ought to believe it. Importantly, this assumption is generally understood as a kind of no circularity assumption. In debating whether the assumption is correct, historical figures are, albeit indirectly, debating whether or not the relation at issue can have reflexive instances. The same goes for discussions around God’s nature as a self-causer. If the relation at issue is that of grounding, then the history of philosophy is rich in discussions about grounding.