  A final issue concerns peer disagreement itself. As some have noted, epistemic peers are extremely rare, if not non-existent (Frances 2010, 2014; King 2011; Matheson 2014). After all, what are the odds that someone else is in precisely as good of an epistemic position as you on some matter—and even she was, would you know it? As we have seen, there are a number of disagreement factors, and the odds that they end in a tie between any two individuals at any given time is quite unlikely. The paucity of peers may be taken to show that the debate of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement is a futile exercise in extreme hypotheticals. After all, if you have no epistemic peers that disagree with you, doesn’t the epistemic threat from disagreement dissolve? Further, there may seem to have been a deceptive shift in the debate. Much of the puzzle of disagreement is motivated by messy real world cases of disagreement, but the vast majority of the literature is focused on idealized cases of disagreement that rarely, if ever, occur.