 Is perfect goodness a possibility? One might think that it is obvious that it is. After all, whatever standard of moral goodness that one puts forward as the ideal, it must be a standard that is possible for agents to meet, for ‘ought’ – at least, the moral ‘ought’ – implies ‘can.’ But one might claim that the standard for moral goodness is not really like that. Instead of putting forward an ideal, the standard of moral goodness is a comparative standard: with respect to cases of appropriate comparison, the standard of moral goodness tells one how the two items being compared – whether desires, traits of character, actions – are ordered with respect to one another. So the standard of moral goodness declares one set of desires morally better than another, or declares them equally good; or declares one set of character traits better than another, or declares them equally good; or declares one career of actions better than another, or declares them equally good. (Put to the side the possibility that some such items are simply incommensurable.) Understood in this comparative way, the standard of moral goodness could still honor ‘ought implies can’: perhaps if A’s performing action X is morally better than A’s performing action Y, this comparison presupposes that performing X is possible for A and performing Y is possible for A. But the key point is that, understood in this comparative way, it is not at all obvious that perfect moral goodness is possible. For it may be that the facts about what it is possible for A to do and the comparative moral standard together entail that for every action that A might perform, there is a morally better action that it is possible for A to perform.