 One might object that the fundamental aims of science are epistemic rather than non-epistemic or that epistemic values should constrain non-epistemic ones (Douglas 2009; Steel 2010, 2015; Steel and Whyte 2012). Some still will push back. First, it is clear that practical aims do outweigh epistemic aims at least sometimes. Idealizations that distort the truthfulness of models may be justified by practical considerations such as greater computational efficiency or tractability. Second, insofar as non-epistemic values outweigh epistemic ones, this can be carefully reflected in scientists’ attitudes towards their theories and models. For example, instead of believing that a given model is true, they may accept it for predictions with regard to a given domain or for policy-making in very specific scenarios. However, as Daniel Steel argues, if scientific inquiry does not prioritize epistemic values, then it is subject to what he calls Ibsen predicaments (after Henrik Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People). An Ibsen predicament occurs when (a) highly valued objectives of a community are linked to some activity, (b) this activity has seriously harmful effects, and (c) if those effects became widely known and acted upon, the community would be threatened (Steel 2017, 51). 