 These studies show that people give very high estimates of prevalence when presented with a generic statement concerning a novel animal kind. When the generics concern familiar kinds, prevalence estimates can be more realistic. Nevertheless, accepting a generic increases people’s tendency to believe a given member of the kind will have the property in question, over and above their beliefs about the prevalence of the property (Khemlani, Leslie, and Glucksberg 2012). For example, people correctly give comparable prevalence estimates concerning the number of ducks that are female vs. lay eggs. However, when asked to judge whether a given duck would have a property (e.g., “suppose you are told that Quacky is a duck. Evaluate the following statement: Quacky lays eggs”), people were significantly more likely to agree that the duck would lay eggs than they were that the duck would be female (Khemlani et al. 2012). These results suggest that people may treat generics as being inferentially quite powerful, in a way that cannot be reduced to their background beliefs about the prevalence of the property. When people are asked to judge whether a given member of a kind will have a property or not, they rely in part on their background judgment of the generic, rather than solely on their beliefs about how prevalent the property is.