This point suggests a third observation from our review: despite the claims of its defenders, biomedical enhancement is not a practice that is not always especially well-suited to a melioristic ethic aimed at improving human welfare. Often a step forward for some purposes is also a step back in other contexts. Many enhanced people are correspondingly disabled, and so by extension are their teams, families, communities, etc. Consider, for example, an enhancement that makes our reflexes faster.  Such an enhancement might increase the risk of making mistakes in ways that would be considered an acceptable trade-off for military pilots on solo combat missions, but not for commercial pilots ferrying hundreds of passengers. If our policies were to focus on reminding us that most enhancements come with trade-offs, we might be able to orient our public policy away from either regulatory or compensatory approaches keyed to “enhancement” in the abstract, and towards the specific social and institutional contexts in which particular enhancement interventions might be considered too risky or unfair.  Should, for example, the Air Force consider the post-service consequences of a hyper-reflex enhancement for pilots in deciding whether to adopt such an intervention? Should enhanced veterans be able to claim accommodation from employers for their service-induced hyper-responsiveness?