  In deciding this debate, one has to keep two issues apart (see e.g., Fine 2000: 81). One is how to interpret Sextus’ characterisation of the kind of dogma which is acceptable to the skeptic (does it involve accepting that one is in a certain mental state, or is it an acceptance of the way the world is, etc.); the other is whether a dogma of the acceptable kind deserves to be called a belief, given what that English term connotes. The second of these points is a matter of philosophical definition, but the first is a properly interpretational dispute. Barnes and Burnyeat claim that the acceptable kind of dogma, on their analysis, is not a belief in any acceptable sense of the word ‘belief’: for me to acknowledge that I am currently having a perceptual experience of a tree outside my window (to acknowledge that it appears to me that there is a tree outside) is no way of believing that there is a tree outside. Striker points out that this is not so obvious, since according to Barnes and Burnyeat, the Skeptic’s actions are governed by these acknowledgments, and there is 