 In this context, it is also important to discuss the translation of the term vijñāna as “cognition”. Both terms refer to a mental phenomenon that provides knowledge. This means that they refer to a state of affairs that pertains in the world. Both terms presuppose an external or mental object they are directed towards. One important difference between these two terms, which shows the difficulty with translating vijñāna as cognition, is that, according to Śāntarakṣita, a vijñāna always has an object but it does not have to have conceptual content. In this sense, even a sensation or feeling, such as the sensation of pleasure, is a vijñāna because it has an object but lacks conceptual content, according to Śāntarakṣita. The sensation has an object because it provides knowledge about mental states and therefore has to have an object of knowledge. However, this object is not conceptual. So, according to Śāntarakṣita, a vijñāna includes affective mental states, such as feelings, sensations and emotions and therefore kleśas. The Western term “cognition”, by contrast, excludes affective mental states.