  Leaving aside definitional issues and turning to the moral status of cheating, moral objections to cheating typically rest on two principal arguments. The first invokes the logical incompatibility thesis – the idea that rule-breaking is not compatible with game playing, because game playing requires strict adherence to the rules (see sect. 2.1). This argument could justify a prohibition of only forms of cheating that involve rule-breaking: it could not ground an objection to cheating that involves the violation of conventions or broad internalist principles. The second argument relies on the idea that cheating is an attempt to gain an unfair advantage, that is, an advantage not permitted under the agreement between players or the set of norms by which players are expected to abide (Gert, 2004). Fairness-based objections may not ground a prohibition to ‘retaliatory’ or ‘compensatory’ cheating that is undertaken to re-establish fairness following an injustice that has placed a competitor at an unfair disadvantage (Kirkwood, 2012).