There are different views about what would be reasonable conditions for choosing among alternative possible moral rules. One view is that everyone’s impartiality would have to be insured by the imposition of a hypothetical “veil of ignorance” behind which no one knew any specific facts about himself or herself (Harsanyi 1953, 1955). Another view is that we should imagine that people would be choosing a moral code on the basis of (a) full empirical information about the different effects on everyone, (b) normal concerns (self-interested as well as altruistic), and (c) roughly equal bargaining power (Brandt 1979; cf. Gert 1998). Parfit (2011) proposes seeking rules that everyone has (personal or impartial) reason to choose or will that everyone accept. If impartial reasons are always sufficient even when opposed by personal ones, then everyone has sufficient reason to will that everyone accept the rules whose universal acceptance will have the best consequences impartially considered. Similarly, Levy (2013) supposes that no one could reasonably reject a code of rules that would impose on her burdens that add up to less than the aggregate of burdens that every other code would impose on others. Such arguments suggest the extensional equivalence of contractualism and rule-consequentialism. (For assessment of whether Parfit’s contractualist arguments for rule-consequentialism succeed, see J. Ross 2009; Nebel 2012; Hooker 2014.)