 But some skeptics are skeptics regarding second- (and higher-) order propositions as well as regarding first-order propositions. Following the same ancient tradition, we will call that kind of skepticism “Pyrrhonian Skepticism”. Without any claim to historical accuracy, we will take Pyrrhonian Skepticism to be absolute skepticism—the thesis that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to any proposition p. Is Pyrrhonian Skepticism so understood self-refuting? It is certainly formally consistent: no contradiction follows just from the propositions that the only justified attitude with respect to the proposition that p is suspension of judgment and that the only justified attitude with respect to the proposition that the only justified attitude with respect to the proposition that p is suspension of judgment is suspension of judgment (say that three times fast!). But consider the principle that whenever someone is committed to a proposition p they are also (perhaps implicitly) committed to the proposition that belief is the (or at least a) justified attitude towards p. Call this the “Commitment Iteration Principle”. If the Commitment Iteration Principle holds, then Pyrrhonian Skepticism is indeed self-refuting. For Pyrrhonian skeptics are committed to the claim that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to some proposition p. By the Commitment Iteration Principle, they are then committed to the claim that belief is a justified attitude with respect to the proposition that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to p. Therefore, if they are in addition committed to the claim that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to that very same proposition, they are committed to an inconsistent set of propositions. But Pyrrhonian skeptics need not hold the Commitment Iteration Principle. Indeed, they are committed to thinking that suspension of judgment is the only justified attitude with respect to the Commitment Iteration Principle itself (and also with respect to analogous principles which may make trouble for Pyrrhonian Skepticism). Of course, Pyrrhonian Skepticism will not be acceptable to anyone who does hold the Commitment Iteration Principle—but neither will Pyrrhonian Skepticism be acceptable to anyone who holds that we should not suspend judgment with respect to some proposition. It is not clear, then, that the charge of self-refutation represents an independent indictment of Pyrrhonian Skepticism. In any case, contemporary philosophers find Pyrrhonian Skepticism interesting not because they take seriously the possibility of its truth, but rather because there are interesting arguments in its favor, the responses to which shape the contours of many contemporary epistemological theories.