  Feminist epistemologies continued to multiply throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, quickly cross-fertilizing and in the process undermining Harding’s classification system. Few current works in feminist epistemology fall unequivocally into a single category given Harding’s three original definitions. For example, the leading theories of feminist empiricism from the 1990s on have very little in common with Harding’s characterization of feminist empiricism, given that they do not explain past instances of sexism and androcentrism as simply “bad science” and they do not accept traditional norms of science as appropriate  correctives (Longino 1990, 2002; Nelson 1990,  1993).[5]  Even Harding has developed her own position as a blend of standpoint theory and feminist postmodernism (Harding 1991). In spite of their significant limitations, however, Harding’s divisions are still often cited, and remain useful in characterizing some of the main directions of the literature.