 Several philosophers argue that a beneficiary must treat a benefactor’s benefit in certain ways in order to count as grateful. Seneca (On Benefits), for instance, claims that accepting the benefactor’s gift in the first place is necessary for gratitude, since turning down a gift is likely to frustrate or disappoint a benefactor, or signal an unwillingness to advance a friendship. (Whether turning down a gift actually constitutes ingratitude is discussed in  section 4.3,  below.) Once beneficiaries accept or receive gifts or favors, Camenisch (1981) argues that beneficiaries must respect certain “use conditions” on the benefits they receive—i.e., not treat such benefits in a way obviously repugnant to the benefactor, or antithetical to her reasonable hopes for how the gift would be enjoyed. If I accept a rare edition of Kant’s works, and then summarily toss it in the trash, this may instantiate a sort of ingratitude. In certain cases, gratitude might also require that a beneficiary compensate his benefactor for certain costs she incurred in providing the benefit. If a good Samaritan damages her car in rushing me to the hospital, offering to pay for the damage might be called for (Simmons 1979).