 Armed with the distinction between truth-making and ontological commitment, we are now able to state a very general shortcoming of the argument. Let it be agreed that Ben Vorlich’s being the height it is and Ben Vane’s being the height it is together make true the claim that Ben Vorlich is taller than Ben Vane; so no further truth-makers are required for this claim to be true. But it doesn’t follow that we aren’t ontologically committed to the existence of an internal relation between Ben Vorlich and Ben Vane when we make this claim. We surely are ontologically committed to Ben Vorlich and Ben Vane when we make the claim that one is taller than the other even though they’re not themselves truth-makers for this claim. They’re not truth-makers for this claim because they might have existed even though Ben Vane was taller than Ben Vorlich or the same height. But recognising that the class of ontological commitments and the class of truth-makers for a given claim may be different classes opens up the possibility that we may be ontologically committed to an internal relation between Ben Vorlich and Ben Vane even though this relation isn’t a truthmaker for this claim either (MacBride 2011: 162–6).