 It’s crucial to note that the norms of awareness capacitarians rely on to substantiate should-have-known allegations aren’t duties of inquiry. While norms of awareness directly demand awareness of relevant considerations, duties of inquiry impose obligations to undertake information-gathering actions that contribute to the occurrence of such awareness (Rosen 2004: 302; 2008: 600–1; H. Smith 2014; Wieland 2017a: 6–8). In other words, while norms of awareness are concerned with agents’ states of mind, duties of inquiry are concerned with agents’  activities.[12]  This naturally generates the following worry concerning norms of awareness: given that “becoming aware is not something we do but something that happens to us” (Sher 2009: 112; see also Rosen 2004: 302; 2008: 600), one might wonder whether the should-have-known criterion can be used to undergird blameworthiness after all. If failures of awareness escape the agent’s direct control, how could it be true that such involuntary failures partly explain direct responsibility for unwitting wrongdoing? (Nelkin 2011: 679–80; Nelkin &amp; Rickless 2015).