 It is important to note that, even in the midst of deciding among the various methods for representing selection processes, these choices have consequences for the empirical adequacy of the selection models. This is true even if the models are denied to have a causal interpretation, as is done by those promoting a “statisticalist” interpretation of selection theory (Walsh, Lewens, &amp; Ariew 2002). On this view, evolution is seen as a purely statistical phenomenon, and population genetics studies statistical relations estimated by census, and not causal relationships. The claim is that the “deeply uninteresting” units of selection problem has been dissolved, whereas in fact, it has simply been restricted to the interactor question (while ignoring the other three “units” questions entirely); the problem of how to deliver an empirically adequate selection model is not directly addressed (2002: 470–471). Instead, an unspecified method is assumed that “identifies classes [that] … adequately predict and explain changes in the structure of the population” (Walsh, Lewens, &amp; Ariew 2002: 471), with no acknowledgment that this involves making a commitment to one or another of the above methods of determining an interactor, whether under a causal interpretation or not. Thus, the interactor problem has not been escaped, whether or not it is interpreted causally (see Otsuka 2016).