 All of (1)–(4) have metaphysically impossible antecedents. (1) and (3) are plausibly false (unless one is a vacuist: see Williamson 2007), but (2) and (4) are trivial truths. (A nonvacuist conditional semantics using impossible worlds delivers just these results: see Berto et al. 2018.) But the structuralist has (1)–(2) and (3)–(4), respectively, express the same propositions, given that [Ziggy] = [Bowie]. If conditionals in general, or even only counterfactuals, don’t involve intentionality, guises will offer little help if they are not supposed to come into play here. However, there are treatments of conditionality along the lines of epistemic modals (Kratzer 1986; Lycan 2001), and the Russellian structuralist may appeal to one of them, or come up with a new one.