 A more plausible picture of obligations of gratitude paints them as obligations that we ought not be upset at having. Even if those obligations sometimes land us in situations we find unpleasant, we should not regret the benevolence that gave rise to those obligations. A similar point could be made about parenthood, love, or friendship. In all such relationships, a parent, lover or friend will sometimes find himself tightly constrained by certain obligations and commitments. Such constraints may be in themselves unpleasant; but a good parent, lover or friend will not take that unpleasantness as reason to regret the special relationship they stem from (Owens 2012). By the same token, it might be argued that a good beneficiary will not regret or avoid having been shown benevolence, despite what obligations may arise as a result. Indeed, insofar as we incur moral obligations in accepting or receiving favors, we might even find pleasure or pride in such obligations. Card (1988) argues that in bestowing a favor upon a beneficiary, we should see the benefactor as expressing her faith in the beneficiary as someone worthy of benevolence, and as someone who can be trusted to return a favor in the future. Beneficiaries should see themselves not as debtors, with the constant need to prove to benefactors that they are indeed grateful, but as trustees, who already have the confidence of their depositors. On this “trusteeship paradigm”, obligations of gratitude are obligations we are proud and honored to have been given.