 Others have suggested what may be called “the Temporality Principle”: the idea here is roughly this: if someone deserves something, D, in virtue of having a certain desert base, DB, then he or she must already have DB at the time he or she begins to deserve D (see, for example, Rachels 1978; Kleinig 1971; Sadurski 1985). You cannot deserve something on the basis of a property you will begin to have only later. The Temporality Principle has been invoked in an effort to explain why it is wrong to engage in “pre-punishment.” It is said that even if a certain person is going to commit a crime, he does not begin to deserve punishment for that crime until he actually commits it. This line of thought has been debated. One problem is that even before he commits the crime, the future criminal already has this property: being such that he will later commit a crime. It might be said that he deserves punishment in virtue of already having this property even before he commits the crime. While the Temporality Principle is widely endorsed, counterexamples have been presented (see, for example, Feldman 1995b). Those counterexamples have not been universally accepted (see, for example, Smilansky 1996a, 1996b).