  Perhaps the most commonly discussed objection to organ sale is the claim that it is exploitative (Greasley 2014; Hughes 1998; Lawler 2011, 2014; Wilkinson 2003). Saying what exploitation amounts to is itself a complex task, however, and I will not say much here about how it should be defined (see the SEP entry on exploitation).  It is, however, worth noting that, on one view, defective (or invalid) consent is a necessary condition for the occurrence of exploitation. Thus (according to this view) a transaction can only be exploitative if the putative victim of exploitation is coerced, lacking capacity, ill-informed, or manipulated (or more generally, if there is some consent-invalidating factor in play). If this view of the relationship between consent and exploitation were correct, then the discussion of exploitation could be ended here; for consent issues were dealt with in the previous section and the exploitation worry about organ sale would only be worth taking seriously inasmuch as those consent arguments discussed above were sound. However, not everyone thinks that defective consent is required for there to be exploitation and so there may be some mileage in looking independently at exploitation.