 Hoffmann-Kolss (2015) argues that a number of classifications of properties needed for metaphysics are hyperintensional. The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is one example, discussed above. Hoffman-Kolss also argues the qualitative/non-qualitative distinction is hyperintensional (the distinction between properties that do not require a relationship to a particular and those that do—e.g., being square vs. being John’s neighbor: see also Hoffman-Kolss 2019). The dispositional/categorical distinction is arguably hyperintensional (Hoffmann-Kolss 2015: 341–342, 346). (One philosophically controversial example may illustrate: on some theories, there is a necessarily-existing God that is necessarily the only omnipotent being. Still, we might think being omnipotent is dispositional, concerning the powers of that being, while being God is categorical (2015: 346).) The distinction between perfectly natural properties that best carve at the joints, and the others, is, too (2015: 345). Hoffman-Kolss’s example here is to contrast the (supposedly) perfectly natural property of being an electron with the infinitely disjunctive identity property of being \(e_1\) or being \(e_2\) or… and so on for all possible electrons \(e\). If electronhood is essential to the objects that have it, something is an electron if and only if it is one of \(e_1\), \(e_2\), etc., but Hoffman-Kolss argues this latter condition is not a perfectly natural one.