 First, Kaufman (2006: 175–85) notes that if a body that has MAs in virtue of which it is dispositively cold is not actually cold, then it might seem that the relational account of qualities is expendable. One reason is that from the fact that a body is dispositively cold and the tenets of any adequate mechanist theory, we can predict and explain what the body would do if it were applied to the tactual organ of a perceiver; so it might seem that CT can do without relational qualities. According to Kaufman, this is not right. This is said to be because by Boyle’s empiricist lights, we have no way of knowing what would happen if snow and the right sort of perceiver were to come together except by observing the event. The point is that we cannot attribute dispositive coldness to a body unless such bodies have, or once had, the relational quality cold.