Despite this point, it is common to classify a theory as non-originalist if it allows that the application of the Constitution should be governed by the best available understanding of what falls under broad language of the Constitution – especially when that language includes moral terms. For example, a theory that allows that punishments not considered cruel at the time the Constitution was ratified may violate the eighth amendment because they are in fact cruel would standardly be considered a non-originalist theory. See entry on Constitutionalism, section 9. Such a position is, however, consistent with the Constitution’s contribution to the law’s being fixed by the original linguistic meaning of the text or by certain kinds of original intentions (see Whittington 2004, 610–11). There is thus an anomaly in the use of the originalism and non-originalism labels: positions that meet the definition of originalism given by its own proponents are standardly treated by both sides of the debate as non-originalist (see Eisgruber 2001, 27).