 Of course, along the lines of the worldly turn we noted in §3.6.3, an externalist might cheerfully just allow that some sentences, e.g., “water is H20,” are in fact analytic, even though they are “external” and subject to empirical (dis)confirmation. Such a view would actually comport well with an older philosophical tradition less interested in the meanings of our words and concepts, and more interested in the “essences” of the worldly phenomena they pick out. Locke (1690 [1975], II, 31, vi), for example, posited “real” essences of things rather along the lines resuscitated by Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1972 [1980]), the real essences being the conditions in the world independent of our thought that make something the thing it is. Thus, being H2O may be what makes something water, and (to take the striking examples of diseases noted by Putnam, 1962 [1975]) being the activation of a certain virus is what makes something polio. But, of course, such an external view would still dash the hopes of philosophers looking to the analytic to explain a priori knowledge (but see Bealer 1987 and Jackson 1998 for strategies to assimilate such empirical cases to nevertheless a priori, armchair analysis). Such a consequence, however, might not faze an externalist like Fodor (1998), who is concerned only to save intentional psychology, and might otherwise share Quine’s scepticism about the analytic and the a priori.