 The leads to the second central idea of Foot’s late work is that moral goodness is a form of what she calls ‘natural goodness’. That is, moral goodness is an aspect of what makes us good as human beings. In this idea, she is developing a strain of thought present in some of her early writings such as “Goodness and Choice” (1961), where she defends the idea that there are objective features of living things that make them good as members of their species. She argues against Hare that there is a sense of ‘good cactus’ that is not merely a matter of preferences that we have in cacti: there are features of a good cactus that depend on what it is to flourish as a cactus (1961 [VV 141]). That is, a blighted, damaged, or otherwise unhealthy cactus is not, in this sense, a good cactus. This notion of ‘natural goodness’ is developed in her late work, where she claims that virtue makes humans good in the same way that blight-free, lush green flesh in a certain shape makes a cactus good. The norms which determine what makes something a good member of its kind she calls ‘natural norms’.