 (2) Common feelings: The next stratum of affectivity is all-pervasive. One of the key insights of Stein’s account of emotions is that every conscious experience is always penetrated and modulated by affectivity. Famously, Heidegger puts forth an existential-ontological version of this claim, which has also been further developed in neo-Heideggerian accounts of “existential feelings” (Ratcliffe 2019). All experiences, including cognitions, conations, perceptions, and volitions, are “colored” or “lit up” by, or “submerged into” what Stein calls “general” or “common feelings” (Gemeingefühle; e.g., 1917: 65–66[48–49], 86[68], 118–119[100–101]; 1922: 123[145]). They are essentially affective states of the lived body. For example, weariness, freshness or irritability are not intentional in the sense that they don’t present or evaluate particular objects, events or persons. But, like sensory feelings, they are in a minimal sense intentional: they relate the emoter to her own overall bodily state and thus indicate the emoter’s “attunement” (Befindlichkeit), as Heidegger will later call it. Accordingly, Stein aptly characterizes common feelings (together with moods) as forms of “self-experiencing” (Sich-erlebens) (1917: 118[100]). Moreover, like sensory feelings, common feelings occupy a “Janus-faced position” (Zwitterstellung): they are not only “in” my lived body, as it were, but also “in me, they emanate out of my I” (1917: 65[48–49]).