 What about our second question: how must basic beliefs be related to inferentially justified beliefs? Here too there are two different kinds of foundationalism: deductivism and non-deductivism. According to the deductivist, the only way in which a (possibly one-membered) set of basic justified beliefs can justify another belief is by logically entailing that other belief. In other words, there has to be a valid argument at least some of whose premises are basic justified  beliefs[19]  and whose conclusion is the inferentially justified belief in question. Given that the argument is valid, the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion—it is impossible for all the premises to be true while the conclusion is false. Non-deductivism allows relations other than logical entailment as possible justificatory relations. For instance, many foundationalists will claim that good inductive inferences from basic justified beliefs provide their conclusions with justification—even though inductive arguments are not valid, that is, even though it is possible for all the premises of a good inductive argument to be true while its conclusion is false. Although these are independent distinctions, traditional foundationalists tend to be deductivists, whereas moderate foundationalists tend to be non-deductivists. Notice that for a traditional, deductivist foundationalist, there cannot be false justified beliefs. Many contemporary epistemologists would shy away from this strong form of infallibilism, and take that consequence to be an argument against the conjunction of traditional foundationalism and deductivism.