 What is a work of art? Are all works of art alike? How so, or how not? When asked to determine what sentences are about, philosophers often will want to know what objects, properties, or relationships the objects of a certain bit of human discourse are and what the referents of its nominal and pronominal phrases are. The answers to these questions might well be taken to be the basic ontology of that discourse. In this sense, the word “ontology” is playing the same role it plays in, for example, computer science: and it answers the question, “What is there?” The most common practice in doing ontology of art is to use a roughly Quinean approach (Quine 1948) since it seems a fairly pragmatic way to undertake the initial task in the ontology of art (see Pettersson 2009 for a detailed discussion). Dissenters from this common practice have often pursued mereological accounts (in terms of parts and wholes) of how certain ostensible “multiple instances” of works of art are related to the works themselves (Cook 2011; Hackett 2017).