 We can also extend the distinction between boring and interesting centered contents from  section 3.1  to doxastic states—this will be useful in what follows. A boring doxastic state is one that might as well be a state of believing a traditional proposition. For Lewis, it’ll be a state of believing a boring centered proposition or its corresponding world-occupancy property. For Perry, it’ll be a matter of being in a belief-state with constant character—one that always relates its bearers to the same traditional proposition. We identify these doxastic states using context-insensitive English sentences (for example, the “John is in Palo Alto” belief-state). Interesting (or interestingly self-locating) doxastic states are ones that aren’t boring. We identify these states using context-sensitive English sentences, such as “I am in Palo Alto”. For Lewis, these states belief-relate an agent to an interesting centered proposition, or its corresponding interesting property. For Perry, these are belief-states that don’t always relate their bearers to the same traditional proposition.