 Truth, Kilwardby says, is an equivocal notion: the truth (ueritas) of a thing is the thing’s being (esse), that is, what the thing genuinely is (NSLPery I.2, M 46vb; see also NSLP 17, 130), namely, its essence or quiddity (essentia vel quidditas) that is signified by its definition (QLIS 44,  141).[16]  Things themselves, and the forms or intentiones through which things come to be known, lack any composition, that is, they are neither affirmed nor denied, and therefore they are not true or false as are declarative sentences (NSLPery, p. 16. See also NSLP 17, 124). Truth is the correspondence of the thing and concept (adequatio rei et intellectus), a definition Kilwardby takes from Avicenna (NSLPery  I.9).[17]