 However, the phrase “degree of belief” may be misleading, because the relationship between confidence, betting behavior, and belief is not straightforward. The dispositionalist or interpretationist, for example, might regard exhibitions of confidence and attitudes toward risk as only part of the overall pattern underwriting belief ascription. Similarly, the representationalist might hold that readiness to deploy a representation in belief-like ways need not line up perfectly with betting behavior. Some people also find it intuitive to say that a rational person holding a ticket in a fair lottery may not actually believe that she will lose, but instead regard it as an open question, despite having a “degree of belief” of, say, .9999 that she will lose. If this person genuinely believes some other propositions, such as that her son is at school, with a “degree of belief” considerably less than .9999, then it appears to follow that a rational person may in some cases have a higher “degree of belief” in a proposition that she does not believe than in a proposition she does believe (see Harman 1986; Sturgeon 2008; Buchak 2014; Leitgeb 2017; Friedman forthcoming).