 Cook Wilson’s ‘particularizations of the universal’ are thus “strictly objective” and “not a mere thought of ours” (SI, 335–336); they thus cannot be phenomenal entities. His thinking here is of apiece with his anti-idealist views on ‘apprehension’. He had argued against T. H. Green’s neo-Kantian stance, that apprehension has no ‘synthetic’ character: any synthesis apprehended is attributed to the object and not the result of an activity of the ‘apprehending mind’. As he put it, “in the judgement of knowledge and the act of knowledge in general we do not combine our apprehensions, but apprehend a combination” (SI, 279), and it is “the nature of the elements themselves” which “determines which unity they have or can have”; the ‘apprehending mind’ has “no power whatever to make a complex idea out of simple ones” (SI, 524). This view implies that universals and connections between them, as particularized, are in rebus and to be apprehended as such (Price 1947, 336). The view is, therefore, that there is no possible apprehension of the universal except as particularized: