 The differences in bargaining power between employees and employers have led, historically, to the formation of particular kinds of associations within the workplace. Trade unions form to protect employees’ position vis-à-vis their bosses, and thereby introduce some parity between these groups. In industries where conflict between capital and labor is pronounced, this can also issue in the right of unions to operate closed shops. In other words, anyone wishing to take employment must join the relevant union and, thus, employers can be denied access to potential employees who refuse (White 1998: 346–347). Here then is a group right to compel association amongst a set of people—with possible provisos for conscientious objectors—to achieve the overall good of this associational form, which is to make good on workers’ basic rights (Rosenblum 1998; cf. Moreno 2008). However, implicitly, these mechanisms assume a particularly adversarial understanding of economic relations, such that granting people this kind of group right can serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy, exacerbating what might otherwise be congenial and mutually beneficial employer-employee relations. On such a view, the state might have to prevent freedom of association among the owners of capital, leading us into situations of monopoly. But, beyond those kinds of provisions, the state should avoid interfering with the spontaneous orderings that emerge from unimpeded association (Lomasky 2008; Epstein 2008; cf. Brody 1992 [1994: 386]).