 Whatever we otherwise make of Harman’s suggestion, the pragmatic strategy appears to unduly restrict the scope of possible disagreement, since it is possible to disagree with people who are not part of the conversation (Björnsson and Finlay 2010). In response, subjectivists and contextualists sometimes give up the notion that disagreement consists of contradictory beliefs, and account for it in terms of the originally non-cognitivist notion of disagreement in attitude (e.g. Finlay 2017). Assume, for simplicity, that disapproval involves desire to have the agent punished, and approval a desire not to have the agent punished. Then, even if Ann’s and Beth’s utterances don’t contradict one another, they disagree in the sense that it is not possible to simultaneously satisfy the desires entailed by the truth of their sincere utterances when they issue a verdict on cannibalism. If Ann gets her way, Beth doesn’t, and vice versa.