 During the last part of his life the majority of Peirce’s philosophical output concerned semiotic, and he developed his account of signs far beyond the 1903 theory. There seem to be two reasons for this. First, Peirce was geographically and intellectually isolated and his main outlet was correspondence with the English woman, Lady Victoria Welby. Welby wrote on various philosophical topics and shared Peirce’s interests in signs and meaning. This seems to have given Peirce a willing and sympathetic audience for his developing ideas on signs. (See Hardwick 1977 and Borges 2013 for more on the Peirce/Welby correspondence). The second reason seems to have been his growing appreciation of the connections between the semiotic process and the process of inquiry. Peirce always thought of his philosophy in a systematic and architectonic way. However, around 1902, an application for funding to the Carnegie Institute saw him express more clearly the connections between different aspects of his philosophy. The application failed, but Peirce had returned to thinking about the place of sign theory in his broader philosophy. As noted above, part of Peirce’s understanding of philosophy in an architectonic system was to treat “logic” as containing three branches – Speculative Grammar, Critical Logic, and Methodeutic. The main impact here was that he came to see sign theory (speculative grammar) as more clearly connected to the logic of scientific discovery (methodeutic) and consequently, as being more central to his account of inquiry. We shall not review Peirce’s account of inquiry here, but as an end directed process leading from doubt-prone to doubt-proof beliefs, Peirce began to see a similar end-directedness running through the semiotic process. This kind of thinking lead Peirce to reassess his account of signs and sign structure: the connection between the process of inquiry and sign chains led Peirce to notice subtleties and nuances that had previously been transparent to him. In particular, it led him to see chains of signs as tending towards a definite but idealized end rather than progressing ad infinitum. Since at the idealized end of inquiry we have a complete understanding of some object, there need be no further interpretant of that object; our understanding cannot be developed any further. (See Ransdell 1977 and Short 2004; 2007 for more on the connections between Peirce’s later account and the end-directed process of inquiry. Indeed, Short (2007) represents the fullest and best developed account of ‘telic’ interpretations of Peirce’s semiotic to date).