 A second feature of Socratic teaching is its intellectualism. Socratic intellectualism is usually expressed in the claim that virtue is knowledge, implying that if one knows what is good one will do what is good. We find a clear statement of the claim in Protagoras 352c; but it underlies a lot of Socratic teaching. The idea is paradoxical because it flies in the face of what seems to be the ordinary experience of knowingly doing what is not good, called akrasia or being overcome (sometimes anachronistically translated as weakness of will). However, Socrates defends the idea that akrasia is impossible. First, he argues that virtue is all one needs for happiness. In the Apology (41c), Socrates says that no evil at all can come to a good man either in living or in dying (…ouk esti andri agathô(i) kakon ouden oute zônti oute teleutêsanti), implying the good man’s virtue alone makes him proof against bad fortune. In the Crito (48b), he says living well and finely and justly are the same thing (to de eu kai kalôs kai dikaiôs [zên] hoti tauton estin…). In turn, in the Meno (77c–78b), Socrates argues that everyone desires happiness, i.e., one’s own welfare. So, in the first place, one always has a good reason for acting virtuously; doing so entails one’s own happiness. However, even if the link between virtue and happiness is granted, another problem remains. It is possible that one can, knowingly, act against one’s happiness, understood, as it is by Socrates, as one’s own welfare. It seems that an individual can choose to do what is not in her own best interest. People can all too easily desire and go after the pastry that they know is bad for them. Socrates, however, seems to think that once one recognizes (i.e., really knows and fully appreciates) that the pastry is not good in this way, one will cease to desire it. There is no residual desire for, e.g., pleasure, that might compete with the desire for what is good. This position is called intellectualism because it implies that what ultimately motivates any action is some cognitive state, rational or doxastic: if you know what is good you will do it, and if you do an action, and it is bad, that is because you thought somehow that it was good. All error in such choices is due to ignorance.