 What, then, does Nietzsche believe about will to power? There are, to be sure, competing views in the secondary literature. Reginster 2006 treats will to power as a will to overcome resistances; Richardson 1996 treats will to power as the tendency of every drive to redirect every other drive towards its own ends. As others have noted (e.g., Clark 1990: 209–212), Nietzsche’s doctrine of will to power, in its original deployment and most of its later occurrences in the published work, is psychological in character: the will to power is posited as the best psychological explanation for a wide variety of human behaviors. Here Richardson’s account seems to fare somewhat better than Reginster’s. (Katsafanas 2013b follows Reginster, and tries to develop a “constitutivist” account of objective value based on the idea that all actions aim to overcome resistances; Huddleston 2017 offers a trenchant critique of the plausibility of such a view.) Yet Richardson’s account has difficulty with some of Nietzsche’s claims, as when he says that “every animal…instinctively strives for optimal conditions under which it can…attain its maximum in the feeling of power” (GM III:7), which seems to propose desire for power as a competitor with psychological hedonism. But a universal desire for either pleasure or power feelings is not especially plausible, even if both motives are important ones. Indeed, as the preceding passages and considerations make clear, Nietzsche could not have believed that will to power was the exclusive explanation for all human behavior. To the extent he sometimes seems to embrace this stronger claim (see the example, above), we must simply take Nietzsche to have overstated his case — something which his penchant for hyperbolic rhetoric and polemics often leads him to do — or to be engaged in the kind of ironic move described by Clark, above. That would, of course, be quite fortunate, since it is hardly plausible that will to power is the exclusive explanation for all human behavior