 There has, as of yet, been comparatively little discussion of pragmatic accounts of metaphysical explanation in the literature. One exception is Thompson (2019), who develops an account along the lines described above, where metaphysical explanations are pairs of context-sensitive questions and answers. Because the role of context is ineliminable, there is no sense to be made of a notion of metaphysical explanation free from pragmatic constraints. However, Thompson accounts for the correctness of particular explanations (in part) by appeal to worldly dependence relations, and so that metaphysical explanation is pragmatic does not imply that it is wholly unconstrained by worldly dependence. A different kind of pragmatic theory of metaphysical explanation is defended by Miller and Norton (2017). Their “psychologistic” account of metaphysical explanation locates the truth conditions for metaphysically explanatory claims in the psychological states of the agents evaluating the relevant “because” claims, alongside worldly necessitation relations. The relevant psychological states are dispositions towards particular beliefs, which are expected to vary between individuals. Claims about what metaphysically explains what are thus only true relative to a specific (type of) context within which the claim's truth is being assessed.