  This is one of two respects in which values resemble secondary qualities. Although redness might be identified with a messy disjunction of physical properties, there would be no point in grouping that disjunction together were it not for human color vision. The other analogy is that this anthropocentrism does not lead (most) philosophers to deny that there are facts about what is and isn't red, or to be generally skeptical of claims about knowledge of color facts. Sensibility theory insists that the same is true of values. Yet there are also two crucial disanalogies between values and color acknowledged by these theories. The first is that sensibility theory explicates value in terms of the responses it merits, not just those it normally causes (McDowell 1985: 143). (To say that an object merits some response is equivalent to saying that the response is fittingly directed at the object.) And an evaluative response to an object is fitting—pending a caveat to be discussed in the final section on right and wrong kinds of reason—when there is sufficient reason to feel it toward that object. Thus sensibility theory explicates values in terms of reasons: it adopts normative reduction. Since it holds both response dependency and normative reduction, sensibility theory is a version of the FA theory of value. 