 As for the constitution of oneself as a person, Husserl (Husserliana, vol. XIV, pp. 170 ff) holds that it occurs, among other things, in connection with communicative or social acts (“Mitteilungen”, “soziale Akte”), which are pre-constituted by the mutual drives and instincts involved in the education of small children who confidently “imitate” the linguistic behavior of educators “loving” them like parents (Husserliana, vol. XIV, 165f). (For additional aspects of the constitution of personhood, see the last two paragraphs of this section and the literature cited there. Further elements of Husserl’s view of personal love, esp. concerning his ethics, are discussed in Melle 2002; Römer 2011; Kern 2019, sec. 22f; Crespo 2019; Heinämaa 2020.) The relevant communicative acts are “I-thou acts”, in which the utterer empathetically ascribes to the addressee the empathetic ascription of the “intention (Absicht)” to motivate the addressee, by means of his or her recognition of that very intention (cf. Husserliana, vol. IV, p. 192), to behave a certain way (Husserliana, vol. XIV, 166f in the light of Husserliana, vol. IV, p. 192); where utterer and addressee simultaneously perceive each other (Husserliana, vol. XIV, p. 167). Thus, these acts are based on “reciprocal empathy” (Zahavi 2018, p. 746), notably on “iterated, reflexive empathy: I empathetically ascribe to the Other(s) an empathetic ascription of an intention to me” (Beyer 2018, p. 100). In I-thou acts, the “originarily social I-thou relationship” is constituted, in which ego and alter ego deliberately and reflexively motivate each other to display certain practical forms of behavior (Husserliana, vol. XIV, pp. 171f). It is at this stage that the subject constitutes itself as a person (belonging to the “world of persons”) by gaining “personal ‘self-consciousness’” of the sort just described in the course of I-thou acts (Husserliana, vol. XIV, pp. 171, 175f). This enables the subject to see him- or herself as subject to acts of self-determination: “If I agree [Vereinbare ich mich] with an other [...], the other determines me to determine myself to take on this or that [commitment; CB]” (Husserliana, vol. XIV, p. 180). (For some other aspects of the role of communicative acts in Husserl’s analyses of constitution see, e.g., Zahavi 2003, ch. 3, sec. C–D; Caminada 2019, esp. ch. 6., sec. 2f.; also see Sections 9f below.)