  This is not to say that the first city is a mistake. Socrates  introduces the first city not as a free-standing ideal but as the  beginning of his account of the ideal, and his way of starting  highlights two features that make the eventual ideal an ideal. One is the principle of specialization. With it Socrates sketches how people might harmoniously satisfy their appetitive attitudes. If reason  could secure a society of such people, then they would be happy, and  reason does secure a society of such people in the third class of the ideal city. (So the model turns out to be a picture of the producers  in Kallipolis.) But the principle can also explain how a single  person could flourish, for a version of it explains the optimal  satisfaction of all psychological attitudes (442d–444a with  432b–434c). Indeed, this principle is central to the first “proof”  for the superiority of the just life. The second feature crucial to  Socrates’ ideal enters when Glaucon insists that the first city is fit for  pigs and not human beings. He objects that it lacks  couches, tables, relishes, and the other things required for a  symposium, which is the cornerstone of civilized human life as he understands  it (Burnyeat 1999). Glaucon is not calling for satisfaction of unnecessary appetitive attitudes, for the relishes he insists on are later recognized to be  among the objects of necessary appetitive attitudes (559b). Rather,  he is expressing spirited indignation, motivated by a sense of what  is honorable and fitting for a human being. He insists that there is  more to a good human life than the satisfaction of appetitive  attitudes. This begins to turn Glaucon away from appetitive  considerations against being just. It also completes the first city’s introduction of the two kinds of arguments for the superiority of the just life, by appealing, as the pleasure proofs do, to the  intrinsic value of different kinds of psychological satisfaction.