 Third, the presentist might follow Adams and distinguish a proposition's being true in a time from its being true at a time. Consider first a negative existential about a currently existing object. It is true that George Bush did not exist in 1820 because the singular proposition [George Bush exists] is false at 1820. The proposition is not true in 1820, because it did not exist when 1820 was present, as its constituent Bush did not exist then. (9), however, is a negative existential about a past object that no longer exists. It is, then, more analogous to (8) from above, illustrating the second half of our intuitions that existence is contingent, than to (7). (8) has a quantificational form on its surface, while (9) appears to be singular. This difference makes is questionable whether appeal to the truth in/truth at distinction can be used by the presentist to develop an account of (9)'s truth and thus whether there is a viable presentist analog to Adams's actualist view. 