 In this setting, at least when E is finite (and in many other cases), beliefs are consistent (i.e., \(\neg B \bot)\); still, the setting also allows ‘bad’ models in which beliefs can turn out to be inconsistent. In Baltag, Bezhanishvili, et al. (2016), the authors provide an example of such a model, and then solve the problem by extending the setting to a topological approach. Indeed, the authors use the topology generated by E, which intuitively describes the different ways in which the available pieces of evidence can be  combined.[6]  This is reasonable as, while E can be understood as containing the pieces of evidence the agent has received from external sources (observations, communication), the topology \(\tau_{E}\) can be understood as the different ways in which she can ‘extract’ further information from them (i.e., the result of her own reasoning processes). Given the topology, it is possible to define (semantically) further epistemic notions, such as arguments, justifications, consistent beliefs, consistent conditional beliefs, and different forms of knowledge. For more on this, we refer to Baltag, Bezhanishvili, et al. (2016: Section 2).