 Before going into the details of how capacitarians answer these questions, let’s see what theses of the regress argument are denied by them. All capacitarians (with the exception of FitzPatrick, see fn. 10) reject theses i and iii, since they are united in the beliefs that blameworthiness for unwitting conduct can be direct and needn’t trace back to culpable ignorance (against thesis i), and also that factual awareness—and a fortiori occurrent and de dicto moral awareness—isn’t necessary for direct responsibility (against thesis iii). Since capacitarians usually focus on factual rather than on moral ignorance, they usually leave thesis iv (Parity) untouched (but see Sher 2017a). However, they seem to be committed to accepting it, given that a crucial aspect of the capacitarian view is that agents are excused for their unwitting wrongdoing whenever isn’t reasonable to expect them to know better due to an unfavorable epistemic situation (Sher 2017a; Clarke 2017a: 242; Murray 2017: 515, 521; Rudy-Hiller 2017: 408). But since sometimes a situation is epistemically unfavorable for forming correct moral beliefs (FitzPatrick 2017: 34–6), it follows from the capacitarian view that at least in some such circumstances agents are excused for not knowing better in moral matters (FitzPatrick 2008: 602). Finally, there is disagreement among capacitarians whether thesis ii (that blameworthiness for ignorance is necessarily derivative) is true or not. Clarke (2014: 171, 173; 2017a: 245–6) tentatively accepts it, since he thinks that failures of awareness aren’t culpable if they don’t result from a culpable benighting action or omission. At the same time, he denies that culpability for ignorant wrongdoing necessitates culpability for the underlying ignorance (Clarke 2017a: 246), thus avoiding the regress in the volitionists’ argument. In Clarke’s view, then, an agent can be blameworthy for an unwitting wrongful action even if the ignorance from which she acts isn’t culpable, as long as such ignorance is substandard—and therefore faulty (Clarke 2017a: 245). (Note that the soundness of this move rests on the defensibility of the distinction between culpable and faulty ignorance. See Rudy-Hiller [2017: 416] for criticism.) By contrast, Rudy-Hiller (2017: 413) rejects thesis ii, since he claims that an agent is directly blameworthy for her ignorance if she is capable of gaining the required awareness and there is no significant impediment to the exercise of the relevant cognitive capacities.