 Historically, MD normativism is associated with Wittgenstein (in particular the “Middle Period” writings) and the tradition of appealing to linguistic conventions, prominent in the 1950s and 1960s (in the writings of Grice, Lewis, Searle, and Strawson for instance). ME normativism appeared on the philosophical scene more recently, and is associated with Saul Kripke’s book on Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations (Kripke 1982). In the book Kripke presents us with a meaning skeptic who challenges the very idea that there are facts in virtue of which our terms have a meaning. Kripke’s skeptic puts down certain constraints on the range of facts that could serve to determine meaning, among these that the essentially normative character of meaning has to be respected. The meaning determining fact, Kripke argues, must be such that it follows from it how the term ought to be applied (1982: 11). Equipped with this normativity constraint the skeptic goes on to argue against all theories that fail to accommodate the required normative dimension of meaning, in particular dispositionalist theories according to which meaning is determined by the speaker’s dispositions to apply her terms (1982: 22–37).