  Finally, Shapiro (2019b; 2019c) has suggested that the parity and wide-computationalist defenses of Constitution do not sit well with other commitments of embodied cognition. As mentioned, such defenses rest on a functionalist theory of cognition (for more on  functionalism, see the entry on  functionalism).  Functionalism may well justify the claim that states and processes outside the brain can be identical to states and processes internal to a brain (can stand in a relation of parity towards them), which in turn grounds the possibility that cognitive systems can contain non-neural constituents. But, Shapiro argues, this strategy for defending extended cognition seems contrary to the central theme of embodied cognition. Motivating the embodied turn in cognitive science is the idea that bodies are somehow essential to cognition. But the parity and wide-computational arguments for extended cognition entail just the opposite—important for cognition are computational processes, and because computational processes are “hardware neutral”, one need not consider the specifics of bodies in order to describe them. Thus, it appears, arguments in favor of extended cognition succeed to the extent that bodies, qua bodies, do not matter to cognition.