 The modularity of mind hypothesis. Fodor (1983) proposed a view of our overall cognitive architecture that rested on a rough distinction between input systems, or relatively rigid computational “modules” that are designed to pick up specific types of information, and more flexible central processors that integrate that information in various ways. Each of these modules has a specific task-orientation, and does its work independently of much of what is going on in the rest of the system. So, for instance, we more-or-less automatically hear sound patterns as sentences of our native language, perceive patterns of light and shadow as configurations of objects in space, and so on. In these terms, the language organ is just one of a set of freestanding mental modules. Fodor suggested a checklist of properties that such modules could be expected to have, and among them is that they are innately  determined.[10] The architectural claim about modular organization does not in itself imply an innate basis, but the hypothesis that the sorts of response patterns to linguistic and visual input (like those just mentioned) have a strong innate basis is plausible and has been experimentally pursued. Fodor’s version of the view is now termed a moderate modularity thesis, because he holds that much of the business of cognition involves ‘central’ processing that is decidedly non-modular. Modules do the work of ‘presenting the world’ to highly integrated non-modular global psychological processes. But others, like Carruthers (2006), have argued that with some adjustment to Fodor’s original characterization of modules, we can argue for massive modularity.