  Or consider Emily, who has always thought it best that she pursue a  Ph.D. in chemistry (Arpaly 2000, p. 504). When she revisits the issue, as she does periodically, she discounts her increasing  feelings of restlessness, sadness, and lack of motivation as she  proceeds in the program, and concludes that she ought to persevere.  But in fact she has very good reasons to quit the program—her  talents are not well suited to a career in chemistry, and the people  who are thriving in the program are very different from her. If she  impulsively, akratically quits the program, purely on the basis of  her feelings, Emily is in fact doing just what she ought to   do.[13]  That her action conflicts with her better judgment does not  significantly impugn its rationality, given all the considerations  that do support her quitting the program. “A theory of rationality should not assume that there is something special about  an agent’s best judgment. An agent’s best judgment is just another  belief” (Arpaly 2000, p. 512). Emily’s action  conflicts, then, with one belief she has; but it coheres with many  more of her beliefs and desires overall. So even though she may find  her own action inexplicable or “surd,” she is in fact  acting rationally, although she does not know it. Contra  Davidson, “we can … act rationally just when we cannot  make any sense of our actions” (Arpaly 2000, p. 513).