 Despite their differences, all bodily experiences seem to display the same epistemological signature: they ground the immunity to error through misidentification relative to the first-person of bodily self-ascriptions. Self-ascription of a property is said to be immune to error if and only if one cannot rationally doubt who instantiates the property when one has gained information about the property in the appropriate way (although one can be mistaken about the property that one ascribes to oneself) (Shoemaker 1968; Evans 1982). For instance, if I think that I am anxious because I feel anxious, my thought is immune to error through misidentification of the subject. But if I think that I am anxious because my psychoanalyst told me so, my thought is not immune to error. Indeed, the psychoanalyst may have confused me with another patient, who is the person suffering from anxiety. To be immune, my thought must be grounded in introspection, that is, on a way of gaining information about one’s mental states from the inside. The question is whether the self-ascription not only of mental properties, but also of physical properties (such as body posture) can be immune to error in such a way. Consider the following example. I form the judgment that my legs are crossed while I am seated around a small table with several other persons. Can I rationally doubt that they are mine? If I make this judgment on the basis only of my seeing legs, then I can confuse my legs with the legs of the person seated next to me. By contrast, if I make this judgment because I feel my legs as being crossed, then the answer is negative. The inside mode of body senses guarantees immunity to error (IEM) because they provide a privileged informational access to one’s own body only. Because of this privileged relation, the judgement “my legs are crossed” is not grounded in the judgement “these legs are crossed” and in the identification “these legs are mine”. Proprioceptive experiences suffice to justify bodily self-ascriptions such that no intermediary process of self-identification is required (Bermúdez 1998; Brewer 1995; Cassam 1995; Evans 1982).