 Metaphysical grounding is widely regarded as hyperintensional. Sometimes a more fundamental fact necessarily leads to a less fundamental fact that it grounds, but the two are merely modally inseparable. A widely discussed example is the grounding of the existence of a set in the existence of its members. On one view, {Socrates, Plato} automatically exists if Socrates and Plato both exist, but it exists only in possible worlds where Socrates and Plato both exist. So the fact that Socrates and Plato both exist grounds the fact that {Socrates, Plato} exists (see Dunn 1990b; Fine 1994). But that {Socrates, Plato} exists is not supposed to ground the fact that Socrates and Plato both exist, even though necessarily one obtains only if the other does. On an attractive account, many complex logical truths are grounded in simpler ones. \({\sim}{\sim}A\) is grounded in \(A, (A \land A)\), is grounded in \(A\), and many other logical equivalents of \(A\) are grounded in \(A\), though they are not the same proposition as \(A\). And as before, while \((A \land A)\) is grounded in \(A, A\) is not grounded in \((A \land A)\) (see Poggiolesi 2018, 2020 for a formal logic of grounding).