Any doctrine that asserts that it is morally desirable or morally required per se or for its own sake that everyone should be equally well off attracts the leveling down objection. The objection is simply that if equality of condition is noninstrumentally morally valuable, then it is morally better, in one respect, if those currently better off than others are made worse off (so long as they do not fall below the average level), even if worsening the condition of these people brings about no gain or benefit for anyone else—but it is implausible to hold that such leveling-down changes in and of themselves improve the situation in any respect. The objection applies to any ideal of equality of condition and also to any ideal of equality of treatment. Recall an ancient quip attributed to the philosopher Sidney Morgenbesser. Roughed up and arrested by the police in the course of student protests at Columbia University, he was asked whether he thought he had suffered unfair, unjust treatment. He replied that the treatment unleashed by the police was unjust (because beating up innocent people is unjust) but not unfair (because “they were beating everybody”). The proponent of the leveling down objection denies that it is in any respect better to beat up more innocent people rather than fewer in order to achieve equality of treatment across innocent people.