 Another important social consideration for hiddenness arguments in general has to do with “defeated evidence” (cf. Anderson 2017). Suppose that God provides sufficient evidence for one to believe that God exists but because we are a social species, another person says or does something that causes one to think differently about one’s evidence. Suppose, for instance, that one is provided with a misleading rebutting or undercutting defeater for evidence that would otherwise be sufficient to believe that God exists. One’s evidence could be defeated by encountering apparent peers with very different experiences and perspectives on the world, and there is a significant overlap between divine hiddenness and the epistemology of disagreement (cf Matheson 2018). It is also possible, however, for one’s evidence to be defeated by the apparent consensus of those one interacts with. All other things being equal, it is usually not rational to believe differently than a majority and especially a super-majority (cf. List 2014). It is at least a question worth asking whether we should expect God not just to provide evidence of God’s existence but to defeat each defeater we acquire through interacting with one another. If it is possible for God to have a reason to allow us to be exposed to unchecked defeaters, it may be that there are broader social networks in which defeaters aggregate or are easier to acquire and that God may have reason not to forbid them. 