 The term “social construction” refers to any knowledge-generating process in which what counts as a fact is substantively determined by social factors, and in which different social factors would likely generate facts that are inconsistent with what is actually produced. The important implication here is thus a counterfactual claim about the dependence of facts on social factors. There are numerous ways in which social determinants of facthood may be consistent with realism. For example, social factors might determine the directions and methodologies of research that are permitted, encouraged, and funded, but this by itself need not undermine a realist attitude with respect to the outputs of scientific work. Often, however, work in SSK takes the form of case studies that aim to demonstrate how particular decisions affecting scientific work were (or are) influenced by social factors which, had they been different, would have facilitated results that are inconsistent with those ultimately accepted as scientific fact. Some, including proponents of the so-called Strong Program in SSK, argue that for more general, principled reasons, such factual contingency is inevitable. (For a sample of influential approaches to social constructivism, see Latour &amp; Woolgar [1979] 1986; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Pickering 1984; Shapin &amp; Schaffer 1985; and Collins &amp; Pinch 1993; on the Strong Program, see Barnes, Bloor, &amp; Henry 1996; for a historical study of the transition from Kuhn to SSK and social constructivism, see Zammito 2004: chs. 5–7.)