 Ensuing generations of philosophers of science have found the logical empiricist focus on expressing the content of observations in a rarefied and basic observation language too narrow. Search for a suitably universal language as required by the logical empiricist program has come up empty-handed and most philosophers of science have given up its pursuit. Moreover, as we will discuss in the following section, the centrality of observation itself (and pointer readings) to the aims of empiricism in philosophy of science has also come under scrutiny. However, leaving the search for a universal pure observation language behind does not automatically undercut the norm of objectivity as it relates to the social, political, and cultural contexts of scientific research. Pristine logical foundations aside, the objectivity of ‘neutral’ observations in the face of noxious political propaganda was appealing because it could serve as shared ground available for intersubjective appraisal. This appeal remains alive and well today, particularly as pernicious misinformation campaigns are again formidable in public discourse (see O’Connor and Weatherall 2019). If individuals can genuinely appraise the significance of empirical evidence and come to well-justified agreement about how the evidence bears on theorizing, then they can protect their epistemic deliberations from the undue influence of fascists and other nefarious manipulators. However, this aspiration must face subtleties arising from the social epistemology of science and from the nature of empirical results themselves. In practice, the appraisal of scientific results can often require expertise that is not readily accessible to members of the public without the relevant specialized training. Additionally, precisely because empirical results are not pure observation reports, their appraisal across communities of inquirers operating with different background assumptions can require significant epistemic work.