 We’ll focus on Sher’s response to this challenge. Concerning the charge of ad hocness, Sher argues that, quite generally, the crucial morally relevant feature implicated in attributions of responsibility isn’t choice, control, or quality of will but origination, understood as an appropriate causal relation between the agent and her action’s right-/wrong-making features (Sher 2009: 147; 2017b: 9–10). So, in Sher’s view, in order to appropriately praise or blame an agent for an action it must be the case that its relevant moral features are suitably connected to her (Sher 2009: 82). One way in which this suitable connection occurs is when the agent is aware of those features and chooses to perform the action in light of them, thus making the action “in a suitably deep sense his own” (2009: 74). Another way (in the case of wrong  acts)[13]  in which the suitable connection occurs is when the agent’s unawareness of the action’s wrong-making features is defective in the sense indicated above and such unawareness is caused by the agent’s constitutive attitudes, dispositions, and traits. When this is the case, Sher claims, the action’s wrongness is suitably connected to the agent and so—assuming that she satisfies other non-epistemic conditions as well—she can justifiably be held responsible for her unwitting wrongdoing (2009: 86–8, 118). For instance, if we assume that Alessandra could have recalled the dog, and also that her failure to do so was caused by constitutive features of her psychology such as her solicitousness to her children and her anxiety about conflict (2009: 92), she satisfies Sher’s EC and so she’s blameworthy for her unwitting omission (assuming, again, that she satisfies other non-epistemic conditions as well). Thus, by appealing to a single notion—origination—that allegedly grounds responsibility both in cases of witting and unwitting wrongdoing, Sher meets the charge of ad hocness.