  Kaplan contemplates two ways of extending his theory to true demonstratives. In his1989a, he uses dthat-terms to do so. A dthat-term is a term of the form “dthat[\(t\)]”, where \(t\) is a singular term, such as a definite description or proper name. The content of ‘dthat[\(t\)]’ in a context \(c\) is the object to which the term \(t\) refers in \(c\). For example, the content of ‘dthat[the dog I see now]’, in a context \(c\), is Fido iff: there is exactly one dog in the world of \(c\) whom the agent of \(c\) sees at the time of \(c\) in the world of \(c\), and that dog is Fido. Kaplan (1989a) uses dthat-terms to represent the demonstrative ‘that’ together with a type of demonstration. Kaplan holds that a type of demonstration presents a demonstratum in a particular way, and a definite description (that may contain indexicals) can capture the way in which the demonstration presents the demonstratum. Thus, Kaplan (1989a) might use the dthat-term ‘dthat[the dog I see to my left]’ to represent Mary’s use of the word ‘that’ together with the type of demonstration that she uses to present a dog to her left. If Mary utters ‘That is larger than that’ while pointing first to a dog to her left and then to a dog to her right, then Kaplan might use the formal sentence (12) to represent Mary’s sentence-plus-demonstrations.