  This argument for the Right Reasons View has been responded to in several ways. Kelly (2010) has since rejected the argument, claiming that when a greater proportion of one’s evidence supports suspending judgment some conciliation will be called for. Since the higher-order evidence calls for suspending judgment regarding the disputed proposition, there will be a conciliatory push even if the original first order evidence still plays an important role in what attitude is justified. Others have responded to the argument by rejecting Kelly’s original description of the case (see Matheson 2009). If my evidence at \(t\) includes not only the first-order evidence, but also the higher-order evidence about myself (ii), then even if the new piece of higher-order evidence gained at \(t'\), (iii), cancels out (ii) this will still call for some doxastic conciliation from \(t\) to \(t'\). Alternatively, (ii) and (iii) can be seen to together call for a suspension of judgment over whether \(E\) supports \(P\). Some have argued that a justified suspension of judgment over whether your evidence supports \(P\) has it that your total evidence supports a suspension of judgment toward \(P\) (see Feldman 2006 and Matheson 2015a). See Lasonen-Aarnio 2014 for an alternative view of the impact of higher-order evidence.