 What does it mean for us to intend as a group? Surely, if we intend to visit the Taj Mahal together, it is you and me who intend the shared activity, not some third subject over and above our heads, the group. That we intend as a group does not displace you and me as the intenders of the action in question. To say that the group intends to go for a walk is the same as saying that the participating individuals intend to go for a walk— if “together” is added to the latter clause (and where exactly it has to be inserted is a crucial philosophical question). Collective intentions can be attributed to individuals, but only collectively, it seems, and not distributively. The view that the intentional attitudes in question are the participant individuals’ collectively rather than distributively, however, is in tension with the view that even if an individual participates in collective intentionality, all the intentional attitudes that individuals has are their own (the Individual Ownership Thesis).