 So, for any given act-set, actualists and possibilists will agree about whether an agent has Ability 1, Ability 2, or both to perform that act-set and thus will agree about each sense in which agents can perform these act-sets. Yet, they will disagree about which sense of ability picks out the morally relevant set of options for an agent. Possibilists (e.g., Feldman 1986; Zimmerman 1996), hybridists (Timmerman &amp; Cohen 2016), and some actualists (e.g., Jackson &amp; Pargetter 1986; Jackson 2014) take Ability 1 to be a morally relevant sense of ability. Most actualists and all securitists (e.g., Portmore 2011, 2018) will take Ability 2, or something close to it, to be the morally relevant sense of ability.