 The restricted moral view has been defended with more and less impressive arguments. (See Murphy 2012.) The less impressive arguments are those that appeal to the idea that there must be moral properties that are not explained in terms of God’s will in order to deal with some of the classic objections to theological voluntarism. To preserve the notion that God is good, one might say, we need to restrict the aspirations of theological voluntarism to those of explaining a proper subset of moral notions, leaving the remainder for an account of God’s goodness; or, to make intelligible the commands that God chooses to give, we need to set aside some group of moral notions to be explained in other than theological voluntarist terms and that can therefore enter into our account of the intelligibility of God’s choices to give certain commands rather than others. But these considerations are not, after all, entirely persuasive. For one might well explain the notion that God is good and account for the intelligibility of divine commands by appeal to normative notions that are nonmoral. (See Section 3  below  for further discussion of these arguments.)