  The ontological status and the coherence of the Ideas within Schopenhauer’s metaphysics has been a bone of contention for commentators (see Hamlyn 1980, Chapter 6; Young 1987, 2005; Atwell 1995). The problem is this: On Schopenhauer’s account there are only two aspects of the world, first, the world as will (the thing in itself or “will”); and, second, the world as representation.  The Ideas, however, fit neatly into neither aspect. On the one hand, the Ideas seem to belong to the world as will: In virtue of their being the “immediate and therefore adequate objecthood of the thing in itself” (WWR I, 197) the Ideas are independent of the cognitive conditions of time, space and causality (WWR I, 204). Yet, unlike the will qua thing in itself, the Ideas may be directly perceived by a subject, and thus are more akin to representations.  In contrast to ordinary representations, however, the Ideas revealed in the phenomenal object have not yet entered into the particularlizing forms of the PSR (most notably, space, time and causality), they are rather universals.