 In recent years, empirical attempts have been made to test the practical implications of moral responsibility skepticism. One widely cited study found that diminishing belief in free will, which is ostensibly related to moral responsibility, caused participants to “cheat” more on a problem solving task (Vohs &amp; Schooler 2008). Another study found that participants who were asked to read anti-free will prompts behaved more aggressively than participants exposed to neutral or pro-free will prompts (Baumeister, Masicampo, &amp; DeWall 2009). Another indicates that reduction in belief in free will correlated with reduction in monitoring of errors (Rigoni, Pourtois, &amp; Brass 2015). And two additional studies found that diminishing free will belief impairs learning from negative emotions (Stillman &amp; Baumeister 2010) and causes participants to exhibit more negative attitudes toward out-group members (Zhao, Liu, Zhang, Shi, &amp; Huang 2014). Such findings seem to suggest that diminished belief in free will and moral responsibility would indeed have negative consequences. Yet such a sweeping conclusion may be too hasty.