 In an influential critique, Bratman objects that choice is possible even when one knows that neither option is best (Bratman 1985, §(Bratman 1985, §V). One can decide between options that are equivalent (like the identical bales of hay that stumped Buridan’s ass) or that are ‘on a par’, in that neither is better or worse than the other, though they are too different to count as equally good. (On parity, see Chang 2002). If unconditional judgement presents its object as more desirable than any alternative, Davidson’s theory wrongly prohibits such decisions. Eugene Chislenko defends that implication, arguing that the practical problem is solved by allowing oneself to drift non-intentionally until one option stands out (Chislenko 2016). But while this might work for Buridan’s ass, who finds himself slightly closer to one bale of hay than the other, and so decides to eat it, it won’t work for decision-making under parity, where small improvements fail to break the tie.