This objection might have force against the application of a quantifier criterion to ordinary language if it could be argued that the quantifiers of ordinary language are sometimes (or always) substitutional.[18]  But it is not in any way an objection to a quantifier criterion as Quine conceived of it. Quine stipulated that the quantifiers of the first-order language were to be interpreted objectually—indeed, the substitutional interpretation cannot be applied to Quine's austere language with no singular terms—and he explicitly acknowledged that, if interpreted substitutionally, all questions of ontological commitment are moot (Quine 1968: 106, 1974: 139). Thus, this could only be a critique of a quantifier account of ontological commitment if it could be argued that the objectual interpretation were somehow incoherent, or somehow had to be reduced, ultimately, to the substitutional interpretation. That would undermine the quantifier criterion, to be sure; it would reverse the Quinean order of things, requiring that names, not bound variables, be the primary locus of reference.  But justifying such a position would be a tall order.