 A distinguished proponent of the interpretation Baylor describes was Servais Pinckaers. Because the foundations of morality are rooted in the divine will, which can change, there was no need for Ockham to resort to a mechanism that discovers the eternal principles of morality as these emerge from human nature since, for Ockham, no such principles exist. Rather, according to Pinckaers’ interpretation of Ockham, moral principles are known through revelation. (Pinckaers 1993: 258). While Pinckaers was correct in his assessment of Ockham’s metaethics—which is fundamentally authoritarian despite elements of rationalism—he was wrong in his characterization of Ockham’s moral epistemology. This is because, while it is indeed possible to come to know the principles of morality via divine revelation, on Ockham’s account, it is also possible, despite their grounding in God’s will, to come to know them via natural reason and experience (see Eardley 2013: 82–87). Examples of the former, that is, of principles that are self-evidently true, are “every blameworthy evil is to be avoided” and “the will ought to conform itself to right reason”. An example of a moral proposition that is grounded in experience, on the other hand, is “an angry man should be calmed with soothing words” (Eardley 2013: 86–87). God obviously wills that we should follow such injunctions. But how can we know his will if not through revelation? Although the contemporary philosopher Peter Geach was not a particularly sympathetic reader of Ockham, he was willing to concede the possibility that a metaethics grounded in divine commands could nonetheless yield a naturalistic moral epistemology. As he put it: