 Despite the normativists’ argument, it seems fair to say that at this point in time, the case from normativism against reductive naturalism about meaning/content has not yet been fully made. To make their case, the semantic normativist could resort to adopting a metaethical approach: arguments in the tradition of Hume and Moore might well be adaptable to their case (cf. Miller 1998, 188ff; Hattiangadi 2007, 38ff; Gibbard 2012; Zalabardo 2012). As Hattiangadi argues, though, the semantic normativist’s case ends up being hostage to whatever controversial assumptions these arguments rely on (motivational internalism, for instance, might be such an issue), thus removing normativism further from being the pre-theoretical constraint on acceptable accounts of meaning/content that Kripke’s skeptic meant it to be. What’s more, one might worry that the topic of “reduction” is itself more nuanced than the normativist makes it to be. As we have seen in  section 2.2,  it is still possible to argue that some (set of) dispositions might play a role in meaning-determination. Alternatively, it is possible to endorse partially reductive accounts construing meaning/content as determined by a dispositional and a non-semantic, but normative, component.