 On scientific grounds, Albalag dismisses the doctrine of temporal origination as “defective” and accepts the eternal existence of the universe as an indisputable truth (we will see below that he accepts the former on the authority of Scripture). Albalag, however, attempts to present the Aristotelian theory of eternity and its fundamental premises in a theologically appealing fashion. Thus, he introduces the theory of “eternal origination” (ḥidūsh neṣaḥi) which maintains that “there was no moment at which the universe was not originated” (Tiqqun n.30: 30; cf. Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, Third Discussion). That the universe has no temporal beginning is a premise that Albalag accepts based on Aristotle’s demonstration of the eternal existence of spheres and celestial motion (see for instance Tiqqun, n.30: 30, 60:84–97; cf. De Caelo I: 2–3). What remains is to show that the universe is not self-sufficient. This procedure is necessary in order to avoid confusing the philosophical doctrine of eternity with that of Epicurus which maintains that “the universe has no cause” (Tiqqun n.30: 45).  More specifically, it shows that the philosophical conception of eternal causation is not heretical and does by no means eliminate the idea of origination.