 Although moral status claims may well obscure more often than they enlighten, they do not, however, merely concern the grounding of specific rights in specific attributes. First, as noted above, theories that share the same criteria for full moral status may differ in the rights they associate with that status, and vice-versa. Moreover, even if Silvers is correct about the exclusionary tendencies of moral status notions, the prior question remains of whether their threshold and range features can be justified. How can the small differences in morally-relevant attributes that place a being above or below the threshold ground large differences in the package of rights and immunities that being possesses? How can all cognitively normal humans have the same package of rights and immunities despite differing greatly in the attributes that place them above the threshold? Those who defend the standard concept of moral status need a moral theory to underwrite its range and threshold features; those who attack it need to deny that any plausible theory could do so.