 In many of the accounts of inaccuracy measures that we’ve considered, such as those that propose the Brier score, the inaccuracy of a whole credence function is given by the sum of the inaccuracies of the individual credences it comprises; and the inaccuracy of every individual credence is measured using the same local inaccuracy measure. You might object, however, that not all credences should be contribute equally to the overall inaccuracy of a credence function of which they are a part. The accuracy of my credence that general relativity is correct is surely more important and contributes more to the overall epistemic utility of my credence function than the accuracy of my credence that there are 1,239,382 blades of grass on my front lawn. Now, we might accommodate this intuition by taking the inaccuracy of the whole credence function to be not the straight sum of the local inaccuracies of the credences it assigns, but rather the weighted sum, where a credence gets greater weight the more important the proposition to which it is assigned is. Now, as Predd, et al. (2009) show, if we define global inaccuracy like this, and if the importance of a proposition is the same at every world, then an analogue of Theorem 4 still holds and we can still establish Probabilism. However, Ben Levinstein (2018) shows that, if the importance of a proposition changes from world to world, the analogue of Theorem 4 will fail and with it the accuracy dominance argument for Probabilism. And, he argues, the importance of a proposition does often change from world to world. In worlds where I have a brother, propositions that concern his well-being have great importance to me, and the accuracy of my credences in them should contribute greatly to the epistemic utility of my whole credence function; in worlds where I am an only child, on the other hand, the importance of these propositions is much diminished, as is the contribution of the accuracy of my credences in them to my total epistemic utility.