 While Augustine is more or less exclusively concerned with the significance of hope for our pursuit of a good Christian life, Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae contains a systematic discussion of (ordinary) hope as a passion (ST I-II, q. 40) and as a theological virtue (ST II-II, qq. 17–22). The former is directed to finite, earthly goods, whereas hope as a theological virtue is directed to ultimate happiness in the union with God. Even though the two kinds of hope are clearly distinct, Aquinas provides a unified account of the formal features of their objects (I-II, q. 40, art.1) (see Bobier 2020a). The object of hope, he argues, is always thought to be good and future. Further, in contrast to mere desire, the objects of hope must be difficult to obtain but nevertheless in the realm of possibility (ST I-II 40.1). This rules out hope for that which is trivial to procure.