 While approval voting implements a form of ‘yes’/‘no’ or ‘pass’/‘fail’ grading of the alternatives, a more general grading-based approach to social choice has been advocated by Balinski and Laraki (2007, 2011). Under their proposal, voters each assign grades to the alternatives, drawn for instance from the familiar spectrum of school grades A, B, C etc., and these grades are then aggregated into collective grades, on the basis of which a winning alternative can be chosen. Their preferred version of this proposal—which they call ‘majority judgment’—defines each alternative’s collective grade as a median grade relative to the individually assigned grades, i.e., a grade that divides the individuals into an equal number whose grade is no lower and an equal number whose grade is no higher. For instance, if an alternative receives the grades A, B, B, E, and E from a group of five individuals, then the median grade is B. When the number of individuals is even, there could be an interval of median or ‘middlemost’ grades. An attractive feature of this way of defining the collective grade is that ‘every grade other than a grade in the middlemost interval is condemned by an absolute majority of the judges as being either too high or too low’ (Balinski and Laraki 2007: 8723). Balinski and Laraki further argue that this proposal would lead voters to express considered evaluations of the alternatives in an intuitively intelligible format and incentivize truthfulness, as discussed below.