 Rationes reales are further distinguished from conceptualizations that are completely mind-dependent, the so-called verbal accounts (rationes secundum dici): I said ‘rationes reales’ because also some &lt;other&gt; rationes are attributed to things, and they do not name anything real or anything that is in the thing itself (a parte rei) but only in the intellect, or according to the intellect. (Summa II q. 54, p. 247; see Bettoni 1959, pp. 236–43; Piron 1999, ch. 2; Piron 2016, par. 7–9) The crucial difference between rationes reales and rationes secundum dici is that the former are conceptualizations that are based on the nature of things themselves (although they do not reflect any real ontological distinctions or elements in them), while the latter are completely mind-dependent modes of thinking: