 To see how these views diverge, consider the following case which is similar to a case described by Ross (2012: 87–88): at \(t_1\) Sally has the ability to immediately form an intention to ⟨not kill anyone five years later at \(t_5\)⟩, although ⟨killing no one at \(t_5\)⟩ is not scrupulously securable for Sally at \(t_1\). On the other hand, killing exactly one person or killing exactly two persons at \(t_5\) are both scrupulously securable for Sally at \(t_1\). According to Portmore’s securitism, one of the objectively morally permissible maximal set of acts that is scrupulously securable by Sally at \(t_1\) involves killing one person at \(t_5\). However, at \(t_5\), not killing anyone is scrupulously securable for Sally, and thus at \(t_5\) Sally is obligated to not kill anyone at \(t_5\). These stipulations in Ross’s case are derived from the fact that at \(t_1\) Sally has an impeccable moral character that will be corrupted through no fault of her own (by being kidnapped by Satanists). But her moral character is not corrupted to such an extent that she is unable at \(t_5\) to refrain from killing anyone. To emphasize, at \(t_1\) the best efficacious intention that Sally can form involves killing one person at \(t_5\) whereas at \(t_5\) the best efficacious intention that Sally can form involves killing no one at \(t_5\). Portmore’s securitism thus prescribes an act at some future time, but then does not prescribe that act once that time is present.