 Arras’s point may be a version of a claim about human rationality. A starting point for this line of argument is the complaint that people who have different starting points as their initial set of beliefs, say with different degrees of credence given to their beliefs, may arrive at different reflective equilibria points—a specific version of which is Arras's point about the global scope of claims of intersubjectivity. This possibility undercuts the suggestion that critical pressures alone deriving can produce convergence. A more general form of this worry is that the model of reflection involved in reflective equilibrium, in which we are to produce coherence among all our beliefs, overemphasizes and idealizes human rationality. The suggestion is that we would be better off presupposing a more minimal form of rationality. A specific version of this complaint is that the method involves an information burden that cannot be met. Yet another version of this criticism is that we should allow for much less “rationalist” forms of modification of our views, recognizing “conversion” experiences like those involved in “paradigm shifts” may affect any account of coherence. Another line of argument emphasizes the information burden of the method—how can we be sure all appropriate theoretical views have been addressed. The suggestion (Arras 2007) is that wide reflective equilibrium is not action guiding in that it does not tell us which views to save and which to revise and so it does not lead to justification or truth.