 More general issues that lie in the background of the debate about ‘default-relativity’ include whether the purpose of the concept of causation is best served by an ‘egalitarian’ or ‘invariantist’ concept of causation or rather by one that takes the concept to enshrine normative considerations. Hitchcock (2017), for example, argues that since our interest in what causes what is, in essence, an interest in what kinds of intervention would bring about the kinds of results we want, we should take the latter line. A still more general issue is whether there is just one concept of causation at which all of the accounts on the table are or should be aiming, or instead several (Hall 2004, McDonnell 2018). Or perhaps causation is what Nancy Cartwright (following Neurath) calls a ‘Ballung’ concept: “a concept with rough, shifting, porous boundaries, a congestion of different ideas and implications that can in various combinations be brought into focus for different purposes and in different contexts” (2017: 136).