 While epistemic logicians had traditionally focused on knowing that, one finds a range of other uses of knowledge in natural language. As Wang (2015) points out, the expressions knowing how, knowing what, knowing why are very common, appearing almost just as frequently (sometimes more frequently) in spoken and written language as knowing that. Recently non-standard epistemic logics of such expressions have been developed, though knowing who constructions are present in Hintikka’s Knowledge and Belief (1962; see also Boër &amp; Lycan 1986; Rendsvig 2012). Thus, beyond propositional knowledge, epistemic logic also suggests ways to systematize the logic of questions and answers (Brendan knows why the dog barked). It also provides insight into the relationships between multiple modes of identification (Zoe knows that this man is the president). Here, the agent can be said to know a fact relating multiple modes of identification insofar as she correctly identifies the president, who she might know from stories in the newspaper with the man she sees standing in front of her, who she identifies as an object in her visual field (Hintikka &amp; Symons 2003). Epistemic logic may also provide insight into questions of procedural “know-how” (Brendan knows how to change a fuse). For example, knowing how to \(\varphi\) can be understood to be equivalent to the claim that there exists a way such that an agent knows that it is a way to ensure that \(\varphi\) (see Wang 2015, 2018). Work concerning the justifications of knowledge have also been undertaken by combinations of justification logic with epistemic logic (see, e.g., Artemov &amp; Nogina 2005; Renne 2008). There is ongoing work on these and other topics, and new developments are appearing steadily.