 The extension of &lt;being&gt; is those concepts on the conceptual tree that fall “under” &lt;being&gt;—those concepts are species of the genus, &lt;being&gt;. Kant speaks of a series of genus-species relations inhering between the members of the class of concepts that serve as a given concept’s extension; whether a concept serves as a genus or a species is relative. The concept &lt;created&gt; is a genus with respect to its species &lt;material&gt; and &lt;immaterial&gt;, but a species with respect to the genus &lt;being&gt;. The intension of a concept consists of those concepts that collectively constitute it. Hence the concept &lt;human&gt; has this intension: “rational animate material created being.” The concepts that collectively constitute a given concept are often called “Merkmale” or “Teilbegriffe,” or what might be called its conceptual parts (“Vienna Logic,” Ak 24: 913). To construct the concept &lt;human&gt;, one puts together the concepts &lt;rational&gt;, &lt;animate&gt;, &lt;material&gt;, &lt;created&gt;, and &lt;being&gt;. To formulate or to grasp the concept &lt;human&gt; just is to grasp these constituents.