 The default position among social psychologists is to treat implicit attitudes as if they are associations among mental representations (Fazio 2007), or among pairs of mental representations and valences. In particular, they treat implicit attitudes as associative structures which enter into associative transitions. Recently this issue has come under much debate. In an ever expanding series of studies De Houwer and his collaborators have taken to show that associative learning is, at base, relational, propositional contingency learning; i.e., that all putatively associative learning is in fact a nonautomatic learning process that generates and evaluates propositional hypotheses (Mitchell et al. 2009; De Houwer 2009, 2011, 2014 2019; Hughes et al. 2019). Other researchers have approached the question also using learning as the entrance point to the debate, demonstrating effects that non-associative acquisition creates stronger attitudes than associative acquisition (Hughes et al. 2019). For example, one might demonstrate that learning through merely reading an evaluative statement creates a stronger implicit attitude than repeated associative exposures (Kurdi and Banaji 2017, 2019; Mann et al. 2019). Other researchers have championed propositional models not based on learning, but instead based on how implicit attitudes change regardless of how they are acquired. For instance, Mandelbaum (2016) argued that logical/evidential interventions modulate implicit attitudes in predictable ways (e.g., using double negation to cancel each other out), while others have used diagnosticity to show that implicit attitudes update in a non-associationistic, propositional way (e.g., after reading a story about a man who broke into a building and appeared to ransack it you learn that we jumped into save people from a fire and immediately change your opinion of the man from negative to positive; Mann and Ferguson 2015; Mann et al. 2017; Van Dessel et al. 2019). (For more on implicit attitudes see the entry on   implicit bias).