  Culpability, as that term is used here, is a moral notion. It is synonymous with moral fault or moral blameworthiness. Mens rea is not sufficient for culpability—even intentional killings are sometimes excused. But it may well be necessary—culpability may presuppose at least some element of mens rea (Simester 2013; cf. Gardner 2007, 227–232). If this is so, the debate shifts to whether we should accept (C). One worry about this principle is its generality. The consequences of criminal liability are not always especially burdensome. And the benefits of liability without culpability may be especially significant. To take but one example, think of regulations that govern the activities of corporations, and which protect the health and safety of the public at large. Making it a criminal offence to violate these regulations, and imposing hefty fines, need have none of the destructive effects of imprisoning individuals. Dispensing with culpability requirements may increase the deterrent effects of the law, by making it harder for violators to escape conviction. Whether (C) is sound depends on whether effects like these—which, ex hypothesi, protect the health and safety of many—can justify imposing criminal liability without culpability.