 A person’s action may be explained in a variety of ways: by reference to the agent’s goal, or habits, or character traits, or to her reasons for acting. For instance, we may say that Jess went to the hospital in order to reassure her father, or that she went because she always goes on Tuesdays, or because she is a dutiful daughter, or because her father was in intensive care. These statements explain why Jess went to the hospital because, given certain background assumptions, they enable a third person to understand Jess’s action: they make it intelligible. In the examples just given, the first explanation gives us Jess’s goal in going to the hospital (to reassure her father), the second and third place her action in the context of her habits (she does it every Tuesday) and her character (she’s dutiful), respectively, and the fourth explanation gives a reason why she did it that was her reason for doing it: a reason that, from her perspective, spoke in favour of going to the hospital (that her father was in intensive care). Among this variety of possible explanations (and there are more), the last one is a distinctive type that is of particular interest here because it is an explanation of an intentional action that rationalises the action: it explains the action by citing the agent’s reason for acting. In Davidson’s words: