 But this standard of collective correctness can be questioned. It rests solely on how often an alternative is individually correct. Yet it might also matter how strongly someone’s correctness standard (e.g., her welfare) is satisfied or violated. This becomes evident in concrete  examples.[34]  To account for degrees, let a correctness standard be given by a value function \(V\), assigning a value or correctness degree to each alternative, formally \(V:\mathcal{A}\rightarrow\mathbb{R}\). If \(V_{1},V_{2},\ldots\) are the (unknown) value functions of the individuals \(1,2,\ldots\), respectively, how valuable or correct are alternatives collectively? Under an additive approach, the collective value function is \(V_{1}+\cdots+V_{n}\). If individual value represents individual welfare or interest, then such additive collective value represents utilitarian collective welfare; but nothing hinges on a welfarist interpretation of value. An alternative in \(\mathcal{A}\) is now correct (individually or collectively) if it maximises the relevant value function. Here collective correctness no longer reduces to correctness for most individuals. Pivato’s (2016) statistical utilitarianism theorem—initially a theorem about making approximately utilitarian-optimal decisions—can be interpreted as a jury theorem for individual correctness of this graded kind and collective correctness of additive  kind.[35]