 A more generous reading of Goodman's proposal would widen the reflective equilibrium he proposes to include some of the beliefs about standards for acceptable inference that logicians develop (though some think that wide reflective equilibrium does not overcome the reliability problem noted above). Such standards are themselves not independent of all inferential practice. They have been developed to reflect views about what counts as good practice in light of the kinds of inferences that people abandon when they are made aware of their inconsistency with other inferences they will not give up. It is against this wider set of beliefs, including the articulation of such standards, that we can identify some inferences as performance errors or otherwise deviant patterns and correct those practices. Some changes in belief in dialogical contexts may well be best explained by noting that some individuals grasp the insights of others. Individuals working with the method of reflective equilibrium may thus see the point of criticisms of previous views they had accepted. This is where some dialogical and individual uses of the method coincide. (We turn to the distinction between wide and narrow reflective equilibrium shortly.)