 A contractual promisor’s intentions, moreover, run not just to her own interest in the joint contractual project, or even to her promisee’s interest in this project (as she understands it), but rather to his perspective on the project, as this is the perspective from which he will decide whether to insist on her performance or to release her. In this way, the promisor recognizes her promisee as an authority over her, with respect to the promised contractual performance. She treats as a final end not just the joint activities described by her contracts but also his person—his will (which may insist on or relieve the duty to perform). Borrowing from Kant, one might even say that a contract constitutes “an act of the united choice of two persons” (The Metaphysics of Morals 6:271) so that offers and acceptances are “represented not as following upon one another but … as proceeding from a single common will” (6:273). Every contract, on this view, establishes a shared perspective over the contemplated performance.