  The next task is to show what provides the moral content for practical deliberations and choices about how to act. Most importantly, we want to know what specific types of actions or goals will allow us to realize ourselves. Here Bradley turns to historical ethical theories to determine whether they can supply what is wanted. Bradley examines teleological hedonism and deontological theories and finds both unacceptable. Deontological theories fail because they place no constraints on what can be willed by a moral agent and so no specific end is indicated and none barred. Deontology is one-sided and abstract: it has focused on the universal aspect of the will and disregarded the other, equally important particular element. What is in fact missing is any adequate psychological account of desire which explains how we are motivated to do specific things, to make specific choices. By contrast, ethical hedonism makes the opposite mistake of focusing on the particular to the detriment of the universal side. Classical Utilitarianism, for example, sees particular pleasant states as the goal of action but cannot present any of these as having any intrinsic value, for they are only means to the maximization of pleasure and could be replaced by any other means that were more, or equally, effective. Moreover—and this is an objection raised by all the British Idealists against hedonism—since pleasant states perish there is no sense in which a number of them can be enjoyed together as felt states rather than merely remembered. So, a sum of pleasures or a maximum of pleasures cannot be the end moral agents are to aim for.