 Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the soul is irremediably inferior to the intellect. Rejecting any internalist interpretation of intellectual processes, Iamblichus regards them as the result of the soul’s illumination by a transcendent entity. Our information on this matter is to be gathered mostly from the late Aristotelian commentators, pseudo-Simplicius (see In De anima 313.1–10, with a reference to the “unparticipated” intellect which, if genuinely Iamblichean, would predate Proclean terminology) and Priscian of Lydia (Metaphrasis in Theophrastum): these relatively neglected texts are the object of the pioneering work Steel 1978. Indeed, such a position implies some knowledge of the philosophical debates on this issue within the Aristotelian tradition (Theophrastus, Alexander). Its significance is enormous, insofar as it directly leads to the rejection of Plotinus’ doctrine of the undescended soul: that is, the idea that something of the soul always remains in the intelligible world. Thus, rejecting the notion that the soul shares homeomereia with the remaining intellectual entities, Iamblichus writes: 