 Rawls concedes that “mixed conceptions are much more difficult to argue against than the principle of utility,” since “the strong arguments from liberty cannot be used as before” (TJ, 316/278 rev.). He discusses mixed conceptions in Theory, §49, and devotes more attention to them later in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (§§34–38). Rawls provides several considerations or “grounds” that should lead the parties in the original position to agree on the difference principle – publicity, stability, and reciprocity – and he adds several more specific arguments that speak against choice of the principle of restricted utility (TJ sect.49; JF sect.38). Mention has already been made of his argument (TJ sect.29) that the difference principle affirms the self-respect of the least advantaged since, unlike the principle of utility, it treats them as ends in themselves and not as means to the greater well-being of the more advantaged. Though still relevant, the force of this argument from self-respect is not as strong when the difference principle is compared with a principle of restricted utility that guarantees a social minimum.