 Throughout The Sweets of Refutation Śrīharṣa’s aim is to argue against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers by means of what he calls refutation-arguments (khaṇḍana-yukti). Refutation-arguments against definitions are supposed to reveal that the relevant definitions are inadequate. In cases where no adequate definition is available for an entity, the relevant entity to be defined cannot be specified, i.e., distinguished from those things that are distinct from  it.[8]  This follows from the thesis, endorsed by Vācaspati Miśra, that the purpose of a definition is to specify the definiendum by distinguishing it from things that are distinct from it. So, if Śrīharṣa’s refutation-arguments are successful in showing that there exists no adequate definition for any of the ontological, logical, and epistemological categories that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher seeks to define, then she will have failed to specify those categories that are essential to her theoretical enterprise.