 Replies to this objection have been made by Seager (1994), Byrne (1997), and Rosenthal (2005), among others. They point out that it is one thing to have a conscious experience of the aspect that differentiates the two pictures, and quite another to consciously experience that the two pictures are differentiated by that aspect. That is, consciously seeing the extra spot in one picture needn’t mean seeing that this is the difference between the two pictures. So while scanning the two pictures one will enjoy conscious experience of the extra spot. A HOT theorist will say that this means undergoing a percept with the content spot here that forms the target of a HOT that one is undergoing a perception with that content. But this can perfectly well be true without one undergoing a percept with the content spot here in this picture but absent here in that one. And it can also be true without one forming any HOT to the effect that one is undergoing a perception with the content spot here when looking at a given picture but not when looking at the other. In which case the purported counter-example isn’t really a counter-example.