Finally, we should comment on the view expressed in some of the cognitive science literature that mental representations of language are primarily imagistic (e.g., Damasio 1994; Humphrey 1992). Certainly there is ample evidence for the reality and significance of mental imagery (Johnson-Laird 1983; Kosslyn 1994). Also creative thought often seems to rely on visualization, as observed early in the 20th century by Poincaré (1913) and Hadamard (1945).  But as was previously noted, symbolic and imagistic representations may well coexist and interact synergistically. Moreover, cognitive scientists who explore the human language faculty in detail, such as Steven Pinker (1994, 2007) or any of the representationalist or connectionist researchers cited above, all seem to reach the conclusion that the content derived from language (and the stuff of thought itself) is in large part symbolic—except in the case of the eliminativists who deny representations altogether. It is not hard to see, however, how raw intuition might lead to the meanings-as-images hypothesis. It appears that vivid consciousness is associated mainly with the visual cortex, especially area V1, which is also crucially involved in mental imagery (e.g., Baars 1997: chapter 6). Consequently it is entirely possible that vast amounts of non-imagistic encoding and processing of language go unnoticed, while any evoked imagistic artifacts become part of our conscious experience. Further, the very act of introspecting on what sort of imagery, if any, is evoked by a given sentence may promote construction of imagery and awareness thereof.