 One could worry that the intertwining of the theoretical and empirical would open the floodgates to bias in science. Human cognizing, both historical and present day, is replete with disturbing commitments including intolerance and narrow mindedness of many sorts. If such commitments are integral to a theoretical framework, or endemic to the reasoning of a scientist or scientific community, then they threaten to corrupt the epistemic utility of empirical results generated using their resources. The core impetus of the ‘value-free ideal’ is to maintain a safe distance between the appraisal of scientific theories according to the evidence on one hand, and the swarm of moral, political, social, and economic values on the other. While proponents of the value-free ideal might admit that the motivation to pursue a theory or the legal protection of human subjects in permissible experimental methods involve non-epistemic values, they would contend that such values ought not ought not enter into the constitution of empirical results themselves, nor the adjudication or justification of scientific theorizing in light of the evidence (see Intemann 2021, 202).