 Clause (1), which articulates the basic idea of Neander’s approach, ensures different content ascriptions to those generated by biosemantics and other ‘use-oriented’ theories. For example, consider again the notorious case of the frog. Plausibly, the relevant visual pathways in the frog’s brain were selected for their disposition to be caused by a certain configuration of visible features (roughly, something’s being small, dark and moving) to produce the sensory-perceptual representation in question, as well as for their disposition to initiate orienting and so on thereby. They were plausibly selected for this preferential response to the configuration of visible features because things with these features were often enough nutritious for the frog. The visual pathways in the frog were not selected for a disposition to respond to the nutritional value of a stimulus, however. For the normal frog’s visual system has no causal sensitivity to the nutritional value of the stimulus and cannot have been selected for a causal sensitivity it did not have. So, on this proposal, the visual content of the representation is there’s something small, dark, moving (or something along these lines) rather than there’s frog food. (For analogous reasons, Pietroski’s kimus are characterized as representing the presence of red, not the absence of snorf; cf. the discussion in  section 3.2.)