 Some philosophers have explored the possibility of a middle path between reductive dispositionalism and non-reductionism. Thus, in a paper in which she discusses Stroud’s view, Ginsborg distinguishes between austere forms of non-reductionism, which she takes to be incompatible with constructive philosophising about meaning, and “less austere and partly reductionist” approaches, which allow that “we could account for meaning in terms of a more basic idea of goal-directed human activity” (2011a: 153), but without allowing that such activity can be captured in purely dispositionalist or physicalist terms. She goes on to articulate a less austere view, which explains meaning in terms of a notion of normativity that she takes to be primitive. On this view, for someone to mean something by an expression is for her to have a disposition to apply it in particular contexts and, crucially, to take the manifestations of that disposition to be appropriate. Taking one’s responses to be appropriate 