  A similar issue arises in the philosophy of perception (see, e.g., Boghossian and Velleman 1991, Peacocke 2001, Thau 2002). When one looks at a cucumber, does the propositional content of one’s experience have a constituent that is a “mode of presentation” of greenness (a neo-Fregean view) or does it instead simply contain the property greenness itself? Using the familiar ordered pair notation for propositional content (see, e.g., Thau 2002, 83), and ignoring issues about whether the cucumber itself is associated with a mode of presentation, the dispute may be put as follows. On the neo-Fregean view, the content of one’s experience of the cucumber is \(\langle\)the cucumber, \(\mathrm{MOP_{greenness}} \rangle\); on the neo-Russellian view, the content of one’s experiences is \(\langle\)the cucumber, greenness\(\rangle\).