 The soundness of this criticism has been the object of a heated scholarly debate, yet no shared solution has been reached (see now Castagnoli 2010). An infallibilist interpretation, according to which all beliefs are true simpliciter (see Theaetetus 161d6-7, 167a7-8; Aristotle, Metaphysics IV 5, 1009a7-8), clearly leads to Protagoras’ confutation for the above reasons. But Protagoras could nonetheless defend himself by endorsing some kind of relativism, according to which nothing is true simpliciter, but always relative to some framework. As a matter of fact, the criticism omits the qualifiers “for me” and “for you”, which are crucial to his thesis (Theaetetus 161d2-3; Aristotle, Met. IV 6, 1011a19-20; Sextus Empiricus, M VII 60). By introducing these qualifiers, Protagoras could reformulate the peritrope charge in such a way as to neutralise it: if what I judge is true and I judge that Protagoras’ thesis is false, it does not follow from this that Protagoras’ thesis is false in an absolute sense, but only that it is false “for me”. And the fact that it is false “for me” does not prevent it from being true for other people: it remains true, for instance, for Protagoras, who can thus avoid the charge that he is turning himself upside down (as well as denying the principle of non-contradiction; it may be argued however that this latter principle is denied when Protagoras’ adversary judges that Protagoras’ thesis is false: in this case she would be relying on Protagoras’ thesis and at the same time denying it).