 The advantages of Mackie’s theory over Mill’s are less obvious. Recall that for Mill, a cause is a totality of positive and negative factors such that, in the respective causal scenario, this totality is sufficient for \(E\). On this theory, events of type \(C\) may be members of a cause for an effect of type \(E\), without there being a strict regular succession between \(C\)-events and \(E\)-events. Moreover, the notion of a totality of factors is consistent with there being several totalities that are sufficient to bring about an event of type \(E\). In other words, several totalities may serve as instances of some cluster in one and the same Mackie-style regularity. These totalities may be represented by conjunctions and joined by disjunctions. If we amend the Millian regularity theory by a requirement of minimal sufficiency, it seems as if we can go back and forth between a Mill-style and a Mackie-style representation of causes, with the qualification that causes in the sense of Mackie are mere factors of a cause in the sense of Mill. In this sense, the two theories seem to be intertranslatable. It should be pointed out, however, that Mackie’s theory gives us a more explicit and concise representation of the several totalities, or clusters, which are minimally sufficient to bring about a certain type of effect. The complex regularities and their elegant logical representation have not been in the conceptual repertoire of Mill.