 All of the bridge principles we have seen so far have the following in common: whether an agent’s full and partial beliefs cohere is a matter of the full and partial beliefs  alone. It is not necessary to mention preferences or utilities in order to evaluate a belief state. There is another tradition, originating in Hempel (1962) and receiving classical expression in Levi (1967a), that assimilates the problem of “deciding” what to believe to a Bayesian decision-theoretic model. Crucially, these authors are not committed to a picture on which agents literally decide what to believe–rather they claim that an agent’s beliefs are subject to the same kind of normative evaluation as their practical decision-making. Contemporary contributions to this tradition include Easwaran (2015), Pettigrew (2016) and Dorst (2017). Presented here is a somewhat simplified version of Levi’s (1967a) account taking propositions, rather than sentences, as the objects of belief.