 Exactly what these principles are, and exactly what method should be used to determine them, are matters of some disagreement among deontological theorists. But there does seem to be a general consensus among deontologists that moral impartiality does not require that an agent be strictly neutral between her own good and the good of other people in ordinary decision-making contexts. Rather, an agent is permitted on deontological views to give special attention to her own projects and interests. Impartiality might be required in certain special contexts—for instance, when one is serving on a hiring committee or a jury, grading student papers, or designing legislation—but it is not seen as a general and pervasive requirement applying to everyday decisions and behavior. In one sense, this places a limit on impartiality’s scope and demands; but it is compatible with viewing impartiality as having a central and irreducible role in morality. After all, on many deontological views the rules and principles permitting partiality at the everyday level (to oneself, to friends and relatives, to one’s own projects, etc.) are justified in terms that appeal directly to impartial considerations. It might be claimed, for instance, that everyone’s autonomy and dignity—which are understood as moral features possessed equally by all—are best respected by adopting a set of moral rules and practices according to which each person is permitted to carve out a space for their own projects and relationships, within which the requirement to be impartial does not generally apply. This is just to say that first-order partiality is compatible with second-order impartiality (Barry 1995; see also Hooker 2010).