 Some of these refinements incorporated into Dilthey’s descriptive program were inspired by reading Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1900–01). Dilthey specifically follows Husserl in his account of how language contributes to “significative apprehension” (1904–9/SW.III, 60). In reading words we do not represent them as mere sets of letters but fulfill their meaning by representing their objects. There is a triadic structural relation between the intuitive content of a linguistic expression, an act that gives it meaning, and the object that embodies that meaning as what is expressed. But whereas Husserl’s phenomenology focused in the conceptual structures of objective apprehension, Dilthey gives equal attention to the felt structures of what he calls “objective having” (1904–9/SW.III, 66). In objective apprehension we progress from attitude to objects, in objective having we regress from objects to attitude. This regressive turn from the outside to the inside is brought to bear on how feelings are to be interpreted. “ Whether we feel our own state or some object, it involves only a state of being as a kind of attitude…. The way this state of being depends on outer objects or on the state of the subject is obscured through an inverse attitude that loses itself in the depth of the subject” (1904–9/SW.III, 69). Instead of regarding feelings merely as subjective states such as pleasure or displeasure, they can be interpreted as attitudes that assess what is given in consciousness as either furthering or diminishing one’s state of being in the world. Feelings can be added to our earlier list of attitudes.