 One of these was universalizability. Though Hare had relied on a linguistic account of universalizability, Turiel interpreted universalizability as a claim about how a specific moral judgment might be generalized to situations involving other people, other places, and other times. “Moral prescriptions”, he tells us, “are universally applicable in that they apply to everyone in similar circumstances” (Turiel 1983: 36; italics in the original). So if a young participant in an experiment judges that it is wrong for a child in her own school to push someone off a swing, and if that judgment is a moral judgment, we would expect the participant to judge that it is wrong for a child who attends a different school in another town or in another country to push someone off a swing in similar circumstances. We’d also expect the participant to judge that the same action—pushing a schoolmate off a swing—would be wrong if it happened sometime in the past or if it were to happen sometime in the future in similar circumstances.