But once again, that is not what most participants actually did. In the same Forsythe study, while 21% gave nothing to the recipient, the remaining 79% gave something, with 21% giving an equal amount of the $10 (Forsythe et al. 1994: 362). Kahneman also ran a version of a dictator game where students in a psychology course could divide $20 with an anonymous fellow student, or keep $18 for themselves and give $2 to the other student. Strikingly, 76% choose the even division (Kahneman et al. 1986: S291). In addition, 74% of participants were subsequently willing to pay $1 to punish an unfair dictator and in the process reward a fair one, even though this would reduce their own monetary payment in the process (1986: S291). Van Dijk and Vermunt (2000) found that information asymmetries were not as prevalent as in ultimatum games. Specifically, there wasn’t a significant effect observed based on whether dictators knew that recipients were aware of the total amount dictators had to allocate. As they conclude, 