 Among Chinese philosophical schools of the pre-Han era, it is the later Mohists who deserve the greatest credit for pioneering and systematizing the studies of language and logic. In the context of a general theoretical framework based on precisely formulated definitions, they developed a workable theory of analogical inference that was sensitive to the idiosyncratic semantic contributions of terms in combination. Awareness of the limitations of compositionality probably led them away from the development of a theory of logical forms, but it stimulated insights about intensional phenomena in language that prompted more sophisticated defenses of their ethical views, and encouraged a broad understanding of how language functions in communicative discourse that warrants ongoing consideration today. Xunzi may have reached a new height in the rigor and clarity with which he presented his logical and linguistic views, but he did not surpass his Mohist forebears in originality, seeking primarily to utilize their insights in support of a largely Confucian ethical agenda. While the Mohists were clearly aware of many of the limitations of their own methods of reasoning, they nevertheless retained the hope that a sophisticated analysis of language would reveal real similarities and differences in experience that would reliably guide ethical action. It is this general hope that was the focus of Daoist critics like Zhuangzi, who argued from radically perspectivalist assumptions that no language, however refined, is adequate to the task of providing consistent normative standards. Whether or not this claim is true is still a matter of debate, with scholars of Chinese philosophy today leaning one way or another on ancient conceptions of the roles of language and logic in human thought and action.