 However, many authors have found this aspect of Sher’s position problematic. Levy claims that while it’s very plausible that origination is a condition on moral responsibility, it isn’t plausible to think “that responsibility consists in origination” (2014: 127). The fact that an agent’s failure of awareness causally originates in her psychology doesn’t seem to warrant blaming her for the action or omission’s wrongness, since the latter isn’t linked to her in a way the shows anything about the quality of her will (Levy 2014: 128; see also Talbert 2017a: 57; Björnsson 2017b: 143). Similarly, while agreeing with Sher that agents can sometimes be held directly responsible for their failures of awareness and subsequent wrongdoing, Angela Smith (2010) argues that this is so only when those failures exhibit a rational connection to the agent’s evaluative judgments. By contrast, a purely causal connection of the sort Sher defends “cannot establish the right kind of connection between an agent and her wrongdoing” to justify blaming her for it (A. Smith 2010: 523). Finally, Moore and Hurd (2011: 184) object that while the moral relevance of conscious choice for blameworthiness is intuitively clear, it isn’t at all clear how the fact that the agent’s “psychophysical apparatus that characteristically causes her chosen actions also caused her on this occasion to do this unchosen action” could analogously make blame appropriate. They thus dispute Sher’s (2009: 140) contention that conscious choice and failures of awareness (caused in the way he indicates) are equally good ways of satisfying the origination relation and grounding  blameworthiness.[14],  [15]