 Epistemic sentimentalists hold that (some) emotions are sources of moral knowledge or at least justification. Many of them believe the stronger claim that emotional experiences are necessary for coming to know basic moral truths, either because they are sources of foundational justification or because justified moral beliefs must cohere with certain emotional experiences. They thus reject both intuitionist views, on which adequate understanding of self-evident moral propositions suffices for justified belief (Audi 2013), and rationalist accounts according to which pure practical reason can yield moral knowledge. In the background are metaphysical and explanatory arguments to the effect that moral truths aren’t the sort of relations or facts that reasoning can discover (see the  Anti-Rationalism Supplement).  Note that this is not to deny that we can reason from basic moral truths to derivative ones, or that non-moral reasoning can’t play a role in moral knowledge. Nor need sentimentalists claim that knowledge of formal moral truths, like the transitivity of betterness, is grounded in emotions.