 Many philosophers defend the argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse against this objection (McGrath 1988; Leslie 1988; Bostrom 2002; Manson &amp; Thrush 2003; Juhl 2005; Bradley 2009; Epstein 2017). In an early response to Hacking, McGrath (1988) argues that the analogy between the argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse and a person who randomly enters a casino and witnesses a remarkable outcome is misleading: while the person entering a casino could have found any arbitrary outcome, we could not have found ourselves in a universe with conditions that are not right for life. The appropriate analogy to consider, according to McGrath, involves someone who is allowed to enter the casino only if and when some specific remarkable outcome occurs and who, upon being called in and finding that this outcome has occurred, infers the existence of other trials in the past. In that scenario, the inference to multiple trials (in the past) is indeed rational, and so, according to McGrath, is the inference from fine-tuned conditions to multiple universes.