 John and David both believe that John is being attacked by a bear. But they display, Perry notes, very different behavior: John curls up into a ball; David runs for help. It’s very plausible to attribute this difference in behavior to a doxastic difference between them. (A difference that makes it appropriate, for example, to say that John, but not David, believes that he himself is being attacked by a bear.) But the doxastic difference isn’t a difference in traditional propositions believed—certainly it isn’t a difference in possible-worlds propositions believed, or in descriptive or de re structured propositions believed. John and David are on exactly the same page about the relevant aspects of the world—it’s a world in which John is being attacked by a bear, and David isn’t. They are on exactly the same page about which relevant descriptive and de re structured propositions are true—it’s true that the prominent advocate of self-locating belief from Stanford is being attacked by a bear, while the prominent advocate of self-locating belief from Princeton is not, that John is being attacked and David is not, etc.