  Turn now to just one way in which personal identity enters into the  broader debate over abortion. Perhaps the most famous anti-abortion  argument in the philosophical literature comes from Don Marquis, who  argues that, because it is prima facie wrong to kill any entity with  a future like ours, and because a fetus has a future like ours, it is prima facie wrong to kill a fetus (Marquis 1989). Peter McInerney and others, however, have denied that fetuses have futures like ours by  appealing to considerations of identity. To have a future like ours,  for instance, presupposes that one is identical to some person who  will experience said future. But a fetus is not a person, it seems,  and so it cannot be identical to any future person. Indeed, none of  the relations deemed relevant to the identity of persons are  present between a fetus and anything else, simply because a fetus  lacks a psychology with memories, beliefs, desires, intentions, and a general character capable of establishing any sort of plausible  connection to a future experiencer, so that any experiences that  experiencer undergoes cannot be the fetus's future  experiences (McInerney 1990, Brill 2003). (The same point might be  true as well for infants, but instead of taking that to be a  reductio of the objection, one might also quite plausibly take it simply to be a point in favor of rejecting Marquis's criterion of  the wrongness of killing: given that infants also lack a future like  ours, Marquis's account is substantially incomplete, for it fails to  explain why killing infants is wrong, when it obviously is.)