 Contemporary theorists who have addressed the morality of irregular warfare have generally argued that terrorism, whether its goal is to persuade the regime to capitulate or to coerce the oppressed into joining the revolution or not supporting the regime, is morally impermissible. Most of the controversy concerns whether any or all of the other forms of irregular warfare are permissible and if so under what conditions. This author (Buchanan 2013) has argued that even if terrorism perpetrated against members of the oppressed population is unjustified, some forms of coercion may be permissible, as when revolutionary fighters are conscripted through the threat of penalties such as expropriation of property or even perhaps confinement or lesser restrictions on liberty. The most plausible justification for such methods of coerced mobilization would characterize the goals of the revolution as public goods of extraordinary moral importance and present coercion as a solution to the collective action problem. Whether coercive mobilization would be justified would depend on at least two factors: whether the forms of coercion employed were necessary, whether they were the least restrictive among the effective alternatives and whether the burdens of coercion were distributed fairly (Finlay 2015: 87–124).