 That much, at least, is plausibly obvious, but unfortunately it does not follow that the final analysis of language will be wholly devoid of complex symbols. The trouble is that for all we have said so far, a fully analysed proposition might yet contain one or more complex symbols that have meaning in their own right. Clearly, Wittgenstein must have been assuming that all genuine referring expressions must be semantically simple: they must lack anything like a Fregean sense. But why should that be so? The seeds of one answer are contained in Tractatus 3.3, the proposition in which Wittgenstein enunciates his own version of Frege’s context principle: “Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning” (3.3). Wittgenstein’s juxtaposition of these two claims suggests that the context principle is supposed to be his ground for rejecting senses for sub-sentential expressions. But just how it could provide such a ground is far from clear. Another, more concrete, possibility is that Wittgenstein simply accepted the arguments Russell had given in “On Denoting” for rejecting senses for sub-sentential expressions. 