 In contrast with Booth and Couch, who challenges Polger and Shapiro for deferring too much to scientists and their taxonomies, Mazviita Chirimuuta chides them for not paying enough attention to actual “functional thinking” in the life sciences, and thus relying too heavily on “toy examples” like corkscrews. Chirimuuta agrees with Polger and Shapiro that the old philosophers’ notion of multiple realization, “MR1.0”, needs replacing, but suggests looking directly into three areas of the life sciences for its replacement, “MR2.0”. One area is evolutionary approaches, where Chirimuuta mentions explicitly Ernst Mayr’s proximate/ultimate explanation distinction, the latter referring to the evolutionary function or “purpose” of a behavior, and so serves as a “necessary, non-replaceable completement” of the former (2018: 407). The second area is reverse engineering, which posits a function in the nervous system and then works back to see how the physical components perform it. The third area is the study of robustness in biological systems, whereby the function of a system is maintained despite alterations in lower-level mechanisms. Chirimuuta notes that Criterion IV (the “differently the same” condition mentioned above) of Polger and Shapiro’s “Official Recipe” for genuine multiple realization would probably preclude many cases of biological robustness, in the same fashion Polger and Shapiro used it to rule out the “radical” ferret rewiring example (discussed above). But for Chirimuuta, this consequence suggests that Polger and Shapiro’s “Official Recipe” may be “missing something interesting about the organization of living systems” (2018: 408); and so may not be sensitive enough to real scientific practice. She notes that for all their talk about relying on scientists’ judgments and taxonomies, Polger and Shapiro’s favorite “toy example”, the corkscrew, comes up a lot when the conditions on genuine multiple realization are being articulated and defended. Her point is that a closer look at some real sciences that engage in functional thinking, at the point when Polger and Shapiro are developing and defending their basic analysis of multiple realization, might have generated a different account of what multiple realization is (“MR2.0”). As opposed to what Polger and Shapiro actually do with real scientific examples, namely bring them up to debunk claims about successful multiple realization based on their already existing detailed analysis. Such an approach seemingly would have produced an account tied much more closely to actual scientific practice.