 It isn’t easy to provide an intuitive reading for the ternary relation \(R\). The basic idea is that the truth of an entailment \(A \rightarrow B\) at a world \(w\) depends on \(w\)’s “seeing an accessibility” (Bremer 2005: 67) between two other worlds \(w_1\) and \(w_2\), such that if \(A\) is true at the former, \(B\) is true at the latter. But what does this mean? This is perhaps the most important philosophical issue facing semantics for relevant logics. One approach is the information-based account of Mares (2004, 2009, 2010) and (Restall 1995b), based on  situation semantics.  Another approach draws on various interpretations of conditionality, such as those found in the literature on conditional logics (Beall et al. 2012). (See the entry on  relevance logic  or Jago 2013c for further discussion.) 