This last claim of Sosa’s brings us back to an earlier point. There seems to be a good sense in which, when epistemologists carefully consider the extent of our knowledge, the cogency (or not) of various skeptical arguments, and so on, they occupy a single, shared context (Conee 2014, 66). Within that context, some deny that we know very much, while their anti-skeptical counterparts insist that we do. But to hold, as EC’s proffered handling of SA implies, that in this context it is the skeptic’s claims that are true is not licensed by EC itself: the propositions expressed by knowledge sentences may be contextually variable, but that does not tell us, concerning some particular context such as a philosophical dispute, which specific such propositions are true, and which false. (It is possible to read Dretske’s objection to EC, mentioned in the previous Section, as intended to make essentially this point.)