 This traditional interpretation was not universally agreed upon, and various interpretations and modifications were presented, especially towards the end of the thirteenth century. In particular, the realist idea that categories are populated by different kinds things (res) came under pressure. Olivi is among the first authors to explicitly reject the idea that Aristotelian categories can be considered as ontologically distinct kinds of things, and he also points out that Aristotle does not offer any good reason to believe that there are exactly ten categories (Summa II q. 28, pp. 490–91). According to Olivi, there are more ways of conceptually carving the world than the Aristotelian categorical scheme, and we cannot infer the ontological structure of the world from our conceptual divisions. Olivi argues that “the diversity of modes of predication does not necessarily entail a diversity of modes of being, because the mode of predication follows the mode of understanding rather than the mode of being […]” (ibid., pp. 485–86; see also q. 54, pp. 262–63). Things that really exist are substances and qualities; the remaining categories are different ways to conceptualize things that really exist (Pini 2008, pp. 160–62; Pini 2005, pp. 74–77; Pasnau 2011, pp. 235–38).