 There is irony in this. The irony is that sense-datum theories find their most natural home in intransitive bodily sensations like pain that have been traditionally and historically contrasted with standard exteroceptual experiences rather than co-classified with them (for many, feeling pain is not a perceptual affair at all). This is ironic for two reasons. First, the main proponents of sense-datum theories advanced these theories mainly as theories of exteroception, that is, perception of external physical reality. Second, when applied to standard exteroception, sense-datum theories don’t seem to support the perceptual direct (naive) realism of common sense at all. Indeed, according to common sense, when I see a red apple on the table, I am directly seeing the apple (at least its surface facing me) and its qualities like its redness. In short, although sense-datum theories that are explicitly advanced as theories of perception (exteroception) in general don’t generate much conviction, they seem to be more convincing when applied to intransitive bodily sensations like pains that have not been usually thought to be perceptual.