  As we saw in section 7.2, Kant recognizes these limits on the significance of the cultivation of taste for moral development, but also described a wider variety of ways in which the former could be beneficial for the latter. The contribution to moral development that Schiller hopes to derive from aesthetic education is essentially cognitive: through the sensitivity to particularity that we acquire from aesthetic education we learn to recognize the circumstances, needs, and feelings of others and thereby to apply our principles to them appropriately. Kant, however, holds that aesthetic experience could give us sensible confirmation of the moral truths we already know through pure reason, but it also give us emotional support in our attempt to act as we know we should, although in no case does he argue that the support that morality can get from aesthetic experience is indispensable. Thus, although Schiller’s essay “On Grace and Dignity” appears to argue for a greater rôle for feelings in fulfillment of the demands of morality than Kant allows, it is only Kant who insists upon moral grounds for striving to realize grace and not just dignity. And while Schiller’s letters On Aesthetic Education insist that aesthetic education is a necessary condition for social justice, Kant has a broader conception of the contributions that aesthetic experience may make to moral and political development, although he certainly does not make the cultivation of taste a necessary (let alone sufficient) condition for the realization of morality.