 In his commentary on Boethius’s text, Albert the Great takes a different approach (In de Div. tract. 4, ch. 1; Loe ed., 75–9). He refers to the view that a potential whole is some sort of intermediary between a universal and an integral whole, but then he proceeds to give a different explanation why a potential whole is a whole: It is a whole because the full and complete list of the capacities will produce the full and complete account of the soul in so far as it is the principle of life and self-motion. But it does not follow from this that any given particular soul will have all of the powers and capacities on the list. Albert also hastens to add that while a full list of the capacities of soul gives us the substance of the principle of life and motion, under this description we are not attending to a substance in the absolute sense. We, thus, should not conclude that a soul is divisible in the way that an integral whole is divisible. That is, these capacities need not answer to little substances or parts of substances that constitute the soul. To help us to see his point, Albert offers an example of another potential whole: