  The proposal is that number properties are related jointly to objects by the many-one relation ‘completion’. I think we can simplify this proposal a little without losing its essential structure. Rather than saying, in a sentence like “Mars is a planet”, that the property planethood resides in Mars by the inherence relation, we would now say that the predicate “…is a planet” is true of Mars, so to speak building the inherence relation (or copula) into the predicate. In an entirely analogous way, we can build the completion relation into the number-predicate, which then becomes, if the number is n, an n-place relation. Thus the sentence “Venus and Mars are two” asserts of Venus and Mars that they stand in a certain 2-place relation, the relation which is the number 2. The Nyāya idea, then, is that number-adjectives are n-place relational predicates, and that numbers are n-place relations holding jointly between n distinct objects. It in no way follows from the statement that the relation 2 holds between Venus and Mars, that it holds just with Venus, any more than it follows from the statement that X is to the left of Y, that X is to the left, full stop. On the Nyāya proposal, then, it looks as though the troublesome inference is blocked because its conclusion is not even well-formed, since the phrase “Venus is two”, like the phrase “X is to the left”, is an incomplete or unsaturated expression.