 Needless to say, recent work on Vienna Circle philosophies continues to inspire a variety of approaches to the legacy they constitute (besides prompting continuing excavations of other members’ non-standard variants; e.g., on Feigl see Neuber 2011). There is Michael Friedman’s extremely wide-ranging project (2001, 2010, 2012) to use the shortcomings of Vienna Circle philosophies as a springboard for developing a renewed Kantian philosophy that also overcomes the failings of neo-Kantianism and provides a philosophy-cum-history fit for our post-Kuhnian times. Then there is Richardson’s proposal (2008) to turn the ambition to develop a scientific philosophy into a research programme for the history of science, so as to reveal more clearly the real world dynamics and limitations of philosophy as a scientific metatheory. And there is Carus’s suggestion (2007) that Carnap’s minimalist explicationism be placed in the service of a renewed Enlightenment agenda (continuing the task of the “scientific world conception”). This connects with the current metaphilosophical interest in conceptual engineering, the relevance of Carnap’s work to which becoming increasingly recognised (Justus 2012, Wagner 2012, Brun 2016, Reck and Dutilh Novaes 2017, Dutilh Novaes forthcoming, Lutz forthcoming). All along, of course, Vienna Circle philosophies also continue to serve as foils for alternative and self-consciously post-positivist programs, fruitfully so when informed by the results of recent scholarship (e.g. Ebbs 2017).