  Unlike  (G*1) ,  Goldman’s revised view requires the first act to be a fully specific simultaneous act-set. Moreover, the kind of act-set that should be directly assessed is a maximal sequence. S has the ability at \(t_1\) to perform X only if S has the ability at \(t_1\) to immediately (at \(t_1)\) perform the first fully specific simultaneous act-set in \(X.\) Goldman’s (1978: 201) notion of a maximal sequence is different from the possibilist’s aforementioned notion of a maximal act-set which extends to the end of one’s life. For, according to Goldman (1978: 193–195), at t an agent can perform an act-set over time if and only if, if at t the agent wanted to perform this act-set, then the agent would do so over time. This implies that the performable act-set over time must be such that the agent can, at t, form an intention to perform this act-set over time that would be causally efficacious if the intention were formed. Goldman’s notion of a maximal sequence is thus more restricted. That is, a maximal sequence X is an act-set available to an agent at t is such that, at t, the agent can form an intention to perform X, and no other act-set that at t the agent can intend to perform is a proper part of X. So, henceforth, we will refer to Goldman’s notion of a maximal sequence as an intentionally maximal act-set, and this is to be distinguished from a maximal act-set.