 Some prominent advocates of extended cognitive states or processes have been skeptical of the idea that consciousness could be extended, often on the grounds that external structures do not possess the kind of informational bandwidth necessary to sustain conscious experience (Clark 2009, Chalmers 2019). Others are more sanguine about this possibility, and extended accounts of experiences (Rowlands 2010) and other conscious states, such as emotions (Krueger 2014; Krueger &amp; Szanto 2016; Carter et al. 2016) have been defended. At the same time, and relatedly, there has been an expansion in the types of external structures thought relevant. In particular, there has been a pronounced social turn in extended mind in recent years, exploring the ways in which social structures and institutions might also, in part, be constitutive of constitute mental processes (De Jaegher et al. 2010, Gallagher 2013, Lyre 2018, and Slors 2019), and the idea that our basic biological cognitive faculties may be transformed by a process of enculturation (Menary 2015) has helped reshape extended mind in recent years. One important example of this social turn pertains to the study of memory, in particular, in the way in which memory is often transactive—involving the combined efforts of two or more people, bonded together as a coupled system (Barnier et al  2008; Sutton 2008, 2010, 2015).