 To some, it would appear to be an obvious fact that individuals are able to understand others, in their being and essence, both as alike and other than themselves. From a phenomenological standpoint, however, this fact is a problem which is neither obvious nor easy to explain, and it is a problem whose solution was viewed differently by both Ortega and Husserl. For Husserl, the solution to this problem was found in his notion of Einfühlung (“empathy”, or literally, “feeling oneself into another”). Husserl’s concept of the Einfühlung in Lebenswelt resembles David Hume’s idea of “sympathy”, and its philosophical function (as a propensity “to sympathize with others”, and as a “transcendental theory of experiencing someone else”) was intended to establish, as thoroughly as possible, a way of presenting the “other” to us. (see Hume 1739 [1985: 367–69]). Ortega renounced the supposition inherent in this solution to the problem because the notion of Einfühlung assumes the “other” is “analogous” to my “I”; the concept assumes that it is a double of my “I” and still fails to serve the function of explaining the most difficult question—namely, how is it possible that this “double” of myself continues to appear to me as constituting the other? The main thrust of Ortega’s argument is directed against Husserl’s formulation, in Cartesian Meditations, of the alter ego as “an analogue” of the ego. The solution of “an analogical transposition or projection”, therefore proved inadequate for Ortega, and the notion of the “appearance of the Other” became the problem to which he extended his existential-phenomenological position of being-for-itself and being-for-and-with-others. In order to clarify somewhat the problem, Ortega replaced Husserl’s notion of “in [my] every intentionality” with his own idea of “my life as radical reality” (see especially Husserl 1933 [1964: 89–100, 104–11]; ZPI: vol. 14, 3–11, 429–33; vol. 15, 40–50; see also, Scheler 1923 [1954: 6–50]; Obras, VII: 161–63). As the individual is never a wordless “I”—for, as radical reality his life is being-in-the-world—also one is never an isolated (Other-less) “I”. For Ortega, this manifestation of “radical realty” constitutes the fundamental feature of being-for-and-with-others and consequently cannot be explained as an isolated “I” that somehow discovers a way of confronting another equally isolated “I”. An individual does not have to find his or her way to another individual for, with the disclosure of one’s own being as being-for-and-with-others, the being of other “I’s” becomes disclosed to one as possessing this identical feature: