More generally, the theory of legal interpretation may take into account goals other than accurately identifying a provision’s contribution. For example, it is often suggested that courts should adhere to the plain meaning of a provision in order to provide an incentive for good drafting. Improving the drafting of statutory and other provisions may in the long run help legal interpreters to identify provisions’ contributions accurately as well as providing other benefits. In the short run, however, the goal of improving the drafting of legal texts may conflict with the goal of accurately identifying a provision’s contribution. There is an important question to what extent it is appropriate for legal interpretation to pursue the former goal at the expense of the latter. To take a very different kind of example, there may be moral reasons why some kinds of mistakes are worse than others (or why mistakes by certain decision-makers are worse than mistakes by others). Such reasons may support following methods that would minimize the more problematic kinds of mistakes at the expense of overall accuracy.