According to the most developed proposal, because the legislature has a standing secondary intention “to stand ready to change the law when there is good reason to do so,” which all legislators share, when the legislature enacts a bill, the legislature has a primary legal intention whose content is the content of the bill, regardless of the intentions of individual legislators (Ekins and Goldsworthy 2014, 65; Ekins 2012, 56–58, 224). The proposal faces an uphill battle to establish the psychological reality of its central claim. The proposal runs into further difficulty by explicating the “content of the bill” as what the speaker intended to communicate (which may go well beyond the literal meaning of the text) (Ekins 2012, chap. 7; Ekins and Goldsworthy 2014, 66–67).[18] The proposal therefore seems to address worries about the existence of collective legislative intentions by appealing to a collective legislative intention. In addition, in the case of contemporary legislation, it is typical that a form of words is chosen as a compromise in order to enable a bill to pass without agreement on what that form of words is to communicate (or what legal norm it is to create). See section 4.2. So it is question begging to assume the existence of the crucial communicative intention that is supposed to constitute the content of the text and, in turn, the legislature’s primary intention. When the verbal formulation constitutes the compromise, it is of no help to say that “the nature of [legislators’] compromise may be discernible from the text and publicly available contextual and purposive evidence” (Ekins and Goldsworthy 2014, 66).