 One difficulty, however, remains with the Ramsey view. It concerns the representation of deductive reasoning, for many logicians the primary objective of logic. Now, Ramsey ([1929] 1931: 232) thinks that the ‘incompleteness’ of theoretical assertions does not affect our reasoning. No formal account, however, is given that relates our deductive practice, in which abundant use of theoretical terms is made, to the existentially quantified variables in the Ramsey sentence. We lack a translation of theoretical sentences (other than the axioms) that is in keeping with the view that the meaning of a theoretical sentence \(\phi\) is the difference between \((\TC \wedge A \wedge \phi)^R\) and \((\TC \wedge A)^R\). As Ramsey observes, it would not be correct to take \((\TC \wedge A \wedge \phi)^R\) as translation of a theoretical sentence \(\phi\) since both \((\TC \wedge A \wedge \phi)^R\) and \((\TC \wedge A \wedge \neg \phi)^R\) may well be true. Such a translation would not obey the laws of classical logic. These laws, however, are supposed to govern deductive reasoning in science. A proper semantics of theoretical terms should take the semantic peculiarities of these terms into account without revising the rules of deductive reasoning in classical logic.