 This is a puzzle about the very notion of mind-dependence. One solution would be Shafer-Landau’s (2003: 15): he suggests that mind-dependence is ultimately a matter of how “the moral standards that fix the moral facts” are “made true”. We could parlay this into a general account of the mind-dependence of normative facts in the following way: a particular normative fact is mind-dependent when the normative principle that governs its grounding in the non-normative is mind-dependent. And a principle is mind-dependent when it is grounded in mental facts. This solution allows mundane first-order claims to make no commitment on the issue of mind-dependence. The important question regarding the mind-dependence of a particular normative fact will be what explains or grounds the connection between, for example, causing unhappiness and being wrong. For example, is the principle of utility only true because I believe it or because of some other mental fact? If so, the principle is mind-dependent, and this mind-dependence is inherited by the fact that my act is wrong.