 Of the opposing geometrical approach to spacetime, Brown and Pooley (2006, p. 84) question the mechanism by which autonomous spacetime structure is supposed to explain or constrain the behaviour of material bodies. Although we will keep our attention focussed on the dynamical view in this subsection, rather than upon its opponents (see the following subsection for more on the explanatory capacities of spacetime), one might, however, ask at this point: does the dynamical view really do better in this regard? How is it that dynamical symmetries are supposed to explain, or account for, spacetime structure? In the context of theories with fixed spacetime structure, this question is answered by proponents of the dynamical view via an ontological reduction of spatiotemporal structure to symmetries of dynamical equations governing matter fields, as indicated in (1) above. (In fact, this ‘reduction’ is better described as a form of elimination, as we will see.) But this, in turn, invites yet more questions: how, metaphysically, is this ontological reduction operating? Can one in fact state dynamical laws, or understand them as “holding” or “governing”, without presupposing facts about spacetime structure?