 The privacy concerns defeat any prima facie right. A legal moralist position must attend closely to what is known about the potential effects on privacy of the criminal law. Such a view would find pertinent Lawrence Tribe’s suggestion as to what the question should be in Bowers v Hardwick—that is: not the question of what Hardwick “was doing in the privacy of his bedroom, but what the State of Georgia was doing there” (quoted in Suk 2009a:  689).[4]  More recently Jeannie Suk has explored the relationship between the criminal law and the value of privacy and intimate relationships. Though not writing from any self-declared legal moralist perspective the ideas illustrate the kind of balanced exploration that the legal moralist seeks. The criminal law in many jurisdictions—Suk’s focus is largely on New York County—showed, historically, a reluctance to enter the intimate space of the home at the heavy cost of enabling domestic abuse against women. This has been replaced in many jurisdictions, such as New York County, by the criminalization in various guises of domestic abuse. An improvement to be sure. However, Suk points to some complex resulting tensions “between protecting women from intimate violence” and respecting their “self-determination” (Suk 2009a: 690). Certain criminal law techniques, such as protection orders that seek the end of an intimate relationship can amount, she claims, to “state-imposed de facto divorce” (Suk 2009a: 685; 2009b) and to various contexts in which “the particular desires of individual women” do not “control” a particular area of their intimate lives (Suk 2009a: 690). Suk’s aim is not to deny that the criminal law should be used to criminalize and enforce specific laws against domestic abuse; the wrong (and harm) of domestic abuse remains a ground for such intervention. It is rather to focus on the delicate balances implied by legal enforcement of such wrongdoing against the value of privacy, intimacy, and self-determination and to evaluate certain specific legal techniques in the light of such a focus. It has led to numerous responses (see Suk 2009a, which contains reactions from eight commentators; on domestic abuse see also Friedman 2003, Dempsey 2009).