 Are these latter motives best described as having a causal influence on behavior? Perhaps they are, according to a more relaxed understanding of causality than that with which Reid officially works. For suppose we agree that there are processes that are instigated by the exercise of active power, such as the process that is instigated by an agent’s willing to raise her arm. In Reid’s view, this process includes the exercise of active power, which is the agent’s willing to raise her arm, the activity of nerves and muscles and, finally, the raising of her arm. If we allow ourselves to talk of elements of this process as causes in a “lax and popular sense,” then perhaps some motives, in Reid’s view, could be called causes. Of course Reid would have to say that in some cases the motives that “cause” us to act are not part of a causal process that we ourselves instigate. Not every desire or mental state we have is the causal consequence of the exercise of our active power in a given way. (That I desire to eat an ice cream cone, for example, appears to be a causal consequence not of the exercise of my active power but of your handing me an ice cream cone.) Reid would have to say, then, that those mental states and events that are not simply the causal consequence of the exercise of active power are parts of processes instigated by some other agent cause, such as God. This may seem odd. But it seems to be the broader picture within which Reid operated. All causal processes in nature (which are not due to us) are instigated by the exercise of God’s active power. A typical case of human action involves the coincidence of the exercise of our active power with God’s (see EAP I.vi and Cuneo 2011a).