 Negative experimental moral philosophy generates results that are then used to discount the evidential value of appeals to intuition (for review, Machery 2017, Chapter 2). For example, Singer (2005), Sinnott-Armstrong (2008d), Lanteri and colleagues (2008), Lombrozo (2009), Schwitzgebel and Cushman (2012, 2015), Liao and colleagues (2012), Tobia and colleagues (2013), Wiegmann and colleagues (2020), Rehren and Walter (2021), and McDonald et al. (2021) have argued that moral intuitions are subject to normatively irrelevant situational influences (e.g., order or framing effects), while Feltz and Cokely (2009) and Knobe (2011) have documented correlations between moral intuitions and (presumably) normatively irrelevant individual differences (e.g., extroversion). Such results might warrant skepticism about moral intuitions, or at least about some classes of intuitions or  intuiters.[1]