 In the literature, the standard view is that assertions and promises generate commitments of different kinds, so that they belong to different families (e.g., Searle 1969, 1979). The relation between asserting and promising is discussed in detail in Watson (2004), who introduces a distinction between primary and secondary commitments. Assertions and promises differ in the primary commitments that they generate. When you promise to φ, your primary commitment is to (intend to) act so as to make φ happen. By contrast, when you assert that p, your primary commitment is to facts that are independent of your actions: namely, for Watson, the defensibility of p (Watson 2004: 68). Furthermore, both assertions and promises also involve a secondary commitment to act in certain ways “if one is queried or if things go wrong” (2004: 67). The speaker’s commitment to defend the assertion if challenged is on this view a secondary commitment, that follows from the primary one (2004: 70).