  Kaplan sometimes argues for his theory by appealing to intuitions about what is said. For instance, Kaplan claims that if John utters ‘I am hungry’ and Mary utters ‘I am hungry’ then what they say is different, whereas if John utters ‘I am hungry’ and Mary utters ‘You are hungry’ while addressing John, then what they say is the same. David Lewis (1980) says that Kaplan’s appeals to judgments about what is said are unpersuasive. Lewis also maintains that Kaplan fails to justify his claim that Kaplanian contents have a distinctive role to play in semantics. Lewis (1980) claims that the primary task of semantics is to describe how semantic values of sentences determine truth-values at contexts and circumstances of evaluation, the latter of which Lewis calls ‘indices’. Lewis holds that this can be done in (at least) two equally good ways. First, we can (like Kaplan) allow the semantic value of a sentence to vary from context to context, and design these varying semantic values so that they determine truth-values with respect to indices. Second, we can instead once-and-for-all assign to a sentence a single semantic value that determines a truth-value given both a context and an index. On views of this latter sort, semantic values are functions from pairs of contexts and indices to truth-values. Lewis claims that there is no theoretical reason to prefer one sort of theory over the other.