 Jackson and Pargetter (1986: 244–245) maintain that there are different sets of options out of which different obligations arise. For instance, from the set of all \(t_1\)–\(t_3\) act-sets available to Jones at \(t_1\), the option with the highest value consists of the act-set that includes ⟨Jones’s voting for the language requirement⟩ at \(t_3\). Therefore, out of the \(t_1\)–\(t_3\) act-set, at \(t_1\) Jones is obligated to ⟨go to the office, then go to the faculty meeting, and then vote for the language requirement⟩. This is because what would happen if this act-set were to occur is better than what would happen if some other \(t_1\)–\(t_3\) act-set were to occur. But on the other hand, from the set of immediately performable acts available to Jones at \(t_1\), the option with the highest value consists of Jones’ ⟨staying home⟩ because what would happen if Jones were to ⟨stay home⟩ is better than what would happen if Jones were to ⟨go to the office⟩. Therefore, out of the performable \(t_1\) acts, at \(t_1\) Jones is obligated to ⟨stay home⟩. Like  (G),  Jackson and Pargetter’s view does not assess an act’s deontic status in the procedural manner with which Goldman’s  (G*1)  or Sobel’s  (S)  assesses an act’s deontic status. Moreover, like (G), Jackson and Pargetter’s view implies the possibility of obligations that cannot be jointly fulfilled. We will henceforth refer to their view as contextualist actualism because what an agent is obligated to do depends on the set of options being considered within a certain context.