 That said, not everyone grants the claimed asymmetry. Both PAP and PAP-omissions should fall together (Frankfurt 1994; Glannon 1995; Fischer &amp; Ravizza 1998: ch. 5; or stand together: Swenson 2016). Consider one final FSC, this time bringing the omission inside to the “locus of responsibility”: a choice (or in this case, the lack of one). Luke the indifferent lifeguard fails to save the swimmer, and indeed fails even to try, for reasons entirely his own: he’s lazy and indifferent. But now add that unbeknownst to Luke, had he even considered saving the swimmer, he would have been paralyzed by an overwhelming fear, compelling him to remain inactive, not even choosing or trying to save the swimmer. Here there is no overdetermination, for the fear and the underlying pathology remain dormant in the actual scenario: the only causal factors relevant to the omission are Luke’s own cognitive states and values, which appear to exert a kind of responsibility-relevant control over his failure. This looks like a genuine FSC, and, if so, a counterexample to PAP-omissions. (For more on the considerable complexities involved with PAP-omissions, see McIntyre 1994; Sartorio 2005; Clarke 2014; Fischer 2017.)