 The most developed and sophisticated interest-based account of group rights has come from Dwight Newman. For Newman (2011, Part I) groups that constitute right-bearing “collectivities” can range from corporations and churches to cultural groups and hockey teams. A collectivity is distinguished by the central values to which it is committed and by a structure which defines its membership and marks it off from other groups. Its members are essential to its existence, but the collectivity is no mere aggregation of its members. Rather, it supervenes on its members. It supervenes on their existence but also on their relationships with one another and their beliefs about those relationships. Supervenience does not imply reducibility; neither the existence of the collectivity, nor its actions or intentions, can be reduced to those of its individual members. For Newman a collectivity has moral status as a collectivity. It can therefore bear moral rights and moral responsibilities as a collectivity. It can also have interests, which are other than the aggregated interests of its members; those interests will lie in whatever makes the collectivity’s life go better as a collectivity. In conformity with Raz’s conception of rights, a group’s interests will generate rights whenever they are of sufficient importance to justify the ascription of duties to others.