 Popper saw clearly that the concept of truthlikeness should not be confused with the concept of epistemic probability, and that it has often been so confused. (See Popper 1963 for a history of the confusion and the supplement  Why truthlikeness is not probability or vagueness  for an explanation of the difference between the two concepts.) Popper’s insight here was facilitated by his deep but largely unjustified antipathy to epistemic probability. He thought that his starkly falsificationist account favored bold, contentful theories. Degree of informative content varies inversely with probability – the greater the content the less likely a theory is to be true. So if you are after theories which seem, on the evidence, to be true, then you will eschew those which make bold – that is, highly improbable – predictions. On this picture, the quest for theories with high probability is simply misguided.