 Among a number of authors associated with the disability rights movement however, a different claim is made. For, such authors suggest that not only can there be no moral obligation to select against disability, parental preferences to screen out disabled donors are morally problematic for two reasons. The first regards the messages that such preferences send about and towards persons living with disabilities, ones which may be seen as discriminatory and offensive: “express[ing] a hurtful attitude about and a hurtful message to people who live with [disabilities]” (Parens &amp; Asch 1999: S2). The second is that the desire to select against disabling genetic traits is based on misinformation regarding both the severity and true nature of disability. In terms of severity, for example, it has been widely reported that persons with disabilities tend to report good quality of life despite the fact that most (non-disabled) observers suggest the opposite (for work on the disability paradox see Albrecht &amp; Devlieger 1999). Regarding the true nature of disability, it is claimed that contrary to the views of many, who hold that disability is inherently disadvantageous, many (and, for those who take an extreme approach, all) of the harms associated with disability are socially constructed. That is, they are often not the result of failures in functioning but society’s failing to account for everyone when designing physical, economic, and social institutions (Glackin 2010). Thus, it is suggested that as disability is often not a feature intrinsic to those who suffer it, to attempt to prevent disability by preventing the existence of persons with disabilities is very much akin to attempts to prevent sexism or racism by preventing the births of black people and women: an inappropriate response to a social problem (Asch 2003).