 One philosophical concern about the theory of major transitions is that the original list was something of a mixed bag (McShea &amp; Simpson 2011). For example, some of the transitions, like the evolution of eukaryotes and the evolution of multicellularity, seem to involve jumps in part/whole complexity. But others, like the evolution of sexual reproduction, do not. So it is not clear at all that these are transitions of the same kind. Indeed, Maynard Smith and Szathmáry suggest that the transitions have three features: (1) changes in the way that information is stored and transmitted; (2) new division of labor; and (3) individuals that could once reproduce independently can no longer do so after the transition. Criterion (3), in particular, links the issue of major transitions to the larger debate about the nature of biological individuality. One potential problem, though, is that not all the transitions on the original list satisfy all three criteria. For example, the shift from primate societies to human societies clearly involves (1) and (2), but not (3). To complicate things further, Szathmáry (2015) revisits the original list of transitions and proposes some changes.