 Another complicating factor here has to do with how one situates a taxonomy of views with respect to a distinction between sensory or perceptual phenomena on the on hand, and thought or cognition, on the other. Susanna Siegel has argued for the view that so-called “high-level” features, like being a pine tree, are “represented in visual experience”. Tim Bayne (2009) has argued for a position similar to Siegel’s, partly by appeal to consideration of the kind of deficits in visual recognition found in associative agnosia. Such views of visual consciousness contrast with Tye’s and Prinz’s. (See Byrne and Siegel 2017 for an illustration of this debate. And see Connolly 2019 for defense of a relatively low-level view, discussed in connection with research on perceptual recognition and learning.) Yet other alternatives are possible here—one might maintain experience encompasses a greater richness of levels than do Byrne, Tye, or Prinz, though without (like Siegel) putting visual experience in the business of representing objects to have high-level properties. One might argue for the experiential reality of spatial object constancy, and of visual recognition of kinds, without committing to Siegel’s version of representationalism: something might subjectively and irreducibly look recognizable to you as a pine tree or a glove, for example—but this isn’t necessarily to say that your visual experience (like your thought) correctly or incorrectly represents it to have a property that would be missing in a genetically different plant, or in a differently purposed artifact (Siewert 2013a, 2015, 2019). The issues raised here turn partly on what sort of description of experience yields the best understanding of visual recognition in the light of what is made evident by Gestalt phenomena and selective deficits in vision, and they seem to call for careful interpretation of relevant experimental work (see Block 2014).