  Some find criminal law’s general justification in value that is neither relational nor essentially public. Consider the prevention of harm, or the prevention of moral wrongdoing. A number of writers appeal to one or both values to justify the existence of criminal law (Feinberg 1987, 146–155; Alexander and Ferzan 2009, 17; Simester and von Hirsch 2011, 29–30). Because there are wrongless harms (think of sporting injures caused without foul play) and harmless wrongs (think of botched conspiracies or undiscovered attempts) the aforementioned values do not always wax and wane together. One possibility is that criminal law’s concern with wrongs is derivative of its concern with harms: criminal law should prevent wrongs (e.g., conspiracy to injure) when and because harm is thereby prevented (e.g., injury itself). Another possibility is that criminal law’s concern with harms is derivative of its concern with wrongs: criminal law should prevent harms (e.g., physical injury) when and because those harms are wrongfully caused (e.g., by assault) (Feinberg 1987, 151–155; Moore 1997, 647–649). A third possibility is that harms and wrongs provide two independent sources of general justification (compare Tadros 2016, 162–166). Whatever the answer, this preventive value is impersonal in two ways: it is not grounded in any special relationship; and it is value that might in principle be realised by any of us.