 Martin argues that the naïve realist disjunctivist should deny that it is possible to give a positive, non-derivative account of the kind of phenomenal event that occurs when one hallucinates. (This is to oppose the suggestion made in Dancy 1995. See Martin 1997, 2004 and 2006. For discussion see Nudds 2009.). For if the naïve realist does offer a positive, non-derivative account of the kind phenomenal event that occurs when one hallucinates, and she also accepts that this kind of event also occurs when one perceives the world, then she will be under pressure to explain why the occurrence of this kind of event doesn’t screen off the explanatory role that she assigns to her naïve realist account of the phenomenal character of genuine perception. (For critical discussion of this objection, see Hellie 2013). Martin’s response to the argument is to say that the naïve realist should affirm that in the case of a causally matching hallucination, there is no more to the phenomenal character of such an experience than that of being introspectively indiscriminible from a certain genuine perception. In the case of the causally matching hallucination its subjective character is exhausted by its possession of the negative epistemic property—that of being introspectively indiscriminible from a veridical perception.