 Though it seems clear in this case that some reconsideration of the first-order matter is required, it is not immediately clear how strong the authority of the second-order might be compared to the first order in coming to an updated belief about the diagnosis, and there are clear cases where the second order should not prevail. If someone tells me I have unwittingly ingested a hallucinogenic drug, then that imposes some prima facie demand for further thought on my part, but if I know the person is a practical joker and he has a smirk on his face, then it seems permissible not to reconsider my first-order beliefs. There are also cases where it is not obvious which order should prevail. Suppose I’m confident that the murderer is #3 in the line-up because I witnessed the murder at close range. Then I learn of the empirical literature saying that eyewitnesses are generally overconfident, especially when they witnessed the event in a state of stress (Roush 2009: 252–3). It seems I should doubt my identification, but how can it be justified to throw out my first-order evidence that came from directly seeing that person, in person and close up? An adjudication of some sort between the first order and the higher order is required, but it is not obvious what the general rules might be for determining the outcome of the conflict, or what exactly would justify them.