 Unlike  Best Option,  this idea is undoubtedly unique to act-consequentialism, but some argue that it isn’t compelling—or, at least, not uncontroversially so (see Hurley 2017). After all, many find it intuitive to think that certain types of acts (e.g., breaking a promise) are wrong even if they bring about the best outcome. For instance, deontologists believe that there are agent-centered restrictions that prohibit you from performing certain act-types even in some situations in which your performing an instance of one of these act-types would prevent two or more others from each performing a morally comparable instance of this act-type (see Scheffler 1985: 409). So, as we saw above, even if there’s something intrinsically bad about acts of this type, the outcome in which you perform an instance of this act-type would, other things being equal, have to be better than the outcome in which two or more others each perform a morally comparable instance of this act-type. So, if the Compelling Idea is to be genuinely compelling even to those who endorse agent-centered restrictions, it better not appeal to the best outcome. For the best outcome is the outcome with the most good, the good being what’s desirable from a universal point of view rather than what’s desirable from the agent’s point of view. And this has led some earnest consequentializers to appeal instead to the following.