 If minds do travel, and Cavendish supposes that they do, then they are material. Cavendish indeed supposes that minds partake of all kinds of  motion.[13]  She holds that the “rational” parts of the mind “move freely without Burdens” (Cavendish 1668b, 5) – for example, when the mind quickly assembles an image of an entity. Ideas are extremely active in their motions, according to Cavendish, and she supposes that only material things move. Note however that in holding that ideas move, she does not want to say that they move from place to place. That is because strictly speaking Cavendish does not hold that there is such a thing as place or location that bodies inhabit. Instead, a body and its place are identical (Cavendish 1668a, 4). For Cavendish, what it means to say that a body moves will be a function of its mereological relations to the bodies that surround it (Peterman 2019).