 Nevertheless, the influence of Cook Wilson’s conceptions was felt in a variety of ways in the second half of the last century. H. H. Price offered in Belief an important commentary on Cook Wilson’s notion of ‘being under the impression that’ (Price (1969, 204–220), reprising some of the content of Price (1935)). He deemed it an important addition to the traditional ‘occurrence’ analysis of belief, as opposed to the ‘dispositional’ analysis. Price usefully contrasted ‘being under the impression that’ with ‘assent’ (Price 1969, 211–212), which is usually said to involve preference and confidence: in prefering p one would decide in favour of p having alternatives q and r in mind, but this is precisely not the case when ‘being under the impression that’, since in this state one does not entertain alternatives. As Cook Wilson points out, “there is a certain passivity and helplessness” involved (SI, 113). There is no confidence either, since in this state of mind doubt is not an option, hence no degree of certainty is involved. Price also explored (1969, 212–216) connections between this unquestioning state of mind and the notion of ‘primitive credulity’ (Bain 1888, 511), i.e., the idea harking back to Spinoza (Ethics IIp49s) that one naturally believes in the reality of anything that is presented to one’s mind, unless some contradicting evidence is also occurring.