  One objection Norris raises concerns how the infinite can represent the finite. His answer again relies upon the thought of Suarez, whom Norris reread carefully before writing his Theories I and II. Suarez had distinguished two ways of being finite. An item can be finite according to its “esse formale” or its “esse reale” (300). If a thing is positively finite, it is limited in such a way that can never be infinite. If a thing is negatively finite, it is finite “though there be no repugnance in its having it [infinitude] from elsewhere” (301–302, brackets added). A divine idea, according to its esse formale is negatively finite whereas according to its esse reale is infinite. Norris believes “Ideas are really Identical with the Divine Nature, and so partake of the same real Infinity and Incomprehensibility that essentially belongs to it” (302). If each idea is identical to God, then each idea is really infinite, and negatively finite. A further consequence is that an idea can be called both infinite and finite without contradiction. Norris also notes there is no multiplication of infinities in God on his view. Here Norris diverges from Malebranche's view as stated in the second dialogue of Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion that God is “infinitely infinite,” which strikes the reader as comparable to Spinoza's infinite attributes.