 Lambert of Auxerre (tr. Maloney, p. 290) speaks explicitly of relation as a property of terms, but most authors describe the phenomenon as the supposition of relatives. The relation in question is that between anaphoric terms and their antecedents. Most treatises consist of a repetition of a standard taxonomy: there are relatives of substance and relatives of accident, relatives of identity and relatives of diversity. For example, relatives of substance and of identity are ‘who’, ‘he’, ‘his’, and among these, reciprocal relatives such as ‘himself’; of diversity are ‘another’ and ‘someone else’. The latter are said to refer back (referre, past participle relatum) to their antecedent but to supposit for something different, as in, e.g., ‘Socrates is running and someone else is debating’. Relatives of accident include, first, those of identity, ‘such as’, ‘like’, ‘when’, and those of diversity, ‘in another way’, ‘other’; in, say, ‘Socrates is running and Plato is other’, ‘other’ refers back to ‘running’; in what way it differs will depend on the author's account of predicates.