 A related but distinct concern is that the fictionalist draws a distinction without a difference: there is no real difference between belief and the supposedly distinct attitude that the fictionalist posits. (For discussion, see Daly (2008), Horwich (1991), O’Leary-Hawthorne (1994), Rosen (forthcoming), Rosen and Burgess (2005), and Thomasson (2013.) As just stated, the objection may sound like an obvious non-starter: of course there is a difference between belief and whatever attitude it is that we take toward fiction. But there are some reasons to still take the objection seriously. First, as discussed above, fictionalists do often appeal to a different attitude from the one we adopt toward paradigmatic cases of fiction, and for that reason alone one cannot move straight from the obvious possibility of engaging in fiction to the possibility of us doing what the philosophical fictionalist says we do, or should do. Second, characteristic of fiction is that we often do abandon the perspective internal to the fiction and instead adopt an external, critical perspective. Nothing similar seems to standardly be going on with, say, mathematical discourse or moral discourse. However, these points noted, it is still natural for the fictionalist to shrug off this concern, saying with Rosen (forthcoming) that the question of whether someone who is generally disposed to behave as if p really believes that p can be settled by what the person is disposed to say upon reflection regarding whether she believes that p or not.