 Fortunately, we already have the materials at hand to see how this could go. Back in  Section 2.7,  we distinguished the attribution of a name to someone (previously identified) from the act of referring to someone with a name. It would be quite natural to interpret a metalinguistic predicate as applying to someone on the basis of a pattern of attributions of a name, rather than on that of reference to them using that name. Indeed, the ordinary sense of “calling someone Alice” is a reasonable gloss of the technical notion of attributing the name Alice to them (Evans in fact employs this terminology—see his 1982: 383). So, for instance, I could not have mistakenly called someone Alice without identifying them independently, and people I refer to with a name but can’t identify independently—for instance people whose names I am reading off a roll—have not, intuitively speaking, been called that name by me.