 Before continuing the examination of Kilwardby’s theory of the human soul, some terminological remarks are in order: Kilwardby uses the term potentiae mostly to refer to the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective souls. There are some exceptions, where he uses formae and even formae substantiales, but the rule is potentiae. For the most part, I leave the term ‘potentia’ un-translated because the options are problematic: ‘power’ should be used to translate ‘virtus’ in the sense of ‘faculty’ (for example, memory is a power of the soul); ‘potency’ should be avoided in order not to confuse it with potentiality, as in active potency; ‘soul’ is misleading because most (if not all) pluralists claimed that there is only one soul in any individual human being—the disagreement between them and unitarians is about whether there is one or many potentiae in a individual human soul rather than whether there is one or many souls in a individual human being; ‘form’ is a too general term—however, for the sake of simplicity I sometimes shall use it, namely in the context of the debate over unicity versus the plurality of substantial forms as that is the traditional designation of the debate. I thoroughly use the term ‘unicity’ to refer to the view according to which the soul is simple, being only one form. Unity is often used in scholarship, but I find it problematic because pluralists—such as Kilwardby—also argue for the unity of the soul, as said above, only disagreeing about its simple (versus composite) nature. Finally, I use ‘intellective’ soul/form (potentia intellectiva) to refer to the specifically human part of the soul; the rational soul (anima rationalis) refers to the whole human soul—which includes the vegetative and sensitive forms. Kilwardby adopts this distinction for the most part, but there are passages—especially in E 5 and QLIIS 8—where he uses rational (rationalis) and intellective (intellectiva) interchangeably.