 In this essay, we discuss a number of central normativist theses, and we begin by identifying different versions of meaning normativism, presenting the arguments that have been put forth for and against them. We then continue by discussing content normativism, providing an overview of the contemporary debate. Both debates are very much on-going and at this point there is little consensus as to whether normativism holds for either meaning or content. Since the first publication of this essay much of the debate has focused on two of its central issues: First, it has been debated whether meaning normativism can be derived from the fact that meaningful expressions necessarily have correctness conditions. This is the argument we labeled the “the simple argument” and in section 2.1.1 we discuss contributions to the debate. Second, the nature of rule-guidance has been much discussed, in particular relating to content normativism, and new proposals have been made as to how it is to be understood. We discuss this in sections 2.2 and 3.2. Finally, the debate surrounding normativity has also evolved into a discussion about the normativity of rationality and around the question of whether or not logic sets the standards for how we ought to reason. Though in this entry we will primarily devote our attention to the meaning and content, we will also make reference to related issues concerning the normativity of rationality (but for more on this specific topic see entry here [insert link]).