 More precisely, in Spinoza’s view, in every encounter with another thing, not matter how confused my ideas of both my own body and the external body (3.2.2), I also form necessarily adequate ideas of any properties that are both 1) “common” to the interacting bodies and 2) “equally in the part and in the whole” (E2p38). That is, I form necessarily adequate ideas of any properties wholly and without distinction present in each particular thing. For example, the property of being extended is one such property: extension is extension is extension, whether it belongs to me or to a mosquito biting me; I am neither more nor less of a physical thing than a mosquito is. Likewise, every body possesses the property of having a capacity for “motion and rest” (“all bodies agree…in that they can move now more slowly, now more quickly, and that now they move, now they are at rest” [E2Ld]). For Spinoza, all such properties that are both universally instantiated (“common” to all things) and non scalar (“equally in the part and in the whole”) are necessarily grasped correctly by any mind. And all ideas of such properties – all “common notions” – are necessarily adequate.