  Hinton (1967 and 1973) develops his disjunctivist view by focusing on the kinds of reports we make about an experience we are undergoing when we are remaining neutral on the question of whether that experience is a veridical perception, an illusion, or a hallucination. For example, when making a report about one’s experience in this neutral way one might say ‘I seem to see an F’, which can be true whether or not one is actually seeing an F, or one might make a claim about what appears to one to be the case. Hinton thinks that those who accept the common element assumption will hold that these ‘Neutral Experience Reports’ are used to pick out the intrinsic properties of one’s experience, which are manifest to one simply in virtue of having the experience, and which the experience could possess whether or not one actually perceives anything. Hinton’s alternative proposal is that these Neutral Experience Reports are equivalent to disjunctive statements of the form ‘I see an F, or I’m having that illusion’. Hinton labels such disjunctive statements ‘Perception-Illusion disjunctions’. Hinton argues that in order to substantiate their common element assumption, his opponents need to show that our Neutral Experience Reports are not equivalent to these Perception-Illusion disjunctions, and he tries to argue that this is a challenge that his opponents cannot meet.