  Asymmetries in color space pose problems for step 3 of the previous argument. But—especially for those with verificationist sympathies—step 3 is problematic even if these concerns are waived. Why be so sure that the “total adaptation” (semantic adaptation plus amnesia) doesn’t reinvert the qualia? After all, if you imagine being the subject yourself, after the period of amnesia you have no sense that anything is amiss—so perhaps nothing is. Similar doubts can be raised about step 2: suppose you use color terminology exactly as you did before the step 1  inversion—that is, spontaneously on the basis of how things  look—but you seem to recall that your past experiences were radically different. Would you be confident that you hadn’t misremembered your past experiences? (See Dennett 1988; 1991, Ch. 12; 1993; 1994; and Rey 1992.)