 Nāgārjuna argues, however, that there is no such end-point and denies the existence of an ontological foundation (see Westerhoff 2017. For the relation of this idea to the debate about the well-foundedness of grounding in contemporary metaphysics see chapter 3 of Westerhoff 2020). This fact is sometimes used as support of the accusation that Madhyamaka is really a nihilistic doctrine, a doctrine that nothing exists. For if the secondary existent is reduced to the primary, and if there is no primary, what is there left? This interpretation has a relatively long history, beginning in ancient India and continuing to find supporters nowadays (see Spackman 2014, Westerhoff 2016). Nevertheless, there are powerful systematic and historical reasons against it. First of all, it is not clear that this kind of ontological nihilism is in fact a consistent position (if there is nothing, is there not at least the fact that there is nothing, i.e. something? See, however, Westerhoff 2021). Secondly, the Mādhyamikas themselves are very clear that their position avoids both of the extreme views, the view that believes in the existence of svabhāva as well as its nihilistic opposite.