 For Albalag, this deterministic worldview on which al-Ghazali’s account of God’s knowledge of future events dwells follows from a narrow understanding of the cause-effect relationship. Possible things, according to Albalag, are realized by either material or efficient causes, or both. Some of these causes are either volitional or natural. Volitional causes, “hinge solely on the power of the chooser”, which means that effects are not necessary and cannot be predicted. Effects arising from natural causes are necessary, only when the natural causes are necessary, that is, when they maintain a fixed order and cannot be hindered by other accidental or voluntary causes. An example of this is a solar eclipse. Foreknowledge of this event and ones like it are correspondingly necessary with respect to the knower. By contrast, some natural causes, despite having an order, can be impeded by voluntary or accidental causes. In such cases, the effects are not necessary, and hence it is not possible to make certain predictions about their occurrence. 