 In King, Speaks, &amp; Soames [2014] and Soames [forthcoming], Soames amends his theory of proposition in several respects. Two of those changes are the following. First, Soames [2010] had rejected the view that cognitive act types are propositions on the grounds that act type are things that we do, but propositions are not. In King, Speaks, &amp; Soames [2014], Soames makes clear that he no longer finds this argument persuasive and is inclined to identify propositions with cognitive act types. Second, Soames gives a new account represent things as being a certain way. On the new account, propositions represent things as being a certain way in a derivative sense. Just as an act can be intelligent in the derivative sense that in performing it an agent is acting intelligently, the proposition that o is red represents in the derivative sense that in performing that act an agent represents o as being red. 