 The specification of the main theme of phenomenology as intentionality is a result of exercising the “phenomenological reduction” (Husserl 1913: §§30–84). Without entering into the various debates about the possibility, extent, and significance of the reduction—all of which are disputed—the minimal sense of the reduction common to Phenomenologists is the suspension of one’s participation in the belief in the existence of the world (and the objects therein), a belief characteristic of our straightforward, everyday experience of the world. Husserl (1913: §31) also uses the term “bracketing” in speaking of the reduction, and this provides a useful metaphor. Just as absolute two, represented as [2], is the number two without a positive or negative index, the reduced experience—say, [perceiving the table]—is the experience along with its object as meant, as significant for us in a particular manner, without the index of existence or non-existence. Some Phenomenologists (e.g., Scheler 1913/1916) reject the deployment of the reduction because they wish to preserve a strong realism regarding the existence of values, and they believe the reduction commits one to a form of metaphysical idealism.