 On the other hand, some theorists have argued that the source of vulnerability is irrelevant to the exploitative nature of a transaction. Robert Goodin, for instance, argues that exploitation consists in “playing for advantage in situations where it is inappropriate to do so”, and involves a violation of the moral norm of “protecting the vulnerable”. Importantly, Goodin holds that this norm applies “regardless of the particular source of their vulnerability” (Goodin 1987: 187). Thus, whether a worker is economically vulnerable because of a past injustice or whether her vulnerability derives from a normal fluctuation of the business cycle is irrelevant. To use that vulnerability to press one’s own advantage is exploitative. Wertheimer claims that “even in a reasonably just society, people will find themselves in situations in which they can strike an agreement that will produce mutual gain, and some of these cases will give rise to allegations of exploitation” (Wertheimer 1996, 9). Similarly, Nicholas Vrousalis rejects the claim that “\(A\) exploits \(B\) if and only if the exchange in which they are engaged occurs against the background of an unjust distribution”, and he concludes that “asset injustice furnishes no necessary condition for exploitation” (Vrousalis 2013: 148—149). Matt Zwolinski echoes these concerns, arguing that the kinds of background injustice to which Roemer’s conditions appeal is not necessary. Zwolinski claims that, “Offering to rescue an individual who became stranded in the desert because of her own poor planning in exchange for her entire net worth is wrongfully exploitative because of the unfairness of the terms of the transaction, not because of the history or institutional background to that transaction” (Zwolinski 2012, 171) (Vrousalis uses as similar case to motivate his objection). Zwolinski also argues that historical injustice is also not a sufficient condition, for we can imagine cases where parties gain from past injustice without thereby engaging in exploitation. If \(B\)’s home is unjustly burned to the ground by an arsonist, and a contractor \(A\) charges \(B\) a normal market price to rebuild it, then \(A\) has not exploited \(B\), despite the fact that \(A\) has profited from the injustice suffered by \(B\) (Zwolinski 2012: 172).