 As we saw, normative realism is compatible with both normative formalism and normative conceptualism, but it is typically objectualist. In this section, then, we return to normative realism in its objectualist form. In  section 3.1,  we saw that normativity formalism provides an affirmative answer to our guiding question, since it explains normativity by reference to rules or norms or social practices. We set aside normativity formalism because the controversial issue is whether a robust or authoritative normativity can be given a constitutive naturalistic explanation. In  section 3.2  we discussed the explanatory challenge faced by realist theories, and in  section 3.3,  we considered primitivist realist theories, which deny that any constitutive explanation of normativity is possible.  Section 3.4  considered both anti-realist and realist versions of normativity conceptualism. Non-cognitivist expressivism is a kind of normativity conceptualism that offers a naturalistic constitutive explanation of the normativity of normative judgments and concepts. Realist versions of conceptualism would either be primitivist, or they would aim to provide a constitutive explanation of the normativity of normative judgments and concepts. In this section, we turn to objectualist forms of ethical realism and the question whether theories of this kinds are able to answer our guiding question.