 It is clear that Plantinga’s argument does not show what he claims that it shows. Consider, again, the argument: “Either God exists, or 2+2=5. It is not the case that 2+2=5. So God exists.” It is a mistake for a theist to say: “Since the premise is true (and the argument is valid), this argument shows that the conclusion of the argument is true”, just as it is a mistake for a non-theist to say that the argument “Either God does not exist, or 2+2=5. It is not the case that 2+2=5. So God does not exist.” shows that God does not exist. Similarly, it is a mistake for a theist to say: “Since it is rational to accept the premises (and the argument is valid), this argument shows that it is rational to accept the claim that God exists”, just as it is a mistake for the non-theist to say: “Since it is rational to accept the premises of the non-theistic argument (and that argument is valid), the non-theistic argument shows that it is rational to accept the claim that God does not exist”. While there is room for dispute about exactly why all of this is so, it is plausible to say that, in each case, any even minimally rational person who has doubts about the claimed status of the conclusion of the argument will have exactly the same doubts about the claimed status of the premise. If, for example, I doubt that it is rational to accept the claim that God exists, then you can be quite sure that I will doubt that it is rational to accept the claim that either 2+2=5 or God exists. But the very same point can be made about Plantinga’s argument: anyone with even minimal rationality who understands the premise and the conclusion of the argument, and who has doubts about the claim that it is rationally permissible to believe that there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness, will have exactly the same doubts about the claim that it is rationally permissible to believe that there is a possible world in which there is an entity which possesses maximal greatness.