 An alternative option, which is investigated in Marshall 2016a, is to hold that ‘in virtue’ may express a number of different reflexive determination, or entailment, relations in (4), and that each of these relations determines a different notion of intrinsicality. In addition to identity, such entailment relations might include metaphysical necessitation, nomic necessitation, and weak metaphysical grounding, where \(p\) weakly metaphysically grounds \(q\) iff either \(p=q\) or \(p\) metaphysically grounds \(q\). Given these relations determine different notions of intrinsicality for each relation \(R\), we may call the notion of interiority corresponding to \(R\) ‘\(R\) interiority’. So, for example, the notion of intrinsicality obtained from (4) by interpreting ‘in virtue’ as expressing the identity relation might be called identity interiority, while the notion of interiority obtained from metaphysical necessitation might be called metaphysical necessitation interiority, and the notion of interiority obtained from nomic necessitation might be called nomic necessitation interiority. (Marshall uses a different terminology, calling the \(R\) interior properties the possession intrinsic properties.)