 According to de Lauretis, an important reason to turn to Peirce is precisely that his theory returns body and history to the subject of  semiosis.[3]  For Peirce, semiosis is an unlimited process, but that does not mean that it is an infinite regression of signs merely circulating back on themselves. Rather, as de Lauretis explains, in their address to someone—and for Peirce, because they are inherently communal, signs always address someone—signs create other signs that are the “significate effects” of the first signs. Peirce calls these sign-effects “interpretants,” and the particular type of interpretant that interests de Lauretis is the one that Peirce calls “logical” because it takes up or makes sense of the emotion and energy of the other type of interpretants. The logical interpretant is a modification of a person’s habits, “habit” used pragmatically by Peirce to mean a tendency or disposition to a certain manner or style of acting. Thus for Peirce, although unlimited, semiosis nevertheless always results in the temporary “resting places” of one’s habits of acting and thinking—“temporary” because a person’s modified habits will contribute to the production of new signs, which will then feed into the on-going process of meaning-creation that will yet again modify subjects by producing additional habit changes. Thus on Peirce’s account—and this is of utmost importance to de Lauretis—signs have their effect in historical, bodily matter and are not narrowly linguistic.