 The second sort of case involves what are often called “intervening” or “superseding” causes. Suppose the defendant sets explosives next to a prison wall intending to blow the wall and to get certain inmates out. He foresees to a practical certainty that the explosion will kill the guard on the other side of the wall. He lights the fuse to the bomb and leaves. As it happens, the fuse goes out. However, a stranger passes by the wall, sees the bomb, and relights the fuse for the pleasure of seeing an explosion; or, alternatively, lightning hits the fuse, reigniting it and setting off the bomb. When the guard on the other side of the wall is killed by the blast, standard doctrines of intervening causation hold that the defendant did not legally cause the death of the guard. Yet this is hard to square with the result that seemingly should obtain under the harm-within-the-risk test. After all, did not the defendant foresee just the type of harm an instance of which did occur? Because the harm-within-the-risk question asks a simple type-to-token question—was the particular harm that happened an instance of the type of harm whose foresight by the defendant made him culpable—the test is blind to freakishness of causal route (Moore 2009a: ch. 10).