  While primary theorists like Christopher Wellman have not yet published their own replies to the objections that his plebiscitary view lacks a much-needed theory of territory, some developments in the literature on territorial rights might be used in defense of the plebiscitary view (though the way in which they do so is considerably less straightforward than is the case with remedial right only theories). Anna Stilz argues that a state has territorial rights if and only if it protects basic rights and claims of justice and reflects the shared will of the population within that territory (Stilz 2019, p. 90). She calls these the values of basic justice and collective self-determination. Stilz also claims that a state can gain the right to rule over a particular territory that is not already subject to the territorial rights of another entity when it is able and willing to satisfy these values. Wellman could use this combination of basic justice and collective self-determination to claim that a separatist group driven by majority vote that is willing and able to satisfy basic rights and justice for its members can gain rights to the territory it needs to form its own independent state—while denying the original state’s territorial claim at the same time. Whether this appropriation of Stilz’s view works depends on whether the conditions that enable the initial acquisition of territorial rights—the establishment of a valid claim to territory over a region that at the time is not the object of a valid claim by any other entity—are the same as those which establish a claim to territory over which some entity has hitherto held valid territorial rights. One might argue that the conditions for the latter are more demanding than for the former.