 With regard to Nozick’s objection, the response is usually to hold that his example of the neighborhood entertainment system is beside the point (Bell 1978). That is, Nozick is probably right to say that one would have no obligation to operate the system on his or her assigned day, but he is wrong to think that fair play would require one to do so. There is no fair-play obligation in cases such as this, either because the passive receipt of benefits is not enough to show that one is a participant in a cooperative practice (Dagger 1997, pp. 69–70) or because the benefits are “of relatively little value” (Klosko 2004, pp. 38–39:). Responses to Simmons’ objections have taken two directions. One is to say that Simmons has drawn too sharp a distinction between the acceptance and receipt of benefits. Between the person who passively receives the benefits of a cooperative practice and the one who knowingly and willingly accepts them is the person – very many people, in fact – who actively participates in the practice without being fully aware, in the ordinary course of life, that she is undertaking an obligation to do her part in a cooperative practice (Dagger 1997, pp. 73–78; Besson 2005, pp. 487–89). Others respond to Simmons’ criticism by denying that obligations must be incurred voluntarily (Arneson 1982; Klosko 2004, pp. 39–57 ). What matters is not that one accepts the benefits of the practice, according to Klosko’s influential account, but that three conditions are met: “Goods supplied must be (i) worth the recipients’ effort in providing them; (ii) ‘presumptively beneficial’; and (iii) have benefits and burdens that are fairly distributed” ( 2004, p. 39 ). If, in sum, a state qualifies as a cooperative enterprise, and if it provides its members with goods that are presumptively beneficial – or “indispensable for satisfactory lives” (Klosko 2005, p. 6) – then its members have an obligation grounded in fairness to obey its laws.