 In examining the anti-naturalism in ethical theory that was derived from the analysis of language, Hook followed Dewey in stressing the distinction between prizings and appraisals. Thus, in Hook’s view, moral statements, like empirical scientific statements, were to be considered as hypotheses whose truth or falsity would depend upon their confirmation by future experience. Consequently, this naturalistic and empirical interpretation of ethical statements involved Hook in continuing debates with the proponents of competing interpretations of ethical statements, such as C.L. Stevenson. Stevenson had proposed two reasons in justification of his view that moral disagreement was most fundamentally disagreement in attitude and, therefore, differentiated from scientific or empirical disagreement. One reason, according to Stevenson, was that persons could agree about all the facts that were relevant to a moral dispute and yet hold different attitudes on the issue so that they supported different policies. The second reason cited by Stevenson was that a disagreement was considered to be resolved when the persons involved in the dispute converged on an agreement in attitude even if they maintained differing views about the facts. On the other hand, the moral dispute was not resolved if persons who had agreed on the facts continued to disagree in their attitudes about the question at issue.