 Another possible ontological role for states of affairs and facts is to provide the terms for the tie of grounding or explanation. The fact that there is an explosion explains the fact that Sam’s head turns (causal explanation). The fact that Mary slapped Sam is explained by the fact that Sam is a sexist (explanation of action by reference to an “objective” reason; Dancy 2000). The fact that Sam admires Mary is explained by the fact that she is charming (explanation of feeling by reference to an “objective” reason). The fact that there is a one-one correlation between the \(F\)s and the \(G\)s is explained by the fact that the number of \(F\)s = the number of \(G\)s (non-causal, conceptual or essential explanation). Sceptics about such claims ask what “the fact that \(p\) explains the fact that \(q\)” adds to “\(q\) because \(p\)”. (See Correia &amp; Schnieder 2012, Mulligan 2007, Trogdon 2013, and the entry on  metaphysical grounding.)