 Premise (1) follows straightaway from the criterion of ontological commitment that we discussed in the last section. Again, this is widely accepted among contemporary philosophers, and for good reason — if you think that a sentence of the form ‘a is F’ is literally true and that it cannot be paraphrased into some other sentence, then it's hard to see how you can deny that there is such a thing as the object a. Therefore, since (3) follows trivially from (1) and (2), the central question we have to answer, in order to evaluate the above argument, is whether (2) is true. (Below, I will discuss the possibility of denying (1), but for now I want to focus on (2).) In any event, in order to motivate (2), platonists need to provide some examples; that is, they have to produce some sentences and argue that (i) they contain singular terms that can only be taken as referring to abstract objects (and that can't be paraphrased away) and (ii) they are literally true. Platonists maintain that there are many different kinds of such sentences. In what follows, we will consider versions of this argument that attempt to establish the existence of mathematical objects (e.g., numbers), propositions, properties, relations, sentence types, possible worlds, logical objects, and fictional objects.