Alternatively, one could restrict the criterion to true theories. That would still allow the criterion to be used to allocate ontological costs, to say which theories are responsible for which costs. Polemical uses of the criterion would have to be foresworn; but perhaps they are problematic in any case. The primary role for the criterion, however, would have to be given up: its role in providing a foundation for theory choice.  For if the criterion of ontological commitment is to be applied only to true theories, then one would have to determine which theories are true prior to applying the criterion. One might as well have as one's criterion of theory choice: “Choose true theories!” So, the idea of restricting ontological commitment to true theories is a non-starter. Could one instead restrict the criterion to the theories one takes to be true? That wouldn't so much solve the problem of false existentials as merely hide it from view. But, in any case, one would be no better off with respect to theory choice. One would have to determine which theories one takes to be true prior to applying the criterion. And so, again, ontological commitment could not serve as a foundation for theory choice. One might as well have as one's criterion of theory choice: “Choose theories you take to be true!” Restricting the application of the criterion of ontological commitment is not the solution to the problem of false existentials.