 Metaethics addresses second-order questions about morality, including metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic questions (see the entry on  metaethics).  Phenomenological questions about moral experience significantly impact views on these topics. If, for instance, some form of moral experience has as an aspect of its presentational  content[9]  putatively instantiated moral properties (e.g., wrongness) or relations (e.g., fittingness), this would be some evidence in favor of a realist moral  metaphysics.[10]  Also, such experiences would arguably provide an experiential basis for justified moral belief and perhaps moral knowledge. And, if moral experience presents such properties and relations as aspects of their content, this would invite a moral semantics according to which judgments in which a moral property or relation is predicated of some item of moral evaluation are truth-apt. Such issues bear on the question of whether ethics is or can be an “objective” enterprise.