 Thus, his approach to meaning might also be viewed as less austere and partly reductionist. We do not have room to explain the details of Brandom’s intricate view; suffice it to say that, on that view, the proper specification of the use that determines meaning essentially involves normative vocabulary. The facts that determine meaning are facts about the entitlements and commitments that are implicit in the performances of speech acts. Thus, what a speaker means by an utterance is to be understood as consisting, roughly, in the performances that she is committed to in virtue of the utterance as well as in the performances that entitle her to make it. Ultimately, these facts are “products of human activity” (xiv), being a matter of our adopting normative attitudes toward one another--of taking one another to be committed or entitled, in light of our performances, to various other performances. However, although there are similarities, there are also important differences between Brandom’s approach and Ginsborg’s. While for Brandom the norms that are constitutive of meaning are socially instituted, for Ginsborg they are natural. Moreover, the notion of appropriateness that Ginsborg fleshes out is more basic than the notion of reason, and thus more basic than the notions of entitlement and commitment that Brandom takes to be constitutive of meaning (Ginsborg 2011a: 172fn21). Still, Ginsborg does think that “expressions have meanings only in virtue of there being ways in which they ought to be applied” (2012: 132). So, to put it crudely, on both accounts, meaning facts are reduced to facts or considerations about what ought to be the case. The question that the austere non-reductionist will raise is whether the latter kinds of fact are apt to solve the indeterminacy problem, and thus to meet the extensionality condition.