 On the second question, about the epistemological position of the Roman Books, the limited textual evidence has elicited from interpreters three answers: some form of mitigated skepticism, fallibilism, or Platonism. The first answer implies that Philo’s view developed once, from radical to mitigated skepticism, whether prior to (Sedley 1981; Vezzoli 2011; Tarrant 2018) or in the Roman Books (Glucker 1978; Lévy 1992, 2010). According to the second answer, the Roman Books adopted a form of fallibilism. Philo’s innovation in the Roman Books may then be understood either as his first departure from radical skepticism (Hankinson 1995; Thorsrud 2009) or as a second change of view, now from mitigated skepticism (M. Frede 1987; Barnes 1989; Striker 1997; Brittain 2001). The third answer, that the Roman Books advocated a form of Platonism, may similarly presume Philo’s views developed either once, from radical skepticism directly to Platonism (Glidden 1996), or twice, first from radical skepticism to mitigated skepticism and then to Platonism (Tarrant 1985).