 First, if knowledge requires something like justified true belief, \(A\) can believe he gains unfairly from \(B\) and his belief can be true, without \(A\) knowing he gains unfairly if \(A\)’s belief isn’t properly formed, that is, if his belief is unjustified. Suppose \(A\) thinks his transaction with \(B\) is unfair because he mistakenly accepts a false account of transactional fairness. Further, suppose that the true account of transactional fairness—whatever it may be—and the false account both entail that \(A\)’s transaction with \(B\) is unfair. If \(A\) believes the transaction is unfair on the basis of the false account, he lacks justification for this belief and so does not know that the transaction is unfair. If exploitation requires \(A\) to know the transaction is unfair, but \(A\) does not have this knowledge he does not exploit. Yet, intuitively, such cases still seem exploitative—indeed, it still seems appropriate to blame \(A\) for engaging in a transaction he believed was unfair (and that was unfair, albeit for different reasons than those \(A\) thought made it unfair).