  In these cases, as with his argument against the satisfiability of condition [c] of the Stoic definition of the cognitive impression, it seems possible to trace a definite strategy behind Arcesilaus’ arguments: he argued against Zeno’s empiricist presuppositions by deploying Platonic objections and theories (see Schofield 1999, Trabattoni 2005, Vezzoli 2016, and von Staden 1978). One might conclude, as some did in antiquity, that Arcesilaus therefore had a hidden objective of undermining Stoic or Epicurean empiricism in favor of Platonic doctrine (see Sextus Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.234). But Arcesilaus’ method implies that he would argue against Platonic doctrines as well, if anyone proposed them. So if he did hold the view that nothing can be known, it seems more plausible to think that he held it due to the success of his arguments against all conceptions of knowledge, rather than solely as the conclusion of an argument relying on a particular epistemological theory. Cicero’s account, then, may give only a partial story of the grounds of Arcesilaus’ skeptical views.