 What of status roles, i.e. institutional roles, in general? These are the most important for our purposes in this entry. According to Searle (see also Ludwig 2017: Chapter 8), institutions necessarily involve what he calls status-functions, and something has a status-function—as opposed to a mere function—if it has, or those who use it have, deontic properties (institutional rights and duties) and, therefore, deontic powers (Searle 2018). Thus an orthopaedic surgeon has a status-function, and therefore a set of deontic powers, including rights to perform operations and charge people for doing so, and duties not to perform operations he or she is not accredited to perform, e.g. brain surgery. These status-functions, and therefore deontic powers, have been created by collectively accepted constitutive rules (constitutive rules, as we have seen, have for Searle the general form ‘X counts as Y in context C’). Importantly, as we saw above, according to Searle, constitutive rules do not regulate a pre-existing activity; rather the activity is created by, and consists in acting in accordance with, constitutive (and related regulative) rules. Accordingly, institutional roles are of the same general kind as pieces in a game of chess (to use one of Searle’s favourite examples (Searle 2018: 305)) and, therefore, unlike driving a car (which, according to Searle, pre-exists the regulative rules that govern it (Searle 2018: 305)); institutional roles and their defining deontic properties, are institutional facts created by collectively accepted constitutive rules. 