 Even so, evolutionary game theory does invite connections to logic. The evolutionary success of simple strategies like Tit-for-Tat (Axelrod &amp; Hamilton 1981) raises the question of just when complex logically based high-rationality strategies can be replaced by equally efficient alternatives simple enough to be played by automata or similar models of bounded agents, (Grädel, Thomas, &amp; Wilke 2002). At a higher level of abstraction, there also is an incipient line of research into the connection between logic and dynamical systems, a standard tool for analyzing evolutionary games. This strand includes a bimodal topological logic of time (Kremer &amp; Mints 2007), fixed-point logics of oscillation (van Benthem 2015), and a systematic linkage between dynamic-epistemic update logics and dynamical systems over metric spaces (Klein &amp; Rendsvig 2019; 2020). At a much concreter level, one important species of evolutionary games are signaling games (Lewis 2002; Cho &amp; Kreps 1987; Osborne &amp; Rubinstein 1994; Skyrms 2010: van Rooy 2004), where agents send and receive signals about the state of the world. Signaling games match up naturally with the earlier dynamics logic of information flow during play.