 Philo, without giving a precise and irreversible definition of the nature of soul, recommends the radical excision of passions in Leg. 3.129, arguing that no moderation of them could be satisfactory. The model is a medical one of major surgery, which will also be used by Seneca. In the fight against passions, enkrateia (self-control) and karteria (endurance) play a decisive role. However, only the sage can live without any passion in Stoicism, and everyone knows that the Stoic sage is extremely rare in the history of mankind. It was impossible for Philo to admit that a human being could be perfect. However, it is said in Deus 67 that Moses aimed at the disappearance of the passions, but did he succeed in it? There are many similarities between Philo’s attitude towards passions and that of the Stoics, but there is also a fundamental difference. For him it is impossible to become free from passion without divine Grace. That does not mean that one has to become passive and wait for God’s intervention. Enkrateia and karteria are individual qualities that are encouraged by the rules of life included in the laws of Moses. However, even before the Law was given to Moses, faith was the condition sine qua non to escape the process of passion. When Abraham received the order to sacrifice his son, he obeyed without any emotion. “He admitted no swerving of body nor mind” (Abr. 175). His faith was so absolute that at no moment did he try to revolt. But there is yet another difference with Stoicism. In this doctrine, the sage cannot lose his perfection, and he remains always in his apatheia (perfect serenity) even if he has reflex reactions (propatheiai) of which his judgment is not responsible. On the contrary, at the death of Sarah, Abraham avoids the two attitudes considered erroneous by Philo. He did not grieve over-bitterly nor did he assume indifference (apatheia) as if nothing painful had occurred. On this occasion, the patriarch chose the metriopatheia, the middle way, which, in philosophy, corresponds to Aristotelian doctrine. Unlike the Stoics, Philo does not try to present apatheia as a kind of ethical heroism. Unlike the Peripatetics, he does not think that ethics always requires reasonable aims. He considers the human being able to transform bad passions into good ones and affirms that there are no natural limits to his perfectibility when he accepts to submit himself to the power of God.