 The puzzle is magnified by the pervasiveness of form contracting in modern markets and by the details of contract law doctrine. For example, the law’s treatment of standard forms as agreements is not so easily dismissed as a “convenient fiction” justified by the general need to enforce standard forms given the many important functions they serve, from allowing large organizations to solve agency problems to saving the consumer costs associated with bargaining over low probability events (Rakoff 1983: 1220–1245). Anglo-American contract law has long recognized a category of “as if” or “quasi-contracts” (see, e.g., Baily v. West (1969)) whose enforcement is justified on exceptional, non-promissory grounds. That is, the law acknowledges cases where promissory intent may be lacking but duties of a contractual form are imposed anyway. In a paradigm case, justification is said to reside in hypothetical consent: an unconscious patient who receives life-saving treatment from a physician without previously consenting owes remunerative duties on a quasi-contractual basis insofar as the patient would have consented if she could have. The law does not subsume standard forms under the category of quasi-contracts. On the contrary, the law enforces standard forms as bona fide agreements.