 The challenge for McDowell is to explain how error can arise in both cases. To accommodate error, McDowell introduces a disjunctive understanding of both experience and behavior (McDowell 1982; Soteriou 2016). Considering the former we can say: either our experience is such as to yield access to the world or it is such as to yield only apparent access. Considering the latter we can say: either the observed behavior is such as to be expressive of the other’s mentality or it only appears to be such. In both cases the way things seem to the experiencing subject is such as to fall short of infallible knowledge as to which disjunct is in question (McDowell 1986 [1998: 240]). We may be fallible with respect to how things are in the world, but McDowell insists that we must be careful to locate this fallibility in the right place. We should not conclude, as so many have, that all experience may be fallible; this is the move that paves the way for radical scepticism. It is, rather, our perceptual capacities that are fallible: sometimes they provide us with experience which is veridical and sometimes they do not (McDowell 2006). The important thing is that, when experience is veridical, we can take it to give us (sceptic-proof) knowledge of the world.