 truth conditions according to which (26) is true iff every woman who owns a donkey beats some donkey she owns (see King 2004 for details and discussion). Some think that the truth of (26) requires every woman who owns a donkey to beat every donkey she owns, and as we saw, DRT, DPL, and the D-type theories discussed assign these truth conditions to (26) (though this is not an essential feature of DRT or dynamic semantic approaches more generally). The truth conditions CDQ assigns to (26) correspond to what is often called the weak reading of donkey sentences (Chierchia (1995) calls this the \(\exists\)-reading) and the truth conditions the accounts discussed thus far correspond to the strong reading of donkey sentences (Chierchia calls this the \(\forall\)-reading). There actually has been a debate in the literature as to which truth conditions sentences like (26) have. There are sentences that are exactly like (26) except for the descriptive material in them that clearly seem to have (only) the weak reading. An example is: