  So what is the right account of this sort of identity? According to  theorists attracted to this general approach, it is the   Narrative Criterion of Personal Identity: What makes an action,  experience, or psychological characteristic properly attributable to  some person (and thus a proper part of his or her true self) is  its correct incorporation into the self-told story of his or her life (MacIntyre 1984, 1989, Taylor 1989, Schechtman 1996, DeGrazia 2005).  Narrative identity is thus really about a kind of psychological  unity, but not just an artless or random unity. Imagine, for  instance, a subject of experiences to whom various experiences merely happened over time. The events would be unified in a purely passive  respect, simply as the experiences contained within the life of that  subject of experiences. But for that subject to be a person, a genuine moral agent, those experiences must be actively unified,  must be gathered together into the life of one narrative ego by  virtue of a story the subject tells that  weaves them  together, giving them a kind of coherence and intelligibility they  wouldn't otherwise have had. This is how the various experiences and  events come to have any real meaning at all – rather than being merely isolated events – by being part of a larger story that  relates them to one another within the context of one life  (Schechtman 1996, 96–99).