 Agentialists generally hold that we can know such recalcitrant attitudes, but only through a process of self-observation, which they regard as problematic. (McGeer is again an exception.) Agentialists argue that if I can know about my own attitude only through observation, then I am “alienated” (Moran 2001) from that attitude; my relation to it, qua agent, is “brute, contingent, non-rational” (Burge 1996); and I can view it only from a “third-person perspective” (Bilgrami 2006) and not “as my own” (Boyle  2009).[10]  Some of agentialism’s critics maintain that knowing an attitude through an observational process does not preclude a thinker from regarding it as her own in the relevant sense (Reed 2010; Borgoni 2015). Some even claim that a detached perspective on one’s own attitudes can be especially enlightening: it can help us to recognize and combat recalcitrant attitudes (McGeer 2008; Levy 2016), and it may be necessary for genuine self-understanding (Doyle 2019). 