 Perhaps the crucial question about the ‘non-spatiality’ criterion concerns the classification of the parts of space itself. If they are considered concrete, then one might ask where the spatiotemporal points or regions are located. And a similar question arises for spatial points and regions, and for temporal instants or intervals. So, the ontological status of spatiotemporal locations, and of spatial and temporal locations, is problematic. Let us suppose that space, or spacetime, exists, not just as an object of pure mathematics, but as the arena in which physical objects and events are somehow arrayed. It is essential to understand that the problem is not about the numerical coordinates that represent these points and regions (or instants and intervals) in a reference system; the issue is about the points and regions (or instants and intervals). Physical objects are located ‘in’ or ‘at’ regions of space; as a result, they count as concrete according to the non-spatiality criterion. But what about the points and regions of space itself? There has been some debate about whether a commitment to spacetime substantivalism is consistent with the nominalist’s rejection of abstract entities (Field 1980, 1989; Malament 1982). If we define the abstract as the ‘non-spatial’, this debate amounts to whether space itself is to be reckoned ‘spatial’. To reject that these points, regions, instants, and intervals, are concrete because they are not located, entails featuring them as abstract. However, to think about them as abstract sounds a bit weird, given their role in causal processes. Perhaps, it is easier to treat them as concrete if we want to establish that concrete entities are spatiotemporal—or spatial and temporal.