 More or less similar accounts of the basic propositions of mathematics can be found in philosophers like al-Fārābi and al-Ṭūsī. However, both some of Avicenna’s contemporaries and some post-Avicennian thinkers took a more empirical and/or more skeptical approach to the truth of mathematical propositions. For example, in his first commentary on Euclid’s Elements, Sharḥ musạ̄darāt, Ibn al-Haytham follows the mainstream view that basic propositions of mathematics are self-evident, necessary, and rationally indubitable. But, in his second commentary, Ḥall shukūk ([Doubts]), he endorses a more empirical position and argues that we acquire these instances of knowledge by facing frequent use of them in daily life. Consider, for example, the common notion ‘things which correspond with one another are equal to one another’. Ibn al-Haytham says that we accept this proposition because we have repeatedly seen that when a body is mapped or superposed upon another body and the lengths of them do not exceed each other, our intellect (ʿaql) judges that these bodies (or, more precisely, their lengths) are equal. Without having such experiences, we could not come to assent to the truth of this axiom. Therefore, our knowledge of such axioms is somewhat sense-experience-dependent (Ibn al-Haytham [Doubts]: 31; R. Rashed 2019).