  Let \(t_0\) be the time at which John first saw the messy shopper and uttered ‘He is making a mess’. Let \(t_1\) be the later time at which John uttered ‘I am making a mess’ and stopped pushing his cart. It seems that John began to believe something at time \(t_1\) that he did not believe at \(t_0\). One proposition he seemingly began to believe for the first time at \(t_1\) is the proposition that the sentence ‘I am making a mess’ expressed in his context at \(t_1\). However, according to direct reference theories, that sentence expressed, in John’s context at \(t_1\), the singular proposition that John is making a mess. But John already believed the proposition that ‘He is making a mess’ expressed in his context at the earlier time \(t_0\), and he continued to believe that proposition through time \(t_1\). If direct reference theories are true, that proposition is also the singular proposition that John is making a mess. So, direct reference theories entail that John already believed, before time \(t_1\), the singular proposition that John is making a mess. So, if direct reference theories are correct, then it is not the case that John began to believe a proposition at \(t_1\) that he did not previously believe. But he did. Therefore, direct reference theories of indexicals are incorrect.