  So let us assume that Relation R grounds our patterns of concern.  Consider, then, prudential rationality. While it is ordinarily  thought to be imprudent to discount the interests of one's Much Later Self (MLS) just because that self will not come into existence for a  long time, Parfit suggests that reductionism provides a different,  more plausible reason to do so. Since one of the relations in R  (connectedness) obtains by degrees, it is very likely it will obtain  to a much reduced degree between me-now and my MLS than it will  between me-now and my tomorrow's self. But if R grounds my patterns  of concern, and a reduced degree of connectedness is one part of R,  then a reduced degree of connectedness justifies a reduced degree of  concern. Thus, I may be justified in caring much less about my MLS  than about my tomorrow's self. This conclusion justifies  discounting my MLS's (expected) interests in favor of my present  interests.