 The centrality of this notion raises the question of what exactly is it for something to look blue, look yellow, look pink, etc. Unfortunately, despite its apparent simplicity, this question is not easily settled. It is usual for theorists to rely upon what is called “the phenomenological use” of “looks F”, where this use can be distinguished from the perceptual-epistemic (and epistemic) and the comparative uses of the same phrase. However, different theorists take the phenomenological use in different ways. For some, it is connected with the idea that the experience or state carries representational content, while others take it to refer to non-intentional aspects of experience. And of those who connect it with representational content, there are some who hold that the content is conceptual, and others who think it is non-conceptual. Finally, it is not at all unusual for some theorists to hold that experiences have two aspects, i.e., non-intentional and intentional characteristics, and/or conceptual and non-conceptual aspects, and that “looks yellow”, say, can be used, on different occasions to refer to these different aspects. (For further discussion, see Shoemaker 1994 [1997], Chalmers 2006, Glüer 2012, the entry on  the problem of perception.)