 Against the Free Will Thesis, Nietzsche argues against both the modern attempts to vindicate free will and moral responsibility. On libertarian views, a free agent (that is, one sufficiently free to be morally responsible) would have to be causa sui (i.e., self-caused, or the cause of itself); but since we are not causa sui, no one can be a free agent. Nietzsche often takes for granted — not implausibly — that our moral and religious traditions are incompatibilist at their core: causally determined wills are not free wills. But Nietzsche also argues against compatibilist views of free will and moral responsibility according to which (1) we are free and morally responsible as long as we do what we desire or we “identify” with the desires on which we act; or (2) we are free and morally responsible as long as we are responsive to relevant reasons for acting. (Rutherford 2011 suggests Nietzsche has more in common with the Stoics and Spinoza when it comes to “free will”: free actions are just ones arising from our real inner nature, but we can not choose to be the type of person whose actions arise from their real nature, since that too is a matter of fate.)