 However, the framing of the dispute between Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism as one concerning conceptual content faces straightforward interpretive challenges, independently of where one stands as to the justificatory role of experience or the best way to interpret the argument of the Deduction. These challenges concern each element of the Conceptualist thesis. First  (§3.1),  it seems that when close attention is paid to Kant’s notion of ‘content’ (Inhalt) it cannot be the case that intuitions have conceptual content. Second  (§3.2),  Kant’s conception of concepts as always employed in judgment appears incompatible with the claim that concepts provide intuition with cognitive relation to an object. Third  (§3.3),  attempts to avoid these challenges by attributing a conception of ‘content’ to Kant in line with our contemporary notion of representational content do not obviously cohere with his view of the contribution of intuition to cognition. The next three subsections detail these challenges. Again, it is important to note that though these challenges are often raised by advocates of some form or another of Nonconceptualism, the challenges themselves are independent of any specific answer concerning, first, whether and how intuition justifies judgment, and second, how Kant proceeds in the argument of the Deduction. After discussing these three challenges to the conceptual content frame regarding its plausibility as an interpretation of Kant (this entry shall largely prescind from discussing Conceptualism’s independent philosophical plausibility),  §4  then examines an alternative way of framing the debate that does not raise these concerns.