 Gratitude also seems to require a desire, tendency or willingness to benefit the benefactor in the future—say, by returning a favor, or buying a thank-you gift. Some philosophers argue that such a tendency of reciprocity is ultimately fundamentally different from gratitude (Feinberg 1966). It might be fairer to say, however, that while reciprocity can be conceptualized apart from gratitude (e.g., as a component of justice), gratitude entails reciprocity. After all, a beneficiary who is devoid of any inclination to reciprocate a favor seems to fall short of gratitude—even if he has the appropriate beliefs and feelings toward his benefactor, and has expressed thanks (Manela 2016a). This seems especially clear in cases where a benefactor requests a reasonable favor from a beneficiary, and the beneficiary refuses to accede to it (Bruton 2003). Outside the case of requests, though, benefactors seem to have a great deal of latitude in when and how they return a favor or present a thank-you gift to a benefactor (Simmons 1979). If R gives Y an unexpected gift, Y should be inclined to do something nice, of roughly equal magnitude, for R in the future; but he seems to have a great deal of discretion in what he does and when. Within this latitude, however, it has been argued that a truly grateful beneficiary would not return a benefit too soon, or too similar in kind, or too close in value (Camenisch 1981; Meilaender 1984). Such responses might be interpreted by the benefactor as “payment” for the “gift”, and might be taken as an attempt to reject the benefit qua benevolent gift or favor.