 This section states and discusses three jury theorems about majority decisions between two alternatives. They assume a population of individuals, labelled \(1, 2, \ldots,\) representing the possible members of the decision-making group. The population might contain, for example, all citizens of a state (for a political decision) or all scientists (for a scientific decision). It is infinite—an idealisation needed for considering arbitrarily large decision bodies. The group has any finite size \(n\geq1\) and consists of the first \(n\) individuals \(1, 2, \ldots, n.\) Each member votes for one alternative. The alternative receiving a majority wins (if \(n\) is even, there can be a tie without collective decision). Following the epistemic approach, one alternative is correct (right, better, etc.) and the other is incorrect (wrong, worse, etc.), independently of the decision process. This makes any individual judgment and any group decision correct or incorrect.