 Reply: The difference between Oscar and Oscar− is not negligible and the two are not almost-identical. Lewis concedes this point but proposes to combine almost-identity with supervaluations to give a mixed solution to the paradox. The supervaluation solution starts from the assumption that one and only one of the dog parts is a dog (and a Dalmatian, and Oscar), but it doesn’t matter which. It doesn’t matter which because we haven’t decided as much, and we aren’t going to. Since it is true that any such decision renders one and only one dog part a dog, it is plain-true, i.e., supertrue, that there is one and only one dog in the picture. But it is not clear that this approach enjoys any advantage over that of relative identity; in fact, it seems to produce instances of RI. Compare: Fred’s bicycle has a basket attached to it. Ordinarily, our discourse slides over the difference between Fred’s bicycle with its basket attached and Fred’s bicycle minus the basket. (In this respect, the case of Fred’s bicycle differs somewhat from that of Oscar and Oscar−. We tend not to ignore that difference.) In particular, we don’t say that Fred has two bicycles even if we allow that Fred’s bicycle-minus is a bicycle. Both relative identity and supervaluations validate this intuition. However, both relative identity and supervaluations also affirm that Fred’s bicycle and Fred’s bicycle-minus are absolutely distinct objects. That is, the statement that Fred’s bicycle and Fred’s bicycle-minus are distinct is supertrue. So the supervaluation technique affirms both that Fred’s bicycle and Fred’s bicycle-minus are distinct objects and that there is one and only one (relevant) bicycle. That is RI, or close enough. The supervaluation approach is not so much an alternative to relative identity as a form of it.