 We see, then, that there are a number of suggestions for how empirical work may shed light on our aesthetic preferences and their aetiology, while doubts remain about the capacity of this work to illuminate the normative structure of aesthetic judgement, which is said to be reason-focused and involve Kantian features such as disinterestedness (though see Meskin, Phelan, et al. 2013: 140–1). A second and familiar objection is the Wittgensteinian thought that merely explaining the origins of a phenomenon doesn’t give us the kind of explanation which philosophers are concerned with (Vrahimis 2020). However, the idea of reasons in aesthetics itself deserves critical interrogation, given the evidence that the reasons people give seem often to be confabulations and that focusing on reasons while making a judgement can make you a worse judge rather than a better one (see Irvin 2014 and Lopes 2014, mentioned above,  Section 1).  Nor is the problem here confined to the aesthetic domain: Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (2017) argue that, quite generally, reasoning works well as an instrument of public debate but poorly as a guide to personal judgement and decision.