 The quest to nail down a viable concept of truthlikeness is motivated, at least in part, by fallibilism (§1.1). It is certainly true that a viable notion of distance from the truth renders progress in an inquiry through a succession of false theories at least possible. It is also true that if there is no such viable notion, then truth can be retained as the goal of inquiry only at the cost of making partial progress towards it virtually impossible. But does the mere possibility of making progress towards the truth improve our epistemic lot? Some have argued that it doesn’t (see for example Laudan 1977, Cohen 1980, Newton-Smith 1981). One common argument can be recast in the form of a simple dilemma. Either we can ascertain the truth, or we can’t. If we can ascertain the truth then we do not need a concept of truthlikeness – it is an entirely useless addition to our intellectual repertoire. But if we cannot ascertain the truth, then we cannot ascertain the degree of truthlikeness of our theories either. So again, the concept is useless for all practical purposes. (See the entry on  scientific progress,  especially §2.4.)