  Ahmed (2015) argues that the anti-Humean argument leveled by Babbage (1837), Holder (1999), and Earman (2000) requires an assumption of the conditional independence of successive testimonies to the putative event, an assumption that is plausibly always violated both conditional on the assumption of its truth and conditional on the assumption of its falsehood. In the abstract to his article, Ahmed summarizes his point by saying that “even multiple reports from non-collusive witnesses lack the sort of independence that could make trouble for Hume.” This enthusiastic promise is tempered, however, by Ahmed’s recognition later in the same article that something very much like the same critique can be leveled granting that conditional independence fails in both cases, provided that the ratio of the likelihoods does not converge to 1 too quickly. So in his own summary, his arguments “do not after all realize the ‘everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion’ that Hume envisaged” (Ahmed 2015: 1042).