 ‘Default’ can mean many different things in theories of meaning. It is so not only because of the multiplicity of approaches and dimensions from which meaning can be studied but also due to the fact the theoretical landscape is changing swiftly and dynamically. First, there is the dimension of the ongoing debates concerning the delimitation of explicit content (e.g., Jaszczolt 2009a, 2016a). Second, discussions about ‘defaultness’ are propelled by the debates concerning the literal/nonliteral vis-à-vis salient/nonsalient distinction (e.g., Giora &amp; Givoni 2015; Ariel 2016). Next, defaultness plays an important role in computational linguistics that develops statistical models for learning compositional meaning using ‘big data’ (Jurafsky &amp; Martin 2017 [Other Internet Resources]; Liang &amp; Potts 2015). More recently, the ongoing ‘revolution’ in philosophy of language noticeable in the progressing departure from analytic philosophy has brought in the debates on socially expected, or socially and politically correct – and as such, standard, or default – meanings in the context of discussions on epistemic norms for assertion (e.g., Goldberg 2011, 2015), theories of argumentation (e.g., Macagno 2022), and, relatedly, commitment and accountability for one’s linguistic actions (e.g., Haugh 2013; Borg 2019). Defaults are also relevant in the discussions of the conventional import of lexical items such as expressives in that their standard expressive (often offensive) meaning may not arise in certain types of context; the view on their truth-evaluability (or at least on what aspects of their meaning are truth-evaluable) is then closely related to the value one attaches to this context-dependence (Potts 2007, 2012; Richard 2008; Geurts 2007).