 One worry for Hattiangadi’s argument is that there seems to be a straightforward way to contextualize the relevant conceivability judgments. Consider an analogy. I cannot remember the atomic number of plutonium. So it is conceivable to me that plutonium atoms have any of a fairly wide range of numbers of protons. But I do not think that it is possible both that one plutonium atom has 100 protons, and that some other possible plutonium atom has 110 protons. If any plutonium atom has 100 protons, they all do. (This stems from my empirically-derived belief that number of protons is essential to the nature of plutonium). Similarly, I can entertain the possibility that utilitarianism is true, or that it is false. But what is hard to wrap one’s head around is the idea that there might be worlds just like this one in all base respects, which vary with respect to whether utilitarianism is true.