 The only way the foreseeability test avoids redundancy is by moving toward the other alternative here, the harm-within-the-risk test. That is, the law could have said that in situations where the defendant was culpable in intending, foreseeing, or unreasonably risking some harm type H, but what his act in fact caused was an instance of harm type J, one should ask whether J was foreseeable, a different question than the one asked and answered as a matter of mens rea (which was about H). Of course, H must be “close” to J for there to be a mind guilty with respect to the harm for which responsibility is sought. Yet this is to do the work of the harm-within-the-risk test, which is to solve what should be called the “fit problem” of mens rea (fitting the harm actually done, J, to the harm foreseen, intended, or risked, H; Moore 2011a). Moreover, it is to do such work badly. Foreseeability is not the right question to ask in order to fit the harm in fact caused by a defendant to the type of harm with respect to which she was culpable (either because she intended to achieve, or foresaw that she would cause, or unreasonably risked achieving, such a harm). If to avoid redundancy the foreseeability test is to be restricted to this non-redundant work, it is better abandoned for the harm-within-the-risk test.