 Another way of trying to solve the puzzle is to deny that God has knowledge of the contingent future. According to this approach, often called “open theism”, there may be future contingent events, but God does not know about them. God does not know about them either because (1) there are no true propositions now that report what future contingent events will occur, or because (2) it is impossible for anyone, including God, to know such true propositions, or because (3) God chooses not to know them in order to preserve our freedom (see, e.g., Swinburne 1986, chapter 10). Open theists also typically argue that foreknowledge alone would be providentially useless to God (see Hasker 1989, for instance; for more on open theism, see Hasker 1989 and 2004, Basinger and Basinger 1986, Basinger 1994, Pinnock 1986, Pinnock et al 1994, Rice 1985, and Davison 1991 and 2003). How can open theism explain prophecies that appear to make reference to future contingent events?