 Some might accept this prediction. In his 2018a and 2018b, Chudnoff in effect does. He compares seeing an ordinary occluded dog with seeing an unfamiliar occluded blob, and claims that our visual experience in such cases has presentational phenomenology only with respect to what is not occluded, and gives us immediate justification for beliefs with respect to only what is not occluded. On his view, our background information about dogs picks up the slack to enable us to have a justified belief about the full shape of the dog, whereas no background information is available for us to have a justified belief about the full shape of the occluded blob. In response, Helton and Nanay 2018 in effect argue that Chudnoff’s view threatens to lead to skepticism about ordinary beliefs about occluded objects, and underestimates the powers of visual experience with respect to novel occluded objects. To avoid potential skeptical problems, some may prefer to take a more expansive view of presentational phenomenology.