 The philosophical foundations of the basic game-theoretic concepts as economists understand them are presented in  LaCasse and Ross (1994).  Ross and LaCasse (1995) outline the relationships between games and the axiomatic assumptions of microeconomics and macroeconomics.  Philosophical puzzles at this foundational level are critically discussed in  Bicchieri (1993).  Lewis (1969) puts game-theoretic equilibrium concepts to wider application in philosophy, though making some foundational assumptions that economists generally do not share. His program is carried a good deal further, and without the contested assumptions, by  Skyrms (1996)  (**) and  (2004).  (See also  Nozick [1998].)  Gauthier (1986) launches a literature not surveyed in this article, in which the possibility of game-theoretic foundations for contractarian ethics is investigated. This work is critically surveyed in  Vallentyne (1991),  and extended into a dynamic setting in  Danielson (1992).  Binmore (1994, 1998) (**), however, sharply criticizes this project as inconsistent with natural psychology. Philosophers will also find  Hollis (1998)  to be of interest.