 These conditions are not only necessary, but sufficient for meaning, Ginsborg argues, because they allow us “to make sense of a given response being correct or incorrect” (2011a: 245), where correctness now is semantic correctness. Once these conditions are fulfilled, a particular use of \(e\) might not only be such that you “did not do what you were disposed to do, but also did not do what you were disposed to regard as appropriate” (2011a: 245). This, Ginsborg submits, is enough to make such a use of \(e\) into a mistake. Once these conditions are fulfilled, that is, the uses you are disposed to make of \(e\) “can retrospectively be identified as the extension of [\(e\)]” (2012: 138). And then, your primitively normative attitude amounts to understanding that \(e\) means what it does.