 We now consider the prospects for agentialism generally. The agentialist’s primary burden is to explain the epistemic dimension of self-knowledge. After all, most cases of knowledge involve a belief being controlled by what is known: e.g., I know my dog’s location only if my belief about his location is controlled by (sensitive to) his actual location. By contrast, the agential approach focuses on our control over what is known. Agentialism is not a genuine competitor to the accounts of self-knowledge unless it explains how agency relative to our attitudes provides for self-knowledge. (Parrott’s (2015) non-epistemic version of agentialism is explicitly not a competitor to those accounts, as its aim is to explain why it is reasonable to defer to others’ self-ascriptions.) Because the various versions of agentialism differ as to the way that agency secures justification or warrant for self-ascriptions, their responses to this challenge will differ.