 Third, as already noted, because those who attempt to launch revolutions do not possess standing armies or effective authority to raise them, they face a serious collective action problem that established states have already solved: they must mobilize a sufficient portion of the population to make war effectively, in spite of the fact that it will often be rational for any given individual to refrain from participating. Any ordinary individual may reason as follows: whether I participate or not has virtually zero probability of determining the outcome; but participation is a cost, perhaps an extreme cost, to me and perhaps to my family or other close associates as well. So, regardless of what others do, the rational thing for me to do, whether I consider my own utility narrowly construed or include the utility of those I care most about, is to refrain from participating. If enough individuals reason in this way, an insufficient number of people will be mobilized to make the revolution succeed. Collective action problems are not always insoluble, of course. Later we will consider several solutions to what may be called “the revolutionary mobilization collective action problem” (REMCAP for brevity)—each of which will be shown to raise serious moral issues. In other words, it is one thing to say the REMCAP can be solved, another to say it can be solved in a morally acceptable way. By way of preview, it is worth noting that the REMCAP has a crucial strategic dimension: while the aspiring revolutionary leadership will try to overcome the people’s incentives for refraining from participation, whether by providing them with benefits conditional on participation or by imposing costs on them for nonparticipation, the regime will attempt to counter the effort to achieve revolutionary mobilization by providing benefits conditional on nonparticipation or imposing costs on participation. The resulting dynamic takes the game-theoretic structure of an arms race in which both the revolutionary forces and the regime use violence and often terrorism against the people (Buchanan 2013). This spiral of strategic violence is not merely a theoretical possibility: some of the leading empirical work on revolutions indicates that it is typical of the revolutionary environment. One especially interesting empirical finding is that the best predictor of whether an individual will support the revolution or the regime is which force controls the space the individual occupies. (Kalyvas 2006: 131–132). Empirical studies document that the cycle of coercion and counter-coercion in revolutionary struggles is ubiquitous (Kalyvas 2006: 10, 12, 215, 228–229). A just war theory designed for the quite different environment of interstate wars is not likely to address the moral problems raised by this feature of revolutionary wars. 