 The fact is that when I have the visual experience of a tree in front of me, I cannot have the following doubt: “someone is standing in front of a tree, but is it I?” (Evans 1982: 222). Evans concludes that visual experiences of the external world from an egocentric perspective guarantee the IEM of self-locating judgments (Cassam 1995; Bermúdez 1998; Peacocke 2012; Schwenkler 2014). Likewise, one may argue that visual experiences of the body could also guarantee IEM in some ecologically valid situations (Evans 1982: 220 fn 26; Peacocke 2012). Proprioception guarantees bodily IEM because of some biological facts about the human body (i.e., the proprioceptive neural system is connected only to one’s own body). In the same vein, one may suggest that there are some other basic biological facts that secure the link between certain visual contents and one’s own body. For instance, I can see my nose if I close one eye and I cannot doubt that this is my own nose when I see it from this specific angle. 