  In an article written mainly as a defense of Warren and Brandeis’ paper and as a response to William Prosser, Edward J. Bloustein (1964) argues that there is a common thread in the diverse legal cases protecting privacy. According to Bloustein, Warren and Brandeis failed to give a positive description of privacy, however they were correct that there was a single value connecting the privacy interests, a value they called “inviolate personality.” On Bloustein’s view it is possible to give a general theory of individual privacy that reconciles its divergent strands, and “inviolate personality” is the social value protected by privacy. It defines one’s essence as a human being and it includes individual dignity and integrity, personal autonomy and independence. Respect for these values is what grounds and unifies the concept of privacy. Discussing each of Prosser’s four types of privacy rights in turn, Bloustein defends the view that each of these privacy rights is important because it protects against intrusions demeaning to personality and against affronts to human dignity. Using this analysis, Bloustein explicitly links the privacy rights in tort law described by Prosser with privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment. He urges that both leave an individual open to scrutiny in a way that leaves one’s autonomy and sense of oneself as a person vulnerable, violating one’s human dignity and moral personality. The common conceptual thread linking diverse privacy cases prohibiting dissemination of confidential information, eavesdropping, surveillance, and wiretapping, to name a few, is the value of protection against injury to individual freedom and human dignity. Invasion of privacy is best understood, in sum, as affront to human dignity. Although Bloustein admits the terms are somewhat vague, he defends this analysis as conceptually coherent and illuminating.