 Just why understanding might have this property is up for debate. Some proposals focus on the “internal” benefits that understanding is alleged to provide. According to Zagzebski (2001), understanding has a kind of first-person transparency, tied to an ability to articulate reasons, that we do not always find in cases of knowledge. Thus to say a chicken-sexer knows the sex of a particular chicken without being able to cite his or her grounds is one thing, but to say that someone understands some subject matter—say, the U.S. Civil War—without being able to explain it or to describe how the subject’s different elements depend upon and relate to one another seems like another, more implausible step (cf. Pritchard 2010). Understanding therefore arguably provides “a more natural home” (cf. Kvanvig 2003: 1993) for internalist intuitions in epistemology than knowledge, because it seems to more naturally appeal to notions such as transparency, articulacy, and reason-giving than knowledge. (For the view that understanding too can be inarticulate, see Grimm 2017.)