 (4) Last but not least, sometimes the expression of P by means of W would manifestly violate some particular maxim if P formed any essential part of what S was out to get across, and the natural inference is that what she was out to get across is something entirely different: the expression of P by means of W readily calls to mind some unique alternative message Q about the world of which P forms no part whatsoever, such that S might plausibly be in a position to vouch for Q’s truth and such that doing so by means of W, if it could be managed, might plausibly comply with all the maxims. (Such is the residual force of the idea that verbal expressions of P are equipment for asserting P that S will still be viewed as vouching for the truth of P as well unless doing so is manifestly out of the question in the circumstances at hand, as it often will be. What she won’t be vouching for is P’s value or interest in the light of her listener’s presumed informational needs.)