 Socrates presupposes that such special knowledge implies knowledge of the definition of reverence. If Euthyphro knows what reverence is, he should teach that to Socrates, so that Socrates may use the knowledge in defense during his own trial. Euthyphro’s first two answers fail the first two conditions of  Socratic definition;  the first is not general (“what I am doing now”—6d), and the second (being loved by a god) would make the same things both reverent and irreverent; one god’s love would make an action reverent, while another god’s hate would make the same action irreverent (8ab). Socrates helps Euthyphro to a better answer (reverence is what is loved by all the gods), but this succumbs to the requirement that a definition state the essence of its subject (11ab). The essence of reverence cannot be conferred on reverent actions by the gods’ approval of them; their approval, rather, must follow on the actions’ partaking of the essential nature of reverence. So actions are made reverent not by pleasing a god, but by satisfying the definition of reverence—or so most modern readers have inferred.