 Let’s focus on \(L'\) first. From a purely model-theoretic point of view the question is moot. We cannot deny that \(QM\) is a structure for \(L'\). Thus, \(L'\) is committed to people vis à vis one structure and to income groups vis à vis the corresponding quotient structure. But let’s pretend that the structures are “representations of reality,” and so the question now becomes: Which representation is preferable? Is there then any reason to prefer the ontology of \(M\) to that of \(QM\)? \(M\) contains people but no sets of people, whereas \(QM\) contains sets of people but no people. By Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment — that to be is to be the value of a variable — commitment to a set of objects does not carry a commitment to its elements. That is one of the odd consequences of Quine’s criterion. Unless there is some ontological reason to prefer people to sets of people (perhaps because sets are never to be preferred), the ontologies of \(M\) and \(QM\) seem pretty much on a par. Both commit \(L'\) to one kind of thing.