 Be as it may, it is certainly worth considering whether expression, hence exemplification, by requiring possession, requires possession that precedes the item’s acquiring exemplifying function. It could be the case that endowing a work with an exemplification function could, at once, endow the work with the feature it exemplifies, a suggestion that seems especially apt to works of art (cf. van der Berg 2012). Whether something like that could be explained, as Goodman would want it, with no reference to either the intentions of artists or, more generally, the context of artistic production remains to be seen. Certainly—and the concern, here, is not just about expression, but about metaphorical reference and exemplification more generally—the suspicion arises that Goodman’s approach, in relying solely on the notion of symbol system to explain reference (i.e., to explain what a symbol refers to and how it does refer to it), ends up underanalyzing the key notions at play: exemplification, metaphorical reference, and, hence, expression. Goodman’s own understanding of symbol systems is that they emerge when certain rules are codified. Yet, of course, artists may succeed, it seems, at securing reference and endowing their works with artistically relevant features within, and thanks to, a specific context of production. Appeal to the rules of a system may not be sufficient to explain how reference is indeed secured. That is, and going back to an issue mentioned above, the rules of a system may never be granular enough to offer a full explanation of how a work of art exemplifies some of its features but not others, or is successfully made to possess, metaphorically, features it expresses.