 GK1 is plausible. It seems easy enough to imagine gunky objects, for instance by imagining an object with a right and left half, each of which itself has a right and left half, which themselves have right and left halves … “all the way down”, and never terminating in simple parts. Moreover, it may even be that actually all objects are gunky. GK2 is trivial: if there are gunky objects in world w, then there is something with parts in w, in which case there are composites in w and nihilism is false in w. GK3 is plausible as well: the actual world contains what would seem to be paradigm cases of composites (trees, etc.), so if composition occurs anywhere, it surely occurs here. Moreover, nihilism is meant to be an answer to the special composition question, and one would expect such an answer to be giving necessary and sufficient conditions for composition—in which case one would expect proponents of nihilism to regard it as a necessary  truth.[73]