 A second line of objection to causal theories of the basing relation in general involves counterexamples raised in Lehrer  1971.[4]  We’ll henceforth call these “superstitious lawyer” examples, and they go like this. Suppose a series of eight grisly murders has been committed, all the available evidence indicates that the lawyer’s client committed the first seven of those murders, and everyone believes that he committed the eighth murder as well. However, the lawyer, being superstitious, has absolute faith in the cards. The cards indicate that his client is innocent of the eighth murder, and the lawyer comes to believe this on the basis of his faith in the cards. The lawyer then re-examines the evidence and finds a very complicated line of reasoning showing that his client is innocent of the eighth murder. The lawyer recognizes that the complicated line of reasoning shows that his client is innocent. However, due to the grisly nature of the case, the lawyer (and everyone else) strongly desires to believe that the murderer of all eight victims has been found. Thus, the lawyer’s belief that the complicated line of reasoning is correct lacks the overwhelming emotional conviction needed to overcome the lawyer’s desire, and thus cannot cause the lawyer to believe that his client is innocent of the eighth murder. It is only his unshakable faith in the cards that is sufficient to cause the lawyer to believe that his client is innocent. Nonetheless, since the lawyer takes the line of reasoning seriously, it seems reasonable to believe that the complicated line of reasoning could give the lawyer knowledge that his client is innocent.