 MOT\(^{dc}\) is very remote from MOT\(^o\). Recall that, according to MOT\(^o\), the object called “the golden mountain” is not an abstract object but something as concrete as every existent mountain in the world. Secondly, and related to this, the idea that some objects do not exist is one of the cornerstones of MOT\(^o\)—but it is not an essential feature of MOT\(^{dc}\), i.e., it doesn’t play an essential role within MOT\(^{dc}\). Within MOT\(^{dc}\), Meinongian objects are defined as a particular kind of abstract objects (namely abstract objects to which two kinds of predicates apply). Of course, one can decide to say that these objects are “nonexistent”; but nothing hinges upon this decision. According to MOT\(^o\), the only difference between Meinongian objects and normal objects consists in the alleged nonexistence of the former. However, in MOT\(^{dc}\), Meinongian objects are distinct from normal objects because only the former are abstract objects which encode properties. This suffices to distinguish Meinongian objects from normal objects. Thus, there is no need to assume that existence is a property of individuals and that there is a difference between “There are objects that are such-and-such” and “Objects that are such-and-such exist”.