 According to Wright there exist cornerstone propositions—or simply cornerstones—for different areas of discourse. In accordance with Wright’s characterization of it, c is a cornerstone for an area of discourse d just in case for any proposition p belonging to d, p could not be justified for any subject s if s had no independent justification for accepting c (see mostly Wright  2004).[10]  Cornerstones for the area of discourse about perceivable things are for instance the logical negations of skeptical conjectures, such as the proposition that one’s experiences are nothing but one’s hallucinations caused by a Cartesian demon or the Matrix. Wright contends that the conclusion Q8 of Moore is also a cornerstone for the area of discourse about perceivable things. Adapting terminology introduced by Pryor (2004), Wright’s conception of the architecture of perceptual justification thus treats Q8 conservatively with respect to any perceptual hypothesis p: if s had no independent justification for Q8, no proposition e describing an apparent perception could supply s with prima facie justification for any perceptual hypothesis p. It follows from this that Moore instantiates the information-dependence template considered in Sect. 3.2. For Q8 is part of the collateral information which s needs independent justification for if s is to receive some justification for P8 from E8. Hence Moore is non-transmissive. (See mainly Wright 2002.) Note that the thesis that Moore’s proof is epistemologically useless because non-transmissive in the sense explained is compatible with the claim that by learning E8, in Moore,s does acquire a justification for believing P8. For instance, Wright (2004) contends that we all have a special kind of non-evidential justification, which he calls entitlement, for accepting Q8 as well as other cornerstones in  general.[11]  Thus by learning E8 we do acquire justification for P8. Wright’s analysis of Moore’s proof and Wright’s conservatism have mostly been criticized in conjunction with his theory of entitlement. A presentation of these objections is beyond the scope of this entry. (See however Davies 2004, Pritchard 2005 and Jenkins 2007. For a defense of Wright’s views see for instance Neta 2007.) 