 This brings us back to the Open Question Argument. So far as I can see, Russell continued to accept premises (1) and (2) and thus—with reservations—sub-conclusion (4). “Good” does not mean that same as any naturalistic predicate X—at least, it does not mean the same as any of the naturalistic predicates that have been suggested so far. But he also accepts something like premise (3), that the meaning of a predicate is the property for which it stands. It was because he believed that some predicates were among the words “which are only significant because there is something that they mean”, and which would be “empty noises not words” in the absence of this something, that he continued to believe in properties, right up until 1959. How then can Russell fend off Moore’s conclusion (5) that there is a property of goodness that is not identical to any naturalistic property of X-ness? By modifying premise (3):