 Although Glazier (2017) calls (7) an instance of essentialist explanation, (7) appears to us to work in a different way than (3). Unlike (3), (7) does not attempt to explain what it is for Socrates to be the individual he is, or even what it is for Socrates to have Sophroniscus as a father. Rather, (7) concerns why Socrates has Sophroniscus as a father, and works by citing a certain fact about the status of this relationship—namely, that it is essential to Socrates—which would presumably help to explain why Socrates must be so. Glazier argues that explanations like (7) do not imply corresponding grounding explanations, and thus explanations like (7) are not grounding explanations. Yet there is a more general pattern here. Even if one is skeptical of the notion of essence, one might attempt to metaphysically explain why Socrates has Sophroniscus as a father in terms of some other status of this fact; for instance, one might appeal to the fact that it falls under a more general “law of metaphysics”, or one might simply appeal to the necessity of this fact alone (see Kappes forthcoming).