 We’ve used the term “constraint” to denote the bounds of what is epistemically permissible. Of course, as a matter of deontic logic, what is permissible must include at least what is required: for a condition to be required is simply for the complement of that condition to not be permissible. But this leaves it open whether, in a particular domain, what is permissible includes more than what is required. Permissivists argue that it does (see Schoenfield 2014 for a defense of permissivism), while anti-permissivists argue that it does not (see White 2005 and Schultheis 2018 for arguments against permissivism). Anti-permissivists concerning constraints on our credences are sometimes described as holding a “uniqueness” view, but this label can easily mislead. A philosopher who thinks that the range of permissible credences is no wider than the range of required credences is an anti-permissivist—but an anti-permissivist view, so understood, is consistent with the claim that the credences we are required to have are not point-valued but are rather interval-valued. Such a philosopher could, for instance, claim that there is only one credence that you are permitted to assign to the proposition that the cat is on the mat, and this required credence is neither .6 nor .7, but is rather the open interval (.6, .7). 