 What should we make of this argument? Williams (2009, 2011) conducts an instructive discussion of it, where he, following Ellis and Lierse, labels it the ‘argument from science’—Mumford (2006) names it the ‘ungrounded argument’. He points out that it is ‘not just one argument, but a small, close-knit family of arguments’. The specific argument we presented earlier is most similar to what he calls the indirect ‘structureless’ version, which he takes as the most common among versions of the argument from science. Williams’s worry about it is that what follows from the reasonable assumption that fundamental particles do not have constituting parts is not that their dispositions are in no way grounded but that their dispositions are not grounded via compositional structure. On his view, it is still an open possibility to the categoricalist that their dispositions are grounded via supervenient structure, meaning that dispositions of a subatomic particle supervene upon categorical properties of the particle itself.