 Griffiths (2002) hypothesized that folk essentialism might be exerting an influence even on scientists’ and philosophers’ professional judgments about innateness. More precisely, the hypothesis states that (1) there is a “folk” or vernacular concept of innateness that most people operate with in non-technical contexts, (2) this vernacular concept is incompatible with scientific developments in such fields as evolutionary and developmental biology, and (3) that researchers working in psychology and perhaps other disciplines will employ the vernacular concept of innateness (often inadvertently) even when reasoning in a scientific context. Machery et al. (2019) have more recently dubbed this the “attractor hypothesis” of innateness, because of its similarity to the idea of a psychological attractor in cultural evolution (Sperber 1996; Claidière and Sperber 2007). An implication of the attractor hypothesis of innateness is that the concept of an innate trait will be highly resistant to scientific revision. Despite attempts to refine the concept, researchers will continue to default to the vernacular concept, the theory goes, and draw faulty inferences despite their efforts to avoid equivocation. Griffiths (2002) draws the normative conclusion that the concept of innateness should be self-consciously eliminated from scientific discourse. This proposal will be discussed below (Section 3.5). The remainder of this subsection discusses recent experimental evidence surrounding the attractor hypothesis of innateness.