 Another way of arguing that akrasia can be rational is to take the existence of a support relation as sufficient for justification of belief in a proposition whether the subject has correct beliefs about that support relation or not (Wedgwood 2011). This is motivated by externalism about justification (see entry on  internalist and externalist conceptions of epistemic justification),  which might be more plausible for justifications subject to self-doubting higher order evidence because it is weaker than other undercutting evidence. In a different tack, it has been argued that a general rule that takes negative self-doubting higher-order evidence to always exert some defeating force on first-order beliefs will be very hard to come by. Because the subject is being asked to behave rationally in the face of evidence that she has not behaved rationally, she is subject to norms that give contradictory advice, and fully general rules for adjudicating between such rules are subject to paradoxes (Lasonen-Aarnio 2014).