  Others describe the possibility of objectivity given the perspectival nature of knowledge in a slightly different way. Using the term “bias” to refer to interest or perspective, Louise Antony characterizes the challenge for feminist epistemologists who criticize the idea of objectivity as neutrality or impartiality as the “bias paradox”: such feminists both criticize neutrality and impartiality (arguing that such impartiality is impossible due to the situatedness of knowledge) at the same time as they must appeal to impartiality in criticizing male bias as “bad” (Antony 1993). Her solution is to adopt a naturalistic and empirical approach to biases, embracing the idea that biases are an inevitable component of knowing, but arguing that it is an empirical question to determine which biases are good in that they lead to the truth, and which are bad in that they lead us away from truth. Richmond Campbell develops these ideas further, arguing that armed with realist conceptions of truth and objective justification, we can explain (without circularity) how feminist biases can lead us closer to the truth within contexts of systematic gender bias in epistemic communities (Campbell 2001, 1998). Elizabeth Anderson uses the case study of feminist research on divorce to argue that the feminist values (which Campbell and Antony might consider biases) used in such research are both empirically testable and supported by the evidence (Anderson 2004). Sharyn Clough suggests that such a holistic relationship between descriptive facts and prescriptive values forms a core feature of feminist science studies (Clough 2004). Miriam Solomon characterizes such views described above as “feminist radical empiricism” because they adopt the view that not only are factual claims empirically testable (as do other feminist empiricists), but more radically they embrace the idea that the values or biases that inform our theory choices are also empirically testable themselves (Solomon 2012). Solomon herself argues for a more pluralistic understanding of the role of values in knowledge production, noting that values are sometimes relevant to the domain of inquiry and can be empirically tested, but not always. Still others such as Audrey Yap caution against any presumption that empirically testing our values will be useful in promoting social change, given deep sources of prejudice and stereotyping (Yap 2016).  