 What Kant calls the Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space presents the first arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant defines the “exposition” of a concept as follows: “By an exposition (expositio) I understand the clear (if it is not explicit) representation of what belongs to a concept; it is metaphysical if it contains what the concept presents as a priori given” (A23/B38). By a concept (Begriff) in this context I take Kant simply to mean a  representation.[8]  So his goal is to characterize the content of the representation of  space. For Kant, an “exposition” is different from a definition: he  is not undertaking a definition of space, the word  ‘space,’ or the concept &lt;space&gt; (for helpful  discussion, see Dunlop 2012). In this regard, Kant follows a long  tradition emanating from Newton’s Scholium following the  Definitions in the Principia, where Newton explains that space, time and motion are familiar to everyone and therefore will not be defined in his work, unlike unfamiliar technical concepts like mass or impressed force, which are defined (Newton 1999, 408). Unlike Newton, however, Kant focuses primarily on our representation of space, rather than on space itself. That seems to be expressed by his notion of an exposition.