 An associative account of political obligation has many attractive features. It provides a justification for a duty to obey the law that does not depend on an individual’s choice or voluntary exercise of will – surely a virtue when so many people have not consented to be ruled by the state that governs them, or to be a member of the political community on whose behalf it does so. The particularity of political obligation – again, the fact that it is owed to the particular political community to which an agent belongs – follows straightforwardly from its nature as an associative obligation. So, too, does the claim that political obligation requires obedience to law. As Samuel Scheffler observes, “membership-dependent reasons are reasons for doing one’s share, as defined by the norms and ideals of the group itself, to help sustain it and contribute to its purposes” (2018, p. 17). Law specifies, perhaps incompletely, what counts as doing one’s share. John Horton makes the same point when he writes that laws “define the terms of association within a polity, [and] concern for the interests and welfare of the polity is a concern for these terms of association” (1992, p. 165). Finally, many people apparently think of themselves as members of political societies, and in virtue of that fact, believe that they have an obligation to obey its laws. To pay one’s taxes, to vote, to serve on a jury or in the armed forces, to coordinate with other members of one’s polity to ensure a safe environment, and so on, is simply to fulfill the obligations of citizenship. An associative account of political obligation captures this (allegedly) widespread sense that “deep and important obligations flow from identity and relatedness” (Tamir 1993, p. 99).