 One way to argue for a platonistic view of properties and relations is first to use the argument of  section 4.2  to argue for a platonistic view of propositions, and then to claim that this argument already contains an argument for properties and relations, because properties and relations are components of propositions. If we adopt a Russellian view of propositions, this is straightforward, because it is built into the Russellian view that propositions are composed of objects, properties, and relations (see  section 1).  If we adopt a Fregean view of propositions, however, the situation is different. On the Fregean view, propositions are composed of senses, which we can think of as meanings, or concepts. Now, Frege himself did not use the word ‘concept’ to talk about these things — he used the German ‘sinn’, which is usually translated as ‘sense’ — but we can use the word ‘concept’ here. On this way of talking, we can say that on a Fregean view, if we have good reason to countenance the existence of, e.g., the proposition that roses are red, then we also have good reason to countenance the existence of the concept red. Now, some Fregeans might want to say that the property of redness just is the concept of redness, and if so, then they could maintain with Russellians that if there exist propositions, then there also exist properties and relations. But most Fregeans would want to deny that properties are concepts, so in order to motivate a platonistic view of properties and relations, they would need an entirely different argument. And since we have already found that the One Over Many argument for properties and relations is not cogent, this other argument would presumably be a version of the singular term argument, one that was aimed specifically at establishing the existence of properties and relations.