 The notion of taking something as valuable, on this view, entails that a value is in the first instance just the object experienced as valuable rather than the value-property alone or an abstract value-object of some kind. Finally, since these takings are pre-predicative, the term “value-perception” or “value-taking” (Wertnehmung) further entails that feelings and emotions as evaluative experiences need not involve propositional content (although they can and, perhaps more often than not, do). In other words, a belief or judgment (even a value judgment) can provide the underlying basis for an (additional) experience of value, in which case the feeling-apprehension or emotion takes [that S is p] as  v.[16]  For more detailed discussion of this view, see Drummond 1995, 2013, 2017; Husserl 1908–9/1911/1914; Loidolt 2010, 2011, 2018; Melle 1991, 1992, 1997, 2007; Peucker 2011; Rinofner-Kreidl 2013; and Vendrell Ferran 2008, 2013. For analyses along these lines of particular moral emotions, see Drummond 2018a, 2020b; Heinämaa 2014, 2018; M. Kelly 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Ozar 2009, 2010, 2018; Rinofner-Kreidl 2014a, 2014b, 2018; and Vendrell Ferran 2018a.