 Until the end of the 19th century, bodily awareness was typically understood in terms of a bundle of internal bodily sensations. Bonnier (1905) first introduced the term schema to refer to the spatial organization of these bodily sensations. But it was only in Head and Holmes (1911)’s fundamental paper (discussed in the next section) that one finds the first systematic analysis of the way(s) the brain represents the body. They initiated what might be called the representationalist approach to bodily awareness (e.g., O’Shaughnessy 1980; Bermúdez 1998; Vignemont 2018; Carruthers 2008; Alsmith forthcoming; Murillo Lara 2018). Proponents of the representationalist approach claim that in order to account for bodily awareness one needs to appeal to mental representations of the body. According to a minimal definition, a body representation is an internal structure that has the function to track the state of the body and encode it, that can misrepresent it and that can be decoupled from it. It plays the role of model that represents in virtue of its resemblance to the structure of the body (Alsmith forthcoming; Gadsby &amp; Williams 2018). Now the question is why positing such internal models.