 Discussion of imagination’s role in perception (in Kant’s sense) and image formation is an area which could stand further attention. In particular, it seems clear that Kant conceives of images as, in some sense, sensory representations. But what kind of sensory representations? Are they intuitions? If so, how do images differ from ‘immediately given’ intuitions? If, as Kant sometimes suggests (e.g., A120-1), image formation is a necessary intermediate stage between given sensory states and constructed intellectual states, how might the structure or content of an image possess features that make it more than a “mere” sensory state, while being nevertheless different from judgment (Tracz 2020)? Moreover, in what sense does image formation require a “schema” and in what sense does such schematization present an intermediary between the sensible and the intellectual? Kant’s notion of a schema is itself much contested, but it seems clearly relevant to the case of perception (Longuenesse 2000; Grüne 2009; Dunlop 2012; Williams 2012; Matherne 2015; Tolley 2019).