 “Limiting retributivism” is not so much a conception of retributivism as it is retributivism with the addition of skepticism about our ability to make any but the most general statements about proportionality (see N. Morris 1982: 182–87, 196–200; Frase 2005: 77; Slobogin 2009: 671). It is, therefore, a view about how much influence retributivism can have in the practice of punishment. Consequentialist considerations, it is proposed, should be consulted to fill in the gap left by the supposed vagueness of proportionality. For example, while murder is surely a graver crime than robbery, the range of acceptable punishment for murder may overlap with that for robbery. If so, a judge may cite the importance of incapacitation to sentence a robber who seems likely to be a recidivist to a longer sentence than a murderer who, for whatever reason, seems to pose little danger to others in the future.