 Quine (1953) suggests that modal operators, when we need them at all, are best interpreted as predicates of sentences. Quine (1956) and Davidson (1968) suggest an approach to propositional attitude ascriptions as implicitly talking about connections between people and sentences: “John believes that it is raining” is regimented as a two-place predicate holding between John and the sentence “It is raining”. For Davidson, this in effect asserts that John stands in a certain relation to a sentence that stands in the same-saying relation to the sentence “It is raining”. This supposedly accommodates how non-English speakers can believe that it is raining. Reconstruing mental attitude reports as reporting relations to sentences has fallen out of favor in contemporary philosophy, for reasons largely orthogonal to intensionality or hyperintensionality: see Propositional Attitude Ascriptions, section 7. Still, with enough ingenuity techniques like Quine’s and Davidson’s could be extended to apparently hyperintensional pieces of language.