 The dogmatist argues (or may argue), however, that Moore’s proof is dialectically flawed (cf. Pryor 2004). The contention is that Moore’s is unsuccessful because it is useless for the purpose to convince the idealist or the external world sceptic that there is a material world. In short, the idealist and the global sceptic don’t believe that there is a material world. Since the idealist and the sceptic don’t believe Q8, they are rationally required to distrust any perceptual evidence offered in favor of P8 in the first instance. For this reason they both will reject Moore’s proof as one based on an unjustified  premise.[13]  Moretti (2014) suggests that the dogmatist could alternatively contend that Moore’s proof is non-transmissive because s’s experience of a hand gives s immediate justification for believing the conclusion Q8 of the proof. According to this diagnosis, Moore’s proof is epistemically flawed because it instantiates a variant of indirectness in which the evidence is an experience of a hand. Pryor’s analysis of Moore’s proof has principally been criticised in conjunction with his liberalism in epistemology of perception. (See Cohen 2002 and 2005, Schiffer 2004 Wright 2007, White 2006, and Siegel and Silins 2015.) 