  There is no consensus among those defending standard realism in the face of theory change. The argument from theory change threatens scientific realism because if what science now says is correct, then the ontologies of past scientific theories are far from accurate accounts of the furniture of the world. If that is so even though they were predictively successful, then the success of our best current theories does not mean they have got the nature of the world right either. The structuralist solution to this problem is to give up the attempt to learn about the nature of unobservable entities from science. The metaphysical import of successful scientific theories consists in their giving correct descriptions of the structure of the world. Theories can be very different and yet share all kinds of structure. The task of providing an adequate theory of approximate truth that fits the history of science and directly addresses the problem of ontological continuity has hitherto defeated realists, but a much more tractable problem is to display the structural commonalities between different theories. Hence, a form of realism that is committed only to the structure of theories might not be undermined by theory change. Gerhard Schurz (2009) proves a structural correspondence theorem showing that successive theories that share empirical content also share theoretical content. (McArthur (2011) argues that structural realism eliminates both theory change in science and scientific discovery.)