 The no-miracle argument for scientific realism holds that realism is the only account that does not make the success of science a miracle (Putnam 1975: 73). ‘The success of science’ here refers to the myriad verified empirical consequences of the theories of the mature sciences—but as we have seen there is a long standing tendency to regard with suspicion those verified empirical consequences the theory was built to fit. Thus the ‘ultimate argument for scientific realism’ refers to a version of the no miracle argument that focuses just on the verified novel consequences of theories—it would be a miracle, this argument proclaims, if a theory managed to have a sustained record of successful novel predictions if the theory were not at least approximately true. Thus, assuming there are no competing theories with comparable records of novel success, we ought to infer that such theories are at least approximately true (Musgrave  1988).[18] 