  However, the disjunctivist who denies that a hallucination can have the same phenomenal character as a veridical perception will be put under pressure to offer some positive explanation of the fact that a hallucination can seem to have the same phenomenal character as a veridical perception, and in particular, to offer some explanation of how it is that a subject can come to know what it is like to have a veridical perception of an F through simply having a hallucination of an F, given that the hallucination does not actually possess the what-it-is-like properties of the veridical perception. As Hellie (2007) notes, while not everything is the way it appears, there is a strong intuition that the phenomenal domain is distinctive—if an experience appears to have a certain phenomenal property, then it has that property as phenomenal character. The tenability of the form of disjunctivism that denies that veridical perceptions and hallucinations can have the same phenomenal character will depend on whether this epistemic assumption can plausibly be denied (see the discussion of this point in section 3.4), and whether the disjunctivist can make a satisfactory case for thinking that veridical perceptions appear to have a phenomenal character that hallucinations could not possess (see section 3.3).