  These cases are taken to show that desires are only connected with reasons if they are also connected with something else, for example intrinsic value, and they do not yield reasons otherwise. Against this the internalist can again challenge intuitions and defend the consistency of the connection, by insisting (e.g.) that a desire to drink a saucer of mud is sufficient for having a reason to do so. Such a reason need not be a good or strong one, after all, and the peculiarity of claiming that there is such a reason may be explained away as being merely pragmatic. In cases in which the reasons for an action are dwarfed by the considerations against it, it is usual to report that there is no reason for the action at all; ‘there is a reason to do A’ typically communicates that there is a relatively weighty reason to do A. Whether or not agents have desire-based reasons in these circumstances remains a contested issue.