  Beall (2000) argued that the account of validity used in multi-valued logics gives pluralists the resources to deal with the problem of mixed inferences. For many-valued logics, validity is accounted for in terms of preservation of designated value, where designated values can be thought of as ways of being true, while non-designated values can be thought of as ways of being false. Adopting a designated-value account of validity, pluralists can simply take \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\) to be the relevant designated values and define an inference as valid just in case the conclusion is designated if each premise is designated (i.e., one of \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n)\). On this account, the validity of (mixed) arguments whose premises and conclusion concern different regions of discourse is evaluable in terms of more than one of \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\); the validity of (pure) arguments whose premises and conclusion pertain to the same region of discourse is evaluable in terms of the same \(F_i\) (where \(1 \le i \le n)\). An immediate rejoinder is that the term ‘true’ in ‘ways of being true’ refers to a universal way of being true—i.e., being designated simpliciter (Tappolet 2000: 384). If so, then the multi-valued solution comes at the cost of inadvertently acknowledging a universal truth property. Of course, as noted, the existence of a universal truth property poses a threat only to strong pluralism.