 As regards  item 3,  current consensus is that it does not represent Descartes’ position. He did not believe that states of mind such as sensory ideas have properties of color or other sensory qualities. Rather, he held that color and other qualities are in the mind “representatively”, or in terms of “objective being” or “objective reality” (Meditations, 1641 [1985: 28–29, 74–75, 113–114]). Descartes is here understood to be invoking a notion of intentionality or intentional  being.[7]  The phenomenal red that one experiences is not an instance of the property red that is predicated of the mind, but rather the idea of red has an intentional content that is experienced as phenomenal red (Yolton 1984: ch. 1; 1996: 74–75; Nadler 2006: 91–92). Similarly, the mind does not itself become square when it experiences a square.