 But some cast doubt on the utility of terms like “works of art” and “artworks” altogether, arguing that, at least with respect to literary and musical communication, the choices open to us seem to be language-dependent in a way that makes it dubious to construe them as elements in “the basic furniture of the world”, so to speak, even if there is nothing intrinsically problematic within our ordinary descriptions of art using these terms (Rudner 1950; Cameron 2008; Pettersson 2009; but for arguments for the indispensability of works-talk see S. Davies 2003). And others raise the equally serious question about whether all events and objects that we describe as art can be distinguished cleanly into single-instance and multiple-instance objects or events (Currie 1988; Hazlett 2012), largely on the grounds that any work of art can be repeatable and that the alleged distinction turns out to be an artifact of our current technological capabilities rather than an enduring feature of some kinds of art.