 An important way of seeing through deceptive arguments is to consider the weight of words carefully, and Valla gives some further examples of fallacies which can easily be refuted by examining the meaning and usage of words and the contexts in which they occur (Repastinatio, 1:320–334; 2:568–578; DD 2:328–69). He considers the fallacies “collected by Aristotle in his Sophistical Refutations as for the most part a puerile art,” quoting the Rhetorica ad Herennium (2.11.16) to the effect that “knowledge of ambiguities as taught by dialecticians is of no help at all but rather a most serious hindrance.” Valla is not interested in providing a comprehensive list of deceptive arguments and errors or in studying rules for resolving them. He does not mention, for example, the basic division between linguistic (in dictione) and extra-linguistic (extra dictionem) fallacies. In a letter to a friend, Valla lists some “dialecticians”—Albert of Saxony (c. 1316–1390), Albert the Great (c. 1220–1280), Ralph Strode (fl. 1350–1400), William of Ockham, and Paul of Venice (c. 1369–1429) —but there is no sign that he had done more than leaf through their works on sophismata and insolubilia (Valla 1984, 201). The few examples he gives seem to come from Peter of Spain’s Summulae logicales. Nor was it necessary to have more than a superficial acquaintance with the works of these dialecticians in order to realize that their approach differed vastly from his. As he repeatedly states, what is required in order to disambiguate fallacies is not a deeper knowledge of the rules of logic but a recognition that arguments need to be evaluated within their wider linguistic and argumentative context. Such an examination of how words and arguments function will easily lay bare the artificial and sophistical nature of these forms of argumentation.