 In an interesting critique of planning solutions to cases of temptation, Tenenbaum and Raffman (2012) challenge the purported centrality of resoluteness. They suggest that, in cases of temptation, instrumental rationality may not require planning and resoluteness, but simply exercising “sufficiently many” “permissions” to do something other than what “would be best at a given moment” when this is required by a “rationally innocent” goal or project. For instance, “suppose you take a break from writing an important memo and start surfing the web. Surely surfing for one additional second will not prevent you from completing the memo, but if you surf for long enough you won’t have time to finish it” (110). Instrumental rationality requires that you stop surfing at an acceptable point. But this need not involve stopping at a point determined by a prior plan. Whether or not you have a plan to stop at time t, and whether or not you resolutely adhere to such a plan need not be of crucial importance. What matters is that, ultimately, you stop in good time by exercising, at one or more points, the rational permission to do something other than what would be best at that moment with an eye to achieving the rationally innocent goal of completing the important memo. Tenenbaum (forthcoming) develops a theory of instrumental rationality that illuminates and accommodates the need to exercise rational permissions of the sort just described.