 Philosophers Slobodan Perovic and Ljiljana Radenovic (2011) have also suggested that nativism/empiricism controversies might be dissolved by identifying the different explanatory interests of the disputants. They focus on the dispute between neo-nativist psychologists who see themselves as heirs to Chomsky’s linguistic nativism (Section 1.5) and the intellectual descendants of anti-nativist developmental psychologists (Section 2.4) who believe that the distinction between innate and acquired behavior is meaningless and that explaining outcomes of development by calling them ‘innate’ is scientifically vacuous (e.g. Oyama 1985; Ford and Lerner 1992; Michel and Moore 1995). According to Perovic &amp; Radenovic these anti-nativists or ‘developmental systems theorists’ target neo-nativist claims about the pattern of gene-environment interaction in the development of cognition and behavior. Neo-nativists claim that the pattern is maturational, with genes as specific causes and environmental factors as merely “permissive” causes (Holtzer 1968). This is a fundamentally internalist form of explanation, with external, environmental factors as mere background conditions and internal, genetic factors doing the real explanatory work. However, while neo-nativist psychologists do make such claims, they do not typically examine the developmental genetics of the traits which they claim are ‘innate’ (Gary Marcus (2004) is one important exception). Instead, their research examines specific stages in psychological development, often well into the life of the individual, and specific environmental factors which might be thought to influence development at those stages. Their experiments aim to show that the developmental outcome at such a stage is not specifically influenced by the details of the environment, but instead follows a pathway determined by internal cognitive structures. In one famous body of research, children make an ‘intellectual breakthrough’ at around age four when they come to properly understand the whole body of kinship terms in their local language, rather than treating categories like ‘uncle’ as defined by the pattern of resemblance between uncles (Keil 1989). The fact that this happens all at once, at around the same age, and despite a great deal of variation in the specific kinship systems that children are learning, supports the view that this transition is the result of an internal, maturational change. While an environment of kinship structures and kinship terms is needed, it functions as a merely permissive or background condition. The explanatory work is done by the internal factors.