  By this time Weyl had repudiated atomistic theories of the continuum, including that of Das   Kontinuum.[19]  While intuitive considerations, together with Brouwer’s influence,  must certainly have fuelled Weyl’s rejection of such theories, it  also had a logical basis. For Weyl had come to regard as meaningless  the formal procedure—employed in Das Kontinuum—of  negating universal and existential statements concerning real numbers conceived as developing sequences or as sets of rationals. This had  the effect of undermining the whole basis on which his theory had  been erected, and at the same time rendered impossible the very  formulation of a “law of excluded middle” for such  statements. Thus Weyl found himself espousing a   position[20]  considerably more radical than that of Brouwer, for whom negations of quantified statements had a perfectly clear constructive meaning,  under which the law of excluded middle is simply not generally  affirmable.