 In closing, it is interesting to note that the version of contemporary intuitionism defended by Huemer (2005) also pushes one towards the modified standard view. The epistemological side of Huemer’s ethical intuitionism is a natural outgrowth of his general epistemological position, which he calls phenomenological conservativism. According to phenomenal conservativism, if it seems to one that a proposition is true, then one is prima facie justified in believing that proposition. Significantly, the specific kind of seeming—perceptual, from memory, by reasoning, or otherwise—is irrelevant to the seeming’s capacity to justify. Huemer’s phenomenological conservativism holds that all our beliefs are based on how things seem, and hence that unless seeming true justifies us in believing, we could not be justified in believing anything. Phenomenal conservativism drives one to the modified standard view of the a priori because the intellectual seeming is what justifies. One might be concerned that the modified standard view understands the distinction between rational intuition and all other kinds of seemings to be very significant epistemically—it is what marks the crucial distinction between the a priori and the empirical—but for phenomenological conservativism it is all just seemings, with no kind of seeming playing any different epistemological role from any other kind of seeming. One might allay the concern by noting that the modified standard view already admitted a role for experience in a priori justification, but distinguished the experience of rational intuition or intellectual seeming from all other kinds of experience. Nevertheless, when considering contemporary versions of moral intuitionism, especially when combined with phenomenological conservativism, it is hard not to notice that, if intuitive moral knowledge as these views conceive it is a priori, then the operative conception of the a priori has strayed a considerable distance from the old root idea of independence from experience.