 Unlike Sartre, Lyotard does not seek a dialectical fusion of freedom, as found in existentialism, and necessity, as found in the objective laws found in the various sciences. Rather he seeks a “third way” of thinking of history that shows how ultimately phenomenology cannot speak to the movements of history found in Marxism, but he also rejects any incipient structuralism of the period that would denude the human of its place in history (Phenomenology, 131). For structuralism, as it would come to define itself over the next fifteen years in works by Lacan and Claude Levi-Strauss (1908–2009), among others, the human subject is largely the effect of discursive grammars in which it is produced. But most importantly for his later work, Lyotard argues that phenomenology offers a way not to think a single key to history, some one meaning to which it must answer, but rather stipulates that history, for phenomenology, has “some meaning” (Phenomenology, 131, his emphasis).