 Essay 2.8 speaks of qualities, real qualities, imputed qualities, powers, and mere powers. Which difference coincides with the distinction of P/SQs? Locke’s report of what he calls “quality” in the subject, unlike the report of what he calls “idea in the mind”, is often taken to be a definition (Curley 1972: 443; Rickless 2014: 84; Jacovides 2007a: 110–11; Stuart 2013: 34–9). Accordingly, Curley (1972: 443–45) argues roughly as follows. For Locke, all qualities are powers to cause ideas by definition, but SQs are such powers and only imputed to be qualities. So SQs are not consistently said to be qualities; but they are consistently said to be powers. He concludes that there are, for Locke, two sorts of powers and the famous distinction is based on RT. One problem is that RT is presented as a consequence of the P/SQ distinction, not the source of it (R. Wilson 2015: 200; Rickless 2014: 88).