This phenomenon, or apparent phenomenon, that the presence of one intention can affect one’s reason to have another intention, should be distinguished from the phenomenon, or apparent phenomenon, that the presence of one intention and the presence or absence of another can make it the case that one violates or satisfies a rational requirement of instrumental coherence as such.  First, what matters for rational requirements is what we believe about the relations between the intentions, whereas what matters for reason would seem to be how they are likely to affect one another, which may be independent of what we believe.  Second, what matters for rational requirements is intending to X as such, whereas what matters for reason is what intending to X means for the future.  In some cases, intending to X (e.g., intending to become King of France in 2023), may not affect the likely future.  In other cases, conditions other than intending to X (e.g., my self-trust that I will X even if I don’t intend it now, or my knowledge that I will be tortured or coerced into X-ing) may affect the likely future in the same way.  Finally, rational requirements are usually taken to be wide-scope, as we will see below. That is, one never needs to have or lack any particular attitude in order to satisfy them.  By contrast, one usually needs to have or lack a particular attitude in order to conform to one’s reason to have a certain pattern of intentions.  If one ought, for example, (to intend to X and not to intend to Y), then one can comply with this requirement of reason only by intending to X and not intending to Y.