 Putnam (1983) went on to apply L. E. J. Brouwer’s intuitionism to the sorites paradox. Brouwer had achieved fame with his fixed point theorem. But reflection on Kant’s philosophy of mathematics led Brouwer to retract his lovely proof. Any non-constructive proof had to be replaced! Brouwer’s recall of established theorems yielded more specific proofs that had higher explanatory power. Theorems that could not be retrofitted became objects of agnosticism. This was sad news for Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. But Putnam welcomes the recall of the epistemicist’s theorem that there is a smallest natural number. The classical logician relies on double negation to deduce a hidden boundary from the negation of the generalization “If \(n\) is small, then \(n + 1\) is small”. Since the intuitionist does not accept this classical rule, his refusal to acquiesce to the induction step does not saddle him with hidden thresholds. Like the epistemicist, the intuitionist treats vagueness as a cognitive problem that does not require rejecting the law of bivalence. Unlike the epistemicist, the intuitionist must not claim to know the law of bivalence. To sustain this agnosticism about bivalence, the intuitionist must parry the sorites monger’s reformulations (Wright 2021, chapter 14). For instance, the intuitionist’s least number principle threatens to re-ignite the sorites.