 In Descartes’ analysis of his idea of God, he discovers that it is innate, since it is neither adventitious nor factitious. It is not adventitious (or sensory), since he has had no sensory experiences of God (i.e., he has never seen, heard, felt, smelt, or tasted God). This would be in line with the theological demand that God is immaterial. It is not factitious, for its content is something that his mind cannot fabricate from other ideas—the idea represents an actual infinity; at best his mind can only produce the factitious idea of a potential infinity. (AT VII 46–7; CSM II 32) Even so, it becomes clear to him that the innate idea of God is like the adventitious idea of the Sun, but unlike the innate idea of what thought is (which has its origin in his own nature), since like the adventitious idea of the Sun, the objective reality possessed by the idea has its origin in the formal reality belonging to something other than his own mind. His analysis concludes that the origin of the objective reality must be in an existing God (an actual infinite substance, something possessing an infinite level of formal reality). In the Sixth Meditation, he will ultimately conclude that the objective reality of his idea of body, also innate, must have, like the innate idea of God, its origin in the formal reality belonging to something other than his own mind, namely, it will have its origin in an existing corporeal substance (an extended being that possesses a finite level of formal reality). Ultimately, the objective reality (i.e., contents) of his innate ideas and adventitious ideas must have their origin in the formal reality of things, some of the latter being things existing independently of his mind.