 List and Pettit provide an argument based on judgement aggregation in support of their view and suggest, further, that the actions of collective entities supervene on those of their members. The judgement aggregation paradox (see also Copp 2007), are supposed to demonstrate the existence of processes of irreducibly collective reasoning from which irreducibly collective intentions and judgements—and, ultimately, group minds—are inferred. (See Szigeti 2013) for counter-arguments to List and Pettit). A key question is whether the examples provided by Copp, by List and Pettit and by others can be accommodated by an analysis which does not help itself to irreducibly processes of collective reasoning, e.g. the notion of joint (epistemic) institutional mechanisms (Miller 2018) mentioned in section 3. Consider the well-known tenure committee example (Copp 2007).