 will be always be false since the things we approve of have nothing in common apart from the fact that we approve of them. That is why “all propositions in which the word ‘good’ has a primary occurrence are false.” But will such propositions in fact be false? Surely X, Y, Z, etc. do have a property in common, namely the property of being X or Y or Z or …! Perhaps Russell would reply that disjunctive properties are not real properties. He took a dim view of disjunctive facts in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, and if disjunctive facts should be rejected, then disjunctive properties would appear to be equally suspect (Papers 8: 185–6/The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: 71–72). Even so, we cannot be sure that in every case the things that we approve of don’t have something in common other than a) the fact that we approve of them and b) that they satisfy a disjunctive predicate. Nor is this the only problem. Though Russell defines “good” in terms of the things that “we” approve (and disapprove) of, what he seems to mean is that each person defines “good” in terms of the things that he or she approves (or disapproves) of. Thus if you and I approve of different things, when I say “M is good” and you say “M is not good” what I mean is that M has the property shared by X, Y, Z … [the things that I approve of] whereas what you mean is that is that it does not have the property shared by A, B, C … [the things that you approve of]. But in that case the Problem of the Disappearing Dispute rears its ugly head. On Russell’s theory my “M is good” and your “M is not good” may be quite consistent. But since they are obviously not consistent, there must be something wrong with Russell’s theory. We can put the point by paraphrasing Russell’s own criticisms of simple subjectivism: