 However, there are major deviations from a straightforward utilitarianism as we might understand it from, e.g., Bentham or Sidgwick (see Albee 1896: 32–35). First, Hutcheson appears to offer us something like a scalar utilitarianism. On a scalar view, there is no absolute rightness or wrongness, but rather degrees of rightness or wrongness that an action may display (see Norcross 2020). And while Hutcheson does discuss the notion of “perfect virtue”—achieved when the good one has the ability to do is equal to the good one does—he admits that there will be degrees of virtue (which simply follows given his mathematical calculations), and does not describe the perfection of virtue as any sort of absolute obligation (see Darwall 1997: 87–88). (Indeed, this point is essential to his critique of Wollaston,  §1.4.)