 The challenge to Inseparabilists is to pin down more precisely how thick terms are both evaluative and descriptive in ways that are continuous with, respectively, thin evaluative concepts and non-evaluative concepts. Simply stipulating new technical notions would leave their claims about the distinctive philosophical significance of thick concepts unsatisfactory. Not just any conceptual entailment of a term seems constitutive of its meaning; while “x is a horse” entails that x is a mammal, it also entails that x isn’t a wombat (or a mountain, or a beer bottle), but not being a wombat (etc.) isn’t part of the meaning of horse (Dancy 2013: 49). But some entailments are such that competence with the term requires grasping them, and thick concepts and descriptive concepts are similar in having non-evaluative entailments of this sort. It is a matter of meaning that lewd acts involve overt sexual display, selfish acts involve the agent giving priority to herself over others, and so on. There is also a methodological rationale for focusing on entailments: linguists study word meanings by considering patterns in competent speakers’ entailment and contradiction judgments, synonymy judgments, and judgments about truth-conditions because these reflect relations among the sorts of entities that semantic theories assign to linguistic expressions as their meanings (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000: ch. 1). (A complication is that the meanings of words may not map one-to-one onto the concepts those words may be used to express. Writers on thick concepts often don’t say what they take concepts and their relation to word meanings to be.)