 Ross relies quite heavily on the Moorean isolation method to defend his value theory (Moore 1903, 93, 95–96, 187–88). You figure out whether something is non-instrumentally valuable by considering it by itself or in isolation (KT 10, 11). His value theory came under much less scrutiny than did his theory of right, and therefore he did not see fit to consider monistic responses to it. This may in part be because there is agreement amongst his main rivals—Moore, Rashdall, Pickard-Cambridge, Ewing, and Johnson—that value pluralism is true. This may also be because he considered the main monistic rival—that is, hedonism—a dead end (RG 98; FE 65). But hedonism lives on (Bradley 2009; Crisp 2006; de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2014; Feldman 2004; Hewitt 2010; Mendola 2006). Therefore, Ross’s value theory may be in for a challenge neither he nor his ideal utilitarian critics anticipated.