 One obvious response to this claim, made by several critics (e.g., Kitcher &amp; Salmon 1987: 317), is that the example does not really involve a case in which, depending on context, H causally explains S and S causally explains H. Instead, although H does causally explain S, it is (something like) the desire for a shadow of length S (rather than S itself) that explains (or at least causally explains) the height (or the choice of height) for the tower. Or, if one prefers, in the latter case we are given something like a functional explanation (but not a causal explanation) for the height of the tower, in the sense that we are told what the intended function of that choice of height is. On either of these diagnoses, this will not be a case in which whether H provides a causal explanation of S or whether instead S provides a causal explanation of H shifts depending on factors having to do with the interests of the speaker or audience or other contextual factors. If so, the story about the tower does not show that the asymmetry present in the flagpole example must be accounted for in terms of pragmatic factors. It may be accounted for in some other way. In fact, although discussion must be beyond the scope of this entry, a number of possible candidates for such a non-pragmatic account of causal asymmetries have been proposed, both in philosophy and outside of it (for example, in the machine learning  literature[13]).  