 To fully develop this view, of course, one would need to say what sort of moral/legal difference pathology is supposed to make—not just any difference will do, since it would not follow from the fact, say, that everyone has a legal or moral right to treatment for transient injuries or diseases that all these conditions are disabilities. Note also that, though this view mentions the medical concept of pathology, as a definition of disability it does not entail a medical model, or indeed even the denial of the affirmational model. The medical/social debate will turn on the extent to which it is pathology itself that makes a moral difference, rather than pathology in combination with social factors. The affirmational model debate will turn on just which effects are definitive of disability; if these are all negative or harmful, it will be harder to understand disability as something to be proud of. But the bare fact that disability arises from pathology, on this definition, does not necessarily preclude pride in it, given Boorse’s normatively neutral definition of pathology.