 Consider a standard problem case: the gardener and the Queen equally fail to water my flowers while I’m on holiday, and their subsequent death (e) counterfactually depends equally on their omissions. But many people’s judgement is that only the gardener’s – and not the Queen’s – omission is a genuine cause of their death (Beebee 2004b, McGrath 2005, Livengood &amp; Machery 2007). We might accommodate that judgement by claiming that it is false that the Queen’s omission was a cause of e, and conclude that we need some additional constraint on causation aside from counterfactual dependence, e.g. that causes must be ‘deviant’ or abnormal: the gardener’s behaviour was deviant (he was supposed to, or perhaps normally does, water my flowers) but the Queen’s was entirely normal (she never waters my flowers, nor would anyone expect her to). Or we might accommodate the judgement by appealing to pragmatic factors such as salience: the gardener’s and the Queen’s omissions are both, equally, causes of e, but in most conversational contexts the Queen’s omission simply isn’t relevant. For example, if I’m interested in finding out who is to blame for the flowers’ death, the Queen’s neglect is simply irrelevant to my investigation since it’s obvious that she is not to blame.