 The chapters on empirical and rational psychology outline an account of the soul in general and of the human soul in particular. In his empirical treatment, Wolff considers what can be known of the soul by means of our ordinary inner experience. He contends that we can distinguish thoughts in terms of obscurity, clarity, and distinctness, but we can also distinguish the soul’s representations in terms of their content. Accordingly, they can be classified into sensations, imaginings, and thoughts proper, which can in turn be traced back to various faculties of the soul, including sensibility, imagination, and the understanding, in virtue of which it is capable of these distinct thoughts. We also discern that the soul is subject to pleasure and displeasure in its (distinct or indistinct) cognition of good and evil, which give rise to desires and willing (based on indistinct and distinct cognition respectively), and when that willing is in accordance with what pleases the soul the most then, for Wolff, its acts are free (GM §519).