 To adopt the capability approach, however, we do need to address the objection that it is potentially sectarian: to avoid the problem of resource-“fetishism”, it asks us to consider whether or not people have certain specific capabilities that are allegedly central to the good life, but there is then a danger of specifying a list that some regard as too biased towards one ethical doctrine or societal culture than another – an issue which is perhaps even more pressing if we are considering a social minimum at a transnational or global level. One response to this apparent dilemma is to try to develop a self-consciously “ecumenical” version of the approach. Aware of the danger of sectarianism, the capabilities theorist seeks to identify capabilities that are genuinely important to people across a wide range of reasonable ethical doctrines and societal cultures; and they seek to find ways to make the application of the approach sensitive to ethical and cultural diversity. Such an approach offers one way of elaborating what we mean by a social minimum: the resources necessary for a person to lead a “minimally decent life in their society” can be understood as the resources necessary to hold a specified range of ecumenically significant capabilities, taking due account of the society’s understanding of how these capabilities are typically realized.