 Suppose we grant Schellenberg’s understanding of openness to relationship as well as his premise  (6),  and suppose we concede that no theistically friendly explanation of nonresistant nonbelief we know of is wholly satisfactory, either individually or collectively. Even so, we might wonder whether we should infer that a perfectly loving God would not permit nonresistant nonbelief. After all, an open-minded and intellectually humble inquirer will want to satisfy her natural curiosity about whether she is in a position to tell whether there are any reasons for God to permit nonresistant nonbelief that, although inaccessible to her, would be accessible to God. For suppose that she were to discover that, even if there is no good basis for thinking there is a God, and even if she does not know of any wholly satisfactory reason for God to permit nonresistant nonbelief, she should be in doubt about whether she is in a position to tell whether there are any unknown reasons. In that case, we would expect her open-mindedness and intellectual humility to lead her to refrain from accepting that a perfectly loving God would not permit nonresistant nonbelief and, in refraining from accepting this, she would refrain from accepting premise  (5).