 But what about the thoroughly virtuous person? Alexander agrees with the Stoics that virtuous people are psychologically incapable of doing anything vicious. However, it does not follow that every action they perform is causally necessitated. There is often a range of available actions that are consistent with virtue, or some leeway in the precise way in which they may do the action which virtue requires, and it is up to them which of these options they choose (Alexander, On Fate ch. 29). Alexander also follows Aristotle in thinking that people are responsible for developing their character through their own voluntary actions, in a way analogous to developing skills through practice. This, thinks Alexander, distinguishes virtuous humans from the gods. Humans are not by nature virtuous. Instead, they have to develop their virtue, and they are capable of either becoming virtuous or not. And so, we praise the person who develops the virtues, because the type of person they became was up to them. But the gods necessarily possess their goodness as a kind of natural gift, and they are incapable of becoming bad. And so, because their goodness was not up to them, we rightly honor the gods for their goodness, but we do not praise them (Alexander, On Fate chs. 27, 32).