  Another way out of the problem posed by the seeming incoherence of the Deductions is to suppose that the subject of one Deduction is numerically distinct from the subject of some of the other Deductions. Multisubjectist interpretations of this kind have been defended by the Neoplatonists (including Plotinus and Proclus), Cornford (1939), Miller (1986), and Sayre (1996). One of the major problems facing multisubjectism is the fact that Parmenides is quite explicit about the fact that the subject form of each Deduction is identical to the subject form of each of the other Deductions. (For further criticisms of multisubjectism, see Meinwald (1991, 24–26). For particular criticisms of the Neoplatonist version of multisubjectism, see Allen (1997, 211–215 and 218–224).)