Another issue in the metaphysics of agency that has received more attention in the recent debate is the nature of omissions (in particular, intentional omissions). According to Sartorio (2009), an intentional omission is the absence of an action that is caused by the absence of an intention. She argues, on the basis of this account, that intentional omissions cannot be accommodated easily by the standard theory. In reply, Clarke (2010a) has argued that in cases of intentional omission the agent usually does have an intention not to act that plays an important causal role, and he has identified various parallels between intentional actions and intentional omissions. On his view, there are no major obstacles to an account of intentional omissions that is compatible and continuous with the standard theory of intentional action. Further, he argues that a failure to account for intentional omissions would not obviously be a shortcoming of a theory of intentional action. There are, after all, significant differences between actions and omissions, and so we should not expect that a theory of action provides all the resources that are required for an account of omissions. (For more on this see Clarke 2014.)