 Some Phenomenologists approach the analysis of feelings and emotions through the theory of value (axiology) [e.g., Edmund Husserl (1908–9/1911/1914, 1920/1924, 1916–35), Nicolai Hartmann (1926), Alexius Meinong (1917), Adolf Reinach (1912/1913), Max Scheler (1913/1916), Edith Stein (1917), and Dietrich von Hildebrand (1916, 1922, 1953)]. (For additional information, see the entries on  Edmund Husserl,  phenomenology,  the phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles,  Nicolai Hartmann,  Alexius Meinong,  Adolf Reinach,  Max Scheler,  and  Edith Stein.)  For these Phenomenologists moral perception and moral emotion merge in experiencing value properties in general and moral properties in particular. They agree that only beings capable of feelings or emotions can grasp values and the significance attaching to them. Harman’s cat example illustrates this. It is clear that we see the cat and someone performing actions that seriously injure the helpless animal. This is an ordinary perception of the features and actions of worldly beings. We also “see” the wrongness of these actions in the disgust or horror that we feel. This is what axiological Phenomenologists mean when they claim that the value is “perceived” by an intentional feeling or an emotion.