 A third theory from this early period distinguishes the “exercised” act from the “signified” or “conceived” act. The details of this theory are not yet well understood, but the basic strategy is to distinguish what the liar says he is doing (namely, lying) from what he really is doing. The author of the Questions on the Sophistical Refutations attributed to John Duns Scotus, who held a version of this theory (Scotus [DS-Q], questions 52–53, pp. 505–15), thought that what the liar is really doing (the “exercised act”) is speaking the truth. In order to avoid the paradox, this theory would seem to be committed to saying that the exercised act and the signified act are two distinct acts, so that the theory, like the theory of transcasus  (Section 2.2  above), is committed to some kind of restriction on  self-reference.[16]