 Intensional semantics has been criticized for the fact that all tautologies get the same meaning (are synonymous). Indeed, a tautology as John is ill or he is not ill gets as intension the function that constantly yields true, and the same holds for other tautologies. If one is interested in discriminating semantically between tautologies, then a refinement of the notions ‘meaning’ and ‘equivalence’ is needed: ‘meaning’ should see distinctions between tautologies, and ‘equivalence’ should be sensitive for the thus refined notion of meaning. The oldest proposals to account for this problem goes back to Carnap (1947, §14) and was later taken up by Lewis (1970, sec. 5): propositions are structured by including in their meanings also the meanings of their parts. Then indeed Green grass is green and White snow is white have different meanings. However, lexical synonyms still pose a problem. Since woodchuck and groundhog are names for the same species, John believes that Phil is a groundhog is, under this view, equivalent with John believes that Phil is a woodchuck. One could consider belief contexts a separate problem, but most authors see it as part of the problem of equivalence of all tautologies.