 The notion of disease is biological malfunction is also tied to a pair of critiques of the “medical model” of disability and of “medical model” of mental health. Both models are criticized for reducing the complexities of disability or psychological welfare to only the individual-level signs, symptoms, and variables recognized by biomedicine (see:  Disability: Definitions, Models, Experience).  As traced in Hogan’s history of the concept, the medical model is either critiqued as insufficiently attentive to other dimensions (especially the social dynamics that drastically shape the relevant health experiences) or oppressive (since the model empowers biomedical experts to unilaterally dictate the disability/psychiatric categories, relevant evidence, diagnoses, treatments, etc.) (Hogan 2019). This is in part a dispute over functioning since debates over normality, difference, and pathology depend on whether/how we commit to the notion that bodies or parts thereof have functions at all. If one’s legs do not perform the function of walking, are the legs pathological? Is the person with those legs inherently diseased? Disabled? Worse off than if they had legs that could walk? One solution is to simply throw out the notion of normal functioning (Amundson 2000). Another related option is to embrace pluralism in the sense of accepting that the relationship between disability and well-being or health is complex, variable, and dependent on individual and social contingencies (Campbell &amp; Stramondo 2017).