 Among leading researchers, Bem’s (1972) view, though now dated, perhaps comes closest to a simple self/other parity view, arguing on the basis of psychological research that our knowledge of the “internal states” of both self and other derives largely from the same types of behavioral evidence and employs the same principles of inference. We notice how we behave, and then we infer the attitudes evidenced by those behaviors—and we do so even when we actually lack the ascribed attitude. For example, Bem cites classic research in social psychology suggesting that when induced to perform an action for a small reward, people will attribute to themselves a more positive attitude toward that action than when they are induced by a large reward (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959; see also Section 4.2.2 below). When we notice ourselves doing something with minimal compensation, we infer a positive attitude toward that activity, just as we would if we saw someone else perform the same activity with minimal compensation. Likewise, we might know we like Thai food because we’ve noticed that we sometimes drive all the way across town to get it; we might know that we’re happy because we see or feel ourselves smiling. Bem argued that social psychology had consistently failed to show that we have any appreciable access to private information that might tell against such externally-driven self-attributions. On Bem’s view, if we are better at discerning our own motives and attitudes, it’s primarily because we have observed more of our own behavior than of anyone else’s.