 A note on the second of these concerns: Several commentators have argued that Kant’s Refutation of Idealism is meant to undermine any metaphysical sort of idealism, including metaphysical idealisms that have been attributed to Kant (Guyer 1987: 317–29). But while this reading has interesting support, one should hesitate to endorse it solely on the ground that Kant maintains that spatial objects are distinct from the states of the perceiver. On a plausible metaphysical interpretation of Kant’s idealism, the esse of objects in space is not their percipi, since Kant’s spatial objects, by contrast with Berkeley’s, are recognition-transcendent. In Berkeley’s position, a subject’s perception of an oar in the water as crooked is not a misperception, for “what he immediately perceives by sight is not in error, and so far he is in the right,” and it is misleading only because it is apt to give rise to mistaken inferences (Berkeley 1713: Third Dialogue); while for Kant this perception is in error. In Kant’s view, the oar is recognition-transcendent by virtue of the Second Postulate’s provision that the actuality of such objects is determined causally: