 It is open to the “state” view theorist to attempt to explain the “state” view distinction in terms of the functional roles of the different state types. She might argue for the distinction by pointing out that the functional role of belief depends on an organism’s conceptual capacities and the functional role of perception does not depend on its conceptual capacities (since, arguably, an organism’s perceptual discriminations can outstrip its conceptual capacities). However, there is a sense in which this would be a mere restatement of the problem rather than a solution to it, since we still need some account of the concept-(in)dependence of these functional roles. Again, an appeal to the different kinds of contents involved in these different states seems to be a straightforward explanation. The “state” view theorist might also attempt to explain the “state” view distinction by appeal to the phenomenological differences between the propositional attitudes and perception. However, this too seems problematic, since it is unclear why the lack of phenomenology should make a belief concept-dependent or why the phenomenology of perception should make it concept-independent (Bermúdez 2007).