 If we think that the causal relation is ternary or quaternary, then some of the arguments we considered earlier can look weaker. For instance, consider what we called the causal differences argument from  §1.1.4.  We argued that we must distinguish the cause “Susan’s stealing the bike” from “Susan’s stealing the bike”, since the latter, but not the former, caused her to be arrested. If we are contrastivists about causation, then we could insist that the differences in focal stress serve to make salient different contrasts for one and the same event: Susan’s stealing of the bike. When we emphasize “the bike”, we suggests a contrast event in which Susan steals something else. And Susan’s stealing the bike, rather than the canoe, didn’t cause her to be arrested. On the other hand, when we emphasize “stealing”, we suggest a contrast event in which Susan does something else to the bike—purchasing it, let’s say. And Susan’s stealing the bike, rather than purchasing it, is a cause of her arrest. Schaffer (2005) even suggests that, if causation is 4-place, then we could take the incredibly coarse-grained Quinean view of events.