 This last technique is called parameterisation: when one is confronted with a seemingly true contradiction, \(A \wedge \neg A\), treat the suspected dialetheia \(A\), or some of its parts, as having different meanings, and hence as ambiguous (maybe just contextually ambiguous). For instance, if one claims that \(P(a) \wedge \neg P(a)\), parameterisation holds that one is in effect claiming that \(P_1 (a) \wedge \neg P_2 (a)\) (e.g. elephants are big and not big, because they are big in the context of land animals on Earth, but not big in the context of stars and planets). In the Metaphysics, Aristotle hints that a critic of the LNC is playing with the equivocal meanings of some words: “for to each definition there might be assigned a different word” (1006b 1–2).