One might object that the three examples just given: “Feed the sticks,” “A cow is to be tied up,” and “Devadatta is a lion” do not all have the same kind of obstacle. Philosophers, in the Aesthetic discipline and elsewhere, work to make the nature of this obstacle precise. While initially the emphasis is on the semantic connection within the sentence itself, for Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā both, by the time of Maṇḍana Miśra (ca seventh century CE) and Vācaspati Miśra (ca tenth century CE), the failure is taken to be wider, including problems with the larger context. In the ninth century work of Mukula Bhaṭṭa, such a widening is apparent as he distinguishes between multiple features of context which may require a word to be taken in a secondary sense: a speaker, sentence, time, place, and circumstance. Sometimes there is a clash between a speaker and a sentence meaning, as in the case taken from courtly love poetry—a common source of linguistic examples—where a young woman utters words, “I go alone to the forest along the riverbank” to a neighbor. She is to be understood as conveying the opposite (she is not going alone) to her neighbor, but intending her husband to overhear and to believe she is telling the truth. Since we know facts (through the poetic context or genre) about the woman’s personal life, Mukula argues that the sentence cannot be taken to mean the literal truth.