  Tim Maudlin argues against Lewis's Humean Supervenience on the basis of quantum entanglement and argues that this means the end of ontological reductionism, and abandoning the combinatorial conception of reality that comes from thinking of the world as made of building blocks, each of which exists independently of the others (1998, 59) and: “The world is not just a set of separately existing localized objects, externally related only by space and time” (60). Similarly, advocates of OSR such as Esfeld, French and Ladyman emphasise that the non-supervenient relations implied by quantum entanglement undermine the ontological priority conferred on individuals in most traditional metaphysics. Some relations are at least ontologically on a par with individuals so that either relations are ontologically primary or neither is ontologically primary or secondary. (Esfeld 2004 and Oliver Pooley 2006 hold the latter view but Esfeld goes further and claims that if there are intrinsic properties they are ontologically secondary and derivative of relational properties (see below).)