 Another problem is that, as a theory of territory, it seems very demanding. If states do not have rights over territory unless they are just states, then, one implication of the argument is that even on a relatively minimalist view of justice (involving guarantees of human rights and due process), no state legitimately exercised territorial rights over its political community at any time prior to the twentieth century, and most states, even now, do not have legitimate territorial rights over their area (Banai 2014). But this seems counter-intuitive. One of the reasons why imperialism was thought to be wrong is that it represents a violation of the colonized state’s territorial rights. But if, say, Morocco had no territorial rights over its territory in the nineteenth Century, when it was colonized by France (on the reasonable assumption that Morocco was not, at the time, human rights-respecting), then there was no specific wrong about imperialism, or indeed any specific violation in French governance over that territory. Of course, we could just say that French rule turned out to be wrongful because it turned out to be unjust, but that argument would also apply to the rule that preceded imperialism and the rule after decolonization, which some have argued is counter-intuitive (Moore 2014, 2015, 2019a).