  To most, line \(B\) seems to be longer, but a careful measurement reveals that \(A\) and \(B\) are of equal lengths. Despite knowing of the illusion, however, line \(B\) continues to seem longer to many. Nevertheless, given that it also seems that a reliable measuring indicates that the lines are of equal length, one is not justified in believing that \(B\) is longer, despite it continuing to seem that way. This result holds even when we appreciate our fallibility and the fallibility of measuring instruments. A parallel account appears to apply to cases of peer disagreement. Even if your original belief continues to seem true to you, you have become aware of information that significantly questions that seeming state. Further, we can imagine a scenario where \(P\) seems true to me and I subsequently discover 10,000 peers and superiors on the issue that disagree with me about \(P\).  Nevertheless, when I contemplate \(P\), it still seems true to me. In such a case, sticking to my guns about \(P\) seems to neither be doing the best that I can nor the reasonable thing to do.