 If Descartes affirms premise 2, it explains why he thinks he’s entitled to this more expansive rule, and without relaxing his epistemic standards. Indeed, a number of texts indicate that he holds some version of premise 2. In the relevant Sixth Meditation passage, Descartes adds that from “the very fact that God is not a deceiver” there is a “consequent impossibility of there being any falsity in my opinions which cannot be corrected by some other faculty supplied by God” (AT 7:80, CSM 2:55f). In another passage he writes that we would be “doing God an injustice” if we implied “that God had endowed us with such an imperfect nature that even the proper use of our powers of reasoning allowed us to go wrong” (Prin. 3:43, AT 8a:99, CSM 1:255). And in the Second Replies, Descartes addresses case of judgments that “could not be corrected by any clearer judgements or by means of any other natural faculty,” adding that “in such cases I simply assert that it is impossible for us to be deceived” (Replies 2, AT 7:143f, CSM 2:102f). These passages make a strong case that something like premise 2 is in play, indeed implying that God’s benevolent nature entails a more expansive rule of truth than the C&amp;D Rule. As will emerge, Descartes looks again to call on this more expansive rule in his effort to prove that he is not dreaming.