 There are three responses available here: the first is to bite the bullet, accept the restriction to  Naive Dominance,  and therefore accept a restriction on the cases in which Probabilism holds; the second is to argue that the practical case and the epistemic case are different, with different decision-theoretic principles applying to each; the third, of course, is to abandon the accuracy argument for Probabilism. Joyce (2018) and Pettigrew (2018a) argue for the first response. They advocate different decision-theoretic principles to replace  Naive Dominance  in the epistemic case: Joyce advocates standard causal decision theory together with a Ratifiability condition (Jeffrey 1983); Pettigrew omits the ratifiability condition. But they both agree that these principles will agree with  Naive Dominance  in cases of act-state independence; and they agree with the verdict that \(c^\dag\) is the only credence function that isn’t ruled out as irrational in Thwarted Accuracy. Konek &amp; Levinstein (2019) argue for the second response, claiming that, since doxastic states and actions have different directions of fit, different decision-theoretic principles will govern them. They hold that  Naive Dominance  (or, perhaps, Undominated Dominance) is the correct principle when the options are credence functions, even though it is not the correct principle when the options are actions. Caie (2013) and Berker (2013b), on the other hand, argue for the third option.