  While there are plausible alternative reactions to fission that  maintain the importance of the identity relation (see, e.g., Lewis  1976, Sider 2001a) – and such views will be explored later  – for now it is important to see what Parfit's version would  mean, if anything, for our practical concerns. What, after all, do we do if identity is not what matters in survival? Given that we have  for the most part been assuming that identity is the relation  grounding our patterns of concern, we are now faced with two options: either we take those patterns of concern to be unjustified  or we find new grounds for them. In Reasons and Persons,  Parfit is officially agnostic on the proper approach (he claims that  arguments for both stances are defensible, yet also can be defensibly denied; see Parfit 1984, 311–312). Nevertheless, it surely seems most plausible to retain the patterns of concern formerly grounded on  identity and simply find a new justification for them. And it seems  obvious that Relation R could provide such a justification. After  all, if we formerly thought identity justified these patterns insofar as it was what we thought mattered for survival, but it turns out  that identity – Relation R plus uniqueness – is not what  matters only because uniqueness is not what matters, then it seems natural and plausible to cite the remaining  aspect of identity (Relation R) as what grounds our patterns of  concern in virtue of being what truly matters in survival (see, e.g., Jeske 1993). How, in other words, could  uniqueness have provided all the relevant justifications? Indeed, Parfit himself seems drawn to such a conclusion in the discussion of rationality and morality that follows. He calls it the Moderate Claim (Parfit 1984, 311).  (This is in contrast to the Extreme Claim, which is that the further fact of identity is what grounds our practical concerns, so to the extent there is no such further fact, our practical concerns are ungrounded.)