 It would be hard to understate the importance of the above ideas to the subjectivist tradition. It is a major testament to the originality of Ramsey’s essay that it contains not only the first appearances of two of the main contemporary arguments for probabilistic norms on partial belief, but also an influential case for a normative link between partial beliefs and known frequencies. Furthermore, most attempts to characterise degrees of belief in the subjectivist tradition have made central appeal to their connection with preferences. (See de Finetti 1937, Savage 1954, Anscombe &amp; Aumann 1963, Maher 1993; for criticisms of the approach, see Joyce 1999, §1.3; Eriksson &amp; Hájek 2007.) Indeed, in much of philosophy, economics and psychology today, the default or orthodox way to operationalise degrees of belief is in terms of choices, along essentially the same lines that Ramsey put forward.