 Different assumptions ab initio regarding what sorts of inferences are legitimate, what sorts of evidence reasonably support belief, whether there is a genuine demand for the explanation of observable phenomena in terms of underlying realities, and so on, may render some arguments between realists and antirealists question-begging. This diagnosis is arguably facilitated by van Fraassen’s (1989: 170–176, 1994: 182) intimation that neither realism nor antirealism (in his case, empiricism) is ruled out by plausible canons of rationality; each is sustained by a different conception of how much epistemic risk one should take in forming beliefs on the basis of one’s evidence. An intriguing question then emerges as to whether disputes surrounding realism and antirealism are resolvable in principle, or whether, ultimately, internally consistent and coherent formulations of these positions should be regarded as irreconcilable but nonetheless permissible interpretations of scientific knowledge (Chakravartty 2017; Forbes forthcoming).