 The virtue of wisdom presents another set of problems for the connection of virtue with the will, which is essential to Foot’s account. Unlike other virtues, wisdom seems primarily to be an excellence of the intellect rather than the will. Yet Foot argues that just because a putative virtue concerns the intellect does not mean that the will is not also essential to it. For her, wisdom has two components. First, it includes knowledge of the all-purpose means to very general good ends. She includes here ends such as “friendship, marriage, the bringing up of children, or the choice of ways of life” (1978 [VV 5]). Such knowledge is within the reach of anyone who wants it, since one need not be especially clever in order to acquire it and, in this way, it is unlike specialized scientific knowledge, which is something within the grasp of a lucky few who possess the necessary talent and opportunity to pursue it. This means that the knowledge involved in wisdom is within the scope of the will: we can get it if we want it, and therefore we can in fairness be evaluated for our success or failure in its realization.