 Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons claim that even if the ethical realist endorses reduction, they face a further explanatory burden before they can fully explain supervenience: “Even if goodness, for instance, is identical to some specific natural property, there remains the task of explaining why this natural property, rather than any other one(s), counts as the correct referent of the term ‘goodness’” (1992, 230; emphasis in original). This is a fair explanatory demand, if we interpret it as the familiar challenge to provide a plausible theory of reference for ethical terms (a demand that Horgan and Timmons have pressed incisively). However this challenge does not appear to have anything distinctive to do with supervenience. Either the reductive naturalistic realist can explain the reference of ‘wrong,’ in which case she can also explain supervenience, or she cannot explain the reference of ‘wrong,’ in which case her view is implausible for reasons that have nothing to do with supervenience.