 Other developments within hermeneutics have been much more favorable toward the renewed interest in realism. Some philosophers, such as Günter Figal and Anton Koch, have discerned important affinities between hermeneutics and new realism, and, in turn, have developed positions that they have identified as ‘hermeneutical realism.’ Hermeneutical realism opposes the postmodern view that interpretations constitute reality, maintaining, by contrast, that interpretive experience belongs to reality. Figal, in his hermeneutical realism, develops his realistic approach principally in terms of the phenomenological problem of appearance. In this, he focuses on space, grasped as what first places us in referential relations to objects, and, with this, makes available interpretive possibilities to determine the sense of them (Figal, 2009, 2010 and 2015). Koch, for his part, develops his hermeneutical realism on the basis of motifs found in German Idealism, arguing for the necessity of the subject, grasped in its spatio-temporal, corporeal, and living subjectivity, as what makes things interpretable (as he has it, readable and translatable) (Koch 2016 and 2019). Thus, on his view, while real things are independent of individual interpretations, such things are not independent of being interpretable in general.