 Levinas does not propose a solution to the conundrum of how non-objective memories can be translated into objects for philosophical reflection. His aim is to deconstruct dialogue down to its embodied condition of possibility, and this leads to a discussion which is not so unlike Husserl’s genetic inquiries into “proto-intentionality [Urintentionalität]” explored in the 1920s. Unlike Husserl, however, he does not aim at a system consisting of levels of drives and affects formatted by higher egoic structures (Husserl, E Manuscript III 9/5a, cited in hu-GDP: lixff). Yet he does exploit a difficulty that beset Husserl’s early phenomenology of time-consciousness, one that would argue in favor of Levinas’ 1974 conception of “diachrony”, or the interruption that he equates with transcendence-in-immanence. This was the paradox of sensation in relation to intentionality that Husserl identified in Appendix 12 of his lectures on internal time consciousness (Hua 10:  130–133).[34]  In his 1965 essay, “Intentionality and Sensation” (DEH: 135–150), Levinas focused on the gap (i.e., diachrony) between bodily sensation entering intentionality and sensation as pre-conscious bodily processes. He recalled the paradox that the sensuous origins of intentionality lay outside intentionality’s field or reach, in the body, even as the ongoing alterations of sensation forge our feeling of ongoing temporal progression. To be explicitly experienced, sensation thus had to intentionalize. Yet much of its prior, bodily existence eludes our consciousness.