  A different version of plenitudinous platonism is developed in Linsky &amp; Zalta 1995 and a series of further articles. (See, for instance, Linsky &amp; Zalta 2006 and other articles cited therein.) Traditional platonism goes wrong by “conceiv[ing] of abstract objects on the model of physical objects” (Linsky &amp; Zalta 1995, p. 533), including in particular the idea that such objects are “sparse” rather than plenitudinous. Linsky &amp; Zalta develop an alternative approach on the basis of the second author’s “object theory”. The main feature of object theory is a very general comprehension principle which asserts the existence of a plenitude of abstract objects: for any collection of properties, there is an abstract object which “encodes” precisely these properties. In object theory, moreover, two abstract objects are identical just in case they encode precisely the same properties. Object theory’s comprehension principle and identity criterion are said to “provide the link between our cognitive faculty of understanding and abstract objects” (ibid., p. 547). (See Ebert &amp; Rossberg 2007 for critical discussion.)