 There have been similar disputes, transacted on the basis of more introspective considerations, concerning the effects of attention on the perception of ambiguous figures (such as the Necker Cube). In response to some considerations that were first raised by Fiona Macpherson (Macpherson, 2006), Bence Nanay has suggested that the effects of attention on the perception of such figures can be explained by those who maintain that every difference in consciousness is a difference of content (Nanay, 2010, 2011). His contention is that the effects of attention on the character of conscious experience should be understood as including a modulation of the specificity of an experience’s content, in which the representations of determinable properties are made more or less determinate. The issues here are similar to those concerning the way in which blurriness should be thought to enter into visual experience (see Section 4.4 of the entry on  representational theories of consciousness).