 However, Boghossian (2015: 341) points out that there is a crucial disanalogy between this case and the extended disposition to break on Alpha Centauri plausibly ascribed to the glass. To think of the dispositions the glass has on earth as manifesting themselves on Alpha Centauri, we don’t need to think of the glass in any way that is inconsistent with its nature as a physical object. It can be regarded as having the same intrinsic physical characteristics on Alpha Centauri as it has on earth, and if it is true that, given those characteristics, it would break if struck on Alpha Centauri, that suffices for the attribution of the extended disposition to break on Alpha Centauri. Matters stand differently with Jones. In order to think of Jones’s dispositions to respond in accessible cases as manifesting themselves in inaccessible cases, we would have to think of her in a way that is inconsistent with her nature as a finite biological being. This is because responding to queries involving inaccessible numbers would require, let’s suppose, a brain the size of the universe. But the fact that with a brain the size of the universe the sum would be produced no more warrants the attribution of the relevant extended disposition to Jones than does the fact that with a brain the size of the universe she would outplay Magnus Carlsen warrant the attribution to her of the potential to win the world chess championship. Jones has no extended disposition of the sort adumbrated by  Blackburn.[10]  The upshot, then, is that Jones’s dispositions do not determine whether she means plus rather than some quus-like function by ‘+’, where quus diverges from plus for inaccessible  numbers.[11]