 In the SN Paul had spoken of the active intellect in terms of a separated substance. The active intellect is connected to the possible intellect and the human soul by inherence and to the phantasm as the phantasm is directly present before it (cf. SN, p. v, ch. 38, fol. 89ra). On the contrary, in the commentary on the De anima, he (1) identifies the active intellect with God Himself, considered as the first cause, and its own activity with God’s activity of illumination in and outside the soul, and (2) affirms that the active intellect is joined to the possible intellect neither by inherence nor by information, but as a form directly present in it (In De an., III, t.c. 19, fol. 143ra). This fact explains why the first of the four main effects produced by the active intellect is set in the external world, and the fourth one both in the external world and in the human mind. In turn, the mutual connections and distinctive features of the actions performed by the active intellect explain why (1) individuals are proper objects of intellection for us; (2) the intelligible species is singular and not universal; and (3) the same intelligible species by means of which we grasp substantial essences is the medium in virtue of which we can understand the peculiar structure of the individual which instantiates that essence (In De an., III, t.c. 11, fols. 136vb and 137rb-va)—all theses which are just the opposite of the most common realist convictions on the matter, as Paul himself points out (In De an., III, t.c. 27, fol. 137va).