 The linguistic analogy relies on experimental evidence about the nature and pattern of our moral intuitions, and it outlines an important role for experiments in moral theory. If the analogy holds, then a descriptively adequate moral theory must be based on the judgments of competent moral judges (although a reformist moral theory need not, or at least not to the same extent), just as grammatical rules are constructed based on the judgments of competent speakers. A pressing task will be the systematic collection of such judgments. The analogy also suggests a kind of rationalism about moral judgment, since it posits that our judgments result from the unconscious application of rules to cases. Finally, the analogy might have metaethical implications. Just as we can only evaluate grammaticality of utterances relative to a language, it may be that we can only evaluate the morality of an action relative to a specific moral system. How to individuate moralities, and how many (assuming there are multiple ones) there are, is a question for further empirical investigation, and here again experimental evidence will play a crucial role.