 Egan and Elga think that the significance of evidence of anti-reliability is taken into account by seeing it as obligating a subject to revise her first-order belief. However, their view implies that to be rational such a revision must be done without attributing anti-expertise to oneself. One can revise whenever one wants of course, but any revision should have a reason or motivation. If one does not give any credence at all to the possibility one is an anti-expert, then what is one’s reason to revise one’s first-order belief? There would seem to be no other way to take on board and acknowledge the evidence of your anti-expertise than to give some credence to its possibility. Egan and Elga say that the belief the evidence should lead a subject to is that she has been an anti-expert and that should lead her to revise (Egan &amp; Elga 2005: 86). But if she avoids incoherence by attributing anti-expertise only to a previous self, then that belief can’t be what leads her to revise her current view. If she does not attribute anti-expertise to her current self then she doesn’t give her current self any reason to revise.