 The same problem, moreover, appears to arise for other sorts of belief as well. Tyler Burge (1979) presents cases in which it seems intuitive that a person, Oscar, and his functionally equivalent counterpart have different beliefs about various syndromes (such as arthritis) and artifacts (such as sofas) because the usage of these terms by their linguistic communities differ. For example, in Oscar's community, the term ‘arthritis’ is used as we use it, whereas in his counterpart's community ‘arthritis’ denotes inflammation of the joints and also various maladies of the thigh. Burge's contention is that even if Oscar and his counterpart both complain about the ‘arthritis’ in their thighs and make exactly the same inferences involving ‘arthritis’, they mean different things by their terms and must be regarded as having different beliefs. If these cases are convincing, then there are differences among types of intentional states that can only be captured by characterizations of these states that make reference to the practices of an individual's linguistic community. These, along with the Twin Earth cases, suggest that if functionalist theories cannot make reference to an individual's environment, then capturing the representational content of (at least some) intentional states is beyond the scope of functionalism. (See Section 4.4 for further discussion, and Searle 1980, for related arguments against “computational” theories of intentional states.)