 Principia Ethica also took the impartialism of its view to be analytic, and in particular claimed that ethical or rational egoism, which says each person should pursue only his own good, is self-contradictory. (Despite his interest in personal love, Moore never considered the intermediate view that Broad (1971)) would call self-referential altruism, according to which each person should care more about the good of those close to him, such as his family and friends.) Sidgwick had claimed that if a rational egoist confines himself to saying that each person’s pleasure is good for him, or from his point of view, he cannot be argued out of his position (1907: 420–21). But Moore argued that the concept of agent-relative goodness invoked here is unintelligible (1903: 97–102/1993: 148–53), and that conclusion does follow from his view that goodness is simple and unanalyzable. If goodness is a simple property, how can a state such as person A’s pleasure have this property “from one point of view” but not “from another”? (Compare squareness. An object cannot be square from one point of view but not from another; it either is square or is not.) All that talk of the good “for” a person can pick out, he urged, is what is simply good and located in that person; and simple goodness gives everyone equally reason to pursue it. In Ethics Moore abandoned this argument, saying that egoism cannot be proven false by any argument, even though he thought its falsity is self-evident (1912: 228–32/1947: 141–43/1965: 98–100). But it is not clear how he could make this concession if he still held, as he preferred to, that goodness is a simple property. Perhaps he was tacitly allowing, as he would in the uncompleted draft Preface to Principia Ethica (1993: 5, 14–15), that it would not centrally damage his position if good were analyzed in terms of ought, as it had been by Sidgwick. There is no contradiction in saying that what each person ought to desire is different, say, just his own pleasure. But if all oughts derive from a simple property of goodness, as Moore always preferred to hold, all oughts must be impartial.