 Hume and Kant share several influences, so there are unsurprising areas of overlap. First, like most eighteenth-century philosophers, both regard the pursuit of virtue as central to human morality. Second, Kant sides with Hume and Hutcheson against the psychological egoism associated with Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, and Mandeville (Wilson 2015b; on this debate within British moral philosophy, see Crisp 2019 and Maurer 2019). Third, they both accept of versions of Grotius’s influential distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, though their uses of the distinction differ (see Schneewind 1990). Fourth, their respective conceptions of virtue are secular by historical standards. Neither recognizes duties to God, for example, and neither counts piety, hope, or monkish self-abasement among the virtues (e.g., EPM 9.1.3 and C 27:379–80).