 \(f\) is a correlated strategy system because the agents tie their strategies, by following their recommendations, to the same set of states of the world \(\Omega\). \(f\) is also a strict Aumann correlated equilibrium, for if each agent knows how Ron makes his recommendations, but knows only the recommendation he gives her, either would do strictly worse were she to deviate from her  recommendation.[26]  Since there are several strict equilibria of Chicken, \(f\) corresponds to a convention as defined in Vanderschraaf (1998). The overall expected payoff vector of \(f\) is (3,3), which lies outside the convex hull of the payoffs for the game’s Nash equilibria and which Pareto-dominates the expected payoff vector (4/3, 4/3), of the mixed Nash equilibrium defined by \(\alpha_1 = 2/3\), \(i = 1,  2.\)[27]  The correlated equilibrium f is characterized by the probability distribution of the agents’ play over the strategy profiles, given in Figure 3.3: