To emphasize the point, consider the everyday concept of a soul, understood as something that is present in conscious beings and survives death. This concept of a soul can be captured by the analytic Carnap sentence: “If certain entities inhabit conscious beings and survive death, then they are souls”. Accordingly, this Carnap sentence will be agreed by everybody who has the concept of soul, whether or not they believe in souls. Yet this Carnap sentence will not per se raise any interesting metaphysical questions for those who deny the existence of souls. These deniers won’t start wondering how the fundamental constituents of reality realize souls—after all, they don’t believe in souls. It is only those who accept the corresponding Ramsey sentence (“There are parts of conscious beings that survive death”) who will see a metaphysical issue here. Moreover, the Ramsey sentence will pose this metaphysical issue whether or not it is accompanied by some analytic Carnap sentence to provide some shorthand alternative terminology. In short, the methodological naturalist can insist that anybody interested in “serious metaphysics” should start by articulating the substantial existential commitments of our folk theories, as articulated in their synthetic Ramsey sentences. Any further analytic conceptual commitments add nothing of philosophical significance.