  The second tenet of FA theory is its response-dependent account of value, on which values are partly determined by human responses and attitudes. As David Wiggins (1987: 206) describes the view, considered as a general theory of value, it holds: “x is good if and only if x is the sort of thing that calls forth or makes appropriate a certain sentiment of approbation given the range of propensities we have to respond in this or that way.” Notice that Wiggins's formulation is deliberately equivocal on the crucial point of whether the sentiment must be merited or merely caused. It allows for both response-dependent views that embrace normative reduction (by using a notion of “appropriate” sentiments) and views that instead reduce value to natural facts (about what sentiments are “called forth”). This illustrates why it is not trivial to characterize fitting attitude theories of value in terms of attitudes deemed to be fitting—that is, via response-dependency and normative reduction. This way of articulating the two tenets of FA theory has the significant implication of ruling out those theories of value that hold one tenet but not the other, which helps settle some outstanding taxonomic issues. Certain “buck-passing” accounts hold the normative reduction claim without response-dependency, whereas dispositional theories, including certain forms of sentimentalism, hold response-dependency without reducing value to another normative notion. This will be discussed further in the sections on buck-passing and sentimentalism.