 Still, what is characteristic of this tradition is a specific interpretation of the idea of the conclusion being contained/understood (intelligitur) in the premises — that is, condition (Co) – which these authors rely on extensively to define the concept of formal consequence. We have seen that for Abelard, something like (Co) is a necessary condition for all consequences/inferences, which Martin (2004) spells out in terms of a criterion of relevance. 13th century authors, such as Kilwardby (for whom (Co) provided the definition of natural consequences) and Faversham, also discussed variations of this idea (Read 2010, 177/8), but prior to the late 14th century, it was not always formulated in epistemic/psychological terms. The authors in the 14th century British tradition typically formulate the definition of formal consequence on the basis of variations of (Co), but giving it a very explicitly epistemic twist.