 Sherwood is also noteworthy for being the first logician we know of to treat ‘is’ as a syncategorematic term (Kretzmann 1968, p. 90). He argues that ‘is’ is equivocal, in that it can indicate either (1) actual being (esse actuale) or (2) habitual being (esse habituale) (Kretzmann 1968, p. 92, Kretzmann 1966, p. 125; Kretzmann translates habituale as ‘relational’ in Kretzmann 1966 and as ‘conditional’ in Kretzmann 1968). As a result, the sentence “Every man is an animal” is ambiguous. When ‘is’ is taken to indicate actual being, “Every man is an animal” “is false when no man exists” (Kretzmann 1968, p. 93). When ‘is’ is taken to indicate habitual being, then “insofar as [”Every man is an animal“] is necessary it has the force of this conditional: ‘if it is man it is an animal’” (Kretzmann 1966, p. 125). In analyzing universal affirmative categorical sentences in this way, Sherwood can be seen as an ‘early adopter’ of our modern truth conditions for these sentences. A consequence of this view is a commitment to the existence of possibilia, things that could exist but which do not; such possibilia have a diminished sort of being (esse diminutum) (Kretzmann 1968, p. 93). This was an unusual position in the thirteenth century (Knuuttila 1993), and it was later denounced by William of Ockham (Freddoso &amp; Schuurman 1980, p. 99).