 We conclude by briefly sketching two further, and problematic, key steps in the metaphysical section of the Perfect City and Political Regime, namely Fârâbî’s argument that the First is both intelligence [ʿaql = Greek nous] and intelligible [maʿqûl = noêton], and his argument that the First is a cause of existence to other things, and immediately to a single Second, the immaterial intelligence which moves the outermost sphere (in the Perfect City), or to a small finite number of Seconds, the immaterial intelligences which move the different heavenly spheres (in the Political Regime). By arguing that the First is intelligence and intelligible, Fârâbî tries to derive versions of the attributes of knowledge and truth standardly ascribed to God, and by arguing that it produces a Second he tries to derive a version of the act of creation standardly ascribed to God. But he is deriving radically stripped-down versions of these attributes and acts, since the First directly knows only itself, and directly creates only the Second (or a few Seconds), even if it may be said as a consequence to indirectly know and create other things too.