 Three primary methodological devices or procedures are at work in Hartshorne’s metaphysics. First, he very often uses a systematic exhaustion of theoretical options—or the development of position matrices, sometimes containing thirty-two alternatives(!)—in considering philosophical problems. This procedure is evident throughout his philosophy, but it is most apparent in his various treatments of the ontological argument. To take another example, he thinks it important to notice that regarding the mind-body problem there are three options available to us, not two, as is usually assumed: some form of dualism, some form of the materialist view that psyche is reducible to body, and some form of the panpsychist (or, as he terms it, psychicalist) view that body is in some way reducible to psyche if all concrete singulars (e.g., cells or electrons) in some way show signs of self-motion or activity. Thomas Nagel famously considers this third option, but Hartshorne actually defends it. The recent surge of interest in panpsychism indicates that Hartshorne was ahead of his time by several decades in his ideas in philosophy of mind.