 Two further philosophical questions about the notion of artistic interpretation take on a particularly complex dimension in relation to conceptual art. First, exactly what information is relevant in artistic interpretation? And, more importantly, to what extent should the artist’s intention be allowed to determine the appropriate interpretation? Views differ widely on this topic. In their article, ‘The Intentional Fallacy’, William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley famously argue in relation to the literary arts that the only kind of evidence that is relevant to interpretation is that which is internal to the work in question. (Wimsatt &amp; Beardsley 1946). An artist’s intention or design is of no interpretative significance. Obviously, this position seems difficult to defend in the case of conceptual art: when we are dealing with pieces such as Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, where the internal evidence is clearly insufficient to discern that it is an artwork in the first place, it seems that we need to know that Warhol intended the boxes to be viewed qua art, at the very least.