 Timothy Williamson (2007) has developed a theory of modal knowledge based on our capacity for counterfactual reasoning, which distinctively deploys imagination in the development of a counterfactual. The topic of  imagination  has gained widespread attention in contemporary debates within philosophy, logic, and the cognitive sciences. The focus has been on the epistemic uses of imagination for both quotidian non-modal knowledge (e.g., knowledge of others’ mental states, learning, planning and decision making) as well as various kinds of modal knowledge (see, e.g., Currie &amp; Ravenscroft 2002; Kind &amp; Kung 2016; Kind 2020; Badura &amp; Kind 2021; Kosslyn, Ganis, &amp; Thompson 2003; Nichols 2006). Theories of modal epistemology that rely to various extents on imagination need not be rationalist; in fact, they are often empiricist. Here we only discuss Williamson’s counterfactual imagination account. For further work on imagination-based accounts, whether rationalist or empiricist, see, e.g., Gregory (2004, 2010, 2020), Byrne (2007), Kung (2010), Ichikawa and Jarvis (2012), Casullo (2012a), and Lam (2018) (On the other hand, note that Hill 2006, Kroedel 2012, and Kment 2014 have offered theories of modal knowledge that variously appeal to counterfactuals and counterfactual reasoning, which do not centrally involve imagination).