 Now, given Otherwise than Being’s rapprochement between the third party and illeity, must the third party not admit two distinct, even irreconcilable senses? The 1961 sense would still refer to social existence and the moderation of responsibility, while the 1974 sense would henceforth point to a radically absent Il, also called “God”. This too has consequences for the question of justice—i.e., whether it is primary to Levinas’ existential ethics, or secondary and largely derivative from responsibility. As we know, the Jewish tradition, and others as well, holds the judge responsible for fair decisions; this specialist of laws is also a member of the community and must obey the Law he adjudicates. This is more than simply a platitude; the judge’s dual status casts light on the competing priorities of responsibility versus justice. To explain his positions Levinas recurs to Psalm 82: “God stands in the divine assembly, among the divine beings. He pronounces judgment”. In other words, only if illeity refers to a transcendent absolute, viz., “God in the divine assembly”, can the third party (understood as the others or society) be raised above an everyday social function and confer on justice something like a regulative idea able to preserve a trace of transcendence.