 The basic idea of causal-doxastic theories is that a belief may be based on a reason if either an appropriate meta-belief is present (as in doxastic theories of the basing relation) or the reason causes the belief in an appropriate way (as in causal theories of the basing relation). One motive for such a view is to avoid superstitious-lawyer style counterexamples while preserving the intuition that a reason’s causing a belief can sometimes establish a basing relation. A second, more fundamental motive begins with the observation that a belief is based on a reason when one has, with regard to the belief, taken proper account of the evidential import of the reason. It would be odd if, e.g., the conscious evaluation and acceptance of the evidential import of a potential reason for a belief was, in principle, completely irrelevant to whether the belief was based on the reason. Intuitively, it seems that taking proper account of a reason may merely involve thinking about the evidential import of the reason in the appropriate way, and whether, in addition, the reason non-deviantly causes (or, causally sustains) the belief is merely a contingent, empirical matter.