 Foot proposes that we reject the demand that moral actions fit with a preconceived notion of practical rationality, such as a desire-satisfaction conception, and, instead, we ought to adopt the view that moral considerations are one set of considerations that generate reasons, among others kinds of considerations that a rational agent must take into account (NG 11). After all, if practical rationality is held to be an authoritative guide to action as well as a virtue, surely practical rationality must require an agent to take account of the moral features of ends. Whether or not practical rationality requires taking account of those features is clearly pertinent to whether it is a genuine virtue, much less a master virtue. This argument suggests that our standards of rationality should derive from our standards for goodness of the will, rather than the other way around. On this view, our conception of practical rationality must fit within our overall conception of the human good. Foot believes that we can see such an approach at work in the way we reject present-desire theories of reasons for action. We commonly think that someone who puts her future at risk for the sake of some trivial, transient desire is behaving foolishly. As Foot writes, 