 Let us begin with option (i). According to this option, in addition to whatever natural duties we have, we have only those further obligations that we have acquired through explicit promises or contracts. The difficulty with this option is that it does little to accommodate the range of special obligations acknowledged by commonsense morality. For example, most of us do not make the sorts of promises that we make to spouses to all of our friends. I have never explicitly promised my best friend to love and care for her. This difficulty is even more apparent in the case of familial relationships. We do not enter into contracts with our parents of the form: take care of me as a child and I will reciprocate when you are older and need care. Nonetheless, it does seem that parents and children owe one another a special degree of concern and commitment. If the defender of special obligations is attempting to accommodate commonsense morality, then she will have done so to a very limited extent if she allows only those special obligations that are acquired through explicit contracts or promises.