On one version of this complaint (e.g., Feldman 2001, Conee 2014), it is said that EC per se does not generate the results essential to the contextualist resolution of SA, for example. That the propositions expressed by utterances of ‘knowledge’ sentences in ordinary contexts are true, for example, is not secured by EC on its own; only a substantive theory of what is required for the truth of a ‘knowledge’ claim (in context) can deliver that result. On another version, the objection is simply that EC does not correctly characterize the skeptic’s position at all. As we have seen, EC has it that skeptical claims express truths only relative to extraordinarily high epistemic standards. But surely, the objection runs, what is at issue between skeptics and non-skeptics is the quality of the evidence we in fact have, and whether we satisfy even our ordinary epistemic standards (see Kornblith 2000, 27; Feldman 2004, 32; cf. Feldman 1999, 2001).