Let us set aside Dworkin's intricate revisionism and return to the basic luck egalitarian project. To reiterate, the basic idea is that justice establishes a moral presumption in favor of equality in the advantages people have (in different versions of the view the idea of “advantage” is variously interpreted). The presumption is overturned when people have the opportunity to be as well off as others but make choices or behave in ways that (a) render them worse off than others and (b) make it the case that compensating them or ameliorating their condition to restore equality of condition between them and others is morally inappropriate or at least not a high priority moral desideratum. The b condition admits of two broadly different construals. One is that when an individual behaves in a way that renders him worse off than others, if some reasonable choice he might have made or reasonable behavior he might have performed would have lessened the probability that he would end up worse off, then there is less egalitarian reason to eliminate this shortfall in his advantage level. Another is that when an individual's faulty or undeserving choice or behavior renders him worse off than others, there is no, or less, egalitarian reason to eliminate this shortfall in his advantage level. The difference between these construals becomes evident if we imagine a person performing an heroic rescue, when she might reasonably and without blame have held back from rescue, and suffers misfortune as a result (Eyal 2007 and Temkin 2011).