 Approaches that focus on revising the notion that self-deception requires holding that p and ~p, the dual-belief requirement implied by traditional intentionalism, either introduce some “doxastic proxy” (Baghramian and Nicholson 2013) to replace one or both beliefs, or alter the content of the self-deceiver’s belief in a way that preserves tension without involving outright conflict. These approaches resolve the doxastic paradox either by denying that self-deceivers believe that p, the welcome but unwarranted belief (Audi 1982, 1988; Funkhouser 2005; Gendler 2007; Fernádez 2013), by denying that they believe that ~p, the unwelcome but warranted belief (Barnes 1997; Mele 2001), or by denying that they hold either that p or ~p (Edwards 2013; Porcher 2012). 