 (3) is true, but not knowable apriori. That said, if the meanings of these two names is just whatever they refer to, we lack any obvious explanation for why (3) isn’t knowable apriori. After all, it just turns out to be an instance of the law of self-identify—something which very plausibly is knowable apriori. The meaning descriptivist, however, can say that what (3) asserts is that two distinct descriptions are satisfied by the same object. Given what the relevant descriptions are likely to be here, this won’t be something that can plausibly be known apriori. (4) presents a different sort of challenge: if the name ‘Santa Claus’ fails to refer, then how can an utterance of this sentence count as meaningful? What, in other words, is such an utterance about? Again, the meaning descriptivist has an easy answer here. What (4) means is something like there is some unique bearded, jolly elf who lives at the North Pole. Finally, one might worry that if ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ just refer, and refer to the same thing, then it becomes rather difficult to see how Fred could believe something about the one but not about the other. But if Fred associates each name with a different description, and if those descriptions are crucial to the meaning of (5), then the problem simply dissolves.