 Where the previous approach to the Reconciliation Project relied on sanctions that an agent imposes on herself, the social sanctions strategy relies on costs imposed by others. This strategy is exemplified by Hobbes’ response to the Foole and Hume’s discussion of the harvesting dilemma, the latter of which Skyrms (1998) and Sobel (2009) identify with the game previously depicted in  Figure 2.  Hobbes maintains that to offensively violate a covenant is to make a choice that tends towards self-destruction, since others will be unwilling to enter into future covenants with one known to do so (Hobbes 1651: 15:5). Similarly, Hume argues that we make promises in order to create expectations of our future conduct, and that we keep promises in order to preserve the trust of others that is needed if we hope to enter into and benefit from future covenants (Hume 1740: 3.3.5: 8–12). As our earlier discussion of the evolution of cooperation anticipated, we can use the theory of repeated games to shed light on this strategy.