 But with this abstract promise comes a concrete threat. The principle tells us that when alternatives are blocked, when only one course of action is available, you are not responsible for what you do. As noted earlier, there are some extreme conditions, such as coercion, that can preclude responsibility by blocking alternatives. But suppose it turns out that even under standard conditions, no one has alternatives. Given PAP, no one is morally responsible for anything. Universal alternative-blockers have frequently appeared in the philosophical literature. They include bivalence, divine foreknowledge, divine sovereignty, mechanism, psychological determinism, and causal determinism. If, due to any of these, none of us can act otherwise than we actually act, then PAP will join in to produce a disturbing conclusion: we are never responsible for what we do. A less global but equally worrisome threat is that our principle will combine with some thesis entailing the widespread reduction of abilities, even if not their elimination. For example, situational, genetic, or socio-economic influences, while not universally blocking alternatives, could so severely limit them in particular cases that, with PAP in the background, moral praise and blame are no longer appropriate. (On the threat of “situationism”, see Nelkin 2005; McKenna &amp; Warmke 2017.)