 One dominant strand in modern medicine sees a disease as essentially a process that recurs across individuals in slightly different forms: a disease is an abstract kind that is realized in different ways (Carter 2003: Whitbeck 1977). But since a disease is a biological insult, distinguishing it from injury is very difficult. Perhaps injuries are not processes in the relevant sense but events. This essay assumes that the conceptual issues raised by illnesses, injuries and other medical conditions are similar enough to let us put this demarcation problem aside. Disability is another important and neglected topic in health and well-being. It will be addressed here only slightly, since the contemporary debates on disease and disability tend to go on in isolation from each other. Only rarely do authors such as Glackin (2010) tackle both. It is worth noting, though, that the disability debate is typically framed in a way that closely resembles the debate over disease. Medical model adherents judge disability to be the product of a functional impairment or failure in human physiology. This resembles what will be called below the naturalistic model of disease, at least as regards assessment of bodily impairment. It contends that people with disabilities, like people with diseases, are rendered worse off in virtue of these functional impairments, and the explanatory burden of their disadvantage is borne chiefly by the failure of their physiology or psychology to perform a natural function. A concept of disability as dysfunction has been resisted by rival pictures of disability that have made headway in recent decades.