 While many ideal consequentialists have treated knowledge as intrinsically good, in some cases supremely so, Principia Ethica did not, saying knowledge is a necessary component of the larger good of appreciating existing beauty but has little or no value in itself (1903: 199/1993: 248). Again Ethics may have reversed this view, citing knowledge several times as one ideal good that may be added to the hedonists’ good of pleasure (1912: 237, 247/1947 146, 152/1965: 102, 106). But Moore never saw any intrinsic value in achievement, for example in business or politics, or indeed in any active changing of the world. As John Maynard Keynes said, his chief goods were states of mind that “were not associated with action or achievement or with consequence. They consisted in timeless, passionate states of contemplation and communion, largely unattached to ‘before and after’” (Keynes 1949: 83).