 Legal probabilists have proposed to interpret proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the requirement that the defendant’s probability of guilt, given the evidence presented at trial, meet a threshold, say, \(&gt;\).95. Variations of this view are common (see, for example, Bernoulli 1713; DeKay 1996; Kaplan 1968; Kaye 1979b; Laplace 1814; Laudan 2006). This interpretation is, in some respects, plausible. From a legal standpoint, the requirement that guilt be established with high probability, still short of 1, accords with the principle that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the most stringent standard of all but “does not involve proof to an absolute certainty” and thus “it is not proof beyond any doubt” (R. v. Lifchus, 1997, 3 SCR 320, 335).