 Act-consequentialism is one of today’s leading moral theories. Broadly construed, it holds that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that its outcome is not evaluatively outranked by that of any available alternative. To evaluatively rank (hereafter, simply “rank”) a set of outcomes is to rank them along some evaluative dimension, such as their overall goodness, their goodness for the agent, their goodness for others besides the agent, or some combination of such things. And when we combine act-consequentialism with different ways of ranking outcomes, we get different versions of act-consequentialism. For instance, Benthamite utilitarianism (Bentham 1789) combines act-consequentialism with the view that outcomes are to be ranked in terms of their overall goodness and that the overall goodness of an outcome is simply a function of the intensities and durations of the pleasures and pains that it contains. On this theory, agents must always maximize hedonic utility—the net balance of pleasure over pain for all concerned. By contrast, ethical egoism (Shaver 2002 [2021]) is an act-consequentialist theory that ranks outcomes in terms of how good they are for the agent. It holds that one outcome outranks another if and only if it is better for the agent. And, so, ethical egoism implies that an agent ought to produce the outcome that’s best for themself even if it’s worse overall. In contrast to these two, self/other utilitarianism (Sider 1993: 128) holds that one outcome outranks another if and only if it outranks the other both in terms of how good it is and in terms of how good it is for others besides the agent. On this view, an agent may perform an act whose outcome is worse than that of some available alternative so long as that outcome is worse only for themself. And these three are but a few of the possibilities.