 Suppose that Achilles wants to run from \(A\) to \(B\) but there are infinitely many gods who—unbeknownst to one another and to Achilles—each have reason to stop him from getting to \(B\). God 1 resolves to instantaneously paralyse Achilles if and when he reaches halfway between \(A\) and \(B\). God 2 resolves to instantaneously paralyse Achilles if and when he reaches one quarter of the way from \(A\) to \(B\). … God \(n\) resolves to instantaneously paralyse Achilles if and when he reaches \(1/2^n\) of the way from \(A\) to \(B\). … Since all of the Gods are able to act on their resolve, Achilles is unable to move: for, if he moved, he would violate the intentions of infinitely many Gods. But, until he does move, none of the Gods act on their intentions. So what actually stops him from moving? Isn’t it absurd to suppose that someone can be rendered immobile by a nested sequence of conditional intentions upon which no one acts?