 Returning to the point of convergence with older specificationism, if the evolving conception of a dialectical activity and what makes it desirable is deliberative rather than arational, there must be reasons, and reasoning, that can modify not only one’s decisions about how to attain what one already straightforwardly wants, but also one’s view of what one is after.  That is, in the jargon, over and above instrumental rationality, deliberation of ends must be possible.  And that returns us to the question of the conception of reasons tied to this contrast between dialectical activity and mere actions.  Per the spirit of Brewer’s view, it shouldn’t be possible simply to spell out what practical reasoning correctly performed must amount to; since practical reasoning is an aspect of most or all dialectical activity, our grasp of what practical reasoning is will continue to develop alongside our grasp of such activities.  Nonetheless, a number of upshots for practical rationality stand out in Brewer’s discussion.