 Joseph Camp in 2002: 125–160 provides Belnap’s four values with quite a different intuitive motivation by developing what he calls a “semantics of confused thought”. Consider a rational agent, who happens to mix up two very similar objects (say, \(a\) and \(b)\) and ambiguously uses one name (say, ‘\(C\)’) for both of them. Now let such an agent assert some statement, saying, for instance, that \(C\) has some property. How should one evaluate this statement if \(a\) has the property in question whereas \(b\) lacks it? Camp argues against ascribing truth values to such statements and puts forward an “epistemic semantics” in terms of “profitability” and “costliness” as suitable characterizations of sentences. A sentence \(S\) is said to be “profitable” if one would profit from acting on the belief that \(S\), and it is said to be “costly” if acting on the belief that \(S\) would generate costs, for example as measured by failure to achieve an intended goal. If our “confused agent” asks some external observers whether \(C\) has the discussed property, the following four answers are possible: ‘yes’ (mark the corresponding sentence with \(\mathbf{Y})\), ‘no’ (mark it with \(\mathbf{N})\), ‘cannot say’ (mark it with ?), ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (mark it with Y&amp;N). Note that the external observers, who provide answers, are “non-confused” and have different objects in mind as to the referent of ‘\(C\)’, in view of all the facts that may be relevant here. Camp conceives these four possible answers concerning epistemic properties of sentences as a kind of “semantic values”, interpreting them as follows: the value \(\mathbf{Y}\) is an indicator of profitability, the value \(\mathbf{N}\) is an indicator of costliness, the value ? is no indicator either way, and the value Y&amp;N is both an indicator of profitability and an indicator of costliness. A strict analogy between this “semantics of confused reasoning” and Belnap’s four valued logic is straightforward. And indeed, as Camp (2002: 157) observes, the set of implications valid according to his semantics is exactly the set of implications of the entailment system \(E_{fde}\). In Zaitsev and Shramko 2013 it is demonstrated how ontological and epistemic aspects of truth values can be combined within a joint semantical framework. Kapsner (2019) extends Belnap’s framework by two additional values “Contestedly-True” and “Contestedly-False” which allows for new outcomes for disjunctions and conjunctions between statements with values \(\mathbf{B}\) and \(\mathbf{N}\).