  Such criticism should be distinguished from a weaker complaint about the Republic’s “utopianism.” One might concede to the Republic its psychology, concede the possibility of the ideal city, and nevertheless insist that  the ideal city is so unlikely to come about as to be merely fanciful. A hard-nosed political scientist might have this sort of response.  But this sounds like nothing more than opposition to political theory proposing ideals that are difficult to achieve, and it is not clear  what supports this opposition. It is not as though political  theorizing must propose ideas ready for implementation in order to  propose ideas relevant to implementation. The  Republic’s ideal can affect us very generally: we can  consider the unity and harmony fundamental to it, and consider  whether our own cities and souls should be allowed to fall short in  unity and harmony where they do. But it can also work in more  specific terms: we should be able to recognize and promote the  strategies and policies crucial to the Republic’s ideal,  including careful moral education societally and habitual regulation  of appetitive desire personally, or the equal opportunity for work  societally and the development of multiple kinds of psychological  attitudes personally.