 In 1897, Russell decided in effect, to sacrifice conditions (2.5) (2.6), and perhaps (2.2) to conditions (2.1), (2.3) and (2.4). In that year he read a paper to the Cambridge Apostles “Is Ethics a Branch of Empirical Psychology” in which he defined goodness as that which we desire to desire. (RoE: 71–78/Papers I: 100–104). Moral judgments (at least judgments about goodness) reduce to “statements of a psychological state” since to say something is good is to say that “we” desire to desire it, a statement well within the frontiers of psychology (whether “we” refers to the community at large or to the speaker whoever he or she may be). And of course, if judgments about goodness reduce to “statements of a psychological state”, they clearly reduce to statements about “what is, has been or will be”, since whether “we” desire to desire something is determined by whatever is the case in “our” minds. Are moral judgments liable to error? Only in so far as we can be mistaken about what we desire to desire, which is, perhaps, not very far. On the plus side, moral judgments will be true or false, and will have a conceptual connection (albeit an iffy one) to our actions and passions. Assuming that (at least sometimes) I actually desire what I desire to desire, the fact that (for me) X is good means that (at least sometimes) I will have a desire to pursue or promote X. Finally, it is perfectly possible to have bad or even evil desires, namely the desires I desire not to desire, thus solving a problem with Russell’s previous attempts at a desire-based ethic (see RoE: ch. 9/Papers I: ch. 39). Thus the answer Russell provides to his own question (“Is Ethics a Branch of Empirical Psychology?”) is a clear, but reluctant, yes.