 First, Newton’s achievement in the Opticks and in the Principia was understood to be of such philosophical import that few philosophers in the eighteenth century ignored it. Most of the canonical philosophers in this period sought to interpret various of Newton’s epistemic claims within the terms of their own systems, and many saw the coherence of their own views with those of Newton as a criterion of philosophical excellence. Early in the century, Berkeley grappled with Newton’s work on the calculus in The Analyst (1734) and with his dynamics in De Motu (1721), and he even mentioned gravity, the paradigmatic Newtonian force, in his popular work Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713). When Berkeley lists what philosophers take to be the so-called primary qualities of material bodies in the Dialogues, he remarkably adds “gravity” to the more familiar list of size, shape, motion, and solidity, thereby suggesting that the received view of material bodies had already changed before the second edition of the Principia had circulated widely. Remarkably, in that same year Roger Cotes, the editor of the second edition of Newton’s Principia, had argued in his editor’s preface that gravity should indeed be considered a primary quality along with the more familiar mechanist properties that had been the subject of so much discussion in previous years. (Newton himself approached the topic more cautiously.) For his part, Hume interpreted Newtonian natural philosophy in an empiricist vein and noted some of its broader implications in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1750). Newton’s work also served as the impetus for the extremely influential correspondence between Leibniz and the Newtonian Samuel Clarke early in the century, a correspondence that proved significant even for thinkers writing toward the century’s end. Unlike the vis viva controversy and other disputes between the Cartesians and the Leibnizians, which died out by the middle of the century, the debate between the Leibnizians and the Newtonians remained philosophically salient for decades, serving as an impetus for Émilie Du Châtelet’s influential work during the French Enlightenment, Foundations of Physics (1740), and also as one of the driving forces behind Kant’s development of the “critical” philosophy during the 1770s, culminating in the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. In addition, Newton’s work spawned an immense commentarial literature in English, French, and Latin, including John Keill’s Introduction to Natural Philosophy (1726), Francesco Algarotti’s Newtonianism for the Ladies (1738), Henry Pemberton’s A View of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophy (1728), Voltaire’s Elements of the Philosophy of Newton (1738), Willem Gravesande’s Mathematical Elements of Natural Philosophy (1747), Colin MacLaurin’s An Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries (1748), and many more besides. Moreover, two subsequent Continental editions of Newton’s text contained substantial philosophical engagements not only with his own ideas, but with those of his potential rivals like the great mathematician Johan Bernoulli and also Leibniz. The famous “Jesuit” (or “Geneva”) edition of Principia mathematica published by Fathers Le Seur and Jacquier in 1739-1744 in three volumes engaged substantially with Leibnizian ideas (Guicciardini 2015). And Émilie Du Châtelet wrote an extensive “analytical commentary” as part of her complete French translation of the Principia, published posthumously in 1759. Part of the idea was to translate Newton’s old “geometric” approach to physics into the new language of analysis, a project that was intertwined with numerous philosophical issues. Newton’s ideas and methods in mathematics, physics and philosophy therefore continued to be of substantial importance well into the Enlightenment.