 If propositions are the “things” that really have logical form, and sentences of English are not themselves propositions, then sentences of English “have” logical forms only by association with propositions. But if the meaning of a sentence is some proposition—or perhaps a function from contexts to propositions—then one might say that the logical form “of” a sentence is its semantic structure (i.e., the structure of that sentence’s meaning). Alternatively, one might suspect that in the end, talk of propositions is just convenient shorthand for talking about the semantic properties of certain sentences: perhaps sentences of a Begriffsschrift, or sentences of mentalese, or sentences of natural languages (abstracting away from their logically/semantically irrelevant properties). In any case, the notion of logical form has played a significant role in recent work on theories of meaning for natural languages. So an introductory discussion of logical form would not be complete without some hint of why such work is relevant, especially since attending to details of natural languages (as opposed to languages invented to study the foundations of arithmetic) led to renewed discussion of how to represent propositions that involve relations.