 The subject of (I)- and (O)-, and the predicate of (I)-propositions, have determinate supposition; the subject and predicate of (E)-, the subject of (A)-, and the predicate of (O)-propositions have confused and distributive supposition; and the predicate of (A)-propositions has merely confused supposition. This is common doctrine; what varies is how these modes are characterised. “It is determinate”, writes William of Sherwood, “when the locution can be expounded by means of some single thing” (tr. Kretzmann, p. 108), but adds a doubt: “It seems that when I say ‘a man is running’ [i.e. an I-proposition] the term ‘man’ does not supposit determinately, since [A] the proposition is indefinite, and [B] it is uncertain for whom the term ‘man’ supposits. Therefore it supposits [A] indefinitely and [B] uncertainly; therefore indeterminately” (pp.  115–6).[24]  But this is simply a matter of terminology, he replies – determinate supposition means suppositing for one, not for many, but for no particular one, for that would constitute discrete supposition. Note, however, that for Ockham, Burley and others, a term with determinate supposition supposits for everything of which it can be truly predicated. The sense in which it is true of one, rather than many, is that the proposition is true if true of one. The term still supposits for all. As Burley says: “The supposition is called ‘determinate’, not because a term suppositing determinately in this way supposits for one suppositum and not for another. Rather the supposition is called ‘determinate' because for the truth of a proposition in which the common term supposits determinately it is required that the proposition be made true for some determinate suppositum” (tr. Spade pp.  102–3).[25]