 Once conceptions have been explicated, it is possible to choose the appropriate conception with which to colligate phenomena. But how is the appropriate conception chosen? According to Whewell, it is not a matter of guesswork. Nor, importantly, is it merely a matter of observation. Whewell explained that “there is a special process in the mind, in addition to the mere observation of facts, which is necessary” (1849, 40). This “special process in the mind” is a process of inference. “We infer more than we see,” Whewell claimed (1858a, I, 46). Typically, finding the appropriate conception with which to colligate a class of phenomena requires a series of inferences, thus Whewell noted that discoverers’s induction is a process involving a “train of researches” (1857/1873, I, 297). He allowed any type of inference in the colligation, including enumerative, eliminative and analogical. Thus Kepler in his Astronomia Nova (1609) can be seen as using various forms of inference to reach the ellipse conception (see Snyder 1997a). When Augustus DeMorgan complained, in his 1847 logic text, about certain writers using the term “induction” as including “the use of the whole box of [logical] tools,” he was undoubtedly referring to his teacher and friend Whewell (see Snyder 2008).