  Putting aside the manifest difficulties involved in characterizing the pattern of holdings that would obtain in these subjunctive baselines, would the fact that redistribution has occurred relative to any of them count for or against them as such? With respect to (1) and (2) the answer is ‘no.’ The mere fact that some policy change leads to a different pattern of holdings than would have obtained had it not been implemented provides no reason to reject it.  Similarly, that a pattern of holdings differs from the pattern that would have obtained in the absence of any taxation would not in itself seem to give us reason to look upon the pattern of holdings that obtain with the tax positively or negatively. In both of these cases, our assessment of the policies should be based upon what we take to be their other morally relevant features, such as whether the changes they bring about further disadvantage vulnerable groups, lead to greater suffering, infringe people’s justified claims to things, and so on. (3), on the other hand, may appear to have basic moral significance. For although few would insist that all should receive exactly what they contributed to production, or that valuable social goals ought never to be pursued when they require that some receive more or less than what they contributed, many might feel that an economic system in which people regularly receive much less than what they contribute to production would be unjust.