 Although it is possible to hold the view that causation in the law shares nothing with causation in science and in everyday life (save use of the same word), such a view is very counterintuitive; some relation between the two concepts of causation surely exists. That leaves two more plausible views of this relation. A strong view of this relation would be that the concepts are the same. The three unified tests for legal causation last considered, and the two metaphysical views of proximate causation earlier mentioned, all would make such a strong relation plausible. A weaker view of this relation would be to regard part of the law’s concept of causation—“cause-in-fact”—to be the same as causation in science and everyday life, but to regard the other part—“proximate causation”—to be the conclusions of policy analyses having nothing to do with anything that could be thought of as causation in any ordinary sense.