 Moreover, some of the intuitionistic consequences of KP are thought to be bad enough. Even if ‘there are no unknown truths’ or ‘there are no undecided statements’ are intuitionistically tolerable, the following appears not to be: If \(p\) is unknown then \(\neg p\). Formally, \(\neg Kp \rightarrow \neg p\). This claim follows intuitionistically from \(p \rightarrow \neg \neg Kp\), which we have already established as an intuitionistic consequence of KP. But \(\neg Kp \rightarrow \neg p\) appears to be false for empirical discourse. Why should the fact that nobody ever knows \(p\) be sufficient for the falsity of \(p\)? See Percival (1990) and Williamson (1988) for further discussions of this and related problems surrounding the application of intuitionist anti-realism to empirical discourse.  DeVidi and Solomon (2001) disagree. They argue that the intuitionistic consequences are not unacceptable to one interested in an epistemic theory of truth—indeed they are central to an epistemic theory of truth.