 The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties features in many metaphysical theories, and it appears to be representation-independent: presumably, if mass is intrinsic it would remain such whatever we said or did. One idea behind the distinction is that a property had intrinsically is had only in virtue of an object’s own nature, while extrinsic properties are partly a matter of how the object stands to other objects. Some have argued that necessarily coextensive properties can differ in whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic (Dunn 1990a; Eddon 2011; Bader 2013; Marshall 2015; Hoffmann-Kloss 2015). Being an instance of Barak’s actual favorite property is plausibly extrinsic, but having a mass may well be intrinsic, even if mass is Barak’s favorite property, and even though, given it is actually his favorite property, anything in any possible world has the first property iff it has the second. The above-named philosophers disagree on how to characterize the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, but they share the view that it has to be hyperintensional.