 Kment (2006a, 2014, chs. 1–2) argues that modal force, and hence necessity and possibility, come in many degrees (cp. Williamson 2016). We often talk about such degrees of possibility when we say things like ‘Team \(A\) could more easily have won than Team \(B\),’ ‘Team \(A\) could easily have won’ or ‘Team \(A\) almost won.’ The first utterance states that \(A\)’s winning had a greater degree of possibility than \(B\)’s winning, while the second and third simply ascribe a high degree of possibility to \(A\)’s winning. A proposition’s degree of possibility is the higher the less of a departure from actuality is required for it to be true. Suppose, e.g., that Team \(A\) would have won if one of their players had stood just an inch further to the left at a crucial moment during the game. Then we can truly say that the team could easily have won. More formally, \(P\)’s degree of possibility is the higher the closer the closest \(P\)-worlds are to actuality (also see Lewis 1973a, §2.5; Lewis 1973b, §2.1; Kratzer 1991). Similarly, a truth’s degree of necessity is measured by the distance from actuality to the closest worlds where it is false. What metaphysical necessity, nomic necessity and the other grades of necessity have in common is that each of them is the property of having a degree of possibility that is above a certain threshold. What distinguishes them is a difference in their associated thresholds.