In the influential textualist and originalist movements, however, there has been a discernible trend away from arguments about restraining judges and toward arguments that textualism and originalism accurately identify the content of the law. Berman (2018, 1340–44) identifies this trend in originalist scholarship. (See also Whittington 2004, 608–09.) As Randy Barnett puts it, “the original meaning of the text provides the law that legal decision-makers are bound by” (Barnett 2013, 417). See, e.g., Calabresi and Prakash 1994, 552; Bork, 1990, 5, 144. Similarly, textualists seem to be gravitating towards the idea that “the text is the law.” Scalia 1997, 22; Scalia and Garner 2012, 383, 397–98; Easterbrook, 2017, 82. As Berman (2018, 1343 n. 60) points out, however, Scalia was not consistent in this regard. See Scalia and Garner 2012, xxviii–xxix, 22, 364–66, 394–96.