 But it is relatively common for logicians to claim that the logical principles that they endorse are valid in virtue of the meanings of the connectives involved. The intuitionist logician denies that A ∨¬A is true in virtue of the meanings of ∨ and ¬ though other logicians will say that it is, and it is difficult to adjudicate such disputes independently of a more substantial theory of the meanings of the connectives. This is yet another area where the dispute over logical pluralism runs into an older dispute in the philosophy of logic, and one that is ostensibly a question about meaning. The two key questions that remain for the success of this monist objection are i) which, if any, argument forms are guaranteed to preserve truth (perhaps in virtue of meaning) in any case whatsoever, and ii) if there are any such argument forms, are there enough of them to constitute a non-trival logic? 