 In many dialogues he condemns the use of images in knowing things and claims that true philosophical knowledge should avoid images. He would have had strong reasons for avoiding the use of myths: they are not argumentative and they are extremely visual (especially those he invented, which contain so many visual details as if he would have given instructions to an illustrator). But he didn’t. He wanted to persuade and/or teach a wider audience, so he had to make a compromise. Sometimes, however, he seems to interweave philosophy with myth to a degree that was not required by persuading and/or teaching a non-philosophical audience. The eschatological myths of the Gorgias, Phaedo and Republic, for instance, are tightly bound with the philosophical arguments of those dialogues (cf. Annas 1982); and the eschatological myth of the Phaedo “picks one by one the programmatic remarks about teleological science from earlier on in the dialogue, and sketches ways in which their proposals can be fulfilled” (Sedley 1990, 381). Some other times he uses myth as a supplement to philosophical discourse (cf. Kahn (2009) who argues that in the myth of the Statesman Plato makes a doctrinal contribution to his political philosophy; Naas (2018a, Chapter 2) offers an interesting interpretation of this myth, and (Chapter 3) discusses Michel Foucault’s reading of it. A number of chapters in Sallis (2017) and in Bossi and Robinson (2018) reassess the myth of the Statesman. One time, in the Timaeus, Plato appears to overcome the opposition between muthos and logos: human reason has limits, and when it reaches them it has to rely on myth (arguably, that also happen in the Symposium; for a very close reading of how Diotima’s speech interacts with Aristophanes’ myth of the androgyne see Hyland (2015).