(P) is plausible.  If x knows that y knows that p, x knows that p is true, since knowledge entails truth.  But plausibly, if x knows that p is true, x knows that p. Suppose, then, that our immutable being is an atemporal God, seeing time from without. God knows that Smith, at t, knows that it is now t.  God knows that Jones, at t+1, knows that it is now t+1.  By (P), God atemporally knows both propositions, without having to change — though if we impose the tokening requirement, we have to add that He can token them to Himself only through other sentences than “it is now t” and “it is now t+1”: for an atemporal being cannot truly token either. Swinburne objects: (P) does not just (say) predicate properties of an individual, but presents the individual to x a particular way, and y does not know what x does unless what y tokens to y presents that individual to y the same way what x tokens to x presents it to x (1993, 170–1).  However, this reply may equivocate on “what y knows.” It is one thing for x and y to know the same proposition, and another, perhaps, for the proposition to have the same overall cognitive significance for x and y. A mode of presentation might affect overall significance without providing further information that might be stated in a further proposition.  Still, (P) is in fact false.  If God tells me that He knows the date of the Second Coming, I know that God knows it: He cannot lie, and I know that He is omniscient anyway.  But I still do not know the day nor the hour.