 Critics by contrast have typically focused on particular problems that appear to arise for metaepistemical non-cognitivism without assuming such problems carry over by parity to metaethical expressivism. For example, according to Jon Kvanvig (2003: 176), metaepistemological non-cognitivism is incoherent (even if metaethical expressivism is not) because a defense of the view will have to presuppose the truth of certain norms of justification and explanation. In a similar vein, Michael P. Lynch (2009) suggests that “we lack any standpoint” from which we can make the position intelligible. This is because, for Lynch, as a prerequisite of holding the non-cognitivist’s position (including a denial of epistemic value facts), one must disengage from any commitment to epistemic values, which is to take up a standpoint disengaged from epistemic values; but this, he maintains, is a standpoint we cannot take up while inquiring. In this respect, the incoherence of metaethical non-cognitivism lies in its incompatibility with inquiry. For criticisms to incoherence-style arguments against epistemic expressivism (though these critiques fall short of outright endorsement of expressivism), see, e.g., Carter &amp; Chrisman 2012 and Kappel 2011).