 Consider another well-known example. Five patients at a hospital are in immediate need of different organs. One patient needs a kidney, another needs a liver, and so forth. If a surgeon used a healthy person undergoing routine tests as a resource for organs, killing him in the process, all of the five would be saved (Harman 1977: 3–4). The healthy person presumably has strong partial reasons to dissent from being used for his organs. But he also arguably has enough impartial reason to consent, namely, that five people will thereby be saved, such that overall he has sufficient reason to consent. So, assuming that the surgeon is trying to treat people only in ways to which they can rationally consent, she might not be treating the healthy person merely as a means, even if before she succeeds in putting him under, he is begging for his  life.[14]  If the account we are considering of using others, but not merely as means does entail that the bystander and the doctor in these two cases are not treating others merely as means, the account suffers from a significant flaw, according to some.