 Unlike Sample’s and Wolff’s appeals to disrespect, Vrousalis’s domination condition is distinct from the unfairness condition. However, it is unclear that Vrousalis’s account can do a better job of capturing intuitions about the scope of exploitation because, as Richard Arneson (2016) points out, it is difficult to see how the use of others’ vulnerabilities for self-enrichment is wrong if such use is not also unfair. He argues “One can readily identify examples in which people exploit the weaknesses of others—use these vulner- abilities to secure advantages for themselves—but in which there is no unfair division of advantages from the interaction and so nothing that qualifies as morally objectionable exploitation” (2016: 10). For example, suppose \(A\) is selling sandwiches and \(B\) is hungry. In such a case, \(B\) is vulnerable to \(A\): \(A\) controls a good that \(B\) desires and which contributes to her wellbeing. \(A\) can take advantage of this vulnerability to make a profit by selling \(B\) a sandwich. If \(B\) had her own sandwich with her she would not be willing to pay \(A\) for one of his, thus \(A\) can make use of \(B\)’s hunger to get her to pay him for the food. But unless the price \(A\) charges is also unfair—perhaps because \(A\) is the only seller, perhaps because \(B\) lacks a sandwich due to injustice, and so on—it is hard to see how \(A\)’s sandwich sale is wrong. Contrary to Vrousalis’s claims, it seems that unfairness is a necessary condition for exploitation.