  Before moving on, it is worth noting that a theory might be foundationally monist in its account of what values there are, but not recommend that people attempt to think or make decisions on the basis of the supervalue. A distinction between decision procedures and criteria of right has become commonplace in moral philosophy. For example, a certain form of consequentialism has as its criterion of right action: act so as to maximize good consequences. This might invite the complaint that an agent who is constantly trying to maximize good consequences will often, in virtue of that fact, fail to do so.  Sometimes concentrating too hard on the goal will make it less likely that the goal is achieved. A distinction between decision procedure and right action can provide a response—the consequentialist can say that the criterion of right action, (act so as to maximize good consequences) is not intended as a decision procedure—the agent should use whichever decision procedure is most likely to result in success. If, then, there is some attraction or instrumental advantage from the point of view of a particular theory to thinking in pluralist terms, then it is open to that theory to have a decision procedure that deals with apparently plural values, even if the theory is monist in every other way.  [6] 