 Despite philosophy of neuroscience’s continuing focus on cognitive/systems/computational-neuroscience (see the discussion in  section 7 above),  interest in neurobiology’s cellular/molecular mainstream appears to be increasing. One notable paper is Ann-Sophie Barwich and Karim Bschir’s (2017) historical-cum-philosophical study of G-protein coupled receptors (GPCRs). Work on the structure and functional significance of these proteins has dominated molecular neuroscience for the past forty years; their role in the mechanisms of a variety of cognitive functions is now empirically documented beyond question. And yet one finds little interest in, or even notice of this shift in mainstream neuroscience among philosophers. Barwich and Bschir’s yeoman history research on the discovery and development of these objects pays off philosophically. The role of manipulability as a criterion for entity realism in the science-in-practice of wet-lab research becomes meaningful “only once scientists have decided how to conceptually coordinate measurable effects distinctly to a scientific object” (2017: 1317). Scientific objects like GPCRs get assigned varying degrees of reality throughout different stages of the discovery process. Such an object’s role in evaluating the reality of “neighboring elements of enquiry” becomes a part of the criteria of its reality as well.