  Observe that \(F_U\) is not merely some property possessed by every \(p\) which happens to have one of \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\). (The property of being a sentence is one such a property, but it poses no trouble to the pluralist.) Rather, \(F_U\) must be an alethic property whose extension perfectly positively covaries with the combined extension of the pluralist truth properties \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\). And since nothing is required for the existence of this new property other than the truth properties already granted by the pluralist, (38) gives a necessary and sufficient condition for \(F_U\) to be had by some \(p\): a sentence \(p\) is \(F_U\) just in case \(p\) is \(F_1 \vee \cdots \vee F_n\). Thus, any sentence that is any of \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\) may be true in some more generic or universal way, \(F_U\). This suggests, at best, that strong pluralism is false, and moderate monism is true; and at worst, there seems to be something instable, or self-refuting, about pluralism.