 Interestingly, there was only one response to Collins’ book in England. Samuel Clarke reviewed it and argued that the notion of a ’necessary agent’ was incoherent, for to be an agent one must be active and Collins’ position was that the humans are completely passive and thus (in Clarke’s sense) not agents at all. Clarke charges that in discussing being able to do otherwise, Collins fails to distinguish between physical and moral necessity (see Harris 2005: 59). Clarke also complained that Collins treated perception as actions, when in fact, perception is passive (Clarke 1738 [1928: 722]). Clarke develops his own account of free will arguing that motives, pleasures and pains, reasons and arguments, are simply occasions for the self-moving power that is active to freely determine action. What we have again is a competing set of explanations for the same phenomena. It appears that Clarke failed to take a number of Collins’ arguments seriously, because the free will arguments being refuted were not his arguments.