 Cassirer developed in Göteborg his characteristic perspective on the relationship between the natural and cultural sciences, which also appealed especially to the expressive function of thought. It was in connection with this work that he articulated a pithy defense of Kant’s regulative conception of infinitely distant practical ideals (e.g., the Kingdom of Ends) against what he takes to be the oppressive (speculative) infinity of Hegel’s Absolute Reason [Cassirer (1939, 28)]: “In his philosophy of history Hegel wanted to provide the definitive speculative demonstration that reason is substance and infinite power. For this, however, we must, according to him, above all attain the insight that reason is ‘not so powerless as to pass for a mere ideal, a mere ought.’ This form of proof has become shaky; the critique of the foundations of the Hegelian system has pulled the ground out from under it. If we turn back from the Hegelian meaning of idea to the Kantian, from the idea as ‘absolute power’ back to the idea as ‘infinite problem,’ we must of course give up the speculative optimism of the Hegelian view of history. But, at the same time, we thereby also avoid fatalistic pessimism with its prophecies and visions of decline [Untergangsprophezeiungen und Untergangsvisionen]. [Our] acting again has a free path to decide for itself out of its own force and responsibility, and it knows that the direction and future of culture will depend on the manner of this decision.”