  A difficulty for this argument comes from the fact that outside of morality we do not, in general, blame or resent people for failing to comply with their practical reasons. If an agent does something foolish or imprudent, for example, we might react with pity or scorn, but not with anything as strong as blame. It seems that the appropriateness of blame requires some condition other than noncompliance with reasons. This does not show that noncompliance with reasons is not one of the necessary conditions for blame, of course, but it opens the possibility that once we identify the further necessary conditions we might find that they are also, by themselves, sufficient conditions for appropriate blame. The internalist might suggest, for example, that the missing condition is partly that the judge have desires or concerns that are harmed by the resented behavior. Proponents of the argument from blame may respond that it is inappropriate to blame harmful non-agents (like trees and tigers) and agents whose harms are unintentional. However it may be possible to excuse these from blame without accepting that noncompliance with reasons is a necessary condition for blameworthiness; for example, with the weaker condition that a blameworthy act stems from having a character from which certain concerns or motivations are absent (Arpaly 2003). Trees and tigers don’t have a ‘character’ in the relevant sense, and harms that an agent causes unintentionally do not stem from her character. If something like this is a sufficient condition for blameworthiness, then this argument from reactive attitudes fails.