 High-level simulation processes are cognitive processes with the following features: (a) they are typically conscious, under voluntary control, and stimulus-independent; (b) they satisfy  PROC,  that is, they are implemented by the reuse of a certain cognitive mechanism, C, and their output states resemble the output states generated by the use of  C.[4]  Here are some cognitive processes that, according to Simulation Theorists, qualify as high-level simulation processes. Visualizing: the cognitive process generating visual images (Currie 1995; Currie &amp; Ravenscroft 2002; Goldman 2006); motor imagination: the cognitive process generating imagined bodily movements and actions (Currie &amp; Ravenscroft 1997, 2002; Goldman 2006); imagining deciding: the cognitive process generating decision-like imaginings (Currie &amp; Ravenscroft 2002); imagining believing: the cognitive process generating belief-like imaginings (Currie &amp; Ravenscroft 2002); imagining desiring: the cognitive process generating desire-like imaginings (Currie 2002). In what follows, we shall consider a couple of them in some detail.