 Although in the boundaries between logic and epistemology, the logic of belief revision and the works of Carlos Alchourrón (Alchourrón and Makinson 1981, 1982; Alchourrón 1996) cannot be forgotten: the AGM model (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson 1985) is still the dominant theory of belief revision (see entry logic of belief revision in this Encyclopedia). Andrés Páez (2006) uses the theory of belief revision to supply a concept of explanation embodied with pragmatic conditions. Closely related with this topic, “defeasible reasoning” was extensively studied by Gustavo Bodanza and Fernando Tohmé (2005, 2009; Bodanza, Tohmé, and Simari 2016; Bodanza, Tohmé, and Auday 2017; see also Bodanza 2002; Bodanza and Alessio 2017). Tohmé also supplied a category-theoretic representation of abduction (Tohmé, Caterina, and Gangle 2015), and analyzed abduction in its application to economy (Crespo, Tohmé, and Heymann 2010; Tohmé and Crespo 2013). Abductive reasoning was also the main interest of Atocha Aliseda (2003; Soler-Toscano, Nepomuceno-Fernández, and Aliseda-Llera 2009), who applied abduction to medical diagnosis (Aliseda and Leonides 2013) and proposed a conditional logic to formalize abduction (Beirlaen and Aliseda 2014). She also published a book completely devoted to abduction (Aliseda 2006), which not only discusses conceptual and formal matters, but also pays special attention to the epistemic applications of abductive reasoning.