 Brito defends, then, the correctness of Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the act of an organic physical body that has life potentially. In keeping with the description of the soul as a substantial form, the soul is defined as that which essentially constitutes the first actualization of the animate body. The rest of the definition singles out the specific kind of body the soul actualizes. First, the body in question is natural and not artificial, for the actualization of the body by the soul creates an individual belonging to a natural kind and not an artifact like a table. Second, it is organized (i.e., organic), for it involves an interconnected set of fundamentally different parts whereby the different operations of the animate body are carried out (QDA-2012-II: 328). Finally, it has life potentially, quite simply because there cannot be something actual in a certain respect that was not previously potential in the very same respect. In other words, one could not be an actual living being if one’s body did not first possess the potential to be alive (QDA-2012-II: 329). Consequently, according to Brito, Aristotle’s definition of the soul correctly places the soul in the class of substantial acts or forms, just as it correctly singles out the specific kind of matter that this act or form actualizes—an organic physical body that has life potentially.