 On the other extreme, one might maintain that no fact is apt to be metaphysically explained. One type of worry is that notions thought by some to be constitutive of metaphysical explanation, such as grounding and essence, are somehow defective (see the entry on  metaphysical grounding §8  and the entry on  essential vs. accidental properties §5).  Another type of worry is that metaphysical explanations would compete with scientific, mathematical, and/or other forms of explanation in a manner that render metaphysical explanations objectionably superfluous. Jeff Engelhardt (2016) develops this line of thought and argues that many philosophers are implicitly committed to an objectionable sort of overdetermination involving metaphysical explanation. The sort of overdetermination he has in mind regards cases where something seems to have a sufficient causal explanation as well as a sufficient metaphysical explanation. For example, for any given house, that house exists both because it was caused to exist (causal explanation), as well as because it is grounded in its parts (metaphysical explanation). Perhaps the best solution to the problem which we can come up with, Engelhardt suggests, is that in cases such as this one the cause in question (C) causes the grounds of the house to obtain, but C does not cause the house to exist. In this case, while C does explain why the house exists, it does not causally explain why the house exists. Rather, C causally explains why the parts of the house are configured in such-and-such a manner, and those parts being configured in that manner in turn grounds the existence of the house.