 One may nevertheless wonder whether Bigelow and Lewis have thrown the baby out with the bathwater. MacBride (2013a) argues that if we do not allow ourselves the general thought that truth-bearers are true or false depending upon how things stand in the world then it is unclear what, if any, credibility (i1), (i2) etc. have. For why should there be something in the world whose existence necessitates that (e.g.) cats purr? Why can’t cats purr, even though there is nothing whose existence entails that truth? Since Slogan is intended to be just shorthand for its instances, (i 1), (i 2) etc. it follows Slogan can’t be any more credible or motivated than its instances. If, however, we allow ourselves a conception of truth which isn’t deflationary, i.e. a substantial conception whereby truth is conceived as a relation borne by a truth-bearer to something worldly that exists independently of us, then, MacBride argues, we will have an independent reason for positing something worldly the existence of which necessitates the truth that cats purr etc. (see also Armstrong 1997: 128). For further discussion of deflationism in connection with truth-making see McGrath 2003, Vision 2005 and Thomas 2011. 