  The members of this school take signification or “to signify” in the general sense of to “make (someone) know (something)” (facere cognoscere) (Petrus Margallus, Log. utriusque scholia, 1520,  148),[49]  and conceive it along the lines of the older description of ‘repraesentare’ in its broadest sense according to which the function of representation could be ascribed to all which “in some way contributes to a thing being known” (quod aliquo modo facit ad hoc quod res cognoscatur).[50]  Consequently, “to signify” often is characterized as “to represent something to an intellect” (aliquid intellectui respraesentare) (Albert of Saxony, Quaest. in artem vet, 1988, 472; John Raulin, In log. Arist. Comment, 1500, fol. g4vb). In order to make this definition cover cases of non intellectual sign interpreters (animals)[51]  as well as the so-called syncategorematic terms which do not properly signify ‘something’ (aliquid), a still more general version was put forward, defining the act of signifying as “to represent something or some things or somehow to a cognitive power (aliquid vel aliqua vel aliqualiter potentiae cognitivae repraesentare) (Gaspar Lax, Parve divis. term., ca. 1502, fol a4vb). This definition roughly expresses what is basically uncontroversial regarding the concept of signification among logicians from late 14th to early 16th century. Even if there were numerous definitional variants of the concept of signification, which often gave occasion to controversies, nevertheless, common to all these variations was their primarily epistemological orientation. Contrary to Ockham's concept of sign, it is not the logical function of referring to a significatum that stands in the foreground, but rather the sign's relation to a cognitive power. In other words, the sign is not primarily characterized by its appropriateness to fulfill a semantic function in the context of a proposition, but rather by its capability to act in an epistemologically efficient way on a cognitive power: “A sign is something that makes think” (signum est res faciens cogitare) (Petrus Margallus, Log. utriusque scholia, 1520, 146). Unlike Ockham's semantic concept of sign, the one favored by the later authors is predominantly pragmatic.