 Next, the picture of action and agency in question, on which you (always, exceptionlessly) decide what to do by asking yourself what someone like you would do, might sound both implausible and unattractive. (Implausible: it assimilates many substantively different forms of decision to one of them; unattractive: agents are turned inward, in the manner iconized by the tradition of absorption painting [Fried 1988] – and it is perhaps no accident that Velleman 2006 appropriates an image from this tradition as its cover art.) But Velleman has a response. True enough, if you were constantly busied with and focused on understanding yourself, something would have gone wrong; but practical reasoning is itself a sporadic activity. Practical rationality is, as he puts it in a vivid metaphor, in the passenger rather than the driver’s seat (Velleman 2015, ch. 13). Most of the time, you’re on autopilot; on his supervisory conception of practical reasoning, as long as you know what’s going on, the supervisor does not need to intervene. Evidently, this solution has a cost, that of attenuating the connection between action and its constitutive motivation; Velleman’s response to the problem is recent, and it’s unclear what we should expect in the way of downstream adjustments to the earlier position. Nonetheless, this is a dramatic move, on a par with the decision to assimilate practical to theoretical reasoning, and it merits careful attention. (He has two secondary responses to the problem, which the interested reader can find at Velleman 2009, 23f and 27f.) 