 Our first order of business is to clarify in what sense metaphysical explanation is a form of non-causal explanation  (§1),  and survey some putative varieties of metaphysical explanation  (§2).  Afterwards, we survey three central, connected choice-points about how to think about metaphysical explanation at the most abstract level. How are metaphysical explanations related to notions of non-causal relationships such as property-instance, part-whole, essence-accident, derivative-ground, role-realizer, and others of central metaphysical importance that metaphysical explanations are said to derive their explanatory power from  (§3)?  To what extent is metaphysical explanation a unified phenomenon  (§4)?  And to what extent is it an objective, mind-independent phenomenon  (§5)?  Next, we survey a recent research program that attempts to extend one of the four main models of scientific explanation—causal-mechanistic, nomological, unificationist, and pragmatic—to metaphysical explanation  (§6).  We conclude by surveying some questions about the scope of metaphysical explanation  (§7).