 In RG, Ross maintains all non-instrumental values are valuable in the same way: their goodness is intrinsic to them (RG 115, 118, 132; also OJ 119; he returns to this position at KT 11–12;). In FE, he adopts a different stance. The value of virtue and intellectual activities is a ‘quality intrinsic to them’ (FE 278). These items are ‘fit objects of admiration’ or objects ‘worthy of admiration’ (FE 282–283). By contrast, the value of justice and pleasure is not intrinsic to them; rather, their value is based on a relation involving us rightly taking an interest or rightly finding (some kind of) satisfaction in them (FE 278). The pleasure of others and justice are ‘worthy objects of satisfaction’ or things in which it is right to take satisfaction or an interest (FE 275, 278, 282, 283, 288–89). The difference in the source of value of the things in the two categories appears to follow from the fact ‘while it is self-evident that the only ground on which a thing is worthy of admiration is that it is good in itself, it is not self-evident that the only ground on which a thing is worthy of our interest or liking is that it is good in itself’ (FE  279).[5]