 The Sarvāstivādins (“advocates of the doctrine that all things exist”) were unique in their stance that the characteristics of conditioned phenomena exist separately as real entities within each moment. Their claim, then, is that all conditioned dharmas—whether past, present, or future—exist as real entities (dravyatas) within the span of any given moment. This induced a host of problems, one of which is that the Sarvāstivāda definition of a moment is difficult to reconcile with its conception as the shortest unit of time (von Rospatt 1995, 44–46 &amp; 97–98). The Sarvāstivāda replies to this criticism by stating that the activities (kāritra) of the four characteristics of conditioned phenomena are sequential: the limits between the birth and dissolution of any event are referred to as one moment. This solution, however, implies that a single event undergoes four phases within a given moment, which inevitably infringes upon its momentariness (Cox 1995, 151; von Rospatt 1995, 52ff).