 To a certain degree Oresme’s theory of the ontological status of accidents is reminiscent of Adam Wodeham’s (c. 1298–1358) and Gregory of Rimini’s (c. 1300–1358) theory of complexly signifiables (complexe significabilia) (Adam de Wodeham 1990, dist. 1, qu. 1, 180–208; Gregory of Rimini 1981, Prologus, qu. 1, artic. 1–3, 1–40; Nuchelmans 1973, 227–242; Biard 2004; Conti 2004; Gaskin 2004). On some occasions Oresme explicitly uses the expression ‘complexe significabile’ in the framework of his ontology of accidents. However, despite these similarities between Oresme’s ontology of accidents and the theory of complexly signifiables it seems that this connection is of a secondary nature. For Oresme the determination of the ontological status of accidents is in the foreground, while Adam Wodeham and Gregory of Rimini had quite another aim. They wanted to determine what the object of knowledge is. Their solution that the significatum totale or significatum adaequatum of a conclusion or proposition is the object of knowledge is not confined to conclusions or propositions concerning accidents, such as ‘homo est albus’, whose significatum totale is hominem esse album (which itself is a significabile per complexum). Rather, their solution applies to any kind of conclusion or proposition: for instance, ‘Deus est’ or ‘homo est animal’. Neither Adam Wodeham nor Gregory of Rimini made any attempt to identify accidents with the correspondent complexly signifiables such as ‘hominem esse album’. Oresme does not derive the ontological status of accidents from their being complexly signifiables. Instead, the converse is true: given that Oresme rejects the traditional view that accidents are accidental forms, he must avoid the use of substantives in denominating the ontological status of accidents and thus quasi-automatically arrives at formulations that are characteristic of the theory of complexly signifiables.