 In addition, it is not obvious that the view of Chalmers and Jackson can satisfactorily explain all the phenomena discussed in  section 1.1.  Some commentators have denied that it can give a viable general account of Kripkean examples (see, e.g., Soames 2005; Vaidya 2008; Roca-Royes 2011). In any case, it is clear that the view can only explain how necessity and epistemic necessity can come apart for sentences whose primary and secondary intensions differ. That may be true of the cases considered by Kripke, but it seems doubtful for the other examples considered in  section 1.1  (mathematical and metaphysical truths, laws, and principles connecting the physical to the mental). In response, Chalmers has argued that none of the latter cases are genuine examples of the necessary a posteriori (1999, 2002a).