 A sensory quality can be thought of as the distinctive property of an apparent phenomenal individual. An “apparent phenomenal individual” is anything of the sort that Bertrand Russell would have taken to be a “sense-datum,” such as (again) a colored region of one’s visual field, or a heard sound or an experienced smell. But it is important to see that qualities of this kind do not presuppose the existence of sense-data or other exotica. Sensory fields are pervaded by such qualities both in everyday veridical experience and in less usual cases. In our first-order sense of the “q”-word, the latter point is the merest common sense, and to deny it would be to take a very radical position. Of course philosophers will immediately debate the nature of these commonsensical qualities and further claims about them, but it is generally agreed that that they are introspectible, apparently monadic or nonrelational, and describable in ordinary English words such as “green,” “loud,” and “sweet” (though it may be questioned whether those words have just the same senses as when they are applied to physical objects and events).