 The intuitive validity of weakening can also be directly challenged. For example, via weakening we can infer that if A is looking for a cat and B is looking for a dog, then A and B are looking for the same thing (an animal). For discussion of this kind of example, see (Zimmerman 2006), and for the special use of ‘the same thing’, (Moltmann 2008). Asher (1987, 171) proposes an even more direct counterexample. Suppose you enter a competition whose prize is a free ticket on the Concorde to New York. So presumably you want a free ticket on the Concorde. But you don’t want a ticket on the Concorde, since you know that normally these are very expensive, you are poor, and you strictly resist desiring the unattainable. Asher is here assimilating notional uses of indefinites to generics, which on his account involve quantification over normal worlds. So if for some bizarre reason you want a sloop, but one whose hull is riddled with holes, it will not be literally true to say you want a sloop.