 For a theory of judgment like the one sketched above to work, the object we judge must be the very object we present. Therefore, Twardowski's thesis must be understood in the strong sense that there are no presentations which do not have an object: if a presentation did not have an object, we would not have an object to judge as existing or non-existing. It is for this reason that a crucial part of Content and Object is devoted to defending this claim, and to showing that, despite appearances, every presentation has an object (§5). This is like saying, coming back to our arrow metaphor, that every arrow points at something. Twardowski's strategy is to show that presentations which are normally deemed by others to be objectless—i.e., arrows that do not point to anything—are not such. There exist no presentations without an object: there are presentations whose object does not exist. Twardowski gives a number of arguments for his position. Of all these arguments, the key one is an argument based on the three functions of names in language.