 A further resource available to contractualism that is not available to utilitarianism is that my reasons for rejecting a principle are not limited to my well-being—however broadly that notion is construed. For ease of exposition, let us for the moment follow the utilitarian, and think of ‘burdens’ solely in terms of negative impact on my well-being. My reason for rejecting a principle might be, not so much that it imposes a certain burden on me, but the way in which it imposes that burden—and what the principle thus says about me. For instance, consider a principle that allocates benefits and burdens on the basis of race, and contrast this with a principle that allocates the same benefits and burdens randomly. I cannot reject the racist principle simply because of the burden it imposes on me—after all, the random principle imposes an identical burden on someone else. Rather, I reject the racist principle because, by regarding my race as a relevant ground for the distribution of benefits, it imposes that burden in a way that constitutes a failure to respect my status as a person.