Before considering the grain argument per se, however, we need to look at Sellars’s phenomenology of perceptual and imaginative experience.  Sellars carefully distinguishes between propositional seeing and objectual seeing, and between seeing an object and what we see of the object.  All perceptual experience, in his view, has conceptual content, which shows up in the propositional content of a seeing or in what we see an object as.  But he is also firmly convinced that not everything in perception is present as conceptual content, as something thought of or believed in.  “We see not only that the ice cube is pink, and see it as pink, we see the very pinkness of the object; also its very shape — though from a certain point of view” (SSOP §25: 88). What we see of the ice cube is present to us in a different way from that in which the (merely) conceptual content of our experience is present to us. What is needed is: