 The main challenge for Natural Duty views is, once again, that it’s unclear how we should make sense of the idea that certain institutions “apply to us”. For even if we rule out just institutions whose activities are not required by justice (like Simmons’ Institute for the Advancement of Philosophers), we are still left with a large number of candidates that, in principle, seem to have authority over us. At least when we think about the political authority of states, we normally think that the scope of the authority is limited to the individuals living on the territory of each state (or individuals related in special ways to those living in their territory). And we normally think that those individuals owe political obligations to their state in particular, obligations that they do not owe to other states, regardless of how just they are. But how can we vindicate this idea, if what grounds political authority is our duty to support just institutions? Why couldn’t we discharge this duty by obeying and supporting some state other than the one which claims authority over the territory where we live? (See Waldron 1993 for an influential answer to this question; and Simmons 2005 for further criticism.)