 Russell’s conception of analysis at the time of the theory of descriptions — c.a. 1905 — is relatively clear: Analysis involves pairing up one sentence with another that expresses the very same Russellian proposition but which does so more perspicuously. The analysans counts as more perspicuous than the analysandum because the former is free of some of the latter’s merely apparent ontological commitments. By the time of Principia Mathematica, however, this relatively transparent conception of analysis is no longer available. Having purged his ontology of propositions in 1910, Russell can no longer appeal to the idea that analysans and analysandum express one and the same proposition. He now adopts “the multiple relation theory of judgment,” according to which the judgment (say) that Othello loves Desdemona, instead of being, as Russell had formerly supposed, a dyadic relation between the judging mind and the proposition Othello loves Desdemona, is now a non-dyadic, or, in Russell’s terminology, “multiple,” relation whose relata are the judging mind and those items that were formerly regarded as constituents of the proposition Othello loves Desdemona (Russell 1910 [1994, 155]). After 1910 Russell can say that a speaker who sincerely assertively uttered the analysans (in a given context) would be guaranteed to make the same judgment as one who sincerely assertively uttered the analysandum (in the same context), but he can no longer explain this accomplishment by saying that the two sentences express the same proposition. 