 What type of acts should one identify with propositions?  For both Hanks and Soames, propositions are types of predicative acts.  The notion of predication here is simply, for atomic propositions, one of an agent’s representing an object o as having property F.  (Hanks (2015, p. 64) characterizes predication as categorization, or the sorting of things into groups according to a rule.  We will take this to be a form of representation.)  Since representation is primarily something done by cognitive agents, according to Hanks and Soames, one might wonder whether the proposition itself is representational, and so possesses truth-conditions, on the type view.  Both theorists respond to this concern by claiming that propositions are representational in a secondary, derivative sense.  There are many examples of types that inherit features of their tokens (a sonata (type) can be discordant in virtue of performances of it being discordant; a movie can be frightening in virtue of its tokens being so, etc.  See the entry on types and tokens.)  Just as an act can be described as intelligent in order to communicate that the agent  acted intelligently in performing the act, type theorists will claim that a proposition represents o as F in a similarly derivative sense wherein any agent who performs the act of predicating F of o will thereby represent o as F.  One question that arises for such a view is whether propositions are genuinely representational entities with truth-conditions, or whether the claim that a proposition represents things as being a certain way is simply a convenient manner of speaking indirectly about the actual and possible representational acts of thinkers.