 Suppose not all presently living and future persons’ claims to sufficiency well-being can be met (but see Wolf 2009: 362). Then we would need to weigh all people’s claims. Proponents of sufficientarianism have proposed different principles of distribution below the threshold of sufficiency. Most prominently, they have argued that we ought to maximize the well-being of present and future individuals below the threshold (so-called “min-deprivation”; Wolf 2009: 356–357); or that we ought to maximize the number of individuals who are sufficiently well-off (so-called “headcount”; Page 2007a: 85–95). Both of these below-threshold principles seem problematic. They will often imply that we ought to sacrifice the worst-off present or future persons for the sake of better-off, but still badly-off persons. According to a third understanding, we should rely on a priority view for unavoidable sub-threshold distributions: benefitting persons below the threshold of sufficiency matters more the more claimants are benefitted and the greater these benefits (Meyer 2009a, 2009b, 2015; Meyer &amp; Roser 2009). This understanding only entails sacrificing the worst-off individuals for the sake of better off but still badly off individuals under circumstances where the former higher weighted claims will be outweighed by the sum of the less weighty claims of more better-off people.