 Theophrastus adopted Aristotle’s analysis of virtue as a mean disposition in regard to emotional response and action; that is, for each individual virtue there are two co-ordinate vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency (fr. 449A FHS&amp;G). To illustrate virtue as the mean disposition relative to us, Theophrastus referred to the garrulous person who says too much, his opposite who says too little, and the virtuous person who lays hold upon due measure (see also, Characters 3 and 7). He also gave similar accounts for temperance, courage and the other moral virtues. In the case of temperance, for instance, he claimed that the insensitive person fails to desire what is in accordance with nature, the intemperate person is marked by excessive desire, whereas the temperate person enjoys pleasures to the extent he ought and in accordance with nature. It is worth noting that in his account of justice, in particular, he seems to have followed more closely Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics rather than the better-known Nicomachean Ethics (see Fortenbaugh 1983); justice is treated as a standard mean disposition co-ordinate with an excess and a deficiency, since neither the man who distributes the larger quantity to himself nor the man who distributes the lesser is considered as just, but the man who distributes the equal portion. Furthermore, in line with the Aristotelian conception of virtue as the mean which is determined by reason and such as the practically wise man would determine it, Theophrastus emphasized that a person must learn to reason correctly or, in other words, to acquire practical wisdom which is, in his view, inseparable from moral virtue (fr. 460 FHS&amp;G); for instance, those who have been insulted may be quite justified in feeling angry and seeking revenge, but without practical wisdom they may choose the wrong course of action and fail to achieve their goal (frs. 526, 527A–B FHS&amp;G).