 The most serious objection to the argument can be put in the form of a dilemma; see for example Guyer (1979 [1997: 264]), Meerbote (1982: 81ff.), Allison (2001: 184–192), Rind (2002). Either the free play of the faculties is involved in all cognitive perceptual experience, or it is not. If it is, then it would seem, counterintuitively, that every object should be perceived as beautiful. (Because of this consequence of grasping the first horn, the dilemma is sometimes characterized instead as Kant’s “everything is beautiful” problem.) But if it is not, then the central inference does not seem to go through. From the fact that I can demand agreement for the state of my faculties in experiencing an object as, say, green or square, it does not follow that I can demand agreement for a state in which my faculties are in free play, since the possibility of experiencing the free play would seem to require something over and above what is required for cognition alone.