 Interest in modularity is not confined to cognitive science and the philosophy of mind; it extends well into a number of allied fields. In epistemology, modularity has been invoked to defend the legitimacy of a theory-neutral type of observation, and hence the possibility of some degree of consensus among scientists with divergent theoretical commitments (Fodor, 1984). The ensuing debate on this issue (Churchland, 1988; Fodor, 1988; McCauley &amp; Henrich, 2006) holds lasting significance for the general philosophy of science, particularly for controversies regarding the status of scientific realism. Relatedly, evidence of the cognitive penetrability of perception has given rise to worries about the justification of perceptual beliefs (Siegel, 2012; Stokes, 2012). In ethics, evidence of this sort has been used to cast doubt on ethical intuitionism as an account of moral epistemology (Cowan, 2014). In philosophy of language, modularity has figured in theorizing about linguistic communication, for example, in relevance theorists’ suggestion that speech interpretation, pragmatic warts and all, is a modular process (Sperber &amp; Wilson, 2002). It has also been used demarcate the boundary between semantics and pragmatics, and to defend a notably austere version of semantic minimalism (Borg, 2004). Though the success of these deployments of modularity theory is subject to dispute (e.g., see Robbins, 2007, for doubts about the modularity of semantics), their existence testifies to the relevance of the concept of modularity to philosophical inquiry in a variety of domains.