 Some commentators criticize free-standing views’ tendency to focus on or prioritize health inequalities to the exclusion of other normative considerations. Hausman (2007, 2013, 2019) argues that health inequalities among individuals are not pro tanto unjust since such inequalities (among individuals) do not permit inferences regarding inequalities in wellbeing or moral standing which are of real moral concern. Daniel Weinstock (2015: 438) cautions against “health consequentialism”, the view that all social determinants of health should be arranged to achieve some preferred distribution of health—e.g., health equality. He argues instead in favor of pluralistic approaches to distributive justice which recognize that the distribution of many of the social determinants of health—e.g., income and education—should also be governed by additional, non-health related principles of justice (see also Wester 2018). Powers and Faden’s (2006) view avoids these problems by positing six dimensions of wellbeing, though this approach faces the challenge of how conflicts among these dimensions ought to be adjudicated.