  The traditional point of departure in the sportsmanship debate is James W. Keating’s ‘Is Sportsmanship a Moral Category?’ (1965). On this account, there is a moral distinction between ‘sport’ (recreational sport) and ‘athletics’ (competitive sport). Standards of ethics appropriate to sport at the recreational level are not equivalent to those appropriate at the competitive level. Indeed, conduct appropriate to the recreational sport may be morally objectionable at the competitive level and vice versa. This moral discontinuity between recreational and competitive sport extends to sportsmanship. Specifically, as the goal of recreational sport is ‘pleasant diversion’, the essence of sportsmanship in that context is ‘generosity’ (Keating, 1965, 34). This requires the participant always to try to increase the enjoyability of the activity both for themselves and for other participants. In athletics, where the overriding goal is ‘honorable victory’, sportsmanship requires ‘fairness’. The type of fairness in question is formal fairness – ‘equality before the law’ (Keating, 1965, 34). An equal and impartial application of the rules, as dictated by formal fairness, purportedly helps to ensure that competition fulfills its purpose as a test of athletic excellence and that victory correctly tracks athletic superiority (Keating, 1965, 34). 