 Frege’s approach is known to run into a number of problems. One of them concerns the iteration of indirect contexts, as in Gottlob suspected that the Greeks did not know that the morning star is the evening star. Though he did not explicitly address the issue, Frege is usually understood as resorting to an infinite hierarchy of ever more indirect senses to be associated with each otherwise non-ambiguous expression (Dummett 1981, 267; Carnap 1947, §30; Kripke 2008, 183; see however Parsons 1981 for a more cautious interpretation). The purported Fregean line of analysis has been criticized for multiplying ambiguity beyond necessity (Janssen 2012) as well as raising serious learnability issues (Davidson 1968, 11). Though Montague did acknowledge a hierarchy of senses, he did not employ it for the analysis of iterated indirect contexts. Instead, he identified Frege’s (1892) senses with intensions along the lines of Carnap (1947) – set theoretic functions on a logical space of possible worlds (or world-time-pairs) whose values are the denotations of expressions – their extensions. In particular, the way in which a description refers to its referent is captured by its dependence on contingent facts. As a case in point, the famous Fregean descriptions differ in intension as long as there is a possible world in which the brightest star at dawn is not the same object as the brightest star at night.