 Not all philosophers accept the “intentionality requirement” on gratitude. Those who do not endorse it include Bardsley (2013), for reasons mentioned earlier in this section, and Patrick Fitzgerald (1998), who denies that R must have φ-ed intentionally under the description “benefiting Y” in order for gratitude to be warranted. According to Fitzgerald, Y’s gratitude to R for harming him might be called for if there was some benefit that came about for Y because of that harm. Thus it might be the case that the Dalai Lama, Fitzgerald argues, should be grateful to the Chinese government for persecuting him, insofar as that persecution gave him the opportunity to become more virtuous. Manela (2016a) disputes this, arguing that it is more accurate to say that the Dalai Lama should appreciate the opportunity the Chinese gave him by trying to harm him but should not be grateful to them for “providing” it.