 A different proposal, due to Harman (1976, p. 168) is that intentions are ‘conclusion[s] of practical reasoning’ (see also Ross 2009, pp. 270–2; Marušić and Schwenkler 2018). But it seems possible to intend an action spontaneously, for no particular reason. In later work, Harman looks downstream of intention, rather than upstream: an intention is a belief about what one is doing or what one is going to do that has the power to guide and motivate action through practical thought (Harman 1986, pp. 375–6; Setiya 2007a, pp. 48–53). This claim interacts with the question about ‘disjunctive’ theories left unanswered at the end of section 2. If intention involves belief, those who treat knowledge as basic, with mere belief its defective form, will take a similar view of ‘knowledge in intention’ (Rödl 2007; Ch. 2; McDowell 2010, §7; Marcus 2012, Ch. 2). In the good case, one’s intention in action involves knowledge of what one is doing: it entails, so cannot cause or motivate, one’s action. In the bad case, one merely intends to act. If not its causal role, however, what distinguishes knowledge in intention from knowledge of other kinds?