 Responses to the non-identity problem, then, may conclude that (1) indeed there is no wrong done by bringing someone into the world in a way that compromises her opportunities for flourishing (Heyd 2009), or that (2) the wrong involved is not one done to the child—for instance, it might be wrong on roughly consequentialist grounds (Brock 1995), because it promotes problematic values or reflects unacceptable motivations (Kumar 2003), or because it fails to promote the interests of an alternative possible child (Holtug 2009), or (3) that the non-identity problem is illusory, and that someone can indeed be harmed by being brought into existence (Benatar 2006, Harman 2004). As Roberts and Wasserman (2009) note, different strategies for resolving the non-identity problem emerge from different accounts of harm—e.g. as concerning states of affairs, or as (uniquely) concerning identifiable individuals—and will therefore have distinctive implications for obligations of beneficence and non-maleficence in reproduction. For some commentators, however, debate surrounding the non-identity problem carries tenuous import for real-life procreative decision-making, and offers little help to prospective parents in addressing the ethical challenges associated with reproduction (e.g. Overall 2012, 154). A strategy for addressing the non-identity problem, then, is not equivalent to a strategy for addressing the challenges of harms and benefits to future children for prospective parents. (See the entry on  parenthood and procreation  for further discussion). 