 Theorists have long objected to knowledge claims whose truth depends on a fact that itself has not been established, especially if that fact is merely taken for granted. It is also standard to reject any knowledge claim whose pedigree smacks of circularity. Both worries arise if we claim to know that one proposition, q, is true on the grounds that it is entailed by a second proposition, p, even though the truth of q was taken for granted in coming to know that p is true. Many theorists will reject pseudocircular reasoning on precisely these traditional grounds. Dretske did not share the first worry but he did raise the second, the concern about pseudocircular reasoning. But there is a growing body of work that breaks with tradition and defends some forms of epistemic circularity (this work is heavily criticized, in turn, on the grounds that it is open to versions of traditional objections). Max Black (1949) and Nelson Goodman (1955) were early examples; others include Van Cleve 1979 and 2003; Luper 2004; Papineau 1992; and Alston 1993. Dretske himself meant to break with tradition, writing under the banner of ‘externalism.’ He explicitly said that most, if not all, of our mundane knowledge claims depend on facts we have not established. Indeed, he cited this as a virtue of his conclusive reasons view. Yet nothing in the nature of the conclusive reasons account rules out our knowing limiting propositions using pseudocircular reasoning, which leaves his reservations mysterious. A set of jar-ish experiences can constitute a conclusive reason for believing jar, a jar of cookies is in front of me. If I then believe objects, there are physical objects, because it is entailed by jar, I have conclusive reason for believing objects, a limiting proposition. (If objects were false, jar would be too, and I would lack my jar-ish experiences.)