 Suppose we adopt an error theory: the view that all atomic, positive statements ascribing meaning, content, or the following of a rule, are false. While some error theories are eliminativist (e.g., Churchland 1981 on propositional attitudes), the error theorist need not subscribe to eliminativism. For instance, J.L. Mackie (1977) argues that although moral judgements are uniformly false, eliminativism can be avoided given that some moral judgements are such that their acceptance facilitates securing the benefits of social cooperation in circumstances where “the limitation of men’s sympathies” (1977: 108) threaten their  attainment.[5]  On this view, even though our practice of making moral judgments results in falsehoods, it meets a subsidiary norm (or norms) in terms of whose satisfaction its pragmatic utility can be  secured.[6]  Might an error theorist about meaning, content and rule-following attempt to avoid eliminativism by following a similar strategy?