 The strategy that Davidson employs in relation to the concept of truth reflects a more general approach that runs throughout his thinking. Rather than trying to reduce key concepts, like truth, to something else, his tendency is to retain the primitive character of those concepts and instead to look to how they are worked out within the larger structure to which they belong (in this respect, Davidson is a moderate ‘deflationist’ about most of his key concepts). The strategy Davidson adopts in respect of truth is therefore much the same strategy as that which he adopts with respect to meaning (which should not surprise us given the role Tarski plays): meaning belongs primarily to sentences, it is not reducible to any other notion, and it is explicated only by reference to a larger linguistic structure. Moreover, this strategy is also one Davidson applies to the topic that occupies a large part of his last work – his inquiry into the problem of the problem of predication or of the unity of the proposition (2005b). How are we to elucidate the relation between a subject and that which is predicated of it in a standard predicative sentence such as ‘Socrates is mortal’? The problem, like the problem that arises when one tries to use the truth predicate reflexively, is that any attempt to explicate the predicative relation seems to give rise to circularity or regress. Davidson’s solution is to deny that predication can be explained by resort to any prior notion of propositionality. Instead Davidson takes predication as basic, irreducible, and able to be explicated only through the sort of structure that is revealed by a Tarski-style theory of meaning. 