 To see why, let e be an electron, and suppose that it instantiates two different universals: a mass universal, um, and a charge universal, uc. Suppose that e is exactly located at region r. Then it will be natural for the immanent realist to say that (i) um is exactly located at r as well, or at least at some region rm that has r as a part, and (ii) uc is exactly located at r or at some region rc that has r as a part. (If these universals are also instantiated elsewhere, then it will be debatable as to whether they are exactly located at r. Perhaps um has only one exact location, which fuses the exact locations of its instances (Effingham 2015). Likewise for uc.) Either way, the immanent realist will say that um and uc have exact locations that overlap. But presumably um and uc do not overlap. Assuming that these universals are non-structural, non-conjunctive, and perfectly natural, they are plausibly simple, in which case they overlap only if they are identical, which they are not. It would seem that a similar point can be made in terms of  tropes—particular,  spatiotemporally located ‘cases’ of properties or relations. For trope theorists who take tropes to be located at spacetime regions, it will be natural to say that mass tropes and charges tropes, for example, frequently interpenetrate. (Since electrons have charge and mass, trope theorists will find it natural say that if an electron is exactly located at a region r, then the electron's mass trope and the electron's charge trope are both exactly located at r as well, hence that those tropes' locations overlap (by being identical). But presumably the tropes themselves are not identical and do not overlap. Three responses to this argument are worth considering.