 Although the problems raised by the ECT case are real, many theorists think that the solution offered by Culver &amp; Gert is deeply problematic. Relying on what many people view as rational (in some broad, non-internal sense of rational) or on what many people view as “a significant harm” will not offer sufficient protection for competent adults with unusual values. If our goal is to ensure that mentally intact individuals are free to pursue their own idiosyncratic and at times unpopular values, then we must avoid building into our account of capacity any specific requirements on choice. Culver &amp; Gert may be right that their proposal would allow them to handle religious cases properly, since many people these days recognize the existence of religious diversity and the need to tolerate certain religiously motivated choices, particularly if those choices primarily affect the subject making the choice. But it is not at all clear that their view could handle the dialysis case mentioned earlier. When precisely does the refusal of further life-saving treatment make sense? How much suffering is too much? Deep continuing disagreements about the proper answer to such questions suggests that it would not be safe to build any particular answer into our notion of competence. To do so is to risk allowing majority values to limit the free choice of others in inappropriate ways by ruling too many people incompetent for the wrong reasons.