 Despite its venerable pedigree and its intuitive force, the thesis that logic should have a normative role to play in reasoning has not gone unchallenged. Gilbert Harman’s criticisms have been particularly influential. Harman’s skeptical challenge is rooted in a diagnosis: our deep-seated intuition that logic has a special normative connection with reasoning is rooted in a confusion. We have conflated two very different kinds of enterprises, viz. that of formulating a theory of deductive logic, on the one hand, and what Harman calls “a theory of reasoning” (Harman 2002) on the other. Begin with the latter. A theory of reasoning is a normative account about how ordinary agents should go about forming, revising and maintaining their beliefs. Its aim is to formulate general guidelines as to which mental actions (judgments and inferences) to perform in which circumstances and which beliefs to adopt or to abandon (Harman 2009: 333). As such, the subject matter of a theory of reasoning are the dynamic “psychological events or processes” that constitute reasoning. In contrast, “the sort of implication and argument studied in deductive logic have to do with [static, non-psychological] relations among propositions” (idem). Consequently, 