 Disunity and autonomy of levels have been associated, conversely, with antirealism, meaning instrumentalist or empiricist heuristics. This includes, for Fodor and Rosenberg, higher-level sciences such as biology and sociology (Fodor 1974; Rosenberg 1994; Huneman 2010). It is against this picture that Dupré’s and Cartwright’s attacks on uniformly global unity and reductionism, above, might seem surprising by including an endorsement, in causal terms, of realism.[4] Rohrlich has defended a similar realist position about weaker, conceptual (cognitive) antireductionism, although on the grounds of the mathematical success of derivational explanatory reductions (Rohrlich 2001). Ruphy, however, has argued that antireductionism merely amounts to a general methodological prescription and is too weak to yield uncontroversial metaphysical lessons; these are in fact based on general metaphysical commitments external to scientific practice (Ruphy 2005 and 2016).