 Non-psychologists have offered different proposals to accommodate error cases. One proposal is to say that in error cases agents act for a reason that is a falsehood that the agent believes. So, in the example above, Othello’s reason is his false belief about Desdemona. Note—not his believing that she’s unfaithful, which would bring us back to psychologism, but his false belief (the content). According to this proposal, then, Othello did act for a reason: a false belief, which is a putative fact that the agent takes to be a fact. The view is defended or at least endorsed by many, among others: Dancy (2000, 2008, 2014), Hornsby (2007, 2008), McDowell (2013), Schroeder (2008), Setiya (2007), and Comesaña and McGrath (2014). Jennifer Hornsby defends the view in the process of offering a disjunctive conception of a reason for acting, analogous to McDowell’s “disjunctive conception of appearances” (Hornsby 2008: 251), summarized in the following passage: