 The key claim Arpaly defends is that responding in this sense to moral reasons doesn’t require awareness of the features to which one is responding. Her central example is the much-discussed case of Huckleberry Finn, who helps Jim the runaway slave to escape despite believing that he is acting wrongly in “stealing” from Jim’s “owner”. Huck does the right thing and, according to Arpaly, does it for the right reasons, namely in response to Jim’s humanity (Arpaly 2003: 77). At the same time, however, Huck is unaware that he is helping Jim because he is a person like himself (although he is aware that he is facilitating Jim’s flight). He “is not capable of bringing to consciousness his nonconscious awareness” of Jim’s humanity (Arpaly 2003: 77), and thus fails to acquire de re awareness of the central right-making feature of his action. Since Huck seems to be praiseworthy despite lacking moral awareness (both de dicto and de re), Arpaly concludes that this kind of awareness isn’t required for praiseworthiness, and something parallel holds for blameworthiness (Arpaly 2015: 151–2).