 Be that as it may, one might try to simplify the pretense-theoretical proposal by reversing the order of explanation. Rather than taking the fictional sentence on its non-conniving use as elliptical for an internal metafictional sentence, we might take the internal metafictional sentence to be really true just when the fictional sentence (on its non-conniving use) is really true. We might, that is, follow Walton in treating the fictional sentence as “primary”; cf. 1990: 401–2). It is in fact relatively easy to discern the sense in which the fictional sentence on its non-conniving use is really true. It is really true just in case there is a pretense of a certain kind relative to which the sentence on its conniving use is fictionally true. In short, the fictional sentence is really true on its non-conniving use if and only if it is fictionally true (for this formulation, see Crimmins 1998: 2–8). (Walton’s 1990 own formulation of the point is weaker, for it gives the proposal a pragmatic twist: by being fictionally true, a sentence may be taken to assert, or to convey, a real truth. See also Everett 2013.)