 McGinn also notes that Kripke has no qualms with adopting a non-reductionist view of meaning in other works—see, for instance, Kripke 1972: 94–97. Goldfarb thinks that “the conception Kripke exploits is basically physicalistic” (1985 [2002: 95]), and thus that pursuing a non-physicalist approach hasn’t been ruled out. Boghossian thinks that what Kripke needs for his treatment of non-reductionism to succeed is an argument from queerness aiming to show that there is something inherently queer about meaning properties, which he fails to provide (1989 [2002: 180]; cf. Hattiangadi 2007: 47–50). Ultimately, Boghossian is sympathetic to the non-reductionist approach, though he thinks that “it really is not plausible” that such a conception might be true of linguistic meaning (1989 [2002: 179]); on his view, it is facts about mental content that are irreducible.