 The fact that data underdetermines theory selection also makes Kantianizing possible. And, so, just as we can consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory, we can Kantianize a non-Kantian theory (Hurley 2013; Sachs 2010). For instance, if we wanted to Kantianize utilitarianism, we need only combine Kantianism (which, on at least one interpretation, is the view that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that it shows the proper respect for humanity) with the assumption that an act shows the proper respect for humanity if and only if it maximizes hedonic utility. Indeed, the point generalizes: for any moral theory X that holds that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that it is F, we can X-ize a non-X theory that holds instead that it is G simply by combining X’s account of the ultimate right-maker with the assumption that an act is F if and only if it is G. (This will be possible so long as F and G are such that it’s possible that an act is F if and only if it is G.)