 Visual images are mental simulations of perceptual states. Are there high-level simulation processes whose outputs instead are mental simulations of propositional attitudes? (If you think that visual experiences are propositional attitudes, you can rephrase the question as follows: are there high-level simulation processes whose outputs are mental simulations of non-sensory states?) Three candidate processes have received a fair amount of attention in the simulationist literature: imagining desiring, imagining deciding, and imagining believing. The claims made by Simulation Theorists about these cognitive processes and their output states have generated an intense debate (Doggett &amp; Egan 2007; Funkhouser &amp; Spaulding 2009; Kieran &amp; Lopes 2003; Nichols 2006a, 2006b; Nichols &amp; Stich 2003; Velleman 2000). We do not have space to review it here (two good entry points are the introduction to Nichols 2006a and the entry on  imagination).  Rather, we shall confine ourselves to briefly illustrating the simulationist case in favour of the thesis that imagining believing is a high-level simulation process.