 Although feminists have not addressed the problems for feminism related to agent internalism, at least two feminists have identified problems with internalism in general, as a logical thesis about the connection between motives and reasons and/or obligations. Peggy DesAutels explores the phenomenon of having a moral commitment to the ethic of care yet failing to follow through on it even when the agent is competent and does not ignore her moral commitments (2004). DesAutels approaches the issue of internalism from an empirical rather than a conceptual point of view, which sets apart her approach from that of standard internalists. She takes herself to be following feminist theorists such as Carol Gilligan and Margaret Urban Walker in examining moral issues, including that of the internalism/externalism debate, as they present themselves in richly detailed concrete situations, which, she believes, makes her account feminist (71). DesAutels argues that moral attentiveness requires “nonpassive vigilance of thought where we attempt to counter known psychological tendencies and subtle social influences that prevent us from seeing and responding to the demands of care” (72). Two interferences with the demands of care are moral oblivion, or, being completely or mostly unaware of a moral demand, and being unresponsive to moral situations. DesAutels urges that we attempt to improve both our own psychologies and the social contexts in which they are embedded by, for instance, becoming more receptive to the subtle ways in which sexism occurs. She is suggesting that, contra internalism, it is possible to make a moral judgment yet fail to be appropriately motivated, due to sexist influences; sexism can make us unaware of a moral demand or unresponsive to it. Attention to the impact of sexism and other forms of oppression that are revealed in concrete situations is a lens that reveals a limitation of internalism as a purely conceptual issue about what it means to have a moral reason.