 The important difference between the two viewpoints—internal and external to the block—is that there is a discrepancy between the parts of the spacetime block that are epistemically accessible from each perspective. The spatiotemporally constrained perspective by which we are bound permits us only limited epistemic accessibility to other spatiotemporal regions. This is the perspective in which, according to causal perspectivalism, causal notions are perfectly serviceable. Once, on the other hand, we imagine ourselves to be omniscient beings that have epistemic access to the whole spatiotemporal block, it should not come as a surprise that our causal intuitions get confused when we attempt to consider how a spatiotemporally bound agent can deliberate about whether or not to affect a particular event that is already determined from our imagined omniscient perspective. It is because we do not know which events are determined to occur and are ignorant about many others that we can be deliberative agents at all. Again, these considerations are relevant just as much to ordinary forward-in-time causation as they are to backward-in-time causation.