 In adopting a descriptive perspective on the structure of scientific theories, each view also deploys, at least implicitly, a prescriptive characterization of our central topic. In other words, postulating that scientific theory is \(X\) (e.g., \(X\) = a set-theoretic structure, as per Suppes 1960, 1962, 1967, 1968, 2002) also implies that what is not \(X\) (or could not be recast as \(X\)) is not (or could not possibly be) a scientific theory, and would not help us in providing scientific understanding, explanation, prediction, and intervention. For the Syntactic View, what is not (or cannot be) reconstructed axiomatically is not theoretical, while for the Semantic View, what is not (or cannot be) modeled mathematically is not theoretical. In contrast, in part due to its pluralism about what a scientific theory actually (and possibly) is, and because it interprets theory structure as distributed in practices, the Pragmatic View resists the definitional and normative terms set by the other two views. As a result, the Pragmatic View ultimately reforms the very concepts of “theory” and “theory structure.” 