 Here we again see evidence of Leibowitz’s strict fact/value distinction, and the corresponding limits it places on rationalism when it is understood as the metaphysical thesis that the world is intelligible “all the way down.” The world and in particular our evaluative commitments within it are not rational all the way down. The fiction that as fully formed rational beings we cast our eye without prejudice over the various modes of practical evaluation and decide in favor of the most rational is dismissed by Leibowitz. Once we have certain commitments, as every person does at the time at which he begins to reflect on them, our rational faculties can indeed be used as tools for exploring them, but not in the expectation that such reflection can be expected to produce a justification or meaning that will convince all rational beings to commit themselves to such a practice. And if we do ask “why commit?” in the expectation of some such answer, we are assuming the factual or theoretical stance towards faith that Leibowitz contends is rejected by Judaism. When it comes to faith, in Leibowitz’s words: