 The key point is that Dorfman’s lack of knowledge about the wrong-making features of his action is irrelevant for assessing his blameworthiness, for he is as blameworthy as he would be had he knew that the stuff was indeed arsenic. Therefore, whatever mental state Dorfman was in at the time of carrying out his plan, it must suffice for satisfying the EC. It’s natural to think that the relevant mental state is simply true belief (Peels 2014: 493). Dorfman truly believed that he was pouring arsenic into her wife’s tea and that by doing so she would die, and this seems enough for him to be blameworthy (assuming he also satisfied other non-epistemic conditions on responsibility). Some philosophers think that mere true belief isn’t enough, though, and claim that what is needed for satisfying the EC is reasonable or justified belief instead (Timpe 2011: 18; Ginet 2000: 270). This would entail that Dorfman satisfies the EC only if it was reasonable for him to believe, or if he was justified in believing, that what the chemist handed over to him was indeed arsenic and thus that he would poison his wife by pouring the substance in her tea (perhaps it was reasonable and justified if Dorfman had never heard about the chemist’s reputation as a liar).