 Unlike the epistemic conception of vagueness, a semantic conception will treat the apparent semantic indeterminacy of vague predicates as real. Borderline cases are values to which the predicate neither definitely applies nor definitely does not apply, where ‘definitely’ gets a semantic analysis as opposed to an epistemic one. The positive extension of a predicate is given by those values to which the predicate definitely applies, the negative extension by those values to which the predicate definitely does not apply, and the remaining (penumbral) cases are values to which the predicate neither definitely does, nor definitely does not, apply. Consistently with a view of vagueness as a semantic deficiency (e.g., Fine 1975) or as semantic indecision (e.g., Lewis 1986), supervaluationists define a notion of “super-truth” (“super-falsity”) as the status of being true (false) irrespective of how the semantic deficiency or indecision is resolved or precisified, i.e., true (false) on every precisification of the predicate. Applying the predicate to something in its positive extension results in a super-true sentence, while applying it to something in its negative extension results in a super-false sentence. Equating super-truth with truth simpliciter and super-falsity with falsity simpliciter then results in a non-bivalent logic with borderline cases giving rise to truth-value gaps.