 The most conservative strategy for attacking the revisionist interpretation of the EC accepts the bulk of the regress argument (theses i, ii and iv) but denies that occurrent awareness of wrongdoing (that is, clear-eyed akrasia) is necessary for blameworthiness (thesis iii). According to this position, a weaker kind of awareness—constituted by dispositional, dormant, tacit, or unconscious beliefs—is all that the EC requires (Haji 1997; Peels 2011; Timpe 2011; Husak 2011; Levy 2013 &amp; 2014: ch. 2; Nelkin &amp; Rickless 2017a: 127). Other proponents of this strategy deny that the content of the requisite awareness must involve a belief in the action’s overall wrongness and claim that a belief in there being sufficient reasons not to perform the action (Robichaud 2014), a belief in one’s acting from morally reproachable reasons (Sartorio 2017), or a belief in there being a non-negligible risk that one’s action is wrong (Guerrero 2007; Nelkin &amp; Rickless 2017a), can be enough for blameworthiness. (See also Levy 2014 [ch. 2] who claims that responsibility requires awareness of the facts that give the action its moral valence rather than awareness of moral wrongness. Cf. Levy 2011 [ch. 6, esp. 141] and  fn. 3  above.) We’ll call this position ‘weakened internalism’: ‘internalism’ because, like volitionism, it assumes that what the EC requires is the presence of certain mental states that track the action’s moral valence as it appears to the agent (Levy 2009); ‘weakened’ because, unlike volitionism, it allows for the possibility that non-occurrent mental states, as well as beliefs that fall short of full-blown akrasia, satisfy the EC.