 Another issue that leads Olivi to questions the idea of divine illumination is related to Henry of Ghent’s realistic view (realistic of the Platonist breed), that knowledge of universal propositions provides a proof for the existence of God. In Olivi’s eyes, the problem here is that if such knowledge is based on grasping the eternal reasons in God (which God used in creation), there is no way to preserve the theological doctrine that we cannot see God in this life. While Henry’s argument is based on the realist idea that necessary truths would exists even in the absence of thinking subjects, Olivi holds that necessary propositions are necessary only because they cannot be formed by a mind without their being true. Having thus undermined the fundamental basis of the theory of divine illumination, Olivi goes on to propose a theory of knowledge that is closer to Aquinas’ view in its appeal to empiricism, but that is more radical and preserves certain aspects of Augustine’s neoplatonist theory—especially as it emphasizes the active nature of the mind in cognitive processes (Piron 2020b, par. 2–3).