 Another way to see what is meant by “content” is to think of this as what is reported when answering the question, “What does she think?” by something of the form, “She thinks that p”. And one might regard the content of thought as what two people share, when what they think is the same (and they think the same thought)—and it’s what differs when what they think is different. Analogous remarks apply to belief and intention. (Though it is not quite as clear that when we speak of what one perceives, this is to be understood in just the same way.) Content is also what may vary independently of the “psychological modes” of states of mind in ways illustrated by saying: Believing that I’ll soon be bald and fearing that I’ll soon be bald differ in mode, but share the content: that I’ll soon be bald, while each differ in content from believing and fearing that I’ll soon be dead. (One may also wish to treat perception as a “mode” alongside believing, fearing, etc.)