 One other response is to embrace infinitism and hold that an infinite regress is not necessarily vicious or problematic. Infinitism has a few defenders (e.g., Peter Klein (1998) and more recently, Fantl (2003) and Aikin (2011)). The infinitist accepts the need to be able to supply non-circular justification for believing what we do, but argues that given the complexity of the human mind and its capacity to entertain and justifiably believe an infinite number of propositions, there is nothing vicious about the relevant regresses we face. There is no reason to suppose that we would be unable to justify every proposition we believe by appeal to some other different proposition which we justifiably believe. Infinitism is a view that should be seriously considered, particularly once one realizes that one not only can but arguably does have an infinite number of justified beliefs (e.g., that 2 is greater than 1, that 3 is greater that 1, and so on.). For some further discussion of infinitism and challenges to it, see Klein and Turri (2014).