 In a research manuscript from 1913 Husserl refers to mental files associated with proper names as “individual notions (Eigenbegriffe)” (cf. Husserliana, vol. XX/2, p. 358), characterizing them as being infinitely “open” and “in flux” (cf. ibid., p. 359). Now it is the “referent” of the relevant mental file, or individual notion, that will normally count as the common intentional object of the experiences bound together in a unified series of successive intentional horizons in which the object “constitutes itself” empirically. (In cases where the “referent” of a mental file changes across time—i.e., is unnoticedly replaced by another object—the situation becomes more complicated. The same goes for cases of perceptual judgements leading to, or taken by the respective subject to be confirming, entries into an already existing file. See Beyer 2000, sec. 7.) Note that “constitution” so conceived does not mean creation.