 However, it is unlikely S could be justified in believing any proposition P in a way that is completely independent of experience. For one thing, S must grasp or understand P before S could be justified in believing it. According to one familiar view, propositions involve properties and in order to understand a proposition, S must have or grasp concepts corresponding to these properties. The majority of our concepts are empirical. Hence, without experience S could not believe, or even understand, most propositions; so without experience S could not be justified in believing these propositions. For example, it is unlikely the concepts of marriage and bachelorhood are innate, so not even  (1)  is a proposition S could be justified in believing without any experience at all. Hence, the sense in which a priori justification is independent of experience must be further specified: at the very least, experiences required to understand a proposition, including experiences necessary to grasp the relevant concepts, do not count against being justified independently of experience.