 As always, the issue is complicated by the effects of context. Whether they are motivational or epistemic (or some combination of the two), partial biases that are entirely appropriate in some contexts, such as friendship, will be deeply inappropriate in others, such as the making of hiring or sentencing decisions. (This assumes, of course, that we are rejecting the consequentialist view that the requirements of strict impartiality are pervasive in all aspects of our lives.) As mentioned above, empirical research on implicit bias strongly suggests that even when we recognize that we are acting in the latter sort of context, and believe ourselves to be acting in a thoroughly impartial and unbiased manner, we may well be fooling ourselves. Thus, formulating a correct theoretical understanding of the scope and demands of partiality and impartiality, as difficult as that task is in itself, may not be sufficient for acting as a truly good or virtuous agent. The more practical task of training our perceptions, inclinations, and motivations in order to see and respond to the world, at least where appropriate, in an impartial way – or, if this is not possible, then to see and act in ways that take into account and correct for our inherent biases – would also seem to be necessary.