 Strong substantive and social-relational approaches are perhaps the most controversial of those surveyed and have as a result attracted trenchant critiques. The first is conceptual. It has been suggested that strong substantive theories conflate autonomy (defined as self-rule) with morally right-rule (Benson 2005a, 132). In other words, on these accounts, agents are autonomous only if they make morally correct choices or choices that coincide with their objective interests. But, it is argued, being autonomous is not conceptually identical to being moral, or to always acting in ways that promote an agent’s interests. Second, it has been suggested that social-relational views are objectionable because they permit paternalism or are implicitly committed to perfectionism (Holroyd 2009; Christman 2004; cf. Mackenzie 2008; Stoljar 2017). For example, Christman argues that Oshana’s position is implicitly committed to an egalitarian ideal; he claims that on her account, no other political arrangement is consistent with personal autonomy (Christman 2004; Christman 2009). Third, it has been alleged that these accounts are too quick to treat oppression as always impeding autonomy. For instance, Meyers claims that certain agents are “firebrand, adventure-loving resisters”, who thrive and flourish when they have the opportunity to oppose social norms (Meyers 2000a, 479). If this is so, autonomy would be possible even in the circumstances of the extremely constraining regime described by Oshana.