 If animals have moral status, the question emerges: what sort of treatment are they owed? Moral treatment is usually considered to be a function of the interests that a being has, and these are closely linked to their psychological capacities. Inspired by findings in comparative cognition, scholars have argued that some animals not only have an interest in experiencing pleasure and avoiding pain, but that they can also enjoy other goods, such as freedom (Gruen 2018; Schmidt 2015), friendship (Frööding &amp; Peterson 2011), relationships of care (Monsó, Benz-Schwarzburg, &amp; Bremhorst 2018), and meaning (Purves &amp; Delon 2018). This has potential implications for the moral treatment that animals are owed, because it could mean that animals are not just wronged when they are made to feel pain, but also when they are deprived of opportunities to enjoy these other goods.