  Ronald Dworkin, by contrast, does purport to offer judges a general theory of legal interpretation which they can use to guide their interpretive activities, and which, if followed correctly, will lead them to the ‘one right answer’ in the case before them (on Dworkin's ‘one right answer’ thesis, see further point (7) below). For Dworkin, it is the aim of all legal interpretation to ‘constructively interpret’ the social practice of law, by imposing purpose upon it such as, ‘to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.’ (Dworkin 1986, p52). The more specific theory which he believes that judges should follow in fulfilling this task—‘law as integrity’—‘instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were created by a single author—the community personified’ (see subsections 2.5 and 3.4, and the entry  interpretivist theories of law).  It should be noted, however, that while Dworkin's general theory of interpretation is designed to assist in guiding judges to the one right answer in a case which comes before them, he claims that it is not recipe-like in the sense of providing judges with a detailed step by step programme for correct judicial decision-making: ‘I have not devised an algorithm for the courtroom. No electronic magician could design from my arguments a computer program that would supply a verdict everyone would accept once the facts of the case and the text of all past statutes and judicial decisions were put at the computer's disposal’ (Dworkin 1986, p. 412).