 What should Inseparabilists say about the common way in which thick and thin concepts are evaluative? Several views have been proposed, but a simple proposal will hopefully suffice to give a feel for the issue. Thick and thin concepts might be thought similar in that both have intrinsic practical relevance (Dancy 2013: 56–7). Whereas the relevance of a non-evaluative concept such as water to your actions needs to be explained by citing other considerations, such as your desire to quench thirst or the fact that you are stranded in the desert, no further explanation is needed for the practical relevance of thin concepts like ought or thick concepts such as courage. It is “to be expected” that courageousness makes a practical difference: it is normally, even if not always, something to aspire to and admire. Whereas competence with non-evaluative concepts requires only the ability to determine whether the concept applies, competence with an evaluative concept requires also grasping its general evaluative point—the sorts of practical difference its instantiation can make in a particular case. For thick concepts, the sort of difference may vary from case to case: rudeness is usually inappropriate, but sometimes neutral and sometimes positively called for. One problem with this view is that its metaethical commitments are too controversial for a general distinction between evaluative and non-evaluative concepts. For example, under the “internalist” view of normative reasons, according to which there is a reason for an agent to perform a particular action only if the action is suitably related to the agent’s motivations, courageous and morally good have no more intrinsic practical relevance than water and wombat (Williams 1981). Whether their application makes a difference to your reasons will depend on your motivations. It is also controversial that “objectionable” thick concepts have intrinsic practical relevance. Why then should other thick concepts?