 The weakest interpretation of the contract is that the contractual result is simply indicative of the correct answer to the justificatory problem, which itself is simply indicative of the fact that R has L. One could be a “realist,” maintaining that whether R has L is a fact that holds whether or not the contract device generates R has L, and independently of whether the correct answer to our justificatory problem (i.e., what we can justify to each other) is that R has L. There is still logical space for a type of contractualism here, but an indicative contractualism of this sort would not be a form of “constructivism.” Some, for example, have argued that Scanlon’s theory is actually based on a sort of natural rights theory, where these rights are prior to the contract (Mack 2007). Even if this is correct, Scanlon can be a sort of social contract theorist. The diversity of possible approaches within social contract theory indicates the variety of different uses to which social contract theory can be applied.