 However, it is not obvious that an agent’s knowledge of her intentional actions is not inferred from immediate knowledge of her own intentions.  Consider, to illustrate the line of thought, Grice's theory of intention and belief.  As noted above, he held a Weak Cognitivist view according to which an agent wills that he Fs and derives from his awareness of willing that he will in fact F (or at least try to F) precisely because he has willed to do so.  However, it seems plausible, as Sarah Paul argues at length in her 2009, that intentions to F, rightly understood, can take the place of the counterpart ‘willings’ in Grice's account.  Thus, an agent, intending to F in the near future, and being immediately aware of so intending, forms inferentially the belief that she will F soon (or at least try to F) precisely because she has intended to do so.  After all, the conditional,