  For instance, consider the following two conceptions. One conception takes platitudes about \(x\) to be expressions that must be endorsed on pain of being linguistically incompetent with the application of the terms \(t_1 , \ldots ,t_n\) used to talk about \(x\) (Nolan 2009). However, this conception does not readily allow for disagreement: prima facie, it is not incoherent to think that two individuals, each of whom is competent with the application of \(t_1 (x), \ldots ,t_n (x)\), may differ as to whether some \(p\) must be endorsed or whether some expression is genuinely platitudinous. For instance, consider the platitude in (17), which connects being true with corresponding with reality. Being linguistically competent with terms for structural relations like correspondence does not force endorsement of claims that connect truth with correspondence; no one not already in the grip of the correspondence theory would suppose that they must endorse (17), and those who oppose it would certainly suppose otherwise. Further inadequacies beleaguer this conception. It makes no provision for degrees of either endorsement or linguistic incompetence. It makes no distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical terms, much less restrict \(t_1 (x), \ldots ,t_n (x)\) to non-theoretical terms. Nor does it require that platitudes themselves be true. On one hand, this consequently leaves open the possibility that universally-endorsed but false or otherwise alethically defective expressions are included in the platitude-based analysis of ‘true’. An old platitude about whales, for example—one which was universally endorsed on pain of being linguistically incompetent—prior to whales being classified as cetaceans—was that they are big fish. The worry, then, is that the criteria may allow us to screen in certain ‘fish stories’ about truth. This would be a major problem for advocates of Ramsification and other forms of implicit definition, since those techniques work only on the presupposition that all input being Ramsified over or implicitly defined is itself true (Wright 2010). On the other hand, making explicit that platitudes must also be true seems to entail that they are genuine ‘truisms’ (Lynch 2005c), though discovering which ones are truly indefeasible is a further difficulty—one made more difficult by the possibility of error theories (e.g., Devlin 2003) suggesting that instances of the \(T\)-schema are universally false. Indeed, we are inclined to say instances of disquotational, equivalence, and operator schemas are surely candidates for being platitudinous if anything is; but to say that they must be endorsed on pain of being linguistically incompetent is to rule out a priori error theories about instances of the \(T\)-schema.