 Dorothy Grover, Joseph Camp, and Nuel Belnap (1975) develop a different variety of deflationism that they call a “prosentential theory”. This theory descends principally from Ramsey’s views. In fact, Ramsey (1929, 10) made what is probably the earliest use of the term ‘pro-sentence’ in his account of the purpose of truth-talk. Prosentences are explained as the sentence-level analog of pronouns. As in the case of pronouns, prosentences inherit their content anaphorically from other linguistic items, in this case from some sentence typically called the prosentence’s “anaphoric antecedent” (although it need not actually occur before the prosentence). As Grover, et al. develop this idea, this content inheritance can happen in two ways. The most basic one is called “lazy” anaphora. Here the prosentence could simply be replaced with a repetition of its antecedent, as in the sort of case that Strawson emphasized, where one says “That is true” after someone else has made an assertion. According to Grover, et al., this instance of truth-talk is a prosentence that inherits its content anaphorically from the other speaker’s utterance, so that the two speakers assert the same thing. As a result, Grover, et al. would take the instances of (ES) to express meaning equivalences, but since they (ibid., 113–5) do not take the instances of truth-talk on the left-hand sides of these equivalences to say anything about any named entities, they would not read (ES) as either (ES-sent) or (ES-prop) on their standard interpretations. So, while their prosententialism is similar to views in position \(\mathbf{A}\) or in position \(\mathbf{B}\) in the chart above, it is also somewhat different from both.