A different rationale has been suggested for imposing I specifically in the case of voting. Many voting procedures are known to present opportunities for voters to manipulate outcomes by misrepresenting their preferences. Section 5.2 discusses the example of Borda counting, which allows voters to promote their own favorite candidates by strategically putting others’ favorites at the bottom of their lists. Borda counting, it will be seen, violates I. Proofs of the Gibbard-Sattherthwaite theorem (Gibbard 1973, Sattherthwaite 1975) associate vulnerability to strategic voting systematically with violation of I, and Iain McLean argues on this ground that voting methods ought to satisfy this condition: “Take out [I] and you have gross manipulability” (McLean 2003: 16). This matter of strategic voting did not play a part in Arrow’s presentation of the impossibility theorem, though, and was not dealt with seriously in the literature until after its publication. See the entry on social choice theory for discussion of this important theme in contemporary theory of social choice.