 Second, opponents have objected to Local Reductionism on the grounds that we can be justified in believing a speaker, S’s, testimony that p even if we lack the relevant non-testimonially based reasons to support the inference from “S said that p” to “p”. (See, e.g., Webb [1994: 263–264], Strawson [1994: 25], Schmitt [1999: 360] and Lackey [2008: 180]). For instance, suppose you arrive in a new country and spot someone on the street. And suppose that you approach this person and ask them for directions. Now, if that person tells you that your hotel is three blocks down the road, then it seems like you are justified in accepting their testimony that this is the case. But Local Reductionism cannot accommodate this result. For insofar as the only thing that justifies your belief is your inference from “This person said that my hotel is just down the road” to “My hotel is just down the road”, then since you know next to nothing about this stranger, and since you also know very little about whether anyone in this area is likely to answer this sort of question honestly, it is hard to see how your non-testimonially based reasons for accepting this person’s testimony are strong enough to justify you in believing what you are told on this occasion. (But see, e.g., Kenyon [2013], who defends Local Reductionism from this worry by arguing that even if a hearer knows very little about the speaker in question, they can still appeal to other contextual information to support their inference).