 One possibility—not pursued directly by Comesaña—would be to appeal to reliabilist resources to provide an answer. Goldman (2011) makes a suggestion along these lines in developing his preferred synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism. Goldman points out that while reliabilists have not traditionally appealed to the notion of evidence, the notions of mental or psychological states play an important role in reliabilist theories. After all, in addition to belief-forming processes, there are also states that serve as inputs to those processes. These include both doxastic states (beliefs, primarily) and various experiences (perceptual, memorial, etc.). Although reliabilists typically do not call these states “evidence”, there is no principled reason why they could not do so. A similar suggestion is made by Beddor (2021), framed in terms of reasons rather than evidence. On Beddor’s proposal, a given psychological state s constitutes a prima facie reason for an agent to hold a belief B just in case there is some reliable (or, in the case of inferential beliefs, conditionally reliable) process available to the agent that is disposed to produce B when fed s as input. (More on the applications of this sort of view below.) Perhaps, then, not only does a reliabilist-evidentialist hybrid help address problems for reliabilism, it also helps answer some pressing questions that have historically faced evidentialists.