  Such paradoxes lead some ‘classy’ Pyrrhonian moral skeptics to deny that any contrast class is ever really relevant. This denial implies that it is never either true or false that a believer is justified (without qualification), if such claims presuppose that some contrast class is really relevant. Alternatively, classy Pyrrhonian moral skeptics might suspend belief about whether any contrast class is ever really relevant or not. Such Pyrrhonian moral skeptics refuse to take any position either way on whether any believer is justified (without qualification), although they can still talk about whether someone is justified in believing a moral claim out of a specified contrast class. Pyrrhonian moral skeptics can then (i) accept skepticism about extremely justified moral belief but (ii) deny skepticism about modestly justified moral belief and (iii) refuse to either assert or deny (dogmatic) skepticism about any moral belief being justified (without qualification). (See Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, chap. 6.)