At the same time, however, to be human is to be underway toward achieving ends that are understood as integral to one’s overarching life-project. My actions at any moment, though typically aimed at accomplishing tasks laid out by the demands of circumstances, are also cumulatively creating me as a person of a particular sort. In this sense, my futural projection as “understanding” has the structure of being a projection onto one’s ownmost possibility of being. So, for example, when I attend a boring parent/teacher conference, I do so as part of handling my current duties. But this act is also part of being a parent insofar as it contributes to determining “that for the sake of which” I understand myself as existing. Given this distinction between current means/ends strategic actions and long-range life-defining undertakings, it is possible to see that there are two senses of freedom in play in Heidegger’s account of human existence. There is freedom in the humdrum sense of doing what I choose to do under ordinary conditions, a freedom Heidegger presumably interprets in an agent-libertarian way. But there is also freedom in an ethically more robust sense. In addition to choosing courses of action among options, Dasein is capable of “choosing to choose a kind of being-one’s-self” (1962 [1927]: 314) through its ongoing constitution of that identity for the sake of which it exists. Thus, I attend the parent/teacher conference and behave in a particular way because I care about being a parent and a citizen of a particular sort. I understand this stance as having repercussions for my life as a whole, and I grasp the need for resoluteness in holding steady to undertakings of this sort if I am to shape my identity in the way I can care about. For Heidegger, the resolute commitment that is made concrete and defined in one’s day-to-day actions is what imparts steadiness and steadfastness to a life. It is also the condition for being responsible for one’s own existence: “Only so can [one] be responsible [verantwortlich]”, Heidegger says (1962 [1927]: 334, translation modified). Authenticity, defined as standing up for and standing behind what one does—as owning and owning up to one’s deeds as an agent in the world—becomes possible in this sort of resolute commitment to the “for the sake of which” of one’s existence.