 There are reasons to doubt whether this sort of theoretically ambitious but selective evolutionary debunking strategy is a viable or stable one (Kahane 2011 and 2014, Rini 2016, FitzPatrick 2017a). A natural worry is that if such debunking arguments really worked against opponents of utilitarianism in the manner suggested, then similar arguments could equally be deployed against utilitarianism if we play by the same rules. The selective debunking arguments used by de Lazari-Radek and Singer give a great deal of negative epistemic weight to the mere existence of possible debunking explanations which, if true, would clearly pose a problem for the targeted beliefs (even though it remains a wide open question whether such explanatory stories are in fact true). That is, they give great weight to the mere ability to tell a plausible debunking story according to which non-utilitarian moral beliefs would turn out to be problematically rooted in ‘contaminated starting points’ (psychological dispositions resulting from morally blind evolutionary forces) that have merely been refined over time by culturally conditioned causal influences operating equally blindly to moral truths. This raises problems for them, however, because one can easiliy enough come up with similar debunking stories about utilitarian beliefs, according to which they would equally turn out to be problematically shaped by morally-blind evolutionary forces that contaminated the starting points.