 With respect to all judgments \(m\) mediated by a set \(\mu\) of judgments, it is of high relevance whether the argument \(\langle \sigma , s\rangle\) corresponding to \(\langle \mu , m\rangle\) fulfills certain criteria. In the sections 3.8 and 3.9 we have already dealt with two logical relations which can obtain between the conclusion \(s\) and the set \(\sigma\) of premises of an argument \(\langle \sigma , s\rangle\) and which can easily be transferred to \(\langle \mu , m\rangle\): it is on the one hand the peculiar feature of \(s\) being a logical consequence of \(\sigma\), and on the other hand the peculiar feature of \(s\) having a certain degree of logical probability \(\gt \bfrac{1}{2}\) relative to \(\sigma\). With respect to empirical judgments, considerations of probability are in the foreground. Logical consequence “transfers” certainty, also in its subjective sense, from the premises to the conclusion of an inference. That is to say, if each member of a set \(\mu\) of judgments is certain for a person \(A\) (as is the case for each immediate judgment), and if a judgment \(m\) is mediated or caused by \(\mu\) insofar as it is inferred by \(A\) from \(\mu\) as a logical consequence of it, then \(m\) is also certain for \(A\) (WL III, 264 f.). In order for this to be the case, it is of course not enough for the argument \(\langle \sigma , s\rangle\) corresponding to \(\langle \mu , m\rangle\) to be logically correct, but it is required that \(A\) infers \(m\) from \(\mu\) in virtue (kraft) of the logical correctness of this argument.