 In some respects Skyrms’ observation shows how Gauthier’s argument for constrained maximization might have been strengthened by drawing on resources from outside the confines of rational choice theory. Indeed, Skyrms shows that the basin of attraction for the equitable equilibrium where all agents press claims of 1/2 expands when agents become more likely to interact with agents of their own strategy type, as they might if they are somewhat able to recognize agents like themselves. For example,  Figure 14  depicts a series of orbits of a correlated replicator dynamic Skyrms uses to model such situations. In this dynamic, an agent meets a counterpart of the same pure strategy type with probability .2 greater than the random chance probability of the ordinary replicator  dynamic.[19]  And, as we can see, even with this relatively minor increase in the likelihood of same type interactions, all of the modified replicator dynamic orbits now converge to \(\be_2\)  .[20]