  As Hare notes (1981: 103), restrictions upon the relevant range of preferences may have the effect of bringing together a utilitarianism that aims to maximize pleasure or happiness, and one that aims to maximize the satisfaction of preference. Yet to have any hope of achieving this we would need a double restriction: the only preferences to be considered must be now-for-now or then-for-then, and they must be fully internal in relating only to conscious states of the subject—indeed, more precisely, to features of those states of which the agent is conscious, or, for short, what it is like to be in those states. However, this position is doubly insecure. First, when discussing the treatment of now-for-then preferences, Hare takes over from Richard Brandt the idea that rational agents seek to maximize the satisfaction of their present preferences after they have been adjusted in the light of full exposure to logic and the facts (1981: 101–5, 214–16). This makes the practical question for the agent not “What do I now prefer?”, but “What would I prefer after full exposure to logic and the facts?” The same issue arises even with now-for-now preferences. Hare discusses, though in a different context (1981: 142–4), the pleasure machine imagined by J.J.C. Smart (Smart &amp; Williams 1983: 18) that maximizes the pleasures of a subject through generating a stream of illusory but enjoyable experiences. He sees it as an advantage of his variety of utilitarianism that, not being “formulated in terms of pleasure”, it can give weight to whether “we prefer a life for ourselves plugged into the machines to one devoted to pursuits now considered normal and enjoyable” (1981: 143). That suggests that we should give weight to now-for-now preferences whose objects are not restricted to conscious features of current mental states. Further, if we follow Brandt, we should ask not what now-for-now preferences an agent actually has, but which he would have after subjection to Brandt’s “cognitive psycho-therapy”. Yet this implication may trouble us, not only because of the indefinite scope it offers to paternalism, but because it would seem undeterminable what an agent would want if indefinitely informed.