 Śrīharṣa’s reply is subtle: even though he is committed to the doctrine of non-duality, Śrīharṣa denies that the burden is upon him to show that the method by which one becomes aware of non-duality is in fact a means of knowing. This is because, sometimes, an agent can become aware of the truth even by means of a procedure that doesn’t yield knowledge, and therefore, doesn’t count as a means of knowing. For instance, in Mist, the agent correctly infers the presence of fire on a mountain after mistaking mist for smoke. For some defenders of Advaita Vedānta, such as Maṇḍana Miśra (8th century CE), there is at least a structural similarity between cases of this kind and the case where an agent becomes aware of the non-distinctness of the world from the self on the basis of experience of hearing Upanisadic sentences that proclaim that non-duality (Kuppuswami Sastri 1984: 41; Thrasher 1993: ch. V; Ganeri 2007: ch. 5). As in Mist, in this case too, the agent moves from error to truth; for the experience of hearing Upaniṣadic sentences is laden with the differences amongst the hearer, the hearing, and that which is heard. Śrīharṣa seems to suggest here that the defender of non-dualism—committed as she may be to the claim that there is nothing in the world that is distinct from the self—needn’t have to cite a method of knowing that will produce the knowledge of that truth.