  The quality of these interactions is discouraging. Like any realistic common sense reasoning problem, the Frame Problem is open-ended, and can depend on a wide variety of circumstances. If you put $20 in a wallet, put the wallet in your pocket, and go to the store, you can safely assume that the $20 is still in the wallet.  But if you leave the $20 on the counter at the store while shopping, you can’t safely assume it will be there later.  This may account for the temptation that makes some  philosophers[27]  want to construe the Frame Problem very broadly, so that very soon it becomes indiscernible from the problem of formalizing general common sense in arbitrary domains. Such a broad construal may serve to introduce speculative discussions concerning the nature of AI, but it loses all contact with the genuine, new logical problems in temporal reasoning that have been discovered by the AI community. It provides a forum for repeating some familiar philosophical themes, but it brings nothing new to philosophy. This way of interpreting the Frame Problem is disappointing, because philosophy can use all the help it can get; the AI community has succeeded in extending and enriching the application of logic to common sense reasoning in dramatic ways that are highly relevant to philosophy. The clearest account of these developments to be found in the volumes edited by Pylyshyn is  Morgenstern 1996.  An extended treatment can be found in  Shanahan 1997;  also see  Sandewall 1994 and  Shanahan 2009.