 Wong presents pluralistic relativism as the best explanation of what he calls “moral ambivalence,” the phenomenon of morally disagreeing with someone while recognizing that the person is still reasonable in making the conflicting judgment—to the point that one’s confidence in being uniquely right is shaken. The extent to which moral ambivalence is widespread is an empirical question  (see section 3).  In any case, Wong presents a sustained and detailed argument that an empirically-based understanding of the nature and conditions of human life both limits and underdetermines what a true morality could be. In many respects, his position is the most sophisticated form of relativism developed to date, and it has the resources to confront a number of the issues raised in the last section (for some critical responses to Wong and his replies, see Xiao and Huang 2014; for more recent discussion, see Li 2019, Vicente and Arrieta 2016, and Wong 2020).