 Pfänder’s early positions provide the basis for a series of arguments that Reinach develops in his 1911 paper On the Theory of Negative Judgment to illustrate that meaning something is an act of its own kind that is fundamentally different from presentation. Reinach, too, seems to understand the notion of meaning something as interchangeable with that of thinking (1908a [1989: 339f]; 1913a [1989: 419], but see Mulligan 2011: 266 for a different interpretation). The broader sense of “thinking”, which is equivalent to that of “meaning something”, is contrasted with a narrower one, which restrictedly points to those acts that are directed towards ideal or abstract objects only (1911a [1989: 104]). Reinach also operates with a broader notion of presentation, which encompasses all acts that secure intuitive access to their objects: this notion includes sensual and categorial perceptions, imaginations, “presentifications” (i.e., the act of making “present” an object in consciousness), etc. (1911a [1989: 101]).