  Oakeshott worked hard to rebut the argument that political philosophy is inherently and unavoidably practical. Not only is it possible to distinguish political philosophy from its object, political activity, but its claim to being philosophical demands that the distinction be recognized. In Oakeshott’s view, moral philosophy properly so-called is theorizing about morality (metaethics). It is concerned to understand and explain, not to prescribe. Prescriptive or normative ethics, he argued early on, is “pseudo-philosophy” (EM 331–346) because it mixes theorizing with moralising. Just as a theory of jokes is not itself a joke (OHC 10), a theory of morality is not itself a morality. The object of theorizing is a “going-on” to be reflected upon (“theorized”) by an observer (a “theorist”) whose reflections may generate conclusions (“theorems”), however provisional (Oakeshott 2004: 391; OHC 3). Theorizing is distinguished from what Oakeshott calls “doing” in that the product of theorizing is an understanding, a theorem or proposition, not, as in the case of doing, an action. In doing, whatever reflection takes place involves deliberating about what to do. The theorizing that distinguishes genuine historical and scientific inquiry from pseudo-history or pseudo-science is not action-oriented and prescriptive but explanatory. What distinguishes philosophical from historical or scientific inquiry is that philosophy is more critical in examining the presuppositions of inquiry: where scientists or historians want to get on with their work, the philosopher is concerned to problematize that work and to examine the experience of thinking itself. Political philosophy, then, is properly philosophical when it examines the presuppositions of political activity. 