 Naturalised epistemologists form a heterogeneous group and not all of them contest all the above features. However, in general epistemological naturalists question the first three traits. (a) They give up the privileged autonomous position of epistemology and uphold that epistemology must be continuous with science. (b) Causal questions must form part of epistemology, epistemologists should take stock of psychological conditions of cognition. (c) The traditional internalist model of justification being unacceptable, either epistemology should give up the task of justification altogether or look for alternative means of justification. Radical naturalists like the early Quine want to replace epistemology by psychology and give up the justification task entirely. Later Quine and more moderate naturalists, on the other hand, re-instate justification but of a different kind: some consider justification offered in terms of causally reliable process of belief generation to be adequate, some others admit epistemic justification but retain naturalism by making it supervenient on natural facts.