 We will start with her last thesis. Anscombe notes that despite their many differences, “every one of the best known English academic moral philosophers” thinks that killing the innocent is sometimes right, such as when the foreseeable consequences of not killing them would be catastrophic. She traces this to Sidgwick’s definition of intention, according to which one intends any and every foreseen consequence of one’s voluntary action. While the moral philosophers she criticizes don’t necessarily accept Sidgwick’s definition of intention, they do accept an ethical thesis based upon it: a person is always equally responsible for the intended and the merely foreseeable consequences of their voluntary actions. Anscombe identifies this move as the difference between the Utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill, who rejected the thought that it could ever be apt to calculate whether to kill an innocent person, and the consequentialism (a term she invented) of later English philosophers. Consequentialism, as she explains, is not directly a doctrine about what makes an action right – this meaning came about only later in the recent history of philosophy. Instead, consequentialism is about what one is responsible for. But the two topics are connected: if you are equally responsible for intentionally killing innocent people and for merely foreseeably killing innocent people, then why would it be wrong to kill one innocent person to save five? For if you don’t, you’d be just as responsible for the death of the five as if you had killed them yourself. Thus even many deontologists (like W.D. Ross) agree with Sidgwick that in some circumstances you have a moral duty to kill innocent people. (See also MTD, 71.) But Anscombe instead held that the consequentialist view of responsibility ultimately rests on a false view of what it is to act intentionally.