 There is variation even among those accounts that give a motivational role to belief. On Velleman’s early view, intentions are ‘self-fulfilling expectations that are motivated by a desire for their fulfillment and that represent themselves as such’ (Velleman 1989, p. 109). Such expectations interact with a general desire for self-knowledge to motivate action by which they are confirmed. More recently, Velleman has replaced the desire for self-knowledge with a sub-personal aim or disposition (Velleman 2000: 19–21). Either way, his view threatens to generate what Bratman (1991, pp. 261–2) calls ‘the problem of promiscuity’: in attributing a general tendency that motivates us to conform to our own expectations, it predicts that we will be just as strongly motivated by beliefs that do not constitute intentions, like the belief that I am going to trip over the step, or mispronounce a word.