 Like  Most Reason to Desire,  this proposal has the advantage of accounting for the thought that the Compelling Idea is something that both utilitarianism and ethical egoism hold in common. What’s more, it seems quite attractive to many—or, at least, to those who accept a teleological conception of action. On this conception, actions are attempts to affect how the world goes. And, thus, whenever one acts intentionally, one acts with the aim of making the world go a certain way. The aim needn’t be anything having to do with the causal consequences of the act. The aim could be nothing more than to perform the act in question. One could, for instance, run merely with the aim of running. But the fact remains that, for every intentional action, there is some end at which the agent aims. Thus, it’s natural to suppose that the reasons for performing an action derive from the reasons for desiring the ends that it would achieve. And, so, one has most reason to act in whatever way will make the world go as one ought to prefer that it goes (see Mill 1861 [1991]: Ch. 1; Portmore 2019: 262–3; Thomson 2003: 8; Wood 2017: 266). After all, wouldn’t it be odd to think that one isn’t permitted to do what would best achieve the aims that one ought to want to achieve? In any case, given  Most Reason to Desire’s  inclusion of the claim that an act’s deontic status is grounded in the agent’s reasons for preferring its outcome to those of the available alternatives (which earnest consequentializers take to be definitive of act-consequentialism), it is at least unique to act-consequentialism.