  The fact that Hinton chooses to focus on the reports we make about our experiences, may be a reflection of the fact that his primary concern is to question an assumption about those properties of experience that we should be in a position to make reports about simply in virtue of having the experience. (“You want a predicate whose applicability to what is happening in or to me is made clear to me by the very fact of that thing’s happening”, Hinton 1967, 224.) We might then understand Hinton as taking his opponent to be committed to the claims that (a) perceptions and subjectively indistinguishible hallucinations have such properties in common, (b) it is the fact that perceptions and hallucinations have such properties in common that explains their being subjectively indistinguishible, and (c) these are the properties we are picking out when we make Neutral Experience Reports. He may then be seen as trying to undermine the assumption that (a) and (b) are correct by throwing into doubt our entitlement to (c).