 Objects are the objectual correlates of nominal acts: if you perceive (think of, remember, imagine, etc.) Napoleon, then Napoleon is the object of your perception. From a linguistic point of view, objects are the referents of singular terms, be they concrete or abstract. In line with Husserl’s LI, early phenomenology takes the category of object to be divided into the two sub-categories of real and ideal objects, which are distinguished by their relation to time (cf. Hua XIX 129f). Ideal objects are atemporal; these are usually taken to be either general or individual objects. Properties and essences are general because they can be predicated of several objects. By contrast, ideal objects, which cannot be predicated of anything else, are individual. So, e.g., Reinach takes natural numbers to be ideal and individual for they are not predicated of other entities (1911c [1989: 58]; 1914 [1989: 539f]). Real objects are temporal, and this category is traditionally divided into material and mental objects. Over the years, this standard classification underwent substantial revision: in particular, the increasing attention devoted to social ontology led phenomenology to enrich its table of categories (Salice 2013). For instance, the case of entities like promissory claims and obligations called into question the strong connection hitherto endorsed or presupposed between ideality and temporality: on the one hand, these entities are neither material nor mental; on the other, they are temporal (they are brought about by a successful promise and extinguish when the promise is honored). Also, we have already seen that investigations into aesthetics led some phenomenologists to accept the existence of essences that are ideal, but nonetheless temporal or historical (for a similar conception, see also Husserl’s notion of “bound idealities”, 1938: 321).