 This, however, raises a difficulty, for the ultimate goal of man would seem to be exclusively tied to philosophy, while the role of religion would be meager. Although this difficulty is not peculiar to Albalag, it is particularly strong in the Tiqqun where a notable dichotomy between ʾemunah (belief) and yediʿah (scientific knowledge) serves to confine religion/Scripture to a domain of knowledge that is quantitatively and qualitatively different from demonstrative knowledge (i.e., prophetic knowledge). Whether this knowledge qualifies as an alternative or a parallel means to philosophy in fulfilling the epistemic requirement of intellectual perfection is a complex question. Insofar as the Tiqqun is concerned, ʾemunah can rightly be equated with fideism (see Tiqqun n.30: 38, 51), unlike the philosophical conception of belief (for which ʾiʿtiqād and taṣdīq were the basic technical terms in Arabic) advocated by many Jewish and Muslim philosophers and theologians (see, for instance, al-Farabi  Book of Demonstration: 63–4; Saʿadia Gaʾon  Book of Beliefs: 14; Maimonides Guide I:50). In view of the latter, belief consists in judgment or affirmation, following from cognitive processes and syllogistic reasoning, that a given perceived object is true. In this way, belief is said to be associated with certainty or approximation of certainty depending on the form of reasoning.