  Not infrequently, pluralism about truth fails to be distinguished from various other theses about associated conceptual, pragmatic, linguistic, semantic, and normative phenomena. Each of these other theses involves attributing plurality to a different aspect of the analysandum (explanandum, definiendum, etc.). For instance, linguistically, one may maintain that there is a plurality of truth predicates (Wright 1992; Tappolet 1997; Lynch 2000; Pedersen 2006, 2010). Semantically, one may maintain that alethic terms like ‘true’ have multiple meanings (Pratt 1908; Tarski 1944; Kölbel 2008, 2013; Wright 2010). Cognitively or conceptually, one may maintain that there is a multiplicity of truth concepts or regimented ways of conceptualizing truth (Künne 2003; cf. Lynch 2006). Normatively, one might think that truth has a plurality of profiles (Ferrari 2016, 2018).