 The logic of \(\Sigma\) begins, according to Royce, with the ontological claim that the terms of the logic “may be defined as, ‘certain possible modes of action that are open to any rational being who can act at all, and who can also reflect upon his own modes of possible action’ ” (1913a,  130–1).[5]  Hence the subject matter of logic is “objects” understood not as fixed entities but as “modes of action.” Note that for Royce, a ‘rational being’ is a purposive being: that is, an agent understood as something capable of action toward a purpose. In World and the Individual he wrote: “At any moment your ideas, in so far as they are rational, embody a purpose” (1900, 441–2). “And so,” he said elsewhere, “the empirical world is a whole, a life fulfilling the purposes of our ideas. It is that or it is nothing” (1900, 368). The logic that Royce proposed is therefore a logic of action where actions are taken as purposive.