 A distinct group of philosophical problems stems from anti-representationalist approaches to immune cognition. Advocates of the so-called immune network theory challenge the classical subject-object epistemology as a relationship between the knower and the known that heretofore has dominated immune theory (Varela 1994: 39). Heralding a shift “from an antigen-centered immunology to an organism-centered immunology”, this view maintains that immune agency requires neither representation nor unified control (Varela 1991). Instead of a hierarchical organizational format, this de-centered orientation rests on the architecture of the network theory proposed by Niels Jerne (Jerne 1974). He theorized that if antibodies of an individual are diverse enough to bind any antigen, they also are capable of recognizing one another. Simply, their mutual interactions must precede any exogenous antigen encounter. Thus, a binding site of one antibody could serve as an antigen to another antibody, which in turn may become the target to still another antibody to create a self-contained, inter-locking lattice-like network (Jerne 1985). He further proposed that excitatory and inhibitory forces resulting from antibody interactions establish an equilibrium state, which, unless upset by an intruding antigen, ensures stable immune dynamics. Thus, according to Jerne’s hypothesis, the immune system is a self-referential network made up of molecules that represent one another and whose reactions against invasive pathogens were only the incidental result of equilibrating mechanisms that restore stable network dynamics.