What, though, about the Anthropological View?  Schechtman offers an interesting take on fission: Such a procedure hasn't yet occurred, so without filling in the social conditions and practices we can't state in advance what the identity of the survivors would be.  If fission happened all the time, all of those future humans would likely be very different sorts of creatures from us, as they would be living a different form of life, and so the identity conditions for individuals like us simply wouldn't apply to them.  If it happened only once or very rarely, the survivors would be sufficiently like us (as we could still engage with them interpersonally, and our interactions with them could still make sense from within our current form of life) that they would be one of us, but they couldn't be identical to the original person.  This is because there would be such a huge range of differences in how they would be treated – by the spouse, children, friends, bank, and employer of the pre-fission person – that each person's relation to the pre-fission person would now just be too different to count as identity (Schechtman 2014, 159–166).  The Anthropological View thus seems as if it can deal with fission while nevertheless preserving a tight relation between identity and practical concerns.