  The stage theorist and relationalist both reject the claim that a persisting object directly bears each of contrary properties it has when it undergoes a change in qualities, the stage theorist rejecting that the same object directly bears the qualities at the different times and the relationalist denying that the properties are genuinely contrary. Some claim that rejecting either of the claims is tantamount to rejecting the very notion of a thing's changing its qualities through time. A proponent of the final version of endurantism, a dynamic relativist, insists that one and the same object, Bush himself, in the case of (10), directly bears the genuinely contrary properties of sitting and not sitting. The relativist avoids contradiction by claiming that an object doesn't simply have (or lack) a property simpliciter but has (or lacks) a property relative to a time. Bush has, relative to t, the property of sitting and lacks, relative to t', the property of not sitting. A proponent of this view rejects the idea that there is a single, fundamental, coherent way things are that transcends how things are at a time. While there are several distinct dynamic accounts worth distinguishing, what unites them all is the idea that, at the most fundamental level, a temporally neutral proposition like (10) is true at one time and false at another. A proponent of this view should be particularly troubled by our question about the constituent of (10). While (10) is true at t and false at t', the time relativization does not affect anything intrinsic to the proposition itself; both Bush and the property remain the same when the proposition is evaluated at these different times. But then what is the subject constituent of (10) and what is its connection to the property of sitting? 