 In standard logic-based analyses of linguistic meanings, the semantic content of a sentence \(\phi\) is defined as the set of evaluation points which verify \(\phi\). Normally, evaluation points are identified with possible worlds and so the semantic content of a sentence is identified with a set of possible worlds (a proposition), those worlds in which the sentence is true. In inquisitive semantics, instead, evaluation points are not worlds, but information states, which are defined as sets of possible worlds (those worlds compatible with the information encoded in the state). The semantic content of \(\phi\) is then inquisitively identified with the set of states which support \(\phi\), thus a set of sets of possible worlds, rather than a set of possible worlds. The original motivation for this move was to arrive at a uniform notion of semantic content which would work for both declarative and interrogative meaning (see Ciardelli, Groenendijk and Roelofsen 2015), since the latter are standardly characterized as sets of propositions, rather than as sets of possible worlds (see the entry on  questions).  The inquisitive move of taking states as evaluation points rather than worlds has important consequences for disjunction. The inquisitive clause of disjunction reads as follows: