 The idea that the normative in some sense is not part of nature goes back at least to Kant (see, for instance, Critique of Pure Reason [1781 [A 547]]). Already Hume (in the Treatise [1739–1740]) argued against the metaethical naturalist that ought cannot be derived from is—to try to do so would be to commit a so-called “naturalistic fallacy”. With the “open question argument”, Moore (in Principia Ethica [1903]) added a weapon to the anti-naturalist’s arsenal also against giving naturalistic accounts of moral evaluations: According to the open question argument, there is no naturalistic (set of) concept(s) analytically equivalent to the moral concept of goodness, since no matter what naturalistic definition is given, the question whether all and only things satisfying it are good still makes sense. Much of recent normativism about meaning/content continues in this anti-naturalist tradition; many normativists about meaning/content hold that the essential normativity of meaning/content makes at least (fully) reductive naturalism untenable.