 In his recent book Mind and Cosmos (2012) Thomas Nagel asserts that “the weight of the evidence favors some form of neutral monism over the traditional alternatives of materialism, idealism, and dualism” (2012: 5). Neutral monism is understood as a view that “accounts for the relation between mind and brain in terms of something more basic about the natural order” (2012: 56). This yields a picture of a “general monism according to which the constituents of the universe have properties that explain not only its physical but its mental character” (2012: 56). Borrowing a concept from Tom Sorrell (whom Nagel cites approvingly), we can say that these basic constituents of the universe are “transphysical and transmental” (2012: 57). This nicely captures the relevant sense of neutrality. The claim that all of the basic constituents must be of the same kind—the conclusion that we are dealing with a monism—is supported by the consideration that any basic constituent could be part of a psychophysical creature, such as ourselves. Hence every basic constituent must be of the kind that can explain the physical and mental traits as we know them. 