 Scheler considers a crying child and the various responses that one may have to her. Firstly there is the possibility that one sees the face but does not see it as expressing distress. Secondly there is the possibility that one sees the face as expressive of distress while remaining indifferent. And finally, there is the situation where one sees the child’s distress and responds emotionally. Scheler associates empathy with the second situation, and labels the emotional response in the final situation  “sympathy.”[8]  The relationship between perception and empathy is explored in somewhat more detail in the work of both Husserl and his student Edith Stein. While Husserl struggles with the idea of empathy in relation to others throughout his career we find in Stein’s work a more settled view (Zahavi 2014). Stein distinguishes empathy from perception, holding that empathy “is a kind of act of perceiving sui generis” (Stein 1917 [1989: 5]): it is like perception in so far as it is direct (like Scheler, Stein rejects the idea that knowledge of others comes about through inference); it is unlike perception in the way in which it gives us its object. Empathy is the way in which we experience foreign consciousness. Stein follows Scheler in holding that our experience of the other is an experience of a soul which is “always necessarily a soul in a body” (1917 [1989: 44]), but she emphasizes the way in which this experience is always imperfect: there is always a distance between what I am aware of when I empathize with the other and what the other is experiencing; I experience the other as other, as a center of intentionality or as a perspective on the world that is different from mine (cf. Zahavi 2014: 192). Without the distance introduced by an imperfect understanding—if understanding here could be perfect—I would be the other (cf. Levinas 1979: 89: “the absence of the other is exactly his presence as other”). It is this distance that Stein accuses Scheler of failing to capture in his more straightforwardly perceptual  account.[9]  As well as appreciating the otherness of the other, there is an appreciation in the work of Stein and Scheler of the ethical nature of my encounter with the other (cf. Levinas and Wittgenstein).