 Take, for example, an utterance of “It is raining” by John now on the CSLI patio in a telephone conversation with Kepa, who is in Donostia. John is talking about the weather in Stanford. Arguably, what John says is that it is raining in Stanford. This is what he intends for Kepa to understand, and it is the content of the belief, formed by looking at the weather around him, that motivates his utterance. Stanford, then, seems to be a constituent, part of the subject matter, of John’s remark. But how did it get there? It seems that it is a matter of pragmatics; it is a fact about John’s intentions that makes his remark to be about Stanford, and that suffices. This is an example of what Perry (1986) calls an ‘unarticulated constituent,’ and an instance of a more general phenomenon we will call ‘unarticulated content.’