 It might seem that consistency and coherence are not strong enough to tell us what the relation should be between the first order and the second order in cases of epistemic self-doubt, in the same way that they don’t seem sufficient for explaining what is wrong with Moore-paradoxical statements (see entry on  epistemic paradoxes).  In the latter I assert either “p and I don’t believe p”, or “p and I believe not-p”. There is a lack of fit between my belief and my belief about my belief in either case, but the beliefs I hold simultaneously are not inconsistent in content. What I say of myself would be consistent and quite sensible if said about me by someone else, thus: “p, but she doesn’t believe p”. Similarly, there is nothing inconsistent in the claim “There is a cat in the distance and she is severely near-sighted”, though there does seem to be a problem with the first-person claim “There is a cat in the distance and I am severely near-sighted” if my assertion about the cat is made on the basis of vision and I give no cue that I mean the second clause as a qualification of the first. My confidence about the cat should have been tempered by my awareness of the limitation of my vision. If there are general principles of rationality that govern self-doubt of our faculties or expertise it seems that they will have to go beyond consistency among beliefs.