 Some interpreters take the sceptical argument to involve the imposition of an epistemological constraint—a constraint related to the epistemic justification of semantic judgments, rather than to the rationality of the applications of expressions. Warren Goldfarb notes that Kripke “does seem to mean that the justifications must in some sense be transparent” (1985 [2002: 98]). José Zalabardo takes Kripke to be demanding that the meaning-constituting facts provide speakers with justification for their judgments about the correctness of the applications of their predicates. Justification is construed in an internalist sense: speakers possess the relevant justification if the procedure through which they decide whether predicates apply to objects involved “conscious engagement with the facts that determine how these questions should be answered” (1997 [2002: 286]). (See also Jackman 2003, Guardo 2012, and Merino-Rajme 2015). Crispin Wright proposes a more specific epistemic constraint, namely, that of accounting for the seemingly puzzling fact that the epistemology of meaning is first-person authoritative even though meaning something by an expression is in crucial respects akin to having a dispositional trait. In Wright’s words, the constraint is to explain 