  Another issue that appears to be undecided concerns so-called identity criteria for events, which has been the focus of an intense debate (Bradie 1983; Pfeifer 1989; Mackie 1997).  Is John’s walk the same event as his pleasant walk? Was Brutus’s stabbing of Caesar the same event as his killing of Caesar? Was it the same as the violent assassination of Caesar? Some philosophers take these to be metaphysical questions—questions whose answers call for adequate identity criteria, which must be provided before we are allowed to take our event talk seriously. In this sense, different conceptions of events tend to suggest different answers, and widely varying ones. At one extreme we find the radical “unifiers”, who take events to be as coarse-grained as ordinary objects (Quine 1985; Lemmon 1967); at the other the radical “multipliers”, who take events to be as fine-grained as facts (Kim 1966; Goldman 1971); and in between several moderate variants (Davidson 1969; Davis 1970; Thalberg 1971; Thomson 1971; Brand 1977; Cleland 1991; Engel 1994; Jones 2013). Other philosophers, however, regard questions of identity to be first and foremost semantic questions—questions about the way we talk and about what we say. No metaphysical theory, it is said, can settle the semantics of ordinary event talk, hence there is no way of determining the truth or falsity of an event identity statement exclusively on the basis of one’s metaphysical views. Which events a statement speaks of depends heavily (more heavily than with ordinary material objects) on local context and unprincipled intuitions (Bennett 1988). If so, then the whole identity issue is undecidable, since one is demanding metaphysical answers to questions that are in large part semantical.