  Most modern readers, perhaps influenced by the critiques of Berkeley and Hume against the first position and certainly less committed to neo-Platonism, take the second approach. The objects studied by mathematical sciences are perceptible objects treated in a special way, as a perceived representation, whether as a diagram in the sand or an image in the imagination. Furthermore, perhaps as a response to Frege's devastating critique of psychologism and Husserl's first attempt at a psychological account of arithmetic, some have suggested that Aristotle has no need for a special faculty of abstracting. Rather the mind is able to consider the perceived object without some of its properties, such as being perceived, being made of sand, marble, bronze, etc. However, this is analogous to the logical manipulation of definitions, by considering terms with or without certain additions. Hence, Aristotle will sometimes call the material object, the mathematical object by adding on. As a convenience, the mind conceives of this as if the object were just that. On this view, abstraction is no more and no less psychological than inference.