 Utterances of belief reporting sentences pragmatically implicate information about how the agent believes what she believes – they pragmatically implicate information about the type of belief state the agent is in – but semantically encode only information about what is believed. An utterance of (4) will typically pragmatically implicate false information about the type of belief state by which Lois grasps (and takes a positive attitude towards) the singular proposition concerning Clark Kent to the effect that he is strong; namely, it implicates that that belief state is linked to the sentence ‘Clark Kent is strong’. An utterance of (1), on the other hand, implicates the information that that belief state is linked to the sentence ‘Superman is strong’. This difference in implicating potential accounts for our intuitions that (1) and (4) convey different information. Those intuitions rightly represent the fact that there is a difference in the information an ordinary hearer will take from a typical utterance of (4) as opposed to a typical utterance of (1), but they are wrongly taken to show that (1) and (4) themselves thus differ in truth-value.