  First, past interests can often be satisfied in the present. Dworkin distinguishes between what he calls “experiential” and “critical” interests (Dworkin 1993, 201-08). Experiential interests are, roughly, interests in having desirable felt experiences, such as enjoyment (and in avoiding undesirable experiences, such as boredom). These interests are indeed tied to the present: there is no point in trying to satisfy one's past experiential interest in a specific enjoyment (for instance, in playing with dolls), if one at present has no hope of still deriving enjoyment from what one used to enjoy in the past. By contrast, critical interests are not tied to the experience of their satisfaction; these are interests in having what one values or cares about become a reality, such as a parent's interest in the success and prosperity of his child or a sailor's interest in preserving his beautiful wooden boat. According to Dworkin, such interests can be meaningfully satisfied even if they belong in the past: for example, even after the sailor dies, it makes sense to preserve the boat he cared about and do so for his sake. Similarly, according to Dworkin, it makes sense to satisfy a formerly competent person's critical interests, such as the interest in avoiding the indignity of dementia, for her sake, even if she has ceased to understand those critical interests now.