 Nevertheless the probabilist—one who thinks that rationality requires probabilistic coherence—will have a difficult time resisting SR since, analogously to what we saw above with anti-expertise, SR follows from coherence if it is supplemented with the further assumption that the subject has perfect knowledge of her own beliefs. Still, this does little to explain intuitively why SR should be binding; even someone who has perfect knowledge that he has a belief should be able to sensibly wonder whether it is a belief he ought to have. That perfect knowledge of our beliefs is a requirement of rationality can be doubted in a variety of ways (Williamson 2000; Christensen 2007b: 327–328; Roush 2016). However, as above so for the discussion here, denying that rationality requires knowledge of our own beliefs does not overcome the problem. Self-correction that will be of any use requires some degree of accuracy about one’s beliefs, and even if a subject doesn’t have perfect self-knowledge coherence still makes reflective demands; Christensen (2007b: 332) has noted that the closer a coherent subject comes to perfect knowledge of his beliefs the more nearly he will satisfy SR.