 Dualism requires us to dismantle the picture of inquiry, information and content sketched in the introduction to  section 1.  Note that it is natural for a dualist to distinguish the space of metaphysically possible worlds from the space of epistemically possible worlds, i.e., from the space of (maximally specific) ways the world might be that cannot be ruled out on the basis of ideal reasoning alone, without empirical evidence (Soames 2005, 2011). The range of epistemically possible worlds outstrips the range of metaphysically possible worlds: there are some ways the world couldn’t have been, but which cannot be ruled by ideal reasoning alone. For example, there is no metaphysically possible world where gold has atomic number 78. But prior to carrying out the right chemical investigations, we don’t have enough evidence to exclude all scenarios where gold has that atomic number, so some worlds where gold has atomic number 78 are epistemically possible. Empirical evidence is not used only to rule out (metaphysical) possibilities, but is sometimes needed to rule out metaphysical impossibilities that are epistemically possible. Consequently, we cannot in general identify information with sets of metaphysically possible worlds, since we need to distinguish between states of information in which the available evidence rules out the same metaphysically possible worlds but different metaphysically impossible worlds. By the same token, the information encoded in a sentence cannot in general be identified with a set of metaphysically possible worlds, since two sentences may be true in all the same metaphysically possible worlds, but not in all the same epistemically possible worlds. If we wanted to identify information and sentential contents with sets of worlds, it would seem more promising to use sets of epistemically possible worlds. But the dualist may instead reject the possible-worlds account of information and propositions altogether (see, e.g., Soames 1987, 2003, 395f.).