 A sticking point for reconciling decision theory with all forms of nonconsequentialism is the difficulty in accommodating absolute prohibitions or side constraints (see Oddie and Milne 1999; Jackson and Smith 2006). For instance, suppose there is a moral prohibition against killing an innocent person, whatever else is at stake. Perhaps such a constraint is best modelled in terms of a lexical ranking and corresponding value function, whereby the killing-innocents status of an act/outcome takes priority in determining its relative rank/value. But this has counterintuitive implications in the face of risk since very many acts will have some chance, however small, of killing an innocent. The lesson here may simply be that the theories in question require development; any mature ethical theory owes us an account of how to act under risk or uncertainty. What is arguably a more compelling challenge for the reconciliation of decision theory and nonconsequentialism is the accommodation of “agent-centred options” and associated “supererogation”. Portmore (e.g., 2007) and Lazar (e.g., 2017) offer proposals to this effect, which appeal (in different ways) to the moral ranking of acts/outcomes as distinct from the personal costs to the agent of pursuing these acts/outcomes.