  These considerations have not, however, moved many philosophers to endorse Overall’s position. Argument (1), besides giving a tendentious characterization of a miracle, exemplifies a fallacy in probabilistic reasoning, assuming that if \(F\) entails \({\sim}E\) and \(E\) is evidence for \(H\), then \(F\) is evidence against \(H\), which is not in general true. Claim (2) is arguably simply false, as such controversies do not appear noticeably to have impeded the progress of science or philosophy. Argument (3) will be effective against a certain sort of theological position, but it is not one that many believers in miracles actually hold. For further discussion of this issue, see the exchanges between Larmer and Overall (Larmer 1988: 75–82, Overall 1997, Overall 2003, and Larmer 2004).