 A capacity for agency is central to the ascription of rights to groups in the accounts of Peter French (1984, 1995) and Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011). French argues that we have reason to ascribe some groups the moral agency and moral personality that we ordinarily ascribe to human individuals. If a group is to be a moral agent, it must be capable of intentional action as a group; it must be able to have purposes, plans, goals and interests that motivate its conduct. It must also be capable of making rational decisions about its intentions and of responding to events and ethical criticism by adjusting its intentions and behaviour as those bear upon others (1995, 10-12). Conglomerate groups, such as business corporations, which possess internal decision structures and expressly formulated policies, can meet those conditions. That suffices to make them both moral group agents and “full-fledged moral persons” equipped with moral responsibilities and moral rights. They are properly accorded “whatever privileges, rights and duties as are, in the normal course of affairs, accorded to all members of the moral community” (1984, 32).