 Finally, we think that the relevant notion of mind-dependence rules out there being mind-independent normative constraints on the kinds of mental states that can ground normative facts. A few examples will explain what we mean. Take the view that what we have reason to do is grounded in what an ideally rational agent in our situation would want to do, where rationality is an irreducibly normative property. Or take the view that value is grounded in being the appropriate object of an attitude such as admiration, where appropriateness is irreducibly normative. Both views ground some significant set of normative facts in mental facts, but they also entail that other normative facts (facts about rationality and appropriateness, respectively) are not grounded in mental states. Such views do not, on our reckoning, count as mind-dependent, for two reasons. First, we have established that the important question about mind-dependence is whether all normative facts are mind-dependent, and these views are views on which some aren’t. Second, and most important, the relevant normative facts are partly grounded in other normative facts that are themselves not grounded in mental facts: facts about rationality or appropriateness are in the grounds, where these facts explicitly do not “ground out” in mental facts.