 One claim central to this account is that confirmation is a three-way relation between theory, evidence, and background belief (cf. Good 1967). Barnes distinguishes between two types of theory endorser: (1) virtuous endorsers post probabilities for theories that cohere with their evidence and background beliefs and (2) unvirtuous endorsers who post probabilities that do not so cohere. A common way of explaining the predictivist intuition is to note that accommodators tend to be viewed with a certain suspicion—their endorsement of T based on accommodated evidence may reflect a kind of social pressure to endorse T whatever its merits (cf. the ‘fudging explanation’ above). Such an endorser may post a probability for T that is too high given her total evidence and background belief—predictivism thus becomes a strategy by which pluralist endorsers protect themselves from unvirtuous accommodators (Barnes 2008: 61–69). 