 Privacy is not defended as an absolute good (Hixson 1987; Boone 1983; Louch 1982; Pennock and Chapman 1971; Negley 1966). Confidentiality, for example, is seldom described as an absolute good in health care (Bok 1982). Philosophers justifiably recommend major exceptions to the practice of confidentiality. First, all health care providers and responsible adults should be obligated to report evidence of abuse or neglect of minor children, such as unexplained fractures and malnutrition, even if the privacy interests of the children and/or their abusers would seem to suggest otherwise (Dickson 1998). Failure of medical workers to promptly disclose can have deadly consequences for vulnerable minors. While confidentiality decisions are left to individuals or their guardians in most instances, minor children are a defensible exception due to their undeveloped cognitive and moral capacities and due to the possibility that their guardians are abusers who would benefit from confidentiality. Second, enshrined in American law as the Tarasoff Rule, mental health providers have an ethical duty to warn police or potential victims of mentally ill patients’ violent imminent intentions (Gates and Arons 1999). These two exceptions reflect a belief that avoiding physical injury to third parties is more important than invariably deferring to patients’ preferences, sparing their feelings and preserving their trust in relationships. Important philosophical questions arise about the extent of “Good Samaritan” duties, whistle-blowing obligations and the duty to warn in health care settings. Ascribing such duties potentially infringes the liberty persons otherwise enjoy to act and refrain from acting as they see fit so long as they do not affirmatively harm others. Arguably the person who declines to help or warn is not the responsible cause of the abuse and violence that befalls others. Yet beneficence argues for low risk, low cost interventions to prevent serious harm.