 Polemically, Levinas urged that the most extreme state he described, nausea, amounts to being-there, what Husserl’s phenomenology called “self-positing”: “… nausea posits itself not only as something absolute, but as the very act of self-positing: it is the affirmation itself of being” (OE: §6). Other forms of self-positing occur, of course, as this event refers to the experience of unity between the embodied self and the ego of intentions, or indeed between what Raoul Moati compared with the “first-” and the “third-person” perspectives (2012 [2017: 38–71]). Thus, in immediate experience, I am my joy or my pain, provisionally, just as I may observe myself joyful, like a third person. Nevertheless, our various efforts to get out of our concrete situations are not the same as what Heidegger deemed projections toward new possibilities, wherein our death lies at the end of all the others, as the ultimate limit, or “possibility of impossibility” (he-BT: §50). For Levinas, by contrast, escape represents a positive, dynamic need. In this youthful work, he also rethinks need as fullness rather than as mere privation. As we indicated, he is working toward a different understanding of existence itself. Whether it is characterized by pleasure or suffering, need is the very ground of that existence. A secular transcendence responds to need, promising a path toward “something other than ourselves” (OE: §3), which is why the deep motivation of need is to get out of our finite condition. Already by 1935, Levinas’ ontology has displaced Heidegger’s being in light of the dynamic relation between the sentient self and the intentional ‘I’; it has refocused attention on the present over Heidegger’s emphasis on the future, and explored new modes by which we experience the being that we are.