 In contrast with the actualist form of theory, the higher-order thoughts that render a percept conscious are not necessarily actual, but potential. So the objection now disappears, that an unbelievable amount of cognitive space would have to be taken up with every conscious experience. (There need not actually be any HOT occurring, in order for a given perceptual state to count as phenomenally conscious, on this view.) So we might be able to retain our belief in the rich and integrated nature of phenomenally conscious experience—we just have to suppose that all of the contents in question are simultaneously available to higher-order thought. (Such availability might be realized by the ‘global broadcast’ of perceptual representations to a wide range of conceptual systems in the brain, for drawing inferences, for forming memories, and for planning, as well as for forming higher-order beliefs. See Baars 1988, 1997, 2002.) Nor will there be any problem in explaining why our faculty of higher-order thought should have evolved, nor why it should have access to perceptual contents in the first place—this can be the standard sort of story in terms of Machiavellian intelligence.