 Before closing this section, it is worth noting that compatibilists sometimes prefer not to insist on the irrelevance of slow switches, but rather to contest whether their relevance undercuts armchair self-knowledge (Falvey &amp; Owens 1994, Gibbons 1996, Butler 1997, McLaughlin &amp; Tye 1998a, Vahid 2003, Brown 2004, Morvarid 2015). A variety of inferential principles might lead to the incompatibilist’s conclusion from the relevance of slow switching. As a more noteworthy example, the principle here might be some kind of “truth tracking” condition; cf. Nozick 1981 (Falvey &amp; Owens 1994). On this approach, the slow switch argument assumes that (W) does not express knowledge, since the subject S fails to track the truth in the following sense: