 While one can tell such stories about the sort of illusions that an observer would experience (each corresponding to specific argument that Everett himself gave in both his long and short theses), there are at least two serious problems with the bare theory. One is that the bare theory is not empirically coherent: if the theory were true, it would be impossible to ever have reliable empirical evidence for accepting it as true given the radical sort of illusions it predicts (See Barrett (1996) for a discussion of the idea of empirical coherence). Another is that if the bare theory were true, one would most likely fail to have any determinate beliefs at all since, on the linear dynamics, one would expect the global state to almost never be an eigenstate of any particular observer being sentient (or even existing). (For a further discussion of how experience is supposed to work in the bare theory and some the problems it encounters see Albert 1992; Bub, Clifton, and Monton, 1998; and Barrett, 1994, 1996 and 1999.)