 A basic compatibilist strategy is to argue that agents can have control over their actions in the sense required for freedom and/or responsibility even if they do not control the causal determinants of those actions. For example, if one acts with the ability to act in accordance with good reasons (Wolf 1990) or if one acts with “guidance control” which consists in part of acting on a reasons-responsive mechanism for which one has taken responsibility, (Fischer and Ravizza 1998), one can be responsible for one’s actions. The key move here is to distinguish between different kinds of factors over which one has no control. If one’s actions are caused by factors that one does not control and that prevent one from having or exercising certain capacities, then one is not responsible. However, if one’s actions are caused by factors that one does not control, but that do allow one to have and exercise the relevant capacities, then one can be “in control” of one’s actions in the relevant sense, and so responsible for one’s actions.