 As for the possible (or passive) intellect, according to Nardi, Ruello, and Kuksewicz, Paul was an Averroist, as he would have supported the thesis of the unicity and separate character of such an intellect for the whole human species. But this is false. On the contrary, Paul’s point of view for this question is close to that of Thomas Aquinas, whose arguments against the unicity of the passive intellect he utilizes in his commentaries on the De anima and on the Metaphysics (after 1420). If his affirmations in the Summa philosophiae naturalis are a bit ambiguous and it is therefore possible to miss their deepest meaning, in these two Aristotelian commentaries he clearly rejects all the main theses of later medieval Averroism (see Amerini, 2012). He thinks that (1) the claim of the unicity of the possible intellect for the whole human species is lacking in a solid philosophical basis, since it can be maintained from the physical point of view only, according to which everything is considered qua affected-by or connected-with motion, but (2) it is false from the metaphysical point of view, which is the most comprehensive of all. From this viewpoint, according to which the possible intellect has to be considered a substantial form (and more precisely, the form of the human body), it is evident that it has a beginning in time, but certainly not an end, and that, like any other material substantial form, it is multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, since one and the same principle in number cannot be the form of a multiplicity of substances. Furthermore, given that different men can form different opinions about the same thing or event, one and the same intellect could hold contradictory views at once, in apparent violation of the law of contradiction (see In De an., III, t.c. 27, fol. 149ra).