  Now notice that there are many entailment relations between qualia-statements—for example, ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Sq(x)}\)’ entails ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx}\)’, and ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Tr(x) \amp By \amp Sq(y)}\)’  entails ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Sq(y)}\)’, and so on. The orthodox representationalist and the sense-datum theorist have simple accounts of these entailments in terms of the structure of the objects of experiences (apparent structure, for the representationalist; actual structure, for the sense-datum theorist). Assuming representationalism: ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Sq(x)}\)’ (equivalently, ‘\(e\) is an experience of something’s looking red and square’) clearly entails ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx}\)’ (equivalently, ‘e is an experience of something’s looking red’). Assuming the sense-datum theory: ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx \amp Sq(x)}\)’ (equivalently, ‘\(e\) is a sensing of a red and square sense-datum’) clearly entails ‘\(e\) has \(Q_{Rx}\)’ (equivalently, ‘\(e\) is a sensing of a red sense-datum’). The orthodox phenomenist cannot give a similar explanation of these entailments, and it is not clear whether she is entitled to them at  all.[40]