 Finally, a possibility that has so far not been considered in the literature is that abduction and Bayesianism do not so much work in tandem—as they do on the above proposals—as operate in different modes of reasoning; the Bayesian and the explanationist are characters that feature in different plays, so to speak. It is widely accepted that sometimes we speak and think about our beliefs in a categorical manner, while at other times we speak and think about them in a graded way. It is far from clear how these different ways of speaking and thinking about beliefs—the epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degrees of belief, to use Richard Foley’s (1992) terminology—are related to one another. In fact, it is an open question whether there is any straightforward connection between the two, or even whether there is a connection at all. Be that as it may, given that the distinction is undeniable, it is a plausible suggestion that, just as there are different ways of talking and thinking about beliefs, there are different ways of talking and thinking about the revision of beliefs. In particular, abduction could well have its home in the epistemology of belief, and be called upon whenever we reason about our beliefs in a categorical mode, while at the same time Bayes’ rule could have its home in the epistemology of degrees of belief. Hard-nosed Bayesians may insist that whatever reasoning goes on in the categorical mode must eventually be justifiable in Bayesian terms, but this presupposes the existence of bridge principles connecting the epistemology of belief with the epistemology of degrees of belief—and, as mentioned, whether such principles exist is presently unclear.