 To this claim we can respond in a number of ways. As suggested by our discussion in  section 3  and  section 4  we can allow for an identity-independent notion of harm in addition to the common identity-dependent notion of harm. Consider the threshold notion of harm at  (III).  Under this interpretation of harm, a person can be understood to be fully compensated for an act or policy (or event) if that person does not fall below the specified standard. According to this interpretation, Robert can be harmed because his ancestors were kidnapped and enslaved. Whether Robert has been harmed due to the way his ancestors were treated depends upon whether the way they were treated has led to Robert’s falling below the specified standard of well-being. That this is true in the case of Robert, however, will turn on a causal link between the past injustices and his current state of well-being. Employing this interpretation of harm and its accompanying interpretation of compensation requires a forward-looking assessment of what others ought to do today in terms of providing compensation for past  injustice.[18]  By providing measures of compensation they ought to counteract the consequences of past wrongs in such a way that the indirect currently living and future indirect victims are as well off as they ought to be. When we analyze historical claims on the basis of such a threshold notion of harm, the current (and future) normative relevance of past wrongs will depend upon their causal relevance for the well-being of currently living (and future) generations. Fulfilling our duties to both the latter might well require compensation for the consequences that stem from the fact that their predecessors have been badly wronged. That their predecessors were wronged, however, does not in itself (independently from its particular consequences) give rise to just claims of compensation on the part of their descendants today.