 Third, Candrakīrti’s argument from the emptiness of emptiness demonstrates the unreality of ultimate reality. The “emptiness-argument” and the “nonself-argument” show that all conventionally real phenomena and persons are empty of intrinsic reality. As we have seen from a critical rational point of view, it is demonstrated that there is no ultimately real or ultimately existent entities or real self of person to be found. The two arguments do not however show that emptiness per se is empty, nor do they show that the selflessness is itself selfless. This raises an important question: does this mean that emptiness is the intrinsic reality of conventionally real entities and selflessness is the intrinsic reality of conventionally real persons? Putting the question differently: could a Mādhyamika claim that emptiness and selflessness are ultimately real or are intrinsically real? This question is reasonable. We tend to posit ultimate reality to be something that is timeless, independent, transcendent, nondual etc. So if emptiness is the ultimate reality of all phenomena and if selflessness is the ultimate reality of all persons,could we say that emptiness and selflessness are nonempty, ultimately real or intrinsically real?