 Those who question the interpretation are apt to note that from the fact that I have awareness of whatever is occurring in my mind, it does not follow that I have distinct awareness. If what’s occurring in my mind is a confused muddle of ideas, then I’ll be aware of a confused muddle of ideas. But in that case, forming a judgment about the present state of my mind is a recipe for error – i.e., given the Fourth Meditation account of proper judgment. Because simpler ideas are generally easier to render clear and distinct, it can perhaps seem that I enjoy introspective infallibility concerning them. For example, while looking at a clear blue sky, it may seem unmistakable that I’m presently having an idea of blue. But suppose that while looking at multicolored sunset, I form an introspective judgment about precisely which color ideas are occurring in my mind. Must Descartes say that such judgments are infallible? Noteworthy is that he writes, of “sensations, emotions and appetites,” that “we are frequently wrong in our judgements concerning them”; adding, that we can avoid such errors “provided we take great care in our judgements concerning them to include no more than what is strictly contained in our perception – no more than that of which we have inner awareness” (Prin 1:66, AT 8a:32, CSM 1:216).