 First, the thought that a potential source of justification must be capable of being calibrated if it is to provide justification seems false. The people inside Plato’s cave who can only see shadows cast on the wall in front of them can be justified in believing that those shadows have a certain shape based on what they see and the reports of others. A priori intuitions involve a kind of intellectual “seeing”, and they can be checked against other people’s reports of their intuitions. That one type of perception can be checked against another (say, sight against touch) does not seem to count for much epistemically. Perhaps a ouija board can be checked against a crystal ball, but without some further explanation, neither agreement, nor disagreement, between them would have significant epistemic implications. Perhaps intellectual or rational intuitions produced under certain circumstances should be discounted, viz., those produced by people who are angry, depressed, drunk, tired, etc., or who are not impartial, have something at stake in the outcome, or have not reflected carefully on the relevant concept. But that does not mean that all of them should be discounted. Calibration may not be necessary for justification. And in some circumstances it seems insufficient, as when there is good reason to think that agreement is accidental or the result of causes irrelevant from an epistemic standpoint.