 Dewey’s identification of intelligent reflection with experimental methods might be thought to suggest a narrowly scientistic worldview, in which values are reduced to purely subjective, arational “oughts” or likings applied to inherently value-free facts or natural kinds discovered and defined independently of human valuations.  In fact, Dewey’s project aims to unify scientific with humanistic inquiry rather than to enforce divisions between the two.  While intelligent humanistic inquiry partakes of experimental method, scientific inquiry itself is an art (EN 285–6).  The categories in terms of which we make intelligent sense of the world are not limited to those which are useful solely for describing objects of abstract, generalized knowledge divorced from feelings and aspirations.  Feelings and aspirations are themselves part of the natural world and hence proper subjects of experimental investigation (EN 316).  The job of art is to create objects that enhance our capacities for meaningful, appreciative experience.  Criticism in turn aims to develop meaningful categories that inform enriched experiences of objects. “Nothing but the best, the richest and fullest experience possible, is good enough for man” (EN 308).