 As is well known, Wyclif presents his opinion on universals as intermediate between those of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome, on the one side, and Walter Burley, on the other (see the entry on   Wyclif).  Like Giles Wyclif recognizes three main kinds of universals: (1) ideal universals, which are the ideas in God and archetypes of all that is; (2) formal universals, which are the common natures shared by individual things; and (3) intentional universals, which are the mental signs by which we refer to the formal universals, or universals in re. On the other hand, like Burley, Wyclif holds that formal universals exist outside our minds in actu and not in potentia, even if, unlike Burley, he maintains that they are really identical with their own individuals (De enti in communi, ch. 5. p. 58). More precisely, universals and individuals are really the same but formally distinct, since they share the same empirical reality, which is that of individuals, but if considered as universals and individuals, they have opposite constituent principles: the generality or natural-tendency-to-be-common for universals, and the thisness or impossibility-of-being-common for individuals (see Tractatus de universalibus, ch. 2, pp. 62-63, ch. 4, pp. 86-87; ch. 10, pp. 208-13).