 Obvious permutations on Grice’s notion of conversational implicature, like Morgan’s and Horn &amp; Bayer’s notion of short-circuited conversational implicatures, won’t be of much use either. (See Morgan 1978 and Horn &amp; Bayer 1984.) Short-circuiting occurs when a nonliteral use becomes standardized. For example, it is at least arguable that uses of ‘Can you pass the salt?’, to take an example from Searle 1975, are standardly requests for salt. According to Morgan and Horn and Bayer, this meant information is a conversational implicature. Ordinary speakers may not recognize, even upon reflection, that they are speaking nonliterally because that nonliteral use has become conventionalized through repetition. And even though ‘Do you have the ability to pass the salt?’ and ‘Can you pass the salt?’ (at least arguably) mean the same thing and hence utterances of them have the same conversational implicating potential, because of past uses an utterance of the latter but not the former will naturally give rise to the request for the salt. Short-circuiting is unlikely to be of use to a Naive Russellian because it requires past uses that meet the conditions for ordinary conversational implicature, those uses of which then become, through repetition, standardized. Those past uses, however, must pass the calculability condition, as they were ordinary conversational implicatures. But it is doubtful that there were at any time widespread uses of propositional attitude reporting sentences that met the necessary conditions for being conversational implicatures, as it is highly dubious that ordinary speakers ever realized that sentences like (1) and (4) say the same thing. Hence, there was never the necessary past use as a standard conversational implicature that could have become standardized.