 If it follows that conceptual or logical metaphysical explanations work in a different way than other types of (grounding) metaphysical explanation, then the unification gained by modeling metaphysical as causal explanation is arguably contradicted by the disunification of metaphysical explanations of the grounding-kind. If you think this is a problem, there are a couple of different options available: you may, first, claim that, although cases of “bare” grounding are bare in the sense that they do not involve any grounding-mechanisms, they are not bare in the sense that they involve no mechanism whatsoever. They do, only the mechanisms they involve are not grounding mechanisms, but rather conceptual or logical mechanisms: mechanisms involving the conceptual and/or logical analogue of the grounding determination relations. Another option is to try to redraw the boundaries for what counts as a metaphysical explanation and argue that cases of bare grounding do not back metaphysical but rather other types of—conceptual or logical—explanation (e.g., Kovacs 2017; McSweeney 2020). This frees the proponent of the mechanistic view from having to introduce different kinds of mechanisms but does not really solve the problem of disunification. Alternatively, the proponent of the mechanistic view could argue that, while there is metaphysical explanation in cases of bare grounding, those are cases where grounding doesn’t play an essential role in the explanation (grounding doesn’t back metaphysical explanation). The result would be an account of metaphysical explanation able to provide us with a unified account only of such explanations which essentially involve grounding. In view of the fact that many believe that conceptual and logical explanation, for example, need to be separately accounted for anyway, this should perhaps be acceptable.