 Alternatively, Kvanvig suggests, we may characterize \(Kp\) rigidly to say, ‘there is an actual being \(x\) and actual time \(t\) such that it is known by \(x\) at \(t\) that \(p\).’ Since this expression designates rigidly (i.e., it makes reference to the actual world regardless of the modal context in which it appears), it may be substituted for \(p\) in the knowability principle. The reinterpreted conjunction does not change its designation when embedded within the scope of \(\Diamond\). Moreover, on this reading of the conjunction, the paradox dissolves. It is possible to know that the reinterpreted conjunction is true. There is no contradiction in supposing that some possible being at some possible time knows that \(p\) is true but never known by an actual being at an actual time. The paradox dissolves.