  One interesting recent development in science, and thus in the philosophy of science, has been the increasing use of, and importance of, computer simulations. In some fields, such as high-energy physics, simulations are an essential part of all experiments. It is fair to say that without computer simulations these experiments would be impossible. There has been a considerable literature in the philosophy of science discussing whether computer simulations are experiments, theory, or some new kind of hybrid method of doing science. But, as Eric Winsberg remarked, “We have in other words, rejected the overly conservative intuition that computer simulation is nothing but boring and straightforward theory application. But we have avoided embracing the opposite, overly grandiose intuition that simulation is a radically new kind of knowledge production, ”on a par“ with experimentation. In fact, we have seen that soberly locating simulation ”on the methodological map“ is not a simple matter (Winsberg 2010, p. 136).” 