 What about reliability? Again, many believe that ordinary perceptual experience justifies belief in part because it is generally reliable, even if its phenomenal features are also relevant to justification. In any case, moral knowledge requires more than justification and truth – as it is common to say these days, a belief must be safe (such that it could not easily have been the case that the person would have formed a false belief using the same method) to amount to knowledge (Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000). As noted earlier, some epistemic sentimentalists, such as Tappolet (2011), are not metaphysical sentimentalists, but rather realists about value. Those who hold a view of this type may argue, as Adam Carter (2019) does, that for emotional experiences to justify belief they must issue from a competence or skill, roughly a disposition to get it right when properly situated. Other epistemic perceptualists, such as Prinz (2007) subscribe to sentimentalist metaphysics. It is open to them to offer a constitutive explanation of the reliability of emotions: since the evaluative facts are constitutively linked to emotional responses, there is good reason to think emotional responses track them, at least in suitable conditions.