 One familiar move is to resort to a hypothetical version of consent theory, appealing not to the actual consent of states, but to international standards that states have good reason to accept. Such a view is propounded by Rawls in The Law of Peoples, which envisions legitimate international law as grounded in principles (“the Law of Peoples”) that would be endorsed in social contracts at two levels: first, among liberal peoples as regulating foreign relations among themselves; second, among liberal peoples together with a sub-category of non-liberal peoples—decent hierarchical peoples. Rawls’ account, however, is problematic in a number of ways. First, it presupposes that decent hierarchical principles enjoy legitimacy with respect to their own populations despite not adhering to basic liberal rights, such as freedom of speech and non-discrimination on the grounds of sex or religion. Second, and relatedly, the doctrine of human rights embodied in the Law of Peoples is very minimalist, excluding not only the aforementioned rights, but also socio-economic rights such as the rights to health, work, and an adequate standard of living. Finally, despite its minimalism, Rawls’ Law of Peoples is ultimately grounded in the perspective of liberal societies—the only members of the Society of Peoples that are “fully reasonable”. But given that “reasonableness” is defined by stipulation as stemming from ideas implicit in liberal democratic culture, rather than by reference to an objectively true criterion, the whole approach is vulnerable to accusations of parochialism. (For another attempt to mobilize Rawlsian approach to international legal legitimacy, with a focus on the great pluralism that characterizes the international order, see Roth 2011: ch.2–4).