 One of the central areas of dispute in the reception of Kant’s critical philosophy concerns his distinction between the cognitive faculties of sensibility (Sinnlichkeit) and intellect (Verstand), and their characteristic representational outputs—viz. intuition (Anschauung) and concept (Begriff). Though the dispute is multi-faceted, it centers on disagreement concerning the interpretation of Kant’s conception of the contribution made by the higher cognitive faculties (or the “intellect” in the broadest sense of that term) to a subject’s sensory apprehension of the world around it. The status of Kant’s distinction has been repeatedly questioned. In the immediate reception of Kant’s critical philosophy, major works by figures such as Solomon Maimon (Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, 1790) and G.W.F. Hegel (Faith and Knowledge, 1802) criticized the coherence of construing sensibility and intellect as independent faculties. The issue has also seen significant discussion in the latter half of the twentieth-century by Anglophone philosophers such as P.F. Strawson, Wilfrid Sellars, and John McDowell. Their work takes up Kant’s distinction between intuition and concept as an important vehicle for asking and answering questions regarding the relation between thought and reality. Such questions include both the issue of how thought could be so much as about an objective reality (Strawson 1959: ch. 2; McDowell 1994a; Ginsborg 2006b), and the issue of how sense experiences caused by a subject’s environment could have a normative, rather than merely causal, significance for the subject’s thinking (Sellars 1968; McDowell 1994b).