 In that case, what would happen if A were to ⟨gamble at home⟩ is better than what would happen if A were to ⟨not gamble at home⟩. For, if A were to ⟨not gamble at home⟩, then A would ⟨kill someone at home⟩. Now, when we consider A’s options to be ⟨gambling at home⟩ or ⟨not gambling at home⟩, contextualist actualism implies that A ought to ⟨gamble at home⟩. This should seem very implausible, even by actualists’ own lights, because what would actually happen if A were to ⟨go to work⟩ is better than what would happen if A were to make any other choice at the time in question. Those who find this result counterintuitive have suggested that an obligatory act O must have a higher value than all of the non-supererogatory options available to the agent, rather than only having a higher value than not-O. In response to this worry, Jackson and Pargetter can remind us that it is also true that A ought to ⟨go to work⟩ out of a different set options, viz. ⟨going to work⟩, ⟨gambling at home⟩, and ⟨killing someone at home⟩. 