 The literature reveals a variety of feminist views on the responsibility of members of the dominant group for the oppression of members of subordinate groups. Cheshire Calhoun defends one of the more lenient positions (Calhoun 1989). Calhoun argues that in “normal moral contexts,” where a person has generally good moral reasoning skills and generally is able to figure out which actions are right, wrong, or controversial, a person’s moral ignorance is inexcusable. But in “abnormal moral contexts,” those in which a subgroup of society “makes advances in moral knowledge faster than they can be disseminated to and assimilated by the general public and subgroups at special moral risk,” a person’s moral ignorance is excusable (396). Such is the case when feminists have moral knowledge that the general public lacks because the public is not familiar with either sophisticated analyses of oppression, or the special new terminology and new categories that are not shared by nonfeminists (e.g., “marginalize,” “the Other,” “marriage as prostitution”). In abnormal moral contexts where ignorance is the norm, persons lack a motive to be morally reflective, so it is not the case that they ought to have known better. Calhoun concludes that many men are not responsible for their participation in women’s oppression on the grounds that they are not culpably ignorant of the moral knowledge that feminists have. Nevertheless, Calhoun argues that we should reproach participants in oppressive systems, since excusing them has the effect of sanctioning their wrongdoing or letting it pass. Her hope is to motivate people to act otherwise and to treat them as capable of self-legislation rather than mere products of social conditioning. Similarly, Samantha Brennan urges that in order to motivate change, the appropriate response to microinequities is to raise awareness about their occurrence, but not to trace back each one of them to a specific person upon whom sole responsibility falls (Brennan 2013, 193).