 While there is thus a plausible (if controversial) epistemic framework that would account for EEP, there are a number of serious challenges to it. After all, even proponents of the perceptualist account of emotion grant that there are a number of notable differences between emotions and sensory perceptual experiences (Tappolet 2016). Some of these differences may be epistemically relevant. To begin with, there seems to be an obvious difference in our everyday epistemic practice: we don’t typically ask for reasons for perceptual experiences, but we do ask for reasons for emotions (Brady 2013). For example, if you say you see a dog outside, I’m unlikely to ask “Why?”, while if you say you’re afraid of the dog, it makes perfect sense to ask the question. Conversely, if I ask you why you think the bridge is dangerous, you’re unlikely to say “Because I’m afraid of it”, while you might well appealing to having seen the dog outside to justify your belief that it is there. As Michael Brady puts it, unlike sensory perceptions, emotions raise rather than silence justificatory demands (2013: 110). What’s more, he maintains, if an emotion like fear justified belief about dangerousness, it would be objectionably self-justifying, since danger merits fear, and “The very fact that I am afraid of the dog cannot, by itself, be evidence that it is fitting or appropriate to be afraid of the dog” (Brady 2010, 123).