 Among the qualitative principles we have been considering, the only way out is via non-strict principles like (Wr+b*), which we considered at the end of the previous section. On this principle, I, the author, merely have reason (as opposed to having sufficient reason) for believing the conjunction of the claims that make up the body of my book, given that I believe each of the claims individually. The crucial difference resides in the fact that this leaves open the possibility that my reason for being logically coherent can be overridden. In particular, it can be outweighed by reasons stemming from other epistemic norms. In the case at hand, it might be thought that our logical obligations are superseded by a norm of epistemic modesty. This, of course, is not uncontroversial. Some maintain that what the Preface Paradox shows is not merely that the normative grip of logic does not take the form of a strict ought, but rather that we in fact have no reason at all to believe in multi-premise closure of belief under logical consequence: my reasons for believing in the conjunction of my claims are not being trumped by weightier reasons for disbelieving it; I have no logic-based reason whatsoever to believe the conjunction in the first place.