 Now, perhaps there is some more local concern about normativity’s being fundamental. That is, perhaps there’s something queer about normative facts being at the bottommost level of reality that is unique to normativity: i.e., perhaps it’s queer that normative facts in particular would be at the bottom layer of reality. This would undermine the above overgeneralization objection. Maybe, for example, it is strange that normative facts would be fundamental because it is taken as a truism that normative facts depend on non-normative ones. And how could they depend (metaphysically?) on anything else if they’re fundamental? But such attempts at more local fundamentality worries would run into their own complications – e.g., what is the relationship between the kind of dependence involved between the normative and the non-normative, on the one hand, and fundamentality on the other? We won’t delve any deeper into such issues here.