 Scotus elsewhere considers the view of Henry of Ghent that the explanation for individuation could be merely a negation. The point about a negation is that it is not in any way real: it is not a thing, or a real form or property of a thing. As Scotus sees it, claiming that individuation could be by a negation is just a way of restating the problem, not of proposing an explanatory solution to it (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 49 (Scotus [OO], 7:413; Spade (1994), 69)). In fact, Scotus takes himself to have not merely an explanation for individuation, but also an explanation for identity. The contrast with modern accounts of haecceities is thus quite sharp. In much modern literature, an item’s haecceity is simply the primitive property of being that item, or being identical with that item. For Scotus, the haecceity is supposed to explain that property. (See further discussion of this in section 6 below.)