 But we don’t regard everything we dislike, or even everything that makes us angry, as morally wrong. The story is at least incomplete. Further, as a psychologist, Haidt naturally offers no a priori arguments against the possibility of reason yielding moral verdicts. All he can claim is that people don’t usually engage in reasoning first. Even if that is true, it doesn’t follow that people’s judgments are not shaped by reasoning or that they are insensitive to reasons. Indeed, Daniel Jacobson (2012) points out that the evidence that people lack reasons for their judgments is in fact very thin. In Haidt’s most famous example, even harmless sibling incest involves a significant risk of suffering emotional repercussions (Railton 2014: 849). The vibe at your sister’s wedding three years later might not be quite the same. People might not be able to immediately articulate such reasons, but that doesn’t show that they were not responding to them. Rather than being mere rationalization, post hoc reasoning might then be a process of trying to articulate the considerations one’s intuitive judgments were responsive to.