 Ockham believed, as Scotus did, that future contingent propositions are true or false, that created wills are non-determined free causes, and that God knows contingent events without their being simultaneously present to God. (For Ockham’s view, see Adams and Kretzmann 1983; Normore 1982.) While Scotus preferred to distinguish God’s eternal knowledge and choice from the temporal order sharply (Lectura I.39.1–2, n. 28, 85; Ordinatio I.40, n. 8), Ockham thought that they can be treated as temporally past. This led him to ask how God’s foreknowledge as something past and hence seemingly necessary is compatible with the contingency of future things. Ockham’s answer was that even though God’s foreknowledge is past, its content is future, and the past truth of future contingent propositions in God’s immutable but contingent knowledge does not fall under the necessity of the past (Ordinatio d. 38, 387–8; Tractatus de praedestinatione 515–516). Many influential late thinkers embraced Ockham’s view. (See Robert Holkot, Sent. II.2 in Seeing the Future Clearly, 127, 145–146; Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super I Sententiarum I.38.2.3 (302–303); Pierre d’Ailly, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum I.11.3S.) This is also the hallmark of what is called the Ockhamist view of divine foreknowledge in contemporary philosophical theology (Zagzebski 1991: 66–97).