 Hintikka’s first reaction to what came to be called the problem of logical omniscience was to see the discrepancy between ordinary usage of terms like “consistency” and formal treatments of knowledge as indicating a problem with our ordinary terminology. If a person knows the axioms of a mathematical theory but is unable to state the distant consequences of the theory, Hintikka denied that it is appropriate to call that person inconsistent.  In ordinary human affairs, Hintikka claimed, the charge of inconsistency when directed towards an agent has the connotation of being irrational or dishonest.  Thus, from Hintikka’s perspective we should choose some other term to capture the situation of someone who is rational and amenable to persuasion or correction but not logically omniscient. Non-omniscient, rational agents can be in a position to say that “I know that p but I don’t know whether q” even in case q can p. He then suggests that q should be regarded as defensible given the agent’s knowledge and the denial of q should be regarded as indefensible. This choice of terminology was criticized insofar as it attaches the pejorative indefensible to some set of proposition, even though the fault actually lies in the agent’s cognitive capacities (Chisholm 1963; Hocutt 1972; Jago 2007).