 Many other forms of classification were tied closely to the particular interests of individual authors. This is particularly the case with those eighteenth-century British authors who argued against Hobbes (as they understood him) and Mandeville that the very possibility of morality requires that we be capable of genuinely benevolent emotions. For this reason, distinctions between self-directed and other-directed emotions and between anti-social and sociable emotions were a common point of organization and contention. Similar concerns also generated a distinction between idiosyncratic affects and emotions that could be cultivated to be broadly shared; in particular, emotions were often divided into the raw and immediate and those that involve an element of reflection. This distinction lent itself also to those philosophers concerned with the historical and social development of humans, as evident in many works of Rousseau. For instance, the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755) presents a kind of natural history tracing the genesis of many emotions through changes in social structure; works such as Emile (1762), La Nouvelle Heloise (1761), and the Confessions (1782) treat the affective maturation and socialization of individuals, as well as the management and effects of the emotions. But for all his genealogical concerns, Rousseau, and indeed many other eighteenth-century authors, showed a good deal less interest in taxonomizing the emotions according to principled systems than did their predecessors.