 Late in life, Kuhn himself, surprisingly, rejected the case-study method as too wedded to the traditional view of science as a direct search for the truth about the universe. The first generations of historical inquiry by philosophers and sociologists so shockingly revealed the presence of many non-epistemic factors and the general failure of any method fully to justify scientific beliefs, he said, that skepticism was the result. The more people learned about how science is actually done, the more skeptical they became. Declared Kuhn, we can more securely derive historical patterning “from first principles” and “with scarcely a glance at the historical record itself” (1991: 111ff). This is not a complete departure from history, however, for it begins from what he termed “the historical perspective”, a non-whiggish understanding of the decisions actually available to the historical actors in their own context. Kuhn’s main point is that such decisions should be considered comparative (“Is this item better than that one, given the contextual knowledge and standards?”), not as judgments of truth or probability. This move reduces the problem of understanding behavior in rational terms to something manageable, he explained. Developing this point, Kuhn said, will bring the only defensible sort of rationality back into scientific practice in a way that largely avoids the old problems of incommensurability. It will also provide a defensible concept of scientific progress and of scientific knowledge (almost by definition)—knowledge as what the scientific process produces. This historical perspective was part of Kuhn’s project of developing a biological analogy for the development of science, wherein disciplinary speciation events correspond to revolutions. Kuhn held that his approach applied to all human enterprises, not just science (Kuhn 2000).