 One way to expand upon Calhoun’s account of integrity is to furnish an epistemic conception of integrity. Greg Scherkoske (2011, 2012a and 2012b, see also discussion in section 6 of this entry) develops such an account. According to Scherkoske “Integrity is an epistemic virtue: that is, it is a stable disposition that reliably places its possessor in good epistemic position and leads to cognitive success” (Scherkoske 2011, 196). Hugh Breakey (Breakey, 2016) develops an alternative to this approach. He argues that integrity is a potentially dangerous trait in that possession of it can lead strong-minded people to act without proper regard for the needs and perspectives of others. However, he argues, “integrity contains substantive moral principles that serve to surgically target the dangers that integrity would otherwise pose.” (Breakey 2016, 613) Integrity fits its possessor with what is required to act as a benign deliberator in community with other deliberators. These are substantive rather than epistemic commitments implicit in the possession of integrity, and include such things as trustworthiness, non-coercion, and sociability. In this way, Breakey proposes a morally substantive account of integrity that includes, not general kinds of moral commitments, but specific commitments targeted at the dangers of being a self-directed and strong-minded individual. By contrast, the following account of integrity is explicitly concerned with quite general attitudes towards morality.