 What might justify your belief that you’re not a BIV? According to some philosophers, you are justified in believing that you’re not a BIV because, for instance, you know perfectly well that current technology doesn’t enable anyone to create a BIV. The proponent of the BIV hypothesis might regard this answer as no better than the Moorean response to BKCA: if you are allowed to appeal to (what you regard as your) knowledge of current technology to justify your belief that you’re not a BIV, then why can’t the Moorean equally well rely on his knowledge that he has hands to justify his belief that he’s not a BIV? Philosophers who accept this objection, but who don’t want to ground your justification for believing that you’re not a BIV in purely externalistic factors, may instead claim that your belief is justified by the fact that your own beliefs about the external world provide a better explanation of your sense experiences than does the BIV hypothesis (see Russell 1912 and Vogel 1990 for influential defenses of this argument against skepticism, and see Neta 2004 for a rebuttal).