 Here a state of affairs is a universal: whether Jones votes for a Republican on his own or because of Black’s intervention, one and the same consequence obtains. In this way, the object of moral appraisal (the state of affairs) doesn’t turn on how things actually go for Jones. But matters look different if the consequence is instead construed as a concrete particular, something produced by Jones in the actual scenario. In that case, PAP-consequences looks vulnerable to FSCs in just the same way PAP is. When Jones votes for the Republican, the particular consequence—that event of one vote’s being cast for a Republican—seems to be something Jones produced on his own, and is thus responsible for. (Whether numerically the same event would have obtained in the counterfactual scenario is a controversial issue, one whose resolution could yield a version of the “flicker” strategy considered in  §4.2.2.)  Let us in any case continue to assume that a consequence is a (universal) state of affairs.