 Having convinced himself that anthropologism is self-refuting, Husserl turns in some detail to showing all forms of psychologism are forms of anthropologism (§38). The views of Erdmann and Sigwart receive most of his attention. In Sigwart’s case, Husserl criticizes, amongst other things, the view according to which it would be wrong to assume that a judgment could be true even if no intellect were ever thinking this judgment. Husserl objects with the thought that it is part of the meaning of the law of gravity that it is true for all times (even prior to its discovery) regardless of whether it happens to be thought by anyone or not (§39) In Erdmann’s case Husserl goes to even greater lengths in order to unearth what he regards as fatal flaws and inconsistencies. The central issue for Husserl is Erdmann’s claim that logical laws are merely hypothetically necessary, that is, that logical laws are necessary only for members of the human species up until the present (§40). Perhaps the most important argument is that Erdmann’s position in inherently unstable: on the one hand, Erdmann argues for the hypothetical necessity, or species-relativity, of logical laws be insisting that we cannot imagine alternatives to logical laws. On the other hand, Erdmann holds that therefore logical laws are psychological laws. Husserl objects that these two theses do not fit together since we can always imagine alternatives to psychological laws (§41).