 It is not possible here to unravel all the details of Findlay’s treatment of beliefs, wishes, wants, and acts of will. Each token case of a propositional attitude can manifest itself as a concentrated “sense” before the mind, or spread itself out as a pattern of behavior in the physical sphere. The account is complicated, perhaps too complicated for anyone to have accepted it. But we must remark on the distinction between believing and wishing, as this points towards the ethics section of the book. When we believe that something is so, we cannot wish that it is so. We can only wish that it be not so. Conversely, when we believe that something is not so, we cannot wish that it be not so, but we can wish that it be so. Wishes, then, are directed at making the non-existent exist or the existing not exist. (or, in a parallel way, towards the making true or the making false of propositions.) This is the starting point of ethics. We wish the world changed in some  way.[6]