One might also raise doubts about Medium. Suppose I know I haven’t yet investigated whether the stores are closed for the holiday on Thursday, and so I haven’t yet formed any beliefs about whether I can go shopping then.  Couldn’t I still intend to go shopping on Thursday? That might be irrational or careless planning on my part, but it seems possible.  (The example might prove even more convincing if we add the feature of Bratman’s example above: suppose, forgetting about my change of mind, I believe I intend to go shopping on Friday, not on Thursday.)  Perhaps doubts could even be raised, not just about whether intending to E involves believing E is possible, but also about whether intending to E involves not believing E is impossible.  Richard Holton (2008), drawing on Anscombe’s example from Intention (§52) of a man who is certain he’ll break down under torture but is determined not to break down, has argued that one could intend some end while believing that end isn’t a “live possibility.” Such combinations, Holton argues, may be irrational, but aren’t impossible. 