 Objection 1: Calibration is not an epistemic goal. It may be objected that neither actual nor hypothetical calibration measures are truth-directed epistemic disutility functions, where this is taken to be a necessary condition on such a function (Joyce 1998: 595; Seidenfeld 1985). We say that a local epistemic disutility function—that is, recall, an epistemic disutility function defined for individual credences—is truth-directed if the disutility that it assigns to a credence in a true proposition increases as the credence decreases, and the disutility it assigns to a credence in a false proposition increases as the credence increases. Calibration measures do not have this property. To see this, let us return to our toy example: the propositions Heads on toss 1, …, Heads on toss 1000 are in \(\mathcal{F}\) and they are all relevantly similar according to \(\sim\). Now suppose that the first coin toss lands heads, but all the others land tails. Then credence 0.001 in Heads on toss 1 is actually calibrated, since exactly one out of one-thousand relevantly similar propositions are true; so it has epistemic disutility 0. Credence 0.993, on the other hand, is not, and thus receives a positive epistemic disutility. However, it is a higher credence in a true proposition, and thus should be assigned a lower epistemic disutility, according to the requirement of truth-directedness. One natural response to this objection is that it is question-begging. Proponents of the calibration argument will simply reject the claim that an epistemic disutility function must be truth-directed. Credences, unlike beliefs, they might say, are not in the business of getting close to the truth; they are in the business of getting close to being calibrated.