 Hartshorne’s Platonic or Bergsonian argument against creation ex nihilo, in simplified form, looks something like this: one can in fact imagine the nonexistence of this or that, or even of this or that class of things, a fact that gives some the confidence to (erroneously) think that this process can go on infinitely such that one could imagine a state in which there was “absolutely nothing.” However, not every verbally possible statement is made conceptually cogent by even the most generous notion of “conceptual,” according to Hartshorne. At the specific, ordinary, empirical level negative instances are possible (e.g., this corkscrew is not a dog), but at the generic, metaphysical level only positive instances are possible (e.g., something must exist), on this view. The sheer absence of reality cannot conceivably be experienced, he thinks, for if it were experienced an existing experiencer would be presupposed.