 Moore’s second innovation was his view that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs can depend only on its intrinsic properties, ones it has apart from any relations to other states. Earlier writers had distinguished between goodness as an end, which they also called intrinsic or ultimate goodness, and goodness as a means, and had said the former cannot rest just on a state’s causally producing goods external to itself. But they seemed to allow that goodness as an end can depend on other relational properties; thus they talked as if a belief’s being true, which is necessary for its being knowledge, can increase its value, while a pleasure’s being that of a bad person can make it worse. Moore did not explicitly state his more restrictive view that intrinsic goodness can depend only on intrinsic properties until “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” of 1922, but it nonetheless guided Principia Ethica at two points. One was the book’s specific formulation of its principle of organic unities, discussed below. The other was its testing for a state’s intrinsic value by the “method of isolation,” which involves asking whether a universe containing only that state and no other would be good (1903: 91, 93, 95, 187–88, 208/1993: 142, 145, 147, 236–37, 256); the point of this method is precisely to insulate judgements of intrinsic value from facts about a state’s external relations by ensuring that there are none such. Moore’s strict view was shared by some later writers such as Ross (1930: 75), while others argued that a better theory of value results if intrinsic goodness is allowed to depend on some relational properties (e.g. Ewing 1947: 114). But Moore was the first to raise this issue clearly.