 Coercion is the standard object of public justification because it is perhaps the characteristic feature of political life. Charles Larmore remarks that public justification has “to do with the sort of respect we owe one another in the political realm — that is, in relationships where the possibility of coercion is involved” (Larmore 2008, 86). John Rawls’s principle of public justification holds that political power requires justification (Rawls 2005, 12) because “political power is always coercive power” (Rawls 2005, 68). Jonathan Quong holds that public justification concerns the imposition of coercive laws (Quong 2011, 233–250). And, as Christopher Eberle puts it (2002, 54), “the clarion call of justificatory liberalism is the public justification of coercion.” Some have wondered whether non-coercive state actions need public justification (2.7). But they nonetheless agree that coercion generally, if not always, requires it.