 Dasti rightly uses the term personhood as signifying the self together with its properties and talks about person (rather than the self) as directly engaged in the world, but he fails to note that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account is plagued with problems. Problems arise when we pay attention to the fact that according to the Nyāya philosophers, although the self is a substance which is separate from the mind-sense organs-body complex, the self is totally dependent on this complex for its functionality. The mind-sense organs-body contact is needed to engender cognition, desire, etc., the self cannot bring cognition into being by itself. Reflection and memory too require the self to be in contact with the mind. Even the effort of the self is induced by the mind-sense-body contact, so it seems that the self cannot initiate any activity by itself. Self by itself is causally impotent (this is, indeed, exactly the Buddhist argument against the existence of the Nyāya self). It seems that the self by itself is just a bearer of its distinctive qualities which are induced by mind-sense organs-body contact. It is merely the passive observer of activity and remote carrier of the mediate (karmic) consequences of actions. Therefore, it is not the self by itself but the embodied self or person that is the agent, doer and originator of all actions and the enjoyer of the results of the action.