 Dharmakīrti begins by pointing to the well-known fact that there is incongruence between the external object and our perception of it. Visual perception, for example, is limited to certain aspects or features of the object. The external object as a whole is never visually perceived. We do not perceive cups and pots, but only its colour, shape, size and so on. So, he asks, what reason is there to cup and pots over and above visual perception of shapes, sizes and colours. This incongruence allows him to conclude that perception does not have the form of the external object or it’s form is deviant. Next he questions whether the realist commitment to causation and resemblance between the form (image, impression) and the external object establishes that perception must have external objects. Causation cannot work on its own by virtue of the well-known fact that our cognitions can and do have internal mental causes. And the notion of resemblance is too weak and vague to do any real work in indexically linking particular forms to objects in front of one’s eyes. These two negative arguments suggest the conclusion that there is no external object to be experienced by cognition. This conclusion is then supported by two further positive arguments referred to as saṃvedana-argument and the sahopalambhaniyama-inference in the literature. The saṃvedana-argument appeals to the nature of cognition as that which appears in a certain way. And this “appearing-to-in-a-certain-way” highlights the intransitive nature of cognition. Cogniton by its nature is self-illuminating, it shines forth itself. This argument is no doubt terse and can do with further explication but Dharmakīrti does not elaborate. The second argument, sahopalambhaniyama-inference is also tersely encapsulated in a single sentence in the text: “No object [is observed] without awareness, nor is an awareness observed being experienced without an object; thus they are not different” (Pratyakṣapariccheda, 390). Taber (2010, 292–3) presents a useful reconstruction of the argument. The argument draws on the logical principle of Identity of Indiscernibles: two things having exactly the same properties are identical. However, the argument at issue just points to sharing of one crucial propert: the property of being perceived at the same time. This crucial property is regarded as sufficient evidence to establish that the two things are “non-different”. Both these arguments deserve further elaboration before we can properly assess whether they are succesful in establishing the conclusion. This new literature in ceratinly a start in the right direction and opens up new research questions for contemporary philosophers.