 Mental anomalism, as initially formulated by Davidson, holds that there can be no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained (Davidson 1970, 208). It is thus restricted to ruling out strict laws of succession with mental predicates occurring in the consequent—laws such as ‘P1 → M1’, ‘(M1 &amp; P1) → M2’, or ‘M1 → M2’. It thus denies that the occurrence of particular mental events such as coming to believe or intend something, or intentionally acting in some way, can be explained by appeal to strict covering laws. But as becomes clear, Davidson’s considered position rejects the possibility of any strict laws in which mental predicates figure—and this includes, in particular, bridge laws of the form ‘P1 ↔ M1’, which form the basis of type-identity theories of mind, as well as any strict laws with mental antecedents. We have already seen how strict purely psychological laws are ruled out by the interaction principle  (2.3).  And, at a more general level, it rules out purported solutions to the problem of deviant causal chains noted in  2.2,  which would spell out, in terms of some required physical and also, perhaps, mental conditions, how behavior must be caused by reasons (“caused in the right way”) in order to be action. (That some physical conditions are necessary in such an analysis is guaranteed, as we have seen  (2.3),  by the open nature of the mental and subsequent psychological anomalism.) Any such adequate analysis of action would entail particular psychophysical laws of the form ‘(M1 &amp; M2 &amp; M3 &amp; P1) → P2’. For such an analysis would state that whatever behavior (P2) which in fact is caused in the right way (M3 &amp; P1) by reasons (M1 &amp; M2) would be the action that is rationalized by those reasons. This provides a schema for generating strict psychophysical laws: by plugging in particular reasons and the causal conditions P1 and M3 proffered by the analysis, we get a strict predictive psychophysical law simply by noting what effect is produced by these causes. (In the course of an extended discussion of the problem of deviant causal chains, Bishop 1989, 125–75, fails to see this connection between it and mental anomalism—see 164.) With strict purely psychological laws thus already ruled out, the focus now is on strict psychophysical laws.