 Green’s main argument for this form of absolute idealism seems to be his concern with the possibility of error (PE §26). Just as we must make room for the possibility of local error in an individual’s conscious experience, so too we have to allow for the possibility of systematic error within an individual’s conscious experience. But just as the idealist explains the possibility of local individual error against the background of larger patterns in the individual’s experience, so too she must explain the possibility of systematic individual error against the background of some larger pattern of experience. In order to find a larger pattern of experience, we must go outside individual consciousness. But the experiences of other individuals cannot, as such, form part of a common and larger set of experiences. If the content and truth conditions of an individual’s thoughts are dependent on the relations between those thoughts and other elements of his consciousness, then individuals, as such, would have incommensurable experiences and thoughts. We can block this relativistic conclusion if there is a single trans-historical corporate mind of which particular finite minds are proper parts. For then there will be a common determinant of the content and truth conditions of the experiences and thoughts of different finite agents. Green’s view seems to be that knowledge and, hence, inquiry presuppose absolute idealism (PE §26).