 Of course, some of the recommended transformations in emotional attitudes may not be possible for us. In certain situations refraining from resentment or moral anger may be beyond our power, and thus even the committed skeptic might not be able to make the change the skeptical view suggests. Yet, a committed skeptic need not eliminate these attitudes completely to accept the conclusion that agents are never deserving of praise and blame, she must attempt instead not to engage or entertain them (Sommers 2007a: 328; Russell 1992: 296). Shaun Nichols (2007), for example, invokes the distinction between narrow-profile emotional responses, e.g., local or immediate emotional reactions to situations, and wide-profile responses, which are not immediate and involve rational reflection (see also Pereboom 2014a). We might expect to be unable to appreciably reduce narrow-profile moral anger as an immediate reaction upon being deeply hurt in an intimate personal relationship. In wide-profile cases, however, diminishing or even eliminating moral anger is open—or, at least, we can disavow it in the sense of rejecting any force it may be assumed to have in justifying a harmful response to wrongdoing. This modification of moral anger, skeptics contend, might well be advantageous for our valuable personal relationships, and it has the potential to bring about the equanimity that Spinoza (1677 [1985]) thought skepticism about free will and moral responsibility, more generally, would secure (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a; cf. Russell 2004).