 With regard to the positive part, neo-Pyrrhonism presents a detailed account of the crucial notion of phainómenon. Porchat thought, in an earlier phase, that phainómenon was to be identified with, or assimilated to, phantasía (Porchat 1985, 1986). That explains why he once construed that notion as implying some form of mentalism: what appears was conceived of as a mental representation. He later rejected that identification (Porchat 1991). On his new explanation, phainómenon is best accounted for by another crucial notion: bíos, or common life. After all, says Sextus Empiricus, what appears is bíos. Thus, Sextus’ explanation of the skeptical standard of action is also an explanation of the notion of phainómenon. By paying close attention to the fourfold everyday observances, one may understand better what the phainómenon is. At the same time, common life is to be understood as what is apparent (what appears to those who live it), not as a reality in itself.