 Goldman began by proposing some desiderata on any account of justification. First, theories of justification should specify conditions for justified belief that do not invoke the concept of justification itself, or any other epistemically normative concepts such as reasonability or rationality. The aim is to provide a “reductive” account of justification that does not appeal explicitly or implicitly to any notions that entail justification or other members of that family. There is bite in this requirement. For example, it might preclude an analysis of justified belief in terms of “evidence”, unless evidence can itself be characterized in non-epistemic terms. What kinds of terms or properties, then, are appropriate for constructing an account of justification? Permissible concepts or properties would include doxastic ones, such as belief, disbelief, suspension of judgment, and any other purely psychological concepts, such as ones that refer to perceptual experience or memory. Given the assumption that truth and falsity are non-epistemic notions, they would also be perfectly legitimate for use in analyzing justifiedness. Another admissible element in an account of justifiedness is the causal relation.