  In  Carnap 1955,  Rudolf Carnap attempted to clarify intensional analyses of linguistic meaning, and to justify from a methodological point of view, by imagining how the analysis could be applied to the linguistic usage of a hypothetical robot. Carnap hoped that the fact that we could imagine ourselves to know the internal structure of the robot would help to make the case for an empirical science of semantics more plausible. This hope proved to be unjustified; the philosophical issue that concerned Carnap remains controversial to this day, and thought experiments with robots have not proved to be particularly rewarding in addressing it. Real robots, though, with real  applications,[9]  are a very different matter. Though it is hard to tell whether they will prove to be helpful in clarifying fundamental philosophical problems, they provide a laboratory for logic that is revolutionary in its potential impact on the subject. They motivate the development of entirely new logical theories that should prove to be as important for philosophy as the fundamental developments in logic of the late nineteenth century proved to be.