 The Mohist program was beset with two basic kinds of problems. First, in the domain of reference, the Mohists encountered difficulties in their method of “extending kinds”. This was the problem of identifying appropriate salience conditions in perception and thought to serve as criteria for naming the similar similarly and the different differently. Second, in the domain of meaning, they faced unexpected questions in their evaluations of the meanings of names in complex expressions, suggesting problems in extending their theory of reference from simple terms to complex expressions on the assumption that the latter are to be treated compositionally. One can see how the Mohists’ preference for reasoning by analogy, and the problems beleaguering their quest for certainty, would have encouraged them to adopt the same orientation with respect to the study of language itself, its grammatical forms and their implications for meaning. They turned their attention to the study of language in hopes that more sophisticated analyses of meaning would help resolve some of the problems afflicting their account of reference. But one would also expect the Mohists to remain apprehensive here about making general statements, just as they found was necessary in their analysis of reference, and this is exactly what we find in the later writings of the Canons, particularly in the Lesser Selection (Xiao Qu), the compilation most noteworthy for its novel insights in the study of language.