  Socrates tries to avoid the relevant absurdity, however it is understood, by supposing that a form is like a day, in the following sense: just as a day can be in many separate places at the same time without being separate from itself, so a form can be in many separate places at the same time without being separate from itself. Parmenides does not think much of Socrates’ suggestion. He immediately counters that Socrates’ day is like a sail: a day can be in many separate places at the same time only inasmuch as different parts of it are over the separate places, just as a sail can cover many separate people only inasmuch as each person is covered by a different part of the sail. Parmenides’ point, then, is that the only way to make sense of Socrates’ day analogy is to reduce it to the Piece-of-Pie Model, the very model against which Parmenides goes on to argue.