  According to Martin, if we think of introspective awareness of experience in the wrong way, the negative epistemic condition (that of being introspectively indiscriminible from a veridical perception) is read only as a condition on one’s cognitive awareness, and not as a condition on experience itself. And Martin thinks that this lies behind many of the objections to his account. In response, Martin tries to argue that read in the right way introspective indiscriminability guarantees that phenomenal consciousness is present. For according to Martin, the disjunctivist should stress the connection between phenomenal consciousness and having a point of view, or perspective on the world, a connection central to Nagel’s (1974) discussion of consciousness. So the negative epistemological condition when correctly interpreted will specify not just a subject’s cognitive response to their circumstances, but rather their perspective on the world (which the introspective perspective coincides with), and this will be sufficient for there to be something it is like for them to be so. It is worth noting that the reasons that Martin gives for recommending this account of hallucination appear to apply just in the case of a causally matching hallucination (i.e. a hallucination that is subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical perception and which involves the same kind of proximate cause and brain state as that involved in the corresponding veridical perception). Moreover, it is not obvious that a disjunctivist needs to give the same account of all hallucinations. So if a disjunctivist were to agree to Martin’s reasoning about causally matching hallucinations, it may be open to her to provide a positive account of other hallucinations.