 Perhaps more serious is the following type of challenge by the concurrentist. The concurrentist at this point might protest and question whether and why the identity of conservation and creation need be taken in this manner. Given that the concurrentist wishes to maintain theological orthodoxy and endorse the CCC thesis as well, the concurrentist might suggest that an alternative understanding of the identity between creation and conservation is available in the following manner: to say that conservation is but continuous creation just is to say that the act of creation and conservation is but a numerically single act on the part of God, and thus it need not be the case that what God does, causally speaking, remains qualitatively the same throughout this one, continuous act. For example, one might take a single, continuous walk during which the pace is at times brisk, at times leisurely, but such difference in terms of exertion throughout the walk does not split the walk into two distinct  acts.[32]  On such a model, the concurrentist could argue that she also agrees that conservation is continuous with creation and thus conservation and creation comprise a single, identical act, but the affirmation of the CCC thesis, cashed out in this way, need not imply that there is no creaturely contribution in moments of conservation. God, on this “continuous maintenance” reading (Winkler 2011, 301) maintains the creature throughout its existence in a single, unified act, but what God does at the initial point of creation differs from what God does when he merely conserves the creature. Note that this “continuous maintenance” reading targets not only the “continuous recreation” reading but “qualitative identity” reading as well. For the latter two readings share the intuition that the identity in question is one in which divine causal contribution be thought to be qualitatively the same, regardless of whether it be in the form of recreation or not. 