 These paradoxes have led a minority of philosophers to be skeptical that self-deception is conceptually possible or even coherent (Paluch 1967; Haight 1980; Kipp 1980). Borge (2003) contends that accounts of self-deception inevitably give up central elements of our folk-psychological notions of “self” or “deception” to avoid paradox, leaving us to wonder whether this framework itself is what gets in the way of explaining the phenomenon. Such skepticism toward the concept may seem warranted, given the obvious paradoxes involved. Most philosophers, however, have sought some resolution to these paradoxes, instead of giving up on the notion itself, not only because empirical evidence suggests that self-deception is not only possible, but pervasive (Sahdra &amp; Thagard 2003), but also because the concept does seem to pick out a distinct kind of motivated irrationality. Philosophical accounts of self-deception can be organized into two main groups: those that maintain that the paradigmatic cases of self-deception are intentional, and those that deny this. Call these approaches intentionalist and revisionist respectively. Intentionalists find the model of intentional interpersonal deception apt, since it helps to explain the selectivity of self-deception and the apparent responsibility of self-deceiver, as well as providing a clear way of distinguishing self-deception from other sorts of motivated belief such as wishful thinking. Revisionists are impressed by the static and dynamic paradoxes allegedly involved in modeling self-deception on intentional interpersonal deception and, in their view, the equally puzzling psychological models used by intentionalists to avoid these paradoxes, such as semi-autonomous subsystems, unconscious beliefs and intentions and the like. To avoid paradox and psychological exotica revisionist approaches reformulate the intention requirement, the belief requirement or both.