 Perhaps the most influential application of game theory to problems associated with nuclear conflict is found in Schelling’s seminal works The Strategy of Conflict (1960)and Arms and Influence (1966) which together reshaped the game-theoretic analysis of conflict. One of Schelling’s most important insights, which the prospect of nuclear war makes especially clear, was the observation that only in rare circumstances are the interests of parties engaged in conflict completely opposed. This led Schelling to emphasize the ways conflict creates and shapes opportunities for bargaining and cooperation. These were issues that had increasingly come to be studied using the tools of cooperative game theory, but Schelling would revitalize non-cooperative game theory by showing how such issues could be more productively analyzed through non-cooperative approaches. Arms races to develop more effective nuclear weapons, and the extensive efforts that governments make to guard nuclear secrets, are also emblematic of the importance of information and timing to the analysis of conflict, and the emphasis Schelling placed on these issues would lead game theorists to re-prioritize the extensive form analysis of games that is better able to capture the influence of incomplete information and the dynamic nature of conflict. Finally, tying together many of the issues sketched above is Schelling’s early work on commitment and threats. As Schelling showed, by pre-committing to a costly course of action (or by limiting one’s future options) an agent can influence the actions of other agents with whom she is engaged in conflict. In fact, Schelling showed that in some cases irrationality can even be an advantage, an argument that Kavka (1987) would develop further in the context of deterrence.