 This account of omnipotence may be vulnerable to a counter-example of the following kind. Arguably, there could be an agent, \(x\), such that: \(x\) has a wide range of powers, \(x\) is essentially limited to these powers, and \(x\) essentially lacks a power, \(P\), which an omnipotent agent ought to possess. Of course, \(x\) would not be omnipotent. Yet, Wierenga’s account of omnipotence paradoxically implies that \(x\) would be omnipotent. Hence, it can be argued that Wierenga’s account does not provide a logically sufficient condition for omnipotence. The assumption that there could be a non-omnipotent agent that is essentially limited in its powers can be defended as follows. An omnipotent agent has the power to overrule (or supersede) any law of nature (a mere physical necessity). For example, God has the power to overrule the law of gravity by bringing it about that a mountain floats in midair without any physical cause. Yet, arguably, it is possible for there to be a non-omnipotent agent who essentially lacks the power to overrule any law of nature. For example, it can be argued that there could be a physical or material agent who is essentially subject to certain laws of nature. Surely, such an agent would lack the power to overrule any law of nature, and so would not be omnipotent.