 It would be difficult to deny that there are normative concepts. We have normative thoughts, such as that so-and-so was an evil person or that such-and-such was the wrong thing to do. There are common thoughts such as that it would be a bad idea to have yet another Dr Pepper. And our having such thoughts reveals that we have the normative concepts involved in them, such as the concepts &lt;evil&gt;, &lt;wrong&gt; and &lt;bad&gt;. But some philosophers deny that there are normative properties that are referred to or represented by our normative concepts, and that there are normative facts that are referred to or represented by our normative thoughts. Accounts of these kinds are anti-realist in that they hold that normativity lies in the realm of thought rather than in the worldly realm of metaphysics. A further complication is that anti-realist accounts of these kinds can be nihilistic – taking it that, to a first approximation, there are no normative truths – or cognitivist and concessive – taking it that, again approximately, there are normative truths but they have no metaphysical commitments – or non-cognitivist – taking it that, roughly, our normative “thoughts” are not strictly speaking representational in the way that (other) beliefs are and that there are normative truths, but only in a deflationary sense.