Thus, Robert Nozick (1981) is well-known for proposing that knowledge requires sensitive belief, where one’s belief that p (formed via a particular method, M) is sensitive just in case, if p were false, one would not believe (via M) that p. While he does not endorse sensitivity as a general condition on knowing, and is not concerned with giving an account of knowledge itself, Keith DeRose suggests that an utterance of ‘S knows that p’ will tend to express a truth only if S believes that p, p, and S’s epistemic position is such that his belief that p is sensitive (DeRose 1995, 36). And, in the case of SA, the mere uttering of P1 induces very high standards for knowledge, as the belief that I’m not a BIV is manifestly insensitive; and at those very high standards, P1 is true. As for P2, DeRose claims that it is true “regardless of what epistemic standard it is evaluated at” (ibid., 39). As it happens, though, in SA P2 is evaluated at the very high standards put into play by P1. But, then, the only reading on which SA’s conclusion is true is at the unusually inflated standards induced by P1. The truth of C thus allows that we correctly say we “know” that we have hands when lower standards are in play, as they usually are.