 At any rate, if queerness is just relative lack of parsimony, the error theorist is opening up a can of worms. Many people are not sold on the value of parsimony in theory selection – or are not sold on its value outside of empirical contexts (see Huemer 2009). Those who are sold on the value of parsimony count it as a pro tanto consideration to be weighed against a host of other factors. That means that even granting that normative facts are queer (in the sense that postulating them is less parsimonious than not doing so), this does not by itself establish that they do not exist, or that we shouldn’t believe in them. In other words, interpreting the  first premise  of the argument from queerness in this way undermines the  second premise,  at least where the second premise is read strongly as the claim that there are no queer facts. (See Morton &amp; Sampson 2014 for a fuller argument against queerness as lack of parsimony.)