 Also, Stalnaker’s argument is restricted to the special case where we take the \({\sim}A \amp{\sim}B\)-possibilities to be ruled out. Consider a case when, starting out agnostic, we become close to certain, but not quite certain, that \(A\) or \(B\) — say we become about 95% certain that \(A\) or \(B\), and are about 50% certain that \(A\). According to Supp, we are entitled to be quite close to certain that if \({\sim}A, B\) — 90% certain in fact. (If \(\mathbf{p}(A \text{ or } B) = 95\)% and \(\mathbf{p}(A) = 50\)%, then \(\mathbf{p}({\sim}A \amp B) = 45\)%. Now \(\mathbf{p}({\sim}A \amp{\sim}B) = 5\)%. So, on the assumption that \({\sim}A\), it’s 45:5, or 9:1, that \(B\).) In this case, no additional possibilities have been ruled out. There are \({\sim}A \amp{\sim}B\)-worlds as well as \({\sim}A \amp B\)-worlds which are permissible candidates for being nearest. Stalnaker has not told us why we should think it likely, in this case, that the nearest \({\sim}A\)-world is a \(B\)-world.