 His picture is that beings of reason are such that, although they do not exist, one may speak and think as if they existed, where the thinking in question is a real, existing formal structure in the mind of an actual thinker. Thinking is in this way contentful, because founded in some real feature of some real thinker, but not therefore such as to take an object. One may think of Socrates or one may think of a gryphon; the gryphon's being thought, however, unlike Socrates's being thought, is not an extrinsic denomination of the gryphon, as it is of Socrates; for Socrates is and the gryphon is not. Were there a gryphon, says Suárez, the formal structure of the thinker would indeed give rise to an extrinsic denomination of it, no more or less that Socrates's being thought gives rise to such a feature of him. Still, he insists, because there is not such a gryphon, there is not such a feature to be had by him.