 and goes on to defend the interpersonalist view. Relatedly, there is the question of how we should understand the notions of practice and custom and the role that they play in a correct conception of intentionality, broadly construed. It might be thought, as Wittgenstein seems to suggest in Philosophical Investigations (e.g., #198; #201–202), that it is essential to thinking and speaking that one be trained into practices or customs, and thus that our conception should reflect the centrality of these notions (McDowell 1984, M. Williams 1999, Stroud 2000, M. Williams 2010, Miller 2015b); at least initially, this appears to favour the communitarian view. (See also Section 4 of Haase 2018 for a different kind of attempt to flesh out the Wittgensteinian notion of practice, and Pettit 1990 for a form of non-reductionism on which communal interaction is required in at least some cases of rule-following). But on the Davidsonian conception, at the centre of which is disagreement and the need to settle it rationally against the constraints of the shared world, the idea of practice might not serve any explanatory purpose; even though shared beliefs may be essential for thought, shared standards of correctness are not essential for language. The Davidsonian conception is a variety of interpersonalism. This intramural debate is very much ongoing.