 Personal relationship goods are not always easy to individuate. This is illustrated in debates about one particular personal relationship, and the good that it generates, namely love—a topic that has received much recent philosophical interest. Love is a form of valuing another individual, whether as an appropriate response to her value (Velleman 1999) or by bestowing value on her through the relationship with the beloved (Frankfurt 2004), perhaps by creating a common history between the individuals in the relationship (Kolodny 2003, 2010). In either case, love has been said to depend on, or even be constituted by, other personal relationship goods. On David Velleman’s (1999) account, according to which love is an appraisal of value, an ability to pay special attention to some individuals to whom one is willing to become vulnerable is what makes possible love for particular individuals. Others, too, think that loving consists in directing one’s attention in order to attend to the valuable features of the beloved (Jollimore 2011) and some of Velleman’s philosophical predecessors, such as Iris Murdoch, believed that attention is the very essence of love and claimed that “Love is the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real” (Murdoch 1959: 51). On this view, love seems to respond to a need to be seen by others, to be known as one really is rather than be a mere pretext for other individuals’ projections. An alternative view identifies love as a form of robust concern, or care, for the beloved, for her own sake (Soble 1990; LaFollette 1996; Frankfurt 1999).