 Another possible answer could be that it is our understanding of the very concept of “contradiction” that is flawed. The reasoning involved in the paradoxes of self-reference all end up with some contradiction, a sentence concluded to be both true and false. We consider this an impossibility, hence the paradox, but maybe we don’t have to? Dialetheism is the view that there can be “true contradictions”, meaning that it is not impossible for a sentence to be both true and false. If adopting the view of dialetheism, all the paradoxes of self-reference dissolve and instead become existence proofs of certain “dialetheia”: sentences being both true and false. Priest (1987) is a strong advocate of dialetheism, and uses his principle of uniform solution (see Section 1.4 above) to defend the dialetheist solution. See the entries on  dialetheism  and  paraconsistent logic  for more information.