 These charges are, however, hard to sustain. Principia Ethica actually downplayed the metaphysical side of its non-naturalism, saying that goodness has “being” but does not “exist”, as numbers, too, have being but do not exist; in particular, goodness does not exist in any “supersensible reality,” because there is no such reality (1903: 110–12, 123–25/1993: 161–63, 174–76). What exactly Moore meant by these claims is unclear, but it’s at least possible to read them as suggesting a non-metaphysical moral realism like those defended more recently by Nagel (1986), Scanlon (1998, 2014), and Parfit (2011, vol. 2: 464–87 ). Nor did his explicit talk of properties mark a significant departure from Sidgwick. This is partly because he did not clearly distinguish concepts and properties, and partly because if Sidgwick thought people ought to pursue pleasure, he would surely have to grant that pleasure has the property of being something people ought to pursue. The question is how ontologically robust Moore’s talk of a property of goodness was, and given his denial that such goodness exists the answer is uncertain. The distinction between more and less metaphysical forms of non-naturalism is not one he clearly addressed.