 That being said, it seems that we can sensibly engage in rational debates over which logic to adopt in the light of various issues (vagueness, the semantic paradoxes, etc.). Consequently, there is a clear sense in which normative conflicts do arise. Now, since Field takes it to be an essential component of the notion of logical consequence that it should induce norms (Field 2009a,b, 2015), we choose a logic by finding out which logical norms it makes most sense for us to adopt. But because Field does not take there to be a fact of the matter as to which set of norms is correct and since the question as to which of the norms best promotes our epistemic ends is often underdetermined, we may expect there to be several candidate sets of logical norms all of which are equally well-motivated. We are thus left with a (more modest) form of logical pluralism on our hands.