 The recent renewal of interest in virtue ethics led philosophers to examine whether there is a place for supererogation in such virtue-based theories. On the face of it, Aristotelian ethics cannot accommodate supererogation since it does not share the deontic conditions on which the idea of transcending duty is based. However, Roger Crisp argues that this view is based on a misreading of Aristotle, for whom both doing the virtuous act (fitting the circumstances) and being a virtuous person are obligatory. It is the duty of a virtuous person to become angry when it is fitting to feel so. Thus, Crisp is led to a sharp anti-supererogationist view. Since virtue is itself a kind of excess, one cannot go beyond it (Crisp 2013). But then, one may wonder, how would Aristotle (according to Crisp’s reading) evaluate the act of throwing oneself on a hand-grenade in order to save the lives of others? Aristotle should either judge it as plainly wrong, wasteful or unfitting (and hence contrary to duty), or as “a noble” deed which is ultimately self-serving, adding glory to the agent, even if only posthumously. This understanding of virtue ethics is extremely demanding in comparison to theories which recognize the separate realm of the supererogatory. However, there are proponents of virtue ethics who believe that supererogation is not only possible but can be analyzed in Aristotelian terms (Stangl 2016).