 Many of these concerns figure in a somewhat new light in a significant, rights-based strand of feminist argument associated originally with Catharine MacKinnon. This approach has subsequently been developed by scholars in several different ways (e.g., Bianchi 2008; Langton 1993, McGowan 2019, Mikkola 2017, Watson 2018). On one distinctive version of this approach, pornography does not merely cause sexual discrimination and others harms; its production and consumption constitutes an act of sexual discrimination (Langton 1993; McGowan 2019). Since this approach has provoked particular interest and discussion among both liberals and feminists, and has come to constitute a dominant framework for much of the contemporary debate between liberals and feminists over pornography, it is worth examining it in more detail. According to MacKinnon, pornography harms women in a very special and serious way: by violating their civil rights (MacKinnon 1984, 1987, 1992). In particular, pornography subordinates women or violates their right to equal civil status; and it silences them or violates their civil right to freedom of speech.