 The debate regarding contextualism is too enormous to enter into here. Still, it is worth asking whether certainty that is protected by the contextualist strategy really should count as genuine certainty. After all, the idea was that a belief one knew with certainty to be correct was one that made one immune from doubt full stop, and not just immune from doubt in the present circumstances. It was supposed to be a belief that one could rely on without hesitation in drawing inferences, evaluating new evidence, and answering questions and challenges from others. Contextually protected certainty is capable of nothing quite so stable and secure. In fact, it looks more like the epistemic version of moral certainty--good enough for most purposes, but not as good as it might be (see Matthen 2014 and Locke 2015 for views that more explicitly eschew the label of “epistemic certainty” in fleshing out this kind of epistemic status).