 Recent empirical research suggests that both positions may have some merit: the meta-ethical views of ordinary people are rather complex. A common method for measuring whether people are objectivists or relativists about a moral statement is to present them with a disagreement between two parties concerning the statement and to ask them if at most only one party could be correct. A response that only one could be correct indicates commitment to objectivism, while a response that more than one could be correct suggests commitment to relativism (or some non-objectivist position). Several studies employing this and related methodologies have provided evidence that, while many people are objectivists about morality, a significant number are not objectivists (for example, see Nichols 2004). Moreover, some studies have shown interesting correlations with these differences. For instance, being in a competitive rather than cooperative interaction and belief in a punishing God correlate with more objectivist intuitions (see Fisher et al. 2017 and Sarkissian and Phelan 2019) while openness to experience and to alternative possibilities are more common among those with non-objectivist intuitions (see Feltz and Cokely 2008 and Goodwin and Darley 2010). In addition, some studies purport to show that there may be causal relationships as well as correlations. For example, the desire to punish generates objectivist intuitions (see Rose and Nichols Forthcoming).