 An interesting application of Dutch Strategy arguments has been made by Hitchcock to the perplexing Sleeping Beauty problem (Hitchcock 2004). In the problem, Beauty is to undergo an experiment in which she will be put to sleep on Sunday night, after which a fair coin will be tossed. If it comes up heads, she will be awakened just once for a short time on Monday, and if tails she will also be awakened again on Tuesday. In each case, after being awakened, she will be put back to sleep with drugs that will erase her memory of having been awake. On Wednesday, she is awakened and the experiment ends. Beauty is aware of these facts about the experiment, so that when she wakes up during the experiment she will not know whether it is Monday or Tuesday. The problem is to determine what her probability should be for heads upon awakening within the experiment. Elga introduced the problem into the philosophical literature (Elga 2000), and argued that upon awakening Beauty should shift her probability from the value of ½ that she assigned on Sunday night to ⅓. Lewis argued shortly thereafter that Beauty’s probability upon awakening should remain at ½ (Lewis 2001), and additional arguments have followed on both sides. Hitchcock shows that there is a Dutch Strategy against either answer, but then argues that there is only force to the one against Beauty if she sticks with ½.