 There are at least three possible ways out of this dilemma. First, the phenomenologist could choose the first horn of the dilemma, but analyse an earlier perceptual experience of his, one that he now remembers. He just has to make sure here not to employ his earlier (and perhaps still persisting) belief in the existence of a perceptual object. Secondly, he could again decide in favour of the first horn and analyse a perceptual experience that he merely intuitively imagines himself to have. (For Husserl’s view on imagination see esp. Husserliana, vol. XXIII.) Thirdly, he could instead choose the second horn, keep employing his existence-belief, but make a kind of “pragmatic ascent” and describe the perceptual experience in such a way that the description, i.e., the speech act thus performed, does not presuppose the existence of a perceptual object. (The following sort of description may serve that function: “I am demonstratively identifying a so-and-so”; “I am performing an act of this-meaning under the aspect so-and-so”.) In any case, Husserl regards “bracketing” as what he calls the “neutrality modification” of a positing act, to be distinguished both from a corresponding supposition (hypothesis) and from what is commonly referred to as suspension of judgment, as in a case of serious doubt (cf. Hua III/1, 247 ff). While in the latter case the subjective probability may be 0.5, no degree of belief whatsoever can be assigned to an act of neutrality-modification (cf. Hua III/1, 252).