 The prima facie advantage of a dispositional account of laws vis-á-vis the cp-law-problem is the following: The dispositional account provides a semantics for cp-laws. According to one version of the dispositionalist account of cp-laws (see Hüttemann 2014), a law statement is true provided the type of system in question has the disposition that the law statement attributes to the system. Reconstructing law-statements as statements about dispositions, tendencies, or capacities rather than about overt behavior turns cp-laws into strict laws. The claim is—as in Mill—that certain kinds of systems have certain kinds of tendencies or dispositions. In stating the law, it is no longer necessary to appeal to cp-clauses. One advantage is that the so-called problem of instantiation, “the problem that many cp-laws appear not to have any instances” (Lipton 1999, 164) can be solved. The law is no longer considered to be a description of the systems’ occurrent behavior that is only manifest under very special conditions—if at all. The law concerns the underlying stable tendencies or dispositions. Furthermore, this dispositionalist account is able to provide a rationale for why scientists are interested in cp-laws. Cp-laws describe how systems behave in the absence of disturbing factors, i.e., if the disposition, tendency etc. can manifest itself completely. This knowledge can be used to account for more complex situations, in which various systems and their dispositions are intertwined—provided laws of superposition are available.