 When inquiring about the nature of the relationship between the intellect and sense experience it is important to keep in mind the technical sense with which Kant uses various terms, as introduced above. There are at least two reasons for doing so. First, to be as clear as we can regarding Kant’s understanding of his own theory. Second, to avoid confusion regarding the relation between Kant’s conception of such terms and our modern Anglophone tradition of use. This latter issue is especially significant since it is not at all clear that Kant’s conception of “experience” admits of straightforward translation into our modern notion. For example, Kant is clear that “experience,” in his sense of an “empirical cognition” (empirische Erkenntnis), includes conceptual synthesis, since such synthesis is what binds the various elements of an empirical cognition together such that they are non-arbitrarily connected (see, e.g., B12, B161, B201, B218, and B233). As a result, all should concede that his usage of “experience” (Erfahrung) and “empirical cognition” (empirische Erkenntnis) typically is meant in a way that assumes a cognitive contribution in the form of conceptual synthesis by the understanding (Allais 2016: 4). Thus, and rather confusingly, if there is a debate to be had concerning Kant’s view of the conceptual or intellectual character of “experience” in its contemporary English sense of a kind of phenomenally conscious state, it may well be located at somewhere other than the level of “experience” in Kant’s technical sense (though for worries about our contemporary philosophical usage of “experience” see Byrne 2009).