 Consider, for example, the category of landlords. To be a landlord one must be located within a broad system of social and economic relations which includes tenants, private property, and the like. It might be that all and only landlords have a mole behind their left ear. But even if this were the case, having this physical mark is not what it is to be a landlord. Similarly, one might want to draw a distinction between sex and gender, sex being an anatomical distinction based on locally salient sexual/reproductive differences (see Ásta Sveinsdóttir 2011 for an alternative conception), and gender being a distinction between the social/political positions of those with bodies marked as of different sexes. One could allow that the categories of sex and gender interact (so concerns with distinctions between bodies will influence social divisions and vice versa); but even to be clear how they interact, we should differentiate them. With this distinction between sex and gender in hand, it is possible that some males are women and some females are men. Because, on this conception, one is a female by virtue of some (variable) set of anatomical features, and one is a woman by virtue of one’s position within a social and economic system, the sex/gender distinction gives us some (at least preliminary) resources for including trans* people within our conceptual framework (see further Bettcher 2014).