 A related interpretative issue concerns the grounds on which organisms resist mechanical explanation, and hence need to be understood teleologically. Many commentators, including McLaughlin (1990), Allison (1992), and Guyer (2001a, 2003b), take organisms to be mechanically inexplicable in virtue of the self-maintaining and self-producing character which distinguishes them from artifacts (see  Section 3.3).  On this approach, organisms have to be explained teleologically because, in contrast to machines, their parts cannot exist independently of the whole to which they belong. Against this, Ginsborg (2004) argues that the self-maintaining character of organisms is irrelevant to their mechanical inexplicability in the relevant sense. Kant’s point in emphasizing the contrast between organisms and machines is not to show that organisms require teleological explanation (since machines such as clocks are no less in need of such explanation), but on the contrary to show that, as natural objects rather than artefacts, they are not to be explained in terms of a designer’s intentions. The disagreement is discussed further in Breitenbach 2006, Watkins 2009, and McLaughlin 2014, all of which engage with the related issue of how the Antinomy is resolved.