 There are various ways to resist the above account without giving up on the idea that acts of metaphysical explanation might sometimes fail on the basis of psychological factors. One might insist that a metaphysical explanation is to be distinguished from an act of metaphysical explanation, and that all that is required for the latter is a true representation of worldly non-causal dependence. Metaphysical explanations abound to various degrees of complexity (etc.) and their existing and counting as metaphysical explanations is not something constrained by pragmatic, epistemic, or psychological factors. How well they fare in acts of explaining is another matter, one that falls under the question of whether or not they are successful explanations. A different way to resist is to insist that all that is required for realism is that one component of the explanation be objective and mind-independent, because whilst the term “metaphysical explanation” refers to a representation of a worldly relation, whether something counts as a metaphysical explanation or not fully depends on the worldly component. (One might motivate this sort of view by claiming that, e.g., grounding is the essential component of any metaphysical explanation, but explanations are representational entities and so strictly speaking it is a mistake to describe the relation as an explanation, even though it alone does all the explanatory work, so to speak.)