 Plausibly, “ought” is hyperintensional: perhaps you ought to call your sister, but it is not the case that you ought to call your sister and be self-identical even though it is impossible to call your sister without calling your sister and being self-identical, and vice versa. (Perhaps you promised to call: but unless you are a philosopher you probably did not promise to be self-identical.) Some of these obligations might be dependent on our representational practices. But perhaps there are obligations of objective morality as well. Perhaps your moral obligation to not callously cause suffering is like this. If there are objective obligations, they might be best construed as hyperintensional: the Moral Law may enjoin you to avoid callously inflicting suffering, but it may be silent about whether you ought to avoid inflicting callous suffering while being self-identical. See Faroldi (2019) for a recent hyperintensional treatment of “ought”.