 Such views have an obvious impact on practical and moral issues. First of all, the Skeptics argue that, so far as we have been given any compelling reason by philosophers to believe, there is nothing good or bad by nature (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism [=PH] III 179–238, Adversus Mathematicos [=M] XI 42–109). And just in case he does find such reasons compelling, the Skeptic will resist the temptation to assent by posing a general counter-argument: what is good by nature would be recognized by everyone, but clearly not everyone agrees – for instance, Epicurus holds that pleasure is good by nature but Antisthenes holds that it is not (DL IX 101) – hence there is nothing good by nature (see section 4 of the entry on  Moral Skepticism).  The practical consequences of suspending judgment are illustrated by two traditions about the life of Pyrrho. In one, Pyrrho himself did not avoid anything, whether it was wagons, precipices, or dogs. It would appear that, suspending judgment about whether being hit by a wagon was naturally good or bad, Pyrrho might walk into its path, or not bother to get out of the way. His less skeptical friends kept him alive – presumably by guiding him away from busy roads, vicious dogs, and deep gorges. Another tradition, however, says that he only theorized about suspension of judgments, and took action to preserve himself and otherwise lead a normal life, but doing so without any judgments as to natural good and bad. Living providently, he reached ninety years of age (DL IX 62).