 On this line of interpretation, then, we find the Mohists contending in canons B8 and B72 that although we can “borrow” the name of one kind and use it of another thing—their examples are that we might name a dog “Crane” or a family might be surnamed “Crane”—it is impermissible to claim things just are whatever we call them. The dog is not actually a water bird. Whether or not something is the sort of thing designated by a name is determined not by our happening to deem it so, but by whether it is in fact relevantly similar to other things that take that name.  General terms must “proceed” (xíng 行), or be projectible to, their extensions in regular, predictable ways. Names of kinds must “proceed” on the basis of inherent similarities.  Canon B72 is in effect attacking the stance, associated with the  “School of Names”  and discussed in certain Zhuangzi passages, that anything can arbitrarily be deemed “so” with respect to some  kind.[18] 