Indeed, Scheffler argues, Goodman confusingly uses “world” and “worldmaking” both in a versional and in an objectual sense. As we said above, Goodman’s claim is that we make a world in the objectual sense by making a version of it.  The claim is based on his conviction that the only structure of the world to which all true versions correspond does not exist independently; rather, it is only to be found because we project this structure onto the world with our conceptualizations. His favorite example is the constellation known as “Big Dipper”. Indeed, we “made” the Big Dipper by picking out one arbitrary constellation of stars and naming it. (More precisely, it is a so-called asterism that is part of the constellation Ursa Major—but the point still stands.) Which arrangement of heavenly bodies makes up the Big Dipper is purely conventional and hence only due to our conceptualization. Hilary Putnam (1992a) suggests that this idea may have some plausibility for the Big Dipper, but it does not, for instance, hold true of the stars that constitute the Big Dipper. True, “star” is a concept with partly conventional boundaries; however, that the concept “star” has conventional elements does not make it a matter of convention that “star” applies to something (and thus merely a matter of making a world version).