 A second concern with “property solutions” stems from the worry that the kind of properties involved, e.g., tensed “Lucretian” properties, are wholly objectionable. Some regard properties such as having contained dinosaurs as “suspicious” or “dubious” entities—they are objectionable entities that shouldn’t be countenanced in a respectable metaphysic. They are objectionable because, in a sense that’s difficult to pin down, they point beyond their instances (their bearers). Thus, having contained dinosaurs is a property that “points beyond” how the world is now; it points beyond the intrinsic nature of its bearer, and “points” to how the world was; namely, containing dinosaurs. And, say the objectors, acceptable properties aren’t like that; respectable properties don’t point beyond (see Sider 2001: 39–42; Crisp 2007: 93–98; Merricks 2007: 134–6; Cameron 2011: 58–62).