 All forms of materialism are deterministic, but in different ways. Nothing compels the materialist to accept that the body and the passions are deterministic just like a simple machine. Unsurprisingly, a lot depends on how causes are understood, and how much weight they are meant to bear in both an ontology and an account of action (see entry on  causal determinism).  Thus it is quite possible to hold, like Helvétius, d’Holbach or Hobbes, that there is a fixed, stable and predictable relation between our sensory input, our mental life and consequently our “temper” and our actions. “As a being that is organized so as to think and to feel”, D’Holbach explained, “you must feel pleasure or pain; you must love or hate in accordance with the way your organs are affected by the causes surrounding you or within you” (D’Holbach 1770/1781: I.i [1990: 18]).