 Another debate involving this sort of possibility was initiated by Goldin (2003) and later on taken up by Slingerland (2013), who have criticized interpretations (e.g., in Ames, 1993; Jullien, 2007) that take Chinese thought to be innocent of commitment to mind/body dualism (which is implicitly or explicitly deemed to be a fundamental error). They present historical and textual evidence to argue that some sort of mind/body dualism operated within many if not all early Chinese texts. Slingerland also backs up his conclusions with qualitative and quantitative analysis designed to guard against cherry-picking passages from texts guided by one’s preconceptions of what is in them. He uses keyword-focused random sampling of passages from the pre-Qin corpus of received texts supplemented by recently discovered archaeological texts from Guodian. Goldin emphasizes that different texts will reveal different views about the relationship of mind and body, whereas Slingerland is inclined to think the texts tend to reveal belief in a “weak dualism” he believes to be a human universal. Weak dualism falls in between a strong dualism that posits an ontological distinction between mind and body, such as Descartes’ claim that mind and body are distinct substances with nothing in common, on the one hand, and a strong “holism” that asserts no qualitative differences between mind and body. Weak dualism holds that there are functional and qualitative differences between mind and body without asserting ontological distinction. Slingerland sometimes mentions “weak holism” as a possible fourth position, but its difference with weak dualism is unclear.