 The entry will report on the second and third debates as they are centrally important for understanding the very possibility of intergenerational justice. In both debates one needs to be clear about how one assesses an act as harmful or beneficial. Owing to the death of the bearer of interests and the contingency of future people the way in which currently living people can be said to harm or benefit previously living and future people is problematic. According to the so-called person-affecting view, an act can be wrong only if that act harms, or will harm or can be expected to harm, a person who does or will exist (see especially Parfit 1984: 363, 295–396; Heyd 1992 and 2014: 2–3; Boonin 2008; Roberts 2013). One important issue is whether one should adopt a person-affecting view or an impersonal view. Some interpret duties of intergenerational justice on the basis of what might be called a weak person-affecting view. According to this view, in assessing whether an act is harmful or wrongful what matters is what has been done to a particular existing or future person. A weakly person-affecting assessment does not require that the act under scrutiny make an existing or future person worse off or harm that person by comparing how well off the person was before. Concerning the questions of whether a future person will be harmed or wronged by having been brought into existence under certain conditions the weak person affecting view relies neither on a comparison with the state the person would have been in had she not been brought into existence, that is with the person’s never-ever existing, nor on a comparison with how well off other people would have been had currently living people acted differently. Never-ever existing and potentially existing people do not count; only those people who actually exist at some time count.