 The first view about the relationship between delusions and self-deception is that, when they overlap, they do so because they both involve a motivationally biased treatment of evidence. If a motivationally biased treatment of evidence is the key feature of self-deception (as for deflationists such as Mele 2001 and 2008), then when we have delusions we can be said to be self-deceived if we treat the evidence at our disposal or search for evidence in a motivationally biased way. This does not seem to be generally the case with delusions, but can apply to some cases of delusions. Some delusions of misidentification (at least according to neuropsychological accounts) do not seem to be akin to self-deception, given that there is no fundamental role for motivational biases in the explanation of how we come to hold or retain the delusion. A different analysis might be appropriate for delusions of jealousy or persecution.