 A second possible consequentialist response is to argue that those who object to consequentialism on the grounds that it is too demanding are placing too much importance on the role of morality in practical reasoning (Brink 1989; Wolf 1982, 1992). If moral considerations dominated practical reasoning – if, that is, they were the only or at any rate by far the most significant considerations in determining our actions – then consequentialism would be untenable, on account of its demanding too much. But when put in their proper place then in the larger scheme of practical reasons and requirements, the extreme demands of consequentialist morality will no longer seem threatening. To borrow a pair of phrases from David Brink, what appear to be ‘moral worries’ about the tendency of consequentialism to make excessive moral demands, might really be ‘worries about morality’ – worries, that is, about whether or not we have reason to act as morality requires. Whether the view of morality presupposed by this strategy is true, however, is questionable; at the very least, it does not seem to be the case that the majority of those who have defended consequentialism as a normative theory of ethics have intended it to be viewed as a theory that could be frequently or easily overridden or ignored (see Railton 1984, Miller 1992 Chapter 10, Jollimore 2001 Chapter 3). One possible exception is Alastair Norcross (2006a, 2006b), who has proposed a modification of utilitarianism he calls “scalar utilitarianism,” which ranks possible actions in terms of moral rightness but makes no claim as to which acts are morally required. Since scalar utilitarianism sees rightness as a matter of degree rather than as a binary property, and refrains from identifying any action as required, he claims that it avoids the demandingness objection and related objections.