 Naiyāyikas are hardly the only theorists who employ the tool. Some Mīmāṃsakas argue that reference is to the universal, the individual being indicated by lakṣaṇā. Gaṅgeśa considers the view that it is the universal that is known by lakṣaṇā, not the individual, the universal as specifying the character of the individual. On the dispute about reference to universals or individuals, Naiyāyikas want to agree with all parties, it seems. Importantly, Gaṅgeśa sees reference to an individual as invariably to an individual of a kind, for example “(A) cow,” would be to one qualified by cowhood: “the referent is an entity as qualified by a universal” (2020: 1576). To focus just on the cowhood would be “indirect indication,” he says, with the indicator being the individual cow referred to. Prābhākaras tend to find no use for lakṣaṇā, since according to them reference is holistic, a matter of the entire sentence, and the meanings of the individual words are united in the hearer’s mind. Thus it is the radical referentialists who seem to need it most.