 If this kind of Pragmatic View is correct, thick concepts seem to lack the broader significance that some have assigned to them. The evaluations normally conveyed by T-utterances will be separable from thick terms in whatever way pragmatic not-at-issue implications are in general separable from the utterances that generate them. And if the conclusion that thick terms aren’t semantically evaluative shows that there are no irreducibly evaluative thick concepts that we must possess in order to think about their subject matter, thick concepts cannot undermine the is-ought distinction, force us to rethink reflection and objectivity in ethics, or be conceptually or explanatorily prior to or interdependent with thin concepts (Väyrynen 2013: ch. 10). However, the relationship between language and concepts is vexed in this area, and may interfere with the implications of Pragmatic Views for the significance of thick concepts. (For discussion, see Väyrynen 2013: 44–51; Zangwill 2013; Eklund forthcoming.) The overall plausibility of the Pragmatic View depends on several further issues. One concerns its implications regarding thin terms. For instance, if thin terms are also open to being regarded as objectionable, then the behavior exhibited by objectionable thick terms in  section 4.1  above either supports a pragmatic view of thin terms as well or doesn’t support the Pragmatic View of thick terms and concepts (Eklund forthcoming). Insofar as we are convinced that thin terms are semantically evaluative, this result might be bad news for the Pragmatic View. (But see Sundell 2016, who argues that thin aesthetic terms aren’t inherently evaluative in meaning, but merely used evaluatively.) This leads us to our last topic: how do thick and thin concepts differ from one another?