 One response is to opt for a variant of simple process reliabilism, which goes by the names of “two-stage reliabilism” (Goldman 1992) or “approved-list reliabilism” (Fricker 2016). Rather than directly giving an account of what justification is, this approach seeks to give a theory of how ordinary people make justification attributions. Approved-list reliabilists offer the following conjecture about how this works. In a preliminary stage, attributors form opinions about the reliability or unreliability of assorted belief-forming processes, using observation and/or inference to draw conclusions about the track-records of these processes in the actual world. They thereby construct mental lists of reliable and unreliable processes: lists of approved and disapproved processes (respectively). In the second stage, they deploy these lists to make judgments about particular beliefs (actual or hypothetical). If somebody’s belief was caused by a process that is on their approved list—or strongly resembles one on their approved list—they consider it justified. If it is caused by a process on their disapproved list, it is classed as unjustified.