 Though the individuals’ mental and psychic life (incl. their attitudes, life-power) are variously influenced—and indeed, in their social identity, or as members of a community co-determined—by communal life, their autonomous (affective and moral) psychology is never “outflanked” or “overridden” (Pettit 1993) by the community (1922: 234[280], 247[296], 224–227[268–271]). Just as they never lose their “individual distinctiveness” (1922: 226[271]), individuals are never “cleared” of their (moral) responsibility for their individual or communal deeds by the community. Communal responsibility for Stein doesn’t simply “suspend” individual responsibility (1922: 162–163[194–196]; 225[269]) Thus, despite occasional appearances to the contrary, which may result from misleading notions such as a “character”, or “personality of the community” (1922: 227[272]), Stein’s account of community steers clear of any problematic form of collectivism (see Szanto 2015b and forthcoming).