 Ross pays little attention to the duty of non-maleficence. His main focus is his four other duties – fidelity, reparation, gratitude, and beneficence – which have a similar structure. Each involves promoting some good or goods (RG 162; 1928–9: 267–68). Phillips thinks at the core of Ross’s view is the notion of an agent-relative intensifier. We have a general reason to promote various goods on grounds of beneficence, and the duties of fidelity, reparation, and gratitude function to intensify reasons to provide certain goods to certain people (Phillips 2019, 67ff). So, for example, if I can benefit a benefactor or a total stranger to the same degree, I have more reason – the reason is more intense – to benefit my benefactor because I have a responsibility of gratitude to them. The duty of non-maleficence is not like this: it does not involve promoting a good (Hurka 2014, 182–83; Phillips 2019, 86–87).