  Correspondence theorists have occasionally made proposals that combine their view with a version of pluralism. An early—although not fully developed—proposal of this kind was made by Henry Acton (1935: 191). Two recent proposals are noteworthy and have been developed in detail. Gila Sher (1998, 2004, 2005, 2013, 2015, 2016a) has picked up the project of expounding on the claim that sentence in domains like logic correspond to facts in a different way than do sentences in other domains, while Terence Horgan and colleagues (Horgan 2001; Horgan &amp; Potrč 2000, 2006; Horgan &amp; Timmons 2002; Horgan &amp; Barnard 2006; Barnard &amp; Horgan 2013) have elaborated a view that involves a defense of the claim that not all truths correspond to facts in the same way.