 For Bergson, we must understand the duration as a qualitative multiplicity — as opposed to a quantitative multiplicity. As the name suggests, a quantitative multiplicity enumerates things or states of consciousness by means of externalizing one from another in a homogeneous space. In contrast, a qualitative multiplicity consists in a temporal heterogeneity, in which “several conscious states are organized into a whole, permeate one another, [and] gradually gain a richer content” (Time and Free Will, p. 122). Bergson even insists that the word ‘several’ is inappropriate to qualitative multiplicity because it suggests numbering. In Time and Free Will, Bergson provides examples of a quantitative multiplicity; the example of a flock of sheep is perhaps the easiest to grasp (Time and Free Will, pp. 76–77). To constitute a quantitative multiplicity, which is always done out of a practical or utilitarian interest, one ignores the content of the space the items occupy, which results in the space being homogeneous. In the case of the flock of sheep, one ignores the fact that the pasture in which they are feeding is beautiful and the fact that the sheep are not strictly identical to one another. One focuses on what they have in common. What one is interested in is the total number of sheep, be it for meat or wool production. We are able to enumerate them because each sheep occupies a discernable location within the field, because they are juxtaposed to one another. Of course, the enumeration of the sheep is represented by a symbol, a number. Similarly, a calendar or a clock is a homogeneous form of time.