 Nevertheless, the Extensional Equivalence Thesis is controversial. For instance, Campbell Brown (2011) has argued that the consequentializer cannot accommodate prohibition dilemmas: situations in which every available act is impermissible. Now, whenever there are certain deontic verdicts that the act-consequentialist supposedly cannot accommodate, there are two options for proponents of the Extensional Equivalence Thesis. One option is to concede that the act-consequentialist cannot accommodate such verdicts but argue that any non-consequentialist theory that includes such verdicts is implausible. This is what Dreier does concerning prohibition dilemmas (see Dreier 2011: 105–6). The other option is to argue that, despite appearances, there’s a way for the act-consequentialist to accommodate these deontic verdicts. Some argue, for instance, that the consequentialist can accommodate prohibition dilemmas by adopting a cyclic ranking of outcomes (Peterson 2010: 158). Thus, if the target non-consequentialist theory holds that all three of an agent’s options—say, A, B, and C—are impermissible, then the consequentialist can just adopt a ranking where A’s outcome outranks B’s outcome, B’s outcome outranks C’s outcome, and C’s outcome outranks A’s outcome. Since each outcome is outranked by that of some available alternative, each available act is impermissible. But, of course, this assumes, as noted above, that the act-consequentialist can adopt an intransitive ranking of outcomes, which Brown contests.