 Wollheim’s theory has been widely discussed and criticised (see especially van Gerwen 2001; Kemp &amp; Mras 2016; Jagnow 2019). The principal objections to it are the following. First, the implication that trompe l’oeils are not representational has been contested (Lopes 1996: 49–50; Levinson [1998] 2001; Newall 2009: 25–26; for a critical assessment of Wollheim’s conception of abstract painting see Caldarola 2012). Second, the suggestion that the figure-ground relationship is a universal feature of depiction has been challenged (Hyman 2006). Third, Wollheim proposes that the standard of correctness, which determines whether the spectator has correctly perceived the content of a picture, “is set … for each painting by the intentions of the artist in so far as they are fulfilled” (Wollheim 1987: 46). But this appears to oversimplify the relationship between the representational content of a picture and the content intended by the artist. It is well known that the meaning of an uttered sentence can diverge from the intended meaning of the speaker, and hard to see why the same should not apply to a picture (see  §4 of the entry on  Paul Grice;  cf. Terrone forthcoming). Fourth, Wollheim declines to offer a detailed characterisation of seeing in, which explains (a) how the experience of seeing a certain kind of object in a surface is related to the experience of seeing the same kind of object face to face (he describes these experiences as “incommensurable” (1987: 47)); or (b) how the experience of seeing one certain kind of object in a surface differs from the experience of seeing another kind of object in a surface (Budd 2008a; Hopkins 1998a). Fifth, Wollheim’s theory is unable to explain the fact that objects are necessarily depicted from an implicit point of view (Hopkins 1998a). Finally—a development rather than an objection—it has been argued that, at least in the case of pictures that have a reference as well as a sense, the experience of seeing a picture has a third aspect, i.e. it is “threefold” rather than merely “twofold”, as Wollheim suggests (see Brough 2012; Nanay 2018; Mion 2019; cf. Voltolini 2018).