  The prospect of increasingly autonomous and intelligent computer technologies and the growing difficulty of finding responsible human agents lead Floridi and Sanders to take a different approach (2004). They propose to extend the class of moral agents to include artificial agents, while disconnecting moral agency and moral accountability from the notion of moral responsibility. They contend that “the insurmountable difficulties for the traditional and now rather outdated view that a human can be found accountable for certain kinds of software and even hardware” demands a different approach (p. 372). Instead, they suggest that artificial agents should be acknowledged as moral agents that can be held accountable, but not responsible. To illustrate they draw a comparison between artificial agents and dogs as sources of moral actions. Dogs can be the cause of a morally charged action, like damaging property or helping to save a person’s life, as in the case of search-and-rescue dogs. We can identify them as moral agents even though we generally do not hold them morally responsible, according to Floridi and Sanders: they are the source of a moral action and can be held morally accountable by correcting or punishing them.