  Section 2 noted that the central question for the interpretation of Arcesilaus’ skepticism is how to reconcile his method with his skeptical commitments, and sections 4–5 set out three accounts of how his commitments are compatible with his method. A further question relates to the purpose of Arcesilaus’ philosophical activity. Competing histories of Arcesilaus’ intentions in Cicero’s Academica offer different answers (see Allen 2018): at one point Cicero suggests that Arcesilaus adopted a Socratic method after he accepted inapprehensibility and universal suspension, in order to facilitate suspension of assent (Academica 1.44–45; cf. Sextus Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.232); but elsewhere he says that Arcesilaus’ aim in questioning Zeno was to discover the truth (Academica 2.76; cf. Cicero On the Nature of the Gods 1.11). So in question is whether Arcesilaus’  method was in the service of inquiry—independently of his commitments to inapprehensibility or universal suspension—or a revival of a Socratic methodology that only reflected skeptical conclusions he already reached.