Let us begin an evaluation of the truthmaker account with a problem for the truthmaker criterion for ontological commitment to particulars: the problem of inessential predication. Consider the sentence ‘Socrates is wise’, and suppose that Socrates really exists. (If not, switch to an inessential predication whose subject is an entity that really exists.) Then it seems undeniable that ‘Socrates is wise’ is ontologically committed to Socrates. But, given truthmaker necessitarianism and the orthodox understanding of essential properties, Socrates will not be a truthmaker for ‘Socrates is wise’ on the truthmaker account. Wisdom, presumably, is not an essential property of Socrates; and so Socrates' mere existence does not necessitate his being wise. But, then, the truthmaker account of ontological commitment for particulars wrongly claims that ‘Socrates is wise’ is not ontologically committed to Socrates. Note that this problem doesn't arise for essential predications. Suppose, for example, that Socrates is essentially human. Then Socrates' mere existence necessitates his being human, and ‘Socrates is human’ has Socrates both as a truthmaker and as an ontological commitment. But pointing this out only seems to make matters worse for the truthmaker account: why should ‘Socrates is human’ but not ‘Socrates is wise’ be ontologically committed to Socrates? Essential and inessential predications should be treated on a par with respect to ontological commitment.