 Such issues of interpretation remain very much in dispute in studies of Godwin (compare Clarke 1977 with Philp 1986 and Lamb 2009a), being complicated by issues concerning the weight to be given to the different editions of Political Justice and Godwin’s later writings. However, even if a utilitarian reading of Godwin is accepted, it remains the case that the doctrine is strictly a precept of individual moral judgment. Because of his broader views as to the corrupting influence of government, there can be no extension of the principle to politics. Each of us must judge as best we can how to advance the good of all, but every person is owed a respect for their private judgment which precludes us from exercising authority over them. By invoking this constraint, Godwin delivers utilitarianism from the more statist approaches of Bentham and later utilitarians. It also ensures that the doctrine retains a fundamentally egalitarian form. The constraint also supports the view that Godwin reached his philosophical position less through the philosophes, than by secularising Dissenting arguments for the sanctity of private judgment and generalising their application to every mode of human activity. This commitment also provides support for a reading of Godwin’s position which sees it as concerned with individual moral perfectibility, couched in the language of utility, rather than as strictly utilitarian.