 Salmon tackled the issue of confirmation of scientific hypotheses in Chapter VII of The Foundations of Scientific Inference and in a number of papers including 1973 and 1975b [2005]. He called attention to the difference between absolute confirmation, taken to mean making highly probable, and incremental, or relevance confirmation, taken to mean increasing the probability of some hypothesis. According to Salmon, the distinction, already made by Carnap in Logical Foundations of Probability, was largely overlooked by subsequent literature, although failure to appreciate it can yield puzzling results. For instance, Carnap showed that it can be the case that two pieces of evidence incrementally confirm a given hypothesis, while their conjunction may disconfirm it. In addition, Salmon pointed out that a piece of evidence that logically entails the falsity of the conjunction of two hypotheses could incrementally confirm each of them. In view of this and other puzzles, Salmon emphasized that “we have said very little when we have stated merely that a hypothesis h has been confirmed by evidence i” (Salmon 1975b [2005: 229]). Conversely, by appealing to Bayes’ rule “we can aspire to a much fuller understanding of relations of confirmation (in both the absolute and the relevance senses)” (Salmon 1975b [2005: 236]).