 For one thing, even if the relevant rules require some sort of acceptance to be in force, not every performance governed by them needs to actually be guided by them (cf. Hlobil 2015; Tracy 2020). Plausible as this might initially seem, especially when thinking along the lines of the game analogy, a general observation of this kind does not yet substantiate the claim that an account of constitutive rules’ being in force that implements this possibility would be applicable to CD rules or  norms.[58]  Moreover, it should be noted that for CD rules or norms, making this move might not just amount to acknowledging that not every instance of belief formation has to be rule-guided. If the move is to stop an intentional condition on rule-following from giving rise to a regress, we might end up having to say that every instance of rule-guided belief formation requires the unguided formation of at least one other belief or intentional state. For every rule that is followed (on a particular occasion), that is, there is another that governs, but cannot guide, the formation of a further intentional state of the rule-follower (on that  occasion).[59]  This is at least a surprising situation to end up in for a defender of the view that belief is essentially governed by rules that can guide belief  formation.[60]  CD normativism might thus prove viable only if the force of the relevant rules or norms can plausibly be construed in complete independence of the attitudes of the thinkers.