 We noted earlier that non-cognitivists have long granted to evaluative utterances and thoughts some secondary “descriptive meaning” and that hybrid theorists have gone on to give that descriptive content nearly co-equal status. One motivation for such views is rooted in a strategy for solving the embedding problem: Hybrid theorists hope to explain logical relations among moral judgements by using the descriptive component of meaning to do much of the work. Hybrid theorists have differed over whether the non-cognitive component is expressed semantically by some component of the sentence or pragmatically. Still hybrid theorists tend to agree that the belief contents are part of the semantic values of the sentences that express them (Jackson 1999, Barker 2000; Copp 2001; Ridge 2006a, 2006b, 2014; Boisvert 2008; Copp 2009).  This would seem to entail that these sentences are inconsistent with any judgement that a sentence expressing only the belief component would be inconsistent with. Hybrid theorists can thus use the alleged descriptive component of the meanings of moral judgments to generate most of the required logical relations that moral judgements bear to other judgements, supplementing the basic account just enough to account for complications introduced by the non-cognitive component of relevant judgements.