 We have talked above in a way that might give the impression that predication is an activity that we perform, e.g., when we say or think that a certain apple is red. Although some philosophers might think of it in this way, predication, or attribution, may also be viewed as a special link that connects a property to a thing in a way that gives rise to a  proposition,  understood as a complex featuring the property and the thing (or concepts of them) as constituents with different roles: the latter occurs in the proposition as logical subject or argument, as is often said, and the former as attributed to such an argument. If the proposition is true (the predication is veridical), the argument exemplifies the property, viz. the former is an instance of the latter. The idea that properties yield propositions when appropriately connected to an argument motivates Russell’s (1903) introduction of the term “propositional function” to speak of properties. We take for granted here that predication is univocal. However, according to some neo-Meinongian philosophers, there are two modes of predication, sometimes characterized as “external” and “internal” (Castañeda 1972; Rapaport 1978; Zalta 1983; see entry on  nonexistent objects).  Zalta (1983) traces back the distinction to Mally and uses “exemplification” to characterize the former and “encoding” to characterize the latter. Roughly, the idea is that non-existent objects may encode properties that existent objects exemplify. For instance, winged is exemplified by that bird over there and is encoded by the winged horse.