 This essentially syntactic account of truthlikeness has some nice features. It induces a partial ordering of truths, with the whole Truth \(T\) at the top of the ordering: \(T\) is closer to the Truth than any other true theory. The set of logical truths is at the bottom: further from the Truth than any other true theory. In between these two extremes, true theories are ordered simply by logical strength: the more logical content, the closer to the Truth. Since probability varies inversely with logical strength, amongst truths the theory with the greatest truthlikeness \((T)\) must have the smallest probability, and the theory with the largest probability (the logical truth) is the furthest from the Truth. Popper made a simple and perhaps plausible generalization of this. Just as truth content (coverage of \(T)\) counts in favor of truthlikeness, falsity content (coverage of \(F)\) counts against. In general then, a theory \(A\) is closer to the truth if it has more truth content without engendering more falsity content, or has less falsity content without sacrificing truth content (diagram 4):