 Unlike Aristotle, Johansson makes no explicit use of language in discerning ontological categories, instead appealing to the method of successive abstraction (Johansson 1989, 1–2). Thus, e.g., we arrive at the category ‘quality’ by moving up in abstraction from a particular shade of dark red, to red, color, and finally quality. Similarly (to use an example of Sellars’) one might try to arrive at the category of ‘substance’ by considering an individual entity, say, Fido, and moving by successive abstraction from “Fido is a dachshund” through “Fido is a dog” and “Fido is an animal”, ultimately reaching “Fido is a substance” (1970 [1974], 321). Like Aristotle’s categories, Johansson’s categories top out with a number of distinctions without a highest single category subsuming them all.