 Given that implicit biases are largely unconscious and resistant to the agent’s direct efforts to change or control them by force of will or mere intention (Brownstein and Saul 2016b, 2), can the agent be morally responsible for having them? Robin Zheng illustrates the tension between holding and not holding agents morally responsible for their own implicit biases (Zheng 2016). Zheng notes that, on the one hand, because we are often unaware of our implicit biases and so cannot control their influence, we do not seem to be responsible for them. But on the other hand, because implicit biases are the products and the perpetrators of social inequality, it seems right to hold agents responsible for them (62). Zheng’s proposal is to have two accounts of responsibility in cases of implicit bias. One is responsibility as attributability, according to which we are morally responsible when our actions reflect who we are as moral agents because they are manifestations of our ends, commitments, or values (62). Because we are often unaware of our implicit biases, on the attributability account of responsibility, we would be off the hook for behaviors that stem from them. Zheng argues for absolving from attributable responsibility a person who would not upon reflection endorse the influence of implicit bias on their action and who has done what they can reasonably be expected to do to avoid and respond to the implicit bias once they are made aware of it (72). A second kind of responsibility is what Zheng calls “accountability responsibility,” according to which we are responsible for our actions when it is appropriate for others to enforce certain expectations and demands on those actions (63). In the case of implicit biases, Zheng believes that we can be attributively not responsible for our biases while being accountable for them. Zheng is lenient in the ways that Isaacs and Brennan are in that she urges that we not hold others attributively responsible for conditions like implicit bias, at least for the reasons that it is nearly impossible to determine whether they harbor them in particular cases, and that people are more likely to do better without accusations of sexism and the like (78).