 Since sensibilities may be more or less refined, the perceptual model appears to fit well with the idea that there are both moral novices and experts. Whatever further account is to be given of these sensibilities, the resulting knowledge is not dependent upon any deduction from general moral principles, at least not one transparently and readily available to the knower. Generalists have observed that similar perceptual metaphors seem equally apt in domains that admit of principles (McKeever and Ridge 2006: ch 4). For example, one might just “see” that a sentence is ungrammatical even if grammaticality is rule-governed. Furthermore, some who develop and defend a perceptual model are not led by it to particularism (Audi 2013). So the perceptual model of moral knowledge seems not to establish particularism, but it was likely never meant to. Instead, the perceptual model is intended to offer more indirect support. If our moral experts reliably achieve moral knowledge without self-consciously adverting to moral principles, then the generalist inherits at least some burden to explain why principles should be a centerpiece of moral theorizing.