 Intentions (like assertions) are not attitudes, but mental actions (whereby intentions as actions [das Fassen eines Vorsatzes] should be distinguished from the states of having an intention [das Haben eines Vorsatzes], Reinach 1913b [1989: 158f], Salice 2018). Intentions aim at realizing projects that are instrumental to reach the goal (which is spelled out by the willing). For instance, if you intend or decide to help the child on the street, you will form a plan or project on how to do that (calling an ambulance, providing first aid, etc.). Intentions are acts of self-determination (or “causally self-referential attitudes” to use Searle’s terminology, 1983: 86ff): the intention is satisfied if it is the subject of the intention that brings about the project (Pfänder 1911a: 174; Heller 1932: 254f). Intentions also self-commit the subject: when the subject forms an intention, they thereby put themselves under a commitment to satisfy it (von Hildebrand 1916: 159; see also Reiner 1927: 71). Intentions have the power of triggering actions (some phenomenologists claim that this triggering identifies a further act lying in between the intention and the bodily movements, see von Hildebrand 1916: 161f, but the existence of this act is contested, see Reiner 1927: 76ff). Finally, intentions control actions via “acts of realization” (Realisierungsakte) that accompany and affect bodily movements (Scheler 1913/16: 142; von Hildebrand 1916: 152).