 We thus have (1) the emotions a composer may have felt when writing the piece (2) the emotions music may arouse in the listener, and (3) the emotion we attribute to the music itself. Accounts of expressiveness that construe it as dependent on (1) or (2) are named, respectively, arousal and expression theories. Both approaches are generally considered as discredited, although a sophisticated version of the arousal theory has been defended by Derek Matravers (1998), and a qualified defense of the expression theory has been advanced by Jenefer Robinson (2005). Accounts of expressiveness that regard it as independent from (1) and (2) need to explain why we use emotion words to describe a non-sentient object. Resemblance theories of musical expressiveness argue that this is because of a perceived similarity between the music and the characteristic vocal and behavioral human expressions of emotions (S. Davies 1980, 1994; Kivy 1989). Appeal to such resemblance in accounting for musical expressiveness is as old as philosophy of music itself, but the careful separation of the emotions in the music from those aroused in the listener distinguishes these views from virtually all their predecessors. The same distinction allows Peter Kivy (1934–2017) to develop a formalist view of musical appreciation that recognizes the role of expressive properties but unties them from the emotions aroused by music (Kivy 1990a). Jenefer Robinson (2005) has developed a sophisticated hybrid theory of expressiveness, arguing that the music’s arousal of emotions at the sub-personal level is partly responsible for the resemblances we perceive in the music.