 Whether and to what extent the practical aims these various models of disability seek to serve are best accomplished by many separate contextual definitions, or one sophisticated one is, in the final analysis itself likely to be a difficult ethical, even political, question. Proponents of social constructionist, ameliorative views of disability, like proponents of similar views of race and gender, have tended to think that there are good practical reasons to define these notions broadly, to draw attention to forms of injustice that many experience, together, as a means for building larger and thus more powerful coalition to push for positive change. And they have, or anyway could, argue that the flexibility and inclusiveness pluralist call for can be accommodated by an open-minded and sensitive debate over just what this one solidaristic definition should or should not include. They might be right, or they might be wrong, but if they are wrong, it is not because the philosophical and political project of offering a unifying definition is a priori misguided.