 One might also wonder about premise  (5):  necessarily, if God perfectly loves such finite persons as there may be, then, for any capable finite person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship with S at t. Whether this is true might depend on what sort of love is perfect, whether it is more like that of a mother for her child, or a grandparent for her distant descendants, or a benevolent reconstructive surgeon for her patient (Cuneo 2013; McGinnis 2015; Rea 2015; Schellenberg 2013). One might argue that premise  (5)  is true only if perfect love is like the first, but wonder what follows if it is like the second or third. In this connection, imagine that what it is for God to perfectly love us is for God to provide for our greatest good, and suppose that our greatest good consists in our being virtuous, caring for our environment and other creatures. In that case, it is not at all clear that openness to a personal relationship of the sort Schellenberg imagines is necessary. So long as God has made our flourishing achievable, that is all that God’s perfect love should lead us to expect. In a similar vein, one might argue that “God loves every human but loves some more than others,” and so “God would not seek the same for each person as lovers do not act impartially between those most loved and others whom they love,” and so a “variable divine love” does not require “that God would always be open to a personal relationship with every person” (Jordan 2021; see Schellenberg 2021b for criticism).