 Granting that ST and TT are distinct theories, we can now ask a different question: are the theories better off individually or should they join forces somehow? Let us be more explicit. Can ST on its own offer an adequate account of mindreading (or at least of the great majority of its episodes)? And what about TT? A good number of theorists now believe that neither ST nor TT alone will do. Rather, many would agree that these two theories need to cooperate, if they want to reach a satisfactory explanation of mindreading. Some authors have put forward TT-ST hybrid models, i.e., models in which the tacit knowledge of a Theory of Mind is the central aspect of mindreading, but it is in many cases supplemented by simulation processes (Botterill &amp; Carruthers 1999; Nichols &amp; Stich 2003). Other authors have instead defended ST-TT hybrid models, namely, accounts of mindreading where the pride of place is given to mental simulation, but where the possession of a Theory of Mind plays some non-negligible role nonetheless (Currie &amp; Ravenscroft 2002; Goldman 2006; Heal 2003). Since this entry is dedicated to ST, we will briefly touch upon one instance of the latter variety of hybrid account.