 The impossibility results for coherence draw on all three debates summarized above: the Lewis-BonJour controversy, the debate over probabilistic measures of coherence and also the dispute in Analysis regarding truth conduciveness. Before we can discuss the results we need to make one further observation. Given the conclusion of the Lewis-BonJour dispute, it is a reasonable expectation that no coherence measure is truth conducive, in the relevant conditional sense, unless the reports (beliefs, memories etc.) in question are individually credible and collectively independent. But assuming this is not sufficient for coherence to stand a reasonable chance of being truth conducive. We must also require that when we compare two different sets of reports, we do so while keeping the degree of individual credibility fixed. Otherwise we could have a situation in which one set of report contents is more coherent than another set but still fails to give rise to a higher likelihood of truth simply because the reporters delivering the propositions in the less coherent set are individually more reliable. Thus, truth conduciveness must be understood in a ceteris paribus sense. The question of interest, then, is whether more coherence implies a higher probability (given independence and individual credibility) everything else being equal. We are now finally in a position to state the impossibility theorems. What they show is that no measure of coherence is truth conducive even in a weak ceteris paribus sense, under the favorable conditions of (conditional) independence and individual credibility.