 After a careful survey of the development of Russell’s neutral monism, Donovan Wishon concludes that Russell’s final version of neutral monism (developed in the 1940s and after) “is very plausibly interpreted as a version of ‘Russellian Physicalism’” (Wishon 2015: 92). Among other things, he draws our attention to Russell’s own claim that “I find myself in ontology increasingly materialistic” (Russell 1946: 700). And he points out that Russell argues that all events, including all our mental events, are subject to the laws of physics. Hence “mental events will turn out to be a subclass of the physical events that make up reality” (Wishon 2015: 112). According to Wishon, this shows that mental events are not ontologically distinct from physical events. Only their special epistemic accessibility distinguishes them from the other physical events (Wishon 2015: 112). In this way, Wishon suggests, Russell final version of neutral monism effectively turns into a version of Russellian Physicalism.