 Although Kratzer and Shimoyama, Alonso-Ovalle, Aloni, Simons and Zimmermann differ in their solution of the free choice paradox, they all agree in endorsing an “alternative-based” analysis of or according to which a disjunctive sentence “\(A\) or \(B\)” contributes the set of propositional alternatives \(\{A, B\}\). Alonso-Ovalle (2006), for example, uses this alternative set in his pragmatic derivation of the free choice implicatures. Aloni (2007) instead assumes that modals and imperatives explicitly operate on the alternative sets introduced in their scope. For example, on her analysis, may\((\phi)\) is true only if the ordinary meaning of may is true of all alternative propositions generated by \(\phi\). Thus, You may go to the beach or to the cinema is true only if You may go to the beach and You may go to the cinema are both true. In the following section we have a closer look at this alternative-based view.