 According to Reinach, a number of properties characterize acts of meaning in contradistinction to presentations (1911a [1989: 102ff]). In particular, meaning something is an intrinsically linguistic act, whilst presentations are not linguistic (1911a [1989: 104]). This is conducive to the idea that, whereas presentations are defined in terms of experiences that enable an intuitive access to the object, meaning acts are “blind” (1911a [1989: 119]): if one means an object, no intuitive aspect of the object becomes present in virtue of the fact that this object has been meant. Reinach notes that this has consequences for how these acts relate to time. The objects of presentations, being intuitively present, stand “in front of” the mind in corresponding acts of perception, imagination, presentification, etc. It is therefore possible for these acts to extend in time for as long as the object stands in front of the mind. By contrast, meaning acts are “temporally punctual” in the sense that to mean something is an act that does not last in time: this is why it would make no sense to ask the subject how long it took her to mean a certain object (Chrudzimski 2015: 289). Reinach complements these ideas by developing an additional argument that turns out to be crucial for the phenomenological understanding of meaning acts.