 The first group comprises theses 1, 5, and 10, which state philosophical doctrines about ontology and ethics, not paradoxes, and which are relatively easy to understand. All three deal with the plurality of possible ways to distinguish things, either as “the same” or “different” or as parts of a whole, ranging from the smallest possible part—the infinitesimal—to the largest possible whole, the “Great One,” which includes everything in the cosmos. How we distinguish things is relative to the scale or perspective we adopt. Thesis 5 is slightly obscure, but it seems to describe the relative or perspectival nature of relations of similarity and difference. Two things can be the same on a large scale, or in some general respect, while at the same time being different on a smaller scale, or in some more specific respect. For example, two animals can be the same in being of the kind horse, yet be different in color. Anything can be similar or different on some scale or other. If we distinguish finely, every individual horse is different, while if we distinguish coarsely, horses are no different from other animals, or even from all other things. There seems to be an unlimited range of levels on which we can distinguish relations of sameness and difference, including deeming every individual different or the myriad kinds of things the same. 