 Heytesbury analyzes insolubilia or self-referential paradoxes most thoroughly in the first chapter of  [RSS],[36]  where he dismisses three alternative solutions to paradoxes to settle for the fourth. The first three positions agree that paradoxical sentences can have precisely their standard meaning. According to the first position held by Roger Swyneshed, paradoxical sentences are false because they imply their own falsity, and a sentence and its negation can be false at the same time if one of them is paradoxical ([RSS] 1494: fol. 4va and 6rb [1979: 18–19 and 45]). According to the second position, paradoxical sentences do not make genuine statements, hence are neither true nor false ([RSS] 1494: fols. 4va–vb [1979: 19]). That is reminiscent of the so-called “cassantes” who claim that paradoxical sentences fail to make a true or false statement (literally “say nothing”) (de Rijk 1966), available, for instance, through Burley or Bradwardine (Roure 1970; Bradwardine B-I). Heytesbury also could have viewed the second position as the interpretation of Bradwardine’s “mediantes”, who claims that paradoxical sentences are neither true nor false, but of a “middle  value”.[37]  According to the third position, paradoxical sentences are either-true-or-false but neither true nor false; they make genuine statements, but fail to have a standard truth-value ([RSS] 1494: fol. 4vb [1979: 19–20]).