 It’s at this point that the moral/conventional distinction becomes relevant. In an influential paper, psychologist R. James Blair (1995) reported using a version of the moral/conventional task with incarcerated psychopathic offenders of normal intelligence and with incarcerated non-psychopathic offenders, all of whom were charged with murder or manslaughter. The responses of the non-psychopathic offenders were similar to those that social domain theorists have reported with normal adults, but the responses of the psychopathic offenders were notably different. They responded in the same way to moral and conventional  transgressions.[27]  Similar results were reported in a study that compared children with psychopathic tendencies to non-psychopathic children who had other emotional and behavioral issues (Blair 1997). These results led a number of authors to conclude that psychopaths do not have “normal moral concepts” (Prinz 2007a: 42–47), or that their moral concepts are “impaired” (Schroeder, Roskies, &amp; Nichols 2010: 96; Nichols 2004: 19 &amp; 113), and thus that they “do not mean what the rest of us mean when using moral terms” (Kennett &amp; Fine 2007: 175). If that’s right, then, these authors maintained, psychopaths do not really make moral judgments, as ordinarily understood, and they pose no challenge to internalism. However, Kumar (2016) argues that philosophers have often overinterpreted Blair’s findings. Though the studies indicate that psychopaths “do not have a full grasp of moral concepts”, Kumar maintains that the studies do not show that psychopaths “completely fail to grasp them”. So while psychopaths don’t make “full-fledged moral judgments”, they can and do make what Kumar calls “proto moral judgments”. Because of this, Kumar maintains, the implications of research on psychopaths for the debate between internalists and externalists is “less straightforward” then philosophers have assumed. In a similar vein, Roskies (2007: 204) argues that studies of psychopaths do not establish “that they lack moral concepts or an adequate understanding of them” or that they are “incapable of anything but moral judgments in an inverted comma sense”.