 Some theorists argue that the relationship between perpetrators and victims is an important element of evil action. For example, Nel Noddings (1989) argues that a primary form of evil consists in neglecting relations, while Zachary Goldberg (2019) argues that to fully understand evil we must understand the asymmetric power relations that exist between perpetrators and victims. Todd Calder (2022) argues that to make sense of the difference between evil action and complicity in evil we must incorporate a relational component into our theory of evil action. According to Calder’s relational component, to perform an evil action we must be close to our victim or their harm (either socially, physically, or agentially). Calder contends that if the relational component is not satisfied the connection between a perpetrator’s actions and their victim’s harm is too tenuous to support a charge of evil action and can, at most, support a charge of complicity in evil (Calder 2022, 474–475).