 Other critics of Searle’s position take intentionality more seriously than Boden does, but deny his dualistic distinction between original and derived intentionality. Dennett (1987, e.g.) argues that all intentionality is derived, in that attributions of intentionality – to animals, other people, and even ourselves – are instrumental and allow us to predict behavior, but they are not descriptions of intrinsic properties. As we have seen, Dennett is concerned about the slow speed of things in the Chinese Room, but he argues that once a system is working up to speed, it has all that is needed for intelligence and derived intentionality – and derived intentionality is the only kind that there is, according to Dennett. A machine can be an intentional system because intentional explanations work in predicting the machine’s behavior. Dennett also suggests that Searle conflates intentionality with awareness of intentionality. In his syntax-semantic arguments, “Searle has apparently confused a claim about the underivability of semantics from syntax with a claim about the underivability of the consciousness of semantics from syntax” (336). The emphasis on consciousness forces us to think about things from a first-person point of view, but Dennett 2017 continues to press the claim that this is a fundamental mistake if we want to understand the mental. 