 This problem runs as follows: often, we don’t associate enough information with a name to pick out any particular individual. Nonetheless, we seem to be capable of using that name to refer to a specific individual. Kripke offers as an example the name ‘Feynman’. Most people, Kripke claims, will at best know that Feynman was a physicist; they will not know anything, aside from the name, that would serve to differentiate Feynman from any other physicist they have heard of. The problem is that an indefinite description like a physicist will not suffice to pick out any particular individual in the world. Even  a physicist named ‘Feynman’ won’t do, at least in a world where two physicists bear this name. At best, this sort of description will pick out an arbitrary member of a class of individuals, not a particular one. And yet, as Kripke points out, it seems perfectly coherent for someone who knows nothing about Feynman, who has only overheard someone using the name, to say to herself “I wonder who Feynman is,” or to ask her friend “Who is Feynman?” In each of these cases, the natural thing to say is that the speaker is using the name ‘Feynman’ to wonder or ask about Feynman. How she can manage to do so, however, looks to be something that is going to be very difficult for the descriptivist to explain—assuming (i) that she  wants to maintain the link between associated descriptions and the information available to an individual speaker, and (ii) that she is unwilling to rely on descriptions like whoever the person I overheard this name from was using it to talk about.