 Campbell proposes that an avowal like “I’m in pain” can express not only pain but also knowledge that I’m in pain (2020: 15). This proposal draws on her Rational Response account of knowledge, which says that knowing that p is “being able to rationally respond to or operate with, the fact that p” (ibid.: 12). On this account, to know that I want water is to have the rational capacities to act on, express, and reason with my desire for water. I exercise these capacities when I rationally respond to my desire in any of a variety of ways: pouring myself a glass of water, or altering my route so that I will pass a drinking fountain, or saying “I want some water”. The utterance “I want some water” expresses self-knowledge, of the uniquely first-personal kind, if it is a direct, rational response to my desire for water. This response must be direct in the ways described earlier: not based on an intermediate judgment or on evidence about my desire. The requirement that it be rational distinguishes expressions of self-knowledge from brute reactions, e.g. a dog’s responding to his thirst by going to his water bowl.