 Early medieval authors were well acquainted with the conception of God’s eternal and timeless knowledge in Augustine and Boethius. This aspect of the question of the divine knowledge and future contingents became a central issue in Thomas Aquinas, who discussed the philosophical theory of future contingents by following Aristotle and Boethius rather than twelfth-century innovators. According to Aquinas, God atemporally grasps all combinations of things in particular times by one eternal vision. Temporal things are timelessly present to God, who has direct knowledge of them and their temporal order, though none of them is past or future with respect to His cognition (Scriptum super libros Sententiarum I.38.1.4–5; Summa contra gentiles I.66; Summa theologiae I.14.9, 14). Things seen as actual are necessary by supposition (i. e., with respect to God’s knowledge and providence), but many of them are contingent with respect to their proximate causes (Scriptum super libros Sententiarum I.38.1.5, Summa contra gentiles I.67, Summa theologiae I, 14.13, De veritate 2.12). The ultimate source of the actuality of the created order is the divine free will (In libros  Perihermeneias I.14, 197). Aquinas assumes that a metaphysical view of the truth or falsity of all temporally definite propositions implies that everything happens of necessity (In libros Perihermeneias I.13, 173). In order to avoid this wrong idea, one should deal with future contingent propositions like Boethius as disjunctively true or false. Their definite truth-values known by supernatural omniscience are beyond human cognitive capacities, except the various degrees of probabilities corresponding to certain types of causes (In libros Perihermeneias I.13, 172, 174). However, in the doctrine of divine providence, all historical propositions are definitely true. This is called Aquinas’s providential determinism (Porro 2013: 121–127; Posti 2017: 82). While there are prophetic predictions of future contingents through a revelatory participation in divine knowledge, their truth remains a supernatural matter (Summa theologiae II–2, 171.3, 6). Speaking about God’s atemporal knowledge as divine prescience is a temporal projection of the divine mode of knowing. For various interpretations of Aquinas’s view, see Wippel 1985; Craig 1988: 99–126; Goris 1996; Marenbon 2005; Knuuttila 2010.