 (iii) Embodied cognition: The turn to “embodied cognition” in cognitive science provides another strong motivation for the turn to process in metaphysics. The standard model of cognition as the computation of symbolic representations fits well with the assumptions of substance metaphysics and suggested a pleasing analogy to classical atomism: mental operations effect relational change of cognitive atoms. But the first rivals to the standard model, connectionism and the so-called “Dynamic Hypothesis” (Van Gelder 2000), were constructed along largely process-ontological lines, replacing the classical conception of cognitions as discrete abstract objects that represent concrete things outside the head with a dynamic conception of cognitions as modes of functionings of a neural net or of process organizations. The neural network model of the mind dominates in recent cognitive science and neuroscience where mathematical models of “predictive processing” (see the entry on  connectionism).  In parallel with the development of the connectionist model of the mind, proponents of “interactivism” and “embodied cognition” argued that the bodily interaction of an organism plays a constitutive role in cognition. A key notion for the early debate about the‘embodiment thesis’ was the concept of “structural coupling,” a phase in the contemporaneous development of two systems (e.g., organism and environment) where mutual dynamic dependencies unfold across system boundaries. During the last decade researchers working in the intersection of cognitive science and philosophy of mind appear to have adopted the “4E model of cognition”, holding that cognition is not only embodied, but also “embedded, enacted, and extended” (Newen et al 2018). The 4E model of cognition is explicitly committed to a process view but much ontological work remains to be done in order to distill biologically relevant process architectures from the statistical formulas (e.g., “Markov blankets”) that characterize neural network  behaviors.[22]