   Thick particulars like our water molecule W don't fare much  better because of the possibility of spoilers. For Armstrong (1997,  35), W is simply the conjunction of its constituent states of  affairs. As we've just seen, however, in the presence of spoilers,  that conjunction would exist — hence, W would exist  — without being Water. Hence, it would seem that at  least some properties that, intuitively, are essential to their  bearers turn out not to be for the combinatorialist. The problem is  compounded by the fact that some intuitively non-essential properties of some thick particulars are arguably essential for the  combinatorialist. The shape properties of a thick particular  A, for example, would seem to be a function of its constituent states of affairs. Moreover, the exemplification of such properties  are not obviously subject to spoilers the way that natural kind  properties like Water are. Hence, as A is identical to  the conjunction of its constituent states of affairs, it would seem  that it will have the same shape in any world in which it exists,  i.e., it will have that shape essentially. 