 The evidential claim is more plausible than the constitutive claim. Consider first the evidential relevance of cognitive and neurological mechanisms for aesthetics. We have just now referred to a dispute about how much of our experience of visual art depends on a work’s tendency to encourage bodily empathy with what is depicted. While people sometimes report experiences of these kinds it may be that they vary in accessibility, with some unnoticed without high levels of attention, though still making a contribution to our overall liking for/valuing of the work. Studies of brain activity across a range of artistic stimuli might suggest that these empathic responses are very common indeed—or that they are relatively unusual—because (let us suppose) empathy has an identifiable neurological signature. Such studies would be useful as evidence for the claim that something needs to be factored in to an account of aesthetic experience. But the relevant something would be the empathic response, not the brain process (See Carroll, Moore, &amp; Seeley 2012: 54 where studies of this kind are described as “data” for aesthetic theories).