The Hole Argument against substantivalism purports to show that, given some auxiliary assumptions, substantivalism illicitly requires the truth of indeterminism. (See Norton’s entry on the Hole Argument.) Defenders of the Hole Argument take this commitment to indeterminism to be a consequence of accepting certain models of general relativity as genuinely distinct possibilities for substantival spacetime. The possible models in question are typically held to differ only haecceitistically, so, for substantivalists, anti-haecceitism provides a route for rejecting the possibilities that are alleged to require indeterminism. For committed haecceitists who endorse substantivalism, some alternative strategy is required. One available option is to revise the relevant conception of determinism by taking it as a thesis about qualitatively discernible possibilities rather than possibilities in general. On the resulting revision, indeterminism requires the availability of qualitatively discernible possibilities. As a consequence, admitting possibilities that differ only haecceitistically would have no implications for the status of determinism. Careful attention to the status and scope of haecceitism therefore proves crucial for assessing this leading argument against substantivalism.