 Recently, there have been additional attempts to follow—broadly speaking—Craig’s project, for which the value of knowledge is understood in terms of the functional role that ‘knowledge’ plays in fulfilling our practical needs. The matter of how to identify this functional role has received increasing recent attention. For example, David Henderson (2009), Robin McKenna (2013), Duncan Pritchard (2012) and Michael Hannon (2015) have defended views about the concept of knowledge (or knowledge ascriptions) that are broadly inspired by Craig’s favored account of the function of knowledge as identifying reliable informants. A notable rival account, defended by Klemens Kappel (2010), Christoph Kelp (2011, 2014) and Patrick Rysiew (2012; cf. Kvanvig 2012) identifies closure of inquiry as the relevant function. For Krista Lawlor (2013) the relevant function is identified (à la Austin) as that of providing assurance, and for James Beebe (2012), it’s expressing epistemic approval/disapproval.