 The discerning reader may object that there is a suppressed ceteris paribus clause in our statement of strict conditionalization. On the intended interpretation, the only external change to your subjective belief state between \(t\) and \(t^\prime\) is that you become certain of \(A\). Moreover, you do not forget anything, fall into doubts about prior beliefs, or acquire any new concepts. Finally, there is no time \(t^{\prime\prime}\) between \(t\) and \(t^{\prime}\) by which your degree of belief in \(A\) is promoted to 1, but before your other subjective probabilities have been able to “catch up”. If there were, you would be probabilistically incoherent between \(t^{\prime\prime}\) and \(t^{\prime}.\) On the intended interpretation, although you acquire the information between \(t\) and \(t^{\prime}\), your subjective probabilities remain unchanged until \(t^{\prime}\), at which point the new information is assimilated holus-bolus. These sorts of considerations apply equally to the other forms of conditioning we discuss in this article, including those in Section 3.4. For a good discussion of the difficulties in interpreting conditionalization, see Spohn (2012, p. 186–8).