 Another two-tiered system, but of a nonconsequentialist variety, is suggested by Alan Gewirth (1988), who accords primacy to the principle that it is a necessary condition for human agency that all be accorded equal rights to freedom and well-being. That commitment, he believes, will also be sufficient to ground special obligations such as those finding expression in personal, familial, and national loyalties. It serves as such a ground because the commitment to individual freedom permits the formation of voluntary associations, including “exclusive” ones, as long as they do not interfere with others’ basic freedom. Such voluntary associations are formed not merely for instrumental purposes, as contributions to our freedom, but are expressive of it. A persisting problem for this account concerns the resolution of conflicts between obligations that arise out of our associational commitments (say, to our families) and those that arise directly out of the general principle (say, to assist the world’s needy). This is of course a general problem, and not just one for Gewirth; but it raises a question about the success of Gewirth’s distinctive project, which was to develop a systematic alternative to the moral pluralism that he associates with Isaiah Berlin, Michael Walzer, and Thomas Nagel.