 Thus, in mechanistic causation, two events are interconnected by a third, whereas in experiential causation, there are only two occurrences, jointly causing experiential change. Here, the two experiences causally interconnected are both subject to “change”, and jointly effectuate a “change in the whole course of the simultaneous experience” (1922: 16[15]). “The life-feeling corresponds to the causing event”, while “the course of the rest of the experience corresponds to the caused event” (1922: 17[15]). But the event, referred to as “the cause” of the experiential change, “is not inserted between causing and caused event”. It is not independent from the experiential change, but rather an intrinsic moment of it. Accordingly, it is impossible for a subject to have certain life-feelings that have no effect on the course of her experiences. But what mechanistic and experiential causation share is that there cannot be causally contradicting events or outright incoherent requisite outcomes of the causal process. For example, 