 The trickiest part of this is the argument for (II). Suppose some significant part of the consequence set C that L can be expected to extract from U is either (undetectably) false or (undetectably) undeserving of L’s attention. This would detract in a very substantial way from the relevance of U: falsity of the part detracts very substantially from overall truth, and lack of pertinence in the part detracts very substantially from overall pertinence. So substantially, in fact, that S will almost always have available to her some other utterance U* the processing of which would have yielded L more in the way of overall pertinent truth than U does—even if we make allowances for motives S may have to conceal part of what she knows from L. If this is the case, then U will scarcely be optimally relevant, the most relevant stimulus within reach, since U* is more relevant and it’s definitely within reach as well.