 Green makes clear that the sort of moral personality that is required by responsibility is a capacity to recognize and be guided by reasons. This is clear from his defense of Kant’s conception of freedom against criticisms. As we have seen, Green does not think that freedom and responsibility require Kant’s doctrine of transcendental freedom. But Green is sympathetic with Kant’s claims about positive freedom and autonomy in the Groundwork. There, Kant identifies positive freedom or autonomy with a will determined by practical reason and the moral law (4: 447). Sidgwick criticizes this conception of freedom in his essay “The Kantian Conception of Free-Will,” reprinted in the Appendix to The Methods of Ethics, for being unable to show how someone might be free and responsible for making the wrong choices, as well as the right ones (Methods 511–16). The possibility of freely chosen wrongdoing shows that Kant’s conception of positive freedom, as conformity with practical reason, cannot be freedom of the kind required by moral responsibility. In his lectures on Kant’s ethics, Green recognizes the same problem for Kantian freedom that Sidgwick does (Works II  107).[5]  But Green thinks that this is a case where the essentials of the Kantian view can be defended, even if this requires amending Kant. Kant’s considered view, Green thinks, contrasts two kinds of positive freedom—(a) the capacity to conform to practical reason and (b) the exercise of this capacity. Freedom as responsibility requires (a), not (b) (Works II 136). On this capacitarian reading of moral personality and responsibility, the person who has the capacity to conform to practical reason and the moral law but fails to exercise it is just as responsible as the person who has the capacity and does exercise it (Works II 107–08, 119,  136).[6]