 A third approach to using game theoretic tools to model social interactions explores how boundedly rational agents might achieve certain outcomes as a result of inductive learning or the presence of focal points. The inductive learning aspect of this approach is known as  evolutionary game theory,  so-called because much of the early work on inductive learning was applied to the question of why various biological traits or behavioral patterns emerge in particular populations. John Maynard Smith’s Evolution and the Theory of Games (1982) is an early classic in this tradition, while subsequent work by anthropologists, economists, and political scientists would apply this approach to problems of interest to social and political philosophers, including especially how cooperation can be sustained in large groups. Where much of the foundational work on inductive learning was done by biologists, much of the early work on focal points was done by economists, with Thomas Schelling’s book The Strategy of Conflict (1960) being particularly influential. Roughly speaking, focal points are actions or outcomes that are likely to be salient (Lewis 1969: 35–36) in the sense that they “stand out” to the agents involved in a game. As Schelling showed, such points are especially important in games where the strategy space is large and/or there are many potential equilibria.