 The remaining four answers are better candidates and come (as in the Euthyphro) from Socrates, though in this case he attributes them to the Questioner, his alter ego. They are that the fine is (1) the appropriate, (2) the able, (3) the beneficial, and (4) pleasure through sight and hearing. These represent a single strategy, which tries to tease out the deeper meaning in the intuition that fine and good things are beneficial. The appropriate and the able are attractive answers, but only when they are taken to imply that the fine is beneficial. This answer, however, leads to an odd result: if to be fine is to be beneficial, then the fine will be productive of the good, and if it is productive of the good, then (apparently) the fine cannot be good, because cause and effect cannot be the same. But that is unacceptable; the fine must be good. The conclusion invites us to ask whether a good can be beneficial in being able to replicate itself. (See Section 6 on  instrumentality.)  The last answer (pleasure through sight and hearing) attempts an aesthetic construction of the fine, and founders on the problem of disjunctive definition. “What’s fine is hard,” Socrates concludes, resigned to being unable to judge what is fine or foul in a speech until he learns what the fine is.