 The important fact for Putnam’s argument is that whichever of these possible meanings is had in vat-English by ‘I am a brain in a vat’, that sentence, as used by a BIV, will be false. We saw that in sense (i), ‘I am a brain in a vat’ would be false in vat-English, since a BIV would never have (perceptual) experiences as of being a BIV. Putnam does not explain why ‘I am a brain in a vat’ would be false in both senses (ii) and (iii). Brueckner (2016: 4) suggests that since in sense (iii) both ‘brain’ and ‘vat’ would refer to certain computer program features, a BIV would not be a BIV in sense (iii): no BIV would be a certain computer program feature that is “located in” a certain other computer program feature. A similar point would hold for sense (ii). From these considerations, Putnam then concludes: “In short, if we are brains in a vat, then ‘we are brains in a vat’ is false. So it is (necessarily) false” (Putnam 1981 [1999: 37]). Here, Putnam seems to think that he has shown the conclusion that he was aiming to show, namely, that we are not brains in a vat. But in fact, the most he has shown so far is that a BIV’s utterance of ‘We are not brains in a vat’ would be true. But this conclusion is simply irrelevant to Putnam’s goal, since as Putnam himself points out, the BIV’s utterance does not mean that we are not BIVs (see Brueckner 1986: 152 and Forbes 1995 [1999: 63]).