 To gain traction on this problem Skyrms considers a simple but nontrivial 3-piece Nash Demand Game that is structurally similar to the Extended Wine Problem of  Figure 8.  In this now familiar game a pair of agents vie for shares of a good. Each issues a claim and receives a payoff equivalent to her claim when the pair’s claims are compatible, and each receives nothing when their claims are incompatible. In Skyrms’ version a claimant can issue a minimal claim, D, to 1/3 of the good; a maximal claim, H, to 2/3 of the good; or a “middle” claim, M, to 1/2 of it.  [14]  As Skyrms notes (1996 [2014: 4]), in games of this sort we tend to think there is one outcome claimants ought to follow, namely, the fair outcome where each claims half of the good at stake. This corresponds to each side following M, and, as we saw earlier, (M,M) is an equilibrium of the game. But the question remains, why would claimants opt for the fair outcome when there are other equilibria that might be preferable?