 The second variant denies the possibility of an impartial basis for assessing moral status. To attempt to grade or evaluate the world’s inhabitants in absolute terms is to treat the universe as having a point of view—the perspective of a deity or a utilitarian Ideal Observer (Williams 2006). Without such a vantage point, human beings can judge the rest of the world only in terms of their own concerns, values and civilization. Indeed, it is only in those terms that we value those characteristics, like rationality and self-consciousness, regarded by individual-attribute theorists as criteria for full moral status (Grau, 2016). Our humanity thus gives us an indispensable frame of reference for evaluating the rest of the world. It also grounds a defensible partiality toward each other that has little in common with racism or sexism. Not only do almost all of us accept naked appeals to the humanity of another being, as opposed to her sex or race, as the basis for action or restraint, we appeal to humanity in rejecting racism and sexism. Naked appeals to race or sex, unsupported by claims about morally relevant attributes, are rarely made by the most unapologetic racist or sexist. The “human prejudice” is more akin to the affinity and loyalty of participants in a shared culture. If it is difficult to see “the human prejudice” this way, it may be because “[h]uman beings do not have to deal with any other creature that, in terms of argument, principle, worldview, or whatever, can answer back” (Williams 2006, 148). A distinctively human “culture” is both pervasive and barely visible in a world that offers no rivals. Williams does not claim that our commitment to that culture would necessarily trump an appeal to participate in a more advanced universal community and relinquish cherished but parochial aspects of our own culture. Nevertheless, that commitment would give us a morally defensible reason, not just a prejudice, against such assimilation.