 This section explores how the identity/non-identity debate relates to the non-phenomenalist/phenomenalist debate. They have often been conflated by equating the “two world” interpretation (non-identity) with the phenomenalist one, and conversely, by equating the “one world” interpretation (identity) with the anti-phenomenalist one. There are grounds to think, however, that these are distinct debates.  Section 5.1  I examines whether claims about the numerical identity or non-identity of appearances and things in themselves are meaningful at all, and, if they are, what warrant we could have for making them within Kant’s theoretical philosophy.  Section 5  investigates whether, assuming that claims of identity or non-identity are meaningful, the identity/non-identity debate is orthogonal the phenomenalist/non-phenomenalist debate.  Section 5.2  that paradigmatically anti-phenomenalist interpretations (e.g., Langton 1998) can be understood as non-identity views.  Section 5.3  examines some reasons for thinking that the phenomenalist interpretation is compatible with the “identity” of appearances and things in themselves.  Section 5.4  considers the interpretive landscape in light of these  results.[57]