 Goldman and Sripada (2005) discuss a series of paired deficits in emotion production and face-based emotion mindreading. These deficits—they maintain—are best explained by the hypothesis that one attributes emotions to someone else through simulating these emotions in oneself: when the ability to undergo the emotion breaks down, the mindreading capacity breaks down as well. Barlassina (2013) elaborates on this idea by considering Huntington’s Disease (HD), a neurodegenerative disorder resulting in, among other things, damage to the disgust mirror mechanism. As predicted by ST, the difficulties individuals with HD have in experiencing disgust co-occur with an impairment in attributing disgust to someone else on the basis of observing her facial expression—despite perceptual abilities and knowledge about disgust being preserved in this clinical population. Individuals suffering from HD, however, exhibit an intact capacity for disgust mindreading on the basis of non-facial visual stimuli. For this reason, Barlassina concludes by putting forward an ST-TT hybrid model of disgust mindreading on the basis of visual stimuli.