  The Unnaturalness Argument is more commonly interpreted as being an intrinsic objection. Even as an intrinsic objection, though, it still might take a direct or an indirect form. A person who thinks that promise-breaking is intrinsically wrong might think that promise-breaking itself is the wrong-making property, or they might believe that promise-breaking is intrinsically wrong because it is the betraying of an induced expectation (Scanlon 1998; Pratt, 2001), which itself is the wrong-making property. On the latter view, promise-breaking is still intrinsically wrong because the betraying of an induced expectation is not a consequence of a prior and distinct act of breaking a promise; rather, in those circumstances, the breaking of a promise is identical to the betraying of an induced expectation. The ontological relationship between the two acts is not analogous to that between pulling the trigger and a person’s death but rather to that between pulling the trigger and firing the gun. Similarly, those who believe that it is wrong to create chimeras because doing so is unnatural might claim that the intrinsic wrongness of these acts stems directly from their unnaturalness or they might think that the link between unnaturalness and wrongness is mediated by another property. As John Stuart Mill observed, concerns about unnaturalness are, for many, derived from concerns about offense to God: