  Parfit's theory has often been called “revisionary,” in  part because of moves like this one (see, e.g., Rovane 1998, 11;  Martin 1998, 15). The thought is that both his theory of identity and its implications for our prudential and moral practices and concerns  require us to change our views both of ourselves and of what matters. But this judgment may be mistaken. After all, Parfit seems to be  trying to show that (a) what in fact matters to us in  survival (revealed by the fission case) is Relation R, not identity,  and (b) what these antecedent commitments about survival imply about  prudence and morality is that the wrongness we currently attach to  great imprudence should merely be called a wrongness of  morality. But in neither case is there any call for revision of  anything substantive in our views of ourselves or in our normative  practices. Indeed, people simply are less concerned with  their MLSs than with their tomorrow-selves, and it is not difficult  to see why: if they cannot imagine being the self in  question, it is extremely difficult either to imagine what that  self's interests are or to take those interests into account equally  with their more closely related stages in practical deliberation. But what generally enables that act of projective imagination is the  expectation of a significant degree of psychological connectedness,  so the less there is expected to be of that relation, the less our  concern for those distant stages is likely to be. This suggests,  then, that Parfit's view is less revisionary than  revelatory: he may be taken to be providing a clear-headed  description of our practices and commitments, and in so doing  revealing to us just what those practices and commitments actually  involve and entail for other aspects of our lives (although see the  discussion of the various articles by Mark Johnston later on for  considerations to the contrary).