Textualists give priority in statutory and constitutional interpretation to the relevant texts.[13] Textualism is typically formulated in opposition to intentionalism or purposivism, as it rejects the search for legislative intentions or more general statutory purposes – at least to the extent that they are not enacted in the text. If the meaning of a text is taken to be clear, textualists reject the appeal to other sources to modify or depart from that meaning, even when the meaning of the text seems to be in tension with apparent legislative purposes. (Eskridge 1990, 686; Scalia 1997, 17–23; Manning 2001, 7, 17; 2006, 92–93, 110–11). A prominent feature of contemporary textualism is a rejection of appeals to legislative history, which textualists regard as unreliable and manipulable (Scalia 1997, 29–37; Scalia and Garner 2012, 376–78; Easterbrook 1990, 448–49; 1994, 65; 2017, 90–91; Manning 2011, 123–24).