 Al-Kindī went on to use the conclusion of this argument to maintain that time itself must be finite and consequently that the period of time during which the world has existed must be finite. Therefore, he concluded on the basis of this argument that the world must have been created at some first moment of time and so is not eternal (al-Kindī 1950, 121–122 &amp; 205–206). Al-Kindī’s argument for the temporal finitude of the cosmos is also the same one preferred by advocates of kalām, and is none other than the “Kalām Cosmological Argument,” recently re-popularized by William Lane Craig (Craig, 2000). In opposition to al-Kindī’s application of the foregoing argument to time, most subsequent philosophers in the falsafa tradition took the conclusion of the above argument to entail only that an actual infinite magnitude or number of things could not exist, that is to say, there cannot exist some wholly completed infinite all of whose parts exist at one and the same moment in time. In those cases where not all of the magnitude or its parts exist together at a single moment—as in the case of time and its parts, the past, present and future—then an infinite, they argued, could exist, albeit only potentially.