 Perhaps the primary objection to possibilism is that it can generate obligations that, if acted on, would result in the worst possible outcome. Versions of this objection have been raised throughout the literature, (Goldman 1976: 469–70; Sobel 1976: 202–203; Feldman 1986: 52–57; Almeida 1992: 461–462; Woodard 2009: 219–221; Portmore 2011: 211; Ross 2012: 81–82; Gustafsson 2014: 593; Timmerman &amp; Cohen 2016: 674). Possibilism generates this consequence because it implies that facts about how agents would freely act play no role in determining deontic verdicts. So, this potentially objectionable consequence of possibilism is a product of a core commitment of the view.