 See Merlin 2003 and Chebotarev and Smais 1998 for surveys of other characterizations of scoring rules. Additional axioms single out Borda Count among all scoring methods (Young 1974; Gardenfors 1973; Nitzan and Rubinstein 1981). In fact, Saari has argued that “any fault or paradox admitted by Borda’s method also must be admitted by all other positional voting methods” (Saari 1989, pg. 454). For example, it is often remarked that Borda Count (and all scoring rules) can be easily manipulated by the voters. Saari (1995, Section 5.3.1) shows that among all scores rules Borda Count is the least susceptible to manipulation (in the sense that it has the fewest profiles where a small percentage of voters can manipulate the outcome). 