 Perhaps the most straightforward of these theories is Foot’s proposal that the virtues of human beings are the general psychological properties needed by humans to thrive in living the kind of life that we do. Just as it is good for a wolf to be able to fit into the pack, it is good for a human to be sociable – to be charitable, honest, trustworthy, and so on. For Foot, the virtues are grounded in the distinctive kind of life human beings have, which is not to say they are grounded in our species membership. Any agent that lived this kind of life would have the same virtues, regardless of the agent’s species. So, for Foot, human goodness is merely analogous to the good for the wolf and the cheetah. For Paul Bloomfield, however, there is more than merely an analogy. He develops a theory that is similar to Foot’s, but one that rests on the nature of our species and on what members of the species need in order to achieve their natural function (2001, 2014, forthcoming).