 While this literature emphasizes the productivity of classificatory plurality in science, it also raises complex questions about its functions and limitations. One issue of increasing concern is the role of social and other non-epistemic values in classificatory practice (Ahn 2020; Ludwig 2016; Winther &amp; Kaplan 2013). Much of the older pluralist literature on issues such as biological taxonomies focuses on the heterogeneity of epistemic interests: researchers with different explanatory interests pay attention to different patterns and therefore classify their target domains in different ways. However, explanatory priorities of scientists have non-epistemic grounds and non-epistemic values also often affect more directly classificatory choices. The burgeoning philosophical literature on psychiatric classification can illustrate not only the plurality of classificatory practices but also the entanglement of epistemic and non-epistemic concerns. For example, different iterations of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) illustrate the flexible and shifting boundaries of psychiatric categories (Wilson 1993; Tsou 2015; Zachar, Regier, &amp; Kendler 2019) through the interplay between epistemic and non-epistemic values. On the one hand, substantial parts of the literature address psychiatric categories as natural kinds (Kincaid &amp; Sullivan [eds.] 2014) by aiming to identify dysfunctions through epistemic criteria of explanation, prediction, and intervention (Tekin 2016). On the other hand, it has been widely argued that the epistemic and non-epistemic aims of psychiatry are inseparably intertwined (Bueter 2019; Cooper 2020; Zachar 2014; Solomon 2020) and that psychiatric classification also responds to more direct pragmatic concerns from applicability in practice to normative concerns about pathologization and medicalization of society.