  Campbell argues that one cannot adequately acknowledge the way in which conscious experience plays this explanatory role if one holds a view of experience according to which an experience is a mental state or event with an intentional content that represents the world as being a certain way. For such a view of experience at best presupposes what is to be explained. It presupposes what is to be explained if the content of such a representational state is conceptual, and it doesn’t have the resources to play the relevant explanatory role if its representational content is non-conceptual. What’s required, argues Campbell, is a conception of experience as something less than conceptual representation of the object of experience, but which nonetheless has the resources to explain how experience of an object can provide one with a form of knowledge of the semantic value of a demonstrative that refers to it. Campbell argues that the only adequate contender is the relational view, for according to the relational view one’s conscious experience in the veridical case acquaints one with a mind-independent object and its categorical properties. This confrontation with, this awareness of, the mind-independent object referred to is what provides one with the relevant form of knowledge of the semantic value of the demonstrative that allows experience to play its explanatory role.