  On the other hand, haecceitists like Plantinga introduce special  properties — haecceities — to similar ends. The haecceity of an individual a is the property of being that very  individual, the property being a. A property is a  haecceity, then, just in case it is possible that it is the  haecceity of some   individual.[36]  It is a necessary truth that everything has a haecceity. More  importantly, for haecceitists, haecceities are necessary beings.  Thus, not only is it the case that, had any particular individual  a failed to exist, its haecceity ha would  still have existed, it is also the case that, for any “merely  possible” individual a, there is an actually existing  haecceity that would have been a's haecceity had a  existed. More generally (and more carefully) put: Necessarily, for  any individual a, (i) a has a haecceity h and  (ii) necessarily, h exists. 