 The precise content of grateful beliefs may vary, depending on the nature of the act of beneficence in response to which they are called for. They may, for instance, include the belief, on Y’s part, that benefactor R is especially brave, or especially thoughtful, or especially self-sacrificing. They may include the belief, on Y’s part, that R cares a great deal about Y (Berger 1975), and perhaps, relatedly, that Y is worthy of being cared about to such an extent (Shaw 2013, Manela 2019). Some have argued that all instances of gratitude have a certain cognitive element in common: a belief in or an awareness of one’s dependence on others—the sort of awareness typically associated with humility (McAleer 2012; Roberts 2014). These philosophers argue that humility is an essential part of gratitude, and that being humble is always part of being grateful. Manela (2016a) argues that this generalization may be overstated. Humility-related beliefs may be a part of a grateful beneficiary’s response to a benefit that he desperately needed and could not provide for himself. But if R benefits Y by doing something that Y was perfectly capable of doing for himself (and something Y himself has done for others in the past), then Y could be grateful to R without, in that instance, being aware of any dependence he might have on others.