 This idea also gave Carnap a new route to the elimination of metaphysics, superseding the Wittgensteinian strategy with its meaning criterion. The new criterion dispensed with meaning. It required that any statement either be at the object level (straightforwardly factual) or translatable into the formal mode of speech—i.e., into the canonical language or an equivalent. Carnap assumed that his canonical language, once fully worked out, could express the entire language of physics, as well as containing its own metalanguage. Since the Vienna Circle’s “unity of science” program held that all knowledge was expressible in the language of physics, Carnap proposed his canonical language as a universal language for all knowledge (Carnap 1932b). Another way of expressing the new criterion, then, was that any acceptable statement must be phrased in the language of physics. The new idea of January 1931 flowed into Carnap’s discussions with Neurath and others to produce the new doctrine of physicalism (Uebel 2007, 2018). 