 It is plausible to assume that Reinach—who in 1913 presented the most advanced and articulated theory of such acts within phenomenology—developed his position in close dialogue with both Pfänder and Daubert (Reinach 1913b; see also Schuhmann 2004b; Smith 1990). In fact, Reinach expands on the ideas that social acts are not descriptions of inner experiences and that these acts have addressees. More specifically, Reinach defines social acts as all those acts that are in-need-of-being-heard (vernehmungsbedürftig, see Mulligan 1987a). A social act performed between two or more human beings is heard (in this specific sense), according to Reinach, when three conditions are satisfied: first, the linguistic utterance is acoustically or visually perceived by the act’s addressee; second, the addressee understands the content of the utterance; third, the addressee understands the type of the act, that is, she understands whether a given utterance is a promise, an order, etc. Furthermore, social acts have illocutionary effects: a promise, e.g., generates a claim on the promisee’s end and an obligation on the promisor’s end. Finally, social acts undergo various modifications: they can be honest or treacherous, they can be addressed to many and/or performed by many, they (or their contents) can be conditional, they can be performed in the name of somebody else.