 Another worry one might raise about thin-truth-ism is that it only differs from fictionalism in a merely verbal way. Let ‘thin-true’ express the kind of truth that thin-truth-ists have in mind, and let ‘thick-true’ express the kind of truth that everyone else in the debate has in mind (i.e., platonists, fictionalists, paraphrase nominalists, and so on). Given this, fictionalists and thin-truth-ists will both endorse all of the following claims: (a) platonists are right that ‘3 is prime’ is a claim about the number 3; and (b) there is no such thing as the number 3; so (c) ‘3 is prime’ isn’t thick-true; but despite this, (d) ‘3 is prime’ is thin-true. Now, of course, thin-truth-ists and fictionalists will disagree about whether ‘3 is prime’ is true, but this will collapse into a disagreement about whether thin-truth or thick-truth is real truth, and this is just a disagreement about what the word ‘true’ means in ordinary folk English, and it’s hard to see why an empirical question about how the folk happen to use some word is relevant to the debate about the existence of mathematical objects.