 Here again the argument is based on construing “White/brown horse is horse” as an identity claim. Recall that in early Chinese thought the same/different relation may refer to either identity or kind relations. Moreover, in classical Chinese, both types of relations are expressed in the same syntactic form, the Chinese analogue of ‘A is (not) B’. So when the context is unambiguous, it is perfectly legitimate to express the fact that A is different from B by saying “A is not B.” Taking advantage of this grammatical feature, the sophist can move legitimately from the uncontroversial claim that having a horse is different from (that is, not identical to) having a brown horse to the intermediate claim that brown horse is different from (not identical to) horse and then not so legitimately to the conclusion that brown horse is not horse. The conclusion indeed follows, but only if we allow the sophist to construe “is not” as “is not identical to.” Notice that this argument seems to involve neither part-whole relations nor separating hard from white (that is, shape from color). Analogy plays a central role, however, as the argument is based on the analogy between brown and white horses. 