 Śāntarakṣita rejects the first option because he argues that according to this idea the foetus would somehow receive the first cognition without any cause. This means that the cognition would be eternal, rather than momentary. Śāntarakṣita rejects the second option because if the cognition is produced by an eternal non-material cause then it should itself be eternal. The argument is that if something which exists eternally can bring about a cognition then there is no point in time at which this cause could have brought about the effect. So the effect is eternal in the same way as the cause. But an eternal effect cannot exist because something which is eternal does not have a cause. The third option that the cognition is eternal runs counter to our experience which tells us that cognitions are momentary. Śāntarakṣita also dismisses the Lokāyata position that cognitions are produced by physical substances because the Lokāyata philosophers argue that material substances are eternal. So, Śāntarakṣita makes a similar argument to the rejection of option two. An eternal cause has to have an eternal effect but cognitions are not eternal. Option five is rejected in TS 1893–1896 where Śāntarakṣita argues that the first cognition of one chain cannot be solely caused by a cognition from another chain because in that case we would expect the knowledge of parents to carry over into their babies.