 Kratzer shows how this definition gives the flexibility to either “lump” some facts together, or to keep facts separate from each other relative to a conditional antecedent. One of her illustrative examples is the  following.[4]  Angelika and Regina must pass a bridge one after the other. Angelika takes one minute to pass the bridge, and Regina is waiting one minute before passing. Assuming Angelika had passed the bridge in 40 seconds, would Regina still be waiting for one minute? Let \(B\) represent “Angelika passes in one minute”, \(C\) “Regina waits one minute” and \(A\) represent “Angelika passes in 40 seconds”, with the proviso that \(A\) and \(B\) are inconsistent. The issue is whether the conditional \(A&gt;C\), “if Angelika had passed in 40 seconds, Regina would have waited one minute”, is true or false. One option is to let  \(\Gamma(w)=\{B,C\}\).[5]  \(\Gamma(w)\cup \{A\}\) is inconsistent, but contains as maximal \(A\)-consistent set only \(\{A,C\}\) and the intersection of this set entails \(C\). This predicts that Regina would have waited one minute indeed under the assumption that Angelika had passed faster. Another option is to let \(\Gamma(w)=\{B\cap C\}\). This time, \(\Gamma(w)\cup \{A\}\) contains \(\{A\}\) as sole maximal \(A\)-consistent set, and this set fails to entail \(C\). Although the two premise sets have the same intersection, the lumping of premises in the second set leads one to retract more facts when making the counterfactual assumption. This flexibility, as emphasized by Kratzer, accounts for the context-sensitivity of conditionals.