 Śrīharṣa’s discussion of distinctness—the property in virtue of which an object is recognized as distinct from another—is deeply connected with his commitment to a form of non-dualism. In the first chapter of The Sweets of Refutation, Śrīharṣa raises the question of how one knows that the self alone is ultimately real. The answer is simple: the Upaniṣads—insofar as they literally proclaim that there is no plurality of objects in the world—provide evidence for this claim. But this answer runs into trouble pretty quickly: the Upaniṣads cannot be trusted with regard to their literal content, since that content is contradicted by the deliverances of perception. The world, as we see it, is populated by a plurality of objects (KKh 74). It is this objection that motivates Śrīharṣa to argue against the ultimate reality of distinctness of  objects.[22]