 According to Paul of Venice, such “germinative” principles (rationes seminales) are of three types: substantial, qualitative, and relative (SN, pars vi, ch. 7, fol. 97rb). All of them are really distinct from matter and are based on a unique passive potency (i.e., a disposition) that is identified with the essence, so to speak, of prime matter (SN, pars vi, ch. 7, fol. 97vb) – and in this reference to a sort of essence of prime matter we can see the influence of Scotism. As a consequence, this basic potency is a kind of second-order potency, since the forms it brings into being are nothing but the potencies of prime matter, which in themselves are dispositional properties. Moreover, this general potency of prime matter consists precisely in the property of being in potency with respect to any kind of form, and therefore in being able to receive all of them (ibidem). The ultimate outcome of Paul’s approach is a form of necessitarianism ex hypothesi, in that every possible object, although not necessary in itself, would nevertheless be necessary with respect to the conditions and circumstances that bring it into being, since conditions and circumstances have to produce it, if they have the capacity to do so.