 Wittgenstein’s philosophical development is normally divided into two periods. The earlier one revolves around his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), in which Wittgenstein claims that language is only meaningful when it describes contingent states of affairs. The propositions of logic, philosophy, ethics, and aesthetics are thus strictly speaking meaningless, in that they are normative or otherwise non-factual. In these early works, Wittgenstein is predictably almost entirely silent about art. Wittgenstein’s late philosophical views found expression in the posthumously published Philosophical Investigations (1953), as well as other writings. In these works, Wittgenstein conceives of linguistic meaning as dependent on the way words are used within particular situations or activities—this he terms a “language-game” (Sprachspiel). Language-games are countless and defy systematization, because they depend on the constantly changing practices that constitute our form of life (Lebensform).