 The violation of bodily and sexual autonomy is no doubt among rape’s most central harms. In their classic discussion, Frye and Shafer (1977) employ the concept of “domain” to elaborate on such violation. A person’s domain—“the physical, emotional, psychological, and intellectual space it lives in” (338)—defines the range of matters over which the person has rightful power of consent. Because a person’s body is at the very center of her domain and is the locus of the properties and capacities that make her a person, the intentional invasion of the body is an especially egregious attack: “to presume to wield an effective power of consent over the personal properties and/or the body of [a] creature … is ipso facto to deny that there is a person there at all” (340). Thus, rape treats the victim not as a person but as an object, and one with a purely sexual function. Frye and Shafer emphasize that rape’s communication of this message constitutes one significant element of its harm: “[rape] gives [the victim] a picture of herself as a being within someone’s domain and not as a being which has domain …. Whether it is the rapist’s intention or not, being raped conveys for the woman the message that she is a being without respect, that she is not a person” (341–42). Hampton sounds a similar theme, contending that through its expressive content—“representing the rapist as master and the victim as inferior object”—rape does an objective “moral injury” to its victim’s value (1999, 135). It is not surprising, then, that many rape survivors describe feeling not only worthless, but also numb, absent, or deadened. The reaction is understandable since, as Cahill observes, “Rape, in its total denial of the victim’s agency, will, and personhood, can be understood as a denial of intersubjectivity itself …. The self is at once denied and … stilled, silenced, overcome” (2001, 132).