There is a more general conflict in this area. One might not uphold the maximizing of primary goods prospects for those in society who are worst off in this respect as a high-priority justice principle. One source of doubt is the thought that the ultimate justice aim should be promoting genuinely good lives for people with good fairly distributed. From this welfarist perspective, how big a pile of resources and opportunities society enables one to attain is not of fundamental moral importance; what matters is what one is enabled to accomplish and does accomplish with whatever resources and opportunities one gets. Another source of doubt is the thought that the Rawlsian difference principle, the identification of distributive justice with maximizing the prospects of the very worst off (subject to the FEO constraint), is too extreme in the priority it assigns to achieving gains for the very worst off. The difference principle in effect says that one should prefer a penny more for the worst off when that group has one member to the alternative of bringing about gains of any magnitude however large for any number of better than worst off persons however huge. Priority for the worse off plausibly takes a less extreme form. So in considering the plausibility of the fair equality of opportunity constraint on boosting the advantages of the worst off when enabling inequalities is the best means to helping the worst off, the difference principle should serve as a stand-in for whatever broadly egalitarian distributive justice aims we take to be most compelling. FEO does not become more acceptable if the Rawlsian principle to which FEO is attached as a constraint is deemed implausible. So conflict between fair equality of opportunity and the Rawlsian difference principle is merely illustrative of further conflict.