  The deontological concept of justification could be conjoined with either accessibility internalism or with mentalism. But these latter two forms of internalism are not logically connected to the deontological concept. Advocates of the deontological concept of justification are defending a thesis concerning the meaning of the term ‘justified,’ and by itself this thesis concerning the meaning of the term has no implications for what the actual justifiers may turn out to be. Hence, if it were a fact that the concept of epistemic justification is deontological, this fact would not imply mentalism.  Nor does mentalism entail the correctness of the deontological concept.  For mentalism is compatible with a concept of justification defined in terms of degree of evidential support, or adequacy of evidential support, and there is nothing particularly deontic about either of these ideas. Exactly the same may be said of accessibility internalism.  It readily conjoins with a concept of justification of either of these evidential sorts, and so accessibility internalism does not entail that a deontological concept of justification is correct.