 Psychological explanation, predication, and rationalization. The explanatory, predictive, and rationalizing potential of (1) differs from that of (4). For example, an utterance of (4), if accepted as true, would typically lead one to expect that, when Lois is looking for some heavy boxes to be moved in her office, sees Clark Kent (dressed in his Daily Planet garb) standing by doing nothing, she would ask him to help, etc.. This, of course, is the wrong result. Lois does no such thing. The Naive Russellian thinks that an utterance of (4) is true in exactly those conditions under which an utterance of (1) is true. But this, it may be thought, is hard to square with the fact that they have such very different explanatory, predictive, and rationalizing potential. (See Richard 1997 for a powerful presentation of this objection.)