 Earnest consequentializing is made possible because theory selection is underdetermined by the data that our theories seek to explain (see Duhem 1914 [1954]; Quine 1951 [1953]; and Baumann 2019). To illustrate, consider two moral theories: utilitarian theological voluntarism and utilitarian act-consequentialism. These two explain the same data set: that all and only acts that maximize hedonic utility are permissible. However, their explanations are quite different. Utilitarian theological voluntarism holds that the explanation lies with the fact that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that it accords with God’s will along with the fact (as they see it) that God is perfectly good and, so, wills each of us to maximize hedonic utility (see Paley 1802). Utilitarian act-consequentialism, by contrast, holds that the explanation lies with the fact that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that its outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative along with the fact (as they see it) that an act’s outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative if and only if it maximizes hedonic utility. Thus, the moral data (i.e., the given set of deontic verdicts) can be explained either in non-consequentialist terms or in act-consequentialist terms. And, to consequentialize, we just need to opt for the latter.