 A different reaction to Ross’s lists of duties is to argue it includes too few responsibilities. Sidgwick famously claimed egoism and utilitarianism represent coordinate but conflicting requirements of rationality. On his view, we ought to maximise our own happiness and maximise general happiness (Sidgwick 1907, 496–509). Sidgwick thought it could not be proved to the egoist that their happiness was not for them all important and so the egoist could not be rationally converted to utilitarianism (Sidgwick 1907, 420). (Sidgwick did think he could convert adherents of something like Ross’s view to utilitarianism (Sidgwick 1907, 337–361.)) In defending egoism, Sidgwick endorsed the existence of non-derivative agent-relative reasons. My good provides me with a special reason to promote my happiness, a reason individuals other than me lack. These reasons compete and (sometimes) conflict with the agent neutral reasons provided by utilitarianism.