 Recognizing the restrictiveness of Bridgman’s early remarks on meaning gives us a useful framework for understanding one common objection to operationalism. As Donald Gillies (1972, 6–7) emphasizes, if we accept the most extreme kind of operationalism, there is no point in asking whether a measurement method is valid; if the measurement method defines the concept and there is nothing more to the meaning of the concept, the measurement method is automatically valid, as a matter of convention or even tautology. Metrological validity becomes an interesting question only if the concept possesses a broader meaning than the specification of the method of its measurement. Not only Bridgman himself but the second-generation operationist psychologists recognized this point very clearly, in their discussions of construct validity (see, for example, Cronbach and Meehl 1955). The measurement method can be said to be valid if it coheres with the other aspects of the concept’s meaning. That way we may also make a judgment about whether an operational definition (or any other kind of definition) is an appropriate one, depending on how well it coheres with other elements of the concept’s meaning and how beneficially it controls other elements of meaning.