 Franklin was the most vociferous opponent of Collins, although recent collaboration between the two has fostered some agreement (Collins 2016). Franklin presented a set of strategies for validating experimental results, all of which relate to “rational argument” on epistemic grounds (Franklin 1989: 459; 1994). Examples include, for instance, appealing to experimental checks on measurement devices or eliminating potential sources of error in the experiment (Franklin &amp; Collins 2016). He claimed that the fact that such strategies were evidenced in scientific practice “argues against those who believe that rational arguments plays little, if any, role” in such validation (Franklin 1989: 459), with Collins being an example. He interprets Collins as suggesting that the strategies for resolving debates of the validation of results are social factors or “culturally accepted practices” (Franklin, 1989: 459) which do not provide reasons to underpin rational belief about results. Franklin (1994) further claims that Collins conflates the difficulty in successfully executing experiments with the difficulty of demonstrating that experiments have been executed, with Feest (2016) interpreting him to say that although such execution requires tacit knowledge, one can nevertheless appeal to strategies to demonstrate the validity of experimental findings.