Equality of opportunity of a sort has also been proposed as an answer to a quite different question. In this role equality of opportunity is conceived to be playing the central core role in a theory of distributive justice. The central question of distributive justice might be formulated in this way: Under what conditions is the distribution of liberties, opportunities, and goods that society makes available to persons just or morally fair? The equality-of-opportunity distributive justice theorist answers that the distribution is just only if it satisfies the norm of equality of opportunity, which requires that unchosen and uncourted inequalities should be eliminated and allows that when some individuals are worse off than others but could have avoided this condition by taking care or by making choices that would have been reasonable to make, given equal initial conditions and a fair framework for interaction, these inequalities may be left standing. (This condition might be claimed to be sufficient for just distribution as well as necessary.) This conception of equal opportunity proposed as the central element of distributive justice has been called the level playing field ideal (Roemer 1995, 1998), and is also known as luck egalitarianism (Cohen 1989, 2004, 2009; Mason 2006; Segall 2013; for criticism, see Anderson 1999, 2010; Pogge 2000; Buchanan et al. 2000; Scheffler 2003, 2005; and Fleurbaey 1995, 2008; for a response, see Tan 2008, 2012). The term “luck egalitarianism” was introduced by Elizabeth Anderson. The idea is that justice requires levelling the playing field by rendering everyone's opportunities equal in an appropriate sense, and then letting individual choices and their effects dictate further outcomes.