 The debate discussed above has largely supposed that a descriptive equivalent would be encoded in the meaning of a thick term, and thus would presumably be something that competent speakers should in principle be able to articulate. But we would struggle to say what the very many ways of being cruel, for instance, have in common without relying on our understanding of cruel (Little 2000: 279). Our poor track record in capturing the extensions of thick terms in independently intelligible non-evaluative terms should then count against Descriptive Equivalence. But note that, so far as the anti-disentangling argument goes, a non-evaluative description could be necessarily extensionally equivalent to an evaluative term or concept without belonging to the latter’s meaning. An evaluative concept could be held to have a non-evaluative “shape” as a matter of a necessary a posteriori equivalence, perhaps in the way that the necessary synthetic equivalence of “x is water” and “x is H2O” is discoverable only a posteriori. (D1) clearly allows this possibility. (D2) must then remain plausible if ‘possible’ is read as including the possibility of mastering the extension of an evaluative term by latching onto a non-evaluative necessary extensional equivalent (provided there is one) in an a posteriori way. The notion of disentangling in McDowell’s argument is therefore not semantic or conceptual. The argument’s real conclusion seems rather to be: