 Mutual epistemic dependence, so understood, says Baker-Hytch, is a consequence of, among other things, “two types of cognitive bias that play a significant role in determining how plausible we will tend to find a given item of testimony”: context biases, such as conformity, prestige, and similarity biases, which together make it much more likely that we accept the testimony of those we personally trust and respect in our communities, and content biases, stemming from the dominance of intuitive processing over reflective processing and the attractiveness of “minimally counterintuitive” ideas, especially religious ones, which are more likely to spread via testimony (Barrett 2011: 52–72; Kahneman 2013; Boyer 2001: 87–100). Thus, given mutual epistemic dependence, we would expect to see considerable divergence in the content of religious beliefs and clustering of those beliefs along geographic and cultural lines. So, (i) seems supported.