 Another generic objection is that higher-order theories, when combined with plausible empirical claims about the mental abilities of non-human animals, will conflict with our common-sense intuition that such animals enjoy phenomenally conscious experience (Jamieson and Bekoff 1992; Dretske 1995; Tye 1995; Seager 2004). This objection can be pressed most forcefully against higher-order thought theories, of either variety, and against self-representational theories; but it is also faced by inner-sense theory (depending on what account can be offered of the evolutionary function of organs of inner sense). Are cats and dogs really capable of having such apparently complex HOTs which presumably contain mental state concepts? Since there has been onsiderable dispute as to whether even chimpanzees (and other primates) have the kind of sophisticated ‘theory of mind’ to enable them to entertain thoughts about experiential states as such (Byrne and Whiten 1988, 1998; Povinelli 2000), it seems implausible that many other species of mammal (let alone reptiles, birds, and fish) would qualify as phenomenally conscious, on these accounts (Carruthers 2000, 2005). Yet the intuition that such creatures enjoy phenomenally conscious experiences is a powerful one, for many people. (Witness Nagel’s classic 1974 paper, which argues that there must be something that it is like to be a bat.)