 Possible problems for the subtraction strategy include the following. (1) The strategy presupposes that all the narrow contents of our beliefs are included in the ordinary contents of belief, so that once we have subtracted the non-narrow contents away the narrow contents will remain. On many conceptions of narrow content, however, narrow content is a more specialized and technical notion than this, and we cannot suppose that the ordinary contents of belief will include narrow contents. (2) The conception of narrow content with which the subtraction strategy fits most naturally is the descriptive content conception discussed in section 2.1. It inherits the principal objection to that view, namely that it is not clear that ordinary language can offer a narrow vocabulary sufficient to describe the narrow contents of our thoughts. Two points should be made in response to this worry. First, while the subtraction strategy assumes that the narrow contents of belief are a subset of the ordinary contents of belief, it need not be committed to the view that all of these ordinary contents are describable in natural language. Second, as noted above, we can think of completely narrow content as a limiting ideal case. The subtraction strategy offers a way of relating broad beliefs to the narrower beliefs on which they depend. This may be useful even if the process does not terminate in beliefs which are absolutely narrow. (3) Although the subtraction strategy offers a way of determining one’s total narrow content, it is not clear whether or how it could be applied to more specific belief states. (4) The subtraction strategy also shares with the diagonalization strategy the problem that it gives us a method of identifying narrow contents only if we already have an independent method of identifying contents in general.