 Second, one can question the idea that a content assignment should assign contents to individual thoughts. An alternative approach is to assign contents not to individual thoughts, but to an agent. YVH call this a “coarse” content assignment, and argue that such an assignment cannot serve the explanatory purposes of narrow content advocates. Jerzak (2021) notes that assigning contents to thoughts assumes that thoughts are atomistic, and argues that on a more holistic view like that of Stalnaker (1990), coarse content assignments would be more appropriate. Byrne (2021) also defends coarse content assignments, and criticizes YVH’s objections to them (though Byrne thinks that coarse assignments will only make things worse for the defender of narrow content). In their reply to Byrne (YVH 2021a), YVH concede that some of their criticisms of coarse assignments are not decisive, and go on to make some interesting suggestions about how a narrow content advocate might try to construct a suitable notion of narrow content for coarse content assignments. They show that on one way of doing so, “Mirror Man would not pose a threat” (YVH 2021a, p. 3051). (Of course, they think that other threats remain.)