It is worth pursuing this line of enquiry a little further, in relation to Galen’s account of primary and secondary properties and of emergent properties. On the one hand, all properties discernible by the senses can be understood on the basis of the primary qualities that exist at the elemental level. On the other, it is an essential part of Galen’s theory of the composition of living bodies from elements that there are qualitatively different properties at higher levels—that there are, in our terms, emergent properties. The fact that we experience pain and sensation, whereas elemental bodies do not, shows that there has been a fundamental transformation in their nature, in the process of the composition of higher-level bodies from lower-level ones. In principle, then, we might think, the fact that hot, cold, wet and dry are the relevant explanatory terms at the lowest level would not necessarily mean that they are helpful terms at the highest level—that of everyday experience. After all, we talk in perceptual terms of substances being sharp, acrid, bitter, etc.—and indeed Galen talks in such terms—without in each case finding it important to give the causal explanation of those secondary properties in elemental terms. More than that: we might expect it to be the case that the use of these elemental terms was simply not helpful or relevant, precisely because of the Galenic theorization, just noted, of higher-level or secondary qualities as different in their nature from the primary ones.