 My exposition of these three worries (like the rest of this entry thus far) has followed the common practice of lumping together the notions of analytic truth and conceptual truth. Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau (2014) have argued that distinguishing these two notions permits them to develop an attractive form of moral realism, and also enables them to explain the supervenience of the moral properties. They distinguish analytic and conceptual truth as follows: for a sentence to be analytically true is for it to be true in virtue of the meanings of the terms that constitute it. By contrast, for a proposition to be a conceptual truth is for it to be true wholly in virtue of the essences of its constituent concepts (ibid., 410–11). Concepts, in turn, are to be understood as abstract non-mental objects. One has a propositional thought in virtue of being appropriately related to some of these objects.