  The third methodological alternative insists that, because our  commonsense intuitions are at loggerheads over the thought  experiments motivating the various metaphysical theories of personal  identity (e.g., brain transplants, teletransportation, and the like), the only plausible solution to this underlying conflict is going to  be revisionary, requiring us to abandon one of the conflicting sets  of intuitions. But on the basis of what? Carol Rovane suggests that  we start instead by deploying something on which everyone could  agree, namely, a conception of personhood that's allegedly built into the foundations of every ethical position (including anti-theoretical ones). Once we determine the key condition of personhood – the  condition Rovane calls “the ability to engage in   agency-regarding relations” (Rovane 1998, 5) – we  can then go on to construct a metaphysical theory of personal  identity on top of this ethical concept. For Rovane, this will yield  the rather surprising possibility of both group persons, composed of  many human bodies (insofar as the group can meet the conditions of  ethical personhood, functioning as an individual agent), and multiple persons, simultaneously existing within only one human body (insofar  as each “personality” can meet the condition of ethical  personhood, functioning as an individual agent, as well)  (Ibid., chapters 4–5).