 David Archard makes the important distinction between having “an obligation to ensure that someone acts as a parent to the child” and having an obligation to act as a parent oneself. He calls the former ‘parental obligations,’ and the latter are dubbed ‘parental responsibilities’ (104–105). Archard defends a causal theory of parental obligations, according to which “those who cause children to exist thereby incur an obligation that they are adequately cared for” (127). Thus, a parent could, according to Archard, fulfill her parental obligations that result from conceiving and bearing a child, by finding adoptive parents who will assume parental responsibilities for the child. As Archard acknowledges, anyone offering a causal account owes us a view about what role one needs to play in the causal generation of a child in order to have parental obligations: if I rent an apartment to a couple that makes it possible for them to have the privacy to pursue the creation of a family, I play a causal role in bringing their child into existence, but surely I do not have parental obligations of any kind.