 By virtue of condition (I), this account of rejecting a reason for a belief allows for a belief to cease to be based on a reason even when the reason is still retained (not, e.g., forgotten). For example, suppose I believe that Pablo Neruda was a great poet because all great poets are revolutionaries and Neruda was a revolutionary. Later, I come to believe that this inference is invalid, yet also come to believe that all Nobel Prize winners in literature are great poets and that Neruda won the Nobel prize in literature. Thus, I never lose my belief that Neruda is a great poet and I never lose (at least some of) my original reasons for believing that Neruda was a great poet (I still believe that all great poets are revolutionaries and that Neruda was a revolutionary). Instead, the reasons for which I believe that Neruda was a great poet have shifted, in part by virtue of the fact that I have come to believe that my original reasons did not support my belief.