 A possible way to reconcile libertarian views of freedom with a strong view of divine providence was posed by the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit, Luis de Molina  (1588).[3]  According to Molina, God is able to know as creator how any exercise of creaturely freedom will go. That is, God knows, for any creature he might create, how that creature will behave in whatever circumstances he might be placed. God is able to know this, moreover, even though the creatures in question will, if created, enjoy libertarian freedom. This kind of knowledge, which Molina called middle  knowledge,[4]  is comprised in what we may call subjunctives of freedom. Consider, for example, the situation in which I will find myself later today, when I deliberate about whether to attend the concert tonight. It is possible to formulate two subjunctive conditional propositions about that situation. The first states that if ever I were placed in the circumstances (call them C) that will then obtain, I would decide (freely) to attend the concert; the second states that in those circumstances, I would not so decide. Let these be symbolized as C &gt; p and C &gt; ~p, respectively. Both C &gt; p and C &gt; ~p count as subjunctives of freedom, and since we are imagining that I will be placed in C later today, it is plausible to think that one or the other of them is true. Let us suppose it is C &gt; p. According to defenders of middle knowledge, God knows prior to any creative act on his part that C &gt; p is true; hence he knows this prior to my existence, and prior to any act of mine. We need not take the “prior” here as temporal, if we hold that God exists outside of time. The idea, rather, is that the truth of C &gt; p is logically or ontologically prior to any creative decision on God’s part, and to any doing of mine, in that its truth is fixed independently of these matters. Further, God is able to know that C &gt; p is true independently of any decision of his, and without appealing to any actual decision on my part as evidence. Finally, God is armed with true subjunctives of freedom for every other set of circumstances in which I might ever have been placed, and the same for every other free individual he has the option of creating, whether he actually chooses to create the creature or not. In effect, then, middle knowledge gives God advance notice of every free decision or action that would ever occur, on the part of any creature he might create (Flint 1998, 37–41).