 In fact, it seems as though Weber is unsure of the proper place of democracy in his schema. At one point, democracy is deemed as a fourth type of legitimacy because it should be able to embrace legitimacy from below whereas his three ideal types all focus on that from above [Breuer in Schroeder (ed.) 1998, 2]. At other times, Weber seems to believe that democracy is simply non-legitimate, rather than another type of legitimate domination, because it aspires to an identity between the ruler and the ruled (i.e., no domination at all), but without assuming a hierarchical and asymmetrical relationship of power, his concept of legitimacy takes hardly off the ground. Thus, Weber could describe the emergence of proto-democracy in the late medieval urban communes only in terms of “revolutionary usurpation” [Weber 1921–22/1978, 1250], calling them the “first deliberately non-legitimate and revolutionary political association” [ibid., 1302]. Too recalcitrant to fit into his overall schema, in other words, these historical prototypes of democracy simply fall outside of his typology of domination as non- or not-legitimate at all.