 Some of Robinson’s arguments are new to our discussion, such as the Time-Lag Argument. It notes that the light reaching our eyes from stars may be hundreds or thousands of years old and so the star may have ceased to exist. On the assumption that the object of veridical perception exists, our perception cannot be of the actual star, and hence must be of another object. But all perception involves a causal process that unfolds in time; hence, on the assumption that perception must be simultaneous with its object, we never perceive the actual properties of the things that reflect or emit light (1994: ch. 3). This argument can be extended to a Causal Argument (1994: ch. 6) which appeals to the fact that we can be made to seem to perceive objects by non-standard causal processes, such as those that underlie hallucination. In such cases, we don’t perceive an external object and so there must be another object that we perceive, having the properties that appear to us (invoking  item 3 of the Classical Notion).  These cases could be phenomenally indistinguishable from normal perception. Hence, arguing that phenomenally indistinguishable items should be classified as the same type of object (as in Price’s Argument from Illusion, Sec. 2.2.3, above), we should conclude that in the normal case we also don’t directly perceive an external object.