 As noted above, the debate between endurantists and perdurantists is an ontological dispute: do temporal parts of ordinary material objects exist, or not? Moreover the endurantist notion of ‘being wholly present’ was understood in terms of parts and wholes. In the past few years, however, some have suggested that debates about persistence are better understood as debates about location – how are material objects located in (or extended through) time, and how does this compare with the way(s) in which material objects are located in (or extended through) space? Temporal parts were introduced at the beginning of this entry via an analogy with spatial parts, but this recent work challenges even the assumption that spatially-extended objects inevitably have spatial parts. The present article focuses, appropriately enough, on persistence questions understood via the notion of temporal parthood, but you can read about alternative approaches in the separate entry on  Location and Mereology,  especially section 6.3.2.