 Here is another reason why the idea that makes our minds our minds is “completely confused”. According to Spinoza, the only way I can cognize my own body as a particular thing existing in time (as opposed to knowing its atemporal “essence”, or knowing the general properties of all bodies) is through its modes or “affections” – that is, through the changes or determinations that this body undergoes, mostly under the influence of external causes (E2p19). “We feel that a certain body is affected in many ways” (E2ax4): we stub our toes, hear a voice, are warmed by the sun, etc. But what we grasp in such experiences is, according to Spinoza, only a “confused” amalgam of the nature of our own body and the nature of the external causes affecting it (for details, see 3.2.2). But, however confused, my first-personal “feeling” of what happens to my body suffices for distinguishing my “mind” from my ideas of other bodies: I don’t “feel” in the same way what happens to my sister’s equally complex body (her mind does), even if I can observe it (and even imitate it empathetically; see E3p27).