 Charles Travis called the claim that in knowing that p one can always distinguish one’s condition from all states in which not-p the ‘accretion’ (Travis (2005, 290) &amp; Kalderon &amp; Travis (2013, 501)) and he argued that it damages the core of Cook Wilson’s and Prichard’s positions (Travis 2005, 289–294). To use the above example of the pig suddenly coming into view, the claim is that, although one can know by reflection that one knows that one is seeing a pig, one cannot by mere reflection exclude the possibility that one is in fact seeing some cleverly engineered ‘ringer’. The upshot of this argument is not immediately clear: if it is the case that one knows p only if p and one knows that one knows that p, how could one be unable to exclude the case that not-p, hence that one does not know p? At all events, Travis sees this as reinstalling the argument from illusion (Travis 2005, 291), that had already been subjected to numerous critiques from an early paper by Prichard to Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia: