 Some people have suggested that the Turing Test is chauvinistic: it only recognizes intelligence in things that are able to sustain a conversation with us. Why couldn’t it be the case that there are intelligent things that are unable to carry on a conversation, or, at any rate, unable to carry on a conversation with creatures like us? (See, for example, French (1990).) Perhaps the intuition behind this question can be granted; perhaps it is unduly chauvinistic to insist that anything that is intelligent has to be capable of sustaining a conversation with us. (On the other hand, one might think that, given the availability of suitably qualified translators, it ought to be possible for any two intelligent agents that speak different languages to carry on some kind of conversation.) But, in any case, the charge of chauvinism is completely beside the point. What Turing claims is only that, if something can carry out a conversation with us, then we have good grounds to suppose that that thing has intelligence of the kind that we possess; he does not claim that only something that can carry out a conversation with us can possess the kind of intelligence that we have.