 Different metaethical stances (see section 4) yield different understandings of what moral progress might consist in as well as different explanations for how moral progress has historically come about. A moral realist, for example, will tend to conceive of moral progress in terms of achieving a more accurate grasp of objective moral truths and refining of our practices and institutions to align more closely with them; and plausible examples, such as the widespread liberalization of moral practices over the past few centuries, will be explained largely by appeal to growing insight into moral truth (Huemer 2016). By contrast, those who reject such appeals to objective moral truths but wish to retain some notion of moral progress (perhaps one that is extensionally very similar) will formulate a different conception of progress and offer socio-cultural explanations of progressive changes that do not rely on appeals to improved insights into moral truth (Kitcher 2011). We will here set aside the many complex issues attending these different approaches and focus on this question: what bearing might our evolutionary past have on our prospects and strategies for achieving the sorts of changes most agree would constitute moral progress?