 But there are other, much less lenient views about responsibility for the harms of oppression that some feminists and race theorists advocate. These accounts arguably ground responsibility in features that are independent of cultural influence, by employing the notion of humanity, the view that all persons are equal in some fundamental sense that transcends gender and race. One way to flesh out this view is to invoke Immanuel Kant’s notion of humanity, that all persons are rational, autonomous beings possessing dignity and deserving of respect. In short, they have intrinsic value in virtue of being persons. According to the accounts of responsibility at issue, members of socially dominant groups, or, “the privileged,” are responsible for knowing and acting on these basic facts about humanity that they share with their subordinates (Zack, 1998, 42–43; Superson, 2004). That is, in spite of the fact that oppression is a difficult concept to grasp, and notwithstanding Calhoun’s and Isaacs’s points about feminists having special knowledge that is not shared by the general public, the privileged ought to recognize, acknowledge, and respect their subordinates in virtue of these features common to all persons, even if patriarchal and racist societies muddle these facts about humanity by, for example, stereotyping all members of the subordinate group. Since knowing that all persons are equal in certain basic respects is a simple matter, defenders of this view do not want to absolve from responsibility those who disrespect others’ humanity. At best, responsibility ascriptions might be made on the basis of the degree of difficulty involved in sorting through patriarchal or racist norms and recognizing that a particular behavior does, indeed, violate a person’s humanity.