  Moral intuitionists and some moral contextualists deny premise (2), but moral skeptics argue that too many beliefs would be justified if people did not need to be able to provide any reason or inference to support their moral beliefs. If Thelma could be non-inferentially justified in believing that eating meat is morally wrong, then Louise could also be non-inferentially justified in believing that eating meat is not morally wrong, and Nick could be non-inferentially justified in believing that it is morally wrong to eat vegetables. Conflicting beliefs can sometimes both be justified, but it seems less plausible to hold that such conflicting moral beliefs are all justified without any ability to support the belief with any inference when each believer knows that other people disagree. If such conflicting beliefs are not justified in the absence of a reason, and if such conflicts are pervasive enough to undermine all non-inferential justification, then premise (2) is true.