 Analytic theologians have expended much effort on metaphysical models which if accurate would arguably show that “the doctrine of the Trinity” is coherent (i.e. seemingly not self-contradictory). But only a recent monograph by Vlastimil Vohánka (2014) asks in depth how, if at all, a person might be able to know that the doctrine of the Trinity is logically possible. Vohánka argues for “Weak Modal Scepticism about the Trinity Doctrine” (83), which is the claim that “it is psychologically impossible to see evidently and apart from religious experience that the Trinity doctrine is logically possible” (86). The arguments for this conclusion defy easy summary (but see Chapter 7 and Jaskolla 2015). What is “the doctrine” in question? Vohánka uses a minimal definition, that “there are three persons, each of whom is God but there is just one being which is God” (47). Admittedly, this better fits one-self theories than it does three or four-self theories (52–7) Like most, Vohánka assumes that a Trinity doctrine is essential to Christianity (57–8), so the main thesis implies the impossibility of knowing that Christianity is logically possible. But the overall project is not an attack on the truth or knowability of Christianity (see the author’s clarifications about his aims on 244–7, 276–7). Rather, such claims as the Trinity and Christianity seemingly can’t be evident to us (i.e. roughly, can’t be obviously true to us, as is 1+1=2 and such propositions–see 18), and moreover, we shouldn’t expect that we’ll have any religious experience in this life which is sufficient to make them evident (277). For all that’s been said, such claims “may well be epistemically justified, well-argued, have clearly high non-logical probability, etc.” (279). But the Christian philosopher should give up on “fulfilling the classical idea of evidentness in matters viewed by him as of utmost importance: the truth of Christianity and of the Trinity doctrine” (ibid.).