  Martin suggests that the notion of indiscriminability that the disjunctivist should appeal to is an ‘impersonal’, ‘objective’ one. He compares the way in which we can talk of objects being visible or invisible. He suggests that in certain contexts, when we say that something is invisible, we may not be talking about the way a given individual, or group of individuals, is such that they cannot succeed in seeing the object. We may rather be talking about what vision can and cannot discern. Furthermore, in asking what vision can reveal to us, we can ask in terms of how vision actually is, or ways in which vision could be. The most extreme claim of invisibility would be concerned with the latter notion. The suggestion seems to be that we should not think that such ‘impersonal’, ‘objective’ talk of invisibility need be reducible to claims about what a given subject, group of subjects, or ideal subject would or would not see. So similarly, we should not take the impersonal, objective talk of introspective indiscriminability as reducible to claims about what a given subject, group of subjects, or ideal subject would or would not come to know through introspection.