 In recent years, the impulse to distinguish moral rules from other types of social norms has received what many philosophers take to be empirical support from the psychological research of Elliot Turiel and his collaborators. Turiel is well-known for having argued that there are two distinct “domains” of social cognition, the “moral” and the “conventional,” and that even very young children are able to distinguish the two. Many philosophers have been quick to jump on this, as proof that moral rules are fundamentally different from “conventional” social norms. Jesse Prinz, for instance, appeals to Turiel’s authority in claiming that “By the time children are 3, they recognize that some rules are moral (e.g. don’t hit other children) and others are merely conventional (don’t talk without raising your hand)” (Prinz 2006, 29–43; see also Joyce 2006[a], 136–137; Nichols 2004, 5–7). Gerald Gaus, again citing Turiel, writes that “even children see moral rules as non-conventional” (2010, 172). This is often a prelude to the claim that moral judgments are generated by some special moral faculty, or set of emotional reactions, or rational capacity, that puts them outside the space of social norms (and thus, many will argue, exempts them from cultural variability). (Heath 2017: 277–278)