 Ewin’s challenge does, nevertheless, raise the important question whether judgments about the worth of loyalty are reducible to judgments about the worth of the associations to which loyalty is given or the legitimacy of what is done as a result of them. Does loyalty have any value independent of the particular associational object with which it is connected or is its value bound up exclusively with the object of loyalty? There is disagreement on this (paralleling disagreements about the obligatoriness of promise keeping). Some argue that loyalty is virtuous or vicious depending on what is done out of loyalty. Others argue that loyalty is always virtuous, albeit overridden when associated with immoral conduct. In the case of a loyal Nazi whose loyalty expresses itself in anti-semitic forms, we could respond in one of two ways. On the one hand, we could point to the fact that the loyalty is likely to aggravate the harm caused. On the other hand, were such a Nazi to act disloyally by allowing Jews who bribed him to escape, we could argue that he is doubly deficient—self-serving and defective in his capacity to form close bonds. Certainly the value of particular associations is of importance to how we value loyalty to those associations; but it is doubtful whether the value of loyalty is simply reducible to the value of the association in question. A person without loyalty or incapable of forming loyalties would seem to be defective as a person.