 Such a reason may, however, be found in the subset view proposed by Shoemaker (2007). To briefly illustrate a key idea, suppose that a certain belief, \(M\), can be realized by alternative physical states \(P_1, \ldots P_n\). Suppose further that this belief is involved in an inference, and that its possessor arrives at a new belief, i.e., arrives at another state that has a new mental property, \(M^*\). Suppose, finally, that \(M^*\) can be realized by alternative physical states \(P^*_1, \ldots, P^*_o\), and that each \(P_i\) is a sufficient physical cause for some \(P^*_j\). A particular \(P_i\) causes a particular \(P^*_j\) by a particular causal route that need not be shared by other \(P\) to \(P^*\) instances, and so \(P_i\) has causal powers not shared by all instances of M. But any instance of \(M\) would have been realized by a sufficient cause of some realizer of \(M^*\). Thus, \(M\)’s causal powers include just those that are relevant to bringing about \(M^*\) (assuming that other conditions, e.g., belief in other premises required for the inference, are held constant). Given these assumptions, it is reasonable to conclude that it is \(M\) rather than its particular realizers that causally contribute to \(M^*\), even though each instance of \(M\) is realized by some \(P_i\) that is a sufficient cause of a realizer of \(M^*\), and thus is sufficient for \(M^*\).