 Though it has been widely discussed, few philosophers have been convinced by this argument. For one, similar problems also arise when attributing beliefs to other humans. Furthermore, such arguments are excessively pessimistic with regards to the limits of what we can know about animals’ beliefs. By studying animal behavior in controlled situations, we can come to know quite a lot about how they understand the world, which would allow us to delineate their beliefs to a much higher degree than Davidson and Stich acknowledge. Moreover, perhaps animals’ beliefs don’t take the form of propositional attitudes made up of concepts, like Davidson assumes. It could be the case, for instance, that the dog thinks of the cat, not as a four-legged meowing mammal, but in terms of the actions they allow: as, for instance, a chase-able or eat-able thing. And lastly, while Davidson’s argument may allow us to conclude that we don’t know the exact form that animals’ beliefs take, a number of philosophers have argued that we can still ascribe content to animal beliefs using a variety of different methods (e.g., Allen 2013; Bermúdez 2003; Rowlands 2012).