 The ways of being Sosein and Dasein are also in a sense relative, or positional. Hartmann presents their positional alternation this way: the Dasein of a tree is the Sosein of a forest (OLF19a); i.e., without the existing tree the content of the forest would be different. Similarly, the Dasein of the branch is the Sosein of the tree, the Dasein of the leaf is the Sosein of the branch, and the Dasein of the vein is the Sosein of the leaf. Things can be inverted, too: the Sosein of the leaf is the Dasein of the vein; the Sosein of the branch is the Dasein of the leaf, etc. The Dasein-Sosein series has two limits: towards the first, original Dasein and towards the last Sosein, the Sosein of the whole of reality. The mainstream interpretation of Dasein and Sosein, or existence and essence, as entirely separate aspects of being, depends on epistemological acts of isolation. Only when aspects are separated do independent substances and dependent qualities appear, and it is for this reason that it seems that qualities do not have any Dasein and, complementarily, that their bearers have no Sosein (OLF20c). This is just one of the novel and transformative findings in Hartmann’s ontological analysis that overcomes difficulties with the traditional contrast between essence and existence.