 Various elements of this intuitive characterization of belief have been challenged by philosophers, but it is probably fair to say that the majority of contemporary philosophers of mind accept the bulk of this picture, which embodies the core ideas of the representational approach to belief, according to which central cases of belief involve someone’s having in her head or mind a representation with the same propositional content as the belief. (But see §2.2, below, for some caveats, and see the entry on  mental representation.)  As discussed below, representationalists may diverge in their accounts of the nature of representation, and they need not agree about what further conditions, besides possessing such a representation, are necessary if a being is to qualify as having a belief. Among the more prominent advocates of a representational approach to belief are Fodor (1975, 1981, 1987, 1990), Millikan (1984, 1993), Dretske (1988), Cummins (1996), Burge (2010), Mandelbaum (2016; Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 2018), and Zimmerman (2018).