  As noted above, questions about the development of a theory of mind were first posed with respect to chimpanzees, and it is to chimpanzees (and other nonhuman primates) that we now return. Until recently, most researchers agreed that there was little evidence to support the claim that nonhuman primates represented agency, goals, attention or the like (Povinelli 2000; Tomasello &amp; Call 1997). However, chimpanzees, macaques, and other primates do follow eye gaze. Researchers have probed whether they appreciate the relationship between the direction of gaze and attention, or between seeing something and acquiring information. A number of recent studies have shown that chimps prefer to steal food from a person (or, in some conditions, a more dominant chimp) who cannot see them as opposed to a person (or more dominant chimp) who can (see Flombaum &amp; Santos 2005; Hare et al. 2000; and Carey 2009 for review). If dedicated mechanisms to identify agents and to support our reasoning about them is part of our evolutionary heritage, as seems increasingly plausible, it should not surprise us to find them in some of our distant relatives—and in the very young.