 One response—perhaps the most common one—is that logic sets forth norms for (theoretical) reasoning. Unlike thinking, which might consist merely of disconnected sequences of conceptual activity, reasoning is presumably a connected, usually goal-directed, process by which we form, reinstate or revise doxastic attitudes (and perhaps other types of states) through inference. Consider the following two examples of how logic might give rise to norms. First, suppose I am trying to find Ann and that I can be sure that Ann is either in the museum or at the concert. I am now reliably informed that she is not in the museum. Using logic, I conclude that Ann is at the concert. Thus, by inferring in conformity with the valid (by the standards of classical logic) logical principle of disjunctive syllogism, I have arrived at a true belief about Ann’s whereabouts. Second, if I believe that Ann is either at the concert or the museum, while at the same time disbelieving both of the disjuncts, it would seem that there is a tension in my belief set, which I have reason to rectify by revising my beliefs appropriately. Logic may thus be thought to normatively constrain the ways we form and revise doxastic attitudes. And it does so, presumably, in our everyday cognitive lives (as in our example), as well as in the context of more self-conscious forms of theoretical inquiry, as in mathematics, the sciences, law, philosophy and so on, where its normative grip on us would seem to be even  tighter.[5] 