 Can the bilking argument be challenged in such a way that the mere possibility of intervention does not generate any serious paradoxes? The bilking argument is due to Max Black (1956) who assumed the following scenario. Suppose Houdini makes a prediction about the outcome of, say, a coin about to be flipped \(B\) before someone actually does the flipping \(A\). We may also assume that in the past Houdini rarely failed in his predictions. In this case we might be tempted to say that the Houdini’s answer is caused by the later flipping. But, as Black argued, after Houdini’s prediction of \(B\), we can always intervene such that the coin is not flipped or arranged opposite to Houdini’s prediction.  The implication is that \(A\) seems both to be the cause and not to be the cause of \(B\). Black also argued that if \(A\) is the cause of \(B\), then the causal antecedents of \(A\) are independent of \(B\). Hence, if we cannot, after \(B\) has occurred, prevent \(A\) from happening, then \(A\) cannot be said to be causally independent of \(B\). But since it is in human power to intervene with respect to \(A\), Black concluded that \(A\) cannot be the cause of \(B\)