 Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of neo-Russellians. The first – what we will call Naive Russellians – insist that the fundamental truth-conditions for belief attributions involve only the objects and properties, not the way those items are represented. According to Naive Russellians, we are wrong to think that (1) (i.e., ‘Lois believes that Superman is strong’) is true and (4) (i.e., ‘Lois believes that Clark Kent is strong’) is false. They are composed in the same way from elements with the same semantic contents. Proponents of this view include Bealer 1982, §39; Berg 1983; Braun 1998, 2000, 2001a,b; McKay 1981, 1991; Nelson 2002, 2005; Reddam 1982; Richard 1983, 1987; Salmon 1986, 1989, 1995a; Soames 1987, 1989, 1995; and Tye 1978, for example. (Bealer has changed his view; see his 1993. Richard has also changed his view in 1989 and has subsequently become one of the most effective critics of Naive Russellianism. We discuss Richard’s later view below in  Section 6.  Tye seems to have abandoned Naive Russellianism. Soames has also altered his view, although much less drastically than the other three, in his 2002.) The other version of neo-Russellianism, to be discussed below in  Section 6,  agrees with the Fregean about the truth-values of (1) and (4) but rejects the Fregean claim that this difference requires a difference in thought content. While (1) is true and (4) is false, proponents of this version of the view accept, that is not because they report attitudinal relations to different propositions; the proposition that Superman is strong just is, as all neo-Russellians insist, the proposition that Clark Kent is strong.