 That is, \(c\) and \(c'\) both assign credence 0 to the true proposition, 1; they are certain that there are either 2 or 3 stars on the flag, but while \(c\) spreads its credence equally over these two false options, \(c'\) is certain of the first. According to Oddie (2019), \(c'\) has greater truthlikeness than \(c\) at the actual world because it assigns a higher credence to a proposition that, while false, is more truthlike, namely, 2, and it assigns a lower credence to a proposition that is, while also false, less truthlike, namely, 3. On this basis, he argues that any measure of epistemic disutility must judge \(c\) to be worse than \(c'\). However, he notes, nearly all measures of gradational accuracy that are used in accuracy dominance arguments for Probabilism will not judge in that way: they will judge \(c'\) worse than \(c\). And indeed those that do so judge will fail to respect truthlikeness in other ways. Jeffrey Dunn (2018) and Miriam Schoenfield (2019) respond to Oddie’s arguments.