 The parental-interest account of parents’ rights addresses problems raised within political philosophy for the family. Brighouse and Swift generate their account partly in response to the challenge of redistribution of children: if the state should promote child welfare, why should children not be redistributed at birth to the best prospective parents, to maximize children’s welfare? But as Gheaus points out, while Brighouse and Swift provide an account of fundamental parental rights, they do not explain why biological parents have rights to rear their biological children, rather than such children being redistributed to better prospective parents, who could thereby undertake their own parenting projects (Gheaus 2012). One response to this concern is to separate the question of how someone obtains parental rights (the topic of the previous section) from the question of whose interests—parent, child, or both—those rights ultimately protect (Millum 2017). Brighouse and Swift also aim to address the family’s notorious effect on equal opportunity – different parenting practices, such as reading bedtime stories, can greatly affect children’s life chances. On their account, certain inequality-producing institutions such as private schools and inheritances are not protected under parents’ rights – but practices essential to parents’ interest in intimacy, such as bedtime stories, are. (For a reply, see Engster 2019.) Finally, a dual-interest view, grounding rights in interests of both parents and children, is also possible (Macleod 2015).