 Another interesting logical problem concerns the “conjunctive force” of disjoined quantified NPs in objectual ascriptions. There is a large literature on the conjunctive force of disjunction in many other contexts (e.g., Kamp 1973, Loewer 1976, Makinson 1984, Jennings 1994, Zimmerman 2000, Simons 2005, Fox 2007), for instance as exhibited in ‘x is larger than y or z’ and ‘John can speak French or Italian to you’. In these cases the conjunctive force is easily captured by simple distribution: ‘x is larger than y and larger than z’, ‘John can speak French to you and can speak Italian to  you’.[12]  However, with intensional transitives we find the same conjunctive force, but no distributive articulation. If we say that Jack needs a woollen sweater or a fleece jacket, we say something to the effect that (i) his getting a woollen sweater is one way his need could be met, and (ii) his getting a fleece jacket is another way his need could be met. But ‘Jack needs a woollen sweater or a fleece jacket’ does not mean that Jack needs a woollen sweater and needs a fleece jacket. This last conjunction ascribes two needs, only one of which is met by getting a satisfactory woollen sweater. But the latter acquisition by itself meets the disjunctive need for a woollen sweater or a fleece jacket. So there is a challenge to explain the semantics of the disjunctive ascription, while at the same time remaining within a framework that can accommodate all cases of conjunctive force — comparatives, various senses of ‘can’, counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents (‘if Jack were to put on a woollen sweater or a fleece jacket he’d be warmer’) and so on; see further (Forbes 2006, 97–111).