 In this section, we will take a closer look at different strategies philosophers have employed in engaging with Bradley’s regress arguments and the associated problems discussed above (I will be using the locution “Bradleyean arguments” to refer indifferently to both of these cateogires). The first fork in the road for philosophers has been to either reject the argument by questioning one or more of the assumptions that the argument makes, or to accept and respond to the argument on its own terms. Those that have chosen the rejectionist approach have mostly done so by challenging Bradley’s skepticism about relations’ ability to relate their relata. Russell, Broad, Blanshard, Alexander, and Grossman have argued that it is a job of relations to relate and that Bradley’s relational regresses cannot get started if relations’ relating role is taken seriously. Many more philosophers, however, have found Bradleyean argument compelling and have responded in one of the following ways. They have appealed to: 1) some sort of non-relational tie or nexus to relate the relata (Bergmann, Strawson); 2) external relations equipped with special features (Meinertsen’s self-relating relations, Vallicella’s external relations with the power of self-determination, Maurin’s and Weiland and Betti’s relata-specific relations); 3) the mutual inter-dependence of the would-be relata (Frege, Baxter, Simons); 4) complexes as brute unifiers of their constituents (Olson, Armstrong); and 5) the benign nature of the regress in question (Armstrong, Orilia).