 Another sort of representation appealed to by some phenomenalists (e.g., Chalmers (2003), Block (2003)) is what Chalmers calls a “pure phenomenal concept.” A phenomenal concept in general is a concept whose denotation is a phenomenal property, and it may be discursive (‘the color of ripe bananas’), demonstrative (‘this color’; Loar 1990/96)), or even more direct. On Chalmers’s view, a pure phenomenal concept is (something like) a conceptual/phenomenal hybrid consisting of a phenomenological “sample” (an image or an occurrent sensation) integrated with (or functioning as) a conceptual component (see also Balog 1999 and Papineau 2002). Phenomenal concepts are postulated to account for the apparent fact (among others) that, as McGinn (1991b) puts it, “you cannot form [introspective] concepts of conscious properties unless you yourself instantiate those properties.” One cannot have a phenomenal concept of a phenomenal property P, and, hence, phenomenal beliefs about P, without having experience of P, because P itself is (in some way) constitutive of the concept of P. (Cf. Jackson 1982, 1986 and Nagel 1974.) (The so-called “ phenomenal concept strategy” puts pure phenomenal concepts to use in defending the Knowledge Argument against physicalism. See Loar 1990/96, Chalmers 2004a. Alter and Walter 2007 is an excellent collection of essays on phenomenal concepts. See Conee 1994 and Pitt 2019 for skeptical responses to this strategy.)