 According to the most familiar model of self-destructive addictive behavior, such behavior results from cravings that limit “the scope for volitional control of behavior” and can in some cases be irresistible, “overwhelm[ing] decision making altogether” (Loewenstein 1999, 235–6). But, as we know from dynamic choice theory, self-destructive behavior need not be compelled. It can also be supported by challenging choice situations and problematic preference structures that prompt dynamic choice problems. Reflection on this point has led to new ideas concerning possible sources of self-destructive addictive behavior. For example, George Ainslie (2001) has developed the view that addictive habits such as smoking—which can, it seems, flourish even in the absence of irresistible craving—are often supported by discounting-induced preference reversals. Given the possibility of discounting-induced preference reversals, even someone who cares deeply about having a healthy future, and who therefore does not want to be a heavy smoker, can easily find herself smoking cigarette after cigarette, where this figures as a series of indulgences that she plans against and then regrets.