 The question that immediately arises is whether a proposition that would undercut an inductive argument from evil if one knew it were true can undercut the argument if one is unable to assign any probability to the proposition’s being true, and if so, how.  One thought might be that if one can assign no probability to a proposition, one should treat it as equally likely to be true as to be false.  But propositions vary dramatically in logical form: some are such as might naturally be viewed as atomic, others are sweeping generalizations, others are complex conjunctions, and so on.  If one treated any proposition to which one could not assign a probability as equally likely to be true as to be false, the result would be an incoherent assignment of probabilities.  On the other hand, if one adopts this idea only in the case of atomic propositions, then given that stories that are advanced in defenses and theodicies are typically quite complex, those stories will wind up getting assigned low probabilities, and it is then unclear how they could undercut an inductive argument from evil.  