 Countering a difference dilemma requires undermining the way the issue was initially formulated (more accurately, mal-formulated).  Feminist critics of the view that pregnancy leave is a special benefit, for example, point out that the only way these benefits can be judged special is if the norm against which they are being evaluated is male. If the standard was female, or even human, such benefits could not be considered special (or even unusual) since they are far more commonly needed than, say, benefits for a broken leg, or prostate cancer (neither of which are considered special benefits). The underlying male standard is invisible because it is traditional for most workplaces, and pregnancy leave would require a change to these norms; but in the view of feminist critics, this underlying standard needs to be exposed as male because in fact it is not equal. (Rhode 1997; Minow 1991)  Once male norms are recognized as only that—male norms—the presumption of difference must be corrected. If the need for correction is taken seriously, then legal recognition of difference cannot by itself imply unequal treatment. An assertion of difference is a factual assessment. Equality is a political (or moral) standard. One does not automatically follow from the other. Thus formulation of the debate in terms of sameness or difference must be transcended by understanding equality. (Smith 2005; Rhode 1997; Minow 1991).