 Ginsborg (1997a) offers an alternative view of the free play derived from her “one-act” reading of the judgment of taste (see  Section 2.3.1),  on which what it is for the imagination and understanding to be in free play just is for the subject to be in a perceptual state of mind which involves a nonconceptual claim to its own universal validity with respect to the object perceived. Zinkin (2006) explains the free play in terms of the common sense (sensus communis) invoked by Kant at §20, which she understands as an intensive form of sensibility, in contrast to the extensive forms of sensibility represented by space and time. (For more on the common sense, see  Section 2.3.7.)  Gorodeisky (2011) criticizes “extra-aesthetic” approaches to the free play which attempt to relate the activity of the faculties in the free play too closely to their activity in cognition, failing to do justice to their distinctly aesthetic character; Ostaric 2017 makes a related complaint. Williams 2022 proposes that the free play is to be understood in terms of how attention is guided: in cognition, our attention is guided by cognitive interest, in aesthetics the subject is guided only by the interests of the imagination, so that the subject has the freedom to let her attention roam.