 One feature of rational agents’ intentional states is that they typically reject obvious impossibility or absurdity whilst being subject to subtle inconsistency (Lewis 2004). One attempt to capture this feature is developed through Jago 2006, 2007, 2009, 2014a. The idea is that only genuine possibilities and non-obvious impossibilities should be epistemically accessible to rational (but imperfect) agents such as us. For some agents, it may be epistemically possible that Fermat’s Last Theorem’s is false, but 0 being 1 shouldn’t be epistemically possible for anyone. That’s why we know the latter but may fail to know the former, says Jago. One worry with this approach is that it is in part proof theoretic, whereas it isn’t clear that proof length correlates well with obviousness. Bjerring (2013) presents other objections to the view. A strategy similar to Jago’s is adopted in Berto 2014, 2017.