 In a second family of distinctions, we find distinctions that are like the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in that they are also drawn in terms of the principles underwriting an agent’s reasons for acting, but are unlike it in that they are not drawn in terms of their relativity to the agent who has the reasons. Two main distinctions fall into this family: universality/non-universality and generality/non-generality. Agent-neutrality is often confused with universality. A reason is universal insofar as any person, A, who judges that one agent, B, has a reason is thereby committed to making the same judgment of anyone else, C, whom they take to be in relevantly similar circumstances. So long as we assume reasons are associated with principles, this will mean that the principle associated with the reason will be universal in scope; that is to say, it will be of the form, “For all x, if x is an agent, then…” Note that this is much weaker than Nagel’s conception of universality; even default principles employ universal quantifiers and are universal in this sense. Universality in this thin sense is rightly taken to be a highly uncontroversial, perhaps even trivial, feature of reasons. However, it would of course be a mistake to infer from this that agent-neutrality should be uncontroversial, for the concepts are quite different. Agent-relative reasons, as well as agent-neutral reasons, can satisfy universality in this sense. An egoist principle, for example, would typically be understood as a universally quantified thesis according to which for all agents A, if a given action maximizes A’s welfare then A ought to perform that action. Nor, of course, is agent-neutrality the same as universality in Nagel’s somewhat stronger sense according to which whatever is a reason in one case must be a reason anywhere. This is obvious once it is made explicit, but historical attempts to derive agent-neutrality from such forms of universality encourage the conflation (see, e.g., Hare 1963: 112–136).