  Another pressing philosophical issue raised by M VII–IX is the alleged difference in the skepticism evident in M XI (‘Against the Ethicists’) as compared to PH.  There can be no doubt that in M, Sextus is much more willing to give the counterargument to the Dogmatists’ positions without laying out the corresponding positive arguments that the Dogmatists gives. This lends an air of negative dogmatism to M. However, this is merely stylistic: there is also no doubt that Sextus frequently emphasizes in M that we shouldn’t take his arguments dogmatically, e.g., at M VII 444; VIII 159, 476 (Frede 1973: 808), or that the upshot of his argumentation is that one should suspend judgment e.g., M VII 443; VIII 298; IX 137: 191–2; X 168 (Bett 1997: xxix). But there are some passages in ‘Against the Ethicists’ which are harder, at least at first sight, to bring into line with the doctrine of suspension of judgment in PH. Sextus stresses in the ethical section of PH III that one should suspend judgment as to whether anything is good or bad by nature (e.g., PH III 235), and so it is no surprise that ‘M XI argues for the conclusion that nothing is by nature good or bad’ (Bett 1997: xiv)—so much one would expect by way of counterarguments to the Dogmatists’ positive arguments. But Sextus gets perilously close to saying that the skeptic should embrace the conclusions of these counterarguments (Bett 1997: xiv): 