  Discussions of epistemic injustice offer an excellent example of work focusing on the challenges of knowing in contexts of oppression, analyzing how many of the wrongs that occur within such contexts have both epistemic and ethical dimensions. Framing epistemic matters in terms of “injustice” marks a significant development in social epistemology, through which attention is drawn to the complex network of epistemic relations between knowers. At the same time, as the discussions of epistemic injustice have broadened and attention has turned to the interaction between different forms of epistemic injustice and the inadequacy of transactional remedies between individual knowers, some have found the language of epistemic injustice and justice too limiting and have reached for different concepts. For example, Dotson frames many of these issues in terms of “epistemic oppression” that involves “persistent epistemic exclusion” (Dotson 2014), and Medina develops an “epistemology of resistance” in response to the epistemic dimensions of oppression (Medina 2013).