  One possible view about properties is that they are not universals but rather particulars of a special sort—viz. abstract particulars (Stout 1923) or tropes (Williams 1953). According to this view, the redness of this apple is different from the redness of anything else, not because of its extreme singularity (other things could agree with the apple colorwise) but because it is the redness of this apple. It exists here and now, where and while the apple exists. Likewise, this morning’s rising of the sun would be numerically different from (though qualitatively similar to) any other morning’s rising of the sun. If so, then the view that events are properties becomes compatible with the view that they are spatiotemporally located. An event would just be a particularized property located at some region of space-time (Bennett 1996). (Once again, this conception is closely related to the conception of events as property exemplifications, although the term ‘exemplification’ suggests a construal of properties as universals. Some authors actually identify the two conceptions (Bennett 1988); others reject the identification on account of the difference between property instances and property exemplifications (Macdonald 1989).)