 From the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s, this experimental format was used in a large number of studies where the vignettes recounted events that the experimenters took to be clear cases of moral transgressions (like unprovoked hitting, stealing, and destroying someone else’s property) or clear cases of conventional transgressions (like chewing gum in class, talking without raising one’s hand, and calling the teacher by her first name), and the results, overwhelmingly, accord with Turiel’s prediction. The transgressions that the experimenters took to be moral were typically judged to be wrong, authority independent, and generalizable to other places and times, and judgments that the transgressions are wrong were usually justified by appeal to the harm the transgression had caused. The transgressions that the experimenters took to be conventional were typically judged to be wrong and authority dependent, they were not generalized to other times or places, and they were justified by appeal to social expectations, the need for social coordination, the commands of people in authority, the threat of punishment, and similar  factors.[9]  Moreover, these distinctions emerged very early in development. By their fourth birthday, and often earlier, most children had systematically different reactions to the sorts of transgressions that were used. These results were an overwhelming victory for Turiel in his disagreement with Kohlberg and Piaget. It is not the case that young children think of all normative rules in the same way; their normative cognition is not “undifferentiated”. Normative cognition in young children is much more subtle, more varied, and more complex than Kohlberg and Piaget had portrayed it. This was a major achievement in the study of child development. But the experimental results and the way they have been interpreted raise a number of important philosophical and psychological questions. We’ll address these questions in the sections that follow.