 Many naturalists go beyond methodological naturalism, however, and embrace a substantive doctrine. S-naturalism in philosophy is either the (ontological) view that the only things that exist are natural or physical things; or the (semantic) view that a suitable philosophical analysis of any concept must show it to be amenable to empirical inquiry. In the ontological sense, S-naturalism is often taken to entail physicalism, the doctrine that only those properties picked out by the laws of the physical sciences are real. In the semantic sense, S-naturalism is just the view that predicates must be analyzable in terms that admit of empirical inquiry: so, e.g., a semantic S-naturalist might claim that “morally good” can be analyzed in terms of characteristics like “maximizing human well-being” that admit of empirical inquiry by psychology and physiology (assuming that well-being is a complex psycho-physical state).