 There are yet other routes to a non-reductive intentionalism, less metaphysically bold. One might question the adequacy of various reductionist strategies that have been employed for specifying a kind of intentionality (or mental representation) that non-circularly guarantees phenomenality—as in Tye’s theory. One way doubts can get a grip is by considering variations on the phenomenon of “blindsight”—which may be reasonably interpreted as involving limited visual discriminatory abilities regarding stimuli that (on account of cortical damage) don’t look—don’t visually appear—anyhow to the discriminating subject. Can we coherently conceive of some such blindsight—a kind of “seeing” without visual consciousness (experience) of the visual stimuli—that nonetheless would meet the conditions this or that reductive intentionalist is committed to thinking guarantee phenomenal vision? Various kinds of enhanced blindsight have been envisaged (Block’s superblindsight 1995, 2002; Siewert’s spontaneous amblyopic blindsight 1998, 2010). We are invited to consider the prospect of visually mediated responses, in action and report, to stimuli of which the subject lacks visual experience—responses that correspond, in their spontaneity and acuity, to what is afforded by very low-grade visual experience. Suppose we can find no non-phenomenal intentional/representational difference, necessarily distinguishing such low-grade visual consciousness from its closest blindsight analogue, to which we can reduce the difference between the two. Then certain prominent versions of reductionism are threatened. But opposition or skepticism regarding all such accounts can coexist with intentionalism in the broadest sense. However, this sort of challenge to reductive intentionalism would leave open questions about what, if anything, to say about brains in vats, zombies, physicalism, and metaphysical basic-ness—and it would even be compatible with some forms of externalism.