  For pluralists, this compromise may not be good enough, and critics of functionalism about truth have raised several concerns. One stumbling block for functionalist theories is a worry about epistemic circularity. As Wright (2010) observes, any technique for implicit definition, such as Ramsification, proceeds on the basis of explicit decisions that the platitudes and principles constitutive of the modified Ramsey sentence are themselves true, and making explicit decisions that they are true requires already knowing in advance what truth is. Lynch (2013a) notes that the problem is not peculiar to functionalism about truth, generalizing to virtually all approaches that attempt to fix the denotation of ‘true’ by appeal to implicit definition. Some might want to claim that it generalizes even further, namely to any theory of truth whatsoever. Another issue is that the \(F\)-role becomes disunified to the extent that \(T\) can accommodate substantially different platitudes and principles. Recall that the individuation and identity conditions of the \(F\)-role—with which truth is identified—are determined holistically by the platitudes and principles constituting \(T\). So where \(T\) is constituted by expressions of the beliefs and commitments of ordinary folk, pluralists could try to show that these beliefs and commitments significantly differ across epistemic communities (see, e.g., Næss 1938a, b; Maffie 2002; Ulatowski 2017, Wyatt 2018). In that case, Ramsification over significantly different principles may yield implicit definitions of numerically distinct role properties \(F_1, F_2 , \ldots ,F_n\), each of which is a warranted claimant to being truth.