 Assent is up to us and under our control, and we are rightly held responsible for what we do, even though we do not have the ability to do otherwise than we do. If we accept PAP, then the actions of the virtuous person will be praiseworthy only if they are capable of acting in a way other than how they do act. But the truly virtuous person is incapable of acting viciously, of doing anything wrong. Imagine that I am a virtuous person, and that I have promised my young daughter a piece of cake if she finishes her dinner. She finishes her dinner and asks for the cake. There is only one action that I can and will do in that particular situation: give her the cake as promised. Let us suppose that there was some small chance that I would not keep my promise—that I’d pretend to look for the cake and not find it, and lie to her about its being missing, so that I could have it for myself later. If I were capable of depriving my daughter of her promised cake so that I could chow down on it later, then I would not really be a virtuous person. There would have to be something wrong with me. And so if we accept PAP, we would have to accept the absurd result that we should not praise virtuous people for acting virtuously, as they cannot do anything other than the virtuous action in any situation. And so, we should reject PAP (Alexander, On fate ch. 26, 196,24–197,3, LS 61M).