 Although the basic idea behind the modal characterization is clear enough from these statements, a moment’s reflection reveals a little bit of trouble. Many properties (some philosophers would say all properties) are such that in order for an object to possess them, that object must exist. According to the basic modal characterization, any such property, if possessed by a contingently existing object, will be counted as an accidental property of that object. But this seems wrong. Consider the property of being a dog. It is plausible (and for present purposes we assume it is true) that an object must exist in order to possess this property. Now consider a particular dog named ‘Emma’, who in fact exists but who might not have existed. There is a possible world in which Emma does not exist. And in this world (given our assumption) Emma is not a dog, since Emma does not exist there. So, according to the basic modal characterization, being a dog is an accidental property of Emma. But however we characterize the distinction between essential and accidental properties, the characterization should not by itself rule out the intuitively compelling claim that Emma is essentially a dog. So the basic modal characterization seems flawed.