 Part II of the Philosophical Investigations was, in fact, an item of contention ab initio. In Anscombe and Rhees’s first edition of 1953 (translated by Anscombe), reasons were given for including it, admittedly as a differentiated part, in the book. In Hacker and Schulte’s (translated and edited) fourth edition of 2009, its position was contrarily explained. It now became, instead of Part II, an almost independent entity – Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment (PPF). It is also emphasized that it was a “work in progress.” Be that as it may, that installment of a post-Philosophical Investigations text exhibits all the vagaries of Wittgensteinian interpretation – behooving philosophers to attend to questions of placement (which Wittgenstein is here represented, middle, later, or other?), affinity (how do these comments relate to Wittgenstein’s later work in general?), and topic (what is Wittgenstein dealing with here, psychology, epistemology, or the method of philosophy?).