 Danny Booth (2018) is sympathetic to Polger and Shapiro’s broader project, and to their conclusion about the importance of mind-brain identities in contemporary cognitive science. But he worries about their deference to scientists concerning how mental kinds are individuated, and thus identified across distinct physical realizations, as their Official Recipe for multiple realization proposes. He points out that many scientists view questions about mental kind individuation as “philosophical”, and so punt this concern back to philosophers. Scientists also sometimes individuate mental kinds on quite narrow grounds; Booth here cites Jacqueline Sullivan’s recent discussions of the difficulty of identifying mental kinds across neuroscience labs that employ different protocols (see discussion of Sullivan’s work in the “Philosophy of Neuroscience” entry, this encyclopedia). Sometimes they do so purely on behavioral grounds which operationalize mental kinds for laboratory experimentation. The latter approach flies directly in the face of Polger and Shapiro’s explicit rejection of mental kind identity in their Official Recipe for multiple realization. Booth also worries about Polger and Shapiro’s more general appeal to an interventionist account of causation to salvage “actual” autonomy for psychology. Nothing stops functionalists or realization physicalists from adopting a similar approach to saving psychology’s autonomy, and in fact many avail themselves of this approach. Booth worries that 