 The problem raises the question whether the (usually significant) good that an agent confers along with existence counterbalances the (usually limited) bad that an agent confers along with any unavoidably flawed existence in such a way that our existence-inducing act (usually) will be deemed permissible. And if it isn’t – if we think instead that obligations are left unsatisfied despite the good that comes with existence – is the moral of the story that moral obligation extends beyond making things better for people? If we agree, in other words, that it is our obligation to create additional good, is it enough that we create additional good for each and every existing and future person? Or does the nonidentity problem show that our obligations extend as well to the creation of additional good for merely possible people as well – or, more generally, for the universe? As we query how to evaluate existence-inducing acts for their moral permissibility – and perhaps, as a prior matter, how to determine whether one outcome, or possible future or world, is better, all things considered, than an alternate world – we find that some of our most deeply held intuitions regarding the nature and structure of morality are thrown into doubt. 