 Some of the most important issues raised by the emotions in early modern philosophy are practical, especially those concerning practical reason, the pursuit of happiness and moral philosophy. As we have seen, the emotions were generally tied closely to motivations for action. They are not necessarily the only, or the immediate sources of motivation: Descartes and Malebranche considered reason to offer motivations of its own, as did Pascal, who also admitted yet other sources of motivation. But many other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Hutcheson and Hume took the emotions to be the driving source of our practical reason. None of them, however, maintained that the emotions were immune to training and refinement, and indeed all early modern philosophers took it as important for both morality and happiness that we do train our emotions. The practical philosophies offered by Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza are particularly concerned with the pursuit of happiness, which they assume involves both managing and cultivating the emotions. Both Descartes and Spinoza sought “remedies” for the passions, which they take to be central to what Descartes called “pursuing virtue” and Spinoza “freedom from bondage.” Spinoza criticized Descartes for thinking that such remedy could provide complete control, but they shared the view that remediated emotions are crucial to the good life, conceived both eudaimonistically and morally. Malebranche considered corrupted passions to be “inordinate” and in need of regulation, a bit of language that Norris and Astell later picked up, although with less emphasis on the perversion of order through sin.