 Reasoning reminiscent of Pascal’s Wager, often with an explicit acknowledgment of it, also informs a number of debates in moral philosophy, both theoretical and applied. Kenny 1985 suggests that nuclear Armageddon has negative infinite utility, and some might say the same for the loss of even a single human life. Stich 1978 criticizes an argument that he attributes to Mazzocchi, that there should be a total ban on recombinant DNA research, since such research could lead to the “Andromeda scenario” of creating a killer strain of bacterial culture against which humans are helpless; the ban, moreover, should be enforced if the “Andromeda scenario has even the smallest possibility of occurring” (191), in Mazzocchi’s words. This is plausibly read, then, as an assignment of negative infinite utility to the Andromeda scenario. More recently, Colyvan, Cox, and Steele 2010 discuss Pascal’s Wager-like problems for certain deontological moral theories, in which violations of duties are assigned negative infinite utility. Colyvan, Justus and Regan 2011 canvas difficulties associated with assigning infinite value to the natural environment. Bartha and DesRoches 2017 respond, with an appeal to relative utility theory. Stone 2007 argues that a version of Pascal’s Wager applies to sustaining patients who are in a persistent vegetative state; see Varelius 2013 for a dissenting view. Pascal’s Wager has even been appealed to in the medical debate over whether antibiotics should be used to prevent a certain kind of inflammation in the heart (Shaw and Conway 2010).