  This characterization of dharma can be taken to suggest that it has something to do with post-mortem existence states of affairs, which were indeed among the expected results of certain Vedic rites. (Early proponents of Mīmāṃsā differed from most other Indian philosophical schools in not taking liberation from saṃsāra to be the ultimate desideratum.) The perennially subjunctive character of talk of dharma perhaps more significantly reflects, however, the view that Vedic injunctions essentially enjoin the ongoing bringing into being (bhāvanā) of a ritual world that must continually be renewed; it is insofar as no one ever finishes bringing this world into being that its realization is always still to come. (See, on this idea, Clooney 1990, 129–161.) Philosophically, the significant point is that, as always yet to be realized, the summum bonum for Mīmāṃsakas is essentially inaccessible to perception, and only language can be thought to represent a way of knowing it. This is surely the paramount intuition informing the entire Mīmāṃsaka project, which centers on confidence in the epistemic status of Vedic injunctions and the mind-independent reality of language.