 Another aspect of Neander’s theory that has been criticized is her causal requirement: the claim that properties can only enter into the content of a sensory-perceptual representation R if they are causally relevant for bringing it about that R is tokened. Green (2017) argues that this requirement, as spelled out by Neander (2017, 270–271), has the counterintuitive consequence that visual representations that appear to represent an object as moving through adjacent regions of space (‘something moves from region 1 to region 2 to …’) actually represent the successive occurrence of object presences in those regions (‘something is in region 1, then something is in region 2, then …’). Ganson (2021a) also takes issue with the causal requirement. He contends that Neander cannot accommodate distance representations that are generated on the basis of visual cues that are statistically, but not causally related to the distance of perceived objects.