 But if neutrality is understood according to the Both View, the case for identifying neutral monism with the dual-aspect theory is strengthened. Much will turn on how the details of the Both View are articulated. It must not, for example, be understood as proposing the identification of mental and physical properties. For the dual-aspect theory insists that the two aspects are fundamental and irreducible to each other. Another question concerns the relationship of the aspects and properties. If aspects are understood as properties, dual-aspect theory may simply collapse into property dualism (see, e.g., Van Gulick 2014). Dual-aspect theorists have pushed back by insisting that aspects are not properties (see Skrbina 2014: 228–29). But this may, in turn, block the project of reconciling the dual-aspect theory with neutral monism. For the neutrality, on the Both as well as on the Neither View, is understood in terms of mental and physical properties.