 Disinterestedness has a long history; it characterizes the popular aesthetic attitude theories of the twentieth century, which argued that a prerequisite for any kind of full appreciation of art is a distanced, relatively contemplative stance towards a work of art. Similar assumptions about the most suitable way to view art lie behind the formalist criticism that dominated visual art interpretation for decades, and that also characterize interpretive norms in other art forms such as literature and music (McClary 1991, 4; Devereaux 1998; Brand 2000). The value of disinterested aesthetic enjoyment has come under heavy critical scrutiny on the part of feminists. Some have deconstructed this idea and argued that a supposedly disinterested stance is at least sometimes actually a covert and controlling voyeurism and as such ought to be abandoned as an aesthetic ideal. Others caution against discarding standards of disinterested, impartial judgment altogether, arguing that such a move relinquishes the important normativity of aesthetic evaluations (Eaton 2008, 2012). Nonetheless, even if disinterestedness and related standards of objectivity are retained, feminists continue to draw attention to the ways in which the mere act of looking can manifest relations of social power. Anne Eaton proposes an alternative notion of “situatedness,” importing into aesthetics a version of feminist standpoint theory to draw attention both to audience positions of appreciation and to the perspectives evoked in works of art (Eaton 2009).