 One question about Kagan’s theory is, what exactly are we measuring when we measure intrinsic value from the perspective of desert? In his book Kagan remains agnostic about whether it is better if a more deserving person gets exactly what he deserves than if a less deserving person does. Maybe this is better; but maybe, on the other hand, a situation in which someone who deserves a high welfare level gets exactly what he deserves is just as good as a situation in which someone who deserves a low (but still positive) welfare gets exactly what he deserves (2012, section 4.3). However, on one natural understanding of the perspective of desert, there is not much room for debate here. It is natural to think that ‘from the perspective of desert,…’ just means ‘taking into account only how close people are to getting what they deserve,…’ If this is right then it is obvious that a situation in which someone who deserves a welfare level of 50 and gets a welfare level of 50 is just as good, from the perspective of desert, as a situation in which someone who deserves a welfare level of 200 gets a welfare level of 200. (One who held this view can, of course, say that in another sense the second situation is better: it is better all-things-considered, because the total amount of welfare in that situation is higher.) The fact that Kagan does not think it obvious that the two situations are equally good from the perspective of desert is evidence that he rejects this account of what the perspective of desert is. (For more on this question about Kagan’s theory, see Appendix I of Feldman 2003, and Skow 2014.) 