 Perhaps the most influential example of a mixed account begins by recognizing that the question of punishment’s justification is in fact several different questions, which may be answered by appeal to different considerations. In particular, Hart (1968: 9–10) pointed out that we may ask about punishment, as about any social institution, what compelling rationale there is to maintain the institution (that is, what values or aims it fosters) and also what considerations should govern the institution. The compelling rationale will itself entail certain constraints: e.g., the rationale of deterrence would rule out punishments that had no deterrent effect or, worse, tended to exacerbate crime levels. What distinguishes hybrid theories such as Hart’s, however, is the claim that there may be constraining considerations that do not flow from punishment’s rationale. On Hart’s account, the compelling rationale for punishment (what he termed its ‘general justifying aim’) lies in its beneficial effects, but our pursuit of that aim must be constrained by nonconsequentialist principles that preclude the kinds of injustice alleged to flow from a purely consequentialist account: principles that forbid, for instance, the deliberate punishment of the innocent, or the excessively harsh punishment of the guilty. (See most famously Hart 1968, and Scheid 1997 for a sophisticated Hartian theory; on Hart, see Lacey 1988: 46–56; Morison 1988; Primoratz 1999: ch. 6.6.)