 Some epistemic democrats worry that an exaggerated focus on jury theorems (and aggregation more generally) suppresses other important epistemic mechanisms, such as democratic experimentation (Anderson 2006; Fuerstein 2008), individual learning as opposed to aggregation (Müller 2018), distributed search, deliberation, and learning. Certainly, jury theorems are only one building block; a comprehensive epistemic analysis of collective decision-making also needs models of such other mechanisms. Nevertheless, jury theorems can assist the epistemic analysis of institutions and help assess political representation, bicameralism, epistemic division of labour, political cue taking, the merits of diversity, and the dangers of excessive bias, to name just a few applications (Goodin &amp; Spiekermann 2018). Jury theorems have also been used to analyse legal institutions, including the importance of legal precedent and, of course, the (in)correctness of jury verdicts (e.g., Vermeule 2009; Feddersen &amp; Pesendorfer 1998; Coughlan 2000).