 What is it to be morally responsible? This entry adopts a broadly “Strawsonian” view in the tradition of P.F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (P. F. Strawson 1962; cp. Fischer &amp; Ravizza 1998, 6–8). To be morally responsible is to be the proper object of the “reactive attitudes,” such as respect, praise, forgiveness, blame, indignation, and the like. If Marija is responsible for adopting a stray cat, it’s proper to praise her for this act. If it turns out Meghan is not responsible for ruining Sean’s tea, then this means it’s not appropriate, for Sean or anyone else, to blame or resent her for what she did. There are other theories of moral responsibility (see entry on  moral responsibility).  What our principle looks like under these alternative accounts will remain open, though one can expect that problems similar to those considered below will arise on any but the most radically revisionary ways of thinking of responsibility.