 On to (ii). Is the intrinsic difference between judgement and presentation one that concerns the content of the mental mental phenomena under consideration? According to the view opposed by Brentano, every judgement is a combining or separating of marks [Merkmale]. The content of a judgement is the combination of at least two marks that are either divided or combined in it. Possessing a content is an intrinsic property of a judgement: every judgement must have a content and the content distinguishes a judgement, in part, from other mental phenomena. Do judgements and presentations differ in content (cf. PES 205 [II 44; SVS 1, 227])? Again Brentano’s answer is NO. If I wonder whether there are red trees, the content of my presentation is a combination of the marks redness and tree(hood). My judgement that there are red trees has the same content as the mere presentation of a red  tree.[6]