 After all, not all duties are directed to specific others. For example, the moral duty of affluent people to give some of their wealth to charity is not owed to any specific person. And “directed duties” appear to have special normative significance. The violation of any duty may be wrong (it may be wrong for a rich person to give nothing to charity). But the violation of a directed duty is more than just a wrong: it is a wronging of the being to whom the duty is owed (Thompson 2004). And unlike a mere wrong, the wronging of some being calls, ceteris paribus, for apology and compensation. Cruft (2013) further argues that the violation of any duty owed to a being is disrespectful of that being. The question is what could possibly account for the extra significance of the duties that have direction. (Cornell 2015 argues against the thesis that one can wrong only those to whom one has directed duties.)