 There are two problems with the view that consent of the oppressed is either necessary or sufficient for rightful authority to initiate revolutionary war. First, in virtually every real world situation, consent will not be unanimous; so two questions immediately present themselves and a plausible answer to either is far from obvious: (1) if consent is necessary for rightful authority, how can anyone have rightful authority over those who do not consent; and (2) if the consent of some is sufficient for rightful authority over all, how many must consent (a bare majority, a supermajority, etc.)? If the point of consent is that without it those who initiate revolutionary war are arbitrarily putting those who do not consent at risk, then the fact that some have consented cannot make the imposition of risks on those who did not consent any less arbitrary. Second, in the very circumstances when the just cause for revolution is most compelling, namely, where the regime exercises thorough-going domination and refuses to reform, it will be difficult if not impossible to obtain valid consent, either because the regime will not allow any plausible process of gaining consent or because people will be afraid to affirm their consent out of fear of retaliation by the regime, or because the regime’s oppression will have distorted their consciousness and preferences to such an extent that they are incapable of giving valid consent. John Simmons (1979) has argued that even where the best democratic political processes are available, genuine consent cannot be obtained; if that is so, then it is hardly likely that consent can be gotten in the much less favorable circumstances in which the aspiring revolutionary leadership might seek it.