 It is also worth noting that the idea that the idea that manipulation undermines autonomous choice might itself be used, somewhat paradoxically, to undermine autonomous choice, especially among the non-elite. This point is comes out forcefully in a comment by Sarah Skwire (2015, Other Internet Resources) on George Akerlof and Robert Shiller’s book, Phishing for Phools (Akerlof &amp; Shiller 2015). Akerlof and Shiller discuss a number of advertising, sales, and marketing practices that they deem manipulative. Skwire suggests that the reason why Akerlof and Shiller call these practices manipulative is that consumers subjected to them make choices that Akerlof and Shiller think are sufficiently irrational that they would only be made under the influence of manipulation. Skwire writes that this approach to detecting manipulation demonstrates “contempt for the decisions made by people who are poorer and from a lower social class than the authors” (Skwire 2015, Other Internet Resources). In short, she suggests that Akerlof and Shiller are too quick to suspect manipulation in cases where people make different decisions from the ones they think best. Whether or not we agree with Skwire’s criticisms of Akerlof and Shiller, her point serves as a cautionary one: Even if we accept that manipulation undermines autonomous choice, we must be careful not to use that as a reason to suspect that people who make different choices from what we think are best must therefore be victims of manipulation. It would be ironic—and unjust—to use the idea that manipulation is a wrongful interference with autonomy as a weapon to delegitimize the autonomous choices of people with whom we disagree or whose situations, needs, and values we do not understand.