 One way to answer this latter question, assuming there are normative properties, is to figure out which normative property, if any, is normatively fundamental. This is not the question about what is metaphysically fundamental, or fundamental simpliciter. It is the question of what the bottom layer of normative facts, so to speak, looks like, and in particular what normative properties show up there, if there is such a bottom layer. Those normative facts might be grounded in non-normative facts of one kind or another, or maybe they’re ungrounded – we’ll come to that question in time. The question here is, what are the normative properties, if any, that all other normative properties depend on, or are explained by? (We are being deliberately opaque about the sense of dependence or explanation involved, since that is a matter of some controversy – while many nowadays want to construe it as grounding [see, for instance, Berker 2018], others are skeptical [Wielenberg 2014: 1.5].) If we can get an answer to that question, it could tell us about the nature of the normative.