 Two reasons might be mentioned for such a situation. First, Indian philosophers did not principally engage in discussions with representatives of the materialist school, except for standardised dismissive refutations of a few basic materialist theories, which are mentioned by Indian philosophers in their works in order to render a ‘complete’ picture of the philosophical spectrum. These standardised, habitually repeated refutations were not applicable to Jayarāśi, who was not a typical representative of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata school. New powerful philosophical machinery would have to be applied to engage in a discussion with Jayarāśi. And that is precisely the second reason: the arguments Jayarāśi consistently applies, his rigid and coherent lines of argumentation proved to be an extremely hard piece of cake to swallow for those whose views he criticised. It seems, therefore, that the general approach of Indian philosophers vis-à-vis Jayarāśi was that of disregard and failure to notice the weight of his work. A few exceptions can be mentioned though of those who attempted to engage with Jayarāśi’s arguments, notably two Jaina philosophers, Vidyānanda and Anantavīrya, and a propounder of the Nyāya system, Bhāsarvajña (Franco (1994:  553–586)). Jayarāśi is occasionally mentioned in a positive light when Indian authors acknowledge his powerful method of critical analysis, and these are primarily, or even exclusively, Jaina authors. Sometimes they even refer to Jayarāśi as an expert in some fields, e.g. by Malliṣeṇa (c. 1229), who says: ‘A refutation of all cognitive criteria in details should be consulted from the Tattvôpaplava-siṁha’ (SVM, p.118.1–2).