 Psychopaths know, at least typically, that their actions are widely perceived to be wrong, to be sure, but they are unable to grasp the distinctive nature and significance of their wrongness. Psychopaths apparently take harm to others to be wrong only because such harms are against the rules. For them, stealing from, or hurting, another is no more wrong than, say, double-parking or line-jumping. But the kind and degree of wrongness, and therefore blame, that attaches to infringement of the rules is very different, and usually much less significant, than the kind and degree attaching to moral wrongs. For psychopaths, all offences are merely conventional, and therefore—from their point of view—none of them are all that serious. Hence, their degree of responsibility is smaller, arguably much smaller, than it would be for a comparable harm committed by a normal agent. Indeed, there are grounds for excusing them from moral responsibility altogether. (Levy 2007a: 132)