 The Dependence Question: Suppose conceivability does provide justification for believing that something is possible. Does it succeed in doing so because conceivability operates on some prior beliefs about the considered scenario? For example, does conceivability guide one to the belief that a round square is impossible because one knows what squares and circles are, and by examining their definition one can arrive safely at the conclusion that such objects are impossible? Similarly, does one simply find water in the absence of hydrogen possible because one either suppresses the knowledge that water contains hydrogen or one does not know that water does contain hydrogen? In the first case, conceivability would seem to depend, to an important extent on, underlying linguistic or conceptual knowledge (along the lines of analytic accounts of the a priori more generally). In the second case, conceivability would depend on both linguistic or conceptual knowledge and empirical knowledge. In both cases, additional essentialist knowledge might be needed (e.g., Kment 2021; Goff 2021; and Roca-Royes 2011a). In Vaidya and Wallner’s (2021),  (§2),  the critical point of the Dependence Question is the following: In order for our conceivability exercises to appropriately justify our modal judgments, those conceivability exercises need to be constrained by some crucial information about the (essence of) the entities involved in them, creating the needed epistemic friction for conceivability. In effect, the Dependence Question is concerned with the issue of the source of modal knowledge. Is conceivability an ultimate source of modal knowledge, or is it derivative, namely dependent on another source, such as linguistic or conceptual knowledge and essentialist knowledge? (see also Berto &amp; Schoonen 2018).