 I primarily self-attribute a certain kind of experience which has an intentional content (Armstrong 1962, 1968, pp. 314–316; and Pitcher 1970, pp. 383–385, 1971 — see also Dretske 1999, 2006; Tye 1997, 2006a). To say that an experience has an intentional content is to say that it represents a certain situation or state of affairs (which may be quite complex), or to say that it has an intentional content with a non-indicative function like issuing a command (imperative content — see below). So for instance, when I see a red apple on the table, I am having a visual experience which represents, among other things, a red apple on the table. Some perceptualists might describe the proper intentional or representational content of experiences in less objectual terms by not naming what is represented in terms of ordinary objects like apples and tables. For these theorists, it is more appropriate to characterize the representational content of perceptual experiences in terms of the ways in which the sensible qualities of those objects are instantiated or distributed in one’s perceptual field. Experiences detect or track these qualities. For instance, they may say that my visual experience represents the instantiation of redness with the instantiation of a certain (apple-like) shape quality, etc. But both ways of characterizing this content are meant to be objective in the sense that they represent extramental reality (at least, partly — it all depends on how one conceives of so-called secondary qualities). Treating perceptual experiences as having intentional content is appropriate and in line with the naturalistic motivation behind developing perceptual accounts in general, for this is how they serve their primary function of informing their owners about their immediate extramental environment, including bodily environment.