 Such remarks may sound philosophically naive to a trained epistemologist. It is not obvious, for instance, that the existence of a mathematical or specifically algorithmic emergent pattern would block a supposed regress entailed by a non-mathematical emergence. Why would science as an activity of (occasionally) non-algorithmic pattern discovery be a merely subjective enterprise? If these claims can be re-phrased in a philosophically sophisticated way, though, they may challenge standard definitions of weakly emergent properties (in the sense of Chalmers 2002). Teller 1992, Clark 1996, and Bedau 1997, for instance, all run together instances of “pattern discovery”—, taken as a subjective, observer-dependent activity—with instances of intrinsic emergence—a phenomenon that, as we have just seen, can be characterized in the context of CA as objective and statistically significant (see the relevant section of the entry on  emergent properties).  