 Proposition r is the conclusion, whereas p and q are the premises. The legal doctrine can thus be logically expressed as \((p\land q)\leftrightarrow r\), stating that premises p and q are both necessary and sufficient for the conclusion r.  Table 1  shows that each judge respects the given legal doctrine, by declaring the conclusion to be true if and only if she deems both premises true. If the judges aggregate their individual opinions using majority rule on the judgments on each proposition, the resulting judgment set is {p, q, not r}, which constitutes a violation of the legal doctrine. This is an instance of the doctrinal paradox: despite the individuals being logically consistent, the group’s judgment on the propositions is not consistent with the legal doctrine. In the example above, the judges cannot declare the defendant not liable and, at the same time, state that both conditions for her liability apply. Thus, the court faces a dilemma. Either judges are asked to express judgments on the premises only, and the court’s decision on r is logically derived from the majority on the premises (the premise-based or issue-by-issue procedure), or the verdict is decided by the majority judgment on r (the conclusion-based or case-by-case procedure) ignoring the opinions on the premises. Instances such as that in  Table 1  illustrate that the two procedures may give opposite results. In the court example the issues on which the judges have to express a position are distinguished into premises and conclusion. We should note, however, that the theory of judgment aggregation does not require such a distinction. The court decision of declaring the defendant not liable (despite a majority in favour of the two criteria to declare her liability) would be inconsistent with the decision rule \((p \land q) \leftrightarrow r\) even without a distinction between premises and conclusion.