 It is tempting to take the ontology of natural language to just be the ontology implicit in cognition, including perception. In fact, often researchers pursuing natural language ontology take research in cognitive science into account or pursue interdisciplinary research in both areas at once (e.g., Wellwood et al. 2012; Wisniewski et al. 1996). While there are without doubt important connections and a significant overlap, the two ontologies need to be kept distinct. To give an example, it is generally agreed that the ontology implicit in cognition in general, that is, the ontology of ordinary objects, is not closed under sum formation, but rather subject to constraints of gestalt (integrity) as well as function (Schaffer &amp; Rose 2017). Thus, the sum of the stuff in my room does not form an entity that belongs to the ontology of ordinary objects and neither does the sum of the Eiffel Tower and the Dalai Lama. But natural language appears to allow for unrestricted sum formation with definite mass and plural NPs and conjunctions of definite singular NPs (the stuff in my room, the Eiffel Tower and the Dalai Lama), at least on the dominant view on which definite plural and mass NPs stand for sums  (§3.1.1).  Another example of a divergence between the ontology implicit in cognition and in natural language is the mass-count distinction, with choices such as the English mass noun pasta and the French plural count noun pâtes hardly reflecting a cognitive distinction  (§3.3).