 Devitt (2008) rejects relational essentialism. He argues that relational essentialism fails to answer two crucial questions. The taxon question: Why is organism O a member of species S? The trait question: Why do members of species S typically have trait T? Devitt suggests that to answer these questions species need intrinsic essences; and because relational essentialism only posits relational essences, relational essentialism fails to answer these questions. Devitt’s target is not merely to discredit relational essentialism, but also to argue for a new form of intrinsic biological essentialism. According to Devitt (2008), a species’ essence is the cluster of intrinsic properties and perhaps the relations that cause the typical traits of a taxon’s members. Let us consider Devitt’s critique of relational essentialism. In doing so, we will learn about both relational essentialism and Devitt’s intrinsic biological essentialism.