 Leeds (1978) (following Quine) makes it clear how the truth predicate is crucial for extending the expressive power of a language, despite the triviality that disquotationalism suggests for the transparent instances of truth-talk. He (ibid., 121) emphasizes the logical role of the truth predicate in the expression of certain kinds of generalizations that would otherwise be inexpressible in natural language. Leeds, like Quine, notes that a central utility of the truth predicate, in virtue of its yielding every instance of (ES-sent), is the simulation of quantification into sentence-positions. But, unlike Quine, Leeds glosses this logical role in terms of expressing potentially infinite conjunctions (for universal generalization) or potentially infinite disjunctions (for existential generalization). The truth predicate allows us to use the ordinary devices of first-order logic in ways that provide surrogates for the non-standard logical devices this would otherwise require. Leeds is also clear about accepting the consequences of deflationism, that is, of taking the logically expressive role of the truth predicate to exhaust its function. In particular, he points out that there is no need to think that truth plays any sort of explanatory role. We will return to this point in Section 4.1.