 The marked status of negative utterances has also been invoked to motivate an asymmetry in the geometry of lexicalization. Within the Square of Opposition, the Aristotelian relations of contradiction, contrariety, and subalternation are supplemented with an additional relation of subcontrariety, so called because the subcontraries are located under the contraries. As the contradictories of the two contraries, the subcontraries (e.g., Some pleasure is good, Some pleasure is not good) can both be true, but cannot both be false. For Aristotle, this was therefore not a true opposition, since subcontraries are “merely verbally opposed” (Prior Analytics 63b21–30). In pragmatic terms, the assertion of one subcontrary (Some men are bald) is not only compatible with, but actually conversationally implicates, the other (Some men are not bald), given Grice’s Maxim of Quantity (“Make your contribution as informative as is required”; see the entries on  Paul Grice,  pragmatics, and  implicature).  The fact that the two members of a subcontrary pair tend to be equipollent or mutually derivable in a given context may explain the fact that only one of the two subcontraries will lexicalize in natural language, and the markedness of negation explains why this is always the positive (I vertex, e.g., some) rather than the negative (O vertex, e.g., no) value (Horn 1989, 2012). Thus the E values none, nor, and never are possible but the corresponding O values *nall (“not all”), *nand (“or not”), and *nalways (“not always”) are never attested. Similar, if less absolute, asymmetries obtain among non-quantificational and indeed non-logical values (van der Auwera 1996, Horn 2012). Various competing explanations to the pragmatic account of Horn (1989, 2012) have been proposed for motivating these asymmetries; see, inter alia, Jaspers 2005, Seuren and Jaspers 2014, and references therein.