 Royzman and colleagues conclude that we should not assume that the sort of socioeconomic differences that Haidt found in his moral/conventional task studies are due to fundamentally divergent values. Rather, since poverty has been linked to impaired cognitive performance, they speculate that the differences between Haidt et al.’s high- and low-SES participants is “a product of the low-SES participants’ cognitive limitations” (Royzman, Landy, &amp; Goodwin 2014: 187) Needless to say, the suggestion that some of the moral judgments made by low SES people in the USA and abroad are the result of impaired cognitive performance is more than a bit provocative! Much more work is needed before accepting this conclusion, and careful skepticism is warranted: Instead of speculating about the causal role of alleged “cognitive limitations” in explaining why low- and high-SES judgments vary, Royzman and colleagues could have actually collected data from both socio-economic groups and tested the claim directly; unfortunately they didn’t. But if Royzman, Landy, and Goodwin are right, then Turiel and other social domain theorists may have been on to something important when they claimed that harm plays a central role in characterizing the moral transgressions picked out by the moral/conventional task, though because of their cognitive style economically challenged people may be less able to assess the moral importance of cases involving harms that are not intrinsic.