  This theory is illustrative only. No defender of a reliable process theory of justification is apt to regard reliability as determined merely by the actual frequency of true versus false belief production or sustenance. Instead, reliability would be thought of as a propensity that a method M has to produce or sustain mostly true beliefs. This important point about how to best understand reliability, however, will not affect the point just made concerning reliable process theories and externalism regarding justification. Exactly the same argument will apply when reliability is understood as a propensity. Reliability of that sort as applied to process M will suffice for the belief to be justified.. Accessibility via reflection to any of the justifiers, if present as a capability in S, will not be relevant to her being justified in believing p, and neither will the absence of such a capability. So, if the reliable process theory as here depicted is correct as an account of justified belief, then internalism regarding justification would be false. This point about lack of access to justifiers is the main contention of the externalist thesis regarding justification. (The actual long run frequency and propensity interpretations of reliability were clearly noted in Goldman 1979, 11. Reference to justifiers is not there made by Goldman; that term came into use about a decade later in work by Alston.  Goldman gives more refined and complex statements of the theory, making use of J-rules, in Goldman 1986, 2009.) 