 This testimony is a fine example of Protagoras’ way of reasoning. The facts are indisputable: a man has unintentionally killed another man. However, everything remains to be said as regards the issues of moral responsibility, legal guilt, and how to judge the whole incident. One and the same indisputable fact may be viewed from many different perspectives: for the physician, the javelin will be responsible for the man's death; for the umpire, it will be the javelin-thrower; for the person who has organised the competition, it will be the umpire. This contrast gives the sophist some room for action: he will attempt to create some agreement, lending meaning and order to the event (Untersteiner 1949 [1954: 56–57]). The notion of correctness is the criterion which enables him to overcome the above difficulties: given that there is some validity to all the above points of view, the problem will be to find the one most suited to the situation, while foregoing any claim to come up with a single, independently valid in all cases, answer. No doubt, the notion of “correctness” finds a prominent place in Protagoras’ thought and allows us to grasp some of its strands of continuity. At the basis of this notion lies the awareness of the problematic relationship between reality and human beings which was discussed in connection with MM, and which finds another expression in the statement that “concerning every subject, there are two arguments opposed to one another” (80B6a DK). With regard to each thing there are two opposite logoi (speeches, arguments, points of view)—A and non-A—precisely because each experience is open to contrasting readings and interpretations (thus, in the case of the above example, each of the three elements can be reduced to this binary logic by arguing whether it has been or not the umpire, or the javelin, or the javelin-thrower). Logos, which expresses our capacity to think and speak, thus cannot exhaust the complexity of reality. However, as already noted with regard to MM, contradictory points of view do not imply confusion or the failure of human possibilities. Rather, the challenge that Protagoras takes up and the promise he makes is to be able to (and teach others to) unravel this complexity by identifying which of any two opposite logoi is the better, or rather the more correct, which is to say the one better suited to the circumstance at hand: this is probably the meaning of his well-known claim to “to make the weaker argument the stronger” (80B6b DK). It is easy to discern the structural analysis that links this notion of correctness to that of the type of usefulness we have discussed in relation to the MM fragment: in both cases the problem is to find the best, most expedient relationship with things in each circumstance, and this can be obtained by using correctly our logos, both in the sense of judging correctly the case and convincing the others.