 Although Supp and Hook give the same answer to Question 1, their reasons are different. Supp answers “yes” not because a proposition, \(A*B\), is true whenever \(A \amp{\sim}B\) is false; but because \(B\) is true in all the “worlds” which matter for the assessment of “If \(A, B\)”: the \(A\)-worlds. Although Supp and Arrow give the same answer to Question 2, their reasons are different. Supp answers “yes”, not because a proposition \(A*B\) may be false when \(A\) is false; but because the fact that most worlds are \({\sim}A\)-worlds is irrelevant to whether most of the \(A\)-worlds are \(B\)-worlds. To judge that \(B\) is true on the supposition that \(A\) is true, it turns out, is not to judge that something-or-other, \(A*B\), is true.