 Altogether, hierarchical evolutionary theory is potentially inclusive of macroevolutionary processes (such as species selection), along with paradigmatic microevolutionary processes (such as organism-level selection), sub-microevolutionary processes (such as genic selection), and even super-macroevolutionary processes (like clade selection). Lewontin (1970) considers the possibility of the following acting as units of selection: molecules, cell organelles, cells themselves, gametes, individuals (this is the term he uses), kin groups, populations, species, communities of species, and phyla. Williams (1966) and Dawkins (1976) are often credited with developing the notion of genic selectionism.  Debate over genic selectionism—a theory within which genes are both the units of heredity and the units of selection—has led to further philosophical discussion regarding what counts as a replicator as opposed to an interactor (Hull 1980; Brandon 1988, 1990; Lloyd 1988; Griffiths &amp; Gray 1994, 1997; Sterelny 1996; Sterelny, Smith, &amp; Dickison 1996; Godfrey-Smith 2000; Griesemer 2000; Nanay 2002).  Various biologists (e.g., Mayr 1963; Gould 1980a; Lewontin 1991) have ardently disputed the claim that genes act as direct targets of selection. Philosophers of biology have taken positions both pro (e.g., Sterelny &amp; Kitcher 1988; Waters 1991) and con (e.g., Sober &amp; D.S. Wilson 1994; Lloyd 2005) on the topic of genic selectionism.