 An analogous account can be given of Kripke’s examples of the contingent a priori: these concern sentences whose primary intensions are necessary and whose secondary intensions are contingent. Assume again that the reference of ‘Julius’ is fixed by the description ‘the inventor of the zip (if such a person exists).’ Then in every world considered as actual, the name singles out the person who is the inventor of the zip in that world (if there is such a person) or nothing (if no such person exists in the world). The primary intension of (4) is necessary. However, when we evaluate (4) in a world \(w\) considered as counterfactual, ‘Julius’ picks out the individual who is the actual inventor of the zip (provided that there actually is such an individual and that he or she exists in \(w)\). And since there are possible worlds where that individual exists but is not the inventor of the zip, the secondary intension of (4) is contingent.