 Portmore (2011: 177) understands a set of acts \(α_j\) to be a maximal act-set in a similar vein to both a possibilist’s notion of a maximal act-set and Sobel’s notion of a life. The set of acts “\(α_i\)” is not identical to “\(α_j\)” when, e.g., one lacks the ability at \(t_j\) to form an intention to perform “\(α_j\)”, although the agent would in fact perform \(α_j\) if the agent were to form at \(t_j\) the intention to perform \(α_i\). For example, earning a PhD may be presently scrupulously securable for an agent, although she is presently unable to form an intention to do all of the things that are required to attain a PhD at least because she cannot presently intend to write about an idea in her dissertation that she has not yet studied (Portmore 2011: 169). So, whenever \(α_j\) and \(α_i\) are not identical, part (1) says that S would perform some act-set if S were to intend to perform some other act-set (along with certain background attitudes).