 Gaṅgeśa’s Nyāya embraces realism along several dimensions, realism in the sense of commitment to entities that exist independently of consciousness. There are, however, exceptions in the properties of a self along with some others that do require consciousness to occur. Knowledge itself and other mental phenomena are counted as reals and knowable intersubjectively, for instance. Realism leads Naiyāyikas to embrace fallibilism from very early, because the transcendence, so to say, of a physical object to the instruments of knowledge is seen to mean that the possibility of error cannot be ruled out—except in the case of apperception, according to Gaṅgeśa (see below). The Jewel is filled out with numerous definitional projects where the definienda (instances of knowledge, for example, as well as physical objects), are realities. And all individuals of whatever fundamental type (substance, quality, motion, universal, inherence, individuator, and absence) are viewed as reals, although the mind can create fictions. Against Buddhist subjectivists, it is argued that the components of false and fictional awarenesses themselves indicate reals. Gold and mountains are real but maybe not a gold mountain. More about illusion and other instances of non-knowledge in practically every subsection below.