 Two notable examples where experimental results have been taken to stand in prima facie tension with orthodox positions in epistemology concern knowledge attributions in cases with (i) shifting stakes and (ii) unsafe beliefs. In the former case, experimental results reported in early papers in experimental epistemology surprisingly did not corroborate a key datum of use appealed to by epistemic contextualists; that is, contextualists such as Keith DeRose (1992, 2009) have relied on the thought that—in “bank” cases (1992: 913)—it is felicitous to attribute knowledge in low-stakes cases but not in high-stakes cases. Critics of contextualism had generally accepted this point about use patterns while challenging the reasoning from here to a contextualist semantics for “knows”. However, early experimental epistemology papers by Buckwalter (2010), Feltz and Zarpentine (2010), and May et al. (2010) reported that participants were similarly inclined to attribute knowledge across cases with shifting stakes, in both low- and high-stakes cases (for discussion see Knobe &amp; Nichols 2017: §2.4).