 A second problem for the claim that the moral point of view is identical with (some version of) the impartial point of view – or indeed, for any view which identifies morality and impartiality in the direct sense – is that it seems plausible to regard some forms of moral partiality as morally admirable, and perhaps even morally required (Blum 1980; Cottingham 1983, 1986, 1996; Jeske &amp; Fumerton 1997; Jollimore 2001; Kapur 1991; Kekes 1981; Keller 2013; MacIntyre 1984; Oldenquist 1982). Loyalty to one’s family, community or country, for instance, is commonly regarded as a virtue. Yet such an attitude is a clear and indeed paradigmatic example of partiality, requiring that an agent feel and act differently toward one set of persons than she does toward humanity in general. Similarly, certain specific moral duties arising from certain particular relationships seem to involve partiality in an irreducible manner. Parents, for example, are thought to be morally obliged to take special care of their own children; to regard one’s child as merely one among millions would be regarded as highly eccentric if not monstrous. Of course, some moral duties do require that an agent be impartial in performing them. But on common sense moral views at least, impartiality seems mostly to be required in the context of specific roles – such as when a person is acting as a judge, an umpire, a journalist, or a representative of some public institution; or, perhaps, when we are evaluating and selecting first-order moral rules. (Baron 1991; Blum 1980; Cottingham 1983). The idea that impartiality is a pervasive and universal moral requirement that should be directly manifested in our thoughts and practices during daily life seems to contradict our ordinary moral intuitions.