 We still need to enforce the conceptual distinction between LF and the traditional notion of logical form. There is no guarantee that structural features of natural language sentences will mirror the logical features of propositions; cp. Stanley (2000), King (2007). But this leaves room for the empirical hypothesis that LF reflects at least a great deal of propositional structure; see Harman (1972), Higginbotham (1986), Segal (1989), Larson and Ludlow (1993), and the essay on  structured propositions.  Moreover, even if the LF of a sentence S underdetermines the logical form of the proposition a speaker expresses with S (on a given occasion of use), the LF may provide a “scaffolding” that can be elaborated in particular contexts, with little or no mismatch between grammatical and propositional architecture. If some such view is correct, it might avoid certain (unpleasant) questions prompted by earlier Fregean views: how can a sentence be used to express a proposition with a radically different structure; and if grammar is deeply misleading, why think that our intuitions concerning impeccability provide reliable evidence about which propositions follow from which? These are, however, issues that remain unsettled.