 There seem to be clear counterexamples to the knowledge first view. Suppose you are driving out in the country and first pass by one of many fields where sheep are grazing, and then a little later pass by the field with the poodles that look just like sheep. In the first cases, you knew there were sheep in the field, but in the last case you did not. Still, weren’t you just as justified, didn’t you have the same sort of evidence, in the last case as in the first ones? No, says Williamson, a defender of the knowledge first view. You are just as epistemically blameless in the last case as in the earlier ones because, for all you know, you are looking at real sheep. You have a legitimate excuse for believing that you are looking at sheep, but you don’t have evidence, nor are you justified in believing, that you are looking at sheep when you are looking at poodles (Williamson 2014: 4–5).