 Other theorists have developed mixed accounts of the motivational component of evildoing. According to these theorists, some forms of evildoing are partly constituted by lacking motives that ought to exist while others are partly constituted by having bad motives. For example, Matthew Kramer argues that evil actions are motivated by either sadism, heartlessness, or recklessness (Kramer 2011, 187–203). Paul Formosa argues, contra Kramer, that some evil actions follow from other motives—not sadism, heartlessness, or recklessness—such as anger or fear, and that any attempt to construct a list of motivating states for evil action is bound to be incomplete or ad hoc (Formosa 2019, 261). Rather than offer a list of possible motivating states for evil action, Todd Calder’s motivational component of evildoing states that to perform an evil action an agent must desire his victim’s significant harm (or states of affairs inconsistent with the absence of this harm) for an unworthy goal, where an unworthy goal is a goal which “if attained, would not make for a better state of affairs than if the harm was averted and the goal not attained” (Calder 2015a, 120. See also Calder 2003, 266–267).