 Is this an empirical question about human agential psychology? (And are there interesting, related questions about animals and infants?) Or could we argue for self-locating attitudes on the grounds that including them in our theory of mind makes that theory simpler, more unified, and more fruitful? When we look not just at immediate action generation, but across the whole spectrum of an agent’s practical deliberation—her hopes, plans, goals, and aspirations—there certainly seems to be a disproportionate focus on how events affect one particular individual, and what that individual is capable of. The various motivational stories we’ve cited suggest that that individual’s experiences and abilities factor into her cognitive architecture in ways that others’ experiences and abilities don’t (or don’t nearly as frequently), and in ways that explain her actions without explaining the actions of others (or explaining them in the same way). Perhaps theories of mind are possible that account for all these patterns of similarity and difference without postulating self-locating beliefs. But it may also be that theories of self-locating belief are the best explanations of these phenomena currently on offer.