 Another version of the objection is not grounded in free will scepticism: it allows that people may sometimes merit a judgement of blameworthiness. But it contends that the ‘affective’ aspect of blame — its realisation in negative reactive attitudes such as anger, hatred, and contempt — has pernicious effects when manifested in the criminal law: such emotion-laden blame fosters all-encompassing condemnations of offenders, rather than condemnation merely of their crimes; and it has contributed to overcriminalisation, overly harsh sentencing, and mass incarceration. On this line of objection, the state’s response to crimes should focus not on retribution but on rehabilitation, treating offenders as morally responsible agents but not blaming them (see Lacey and Pickard 2013, 2015, 2018, 2021; for similar accounts, see Kelly 2018; Nussbaum 2016: ch. 6).