  The next issues to consider are (1) what is to be made coherent in coherence accounts of legal reasoning, and (2) what role coherence plays in explaining or justifying judicial decisions on such accounts. Regarding the question of what is to be made coherent in coherence accounts of legal reasoning, Raz 1994a contends that coherence accounts, when applied to law, require a ‘base’ or something which is to be made coherent, which differs in character in some crucial respects from the sort of base which features in coherence accounts in other areas of philosophy. Raz points out that while coherence accounts of justified belief take each person's belief set as their ‘base’ or as that which is to be made coherent, coherence accounts of law cannot be person-relative in this way, on pain of failing to offer an account which is in touch with the concrete reality of law in the jurisdiction under consideration. Raz's contention is that the law of a given jurisdiction does not vary with the beliefs of those subject to it, and in his view, that law is objective in this way means that there must be a common base to which coherence accounts in law are addressed. His suggestion in this regard is that coherence accounts in law take court decisions and legislative and regulatory acts as their base, and hold law to be the set of principles that makes the most coherent sense of that base. Raz further distinguishes between coherence accounts of law and coherence accounts of adjudication. The essential difference between them is the stage at which considerations of coherence come into play. In the case of a coherence account of law, the whole of what the law is is determined by applying a coherence test to those court decisions and legislative and regulatory acts of a given jurisdiction. A coherence account of adjudication, however, accepts that the vagaries of politics and the influence of political considerations on legislative and judicial decisions make it unlikely that the settled law of a jurisdiction will exhibit coherence to any great extent. This being so, if we are to apply a coherence account in order to determine how judges ought to decide cases according to law (legal reasoning in sense (b)), then we should assume a coherence-independent test to identify the settled law of a jurisdiction first, and then bring in considerations of coherence at a later stage, and hold that courts ought to adopt that outcome to a case which is favoured by the most coherent set of propositions which, were the settled rules of the system justified, would justify them. 