 As intended, (D3) does not require an omnipotent agent to have the power to bring about either impossible or necessary states of affairs, or states of affairs such as (a)–(f). Furthermore, (D3) does not unduly limit the power of an omnipotent agent, since an agent’s bringing about a state of affairs can always be “cashed out” in terms of that agent’s bringing about an unrestrictedly repeatable state of affairs that it is possible for some agent to bring about. That is, necessarily, for any state of affairs, \(s\), if an agent, \(a\), brings about \(s\), then either \(s\) is an unrestrictedly repeatable state of affairs which it is possible for some agent to bring about, or else \(a\) brings about s by bringing about \(q\), where \(q\) is an unrestrictedly repeatable state of affairs which it is possible for some agent to bring about. For instance, an omnipotent agent can bring about the state of affairs, that in one hour, Parmenides lectures for the first time, by bringing about the state of affairs, that in one hour, Parmenides lectures, when this lecture is Parmenides’s first. And although the former state of affairs is a nonrepeatable one that (D3) does not require an omnipotent agent to be able to bring about, the latter state of affairs is an unrestrictedly repeatable state of affairs that (D3) does require an omnipotent agent to be able to bring about.