  According to another line of objection, one that is more sympathetic to McDowell’s general epistemological outlook, one can resist the tempting line of argument in a way that closely parallels McDowell’s proposal, but without being committed to a disjunctive view of appearances. Williamson (2000) proposes a view of this kind. According to this view, when one genuinely perceives the world and sees that such and such is the case, one is in a factive mental state of knowing that such and such is the case. This factive mental state can only obtain when one is veridically perceiving the world, and it cannot obtain when one is hallucinating. Furthermore, this factive mental state is not to be given a conjunctive analysis. It is not to be regarded as being in a state that can be conjunctively analysed in terms of having an experience that such and such is the case, plus some further, extra-mental conditions that are ‘blankly external to one’s subjectivity’. So the proponent of this view agrees with McDowell that when one sees that such and such is the case one is in a distinctive kind of mental state that cannot be conjunctively analysed. However, the proponent of this view rejects McDowell’s claim that one should give a disjunctive account of appearances. For accepting that one cannot give a conjunctive analysis of seeing that such and such is case is compatible with saying that its appearing to one that such and such is the case is a mental state common to genuine perception and hallucination, where such a state is not to be given a disjunctive characterisation. (For further discussion of this line of objection, see section 4.3)