 provided the group’s members think that their obligations are special, personal, and derive from a good faith interpretation of equal concern for the well-being of all its members. But for him these conditions are not a matter of the members’ actual feelings and thoughts. Rather, they are interpretive properties that we would do well to impute to the members. Even so, why think that they ground a duty of obedience, as opposed to a duty of respectful attention, or a duty to apologize for cases of non-compliance? Certainly obedience is not part of Dworkin’s paradigm virtue of “fraternity”—mutual aid and support are the normal obligations there. Indeed, the classical associative model for political authority was not fraternity, but paternity, against which Locke argued so decisively. This is not to deny that we owe something to those decent associations of which we find ourselves non-voluntary members—but this doesn’t seem enough to vindicate political obligation (on Dworkin’s view, see Perry 2008).