 Accordingly, Brito also considers the animate body—the hylomorphic composition of body and soul—to be an essential unity—a unity where the body is the material part and the soul is the formal part (QDA-2012-II: 325). Like Aristotle, Brito dismisses as misleading the question about the metaphysical link that binds soul and body together into an essential unity. In fact, there is no such link that could belong essentially and intrinsically to the animate body. If there were, it would be either material or formal. It cannot be material, because whatever is material is also potential, and whatever is potential is unable to actually connect body and soul. If it were formal, it would be either a substantial or an accidental form. It cannot be a substantial form, for then the animate body would have two substantial forms—a possibility that Brito categorically rejects. And it cannot be an accidental form, because the possession of accidents naturally implies the possession of a substantial form that serves as their support. Hence, we end up with an additional substantial form that supports the accident that binds body and soul. Consequently, the cause of the union of body and soul can only be an extrinsic agent that does not belong essentially to the animate body (QDA-2012-II: 326).