 Morris 1994 is sympathetic to (1), while Hacking 1972 finds it “a monstrous premiss” (189). One way to defend it is via the classical interpretation of probability, according to which all possibilities are given equal weight. The interpretation seems attractive for various gambling games, which by design involve an evidential symmetry with respect to their outcomes; and Pascal even likens God’s existence to a coin toss, evidentially speaking. However, unless more is said, the interpretation yields implausible, and even contradictory results. (You have a one-in-a-million chance of winning the lottery; but either you win the lottery or you don’t, so each of these possibilities has probability 1/2?!) Pascal’s argument for (1) is presumably that “[r]eason can decide nothing here”. (In the lottery ticket case, reason can decide something.) But it is not clear that complete ignorance should be modeled as equiprobability. Morris imagines, rather, an agent who does have evidence for and against the existence of God, but it is equally balanced. In any case, it \(is\) clear that there are people in Pascal’s audience who do not assign probability 1/2 to God’s existence. This argument, then, does not speak to them.