 Furthermore, there is disagreement on the question of whether Hume holds that these true critics will be uniform in their verdicts. Interpretation of Hume’s position is complicated by the way that he consistently affirms his motivating insight, borrowed from Hutcheson, that sentiment is the essence of evaluation. Even the worst critic says nothing false in foolishly saying that one work is better than another, however misguided their sentiment. Passages where even the best critics will diverge in their evaluations are emphasized by Wieand (1984), Savile (1993, pp. 70–71), and Mothersill (1997). Most notably, all critics have “innocent and unavoidable” preferences (SOT, 281) and so they are better or worse at evaluating different categories of art. Furthermore, these preferences change during the lifetime of each critic. Consequently, the critical judgments of some critics will diverge from those of other highly qualified critics. But when critics’ differences arise from unavoidable and “blameless,” preferences, there is no interference of prejudice (SOT, 280). In short, the problem of finding a standard of taste leads Hume to the problem of deciding which disagreements are blameless, in order to distinguish them from prejudices that disqualify a sentiment as a public recommendation.