 Almost all accounts of emergence suppose that emergents are not just distinct from, but also distinctively efficacious as compared to, their bases. Weak emergentists typically deny that emergents have any fundamentally new powers, on grounds that such new powers would be, either directly or indirectly, powers to produce certain basic physical effects, violating the causal closure of the fundamental physical realm. They maintain, however, that distinctive efficacy does not require having a new power. Distinctive efficacy might be understood in terms of distinctive counterfactual patterns over time, yoked to a counterfactual account of causation (LePore &amp; Loewer 1987 and 1989); difference-making or “proportionality” considerations in accounting for macroscopic as against microscopic effects (Yablo 1992); or more generally through the proposal that special science laws track comparatively abstract levels of causal grain (Antony &amp; Levine 1997, Wilson 2010).