 The problems for perceptualism don’t end with dependence on cognitive basis, however. There is reason to believe that emotions also depend on our desires or concerns (Roberts 2003). I’m only sad when you break an old vase if I wanted to keep it, or afraid of the growling wolf if I don’t want to be eaten. When it comes to belief or indeed perceptual experience, it’s a strike against justificatory standing if the state is influenced by a desire – as Markie (2005) observes in criticizing epistemic liberalism, if a rock seems like a gold nugget to you just because you really want it to be a gold nugget, this seeming doesn’t justify belief in its being a gold nugget. So why isn’t this sort of cognitive penetrability a problem for EEP? A natural way to get around the problem is to say that the desires or concerns underlying the emotional appearance must themselves be correct or justified. The problem with this suggestion is that one then needs a story of how desires are correct or justified that doesn’t itself appeal to emotional experience, which doesn’t seem compatible with emotions playing a foundational epistemic role (see Helm 2001 for a coherentist take).