 Green not only criticizes the evaluative hedonism he finds in Mill; he also rejects evaluative hedonism outright. One argument he makes is that evaluative hedonism is actually inconsistent with psychological hedonism. Evaluative hedonism says that our ultimate aim ought to be to maximize net pleasure or to seek the largest sum of pleasures, whereas psychological hedonism claims that pleasurable experience is the ultimate object of desire. But a sum of pleasures is not itself a pleasure, and so, according to psychological hedonism, we could not act on the requirements of evaluative hedonism (PE §221). This may be a problem for someone who combines both evaluative and psychological hedonisms. However, this is not a problem for an evaluative hedonist such as Sidgwick who eschews psychological hedonism (PE §§222, 334, 351). Green must offer some other argument against the person who thinks a self-conscious agent would identify his personal good with pleasure. Green’s real disagreement with Sidgwick concerns whether the only things reflectively desirable for an agent are her own states of consciousness. Green recognizes “ideal goods” for an agent that involve her own activities and her relations to other members of her community (PE §§159–61, 357; cf. Methods 113–15).