 The evaluation of this consequentialist strategy is a difficult issue. Consequentialists are surely correct to point out that obsessive consequentialist strategizing is likely, at a certain point, to turn counter-productive, and that a consequentialist agent is therefore well-advised to develop more moderate approaches. On the other hand, Mill and many other consequentialists seem to underestimate the amount of good that a dedicated consequentialist agent might be able to contribute, and thus, to underestimate the amount of good that she will be required to contribute. Moreover, our powers to influence the lives of strangers have increased considerably since Mill’s day. As Susan Wolf writes, “[T]his argument is simply unconvincing in light of the empirical circumstances of our world. The gain in happiness that would accrue to oneself and one’s neighbors by a more well-rounded, richer life than that of the moral saint would be pathetically small in comparison to the amount by which one could increase the general happiness if one devoted oneself explicitly to the care of the sick, the downtrodden, the starving, and the homeless” (Wolf 1982, 428; see also Singer 1972). This thought is borne out by the empirical facts. If we look at the lives of actual ‘effective altruists,’ who are motivated by a commitment to make as great a contribution to general well-being as possible, we find that such people have indeed found it necessary to transform their lives in fairly radical ways and to make large sacrifices in terms of time, money, and comfort, and often in terms of relationships and personal happiness (see examples in MacFarquhar 2015).