 Presentism can be amended via the addition of atemporal truth-makers—truth-making entities that are, in a sense, “outside” time (see Bourne 2006; Crisp 2007). This is “ersatz presentism”. Ersatz presentists claim that, e.g., &lt;Curie existed&gt; is “made true” by an abstract time that represents how things were when Curie existed. (This is an “ersatz” time, rather than a “genuine” concrete time.) One way to understand ersatz presentism is as the view that there’s an abstract four-dimensional manifold of times that represents how things were, are now, and will be. This manifold is ordered by an ersatz B-theoretic “earlier than” relation and forms an ersatz B series of times. The truth-makers for truths about the past are abstracta: the ersatz times. An ersatz time, T, represents how things were (at some past time) by some other ersatz time, T*, accurately representing how the concrete world is now, and by T bearing the “earlier than” relation (the “ersatz B-relation”) to T*.