David Henderson (2009, 2011) has also argued that, by reflecting on “the point or purpose of the concept of knowledge”, a form of EC “gets a kind of principled motivation” (2009, 125). Henderson also claims, however, that his ‘gate-keeping contextualism’ has the virtue of respecting the attractions and motivations of Invariantism. Like Craig and Greco, Henderson takes a central function of “knowledge” ascriptions to be the certification of agents as good sources of information. Those agents might belong to applied practical or general-purpose source communities. In the former, where “the attributor is engaged in gate keeping for a group focused on some practical project”, s/he “should be contextually invested in such interests” (2009, 126); and here, Henderson argues, we find a new rationale for EC. However, when an attributor is gate keeping for a general-source community, where the information may potentially be very widely shared and there is likely to be no “simple decisive understanding of just what counts as actionable information”, we get the much more Craigian recommendation that