 It is worth noting that possibilism is thought to be subject to a related problem. While it doesn’t allow agents to avoid incurring moral obligations for having a vicious moral character, it does allow agents to avoid incurring moral obligations to curtail their vicious moral character (Timmerman and Swenson 2019). To illustrate the problem, suppose that one of the optimific act-sets Apathetic Andy can perform over time includes ⟨playing video games tonight and donating his expendable income to charity tomorrow⟩. Andy is, however, quite apathetic. As such, he won’t ⟨donate his expendable income to charity tomorrow⟩ unless he first ⟨reads work by Peter Singer tonight⟩. If he ⟨plays video games tonight⟩, he will merely reinforce his selfish nature and ⟨use his expendable income to purchase more video games tomorrow⟩. Here’s the catch. The other optimific act-set Apathetic Andy can perform is to ⟨read work by Peter Singer tonight and donate his expendable income to charity tomorrow⟩. Moreover, if Andy ⟨reads work by Peter Singer tonight⟩, he would ⟨donate his expendable income to charity tomorrow⟩. Performing this optimific act-set won’t be pleasant for Andy, though, since he finds reading philosophy to be tedious. Here’s the problem. Possibilism renders the verdict that Andy is permitted to ⟨play video games tonight⟩, which would not only result in a suboptimal outcome, but also exacerbate (rather than curtail) his bad moral character. By contrast, actualism entails that Andy is obligated to improve his moral character by ⟨reading work by Peter Singer tonight⟩, and actualism thus ensures that Andy would ⟨donate his expendable income to charity tomorrow⟩. So, both possibilism and actualism seem to let agents with vicious moral characters off the hook too easily, albeit in different circumstances and in different ways.