 The self-constitution view of integrity inherits many of the challenges encountered by the self-integration view and the identity view, described above. These challenges are not decisive objections, but defence of the self-constitution view will need ultimately to take account of them. In addition, the view appears to rely on a constructivist account of normative reasons. (See Bagnoli, 2011.) In particular, the kind of agency Korsgaard appeals to when she identifies integrity with successful agency and self-constitution must be inescapable if it is to constitute the very possibility of being a person. David Enoch (2006) argues that this kind of agency is optional, and that one could coherently aspire to a distinct form of agency – he calls it “shmagency” – which allows one to act in a practically successful way without committing oneself to universalizable, categorical norms of action. The issue turns on whether the account of agency developed by Korsgaard is inescapable; whether is must govern reflection on what to do by any rational self-conscious being and whether this inescapable characteristic of agency, if it exists, stretches to an ideal of a complete life of unified agency that Korsgaard identifies with integrity.