 She sees the individual-moral domain (notably excluding duty) as governed by a ‘perfectionism’ that is continuous from Sovereignty to Metaphysics. The aspiration to the highest moral goodness is the proper aim of the human person. By contrast, the polity cannot be ‘perfected’; its proper aim is to be ‘decent’ (MGM 1992: 356), to try to limit the evil contained therein (MGM 1992: 368, from Simone Weil). This view is a radical departure from Murdoch’s political thinking in her fascinating 1958 essay, “A House of Theory”, her only pre-Metaphysics political philosophy writing. There, and in occasional remarks in Sovereignty, Murdoch sees moral ideas and ideals as the appropriate normative source for sociopolitical arrangements—for example, as in “House”, the ideas of dignity in work, and the communal bonds of work. In Metaphysics this view is largely (not entirely) rejected (Blum forthcoming).