 The fourth type of response to the regress argument is the one that departs more radically from the idea that responsibility requires awareness. According to it, agents can be directly blameworthy not only for actions and omissions performed out of moral ignorance, but also for actions and omissions performed out of factual ignorance; that is, for fully unwitting wrongful conduct. (Recall that quality-of-will theorists restrict their claims to morally ignorant wrongdoing. Again, exceptions are Angela Smith 2005 &amp; 2017 and Björnsson 2017b.) Since what all the adherents to this position have in common is the idea that blameworthiness in these cases is largely (though not exclusively) explained by the presence of certain capacities possession of which makes the agent capable of acquiring the relevant awareness, their position can be dubbed ‘capacitarianism’. In their view, the best formulation of the EC is disjunctive (Sher 2009: 87): agents satisfy the epistemic requirements on responsibility either if they are aware of the relevant factual and moral considerations or if they should and could be aware of them given the available evidence, the opportunity to adequately process it, and their cognitive capacities. Capacitarians differ on what else (if anything) has to be added to the second disjunct, but they all agree that a central element in the explanation of blameworthiness for ignorant wrongdoing is the fact that the agent should and could have known better than she did (FitzPatrick 2008 &amp; 2017; Sher 2009; Clarke 2014 &amp; 2017a, b; Murray 2017; Rudy-Hiller 2017; Amaya &amp; Doris 2015; Murray &amp; Vargas 2018 [Other Internet Resources]; Vargas 2018 [Other Internet  Resources]).[10]