  With an account of virtue in hand, we can now begin to define moral terms. Thomson is a virtue theorist: to be moral is to be virtuous. For Thomson, it makes no sense to ask whether an act is morally good or not, because “act”, like “smudge”, is not a goodness-fixing kind. Accordingly, acts are only the kinds of things that can be good-modified. Just as there is no such thing as a good smudge, but only smudges that are good in some respect (e.g., for use in Rorschach tests), there is no such thing as a good act, but only acts are good in some respect—e.g., a moral respect. Acts are morally good when they spring from an agent’s morally virtuous traits. And a trait is a moral virtue when a \(K\) is as morally good as a \(K\) can be only if it has that trait (and it’s possible for \(K\) to either have or lack that virtue) (Thomson 2008, 79).