 In “Moral Permissibility Constraints on Voluntary Obligations,” Alistair Macleod argues for the claim that there are moral limits on the types of voluntary actions that can give rise to special obligations: “Actions … must survive moral scrutiny – which means, in effect, that it must be possible to characterize them as morally permissible actions – if the duties that are generated by the acts in question are to be given recognition as  moral duties ” (132; emphasis in original). Special moral obligations can only arise from voluntary actions and choices that are morally justifiable (135). Of course, Macleod could then take the Cocking and Kennett route and still regard those voluntary actions which are not morally justified as creating reasons of some kind, or he could deny that morally impermissible choices, such as, perhaps, becoming friends with a Nazi, create any sort of reasons whatsoever. In his discussion of “Reasonable Partiality Towards Compatriots,” David Miller claims that special obligations “arise only from relationships that are intrinsically valuable” (65), and “the attachments that ground them [cannot] inherently involve injustice” (66). So membership in the Nazi party will not generate special obligations, because that group does “inherently involve injustice.”