 If this principle were a true rational requirement, then rational agents in situations like Aisha’s would end up with a strong coherence between their first-order beliefs and their beliefs about what is rational. Rational Reflection says, for instance, that it cannot be rational for Aisha to be rationally certain that it is rational to have .9 confidence in G, without also having .9 confidence in G. And it cannot be rational for Aisha to be uncertain, without also adopting a weighted average of the credences that she regards as possibly rational (weighted by her credence, in each, that it is rational). In the version of the case discussed in the introduction, one might interpret Aisha’s higher-order evidence as indicating that her high confidence in G is only 50% likely to be rational, given her first-order evidence. If it is 50% likely that high confidence is rational, and 50% likely that low confidence is rational, Aisha should plausibly adopt the weighted average of these possibilities and arrive at a middling level of credence. Rational Reflection supports this explanation of the story.