 However, various philosophers have employed hyperintensional resources to theorize about aspects of the world beyond representation. Famously, Fine (1994) argues that work on the essences of things must play a central role in metaphysics and essence talk must be hyperintensional. In the construction “\(x\) is essentially \(F\)”, we cannot be guaranteed to preserve truth by substituting necessarily equivalent predicates. Socrates is (suppose) essentially human, but not essentially (human and a member of a set), although necessarily someone is human if and only if they are human and a member of a set. Fine extends this to talk of real definition generally: it is the real definition of 2 that it is the successor of 1, but not the real definition of 2 that it is \(10-8\), even though “the successor of 1” and “\(10-8\)” necessarily have the same extension. (These examples are not in Fine 1994, but we take it he would endorse them given his discussion on pp. 4–5 and p 14.) Dunn (1990b) also argues that one needs hyperintensional resources (in his case, from relevant logic) to capture essentialist claims.