 Avoiding the exportation principle is not difficult, however (Kiourti 2010, Chapter 4; Jago 2013b). For it to be valid, it seems to require genuine worlds, as in Lewis’s (1986) genuine modal realism or Yagisawa’s (1988, 2010) extended modal realism. Adopting an ersatz conception of worlds blocks the principle. If a world represents that \(A\) (say, by containing a sentence or proposition expressing that A), but is not in itself such that \(A\), then the principle is blocked. ‘At \(w: (A \wedge \neg A)\)’ will be interpreted as: \(w\) contains the sentence (or proposition) that A \(\wedge \neg A\), whereas ‘at \(w: A\)’ will mean that \(w\) contains the sentence (or proposition) that A, and ‘not at \(w: A\)’ will mean that \(w\) does not contain the sentence (or proposition) that A. But an impossible world may contain both, or neither, of \(A\) and \(\neg A\), so that containing one implies nothing about containing the other. An impossible world may (depending on how fine-grained we take them to be) also contain the conjunction \(A \wedge \neg A\) independently of whether it contains both \(A\) and \(\neg A.\) So the inference from ‘at \(w: (A \wedge \neg A)\)’ to ‘(at \(w: A) \wedge \neg\)(at \(w: A)\)’ is blocked (possibly twice over). 