  La Forge is one of the first Cartesians (together with Cordemoy and Geulincx) who openly defends occasionalism. La Forge’s occasionalism, however, is distinctive for both its scope and the arguments it uses. La Forge’s occasionalism is restricted to the domain of physical interactions among bodies and allows for the causal activity of finite minds. In this sense, La Forge (unlike Cordemoy, Geunlincx and Malebranche) is an advocate of “partial occasionalism” (Radner 1993, Sangiacomo 2014). In order to establish this form of partial occasionalism, La Forge builds his case around a specific issue in Cartesian physics, namely, the (im)possibility of any transfer of motion between interacting bodies. His ‘non-transfer’ argument aims, in turn, to solve some ambiguities in Descartes’s own treatment and provide enough support for body-body occasionalism without undermining the causal efficacy of immaterial substances.