 Once the act-consequentialist both rejects hedonism and construes an act’s outcome broadly, they can hold that certain types of actions are intrinsically bad—that, for instance, “breaking a promise is intrinsically bad” (Ewing 1948: 187). The consequentializer can, then, insist that whatever features of actions that the target non-consequentialist theory takes to be intrinsically wrong-making are instead features of outcomes that make them rank poorly—the idea being that what’s most salient is not whether an act has the property of being a promise-breaking but whether its outcome has the property of being one in which this promise-breaking occurs. The consequentializer can thereby accommodate our intuition that breaking a promise is wrong even if breaking it would produce just as much hedonic utility as keeping it. It’s wrong because outcomes in which promises are broken are, other things being equal, worse than those in which they are kept.