  But how do we come by the normative criteria of adequate recognition? Whereas Kantian contractualists ask themselves which standards are acceptable to all (in a hypothetical choice situation), most theorists of recognition follow a more Hegelian route. They argue that the social practices of recognition in which subjects live already provide them with all the normative resources needed to criticize and transcend these practices. Thus, Hegelian theories of recognition in all their variations choose an interpretative or—perhaps more adequately—reconstructive path: Because we are socialized into a specific recognition order we also internalize (via the exchange with and through the “view” of others) a given space of (historical) reasons that shapes our practical identity and our normative expectations springing from this identity. This is also supposed to explain the close connection between the normative and the psychological dimension of recognition: On account of our intersubjectively acquired identity we have a psychological need to be recognized as having the normative status we deem to deserve. Consequently, because it is a normatively structured need to the disappointment of which we usually react with indignation, its appropriateness can always be questioned by reference to the reasons available to us (Iser 2008, 173).