 Similar and even worse worries arise for a subset of non-naturalists who grant the debunkers’ claims about pervasive evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs and also insist that moral properties and facts have played no role at any point in the formation of our moral beliefs, which have instead been caused by some ‘third factor’ that happens to have brought about the desired correlation (Wielenberg 2010, Enoch 2011). One can, of course, tell a story about some such third factor: perhaps the ‘evolutionary aim’, survival and reproduction, also happens to be good, so that in giving us moral beliefs that promoted survival and reproduction evolution also happened to give us moral belief dispositions that are largely accurate (Enoch 2011). But the question is again how one is entitled to rely on moral intuitions (e.g., that survival and reproduction are good) in telling that story, even after granting that those intuitions are simply the product of ‘morally blind’ causes, i.e., causes operating entirely insensitively to moral properties and facts. There are also deeper difficulties concerning oversimplifications in such accounts (e.g., regarding the ‘evolutionary aim’) and the fact that on this approach the correlations between moral beliefs and moral truths ultimately rest on a mere accident, raising doubts about whether such accounts can really make sense of the kind of moral knowledge and understanding realists think we have (Bedke 2009, FitzPatrick 2014b).