 It should be noted, however, that this perspective suggests a distinction between an “internalist” and an “externalist” version of the regress (in the terminology of Orilia 2006a). In the former, at each stage we postulate a new constituent of the fact, or state of affairs, \(s\), that exists insofar as \(a\) has the property \(F\), and there is viciousness because \(s\) can never be appropriately  characterized.[10]  In the latter, at each stage we postulate a new, distinct, state of affairs, whose existence is required by the existence of the state of affairs of the previous stage. This amounts to admitting infinite explanatory and metaphysical dependence chains. However, according to Orilia (2006b: §7), since no decisive arguments against such chains exist, the externalist regress should not be viewed as vicious (for criticisms, see Maurin 2015 and Allen 2016: §2.4.1; for a similar view about predication, see Gaskin 2008).