 The commentary on the Sentences passage in question divides analogy into: (1) the analogous according to intentio (“intentio” is a synonym for ratio or concept), but not according to esse (act of being); (2) the analogous according to esse, but not according to intentio; and (3) the analogous both according to intentio and according to esse. Aquinas offers healthy as belonging to an animal, to urine, and to medicine as an example of the first kind of analogy; body as belonging to corruptible and incorruptible bodies as an example of the second kind of analogy — which Aquinas says is not a case of analogy from the perspective of logic but is analogy from the perspective of metaphysics and physics; and, finally, being, truth, and goodness as examples of the third kind of analogy. Capreolus and Cajetan affirm that the first kind of analogy (analogy of attribution) requires more than one ratio or concept — e.g., one for the healthiness of an animal; another for the healthiness of urine; another for the healthiness of medicine; etc. They maintain that this diversity of rationes prevents a name that is being said by analogy in this way from appearing in a valid syllogistic demonstration. By contrast, names said by analogy in the second way have only one ratio and present no obstacle to demonstrative reasoning. Indeed, names said by analogy in the second way are not even considered analogous but univocal from the perspective of logic, which considers the ratio apart from its esse rather than the ratio together with its esse. Names said by analogy in the third way have one ratio in a qualified sense of unity. As Cajetan explains it, strictly speaking the different analogates have diverse rationes, but, inasmuch as the diverse analogates in the third mode of analogy are proportionally similar to one another, it follows that the ratio of one is proportionally one and the same as the ratio of the other. Cajetan draws the further inference that valid demonstration can proceed on the basis of this kind of analogy provided that what is demonstrated from one analogate about another is demonstrated about the other only insofar as the analogates are proportionally similar. Accordingly, Cajetan claims that names said by analogy in the third way (which Cajetan calls analogy of proper proportionality) meet John Duns Scotus’s conditions for univocity: they have sufficient unity to ground a contradiction and to serve as a middle term in a syllogism without the fallacy of equivocation. 