 Furthermore, although the formal frameworks associated with game theory did not emerge until the mid-twentieth century, it’s now widely recognized that the work of many earlier philosophers are amenable to game theoretic analysis, and that, in many cases, these works clearly anticipated important developments in game theory. For instance, Barry (1965), Gauthier (1969), Hampton (1986), Kavka (1986), and Taylor (1987) provide game-theoretic characterizations of Hobbes’ arguments for the inevitability of war in the State of Nature and for the benefit of establishing a sovereign. Indeed, this branch of Hobbes scholarship continues to develop, as evidenced by recent works by Vanderschraaf (2007 &amp; 2010), Moehler (2009), and Chung (2015). And, while Hobbes’ arguments have attracted the most attention from game-theoretic minded scholars, Grotius (1625), Pufendorf (1673), Locke (1689), Hume (1740), and Rousseau (1755) also offer what can be interpreted as informal game-theoretic arguments in their discussions of morality, the State of Nature, and the natural law. Of these, Hume’s analysis of convention in the Treatise (Hume 1740: 3.2.2–10) is particularly noteworthy for its informal account of equilibria and analysis of the role that mutual knowledge plays in allowing agents to arrive at and sustain certain equilibria (Vanderschraaf 1998). Moreover, Hume’s discussion of how agents can settle into conventions as the result of gradual trial and error processes, and his suggestion that agents follow some conventions as a result of properties that make certain alternatives conspicuous, anticipates analyses of games based on both inductive learning and focal points (Skyrms 1996; Sugden 1986).