 Work on the relation between minds and bodies strongly influences arguments about social dualism. In particular, many philosophers of social science have adopted anti-dualist strategies pioneered by philosophers of mind, especially the “non-reductive physicalism” developed by Davidson, Putnam, Fodor, Kim, and others. As applied to minds, this is the view that there may be in-principle obstacles to reducing mental properties or facts to physical properties or facts, even though the mental is exhaustively determined by the physical. Philosophers of the social sciences applied this to social entities in the form of “non-reductive individualism”. There may be obstacles, this view holds, to the reduction of social phenomena to individualistic ones, even though the social is exhaustively determined by the individualistic (Macdonald &amp; Pettit 1981; Mellor 1982; Currie 1984; Kincaid 1986, 1997, 1998; Tuomela 1989; Little 1991; Bhargava 1992; Pettit 1993, 2003; Hoover 1995, 2001a, 2009; Stalnaker 1996; Sawyer 2002, 2005; Schmitt 2003a; List &amp; Spiekermann 2013). More recently, some philosophers have challenged these arguments as inadequately characterizing the “supervenience base” (see sections  3.1.3  and  3.1.4).  These philosophers agree with the basic strategy for denying dualism. But they deny that the “individualistic” is the proper way to understand the building blocks of the social, arguing instead for a broader set of building blocks.