 In comparing accounts of moral status, it is important to note two possible differences between such accounts. First, they may propose different conditions as sufficient for full moral status. Some accounts, for example, claim that membership in the human species is sufficient for that status. Second, they may offer different explanations of how the satisfaction of those conditions grounds or warrants full moral status. For example, even if being a Homo sapiens suffices for possessing full moral status, there may be different rationales for why it is sufficient: 1) because it is in the nature of Homo sapiens to be rational; 2) because the rational nature of the species requires respect for all of its members, rational or not; or 3) because members of the same species have a duty of partiality to each other, regardless of their individual attributes. Thus, the two accounts ground moral status in the same relational property—membership in the human species—and they make membership a sufficient condition for full moral status. But they use the fact of species membership differently in justifying moral status. They might also associate different rights with full moral status, in accordance with their different ways of grounding it. And, as discussed in  Sec. 4,  they may have different implications about who is required to recognize or respect an individual’s status.