 An aggregation rule that becomes possible when the weak Pareto principle is dropped is an imposed rule, where, for any profile \(\langle R_1, R_2 , \ldots ,R_n\rangle\), the social preference relation \(R\) is an antecedently fixed (‘imposed’) ordering \(R_{\textit{imposed}}\) of the alternatives. Though completely unresponsive to individual preferences, this aggregation rule satisfies the rest of Arrow’s conditions. Another possibility, which is no less degenerate, would make one individual an ‘inverse dictator’. Here, for any profile \(\langle R_1, R_2 , \ldots ,R_n\rangle\) and any \(x, y \in X\), we have \(xRy\) if and only if \(yR_i x,\) where \(i\) is some antecedently fixed individual. Thus the social preference is always the opposite of individual \(i\)’s preference. Formally, this aggregation rule satisfies all of Arrow’s conditions except the weak Pareto principle.