 A second argument, or class of arguments, depends on what Sharon Street (2009) calls ideally coherent eccentrics (ICEs): characters who have some intuitively bad motive (or desire, or belief, etc.) that survives some idealization process. What process is relevant will depend on the particular mind-dependence view under consideration, but the idea is that some ICEs will survive any plausible idealization process. Generally, we can say that they have some objectionable mental state that coheres both with their other relevant mental states, and with the non-normative facts. The outcome, in abstract terms, is that for any given view of normativity V on which normative fact N for agent A is fully grounded in mental fact M, there is some ICE for whom M obtains, and thus N obtains for that ICE on V, but it is intuitively clear that N does not obtain for that ICE. So we should reject V.