A second, much more problematic set of Lukács’ commitments becomes explicit in his writings between the 1930s and the 1950s. This concerns his conviction that, after Hegel, modern thought has become sharply divided into the two opposing tendencies of Marxist dialectics and of bourgeois “irrationalism”. Lukács’ view that virtually all non-Marxist theorists after Hegel—including Schelling, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Heidegger—can be subsumed under the label of irrationalism (a blanket term which, depending on the context, refers to everything from theories of “intellectual intuition”, ontological subjectivism, and “aristocratic” epistemological positions to the denial of progress in history) is perhaps motivated by an earnest desire to apply a method of “immanent critique” (see Aronowitz 2011) to the developments within philosophy that have facilitated the rise of National Socialism. Some of his arguments against Heidegger also resemble Adorno’s critique (see also Adorno 1997). But overall, the philosophical arguments for the simplistic distinction between progressive materialism and irrationalism—in particular those that he presents in The Destruction of Reason (according to George Lichtheim “the worst book he ever wrote”, Lichtheim 1970: 68)—are dogmatic and superficial. A number of particularly problematic claims are made in the postscript to the Destruction where Lukács not only defends the Soviet Union under Stalin, but also accuses Bertrand Russell of being secretly religious (1954: 808) and characterizes Wittgenstein and the pragmatists as proponents of a form of subjectivism that facilitates the rise of a new fascism (1954: 782ff.; for other examples, see the unpublished 1933a).