 Relatedly, default meaning is an important concept for the discussion of deception, such as lying and misleading. Insincerity has recently engendered heated debates in linguistic pragmatics in that it is a moot point what exactly counts as lying. For example, is lying saying something that the speaker believes to be false? Or is it saying something with an intention to deceive but the content of which need not necessarily be false (see e.g., Stokke 2018)? And, what exactly counts as ‘saying’ for the purpose of lying (see e.g Saul 2012)? Further, can one lie through implicatures and presuppositions (Meibauer 2014)? And perhaps we ought to venure even further. As Heffer (2020: 6) says, “…we need to extend the scope of untruthfulness both from utterance insincerity (lying and misleading) to discursive insincerity (withholding), and from intentional insincerity to epistemic irresponsibility” (see also Carson 2010). Epistemic sincerity is the default in ordinary, ‘non-strategic’ contexts, so, lying, misleading, and bullshitting (that is, speaking without regard for truth or falsehood) can easily go through. But here the question as to what exact meaning the speaker is accountable for is intimately related to the question of conversational salience and defaults.