 As mentioned above, practitioners of all stripes tend to recognize the importance of empirical findings about cognition and inquiry. There are multiple reasons for this sensitivity beyond a predilection for naturalism. First, even though VE is a normative discipline as discussed above, some practitioners accept a version of the ought implies can principle. To the extent that empirical research in psychology, cognitive science, and other fields delineates the limits of human cognition, such research constrains the inquiries, dispositions, and states that can be epistemically demanded of people. More ambitiously, one might think that extremely demanding epistemic norms are sometimes inappropriate even if, strictly speaking, they can be satisfied. Second, even if one rejects ought implies can, an alleged strength of VE is its ability to respond successfully to skepticism. However, if the dispositions practitioners assume to exist are never or rarely embodied by humans, then skepticism looms. Note that this argument goes through even if people could acquire and manifest epistemic virtues, just so long as they in fact don’t. Third, empirical research may help to solve the generality problem. Any episode of acquiring a belief can be classed under an indefinite number of headings; some such classifications individuate highly reliable dispositions, while others individuate less reliable dispositions. When I infer from the fact that every emerald I’ve examined is green that every emerald (whether examined or not) is green, should my inference be described as inductive generalization or inductive generalization employing projectable predicates? Though the generality problem was first articulated as a hurdle for process reliabilism (Pollock 1984), Goldman (1986: 50) and Zagzebski (1996: 300) recognize that VE faces its own version of the problem. Should epistemic virtues be coarsely individuated, so that open-mindedness makes the cut, or should they be finely individuated, so that open-mindedness towards friends while in a good mood makes the cut? Zagzebski (1996: 309) argues that this question should be answered empirically, with a preference for coarse individuation. Finally, practitioners who favor an ameliorative or educative approach to VE have an additional reason to attend to empirical findings, because these may reveal common cognitive defects that could potentially be set right, as well as suggesting more promising prospects for cognitive and epistemic training and development than those employed in contemporary pedagogy.