 The third line of criticism concerns whether the Fast-and-Frugal program truly mounts a challenge to the normative standards of optimization, dominance-reasoning, and consistency, as advertised. Take-the-Best is an algorithm for decision-making that does not comport with the axioms of expected utility theory. For one thing, its lexicographic structure violates the Archimedean axiom  (section 1.1, A2).  For another, it is presumed to violate the transitivity condition of the Ordering axiom  (A1).  Further still, the “less-is-more” effects appear to violate Good’s principle (Good 1967), a central pillar of Bayesian decision theory, which recommends to delay making a terminal decision between alternative options if the opportunity arises to acquire free information. In other words, according canonical Bayesianism, free advice is a bore but no one ought to turn down free information (Pedersen &amp; Wheeler 2014). If noncompensatory decision rules like Take-the-Best violate Good’s principle, then perhaps the whole Bayesian machinery ought to go (Gigerenzer &amp; Brighton 2009).