 This point is made with demonstratives, which are among the most fickle of the indexicals of language, seemingly capable of referring to anything regardless of context. But we can appreciate the generalization Zhuangzi is hinting at when we consider again how the Mohists explained acts of reference. Recall that when the Mohists say “There is a horse” (you ma), they appear to be making a claim to the effect that a certain object x resembles the model m for horses. If they state this with the demonstrative bi (“this”), then they are making the further claim that some object x to which they stand in a certain relation (likely of perceptual acquaintance) resembles the model m for horses. Note also that the Mohists recognize that objects do not always resemble their standards exactly; sometimes it is only partial, in which case the object of reference must resemble it “in the appropriate way”, according to a criterion (yi). Presumably, this criterion identifies something salient in the comparison that remains consistent across linguistic contexts. Zhuangzi’s point would then amount to the claim that no salience conditions are ever invariable across linguistic contexts. The uniqueness of each act of reference undermines the possibility of identifying any contextually invariant rule, since the conditions of successful reference involve facts not only about the relations of names and objects but also about the relations of acquaintance one has with those objects. Indeed, given the great emphasis on indexicality in the Zhuangzi, some scholars have claimed that Zhuangzi holds the thesis that all language is indexical. This is a view that cannot be defended here; readers may consult Hansen 1992 for a lengthy treatment.