 These many policies pose classic dilemmas of difference and can be deconstructed by understanding the male norms they assume, as discussed in Section 1. Employment policies concerning pregnancy are notorious examples warranting separate mention. At one point, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that failure to cover pregnancy under state or employer disability insurance programs was not discrimination on the basis of sex, as it differentiated between pregnant persons and non-pregnant persons.  (Geduldig v. Aiello,  417 U.S. 484 (1974);  General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,  429 U.S. 125 (1976)). Since pregnancy did not affect all women, denying pregnancy benefits did not discriminate against women on the basis of sex, or so the reasoning went, although these policies would certainly have different impacts on women than on men. Men and women were being treated the same: neither received pregnancy benefits. So men did not receive any benefits that women did not receive. And women did not receive any benefits that men did not receive. The logical implication was that requiring a benefits program to include pregnancy benefits for women would entitle them not to equal rights, but to special rights; not to equal treatment but to special treatment (Olsen 1995; Smith 1993; Bartlett &amp; Kennedy 1991). Feminists were stunned by this argument—after all, only women can become pregnant—and the US Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act several years later.  The most recent battleground over apparently neutral rules has been the recognition of exceptions for employers with religious objections from providing contraceptive coverage for their employees.