 Another important thing to notice about Jeffrey’s way of calculating desirability, is that it does not assume probabilistic independence between the alternative that is being evaluated, \(p\), and the possible ways, the \(p_i\)s, that the alternative may be realised. Indeed, the probability of each \(p_i\) is explicitly conditional on the \(p\) in question. When it comes to evaluating acts, this is to say (in Savage’s terminology) that the probabilities for the possible state-outcome pairs for the act are conditional on the act in question. Thus we see why the agent can describe her decision problem just as she sees it; there is no requirement that she identify a set of states (in Jeffrey’s case, this would be a partition of the proposition space that is orthogonal to the act partition) such that the states are appropriately fine-grained and probabilistically independent of the acts.