 “Good sex” and “bad sex” can refer to moral, pleasurable, aesthetic, practical, legal, and, especially with sex, naturalness (Soble 2008: 85–87; Soble, with Halwani 2017: 8–16). It is unclear what aesthetic sex is (this is in need of philosophical exploration), but applying some common aesthetic concepts, such as “unity”, “coherence”, and “completeness”—concepts used in defining the aesthetic experience (Beardsley 1982: chs. 1, 5, 16; cf. Levine 2006; Singer 2001: ch. 5)—might be useful: a sexual act can be coherent, unified, and fulfills the parties’ expectations (this is Beardsley’s view of completeness; 1982: 85–86). Assuming these three are the only components of aesthetic experiences, sexual activity can provide an aesthetic experience to its participants. Other concepts, such as “beauty” and its opposites (e.g., “dullness”, “monotony”, “the disgusting”, “the insipid”) can also be relevant, though whether they retain their aesthetic sense when applied to sex is the question. This last point is as true, if not more, of “pleasure”: Is there such a thing as aesthetic pleasure, and can it be a property of sexual acts?