 One way to get around some of the problems of Searle’s account, while similarly holding that all intentionality is tied to consciousness, would be to argue that non-experiential “aboutness” can be found all too pervasively, and had all too cheaply—so that only the aboutness that experience brings should be considered “real intentionality”. This, roughly, is the view Galen Strawson (2008) proposes. He acknowledges we may try to narrow the attribution of intentionality, and avoid a trivializing Dennett-like proliferation of “intentional systems”—but without appeal to consciousness. We might, for example, propose that real intentionality depends on evolution-imposed functions to indicate. But such approaches he thinks offer us no truly principled demarcation; they end up simply dismissing legitimate counterexamples, and ultimately trade on “anthropomorphic/zoomorphic human prejudices”. However, once we recognize that “experiential qualitative character” encompasses a richly diverse range of sensory and cognitive states, we will be able to see how it also can constrain what our perceptions are of, and what our thoughts are about; only such consciousness-imposed constraints will give us a non-arbitrary “stopping place” for their of-ness or aboutness to find an object.