 RTT as stated requires qualification. There is a clear sense in which you believe that there are no elephants on Jupiter. However, you probably never considered the question until now. It is not plausible that your belief box previously contained a mental representation with the meaning that there are no elephants on Jupiter. Fodor (1987: 20–26) responds to this sort of example by restricting (1) to core cases. Core cases are those where the propositional attitude figures as a causally efficacious episode in a mental process. Your tacit belief that there are no elephants on Jupiter does not figure in your reasoning or decision-making, although it can come to do so if the question becomes salient and you consciously judge that there are no elephants on Jupiter. So long as the belief remains tacit, (1) need not apply. In general, Fodor says, an intentional mental state that is causally efficacious must involve explicit tokening of an appropriate mental representation. In a slogan: “No Intentional Causation without Explicit Representation” (Fodor 1987: 25). Thus, we should not construe (1) as an attempt at faithfully analyzing informal discourse about propositional attitudes. Fodor does not seek to replicate folk psychological categories. He aims to identify mental states that resemble the propositional attitudes adduced within folk psychology, that play roughly similar roles in mental activity, and that can support systematic theorizing.