 Kant’s ethics and political theory overlap with but also depart from Leibniz’s. Leibniz argued that justice requires not only that one forebear from harming others or giving them cause for complaint; justice also requires helping them by seeking their good and preventing evil when doing so is not too difficult. (Riley ed. 53–5). He suggested a variety of social improvements and measures for the remediation of poverty and anticipated the universalist formulations of Kant’s maxim-test from the Groundwork. “Put yourself in the place of another, and you will have the true point of view for judging what is just or not.” Although it is ‘impossible to act so that the whole world is content,’ the affected ones can be made as content as possible (Riley ed. 56–7). Kant’s ethics by contrast does not make the enhancement of welfare or the avoidance of harm criteria of moral goodness or rectitude, though some commentators would insist that his universalization test implicitly depends on such criteria. He acknowledges a traditional duty to benevolence but gives no socio-political examples of welfare policies and shows himself distinctly sceptical about what he considered exaggerated, tender-hearted utilitarianism (25:504–5). 