 Langton and Lewis claim their account works given a variety of ways of understanding ‘natural’ and ‘more natural than’ in their analysis of ‘non-disjunctive’. In particular, they hold that the account will work if ‘natural’ is understood to express the notion of perfect naturalness, or fundamentality, in the Lewis (1986a) account, and ‘more natural than’ is understood to mean ‘is more fundamental than’. They also claim that the account will work if the natural properties are those taken to correspond to Armstrongian universals, or the properties expressed by the predicates in canonical formulations of physics, or the properties expressed by the predicates in canonical formulations of common-sense. Langton and Lewis say that it should not matter how we draw the distinction between natural and non-natural properties for present purposes, as long as we have it, and properties like being lonely and round or accompanied and cubical are not natural. As a result of this, Langton and Lewis think that their account is more neutral than Lewis’s earlier account and should therefore should appeal to a larger range of philosophers than the earlier account.