 Above I presented a new operationalism as a promising framework for the analysis of scientific practice. Do Bridgman’s ideas and attitudes also hold any current relevance for practicing   scientists?[5] It should have been clear from the discussion in Section 1 above that Bridgman intended to reform scientific practice itself, not just its second-order analysis, so we must ask whether his reformist agenda has anything left in it for current science. To the casual reader, much of Bridgman’s writing will seem like a series of radical complaints about the meaninglessness of various concepts and statements. But he was not interested in skeptical critique as an idle and indiscriminate philosophical exercise. He got most worried when a concept was being extended to new situations where the familiar operations defining the concept ceased to be applicable. His arguments often had an iconoclastic flavor because he was exceptionally good at recognizing where a concept had been extended to new domains unthinkingly and most people were not even aware that the extension had been made. From the methodological lesson he took from Einstein to the insights gained in his own high-pressure physics, an important focus of Bridgman’s operationalism was on regulating the extension of concepts to uncharted domains.