 The continuing debate on the issue of the linguistic status of normative statements generated an effort to clarify the nature of ethical disagreement as a means for the resolution of that debate. In C.L. Stevenson’s Ethics in Language, the analysis of the nature of ethical disagreement was considered as providing a method of mediation between pragmatist and logical positivist views in ethical theory. In his graduate seminars on ethical theory, Hook made use of Stevenson’s Ethics in Language as the point of departure for his defense of pragmatic ethics against the criticisms that derived from the analysis of moral language. Stevenson had located Dewey’s interpretation of ethical norms within the broad framework of patterns of moral discourse. For Stevenson, dispute over Deweyan norms or appraisals would represent a pattern that he identified as “disagreement-in-belief.” For this kind of disagreement Stevenson shared Dewey’s view that scientific method provided a competent mode of adjudication. Normative disagreement of this kind could be considered as a parallel to empirical disagreement on experimental scientific questions where true decisions between conflicting hypotheses could be arrived at by an appeal to the evidence of their future consequences.