 As noted above, the central concept in the teleological account of social institutions (Miller 2010) is that of joint action. On the teleological account, joint actions consist of the intentional individual actions of a number of agents directed to the realisation of a collective end. (Note that intentions are not the same things as ends, e.g. an agent who intentionally and gratuitously raises his arm ex hypothesi has no end or purpose in doing so.) Importantly, on the teleological account, a collective end—notwithstanding its name—is a species of individual end; it is an end possessed by each of the individuals involved in the joint action. However it is an end, which is not realised by the action of any one of the individuals; the actions of all or most realise the end. So contra anti-reductionist theorists such as Gilbert, Tuomela and Searle, the teleological account holds that joint actions can be analysed in terms of individualist notions. A second major point of differentiation from collective acceptance accounts is that on the teleological account conative notions, such as we-intentions and, more relevantly, collective ends, cannot in and of themselves generate deontic properties, specifically institutional rights and duties. Accordingly, the basis for deontic properties must lie elsewhere. As we shall see, on the teleological account, the basis for deontological properties is to be found in large part in the collective goods provided by institutions.