Hare was aware of the point. And if we were dealing with only a few different types of attitude and corresponding expressive speech act it should be no difficulty at all.  But once we introduce new sentences joining the terms we have so far with logical connectives we are likely to need to postulate yet further attitude types and to need further principles to capture their logical properties. Such complex sentences express attitudes that don’t reduce to the attitudes which would be expressed by either conjunct (Schroeder 2008c, 49).  It would thus be wrong to equate the attitude expressed with either accepting the one attitude or accepting the other.  Relatedly, a speech act “asserting” a disjunction with one normative disjunct and one non-normative disjunct should be a new kind of speech act.  It doesn’t universally prescribe anything, nor (on the theory we’re working with) does it assert anything. And similarly for the attitude expressed by that speech act. It will be a new type of state of mind. So we’ll need a new sort of neustic to capture the kind of speech act this is. And we’ll need additional rules to tell us about the logic of speech act types represented by those neustics. 