 We will conclude this article with a brief look at some philosophical speculations about what the neural architecture of unified consciousness might or must be like. One of the hottest issues in current consciousness research is the issue of how brains achieve consciousness and what parts of the brain are most involved in doing do, what the ‘neural correlates of consciousness’ (NCC) are. Any real insights into the NCCs of consciousness in general are also likely to contain insights into the NCCs of unified consciousness. This literature is now so vast that it would take a whole additional article to discuss the topic. (Koch 2004 is an excellent review of the empirical neuroscience and Chalmers 2000 is the most extensive exploration of the conceptual issues to date.) Because of space limitations, here we will restrict ourselves to three of the most influential philosophical approaches to what the neural architecture of consciousness might be like, those of Paul and Patricia Churchland (see for example Paul Churchland 1995: 214), Daniel Dennett (1991), and Susan Hurley (1998). 