 While growing attention has been paid in recent years to the logical insights and contributions of philosophers of other major traditions of early China, particularly those of the  School of Names,  scholarship on early Chinese views on logic and language still tends to concentrate on the contributions of the school of  Mohism,  which played a central role in the debates of philosophers of all major schools of thought during China’s Warring States period (479–221 BCE). The Mohists helped to critically refine early Chinese conceptions of the content and function of logic and language in relation to their aspirations for developing a comprehensive ethical theory about the proper governance of the state and of the individual’s role within it. Arguably, much of the Mohists’ motivation for developing this theory should be credited to those whom the Mohists themselves identified as their philosophical adversaries or antagonists, and this point extends to the determination they exhibited in developing an explicit philosophical theory of logical reasoning. Among those adversaries were the followers of  Confucius,  whose appeals to authority and established traditions for the justification of ethical views the Mohists found objectionable, and the advocates of  Daoism,  whose views appeared to undermine the possibility of any invariable and objective standards for ethical conduct. But quite possibly a more compelling influence, at least in regards to the development of Mohist logic, sprang from the medley of thinkers and dialecticians who have traditionally been associated with the School of Names. While no explicit theory of logical reasoning is attributed to this school, the thinkers associated with it had a reputation for unexampled deftness in the practice of dialectics and argumentation, and are regarded by many scholars today as among early China’s most subtle practitioners of logic (Fung 2020a). On the other hand, these thinkers were also derided by their contemporaries, including by the Mohists, for their sophistry, for their dispositions to muddle and confuse, and for their apparent desire to obscure the proper use of language. Whether masters of logical reasoning or merely performers of fallacious dialectics, they were taken seriously enough by their opponents to be regarded as threats to the order, stability and harmony of society. The later Mohists, in particular, whose views on logic and language occupy the greater part of this entry, framed many of their own arguments in ways that are plausibly interpreted as responses to their views, and probably many of the later Mohists’ own logical and linguistic insights are owed to the very puzzles and frustrations they experienced in their efforts to supplant these views with the honest integrity of more rigorous and transpicuous ideas.