 The actualist HOT account avoids some of the difficulties inherent in inner-sense theory, while retaining the latter’s ability to explain the distinction between conscious and unconscious perceptions. (Conscious perceptions will be analog states that are targeted by a HOT, whereas perceptions such as those involved in blindsight or subliminal perceptions will be unconscious by virtue of not being so targeted.) In particular, it is easy to see a function for HOTs, in general, and to tell a story about their likely evolution. A capacity to entertain HOTs about experiences would enable a creature to negotiate the is/seems distinction, perhaps learning not to trust its own experiences in certain circumstances, and also to induce appearances in others, by deceit. And a capacity to entertain HOTs about mental states (such as beliefs and desires) would enable a creature to reflect on, and to alter, its own beliefs and patterns of reasoning, as well as to predict and manipulate the thoughts and behaviors of others. Indeed, it can plausibly be claimed that it is our capacity to target higher-order thoughts on our own mental states that underlies our status as rational agents (Burge 1996; Sperber 1996; Rolls 2004).