 In connection with other minds, we might press Descartes’ first sceptical consideration, thus: I am sometimes deceived about what another is thinking or feeling. But, as with the external world, this is not sufficient for radical doubt concerning others. Radical doubt may be thought to arise when one presses the third sceptical consideration, the possibility that an Evil Demon (or mad scientist) has contrived that all others apart from myself are automata/zombies—non-thinking, non-feeling individuals who move in a manner similar to the way I move. We can associate a ‘thin’ sceptical problem with the former doubt and a ‘thick’ sceptical problem with the latter (Avramides 2015). The former is a problem we grapple with in our everyday lives; the latter is a distinctively philosophical problem. It is the thick skeptical problem that leads to the possibility of solipsism—that I am alone in the universe.