 Given the central importance which it later attained, it is surprising how late supposition was in being identified as one of the properties of terms. In the twelfth century, the primary distinction was that between signification, or univocation, and appellation. As early as Anselm's De Grammatico we find a distinction between significare per se (signify in itself) and significare per aliud (signify relatively). The latter was also known as appellare (to name or appellate). Whereas in the former (per se) what was signified was a form, in the latter what was signified, or appellated, was a thing. A single form is common to a number of things we call by the same name, so one crucial problem in the philosophy of language is to understand how the different uses of a name are unified in the face of the distinctness of the many individuals talked about. In this way, we can understand the importance in the twelfth century of univocation in contrast with appellation. Proper names, naming single items, are contrasted with appellative names, naming many. Univocation is the signification of a univocal word, described in the Fallacie Parvipontane as “retaining the signification of the name while varying its supposition/appellation” (my  translation).[3]  Thus a fallacy of univocation occurs when one does not realise that what is being talked about (the supposita or appellata) change. For example, to infer ‘A dodo lives’ from ‘A dodo lived’ is a fallacy (of univocation) since the former is false (there are no living dodos for ‘dodo’ to stand for) while the latter is true (for the past tense ampliates ‘dodo’ to stand for past dodos – see  section 4).[4] 