One can still find a fairly widespread commitment to this desire-belief version of the standard conception (in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, ethics, meta-ethics, and in other areas of research). In the philosophy of action, however, it is now widely thought that intentions cannot be reduced to desires and beliefs (and combinations thereof). On this view, intentions play a crucial and irreducible role in practical reasoning, long-term planning, and in the initiation and guidance of action (see, especially, Bratman 1987; see also Harman 1976; Brand 1984; Bishop 1989; Mele 1992, 2003; Enç 2003). It is nevertheless still widely accepted that there is a close connection between intentional action and acting for reasons and that intentional actions are typically performed for reasons (Mele and Moser 1994; Mele 2003; Enç 2003; Clarke 2010b, for instance).