 It is when we realize that the exculpatory implication applies not just to close-to-home cases of procreative choice but also to a disturbingly large segment of all our future-directed choices – including choices that don’t seem on the face of things to have anything to do with whether one person is brought into existence rather than another – that we begin to appreciate the significance of the nonidentity problem. In at least some of those cases, we are (likely) going to find intuition (3) itself compelling; we are (likely) going to be convinced – as we shall see – that the choice under scrutiny is clearly wrong. We will then seem forced to abandon either intuition (1) or (2). If it’s the former we let go of rather than the latter, then our challenge is to account for the fact that the choice is wrong despite the fact that same choice seems to be good for – indeed maximizing for – each and every existing and future person. If it’s the latter, then our challenge is to explain how a choice can make things worse for, or harm, or in some way be bad for, a given person despite the fact that it is maximizing for that person.