 The terminological distinction between “sensation” and “perception”, explicitly so formulated, is usually credited to Reid, although it can be found in Nicolas Malebranche (Simmons 2009). Taken as a broad conceptual distinction with several terminological and substantive variants, it is more widely present. Descartes, in the Meditations (1641 [1985: 55]), speaks of the perception of objects as arising from sensory ideas caused by such objects. Subsequently, in the Sixth Replies, he distinguishes between the immediate mental products resulting from stimulation in the sense organs, nerves, and brain, such as perception of an extended area of light and color, and subsequent inferences or calculations that yield perception of an object with a specific size, distance, and shape (1641 [1985: 295]). In other places, Descartes offers a physiological account of the perception of distance that renders the third dimension part of the sensory core (Dioptrics, 1637, Sixth Discourse [1965: 105–106]; see Hatfield 2020: 212–213); even so, a judgment would still be needed for object perception.