 This kind of example gives rise to several problems. First, if EU maximization is supposed to explain why someone made a particular choice, it ought to be able to distinguish these two reasons for preference; but if global sensitivity can be captured at all, it will have to be captured by a diminishing marginal utility function, identical to that of the first person in each pair. Second, if one adopts a view of the utility function according to which the decision-maker has introspective access to it, a decision-maker might report that she has preferences like the tolerant coffee drinker or the miser—her utility function is linear—but nonetheless if she maximizes EU her utility function will have to be concave; so EU maximization will get her utility function wrong. Finally, even if one holds that a decision-maker does not have introspective access to her utility function, if a decision-maker displays global sensitivity, then she will have some preferences that cannot be captured by an expectational utility function (Allais 1953, Hansson 1988, Buchak 2013).