Bratman (2000, 2001) agrees with Velleman that the standard theory does not explain genuine self-governance. On his view, though, an account of “full-blown agency”, as he calls it, does not require reference to a mental attitude that the agent cannot disown. Building on his work on temporally extended planning agency (Bratman 1987), he argues that an agent’s “self-governing policies” have the “authority to speak for the agent”, because they help to establish and support the agent’s identity across time, and because they specify which desires are to be treated as providing justifying reasons in practical deliberation. According to Bratman, these self-governing policies explain what it is for an agent “to take a stand in favor of or against certain motivations, a stand that can itself be subject to reexamination and revision” (2000: 50–51). (For a critical discussion of Bratman’s account see Hornsby 2004 and Franklin 2017.)