 Another common line of objection to doxastic theories concerns the possibility of meta-beliefs (to the effect that a reason is a good reason to hold a belief) which do not establish basing relations. For example, suppose Ezekiel belongs to a religious cult and slavishly believes whatever the cult leader, Exidor, tells him. One day Exidor tells Ezekiel that his belief in God is a good reason to believe everything else Ezekiel believes, and Ezekiel slavishly comes to believe this. Nonetheless, it would seem highly counter-intuitive to accept that, now, everything else Ezekiel believes is in fact based on his belief in God. Perhaps one way to avoid this sort of objection is to add additional conditions as to which meta-beliefs are capable of establishing basing relations. One such solution is discussed below, in the section regarding causal-doxastic theories of the basing relation.