 The most numerous, and influential, replies were written by Lars Bergström, who argued that the contradiction arises only if it is assumed that \(\langle A\rangle\) and \(\langle B\rangle\) are alternatives in the relevant sense. He argued that \(\langle A\rangle\) and \(\langle B\rangle\) are not, in fact, alternatives since they are compatible (Bergström 1968b: 43). Notably, this is an issue of which Bergström was clearly aware of in his (1966: ch. 2) book in which he argued that “two actions can reasonably be regarded as alternatives (in the morally relevant sense) only if they are incompatible or mutually exclusive”. If, by hypothesis, S is obligated to perform \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\), then \(\langle A\rangle\) and \(\langle B\rangle\) must be compatible and so are not alternatives (1968b: 44). The subsequent literature consisted of a back-and-forth between Bergström and Castañeda that primarily revolved around identifying the morally relevant set of alternatives and Bergström’s attempts to formulate a utilitarian principle that avoids Castañeda’s objection (Bergström 1968a,b, 1971, 1973, 1976; Castañeda 1968, 1969, 1972). As will be shown in the subsequent sections, the issue of identifying the morally relevant set of alternatives forms the crux of the actualism/possibilism debate.