 The first fact concerns the goal that philosophers who contributed to the definition of morality literature were trying to  achieve.[4]  That goal is best explained with the help of a crucial distinction. Often, when we ask whether a person’s judgment is moral, what we want to know is whether her judgment on some moral matter is true—or something in that vicinity: correct, or valid, or justified, or wise. What we are asking, to use Frankena’s (1967) useful terminology, is whether the judgment is moral as opposed to immoral. But one point on which these philosophers were crystal clear is that moral truth is not what they were trying to explain. Rather, borrowing again from Frankena, what they were trying to do was to distinguish moral judgments and principles from non-moral judgments and principles. They wanted to know how to determine whether a person’s judgment was a moral judgment rather than some other kind of judgment—prudential, or religious, or aesthetic, or legal. Whether the judgment was true, or valid, or justified was simply not their concern. When considering the work of Turiel and his followers, it is particularly important to keep this distinction in mind, because it sometimes seems that these authors, and some of their critics, don’t. After offering evidence putatively establishing that a particular judgment is moral rather than conventional (and thus that it is moral rather than non-moral), authors will sometimes go on to write as though they had established that the judgment is true (see, for example, Nucci 2001: 104–106).