 Perhaps the clearest example for the progress that a processist approach can bring to longstanding tasks of philosophy is in the theory of selfhood and personhood. Whatever cultural notions of ‘person’ and ‘self’ we may have acquired, our immediate self-awareness reveals us to ourselves as engaged in doings and undergoings. What we find ourselves to be doing and undergoing we understand as belonging to a space of possible occurrences. We notice patterns in what might possibly be going on with us, and some of these patterns we use to identify ourselves: in terms of our talents, skills, capabilities, traits, dispositions, habits, inclinations, and tendencies to action and inaction. It is integral to your self-awareness at this moment that your reading is yours, the reading of a self that is the same over time. But the sameness of this self we experience not as the sameness of a time-invariant thing but as the sameness of an ‘operation’ of integration—an ongoing unification of experienced patterns in ways that enable a first-person perspective. Some process philosophers have taken the experience of dynamic sameness in self-experience as the basis for constructing a process-metaphysical account of personhood that defines the core self as a unified manifold of actions and capacities, tendencies, and dispositions to (physical or psychical) actions (see e.g. Rescher 1996 ch.6). In this way they preserve a concept of personhood that renders the self or ego experientially accessible. The unity of a person is a unity of experience—the coalescence of all of one’s diverse micro-experiences as part of one unified macro-process. Importantly, processists do not equate the cross-temporal unity of a person-process with a sequence of momentary total states of consciousness, as neo-Humean accounts currently postulate; rather, it is the sort of unity of process that links each minute’s happenings into a single overall journey. From the process point of view a self just is the complex process composed of various physical interactions, experiences, feelings, moods, and actions in their systemic interrelationship. The whole individual person is continuously ‘in the making’ or being constituted, yet it also continuously influences which components (e.g., experiences, feelings, actions) enter into the constitution of the whole and in which ways these components occur. Such circular dependencies between a whole and its parts cannot be accommodated within a theory of individuals that is committed to the basic constructional principles of the substance paradigm, especially the claim that concrete individuals are fully determinate. Relationships of mutual constitution are legitimate theoretical tools within process ontologies where entangled recursive definitions are not in conflict with basic tenets about individual entities. By extending the dynamic dependencies among the component processes of a self to include aspects of the person’s physical and social context, a process account of persons can formulate in a differentiated and scientifically informed fashion various claims about the formative role of our  environments.[16]