 In light of the example, it is no surprise that political scientists were the primary users of cooperative theory during the years while noncooperative game theory was still being fully developed. It has also been applied usefully by labor economists studying settlement negotiations between firms and unions, and by analysts of international trade negotiations. We might illustrate the value of such application by reference to the second example. Suppose that, given the weight of domestic lobbies in South Africa, the South African government will never agree to any trade agreement that does not allow it to protect its automative assembly sector. (This has in fact been the case so far.) Then allowance for such protection is part of the core of any trade treaty another country or bloc might conclude with South Africa. Knowing this can help the parties during negotiations avoid rhetoric or commitments to other lobbies, in any of the negotiating countries, that would put the core out of reach and thus guarantee negotiation failure. This example also helps us illustrate the limitations of cooperative game theory. South Africa will have to trade off the interests of some other lobbies to protect its automative industry. Which others will get traded off will be a function of the extensive-form play of non-cooperative sequential proposals and counter-proposals, and the South African bargainers, if they have done their due diligence, must be attentive to which paths through the tree throw which specific domestic interests under the proverbial bus. Thus carrying out the cooperative analysis does not relieve them of the need to also conduct the noncooperative analysis. Their game theory consultants might as well simply code the non-cooperative parameters into their Gambit software, which will output the core if asked.