 The question of truth lies at the heart of the realist/anti-realist controversy that was once a major concern of many Anglo-American philosophers. Despite his insistence on the indispensability of an irreducibly basic concept of objective truth, and his rejection of both sceptical and relativist positions, Davidson has been variously assimilated, at different times and by different critics, to both the realist and the anti-realist camps. Yet realism and anti-realism are equally unsatisfactory from a Davidsonian point of view, since neither is compatible with the holistic and externalist character of knowledge and belief. Realism makes truth inaccessible (inasmuch as it admits the sceptical possibility that even our best-confirmed theories about the world could all be false), while anti-realism makes truth too epistemic (inasmuch as it rejects the idea of truth as objective). In this respect, and as he himself makes clear (see 1990a, 2005b), Davidson does not merely reject the specific premises that underlie the realist and anti-realist positions, but views the very dispute between them as essentially misconceived. This reflects a characteristic feature of Davidson’s thinking in general (and not just as it relates to realism and anti-realism), namely its resistance to any simple classification using the standard philosophical categories of the day. 