All evaluative judgments are aesthetic; they evaluate the represented relations in their object. Practical philosophy or ethics evaluates relations of the will. Therefore, ethical judgments are a kind of aesthetic judgment (cf. SW VII: 10; SW X: 309; Beiser 2014: 108; 125, ff.). Because such judgments often conflict, the task of practical philosophy is not to pass judgment itself, but to cause us to judge correctly. Hence, all practical philosophy can and should do is to “correctly present the object, [in such a way] as to be perfectly grasped”, that object being relations of the will (SW II: 334); thus, as figured bass presents a theory of beautiful tonal relations, practical philosophy seeks the “whole set of relations by which the will becomes the object of praise or blame” (SW IX: 329: n.*). Like Kant, Herbart holds that the determining grounds of moral action must be found in a priori norms, and rejects eudemonism or any “material motives” as grounds for practical laws (cf. Beiser 2014: 94, 125, ff.). For Herbart as for Kant, morally evaluative judgments are to be made solely with an eye to the “form of the will”, which ethics determines.