Bundle theory has been charged with ruling out the possibility of accidental properties in concrete particulars. Bundles of properties have all of their constituent properties essentially. Objects generally do not. This chair could have been blue instead of red, but the bundle of properties that characterize the chair could not have failed to include that red property. One way around this objection is proposed by O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover: combine bundle theory (although for them properties are universals) with a specific account of modality, a counterpart semantics for statements about ordinary particulars (1998). What makes it true that a particular object o could have had different properties is that a non-identical counterpart to o, n, in another possible world has different properties than does o. As long as there is a possible world in which there is a object-bundle, n, that is non-identical counterpart to o and differs from o with respect to its properties, then o could have differed in just that way.