 In Davidson’s work the question ‘what is meaning?’ is replaced by the question ‘What would a speaker need to know to understand the utterances of another?’ The result is an account that treats the theory of meaning as necessarily part of a much broader theory of interpretation and, indeed, of a much broader approach to the mental as such. This account is holistic inasmuch as it requires that any adequate theory must address linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour in its entirety. As we have already seen, this means that a theory of interpretation must adopt a compositional approach to the analysis of meaning; it must recognise the interconnected character of attitudes and of attitudes and behaviour; and it must also attribute attitudes and interpret behaviour in a way constrained by normative principles of rationality. Rationality is not, however, the only principle on which Davidson’s account of radical interpretation depends. It involves, in fact, a marriage of both holistic and ‘externalist’ considerations: considerations concerning the dependence of attitudinal content on the rational connections between attitudes (‘holism’) and concerning the dependence of such content on the causal connections between attitudes and objects in the world (‘externalism’). Indeed, this marriage is evident, as we saw earlier, in the principle of charity itself and its combination of considerations of both ‘coherence’ and ‘correspondence’. Davidson holds, in fact, that attitudes can be attributed, and so attitudinal content determined, only on the basis of a triangular structure that requires interaction between at least two creatures as well as interaction between each creature and a set of common objects in the world. 