 Proposing a subtle modification, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (Al-Manṭiq, vol. 6, chapter 6, 63) argues against Democritus that everything that is divisible in imagination is divisible in the extramental world. He believes that there is a lower limit to the length of divisible magnitudes that we can imagine. It is not true that every magnitude, no matter how small, is divisible in the estimation. He does not reject that in Euclidean geometry magnitudes are infinitely divisible. But he seems not to accept that it is possible to make a visual image (through the faculty of estimation) of every magnitude we can talk about in the context of Euclidean geometry. Embracing physical atomism (in his later works), al-Rāzī denies that continuous Euclidean geometry can represent the real structure of the extramental world (Setia 2006; Eftekhari 2018; 2019). The claim that continuity has no reality other than in the faculty of estimation is often restated in the works of the later atomists like ʿAḍūd al-Dīn al-ʾĪjī (d. 1355) (Hasan 2017: 233–35).