 In Henry, “life” (vie) has therefore no biological meaning, but an exclusively phenomenological one, which means that it refers to this fundamental mode of appearing that is, as self-appearing, radically distinct from the ek-static nature of intentionality. It is not the opening to an other, but enclosed in itself, undergoing itself in self-experience (épreuve de soi that Henry distinguishes from conscience de soi, self-awareness), which is precisely for Henry the condition of possibility of any experience of an other or hetero-affection. As Henry intends to illustrate in Barbarism through the somewhat ironic example of a biology student, none of the forms of intentional directedness—including the most elaborate forms of scientific knowledge—would be possible if they weren’t revealed as such to a living subject that is characterized by auto-affection or, better yet, that is auto-affection. Henry also uses the term “transcendental affectivity” to characterize this self-appearing proper to his phenomenological concept of life: it is transcendental in the sense that it is the condition of possibility of every possible phenomenon, and it is affectivity because the self-experience that characterizes the living (vivant) is a form of primal suffering (souffrir originaire) or pathos.