 In a similar way Armstrong endeavours to sweep away the need for negative facts by affirming “the biggest totality state of all, the one embracing all lower-order states of affairs”, i.e., the existence of a totality state that consists in an aggregate of all the (1st order) states of affairs there are related by T to the property of being a (1st order) states of affairs (2004: 75). It’s one of Armstrong’s abiding contentions that the world is “a world of states of affairs, with particulars and universals only having existence within states of affairs” (1989: 94). Consequently this totality state comprises a vast swathe of what exists—whether particulars, universals or states of affairs that consist in particulars having universals. So it follows from the existence of this totality fact that there are no more (1st order) states of affairs that are not already included in the aggregate of states that T relates to the property of being a (1st order) states of affairs. Nor are there any particulars or (1st order) universals had by those particulars that are not constituents of the state of affairs included in that aggregate. It also follows that there are no more particulars or (1st order) universals. So this totality fact serves as truth-maker for all these negative truths.