 In view of these properties, it may seem that the voting game presents far less of a dilemma than the PD. There are, after all, equilibria that are pareto-optimal outcomes. In practice, however, it is difficult to see how these equilibria could be attained and the all-defect equilibrium could be avoided. When n is large, defection “almost dominates” cooperation. In the voting case, for example, a player might plausibly reason: if few of my fellow supporters vote, my vote will be futile, if many of them do it will be unneccessary. Even if a group were in the unlikely situation of being just below the threshold of minimally effective cooperation, a prospective voter would have no way of knowing this. In the pollution and conservation examples moves should really not be modeled as simultaneous (see Asynchronous Moves below), so we may perhaps be a little more optimistic. By observing the actions of those who have moved previously a player might know whether at his turn the threshold of minimally effective cooperation is near. In most real-world situations, however, a player can deduce this only by observing the effects of those actions, and often these effects manifest themselves only after his move is made. A conspicuous example of this delay effect might be the succession of carbon-emitting activities leading to climate change.