 Two distinct types of motivation can be identified for this claim. The first is a broadly functionalist one, akin to the functionalist motivation for state-oriented extended mind. The idea is that the computational profile of the process of manipulating the book is broadly similar to that of internal processes responsible for cognition (Wilson 1994, 2004; Clark 1989, 1997, 2008a, 2008b; Rowlands 1999, 2010, Wheeler 2010). Standard accounts of cognition postulate information-bearing structures (roughly, representations) and transformative processes performed on those structures, where these processes have the function of identifying information and making it available either to the cognitive subject or to further processing operations. Thus, for example, David Marr’s canonical account of vision postulates a series of information-bearing structures—retinal image, raw primal sketch, full primal sketch, and so on, combined with operations that successively transform one structure into the next. The overall function of these processes is to identify and make available to the subject information that can be used to solve the task of seeing an object. Similarly, when Otto manipulates his notebook this, in general terms, is also what he seems to be doing: acting on information-bearing structures with a view to making available information that he needs to solve the cognitive task of remembering the location of The Museum of Modern Art. From this suitably abstract computational perspective, it is argued, there does not seem to be a huge amount of difference between internal processes performed by the brain on information-bearing structures and external processes performed by the organism on information-bearing structures. They have the same abstract computational profile and purpose.