 First, it is unclear why a liberal state would be justified in promoting promissory virtue for its own sake, which seems a far more controversial end for the state to adopt than various others that might justify enforcing promises (such as preventing harm to promisees or efficient coordination; see below). Raz (1982: 937) argues that “enforcing voluntary obligations is not itself a proper goal for contract law” because “[t]o enforce voluntary obligations [for their own sake]” would be “to enforce morality through the legal imposition of duties on individuals”. Raz adds, “[i]n this respect, [enforcing promissory morality] does not differ from the legal proscription of pornography”. This challenge is aligned with neutralist conceptions of liberalism. A state that aims at relative neutrality on contested moral claims and restraint in the exercise of power must connect the enforcement of contracts to ends that are widely embraced as worthwhile.