 One may well wonder whether this sort of signaling and team play has any importance beyond showing competitive scholars how to win round-robin IPD tournaments. In an evolutionary setting armies of enablers would rapidly head towards extinction, leaving a master strategy to face its high-scoring competitors alone. There are, of course, examples among both animal species and human societies of successful “teams” among which large numbers are exploited for the benefit of few. Presumably, in these cases the exploiters transfer enough to the exploited to ensure the latter's continued availability. Perhaps such payoff transfers within teams should be permitted in IPD tournaments intended to explore these issues. Even without such rule changes, however, there are less extreme forms of team play that would perform better in an evolutionary setting. If one allows enablers to recognize and cooperate with one another, they will gain considerably with no loss to their master, except when an enabler wrongly identified an outsider as one of its kind. If one allowed them to play reasonable strategies against outsiders they would gain still more, though the risk to their master (through outsiders' gain) would be considerably greater. Even without allowing themselves to be exploited by a master, teams could benefit by playing \(\bC\) among themselves and \(\bD\) with outsiders, or \(\bC\) among themselves and a reasonable strategy against outsiders. Slany and Kienreich (the Graz group) label these approaches EW, EP, DW, and DP and observe (among other properties) that for teams of equal and sufficiently large size this order mirrors the order of the best-performing member of the team from best to worst. 