 The most popular answer to this question, in recent years, has been that facts about reasons are normatively fundamental (Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014; Dancy 2004). Facts about goodness, obligation, virtue, etc. – all other normative facts – depend on facts about reasons. Others think that value is normatively fundamental, explaining reasons and all other normative phenomena (Maguire 2016), while still others think that facts about fittingness are normatively fundamental (Howard 2019). Some have even suggested that “thin” normative facts – which, roughly speaking, merely tell us normative information – are the wrong focus, and that “thick” normative facts – roughly, facts that tell us something normative and non-normative – could be at the bottom of it all, normatively speaking (Roberts 2017, Morton 2019). On that view, the fact that an act is courageous is normatively more fundamental, and perhaps also metaphysically more fundamental, than the fact that it is good, rather than the other way around.