 A question that arises for any epistemology of perception but that is more salient for seemings internalism concerns which perceptual beliefs are epistemologically basic. Is my belief that there’s a dog in front of me basic, or does its justification depend on the justification of more elemental beliefs: that there’s a medium sized, 3-dimensional object of such-and-such a shape and a furry texture, etc.? Is my belief that that’s Django on the floor in front of me basic, or does it depend on the beliefs that there’s a black and tan dog of a certain description, and that Django is a black and tan dog who fits that description, etc.? One reason this matters, especially for the present views, is that it is closely linked to separate issues concerning the contents of perception  (see the entry on the    contents of perception).  If I can have the basic perceptual belief that Django the dog is here in front of me, then does this mean that I must be capable of having a perceptual experience with the content that Django is in front of me?