 According to Husserl’s analysis, experience of any sort (perception, memory, imagination, etc.) has a common temporal structure such that any moment of experience contains a retentional reference to past moments of experience, a current openness (primal impression) to what is present, and a protentional anticipation of the moments of experience that are just about to happen (Husserl 1966; see Gallagher 1998). The retentional structure of experience, that is, the fact that when I am experiencing something, each passing moment of consciousness does not simply disappear at the next moment but is kept in intentional currency, constitutes a coherency that stretches over an experienced temporal duration. Husserl’s favorite example is a melody. When I experience a melody, I don’t simply experience a knife-edge presentation (primal impression) of one note, which is then completely washed away and replaced with the next discrete knife-edge presentation of the next note. Rather, consciousness retains the sense of the first note as just past, as I hear the second note, a hearing that is also enriched by an anticipation (protention) of the next note (or at least, in case I do not know the melody, a sense that there will be a next note, or some next auditory event). Husserl claims that we actually do perceive melodies—in opposition to an earlier view propounded by Brentano, viz., that with the help of our imagination or recollection we construct or reconstruct such unities out of a synthesis of mental acts. That we actually perceive melodies (without first constructing them using memory and imagination) is possible only because consciousness is so structured to allow for this temporal presentation.