 According to the consequence approach, Popper was right in thinking that truthlikeness depends on the relative sizes of classes of true and false consequences, but erred in thinking that all consequences of a theory count the same. Some consequences are relevant, some aren’t. Let \(R\) be some criterion of relevance of consequences; let \(A_R\) be the set of relevant consequences of \(A\). Whatever the criterion \(R\) is it has to satisfy the constraint that \(A\) be recoverable from (and hence equivalent to) \(A_R\). Popper’s account is the limiting one – all consequences are relevant. (Popper’s relevance criterion is the empty one, \(P\), according to which \(A_P\) is just \(A\) itself.) The relevant truth content of A (abbreviated \(A_R^T\)) can be defined as \(A_R\cap T\) (or \(A\cap T_R\)), and similarly the relevant falsity content of \(A\) can be defined as \(A_R\cap F\). Since \(A_R = (A_R\cap T)\cup(A_R\cap F)\) it follows that the union of true and false relevant consequences of \(A\) is equivalent to \(A\). And where \(A\) is true \(A_R\cap F\) is empty, so that A is equivalent to \(A_R\cap T\) alone.