 The basic needs account is relatively straightforward to interpret in the context of salary negotiations: it suggests that whatever the wage employers offer their employees, it should at least be sufficient to ensure the needs of these workers are met. But suppose \(A\) buys an apple from \(B\)’s stand: what, in this case, does the basic needs account identify as a fair price? Must \(A\) pay a price that meets \(B\)’s basic needs for a year? Surely not. A day? Perhaps, but what if \(B\) sells many apples? Does this mean \(A\) should pay less? The degree to which \(B\) is able to meet her needs via her apple stand depends on the market she finds herself in—the supply and demand for apples—as well as features about herself, such as how long or hard she works. One consequence of this observation is that the basic needs approach may be impossible to instrumentalize in discrete cases. A second consequence is that, since \(A\)’s meeting \(B\)’s basic needs depends, in part, on \(B\)’s own choices, a moral hazard problem arises (Ferguson 2016b). Indeed, this problem confronts all accounts of exploitation that are not responsibility sensitive.