 Second, the example also indicates that, when confronted with facts or objects and their values, one can also adopt an affective position towards those correlates: when one feels emotions towards them, one affectively responds to them (see von Hildebrand 1916: 134f; Brunswig 1911: 47; Reinach 1912/13 [1989: 295ff]; Scheler 1913/16: 267ff; on the early phenomenological conception of emotions and its development, see Vendrell Ferran 2008; Müller 2019; Szanto &amp; Landweer 2020). The distinction between the cognitive act of feeling values and emotions is illustrated by the possibility of a subject’s grasping the value-property of something by, nonetheless, remaining affectively inert towards it (von Hildebrand 1916: 200f): e.g., it is possible to observe a moral wrongdoing without eliciting indignation or to perceive a commendable action without admiring it. In this case, the act of feeling has not triggered an emotive response towards it. The value-property, which in contemporary debates on emotions is also called the emotion’s “formal object” (Kenny 2003), is the condition of fit of the emotion: an emotion is fit or warranted if it tracks a value-property.