  The basic idea behind (G) is captured in the aforementioned rough definition of actualism. Here are the details. “\(A_i\)” may apply to a single act or a sequence of acts over time. The main problem that Goldman finds with (G) is that even if \(A_i\) satisfies (1) and (2), (G) does not take into account the following sort of case: “\(A_i\)” refers to a sequence of acts over time, the following counterfactual is true: “if the agent were to perform the first half of \(A_i\), then the agent would not perform the second half of \(A_i\)”, and the sequence of acts that would follow the performance of the first half of \(A_i\) would be worse than the sequence of acts that would follow an alternative to the first half of \(A_i\). (G) implies that in this sort of case the agent has jointly unfulfillable obligations at the same time t, viz. an obligation at t to perform \(A_i\) and an obligation at t to refrain from performing the first half of \(A_i\). For example, according to (G) Procrastinate ought to ⟨agree to review the paper &amp; write the review⟩ from \(t_1\)–\(t_2\) because the sequence of acts that would follow this act sequence from \(t_2\) is better than any sequence from \(t_2\) which would follow any alternative act sequence at \(t_1\)–\(t_2\), including the alternative of ⟨declining to review the paper &amp; not writing the review⟩ from \(t_1\)–\(t_2\). But, on the other hand, according to (G) Procrastinate ought to ⟨decline to review the paper⟩ at \(t_1\) because the sequence of acts that would follow this from \(t_1\) is better than any sequence from \(t_1\) which would follow any alternative act at \(t_1\), including the alternative of ⟨agreeing to review the paper⟩. Obviously, it cannot be the case that both obligations are fulfilled.