 These arguments show that mathematical objects are neither separate entities fully detached from the sensible world nor the causes of natural things. Avicenna’s refutation of Platonism and Pythagoreanism regarding mathematical objects was so convincing and influential that these approaches almost completely disappeared in post-Avicennian philosophy. This was so despite the strong presence of Pythagorean and/or Platonic elements in other (i.e., non-mathematical) aspects of the philosophy of some post-Avicennian thinkers, like Suhrawardī (d. 1191) (Walbridge 2000; De Smet 2022). The details of some Avicennian criticisms of  (SM)  and  (PM)—which  were usually taken as auxiliary parts of Avicenna’s general criticism of the Platonic account of universal forms—were of course criticized by later philosophers (Arnzen 2011; Benevich 2019). These criticisms did not revive mathematical Platonism and/or Pythagoreanism in post-Avicennian Islamic philosophy. Having said that, the discussions of the weakness and strength of the arguments for and against mathematical Platonism continued to be of interest to post-Avicennian philosophers. Perhaps the most important work in which such arguments are collected is a book, entitled The Platonic Intelligible Forms, written between 1329 and 1339, by an unknown author (see the Arabic text of the book in Badawī 1947: 1–145, and its German translation in Arnzen 2011: Appendix 1).