 Discussing the object of musical imitations, Aristotle introduces an interesting distinction between mere indications or signs (sēmeia) of emotional states and the states themselves. Signs of emotional states are the observable behavior that accompanies the occurrence of such states. Aristotle holds that the visual arts merely imitate signs of emotions. For instance, a painter may represent a man weeping or smiling. However, music is able to imitate the emotional states themselves. A plausible reading of Aristotle’s view is that he regarded music as capable of arousing the emotions it imitates, and that this capacity ultimately explains how music may imitate emotional states themselves, as opposed to their manifestations. On this analysis, the object of musical imitation cannot be specified separately from the emotional response the music arouses in the listener (Halliwell (2002: 248) stresses this point; Sörbom 1994 offers an alternative interpretation).