 Various solutions have been proposed to the paradox of free choice. Many have argued that what we called the Free Choice Principle is merely a pragmatic inference and therefore the step leading to 3 in  (37)  is unjustified. One argument in favor of such a pragmatic account comes from the observation that free choice effects disappear in negative contexts. For example, No one is allowed to eat the cake or the ice-cream cannot merely mean that no one is allowed to eat the cake and the ice-cream, as would be expected if free choice effects were semantic entailments rather than pragmatic implicatures (Alonso-Ovalle 2006). Various ways of deriving free choice inferences as implicatures have been proposed (e.g., Gazdar 1979; Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Schulz 2005; Fox 2007 and Franke 2011; see however Fusco 2014 for a critical discussion of pragmatic accounts to free choice).