 Restall (2015) argues that the the acceptance/rejection issue makes gappy and glutty approaches symmterical: gap theorists cannot assert some true claims about paradoxes, but glut theorists cannot reject some false claims about non-paradoxes; see also Restall 2013, Jenny 2017. In a note by Laura Goodship (1996), she suggests that the proposal of separating denial from assertion of negation runs into problems related, again, to Curry’s paradox. Her proposal is, in effect, that it would be more natural for dialetheists to both accept and reject things after all. Focusing on the phenomenon of disagreement in natural language, Ripley (2015a) argues that dialetheists (and paracompleteists) should rejoin classical logicians in taking negation to embed denial, and denial to express disagreement. Ripley proposes that dialetheists simply admit that (1) agreement and disagreement are incompatible (“it’s incoherent to do both”, p. 306), but (2) in some cases, assert and deny the same thing. The result would be what Ripley calls paracoherentism, which (in echo of paraconsistency) would try to allow local incoherence without global incoherence. How this could be done is an open question. Ripley suggests dropping the transitivity of logical consequence. Goodship herself ultimately recommends dropping modus ponens, a proposal that has been dubbed the ‘Goodship project’ (Beall 2015, Omori 2016, Priest 2017). 