 A formal investigation of the relationships between belief merging and judgment aggregation can be found in (Everaere et al. 2015, 2017). As we have seen, belief merging takes a profile of propositional belief bases as input, where such bases represent the beliefs of a certain individual, not restraint to a given agenda. Judgment aggregation, on the other hand, asks people to submit their judgments on a specific set of issues. The analysis rests on the assumption that an individual’s beliefs allow deriving her opinion on the agenda’s items. Thus, in (Everaere et al. 2015) a projection function p (assumed to be identical for all the individuals) is defined. The role of such projection function is precisely to determine the judgments of an agent (input of judgment aggregation operators) starting from her beliefs (input of belief merging). So, for example, if an individual only believes \(a\land b\) and one of the agenda items is a, then the projection function can derive that the person submits a “yes” as judgment on a. However, if she believes only a and one of the agenda item is \(a\land b\), she will probably be not able to submit a judgment on that item. For this reason, individual judgment sets in (Everaere et al. 2015) are not necessarily complete (individuals can abstain on some agenda’s issues). Using the projection p, two paths along which a collective judgment can be derived from a profile of belief bases are considered. Along one path (merge-then-project), the individual belief bases are first merged using a merging operator and then the collective judgment is computed by the projection p. Along the other path (project-then-aggregate), starting from the individual bases, the individual judgment sets are first computed by p and then aggregated using a judgment aggregation procedure to determine the collective judgment on the given agenda. Thus, the question addressed is whether the two collective judgments obtained by following the two paths coincide. Two cases are considered: the general case (incomplete agendas) and the case in which the agenda is complete (i.e. it contains all possible interpretations). For example, the agenda \(A= \{\neg a \land \neg b, \neg a \land b, a \land \neg b, a \land b\}\) is complete whereas the agenda \(A= \{\neg a \land \neg b, \neg a \land b, a \land \neg b\}\) is not. Hence, if an individual believes \(a\land b\), her judgment set will be \((0,0,0,1)\) in the first agenda and \((0,0,0)\) in the second one, which may lead to different collective outcomes depending on whether the merge-then-project or the project-then-merge path is used. The fact that by properly choosing the agenda one may manipulate the result has been investigated in the judgment aggregation literature (Dietrich 2016, Lang et al. 2016). In the general case, IC merging methods can give results that are inconsistent with those obtained by using judgment aggregation operators satisfying unanimity or majority  preservation[5].  On a more positive side, when the agenda is complete, the collective judgments obtained by following the two paths coincide for some judgment aggregation operators satisfying properties closed to some IC merging postulates. 