 That wh-IEM is a distinct phenomenon from IEM as it is standardly formulated is shown by the fact one may consistently claim that a form of experience, for example memory, does not put one in a position to think, of some a distinct from oneself, that a was F, yet nevertheless does put one in a position to think that someone was F. That is, it might give rise to judgements that are IEM but not wh-IEM. The converse, however, is not possible. For since “a was F” entails “someone was F”, it will not be possible for a judgement, relative to some grounds, to be wh-IEM without it also being IEM. If a judgement is based on an identification, it will be subject to errors of wh-misidentification. For this reason, wh-IEM might legitimately be considered the more fundamental notion (as it is by Pryor 1999).