 ….that there are radically different sorts or senses of value between which quantitative or even ordinal comparison is not readily possible, that there is a deep distinction between values that appear purely personal and those that claim cogency or validity, that value and values have a close and necessary relation to feeling, but that values that claim cogency or validity cannot be exhaustively analyzed or even explained in terms of mere feeling, that the main ‘heads’ of impersonal valuation, freedom, fairness, happiness etc, are moderately clearly and readily agreed upon though their detailed specification or correct practical implementation is infinitely controversial, that value and disvalue have close connections with various senses of “ought” but that the central sense of the latter reveal it as a much more restricted conception, much more closely concerned with disvalues and their avoidance than with values… that the values called “moral” presuppose all other types of value as objects of pursuit, but their value does not depend on the latter value, that moral value has a close connection with the readiness to sacrifice personal good for impersonal good, etc. (AE: 78)