 However, the dictum regarding the need to avoid anthropomorphism is also a philosophical assumption embedded in comparative cognition and, as such, it can be questioned. It has been argued, for instance, that a blanket ban against the attribution of human-like qualities to animals would beg the question by assuming that said qualities are indeed uniquely human (Fitzpatrick 2017a). Frans de Waal (1999) uses the term “anthropodenial” to refer to the a priori rejection of the possibility that humans and animals may share characteristics, and argues that it is just as worrisome as anthropomorphism. He points out that there is an imbalance in comparative cognition, such that the over-attribution of mental capacities to animals is seen as much more problematic than the under-attribution. The reason behind this is that comparative psychologists are wary of violating Morgan’s Canon. However, by looking to preserve cognitive parsimony at all costs, de Waal argues, comparative psychologists may be disregarding evolutionary parsimony, which dictates that we should offer explanations that posit the fewest possible changes in the phylogenetic tree. We should thus steer clear of both anthropodenial and anthropomorphism. A similar point was made by Kristin Andrews and Brian Huss (2014), who coined the term “anthropectomy” to refer to the mistake of denying that an animal has a certain characteristically human capacity when in fact they do have that capacity. They argue that anthropomorphism and anthropectomy are both errors, they both amount to a false depiction of how the world actually is, and so there is no reason to fear one over the other.