 The latter contention has not stayed unchallenged. Suppose one accepts a notion of epistemic justification with internalist resonances saying that a factor J is relevant to s’s epistemic justification only if s is able to determine, by reflection alone, whether J is or is not realised. On this notion, s’s seeing that p cannot provide s with justification for believing p unless s can rationally claim that she is seeing that p upon reflection alone. Seeing that p, however, is subjectively indistinguishable from hallucinating that p, or from being in some other delusional state in which it merely seems to s that she is seeing that p. For this reason, one may find it compelling that s can claim by reflection alone that she’s seeing that p only if s has an independent reason for ruling out that it merely seems to her that she does (cf. mainly Wright 2011). If this is true, for many deductive arguments from p to q, s will be unable to acquire non-inferential and infallible justification for believing p of the type described by the disjunctivist and capable of transmitting to q. In particular, this will happen whenever q is the logical negation of a proposition ascribing to s some delusionary mental state in which it merely seems to her that she is directly perceiving that p. 