 Others have drawn on empirically-oriented work on culture and cognition to inform more specific debates within moral theory, broadly construed. A wealth of empirical evidence has demonstrated cultural differences in behaviors, norms, and judgments concerned with reciprocity, fairness, and altruism (Sober &amp; Wilson 1998; J. Henrich, Boyd, et al. 2004, 2005; Mathew, Boyd, &amp; Van Veelen 2013; Baumard, André, &amp; Sperber 2013; Sterelny 2016). Naturalistic philosophers, in turn, have attempted to clarify the significance of the revealed variation, spelling out what it might mean for metaethical theorizing (Machery, Kelly, &amp; Stich 2005; Doris &amp; Plakias 2008) or how it might reflect on the range and moral status of different forms of altruism and cooperation (Binmore 2006; Zollman 2008; Clavien &amp; Chapuisat 2013; Sterelny, Joyce, et al. 2013, Sterelny 2021; Curry 2016; Curry et al. forthcoming; Piccinini &amp; Schulz 2019; Doris, Stich, &amp; Walmsley 2020). Several philosophers have argued that there is non-trivial cultural variation in the most basic components of morality, and as such that there are unlikely to be many moral universals (Prinz 2008; A. Levy &amp; Levy 2020; cf. Mikhail 2007, 2011).