 Group rights conceived collectively may seem less threatening to individuals than group rights conceived corporately. Because, on the corporate conception, a group has moral standing independently of its members, its standing, will and interest can rival and override those of its individual members. A collective right by contrast, because it is held jointly by the individuals who make up the collectivity and is grounded in their standing and interests, presents no similar danger. But fear of collective rights may still be provoked by the way in which those rights derive from the aggregation of individual interests. As we have already seen, on Raz’s conception of collective rights, numbers count. Numbers affect both whether groups have rights and how weighty their rights are (1986, 187, 209). Others are loath to accept that rights can derive from, or be affected by, that sort of aggregation (Réaume 1988, 2003; Tamir 1999, 166–71). In contemporary philosophy, rights-thinking is commonly opposed to maximizing consequentialism, of which utilitarianism is the prime example. Ascribing rights to individuals is a way of acknowledging their separateness as persons and of safeguarding them from the aggregative excesses of utilitarianism. But if the aggregation of interests can yield collective rights, a morality of rights may begin to assume the character of, and to present the same dangers as, the very sort of utilitarian thinking that many rights-theorists intend it to preclude, especially for those outside the right-holding group.