 with these classifications thus averting us to the “limitations of purely reductive research agendas in biology and neuroscience” (Chirimuuta 2018: 409). If Chirimuuta is here advocating pluralism about scientific explanation, Polger and Shapiro are in full agreement; they are avowed methodological pluralists. But if Chirimuuta is here advocating some kind of “Essential Autonomy Thesis”, that higher-level regularities are “somehow invisible” to would-be reducing explanations, or “can only be captured in the proprietary vocabulary of a special science”, then Chirimuuta’s MR2.0 sounds suspiciously like MR1.0, with the latter being a view she herself insists needs to be rejected. They then insist that Chirimuuta’s own discussion of the role of functional thinking in biology and neuroscience stresses its methodological importance. Again, Polger and Shapiro have no complaint about that. Their critical focus is on an inference from this pluralist methodology and the ability to model a system in this fashion to the conclusion that the system is ipso facto multiply realizable” (2018: 454–455). Being a fellow rejecter of MR1.0 and its accompanying Essential Autonomy Thesis, Polger and Shapiro insist that Chirimuuta should also reject any such inference.