  A further criticism that has been levelled against McDowell’s proposal is that his disjunctive account of experience fails to bring with it the epistemic benefits that he advertises it as having. McDowell has suggested that in showing how the disjunctive account he recommends allows us to resist the tempting line of argument that he considers, he has shown us how to “remove a prop” upon which a certain line of sceptical argument depends. (In particular, see McDowell 2008). Against McDowell, Wright (2002, 2008) argues that disjunctivism provides us with nothing to address mainstream perceptual scepticism. Wright claims that the traditional Cartesian sceptical argument does not rely on the impossibility of direct perceptual acquaintance with the world. It allows that you may be having a perceptual experience that involves a fact in the world making itself perceptual manifest to you. What it attempts to undermine is the idea that anything other than agnosticism as to whether or not you are perceiving is warranted, even in this situation. (See also Conee 2007, and Byrne 2014.)