  William appeals to God's power to show God has will and knowledge. He argues that God must be omnipotent: he cannot be forced or impeded and has a “two-way” power, identified by William with what Aristotle calls a rational power. This is a power that “extends to both opposites, namely, to make and not to make” (Switalski 1976, 57; Teske and Wade 1989, 99), in contrast with something, such as fire, which when “it encounters what can be heated is not able to heat or not to heat . . . but it necessarily has only the power to heat” (Switalski 1976, 54; Teske and Wade 1989, 97).  However, because a two-way power is poised between acting and not-acting, it must be inclined to acting by something, and William thinks this can only be through a choice. Therefore, God must have will and choice; and since “it is impossible that there be will and choice where there is no knowledge” (Switalski 1976, 59; Wade and Teske 1989, 101), God must also have knowledge. William goes on to argue that God must indeed be omniscient, since “his wisdom is absolute and free, not bound in any way to things, nor dependent upon them” (Switalski 1976, 61; Teske and Wade 1989, 102).