 The problem with construing the pure forms of intuition as the product of acts of synthesis is that Kant’s characterization of the mereological structure of a representation produced by such a synthesis is at odds with his characterization of the mereological structure of the pure intuitions. One version or other of this point has been noted by a variety of scholars (Wilson 1975; Aquila 1994; Falkenstein 1995: 139; Mohr 1998: 112–113; Aquila 2001; Bell 2001; Fichant 2004; Banham 2005: ch.6; Messina 2014; McLear 2015; Allison 2015, 410ff; Onof and Schulting 2015; Guyer 2018; Roche 2018). Here, in brief, is the most straightforward version of the argument challenging Intellectualism: