 Royzman, Landy, and Goodwin rightly note that the moral/conventional task is “one of the most widely used measures of mature moral judgment” (2014: 178). But why should we believe that any version of the moral/conventional task really does enable us to pick out genuine moral judgments? As we noted in  Section 2,  there is a great deal of philosophical work aimed at providing a definition of morality, and while some philosophers offered accounts that are compatible with features of the moral/conventional task, many philosophers disagreed. So there is no philosophical consensus about the definition of morality that would support the claim that Turiel’s moral/conventional task, or anything in that vicinity, can be used to identify moral judgments. One way around this impasse, as we saw in  Section 5,  is the suggestion that “moral judgment” can be regarded as a natural kind term, and the hypothesis that the features used in the moral/conventional task are the essential features of the natural kind the term denotes. For that hypothesis to be plausible, it would have to be the case that the features used in the moral/conventional task form a nomological cluster. But a number of authors, including Kelly and colleagues (2007); Fessler, Barrett, and colleagues (2015); Kumar (2015); and Stich (2019) have argued that findings like those we have reviewed in  Section 5  challenge the claim that the features used in the moral/conventional task form a nomological  cluster.[24]  The study by Fessler, Barrett, and others poses a further challenge to versions of the moral/conventional task that include questions about seriousness since it found that harmful transgressions were judged to be less bad when they occurred long ago or far away. Moreover, in cultures around the world there is a wide range of behaviors that are considered serious transgressions that are far removed from the familiar schoolyard transgressions typically invoked by social domain theorists—transgressions like apostasy and blasphemy, necrophilia and speaking ill of the dead, marrying a cousin, failure to circumcise one’s sons, and many more. Most of these have never been used in moral/conventional task studies. Since people’s judgments about transgressions like these have never been studied, we simply do not know whether they would evoke the pattern of judgments that social domain theorists find for schoolyard transgressions. If they don’t, that might provide additional evidence against the claim that moral/conventional task judgments form nomological clusters. On the other hand, Royzman, Landy, and Goodwin (2014) alert us to the possibility that poor reasoning may be responsible for some, perhaps all, cases where the components of the moral/conventional task come unglued. So much more work will be needed before we can draw a confident conclusion about whether Turiel’s “criterion judgments” version of the moral/conventional task, or any other version, actually enables us to determine which of a person’s normative judgments are moral judgments.