  Of course, the role such a reconstruction of Mackie’s argument assigns to moral disagreement is exceedingly limited, so it hardly accounts for the attention that moral disagreement has received in the debate about moral realism. Can the argument be reconstructed in a more direct way? As several commentators have pointed out, what might be needed is an epistemic premise (e.g., Bennigson 1996; Loeb 1998; Tersman 2006, ch. 3, Enoch 2009; and Locke 2017). The question is what the existence of moral facts predicts about existing moral disagreement, and the problem is that it is hard to see how it generates any such predictions on its own. Further assumptions are needed, and one candidate is the idea that the facts, if they exist, are accessible to us in the sense that we can in favorable epistemic circumstances acquire knowledge of them. David Wiggins has formulated the idea as follows: “If X is true, then X will under favourable circumstances command convergence” (1987, 147). Given such a claim, one could then argue that moral realism predicts less disagreement (in the relevant circumstances) than that which actually exists. This would be a direct reason to reject it.