 But the debate goes on amongst philosophers. Harriet Baber comes close to suggesting that women do not have deformed desires or adaptive preferences (Baber 2007). Baber argues against Nussbaum’s view that disadvantaged women who have adaptive preferences might get what they want when they satisfy these preferences, but they are not better off because their desires are deformed. In contrast, Baber believes that adaptation is irrelevant to whether preference-satisfaction contributes to one’s welfare: if I want something, getting it is good for me regardless of how I acquired that desire (110). Baber’s explanation for the choices that deprived women make is that they are making the best of a bad situation, choosing not necessarily what they would prefer all things considered, but rather what they would prefer given their options. While Nussbaum believes that Jayamma, who settles for a low-paying job with poor working conditions because she believes this to be her lot in life, lacks a conception of herself as a person with rights that can be violated and a belief that she is wronged, Baber believes that she has just settled for second best, since she would grab a raise if it were offered to her (Nussbaum 2000, 113; Baber 111). Similarly, Nussbaum believes that Vasanti, who stays in an abusive marriage for years, does not see herself as having rights that are violated, but has a deformed preference to put up with abuse as part of women’s lot, while Baber denies that Vasanti has such a preference, suggesting instead that she prefers a bundle that includes putting up with abuse along with having a home and basic necessities (Nussbaum 2000, 68–69; Baber 113–114). Baber argues further that when women do, in fact, acquire adaptive preferences, as is the case with Srey Mom, once sold into slavery, who now at least partly wants to remain a prostitute when given the chance to go into the community where she will be ostracized, we beg the question if we assume that their choices are uninformed or cooly calculated (121). Baber’s view in the end is that it is an empirical question whether the women in the cases described are rational self-interested choosers who make the best of a bad situation, or whether they are damaged by deformed preferences. She maintains that they, as well as most members of traditionally disadvantaged groups who succumb to bad treatment, are rational self-choosers (122).