 Elisabeth’s remarks to Descartes also suggest that she is willing to revisit Descartes’s substance dualism. She presses Descartes to further articulate his account of substance, pointing not only to the problem of mind-body interaction, but also to cases where the poor condition of the body—the vapours, for instance—affects capacity for thought. These cases, she intimates, would be more straightforwardly explained by considering the mind to be material and extended. The issue of the role of the condition of the body in our capacity for thought also figures in the correspondence of 1645, concerning the regulation of the passions, from both a theoretical and a personal perspective. Elisabeth maintains that we have autonomy of thought—that we have control over what we think and can turn our attention from one object to another— and so that the order of thought does not depend on the causal order of material things. However, at the same time she acknowledges that the capacity for thought, and the free will essential to it, is dependent on the overall condition of the body. Elisabeth thus rejects an account of mind that reduces thinking to bodily states, but at the same time she calls into question the idea that the capacity of thinking exists wholly independently of body, that is, that a thinking thing is substance properly speaking. As Alanen (2021) puts it, what is at issue in this exchange is how to understand the agency proper to thought. Shapiro (1999 and 2007) suggests that while Elisabeth might be willing to revisit substance dualism, she does not advocate clearly for any alternative. Janssen-Lauret (2018) maintains that in the end Elisabeth endorses substance dualism and argues that Elisabeth subscribes to a naturalistic dualism, which holds that the soul is both conscious and extended without endorsing materialism.