Given the ardent pronouncements in the 1947 article with Quine, the common misunderstanding that Goodman’s mature nominalism encompasses, or is motivated by, the rejection of abstract objects is understandable. Nonetheless, it is incorrect. Goodman does not reject all abstract objects: in The Structure of Appearance, he embraces qualia as abstract objects (see  section 4 below),  some of which (in fact all but moments) are universals (SA, §VII.8). Goodman’s mature nominalism, from The Structure of Appearance onwards, is a rejection of the use of sets (and objects constructed from them) in constructional systems, and no blanket rejection of all universals or abstract particulars. To be sure, Goodman also refuses to acknowledge properties and other non-extensional objects, but the reason for his rejection of such entities is independent, and in fact more fundamental, than his nominalism: it is his strict requirement of extensionality (WW, 95n3; see also  section 6 below).  Goodman does occasionally include extensionalism in his nominalism (see LA, xiii, 74; under the entry “nominalism” the index of LA references some passage which discusses properties ; see also MM, 51; WW, 10n14). Strictly speaking, however, nominalism for Goodman is the refusal to use class terms in a constructional system—no more, and no less.