 The exact nature of objections to a supposedly mythical “Given” vary, as do their putative connections to Kant’s arguments (Watkins 2008, 2012). One objection made by Sellars is that justifiers for belief must have a compositional, fact-like structure that mirrors the propositional structure of belief. Sensory experiences (understood as sensations), on Sellars’ view, are particulars rather than facts and so cannot play any justificatory role (Sellars 1963: 128; cf. BonJour 1985: ch. 4). Thus, the view goes, if the belief caused by an experience (such as the belief you might have that there is a computer screen before you) and thereby adopted by you is also to be justified by that experience, then the experience itself must be able to function as a premise in an argument for which the relevant belief is the conclusion. This is the “premise principle,” as it has been called in contemporary epistemology (Pryor 2005). Acceptance of the premise principle thus plays a significant role in motivating the position that sensory experience without propositional (i.e., conceptual) content cannot justify belief.