  Stepping back from the Cohen versus Rawls polemic (on which, see Williams 1998, Pogge 2000, Scheffler 2006, and Shiffrin 2010), we should note that any theory of egalitarian justice must indicate how its requirements for institutions and practices mesh with its views concerning what justice requires of individuals. For example, any ordinary person seeking to fashion a fulfilling life for himself will form friendships and close family ties and other associations that will command his loyalty. Being a good friend, one will be partial to one's friend over others in some contexts; being a good family member, one will be partial to one's family members over others; being a good citizen, one will (perhaps, this case is more controversial) have a special loyalty to one's compatriots. These special-tie commitments appear to be unavoidably in tension with any commitment to any impartial justice norms (Scheffler 2003). Suppose we accept the idea that the person committed to egalitarianism will not seek to expunge all personal commitments from her life but will seek to accommodate impartial ethical and partial concerns in some way that does justice to both. What way is that? Presumably the answer will vary across the different types of personal commitments that might lead one to do what cuts against justice requirements. Relations to colleagues, family members, friends, lovers, parents, children, ethnic and social group comrades, and so on will pose different sorts of problems that will require different sorts of accommodations and adjustments. A complete egalitarian theory includes principles that would properly guide these accommodations and adjustments. (For an attempt to work out these issues for one domain, that of parents and children, from a perspective sympathetic to Cohen's line, see Brighouse and Swift 2009).