 Gaṅgeśa often refers to the problem of the word list that is not unified, several times appearing to reinstate a grammatical understanding of “expectation” as opposed to how objects—referents—are related in fact. And once (2020: 1547) this comes right at the heart of his endorsement of “incremental referentialism” as opposed to the connectivist, “holistic” variety of the Prābhākara. He says, “ … a word endowed with expectation and meeting the other requirements is what brings about a particular presentation of an overall connection.” This seems to be the answer to the problem of the list whose items do not show grammatical connections although they are just what the things themselves demand to constitute a fact, a truth-maker: “Pot, being-the-object-of-an-action (as designated by the accusative case), bringing, action.” The endings on the words in the list do not refer to relations that connect up the other things properly. This is the difference. Each item listed appears incomplete because, for example, reference to bringing demands not only the meaning of a word as something that could be brought but a word in the accusative case with the case ending indicating that it is in the right kind of relation objectively. Every base word is by itself “unsaturated,” to use the Fregean term, referring to something in the world that has to hook up with something else referred to, if there is to be a sentence and statement, abhihitânvaya.