 The only Oxford philosopher of note who opposed the ‘realists’ before World War II was R. G. Collingwood, who died too soon in 1943. He felt increasingly alienated and ended up reduced to invective, describing their theory of knowledge as “based upon the grandest foundation a philosophy can have, namely human stupidity” (Collingwood 1998, 34) and their attitude towards moral philosophy as a “mental kind of decaudation” (Collingwood 2013, 50). Collingwood objected to Cook Wilson’s anti-idealist claim that ‘knowing makes no difference to the object known’, that in order to vindicate it one would need to compare the object as it is being known with the object independently of its being known, which is the same as knowing something unknown, a contradiction (Collingwood 2013, 44). But Collingwood’s argument did not rule out the possibility of coming to know an object, while knowing that it was not altered in the process. (For critical appraisals, see Donagan (1985, 285–289) Jacquette (2006) and Beaney (2013).) In another telling complaint, he criticized the Oxford Realists for being interested in assessing the truth or falsity of specific philosophical theses without paying attention to the fact that the meaning of the concepts involved may have evolved through history, and so there is simply no ‘eternal problem’ (Collingwood 2013, chap. 7). This points to a lack of historical sensitivity, which is indeed another feature of analytic philosophy that arguably originates in Cook Wilson.