 Another way to motivate presentism is via appeal to experience. To borrow a famous example, consider a headache (e.g., Zimmerman 1998: 212). If a headache exists, it hurts. It can’t exist and fail to hurt. Now, suppose that we endorse the existence of the past (and deny presentism). Past headaches exist. But they don’t hurt (at least, so goes the claim). If headaches from hangovers last year hurt us, neither author would be in a position to write this, so severe would be the pain. Since headaches must hurt, if they exist—it’s part of their essence to do so—past headaches cannot exist. This goes for the future headaches as well. Thus, presentism is true. (For the classic statement of the “thank goodness that’s over” argument, in favor of A theories of time, see A.N. Prior 1959. The wider literature is voluminous. Representative recent works include: Suhler &amp; Callender 2012; Hoerl 2015; Pearson 2018.)