 Since interpretations of impartiality, what it requires, and how it connects with other moral concepts can vary considerably, contractualist theories that recognize impartiality as a core element can nevertheless vary widely in terms of what they requires of agents. Harsanyi (1977) argues that a version of utilitarianism can be defended on the basis of an “equiprobability model,” according to which an agent ought to choose between social systems “under the assumption that, in either system, he would have the same probability of occupying any one of the available social positions” (Harsanyi 1982, 45; cf. Hare 1981). Gauthier (1986) also views his theory as meeting the demands of impartiality, even while explicitly denying that a substantial notion of equality plays a major role: “Equality is not a fundamental concern in our theory. In arguing that social institutions and practices are justified by appeal to a hypothetical ex ante agreement among fully informed rational persons, we have appealed to the equal rationality of the bargainers to show that their agreement satisfies the moral standard of impartiality. But impartial practices respect persons as they are, the inequalities among them as well as the equalities” (270). Obviously, such a combination of claims is not uncontroversial; while it is clear that a notion of impartiality can be defined that respects existing inequalities as well as equalities, it will not be immediately obvious to everyone why such a notion ought to have deep moral significance or to be reflected in our moral practices.