 Is quantum mechanics compatible with the principle of causality? This is an old question—indeed one of the very first interpretational questions confronted by the early commentators on the theory (Hermann 2017; Schlick 1961, 1962). The contemporary literature continues to exhibit considerable skepticism in regards to the prospects of explaining quantum phenomena causally (Hausman &amp; Woodward 1999; Van Fraassen 1982; Woodward 2007), or at any rate locally causally, especially in the wake of Bell’s theorem (Myrvold 2016). As a result of some fascinating theoretical work (Allen, Barrett, Horsman, Lee, &amp; Spekkens 2017; Costa &amp; Shrapnel 2016; Shrapnel 2017), however, it seems that the prospects for a locally causal explanation of quantum phenomena are not quite as hopeless as they may initially have seemed, at least in the context of an interventionist theory of causation. This is not to say that decades of physical and philosophical investigations into the consequences of Bell’s theorem have all been mistaken, of course. For one thing, the interventionist frameworks utilised in this new work are operationalist, thus the relevance of this work to so-called hidden variables theories of quantum mechanics is unclear. Second, the interventionist frameworks utilised are not classical, and neither is the kind of causality they explicate. Indeed, in regard to the latter point, it is arguably the key insight emerging from this work that the frameworks previously utilised for analysing interventionist causation in the quantum context are inappropriate to that context. In contrast to a classical interventionist framework in which events are thought of as primitive (i.e. as not further analysable), events in these generalised frameworks are characterised as processes with associated inputs and outputs. Specifically, one characterises quantum events using a concept from quantum computation and information theory called a quantum channel. And within this generalised interventionist framework, causal models of quantum phenomena can be given which do not need to posit non-local causal influences, and which satisfy certain other desiderata typically required in a causal model (in particular that such a model respect the causal Markov condition and that it not require ‘fine-tuning’; see Shrapnel (2017)).