 Furthermore, the distinctive qualities of the self are not its essential qualities. The self is without its qualities temporarily during sleep and similar states and loses these qualities permanently in the state of liberation (mokṣa). The self in the state of liberation is totally lacking in consciousness, Dravid describing it as ‘an insentient stone-like condition’ (1995, 1). The firm separation between the self and its qualities means that even though the latter are always changing, the self is totally unaffected by these changes. The Buddhist objects if the self remains totally unaffected by changes in its qualities it would not be able to register the changes, that is to say that the self by itself would not be able to perceive those changes (Watson, 2018, 337). This robs the self of its status as the cognizer (jñātṛ); it is rather the embodied worldly self or persons that perceive. So, it seems that the Nyāya self by itself can’t even be an experiencer. To ensure that self can really live up to its job description as an agent and experiencer the Nyāya discussion should have been focused on the embodied wordly self or person that is the agent (kartṛ), enjoyer (bhōktṛ) and cognizer (jñātṛ), rather than the self.