 Wilson takes the lesson of the sceptical argument to be not that there are no meaning facts, but rather that a certain conception of such facts, which he calls classical realism, is hopeless, and conceives of the sceptical solution as accommodating meaning facts when conceived in a different way (Wilson 1994; see also Wright 1992: chapter 6). Classical realism is sometimes referred to as semantic platonism, the view that “the meanings of our words are guaranteed by the pre-existing structure of reality” (Pears 1988: 363; cf. Child 2001, Verheggen 2003, Zalabardo 2003, Hanks 2017). What is essential to classical realism or semantic platonism is that the properties that guarantee meaningfulness must be antecedently singled out by individuals (or communities) in order to endow their words with semantic standards (Wilson 1994 [2002: 251]). As Zalabardo puts it, what is required is 