 I note that the common-sense view that an institution consists (essentially) of an embodied structure of roles has been thought by some to be undermined by the consideration that actions are ascribed to institutions per se (as opposed to their members), e.g. in the sentence, ‘The Supreme Court of the United State ruled that segregation is unconstitutional’, and the fact that an institution could have had different members than the ones it actually had, e.g. someone other than Brett Kavanaugh might have been nominated by President Trump to sit on the Supreme Court and confirmed by the US Senate. In response to this kind of argument Ludwig has, in effect, defended the common-sense view by proffering his time-indexed, reductive individualist view according to which not only is the Supreme Court the group that consists of everyone who is at any time a member of the Supreme Court, but what the Supreme Court does at any time is what the those justices at that time do (Ludwig 2017: 66). Importantly, Ludwig points out that the term, “the Supreme Court of the US” functions as a definite description and not a name. As is the case with all definite descriptions, e.g. “the President of the US”, the individuals picked out by “the Supreme Court of the US” could have been different (Ludwig 2017: 68). 