 Kilwardby follows Aristotle’s remark that ‘A contingently belongs to B’ may mean either ‘A contingently belongs to that to which B belongs’ or ‘A contingently belongs to that to which B contingently belongs’, Notule libri Priorum 18.682–697. Kilwardby argues that the subject terms in contingency syllogisms are read in the second way and ampliated, if syllogistic relations do not demand restrictions. In explaining the difference in this respect between necessity propositions and contingency propositions, he states that since the terms in per se necessity propositions are essential, ‘Every A is necessarily B’ and ‘Whatever is necessarily A is necessarily B’ behave in the same way in logic. Contingency propositions which are ampliated do not mean the same as those which are not ampliated (Notule libri Priorum 18.187–207; 18.653–672). For the conversion of both types of contingency propositions and the role of the distinction between essential and accidental terms in defining the truth conditions of contingency propositions, see Thom 2019, 139–149. In the conversion of  de re readings of unampliated contingency propositions, the possibility changes into actuality, which is in agreement with the frequency interpretation of modality.