 What about particular finite modes described in [iv]? On Garrett’s proposal, their existence too will be necessary, which commits Spinoza to full-blown necessitarianism. To see why, notice that the difference between [iii] and [iv] is not a function of the presence or absence of the following-from relation itself. The difference is between following from God’s absolute vs. non-absolute nature, whatever that distinction amounts to. Once again, Spinoza’s modal transfer principle is indifferent to the difference between [iii] and [iv]. The principle is too coarse-grained to track the absolute/non-absolute distinction; it just tracks the following-from relation from a necessarily existing source. Since both conditions of the principle are satisfied in [iv], necessity is transferred from the entire collection of finite modes to the individual members themselves. Thus, the desk exists necessarily. If this is correct, Spinoza can consistently claim that every finite mode exists necessarily and follows from God’s nature in some way, while still maintaining that no particular modes follows directly or indirectly from the absolute nature of God.