 Groups may be found improper subjects of rights because they lack properties, other than genuine integrity, that are deemed essential for right-holding. As we have seen, proponents of the interest theory of rights are able to view group rights more generously than those who adhere to the choice theory, although the supposition that groups can have interests has not gone unchallenged (Wall 2003, 273). Choice theorists can extend rights to organised groups that possess decision-procedures (Preda 2012; Sumner 1987, 209–211), but some argue that even those groups are incapable of the agency required for right-holding (Wellman 1995, 157–65; Wall 2000, 2003, 270–6; cf. Nickel 1997). Again, if sentience is a necessary condition of right-holding, that may disqualify groups as right-holders: “groups are composed of sentient individuals, but they do not themselves feel anything” (Rainbolt 2006, 208. See also Kymlicka 1989, 241–2; Ellis 2005, 206–7. For a contrary view, see Graham 2002, 89–104).