 In the published version of his John Locke lectures at Oxford, Hintikka in 1973 raised the Dawkins question (see above) for these games. His answer was that one should look to Wittgenstein’s language games, and the language games for understanding quantifiers are those which revolve around seeking and finding. In the corresponding logical games one should think of \(\exists\) as Myself and \(\forall\) as a hostile Nature who can never be relied on to present the object I want; so to be sure of finding it, I need a winning strategy. This story was never very convincing; the motivation of Nature is irrelevant, and nothing in the logical game corresponds to seeking. In retrospect it is a little disappointing that nobody took the trouble to look for a better story. It may be more helpful to think of a winning strategy for \(\exists\) in \(G(\phi)\) as a kind of proof (in a suitable infinitary system) that \(\phi\) is true.