 There are two immediate challenges faced by the different versions of positionalism. Can the account be generalized to cover all relations? If, for example, the binary symmetric relation that holds between two things \(a\) and \(b\) whenever \(a\) is next to \(b\) has two argument positions, £ and $, then there should be two possible ways of assigning \(a\) and \(b\) to £ and $. But this means (absurdly) that there are two different ways for \(a\) and \(b\) to be next to one another, i.e., symmetric relations admit of differential application too! Orilia’s onto-thematic role approach handles this kind of case by conceiving of thematic roles as “intra-repeatable” (Orilia 2014: 294), so there is only one role or position in play in this relation (£ = $) and so the possibility of different assignments to different roles or positions doesn’t arise. Similarly, Dixon’s “pocket” theory handles this case by conceiving the next to relation as having only one pocket. But, as Fine (2000: 17–18, 2007: 58–9) and MacBride (2007: 36–44) argue, and as Dixon (2018: 31, n.21) acknowledges, this kind of strategy doesn’t straightforwardly extend to more complex partially symmetric relations such as being arranged clockwise in a circle in that very order, or, playing-tug-of-war. Accordingly Orilia (2011: 6–9, 2014: 296–301) proposes a programme of analysis whereby more complex relations are reduced to simpler ones that the onto-thematic role approach can accommodate. By contrast, relative positionalism can handle these kinds of partially symmetric relations without any analysis (Donnelly 2016: 88–96, Dixon 2019: 56–67), but not multigrade relations which lack a fixed arity n, hence cannot be modelled by a n! package of relative properties (Donnelly 2016: 94, Dixon 2019: 59) (For further criticisms of positionalism see Hochberg 1999: 153, 2000: 40–1).