 Perhaps the culprit is taking self-locating attitudes to be directed at such moving targets; perhaps self-locating credences are not attitudes adopted towards Lewisian propositions. Since around 2008—spurred in large part by Elga’s (2000) introduction of the “Sleeping Beauty Problem” to the philosophical literature—a number of self-locating update schemes have been proposed. Most work with formal models built on Lewisian contents, though some authors have employed other structures: Chalmers (2011) primary intensions; Braun (2016) Russellian propositions with guises; Stalnaker (2008) more complex centered-worlds constructions. Nevertheless, as of this writing a general consensus has emerged that no matter what theoretical account one gives of doxastic states, the Bayesian updating rules of Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization will have to be amended or supplemented in some way.