 But even if the earnest consequentializer doesn’t need to accommodate every deontic verdict that every plausible non-consequentialist theory can accommodate, they do need to consequentialize a good number of them. Moreover, they need to do so without sacrificing whatever the Compelling Idea is. And whether they can do that depends on what the Compelling Idea is. To illustrate, suppose that we take the Compelling Idea to be  Best Outcome.  Since the best outcome is the outcome that’s best from what Sidgwick (1907) described as “the point of view of the universe”, it seems that we must abandon this idea if we want to consequentialize certain deontic verdicts, such as those stemming from agent-centered restrictions (but see Dougherty 2013; N. R. Howard 2022; and Setiya 2018 for a contrary position). And this is why many earnest consequentializers reject  Best Outcome  in favor of  Best-Relative-to,  Most Reason to Desire, or  Reasons for Preferring Ground Deontic Statuses.