 Although the semantic account of computation appears to fit the needs of philosophers of mind, it appears less suited to make sense of other sciences. Most pertinently, representation does not seem to be presupposed by the notion of computation employed in at least some areas of cognitive science as well as computability theory and computer science—the very sciences that gave rise to the notion of computation and the origin of the computational theory of cognition (Fresco 2010). If this is correct, the semantic account may not even be adequate to the needs of philosophers of mind—at least those philosophers of mind who wish to make sense of the analogy between minds and the systems designed and studied by computer scientists and computability theorists. Another criticism of the semantic account is that specifying the kind of representation and representational manipulation that is relevant to computation may require a non-semantic way of individuating computations (Piccinini 2004). These concerns motivate efforts to account for computation in non-semantic terms.