 Soames (1987) proposes a pragmatic-metalinguistic strategy similar to the one tried by Stalnaker (1984), discussed in  §2.2:  one should distinguish attitudes towards sentences and towards propositions. Soames comes up with examples showing that the former can be an unreliable guide to the latter, e.g., one can sometimes believe a proposition, but only assent to one of two distinct sentences expressing it. You do know that Mike is Jack the Ripper by knowing that Mike is Mike, for it’s the same proposition. But you will assent to, or assert, only the sentence that reports your knowledge in the trivial clothing. Then, the ancients believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus, Tama fears that all woodchucks are woodchucks, and so on. If you think otherwise, it’s because you confuse belief reports with reports of linguistic practices. Ripley (2012) argues that it’s difficult to account for phenomena concerning such attitude reports by throwing them in the box of pragmatics and conversational implicatures: failures of substitutivity salva veritate behave in systematics ways in contexts of iterated embeddings, and this calls for a systematic, compositional treatment.