 For example, one might reject (i) in favor of the view that exact location is a three-place relation that holds between a located entity, a region of space, and an instant of time (Thomson 1983, Costa 2017). This is a natural view for those who accept Eternalism and the B-theory but deny the Spacetime View, and instead think of space as a three-dimensional entity that endures through, and is separate from, time. (This picture is discussed in Skow 2015 and Gilmore, Costa and Calosi 2016.) To allow for the possibility of motion, those who endorse such a view will want to be able to say, of a given material object, that it is exactly located at region r1, not at region r2, at time t1, and that the same object is exactly located at r2, not at r1, at time t2. To allow for the possibility that time is gunky and does not contain instants, one might take exact location to be expressed by ‘x is exactly located at region r within interval s’. A different option is to reject (i) in favor of the view that exact location is variably polyadic, an idea floated by Jones (forthcoming: note 29).