 The situation is more dire when it comes to falsehoods. If \(K\) is in fact false then, without the disastrous principle of the value of content for falsehoods, there is certainly no guarantee that \(K\)*\(A\) will constitute a step toward the truth. (And even if one endorsed the disastrous principle one would hardly be better off. For then the addition of any proposition, whether true or false, would constitute an improvement on a false theory.) Consider again the number of the planets, \(N\). Suppose that the truth is N\(=8\), and that your existing corpus \(K\) is (\(N=7 \vee N=100)\). Suppose you somehow acquire the truth \(A\): \(N\gt 7\). Then \(K\)*\(A\) is \(N=100\), which (on average, min-max-average and min-sum-average) is further from the truth than \(K\). So revising a false theory by adding truths by no means guarantees progress towards the truth.