 Goldman’s  (G*1)  and Sobel’s  (S)  enjoy the theoretical and practical virtue of simplicity by prescribing a single obligatory act sequence at a time rather than multiple, jointly unfulfillable prescriptions at a time. But this theoretical virtue comes at the cost of a possibilist objection: their views allow agents to avoid incurring moral obligations simply in virtue of having an imperfect moral character, and this allows agents to, morally speaking, get off the hook too easily (Jackson &amp; Pargetter 1986: 240; Zimmerman 1996: 193–194, 2006: 156; Portmore 2011: 207; Baker 2012: 642–43; Timmerman 2015; Timmerman &amp; Cohen 2016; Cohen &amp; Timmerman 2016). For example,  Procrastinate avoids incurring an obligation to comment on a student’s paper simply because she is disposed to behave badly. Actualism is committed to this even in cases in which an agent is disposed to behave badly just because they intend to behave badly. But, possibilists claim, agents cannot avoid incurring an obligation to \(\phi\) simply because they intend to \(\phi\) poorly. More generally, possibilists claim that being disposed to do wrong does not allow one to avoid incurring obligations to do good.