 At the root of all of the objections to normative naturalism is perhaps the “Just too Different” objection, the claim that normative properties are just too different in their nature from natural properties for them to be natural properties (Parfit 2011; Enoch 2011; Copp 2020a). This is an intuitive claim rather than an argument. Derek Parfit contends, for example, that the normative concepts rule out naturalism; that wrongness could no more be identical to some natural property than heat could be identical to a cabbage (Parfit 2011, vol. II: 325). A naturalist might respond that, similarly, heat seems to be too different from mean molecular kinetic energy for it to be identical to that, yet the consensus seems to be that heat is identical to mean molecular kinetic energy, or something like that. So “just too different” intuitions are hardly decisive.