 Indeed, some of the most compelling counterexamples to EU axioms of preference rest on ethical considerations. Recall our earlier discussion of the basic Ordering axioms in  Section 1.  The Transitivity axiom has been challenged by appeal to ethically-motivated examples of preference cycles (see Temkin 2012). The notion of a non-continuous lexical ordering was mentioned above in relation to ethical side constraints. The dispensability of the Completeness axiom, too, is often motivated by appeal to examples involving competing ethical values that are difficult to tradeoff against each other, like average versus total welfare. Other suggestive examples against Completeness involve competing notions of personal welfare (see, e.g., Levi 1986; Chang 2002). Must a rational agent have a defined preference between, say, two career options that pull in different directions as regards opportunities for creative self-expression versus community service (perhaps a career as a dancer versus a career as a doctor in remote regions)? Note that some of these challenges to EU theory are discussed in more depth in  Section 5  below.