 This Simple Truth Content account preserves what many consider to be the chief virtue of Popper’s account: the value of content for truths. And while it delivers the absolute worthlessness of falsehoods (no falsehood is closer to the truth than a tautology) it avoids the relative worthlessness of falsehoods. If \(A\) and \(B\) are both false, then \(A_T\) may well properly contain \(B_T\). But that holds if and only if \(A\) is logically stronger than \(B\). That is to say, a false proposition is the closer to the truth the stronger it is. According to this principle – call it the value of content for falsehoods – the false proposition that there are nine planets, and all of them are made of green cheese is more truthlike than the false proposition there are nine planets. And so once one knows that a certain theory is false one can be confident that tacking on any old arbitrary proposition, no matter how inaccurate it is, will lead us inexorably closer to the truth. This is sometimes called the child’s play objection. Among false theories, brute logical strength becomes the sole criterion of a theory’s likeness to truth.