 The paper created a sensation and has been the most influential philosophical article of the past 100 years. But Quine explicitly allowed for the existence of the class of logical truths (such as “No unmarried man is married”) as narrowly analytic sentences and their relationship to broadly analytic sentences (such as “No bachelor is married”), when the definitional relationship between them has been suitably stipulated (as in “bachelor \(=_{\df}\) unmarried, adult male” in a language framework \(\mathbf{L})\). In cases of this kind, he conceded, inter-substitutability, synonymy, and analyticity are related in an unproblematic way. It would have been odd for a logician to deny the existence of logical truths or the role of stipulations, which are basic to the construction of formal systems, which suggests that he may not have actually defeated the idea of analyticity, after all (Fetzer 1993).