  Kant seems to have used the terms   ‘unity of consciousness’ (A103)  and ‘unity of apperception’ (A105, A108)  interchangeably. The well-known argument at the beginning of the first edition attack on the second paralogism (A352) focuses on this unity at a given time (among other things) and what can (or rather, cannot) be inferred from this about the nature of the mind (a topic to which we will return below). The attack on the third paralogism focuses on what can be inferred from unified consciousness over time. These are all from the first edition of CPR. In the second edition, Kant makes remarks about unity unlike anything in the first edition, for example, “this unity … is not the category of unity” (B131).  The unity of consciousness and Kant’s views on it are complicated issues but some of the most important points include the following.