 We will close this discussion with two notes about the relationship of the dispute between EP and NEP to the transparency thesis that we discussed earlier. This is the thesis that we are not directly conscious of our own experiences. (‘Transparent’ here means that while I am conscious via conscious states, I am not conscious of them. I ‘see through’ them, as it were; hence ‘transparency’.) First, all claims for both EP and NEP that we have considered would seem to go through even if the transparency thesis were true. So transparency would not undermine this debate. Secondly, even Tye (2003), who accepts both NEP and transparency, also accepts that NEP does not require or entail transparency. Rather, he seems to think that the transparency thesis is true and, since it is true, this constrains what could be unified in phenomenal unit. Accepting the constraint, he has to say that, “Phenomenal unity is a relation between qualities represented in experience, not between qualities of experiences” (Tye 2003: 36), however unintuitive this claim may be. Certainly there are approaches that can both accept NEP and reject transparency. That is true, for example, of those who hold that conscious states are self-representing states, states of which one becomes conscious just by having them. These theorists will hold that one can be directly conscious of one’s own conscious states, yet they could still hold that states of unified consciousness have an NEP structure. 