  Generally, there are two ethical approaches that might be used to ground or justify reparations: utilitarian versus rights-based. Utilitarian approaches to reparations seek to justify and articulate reparations in terms of equity for oppressed citizens relative to other citizens of a society, no matter to which, say, “racial” or ethnic groups they belong. Further, their commitment to a suitably described principle of utility will attempt to promote rights to reparations up to a point wherein social utility maximization and equality amongst the citizenry are threatened based on the perceived consequences of the application of a particular reparative policy. But this level of commitment to the rights to reparations is criticized for its inadequate commitment to honoring said rights qua rights, thereby subsuming the rights to reparations under the utilitarian commitments to social utility considerations and equality (Corlett 2010: 33–79), something the rights-based approach would reject concerning rights in general (Feinberg 1980; Rawls 1999). For the rights-based approach to reparative justice, a right to reparations fashioned by social utility maximal considerations is no right at all. The rights to reparations, like other rights, must be honored, not merely promoted in accordance with the ethics of a utilitarian calculation. For if X is a right at all, X as a right trumps social utility considerations.