  Views that downplay the role of evaluative judgment in action and  hence tack more toward the externalist side of the channel may more  easily be able to accept the possibility and indeed the actuality of  weakness of will. But they are subject to their own challenges. For  example, suppose we follow Mele’s image of akrasia and posit that a certain agent is caused to do x by motivation to do  x which is dramatically out of kilter with her assessment of the merits of doing x. In what sense, then, is her doing  x free, intentional, and uncompelled? Such an agent might  seem rather to be at the mercy of a motivational force which is, from her point of view, utterly alien. Thus, worries about distinguishing  akrasia from compulsion come back in full force in  connection with proposals like these. (See   fn. 7  above for relevant references; Buss and Tenenbaum press these worries against accounts like Mele’s in particular.) Moreover, there is the  danger, for accounts of this more externalist stripe, of taking too  much of the mystery out of weakness of will. Even if akratic action  is possible and indeed actual, it remains a puzzling, marginal,  somehow defective instance of agency, one that we rightly find not  fully intelligible. Views that do not assign a privileged place in  rational deliberation and action to the agent’s overall assessment of her options risk making akratic action seem no more problematic than  Julie’s or Jimmy’s decisions, or Hare’s agent who fails to pick up  the roundest stone in the vicinity.