 Feminists might also question whether the internalist is correct in thinking that if an otherwise rational person fails to be motivated by her moral judgment, then she is irrational. Consider an example that I will return to in Section 2, Thomas Hill’s well-known case of the Deferential Wife, who is utterly devoted to her husband, buying clothes he prefers, having sex when he is in the mood, and moving where he wants. She tends not to form her own interests, values, and ideals, and counts them as less important than her husband’s when she does. She believes that women are mentally and physically equal, if not superior to men, but that it is women’s proper role to serve their husbands. She does not believe that her rights are being trampled on because she is glad and proud to serve her husband. She is confused about her worth as a person, and is servile, or, lacking in self-respect, despite being glad and proud to serve her husband (Hill 1973). A legitimate explanation for the Deferential Wife’s confusion about her worth is her socialization in a patriarchal society which sends her many messages of inferiority. Her confusion about her worth prevents her from being motivated by a reason to be self-respecting. An internalist might impugn her rationality: if she truly recognizes that she has a reason to be self-respecting, yet remains unmoved, she must be irrational. But the internalist’s judgment that she is irrational seems at odd with feminist aims, since it fails to acknowledge the role that socialization plays in whether she is motivated by the reasons she has. It places the blame for failing to be motivated by a reason squarely on the victim of such circumstances and her rational capacities, when it may be the case that the Deferential Wife reasons correctly, understands what it means to have intrinsic worth, sees that if a person had intrinsic worth she would respect herself, but gets the facts wrong about her own worth due to her experiences. The feminist objection is that a person’s social circumstances are a better explanation of the disconnection between reasons and motivations than a failure of rationality (Superson 2010).