 Only a small portion of the options available in the extensive literature on fictions have actually been explored in the context of scientific models. Contessa (2010) formulates what he calls the “dualist account”, according to which a model is an abstract object that stands for a possible concrete object. The Rutherford model of the atom, for instance, is an abstract object that acts as a stand-in for one of the possible systems that contain an electron orbiting around a nucleus in a well-defined orbit. Barberousse and Ludwig (2009) and Frigg (2010b) take a different route and develop an account of models as fictions based on Walton’s (1990) pretense theory of fiction. According to this view the sentences of a passage of text introducing a model should be seen as a prop in a game of make-believe, and the model is the product of an act of pretense. This is an antirealist position in that it takes talk of model “objects” to be figures of speech because ultimately there are no model objects—models only live in scientists’ imaginations. Salis (forthcoming) reformulates this view to become what she calls the “the new fiction view of models”. The core difference lies in the fact that what is considered as the model are the model descriptions and their content rather than the imaginings that they prescribe. This is a realist view of models, because descriptions exist.