  In reply, C. D. Broad rightly noted that this does not show that egoism is self-contradictory, since it is not part of egoism to hold that what is good ought to be pursued by everyone (Broad 1942). But that reply does not defend egoism from the charge of falsity.  To do so, one might understand “my good” not as composed from what Moore calls “good absolutely,” but as being a sui generis concept, good-for-me (Mackie 1976, Smith 2003), or as analyzed in terms of what I, from my point of view, ought to desire. In neither of these cases does it follow from “my possession of x is good-for-me” that others ought to maximize what is good-for-me.  One might even argue that claims about “good absolutely” do not justify claims about what one ought to do, without in addition there being a special relation between the agent and the proposed change.  If so, it does not follow simply from my possession of x being good that others ought to do anything (Prichard 2002 217).