 The third category, the right to a person akin to a thing, is Kant’s own fusion of the traditional categories of property and contract. Kant argues that some contracts or rightful obligations such as the parent-child relation allow one party to the contract to control not only the choice of the other, but also to possess some power over the body of the other, such as the power to insist that the other remain in the household. Kant sees the spousal relation, the parent-child relation, and the master-servant relation as the three types of this rightful relation. In the case of children Kant considers not only the parent’s duty to nurture the child along with a right to control the child but also the status of an adult child remaining in the household, similar to the status of a servant. Regarding servants Kant gives the head of the household a right to control them while under contract without allowing any lifelong control, which would amount to slavery as a complete denial of the servant’s freedom. His discussion of marriage, which focuses on this legal relation in abstraction from empirical considerations such as love, treats marriage as reciprocal access to the other’s sexual organs. While each partner in the marriage is using the other as a means for enjoyment and thus as a thing, the marriage contract’s reciprocity “restores” their personality as ends in themselves (6:278). Kant describes this legal relation as equal in these powers of possession and in the communal property. Both men and women must have reciprocal relations of this kind; for example, a man’s use of a prostitute as a thing violates her dignity as an end in herself. Despite this equality at the level of a priori right, Kant holds that men have a natural superiority in their capacity to promote the couple’s common interest, and that laws codifying husbands’s rule over wives are not unjust. Certainly Kant’s personal sexism plays a part in his views on marriage, as it did in his exclusion of women from voting. Some of Kant’s own contemporaries objected to his views on women, and an early review of the “Doctrine of Right” rejecting Kant’s novel category of property to persons akin to things prompted him to respond in an Appendix to the book’s second edition (6:356–372, esp 6:357–361).