  Second, several authors have responded to the Skolemite argument by directly criticizing the algebraic conception of set theory and defending more ordinary and intuitive understandings of set-theoretic language (Myhill 1967; Resnik 1969; Hart 1970; Benacerraf 1985). There are three issues which we should highlight here. First, it's hard to see how the algebraic conception could provide a general account of mathematical language, given that the conception itself seems to presuppose an intuitive background theory in which to formulate and prove our model-theoretic results (e.g., the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems). This issue is exacerbated when we focus on the third step in the Skolemite argument, since that step seems to require both an absolute account of the natural numbers and an absolute account of enumeration in order to formulate its conception of “absolute countability” (see Resnik 1969; Benacerraf 1985; and Shapiro 1991; see Thomas 1971; Klenk 1976; and Bellotti 2006 for some concerns about this line of argument).