 The ought-to-be reading of ‘ought’ has been employed implicitly or explicitly to defend Bayesian norms—not just by Bayesian philosophers (Zynda 1996; Christensen 2004: ch. 6; Titelbaum 2013a: ch. 3 and 4; Wedgwood 2014; Eder forthcoming), but also by Bayesian psychologists (Baron 2012). The distinction between the ought-to-be and the ought-to-do oughts is most often defended in the broader context of normative studies, such as in deontic logic (Castañeda 1970; Horty 2001: sec. 3.3 and 3.4) and in metaethics (Broome 1999; Wedgwood 2006; Schroeder 2011).