 On the interpretations advanced by Saner, O’Neill, Neiman and others, Kant was aware of all these options and rejected each. We saw above (§1.4) that Kant characterizes reason in terms of a self-reflexive procedure. Reason is autonomous and submits to no external authority; it gains authority from submitting itself to critique; and critique involves rejecting any mode of thinking or acting that cannot be adopted by all. In less abstract terms, the self-scrutiny of reason is scrutiny by all those who demand justification for any particular mode of thought or action. Such a view does not assume that we are necessarily bound to our interests and inclinations (as the instrumental account does). It does not ask us to rely on what others do accept (as the communitarian account does). It does not involve the fantasy that we already know or intuit what everyone should accept (as the perfectionist account does). It proposes, instead, a vision of human beings who are able to step back from their particular inclinations, habits and intuitions, and who are willing to use this ability to seek terms that all can accept—to construct an intersubjective order of co-existence, communication and cooperation on terms that all can accept. 