 Stevenson accepts, then, non-cognitivism, a view according to which moral judgments are essentially constituted at least in part by attitudes and moral disagreement is essentially disagreement in attitude. Stevenson’s main focus project is on developing, in sufficient detail, an attractive non-cognitivist account of moral problems, rather than on arguing for the superiority of non-cognitivism over the competing views (although see 1937; 1944, ch. 12; 1950a). However, he does support his claim that moral disagreements would essentially involve disagreement in attitude by considering a number of examples (e.g., 1944, 13–18; 1948b, 3–4). In addition to the kinds of cases mentioned above, Stevenson invites us to consider, for instance, a person who seems to be fully persuaded that what he did was wrong and, for that very reason, is more in favor of doing it again: