 In his longer commentary on De interpretatione, Boethius says of God that “he knows future events as happening contingently and not necessarily so that he does not ignore the possibility that something else might take place” (In Perihermeneias II, 226.9–12). Boethius also stresses that since the truth of future contingents is not accessible to humans, the predictions of the form “A sea battle will take place tomorrow” are false in the sense that they assert the truth of something that cannot be known (In Perihermeneias II, 211.26–213.18). In his later treatise Consolatio philosophiae Boethius states that “I do not think that anybody would say that those things which are happening now were not going to happen before they happened” (V. 4.19) In this treatise, Boethius argues that God is atemporal and has the totality of changing history present to him. God’s knowledge is thus not foreknowledge since it is not temporally located, but the predictions of future contingents are true or false from the point of view of God’s eternal knowledge of the things referred to (V.6, 25–32; see also Augustine, City of God 11.21). According to Boethius, it is necessary that if God knows that p, then p. This ‘conditional necessity’ does not imply the ‘simple necessity’ of p (Consolatio philosophiae V, 6.27–30). Some medieval authors read this distinction in Boethius and Augustine as a modal placement solution to the problem of foreknowledge and free will (Matthews 2004). Thomas Aquinas, for example, refers to Boethius’s distinction using the terms necessitas consequentiae and necessitas consequentis (Summa contra gentiles I.67; De veritate I.23, ad 13). For Boethius, see Evans 2004; Marenbon 2005; Sharples 2009; Marenbon 2013.