 Locke famously appeals to the notion of tacit consent in order to accommodate special political obligations given his voluntarist commitment: “every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it” (64). A person gives tacit or implicit, as opposed to express or explicit, consent, when her consent is expressed via refraining from some action or type of action. As A. John Simmons (1979) has argued, either refraining from or performing some action can only be taken as indicative of consent when certain conditions are met: the person must be aware that she is in a situation in which consent is appropriate and/or expected, it must be made clear in some way what must be done or not done in order to give consent, it must be clear when action is to be taken or avoided, and the consent-giving action or failure to act must be possible and not extraordinarily costly. It has been argued that the political context, at least as it is in the modern nation-state, fails to meet any of the above conditions, and so it is implausible, if one accepts voluntarism and the claim that all voluntarily assumed obligations are contractual in nature, to suppose that persons in modern nation-states have special political obligations.