 Deniers of circumstantial and constitutive luck have various options in reply, however. They can continue to seek another schema for the relevant counterfactuals, or identify a more fundamental feature of agents which give rise to counterfactuals that merely serve as evidence of such a feature without carrying all of the explanatory weight themselves. Or they can point out that a person’s overall degree of blameworthiness depends not only on a single counterfactual, and point out that there might be other relevant counterfactuals that are also true of the agent, some of which might mitigate or even make the agent laudable. When one keeps all of these counterfactuals in view at the same time, it becomes much more intuitive that agents for whom an identical set of counterfactuals is true are indeed equally blameworthy (or praiseworthy). (See Zimmerman 2015.) At this point, we again seem to reach a potential clash over intuitions. For example, Hanna offers the case of Jenny who “lives in a stable, idyllic, isolated utopian society. Consequently, she hasn’t developed to a sufficient degree all the traits that would dispose her to resist tyranny. Unfortunately, for these reasons…Jenny would collaborate if she were in Nazi-Germany-like conditions.” Hanna’s intuition is that Jenny is not as culpable as an actual Nazi collaborator, whereas it seems that Zimmerman, having all the counterfactuals in view for each of the two agents, has the opposite reaction. It seems that a full adjudication of the debate will require a comparison of entire frameworks, including appeal to an even larger range of intuitions about cases, general moral principles, and explanatory power, among other things. 