 Yet the actions of non-omnipotents are a bit more difficult to explain. Why, when my friend and I both realize my pants are aflame, do I but not he drop to the ground and roll? Cappelen and Dever deny that this is because I possess some special self-representing cognitive state that my friend lacks. They trace the difference in action not to a difference in belief or desire, but instead to a difference in ability. Both my friend and I believe that Mike’s pants are aflame, and both of us desire that Mike drop to the ground and roll around. But Mike has the ability to make that happen, while Andy lacks that ability (at least directly—Andy can do things like shout at Mike in an effort to induce dropping and rolling); so Mike does it and Andy doesn’t. Cappelen and Dever suggest that one can explain all the differences in action here without invoking self-locating self-representations at any point.