 Commissive accounts of self-knowledge also involve self-shaping, but not a form of self-shaping in which the introspective judgment brings into existence an ontologically distinct target state, but rather a kind of self-shaping involving a self-fulfillment or containment component similar to that discussed in Section 2.3.1 above. Moran (2001), for example, argues that normally when we are prompted to think about what we believe, desire, or intend (and he limits his account primarily to these three mental states), we reflect on the (outward) phenomena in question and make up our minds about what to believe, desire, or do. Rather than attempting to detect a pre-existing state, we open or re-open the matter and come to a resolution. Since we normally do believe, desire, and intend what we resolve to believe, desire, and do, we can therefore accurately self-ascribe those attitudes. Coliva (2016) argues that the self-ascription “I believe that P” is like a performative statement in that it constitutes a comment to the belief that P. (See also Wright 1989; Falvey 2000; Heal 2002; Boyle 2009, forthcoming.)