 The meaning of a term is the “conjunction” or union of two dispositions, one “active” disposition to evoke psychological states of a hearer, another “passive” disposition to be used to express the psychological states of a speaker, where a disposition is a complex causal network of stimuli (e.g., an utterance, in the case of a sign’s active disposition, or a mental state, in the case of a passive one), responses (e.g., a belief, in the case of an active disposition, or an utterance, in the case of a passive one), attendant circumstances (e.g., the context of utterance), and basis (perhaps the sign’s history of use within a linguistic community) (1944, 57–58). Stevenson warns that his account of meaning, understood in causal-dispositional terms, should not be taken as anything close to a complete theory of meaning, but only as “half analysis, half analogy,” “a device for pointing to” one that must be extraordinarily complex (1944, 58).