 As for the epistemological interpretation, some scholars have suggested that the manuscripts are in error at this point, and that what the text should say is “on account of the fact that (dia to) neither our sensations nor our opinions tell the truth or lie”. The change is justified on linguistic grounds; it is alleged that the text in the manuscripts as they stand is not acceptable Greek. The considerations for and against this proposal are technical, and debate has yielded no consensus on this question. However, it is clear that if one does make this small alteration to the text, the direction of the inference is reversed; the point about our sensations and opinions now becomes a reason for the point about the nature of things, not an inference from it. And this, it has been argued, points towards the epistemological interpretation. The idea would then be that, since our sensations and opinions fail to be consistent deliverers of true reports (or, for that matter, false reports) about the world around us, there is no prospect of our being able to determine the nature of things. However, even if we retain the manuscript text, the epistemological reading may still be possible (so Green (2017)). The idea would be that, in order for our sensations and opinions to tell the truth or lie, they would have to do two things: 1) present an appearance of things and 2) present this appearance as how things really are. But since we are not able to determine the latter (as we were just told in the statement about the nature of things), our sensations and opinions cannot do this; they can only register appearances, and that is not enough for them to tell either truths or falsehoods.