 Willing is founded on and inseparable from desire, but it is not reducible to desire. Desiring is not willing insofar as it is not constrained by practical modalities (e.g., possibility versus impossibility) and it is not a determination to undertake an action. I can wish for the impossible or for what is past (or both, as in “I wish I did not have that second piece of pie at dinner last night”), and I can desire some future good but not wish to do what is required to obtain that good. Moreover, once one chooses to do A, and nothing interferes, one does A. We do not resist performing an action once we have willed it, but we do regularly resist some desires (Husserl 1908–9/1911/1914 [1988: 103, 221–224]; Melle 1997: 179; see also Bratman 2012: 73). The wishing that is relevant for the will and for action is a wishing for what is practically possible, what is realizable in action. This wishing takes the form of desire, and the volitional intention—the fiat—determines us to act.