 Such an account is not wholly satisfactory. First, the phenomenology of audition suggests something stronger than indirect, epistemically mediated awareness of things such as collisions or guitar strummings or lions roaring. Reflection suggests auditory awareness as of collisions, strummings, and lions. Second, the capacity to refer demonstratively to such things and events on auditory grounds also suggests genuine perceptual awareness of them. Third, we commonly perceptually individuate sounds in terms of their apparent sources, and our taxonomy reflects this. “What did you hear?” “I heard paper ripping,” or, “The sound of a dripping faucet.” We distinguish two quite similar rattles once we hear one as of a muffler clamp and the other as of a loose fender. Furthermore, characterizing certain audible features and explaining perceptual constancy effects involving such features requires appeal to sound sources. Handel says of timbre: “At this point, no known acoustic invariants can be said to underlie timbre... The cues that determine timbre quality are interdependent because all are determined by the method of sound production and the physical construction of the instrument” (Handel 1995, 441). Explaining loudness constancy—why moving to the back of the room does not change how loudly the lecturer seems to speak—appeals to facts about the sources of sounds (Zahorik and Wightman 2001). Auditory processing proceeds in accordance with natural constraints concerning characteristics of sound sources, and information concerning sources shapes how auditory experiences are organized. This is to say that processes responsible for auditory experience proceed as if acoustic information is information about sound sources. Finally, audition-guided action supports the claim that we hear such things and events. Turning to look toward the source of a sound or ducking out of the way of something we hear to be approaching—behaviors guided by auditory experience—would make little sense if we heard only sounds. In the first place, these reasons ground a case for thinking that auditory perceptual experience does not strictly end with sounds and auditory objects. In particular, awareness as of a source, even if dependent upon awareness as of a sound, may be constitutive of one’s auditory perceptual experience.