  According to this alternative way of formulating disjunctivism, the disjunctivist holds that veridical perceptions and hallucinations differ mentally in some significant respect—i.e., there are certain mental features that veridical perceptions have that hallucinations cannot have. So the disjunctivist rejects the claim that the differences between a case of veridical perception and a case of hallucination can simply be due to differences in the extra-mental states of affairs that obtain in those situations. Note, however, that this formulation of the disjunctivist commitment leaves open the possibility that veridical perceptions and hallucinations can have at least some mental features in common. (See Logue 2012a, 2013, and 2014.) There is a sense, then, in which it thereby leaves open the possibility that there can be a common mental element to veridical perception and hallucination.