 As regards the reception of Marty’s own philosophical views, this can be found in the case of the Prague Linguistic Circle which arose after his death (Leška 1995) and also to some extent in Polish philosophy (Woleński 1990). Moreover, Marty was by no means unknown among the Munich phenomenologists (Schuhmann 1990) and may well, with his emphasis on communicative function, have had a hand in their theories of speech acts. The most salient case of the reception of Marty, however, is that of Karl Bühler’s theory of language, in which Marty’s contribution is explicitly acknowledged (Bühler 1934). Be this as it may, Marty’s views still await further examination and possibly further absorption into the continuing developments of linguistics and philosophy of language. The lament which was expressed more than eighty years ago (Funke 1924), that Marty’s work had not been sufficiently appreciated by the linguists of that time, can still very well be expressed today. The main obstacle here, aside from the already mentioned charge of psychologism, is the difficulty involved in reading his writings. While Meinong and Husserl wrote sentences which seem to go on forever, the polemics that Marty incessantly conducts make his works even less palatable than theirs for many a reader, especially since the targets of his polemics are in many cases authors who are either forgotten or known by less than a handful of specialists. It is thus no wonder that no extensive philosophical text of his has been translated into English until recently (Marty 2010a–2010d). Nevertheless, a case can be made, as this has briefly been indicated in the foregoing discussion, that the voice of Marty was unique in philosophy of mind and especially in philosophy of language and perhaps in ontology as well. By no means have the possibilities of drawing philosophical sustenance from his work been exhausted.