 A reason for thinking that moral judgments ought not involve emotion is that emotions sometimes seem to lead to judgments that are distorted or off-track, or that seem otherwise unjustified. One emotion in particular is often mentioned in this context: disgust. This emotion, which seems to be unique to human animals and emerges relatively late in development (from the ages of about 5–8), involves a characteristic gaping facial expression, a tendency to withdraw from the object of disgust, a slight reduction in body temperature and heart rate, and a sense of nausea and the need to cleanse oneself. In addition, the disgusted subject is typically motivated to avoid and even expunge the offending object, experiences it as contaminating and repugnant, becomes more attuned to other disgusting objects in the immediate environment, and is inclined to treat anything that the object comes in contact with (whether physically or symbolically) as also disgusting. This last characteristic is often referred to as ‘contamination potency’ and it is one of the features that makes disgust so potent and, according to its critics, so problematic. The disgust reaction can be difficult to repress, is easily recognized, and empathically induces disgust in those who do recognize  it.[13]  There are certain objects that almost all normal adults are disgusted by (feces, decaying corpses, rotting food, spiders, maggots, gross physical deformities). But there is also considerable intercultural and interpersonal variation beyond these core objects of disgust, where the emotion extends into food choices, sexual behaviors, out-group members, and violations of social norms. Many studies have claimed to show that disgust is implicated in harsher moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt, &amp; Clore 2008), citing experiments in which subjects filling out questionnaires in smelly or dirty rooms evaluated moral transgressions more harshly. Many of these studies have however failed to replicate, raising doubts about the influence of incidental disgust on moral judgment (e.g., Johnson, Cheung &amp; Donnellan’s (2014) failed replication of Schnall et al. (2008); Ghelfi et al. 2020). 