 However, some object that the causal-emergence construal undermines the claim that on Russellian monism consciousness is integrated into physical causation (Alter and Nagasawa 2012: 81; Chalmers 2013 [2015: 253–259]). The objection could be stated as follows. On the causal-emergence construal, there are causal laws connecting quiddities (or quiddities and structural properties) to macrophenomenal consciousness: laws that are neither a priori entailed nor metaphysically necessitated by the structural truths that physical theory describes. In this respect, such laws would be just like psychophysical laws posited by traditional interactionist dualism. And it is precisely because of the need to posit such psychophysical laws that traditional interactionist dualism is charged with failing to integrate consciousness adequately into physical causation (Smart 1959). Thus, on the causal-emergence construal, that charge would apply equally to Russellian monism (but see Goff 2015: 294–97; 2017: Part II passim).