 In the last couple of decades, however, a growing number of philosophers have argued that causation by substances is ontologically fundamental. Some (e.g., Jacobs and O’Connor 2013; Lowe 2008: 143–46; O’Connor 2014; and Swinburne 1997 and 2006) hold that, fundamentally, all causation is substance causation. Others (e.g., Alvarez and Hyman 1998; Hyman 2015: 40–42; Mayr 2011: 229–30; and Steward 2012: 207–16) advance causal pluralism, on which entities of a variety of different categories—the list includes substances, events, properties, features, aspects, and facts—cause things, and causation by each of these kinds of thing is equally fundamental. The pluralist picture is not one of competition but of interdependence; as it may be put, events cause things only when the substances in which these events are changes cause those things, and substances cause things only when changes in those substances cause those things. (Hyman [2015: 41] suggests a similar view.)