 The Navya-Nyāya notion of non-conceptual perception differs from that of the Buddhists in many respects, two of which are very important. First, according to Navya-Naiyāyikas, there is no apperceptive evidence for non-conceptual perception, unlike the Buddhists who contend that conception-free awareness is necessarily self-aware. The Navya-Naiyāyikas, as is obvious from the quote above, emphasize that the evidence for a non-conceptual sensory grasp of universals comes in the form of an inference. Second, according to Navya-Nyāya, the object of non-conceptual perception is a qualifier (concept), although not given as that in the first instance, but not a bare particular as the Buddhists hypothesize. It is, as the above quote explains, posited by the force of an inference; the ‘bare object’ of non-conceptual perception becomes the qualifier in a resultant determinate perception. While this does not satisfactorily address Chakrabarti’s concern that lack of apperceptive evidence implies that the subject cannot assign an intentional role to the object of non-conceptual perception, Chadha (2006) argues that the subject’s not being in a position to assign an intentional role to the object of non-conceptual perception is no hindrance to the intentionality of non-conceptual perception itself. Non-conceptual perception is awareness of a “non-particular individual” (Chakrabarti, 1995) and can be assigned the intentional role of a qualifier in virtue of the recognitional abilities acquired by the subject on the basis of the perceptual episode. The subject sees a non-particular individual but, since there is no apperceptive or conscious awareness, the subject does not see it as an instance of a universal or a qualifier. Chadha explicates Gaṅgeśa’s insight that a qualifier is given as a non-particular individual, neither divorced from nor joined to the qualificandum and, therefore it is wrong to suggest that lack of apperceptive evidence implies that non-conceptual perception is not an intentional perceptual state.