 Śrīharṣa describes two ways in which his refutation-arguments could be useful. First of all, they are supposed to favor the kind of non-dualism—defended by supporters of Advaita Vedānta—which says that the self or consciousness is the only thing that is ultimately exists. According to Śrīharṣa, the refutation-arguments show that we cannot establish the ultimate reality of the variegated world as it appears in perceptual experience, the world which appears to be constituted by a plurality of things and whose existence we assume for our everyday practical purposes (KKh 63). This is because we cannot adequately define the various ontological and epistemological categories—such as difference, causation, relation, knowledge, perception, etc.—using which we make sense of that world and our epistemic relationship with it. It is in this sense that the variegated world as it appears to us in perception is indeterminable  (anirvicanīya).[9]  And in the absence of such definitions, the distinctions amongst these constituents of reality and our methods of knowing them cannot be treated as ultimately real. This in turn will clear room for non-dualism.