  The view that law is a reflection of ideology was taken up again in the 1970s and 80s, with the emergence of the Critical Legal Studies movement. Critical Legal Studies was a radical school of thought shaped by a number of influences: the Marxist and realist traditions; the philosophical perspective of ‘deconstruction;’ and the politics of issues such as feminism, environmentalism and anti-racism. The movement takes up the realist idea that law is fundamentally indeterminate, and echoes Marxist views about how the interests of the powerful shape law. Exponents offer some astute observations about the ways in which law is taught and practiced in order to give the misleading impression of law’s certainty and legitimacy. Particular legal doctrines are targeted for papering over the inconsistent and arbitrary features of legal decision-making; the rule of law, for example, is criticized for a naïve view of the form of law as unaffected by law’s content and the social context in which law operates. The indeterminacy of law can produce a variety of results; Duncan Kennedy, for example, points out the surprising ways in which the ideology of formal legal reasoning can remedy injustice, even if ideology often disables such remedies as well (Kennedy 1976). Thus the ideology view can now be taken to reflect a consensus among radicals of all stripes on the role of law as a dissembling force to safeguard the unjust relations of the status quo.