 The other theory is the interest or benefit theory for which the crucial feature of a right lies in its providing for the right-holder’s interest or benefit (e.g. Kramer 1998; Lyons 1969). If we take the case of claim-rights again, those rights can be ascribed to the beings at whose interests the corresponding duties are directed, irrespective of whether the right-bearer is able to control the performance of those duties. Of course, not every interest will generate a right and interest theorists usually therefore propose more discriminating versions of the theory. David Lyons (1969, 176), for example, provides that someone has a claim-right only if they are the “direct, intended beneficiary” of another’s duty. In another much-used formulation, Joseph Raz (1986, 166) holds that X has a right “if and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty”.