  The second possible interpretation takes Griffin’s claim that worth to life is not a supervalue seriously. On this interpretation, it is hard to see what worth to life is, if not a supervalue. Perhaps it is only a value that we should resort to when faced with incomparabilities. However, this interpretation invites the criticism that Griffin is introducing a non-moral value, perhaps prudential value, to arbitrate when moral values are incommensurable.  In other words, we cannot decide between incommensurable values on moral grounds, so we should decide on prudential grounds. This seems reasonable when applied to incommensurabilities in aesthetic values. One might not be able to say whether Guernica is better than War and Peace, but one might choose to have Guernica displayed on the wall because it will impress one’s friends, or because it is worth more money, or even because one just enjoys it more. In the case of moral choices this is a less convincing strategy: it introduces a level of frivolity into morality that seems out of place.