 A second interpretive problem concerns the meaning of the two terms – “dependence” and “involvement” – used by Spinoza to characterize the relation between causes and cognitions in E1ax4. “Involvement” is most often glossed as “implication”. But Wilson has argued that in key passages (e.g. E2p45) involvere stands more specifically for the relation of implication between an attribute concept (e.g. extension, thought) and cognition of a mode (1999: ch.10). On this reading of “involvement”, Spinoza’s claim in E1ax4 that cognition of effects “involves” a cognition of causes amounts to the relatively intuitive claim that conceiving of extension or thought is necessary for conceiving of any particular mind or body. So understood, the axiom doesn’t direct us to discover the causes of things so that we may have truly scientific knowledge of them, but instead merely describes what is entailed by even the most minimal and inadequate conception of anything whatsoever.