 Although context-dependence is not a problem for many models of explanatory reduction, issues can arise for some models of mechanistic explanation. A mechanistic approach decomposes a system into components and scrutinizes the functioning of each component in isolation (where possible). However, a mechanistic explanation must also epistemically “recompose” the mechanism behavior (the explanandum) from these component functions (Bechtel 2010). There are molecular systems consisting of highly interconnected and functionally integrated networks whose complex organization does not permit a recomposition of the system behavior from the component functions studied in isolation (Green et al. 2017, Kaiser 2015). The functioning of individual components is transformed by the many influences of the other components. This empirical situation also is important because it stands behind many instances where molecular biologists claim a limit of “reduction”—these complex system interactions lead to emergence in some sense. This highlights that biologists frequently attempt to account for mechanism functioning or system dynamics and not just mereological or structural constitution (e.g., reducing the Mendelian kind “gene” to biochemical kinds).