 Take agent neutrality. Insofar as welfare prioritarianism is a genuinely consequentialist notion, it says that the correct course of action is the course of action that is optimal as judged from a standpoint that does not change with the position of the agent or the relationships that the agent happens to stand in (Williams 1973; Nagel 1986; cf. Sen 1993). Understood in this way, welfare prioritarianism does not require an agent to perform the action that is optimal from the standpoint of the worst off member of her own family. Instead, it requires an agent to perform the action that is optimal from the agent neutral standpoint of, say, the welfare of the worst off person in the world or the average welfare of all those in the class of people who are worst off in their respective families. If people have reason to pay special attention to the worst off member of their own families, on this view, it is because a pattern of reasoning along these lines leads to the highest level of welfare for the worst off person in the world or the highest average welfare for those in the relevant class.