 To address the question of why we need to be able to prove these truth-involving generalizations, suppose that we accept a proposition like \(\langle\)Every proposition of the form \(\langle\)if \(p\), then \(p\rangle\) is true\(\rangle\). Call this proposition “\(\beta\)”. Now take ‘\(\Gamma\)’ to stand for the collection of propositions that are the instances of \(\beta\). Horwich (2001) maintains that an account of the meaning of ‘true’ will be adequate only if it aids in explaining why we accept the members of \(\Gamma\), where such explanations amount to proofs of those propositions by, among other things, employing an explanatory premise that does not explicitly concern the truth predicate. So, one reason it is important to be able to prove a ‘true’-involving generalization is because this is a condition of adequacy for an account of the meaning of that term. One might argue that anyone who grasps the concept of truth, and that of the relevant conditional, should be said to know \(\beta\). But if a given account of truth, together with an account of the conditional (along, perhaps, with an account of other logical notions), does not entail \(\beta\), then it does not provide an acceptable account of truth.