 If Nietzsche is not a realist about value, then he must be an anti-realist: he must deny that there is any objective fact of the matter that would privilege his evaluative perspective over its target. (This, in fact, is the most familiar reading outside the secondary literature on Nietzsche; one finds this view of Nietzsche’s metaethics, for example, in the sociologist Max Weber and the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre, among many others.) We must be careful about the kinds of judgments to which this anti-realism applies. Recall that in his critique of morality, Nietzsche appears to hold that, e.g., “herd” morality is good for the herd, but that it is bad for higher men. He says, for example, that, “The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd — but not reach out beyond it” (WP 287; emphasis added); and elsewhere he describes slave morality as simply “the prudence of the lowest order” (GM I:13). It may appear that regarding value judgments pertaining to welfare or prudential goodness — what is good or bad for particular sorts of persons — Nietzsche believes there is an objective fact of the matter, though one relative to type-facts about persons. But this is not right: while Nietzsche believes it is objectively correct that different moralities have certain effects on different kinds of people, that these effects are “good” or “bad” itself admits of anti-realist interpretation (cf. Leiter 2015: 119 for a revision of the view defended in Leiter 2002). Even more importantly, though, Nietzsche’s anti-realism applies to the “revaluative” judgment that follows upon these judgments about the effects of different moralities: that is, the judgment that because herd morality is good for the herd but bad for higher men, herd morality (or the universal reign of herd morality) is bad or disvaluable. (Leiter 2019: 84–111 argues that Nietzsche’s anti-realism even extends to epistemic value, an issue beyond the scope of this entry.)