 One scenario for (xiii) is the situation where Solange is invariably a lively contributor to any seminar she attends. Moreover, the contributions she makes are always insightful, hence guaranteeing an interesting time for all who attend. In this case, Solange’s presence at least in part explains or is a reason why the seminar was good. Note that some writers distinguish explanatory reasons of this sort from full-bodied explanations (Nebel 2018). A different scenario depicts Solange as someone who has an almost unerring knack for spotting which seminars are going to be good, even though she is not always active in the discussion. Her attendance at a seminar, according to this story, provides a reason for thinking—or is evidence—that the seminar is good. We might say that according to the first story, the seminar is good because Solange is at it. In the second case, Solange is at it because it is good. Examples of this kind were first introduced in Wilson (1979) following on from the attack on the validity of contraposition in Downing (1975). Notice that the hook (as understood in classical logic) does not capture the reason for thinking relation, for it permits any true consequent to be inferred from any other statement whatever. Where the conditional is a reason for thinking relation, then the antecedent must provide some support for the consequent—hence has to provide some supporting evidence for accepting the consequent. A formal exploration of one reason for thinking relation is given in Vincenzo Crupi and Andrea Iacona’s study of the evidential conditional (Crupi and Iacona 2020, and see the fully developed logic of the evidential conditional in Raidl, Iacona and Crupi 2021). These writers treat the reason for thinking or evidentiary relation as one in which the antecedent provides a “reason for accepting” the consequent. See also Igor Douven on the “evidential support thesis” (Douven 2008, 2016). 