 As Gauthier (1986) argues, the bargaining problem provides a framework for a contractarian analysis of the social contract by modeling how parties with partially conflicting interests might arrive at a mutually acceptable set of rules they can each follow to their own advantage. This contrasts with the contractualist approach of Harsanyi (1953, 1955, 1977), Rawls (1958, 1971), and Scanlon (1982, 1998) that characterizes the social contract as an object of rational choice made under constraints designed to ensure that the choice is appropriately unbiased, and which, in principle, could be made by a single agent. Braithwaite (1955) was the first to use the Nash bargaining problem to derive a social contract, in his case a rule for fairly dividing a resource between two claimants. Later, Hampton (1986) and Kavka (1986) argued that the Hobbesian device of creating a commonwealth by design incorporates elements of a Nash bargaining problem. Gauthier (1986) and Binmore (1994, 1998) used the Nash bargaining problem for developing standalone theories of distributive justice. More recently, Muldoon (2016) and Moehler (2018) have used the Nash bargaining problem to model the problem of how members of deeply pluralistic societies can find rules for living together peacefully.