  Leibniz introduces three main lines of attack against the  Clarke-Newton conception of absolute space and time. The first line  focuses on the suggestion that space and time might be identified  with the divine attributes, and on Newton’s claim – made in his  Optics[31]  – that space is, as it were, the sensorium of God.  Leibniz, at root, argues that such claims are deeply misleading at  best, heretical at worst. Thus, for example, against the suggestion  that space might be identified with God’s Immensity, he  writes to Clarke, “if space is a property of God … space belongs to the essence of God. But space has parts: therefore there  would be parts in the essence of God” (Fifth Paper, paragraph  43; G VII.399/Alexander 68). Likewise, he argues that if time were  identified with God’s Immensity, then we would have to say  that since things are in time, they are in God’s Immensity,  and thus in God’s essence, “Strange expressions; which plainly  show, that the author [i.e. Clarke] makes a wrong use of terms” (Fifth Paper, paragraph 44; G VII.399/Alexander   68).[32]  Finally, from his first letter on, Leibniz seizes on what he takes to be the impious implication of Newton’s suggestion that space might in some sense be considered the seat of divine perception or cognition,  writing, “Sir Isaac Newton says, that space is an organ, which  God makes use of to perceive things by. But if God stands in need of  any organ to perceive things by, it will follow, that they do not  depend altogether upon him, nor were produced by him” (First  Paper, paragraph 3; G VII.352/Alexander 11). 