 One key motivation involves a comparison with the “upstanding” approaches  (§6.1)  and the first problem we raised, viz. getting the “right results”. If we think that there are truth-makers, then we must ensure that the truth-making entities get things right. That is, if the world contained a green banana, then it had always better be true, any time after the fact, that a truth-maker exists for &lt;There was a green banana&gt; (rather than, say, a truth-maker for &lt;There was a red banana&gt;, in the case where the world never contained a red banana). But notice, then, that this seems to imply some kind of “fixing” relation; how the world was (containing a green banana, not containing a red banana) serves to “fix” what truth-makers exist now. “Fixing” is, plausibly, a relation. And, if x fixes y then, intuitively, both x and y must exist; both relata of the fixing relation should exist. But on the presentist picture, that’s unacceptable. Past things don’t exist. In that case, the required “fixing” relation isn’t existence-entailing; it doesn’t require the existence of both relata. And, if that’s right, then presentists may as well “cut out the middleman” (so to speak) and treat the truth-making relation as “non-existence-entailing” and avoid any ontological inflation. Presentists don’t require ontological commitment to present truth-makers (ersatz times, Lucretian properties, etc.) for truths about the past. They can do without. (See Ingram 2019: 179–92 for critical discussion.)