 One important contrast with Kriegel is that for Kauppinen, moral appearances are not themselves judgments, but explain and potentially justify moral beliefs. Moral appearances are thus taken to be in this respect parallel to perceptual appearances – non-doxastic states that attract assent to their propositional contents  (see Section 5.1).  (Graham Oddie (2005) defends a view according to which desires constitute appearances of value, and play a similar epistemic role.) Since appearances often cause moral beliefs, the two kinds of thought often co-occur. But moral beliefs can be arrived at and held independently of moral appearances. This accounts for the force of motivational externalist objections and the possibility of amoralism (though on Kauppinen’s view, fully competent moral agents are motivationally and deliberatively sensitive to beliefs with such contents). Since the beliefs expressed by moral judgments are ordinary descriptive ones, there is no need for a separate moral semantics. Pluralist views thus split the difference between non-cognitivist and cognitivist sentimentalism: each is, broadly speaking, true of one important kind of moral thought (in contrast to hybrid views, according to which each thought has both non-cognitive and cognitive elements).