 Another way to develop the skill model could urge that the skill in question is the skill of applying (or reasoning with) generalizations of a certain kind. Here the claim may be that moral principles (or generalizations) require judgment to apply, or are defeasible, or come with implicit ceteris paribus clauses. This commits the particularist to principles of a kind, while also allowing both that morality is importantly distinctive and that some traditional moral theorists have erred by seeking a sort of principle that is not to be found. This path leads to interesting intermediate positions that are certainly more friendly to principles than Dancy’s particularism while at the same time concerned to emphasize the limitations of principles. For example, Richard Holton (2002) suggests that sound moral principles are conditionals containing an implicit “that”s it’ clause. The dictum that lying is wrong is then more perspicuously expressed as the claim that if an action amounts to lying and “that”s it’ then the action is wrong. In this context, “that’s it” expresses the idea that no other moral principle, given the facts at hand, supersedes the principle that lying is wrong.