 The first of these two questions is slightly easier to answer than the second. A moral theory is agent-neutral if it gives us common aims, but if we have common aims then whenever there is a reason for you to promote an aim there will also be reason for me to promote that aim (if I can). So Parfit’s agent-neutral moral theories provide agent-neutral reasons in his sense—in the sense of being such that a reason for one agent is guaranteed to be a reason for any agent situated to promote the end which figures in that reason. By contrast, a moral theory is agent-relative if it does not give every agent a common aim. However, if we do not have common aims then what is a reason for you may be no reason whatsoever for me even if I am in a position to promote the end which figures in that reason. So Parfit’s agent-relative moral theories provide agent-relative reasons in his sense—reasons which are not such that a reason for one agent entails a reason for any agent in a position to promote the end which figures in that reason. So Parfit’s agent-relative moral theories concern agent-relative reasons in his sense and his agent-neutral moral theories concern agent-neutral reasons in his sense. So the use of the same terminology is no coincidence, and presumably Parfit would agree that the agent-relativity of a reason is well understood in terms of the agent-relativity of the principle associated with that reason. Indeed, the primary reason we have included Parfit’s version of the distinction in this discussion of the principle-based version of the distinction is the suspicion that his distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons is really just a corollary of his distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral theories. The fact that Parfit clearly thinks that his distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons is just the same as Nagel’s distinction also suggests that Parfit’s distinction is well understood as principle-based, since Nagel’s version of the distinction is a paradigmatic instance of a principle-based version of the distinction. The other (closely related) reason for including Parfit’s version of the distinction here is that it also shares the chief vice of Nagel’s version. As explained below, neither Nagel’s nor Parfit’s version of the distinction sits well with radical forms of moral particularism.