 Notice that the substantial factor test “solves” the overdetermination problem mostly because it does not say enough to get itself into trouble in such cases. It thus allows our clear causal intuitions full play in these cases. The ad hoc nature of this solution is evident when one sees how the First and Second Restatement of Torts managed to salvage what they could of the sine qua non test: if a putative causal factor is a necessary condition of some harm, then (under the Restatements) it is per se substantial. Necessary condition–hood, in other words, is sufficient for cause in fact. But necessary condition–hood is not necessary for cause in fact, so that a factor can be substantial even if it is not a necessary condition. This amounts to saying that one should use the necessary condition test when it works, but when it yields counterintuitive results (as in the overdetermination cases) one shouldn’t use it but should rely instead on causal intuitions that are not based on counterfactual relations. As much is admitted in a recent revival of the two Restatements’ primitivism about causation, according to which one is explicitly directed to find either counterfactual dependence of a harm or “actual contribution” to that harm (Stapleton 2015).