 It is easy to see that Plantinga-style objections will not appear decisive to those who reject his metaphysical framework. Indeed, Plantinga’s accusations of category mistake may strike students of the main medieval proponents of DDS as so many misunderstandings based on a foisting of a foreign framework on their ideas. Plantinga, along with many other philosophers, thinks of individuals and properties as belonging to disjoint categories connected by an external relation of exemplification. Individuals are causally efficacious concreta whereas properties are causally impotent abstracta. Such an approach to ontology renders the divine simplicity inconceivable from the outset. For if God is a concrete individual and his nature (conceived perhaps as the conjunction of his omni-attributes) is an abstract property, then the general ontology rules out any identity or sameness of God and his nature. Any such identity or sameness would violate the separateness of the two categories. To identify an unexemplifiable concretum with an exemplifiable abstractum would amount to a category mistake. At most, a Plantinga-style approach allows for God’s exemplification of his nature where the (first-level) exemplification relation, unlike the identity relation, is asymmetrical and irreflexive and so enforces the non-identity of its relata. In short, if God exemplifies his nature, then God must be distinct from his nature, just as Socrates must be distinct from his nature. God’s nature is then something he has, by exemplification, not, pace Augustine, something he is by some form of identity or sameness. 