 One possible problem concerns vulnerability in the labor market. As we saw above in section  2.5,  one rationale for having a welfare state to enact a social minimum is that, by providing access to urgently needed goods independently of the sale of labor-power, it can reduce the pressure on disadvantaged workers to scramble into poor quality (exploitative or abusive) jobs. There is a danger that work-conditionality rules undermine this desirable effect. If, for example, the government tells an unemployed person that they must look for a job and take any job offered by an employer on whatever terms this employer states, or else lose all welfare benefits, then this person will be under severe pressure to find and take a job. They will clearly have much less power to refuse jobs that involve exploitative or abusive treatment than if they received welfare benefits unconditionally. According to some critics, this is the whole point of work-conditionality: to weaken the bargaining position of labor in the interests of business and the property-owning classes (see Piven and Cloward 1993). A distinct but related objection is that work-conditionality might place a burden of “shameful revelation” on those claiming transfers: to qualify for transfers, they have to show that they have looked for a job, but failed to get one, which is potentially damaging to self-respect (Wolff 1998).