 A third line of criticism attacks the rationale for assigning a low number to \(p(F\mid \neg D)\). The complaint is that the rationale actually makes \(p(F\mid \neg D)=0\), and also assigns probability 0 to many other, intuitively much more probable, ways the universe might have turned out. How so? The rationale for a low \(p(F\mid \neg D)\) goes something like this: take an apparently fine-tuned parameter of our universe, like its expansion speed. This speed had to be exactly between 9 and 10 km/sc, let’s pretend, for the universe to be able to support life. But given that it could have been any speed from 0 km/sc to 100 km/sc to \(1,000,000\) km/sc to…that it would end up in the narrow 9–10 km/sc window was extremely unlikely to happen without divine guidance. But, the objection goes, the same could be said of much larger ranges, like a \(10^1\)–\(10^{10}\) km/sc window. Even that large range is a drop in the infinite bucket of speeds that could have obtained, from 0 through the entire positive real line. In fact, any finite range is effectively 0% of infinity—indeed, it really is \(0\%\) on the standard ways of measuring these things (Colyvan, Garfield, and Priest 2005). So even if our universe only needed “coarse tuning” to support life, i.e., even if it would have supported life given any of a massively broad yet finite range of conditions, a parallel premise to (1) could be justified by this rationale, and a corresponding “coarse-tuning argument” for design offered (McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup 2001).