 For Speaker Subjectivism, there is a non-cognitive element to moral judgment, but moral sentences can nevertheless be given standard truth-conditional semantics. Its attraction is thus making sense of judgment internalism without the need for non-standard semantics or metasemantics. A generalized version of Speaker Subjectivism is Metaethical Contextualism, according to which the standard relative to which something is said to be right or wrong need not be the speaker’s own, but is instead determined by the context of utterance, in something like the way that the context fixes the content of a tacitly indexical sentence like “Zheng is tall” (Dreier 1990; Björnsson and Finlay 2010). So just like in uttering “Zheng is tall”, we might say that Zheng is tall for a child, in uttering “Stealing is wrong” we might say that stealing is wrong by the standards you and I accept, for example.