 At the turn of the last century, it was also held by the neo-Kantian philosopher Leonard Nelson (Nelson 1908 &amp; 1949), to whom Cook Wilson alludes in SI (872), but it was also held unbeknownst to him by members of the Brentano school, such as Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, and Edmund Husserl. (See Mulligan (2014) for a survey.) It was to become the central plank of ‘Oxford Realism’. For the Oxonians and the Brentanians one knows that p only if one ‘apprehends’ that p. As Kevin Mulligan put it: “one knows that p in the strict sense only if one has perceived that p and such perceiving is not itself any sort of belief or judging” (Mulligan 2014, 382). A version of this view is defended today by Timothy Williamson, according to whom knowledge is a mental state “being in which is necessary and sufficient for knowing p” (Williamson 2000, 21), and which “cannot be analysed into more basic concepts” (Williamson 2000, 33). The claim is, however, about ‘knowledge that p’ and not anymore about ‘apprehending that p’.