  Simplicius only alludes to Zeno’s argument for smallness, without  setting it out: he says that Zeno derived the conclusion that  “none have magnitude on the grounds that each of the many is  the same as itself and one.” Although this is not much to go  on, the argument may plausibly be reconstructed as follows. Each of  the many is the same as itself and one. Whatever has magnitude can be divided into distinguishable parts; whatever has distinguishable  parts is not everywhere the same as itself; thus, whatever has  magnitude is not everywhere, and so is not genuinely, the same as  itself. Whatever is not the same as itself is not genuinely one.  Thus, whatever has magnitude is not genuinely one. Therefore, each of the many has no magnitude. The basic assumption here is that to be  “the same as itself” is what it means for something to be “one” in the strict sense Zeno envisages, whereas any  magnitude, which will have distinguishable parts in virtue of being  spatially extended, will fail to be strictly one and self-identical. 