 If the suggestion is that meaning statements have a prescriptive content it would provide another very direct argument in support of ME normativity, one that does not have to proceed via the controversial claim that the notion of semantic correctness is an essentially normative notion. This is an advantage over the simple argument. However, there are also disadvantages. For instance, the question arises whether the claim that meaning statements lack descriptive content can accommodate the role of such statements in inferential contexts (see Gauker 2007: 194–195 for a discussion). Another question concerns the implications from “ought”-statements to meaning statements. According to the simple argument, “‘Green’ ought to be applied to \(x\) if and only if \(x\) is green” follows immediately from “‘Green’ means green”. According to this argument the converse also holds: “‘Green’ means green” follows directly from “‘Green’ ought to be applied to \(x\) if and only if \(x\) is green” (cf. Gibbard 2012: 12 and 113–115). The latter has been questioned on the grounds that even if it is true that “green” ought to be applied this way, the “ought” in question may not have anything to do with semantics but, say, with religious practices (Byrne 2002: 207).