 Consider the outcome 1M, which is the only outcome that Germany reckons acceptable. Germany, as already observed, have an effectivity function of \(E(\{\textrm{Germany}\})=\{W\}\) so, on their own, are not able to turn their preference into an outcome. However, together with other Countries, they are able to do so. Suppose their allies are Belgium, France and The Netherlands. Is 1M then a good outcome? If we look at the preferences of the other players in the coalition, i.e., Belgium, France, The Netherlands, we observe the following. Belgium had rather an outcome between 4M and 5M, France and The Netherlands exactly 5M. These Countries could get together and select 5M, which is an outcome that is acceptable to them. However the effectivity function of \(\{\)Belgium, France, The Netherlands\(\}\) is \(E(\{\)Belgium, France, The Netherlands\(\})=\{W\}\), which means that the three Countries are not enough to pass the 5M bill. But the coalition made by Belgium, France, Italy and The Netherlands would be. Notice moreover that 5M is one of Italy’s preferred outcomes. 5M is in fact the only stable outcome of the game: there is no coalition that is together willing and capable of deviating from it.