  Nevertheless, there are empirical grounds for concern that behavior suggesting consciousness in animals may be the product of unconscious processes.  Allen et al. (2009) describe work on learning in spinal cords of rats that shows phenomena analogous to latent inhibition and overshadowing.  In intact animals, these learning and memory related phenomena have been argued to involve attention.  But their similarity to mechanisms in the spinal cord, assumed by most not to involve consciousness, calls into question their status as evidence for consciousness. There are, of course, differences between the learning capacities of spinal cords and the learning capacities of intact organisms, and there are prima facie reasons for thinking that sophisticated forms of learning are related to consciousness (Clark &amp; Squire 1998; Allen 2004; Ginsburg &amp; Jablonka 2007b). But  the current point is similar to that made about blindsight: a more fine-grained analysis of these similarities and differences is needed before conclusions about consciousness can be drawn.