 Who allegedly subscribed to this triad? Some of Sellars’s examples draw from early modern philosophy; he effectively attributes a version of A and B to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (1956: §28) but, it seems, not C. He criticizes Ayer’s linguistic analysis (1956: §§8–9) but suggests that it is aimed more at analyzing object-talk into sense-data talk than at showing sense-data talk to be epistemically basic (as in A). He briefly alludes to Broad (1956: §11) and Price (1956: §31), without ascribing the triad to them. He also devotes considerable attention further on to the role of an ostensive “given” within the “positivistic conception of science” (1956: §43), and it is tempting to surmise that his main target was that conception as put forward by Carnap, Reichenbach, and others. To assess that direction, we would need to interpret the positivist shift from elementary experiences to protocol sentences as epistemically basic, which would take us far afield (but see Leitgeb &amp; Carus 2020).