 As a basis for repatriation, however, the concept of inalienable cultural property faces a series of objections. For one, we lack objective standards for assessing claims that a particular item is fundamental to group identity (Harding 1997: 751). Second, the relationship between an object and group identity need not obviously require possession of the object (Harding 1997: 751; Coleman 2010: 89). Third, we might worry about claims concerning the necessity of possessing objects for group identity if a group has been separated from the object for a long time, which is especially common in repatriation cases (Harding 1997: 752). Such circumstances seem to present us with a dilemma: either the cultural group has persisted without the object, in which case the claim for the necessity of its return is undermined; or the object is essential to group identity, in which case the claim to be the same cultural group in its absence is weakened (cf. Waldron 1992). Finally, the idea that cultural identity might truly be linked with an object inalienably and in perpetuity can suggest a troublingly static notion of cultural group identity, especially if such relationships are codified into law (Harding 1997: 752; Coleman 2010).