 However, popular though it is, this view is not entirely uncontroversial. For instance, MacBride (2014) argues that there is no need to appeal to truthmaking to explain this type of asymmetric dependence between truth and being. In fact, there are reasons to think that truthmaking cannot explain the asymmetry, at least not on the basis of the idea that truth supervenes on being. Part of the confusion here seems to surround the relevant notion of supervenience. On Armstrong’s (2004: 8) construal, the relevant notion of supervenience is symmetric: truth supervenes on being, but being also supervenes on truth. So it appears that the required asymmetry cannot arise from supervenience itself (see also Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005). While these problems must be settled elsewhere, it suffices to say that some variety of ontological dependence is no doubt at work in truthmaker theory—there is an on-going debate as to how truthmaking should be specified. One recent suggestion that may have some mileage is that the relevant asymmetry could be recovered if truthmaking is understood as truth-grounding, that is, some entity x grounds the truth of some proposition p if p is true in virtue of the existence of x (see Tahko 2013 for discussion).