 Assuming that awareness involves some or another type of belief, let’s turn now to the second question broached above, namely how these beliefs must be entertained for the person to possess the relevant awareness. The main dispute here is between those philosophers who think that the pertinent beliefs must be occurrently entertained (Zimmerman 1997: 421–2; 2017: 79; Ginet 2000: 270; Rosen 2004: 309; Levy 2011: 141) and those who think that it’s enough if these beliefs are dispositionally entertained (Haji 1997: 531; Peels 2011: 580; Timpe 2011: 18; Levy 2013: 167; 2014:  34).[3]  According to the ‘occurrentist’ camp, an agent satisfies the EC only if, at the time of action, she consciously believes that her action is right/wrong and consciously contemplates some of its possible consequences (Zimmerman 1997: 421). Otherwise, and for the purposes of attributions of responsibility, she is ignorant of relevant considerations and so, in principle (recall the possibility of culpable ignorance), she has an excuse for her wrongdoing (Zimmerman 2017: 79; see  sect. 3.1  below for an argument in favor of this position). As we’ll see below  (sect. 2),  the occurrentist interpretation of the EC plays a central role in a revisionist argument against commonsense attributions of responsibility.