 As before, an assumption of the argument is that the existences under consideration are worth having. We should understand, however, that at least in theory a particular existence can be less than worth having: a child will be brought into existence who is made so miserable (as a result, e.g., of a genetic impairment) that we want to say that it is wrong, and makes things worse, to bring that child into existence to begin with. In such cases, some philosophers hold fast to intuition (3) and others don’t. David Heyd thus maintains that the acts under scrutiny are not wrong. According to Heyd, comparisons between the wellbeing level a given person has at a world at which that person exists and the wellbeing level that same person has at a world where that person never exists are not cogent and hence we are forced (given intuitions (1) and (2)) to conclude that no wrong has been done (Heyd, 2009; Heyd 1992, 30–33). Philosophers who think, however, that such comparisons can cogently be made – who accept, we can say, Existence Comparability – remain free to limit their “bite the bullet” conclusion to the case where the existence is worth having. Thus, David Boonin is, for example, at least neutral on Existence Comparability. That is, he doesn’t reject the view that we can isolate and set aside those cases in which “life [is] worse than no life at all” (Boonin 2008, 130 and 135; Boonin 2014; see also Bayne 2010). Moreover, Boonin implicitly limits his own “bite the bullet” strategy to cases in which the life is worth living. Only in those cases does he press the point that the acts under scrutiny are not morally wrong. 