 The proponent of the sceptical solution can be understood as rejecting eliminativism about our practices of ascribing meaning. Mirroring parallel discussions in metaethics, the two most obvious paths available to her involve providing either an error-theoretic account or a non-factualist account of ascriptions of meaning. We shall follow Boghossian in viewing these paths as forms of irrealism about meaning, content and rules (Boghossian 1989, 1990). A prominent general line of argument in the recent literature suggests that irrealist views of any area make presuppositions that irrealist views of meaning and content are bound to deny, so that irrealism about meaning and content is ultimately incoherent (Boghossian 1989, 1990; Hattiangadi 2007, 2017, 2018; Miller 2011, 2015a, 2020). We’ll illustrate this general line of attack by sketching an argument to the effect that, regardless of whether one pursues an error-theoretic or a non-factualist approach, adopting irrealism leads inexorably to an “insane and intolerable” and “incredible and self-defeating” form of eliminativism on which the notions of meaning and content do turn out to “vanish into thin air”. We’ll then briefly consider an alternative way of providing a sceptical response, which aims to revise the conception of meaning fact that is at work in the sceptic’s mindset.