 When analysed in standard truth-conditional semantics, defaults can contribute to the truth-conditional content or affect what is implicit – presupposed or implicated (see e.g., Potts 2015). The side on which we find defaults in this distinction is largely dictated by the orientation concerning the semantics/pragmatics boundary, where the choice ranges from traditional semantic minimalism to radical versions of contextualism. I discuss these in more detail in the following sections. But it has to be remembered that the category is tangential to such concepts as what is said, conversational implicature, conventional implicature, presupposition, or, to use a more general term, projective content (on universals in projective content see Tonhauser et al. 2013). For example, presuppositions are stronger than defaults: presupposition triggers such as ‘know’, ‘regret’, ‘again’ or ‘manage’ do not give the hearer much option of interpretation, save admitting some form of metalinguistic or quotative reading when these are negated as in (3).