  Dworkin argues that the attribution of the four conditions to a relationship occurs through an interpretation of that relationship so it need not be the case that each person is aware of satisfying any of the four conditions when they do. Consider a person who appeals to his fellow citizens on the basis of a principle of freedom of speech on the grounds that it is part of their constitution. This person is committed to legal principles that he shares with other citizens. He will be committed to the principles underlying the other elements of the constitution and the legal history of his country. He will be committed to a principle of equality to the extent that it is part of the constitution. We can interpret this person's behavior and the similar behavior of others as committed to special obligations to their fellow countrymen to the extent that it is the shared constitution they are appealing to. We can interpret this person as expressing a kind of equal concern for his fellow countrymen to the extent that he is appealing to legal principles that protect all. And we can interpret him in this way even if he himself would not have asserted it. And to the extent that people conform to this kind of practice more generally, we can interpret their behavior generally as satisfying the four conditions of associative obligation.