  Others have been sufficiently moved as well by the recognition of  conflicting intuitions in the puzzle cases to seek an entirely  different approach to the issue of personal identity (see, e.g.,  Wilkes 1988, Schechtman 1996). But it is not yet clear why such a  radical revision in methodology is called for. After all, the fact  that our intuitions conflict in the puzzle cases does not necessarily mean that there is some deep-seated, ineliminable incoherence in the  concepts we're applying to them. Instead, it may simply mean that  there are conditions restricting the deployment of our concepts to  anything other than paradigm cases, or it might mean that we are  actually unsure what our intuitions are about the puzzle  cases (for the former objection, see Gendler 2002a, 231; for the  latter, see Degaynesford 2001, 171). (Further, even if we do agree on the need for a distinctly ethical conception of personhood and  personal identity, it is not clear why the one Rovane has chosen is  supposed to be uniquely suited to our purposes. After all,  there will be plenty of other possible conceptions that are at least  as plausible as having the agency-regarding ability, including  conceptions emphasizing the ability to experience complex emotions,  to control certain aspects of their world, or to feel pleasure and  pain [see Gendler 2002a, 236]. Why privilege agency-regarding  capacities over these?)