 Externalists have responded to this challenge by pointing out that the fact that a good person is motivated to do what she thinks right does not preclude her from also being motivated non-derivately by direct concern, for example, for the welfare of loved ones. They have also argued that there is nothing fetishistic in supposing that the good person is motivationally disposed to do the right thing and that, in any case, alternative externalist explanations of a reliable connection between moral judgment and motivation are available (Copp 1997, 49–50). An individual could, for example, simply be disposed to desire immediately to do whatever she believes it right to do or whatever she judges to be valuable, rather than being disposed to do the right thing, whatever it turns out to be (Copp 1997, 50–51). Sigrun Svavarsdottir (1999) has argued that Smith is mistaken when he claims that the externalist’s only option for explaining motivational shifting is to appeal to a desire to do the right thing, but she thinks that something close to the view Smith rejects provides just the right externalist picture of moral motivation. We should, on her view, understand the good person as concerned with doing what is morally valuable or required, where that concern should be understood to encompass what is honest, fair, kind, considerate, just, and so on. The fact that the good person is so motivationally disposed does not mean, as Smith seems to suggest, that she cares only about one thing, namely, doing what she believes is right. Nor does it mean that she undertakes an act conceiving of it simply as the right thing to do. On the contrary, it is compatible with the externalist picture that the good person will often simply respond directly to another’s need for comfort or relief. Moreover, an externalist view that conceives of the good person as motivated by the desire to be moral does not involve introducing an alien (or alienating) thought—“it’s the right thing to do”— into her consciousness in order to explain moral motivation. Rather, having formed the moral judgment that she ought to φ, the desire to be moral plays, in the good person, a role in effecting the “psychological transition” from judging it right to φ to wanting to φ (Svavarsdottir 1999, 201). Finally, Svavarsdottir argues that although a desire to do the morally right action, say, aid another in need, may derive at first from a desire to be moral, it may come to operate independently of the latter desire, so that her desire to aid is not simply an instrumental desire (Svavarsdottir 1999, 205–206, 213–214).