 On most views, even if it were true that logical truths are true in all counterfactual circumstances, a priori, and analytic, this would not give sufficient conditions for a truth to be a logical truth. On most views, a logical truth also has to be in some sense “formal”, and this implies at least that all truths that are replacement instances of its form are logical truths too (and hence, on the assumption of the preceding sentence, true in all counterfactual circumstances, a priori, and analytic). To use a slight modification of an example of Albert of Saxony (quoted by Bocheński 1956, §30.07), “If a widow runs, then a female runs” should be true in all counterfactual circumstances, a priori, and analytic if any truth is. However, “If a widow runs, then a log runs” is a replacement instance of its form, and in fact it even has the same form on any view of logical form (something like “If a \(P\) \(Q\)s, then an \(R\) \(Q\)s”), but it is not even true simpliciter. So on most views, “If a widow runs, then a female runs” is not a logical truth.