 The relation between mental imagery and imagination is important for another reason: we have seen that we can have mental imagery without imagination (see the flashback and the earworm examples). But how about the other way round? Can we have imagination without mental imagery? In other words, does imagination necessarily involve the exercise of mental imagery (Kind 2001, Van Leeuwen 2016, Langland-Hassan 2020)? This debate has been further complicated by the standard distinction between sensory and propositional imagination (roughly, imagining seeing x versus imagining that x is F), and the role imagery plays in these two forms of imagination – roughly, the difference between them is that the former, but not the latter is necessarily accompanied by (or constituted by) mental imagery. Without taking sides or venturing into the literature on the distinction between sensory and propositional imagination, it needs to be pointed out that many of the arguments on either side appeal to introspection (Byrne 2007, Chalmers 2002). If we allow for unconscious mental imagery, then these arguments would not lead to any kind of conclusive resolution. The only way in which we can assess whether imagination necessarily involves mental imagery is by empirical means.