 A further reason which has prompted scholars to think that included among the syllogisms Dignāga would accept as good ones are ones which might not be deductively valid is the fact that he has retained an example phrase in example statements, for such phrases have no bearing on the deductive validity of Dignāga’s canonical syllogism. This doubt is re-enforced by the fact that example statements, stripped of their example phrases, are contrapositives of one another. Thus, one being logically equivalent to the other is also logically superfluous with respect to it. Yet, Dignāga seems to be aware of the equivalence, for he acknowledges in his commentarial discussion of the three forms (PS 2.5) that the second and third forms are equivalent (Katsura 2000 p. 245; Katsura 2004b pp. 121–124), from which it follows that any two statements, one of which satisfies the second form and the other of which satisfies the third form are equivalent.