A complication is that one might conceivably formulate a version of luck egalitarianism so that it says that all those who try equally hard or are otherwise equally meritorious or virtuous—regardless of their native talent or talent potential—should have the same prospects of gaining especially advantageous or better than average outcomes, while leaving it entirely open what should be the spread between the best and worse outcomes available in the society.  This version of luck egalitarianism would be a more demanding version of substantive equality of opportunity than FEO. In contrast, luck egalitarianism as characterized here specifies that people's condition should be equal unless those who get the short end of the stick are appropriately held responsible for their condition. In addition to taking equality to be the moral default position, a fully elaborated luck egalitarian doctrine would specify the factors that determine, when inequality is warranted, what degree of inequality is warranted. For example, the view might be that when inequalities are voluntarily courted or chosen via fair interaction, whatever spread between worse off and better off develops is acceptable. A different elaboration would hold that when people are unequally well off, each person's level of advantages enjoyed ought to be in proportion to her degree of deservingness as fixed by some standard of desert.