 Stein’s contribution to the philosophy of sociality goes far beyond her investigation of interpersonal or empathic relations. Though empathy is a necessary basis for any form of sociality, it is certainly not sufficient for all forms of being-together. Accordingly, in her two books, Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie and Geisteswissenschaft (1922) and Eine Untersuchung über den Staat (1925), Stein discusses a complex range of social entities and facts and the mechanisms that constitute them. Initially, Stein follows her phenomenological contemporaries (Scheler 1916/1926), as well as earlier social psychologists (Le Bon 1895) and sociologists (Tönnies 1887/1935; Simmel 1908; Litt 1919) in distinguishing three general “types of socialization” (Vergesellschaftung) (1922: 110[130]): the “mass” or “crowd” (Masse), “society” (Gesellschaft), and “community” (Gemeinschaft) (1922: 230–246[283–295]; see Szanto forthcoming). But Stein not only adds to this her systematic analysis of the state (1925) (see  sect. 4.1),  in her treatise on “Individual and Community” (1922), she offers an unprecedentedly fine-grained phenomenological analysis of the cognitive, experiential, intentional, volitional, affective and moral life of communities in general. Before elaborating the nature of communities, let us briefly demarcate it from the crowd and societies or associations.