The most widely held theory of law, at least in law schools, is HLA Hart’s (1994) inclusive positivist theory, and many theorists of legal interpretation profess to accept Hartian positivism (Alexander 2015; Baude and Sachs 2018; Baude 2015, 2364–65; Sachs 2014, 2261; 2015, 825–26; Fallon 2018, 90–91; Goldsworthy 2019). What are its implications for legal interpretation? On Hart’s account, the content of the law is determined at the most fundamental level by the convergent practices of judges and other officials.[35] In Hart’s well-known terminology, judges’ convergent practices and attitudes constitute a rule of recognition that specifies how the content of the law is determined (Hart 1994, 100–10).[36] (For simplicity, I restrict attention to judges.) To illustrate with respect to statutes, if judges (in a particular jurisdiction): (1) regularly treat statutes as contributing to the law in a particular way; (2) are disposed to criticize other judges who fail to do so (or threaten to fail to do so); and (3) regard such criticisms as justified, then the rule of recognition in the jurisdiction is that statutes contribute to the content of the law in that way. (See entry on Legal Positivism.)