 In addition, there are a variety of other arguments in support of ME normativity. One such argument grants that correctness conditions are not themselves normative, but suggests that we derive the normativity of meaning from the idea that we ought to speak the truth (Ebbs 1997; Haugeland 1998: Soames 1997: 221, 224). As noted above, this only succeeds if the obligation in question can be said to derive purely from semantic sources. The question, then, is whether there is any reason to suppose that we have a semantic obligation to speak the truth. The impression that there is, it has been suggested, is a result of a conflation of semantics and pragmatics. Thus, it is commonly held that there are rules of assertion, and some of these are such that they are violated when the speaker makes a false judgment. For instance, it has been proposed that there is a “knowledge rule”: “One must: assert \(p\) only if one knows \(p\)” (Williamson 2000: 242). However, opponents of ME normativity stress, these are pragmatic rules, regulating the performance of speech acts, not semantic ones. If such rules are essential for the possibility of assertion, then assertion is essentially normative, but it does not follow that meaning is (Glüer &amp; Wikforss 2009: 37–38; Speaks 2009). For discussion of the claim that assertion is normative, see the entry on  assertion,  for a suggestion as to how to connect norms of assertion to the meanings of sentences by means of the Alstonian idea of meanings as speech-act-potentials (Alston 2000), see García-Carpintero 2012, 2021.