 Though Moore in Principia Ethica thought beauty good in itself, he did not insist on this view when valuing the appreciation of beauty; the latter might be good even if the former was not. But he still thought the existence of beauty makes a significant difference to value. More specifically, he thought the admiring contemplation of beauty that actually exists and causes your contemplation is significantly better than an otherwise similar contemplation of merely imagined beauty, and better by more than can be attributed to the existence of the beauty on its own. This view involved an application of his “principle of organic unities,” which is one of his main contributions and says the value of a whole need not equal the sum of the values its parts would have on their own (1903: 27–29/1993: 78–80). If state x on its own has value a and state y on its own has value b, the whole combining them by relation R need not have value a + b; it may have more and it may have less. This principle had been accepted by Idealists such as Bradley, who gave it a characteristically anti-theoretical formulation. They held that if x and y combine to form the whole x-R-y, their values, like their very identities, are dissolved in that larger whole, whose value cannot be computed from the values of its parts. It was Moore’s contribution to accept the principle in a way that rejected this anti-theoretical interpretation and allowed computation, though exactly how it did so depended on his strict view that intrinsic value can depend only on intrinsic properties.