 More had some detailed criticisms of Cartesian physics, including his account of refraction, and his vortex theory of celestial motions (which, More pointed out, ought to have given rise to celestial cylinders, rather than spheres, because the vortexes were held to be rotating in a plane around the equators of celestial bodies) (see, for example, More 1662, in Antidote Against Atheism, separately paginated, 39; see also the Preface General, xv), but the more philosophical criticisms revealed the most significant differences between them. More’s belief in an absolute space and time, which was going to play a major role in his subsequent philosophy, was foreshadowed here in his critique of the Cartesian concepts. He rejected not only Descartes’s distinction between a universe which is indefinite in extent and one which can be concluded to be infinite, but also Descartes’s definition of body as extension, and the concomitant impossibility of void space (Koyré 1957, Grobet 2010, Agostino 2017). More began to develop here one of his most idiosyncratic beliefs, that everything had to exist in space. For Descartes bodies were extended things, but immaterial entities, such as God, angels, and souls, were not extended and could not be said to occupy space (to do so was a category mistake). For More, by contrast, immaterial entities had to exist in space, and had to be extended. What did not exist in space, according to More, did not exist at all (Koyré 1957, Grant 1981, Reid 2012). Another group of criticisms derived from More’s dissatisfaction with Descartes’s version of mind-body dualism, including aspects of the union and interaction of body and soul, the denial of souls in animals, and major differences about what can be achieved by matter in motion, and what for More required a more active principle. More agreed with Descartes that matter was inert and therefore could only be moved in passive response to an external mover. Where Descartes assumed the only such external movers were other moving bodies (initially, matter had been put into motion by God at the Creation and subsequently motion was transferred from one body to another in accordance with the three laws of nature Descartes had devised), More insisted that bodies could be moved by self-active, self-moving, immaterial entities, such as souls and even God himself (Henry 1986, 1989; Reid 2012, 2018).