 State-oriented extended mind identifies a mental state (e.g., a belief) with an external structure (e.g., a sentence). However, mental states are not the only candidates for the vehicles of content. Mental acts—thinking, believing (or judging), remembering, etc.—have at least as much claim to be regarded as such vehicles. And switching the focus from states to acts affords the possibility of a more process-oriented interpretation of extended mind. We might regard Otto’s notebook as an item of scaffolding in roughly the sense championed by Vygotsky (1934 [1962]). In these terms, the state-oriented version of extended mind identifies a mental state with a piece of this scaffolding—if this piece plays the requisite functional role. In the process-oriented version of extended mind, focus switches from the scaffolding to the process of manipulating the scaffolding. This manipulating of the scaffolding can, on the process-oriented version of extended mind, form part of a cognitive process.