 Ryle was only the first of many to be accused of misreading Anderson. Criticisms of Anderson’s position from within mainstream English-language philosophy have always seemed to his followers to miss their mark. They have generally failed to recognise the ontological, non-representational, non-semantic basis for his empiricism. Robert Brandom’s recent criticism and rejection of the “theoretical, explanatory and strategic commitments” motivating Anglo-American philosophy in the 20th century lists these as: empiricism, naturalism, representationalism, semantic atomism, formalism about logic, instrumentalism about practical norms (Brandom 2000). Anderson would reject all of these criticisms of his own work as they stand. Brandom regards the notion of “facts” and “states of affairs” as emblematic of atomistic, representationalist thought. Anderson would have replied imperiously as he did to Gilbert Ryle’s “representationist” criticisms: “That is nothing to me”. 