 Similarly, although one can present social sanctions arguments for acting morally to agents like the Foole, these arguments depend on members of society being willing to sanction bad behavior and capable of doing so effectively, and this is by no means guaranteed. In fact this is a difficulty that the functional analysis of norms clearly anticipates. For example, in addition to highlighting the importance of conditional strategies and the willingness to sanction bad behavior Axelrod (1984) also emphasized the importance of employing strategies that are easy for others to interpret. While Bicchieri (2006) emphasizes the problems that are prone to arise in circumstances where it’s not clear which norm applies, and Boyd &amp; Richerson (2005) have drawn attention to the costs associated with policing norms. Accordingly, the Foole can object that, even if all the members of her community were committed to following something like the Humean strategy to the best of their abilities, it’s not obvious that they would be able to reliably follow it. In fact, the Humean strategy rests upon some rather demanding epistemic assumptions, including especially that community members can reliably distinguish between guilty and innocent partners, something that may become increasingly unlikely as the size of a community increases.