 Critical statements are of three kinds, Beardsley thinks: descriptive, interpretative, and evaluative. The first concerns non-normative properties of works of art that are simply in it, in some sense, and are available, at least in principle, to anyone of normal eyes and ears if sufficiently sensitive, attentive, and experienced. “There is a small red patch in the upper right-hand corner of the painting” is a descriptive statement, but so is “Haydn’s 23rd Symphony abounds in dynamic tension”. The philosophical problems that descriptive statements give rise to involve the concept of form, Beardsley thinks. Interpretive statements are also non-normative but concern the “meaning” of a work of art, with “meaning” here referring to a semantic relation, or at least a purported semantic relation, between the work and (a small number of exceptions aside) something outside it. “That’s a picture of Notary Sojac” is an interpretive statement, as are “That’s a picture of a unicorn”, “The passage refers to Brutus’s betrayal of Caesar”, and “The thesis of Macbeth is exceedingly simple: Thou shalt not kill”. Last, critical evaluations are normative judgments that basically say that a work of art is good or bad, or how good or bad it is. “Mozart’s ‘Turkish March’ is an excellent short piano piece” is a critical evaluation, and so is “‘The Face on the Barroom Floor’ is wretched verse”. The judgment “This is beautiful”—the paradigm of a judgment of taste according to Kant—is sometimes thought of as a critical evaluation (Aesth: 9), but more often (e.g., Aesth: 463, 507), and always in Beardsley’s later writing, as a descriptive judgment, and one that frequently forms at least a partial basis for a critical evaluation.