 The idea that moral judgments are generated by a “special moral faculty” can be developed in a variety of ways, some of which have led to a resurgence of interest in moral nativism. As noted earlier, Turiel and his fellow social domain theorists are constructivists who reject nativist accounts of the morality. But a number of philosophers, including Susan Dwyer (Dwyer 1999, 2006, 2007; Dwyer, Huebner, &amp; Hauser 2010), Richard Joyce (2006a, 2006b), John Mikhail (2014, 2022), and Shaun Nichols (2005) have used the findings of the social domain theorists in arguments aimed at establishing that substantial aspects of morality are innate. Some of these authors go on to argue morality is the product of natural selection and that it is an adaptation. Other philosophers, notably Jesse Prinz (2007a: ch. 7; 2007b) and Edouard Machery and Ron Mallon (2010) have elaborated detailed responses.