 Let us go back to Geach’s remark that we “need not” interpret identity absolutely. While this is true, we need not interpret it as indiscernibility either. There are always the quotient structures (Quine 1963) . Instead of taking our “reality” to be \(M\), and our “identity” to be indiscernibility in \(M\), we can move to the quotient structure, \(QM\), whose elements are the equivalence classes, \([x]\), for \(x\) in \(M\). If \(x\) and \(y\) are indiscernible in \(M\), then in \(QM\), \([x]\) and [\(y\)] are absolutely identical. We can do this even if we wish to treat FOL\(^=\) as a proper theory. For example, suppose \(L'\) is a language in which people having the same income are indiscernible. The domain of \(M\) now consists of people. \(QM\), however, consists of income groups, equivalence classes of people having the same income, and identity in \(QM\) is absolute. Geach objects to such reinterpretation in terms of the quotient structures on the grounds that it increases the ontological commitments not only of \(L'\) but of any language of which \(L'\) is a sublanguage.