 One important idea secured by early-phenomenological discussions about presentations and acts of meaning something is that, in acts of the first kind, the subject is acquainted with or simply has the object in a purely receptive or passive sense (rezeptives Haben, see von Hildebrand 1916: 134; Pfänder 1911a: 167f; Reinach 1911a [1989: 102]; Karelitzki 1914: 35, among others). This is why the broad family of presentations are sometimes called “cognitions” (Kenntnisnahmen, literally: the experience of “taking note of something”, von Hildebrand 1916: 139ff). The receptive way in which the subject relates to the object in presentations is contrasted with an active one: once the subject has the object in cognition, she can adopt an attitude (a position or a stance, Stellungnahme) towards that object (Reinach 1911a [1989: 109f]; von Hildebrand 1916, Stavenhagen 1925). Phenomenologists generally agree on the idea that, based on one’s cognitions, a subject can form attitudes of a doxastic, affective, or conative nature. Another way of formulating this idea is that cognitions “found” attitudes, where “founding” expresses existential (one-sided) dependence: attitudes would not exist without cognitions, but not vice versa. One way to understand the receptive/active distinction is that attitudes can be made subject to a specific sense of the “why?” question (Uemura &amp; Salice 2019): if you believe that p, feel a certain emotion about p, or want that p, you put yourself under the rational demand of providing reasons for your attitudes. The remainder of this subsection summarizes early phenomenology’s main ideas about these three kinds of attitudes.