 The truth-maker objection is presented as a tension between three independently plausible principles: (i) presentism, (ii) that there are (evidence-transcendent and objective) truths about the past, and (iii) truth-maker theory, the view that truths about the past are “made true” by some existent (see, e.g., Keller 2004: 85–87; Cameron 2011: 55–57; Tallant &amp; Ingram 2015: 355, for this mode of presentation). Obviously, we cannot defend presentism and abandon (i). Further, rejecting (ii) seems a steep price to pay (cf. Dawson 2021; Miller forthcoming). If there are no truths about the past, then it’s hard to make sense of the idea that things change from moment to moment (or that time passes; see  §7).  That leaves us with (iii). Here, three options present themselves: locate the required truth-makers, deny that truths about the past require truth-makers, or argue that truth-making isn’t the kind of relation that requires the existence of both relata. We consider these options in turn.