  The rejection of an immutable self abiding in each individual seems  to have undermined all attempts to analyze consciousness on its own  terms. Even though the Sanskrit term vijñāna  (which in the Upaniṣads designates consciousness as an abiding  characteristic of the self) is adopted by the Buddhists as an  appropriate designation for consciousness, the interpretations found  in the Nikāyas and the early Abhidharma deny its immutability  and instead regard it as indistinct from perceptual cognition. At  this early stage in the development of a Buddhist theory of mind,  vijñāna still retains its double meaning: (1) that of ‘consciousness’ as a factor in the chain of  dependently arisen phenomena that is essential for the continuity of  the karmic process; and (2) that of ‘cognition’, a  faculty that is associated with each of the five sensory modalities  and with the mind [see Samyutta Nikāya, III, 87;  Majjhima Nikāya, I, 292]. In later Abhidharma  traditions, such as those of the Sautrāntika and  Yogācāra Schools, consciousness is discussed mainly in  relation to the aggregates of cognition  (vijñānaskandha), which are primarily the senses  and the mental faculty [see AKBh ad I, 16a].