 Hence, \(u(g, h^*)\) is the real truth value \(tv(g)\) of \(g\) relative to the domain \(U\). It follows from (1) that the expected utility \(U(g\mid e)\) equals the posterior probability \(P(g\mid e)\) of \(g\) on \(e\). In this sense, we may say that posterior probability equals expected truth value. The rule of maximizing expected utility leads now to an extremely conservative policy: the best hypotheses \(g\) on \(e\) are those that satisfy \(P(g\mid e) = 1\), i.e., are completely certain on \(e\) (e.g. \(e\) itself, logical consequences of \(e\), and tautologies). On this account, if we are not certain of the truth, then it is always progressive to change an uncertain answer to a logically weaker one.