  Godfrey develops his position in conscious opposition to Henry of Ghent, and with a considerable but unacknowledged dependency on Aquinas’s De aeternitate mundi which, as noted above, was contained in his Student Notebook. But after he has, with Aquinas, shown that there is no contradiction in holding that something can be created and still not have begun to be, Godfrey considers certain objections against this position. One of these objections clearly gives him pause. If the world had been created from eternity, on every given day extending backward into a beginningless past God could have created some material object such as a stone. But if that had happened, an actual infinity of stones would now exist and God could unite all of them into one infinite body. But an infinite body is an impossibility, and so too is an infinity of simultaneously existing finite bodies and, therefore, so is an eternally created world (PB 2.68–69, 76; Wippel, 1981, 160–63).