 Still, even if egalitarian considerations that reflect a concern with the relative differences between people can contribute to the specification of the threshold, a plausible threshold arguably is not going to be based on that concern only. Otherwise—this is an implication of the first interpretation—any level of well-being would be considered justified as long as all future people fare equally badly. This presupposes attributing intrinsic value exclusively to equality—an implausible view (see the entry on  equality  and  §4.2  below and §4.5  below). Moreover, to define the threshold standard of well-being of future people as the level of well-being achieved by currently living people (whatever it may be) is less than plausible, unless we were to attribute intrinsic value exclusively to intergenerational equality, so understood (see Marmor 2003, Steiner 2003, Raz 2003, Gosepath 2004: 454–63; and Holtug &amp; Lippert-Rasmussen 2007). This understanding does not only imply that it is worse for future generations to be worse off than the present generation; it also implies that it is, in one respect, worse for future generations to be better off. In the intragenerational context some philosophers have argued that this implication (the recommendation to “level down” persons’ well-being) is implausible (see Parfit 1997; Raz 1986: 230–235). An analogous objection applies to intergenerational relations as well. It is doubtful that a more equal distribution across generations is better if it came at the cost of some generations being worse off, and none being better off. Under certain circumstances this view would deny that currently living people may stand under a duty of justice positively to save for future people so that they will achieve a sufficientarian level of well-being (see  §4.5  on Rawls’ “savings principle”).