 For this natural kind defense to work it must, of course, be the case that the features that are used to identify moral and conventional judgments actually do form nomological clusters, and that most intuitive cases of moral judgment evoke the moral pattern of criterion judgments while most intuitive cases of conventional judgment evoke the conventional pattern of criterion judgments. Do the empirical findings support the natural kind defense? There is a large literature indicating that they do. The pattern of criterion judgments that the natural kind defense requires has been found in studies with participants ranging in age from toddlers to adults (Nucci &amp; Turiel 1978; Smetana 1981; Nucci &amp; Nucci 1982). It has also been found in participants of a number of different nationalities and religions (for reviews see Tisak 1995; Smetana 1993; Nucci 2001) and in children with a variety of developmental disorders, including autism (Blair 1996; Blair, Monson, &amp; Frederickson 2001; Nucci &amp; Herman 1982; Smetana, Kelly, &amp; Twentyman 1984; Smetana, Toth, et al. 1999). There have been a few studies that did not fit the expected pattern, notably Nucci and Turiel (1993) who found that orthodox Jewish children judged that a variety of intuitively non-moral religious norm transgressions were authority independent though they were not generalizable, and Nichols (2002) who found that American college students judged that an intuitively conventional etiquette transgression was authority independent though not generalizable. But as Kumar notes, the nomological clustering that the natural kind defense requires “is not supposed to be exceptionless” (Kumar 2015: §5; 2016: §3.2).