 Consciousness does not automatically include some kind of self-reflection. An experience’s being conscious does not consist in the subject’s having a higher-order thought; that is, consciousness only allows self-reflection by self-presentation in the sense of (C2), but does not already involve any higher-order thoughts or inner perception in a Brentanoan sense. Meinong’s use of “self-presentation” seems to have two readings: (1) as an ability-based term, when you say that the self-presentation of an experience consists in its ability to be apprehended directly, that is, without any supplementary psychological content; (2) as a nondispositional term that expresses a manifest self-presentation in the sense that the experience is actually self-presented. (C3) expresses the thesis that being a self-presenting state is a mark of consciousness: The whole of a person’s manifest mental life is self-presenting (understood as “selfpresentable”, as an ability-based term); that is, all experiences of a subject are in this sense self-presenting to the experiencing subject. (Cf. Marek 2003; 2012.) 