 It might be noted that the terms “boat” and “wood” are not co-extensive, and hence cannot be interchanged to test whether or not the context in which they occur is intensional. Yet while it is true that the Mohists recognized names of different scope (lei categorizes names that classify many things while si categorizes those that refer to just one), they were clearly not confined to conceiving expressions of the form “X is Y” as assertions of predication. As noted above, their concept of “sameness” (tong) was inclusive enough to accommodate a reading that in no way presupposes a failure of extension. For instance, a boat is wood in the sense that it is made up of wood, where “wood” is conceived not as a general kind, but as the very stuff of which the boat in question is made. This is likely what the Mohists had in mind with this example because the point they are making clearly turns on a comparison of the meanings of linguistic complexes (“entering a boat” and “entering wood”) and how the meanings of words change in virtue of the contexts in which they occur.