 Various questions may be raised about the value and significance of this experimental work. In recent years an important issue in psychology has been the extent to which experimental results can be replicated. It has been argued that the replication rate in experimental philosophy is comparatively high (see Cova et al. 2018) and some studies of people’s acceptance of moral objectivity have been replicated (for example, see Wright 2018). Another issue is whether the samples of these studies are sufficiently diverse to be indicative of the meta-ethical commitments of all human beings. Once again, there have been concerns that psychology studies have been unrepresentative (for example, because they rely too heavily on undergraduate students in the United States). However, at least some studies pertaining to moral objectivity have included a more diverse group of subjects (for example, Beebe et al. 2015 and Sarkissian et al. 2011). A different question is to what extent these studies actually measure acceptance of moral objectivism or  moral relativism. Many studies focus on moral objectivism and these may leave unclear people’s views about a position such as MMR (Since there are a variety of positions that reject objectivism). However, some studies have focused on moral relativism specifically (for example, Sarkissian et al. 2011).