 Instead, Parfit argues that contractualists should permit both personal and impartial reasons as grounds for reasonable rejection. Impartial reasons, here, are grounded in the moral claims or the well-being of individuals. “We have such impartial reasons to care about the well-being of every individual or person” (Parfit 2011, volume 2, p. 238). The crucial feature of impartial reasons is that they are not narrowly person-affecting. In a different people choice, we have an impartial reason to maximise the well-being of future people—even though different possible futures include different groups of possible people. “Since [because of the non-identity problem] we cannot appeal to the personal reasons that are had by people who never exist, we should appeal to the impartial reasons that are had by people who do exist” (Parfit 2011, volume 2, p. 240).