 Parfit’s “Kantian Contractualist Formula,” mentioned in the previous section, adheres to the contractualist approach to moral theorizing, which gives expression to two insights fundamental to Kantian thinking: that morality is objective, and not simply a matter of personal opinion or expression of interest and desire; and that from the standpoint of morality, each person matters just as much as, and no more than, any other person. Contractualism borrows from the social contract tradition the idea that morality may be viewed as the result of an agreement between those who are to be bound by its dictates. Two variants of this approach can be distinguished. The former, sometimes referred to as contractarianism, identifies the participants in the bargaining process with actual individuals, and thus is broadly historical. The latter approach, by contrast, appeals to what agents would choose under various, quite possibly unrealizable conditions, and is thus hypothetical rather than historical. It is the latter approach that will concern us here.