 One auxiliary assumption one may question is the traditional link between quantification and existence. Even if there is no change in the domain of quantification, you may nevertheless think that existence is only temporary. Socrates did not exist either before 490 BCE or after 399 BCE, and the mere fact that he is, has and will always be something is not reason to attribute existence to him. One variant of this move is a direct descendant of Meinong’s view on existence as a mere species of being. But to the extent to which Meinongianism may be accompanied with the implausible thesis that no matter what condition we substitute for \(F\) in “the \(F\) is \(F\)” gives rise to a true sentence, it would seem to entail that “the round square is a round square” is true, which seems hopeless. But the Meinongian thesis is not compulsory for more plausible developments of the view that not everything exists, even though everything is  something.[26]  What is not negotiable, though, is the thesis that existence should not be taken to be expressed by a quantificational expression, but rather by a predicate which may or not apply to objects in the domain. The moral of the temporal versions of BF and CBF is only that unrestricted quantification ranges over an immutable and necessary domain of objects, whether or not they enjoy temporary and contingent existence. The difficult question remains of how to answer Quine’s question “what is there?” once one abandons the thesis that no matter what condition \(F\) may be, there are objects that satisfy the condition. For more on different variants of Meinongianism, the reader may consult the entry on  existence.