 Sara Protasi (2016) offers a more complex taxonomy of envy which includes a version of benign envy that she calls “emulative envy.” She draws two cross-cutting distinctions: whether the subject is focused upon the good or upon the rival, and whether she perceives the good as obtainable or unobtainable. Focus is understood not in terms of salience or conscious attention, but as a matter of evaluative concern: “what the envier focuses on is whatever she cares about, from a prudential point of view.” (2016, p. 4) In emulative envy, the envier is focused on the good and believes himself capable of obtaining it. She is motivated to improve her standing, not to bring down the rival. But emulative envy is supposed to be distinct from admiration or even longing. It is meant to be a species of envy in general, which Protasi defines as “an aversive reaction to a perceived inferiority to a similar other, with regard to a good that is relevant to the sense of identity of the envier.” (2016, p.2) A question for this account is what role the perceived inferiority to the rival can be playing in emulative envy, if the envier is held to care only about the good, and not the inferiority as such. If it is playing no role, then why think this is a species of envy in general, rather than a (no doubt common and important) emotion of some other sort? But if it is allowed that emulative envy does also include a concern about inferiority as such, distinct from the desire for the good, then the question is how to make that concern compatible with an insistence that there is no desire that the rival lose the good. 