 The most radical rejection of face value theory is the denial of (a*), i.e., that religious utterances express religious  propositions.[1]  These theories will be explored in  section 2.  The most famous example of this position is Ayer’s version logical positivism  (2.1).  Non-cognitive accounts, from which we have selected Braithwaite  (2.2.1)  and Berkeley  (2.2.2),  are similarly radical but are differently motivated and offer a more positive alternative account of the meaning of religious utterances. The prospects for a more sophisticated non-cognitivism are considered in  2.2.3.  A third class of theories  (2.3),  propose that religious utterances are paradoxical or fail to express complete propositions. A fourth group, reductionist and subjectivist theories  (2.4),  allow that religious utterances express propositions but not the ones that they appear to. Instead, their truth conditions are given by “reduced” (typically non-religious) sentences.