 At first glance, Tremain’s Foucauldian claim can seem to be talking past the interlocutors considered above; no more a distinctive analysis of disability to compete with the foregoing than was Foucault’s famous claim that “knowledge is power” a competitor to Plato’s or Goldman’s or Sosa’s analytic definitions of knowledge (see entry on  the analysis of knowledge).  As in that case, however, a recognition of the role the concept of disability plays in reproducing unjust social conditions can cast doubt on reliability of the commonsense judgments and linguistic intuitions appealed to by rival analytic definitions. Such judgments and intuitions are, so the Foucauldian could argue, products of the apparatus, not an independent basis for assessing or understanding its assignment of positions. However, several of the analytic accounts discussed in the preceding action were developed with awareness of and due skepticism towards the ideological roots of prevailing convictions about disability and do not explain disability as a natural, biological category. It is unclear then, if a Foucauldian challenge could undermine the evidence used to develop these accounts.