 are true, it will be an important advantage of a setting version of interventionism over a formulation in terms of a possibility constrained notion of intervention that the former but not the latter is able to capture claims like (R). By contrast, others will think that claims like (R) are, if not false, at least unclear and unperspicuous, and that it is a point in favor of a possibility constrained version of the interventionist account that it can capture this. Those who take this second view will think that claims like (R) should be replaced by claims that involve causes that are straightforwardly manipulable. For example, (R) might be replaced by a claim that identified the genetic factors and biochemical pathways that are responsible for raven pigmentation—factors and pathways for which there is a well-defined notion of manipulation and which are such that if they were appropriately manipulated, this would lead to changes in pigmentation. Theorists like Rubin and Holland will think that such a replacement would be clearer and more perspicuous than the original claim (R) Another illustration of this general idea that replacing claims involving non-manipulable candidate causes with claims involving candidate manipulable causes clarifies their meaning is discussed in  The Role of the Manipulability Theory in Clarifying Causal Claims.  