Then \(B\) will receive just 9 points \((1+4+4)\). \(A\) receives the same 10 as before, though, and now outranks \(B\). This example illustrates two important points.  First, Borda counting does not satisfy Arrow’s condition I, since while each voter’s ranking of \(A\) with respect to \(B\) is the same in the two profiles, the social ordering of this pair is different. Second, Borda counting provides opportunities for voters to manipulate the outcome of an election by strategic voting. If everybody’s preferences are as in the first profile, voter \(1\) might do well to misrepresent his preferences by putting \(B\) at the bottom of his list. In this way, he can promote his own favorite, \(A\), to the top of the social ordering (he will get away with this, of course, only if the other voters do not see what he is up to and adjust their own rankings accordingly, by putting his favorite \(A\) at the bottom). The susceptibility of Borda counting to strategic voting has long been known. When this was raised as an objection, Borda’s indignant response is said to have been that his scheme was intended for honest people. Lull and Nicholas of Cusa recommended, before voting by this method, earnest oaths to tell the truth and stripping oneself of all sins. 