 Green agrees with Butler that psychological egoism (hedonism) is implausible but thinks that people mistakenly accept it because they mistake the pleasure that can be expected to attend the satisfaction of desires for the object of desire. Because the pleasure is consequential on the satisfaction of desire, the object of desire cannot be that pleasure. This point is relevant, Green thinks, to Mill’s alleged evaluative hedonism (PE §§162–69). Green notes that in Mill’s higher pleasures doctrine and in the proof that Mill seems to assign intrinsic value to objective pleasures, that is, to activities and pursuits that exercise our higher capacities. Green thinks that these claims about the superior value of such activities are anti-hedonistic, but he thinks that Mill fails to see this only because he focuses on the (subjective) pleasure that is expected from engaging in such activities. But this confuses, Green thinks, what we value and a by-product of what we value.