 One complaint against both these lines of evidence is that they do not enable us to distinguish between attention to a thing and attention that is directed to a part of space (in which that thing happens to be), with the result that they cannot demonstrate attention to a thing in the absence of consciousness of that same thing (Mole, 2008a). Research by Liam Norman, Charles Heywood and Robert Kentridge goes some way towards addressing this complaint. Norman, Heywood and Kentridge present normal participants with a screen showing an array of small, rapidly flickering Gabor patches. Objects the boundaries of which are defined by changes in the orientations of these patches are not consciously experienced: Participants merely see the whole screen as a flickering array of patches. Cues that direct the attention of those participants do nonetheless seem to draw attention to these unseen objects, as indicated by differences in the response times to items that are subsequently presented in and outside of their boundaries (Norman, Heywood &amp; Kentridge, 2013).