 The neuroscientific threat to moral responsibility originates with the pioneering work of Benjamin Libet and his colleagues. In their groundbreaking study on the neuroscience of movement, Libet et al. (1983) investigated the timing of brain processes and compared them to the timing of conscious will in relation to self-initiated voluntary acts. They found that the conscious intention to move (which they labeled W) came 200 milliseconds before the motor act, but 350-400 milliseconds after readiness potential (RP)—a ramp-like buildup of electrical activity that occurs in the brain and precedes actual movement. These findings lead Libet and others to conclude that the conscious intention or decision to move cannot be the true cause of action because it comes too late in the neuropsychological sequence (see Libet 1985, 1999; Wegner 2002; Soon et al. 2008; Pockett 2004; Obhi &amp; Haggard 2004; Haggard &amp; Eimer 1999; Roediger, Goode, &amp; Zaromb 2008). For some scientific skeptics, these and other findings (e.g., Soon et al. 2008) suggest that the causal efficacy of the kind of willing required for free will and moral responsibility is an illusion (e.g., Wegner 2002).