 Bridgman’s philosophical views, however, were not just an articulation of views widely shared by physicists. Albert E. Moyer (1991) stresses that Bridgman’s operational analysis served the function of making special relativity and quantum mechanics more palatable by showing how they could be understood in a way that most physicists could cope with. But the operational way of rendering the new physics was not agreeable to all physicists (or philosophers of physics), although it was consonant with the stances taken by some leaders in the field including Bohr, Heisenberg and Oppenheimer (Moyer 1991, 376, 389). We have already seen Einstein’s objections to Bridgman’s interpretation of relativity. Mario Bunge (1988) argues that operationalism is “written into the standard (or Copenhagen) interpretation of the quantum theory”, but that this interpretation gives a clear misrepresentation of the actual practices in quantum physics. Analyzing Dirac’s version of the theory, Hesse (1952) concluded that concepts of quantum theory did not have simple operational meanings, and Dirac’s “observables” were concepts without operational definitions. Rather, in Hesse’s view, concepts in such situations only derived their meanings from theoretical analogies.