 These differences between our relations to one another and our relations to subsequent or antecedent generations give rise to a number of important debates. Among them are the following: The first concerns the normative significance of the non-changeable fact that remote future people as well as deceased people do not even have the potential for exercising power over presently living people. According to the Will Theory, for a person to have a right vis-à-vis another person requires the former to be able to exercise his or her rights with respect to the conduct of the latter (Hart 1955: 183–184; Hart 1982: 183; Wellman 1995: 91–92; Steiner 1994: 59–73). Thus, the unchangeable power-asymmetry among non-contemporaries will exclude the possibility of future non-contemporaries and deceased people being bearers of rights claims against presently living people (Steiner 1983; Steiner 1994: 249–261; Fabre 2001; see also Ackerman 1980: 70–75). Consequently, for the proponents of the Will Theory considerations of justice (as understood in this entry) do not apply to intergenerational relations. According to the Interest Theory of Rights (Raz 1984; Raz 1986: 166–188; Raz 1994: 45–51; Kramer 1998: 60–101) being able to exercise one’s rights—to demand or waive the enforcement of a right—is neither sufficient nor necessary for someone to be the bearer of the right. For a person to hold a right, the right, when actual, necessarily preserves one or more of the persons’ interests (Kramer 1998: 62). Understanding the relations between currently living people and future non-contemporaries in terms of justice assumes that for a person to have a valid justice claim vis-à-vis another person (who stands under the correlative duties) does not depend upon being able to harm or benefit the other person (Barry 1989b: chs. 4–6; Buchanan 1990; but see Gauthier 1986; Heyd 2009a; Hiskes 2009: 9).