 How might Replacement Naturalism in legal philosophy, motivated by these Quinean doubts about conceptual analysis and intuitions, proceed? Leiter (2001b) suggests one possibility, which invokes the following example. Joseph Raz (1985) has offered an influential conceptual argument against Soft Legal Positivism’s claim that there is no constraint on the content of a rule of recognition beyond the fact that it is a social rule: its existence-conditions are given by the actual practice of officials in deciding disputes, but what criteria of legality officials appeal to (i.e., the content of the rule of recognition) is dependent upon whatever the conventional practice of officials in that society happens to be. Raz offers an analysis of the concept of authority to show that Soft Positivism is incompatible, even in principle, with the law’s having the authority it claims to have. According to Raz, it is a non-normative prerequisite for a claim to authority that it be possible to identify the authority’s directive without reference to the underlying “dependent” reasons for that directive. This is a prerequisite for authority because what distinguishes a (practical) authority, on Raz’s “service” conception, is that its directives preempt consideration of the underlying reasons for what we ought to do, and thereby make it more likely that we will do what we really ought to do. Authoritative reasons are claimed to be exclusionary reasons, excluding from consideration those dependent reasons (including, importantly, moral reasons) on which the authoritative directive rests. Soft Positivism, then, undermines the possibility of the rule of recognition claiming authority, since for Soft Positivism a rule of recognition can, in principle, employ dependent reasons as criteria of legal validity. Thus, it would be impossible to identify such a rule of recognition’s directives about legal validity without recourse to precisely the dependent reasons the rule was supposed to preempt.