 If these utterances can be acceptable, that would be evidence that the evaluation normally conveyed by chaste isn’t part of its truth-conditions. A speaker of  (7)  makes it clear that she would rejoice in a more sexually explicit carnival, thus shedding a commitment to evaluating the carnival negatively if it were more explicit. If that evaluation were part of the truth-conditions of lewd, we would expect  (7)  not to sound coherent on a literal use of lewd. The denial in  (5)  and suspension in  (6)  don’t concern only whether the speaker approves of the way of valuing associated with the thick term but also that evaluation itself. An utterance of  (5)  brackets the question whether the truth-conditions of  (3)  hold and denies the evaluation either way. If you forced a chaste-objector to judge  (3)  as either true or false, she might prefer to classify it as true while using something like  (5)  to signal that she is using chaste non-evaluatively. Uttering  (6)  would be a way for someone who is agnostic about whether chastity is good in any way to suspend the evaluation while conceding that the truth-conditions of  (3)  hold. It isn’t clear how either  (5)  or  (6)  could be compatible with locating the evaluation in the truth-conditions of  (3).  So the proponents of the Semantic View may need to claim that utterances of  (5)–(7)  either don’t involve literal uses of thick terms or are infelicitous despite the fact that many speakers don’t find them to be linguistically odd as utterances.