 The modal-existential analysis of ontological dependence can thus be developed further, and it can perhaps overcome some of the problems that were pointed out earlier. But there are areas where a more fine-grained notion would seem to be required and there is also a historical precedent (e.g., in Aristotle) for such a notion. It should be noted though that much of the contemporary literature in defense of a non-modal, fine-grained analysis (such as Fine 1994b and Koslicki 2012), operates in a “neo-Aristotelian” framework which typically assumes some “non-modalist” version of essentialism. Accordingly, there is an obvious rift between the modal-existential analysis and the essentialist analysis—one that we cannot fully bridge here. In any case, it is good to keep in mind that the notion of ontological dependence itself, when used as a tool to formulate the commitments of a specific theory, does not immediately force one to make a commitment in this regard, even though some of its applications may entail such a commitment.