 Another good example of Valla’s reduction of scholastic terminology, distinctions, and concepts is his critique of the transcendental terms (Repastinatio 1:11–21; DD 1:18–36). According to Valla, the traditional six terms—“being,” “thing,” “something,” “one,” “true,” and “good”—should be reduced to “thing” (Latin res) since everything that exists, including a quality or an action of a thing (also called a “thing”) is a thing. A good thing, for example, is a thing, and so, too, is a true thing. From a grammatical point of view, such terms as “good” and “true” are adjectives, and when used as substantives (the good, the one), they refer to qualities; hence, there is nothing “transcendental” about them. Valla’s grammatical approach is evident in his rejection of the scholastic term ens. Just as “running” (currens) can be resolved into “he who runs” (is qui currit), so “being” (ens) can be resolved into “that which is” (id quod est). “That,” however, is nothing other than “that thing” (ea res); so we get as a result the laborious formula: “that thing which is”. (Repastinatio 1:14; DD 1:23–25.) We do not, however, need the phrase “that which is” (ea que est): “a stone is a being” (lapis est ens), or the equivalent phrase into which it can be resolved, “a stone is a thing which is” (lapis est res que est), are unclear, awkward, and absurd ways of saying simply that “a stone is a thing” (lapis est res). Valla also rejects other scholastic terms such as entitas (“entity”), hecceitas (“this-ness”) and quidditas (“quidity”) for grammatical reasons: these terms do not conform to the rules of word formation in Latin. While he is not against the introduction of new words for things unknown in antiquity (e.g., bombarda for “cannonball”), the terminology coined by the scholastics is a different matter entirely.