Even so, there is a debate over the interpretation of Kant’s claim, particularly about the logical scope of “requires.” According to the wide-scope interpretation of Kant’s claim, what reason requires is that one either will the means or not will the end.  In contrast, according the narrow-scope interpretation of Kant’s claim, if one wills the end, then what reason requires is that one will the means.  The wide-scope interpretation posits a disjunctive requirement (that one either not will the end or will the means) that, like Kant’s categorical imperative, applies to every rational agent, regardless of the particular ends she wills.  But it’s hard to square the existence of such a universally applicable requirement with some other claims Kant makes about how hypothetical imperatives are to be distinguished from categorical ones, and how hypothetical imperatives could be derived from an analysis of the concept of willing an end. (See Schroeder 2005b.  For a defense of the wide-scope interpretation against Schroeder’s objections, see Rippon 2014. For a related discussion of these issues, see Schwartz 2008.)  