 Above I noted the plausibility of the claim that nothing can benefit me if I don’t enjoy it. Some non-hedonists have denied this, while accepting the so-called ‘experience requirement’ on well-being. They suggest that what matters is valuable consciousness, and consciousness can be valuable for non-hedonic reasons (see Kraut 2018; Kriegel 2019). But there is a yet more weighty objection both to hedonism and to the view that well-being consists only in conscious states: the so-called ‘experience machine’. Imagine that I have a machine that I could plug you into for the rest of your life. This machine would give you experiences of whatever kind you thought most valuable or enjoyable—writing a great novel, bringing about world peace, attending an early Rolling Stones’ gig. You would not know you were on the machine, and there is no worry about its breaking down or whatever. Would you plug in? Would it be wise, from the point of your own well-being, to do so? Robert Nozick thinks it would be a big mistake to plug in: ‘We want to do certain things … we want to be a certain way … plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality’ (Nozick 1974, p. 43).