  This conception must confront two major problems: The first is conceptual. It is head-scratching how a libertarian can be a paternalist in the standard senses of these terms. Genuine libertarians firmly support freedom of choice, freedom of contract, and the like, which seems to lack any firm support in “libertarian paternalism.” Second, what an informed and competent person chooses to do generally supplies the evidence of his or her true values, not some hidden value that contradicts what they choose. For example, if a politically conservative man fails in one election to support the platform of a party whose platform he has always wholly supported and has often said he will always support, he seems in some respect committed to his party’s platform, but his departure from the platform in this case seems to be the best evidence we have of his true values now on the particular matter of which political positions he supports. It would be improper to assert that he supports the current platform of the party he has always supported in the past. Similarly, a justified paternalism must have adequate evidence of any assumption it makes about an individual’s deepest beliefs or hopes and whether they are misguided in any given case.