 One apparent lesson from PAP-significant is that, contrary to the simplifying assumption adopted at the outset of this entry, one cannot cleanly separate PAP’s condition on moral responsibility from epistemic requirements (cp. Mele 2010). In particular, in order for alternatives to count as explanatory in the relevant sense, they must be reasonable from the point of view of the agent. Similar entanglements arise when one considers PAP’s historical clause  (§3.3;  see, e.g., Ginet 1996; Ekstrom 2000: 211). Luther is responsible for his defiant act even if he could not have at the time done otherwise. His responsibility can be “traced” to past self-forming choices in which he could have done otherwise. If these are to help explain his responsibility when brought before Charles V, it seems as if Luther must in the past have known, at least in broad outline, how those choices would shape his future actions. But if there are such epistemic conditions in PAP’s historical rider, there may be problems looming, ordinary cases (not FSCs) in which a person is responsible for her action at t, cannot at t do otherwise, and yet whose responsibility cannot be traced to choices in the past with the appropriate epistemic credentials. (See Vargas 2005, and for discussion, Fischer &amp; Tognazzini 2009; Shabo 2015.)