 So, to sum up this case against reductionism about relations: there seem to be far fewer (if any) monadic physical properties than the reductionist view needs. But this it is not the only case that has been made. It has also been argued on the basis of quantum entanglement, the fact that the quantum states of entangled particles cannot be described independently of one another, that physics is committed to relations that don’t supervene upon intrinsic properties (Teller 1986). More radically, it has been argued that a consideration of quantum entanglement pushes us towards the metaphysical outlook that there are no intrinsic properties (Esfeld 2004, 2016) or even that there are no objects but only relations (French &amp; Ladyman 2003; Ladyman &amp; Ross 2007: 130–89, Ladyman 2016; for objections see Psillos 2001, 2006, Brinceño &amp; Mumford 2016).