 (These arguments do not refute the kind of immanent realism defended by the early Maddy (1990). On Maddy's view, sets of physical objects are located in spacetime, right where their members are. Thus, if you have two eggs in your hand, then you also have the set containing those eggs in your hand. Maddy's view has no problem accounting for the massive infinities in mathematics, for on her view, corresponding to every physical object, there is a huge infinity of sets that exist in space and time, right where the given physical object exists. Given this, it should be clear that while Maddy's view says that sets exist in spacetime, it cannot be thought of as saying that sets are physical objects. So Maddy's view is not a physicalist view in the sense that's relevant here (as was pointed out above, it is better thought of as a non-standard version of platonism). Thus, in the present context (i.e., the context in which platonists are trying to undermine views that take mathematical objects to be physical objects), platonists do not need to argue against Maddy's view. Of course, in the end, if they want to motivate the standard version of platonism, then they'll have to give reasons for preferring their view to Maddy's non-standard version of platonism, and this might prove hard to do. For some arguments against Maddy's early view, see, e.g., Lavine (1992), Dieterle and Shapiro (1993), Balaguer (1998a), Milne (1994), Riskin (1994), Carson (1996), and the later Maddy (1997).)