 Still, thus far Finnis's charge of incoherence remains a threat. After all, Suárez does say that the force to oblige (vis obligandi) can only come from an act of will. A solution is provided by Terence Irwin. In his reading, what intrinsic moral properties of actions generate are not obligations, but rather duties (debita) (Irwin 2012). Obligations, unlike duties, involve a sort of “moral motion”. The idea is that obligations constitute an act of imposing an obligation, an obliging. Obliging is the tool the holder of legitimate power has in order to move those under his command to do some actions and refrain from others. As is clear from Suárez's discussions on the influx of divine grace, God's grace moves us morally (rather than physically) by making the performance of some good actions more attractive to reason than they would otherwise be (De Gratia Dei seu de Deo Salvatore, III.41.3, in Suárez, Opera omnia VIII). Intrinsic goodness does not involve an obliging because it is not impelling us to do anything; unlike the presence of law or the effect of grace, intrinsic goodness is not a new influx that was not there before. But this is not to say that intrinsic goodness does not exert a rational attraction on moral agents; it is simply that our natural tendency to do what is good is not the result of any sort of moving or pushing. In this reading, there is no contradiction between making room for the existence of pre-positive duties and insisting that obligations only originate in law. The distinction between obligations and duties is not merely a verbal one, but points to the difference between what in Aristotelian terms would be an efficient and final cause of motion.