 Basically, “always” takes two sentences, and returns true iff every minimal situation that satisfies the first sentence has a minimal extension that satisfies the second sentence. A minimal situation is one that contains one or more thin particulars—an individual abstracted away from its properties—and one or more properties or relations that the thin particular(s) instantiate(s). An extension of a minimal situation includes all those same particulars and properties and relations, with (possibly) some more particulars, properties, or relations in addition. On Elbourne’s account “if” doesn’t play any role in contributing to the truth conditions of a donkey conditional; it is semantically vacuous. It is the (sometimes silent) adverb of quantification along with the semantics of the antecedent and consequent that do the work in yielding the truth conditions. The following are the truth conditions for (47) on Elbourne’s account. (We won’t go through the derivation for relative clause donkey anaphora, but it works similarly. See Elbourne 2005: 53.)