 Searle (1995, 2010) proposes a theory of those social facts he calls “institutional facts”. He modifies a Hart-style approach in three ways. First, he augments Hart’s account of what it takes for members of a society to accept a rule: he argues that the community must collectively accept the rule (see  5.2  on collective attitudes). Second, he does not require that rules be implemented in behavior: institutional facts depend only on mental states in a society, not on practices. Third, he argues that the “constitutive rules” for institutional facts all share a common form: they involve a certain kind of status assigned to objects in the world. The general form of constitutive rules, according to Searle, is “X counts as Y in context C”. An object X counts as having the status or symbolic function of Y in the context of a community. For example: a line of stones (X) counts as having the status of functioning as a border wall (Y) in a village (C). Another example: a piece of paper issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (X) counts as having the status of functioning as money (Y) in the United States (C). Among the institutional facts, according to Searle, are social categories such as money, borders, cocktail parties, and public offices. Tuomela (2002) advances a related collective acceptance theory of social entities.