 How would rejecting the definite/indefinite distinction affect debates on whether token definite descriptions sometimes refer? Well, if it were clear that indefinite descriptions could not be used to refer, and if these were indeed semantically equivalent to definite descriptions, then we would have additional reason to think that definite descriptions cannot be used to refer either. On the other hand, some have argued that indefinite descriptions can refer, though these arguments are highly controversial (see Chastain (1975) and Fodor and Sag (1982); again, see the entry on  descriptions  for further discussion and references). Even if we were to reject such a view, advocates of the unitary theory still typically grant that there is a pragmatic difference marked by the use of ‘the’ as opposed to ‘a’. So it would be open to the stalwart defender of the view that token definite descriptions sometimes refer to try to argue that such pragmatic markers can play a significant role in regulating the use of descriptions to  refer—despite these markers being nowhere reflected in meaning at the level of what is said or asserted. Obviously, none of this will be settled here.