 That default schema looks to be a version of the authorship view of action supporting an instrumentalist or means-end (rather than, as in Korsgaard’s development of it, a Kantian) account of practical reasons. However, as Velleman’s position has evolved, he has suggested further patterns. Often one emotion naturally gives rise to a sequel, as when in one familiar pop-psychology meme, denial of a loss is supposed to be followed by anger, which is in turn succeeded by bargaining, which is followed by, ultimately, acceptance. Such emotion cascades are the spines of narratives, and an action is rendered narratively intelligible as following on a step of such a cascade (Velleman 2009, 191, 194–197). Thus, when supported by a desire to be intelligible to oneself, narratives give rise to actions. So instrumental reasons have been supplemented by what Velleman construes as narrative reasons, and in later work, Velleman has further proposed character for the explanatory role (2009, ch. 1): if you stay in character (in rather the way that actors on stage aim at), what you do will make sense to you, and if you are motivated by the desire to make sense to yourself, what you then do will count as an action. (A bit of nuance: in his earlier work, Velleman took the relevant desire to be a substantive motivation, on a par with other desires in the cognitive mix, but he has since relaxed the characterization; we can perhaps more properly think of it as a drive, implemented as a structural feature of a cognitive system, rather than one of the items moved around inside that system; compare Velleman 2015, pp. 169, 246.) 