 Until recently, it was thought that Frege solved this problem in §10 by restricting the universal quantifier \(\forall x\) of his Gg system so that it ranges only over extensions. If Frege could have successfully restricted this quantifier to extensions, then when the question arises, whether (arbitrarily chosen) object \(x\) is identical with \(\epsilon F\), one could answer that \(x\) has to be the extension of some concept, say \( G\), and that Basic Law V would then tell you the conditions under which \(x\) is identical to \(\epsilon F\). On this interpretation of §10, Frege is alleged to have restricted the quantifiers when he identified the two truth values (The True and The False) with the two extensions that contain just these objects as members, respectively. By doing this, it was thought that all of the objects in the range of his quantifier \(\forall x\) in Gg become extensions which have been identified as such, for the truth values were the only two objects of his system that had not been introduced as extensions or courses of value.