 (e) Cases involving causal preemption seem to show that the simple counterfactual account of what it is to make things worse for a person – an act is worse for a person only if it makes that person “worse off than [that person] would otherwise be” – fails (Bontly 2016, 1236). For the premises of the nonidentity problem itself, then, to remain plausible, we must understand what it is for an act to be “worse for” a person in another way. One option is to say that an act is worse for someone if and only if it “affects that person for the worse,” where it is understood that an act that has an “effect” on a person that is itself adverse in some way is sufficient to show that the act “affects that person for the worse” (Bontly 2016, 1237–38). We then suspect an equivocation when we realize that we can’t both hold that understanding of what it is for an act to be “worse for” a person constant and at the same time insure that still other premises of the nonidentity argument remain plausible. Specifically: while the claim that an act is not worse for a person if (sufficient condition) that person has a life worth living and “would never exist had [that] act not been performed” seems plausible, the claim that that act does not “affect [that person] for the worse” given those same conditions “seems rather more dubious” (Bontly 2016, 1238–1241).