 Furthermore, for Williamson modal knowledge typically has a special epistemic status which is in between the a priori and a posteriori categories. In Williamson’s terminology, the kind of knowledge in question is “armchair”. That is, on the one hand, the knowledge in question isn’t strictly a posteriori, since apparently we can’t fully derive it from empirical experience. And, on the other hand, such knowledge doesn’t fit the model of a priori knowledge, either, since arguably background information from science, and experiential contribution more generally, plays a role that goes beyond merely enabling concept possession and use. Williamson also contends that the a priori / a posteriori distinction is in general too superficial or it “doesn’t cut at the epistemic joints” (2013: 8. For discussion, see e.g. Boghossian 2011, Boghossian and Williamson 2020; Casullo 2013; Jenkins 2008; Mallozzi 2021d; Malmgren 2011).