 This suggestion, however, flies in the face of the fact that for an infalling observer, nothing out of the ordinary would be experienced at the event horizon (as discussed in  section 3.1  above). Indeed, in general she could not even know that she was passing through an event horizon at all, unless classical general relativity were very wrong in regimes where we expect no quantum effects to show themselves. This obviously contradicts the suggestion that she might be burned up as she passes through the horizon. The black hole complementarian tries to resolve this contradiction by agreeing that the infalling observer will notice nothing remarkable at the horizon, but then suggests that the account of the infalling astronaut should be considered to be complementary to the account of the external observer, rather in the same way that position and momentum are complementary descriptions of quantum particles (Susskind et al. 1993). The fact that the infalling observer cannot communicate to the external world that she survived her passage through the event horizon is supposed to imply that there is no genuine contradiction here. This solution to the information loss paradox has been criticized for making an illegitimate appeal to verificationism (Belot et al. 1999). Bokulich (2005), to the contrary, argues that the most fruitful way of viewing black hole complementarity is as a novel suggestion for how a non-local theory of quantum gravity will recover the local behavior of quantum field theory while accommodating the novel physics of black holes. 