 Those familiar with the history of ethical intuitionism know that its critics have found the view unsatisfactory because the intuitionists had almost nothing informative to say about why, in a given situation, a particular moral principle takes precedence, and how we could know that it did (see McNaughton 1996). In hindsight, it is remarkable that Reid shows little interest in this problem, stating that it is usually clear to a candid mind which moral principles take precedence and what one should do (see EAP V.i; although see Roeser 2010a, 15–16). Instead, Reid is more concerned to argue that there must be first-principles of morality. In his argument for this claim, Reid appeals to a traditional regress-style argument according to which there must be some fundamental moral principles which both ground and justify our moral deliberation on pain of our being unable to engage in such deliberation, which we clearly can (see EAP V.i).