 The commonest way to think of “looks blue” is to think of the phrase as having a semantic structure, with “blue” having its usual sense. This use, which is found in common practice, can be contrasted with an unstructured sense of “looks-blue”, in which the term “blue” does not make the same contribution. For X to look-blue in this sense is usually taken to mean that X causes a certain type of experience (or type of visual state), a type that is not defined by reference to the property of being blue, and whose occurrence does not require the subject to have the concept of being blue. It is often thought of in these terms: for X to look-blue to S is for X to induce in S a blue-ish-appearance—or appearing. (For further discussion, see Chisholm 1966: 95–99, Cornman 1975: 73–77.) This use of “looks” is usually introduced by philosophers for theoretical purposes, though some argue that it is implicit in the ordinary use of “looks blue”, “looks square”, etc. 