 One topic of particular interest in this respect is ‘disjunctivism’ (see Soteriou (2016) for an overview). This is the view that in perception one is faced either with cases of genuine perception or with cases of illusion or hallucination, as in ‘I see a flash of light or I am having the perfect illusion of doing so’ (Hinton 1973, 39). Such disjunctions were first analysed in detail by Michael Hinton (see Hinton (1973) and Snowdon (2008)), but there have been suggestions that disjunctivism harks back to Austin or even Cook Wilson and Prichard (Kalderon &amp; Travis (213, 498–499), for Austin’s case, see also Longworth (2019)). Adjudicating such claims depends on one’s understanding of disjunctivism itself, but a few points can be adduced. Disjunctivism should not be confused with any ‘naïve’ or ‘direct realism’, but one may appeal to it to defend such views, therefore one should expect Cook Wilson and Oxford Realists to have taken some steps towards it. The sharp distinction between knowledge and belief (section 5), with the rejection of any ‘highest common factor’ between the two, should count as a first step. (The above-mentioned critiques of the argument from illusion reinforce this point.) A further step towards a form of disjunctivism is also taken when, having distinguished knowledge from belief, Cook Wilson also claimed that belief presupposes knowledge: it is only when assessing what I may know about some thing that I might realize that it is not sufficient to claim that ‘I know that p’, so that I remain circumspect and merely claim that ‘I believe that p’ (see sections 4 &amp; 5).