 As with many of Avicenna’s theories, Albalag raises a number of objections to this account of celestial motion. Firstly, Albalag dismisses the conception of complementary efficient-final causation as unwarranted, since, in his understanding, a final cause could hardly continue the activity of a terminated efficient cause. Secondly, Albalag rejects the theory of the spheres’ animation by souls (For background on this theory see Wolfson 1962: 65– 93; Freudenthal 2002: 111–137).  His argument against that theory proceeds from the eternity premise as follows. Forces inhering in bodies (including celestial bodies) are finite. As such, they could hardly move the body in which they inhere infinitely. But we know that the nature of spheres is such that they move eternally and this means that celestial souls are superfluous in this regard. That Nature (ha tevaʿ) “does nothing in vain” (cf. Aristotle Politics 1252b30–1253a1; Averroes Commentary on Metaphysics: 178) prompts the conclusion that spheres do not have souls (Tiqqun n.61: 87). Although the basic lines of this argument are derived from Averroes, Albalag seems to adopt a firmer position than Averroes in denying the animation of spheres by souls. While Averroes rejects Avicenna’s twofold account of celestial motion and argues in some of his works (especially De Substantia Orbis: 71; cf. Commentary on Metaphysics: 164) that celestial motion could hardly be dependent on a finite force inhering in the celestial body, he uses the term soul interchangeably with form in reference to the principles of motion in celestial spheres: the immaterial separate intellects. In other works, we still find indications that spheres are ensouled (e.g., Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, fourth discussion). These variations in Averroes’ standpoint in regard to the theory of the spheres’ animation by souls have invited different interpretations (see Donati 2015; Kogan 1984: 190–201).