 This debate has been somewhat complicated by the fact that proponents of the human-uniqueness of mental time travel tend to rely on descriptions of the ability that are laden with researchers' and subjects' phenomenological, introspective or intuitive descriptions of the way their own minds work (e.g. Tulving 1985; Suddendorf and Corbalis 2007), whereas animal behavior researchers must rely on strict standards of behavioral evidence to support their claims. Animal behavior researchers are typically circumspect in their interpretations, limiting their claims to operationalizable terms such as ‘what-where-when’ memory, or ‘episodic-like’ memory, rather than making claims about the nature of the experience that may be involved in an animal's performing a task.  The situation may therefore represent a double standard in the interpretation of evidence about human and nonhuman animal subjects, with researchers uncritically making liberal assumptions about human cognition that would not be allowed for animal researchers — an example of what Buckner (2013) has called ‘anthropofabulation’. The question of to what extent, and in what ways, humans' awareness of time differs from that of other animals remains an open one, and an active line of research. 