 More recently, two new annotated translations of primary texts, the first by Eltschinger et al. (2018) and the second by Taber and Kataoka (forthcoming) have become available. These translations offernew insights into the debates between the Hindus and Buddhists. In the text Kumārila takes up the linguistic concerns raised above. He notes that if the relation between a word and a meaning is established by not observing that the word is applied to certain things, and one never observes what the word is applied to, then the word simply would have no meaning at all (Apohavāda, 75). Kumārila developed this concern into what is known as the mutual presupposition argument. The objection goes: If someone is taught the meaning of the word ‘cow’ by being told, “The word ‘cow’ refers to what is not non-cow,” then one must know what a non-cow is. But how can one comprehend what a non-cow is if one does not already know what ‘cow’ means. The meaning of ‘cow,’ it seems, presupposes the meaning of ‘non-cow,’ while the meaning of ‘non-cow’ presupposes the meaning of ‘cow’ (Apohavāda, 83–85ab, reprinted in Taber). The apoha theory, as we can see in the examples, is introduced using general terms like cow, white and so on. The theory may seem to work in the case of general terms because there are entities that are cow and others that are not cow, there are entities that are white and others that are not white and so on. But such a dichotomy does not hold in the case of every word. Sen (2011) offers the example of the word ‘all’ (sarva). There is no entity called ‘not all’ (asarva), which may be obtained by negating the meaning of the word ‘all’. Nor can it be suggested that the expression ‘not all’ is applicable to unity, duality, etc., because the word ‘all’ stands for a collection, the components or constituents of which may be things that are one, two, and so on in number; and once all the constituents of this collection are negated, the word ‘all’ will become an empty expression (Sen, 2011, 182). Kumārila also argues that the Apohavāda is unable to account for words which designate actions, connectives like ‘and’, ‘or’ ‘not’ and ‘but’, verbal prefixes and prepositions, adjectives like ‘knowable’ and ‘cognizable’ and so on (Taber and Kataoka forthcoming).