 Disagreement over non-conceptual representation concerns the existence and nature of phenomenal properties, the role they play in determining the contents of sensory representations, and which kinds of properties can be represented by non-conceptual states. Dennett (1988), for example, denies that there are such things as qualia at all (as they are standardly construed); while Brandom (2002), McDowell (1994), Rey (1991) and Sellars (1956) deny that they are needed to explain the content of sensory experience. Among those who accept that experiences have phenomenal content, some (Dretske, Lycan, Tye) argue that it is reducible to a kind of intentional content, while others (Block, Loar, Peacocke) argue that it is irreducible. (See the discussion in the next section.) A further debate concerns the non-conceptual representability of high-level properties such as kind properties and moral properties. (See, e.g., Dretske 1995 and Siegel 2010, and the entry on the contents of perception.) 