 It is important to note that commitment to one of these three categories of sin does not entail a commitment to either or both of the others; a commitment to the existence of sinful acts, for instance, does not entail a commitment to sinful dispositions or vices. There are some in the Christian tradition who think that being vicious doesn’t entail being sinful (e.g., William of Ockham; see Sweeney 2018). Furthermore, one can affirm the existence of both sinful actions and sinful dispositions without being committed to the existence of sin as a state of being, that is, without being committed to the doctrine of original sin. Immanuel Kant, for instance, affirms the two former categories while rejecting the latter (Kant Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone [1793]; see also Quinn 1990). In addition to considering sin as action, disposition, and state, the present article also addresses the noetic effects of sin  (section 5)  and the idea of structural sin  (section 6),  according to which sin can be embedded in the structures of various social systems.