 Particularists rarely put their account of moral knowledge in terms of justification. But when particularists do put their view in terms of justification (see below) they claim that the justification involved is a priori. The thought seems to be this: if one can issue a moral verdict in a particular case on the basis of the moral reasons one is presented with in that case, then one must know what those reasons are, as well as how to weigh them to reach a verdict. But, according to particularists, there are no principles one can use to know those things; thus, one must see—through the exercise of intuition—what one’s reasons are and how to weigh them against each other. That is, one must intuit propositions such as R is a reason to φ in this case and In this case, on balance, the reasons support φ-ing. Particularists seem committed to a version of the modified standard view of a priori justification. There is a distinct experience of rational “seeing”” in virtue of which one is a priori justified in believing these propositions regarding a particular case. If the propositions one is thereby justified in believing are self-evident, it seems that they are self-evident only in the attenuated sense that it is possible to have rational insight into their truth, and hence possible to be justified in believing them, solely on the basis of understanding them and thinking about them. It is also worth taking note that the moral propositions particularists hold that we are a priori justified in believing are relative to a particular context: what one can come to see is that something is a reason to φ for a particular agent in a particular situation or that the balance of reasons support φ-ing for this particular agent in this particular situation.