 The question of whether pornography causes harm raises tricky conceptual issues about the notion of causality, as well as empirical and methodological ones (Eaton 2007; Schauer 1987; The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography 1986, excerpts from which are reprinted in Mappes and Zembaty 1997, 212–218). The causal connection between consumption of pornography and violent sexual crime, if there is one, is unlikely to be a simple one. As some liberals have argued, it seems implausible to think that consumption of pornography, on a single or even repeated occasions, will cause otherwise “normal, decent chaps” with no propensity to rape suddenly “to metamorphose into rapists”(Feinberg, 1985, 153; also see entry on  Freedom of Speech). However, we might agree with Feinberg and yet think that pornography might still be a cause of rape. Consumption of pornography might cause rape by making it more likely that those who are already inclined to rape will actually rape, thereby increasing the overall incidence of rape. Of course, pornography may not be the only cause of rape or other violent sexual crime. The contributing causes of violence against women are likely to be numerous and connected in complex ways: they may include, among other things, “macho values” (as Feinberg suggests) and certain sorts of childhood events and circumstances (as R. Dworkin says). But the mere fact that there may be other causes of sexual violence against women does not show that consumption of pornography cannot also be a cause. Consumption of pornography may, on its own, be neither necessary nor sufficient for violent sexual crime (or for sexist attitudes and behavior more generally); yet it might still be a cause of violent sexual crime and these other harms if it increases the incidence of them.