 The notions of purpose or end [Zweck] and of purposiveness [Zweckmässigkeit] are defined by Kant in the “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment”, in a section entitled “On Purposiveness in General” (§10). A purpose is “the object of a concept, in so far as the concept is seen as the cause of the object”, and purposiveness is “the causality of a concept with respect to its object” (§10, 220). But Kant often uses the terms “purpose” and “purposive” in ways that are related to, but do not quite fit, these definitions. In particular “purpose” is sometimes used to apply to the concept rather than the corresponding object (e.g., Introduction IV, 180), and “purposiveness” is usually used to denote, not the causality of the concept, but the property in virtue of which an object counts as a purpose (e.g., FI IX, 234). Kant also characterizes “purposiveness” as the “lawfulness of the contingent as such” (FI VI, 217; see also FI VIII, 228, Introduction V, 184, and §76, 404).