 The notion of ontological dependence sheds light on the sense in which states of affairs “involve” particulars and properties: a state of affairs involves those objects on which it ontologically depends. Consider as a representative example Richard’s 2013 view of propositions as states of affairs. He identifies states of affairs with ways for things to be. A way for things to be is, in turn, identified by the things and the way these things need to be for the way for things to be to be how things are. A way for things to be is a property the world might have. The existence of this property depends on the existence of the properties and particulars we need to refer to in identifying it. If there is no Eiffel Tower, for example, there is no way for the Eiffel Tower to be. Hence, states of affairs ontologically depend on particulars and properties. Richard (2013: 704) goes a step further by saying that ontological dependence is “a mark of mereological relations”. Hence, states of affairs should have constituent structure. But the additional claim that states of affairs are (in some sense) wholes with parts does not explain more than the ontological dependence claim. Rather the opposite: it leads to the problems discussed above.