 The most common capacity that has been used to ground animals’ moral status is sentience, roughly defined as the capacity to feel pleasure and pain. Sentience is widely regarded as sufficient for animals to be owed moral consideration, since only sentient animals care about what happens to them. Early animal ethics focused on animals most directly and gravely affected by human practices, namely, the mammals and birds used in food production and biomedical research, and built a case in their defense based on evidence of their sentience. In recent years, evidence of sentience in other taxa is being used to argue that the circle of moral consideration should be widened to include fish (Balcombe 2016; Sneddon 2006), cephalopods (King &amp; Marino 2019; Mather &amp; Anderson 2007), and arthropods (Mikhalevich &amp; Powell 2020). Evidence from comparative psychology that points to some animals being capable of sophisticated forms of agency has also been used in attempts to ground moral status on this capacity (Sebo 2017; Wilcox 2020). Other philosophers object to using individualistic cognitive capacities to ground moral standing, and instead rely on our perception of animals and pre-existing relationships as the relevant properties (Crary 2010; Diamond 1978; Gruen 2015). However, it has been argued that even these approaches cannot ignore the cognitive capacities of individuals (Monsó &amp; Grimm 2019).