 Bridgman’s individualistic bent, both in epistemology and social life, was in stark contrast to the logical positivist vision of knowledge and society, particularly the strand of positivism driven by Otto Neurath (1882–1945). The latter’s aversion to the private compelled him to express even first-hand observation reports as third-person happenings in space and time, of the following type: “Otto’s protocol at 3:17 o’clock: [Otto’s speech-thinking at 3:16 o’clock was: (at 3:15 o’clock there was a table in the room perceived by Otto)].” (Neurath 1932–33 [1983, p. 93]). Bridgman was unyielding in his opposition to Neurath’s type of objectification of personal experience. To him, operations provided the best possible refuge from the ocean of uncertainty always threatening to engulf science, and the relative certainty was only possible if he was learning from his own operations, not from second-hand reports from some other person. In this regard Bridgman was closer to the strand of logical positivism represented by Moritz Schlick (1882–1936), who insisted on maintaining the notion of direct experience as the final arbiter of knowledge. Schlick (1930 [1979]) admitted that experience was fleeting and only provided momentary points of verification rather than any lasting “foundation” one could build knowledge on. Bridgman’s operations had more promise in this regard, as the operations were meant to be repeatable so the descriptions of operations and their results would be lasting. However, that was not to be such a straightforward matter, as we will see in Section 3.4.