 For physicalists in the philosophy of mind who maintain that the mental is grounded in, supervenient on, or identical with the physical, there is a pressing need to explain what makes it the case that some particular phenomenal feel should be associated with a given physical state (see, e.g., Chalmers 1996; Levine 2001). This explanatory gap is an epistemic one, and so there are two ways we might proceed. The first is to insist that unless the explanatory gap has been closed, we do not have a metaphysical explanation of the mental in terms of the physical. The second is to allow that we might have a metaphysical explanation without a corresponding epistemic one. Schaffer (2017) argues that grounding, and the metaphysical laws that provide the framework for grounding, close the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical (and many more besides). Rabin (2019) disagrees, claiming that the gap between consciousness and physical fundamentalia has a special status, persisting even if we grant that the former is metaphysically explained by the latter.