 Russell remains famous as a logician, a metaphysician, and as a philosopher of mathematics, but in his own day he was also notorious for his social and political opinions. He wrote an immense amount about practical ethics—women’s rights, marriage and morals, war and peace, and the vexed question of whether socialists should smoke good cigars. (They should.) And unlike present-day practical ethicists (with a few notable exceptions such as Peter Singer) he was widely read by the non-philosophical public. (See for instance Phillips 2013, which details Russell’s successes as a popular moralist in the 1950s.) But though Russell was famous as a moralist and famous as a philosopher, he does not have much of a reputation as a moral philosopher in the more technical sense of the term. Until very recently, his contributions to what is nowadays known as ethical theory—meta-ethics (the nature and justification, if any, of moral judgments) and normative ethics (what makes right acts right etc)—were either unknown, disregarded or dismissed as unoriginal. Key texts on the history of twentieth century ethics—Warnock’s Ethics Since 1900 (1978), Urmson’s The Emotivist Theory of Ethics (1968), Milller’s Contemporary Metaethics: an Introduction (2013) and Schroeder’s Non-Cognitivism in Ethics (2010)—say nothing, or next to nothing, about Russell, at least in his capacity as a moral philosopher. It is only very recently—in the last fifteen years or so—that ethical theorists have begun to pay attention to him. (See Pigden 2003, 2007 and Potter 2006, though L.W. Aiken 1963 anticipated Potter and Pigden by about forty years.) Perhaps Russell would not have repined, since he professed himself dissatisfied with what he had said “on the philosophical basis of ethics” (RoE: 165/Papers 11: 310). But since he took an equally dim view of what he had read on that topic, the fact that he did not think much of his own contributions does not mean that he thought them any worse than anybody else’s. In my view, they are often rather better and deserve to be disinterred. But “disinterred” is the word since some of his most original contributions were left unpublished in his own lifetime and what he did publish was often buried in publications ostensibly devoted to less theoretical topics. Thus Russell’s brilliant little paper “Is There an Absolute Good”, which anticipates Mackie’s “The Refutation of Morals” by over twenty years, was delivered in 1922 at a meeting of the Apostles (an exclusive, prestigious but secret Cambridge discussion group of which Moore, Russell, and Ramsey were all members) and was not published until 1988. And Russell’s version of emotivism (which anticipates Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936) by one year, and Stevenson’s “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms” (1937) by two) appeared towards the end of a popular book, Religion and Science (1935), whose principal purpose was not to discuss the nature of moral judgments, but to do down religion in the name of science. However, Russell’s dissatisfaction with his writings on ethical theory did not extend to his writings on social and political topics.