When existence questions are interpreted externally, they purport to be about “reality” independent of any particular linguistic framework. So interpreted, according to Carnap, these questions—such as “do numbers exist?” or “do physical objects exist?”—are pseudo-questions lacking any cognitive meaning. Since metaphysicians engaging in ontological disputes over these questions evidently have the external interpretation in mind—they do not take them to be trivial—much of traditional metaphysics for Carnap was cognitively meaningless as well. The best one can do to make sense of external existence questions is to re-construe them as pragmatic questions as to which frameworks to accept. The question, “do numbers exist”, for example, could be re-construed as the question, “is it useful to introduce the number framework”. A framework could be deemed useful, for example, if it facilitated factual communication in ways that were “efficient, fruitful, and simple” (Carnap 1950).