 Ontological Pluralism. Objects belong to different fundamental categories. Because there are fundamentally different kinds of objects, their investigations are also assigned to different disciplines. This is why psychologism has to be discarded: logical psychologism, e.g., collapses different categories (the psychological and the logical) into one, leading to the conclusion that there is one single discipline—psychology—in charge of their investigation. The flip side of ontological pluralism is anti-reductionism and a descriptive approach to ontological questions: all objects must be described as they are—without failing to the temptation of reducing one kind of objects to another (Geiger 1933). Against this backdrop, eidetic descriptions are occasionally contrasted to definitions that characterize a concept in terms of other concepts: the idea is that definitions of this sort should be avoided because they “betray” the very essence of the definiendum (cf. Reinach 1914 [1989: 535], on the relations between explanation and description, see also Brunswig 1904 and Mulligan 2012: §1). This view has been criticized, even within phenomenology, for being conducive to a form of phenomenology characterized as “picture book phenomenology” (Bilderbuchphänomenologie, Scheler 1913/16: 11; Héring 1939: 370 n 1).