 In addition, Reinach suggests that states of affairs are either positive or negative, and he argues that either a positive state of affairs or its negative contradictory obtains (e.g., either the being-red of the rose obtains or its not-being red). The principle of the excluded middle is hence claimed to hold for states of affairs and, analogously, other principles traditionally believed to be of a logical nature (and in particular the laws of inference, see 1911a [1989: 115]) are interpreted by Reinach as being primarily ontological principles, i.e., principles which hold for states of affairs. That is, states of affairs are the objects of logic (1911a [1989: 138 n 1]), and logic is primarily about states of affairs and only secondarily about truth-bearers (on this point, see also Gallinger 1912, Honecker 1921, Gardies 1985).