Truthmaker accounts, like entailment accounts, have the feature that ontological commitment depends only on the content of a theory, not on its logical form. That will be so if the primary truthbearers are taken to be non-linguistic propositions (individuated by content) rather than sentences. In that case, ontological commitment applies directly to the propositions, or to theories construed as sets of propositions, and only indirectly to the sentences, or sets of sentences, that express those propositions. That has the benefit, as with the entailment account, of freeing the notion of ontological commitment from language (see §2.1).  But taking propositions to be truthbearers will not be to every truthmaker theorist's liking. Moreover, different views on the nature of propositions—possible worlds accounts, Russellian accounts, Fregean accounts, to name a few—lead to somewhat different truthmaker accounts. To remain neutral in what follows with respect to the existence and nature of propositions, sentences will be taken to be the bearers of truth, and ontological commitment will continue to be applied to theories construed as sets of sentences.[29]