 The idea that remembering the past is linked to imagining the future may go back as far as Augustine (Manning, Cassel, &amp; Cassel 2013), but it has until recently played little role in the philosophy of memory. It has, however, come to play an important role in the psychology of memory, as psychologists have moved away from a conception of episodic memory as what-where-when memory and towards a conception of episodic remembering as a form of constructive mental time travel. Reinforced by impressive brain imaging evidence and extensive research on representational and phenomenological overlap between remembering the past and imagining the future (Klein 2013; Schacter et al. 2012; Szpunar 2010), this new conception emphasizes the similarities between episodic memory, episodic future thought (in which the subject imagines possible future events), and, increasingly, processes such as episodic counterfactual thought (in which the subject imagines alternatives to past events). Taking the new conception to its logical conclusion, many have suggested that, rather than distinct capacities for episodic memory and episodic imagination, humans in fact have a single general capacity for mental time travel (Suddendorf &amp; Corballis 2007). In psychology, this new conception has led to theoretical frameworks such as the constructive episodic simulation approach (Schacter, Addis, &amp; Buckner 2008) and the scene construction approach (Mullally &amp; Maguire 2014), both of which emphasize the simulational character of remembering. In philosophy, it has led to simulation theories of remembering (Shanton &amp; Goldman 2010), which see remembering as a process of imagining past events, a process in which a causal connection to the remembered event is at best incidental.