 A typical line for those convinced that the regress is vicious has consisted in proposing that instantiation is not a relation, or at least not a normal one. Some philosophers hold that it is a sui generis linkage that hooks things up without intermediaries. Peter Strawson (1959) calls it a non-relational tie and Bergmann (1960) calls it a nexus. Broad (1933: 85) likened instantiation to glue, which just sticks two sheets of paper together, without needing anything additional; similarly, instantiation just relates. An alternative line has been to reject instantiation altogether. According to Frege, it is not needed, because properties have “gaps” that can be filled, and according to a reading of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, because objects and properties can be connected like links in a chain. However, both strategies are problematic, as argued by Vallicella (2002). His basic point is that, if \(a\) has property \(F\), we need an ontological explanation of why \(F\) and \(a\) happen to be connected in such a way that \(a\) has \(F\) as one of its properties (unless \(F\) is a property that \(a\) has necessarily). But none of these strategies can provide this explanation. For example, the appeal to gaps is pointless: \(F\) has a gap whether or not it is filled by \(a\) (for example, it could be filled in by another object), and thus the gap cannot explain the fact that \(a\) has \(F\) as one of its properties.