 Phenomenology is not the only site of feminist philosophy that underscores the body and resists the mind/body dualism characteristic of modern notions of autonomous selfhood. The contemporary fields of affect theory and new materialism have pushed feminist conceptions of embodiment and selfhood even beyond a recognition of situated relationality, sometimes arguing for a radical rupture of the self/other distinction. Sara Ahmed and Teresa Brennan suggest that affects and emotions neither go from the “inside out” nor come from the “outside in”; rather, emotions may be found within the very atmosphere of the social (Ahmed 2004; Brennan 2004). Ranjana Khanna sees affects as openings onto the other both “within” the self and beyond it (Khanna 2012). For feminist new materialisms, the body is not an individual expressive whole (as it remains in phenomenology); rather, the body is a “sexually preconstituted, dynamic bundle of relations” (Braidotti 2006) that is interconnected with the environment through intensities and flows (Grosz 1994). Feminist materialism often positions itself in contrast to poststructuralism because of the former’s emphasis on the material body, but both of these approaches underscore the radical heterogeneity, or even nonexistence, of the self. And the new materialist focus on the body, following the “cyborg” theory of Donna Haraway, suggests that biological bodies are not set in opposition to technology; rather, they are densely imbricated. Feminist materialism seeks to dislocate identities and focus on becomings (Braidotti 2016).