  There is good evidence that Arcesilaus followed the Socratic model consistently. It is clear that he went to some lengths not to make positive affirmations of any sort in his own right in his arguments (see Diogenes Laertius 4.36, Philodemus Index Academicorum 20.1–4, cf. 18.40–19.9). Our sources also confirm that Arcesilaus took his method to entail that he did not reveal his own view on the matter in question in any case, if he had one, including, for instance, the view that the claim argued against is false (see e.g., Cicero De oratore 3.67). Further, our most detailed sources actually identify the radical change of position in the Platonic school he introduced—the transition from the Old Academy to the skeptical Academy—in terms of his adoption of this method (see Diogenes Laertius 4.28, Philodemus Index Academicorum 18.7–16 &amp; 21.36–42 and Sextus Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.220–35, esp. 232). And this explains his reputation as a ‘dialectician’ (or, more negatively, as a ‘sophist’ or ‘eristic’ or ‘magician’), as well as why the skeptical Academy came to be defined primarily by its critical stance towards the doctrines of other schools (and particularly towards the energetic philosophical programs of the new movements initiated by Epicurus and Zeno during his lifetime). But if Arcesilaus followed this model consistently by arguing against every philosophical position that came to his notice and refraining from making any positive arguments or affirmations on any philosophical question, it is hard to see why we should think that he accepted any doctrines, including inapprehensibility and universal suspension of assent. Thus, the first difficulty is that Arcesilaus’ method in principle obscures any views he may have held.