Whilst originally conceived as an objection to the idea of prerogatives, several theorists of defensive harm embrace this conclusion, arguing that prerogatives (or the related notion of associative duties), play an important role in explaining the scope of permissible self- and other-defense (Levine 1984; Davis 1984; Quong 2009; 2020: Ch. 3; Fabre 2009b; 2012: 61; Lazar 2013). According to these writers, the extra weight that we may attach to our own interests, or the interests of special others, permits us to infringe others’ rights not to be harmed. Jonathan Quong argues that prerogatives provide an independent justification for harming, in addition to liability and lesser-evil justifications (Quong 2009; 2020: 70). Seth Lazar, in contrast, argues that the additional weight we must ascribe to the interests of special others, in light of our associative duties to them, affects what counts as the lesser-evil when acting in other-defense (Lazar 2013).