 Why do we readily grant, then, that we don’t know that there are an even number of stars in the Milky Way? To begin with, the vast majority of us do not even believe that proposition, and it is widely acknowledged that knowledge requires  belief.[1]  But even those who believe it do not know it, even if they luck out and it is true. They do not know it because they are not justified in believing it, and knowledge requires  justification.[2]  Of course, they are not justified in disbelieving that proposition either. Belief and disbelief are two of the so-called doxastic attitudes that we can adopt towards a proposition. We can also, of course, not even consider a proposition, and thus not adopt any doxastic attitude towards it. But most philosophers would hold that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third possible doxastic attitude that we can adopt towards a proposition: we can suspend judgment (or withhold assent) with respect to it. Suspension of judgment is thus a bona fide doxastic attitude alongside belief and disbelief, and is not to be equated with the failure to adopt any doxastic  attitude.[3]  Because it is a genuine doxastic attitude, suspension of judgment (just like belief and disbelief, and unlike the failure to form any doxastic attitude) can itself be justified or unjustified. For instance, we would ordinarily think that suspension of judgment is not justified with respect to the proposition that Paris is the Capital of France, but it is with respect to the proposition that there are an even number of stars in the Milky Way.