 One thing that the representational and relational views agree on is the key epistemic role of data as empirical evidence for knowledge claims or interventions. While there is a large philosophical literature on the nature of evidence (e.g., Achinstein 2001; Reiss 2015; Kelly 2016), however, the relation between data and evidence has received less attention. This is arguably due to an implicit acceptance, by many philosophers, of the representational view of data. Within the representational view, the identification of what counts as data is prior to the study of what those data can be evidence for: in other words, data are “givens”, as the etymology of the word indicates, and inferential methods are responsible for determining whether and how the data available to investigators can be used as evidence, and for what. The focus of philosophical attention is thus on formal methods to single out errors and misleading interpretations, and the probabilistic and/or explanatory relation between what is unproblematically taken to be a body of evidence and a given hypothesis. Hence much of the expansive philosophical work on evidence avoids the term “data” altogether. Peter Achinstein’s seminal work is a case in point: it discusses observed facts and experimental results, and whether and under which conditions scientists would have reasons to believe such facts, but it makes no mention of data and related processing practices (Achinstein 2001).