 If Henry’s critique of intentionality is construed through a critique of Husserlian phenomenology, it nevertheless comports a much wider perspective that includes a “deconstruction” of the history of philosophy in general, insofar as the latter relies on a limited concept of appearing or phenomenality. Every philosophy, Henry argues, relies on phenomenological presuppositions and, therefore, “a critique of phenomenality necessarily concerns philosophy in general” (PNI 105). Phenomenality as such, however, is the object of phenomenology. As Husserl notes in, for instance, his Göttingen Lectures of 1905, phenomenology is concerned with how objects are given (Gegenstände im Wie, Husserl [GW]: 117). The mode of givenness, i.e., appearing itself, is therefore what phenomenology must investigate. For Henry, however, this line of thought must be taken one step further to include the fact that appearing itself must appear. Since things are devoid of the ability to become phenomena by themselves, Henry argues, that which makes them appear has itself to appear. Otherwise, nothing would appear at all (PNI 107–8). As a result, phenomenology cannot be reduced to a method that would make us see how things appear to us.  Instead it finds its proper object with the question “How does appearing appear?” According to Henry’s reading of the phenomenological tradition, however, we are faced with a very peculiar situation where intentionality is considered the sole mode of appearing.