  However, as Lynch (2004: 394) cautioned, biconditionals that specify necessary and sufficient conditions for \(p\) to be true still leave open questions about the ‘deep’ metaphysical nature of truth. Thus, given the choice, Lynch—following up on a suggestion from Pettit (1996: 886)—urged functionalists to identify truth, not with the properties realizing the \(F\)-role in a given region of discourse, but with the \(F\)-role itself. Doing so is one way to try to secure the ‘unity’ of truth (on the presumption that there is just one \(F\)-role). Hence, to say that truth is a functional kind \(F\) is to say that the \(\tau\)-term ‘truth’ denotes the property of having a property that plays the \(F\)-role, where the \(F\)-role is tantamount to the single unique second-order property of being \(F\). Accordingly, this theory proposes that something is true just in case it is \(F\).