 Nevertheless, it does seem that an argument can be made that any reasonable person will satisfy this axiom. Suppose you are indifferent between two propositions, \(p\) and \(q\), that cannot be simultaneously true. And suppose now we find a proposition \(r\), that is pairwise incompatible with both \(p\) and \(q\), and which you find more desirable than both \(p\) and \(q\). Then if it turns out that you are indifferent between \(p\) joined with \(r\) and \(q\) joined with \(r\), that must be because you find \(p\) and \(q\) equally probable. Otherwise, you would prefer the union that contains the one of \(p\) and \(q\) that you find less probable, since that gives you a higher chance of the more desirable proposition \(r\). It then follows that for any other proposition \(s\) that satisfies the aforementioned conditions that \(r\) satisfies, you should also be indifferent between \(p\cup s\) and \(q\cup s\), since, again, the two unions are equally likely to result in \(s\).