 Responses to Bratman’s theory have focused largely on the nature of these alleged requirements. Bratman (1987, §2.5) argues that intentions do not provide inputs to practical reasoning by providing additional reasons. This conception is, on the one hand, too weak, since it treats the fact that I have settled on doing A as just one consideration among many in favour of doing it, whereas means-end coherence is a strict or peremptory demand. And it is, on the other hand, too strong, since it permits a form of illicit bootstrapping in which an irrational decision can generate a reason that tips the balance in favour of acting on it. (Do intentions ever provide reasons? Many deny this; see, for instance, Broome 2001; Brunero 2007; Cullity 2008; Kolodny 2011. But Bratman’s argument leaves room for such reasons, so long as the actions they support would be rational without them. For versions of this point, see Chang 2009; Ferrero 2010; Smith 2016.)