 Most Chinese philosophers who lived after the unification of China in 221 BCE, which was largely dominated by Confucianism after a brief period of suppression initiated by the First Emperor Qin Shi Huang, do not appear to have had any special distrust of the content of the senses, or were not responding to those who did, and so were not compelled to view the veracity of representation as a problem of significance. Consequently, scholars have variously characterized Chinese philosophical thought in ways that contrast it with Western preoccupations with discursive rationality. It is common, for example, to view early Chinese philosophers as largely preoccupied with problems centering on the proper governance of society and how citizens ought to conduct themselves within it. As much as in any other major philosophical tradition, the early Chinese philosophers were concerned with questions about what kind of life is worth living and what things, circumstances, or actions are to be regarded as ultimately valuable. Their philosophical investigations led them to conceptualize ideals of right conduct, appropriate behavior, and social propriety (Hall and Ames 1987). But the methods they employed to establish these ideals tended to emphasize reasoning by example from the actions or conduct of key moral exemplars rather than deducing particular judgments of practical action from general principles. For this reason they were more preoccupied with identifying proper normative standards by which to judge the similarity or resemblance of a thing or action with that of a chosen standard. Arguably, this encouraged a conception of logic based mostly on methods of inductive, analogical reasoning, given their special concern with the problem of resemblance, and this view is borne out to a large extent in the Mohists’ more self-conscious appraisals of their own methodology and in the modes of reasoning they use to illustrate it (Yuan 2012; Fraser 2013).