 In a second text, The One True and Complete Agent and the Incomplete Metaphorical Agent, al-Kindī may seem to attribute genuine agency to God alone (al-Kindī OPK: 169–171; McGinnis and Reisman 2007: 22–23). In this text, al-Kindī defines a true agent as one that acts without being acted upon in any way. God is said to be the sole true agent. He likewise defines a metaphorical agent as one who acts as a result of having been acted upon, i.e., one that is both an agent and a patient. Every created agent is said to be a metaphorical agent. Al-Kindī then argues that God is truly the First Cause of everything acted upon because he is an agent not acted upon in any way. As he sees its, God is the immediate cause of a first thing acted upon and a cause through mediation of the effects of the first thing acted upon and so on (Adamson 2007: 57–62). Al-Kindī’s account of “true” agency is rather different from that of an occasionalist. While the occasionalist holds that causal efficacy belongs to God alone, al-Kindī attributes causal efficacy to God and to created things. The latter differ from God in that they are both agents and patients. Generally speaking, the doctrine of occasionalism is rejected by the philosophers.