 There is no criterion of “truth”, “nothing by believing which we believe something else” (EMP, 55). Truth is simply what is conveyed by the copula, the “is” of the proposition. It cannot reside in correspondence between a believed proposition and something else we call reality, nor in relations between propositions in terms of coherence. Propositions are not forms of words: we convey our beliefs by words, but what we are putting forward for acceptance is not the form of words but the state of affairs itself. Representionalist and correspondence theories of truth are “attempts to get behind the proposition – to maintain (in words!) that we mean more than we can say.” (EMP, 5). We must abandon the notion of “thought” as something contrasted with or identified with things. Our thoughts are just our dealings with things – Anderson shared with Norman Kemp Smith a quasi-Calvinist conception of knowledge as a striving and grappling with problems rather than mirroring an external reality. Anderson dismisses most contemporary philosophies as “varieties of representationalism” (EMP, 87). The proposition is not “about” anything in the sense of representing an external reality. 