 This translation is but one of many that have variously interpreted the original text, and some scholars have claimed that the original is in need of textual emendation due to copyist errors in centuries past (e.g., He 1971 and Chen 1983; see also Zong 2000). However, it does make sense when we recognize that the Mohists spent a great deal of effort thinking about how the meanings of simple names vary in combination with others. According to A.C. Graham, the names gou (dog) and quan (canine) were the Mohists’ stock examples of terms that refer to the same thing, but which have slightly different senses, probably due to their individual etymologies. Contemporary philosophers of language might consider that the Mohists were on the verge of developing an ontology of mental states with these examples, thinking of the opacity of the context “knowing” as a consequence of potential failures of knowledge. Jack might know what a dog is, but he might not know what a canine is, regardless of the co-extension of “dog” and “canine”. But the Mohists were not likely thinking of language in any way as a window to the mind. There is no indication anywhere in Mohist literature suggesting that they were interested in developing a classification of mental states. Indeed, the Mohists weighed the consequences of comparing linguistic expressions involving not only those intensional verbs we usually associate with mental states, such as “know”, “think of”, “believe”, “love” and the like, but also apparently intensional contexts introduced by verbs having nothing obviously to do with the mind, and they provide no indications that they thought about distinguishing them.