 Meinong’s philosophical psychology is influenced by Brentano’s descriptive psychology, but Meinong modified it in several ways. There are at least four main modifications involving Brentano’s view of mental phenomena, especially Brentano’s tripartite classification of such phenomena into representations, judgements, and phenomena of love and hate (or emotions [Gemütsbewegungen]): (1) Meinong’s first deviation consists in dividing up the class of emotions into the classes of feelings [Gefühle] and of desires [Begehrungen]. (2) His second modification consists in introducing the differentiation between serious [ernstartige] and fantasy [phantasieartige] experiences (the latter include what he called “assumptions”). (3) He distinguishes between the act, the (psychological) content, and the object of a mental phenomenon (see above 4.1). (4) He gives up Brentano’s thesis that we can be intentionally directed to one and the same object in different ways, i.e., by different kinds of mental acts, and he argues in favor of proper, nonreal (ideal) objects corresponding to judging, feeling, and desiring. (For further investigations regarding the affinities and divergences between both philosophers, see Rollinger 2005 and Marek 2017.) 