 Kant’s view is similar to the social contract theory of Hobbes in a few important respects. The social contract is not a historical document and does not involve a historical act. In fact it can be dangerous to the stability of the state to even search history for such empirical justification of state power (6:318). The current state must be understood, regardless of its origin, to embody the social contact. The social contract is a rational justification for state power, not a result of actual deal-making among individuals or between them and a government. The social contract is not voluntary; rather, individuals may be forced into the civil condition against their consent (6:256). Social contract is not based on any actual consent such as a voluntary choice to form a civil society along with others. Since the social contract reflects reason, each human being as a rational being already contains the basis for rational agreement to the state. Are individuals then coerced to recognize their subjection to state power against their will? Since Kant defines “will” as “practical reason itself” (Groundwork, 4:412), the answer for him is “no.” If one defines “will” as arbitrary choice, then the answer is “yes.” Kant holds that individuals can be coerced to leave the state of nature and enter a civil condition (6:307), but since the state of nature, like the social contract, is merely an idea of reason, this authorization for coercion means that now individuals are rightfully subject to the coercive power of the state regardless of any explicit consent on their part. This dichotomy between agreement based on one’s empirical will and agreement based on one’s pure practical reason also arises with regard to Kant’s theory of punishment (section 7). A substantial difference between Kant on the one hand and Hobbes and Locke on the other hand is that the latter base their arguments on the individual benefit for each party to the contract, whereas Kant bases his argument on Right itself, understood as freedom for all persons in general, not just for the individual benefit that the parties to the contract obtain in their own particular freedom. To this extent Kant is influenced more by Rousseau’s idea of the General Will.