 Sapaṇ is perhaps uniquely attuned to how decisively it is karma that underwrites the doctrine of apoha, the Buddhist approach to concept formation in the light of emptiness. Not even Dharmakīrti, whose epistemology courted Buddhists of the Śrāvakayāna, was willing to be as vividly pragmatist. Be that as it may, Sapaṇ makes constant reference to Dharmakīrti and is reasonably seen to have provided a faithful extension of his views. Above all, Sapaṇ maintains without exception the key ontological distinction in Buddhist epistemology between real, causally effective momentary particulars that are the potential objects of perception, and false conceptual constructions that are the seeming objects of cognition. Where all of reality is divided into these categories, we can see even by the definitions that concepts and abstract objects must be unreal. Chapa and his followers spoke of intermediate categories of various kinds—cognitive and perceptual objects that are not simply momentary bare particulars—and Sapaṇ and his followers targeted them as insufficient to a Buddhist view.