 Davidson’s employment of the notion of coherence is best viewed, not as a way of understanding truth, but rather as reflecting his commitment to the fundamentally rational and holistic character of the mind. It also connects with Davidson’s rejection of those forms of epistemological foundationalism that would attempt to ground knowledge or belief in the sensory causes of belief – beliefs, as one might expect given Davidson’s holistic approach, can find evidential support only in other beliefs. Similarly, Davidson’s sometime employment of the notion of correspondence is best understood, not as providing, any direct elucidation of the nature of truth, but rather as deriving from his externalist commitment to the idea that the content of belief is dependent upon the worldly causes of belief. In ‘True to the Facts’ (1969b) Davidson does defend what he there presents as a form of correspondence theory of truth. However, not only does Davidson later relinquish the claim that his is a ‘correspondence’ view of truth (this is already evident in ‘The Structure and Content of Truth’ [1990a], much of the material from which was later incorporated into Truth and Predication [2005b]), but the account set out in ‘True to the Facts’ is, in any case, far removed from what is usually taken to be involved in any correspondence theory. 