 What impartiality requires, many would argue, is not that everyone receive equal treatment, but rather that every person be treated as an equal (Dworkin 1977, 227). While the distinction between equal treatment and treatment as equals is difficult to make out with precision, the main idea is fairly clear: treatment as equals requires that persons are not treated equally, but rather treated in accordance with what rights they possess, what legitimate claims they put forward, and, in general, with what they deserve. (Recall Hooker’s related distinction between impartial treatment and impartial application of partiality-permitting rules). Thus, to inflict a one year jail sentence on all accused persons, regardless of whether they are guilty or innocent, is to provide equal treatment to members of that group; but it is not to treat them as equals. As mentioned, however, the concept of being treated as an equal is a somewhat elusive one, and there is certainly room to wonder whether the chambermaid, in being sacrificed for in the interests of those who stand to benefit from Fenelon’s survival, truly is being treated as an equal. (Someone with Kantian intuitions, at any rate, is unlikely to think so.)