 In contrast, antirealists about metaphysical explanation at the most extreme end of the spectrum do not see any role for worldly dependence relations (see, e.g., Dasgupta 2017 and Taylor forthcoming for discussion). They might adopt the two-component view discussed above and maintain that both the relation involved in metaphysical explanation and how it is represented are conceptual matters (e.g., because they are antirealists about the relevant non-casual dependence relations), or they might think that metaphysical explanation has only one component. That component might be a conceptual relation or a non-causal dependence relation understood in an antirealist way, or it might be something more representational. For example, one might follow Shaheen (2017) in taking the use of causal metaphors to be a component of our talk about metaphysical explanation, while going further than he does by denying that the metaphorical cause-like sense of “because” used in metaphysics has objective, mind-independent truth conditions. Or one might follow Thompson (2019), who thinks of metaphysical explanations as answers to certain kinds of questions. Both views are consistent with thinking that non-causal dependence relations play a role in metaphysical explanation (by being what certain kinds of because-claims are about, or helping to make it the case that a particular answer to a question is correct) but the relations are not themselves a component of the explanation.