 Commodification of the body especially in reproduction is a topic of extensive discussion among feminist philosophers of law. As reproductive technologies have become increasingly sophisticated, pressures for women to sell their oocytes or to be paid to bear children for others have mounted. Some liberal theorists urge that if paid sex, paid surrogacy, paid gamete donation, and the like can be achieved voluntarily, these are legitimate forms of economic opportunity. To prohibit them is to deprive some people—primarily women—of opportunities that might be of value to them and to deprive the biologically and the socially infertile of the ability to form families. Indeed, if all forms of sexuality, including marriage, were viewed on the model of economic relationships, some argue, equality for women would be furthered  (Ertman 2001).  Feminists critical of this liberal position argue that commodification may misperceive the nature of the body in human life by understanding it as the subject of property—despite the all-too-apparent reality that alternatives to commodification may be worse (Radin 1996). Relatedly, some contend that commodification of the body in practices such as paid surrogacy is inherently exploitative (Dickenson 2007).