 In this case it seems that a theory of health is in danger of becoming a general theory of well-being, and Richman does not discuss the relationship between the two. A further complication is the relationship between medical interventions designed to cure diseases, and other medical interventions which are “enhancement technologies” (Elliott 2003). The line between enhancement and therapy is very hard to draw: Harris (2007, 21) for example, uses the example of vaccination, which is both a therapeutic protection against infection and an enhancement of our natural immune system. Perhaps, too, many of us would benefit from a boost to our powers of concentration, or a lift in our mood, which pharmaceuticals might supply. But neurological enhancements, unlike vaccines, can help us to meet our goals without guarding against disease. Perhaps what is needed is a weaker view of the relation between health and goal-directedness, such as that offered by Whitbeck (1981, 620). Whitbeck defines health in terms of the psychophysiological capacities of an individual that support her “goals, projects and aspirations in a wide variety of situations”. This view loosens the tight Richman-Budson connection between health and goal-directed action, and suggests a view on which we can see biological capacities as at the core of health in so far as they help people’s lives to go better. So there seems to be a broad but not unanimous view that whatever one thinks about the value-ladenness of health we need a threefold distinction between disease, health (which may or may not be partly evaluative, and some properties of a person’s life that enable us to evaluate how well it is going for them. Not all such properties are health problems – someone who is oppressed is not unhealthy simply in virtue of being oppressed (though oppression can certainly cause health problems) – oppression itself can be distinguished from the health problems that may follow from the nature of oppression 