 First, there is the supersubstantivalist strategy. Supersubstantivalists say that each material object is identical to the region that is its exact location. A first attempt at a supersubstantivalist definition of exact location is this: for x to be exactly located at y is for x to be identical to y. But this faces counterexamples involving abstract entities. The empty set is identical to itself but is not exactly located at itself. A natural repair invokes either the notion of a region (for those who are willing to say that all regions are exactly located at themselves) or the notion of a material object (for those who are not): for x to be exactly located at y is for x to be a region (alternatively: a material object) and identical to y. Weak location can then be defined via (D9). This account of exact location makes it hard to avoid full-blown Mereological Harmony, as captured by (H1)–(H8) below. (See Section 3.) As a result, every threat to Mereological Harmony, including the arguments for interpenetration, extended simples, and mutlilocation, is thereby a threat to the given account of exact location. But by the same token, one might argue that every instance of Mereological Harmony is explained by, and hence confirms, the supersubstantivalist strategy.