 Relatedly, the self-torturer’s preferences over the available setting options are intransitive. If his preferences were transitive, then, given that he prefers setting 2 to setting 1 and setting 1 to setting 0, he would prefer setting 2 to setting 0. Given that he also prefers setting 3 to setting 2, he would (assuming transitivity) prefer setting 3 to setting 0. Given that he also prefers setting 4 to setting 3, he would (assuming transitivity) prefer setting 4 to setting 0. Continuing with this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that he would, if his preferences were transitive, prefer setting 1000 to setting 0. Since he does not prefer setting 1000 to setting 0, his preferences are intransitive. And this intransitivity can lead the self-torturer down a terrible path. In particular, if, each week, the self-torturer follows his preference over the pair of settings he must choose between, he will end up in a situation that he finds completely unacceptable. This is quite disturbing, particularly once one realizes that, although the situation of the self-torturer is pure science fiction, the self-torturer is not really alone in his predicament. As Quinn stresses, “most of us are like him in one way or another. [For example, most of us] like to eat but also care about our appearance. Just one more bite will give us pleasure and won’t make us look fatter; but very many bites will” (Quinn 1993, 199).