 Raphals (2015) does explicitly include the latter as a fourth position and seems to distinguish the two intermediate positions according to whether they emphasize more or less the distinction between mind and body, noting that there is no firm boundary between the two. Mencius’ conception of mind and body seems to fall somewhere in this intermediate zone. He regards mind (xin) as an organ of the body whose function is to think, and it has the four sprouts of goodness. Thus there are functional and qualitative distinctions he makes between mind and the (rest of the?) body, and the mind is certainly functionally distinct, but it is consistent with what he says to regard mind as composed of the same energy-stuff (qi) that composes the body. Indeed, Chinese metaphysics later came to commonly recognize qi as the universal stuff of the world. On the other hand, as Goldin points out, no less a text than the Zhuangzi provides passages that suggest the possibility of disembodied minds, such as speculation that a dying friend might next turn up as a rat’s liver or an insect’s leg. Raphals points out much of the interest and the variety of ways in which early Chinese thought relates the mind to the body as lying not in the dualist/holist contrast but in the details, such as the body portrayed as the container of the mind, or the mind being ruler of the body. Comparing ideas from Greek and Chinese texts, she finds that neither dualism nor holism is anyone’s cultural property.