 One might think it is obvious that there could not be a correct naturalistic constitutive explanation of normativity or of the normative properties. Consider the property wrongness, assuming there is such a thing. Assuming that this property is normative, a correct constitutive explanation of the essential nature of this property would need to identify a natural property (or naturalistic condition) as the explanans, and this natural property would have to be normative. According to a kind of meta-ethical utilitarian naturalism, for example, for an action to be wrong is for it to fail to maximize the general happiness. Since wrongness is normative, this theory is correct only if the property failing to maximize the general happiness is normative. But it might seem obvious that this property is not normative, and therefore that the utilitarian naturalist view cannot be correct. It is part of the essential nature of wrongness that it is normative, but, one might think, it obviously is not part of the essential nature of the property of failing to maximize the general happiness that it is normative. Indeed, it might seem, this property obviously is not normative. Failing to maximize the general happiness is normatively relevant, the utilitarian thinks, because an action that fails in this way is wrong for this reason – but this is not a matter of its nature. Or so one might think. And, generalizing, one might think that there could not be a correct naturalistic constitutive explanation of the nature of any of the normative properties because natural properties are not normative.