 Since the normal conditions “\(N\)” express the proposition that the given situation or world is normal, it would seem that the ranking-of-worlds account entails the possibility of a strict completion by adding the normality condition \(N\) to the antecedent: “if \(N\), then \(Y = f(X)\)”. Indeed, it follows from the truth condition for the assertion “normally (or cp) \(L\)” in a ranked world model (where \(L\) is e.g., \(Y = f(X))\) that there exists a proposition \(N\)—namely the set of all worlds with rank 0—such that “normally \(L\)” is true in the given ranked model iff the material implication \(N\rightarrow L\) is true in all worlds of this model. This does neither imply, however, that (a) the completing proposition \(N\) can be linguistically expressed, nor (b) that it can be expressed in a non-trivial way, in the sense that \(N\) does not already imply \(L\) on logical reasons alone. Since one can only speak of a strict completion of “normally \(L\)” if (a) and (b) hold, it follows that the ranking-of-worlds account does in fact not entail the possibility of a strict completion. This result is adequate, because as we have argued above, in most cases (especially in all non-deterministic situations) a strict completion is impossible. Thus, it has to be kept in mind that speaking of “normality conditions” does not imply that these “normality conditions” can be expressed by any (non-trivial) proposition. For example, there is not any non-trivial proposition \(N\) which could turn the conditional “normally a Cs\(^{137}\) atom decays after 60 years” into a strict implication of the form “if \(N\), then a Cs\(^{137}\) atom decays after 60 years”. Also note that the ranked-worlds accounts and the conditional probability accounts are equivalent as a semantics for logical axiomatizations of conditional reasoning (see section 8.3).