 The point is often framed in terms of a “relevant alternatives” epistemology (cf. Goldman 1976; 1986). The suggestion is that in order to know that p, one does not need to rule out every possible scenario where ~p. Rather, it suffices just to rule out the “relevant alternatives” where ~p. And ordinarily, deviant skeptical possibilities are not among the relevant alternatives that a knower needs to exclude. Thus, while driving along the countryside, one can ordinarily know if one sees a barn—even without excluding the possibility of a mere barn façade. For barn façades are ordinarily irrelevant. In the same way, slow switch possibilities ordinarily are irrelevant to knowing what content a thought has (Warfield 1992, Falvey &amp; Owens 1994, Gibbons 1996, Brown 2004, ch. 2). Accordingly, it is normally unnecessary to rule out such a possibility in order to know from the armchair one’s own thought.