 How plausible is (8) as an account of physicalism? One objection concerns the notion of a fundamental property quite generally. For at least some philosophers, Lewis’s ideas about fundamentality are, as he himself puts it, a throwback to medieval metaphysics (Lewis 1983). Another objection is that physicalism on this view seems empirically speculative, since it seems to entail that there is a fundamental level in the world; if so, definitions in terms of grounding may do better (Schaffer 2003). Whatever is the truth about these objections, it is an interesting historical fact that Lewis defines physicalism twice-over. He defines it as supervenience physicalism (as we saw above) and also as fundamentality physicalism. There is no suggestion in his work that these are in any sense in tension (for further discussion, see Stoljar 2015). This underscores the point made earlier, namely, that in practice all versions of physicalism, and hence any answer to the completeness question, will include modal and non-modal elements. 