 There are strong and weak versions of RI. The weak version says that RI has some (in fact, many) true instances but also that there are predicates \(F\) such that if \(x\) and \(y\) are the same \(F\), then, for any equivalence relation, \(E\), whatsoever (whether or not an identity relation), \(E(x,y)\). This last condition implies that the relation x and y are the same F satisfies LL. The relation \(P\) defined so that \(P(x,y)\) if and only if \(H(x)\) and \(H(y)\), where \(H\) is some predicate, is an equivalence relation. Hence, if \(H\) holds of \(x\) but not of \(y\), there is an equivalence relation (namely, \(P(x,y))\) that fails to hold of \(x\) and \(y\). If we add that in this instance ‘\(x\) and \(y\) are the same \(F\)’ is to be interpreted in terms of the relation \(I(A,x,y)\), then the weak version of RI says that there is such a thing as relative identity and such a thing as absolute identity as well. The strong version, by contrast, says that there are (many) true instances of RI but there is no such thing as absolute identity. It is difficult to know what to make of the latter claim. Taken literally, it is false. The notion of unrestricted identity (in the sense of ‘unrestricted’ explained in §1) is demonstrably coherent. We return to this matter in §5 .