 Epistemic agency concerns the control that agents may exercise over their beliefs (and other doxastic states). It is common to distinguish between two main positions: indirect doxastic voluntarism and direct doxastic voluntarism. The former concerns the ways in which we may acquire or revise beliefs by doing research, evaluating the evidence, considering opposing opinions, and so on. It is fairly uncontroversial that we can exercise control over our beliefs in such indirect ways. In contrast, direct doxastic voluntarism is very controversial. It says that we have direct voluntary control over some of our beliefs, where voluntary control is usually understood as the kind of control that agents exercise in the performance of intentional actions. A main issue here is that direct doxastic voluntarism appears to be incompatible with the nature of beliefs. Beliefs are supposed to represent the world (or “aim at truth”). One may argue that there is no fundamental difference in the control over action and belief-formation, because in both cases the control consists basically in reason-responsiveness. But this proposal overlooks the central role of intentions. According to the standard theory, actions must be initiated and guided by intentions, in addition to being responsive to reasons. The challenge is to find beliefs-formations that are initiated and guided by intentions in the same or similar way as intentional actions. (For a more extensive overview and references see Vitz 2019.)