 As the above discussion demonstrates, much work in global justice begins with interpretations of—and arguments about—Rawlsian principles. Some recent work, however, has sought to break the Rawlsian spell, by demonstrating the plausibility of principles and theories not foundationally linked to Rawlsian arguments. This work includes many recent philosophical theories which—while undoubtedly influenced by Rawls—are less concerned with applying Rawlsian methods directly to global institutions (see also R. Miller 2010; Brock 2009; Altman &amp; Wellman 2009). We will here examine four important recent contributions to this project. The first, which we might call pure egalitarianism, argues that egalitarianism applies among persons considered as human; no institutional framework is needed to give rise to strong duties of distributive justice. The second, associated with Thomas Pogge, argues that the global institutional structure we see today is not merely unjust, but actively violating the negative rights of the global poor. The third notes that the fact of history—in particular, the shared experience of colonialism and imperial exploitation—is a central, and underexplored, part of any plausible account of global distributive justice. The fourth, finally, argues that an independent concern with property rights is necessary for the evaluation of global justice. We will consider these arguments in turn.