 Whether Y wants or accepts R’s φ-ing. Philosophers also debate whether certain features of the beneficiary are necessary for gratitude to be owed. Simmons (1979), for instance, claims that Y owes R no gratitude for benefits R forced on Y against Y’s will. Furthermore, it seems, Y must want R’s benefit in order for gratitude to be called for. If R delivers a benefit without Y’s desire or consent to receive it, this may betray a disregard for Y’s autonomy that would ultimately undermine R’s desert of gratitude (Berger 1975; Camenisch 1981; Meilaender 1984: 168). This condition seems too stringent in cases where a beneficiary desperately needs a benefit but is not able to accept it, say, because of incapacitation. In response to such worries, Simmons adds the proviso that if Y does not actually want the benefit, it may suffice for gratitude to be owed that Y would want the benefit if certain “impairing conditions” (such as drunkenness, mental disorder or ignorance) were removed. Still, some philosophers think gratitude may be called for in the absence of both Y’s desire and such impairing conditions. McConnell (1993), for instance, argues that a child who accepts an offer of college tuition from a benefactor owes that benefactor gratitude, even if she does not want to go to college.