 Dissatisfied with many-valued and supervaluationist approaches, Kamp (1981) introduced a contextualist solution to the paradox. Focussing on the inductive form of the sorites, Kamp maintained that every instantiation of the major premise is true in its individual context, where a context consists of the sentences (containing the given predicate) previously accepted as true. (For Kamp, a context just is a set of sentences.) Each instance is true because its antecedent must be added to the operative context before its consequent is evaluated, and the neighboring values referred to in the antecedent and consequent are only incrementally different. In a classical semantics the universal major premise would then be true as well; but Kamp adopts a non-classical definition dictating that the universal premise is true in contexts (i) where its instances are true and (ii) that remain coherent when the universal premise itself is added. The trouble is that adding that premise produces an incoherent context that “assign[s] opposite truth values to one and the same sentence” (Kamp 1981: 252). Hence the premise is false, despite all of its instances being true. The contextual relativity of this view is intuitively appealing, and it is free of the need to explain why each instance of the universal premise seems true when at least one must be false. At the same time, the nonstandard semantics for the universal quantifier may seem unintuitive.