 McCosh was correct in claiming that neither the empirical psychology of Bain, nor the Hegelian Idealism of Caird, was an adequate successor to the philosophical tradition to which, for the most part, they owed their origins. Nevertheless, both succeeded in attracting the talent and enthusiasm of a new generation of scholars, and they did so to powerful effect. Psychology became a hugely influential voice in the world of intellectual inquiry, and alongside other social 'sciences' such as sociology, economics and political science, this seemed to validate a strictly empirical approach to the study of many of the topics that had occupied the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. As a result, all these new subjects, whose origins owed much to Scottish philosophy, grew in allegiance and prestige. Inevitably, this development had a philosophical effect. The new 'sciences' gave greater credibility to the empiricist epistemology that appeared to underwrite them. Meanwhile, in a similar spirit, Idealist philosophy came under attack. In 1903, the Cambridge philosopher G.E. Moore published an essay entitled “The Refutation of Idealism”. It is arguable that Moore did not understand what he was aiming to refute, but in any event his essay began a return to ascendancy by the British empiricist tradition, aided in part by the Logical Empiricism that emanated from Austria and then took root in America. In due course this spelt the end of British Idealism. For empiricists, the most significant Scottish philosopher was now identified as Hume, whose naturalism, ironically, had been importantly rehabilitated by Norman Kemp Smith, Seth's student and successor. By this time Reid's star had long been waning, and he quickly came to be forgotten. For more than fifty years, both Reid and Hegel disappeared from the curriculum and conscientiousness of philosophers in Scotland. Accordingly, two major contributors to the 'recent philosophy' that Seth took to be the relevant context of his Gifford Lectures, were silenced. Little wonder, then, that his brilliant rapprochement between these perpetually antagonistic currents in philosophical thought soon disappeared.