 Some supporters of PIT adopt an eliminativist strategy towards such unconscious states. Searle (1990, 1991, 1992) argues, roughly, for the claim that only conscious or potentially conscious states exhibit intentionality. Since most unconscious states posited by cognitive science are not potentially conscious, they are not intentional. Searle presents this view of unconscious states as being in conflict with cognitive science. In contrast, Graham, Horgan, and Tienson (2007) and Mendelovici (2018) highlight the agreement between the assumptions of cognitive science and eliminativism about unconscious states: everyone agrees that unconscious states play functional roles, bear tracking relations to things in the environment, and have no phenomenal properties. Everyone also agrees that it can be fruitful to treat unconscious states as if they represented certain contents. The main disagreement is over whether unconscious states really do qualify as intentional. 