 At this point a comment is in order regarding a feature of this proposal that may seem puzzling. The boundaries of the category “scientific explanation” are far from clear, but while  (3)  is arguably an explanation, it is not what one usually thinks of as “science”—instead it is a claim from “ordinary life” or “common sense”. This raises the question of why adherents of the DN/IS model don’t simply respond to the alleged counterexample  (3)  by denying that it is an instance of the category “scientific explanation”—that is, by claiming that the DN/IS model is not an attempt to reconstruct the structure of explanations like  (3)  but is rather only meant to apply to explanations that are properly regarded as “scientific”. The fact that this response is not often adopted by advocates of the DN model is an indication of the extent to which, as noted in  Section 1,  it is implicitly assumed in most discussions of scientific explanation that there are important similarities or continuities in structure between explanations like  (3)  and explanations that are more obviously scientific and that these similarities that should be captured by some common account that applies to both. Indeed, it is a striking feature not just of Hempel (1965b) but of many other treatments of scientific explanation that much of the discussion in fact focuses on “ordinary life” singular causal explanations similar to  (3),  the tacit assumption being that conclusions about the structure of such explanations have fairly direct implications for understanding explanation in science.