If criteria of ontological commitment cannot be applied directly to ordinary language, then attributions of ontological commitment to philosophers—or ordinary folk, but we will focus on philosophers—cannot be made just by examining the statements or theories that they accept. Those statements or theories may have prima facie ontological commitments, to be sure, in virtue of their quantificational or referential apparatus. But some method is needed to determine which prima facie commitments count as genuine commitments. Enter here the method of paraphrase endorsed by Quine and his modern day followers. According to this method, we must first ask the philosopher to provide paraphrases of her statements into the regimented portion of our language, paraphrases that are acceptable by standards agreed to in advance. We then apply our criterion of ontological commitment to the regimented paraphrases. If the philosopher provides acceptable paraphrases that are not ontologically committed to Ks, then she is acquitted of commitment to Ks. If the paraphrases she provides are ontologically committed to Ks, then she is guilty of such commitment. If she opts out, refusing to provide paraphrases into the regimented portion of language, then attributions of ontological commitment are moot.