 Just as the argument from fine-tuning for design, the argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse must come to terms with the problem that the existence of life is old evidence for us. If one applies Howson’s ur-probability solution to it, one must consistently interpret all the probabilities in equation \(\eqref{simplemult}\) as assigned from the perspective of a counterfactual epistemic agent who is unaware of her/his own existence. At least prima facie, it is unclear what background knowledge can be assumed for an agent in that curious condition (see  Section 3.3  for considerations). Juhl (2007) speculates that motivating a non-negligible prior \(P(M)\) is impossible without implicitly relying on evidence which entails that the conditions are right for life. If this is correct, it means that running the fine-tuning argument for the multiverse as in equation \(\eqref{simplemult}\) based on an empirically well motivated non-negligible prior \(P(M)\) would inevitably involve fallacious double-counting (“double-dipping”, as Juhl calls it (2007: 554)) of the fine-tuning evidence \(R\).