  Other philosophers have insisted on distinguishing events from facts but have given accounts that effectively amount to an assimilation. This is true especially of those theories that construe events as property exemplifications, i.e., exemplifications of properties by objects at times (Kim 1966; Martin 1969; Goldman 1970; Taylor 1985; Hendrickson 2006). On such theories, events are individual entities. But because they have a structure, a difference in any constituent is sufficient to yield a different event. In particular, a difference in the relevant constitutive property is sufficient to distinguish events such as Caesar’s death, construed as Caesar’s exemplification of the property of dying, and Caesar’s violent death, construed as his exemplification of the property of dying violently (Kim 1976). Again, this makes events virtually as fine-grained as facts. It bears emphasis, however, that this consequence is not intrinsic to the theory of events as property exemplifications. Both Caesar’s death and his violent death could be construed as Caesar’s exemplification of one and the same property P, describable both as a dying and—with greater accuracy—as a dying violently. Thus, even if construed as a structured complex, an event can be coarsely referred to insofar as its names need not be sensitive to this structure (Bennett 1988). In this way the distinction between events and facts can be reinstated in terms of a firm distinction between semantic and metaphysical aspects (respectively) of the theory of event-descriptions.