 Cassirer modifies Hegel in 1925 [Cassirer (1925, ix–x)]: “Seen in this way, the problem of myth bursts the bounds of psychology and psychologism and takes its place in that universal domain of problems which Hegel designated as ‘phenomenology of spirit.’ That myth stands to the universal task of the phenomenology of spirit in an internal and necessary relationship can be mediately derived from Hegel’s own conception and determination of this concept: ‘The spirit which … knows itself as developed spirit,’ he writes in the preface to the Phänomenologie des Geistes, ‘is science.’ [Thus begins a considerably longer quotation from (GW 9, 22–4), which concludes ‘Knowledge in its first phase, or immediate spirit, is non-spiritual, i.e., sensible consciousness.’] These propositions, in which Hegel characterizes the relationship of ‘science’ to sensible consciousness, are valid to the full extent and with full precision for the relationship of knowledge to mythical consciousness. For the proper point of departure for all becoming of science, its beginning in the immediate, lies not so much in the sphere of sensible intuition as in that of mythical [intuition]… If, therefore, in accordance with Hegel’s demand, ‘science’ is supposed to offer the ladder to natural consciousness that leads to itself, then it must set this ladder one more rung lower.”