  It is necessary to be precise, however, about the exact role played by history in Rehberg's philosophy.  The historical strands of his thought have often been exaggerated, as if he completely rejected the natural law tradition and all rationalism in  politics.[50]  Although he was indeed skeptical about many claims made for natural law, he never denied its very existence; and although he doubted that practical reason determines concrete maxims, he never questioned that it could lay down the most general principles of morality.  More exactly, his position is that natural law and practical reason are necessary, but not sufficient, for moral and political practice. History completes reason, but it does not replace it.  This residual rationalism in Rehberg's political thought appears in some of his later articles on the historical school of  law.[51]  Reaffirming the Kantian view that there is an a priori dimension of right, he argued against the doctrine that all laws are nothing more than arbitrary commands.  In this regard, Fichte's critique of Rehberg is unfair and misses the  point.[52]  Rehberg taught not that historical traditions determine the standard of right, as Fichte claimed, but only that they determine how it should be applied and developed in specific circumstances.