  The “purest” option for the combinatorialist is simply to brazen it out and argue that the actual simples are, in fact, all the simples there could be (Armstrong 1989, 54ff; Driggers 2011, 56–61).  A more robust option suggested by Skyrms (1981) makes some headway  against the problem by introducing an “outer”, or  “second-grade” realm of possibility, but at the cost of  moving beyond the basic intuitions of combinatorialism (Armstrong  1989, 60; 1997, 165–167). Finally, Sider (2005, 681) suggests that  combinatorialists who (like Armstrong) are modal fictionalists can  deal with the problem of missing entities simply by appealing to yet  more fictionalism: As the combinatorialist fiction already  includes non-actual states of affairs with actually existing  constituents, there seems no reason not to extend the fiction to  include non-actual states of affairs whose constituents include  non-actual particulars and universals. Fictionalism itself, however,  leaves the combinatorialist with the deep problems detailed by Kim  (1986), Lycan (1993), and Rosen   (1993).[60] 