 While the orthodoxy of truth-conditional accounts of meaning adds weight to this challenge to deflationism, it is still, contra Devitt, an open question whether any non-truth-conditional account of meaning will turn out to be adequate. Moreover, even if there is no viable “truth-free” account, several philosophers (e.g., Bar-on, et al. 2005) have argued that deflationism has no more problem with a truth-conditional theory of meaning than any other approach to truth does. Others have gone further, arguing positively that there is no incompatibility between deflationism and truth-conditional theories. Alexis Burgess (2011, 407–410) argues that at least some versions of deflationism are compatible with mainstream model-theoretic semantics in linguistics (understood as providing explanations of truth conditions) and the recognition of “the manifest power and progress of truth-conditional semantics”. Claire Horsick (2008) argues that “circularity” arguments for incompatibility (or, as she prefers, “immiscibility”) fail. The only circularity involved here, she claims, is a harmless kind, so long as one is (like some proponents of truth-conditional semantics) offering a reciprocal, rather than a reductive, analysis of meaning. Mark Lance (1997, 186–7) claims that any version of deflationism based on an anaphoric reading of ‘is true’ (as in Brandom 1988, 1994) is independent of, and thus compatible with, any underlying account of meaning, including a truth-conditional one. Williams 1999 likewise claims that the role of truth in meaning theories for particular languages is just the expressive role that deflationists claim exhausts the notion of truth’s function. Of course, all of these claims have been contested, but they seem to show that the thesis that deflationism is inconsistent with a truth-conditional theory of meaning is neither a forgone conclusion nor necessarily an objection to deflationism, even if the thesis is correct. (For further discussion of this issue, see Gupta 1993b, Field 2005, Gupta and Martinez-Fernandez 2005, Patterson 2005, and Horisk 2007.) That said, one outstanding question that remains regarding the viability of any deflationary approach to truth is whether that approach can be squared with an adequate account of meaning.