  Of course, once we abandon identity as what matters –  especially if we do so in favor of a relation(s) that does not  guarantee life-long unity (e.g., connectedness) – then it is  not so clear anymore why what is best for the life-as-a-whole  “unit” should matter at all. But if considerations of  life-long welfare are set aside, then it is hard to see how EAS's  advance directive could still have any moral authority over FDS's  expressed interests. EAS's “life” would be over, for all  intents and purposes, so it seems that no matter what happens to FDS, it cannot retroactively affect the value of EAS's already-completed  “life.” This is the kind of move urged by some theorists  regardless of considerations of identity. What we should abandon,  they suggest, is the intuition that EAS's preferences are  authoritative over FDS's at all (Dresser 1986, Jaworska 1999). Many  demented patients are still capable of a kind of autonomy –  involving the capacity to value – and so their wishes  ought to be respected, goes this line, over the decisions of their  earlier selves (Jaworska 1999, 109). Of course, this kind of view  won't apply to end-stage dementia patients, but they may be  patients incapable of expressing (or having?) genuine preferences in  the first place.