 Theories of the sense of bodily ownership try to answer the following question: how does one go from degree 0 to degree 2, from a proprioceptive experience with the nonconceptual content [this leg is bent] to a proprioceptive judgment with the conceptual content [my leg is bent]? These theories pursue two objectives. First, to avoid positing new phenomenal properties unless necessary (Wu forthcoming). Secondly, to account for empirical data. On the one hand, the rubber hand illusion provides an experimental window in what is required for one to experience a hand as one’s own. On the other hand, one needs to understand how it is possible for an individual not to experience one’s limb as one’s own in disownership syndromes, as in somatoparaphrenia (Romano &amp; Maravita 2019), depersonalization disorder (Billon 2017), Cotard syndrome (Billon 2015, 2016), and xenomelia (Brugger et al. 2013), as well as in chronic pain (Moseley et al. 2012) and complex post-traumatic disorder (Ataria 2018). The interpretation of these various results, however, is controversial (Alsmith 2015; Wu forthcoming; Bradley forthcoming; Chadha 2018), and at most one can only offer an inference to the best explanation.