 Deontic reasoning Preference is closely related to obligation and permission. This shows in particular on the formal side, where preference logic in both static and dynamic variants (Hansson 1990; van Benthem, Grossi, &amp; Liu 2014) has clear analogies with  deontic logic.  Moreover, deontic and game-theoretic perspectives have given rise to many fruitful connections. In one direction, deontic notions may be seen as high-level descriptions of optimal actions given the information and obligations of agents (Kooi &amp; Tamminga 2008; Anglberger, Gratzl, &amp; Roy 2015). Conversely, an agent’s goals and intentions may be derived from their obligations (Klein &amp; Marra 2020). More generally, game solution procedures can enrich accounts of deontic notions (Başkent, Loohuis and Parikh 2012; Horty 2018). The connection between games and deontic reasoning may also highlight new topics, for instance on the relation between individual and collective preferences (Duijf, Tamminga &amp; Van De Putte 2021). Lastly, in artificial intelligence, deontic perspectives arise in tracking the behavior of a distributed system in relation to its goals, (Ågotnes &amp; Wooldridge 2010).