 Concerning the second criterion, it was noted at the end of  section 3.3  that the disagreement between quality-of-will theorists and the rest is partially grounded on competing conceptions of responsibility, and this suggests that settling the debate on the EC partly depends on how this broader dispute is resolved. Some philosophers think that it can be shown that one conception is the only correct one (Levy 2005; A. Smith 2012), but the consensus seems to be that the different conceptions are all valid, since each of them captures different aspects of our responsibility practices (Watson 1996; Shoemaker 2011; Zimmerman 2015). If the latter view is correct, it’s entirely possible that certain epistemic requirements apply to some types of responsibility but not to others (Mason 2015; Zimmerman 2017) and, consequently, it might well be the case that there are different EC depending on the type of responsibility we focus on.