 In developing this proposal, Pritchard draws on Wittgenstein’s final writings collected in On Certainty. There, in a discussion of the possibility of skepticism, Wittgenstein observes that “the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn” (1969, §341). On Pritchard’s reading, these “propositions” are not beliefs – which he takes to be responsive to rational considerations – but commitments of a more fundamental, practical kind. Wittgenstein’s point was a general one, but just for that reason, Pritchard contends, it illuminates philosophical debates about the justification of “religious” beliefs. “The religious believer’s overall set of commitments … includes fundamental commitments which are more a matter of faith than of reason, but this fact alone doesn’t mark any epistemically significant difference between the life of faith and a life lived without it. With the relationship between faith and reason and its role in the production of rational belief understood along quasi-fideistic lines, religious commitment can be at its most fundamental level a matter of faith and yet there nonetheless be rational religious beliefs” (118). If Pritchard is correct, something like faith is a feature of rationality, and so-called religious faith is epistemically on par with a-rational commitments in other domains.