 One way to proceed is to extend this idea. Begin with the intuition that there’s something special about the present—something distinctive. This seems attractive enough. But how might we capture it in our metaphysical model of time? One way to do it is to assert that present things are the only things that exist, that is, to endorse the presentist’s ontic thesis. Certainly, this marks the present as distinctive. And, to the extent that we wish to capture and preserve the idea that the present is “special” (in some sense), presentism fares well against this measure. But, of course, any model that privileges the present in some way or other will fare well against the same measure (such as the growing block theory, which states that the present is special in virtue of being the latest moment of existence). So, for this argument to motivate presentism fully, further argument must be given for thinking that rival views don’t come up to scratch.