 Just as God’s proposed extension had to be protected from charges that he must therefore be divisible (by introducing the concept of indiscerpibility), so his existence in time had to be protected from charges that his existence must be successive (and therefore susceptible to change from moment to moment) (Thomas 2018, 38). More insisted, accordingly, that God’s existence was not successive, but that his existence somehow transcended time and was present to all eternity all at once (Thomas 2018, 34). It has been suggested, therefore, that with regard to time or duration, More accepted a holenmeristic view that God could be entirely “in every moment yet is not spread out in time” (Thomas 2018, 45). Holenmerism with regard to space is the view that God is entirely in the whole of space and entirely in every tiny part of space; so, it cannot be equated with the view that he is entirely in every tiny part of time, but is not in the whole of time. It is by no means clear, therefore, that “whilst More rejected holenmerism for divine spatial presence, he maintained it for divine temporal presence” (Thomas 2018, 45). We should bear in mind that “holenmerism” was a neologism coined by More and he applied it only to claims about spatial occupation. To say that God is everywhere in his entirety and in every part of space (be it never so small) in his entirety is clearly an absurd claim, a “mad Jingle”, as More said (1662, Immortality of the Soul, separately paginated, 43). But to say that all moments of time, past, present, and future, are simultaneously present to an eternal God, while certainly puzzling, does not seem so obviously contradictory. The historical fact is, More’s view of God’s relationship to time was fairly standard among contemporary theologians, and should not be compared with his highly radical and unheard of view of God’s relationship to space (Grant 1981, 223).