 This objection is, in a sense, symmetrical to one considered in relation to fair-play accounts. There we saw that merely receiving the services provided by the state is not enough to ground political obligation unless those receiving these benefits have certain mental states (i.e., the intention to accept the benefits). Here the objection is that receiving the same services is not enough to ground political obligation unless those providing them have certain mental states (i.e., the intention to benefit their recipients). However, it’s worth noticing that the former objection applies here as well. As we have seen, the services provided by the state are hard to avoid and, more importantly, the demands that states make on us are the same whether we welcome those services or not. But the claim that we can incur duties of gratitude for benefits that we don’t welcome, and perhaps explicitly reject, seems controversial. Once again, it might be that it’s irrational to reject the benefits, but if we do (and we are sincere), it’s unclear that any costs may be imposed on us as a way of discharging our duties of gratitude.