 As noted, in recent years the idea that the firm is something that can be owned has been challenged (Bainbridge 2008; Stout 2012; Strudler 2017). If this is right, then the ownership argument collapses. But similar contractarian arguments for shareholder control of firms have been constructed which do not rely on the assumption of firm ownership. All that is assumed in these arguments is that some people own capital, and others own labor. Capital can “hire” labor (and other inputs of production) or labor can “hire” capital. It just so happens that, in most cases, capital hires labor. We know this because in most cases capital-providers are the ultimate decision-makers in the firm. In a publicly-traded corporation, they elect the board. These points are emphasized especially by those who regard the firm as a “nexus of contracts” among various parties (Easterbrook &amp; Fischel 1996; Jensen &amp; Meckling 1976).