 The line of argument Kripke uses, if successful, is applicable to all non-actual natural kinds and their analogs (except for natural-kind analogs of Kaplan’s automobile or Salmon’s Noman). It is unclear that it or something like it is successfully applicable to individuals like Vulcan, but if it is, then we must say that such individuals are impossible objects. Some theorists liken Vulcan to fictional objects, as we will see in the next section, and some theorists argue that fictional objects are impossible objects (Kaplan 1973, 1980 version of Kripke 1972: 157–58, Fine 1984: 126–28, Yagisawa 2010: 271–77). If Vulcan is an impossible object, the problem of uniquely specifying Vulcan, as opposed to Nacluv, becomes less urgent, for it is not evident that we should be able to specify an impossible object uniquely and non-trivially.