 There was, however, no doctrinal unity on perception among Cook Wilson’s epigones. Prichard was probably the first to put Cook Wilson’s views into print in ‘Appearances and Reality’ (Prichard 1906) but, as already pointed out, he ended up arguing that in perception we systematically mistake colour expanses for objects. H. H. Price, who was at first close to Cook Wilson (Price 1924), incorporated a sense-data theory while rejecting phenomenalism in Perception (Price 1932). He became for that reason one of Austin’s targets in Sense and Sensibilia (Austin 1962), which remains, for all its novelty, faithful to Cook Wilson’s orthodoxy on knowledge. At all events, a form of direct realism in the theory of perception is one of the characteristic features of Oxford Realism. It is an ancestor to contemporary variants such as the position argued for by John McDowell in Mind and World (McDowell 1994) and, after a long eclipse, Cook Wilson’s views are once more playing a role in current debates about perception. (See for example references to them in Kalderon (2011, 241; 2018, xv, 49, 88 &amp; 184), Siegel (2018, 2), Stoneham (2008, 319–320).)