However, with other kinds of costs, or objectionable features, it may sound wrong to say even that one has reason for the means. Suppose I have reason to alleviate pangs of hunger.  One sufficient means to this is eating a sandwich; another sufficient means is killing myself  (Broome 2005b). Some will resist the conclusion that I have any reason at all to kill myself.  This is an argument against Strong Reasons Sufficiency and Weak Reasons Sufficiency.  Or suppose I have reason to improve college policy.  But a necessary means to this is to kill the old don who resists any change (because unanimous approval is required).  Some will resist the conclusion that I have any reason at all to kill the don. This is an argument against Strong Reasons Necessity and Weak Reasons Necessity.  However, it may not be an argument against Ought Necessity.  It may be said that the fact that improving policy requires killing the don is itself a strong reason against improving policy, in light of which it is not true that one ought to improve it.  In that case, Ought Necessity does not imply that one ought to kill the don, which seems intuitive. In any event, the force of the intuition on which the argument rests may be resisted.  Granted, it sounds odd to say that one has reason to kill oneself.  But this may have a pragmatic explanation.  Why bother to identify any reason to kill oneself when it is vastly outweighed by the reasons against doing so?  (Raz 2005a; Schroeder 2005a, 2007).