 (4) Finally, I may find myself in epistemic circumstances in which inconsistency is not merely excusable on account of my “finitary predicament” (Cherniak 1986), but where inconsistency appears to be rationally required. Arguably, the Preface Paradox constitutes such a scenario (Makinson  1965).[15]  Here is one standard way of presenting it. Suppose I author a meticulously researched non-fiction book. My book is composed of a large set of non-trivial propositions \(p_{1},\dots, p_{n}\). Seeing that all of my claims are the product of scrupulous research, I have every reason firmly to believe each of the \(p_{i}\) individually. But I also have overwhelming inductive evidence for \(q\): that at least one of my beliefs is in error. The \(p_{i}\) and \(q\) cannot be jointly true since \(q\) is equivalent to the negation of the conjunction of the \(p_{i}\). Yet, it would seem irrational to abandon any of my beliefs for the sake of regaining consistency, at least in the absence of any new evidence. The Preface Paradox thus may be thought to tell against  CON:  arguably, I may be within my rational rights in holding inconsistent beliefs (at least in certain contexts). However, it also seems to constitute a direct counterexample to  IMP.  For in the Preface scenario I believe each of the \(p_{i}\) and yet it looks as if I ought to disbelieve an obvious logical consequence thereof: their conjunction (because \(q\) is transparently equivalent to \(\neg (p_{1} \land \dots \land p_{n})\)).