 (4) Emotions: “Emotions in the pregnant sense” (1917: 119[100]), or “spiritual feelings” (geistige Gefühle) (1917: 66[50]), as Stein also calls them, are properly speaking intentional states: “[emotions] are always feelings of something. In every feeling (Fühlen), I am directed at an object” (1917: 119[100]). Stein also concurs with what is sometimes called the “foundational thesis”, held by Brentano, Husserl or Pfänder, according to which emotions are grounded in or derive their intentionality from some presentational or representational act (Vorstellung) or cognition (Drummond 2018: 9ff.). This is the reason why a “purely feeling subject is an impossibility” (1917: 125[107]; see also 1917: 67[50]). On the other hand, Stein controversially contends that, just as in the case of moods, a “pure spirit” or a “body-less subject” may become for example frightened, but will not “lose its mind”, as the fear will not exerting any psychic causality. Such a creature will also “feel pleasure and pain in its full depth”, even if “these emotions don’t exert any [bodily] effect”. Spiritual feelings are as a matter of fact bodily felt, but considered in their “pure essence” “not body-bound (leibgebunden)” (1917: 66–67[50]).