 Some Simulation Theorists defend a strong view of simulation-based mindreading (Gordon 1986, 1995, 1996; Gallese et al. 2004; Gallese &amp; Sinigaglia 2011). They maintain that many simulation-based mindreading events are (entirely) constituted by mental simulation events (where mental simulation events are simulated mental states or simulation processes). In other words, some Simulation Theorists claim that, on many occasions, the fact that a subject S is representing someone else’s mental states is nothing over and above the fact that S is undergoing a mental simulation event: the former fact reduces to the latter. For example, Lisa’s undergoing a mirrored disgust experience as a result of observing John’s disgusted face would count as a mindreading event: Lisa’s simulated mental state would represent John’s disgust (Gallese et al. 2004). Let us call this “the Constitution View”.