 Let's move on now to a discussion of fictionalism, which is the last option for nominalists. Unlike paraphrase nominalists, fictionalists admit that the platonist's face-value semantics for mathematical discourse is correct; but because fictionalists don't believe in abstract objects, they think that mathematical sentences like ‘3 is prime’ are not true. In other words, fictionalists maintain that (a) platonists are right that sentences like ‘3 is prime’ do purport to be about abstract objects, but (b) there are no such things as abstract objects, and so (c) these sentences — and, indeed, our mathematical theories — are untrue. Thus, on this view, just as Alice in Wonderland is not true because there are no such things as talking rabbits, hookah-smoking caterpillars, and so on, so too our mathematical theories are not true because there are no such things as numbers and sets and so  on.[7].  (Fictionalism has been developed by Field (1980, 1989, 1998), Balaguer (1998a, 2009), Rosen (2001), and Leng (2005a, 2005b, 2010). One might also interpret Melia (2000), Yablo (2002a, 2002b, 2005), and Bueno (2009) as fictionalists. Finally, Hoffman (2004) endorses a kind of fictionalism, but her view is very different from the one under discussion here; for a bit more on her view, see the entry on  fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics.)