 Still, it is worth bearing in mind that the available vocabulary may not fully capture what we now think of as emotion, affect, or mood. Whether called ‘passion,’ ‘affect‘ or ‘sentiment,’ emotions were usually conceived as having objects, which could be understood causally or intentionally (or both). Kames’s conception of an emotion “in its nature quiescent, and merely a passive feeling, [such that it] must have a cause; but cannot be said properly speaking, to have an object” was unusual and prompted him to introduce an innovative distinction between ‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ (Elements of Criticism I, chap. ii). Sometimes the preferred terminology didn’t even capture the range of affective states recognized by early modern philosophers. Descartes, for instance, wrote of “internal” or “intellectual” emotions, which are not passions proper, but certainly have affective components, as well as being causally intertwined with the true passions. Spinoza distinguished “affects” from various emotions and moods that for him indicated “strength of mind,” while reserving a special status for “blessedness” [beatitudo]. On the other hand, ‘passion’ didn’t even begin to get its contemporary flavor of violent, often sexually-charged emotions until the middle of the eighteenth century (at the earliest), and so what counted as a passion can sometimes come as a surprise. Hobbes included “competition” and “glory” among his passions, and many favorite early modern passions are quite placid, such as ‘wonder,’ or ‘the love of truth.’ There was also a whole special vocabulary for affective states that were recognized by various medical traditions, ranging from ‘splenetic humour’ to general ‘melancholy.’