 Accounts of contract that emphasize the normativity of the contract relation face a shared challenge, although it expresses itself differently for different versions of the view. The challenge is to explain why the motives parties adopt in the shadow of legal enforcement do not undermine the value of the special relationship, whose desirability grounds contractual obligation on the relational model. Theorists who embed the contract relation inside pre-existing social and moral relationships must explain why the self-interested motives associated with contractual compliance—“greed and fear” as G. A. Cohen (2009: 40–44) puts it—do not “crowd out” the desirable attitudes and motives out of which the enveloping pre-legal relationships are built. This concern has been much discussed—both the empirical reality of crowding out (see, e.g., Deci, Koestner, &amp; Ryan 1999; Gneezy and Rustichini 2000) and its normative significance for valued social relationships (Atiq 2014). Theorists who understand contract as a free-standing relation can avoid this challenge and might even embrace the crowding out of socially thicker motives as a feature of the contract relation rather than a bug (Markovits 2011). But the general problem remains in place of explaining how an arm’s-length relation among self-interested parties might establish a morally desirable form of solidarity. This challenge becomes especially pressing in light of the fact that most contracts have organizations as a party (Leib 2015). Organizations lack the properties of natural persons out of which the relational theories build their accounts of the normativity of the contract relation. Whereas contracts among organizations are the natural domain for economic theories (see  §1.3),  they are difficult for relational theories to compass.