 Pereda’s recent work also shows he thinks that there is an originality problem facing Latin American philosophy, an skeptical view presupposed by his claim that philosophy in the region is “invisible” (i.e., suffers from the IDP and EDP mentioned above). Like Frondizi, Pereda first praises the work of Latin American essayists, and even takes it to be a model that philosophy must emulate in order to overcome its invisibility problems. But to be a model that needs emulation is one thing, to count as Latin American philosophy quite another. Since Pereda also locates non-academic philosophy somewhere else, as a result, he runs head-on into a conclusion similar to Frondizi’s skepticism about the features of Latin American philosophy. Such skepticism is inevitable because on Pereda’s view, Latin American philosophy suffers from the “arrogant reasoning” of its practitioners, which fuels the epistemic vices of “nationalist enthusiasm” (in the case of distinctivists) or “subaltern fervor” and “craving for novelty” (in the case of universalists). Such vices, and ultimately arrogant reasoning itself, are to be blamed for the internal and external invisibility of Latin American philosophy.