 Other things.  Intuitively, not only could there  have been fewer things, there could have been more things or, more  generally, things other than those that actually exist. As  above, combinatorialism as it stands seems able to account for many  instances of this intuition: Figure 2 illustrates how a non-actual  hydronium ion I might exist in another world. Likewise, there  seems no reason to deny, e.g., that there are rearrangements w of the actual world's simples wherein exist all of the human beings  that actually exist (at, say, 0000GMT 1 January 2013) and more  besides that are composed of simples that, in fact, constitute things other than human beings (Armstrong 1997,   165).[58]  Combinatorialism also seems able to account for the possibility of  conjunctive and structural universals that are simply rearrangements  of actual simples. It is not implausible to think that such  recombinations can give rise to, say, exotic biological kinds that  have no actual instances (Armstrong 1989, 55–56). Thus, in  particular, combinatorialism seems quite able to provide the truth  condition   (24)  for   (23)  and, hence, can account for some possibilities involving  “missing” universals that, intuitively, ought to be  possible. 