 Interpretations of Husserl diverge, partly due to difficulties in being clear about how to interpret his shift from the “quality/matter” to the “noema” terminology, his immanent/transcendent contrast, and a closely associated aspect of his philosophy—one to which he attached great importance—his method of “transcendental-phenomenological reduction”. Husserl claimed it is possible (and, indeed, essential to the practice of phenomenology as an a priori discipline, distinct from psychology) that one investigate consciousness in a way that withholds certain commitments concerning spatio-temporal particulars. Husserl held that what makes the relevant suspension of commitment possible is that, given the essentially perspectival (in his terms, the evidentially incomplete or “inadequate”) nature of perceptual experience of an object, in no case does anything subjectively evident about the actual course of your experience of an F as such completely rule out the possibility that there was in fact no transcendent object, then experienced as an F. (Ideas [1913] 1983 §§ 42–50.) On one interpretation of his methodological “bracketing”, Husserl infers that intentional experience is always in essence detachable from any such worldly (“external”) objects to which it is in fact directed.