Second, Dworkin’s law as integrity theory is primarily a theory of law – of how the content of the law is determined (metaphysically) – rather than a theory of legal interpretation. (See the entry on legal interpretivism.) According to law as integrity, the content of the law is constituted by the best constructive interpretation of the legal system (as well as more specific consequences that follow from those principles) (Dworkin 1986, chap. 7). Thus, Dworkinian constructive interpretation figures centrally in his account of what determines the content of the law. Dworkin further argues that the best interpretation of the legal system is the set of principles that best fits and justifies the legal practices, including constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions (1986, chaps. 4–10). And he offers a well-known account of the dimensions of fit and justification (1986, especially chapter 7).