  While McMahan may be right that strong interests of an earlier person trump comparatively trivial interests of a current nonperson, his answer covers only a subset of possible conflicts between the earlier and current self. It is much more difficult to arbitrate between the two selves when the interests of the current nonperson are also substantial. I have argued (Jaworska unpublished) that when the interests of the earlier person are relatively minor, substantial interests of the current nonperson ought to trump. Thus, for example, if the earlier self had only a relatively weak preference to die — let's say she simply didn't want to further complicate relationships with family members for whom she happened not to care all that much — the current self's substantial interest in continuing to live ought to prevail. More controversially, I also argued that highly vital interests of the current nonperson ought to trump even some non-trivial, rather serious interests of the earlier person. Thus, in the standard version of the “preference to die” scenario, what is at stake for the earlier self is a rather serious interest in maintaining the integrity of her life narrative. However, this interest does not reach the level of high vitality, because there is only so much damage that a period of senility at the end of a life can do to an otherwise successful life-narrative. By contrast, the current self's interest in her very survival is more highly vital. It is also, unlike the earlier self's interest, an active interest — an ongoing subject of interests has reason to be strongly prudentially invested in it. These factors combined lend, in this scenario, priority to the interest of the current self.