 The parallel to option and brute luck is suggestive, but a defender of the unqualified Control principle has resources here. Appealing to the distinction between scope and degree, one might grant that the reckless driver is, importantly, responsible for more things (including a death), but not more blameworthy. In fact, the parallel to the treatment of option luck in the debate about distributive justice may fit best if we are interested in what we are responsible for, rather than how responsible we are. Further, we have seen reason to think that on reflection we should not blame one reckless driver more than another. One might question Otsuka’s premise that degree of blameworthiness is to be understood in terms of appropriate degree of attitudes such as resentment (or even the weaker premise that the degree of blameworthiness tracks the appropriate degree of such attitudes). But even if we accept this premise, we might conclude that while it is understandable that one dog owner would be more resentful than the first, more resentment is not actually justified. This observation takes us back to the subtle nature of the dialectic. 