 And what are these drift processes? They are the same physical indiscriminate sampling processes that Gulick, the Hagedoorns, Wright, and Fisher (and later, Kimura, who will be discussed further below) sought to characterize: the sampling of gametes in the formation of zygotes, the sampling of parents, the founding of new populations, and the splitting of populations. (Note that this is not intended to be an exhaustive list). The outcomes are likewise those mentioned by drift’s founders: fluctuations of gene frequencies from one generation to the next, loss of variants from a population, and fixation of a type in a population. (Again, this is not an exhaustive list). Each of these outcomes is affected by population size, as any indiscriminate sampling process is; smaller populations undergoing drift tend to experience greater fluctuations in gene frequencies, a faster loss of variants from the population, and faster fixation of types in a population. Thus, the Beatty/Hodge/Millstein account of drift—the Causal Process Account of Drift—is one that is grounded in the historical development of the term and in biological practice, with the philosopher’s role being one of clarification and elaboration. Christopher Stephens (2004), Robert Northcott (2010), and Chris Haufe (2013) also seem to endorse the bare bones view of drift as a sampling process, if not the Causal Process Account of Drift in all of its details.