 As may be surmised, by relying on the above-mentioned methodological stance, Zen Buddhism has produced an understanding of reality—one’s own self, nature with life activities and human nature—quite different from those offered by Western philosophy. Therefore, we can say that Zen is an anti-philosophy in that it is not a systematization of knowledge built on the use of a discursive mode of reasoning anchored in the (alleged) certainty or transparency of ego-consciousness, one that follows an epistemological paradigm built on an ego-logical, either-or, dualistic mode of knowing. Yet, it upholds something like a philosophy that springs forth through a reflective restatement of the practice, though this “upholding” must be understood with a proviso that it maintains, as mentioned in the foregoing, a “positionless position.” (Abe, 1989.) This is because Zen abhors “holding onto” anything, which Zen considers a case of “self-binding without a rope.” Such a self-binding would trap the Zen practitioner into a mode of attachment that is the source of suffering and, consequently, would disrupt the sense of embodied freedom it cherishes.