 Take a relativistic spacetime structure to be a structure that includes a relation of temporal precedence on which the past of a spacetime point is the set of points on or within its past lightcone, and its future, the set of points on or within its future lightcone, and other points are temporally unrelated to it, neither past nor future. One can ask whether a given account of the goings-on in the world is compatible with a relativistic spacetime structure. If a theory requires events outside of its lightcone to be partitioned into those that are past, future, and simultaneous with a point, as does the de-Broglie Bohm theory, it is not compatible with a relativistic spacetime structure. Compatibility of a theory with relativistic spacetime structure, in this sense, is a distinct issue from Lorentz covariance of the equations expressing the theory’s dynamical laws. One can construct theories on which nonrelativistic spacetime structure is introduced dynamically, as is done by Dürr, Goldstein, Münch-Berndl and Zanghì (1999), who formulate a Bohmian theory against a background of Minkowski spacetime by introducing an auxiliary field that picks out a distinguished foliation that is then used to formulate the dynamics of the theory (see Dürr et al. 2014 for discussion). Berndl, Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghì (1996) consider the class of trajectory theories—that is, theories that, like the de Broglie-Bohm theory, assign definite trajectories to particles—and prove that such theories could not satisfy the Born-rule distribution postulate along arbitrary spacelike hyperplanes. The argument generalizes to any theories, such as modal interpretations, that assign definite values to variables other than position (Dickson and Clifton 1998, Arntzenius 1998, Myrvold 2002). Theories of this sort, therefore, must invoke a distinguished foliation.