 Simon accepts the common medieval definition of a true thought as one that is in agreement (adequatio) with things, an agreement determined by the way things are. However, unlike other thirteenth-century masters of arts (e.g., Robert Kilwardby and Radulphus Brito), Simon maintains that this agreement concerns the second, and composite, operation of the intellect—composition and division—as well as the first, and simple, one—the apprehension of quiddities (In Perih.: q.6). Hence, while other masters hold that truth can only obtain between composite objects (i.e., composite thoughts and composite things), Simon holds that, since the intellectual apprehension of a quiddity is naturally in agreement with this quiddity, it is also susceptible of being true (In Perih.: q.6). Regarding the truth of composite items, however, Simon’s position is remarkably elegant, as is evident from his discussion of empty reference in his commentary on the Prior Analytics.