 Besides tools from algebra and analysis, logical investigations about paradoxes have recently applied graph theory (see Cook 2004, Rabern, Rabern and Macauley 2013, Beringer and Schindler 2017, Hsiung 2017): a basic idea is the attempt to grasp in geometric terms the patterns of paradox, their structural features. For instance, one can assign a reference graph (rfg) to sentences of the language of arithmetic with truth via Leitgeb’s notion of dependence (Leitgeb 2005). It is further conjectured that a solution to the characterization problem for dangerous rfgs amounts to the claim that basically the Liar- and the Yablo graph are the only paradoxical rfgs. This route is independently developed in Rossi 2019 by exploring the wide range of semantic behaviours displayed by paradoxical sentences, and providing a unified theory of truth and paradox. The result is a theory of truth that yields a threefold classification of paradoxical sentences (liar-like sentences, truth-teller-like sentences, and revenge sentences), and proposes a way of interpreting all three kinds, as well as paradox-free sentences, within a single model, where the basic tool is a notion of “semantic graph”. In Hsiung 2020, instead, Leitgeb’s approach is combined with the one of Beringer and Schindler 2017 to study a type of paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which is defined in terms of Leitgeb’s dependence relation itself.