  Two consequences are apparent. Firstly, the functionalist’s commitment to alethic properties realizing the \(F\)-role seems to be a commitment to a grounding thesis. This explains why Lynch’s version of alethic functionalism fits the pattern typical of inflationary theories of truth, which are committed to (6) and (7) above. Secondly, however, like most traditional inflationary theories, Lynch’s functionalism about truth appears to be monistic. Indeed, the functionalist commitment to identifying truth with and only with the unique property of being \(F\) seems to entail a commitment to strong alethic monism in (5) rather than pluralism (Wright 2005). Nonetheless, it is clear that Lynch’s version does emphasize that sentences can have the property of being \(F\) in different ways. The theory thus does a great deal to accommodate the intuitions that initially motivate the pluralist thesis that there is more than one way of being true, and to finesse a fine line between monism and pluralism.