To illustrate the problem of sufficiency, consider the following examples. Suppose, as is standard, that the existence of a set necessitates the existence of any of its members. Then, intuitively, the sentence ‘{a, b} exists’ is implicitly committed to a, a result that is captured by entailment accounts of ontological commitment. But since the existence of a is not sufficient for the existence of {a, b}, a is not a truthmaker for ‘{a, b} exists’, and the truthmaker criterion for particulars fails to capture this commitment. For a second example, suppose that, necessarily, elephants have trunks, but that any trunk could exist without there existing any elephants. Then, intuitively, the sentence ‘elephants exist’ is ontologically committed, not only to elephants, but to elephants' trunks, a result that is captured by entailment accounts. But since trunks are not among the truthmakers for ‘elephants exist’, the truthmaker criterion for kinds fails to capture this commitment. For a final example, consider the sentence ‘bachelors exist’. Since it is analytic (suppose) that males exist if bachelors exist, this sentence, intuitively, is ontologically committed to males, a result that is captured by both quantifier and entailment accounts. But no male is a truthmaker for ‘bachelors exist’, since any male could exist without there existing any bachelors. So, again, the truthmaker criterion for kinds fails to capture an implicit commitment.