Besides the view that value is some sort of mystical property of objects, other ones are identified by Ehrenfels in opposition to his. Among these views is the one put forward by the so-called “first school” of Austrian value theory, as put forward by certain outstanding economists (specifically C. Menger, E. Böhm von Bawerk, and F. von Wieser, as mentioned in Ehrenfels 1897, 3 n.). On this view the value of objects “is neither a property nor an essence of them, considered as such, but rather merely their indispensability in the satisfaction of our desires” (Ehrenfels 1897, 3). While Ehrenfels fully appreciates this school’s contribution to the understanding of value (Smith 1994, 282), he nonetheless thinks that it does not provide a satisfactory theory of value in general due to its narrow focus on economic value. There are for him other types of value besides this, as exhibited by counter-examples (as when the lock of hair belonging to one’s mother is kept as a thing of value). A general theory of value on his view is to illuminate economic value and not vice versa.