 Russell tries to sidestep these problems by distinguishing between “primary desires, for ends, and secondary desires, for means”. The good for each person is what he desires for its own sake and generally speaking he cannot be mistaken about this. But he can be mistaken about whether a given object is the means to what he ultimately desires. Furthermore, if he is mistaken, his secondary desires may be immoral. As Russell realizes, this leads to the “Socratic maxim that no man sins wittingly” since nobody can desire what he believes to be bad. But an agent can both desire the bad and have bad desires, since his secondary desires may be inimical to his ultimate ends. Unfortunately this amendment cannot save the theory. According to Russell’s theory, in some cases at any rate “X is good”, means “I want X for its own sake”, and such judgments are relatively immune from error. Furthermore, people do seem to desire what they believe to be bad (the “Socratic maxim” is not known as the “Socratic Paradox” for nothing!) and we commonly think that desires for ends, as well as desires for means, can be bad. Finally, the theory, even in its amended form, reduces moral judgments to statements of a psychological state. Thus the theory violates Russell’s theoretical constraints and is inconsistent with the way we usually talk.