 Regarding the first question, Wittgenstein claims that “An obvious, and correct, answer to the question ‘What makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so?’ is that it is the intention” (1958: 32). But Goodman disagrees. He acknowledges that intentions are “usually involved” in setting up symbol systems, as they are in building bridges, “but in both cases, we can study the results independently of the thoughts of the makers” (1972: 125). He claims that what a painting or drawing denotes pictorially depends solely on the arrangement of colours on its surface, and the semantic and syntactic conventions that define the symbol system to which it belongs (1968: 42). But it seems to follow that few portraits, if any, portray a single individual, as opposed to every member of a class of similar individuals. For if pictures are effectively predicate-like symbols in a pictorial system, then unless X is the sole individual satisfying a portrait, i.e., unless the portrait is a uniquely identifying pictorial “description” of X, X is not the only subject of the portrait, the sole individual it portrays. Furthermore, it is hard to see how one can paint an inaccurate portrait of someone, just as it is hard to see how one can use an inaccurate description to refer to someone (e.g., “The man drinking a martini is my brother”, when he is actually drinking a daiquiri), if whom one refers to depends purely on the syntax and semantics of the phrase (Kripke 1977).