 Those who believe that nudging is manipulative and that manipulation is objectionable for the same sorts of reasons as coercion is objectionable do not see libertarian paternalism as a viable middle path between paternalism and the liberty tradition. Instead, they argue that it is simply a different form of paternalism, one that raises the same or very similar concerns about respect for individuals as coercive paternalism (see Quong 2011; Noggle 2018; Soccia 2019). Moreover, as noted above in the discussion of the liberty tradition, some have granted that individuals are not good at the relevant kinds of decision-making but deny that government actors are sufficiently competent or well-motivated to design nudges that do more good than harm. Whether this objection to libertarian paternalism sticks is a complicated empirical question. But insofar as one accepts that libertarian paternalism is manipulative, it does not avoid worries from those in the liberty tradition.