 As for  (NKS2),  we just examined the case of free will. In Wolfram’s perspective, free will looks just like another puzzling philosophical phenomenon explained away by the advance of (a new kind of) science. Just as life was puzzling before the discovery of the double helix, free will was puzzling before the discovery of a suitable scientific theory, one that can finally account for the separation between micro and macro level. Many reductionist philosophers are no strangers to this kind of argument. The concepts and intuitions used in contemporary philosophy are often rooted in current scientific practices. When groundbreaking discoveries are made, old arguments may be revised: troublesome concepts become harmless and new challenges are introduced. From this perspective, Wolfram’s account of the free will problem may lack philosophical rigor, but it is a promising start to re-address the challenge armed with new scientific models of determinism and complexity—pretty much as Dennett does. While many successful applications are needed to fully vindicate  (NKS2),  our first assessment concludes that, at the very least, it is not obviously false. As for the “new regularities” promised by  (NKS2),  we will address them in the next section. 