 Perhaps the most important “practical” ethical result of this discussion appears in Sapaṇ’s clear advocacy of moral contextualism. Different systems of vows require different behaviors—and yet within each system, these behaviors are morally significant and genuinely beneficial or harmful. The fact that there are some eighteen different systems of monastic vows, which differ among themselves about countless particulars, does not undermine the validity of each system on its own terms, and does not allow for impromptu mixing and matching. A resonant example Sapaṇ cites is that whereas some systems consider the killing of an unborn fetus an instance of the taking of a human life, other systems do not. But the taking of a human life is one of the principal downfalls (pārājika), an irredeemable infraction of the monastic vows that causes immediate expulsion. And presumably, if you have violated your vows in this way, you cannot simply move to another monastery where killing a fetus is not considered having taken a human life. But more importantly, Sapaṇ explains that the vows, though they differ one from the other, are all approved by the Buddha as sets that serve the function of monastic vows, which is to prevent the vow-holder’s mind from straying into infractions—like a fence around a field. Vows have morally consequential effects upon the mind, and they consist in coherent, Buddha-approved systems.