 Using the distinction between intuitions and other ideas, Bolzano is now able to draw an important epistemological distinction among propositions and in particular also among true propositions: A proposition is a conceptual proposition iff it does not contain any intuition but consists exclusively of concepts, such as the propositions [God is omnipotent], [Gratefulness is a duty], or [\(\sqrt{2}\) is irrational]; all the other propositions are called ‘empirical propositions’ (or also ‘perceptual propositions’) by Bolzano, e.g. [That is a flower], or [Socrates was an Athenian] (WL II, 33 f.). There is no problem in transferring this distinction from the sphere of propositions to the sphere of judgments, since (as already mentioned) by every judgment a certain proposition is uniquely determined (via relation \(\mathbf{G})\) as its “material” (WL III, 115).