 The variety of norms or values that underpin normative reasons requires some modification of the claim that reasons that favour actions make those actions right. If a reason favours my doing something, then I have a “pro-tanto” reason to do it: it is pro tanto (i.e., to that extent) right for me to do it. But there may be a reason against my doing it: a pro-tanto reason not to do it. The fact that a joke is funny may be a reason to tell it; but the fact that it’ll embarrass someone may be a reason against doing so. In that case, I have a pro-tanto reason to tell the joke and a different pro-tanto reason not to tell it. Whether it would be right for me to tell the joke, whether I have an “all-things-considered” reason to tell it, will depend on whether either of the reasons is stronger than the other. If so, that reason will override or “defeat” the other reason. Only if the pro-tanto reason for telling the joke is undefeated will it be right or justified all things considered for me to tell the joke.