 The problem that arises from this for Carnap is not the failure to single out the intended interpretation of the theory: as noted, Carnap clearly thought it an advantage of the method that it remained suitably indeterminate. The problem for Carnap is rather that, subject to its empirical adequacy, the truth conditions of the Ramsey-sentences are fulfilled trivially on logico-mathematical grounds alone. As he stated, Ramsey-sentences demand that there be a structure of entities that is correlated with observable events in the way described. Yet given the amount of mathematics that went into the ramseyfied theory—“virtually the whole of mathematics”—some such structure as demanded by the Ramsey-sentence is bound to be found among those entities presupposed by its representational apparatus. (Here the cardinality constraint is no constraint at all.) That any theory is trivially true for purely formal reasons (as long as it is empirically adequate) therefore is held against Carnap’s proposal to use Ramsey sentences as reconstructions of the synthetic content of the theoretical part of empirical scientific theories. Given that with ramseyfications “the truth of physical theory reduces to the truth of its observational consequences” (Demopoulos and Friedman 1985, 635), this is a problem for Carnap’s project on its own terms: any surplus empirical meaning of theoretical terms that Carnap sought to capture simply evaporates (Demopoulos 2003).