 The soul as an incorporeal substance is treated by Valla in a separate chapter (Repastinatio, 1:59–73; 2:408–410; 418–419; DD 1:104–29). Rejecting the Aristotelian hylomorphic account, he returns to an Augustinian picture of the soul as a wholly spiritual and immaterial substance made in the image of God, and consisting of memory, intellect, and will. He rejects without much discussion the various functions of the soul (vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, intellectual), which would entail, he thinks, a plurality of souls. He briefly treats the five exterior senses but is not inclined to deal with the physiological aspects of sensation. The term “species” (whether sensible or intelligible) does not occur at all. The Aristotelian sensus communis—which the medieval commentary tradition on De anima had viewed as one of the internal senses, alongside imagination (sometimes distinguished from phantasia), memory, and the vis aestimativa (foresight and prudence)—is mentioned only to be rejected without further argument (Repastinatio, 1:73; DD 1:128). Imagination and the vis aestimativa are absent from Valla’s account, while memory, as the soul’s principal capacity, appears to have absorbed all the functions which scholastics had divided among separate faculties of the sensitive soul. What may have provoked Valla’s anger about the traditional picture is the seemingly passive role allotted to the soul in perception and knowledge: it seems to come only at the very end of a long chain of transmission, which starts with outer objects and concludes with a merely receptive tabula rasa. In his view, the soul is far more noble than the hylomorphic account of Aristotle implies, at least as Valla understands that account. He therefore stresses on various occasions the soul’s dignified nature, its immortality, unity, autonomy, and superiority to both the body and the animal soul, comparing it to the sun’s central place in the cosmos.