 For this reason and in virtue of the realist epistemology which he tied to this conception (immediately below), Cook Wilson is often read as having held a form of ‘immanent realism’, as opposed to the moderate forms of nominalism more typical of trope theories (Armstrong (1978, 85) or Moreland (2001, 165 n. 16)). One objection against this stance is that there is not much point having both universals and tropes. As David Armstrong put it, one of the two is bound to be redundant: “Either get rid of universals, embrace a trope version of Resemblance Nominalism or else cut out the middlemen, namely, the tropes” (Armstrong 1989, 17 &amp; 132). This reading cannot be the last word, though, since Cook Wilson also appears only to have admitted one sort of entities, the tropes or ‘particularizations of the universal’. Thus, there seems to be a tension, at best unresolved, in Cook Wilson’s stance, which could explain why it has found few supporters, one exception being J. R. Jones (1949, 1950 &amp; 1951).