 Recent decades have witnessed a resurgence of arguments in defense of an associative account of political obligation. Associative obligations are ones that agents are alleged to have merely in virtue of their occupying a role in some socially salient relationship, such as being a parent, a friend, or a doctor. These roles are at least partly constituted by the various obligations their occupants owe to the other(s) in the relationship; to be X’s parent or Y’s friend just is to have certain duties to X or Y (as well as certain claims against them). Exactly what those obligations are varies somewhat depending on the relationship in question and the society in which the participants in that relationship are embedded. These variations reflect different conceptions of the relationship’s value or purpose, or of the particular obligations that follow from a specific conception. Whatever their number and content, associative obligations are owed only to particular others, namely those with whom an agent has a certain kind of relationship, rather than being owed universally to all moral agents or sentient beings in virtue of their status as such.