 (c) Proposal (c), which rejects theories of personal identity that reflect a rigid form of essentialism, posits that there exist “many entities in the vicinity of” the child who eventually comes into existence in the various nonidentity cases and is the subject of our person-based concern. If we accept both the person-based idea that an act is wrong only if it is bad for a particular person – a person who does or will exist – and the idea that an act is bad for a person only if that person “would have existed” had an alternative act been chosen, we are, without realizing it, focusing on distinct entities, with one claiming holding of one entity and the other claim holding of another. Dasgupta 2018, 541–542; 550–554. For a proposal that similarly rejects a strict form of the origins (genetic) account of personal identity in favor of a Lewisian “counterpart-theoretic” approach for the purpose of solving the nonidentity problem and specifically aims to retain the cogency of certain harm claims in that context, see Wrigley 2012. An account that also appeals to counterpart theory with the aim of resolving not just the nonidentity problem but the full range of population problems can be found in Meacham 2012. For a more general discussion, see Cooper 2015.