 Jenkins thinks that our concepts are grounded. Her argument for thinking this is that our basic concepts are useful, and in that respect they are sort of like maps. If they did not fit the world (weren’t grounded) even though they are founded on sensory input, their usefulness would be a miracle. They would be like a map that fits the world that was based on a dream. Since we should not believe in miracles, those concepts must fit the world. The best explanation of the usefulness of our concepts is that they accurately represent features of the world that produce our sensory inputs that allow us to navigate successfully in the world. She thinks that this No-Miracles Argument shows that it is reasonable to think that our concepts (or groups of concepts) mirror the world’s structure (Jenkins 2008a: 139). If we have justified concepts, ones we have reason to think fit the world, we can examine them to see what they involve and then have a priori justification for believing that certain propositions that involve them are true of the world. So, on her view, we (but not BIVs) could know a priori, merely on the basis of examining our concepts, that all vixens are female and that there are (or at least were) vixens, and that all bachelors are unmarried and that there are (or at least were) bachelors. If we have grounded concepts, we (but not BIVs) can have a priori knowledge that all of these propositions are true. Yet gaining this sort of knowledge about our external environment a priori seems impossible.