  As we have seen, there are a variety of different disjunctivist views, often motivated by quite different concerns, and the disagreements that these disjunctivists have with their opponents are relevant to a number of debates in the philosophy of perception and epistemology—debates about the metaphysics and phenomenology of perceptual experience, our concept of perception, the epistemological role of perceptual experience, and self-knowledge. Many of the disjunctivist views and arguments that have been outlined here have been proposed relatively recently, and the debates they have inspired seem set to continue. In a further recent development disjunctive theories of perception have inspired similar disjunctive approaches in the philosophy of action—concerning both the ontology of action and a subject’s reasons for performing actions. (For discussion of disjunctive approaches to action see Haddock and McPherson 2008b, Ruben 2008, Hornsby 2008 and Dancy 2008.)