 This way of summarizing the Mohist philosophical enterprise does leave unanswered important questions about the ultimate justification of ethical claims. Early Chinese thought does not provide an explicit distinction between fact and value, so it is a matter of controversy to determine which has epistemic priority in Mohist thought—the normative standards by which the correct uses of language guide behavior, or the evaluations of reason that are determined by our ability to ascertain real similarities and differences in perception and thought. This problem is perhaps less controversial in the interpretation of Confucian philosophy because the priority of normative standards in the Confucian program of ordering names is attested by clear examples. It is evident, for instance, in section 1B/8 of the Mencius, which acknowledges the admissibility of killing a wicked ruler in spite of the prohibition of regicide, on the premise that this ruler is not really a king (or does not warrant the name “king”). The Confucian view is that anyone who is a king ought to act like one; otherwise the name is unwarranted. Hence, correct naming is also a prescription for conduct.