 In a similar vein, Reichenbach (1935 [1949] and 1938) had set himself the task of justifying induction as the best possible method for prediction and action. Given his commitment to frequentism, he meant to show that the rule of induction satisfies the “principle of the greatest number of successes”, namely that it leads us to act in the most successful way possible. Accordingly, the rule of induction is justified on account that if successful predictions are attainable at all, its application will assure the attainment of that goal. Reichenbach’s justification relies on the self-correcting character of the method, whose repeated application guarantees convergence to a unique value in the long run whenever there exists a limit of the relative frequency. However, his argument applies to a whole class of asymptotic rules, all of which satisfy the convergence property. The thing is that one can add to the relative frequency a corrective term which modifies the observed frequency to obtain a slightly different posit. The particularity of the rule of induction is that it makes no use of the corrective term. Well aware of the fact that his argument applied to an infinite class of asymptotic rules, Reichenbach privileged the rule of induction on the grounds of its descriptive simplicity. This applies to descriptions (statements) which are semantically equivalent, as opposed to inductive simplicity which applies when one of two or more descriptions, or hypotheses, which are not semantically equivalent, is believed to be more likely to be true.