 One ought to ask, however, whether either model preserves the divine aseity which is a main motive for the divine simplicity (Brower 2009). If the simple God’s knowing of Socrates includes the man himself in his bodily reality, this would seem to make God dependent on something other than himself. Brower thinks the problem can be defused by observing that God is the cause of the contingent entities on which his contingent knowledge depends. Grant (2012, 267), however, thinks that neither externalist model poses a problem for aseity whether or not God causes the contingent objects he knows. If God exists from himself, then he is a se. But the existence of a thing is intrinsic to it, not relational. So it suffices for the divine aseity that God not depend on anything else for what he is intrinsically. That God’s knowing of Socrates depends on Socrates is not to the point: this knowing is purely relational and not intrinsic to God.