 The Frege-Geach objection may ultimately undermine Stevenson’s theory of moral language, though not, as because his theory identifies a sentence’s meaning with the illocutionary force of its utterance. Associating a sentence’s meaning instead with the set of its passive and active dispositions, Stevenson’s theory of meaning implies that sentences will have relatively stable meanings across contexts of use  (Sections 3.1  and  3.2),  and therefore, that these dispositions might themselves be contributed to the more complex sentences into which they embed. Precisely how Stevenson’s dispositional theory could be extended to account for compositionality in this way is unclear, and Stevenson himself appears never to have been sufficiently worried by the Frege-Geach objection to respond to it. One idea would be that sentential operators, such as ‘if … then’ and ‘it is possible that’ be treated as functions from the dispositions of the component sentences to a resulting set of dispositions, where the latter would constitute the meaning of the complex sentence. Stevenson hints at such a possible extension of his theory while discussing the compositionality of atomic sentences: