 Let’s briefly turn to a handful of apparent difficulties, as a way of bringing the view into clearer focus and indicating some of its resources. First, the question of what counts as a practical reason gets deferred, in Velleman’s position, to a philosophical account of theoretical explanation. We noticed in passing that not every predictive technique will deliver reasons for action. (Another instance: one can often predict one’s choices as the mistakes one is prone to make, but to treat what you understand to be a mistake as a reason is next door to a Moore’s Paradox.) So Velleman must in some way restrict the scope of the considerations that can figure into one’s self-fulfilling predictions. There is not just one type of privileged explanation that will serve; recall that Velleman allows both narrative and desire-driven folk-psychological explanations, perhaps along with others. The reader is directed to remarks which are evidently meant to address the issue of the required scope restriction (Velleman 2009, 31f, 42f; cf. also 2006, 7f, 14); the move doesn’t lend itself to a terse reconstruction or assessment, and here we will leave the intended resolution open. 