 What hinges on whether grounding is representational or worldly? This isn’t entirely clear. You might think that grounding being worldly ensures that the relata of grounding are relatively coarse-grained, and grounding being representational ensures that the relata of grounding are relatively fine-grained. Consider the following two facts: [The liquid is H2O] and [The liquid is water]. Representationalists, so the thinking goes, might claim that we have distinct facts here, as they have different concepts as constituents. And proponents of the worldly approach might claim that we have only one fact here, as there is no difference in constituents or manner of combination. And this, of course, is potentially relevant to theorizing about grounding—if [The liquid is H2O] and [The liquid is water] are the same fact, then the claim that the former grounds the latter or vice versa is false provided that grounding is irreflexive (see  §2.3).  Note, however, that representationalists can coherently maintain that facts are relatively coarse-grained—perhaps they think that, while facts are Fregean propositions, concepts are relatively coarse-grained (Correia 2020). And proponents of the worldly approach can coherently maintain that facts are relatively fine-grained—perhaps they think that, while facts are true Russellian propositions (ordered sets of non-representational items including properties), properties are relatively fine-grained (Dorsey 2015).