 In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes draws a close parallel between the will’s relation to the true and to the good. Just as the will is compelled to assent to what is clearly and distinctly perceived to be true, so it is compelled to choose what is clearly and distinctly perceived to be good: “if I always saw clearly what was true and good, I should never have to deliberate about the right judgement or choice” (AT VII 58/CSM II 40). And analogously, we might suppose, just as the recipe for avoiding error is to withhold assent from that whose truth is not perceived clearly and distinctly, so the recipe for avoiding moral error, or sin, is to refuse to choose that whose goodness is not perceived clearly and distinctly. In his objections to the Meditations, Arnauld cautioned Descartes on this point, suggesting that the comments he makes “on the cause of error would give rise to the most serious objections if they were stretched out of context to cover the pursuit of good and evil” (AT VII 215/CSM II 151). Heeding Arnauld’s warning, Descartes added a disclaimer to the Synopsis of the Meditations: “But here it should be noted in passing that I do not deal at all with sin, i.e. the error which is committed in pursuing good and evil, but only with the error that occurs in distinguishing truth and falsehood” (AT VII 15/CSM II 11). This assertion flatly contradicts the text of the Fourth Meditation, where Descartes had written that, where the will is indifferent, “it easily turns aside from what is true and good, and this is the source of my error and sin” (AT VII 58/CSM II 40–1). In light of this, and Descartes’ insistence to Mersenne that the disclaimer be placed in parentheses to indicate that it had been added, there is reason to see Descartes as upholding the same account of the will in relation to the true and the good.