 Before turning to the second lap of Korsgaard’s response, let’s introduce a second worry: that the argument’s attempt to exploit the wholeness of the agent, allegedly the essential feature of agency, is taking a wrong turn. Recall Korsgaard’s artifactual analogy: a chair is something you sit on, and so a chair is defective when you can’t sit on it – and of course it’s defective as a whole, because its job, as a whole chair, is to be a seat. For any constitutive standard, it’s the thing as a whole that’s supposed to live up to the standard; so what’s distinctive about one standard or another is what the thing does or is, and not that it does it, or is it, as a whole. If, when it came to understanding chairs, you devoted your theoretical attention to that ‘as a whole,’ as opposed to the seating, something would clearly have gone wrong. (Imagine a theorist of chairs arguing that the constitutive standards for being a chair must be met by the chair as a whole, and thus the essential feature of chairs, and the key to understanding them, is that they hold themselves together.) Why isn’t Korsgaard’s focus on the shared unity condition some sort of red herring? 