  Tye (2007) favours a different ‘moderate’ approach. He holds that veridical perceptions have object-dependent singular intentional contents that hallucinations cannot have, and he holds that veridical perceptions and hallucinations can have the same phenomenal character. However, he rejects the claim that there is a layer of existential content that provides a common mental factor for veridical and hallucinatory experiences. According to Tye, veridical perceptions and hallucinations have intentional contents that represent clusters of properties. In the case of veridical perception the cluster of properties is represented within a content that is singular and object-dependent, whereas in the case of hallucination the cluster of properties is represented within a content that is ‘gappy’. (See also Schellenberg 2010, 2013, and 2016.) Tye’s suggestion is that veridical perceptions and hallucinations have contents with a common structure, and this structure may be conceived as having a slot in it for an object. In the case of veridical perception the slot is filled by the object perceived, and in the case of hallucination the slot is empty, and hence the content is ‘gappy’. Tye claims that the phenomenal character of a given visual experience is the cluster of properties represented by that experience. And he claims that this is why veridical perceptions and hallucinations can have the same phenomenal character.