 The chief reason that Fechner advocates atomism is because he thinks that it better explains the facts than its rival, dynamicism. Atomism is not simply a good model of explanation but the correct ontology, i.e., the right account of what exists in the world. That is to say, atomism does not work simply on a hypothetical basis: if atoms exist, then we can account for the phenomena; rather, it postulates that atoms do exist, and that only as such do they explain phenomena. The atomist knows that the existence of atoms cannot be confirmed by experience; but he still insists that the only way to explain what we do know about experience is to assume the existence of atoms (Atom: 25, 30). Here again the natural scientist follows the guide of analogy. He assumes that the same laws that hold for the macroscopic world also hold for the microscopic, an assumption which brings consistency into his general worldview (Atom: 33, 35–6, 88). Fechner concedes that many phenomena explicable according to atomism are also explicable according to dynamicism; but he insists that there always comes a point where phenomena reveal themselves that dynamicism cannot explain (Atom: 13, 21, 24). When we examine mass macroscopic phenomena in greater detail—taking them apart into their microscopic constituents—we find that the facts we then discover are explicable according to atomism alone. 