 More recently, critics of emotion-based retributivist accounts have contended that the emotions on which retributive (and other deontological) intuitions are based have evolved as mechanisms to stabilise cooperation; given that we have retributive emotions only because of their evolutionary fitness, it would be merely a coincidence if intuitions based on these emotions happened to track moral truths about, e.g., desert (see especially Greene 2008; also Singer 2005). A problem with such accounts is that they appear to prove too much: consequentialist accounts also rely on certain evaluation intuitions (about what has value, or about the proper way to respond to that which we value); insofar as such intuitions are naturally selected, then it would be no less coincidental if they tracked moral truths than if retributive intuitions did so. Thus the consequentialist accounts that derive from these intuitions would be similarly undermined by this evolutionary argument (see Kahane 2011; Mason 2011; but see Wiegman 2017).