 The argument, according to which the species relativist misconstrues the meaning of truth by allowing the same judgment to be both true and false, is clearly question-begging. Husserl’s argument boils down to this: ‘It is contradictory to claim that truth is not absolute because truth is absolute’ (Føllesdal 1958, 37). Husserl simply takes the absoluteness of truth as self-evident. He also overlooks that, properly construed, the relativistic notion of truth does not violate the Principle of Non-Contradiction. If truth is taken as ‘truth-for-S’ (i.e. truth for a species), such that the hyphenisation is irreducible, then one and the same judgment can be true-for-S1 and false-for-S2 without the Principle of Non-Contradiction being violated (Meiland 1977, 571). The further argument, according to which truth cannot be relative to species because truth is eternal, can obviously be rejected as a petitio principii as well. Finally, Husserl claims that if truth were relative then so would be the existence of the world. Here too Husserl does little more than invoke self-evidence for his position. He takes it as self-evident that the existence of the world cannot be relative and he does not show that the opposite assumption is self-refuting.