 Just acquisition takes the form of just initial acquisition, just transfer, or just rectification of an unjust taking. An existing holding will be just if it arises from an act of just initial acquisition or an act of just initial acquisition followed by one or more acts of just transfer, or an act of just rectification that counteracts an unjust taking of a just holding. An adequate theory of justice in holdings will specify the processes that constitute just initial acquisitions, just transfers, and just acts of rectification. Nozick tells us that each of these principles is a “complicated truth” (150) that he will not attempt to formulate. Thus, we never get statements from Nozick of what specific initial acquisition or transfer or rectification processes that result in agent C’s possession of H generate or convey to C an entitlement over H. Nozick never directly seeks to explain why certain specific processes—certain specific means of acquisition—have the power to generate or convey entitlements. He never addresses the ways in which historical contingency and convention may select (from among morally eligible procedures) the specific procedures that count as entitlement conferring within a given society. (Mack 2010 and Bryan 2017)