 However, the practical rationality of hope does not seem to be exhausted by instrumental considerations. Bovens argues that in cases where hoping has no instrumental value (because we cannot help bring about the desired state), hope can still have intrinsic value in virtue of its concomitant mental imaging: This characteristic of hope is responsible for its intrinsic value in three respects: First, hope has intrinsic value because the mental imaging connected to it (that is, the imaginative anticipation of the fulfillment of one’s hope) is pleasurable in itself (Bovens 1999: 675f.). Second, hope has epistemic value because it increases one’s self-understanding. Third, hope has intrinsic worth because it is constitutive of love towards others and towards oneself, which are intrinsically valuable activities. It is in virtue of mental imaging that hope is intimately connected to love, because spending mental energy in thinking about the well-being of another person is constitutive of loving her. Bloeser and Stahl (2017) argue that certain hopes—fundamental hopes—can be rational in virtue of their contribution to the practical identity of the hoping person.