  It is easy to misstate this objection (Demos 1964, Dahl 1991). The problem is not that the  question is about justice as it is ordinarily understood and Socrates is failing to address conventional justice. Neither the question nor  the answer is bound to how justice is ordinarily understood, given  what happened in Book One. Moreover, the problem is not that  Socrates’ answer is relevant only if the class of the psychologically just and the class of the practically just are coextensive. That  would require Socrates to show that everyone who acts justly has a  just soul, and Socrates quite reasonably shows no inclination for  that thesis. (Some people do what is right for the wrong reasons.) He may have to establish some connection  between doing just actions and becoming psychologically just if he is to give reasons to those who are not yet psychologically just to do  just actions, but an account of habituation would be enough to do  this (cf. 443e, 444c–d).