 If Heidegger is read in the direction of decisionism, however, he foreshadows those Phenomenologists who offer a constructivist account of value centered on the notion of freedom (e.g., Sartre 1943, Beauvoir 1947, and Merleau-Ponty 1945; also see the entry on constructivism in metaethics). They believe that values are created (“constituted” or “constructed”) in the exercise of human freedom. The Phenomenologists who take a constructivist approach to value and who claim that values are created in the exercise of human freedom adopt somewhat differing accounts of freedom. The most radical view (e.g., Sartre 1943) claims that the exercise of the freedom definitive of human beings constitutes the reality of values in consciously and actively transcending the agent’s situation, and that this exercise lacks transcendent values to justify it. Freedom, although itself unconstrained, nevertheless in its exercise, encounters factical obstacles, including most importantly the presence of other autonomous agents. A weaker version (e.g., Beauvoir 1947) also places freedom and transcendence at the center of her ethical life while recognizing the obstacles freedom faces. The goal at which freedom aims “is not fixed once and for all” but rather “is defined all along the road which leads to it” (Beauvoir 1947 [1948: 153]). For Beauvoir, this fundamental ambiguity characterizes human existence. Against the stronger view, however, Beauvoir believes that the other’s freedom cannot be viewed simply as an obstacle to one’s own exercise of freedom. Rather, one’s own freedom and the realization of one’s projects requires the cooperative freedom of others.