  A strong argument can be made that it is Mozi, not Confucius, who deserves the title of China’s first philosopher. Before the rise of the Mohist school, Ru or so-called  “Confucian”[2]  thought seems to have consisted mostly of wise aphorisms offering moral coaching aimed at developing virtuous performers of social roles as described in traditional li (norms of ritual propriety). Mozi and his followers were the first in the Chinese tradition to point out that conformity to traditional mores in itself does not ensure that actions are morally right. This critical insight motivated a self-conscious search for  objective moral standards,  by which the Mohists hoped to unify the moral judgments of everyone in society, thus eliminating social disorder and ensuring that morality prevailed.  The normative standard through which they proposed to achieve these aims was the “benefit (lì) of all  the world”: Actions, practices, and policies that promote the overall welfare of society were to be considered morally right, those that interfere with it morally wrong. This consequentialist standard was justified by appeal to the intention of Heaven (Tian), a sky or nature deity that the Mohists claimed is committed impartially to the benefit of all. Heaven’s intention provides a reliable epistemic criterion for moral judgment, they held, because Heaven is the wisest and noblest agent in the cosmos. This basic consequentialist and religious framework motivated a set of  ten core ethical and political doctrines,  which the Mohists sought to persuade the rulers of their day to put into practice. This article will discuss the  motivation  for the Mohist philosophical and political project, the central  epistemic and  logical  notions that structure Mohist thought, and the details of the Mohists’  ethical  and  political  doctrines, including their strengths and weaknesses.