  Even those who think that one can—at least conceptually—conceive of non-ideological forms of recognition have started to pay more attention to the ways in which relationships of recognition are always also relationships of power (see the contributions in van den Brink/Owen 2007). This becomes especially urgent if one realizes, as already indicated above, that values and norms—being products of human thought and attitudes—can express disrespect even if those who follow them are not really aware of this. Subjects may attempt to convey recognition within a framework that is itself disrespectful. For example, a lord in the 18th century who treated his maid according to the accepted norms of that time—for example, by treating her as if she was invisible—may not have (intentionally) disrespected her with regard to the socially valid system of norms and values. Thus, he might have been considered a “decent” lord according to prevailing standards (whereas other lords might have been described as “cruel”, etc.). However, at least some probably want to say that this lord—in another sense—did not adequately respect his maid (and that therefore the social changes since then manifest moral progress). Nonetheless, some authors regard even ideological recognition (as being, for example, a dutiful maid) as something positive insofar as it strengthens the subject’s sense of worth and is clearly superior to acts of misrecognition (Honneth 2004, 323–347). Yet, others may mourn such ideological recognition for the incapacitating effects on the recognized subjects’ will to resist. Recently, these controversies have been taken up in a fruitful dialogue between these two traditions (Bankovsky/Le Goff 2013, Honneth/Rancière 2017, Honneth 2018, esp. 211–235).