 Given the conclusion, the label “anti-disentangling argument” would seem more accurate (Roberts 2011). In support of (D2), McDowell asks us to imagine “a specific conception of some moral virtue … current in a reasonably cohesive moral community” and then consider an “outsider” to the evaluative perspective of those who deploy the concept (McDowell 1981 [1998]: 201). An example might be someone who cannot even imaginatively engage with the kind of sexual morality that is normally conveyed by applying lewd to overt sexual display. Many people find it implausible that such an outsider could master the extension of lewd by grasping a non-evaluative content that applies to all and only the items the insiders call lewd (assuming there is one), and that this is so in principle, not merely because of the contingent limitations of our language. Unless there is a way to grasp the extension without engaging with insiders’ evaluative perspective, it would seem that evaluative classifications are in principle not graspable with purely non-evaluative representational resources (McDowell 1981 [1998]: 216).