 But for our purposes, the most interesting nonprototypical transgression used by Turiel and his colleagues was incest. “Of all the nonprototypical issues we investigated”, they tell us, “incest was most closely assimilated to reasoning in the moral domain” (1991: 78). A substantial number of participants judged that incest was “not all right”, they generalized the judgment to other countries, and they indicated that their judgment was authority independent—not contingent on the laws or practices that prevailed in the United States or elsewhere. So their responses fit the “moral” pattern of criterion judgments. But typically these participants did not justify their judgments by appeal to harm, justice or rights. Rather, they appealed to what Turiel and colleagues labeled “deterministic beliefs”, which are “standards dictated by psychological normality, biological order or religious order” or to “custom and tradition” (1991: 24 &amp; 78). So the pattern of criterion judgments about incest provided by these participants looks to pose a direct challenge to Turiel’s definition of morality. They exhibit the “moral” criterion judgment pattern, but they do not judge that the transgression is harmful.