 The epistemological difficulties of both-sided probability (and of reasonable disagreement between competent reasoners) were not, however, analyzed in depth by medieval scholastics. Nor did they investigate how an epistemology of acceptance of probable opinions as premises for action differs from one which assumes assent or affirmation of the opinions in question. All this happened much later in the scholastic tradition, in the seventeenth century; but this is another story (Deman 1936; Fleming 2006; Gay 2012; Knebel 2000; Schuessler 2019; Schwartz 2019; Tutino 2018). The developments in question were linked to the rise of a new scholastic doctrine called probabilism in the seventeenth century. Probabilism, as understood at the time (the modern understanding of the term is quite different), legitimizes a specific way of using probable  opinions.[41]  It is not synonymous with any kind of probabilistic reasoning. However, we need not deal with scholastic probabilism any further because the doctrine did not exist in the period now under consideration. It is sometimes attributed to medieval authors, but such ascriptions should be contested and, in any case, should not be accepted without deeper discussion for authors who wrote before 1500.