 Suppose, however, that worlds were conceived as world stories, i.e., as maximal consistent sets of propositions (see Section 2). How, then, might truth at a world be understood?  One approach, favored by Adams (1981), is to explain truth at a world in terms of truth in a world, understanding the latter to amount to truth were the world actual (were all its members true).  On this approach, we would understand what is true at a world in terms of what is true in it, together with certain facts about the actual world.  However, the conceptualist cannot abide this approach.  For, on this approach, the members of any world are true in that world.  But since the members of any and every world are propositions, it would follow that, contrary to conceptualism, that it is necessary that there are propositions.  A more conceptualist-friendly approach is to reverse the order of explanation, to explain truth in a world in terms of truth at a world + existence in that world.  How could truth at a world be understood? A natural proposal is to understand it as membership in a world story. 