 Philosophers of science have responded in a variety of ways to the suggestion that a few or even a small handful of serious examples of empirical equivalents does not suffice to establish that there are probably such equivalents to most scientific theories in most domains of inquiry. One such reaction has been to invite more careful attention to the details of particular examples of putative underdetermination: considerable work has been devoted to assessing the threat of underdetermination in the case of particular scientific theories (for recent examples see Pietsch 2012; Tulodziecki 2013; Werndl 2013; Belot 2014; Butterfield 2014; Miyake 2015, and others). Another reaction has been to investigate whether particular kinds of theories or domains of science (e.g. ‘historical’ vs. ‘experimental’ sciences) are more vulnerable to problems of underdetermination than others and, if so, why (see Cleland (2002), Carman (2005), Turner (2005, 2007), Stanford (2010), Forber and Griffith (2011)). But champions of contrastive underdetermination have most frequently responded by seeking to argue that all theories have empirical equivalents, typically by proposing something like an algorithmic procedure for generating such equivalents from any theory whatsoever. Stanford (2001, 2006) suggests that these efforts to prove that all our theories must have empirical equivalents fall roughly but reliably into global and local varieties, and that neither makes a convincing case for a distinctive scientific problem of contrastive underdetermination. Global algorithms are well-represented by Andre Kukla’s (1996) suggestion that from any theory T we can immediately generate such empirical equivalents as T′ (the claim that T’s observable consequences are true, but T itself is false), T″ (the claim that the world behaves according to T when observed, but some specific incompatible alternative otherwise), and the hypothesis that our experience is being manipulated by powerful beings in such a way as to make it appear that T is true. But such possibilities, Stanford argues, amount to nothing more than the sort of Evil Deceiver to which Descartes appealed in order to doubt any of his beliefs that could possibly be doubted (see Section 1, above). Such radically skeptical scenarios pose an equally powerful (or powerless) challenge to any knowledge claim whatsoever, no matter how it is arrived at or justified, and thus pose no special problem or challenge for beliefs offered to us by theoretical science. If global algorithms like Kukla’s are the only reasons we can give for taking underdetermination seriously in a scientific context, then there is no distinctive problem of the underdetermination of scientific theories by data, only a salient reminder of the irrefutability of classically Cartesian or radical  skepticism.[11]