 Consequently, Yorck rejects from the start the transcendental method in philosophy as insufficient for grasping lived historical reality. Transcendental philosophy reduces historical life to the merely “subjective,” which misses the genuine characteristic of Geist, spirit or mind, namely its real, historical extension and connection. As Yorck puts it, “the transcendental method” merely suspends or sublates “the realm of the objective,” but it fails to “extend the region of Geist” (CR, p. 194). Insisting that “the character of subjectivity does not even reach the realm of Geist” (CR, p. 194), Yorck clearly implies that the “realm of history” is the proper domain for Geist. It follows that, despite his criticism of the narrow confines of transcendental and/or subject-centred philosophy, Yorck's philosophical conception of history is still inscribed within the confines of Geist-philosophy. Following Hegel, who argues that everything hinges on the understanding that “substance is  subject” (Hegel 1807, p. 19), Yorck agrees that everything hinges on the understanding that “substance is history” or “substance is historical  spirit.”[4]