 The relevance of bargaining theory to the theory of distributive justice has been questioned. First, if the disagreement point is defined, as it probably should, in relation to the relative strength of parties in a “state of nature”, then the scope for redistributive solidarity is very limited. One obtains a theory of “justice as mutual advantage” (Barry 1989, 1995) which is not satisfactory at the bar of any minimal conception of impartiality or equality. Second, the welfarist formal framework of the theory of bargaining is poor in information (Roemer 1986b, 1996). Describing alternatives only in terms of utility levels makes it impossible to take account of basic physical features of allocations. For instance, it is impossible to find out, from utility data alone, which of the alternatives is a competitive equilibrium with equal shares. As another illustration, Nash’s and Kalai and Smorodinsky’s solutions both recommend allocating an indivisible prize by a fifty-fifty lottery, whether the prize is symmetric (a one-dollar bill for either party) or asymmetric (a one-dollar bill if party 1 wins, ten dollars if party 2 wins).