 Stein spends a considerable portion of the treatise specifying the nature of rights and law at stake. In particular, she differentiates between positive and pure law, subjective, natural, human and civil rights, discusses the function of the state in interpreting, enforcing, or adjudicating rights as well as the legal and ontological status of the state itself as a subject of law (1925: 40[51], 56–73[73–96]). Drawing on Reinach (1913), she first distinguishes “pure” and “positive law”. Pure law is a-temporal and applies universally “at all times and for all peoples” (1925: 33[39]); whereas positive law is created by spontaneous decisions and hence can vary socio-historically. Based on this distinction, Stein argues that, “wherever there is no idea of a positive law, the idea of a state can (…) neither be grasped” (1925: 64[84]).