 Recent developments in hermeneutics have arisen in response to ‘new realism.’ This school of thought is represented especially by philosophers Maurizio Ferraris and Markus Gabriel, and invites comparisons with the ‘speculative realism’ of philosophers such as Quentin Meillassoux and Graham Harman (see Ferraris 2012, Gabriel 2015, Gabriel 2020, Meillassoux 2008; Harman 2018). The new orientation toward realism is characterized, first of all, by a rejection of a common thesis of postmodern and radical constructivism: the position that our interpretations are constitutive of what we otherwise call reality. To this extent, the new interest in realism is compatible with other forms of realism. Yet, new realism opposes not only radical constructivism but also a basic tenet of metaphysical realism: the idea that reality is comprised exclusively of mind-independent things. One of the most influential approaches of such new-realist opposition against metaphysical realism is found in Gabriel. He makes a distinction between metaphysics and ontology, and argues in his new realist ontology that what we usually associate with mind, namely, our descriptions or interpretations of things, are no less real than what they relate to. Such descriptions or interpretations are rather distinguished by their function, which is to individuate (Gabriel 2015, 9–11).