  While focus on selves could perhaps yield a very complicated form of  consequentialism (involving the introduction into deliberation of the good of all affected parties – including future selves –  weighted according to the degrees of connectedness obtaining between  them and the deliberator), another, perhaps more promising, approach  would be to appeal to reductionist selves to buttress a different  ethical theory altogether, namely contractualism. One longstanding  objection to the theory is that it has no way of motivating the  amoralist to adhere to the demands of morality. But we can assume  that the amoralist is at least prudentially rational. If so, then one very plausible way to model ordinary prudential deliberation is as  consisting of a desire that one's actions be justifiable to all  affected future stages of oneself (see, e.g., McClennen 1990, 217).  But if the relation that matters in identity is connectedness, it  should ground such prudential concern in a way that restricts  required justification only to those stages with whom one expects to  be connected. Then if connectedness holds interpersonally, the  rational amoralist must also extend that desire for justifiability to all those with whom he is psychologically connected, and this will  take him a long ways towards having the moral motivation at the heart of contractualism (D. Shoemaker 2000;  for the basic view of contractualism presupposed here, see Scanlon  1982 and 1998).