 Yet another version of eliminative structuralism that has started to attract more attention in the literature is concept structuralism.  In cases where this position is meant to do without any appeal to abstract objects (e.g., by basing itself on formalism), it amounts to a fully eliminative view. Various questions remain, however, about the appeal to concepts in it, i.e., about their existence, nature, and identity (cf. Parsons 2018).  Depending on the answers, a strict nominalist might still find this position unacceptable, since concepts may be seen as another problematic kind of abstract entities.  If a concept structuralist allows for abstract objects, such as sets, to play a secondary role, this becomes a semi-eliminative position. Structures conceived of as abstract objects are still eliminated (by reconceiving them as concepts), but relational systems remain.  Alternatively, we might be dealing with a particular form of methodological structuralism here, where additional metaphysical questions are brushed aside.