 This theory of prophecy parts ways with the standard contemporary theory of prophecy according to which prophets are accomplished philosophers endowed with a strong imaginative faculty. By virtue of this faculty, prophets, unlike philosophers, are able to carry out the necessary political role of establishing laws conducive to the welfare of society, and reformulate theoretical knowledge in a language easy for the multitude to understand. Whatever theoretical knowledge a prophet attains through emanation from the Active Intellect—the intellect of the sphere of the moon to which philosophers variably ascribed epistemological and ontological roles in the sublunary realm—accords with philosophical knowledge; the difference being particularly quantitative (Macy 1986; Rahman 1958). Even the Avicennian theory of prophecy, which links the prophetic mind to the divine realm, does not ascribe to prophetic knowledge a specific qualitative merit above philosophical knowledge; prophets apprehend the principles of all existents, the middle term of every syllogism and intelligible forms instantaneously and effortlessly through divine intuition (ḥads). (Rahman, 1958: 32; Marmura 1963: 49–51; Morris 1992: 84). That is, there are no grounds for contradiction, as Albalag’s theory of prophecy suggests.