  Moore went on to introduce the term “proposition” for complexes of concepts such as that which would be involved in a belief or judgment. While propositions represent the content of judgments, according to Moore, they and their constituents are entirely independent from the judging mind. Some propositions are true, some are not. For Moore, however, truth is not a correspondence relationship between propositions and reality, as there is no difference between a proposition—understood as a mind-independent complex—and that which would make it true (Moore 1899, 5; Moore 1901). The facts of the world then consist of true propositions, themselves understood as complexes of concepts. According to Moore, something “becomes intelligible first when it is analyzed into its constituent concepts” (Moore 1899, 8). “The Nature of Judgment” had a profound influence on Russell, who later heralded it as the first account of the “new philosophy” to which he and Moore subscribed (MPD, 42).