 (18), as it stands, fails to provide a completely specified account of intrinsic aboutness, since it contains the locution ‘quantifies only over parts of \(x\)’ which needs to be defined, and it is not straightforward to give the needed definition of this locution. Marshall’s account of ‘quantifying over parts of \(x\)’ can be simplified if we assume mereological essentialism and the view that ‘some’ is the only perfectly natural quantifier. (Mereological essentialism is the view that necessarily, for any \(x\), necessarily, for any \(y\), if \(y\) is part of \(x\), then necessarily if \(x\) exists, then \(y\) is part of \(x\).) Given the simplifying assumption of mereological essentialism, Marshall endorses (19), where \(F\) and \(G\) are predicates expressing properties and ‘\(\leq\)’ symbolises ‘is part of’.