  If \(D\) must be aware of those aspects of her actions that make them of interest to the criminal law, she is less likely to be ambushed by criminal offences that prohibit those actions. In this way, mens rea requirements contribute to personal autonomy by increasing our ability to steer our lives away from criminal conviction and punishment. So (RL) supports (MR). Does it also support the correspondence principle? This is less clear. One view has it that \(D\)’s awareness of the facts that made her driving dangerous disqualifies \(D\) from complaining that she was ambushed by liability for \(V\)’s death (at least as long as said liability was adequately publicized). On another view, \(D\)’s autonomy not only counts in favour of helping \(D\) to anticipate criminal liability, it also counts in favour of helping \(D\) to anticipate its legal consequences, such that \(D\) can decide if the price of those consequences is worth paying (Hart 1968, 47; Ashworth 2008). If it does not occur to \(D\) that \(\phi\)ing might cause death, it also does not occur to \(D\) that \(\phi\)ing might result in her suffering the additional punishment prescribed for causing it. \(D\) is more likely to factor this information into her decision-making if the criminal law insists that \(D\) is aware of the risk—if it insists on correspondence between actus reus and mens rea.