 Pyrrho, a murky figure, roughly contemporary with Epicurus and Zeno the Stoic, left no writings. In the late, anecdotal tradition he is credited with introducing suspension of judgment (DL IX 61). He became the eponymous hero for the founding of Pyrrhonian skepticism in the first century B.C. (See entry on  Pyrrho  and on  Ancient Skepticism.)  Having discovered that for every argument examined so far there is an opposing argument, Pyrrhonian Skeptics expressed no determinate opinions (DL IX 74). This attitude would seem to lead to a kind of epistemic paralysis. The Skeptics reply that they do not abolish, e.g., relying on sight. They do not say that it is unreliable and they do not refuse, personally, ever to rely on it. Rather, they have the impression that there is no reason why we are entitled to rely on it, in a given case or in general, even if we go ahead and rely on it anyhow (DL IX 103). For example, if one has the visual impression of a tower, that appearance is not in dispute. What is in dispute is whether the tower is as it appears to be. For Skeptics, claiming that the tower is as it appears to be is a dogmatic statement about the object or the causal history of the appearance. As far as the Skeptic is concerned, all such statements have failed to be adequately justified, and all supporting arguments can be opposed by equally convincing counter-arguments. Lacking any grounds on which to prefer one dogmatic statement or view over another, he suspends judgment.