 Medina argues that knowers have a “shared responsibility with respect to epistemic justice for the correction of blind spots and social insensitivities associated with racism and (hetero)sexism” (2013, 25), suggesting that those subjects whose privilege prevents them from developing knowledge of or sensitivity to experiences beyond their own have an obligation to unsettle their epistemic ease by seeking out “epistemic friction” and “cultivat[ing] a resistant imagination” (26) that would sensitize them to the experiences of marginalized and stigmatized subjects. The prescription that Medina offers for accomplishing such cultivation, which he terms “guerilla pluralism” (284), is inspired by a combination of insights from Foucault and James. Both Foucault and James conceive truth and knowledge as plural and as the product of particular interests and purposes. One of the key ways in which they differ, however, is in the implications of this view of knowledge that they emphasize: whereas James offers a “melioristic pluralism,” in which epistemic contestations and negotiations are directed toward improving the objectivity of the different standpoints available, toward correcting their biases and mistakes, and toward “maintain[ing] their truth alive” (283), Foucault’s genealogical approach offers a less rosy view of the possibilities of epistemic melioration, and aims less at learning than unlearning received ways of viewing the world. Foucault, then, would have us “resurrect counter-memories, not just for the sake of joint cooperation, but for the sake of reactivating struggles and energizing forms of resistance” (284). Drawing from Foucault the importance of specific mechanisms to break down settled regimes of power/knowledge and from James the imperative to find a way to move forward in improving the social conditions in which we live, Medina advocates the formation of a resistant social imagination through genealogical investigations: “genealogical investigations constitute critical interventions in the social imagination that can help us make our sense of a shared past more pluralistic and open to diversity” (292). This is not to say, however, that the end point of such investigations will be the total overcoming of oppression or even of culpable shared ignorance. Rather, in a pragmatic vein, Medina emphasizes a fallibilist approach to investigation that remains open to correction and critique through “radical solidarity: the cultivation of an ever-expanding accountability and responsiveness to indefinitely many others, which is required by a resistant epistemic agency” (302). Such fallibilism, unlike radical relativism in which “any way of framing and interpreting is as good as any other,” is committed to producing a resistant imagination characterized by its exertion of “beneficial epistemic friction” (303) that is aimed at continual self-correction and resistance to oppression and the ignorance that necessarily accompanies it.