 Sapaṇ’s strict nominalism rejects the reality of cognitive and linguistic objects, which makes him an “illusionist” about the mind. Where Daniel Dennett (1991) criticizes the “Cartesian theater” model of the mind, in which images play across a mental screen, Buddhist philosophers criticize the “duality” that constitutes the subject/object binary. The notion of a cognitive object, for this tradition, is intertwined with the false reification of the self, a cardinal Buddhist error. There could only be mental objects if there were mental subjects; viewing subjects and mental objects are attributable, together, to the tendency of ordinary beings mistakenly to project a “self”. Moreover, the utility of concepts for language and thought would require that they be unchanging against the backdrop of the Buddhist view that all things are impermanent; if, as Sapaṇ argues, they were impermanent, they would be mind-dependent, and hence private objects (see Stolz 2006). What needs to be explained, therefore, is not the reality of concepts, but the causes that bring about their seeming to appear and function.