 As well as asking about the source of justification for our moral beliefs (see e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong 1996), moral philosophers have been concerned with distinctively moral regresses, which arise not when we attempt to account for the justification of a moral claim, but rather when we attempt to account for the moral status of something by appealing to something else of the same moral status, and so on. Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a) thought that some things were good because we desire them for the sake of something else that is good. But if everything that is good is good simply because it aims at something else that is good, this would lead to a regress and “all desire would be futile and vain”. And so Aristotle argues that there must be a Highest Good—something that is desired for its own sake—that other things can be good in virtue of aiming towards this highest good. Aristotle is a Moral Foundationalist: there is something whose goodness does not get explained by reference to anything else, by means of which the goodness of other things is accounted for.