 As we saw in  Section 9,  Turiel’s work played an important role in Nichols’ (2002) elaboration and defense of his version of moral sentimentalism. In another pair of publications (Nichols 2004: Ch. 4; 2007) Nichols invoked the work of the social domain theorists (Turiel 1983; Smetana 1989, 1993; Tisak 1995) to mount an argument against what he took, plausibly enough, to be the most visible and carefully developed alternative version of sentimentalism, developed by Alan Gibbard (1990). The problem with Gibbard’s theory, Nichols maintains, is that it is “seriously overintellectualized” and “too ingenious to be a plausible account of normal moral judgment” (Nichols 2007: 261 &amp; 259). On Gibbard’s account,