 If SCP is science, then neither realism nor empiricism fit the main aims of science as articulated by prominent philosophers of science. If so much of conservation biology involves developing algorithms and computer programs and articulating various conventions, then truth and empirical adequacy are relevant for parts of the discipline but irrelevant for large swaths. Moreover, if theory structure and confirmation are irrelevant to those swaths because they concern truth or empirical adequacy, then the topic of scientific explanation will be irrelevant as well. Since there are few theories and models, then the questions regarding Bayesian versus frequentist methods of scientific inference will find less purchase in conservation biology practice. Additionally, and maybe most important, socioeconomic values are inputs into conservation biology and it simply cannot be done without them. Or, if it is to be done, it will be the values of a small set of scientists thus privileging the wrong people (Guha 1998, Martin 2017). If SCP is central to conservation biology, much of philosophy of science is irrelevant to conservation biology. Conservation biology increasingly looks like a pragmatic or instrumental endeavor. One possible response would be to develop a pragmatist or instrumentalist philosophy of science which de-emphasizes truth and empirical adequacy (Dewey 1938; Laudan 1978).