 At the heart of this complaint is a more general one, to wit, that there is a problem with the attempt to infer anything as necessarily existing. Although, according to Kant, reason is unavoidably led to the notion of an absolutely necessary being, the understanding is in no position to identify any candidate answering to the idea. (cf. A592/B620). Clearly, the ontological argument is designed to show that, in fact, there is one (and only one) candidate answering to this idea, namely, the ens realissimum. But it does so by deducing the necessary existence from the concept of the ens realissimum (a being that contains all reality or predicates) only via the minor premise that “existence” is a predicate or reality. Kant, however, famously denies that existence is a “real predicate,” or determination. Thus, one criticism is that the argument conflates merely logical with real (determining) predicates. A real (determining) predicate is one that enlarges the concept to which it is attached. It seems clear that the locus of the error here, as in the other metaphysical disciplines, is the view that the idea of the ens realissimum provides us with a concept of an “object” to which it would be appropriate to apply categories or concepts in a determining way. Thus, included in Kant’s criticism is the claim that the category of existence is being subject to a transcendental misemployment (A598/B626). This misapplication of the category is problematic precisely because, according to Kant, we are dealing only with an object of pure thought, whose existence cannot be known (A602/B630).