  Note that Hare is not simply saying that a person’s actions are the  most reliable source of evidence as to his evaluative judgments, or  that if a person did b the most likely hypothesis is that he judged b to be the best thing to do. Hare is saying, rather, that it follows from a person’s having done b that  he judged b best from among the options open to him at the  time. On this view, then, akratic or weak-willed actions as we have  understood them are impossible. There could not be a case in which  someone genuinely and in the fullest sense held that he ought to do  a now (where a was within his power) and yet did  b. On Hare’s view, “it becomes analytic to say that  everyone always does what he thinks he ought to [if physically and  psychologically able]” (Hare 1952, p. 169).