 The proof-centered approach highlights epistemic aspects of logical consequence. A proof does not merely attest to the validity of the argument: it provides the steps by which we can establish this validity. And so, if a reasoner has grounds for the premises of an argument, and they infer the conclusion via a series of applications of valid inference rules, they thereby obtain grounds for the conclusion (see Prawitz 2012). One can go further and subscribe to inferentialism, the view by which the meaning of expressions is determined by their role in inference. The idea is that our use of a linguistic expression is regulated by rules, and mastering the rules suffices for understanding the expression. This gives us a preliminary restriction on what semantic values of expressions can be: they cannot make any distinctions not accounted for by the rules. One can then go even further, and reject any kind of meaning that goes beyond the rules—adopting the later Wittgensteinian slogan “meaning is use”. This view is favored by anti-realists about meaning, since meaning on this view is fully explained by what is knowable. 