 Sider  (2011)  gives pride of place to evaluative considerations in his discussion of naturalness: according to him, the fact that “it’s better to think and speak in joint-carving terms” unifies many of the other roles for naturalness. He characterises naturalness as a second “aim of belief”, on a par with truth. He furthermore holds that merely using words or concepts that stand for unnatural properties is (non-instruementally) bad, even when there is no difference in the propositions believed. His thought is that simply using such words or concepts, no matter what beliefs one forms, involves ‘carving the world up  incorrectly’.[59]  Dorr and Hawthorne  (2013)  argue against Sider’s picture of naturalness as a value independent of truth, on the grounds that believing a false natural proposition is worse than believing a false unnatural one, whereas on Sider’s account it should be better. For example, a pill that induces many false beliefs about phone numbers should be preferred to one that will induce a single false belief about whether neutrinos have mass. They also claim that the value or disvalue in using certain words or concepts is merely instrumental, flowing entirely from their tendencies to promote or hinder belief.