 Kant holds that persons, as ends in themselves, have dignity (Die Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysics of Morals) (1797), 6: 435). But what is dignity? Until the last century or so, “dignity” (from the Latin dignitas, worthiness) referred to a high social status associated with the aristocracy, offices of power, and high church positions. Dignity thus distinguished socially important people from the hoi polloi, who had no dignity (Debes 2017). Kant’s view that every person has dignity thus marks a revolution in valuation (but see Dean 2014 and Hay 2012 for the view that only morally good people have dignity). Commentators disagree about how to understand what Kant means by dignity (cf. Sensen 2017, 2011; Cureton 2013; Darwall 2008). But the most common interpretation is that dignity is a distinctive kind objective worth that is absolute (not conditional on anyone’s needs, desires, or interests, and a value that everyone has an overriding reason to acknowledge); intrinsic or inherent (not bestowed or earned and not subject to being lost or forfeited); incomparable and the highest form of worth (a being with dignity cannot rationally be exchanged for or replaced by any other valued object, and is infinitely valuable, we might say, rather than worth $5 or $5 million).