 The later Mohists most likely fall on the realist side of this spectrum, although their account of the grounds for kind distinctions is so sketchy that any interpretation of their position is partly conjectural. Their stance seems to be that whether we recognize some kind by dubbing its exemplars with a name—as when we dub horses “horse”—is determined by our practices, but that whether a group of objects, such as horses, form a kind is determined by whether the objects are intrinsically similar, independently of our practices (A78, A86).    The texts do not clearly indicate whether, for example, the aggregate oxen-and-horses—that is, draft animals—could conventionally be deemed a kind (cf. B67). Perhaps the Mohists would instead hold that, as draft animals, oxen and horses are “the same” in being “united” by their function in pulling carts (that is, by the third of the four types of “sameness”). Canon B66 seems to imply that hornless oxen and horses cannot form a kind, probably because no feature distinguishes just this grouping of hornless animals from all others. By contrast, perhaps hornless quadrupeds could constitute a kind, because their inherent similarity in having four legs but lacking horns distinguishes them from all other creatures. In the end, later Mohist texts offer no explicit, detailed explanation of exactly which similarities between things constitute the basis for kinds. On this point, their treatment contrasts with that of, for example, Xunzi, who clearly indicates that the relevant “samenesses” are constituted through social practices. [21] 