 By contrast, (Zimmerman 1993) and (Forbes 2000, 2006) propose revisions in (19) itself and its ilk. Zimmerman (161–2) replaces the quantifier intension with a property intension, since he holds that (i) unspecific readings are restricted to “broadly” existential quantified NPs, and (ii) the property corresponding to the nominal in the existential NP (e.g., ‘woollen sweater’) can do duty for the NP itself. Of course, the proposed restriction of unspecific readings to existentials is controversial (cf. our earlier example, ‘Guercino is looking for every dog on Aldrovandi’s estate’). It may also be wondered whether there is any less of a need to explain what it is to stand in the seeking relation to a property of objects than to a property of properties (but for a response to this kind of objection, see Grzankowski 2018, 146–9).