 Thus, to consequentialize a non-consequentialist theory, we combine act-consequentialism with a ranking of outcomes such that the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory yields, in every possible world, the same (or nearly the same) deontic verdicts that the target non-consequentialist theory yields. Historically, this has most often been done in the hopes of coming up with a version of act-consequentialism that avoids most, if not all, of utilitarianism’s counterintuitive implications. And this project is often called “the consequentializing project” (Portmore 2007; S. A. Schroeder 2017; Suikkanen 2020). But, as we’ll see below, some contemporary philosophers consequentialize for other reasons. Indeed, there are three different types of consequentializing and, consequently, three distinct consequentializing projects. And, so, when we consider various objections to consequentializing below, we’ll need to be careful not to conflate them, as many of these objections apply only to certain types of consequentializing.