 One might object that persistence of consciousness in deep sleep is not possible given the mainstream premise of identifying consciousness as intentional experience. Śaṅkara disagrees with the premise that consciousness is intrinsically intentional. (This was a matter of great debate between Advaita Vedānta and rival philosophies like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). He counters that the absence of intentional experience in deep sleep does not entail the lack of consciousness insofar as consciousness is not intrinsically intentional. It exists even in the absence of cognition representing an object. Rejecting his position is difficult because one cannot claim direct perception of unconsciousness in deep sleep, and in that case cannot inductively infer unconsciousness either. Rather than viewing deep sleep as the absence of consciousness, Śaṅkara claims there is simply an absence of objects. Consciousness of the absence of objects is not the absence of consciousness. This is akin to having one’s eyes wide open and seeing but in a pitch-black room. Consciousness simply has nothing to illumine, therefore no intentional experience occurs nor any awareness of one’s self as a knower. This presence of consciousness in deep sleep is possible because it is self-illuminating and exists independently from objects or knowing agents. (See Śaṅkara’s discussions of deep sleep in BṛUBh 4.3, GKBh ch.1, and BrSūBh 3.2.7–10. For further studies see Thompson 2015; Comans 1990; and Sharma 2004).