 With respect to friendship, some have defended what can be called an ‘Aristotelian’ account of special obligations. Jennifer Whiting, for example, argues that we ought to take special care of our friends if they are worthy of such concern. Thus, if I have a virtuous friend, I am required to care for her because her character renders her deserving and a suitable object of such concern. The obvious worry about any such Aristotelian account is its distance from commonsense. According to the Aristotelian account, I have special obligations to friends and family if they are deserving of special concern. But commonsense allows that I have special obligations to friends and family members even if they are not particularly or especially virtuous. It seems that I have special obligations to help my intimates be virtuous, even if they are not yet virtuous. The Aristotelian view only accounts for our special obligations to those of our friends or loved ones who are virtuous. But what about our less than virtuous intimates? The Aristotelian must either deny that we have special obligations to our non-virtuous intimates or allow that something other than virtuous character grounds special obligations to most of our intimates. So the Aristotelian account is either implausible or radically incomplete as an account of special obligations.