 Although James teaches that there are preexisting ideas and volitions in the soul similarly to the way in which seminal reasons preexist in matter, there is an important difference between the two cases. For the “inclining principles” in matter, he explains in Quodl. III, q. 4 (p. 70, 416–424), stand farther from their actualization than do the inclining principles in the soul. They thus require more on the part of the extrinsic transmutative cause than do the soul’s inclining principles. So much so, James explains, that it sometimes appears that all the work is being done by the extrinsic agent. This is not so, of course, as the “intrinsic inclining principle” also plays a role. Because James assigns such an important role to external agent causes in his account of natural change, one of the common complaints directed against theories of seminal reasons, namely that they deny the reality of secondary causes, clearly does not apply to his version of the theory. 