 Whatever advantages or disadvantages sense-datum theories might have with respect to genuine perception (exteroception) and misperception in general, its attraction seems undeniable when it comes to its treatment of pains and other “intransitive” bodily sensations like itches, tickles, tingles,  etc.[4]  According to many sense-datum theorists, pains are paradigm examples of phenomenal individuals, mental objects with phenomenal qualities whose existence depends on their being sensed or felt, and thus are logically private to their owners who feel them. This position presumably explains why we have the act-object duality or ambiguity in pain talk that we discussed earlier: pains qua localizable objects cannot exist without the corresponding acts, i.e., without someone’s acts of experiencing them (Broad  1959).[5]  In other words, the concept of pain plausibly applies to both the object part of the act-object pair and to the act of being directly aware of these objects.