 However, Olivi finds a simple division between really existing things (substances and qualities) and conceptualizations that the mind makes too coarse. Although he goes some way towards nominalism, he does not go all the way (Boureau 1999, 45). In many contexts, he upholds the realist intuition that our concepts are based on how things really are—they are ontologically committing. To achieve this aim, he uses the notoriously difficult concept of rationes reales, which can be translated, for instance, as “real aspects” (Pini 2008, pp. 160–61; Pasnau 2011, p. 236), or “modes of partial intelligibility” (Piron 2016, par. 8). The core idea is that the human mind can consider the reality from different perspectives, by focusing on some aspect of it and leaving other aspects aside. For instance, it is possible to think about Socrates from the point of view of his quantity. Ontologically speaking the object of thought is still the individual rational substance Socrates—the fact that we think about his quantity does not entail real existence of quantity as a distinct thing (res)—but we focus only on his height and weight and, as it were, abstract them from him. These properties are not mind-dependent but real in the sense that Socrates really is of a certain quantity, but the core of Olivi’s view is that these qualities are nevertheless not ontologically distinct from Socrates’ substance. The category of relation functions in a similar way: