 Peter Milne takes an interest in assertion mainly in order to “work back” from there to how logic constrains belief. He concludes that logic exerts normative force at least on the stock of beliefs that constitute the agent’s evidence (Milne 2009: 286). Other authors explicitly prioritize the external dimension of reasoning, conceived of as a social, inter-personal phenomenon. According to them, it is reasoning in this external sense (as opposed to intra-personal processes of belief revision, etc.) that is the primary locus of logical normativity (MacKenzie 1989). The norms govern our rational interactions with our peers. For instance, they might be thought to codify the permissions and obligations governing certain kinds of dialogues. Viewed from this perspective, logic’s normative impact on the intra-personal activity of reasoning is merely derivative, arrived at through a process of interiorization. A view along these lines has been advanced by Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2015). In a similar vein Sinan Dogramaci (2012, 2015) has proposed a view he calls “epistemic communism”. According to epistemic communism our use of “rational” applied to certain deductive rules has a specific functional role. Its role is to coordinate our epistemic rules with a view to maximizing the efficiency of our communal epistemic practices. On the basis of this view, he then elaborates an argument for the pessimistic conclusion that no general theory of rationality is to be had.