 Such “dual aspect” frameworks of thinking have received increasing attention in contempory discussion, and they have a long tradition reaching back as far as to Spinoza. In the early days of psychophysics, Fechner (1861) and Wundt (1911) advocated related views. Whitehead, the modern pioneer of process philosophy, referred to mental and physical poles of “actual occasions”, which themselves transcend their bipolar appearances (Whitehead 1978). Many approaches in the tradition of Feigl (1967) and Smart (1963), called “identity theories”, conceive mental and material states as essentially identical “central states”, yet considered from different perspectives. Other variants of this idea have been suggested by Jung and Pauli (1955) [see also Meier (2001)], involving Jung’s conception of a psychophysically neutral, archetypal order, or by Bohm and Hiley (Bohm 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1993; Hiley 2001), referring to an implicate order which unfolds into the different explicate domains of the mental and the material. They will be discussed in more detail in  Section 5,  “Brain and Mind as Dual Aspects”. 