 Dicke (1961), criticizing Dirac, argues that standard cosmology with time-independent gravity suffices to account for the coincidence, provided that we take into account the fact that our existence is tied to the presence of mainline stars like then sun and of various chemical elements produced in supernovae. As Dicke shows, this requirement dictates that we could only have found ourselves in that cosmic period in which the coincidence holds. Accordingly, contrary to Dirac, there is no reason to assume that gravity varies with time to make the coincidence unsurprising. Carter (1974) and Leslie (1986, 1989: ch. 6) describe Dicke’s account as an “anthropic explanation” of the coincidence that impressed Dirac, and Leslie discusses it continuously with the argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse. (Earman [1987: 309], however, disputes that Dicke’s account is adequately characterized as an “explanation”.) But whereas Dicke’s account of the coincidence uses life’s existence as background knowledge to show that standard cosmology suffices to make the coincidence expectable, the standard argument from fine-tuning for the multiverse, as reviewed in what follows, treats life’s existence as requiring a theoretical response (rather than as background knowledge) and advocates the multiverse hypothesis as the best such response. Friederich (2019b; 2021: ch. 6) outlines how to set up the fine-tuning argument for the multiverse so that it uses anthropic reasoning analogously to the Dicke/Carter accounts of large number coincidences.