 When one discusses the relationship between bodily awareness and action, one frequently appeals to the notion of body schema. It is used, however, in many different ways. One of the main controversies is whether it should be conceived as a specific type of mental representation of the body. For Merleau-Ponty (1945), and more recently for Gallagher (2008), the body schema should be conceived as a sensorimotor function, devoid of intentional content. Their definition is in line with a general trend in the last thirty years that rejects the necessity to posit representations in the mind (Gallagher 2008; Thelen &amp; Smith 1994; Turvey &amp; Carello 1995; van Gelder 1995; Thompson 2005; Zahavi &amp; Parnas 1998). On this view, representations are inadequate because they are too costly and they are unnecessary because they can be easily replaced by sensorimotor loops. The body ca be conceived as “its own best model”, to use Brooks’s (1991) expression. If biological systems only know what they need to in order to get their job done (Clark 1997), is the body really something that the brain needs to represent in this sense? All that may be needed is to pay attention to it (Kinsbourne 1995; Hochstetter 2016).