 The main sticking point in this argument is the move from (3) to (4). (For a denial of (2) based on the possibility and moral unsurpassability of an infinitely valuable world, see Climenhaga 2018.) Detractors of this argument wonder whether it follows from the fact that any world actualized by God is morally surpassable that any act of actualizing a world is morally surpassable. It is easy to be tempted by the following line of thought. If we think of an action as a state of affairs to be evaluated in terms of moral goodness in the same way that any other state of affairs is to be evaluated, then there is a pretty straightforward argument for the view that any act of actualizing a world will be surpassable. For if one prefers from a moral point of view the obtaining of possible world w2 to the obtaining of possible world w1, then it seems very plausible that one would, from the moral point of view, prefer God’s actualizing w2 to God’s actualizing w1.