 At this point, defenders of historical accounts might opt for an alternative defence, arguing that if the disadvantage that B uses to exploit \(A\) is indeed one that she is responsible for bringing about, then \(B\) does not exploit her when he benefits from this disadvantage. Support for this position is provided by the moral hazard objection, mentioned above: if \(A\) knows the consequences of her actions will be subsidised by \(B\) (by placing a constraint on the advantage \(B\) can reap from his future interactions with \(A\)), then \(A\) has an incentive to take risks, the consequences of which are at least partly borne by \(A\) (Ferguson 2016b). There is also an intermediate position available here. We might acknowledge that if \(B\) is responsible for her plight, then \(A\) is permitted to gain from \(B\)’s disadvantage, while also placing limits on the amount of gain that \(A\) can extract in such circumstances. As Serena Olsaretti has argued, the grounds of responsibility, which concern “the features of people that we can … hold them responsible for” differ from the fairness of the ‘stakes’ of their choices, the costs “attach[ed] to whatever features constitute the justifiable grounds of responsibility” (Olsaretti 2009: 170). An account of just stakes may therefore be used to make space for this intermediate position, where \(A\) can gain from \(B\)’s self-caused vulnerability, but only within certain limits.