 The idea of qualitative multiplicities is difficult to understand, although it is the heart of Bergson’s thinking. Normally, we would think that if there is heterogeneity, there has to be juxtaposition. But, in qualitative multiplicities, there is heterogeneity and no juxtaposition. Qualitative multiplicities are temporal; qualitative multiplicity defines the duration. As with quantitative multiplicities, Bergson gives us many examples. But perhaps, the most significant example is the feeling of sympathy because, in the 1903 “Introduction to Metaphysics,” Bergson defines intuition as sympathy. Here, in Time and Free Will, he calls it a moral feeling (Time and Free Will, 18–19). Our experience of sympathy begins, according to Bergson, with us putting ourselves in the place of others, in feeling their pain. But, Bergson continues, if this were all, the feeling would inspire in us abhorrence of others, and we would want to avoid them, not help them. But then, one realizes that, if one does not help this poor wretch, it is going to turn out that no one will come to my aide when I need help. There is a “need” to help the suffering. For Bergson, these first two phases are “inferior forms of pity.” In contrast, true pity is not so much fearing pain as desiring it. It is as if nature committed a great injustice and what we want is not to be seen as complicitous with it. As Bergson says, “The essence of pity is thus a need for self-abasement [s’humilier], an aspiration downward” into pain. But, this downward aspiration develops into an upward movement into the feeling of being superior. One feels superior because one comes to realize that one can do without certain sensuous goods. In the end however, one feels humility, humble since one no longer needs and desires such sensuous goods. By denying ourselves of these goods, we, in a way, reestablish justice. Later in the 1932 Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson shows that the feeling of sympathy in fact progresses to the point of love for all things. In any case, the feeling of sympathy is “a qualitative progress.” It consists in a “transition from repugnance to fear, from fear to sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility.” There is a heterogeneity of feelings here. The feelings are continuous with one another; they interpenetrate one another, and there is even an opposition between inferior needs and superior humility. If we tried to juxtapose the feelings, that is, separate them spatially, the feelings would have a different nature than when they interpenetrate. There would be no progress from one to the other. They would be isolated psychic states. Therefore, for Bergson, a qualitative multiplicity is heterogeneous (or differentiated), continuous (or unifying), oppositional (or dualistic) at the extremes, and, most importantly, temporal or progressive (an irreversible flow). Bergson also calls the last characteristic of temporal progress mobility; this characteristic truly distinguishes duration from space, which is an “immobile medium” (The Creative Mind, p. 180). Finally, because a qualitative multiplicity is heterogeneous and yet interpenetrating, it is inexpressible. The continuous and heterogeneous multiplicity of consciousness is given immediately, that is, without the mediation of symbols (Bergson 1992, 162). For Bergson — and perhaps this is his greatest insight — freedom is mobility. Because Bergson connects duration with mobility, in the second half of the Twentieth Century (in Deleuze and Foucault, in particular), the Bergsonian concept of qualitative multiplicity will be dissociated from time and associated with space (Deleuze 1986).