 Further, some of the results this theory delivers for embedded conditionals are not plausible. Mother says “If it doesn’t rain tomorrow we’ll go to the beach, and if it rains we’ll go to the cinema”. This rightly inspires confident expectations. But on the present theory, as one or the other conditional has a false antecedent, the conjunction cannot be true. Yet one or the other conditional might be false, due to some unlikely contretemps, such as illness, in which case the conjunction is false. So the probability that it is true, given that it is either true or false, is 0. The children are 99% confident that if \({\sim}R, B\), and 99% confident that if \(R, C\), but, on this account, they should be 0% confident that (if \({\sim}R, B)\) &amp; (if \(R, C)\). (McGee (1989) raises this objection to the account.)