 Another maverick Confucian of this period was Wang Tingxiang (1474–1544). In opposition to the metaphysical dualists of his time, Wang proposed that the ordinary features and behaviors of qi (vital stuff) could account for everything in the cosmos, including the sources of order and creation that mainstream Neo-Confucians tended to identify with irreducible li (Patterns) (Ong 2006; Y. Liu 2000: 55–85). He also rejected the fundamental unity and oneness of the universe and—still more astonishingly—denied that a comprehensive unity was even desirable (Kim 2008; Ong 2006). And Wang furthermore took the decidedly unorthodox view that goodness and the predispositions for virtue aren’t necessary features of human nature, suggesting instead that the moral emotions that people often cited as evidence of natural goodness, such as moral shame, are primarily responsive to social norms and expectations (Ong 2006: 474). In taking this position he defied a centuries-old Confucian consensus about human nature that was rarely contradicted in the Song, Yuan, and Ming dynasties.