 In this philosophical literature, there is a long list of features that were argued to be necessary if a judgment or a rule is to count as moral. Perhaps the most widely discussed of these was Hare’s proposal that moral rules must be “universalizable”. As Hare unpacked the notion, it required that there be no names or definite descriptions in moral rules. Another widely discussed proposal, also due to Hare, was that moral rules are “prescriptive”. What this means is that the “action-guiding force [of moral rules] derives from the fact that they entail imperatives” (Wallace &amp; Walker 1970b: 9). A third proposal was that if an action guiding principle is a moral principle for a person, then she must regard it as “overriding or supremely important” (Frankena 1967 [1970: 155]). “In cases of conflict between moral and nonmoral principles, the former are necessarily overriding” (Taylor 1978: 44; for a similar proposal, see Cooper 1970: 95). Yet another frequently discussed necessary condition was that moral rules are behavior guiding rules whose violation is met with social sanctions, “the reproach of one’s neighbors” (Cooper 1966 [1970: 73]) or something more serious, like ostracism (Sprigge, 1964 [1970: 129 ff]). This was sometimes paired with the idea that moral transgressions are followed by the transgressor sanctioning himself with feelings of guilt or shame or disliking himself (Wallace &amp; Walker 1970: 14; Sprigge 1964 [1970: 130]). All of these proposals were “formal” in the sense that they did not impose any constraints on the contents of moral rules or moral judgments. And this is far from a complete list of the formal conditions that were proposed; there were many more (Frankena 1963 offers an extensive list, along with many references).