 From the skeptical perspective, then, morality is not about backward-looking assessments of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, since these are rejected. Rather, morality is forward-looking and functions by invoking the ‘ought’ of axiological recommendation, the epistemic sense of the notion of ‘can,’ and (at least in the case of Pereboom (2014a, 2017b)) a forward-looking notion of blame grounded in the goods of protection, reconciliation, and moral formation. While critics may fear this is still not enough since morality must be capable of grounding backward-looking judgments of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, the skeptic’s conception of morality may nevertheless be sufficient for the vast majority of our moral practices. [Cf. Fischer 2004; Athanassoulis 2005; Edmundson 2007; Rosen 2004; Moya 2010; Morris 2015]