 (dr), called “sensus divisus” by Heytesbury, denotes that there is a person (who happens to be Socrates) of whom I correctly know that he is running in Beaumont, but about whom I may or may not know that he is Socrates; his kinematics, but not his identity, is part of my belief. On the other hand, according to (dd), called “sensus compositus” by Heytesbury, I know that it is Socrates who is running in Beaumont. Hence if I believed that Socrates died years ago, (dr) could be true but (dd) would be false ([SCD] 1494: fol. 3va [1988a: 427] and [RSS] 1494, fol. 13rb and [1988b:  444]).[26]  By strictly endorsing the Aristotelian framework and analyzing epistemic contexts in terms of the de re/de dicto ambiguity, Heytesbury does not participate in the fourteenth-century developments in the logical analysis of  language.[27]  Also, his criteria for distinguishing between the two readings are purely syntactic, whereby scholastic Latin is viewed as an artificial language with strict formation  rules.[28]