  Versions of ESR that employ the Ramsey sentence of a theory and the distinction between observational and theoretical terms are embedded in the so-called syntactic view of theories that adopts first-order quantificational logic as the appropriate form for the representation of physical theories. According to Zahar (1994, 14) the continuity in science is in the intension rather than the extension of its concepts. He argues that if we believe that the mathematical structure of theories is fundamentally important for ontology, then we need a semantics for theories that addresses the representative role of mathematics directly. Such an account of scientific representation is allegedly found in the so-called ‘semantic’ or ‘model-theoretic’ approach associated primarily with Patrick Suppes, Fred Suppe, Ron Giere and Bas van Fraassen (see da Costa and French 2003). The relationship between structuralism and the semantic view is discussed by van Fraassen (1997, 2008), and Thomson-Jones (2011). Chris Pincock (2011) criticises structural realism on the basis of an analysis of the role of mathematics in scientific representation. Ladyman (1998), and Ladyman and Ross (2007) argue that the Newman problem does not arise for ontic structural realism since it eschews an extensional understanding of relations.