 Nishida insists that this idea of God can be understood no more in terms of an immanent pantheism than in terms of a transcendent theism. It may perhaps best be called “panentheism”; but for Nishida this too remains a static term of “objective logic” and fails to capture the necessity of thinking God as both irreducibly transcendent and thoroughly immanent. As Nishida is fond of saying, God or the Buddha is “immanently transcendent.” It is the paradoxical logic one finds in the Prajñāpāramitā Sutras of Mahāyāna Buddhism (i.e., what D. T. Suzuki called the “logic of soku-hi,” a logic of “is and is not”) that Nishida thinks most profoundly expresses the “absolute dialectic” of the divine as the dynamic principle of absolute nothingness (NKZ XI, 399; see Nishida 1987, 69–71).