 The first group of solutions does not take into consideration the amputation event that occurred at \(t'\) when they account for what exists — you may dub them untemporalized solutions. One extreme option in this category is to deny that there are such things as Oscar−. Undetached proper parts of objects don’t exist (van Inwagen 1981). A less extreme version allows for commonsense undetached parts, like tails or feet — of course Oscar− does not belong to this category, so it does not exist (Carmichael 2020). On the other hand, a more extreme option is to deny the existence of both Oscar and Oscar− — this may follow from some reductionist view like the one that only elementary particles exist. A third, less extreme, option is to insist that objects of different kinds, e.g., a clay statue and the piece of clay it is composed of, can occupy the same space at the same time, but objects of the same kind, e.g., two statues, cannot (Wiggins 1968; for refinements, see Oderberg 1996). So Oscar and Oscar− are different despite the fact that from \(t'\)onwards they occupy the same space. Guillon (2021) notes that there are three varieties of this colocationist view. First, one may maintain that they are different despite sharing all parts: every proper part of Oscar is a proper part of Oscar− and vice versa. The second colocationist variety allows for two different material objects to be sums of the same set of material objects — so Oscar and Oscar− may be different although they are ultimately composed of the same particles. Finally, one of them, most probably Oscar−, may be considered a proper part of the other. Obviously, these three options are meaningful only if one does not assume the full strength of  general existentional mereology.  The last global option is to claim that Oscar and Oscar− are two distinct, temporally extended objects — a dog part, Oscar−, and a dog, Oscar, which overlaps at \(t'\). Temporal parts of distinct objects can occupy the same space at the same time.