 Peter Strawson in his Woodbridge Lectures (Strawson 1987) points out that the term ‘naturalism’ is elastic in its use. He distinguishes two main varieties: hard or reductive and soft or liberal naturalism. Hard naturalists view human beings with their different endowments as mere ‘objects’—parts of nature—to be described, analysed and causally explained. The claim is that it is possible to have an absolute and pure objective view of human beings and their behaviour. Soft naturalists, on the other hand, are ready to accommodate subjective dispositions and personal attitudes within a general naturalistic framework. Following John McDowell (1998, 2004, 2008), Ganeri (2012) proposes a more nuanced naturalist scheme to classify non-Cartesian Theories of Mind/Self propounded by classical Indian philosophers where the distinction between hard naturalism and relaxed/ liberal naturalism depends on a distinction between a realm of law and a space of reasons. While the realm of law provides an explanatory framework for ideal physics, the space of reason or the logical space justifies ‘conditions of our humanity’. On this theory, thinking, knowing, freedom of will, considered ‘natural powers of human beings’ can be accommodated within relaxed naturalism, ‘though they are beyond the reach of natural scientific understanding, …, without thereby relegating them to the sphere of the occult or supernatural’ (McDowell, 2008). Another way of discriminating naturalists in recent literature (Kornblith 1985, Papineau 2007) is to distinguish between methodological and substantive naturalism; where the former has as its sub-varieties (a) Replacement Theory and (b) Expansionist/ Normative Theory, while the latter may be subdivided into Ontological and Semantic varieties. According to Methodological Naturalism, philosophical theorizing should be continuous with empirical enquiry in the sciences. Some Methodological Naturalists want to do away with normative justification theories and to replace them with empirical and descriptive explanatory accounts. Other Methodological Naturalists are more liberal and retain the normative level with the proviso that the theorist must not forget that ‘it is an empirical question what normative advice is actually usable and effective for creatures like us’. Ontological Substantive Naturalism is the reductive view that there exists only natural and physical things and Semantic Substantive Naturalists emphasize that philosophical analysis of any theoretical concept must show it to be amenable to empirical enquiry.