Questions have been raised about EC’s ability to account for certain other data. Andy Egan et al. (2005) argue that Relativism, rather than EC, gets the semantics of epistemic modals right. According to Relativism (see Section 6), the truth values of knowledge sentences depend upon the standards in play in the contexts in which they are assessed, as opposed to the standards operative in either the subject’s or the attributor’s context. Bach (2005, 66) and Feldman (2004, 27) question whether the contextualist model might apply to one’s thoughts about whether various ‘knowledge’ sentences express truths. Timothy Williamson (2005a, 100–101) and John Hawthorne (2004, 109–110) raise related concerns about the preservation of information in memory and testimony: storing or conveying the information that ‘S knows that p [plus some date index]’ may lead to problems, since subsequent uses of that information may occur in contexts in which different standards are in effect. In addition, Williamson (ibid., 102ff.) argues that EC, because it privileges attributor over subject factors, does not respect the autonomy of the subject, qua agent, in settling the contents of questions involved in practical decision making. And Hawthorne (ibid., 98ff.) contends that EC has implausible consequences for reports of propositional attitudes in which ‘know’ occurs.