 would seem to be in some important way unintelligible, very like contradictions in terms (the “#” indicates semantic anomaly). Philosophers standardly refer to sentences of the first set as “synthetic,” those of the second as (at least apparently) “analytic.” (Members of set III. are sometimes said to be “analytically false,” although this term is rarely used, and “analytic” is standardly confined to sentences that are regarded as true.) We might call sentences such as (5)-(10) part of the “analytic data” to which philosophers and linguists have often appealed in invoking the distinction (without prejudice, however, to whether such data might otherwise be explained). Some philosophers might want to include in set III. what are called category mistakes (q.v.) such as #The number three likes Tabasco sauce, or #Saturday is in bed (cf., Ryle, 1949 [2009]), but these have figured less prominently in recent discussions, being treated not as semantically anomalous, but as simply false and silly (Quine 1960 [2013, p. 210]).