 In philosophical as opposed to theological terms, what the thinkers labeled “fideists” have tended to find objectionable is not reason per se, but evidentialism – i.e., the doctrine (expressed forcefully by Clifford) that beliefs can be rational only if they are supported by evidence. Since evidentialism might otherwise seem to give rise to a regress problem, it is generally conjoined with some version of foundationalism which purports to delineate a criterion of “proper basicality” – i.e., a set of conditions under which beliefs can rationally be held without further evidential support. Whereas some putative fideists – like Pascal – argue that religious beliefs can be given non-evidential support, others can be interpreted as suggesting that such beliefs are themselves properly basic, or (as Plantinga has argued more recently) that no criterion of proper basicality that would exclude religious beliefs can itself be shown to be justified. Their contention in either case is that the believer can be rationally justified – or at least cannot be shown to be behaving irrationally – in holding certain beliefs, even if these beliefs themselves are not supported by evidence. Conceived of in this way, the putative fideist’s position – though not uncontroversial – is hardly the brazenly paradoxical doctrine it might at first appear to be.