 One might think that from an epistemic standpoint, the “intuitions” that philosophers have when considering “suitably elementary propositions” are what should be studied because, as Bealer said, “if we limit ourselves to suitably elementary propositions, then relative to them we approximate ideal cognitive conditions”, and philosophers come nearer to having a full understanding of the relevant concepts. Studies of that sort are being done (see Schwitzgebel &amp; Cushman 2012, 2015). Some results suggest that philosophers’ intuitions, like those of non-philosophers, are affected by how an example is described (called “framing effects”) and by the order in which the examples are presented (“ordering effects”). This suggests that the intuitions of philosophers are no more reliable than those of non-philosophers. But perhaps the experimental situation is not ideal and that ideal conditions are the ordinary settings in which philosophers do their work. (See, Kahneman’s description (2011: 234–235) of the approach taken by Gary Klein and his followers who criticize artificial experiments and recommend studying “real people doing things that matter” (Kahneman 2011: 235).