 Given that Cook Wilson’s views on knowledge and belief (see section 5) are linked to Plato’s own distinction between ἐπιστήμη and δόξα, it is worth mentioning that they also had an impact on the study of Plato’s dialogues. For example, although A. D. Woozley held a different view of knowledge as “not something generically different from belief, but as the limited case of belief” (Woozley 1949, 193), Cook Wilson’s distinction between knowledge and belief is introduced as an interpretative tool in chapter 8 of R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Plato’s Republic. A Philosophical Commentary (Cross &amp; Woozley 1964), while the idea that knowledge involves ‘reflection’ (the ‘accretion’ described in section 5) and the concept of ‘being under the impression that’ are involved in Ryle’s discussion of knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus (Ryle 1990, 23 &amp; 27–28). (For a similar claim about Theaetetus, see Prichard (1950, 88), and for Ryle on Cook Wilson on Parmenides, see end of section 7.) The impact of Cook Wilson’s views was at any rate not limited to Plato studies: they form, for example, the basis for H. A. Prichard’s critique of Kant in his Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (Prichard 1909) or of his lectures on the Descartes, Locke, Berkeley and Hume on knowledge (Prichard 1950, chap. 5). (See in particular Prichard (1909, 245), quoted below or (1950, 86, 88 &amp; 96) for statements of the distinction between knowledge and belief.)