 With respect to the normative concepts – concepts such as the concepts &lt;wrong&gt; or &lt;virtue&gt; – the explanatory accounts we are looking for would be conceptual analyses, so they presumably would be a priori. This does not mean that they would be obviously true, nor even that any rational person who had the concept would recognize a correct analysis as being correct. (For discussion of this point, see entries  analysis  and  moral non-naturalism, section on the open question argument).  With respect to the normative properties – properties such as the property of being wrong, or that of being a virtue – the explanatory accounts we are looking for would be metaphysical analyses, so, arguably, they would not be a priori (Schroeder 2005, King 1998, Rosen 2010). Since these accounts would be (putative) accounts of the essential natures of the properties, they would be necessarily true if true at all, and they would underwrite identity claims. If it is the essential nature of something’s being an acid that it be a proton donor, then to be an acid is to be a proton donor. If it the essential nature of wrongness is being A, B, and C, then to be wrong is to be A, B, and C.