 Sandra Harding developed a different widely used set of categories of feminist philosophies in the context of philosophy of science and epistemology (1986). Harding distinguishes feminist empiricists (practicing natural and social scientists who tended to rely on logical positivist theories), feminist standpoint theorists who drew from Marxist epistemology, and feminist postmodernists. Although Harding is distinguishing feminists by philosophical methodology, it is important to emphasize that her category of “feminist empiricist” captures a trend among pathbreaking women scientists who aimed to hold scientific practice to alleged standards of scientific objectivity and neutrality; however, the assumptions behind this trend are not what philosophers today have in mind when speaking of feminist empiricism. Contemporary analytic feminist empiricist philosophers tend to be post-Wittgensteinian-Quinean-Davidsonian empiricists, so not subject to the principal objections Harding raised of the scientists. See, for example, Longino (1990, 2002), Nelson (1990), Solomon (2001), E. Lloyd (2008), as well as essays collected in Scheman and O’Connor (2002), Nelson and Nelson (2003), Clough (2003), Superson and Brennan (2005), Grasswick (2011), Crasnow and Superson (2012), and Garavaso (2018).