 In between these extremes are various options for handling the underdetermination, corresponding to different levels of ‘deep’ realism. Thus one might try to argue that the underdetermination can be ‘broken’ in some way. One might, for example, appeal to some metaphysical factor or other in support of one package over the other, or shift to meta-metaphysical considerations in order to argue, for example, that individuality based on weak discernibility has certain advantages over rival accounts and also over non-individuality, with its attendant non-standard formal underpinning. However Arenhart argues that weak discernibility generates further metaphysical underdetermination and hence cannot support a fully naturalistic understanding of quantum mechanics as some of its advocates have claimed (Arenhart 2017b). Alternatively, of course, one could argue the other way and insist that the non-individuality package avoids having to choose between different metaphysical accounts of individuality, at least, and that the formal shift to quasi-set theory is not as dramatic as might be thought. Ultimately, however, its not at all clear what weight should be given to the various factors involved or even if a coherent weighting scheme can be applied in the first place.