 The feeling-apprehension of the a priori (dis)value underlies the grasp of an object as a good (or bad). The felt value is the good-making characteristic of the object valued as good or the bad-making characteristic of the object valued as bad. Contra the “weak” view, however, the value itself does not depend on the features of the object that is the bearer of the value. While valued objects (goods), considered as objects of desire, are empirical, variable, and subjective, the values themselves are not; they are a priori, immutable, and objective ideals. The perceptual experience of the bearer is only contingently related to—that is, is the occasion for—the feeling-apprehension of the value. Aspects of this view are analyzed and developed in Barber 1993; Bartky 1997; Blosser 1987, 1995, 2005, 2012; Davis 2009, 2012; Frings 1996, 1997; E. Kelly 1977, 2011; Schneck 1987; Spader 2002; Steinbock 2007, 2013, 2014, 2016; and Vendrell Ferran 2018b.