 At [Commentary on De Interpretatione] 89.12–100.25 Al-Fārābī presents a distinctive view of statements about the future (cf. Adamson 2006, Knuuttila 2015). In connection with a future battle, the disjunction “The battle either will or will not take place” is a necessary proposition and hence true. But since the future is indeterminate, neither of the sentences “The battle will take place” and “The battle will not take place” is true; moreover the lapse of truth value is something intrinsic in the world, it is not just our ignorance. Granted, if Allah knows that Zayd will leave home tomorrow, then it is true now that Zayd will leave home tomorrow, and this implication is a necessary truth. But the necessary truth of this implication doesn’t entail the necessary truth of its conclusion, and hence Zayd still has the freedom to choose. Al-Fārābī doesn’t make clear whether he is doubting the modal inference