   It is likely that Russell’s contention that particulars are independent from one another was connected in his mind with his views on relations. In holding the view that relations among simple particulars are external, Russell saw himself as denying the view that when a bears R to b, there is some part of a’s “nature” as an entity that involves its relatedness to b. It might be thought that Russell’s doctrine of external relations committed him at least to certain principles regarding the modal status of atomic facts (if not the independence principle). According to certain ways of defining the phrase, what it means for a relation to be internal is that it is a relation that its relata could not fail to have; an external relation is one its relata could possibly not have. Russell then might be seen as committed to the view that atomic facts (all of which involve particulars standing in relations, in the broad sense above) are always contingent. While this does not directly bear on the question of their independence, it would nevertheless commit Russell to certain tenets regarding the modal features of atomic facts.