 Some of the recent controversies concerning the objects of cognitive success concern the metaphysical relations among the cognitive successes of various kinds of objects: Does the cognitive success of a process involve anything over and above the cognitive success of each state in the succession of states that comprise the execution of that  process?[2]  Does the cognitive success of a particular mental state, or of a particular mental act, depend upon its relation to the larger process in which it  exists?[3]  Is the cognitive success of an organization constituted merely by the cognitive successes of its members, or is it something over and above those individual  successes?[4]  Is the cognitive success of a doxastic agent completely explicable in terms of the successes of its doxastic states, or vice versa? And either way, what sorts of doxastic states are there, and with respect to what kinds of possible success are they assessible? The latter dispute is especially active in recent years, with some epistemologists regarding beliefs as metaphysically reducible to high  credences,[5]  while others regard credences as metaphysically reducible to beliefs about probabilities (see Byrne in Brewer &amp; Byrne 2005), and still others regard beliefs and credences as related but distinct phenomena (see Kaplan 1996, Neta 2008). 