 These Phenomenologists also agree that intentional feelings or emotions grasp value-objects independent of those feelings, in the sense that neither a thing’s being valuable nor the truth or falsity of value attributions is reducible to or solely dependent upon the intentional feeling. There are important differences, however, in how Phenomenologists understand the relation between the “mere” perceiving of material things and experiencing the value property and how they understand the independence of the value-object. These differences are tied to different understandings of the German term  wertnehmen,[14]  which parallels wahrnehmen, to perceive. Focusing on the aspect of “taking”—nehmen—common to perceiving and valuing emphasizes their relation. A taking is a single, unified experience having two distinguishable aspects, a taking as true and a taking as valuable. The truth-taking and the value-taking occur together even as they remain distinguishable. Although their focus is on value in general, these Phenomenologists agree that the emotions have moral relevance and that our choices are in some manner rooted in the emotional disclosure of the value of both the ends at which the agent aims and the actions conducive to those ends. By extension, therefore, and despite differing accounts of the experience of value, they also view themselves as moral realists (see the entry on  moral realism).