  A third objection returns us to the asymmetry discussed at the end of section 1. Many of the powers and permissions by means of which criminal justice is done are withheld from private persons. Most obviously, private persons are not typically permitted to use force to punish others for crime. Few think that this should be changed. Vigilantism should remain criminal. If the values that justify having criminal law are essentially public, we appear to have an easy explanation of this fact: private persons cannot, even in principle, realise the values that justify criminal punishment; so they should not be permitted to punish. If those values are not essentially public, things are more difficult. There will surely be cases in which private persons are best placed to discharge \(D\)’s secondary duties—in which the state will not punish \(D\), but our imagined moot court would fine \(D\) a proportionate amount. It is not immediately clear that those who find criminal law’s general justification in impersonal values can explain why the moot court may not extract the money (Thorburn 2011a, 92–93).