 Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752) a protege of Samuel Clarke attacked the Locke/Collins account of personal identity in the Appendix on Personal Identity to his Analogy of Religion. Butler largely accepted Clarke’s substantialist account of identity and personal identity. Indeed he clarified Clarke’s position by summarizing it briefly and naming the distinction Clarke had been making between real and fictional identity. He called it the distinction between identity in the strict and proper sense and identity in the loose and popular sense (Ducharme 1986: 370). He reiterates Clarke’s claim that Collins’ account of personal identity is dangerous to religion and in particular the doctrine of the resurrection. He accused Collins of taking Locke’s doctrines “to a strange length” (Butler as quoted in Perry 2008: 102). By this Butler meant that Collins’ account of personal identity would not allow a person’s identity to persist for more than a moment and thus that Locke’s account of personal identity implied and that Collins explicitly stated a doctrine of successive persons. Butler claimed that such a doctrine would destroy both morality and any doctrine of the resurrection. This has been an influential misinterpretation of Collins (see Uzgalis 2008a: 322–326).