 Indeed, philosophers who believe there are good reasons for distinguishing morally between Trolley and Bridge are unlikely to be convinced by the above debunking explanation, for the following reason. Suppose we vary Bridge to equalize the cases for the factor Greene emphasizes: instead of having to shove the man off the bridge, all you have to do in Bridge Lever is flip a switch, and the switch will activate a lever that knocks the bystander off the bridge in front of the trolley. These cases are now equalized to be “impersonal”: neither now involves violence that is “up close and personal”. But does this variation change our moral response? If it does not, and we find Bridge Lever again objectionable (just like Bridge) while allowing for Trolley, then Greene’s proposed explanation would not work: we would need a different explanation for this pair of cases, such as the reason-giving explanation deontological philosophers would give. Even with regard to the original pair of cases, while Greene may be right that evolved dispositions against personal violence play some role in explaining our reactions, this needn’t be the whole explanation. It may be that this is another case of overdetermination (see section 2.4).