 Field (2003, 2008) has proposed influential solutions of the semantical paradoxes which combine Kripkean and revision theoretic techniques. According to him, the present solutions to the paradoxes are not satisfactory because of the following points: (i) the lack of a decent conditional (and biconditional); (ii) the failure of (some instances of) the T-schema (A ↔ T(⌈A⌉); (iii) the failure of intersubstitutivity between A and T(⌈A⌉); (iv) the impossibility of providing an internal analysis of the defectiveness of the paradoxical sentences. Field (2008) has consequently developed a theory of truth with a non-classical conditional operator, which allows to express a notion of determinate truth and to state that the Liar is not determinately true. Analysis of Field’s construction requires sophisticated set-theoretic and recursion theoretic developments (see Welch 2008, 2009, 2011). Moreover, the possibility of logically enriching Kripke’s theory of truth with novel conditionals has opened up new routes: e.g. Rossi (2016) provides an interesting method of incorporating a conditional conforming to Łukasiewicz three-valued logic in a fixed-point construction for truth. In the same direction, a considerable attention has been directed in recent literature to the so called revenge problem: typical solutions, say, of the Liar paradox, rely on notions that, if expressible in the object language, give rise to new versions of the paradox. So, the solution is only an illusion. The revenge problem can be instantiated by the so-called Strengthened Liar: informally, once we have a model which makes the Liar sentence L itself neither true nor false, and we can express this very fact, L is after all not true. But this is the claim made by L, and hence L is true. So the paradox seems to show up again (for more details, see the entry  liar paradox and  the collection of essays contained in Beall 2007).