 Whether R’s φ-ing must actually benefit R. Most philosophers agree that R’s φ-ing need not result in Y’s actually being benefited in order for R to deserve Y’s gratitude. Some philosophers suggest that the mere offer of a benefit, even if it is not accepted, calls for gratitude in the offeree (Camenisch 1981). Others argue that gratitude may be called for in response to R’s attempt at benefiting Y, even if the attempt does not succeed. There is a parallel here with the conditions under which resentment or blame are deserved. If one agent intends, plans and attempts to harm another, then it seems he deserves resentment and blame, even if his attempts were thwarted at the last minute by chance. By the same token, if R intends, plans and sacrifices in an attempt to benefit Y, but finds her attempts thwarted at the last minute by chance, it seems she still deserves gratitude. This claim may not be absolute. Dowling (1995), for instance, argues that if R inadvertently harms Y in attempting to benefit him, gratitude may not be owed. This may be true especially in cases where R knew, or should have known, that φ-ing would expose Y to non-negligible risk of harm.