  Just as counterfactuals are context-dependent and vague, so is our intuitive notion of overall similarity. In comparing cost of living, New York and San Francisco may count as similar, but not in comparing topography. And yet, Lewis’ (1973b: 92) Proposal has faced a barrage of counterexamples. Lewis and Stalnaker parted ways in their responses to these counterexamples, though both grant that Lewis’ (1973b: 92) Proposal was not viable. Stalnaker (1984: Ch.7) proposes the projection strategy: similarity is determined by the way we “project our epistemic policies onto the world”. D. Lewis 1979) proposes a new system of weights that amounts to a kind of curve-fitting: we must first look to which counterfactuals are intuitively true, and then find ways of weighting respects of similarity—however complex—that support the truth of counterfactuals. Since Lewis’ (1973b: 92) Proposal and Lewis’ (1979) system of weights are more developed, and have received extensive critical attention, they will be the focus of this section.[35] It will begin with the objections to Lewis’ (1973b: 92) Proposal that motivated Lewis’ (1979) system of weights, and then some objections to that approach.