 But this idea of a connection between (L1) and (O2) is not unproblematic. First there is a problem about making this approach to (O2) more precise. How to understand the notion of ‘reality in itself’ is not at all clear, as is well known. It can’t just mean: reality as it would be if we weren’t in it. On this understanding it would simply be the world as it is except with no humans in it, which would in many of its grander features be just as it in fact is. But then what does it mean? Similar, but different, worries apply to those who rely on notions like ‘fundamental’, ‘substance’, and the like. We won’t pursue this issue here, though. Second, there is a serious worry about how the formal language which is supposed to be the fundamental language is to be understood. In particular, is it supposed to be merely an auxiliary tool, or an essential one? This question is tied to the motivation for a formal fundamental language in the first place. If it is merely to overcome ambiguities, imperfections, and context sensitivities, then it most likely will merely be an auxiliary, but not essential tool. After all, within natural language we have many means available to get rid of ambiguities, imperfections and context sensitivities. Scope ambiguities can be often quite easily be overcome with scope markers. For example, the ambiguities in ‘\(A\) and \(B\) or \(C\)’ can be overcome as: ‘either \(A\) and \(B\) or \(C\)’ on the one hand, and ‘\(A\) and either \(B\) or \(C\)’, on the other. Other imprecisions can often, and maybe always, be overcome in some form or other. Formal languages are useful and often convenient for precisification, but they don’t seem to be essential for it.