 Phylogenetic inference should also be of interest to a wider range of philosophers for the way it can function as a case study for other philosophical issues. The recent history of phylogenetics has provided philosophers with test cases for how scientists shift from one set of commitments to another (Hull 1988), for the role of inductive logic and probability in both explanation and model construction (Sober 1988a,b; Haber 2005), and for what constitutes a good scientific explanation (Felsenstein &amp; Sober 1986; Sober 2004; Haber 2009). O’Hara (1988) and Ereshefsky (2012) look to phylogenetics to see how narrative or historical explanations function in the sciences. Other examples of philosophers using phylogenetics to assess philosophical theses include Velasco (2012) and Vassend (2020) using phylogenetics to examine practices of modeling and idealization, and Haber (2005) looking at what phylogenetic inference tells us of how probabilistic reasoning may be used to assess singular historical events. Aleta Quinn proposes a taxonomy of disputes in contemporary systematics that she argues stems from disputes over application of the principle of total evidence (2019), and uses the case of phylogenetics to examine a well known objection leveled against proponents of inference to the best explanation in the sciences (2016), the “best of the bad lot argument” (van Fraassen 1989), or the “underconsideration objection” (Lipton 2004). And finally, Andreasen (1998, 2000) looks to phylogenetics to answer the question of whether biological races are real.