 This highlights a broader point connecting all three domains, as well as the relationship between philosophy and disability more generally. Most philosophical discussions of disability have implicitly assumed the perspective of persons who do not have a disability. They have asked whether other people, the people with disabilities, have lower levels of well-being; whether other people, the people with disabilities, are less healthy; whether other people, the people with disabilities, will pose a comparatively higher burden as friends or intimates. In much recent work in political philosophy, disability has figured most prominently as a paradigm example of bad luck, and the question is whether and to what extent we the able-bodied should compensate disabled others for their misfortune (see  SEP entry on disability and justice).  By implicitly adopting the perspective of nondisabled persons, from which persons with disabilities appear only in the third-person, much mainstream work in philosophy has failed to take seriously the perspectives of persons with disabilities—even when those perspectives are directly relevant to the conceptual question under discussion: what is the nature of well-being, or friendship, or health? We hope that this entry can be a point of departure for a discussion of these concepts that takes into account a wider range of relevant considered judgments, intuitions, and perspectives.