 Serious engagement with emergent properties did not really take place until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There are now a variety of different versions of emergentism, both scientific and philosophical, many of which bear hardly any resemblance to Collins account of properties had by wholes which are not had by the parts of that whole. However, in an article “Aggregativity: Reductive Heuristics for Finding Emergence” William Wimsatt describes a version of the distinction between emergent and non-emergent properties, coming from Complexity theory, that both improves on and articulates the insight that makes Collins’ account so interesting, though Wimsatt was unaware of the historical precedent (Wimsatt 1997 [2008]). That insight is that properties that are a result of the organization of parts are essentially emergent. Even if they can ultimately be explained, this will not change their status as emergent properties (see also Uzgalis 2018: 272).