 The conceptions of good or rational feelings (i.e., the affective dispositions and reactions of the wise person) and proto-emotions render Stoic thought on the emotions less implausible than it is sometimes taken to be. But still, students of ancient theories of emotion have often felt that one simply must side with an Aristotelian position—with the view that there are adequate, measured emotions. Suppose someone commits a crime; are we not justly angry, and should we not react to the crime? As Seneca puts it, will the ideal agent not be angry if he sees his father murdered and his mother raped? Yes, he argues, we should react, but not with emotions and emotional action (revenge), no matter how curbed they might be through reflection. The idea of “moderate emotions,” says Seneca, is about as absurd as the idea of “moderate insanity” (Letter 85.9). Emotions are irrational (85.8); there is no taming of the irrational, precisely because it is irrational. Emotions thus cannot be moderated—they must be replaced with rational responses. The ideal agent will avenge and defend others out of duty (quia oportet) (On Anger 1.12), not out of anger or lust for revenge. Scholars disagree, however, whether Seneca’s consolatory writings are an exception. According to Konstan (2015), Seneca’s consolations recommend metriopatheia, moderate affection, instead of apatheia, the elimination of grief. Alternatively, Fournier argues that Ad Marciam displays a progression from the aim of moderate grief to the aim of elimination of grief (2009). According to Machek (2015), moments where Seneca seems to advocate metriopatheia can be interpreted as invoking the ideal agent’s proto-emotions.