 A Draper-style argument is one type of indirect inductive argument from evil.  It is important to notice, however, that in formulating an indirect inductive argument from evil, one need not proceed along the route that Draper chooses.  This is clear if one focuses upon Hume’s formulation, and then thinks in terms of the idea of an inference to the best explanation of the “mixed phenomena” that one finds.  If one explains the fact that the world contains an impressive mixture of desirable and undesirable states of affairs by the hypothesis that the creator of the world was an omnipotent, omniscient, and indifferent deity, then nothing more needs to be added.  By contrast, if one wants to explain the mixed state of the world by the hypothesis that the creator of the world was an omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect deity, one needs to postulate the existence of additional, morally significant properties that lie beyond our ken, and ones, moreover, that are so distributed that the mixed appearance does not correspond to what is really the case.  A theistic explanation is, accordingly, less simple than an indifferent deity explanation, and therefore, provided that one can argue that the a priori probability of the latter hypothesis is not less than that of the former, one can appeal to the greater simplicity of the latter in order to conclude that it has a higher posterior probability than the theistic hypothesis.  It then follows, given that the two hypotheses are logically incompatible, that the probability of the theistic hypothesis must be less than one half.