 One may approach the question of the normativity of logic by taking the notions of logical consequence and of validity to be settled and to then investigate how these (and perhaps related) notions constrain our attitudes towards the propositions standing in various logical relations to one  another.[1]  An alternative approach has it that logic’s normative role in thinking or reasoning may be partly definitive of what logic is. Hartry Field, for one, advances an account of validity along the latter lines. In his 2015, he argues that neither the standard model- or proof-theoretic accounts of validity nor the notion of necessary truth-preservation in virtue of logical form succeed in capturing the notion of validity. More specifically, neither of these approaches is capable of capturing the notion of validity in a way that does justice to logical disputes, i.e., debates over which logical system is the correct one. On the standard approaches to validity, such disputes are reduced to merely verbal disputes inasmuch as “validity” is defined relative to the system of logic in question. No one, of course, ever disputed that a given classical argument form is valid relative to the notion of validity-in-classical logic, where as an intuitionistically valid argument is valid relative to the notion of validity-in-intuitionistic logic. The problem is that there is no neutral notion of validity one could appeal to that would enable one to make sense of logical disputes as genuine debates, which, arguably, they are. What is needed to capture the substantive nature of these disputes, therefore, is a workable non-partisan notion of validity, one that is not internal to any particular system of logic. The key to availing ourselves of such an ecumenical notion of validity, Field claims, resides in its conceptual role. The conceptual role of the notion of validity, in turn, is identified with the way in which a valid argument normatively constrains an agent’s doxastic attitudes. Roughly, in the case of full belief, in accepting an argument as valid, the agent is bound by the norm that she ought not believe the argument’s premises while at the same time not believing its conclusion. In other words, validity’s conceptual role resides (at least in part) in the normative role played by valid arguments in reasoning. Note that Field is not proposing to define validity in terms of its normative role. The notion of validity, Field contends, is best taken to be primitive. But even once we take it to be primitive, it still stands in need of clarification. It is this clarificatory work that is done by a characterization of validity’s conceptual role. And it is in this sense that the normative role of logic is supposed to characterize the very nature of validity (understood as a notion shared by various distinct logics).