 Notwithstanding these finer disputes, Bayesians agree that pragmatic considerations play a significant role in managing beliefs. One important way, at least, in which an agent can interrogate her degrees of belief is to reflect on their pragmatic implications. Furthermore, whether or not to seek more evidence is a pragmatic issue; it depends on the “value of information” one expects to gain with respect to the decision problem at hand. The idea is that seeking more evidence is an action that is choice-worthy just in case the expected utility of seeking further evidence before making one’s decision is greater than the expected utility of making the decision on the basis of existing evidence. This reasoning was made prominent in a paper by Good (1967), where he proves that one should always seek “free evidence” that may have a bearing on the decision at hand. (Precursors of this theorem can be found in Ramsey 1990, published posthumously, and Savage 1954.) Note that the theorem assumes the standard Bayesian learning rule known as “conditionalisation”, which requires that when one’s learning experience has the form of coming to know some proposition (to which one had assigned positive probability) for sure, one’s new degrees of belief should be equal to one’s old degrees of belief conditional on the proposition that now has probability one. Indeed, the fact that conditionalisation plays a crucial role in Good’s result about the non-negative value of free evidence is taken by some as providing some justification for this learning rule.