 Objection from Normativity. Stevenson writes that whether a statement, adduced as a reason in support of an ethical judgment, “will in fact support or oppose the judgment will depend on whether the hearer believes it, and upon whether if he does, it will actually make a difference to his attitudes,” and that such statement or consideration “may conveniently be called a reason (though not necessarily a ‘valid’ one) regardless of whether it is accepted or not” (1944, 115). It may easily seem, then, as if Stevenson would wish to explain what it is for some consideration, R, to count in favor of some action, for instance, in terms of the causal efficacy of citing R in producing the action in question, or in altering attitudes. It may seem as if he would wish to explain normativity, or normative authority, directly in terms of psychological impact. This may seem implausible, regardless of the details of the psychological story.