 Be careful though not to be misled by these examples. \(A\) can only be (wholly) inside \(B\) if \(A\) is distinct from \(B\). So the relation in which \(A\) stands to \(B\) if \(A\) is (wholly) inside \(B\) requires a distinct subject from terminus. By contrast, \(A\) can be black without prejudice to anything else. But we cannot infer straightaway that every relation holds between more than one thing because there may be some relations that a thing bears to itself, if, for example, identity is a relation. So we cannot distinguish properties from relations by appealing to the number of distinct things required for their exhibition, since these may be the same, viz. one. Hence the plausibility of thinking that a relation differs from a property because a relation, unlike a property, proceeds from a subject to a terminus, even if the subject and terminus are identical.