 What kind of claim to agreement is made by a judgment of taste? Kant seems to suggest that a judgment of taste demands agreement in the same way that an objective cognitive judgment demands agreement (see, e.g., Introduction VII, 191 and §6, 211): just as, in claiming that a perceived object is green or square, I take it that everyone else ought to share my judgment that the object is green or square, so, in judging an object to be beautiful, I claim that all other perceivers of the object should find it beautiful too. But even if this is granted, one might still raise questions about the character of the demand, either because there are in turn questions to be raised about what it is for a cognitive judgment to claim agreement, or because it is not clear that the claim can in fact be the same, given that in the aesthetic case one is claiming that others share one’s feeling, as opposed to demanding that they apply the same concept to the object. Guyer (1979) argues that the claim should be understood as a rational expectation or ideal prediction rather than as a normative demand: someone who judges an object to be beautiful is claiming that under ideal circumstances everyone will share her pleasure (1979 [1997: 123–130 and 144–147]). Savile (1987) and Chignell (2007) follow Guyer in understanding the claim in this way; Harbin (2020), while not endorsing the “ideal prediction” interpretation proposed by Guyer, agrees with him in rejecting the view that judgments of beauty make a genuinely normative claim on others’ agreement; Feloj (2020) holds a similar view. Harbin’s argument is challenged in Dunn 2020.