 The situation may be summed up in schematic terms. There are true comparative claims of the form \(a\Rel b\) which are either determined to be true by, or supervene upon, the intrinsic natures of the things they relate, \(Fa \amp Gb\). Philosophers of a reductionist persuasion have argued that this shows there is no need to admit an internal relation \((R)\) over and above the intrinsic characteristics or monadic foundations of the things related \((F, G)\). But the intrinsic characteristics of the things related only determine the truth of the claim that \(a\Rel b\), or the truth of the claim that \(a\Rel b\) only supervenes upon \(Fa \amp Gb\), because these characteristics stand in an internal relation themselves, \(F \fR G\). Because the monadic foundations, \(Fa\) and \(Gb\), are only empowered to determine that \(a\Rel b\) because \(F\) and \(G\) lie in this internal relation, \(\fR\), it follows that internal relations still perform an indispensable role in our theorising about the world. One line of response to this argument is to deny that the ontological commitments and the truth-makers for a claim might come apart by defining ontological commitment in terms of truth making, by roughly speaking, maintaining that to be is to be a truth-maker, but then an alternative theory of truth will need to be provided for ordinary and formal languages if quantificational structure is never ontologically committing and it unclear whether this can be done (Heil 2016: 129; MacBride 2018: 157).