 Since imperfect duties of humanity do not suffice for maintaining social relations, particularly those involving precise mutual expectations, Pufendorf introduces (DJN III.4) another class of absolute duties arising from pacts among individuals. The natural law stipulates no specifics here but merely commands that we enter into some such consensual arrangements, since without them sociality would be hampered and humans remain in the natural state. Pact-generated obligations are both adventitious, or based upon some antecedent human deed responding to circumstance, and perfect in the sense of specific and compellable. They arise from either unilateral promises or bilateral agreements, and they create perfect rights (i.e., justified expectations of exact performance) in others (DJN I.7.7). It appears here that Pufendorf is an obligation theorist in that rights derive from obligations (DJN III.5.1; cf. VIII.3.5), yet there are also rights without corresponding obligations; that is, correlativity exists, but incompletely (Mautner 1991, 1989). He also rejects once more Hobbes’s notion of a right to all things and maintains that rights claims to natural objects must rest, if they are to have normative force, on the express or tacit consent of others (DJN III.5.2–3); that is, they arise out of social interaction and are not presupposed by it. Given its importance for the development of human social life, five more chapters are devoted to the topic of promises and pacts: on their nature, subject-matter, types, and conditionality, as well as the sorts of individual and collective agents capable of generating consent-based obligations by promising or agreeing with one another. The discussion as a whole is fundamental to the hypothetical laws of nature articulated in the rest of the work, in the context of various consensually created adventitious human institutions.