 Following Shapere (1982), one could respond by adopting an extremely permissive view of what counts as an ‘observation’ so as to allow even highly processed data to count as observations. However, it is hard to reconcile the idea that highly processed data like fMRI images record observations with the traditional empiricist notion that calculations involving theoretical assumptions and background beliefs must not be allowed (on pain of loss of objectivity) to intrude into the process of data production. Observation garnered its special epistemic status in the first place because it seemed more direct, more immediate, and therefore less distorted and muddled than (say) detection or inference. The production of fMRI images requires extensive statistical manipulation based on theories about the radio signals, and a variety of factors having to do with their detection along with beliefs about relations between blood oxygen levels and neuronal activity, sources of systematic error, and more. Insofar as the use of the term ‘observation’ connotes this extra baggage of traditional empiricism, it may be better to replace observation-talk with terminology that is more obviously permissive, such as that of ‘empirical data’ and ‘empirical results.’