 Lastly, it should be noted that neo-Pyrrhonists are empiricists, but their empiricism is improved by current philosophy of science. For instance, they may endorse the hypothetic-deductive method. For them, we can explore the world empirically, and in their skeptical view of the world they may incorporate scientific results. For instance, we think that the earth moves, and we no longer think that the earth is at the center of the universe. Scientific results may and do have important impacts on our view of the world, including on the neo-Pyrrhonists’. Porchat went as far as to distinguish between a philosophical realism and a scientific realism (Porchat 1991, 1994), asserting that neo-Pyrrhonists need not be instrumentalists, but could hold scientific realism, although not, of course, philosophical realism. If there is objective knowledge of the common world, it seems that the sciences can improve on that knowledge being guided by an experimental method such as the hypothetic-deductive. Neo-Pyrrhonian zétesis is not only a philosophical inquiry to destroy dogmatism, as in the case of Sextus, but also an empirical exploration of the world of phenomena.