 A special case of this argument, called an evolutionary debunking argument, has led to vigorous debate recently (cf. Kahane 2011, May 2018).  Some moral skeptics (or at least skeptics about moral realism) argue that moral beliefs can be explained by evolutionary biology perhaps with help from psychology, sociology, or culture without appeal to any moral fact or truth. Such truth-independent explanations are then supposed to show that moral beliefs are either not true, not really (mind independently) true, or not justified (cf. Joyce 2006, Street 2006, Braddock 2017). As with other arguments from the explanatory impotence of moral facts, critics can reply either by arguing that moral facts do some explanatory work (e.g. Copp 2008 with reply by Street 2008) or by arguing that moral beliefs can be justified even if moral facts do not do any explanatory work (cf. Bergmann &amp; Kain 2014).