 Meinong’s view on non-existent and impossible objects was sharpened by Twardowski 1894. Twardowski’s work can be seen as the occasion for Meinong to begin thinking more deeply about the content/object distinction, and indeed Meinong took over some of Twardowski’s arguments. However, Meinong never thought that Twardowski’s distinction and conception of the content of a representation could be understood as a precise conceptual clarification that should be adopted unquestioningly. Meinong stated that there was a great deal of interesting and useful information in Twardowski’s 1894 study, but he said this with respect to “the whole difficult and important problem of objects” and not exactly in relation to the difference between content and object (1899, §2: 185 [141]). Meinong, for example, accepts Twardowski’s critical attitude to the view that there are objectless, empty representations, a thesis Bolzano put forward “with special emphasis” (see the entry on on  Bernard Bolzano,  Section 3.5). After 1894, Meinong took psychological contents as something purely mental and concrete. Such contents are therefore always something real. Twardowski, however, says that the content is a mental picture, but he also identifies the mental content with the meaning of a name and with Bolzano’s objective representation (idea), i.e., the representation (idea) in itself, or as such, [Vorstellung an sich]. For that reason Twardowski (1894: 31 [29]) takes the content — in contrast to the (real) act — as something that “always lacks reality”. Meinong, however, became more and more aware of the purely mental nature of the psychological content. He realized that the psychological content was not something abstract or conceptual in the sense of something intensional, that it was not some sort of meaning at all.