 Intuitively, at least for many people, these young women, diagnosed with a serious mental disorder and pursuing thinness at the expense of health and life, lack the ability to make their own decisions. For some theorists, indeed, such cases are paradigm cases of incapacity, the kinds of cases a theory ought to be able to account for. However, the cognitively focused four-abilities model cannot account for these cases because the young women, though pursuing self-destructive behavior, are cognitively intact. Indeed, it is not uncommon for patients with severe anorexia to count as having capacity by the usual criteria (Elzakkers et al. 2016). The only unusual thing about their decisions seems to be what they decide to pursue and the values that lie behind this. Is there, then, a way to appeal to the values such patients express as part of explaining why they lack capacity? The traditional understanding of value neutrality  (§5.4  above) suggests we can’t. But Tan and others (Tan, Hope, &amp; Stewart 2003a,b; Tan, Stewart, et al. 2006a) suggest that the key is to recognize that these values (unlike, for example, the unusual values of the Jehovah’s Witness) are caused by the mental disorder itself (For a similar point in relation to addiction see Charland 2002, 2011). The values in question are “pathological values”.