 The Stoics identify fate with the causal organization of the cosmos. Every thing that occurs has a cause which is sufficient to produce exactly that outcome. And given the totality of circumstances, it is causally impossible for things not to turn out the particular way that they do (Alexander, On Fate ch. 22). Alexander believes that having things causally determined by fate in this way is incompatible with some outcomes being contingent. On the Stoic position, if there is going to be a sea battle tomorrow, the causal structure of the cosmos guarantees that there will be a sea battle tomorrow and makes it impossible that there not be a sea battle tomorrow (Alexander, On Fate ch. 9). But deliberating about things that will necessarily occur or necessarily not occur is pointless; it makes sense to deliberate only about things that can either possibly occur or not. Furthermore, if I deliberate about whether to instigate a sea battle or not, it makes sense to do so only if I have the ability either to instigate a sea battle or not to do so. I do not deliberate whether or not to fly if I cannot fly, or if I must fly (Alexander, On Fate ch. 11–12). So, effective deliberation requires that a person have the ability to do otherwise than they do, and Alexander thinks that such an ability is incompatible with causal determinism.