  Pluralists seem to have difficulty accounting for truth’s use as a device for generalization. One response is to simply treat uses of ‘is true’ as elliptical for ‘is true in one way or another’. In doing so, pluralists account for generalization without sacrificing their pluralism. A possible drawback, however, is that it may commit pluralists to the claim that ‘true’ designates the disjunctive property of being \(F_1 \vee \cdots \vee F_n\). Granting the existence of such a property gives pluralists a story to tell about generalizations like (55) and (56), but the response is a concessive one available only to moderate pluralists. However, as noted in §4.2.3, the existence of such a property is not a devastating blow to all pluralists, since the domain-specific truth properties \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\) remain explanatorily basic in relation to the property of being \(F_1 \vee \cdots \vee F_n\).