  As characterized here, priority says one ought always to choose the act that maximizes the moral value that is brought about, with moral value being larger, the larger the benefit one brings about for a person, and larger, the worse off the person would be absent this benefit over the course of her life. A challenge to priority, raising a doubt against the thought that morality should dispense with any relational equality concern, points out that priority says that if one's acts can affect only oneself, one morally must do the act that maximizes one's lifetime benefit level. Here priority and prudence coincide in their dictates as to what one should do. But suppose the acts one can choose are risky, they might produce better or worse outcomes. A natural extension of priority says that when one's choices are risky and affect others, one should be risk averse, the degree of risk aversion that is called for depending on how much weight should be assigned to getting benefits to a person, the worse off the person is. So far, so good. But priority applies to the choice of a single person whose acts affect only himself: Consider Robinson Crusoe alone on an island. He can choose to swim, which would be fun but carries some risk of being eaten by a shark and dying immediately, or instead climb coconut trees on the beach, less fun but carrying no risk of harm as grave as a shark attack. Rational prudence, we think, does not dictate that Crusoe be conservative in his choices by giving extra weight to the outcome in which he suffers low lifetime well-being. Prudence permits Crusoe to be risk-loving, risk-averse, or risk-neutral is deciding among options such as swim with the sharks or climb on the safe beach. But the natural extension of priority makes it a strict moral requirement that he be risk-averse, giving extra weight (above and beyond what his own preferences dictate) to avoiding the outcome in which death right away induces low lifetime well-being. That seems odd. We might respond by saying that egalitarian values only come into play in dictating what we ought to do when our acts affect other people, and thus affect how badly off or well off people are relative to each other. When choices affect only the self, following ordinary prudence is fine. That response abandons extended priority and challenges the idea that priority captures our moral convictions regarding why there is extra moral reason to help those who are worse off than others (see Otsuka and Voorhoeve 2009).