 Although Simpson’s Paradox has been known for over a century and has a straightforward probabilistic analysis, we predict that it will remain a source of fruitful philosophical discussion. Pearl’s causal analysis of the paradox is relatively recent, and it is only now that graphical causal models are starting to play a central role in philosophical discussions of the paradox. Despite the continuity between graphical accounts and earlier probabilistic theories of causality, here we have highlighted ways in which the newer methods lead one to draw substantially different implications from the paradox. Pearl’s account renders certain debates from the earlier literature moot, while opening up new debates about the proper interpretation of the paradox. The responses to Pearl considered in  section 4  are only the first steps in a broader discussion about the relationships between causation, probability theory, and the psychology of reasoning. There remains room to clarify what it means to explain the paradox, and what counts as empirical support for a particular explanation. Such work would open the door to empirical testing, which has thus far been limited.