 A further related complication is that it is not clear that computers perform syntactic operations in quite the same sense that a human does – it is not clear that a computer understands syntax or syntactic operations. A computer does not know that it is manipulating 1’s and 0’s. A computer does not recognize that its binary data strings have a certain form, and thus that certain syntactic rules may be applied to them, unlike the man inside the Chinese Room. Inside a computer, there is nothing that literally reads input data, or that “knows” what symbols are. Instead, there are millions of transistors that change states. A sequence of voltages causes operations to be performed. We humans may choose to interpret these voltages as binary numerals and the voltage changes as syntactic operations, but a computer does not interpret its operations as syntactic or any other way. So perhaps a computer does not need to make the move from syntax to semantics that Searle objects to; it needs to move from complex causal connections to semantics. Furthermore, perhaps any causal system is describable as performing syntactic operations – if we interpret a light square as logical “0” and a dark square as logical “1”, then a kitchen toaster may be described as a device that rewrites logical “0”s as logical “1”s. But there is no philosophical problem about getting from syntax to breakfast. 