 Another important issue concerns what it means for object-induction to be “meta-inductively justified”. The meta-inductive strategy wMI and object-induction are clearly different strategies. They could result in different predictions tomorrow, if OI would stop working and another method would start to do better. In that case, wMI would begin to favour the other method, and wMI would start to come apart from OI. The optimality results provide a reason to follow wMI. How exactly does object-induction inherit that justification? At most, it seems that we get a justification for following OI on the next time-step, on the grounds that OI’s prediction approximately coincides with that of wMI (Sterkenburg 2020, Sterkenburg (forthcoming)). However, this requires a stronger empirical postulate than simply the observation that OI has been more successful than non-inductive methods. It also requires something like that “as a matter of empirical fact, the strategy OI has been so much more successful than its competitors, that the meta-inductivist attributes it such a large share of the total weight that its prediction (approximately) coincides with OI’s prediction” (Sterkenburg 2020: 538). Furthermore, even if we allow that the empirical evidence does back up such a strong claim, the issue remains that the meta-inductive justification is in support of following the strategy of meta-induction, not in support of the strategy of following OI (Sterkenburg (2020), sec. 3.3.2).