 Alexander also believes that the Stoic position implies that our actions are not really “up to us”, i.e., that we do not have the sort of control over our actions which is required to be rightly praised, blamed, rewarded, or punished for them. Alexander thinks this because he subscribes to something like the principle that “ought implies can”, i.e., that a person can be morally obligated to do something only if they have the ability to do it. This is shown in our own case, when we feel regret and blame ourselves for doing something because we think we were able not to choose to do the evil thing we had done (Alexander, On Fate ch. 12, 180.29–31). And in the case of other people, too, we blame and punish them on the assumption that they were able to refrain from wrongdoing. If they had to do what they did, under the circumstances, they are blameless. (Alexander thinks that it is inadequate to say that they would have acted differently if circumstances had been different; Alexander, On Fate ch. 16.)