 Crusius’ ethics is characterized by the principled separation of the will from the understanding as distinct powers, and a re-orientation of his moral theory with respect to the former. The human will depends on the understanding to supply it with ideas in accordance with which it acts, but Crusius is clear that the will is not solely determined to its action through some cognition (i.e., of perfection) in the act itself; rather, the goodness of an action consists more generally in its being conformable to the will (Crusius 1745: §26; Schneewind 1998: 447), and in any case the human will is always free to act or to omit to act in accordance with the understanding’s ideas. The human will is possessed of three basic desires—the first is for our own perfection, in accordance with which the talents of the intellect among others are promoted (Crusius 1745: §117); for unification with objects perceived as perfect, from which proceeds a drive to moral love through which we desire to join with other rational beings without any further end (Crusius 1745: §125); and finally, the desire to recognize a divine law which, despite its abstract-sounding name, is identified by Crusius with the phenomenon of conscience (Gewissenstrieb). It is through conscience that we are able to recognize the divinely given moral law (Crusius 1745: §132), and conscience thereby also discloses our dependence on God as divine lawgiver (Crusius 1745: §165). As such, conscience supplies us with a motivation to obedience where, according to Crusius, this obedience constitutes an essential component (the “form”) of virtue (Crusius 1745: §177). A derivation of our duties thus depends on a consideration of God and His aim in creating the world, which Crusius identifies as all human beings’ attainment of virtue, as opposed to knowledge or happiness in its own right, through their free actions (Crusius 1745: §213). On this basis, he proceeds to derive duties to God, to others, and to the self (for discussion, see Schneewind 1998: 452–6).