 Ann Cahill argues that the notion of ‘objectification’ is the wrong tool for analyzing different forms of sex work. Accounts that rely on this concept construe respect for the subjectivity and autonomy of persons as a moral duty, while treating a person as a physical thing or a body is morally impermissible. In this way, such accounts privilege the mind over the body, and treat the bodily components of the self as less important or dignified. Feminists and other moral theorists whose critiques of sex work build on the alleged wrongs of objectifying persons cannot “explain how the experience of being treated as a sexually appealing body can actually enhance rather than undermine one’s sense of self” (Cahill 2014: 842). Cahill proposes that we degrade others when we recognize in another subject only those aspects of their subjectivity important to ourselves. “Derivatized subjects” are often reduced to the roles they fulfill for another subject (e.g., waiter, mother, etc.), and are only valued for the traits suitable to these roles. Derivatization degrades people not by treating them as a mere body, but by treating people such that their subjective qualities and identities are determined by the needs of others. Cahill contends that sex work is problematic when it involves derivatizing sex workers (defining them in terms of the demands of their clients), but that sex work does not inherently involve this kind of degradation. She suggests that derivatization is especially morally problematic when it reflects and reproduces unjust social privileges.