 What does this mean for the question of logic’s normative status? It follows that it is only once we choose to disambiguate “logical consequence” in a particular way—as classical or intuitionistic, say—that the normative import of that particular conception of consequence makes itself felt. After all, on the pluralist picture a given conception of consequence cannot be normatively binding in virtue of being (uniquely) correct, i.e., in virtue of being descriptively adequate with respect to the entailment facts, as it were. Hence, if I opt for an intuitionistic conception of consequence and you go in for a classical one, I have no grounds for criticizing your move from, say, \(\neg \neg A\) to \(A\), save perhaps pragmatic ones. To be sure, such a move would be impermissible according to my preferred notion of consequence, but it is perfectly acceptable according to yours. According to the pluralist, then, there exists no absolute sense, but only system-relative senses, in which a logic can normatively bind us. Pluralism about logic thus seems to give rise to pluralism about logical normativity: If there are several equally legitimate consequence relations, there are also several equally legitimate sets of logical norms. Consequently, it is hard to see prima facie how substantive normative conflicts can arise. If the consequence relations of classical and intuitionistic logic are equally legitimate, there is little to disagree about when it comes to the norms they induce. The classicist and the intuitionist simply have opted to play by different rules.