 Could a broadly Fregean account of structured propositions do better? In this view, we don’t take the constituents of structured propositions as denotations (think objects and properties), rather as Fregean senses. Much now depends on how these are understood. If they are taken à la Carnap, as functions from the possible worlds of SPWS to extensions, there is little hope to account for “Mike is Mike” vs. “Mike is Jack the Ripper” cases. Now [Mike] and [Jack the Ripper] are functions from possible worlds to individuals; but unless one clashes with the Kripkean criticisms of descriptivism on names (Kripke 1980), they had better be constant functions: given that they both actually pick out Mike, they should output Mike at all possible worlds (at which Mike exists). But then [Mike] and [Jack the Ripper] will be defined on the same set of things and will give the same output for any input.