 One of the goals of Kant’s critical philosophy is to articulate the conditions of the possibility of what he calls “experience” (Erfahrung). As we’ll see below, Kant’s use of the term is rather more technical than is typically meant in English by talk of, e.g., a subject’s “experience” of the color red. Indeed, Kant sometimes speaks of there being only a single or universal experience (A110, A493/B521), which at least strongly suggests that he is not construing experience in a purely subjective or phenomenological manner. Rather, in talking of the conditions of “experience” in this way, Kant is most obviously concerned with the conditions under which objective empirical knowledge is possible—including knowledge that Kant’s thinks we actually have, such as is exemplified in the sciences of mathematics and physics. Kant’s hope is that by articulating the conditions under which such knowledge is possible, he will be able to indicate how it is that metaphysics itself could become a science. He pursues this goal via an examination of those features of the mind relevant to the conditions of “experience” so construed. This amounts to an examination of the conditions for “cognition” (Erkenntnis), or the mind’s “relation to an object” (B137). There is some controversy about the best way to understand Kant’s use of this phrase, but for the moment we’ll understand it as involving relation to a possible object of experience, and as being a necessary condition for the positive substantive knowledge (Wissen) characteristic of a proper science (i.e., a Wissenschaft).