 More generally, Sturm’s project is diametrically opposed to Leibniz’s. At the core of Leibniz’s criticisms is his commitment to the traditional scholastic view that the notions of substance and action are deeply interconnected (e.g. Leibniz 1989, 160). The commitment to the notion of action as the fundamental ground to think about the very nature of substances underpins Leibniz’s main objections to Sturm’s account of the passivity of forms. Leibniz cannot accept that any natural being could ever be adequately conceived, or taken to have any ontological consistency, without referring to some kind of activity. However, Sturm rejects precisely Leibniz’s fundamental commitment to activity as the ontological ground of substances. As a result, Sturm hardly offers Leibniz any answer that would be satisfying from the latter’s point of view.