 One question about the phenomenology of moral judgment is whether experiences of making a moral judgment have a phenomenal essence in the sense that there is some phenomenal property (or properties) that such experiences have in common and that serves to distinguish them from experiences of making non-moral judgments. Mandelbaum, whose work in ethics links the Phenomenological and analytic traditions, defended this kind of essentialism. As noted earlier, he drew a phenomenological distinction between “direct” moral experiences of obligation and “removed” moral experiences. The former type is where one judges that one is morally obligated to either do or refrain from performing an action that is called for in one’s immediate circumstances. Mandelbaum describes this phenomenon as involving a “reflexive felt demand” emanating from one’s immediate circumstances (rather than from one’s antecedent preferences) directed toward oneself and grounded in one’s sense of a particular response best fitting the circumstances. Because the source of the felt demand is one’s circumstances and not one’s preferences, judgments grounded in this kind of demand are experienced as objective. Removed moral judgments, by contrast, are of two sorts and include judgments of obligation about one’s past self and about others, as well as judgments about the goodness and badness of character traits (virtues and vices). Supposing that direct and removed kinds of moral experience exhaust the realm of judgment-involving moral experiences, the question is whether there is something essential to all such experiences that unifies and distinguishes them from experiences involving non-moral judgments.