  David DeGrazia has tried to counter this picture by suggesting that, in addition to the factors discussed by McMahan, the earlier self's appropriate degree of prudential concern for the current self can be boosted by the earlier self's autonomously formed self-narrative: if the earlier self identified with the current self, in the sense of seeing the current self as a true stage in the unfolding complex narrative of her life, strong prudential concern is warranted (DeGrazia 2005, 196). Oddly, this view makes the rational level of prudential concern for the future partly a matter of choice of the earlier self. Yet, unlike our ordinary concerns for specific plans, projects, other people, etc., which are up to us, prudential concern is a requirement of rationality and should not be a matter of choice. Just as we cannot rationally have prudential concern for someone else simply because we happen to incorporate (perhaps delusionally) their life into our self-narrative, similarly, if we are not otherwise warranted to have prudential concern for our own future self, we cannot change this simply by virtue of how we happen to construct our self-narrative.