 The positively remarkable thing here, it seems to us, is that Searle appears to be unaware of the brute fact that most AI engineers are perfectly content to build machines on the basis of the AIMA view of AI we presented and explained above: the view according to which machines simply map percepts to actions. On this view, it doesn’t matter whether the machine really has desires; what matters is whether it acts suitably on the basis of how AI scientists engineer formal correlates to desire. An autonomous machine with overwhelming destructive power that non-consciously “decides” to kill doesn’t become just a nuisance because genuine, human-level, subjective desire is absent from the machine. If an AI can play the game of chess, and the game of Jeopardy!, it can certainly play the game of war. Just as it does little good for a human loser to point out that the victorious machine in a game of chess isn’t conscious, it will do little good for humans being killed by machines to point out that these machines aren’t conscious. (It is interesting to note that the genesis of Joy’s paper was an informal conversation with John Searle and Raymond Kurzweil. According to Joy, Searle didn’t think there was much to worry about, since he was (and is) quite confident that tomorrow’s robots can’t be  conscious.[45])  