 It is often assumed nowadays that, when an object exemplifies a property, there is a further, complex, entity, a fact or state of affairs (Bergmann 1960; Armstrong 1997, entries on  facts  and  states of affairs),  having the property (qua attributed) and the object (qua argument) as constituents (this compositional conception is not always accepted; see, e.g., Bynoe 2011 for a dissenting voice). Facts are typically taken to fulfill the theoretical roles of truthmakers (the entities that make true propositions true, see entry on  truthmakers)  and causal relata (the entities connected by causal relations; see entry on  the metaphysics of causation, §1).  Not all philosophers, however, distinguish between propositions and states of affairs; Russell (1903) acknowledges only propositions and, for a more recent example, so does Gaskin (2008).