  On Schiller’s account, Kant’s first mistake is to locate the ideal of beauty vaguely in the human figure rather than specifically in the bodily accompaniments of intentional actions that are the products of the human will, which, according to Kant himself, is the primary locus of moral value. This also means that it is a mistake for Kant to suggest, if that is what he means, that the ideal of beauty can be found in a general type of human being rather than in particular human beings, for actions are always done by particular human beings. Kant is of course committed to the general thesis that beauty is always a property of a particular, but it might be argued that he has lost sight of that commitment when he locates the ideal of beauty in something as general as “the human figure” as the expression of human morality. Schiller argues that the “architectonic beauty of the human form,” that is, the fixed configuration of the features of a person’s appearance, “comes directly from nature and is formed by the rule of necessity” (“On Grace and Dignity,” NA 255; Curran 127), and thus cannot plausibly be taken as an expression of the moral character or condition of a person, which is determined by the person’s will or free choice. Any aspect of beauty that can be interpreted as an expression of moral condition must thus be found in the voluntary actions of particular persons rather than in their fixed features. More specifically, grace, as a condition in which a person is not merely committed to doing what morality requires as a matter of principle but is also so committed to doing this that it has become part of his character and thus seems as much natural as voluntary, is revealed in the motions that accompany a person’s directly willed actions but are not themselves consciously willed (“On Grace and Dignity,” NA 167; Curran 136). For example,