 Let us consider the case of a person who wishes that there were such a thing as a philosopher’s stone. If the fact of the existence of the philosopher’s stone is identical with the fact of the possession by some object in the universe of the properties of the philosopher’s stone, then we must suppose that the person in question is really wishing that one or the other of the objects in the universe should possess the properties of (a) being a stone, and (b) turning baser metal into gold. But it is perfectly clear that the man might wish nothing of the kind. He might be perfectly content with all the objects in the universe… If a childless woman wishes for child, she does not wish to stand in the relation of motherhood to one of the children actually in the world, but to another child, which is not in the circumstances an actual child at all, but which would become an actual child if her wish were fulfilled. It is no doubt true that, if her wish is fulfilled, one of the things actually in the world will be her child, but it is equally true that, while she is wishing, she is directing her mind to something which lies beyond the actual world, and which will possibly always like beyond it. (M: 30–53-4 )