  At least on paper, the procedural protections on offer in criminal proceedings are more robust than those available to the accused in legal proceedings of other kinds. This is explained in large part by the consequences of criminal conviction. If \(D\) is found guilty in a criminal court, \(D\) gains a criminal record. Depending on the crime, \(D\) may be disenfranchised, banned from certain professions, refused entry to other countries, and declined access to insurance, housing, and education (Hoskins 2014; 2016). This is to say nothing of criminal sentences themselves. Those sentences are typically punishments: the object of the exercise is that \(D\) suffer some harm or deprivation; \(D\) is to be made worse off than she otherwise would have been. This is not to say that suffering or deprivation must be the ultimate end of those who punish. That \(D\) suffer or lose out may be a means to any number of ultimate ends, including deterrence, restoration, or rehabilitation. What it cannot be is a mere side-effect. This is one thing that distinguishes criminal sentences—at least of the punitive kind—from the reparative remedies that are standard fare in civil law. Those remedies are designed to benefit \(P\)—to wipe out losses the plaintiff suffered in virtue of the defendant’s wrong. True, \(D\) often loses in the process of ensuring that \(P\) gains. But we can imagine cases in which this is not so: in which an award of damages leaves \(D\) no worse off than \(D\) was before. The award may remain a reparative success. It cannot be anything other than a punitive failure (Boonin 2008, 12–17; Gardner 2013).