 However, there are reasons for caution. As Mallet’s paper shows, al-Fārābī in his further discussion of topics, both in [Analysis] and in [Debate], heads off in completely different directions (which are too complex to pursue here, but see Hasnawi 2009 and Karimullah 2014). Moreover al-Fārābī has a habit of justifying inferences by reference to real-world information about their terms (i.e., their matter) that is not contained in the premises. He does this with the syllogistic mood Baroco ([Syllogism] 27.8–12, [Short Syllogism] 79.5–12), and there is a one-premise example at [Commentary on De Interpretatione]  136.10.[20]  Elsewhere he plays fast and loose with the “forms” of arguments, for example reducing a many-premise version of induction to a two-premise categorical syllogism without giving any indication of how a string of premises are reduced to a single one ([Syllogism] 35.14–18). 