  Some philosophers have proposed that implicit measures assess a distinct kind of “action-oriented” attitude, which is different from ordinary attitudes, but not necessarily in terms of being unconscious. The core idea here is that implicit attitudes link representations with behavioral  impulses.[6]  Gendler’s (2008a,b, 2011, 2012) account of “alief,” a sui generis mental state comprised of tightly woven co-activating representational (R), affective (A), and behavioral (B) components, is emblematic of this approach. Gendler argues that the R-A-B components of alief are “bundled” together or “cluster” in such a way that when an implicitly biased person sees a black face in a particular context, for example, the agent’s representation will automatically activate particular feelings and behaviors (i.e., an R–A–B cluster). This is in contrast to the “combinatoric” nature of ordinary beliefs and desires, that is, that any belief could, in principle, be combined with any desire. So while the belief that “that is a black man” is not fixed to any particular feelings or behavior, an alief will have content like, “Black man! Scary! Avoid!”