 On an interesting novel version of the perspective-based approach defended by Löschke, it can enable us to understand agent-relative reasons as valid even if all value is agent-neutral. This is because the perspective of the agent on the relevant agent-neutral value matters to their reasons in a way that makes the reason count as indexed to that agent in an important sense (Löschke 2020). The core idea is that the strength of a reason can be relative to an agent in virtue of that agent’s perspective, even if its status as a reason (with whatever strength it may have) is not. Löschke calls his approach the “normative force interpretation,” it is relatively clear that it is a version of the perspective-based approach in my sense.  Löschke puts his view in terms of the agent’s perspective here, for example: “NFI is in line with the idea that agent-relative reasons stem from the first-person perspective of agents and that moral theory must make room for the importance of what an agent considers to be important and valuable in life” (Löschke 2021: 369).