 One difficulty is the problem of the subject. Suppose we are terminators rather than anti-terminators (discussed in Section 2.6). Suppose, too, that you die at time t1 but had you not you would have experienced joy at time t2. Time t2 arrives while you are dead, so that, given the termination thesis, t2 arrives while you no longer exist. Consider the property, lacks joy. Does it make sense to attribute this (or any other) property to you at t2? Does it make sense to say that some subject has a property at a time when that subject does not exist? If not, it seems difficult to make sense of your having a welfare level then. Epicurus seemed to be thinking along these lines when he wrote that “death is nothing to us, since when we are, death is not, and when death is present, then we are not.” (Echoing Epicurus, Nagel 1970 wrote “So long as a person exists, he has not yet died, and once he has died, he no longer exists; so there seems to be no time when death, if it is a misfortune, can be ascribed to its unfortunate subject.” But if this is the reason we cannot ascribe misfortune to a victim of death then we cannot even ascribe death to any victim.)