One strand of empirical research that is relevant to questions concerning the role of consciousness in agency is the work on automaticity; in particular, the research on automatic goal pursuit. It has been shown, for instance, that the goal to perform a certain task accurately can be primed, so that the agent pursues the goal without any awareness of doing so (Bargh et al. 2001). There is a large body of research on this, and it has been suggested that this research shows that most of our actions are executed automatically and without conscious control (Bargh and Chartrand 1999, Custers and Aarts 2010).[22] This claim is less radical than the claims put forward by Libet (1999) and Wegner (2002), as it concerns only the extent or scope of conscious control. Further, this appears to be much less challenging once it is noted that the great majority of automatic actions are sub-routines that are in the service of higher goals and long-term intentions. Consider, for instance, all the sub-routines that one performs while driving a car. The claim that such actions are performed automatically and without conscious control can be reconciled with our commonsense conception of agency and it can be accommodated by the standard theory, provided that conscious intentions and plans can recruit the relevant routines automatically, either by generating the relevant motor intentions, or by activating the relevant motor schemata. (For more on this see Pacherie 2008; Adams 2010; Clarke 2010b.)