 This separability of justification from claims about truth is important to Rawls, even more so in his later work than in A Theory of Justice. In his earlier work, Rawls never claimed that what emerged from his contract and other justificatory conditions were “truths” of justice. (Arras’s (2007) conclusions emphasize the point that the method of reflective equilibrium does not assure us of truth—but the point was made explicit by Rawls himself decades earlier.) Rather, the method of reflective equilibrium suggested ways in which convergence might be achieved among those who began with disagreements about justice (of course, as Arras (2007) and Kelly and McGrath (2010) emphasize, the method of reflective equilibrium does not guarantee convergence either). By drawing attention to the many features of a comprehensive theory on which argument and evidence could be brought to bear, the method of wide reflective equilibrium held out promise that more convergence might result than if people had only considered judgments and principles to agree and disagree about. Convergence did not imply that truth was reached. A proponent of moral truth might still hope, however, that convergence could be taken as evidence for truth, just as it commonly claimed in non-normative areas of inquiry, contrary to the phenomenon that believing may yield seeing.