 Grice drew attention, then, to situations in which a person is justified in believing a proposition, which would nevertheless be an unreasonable thing for the person to say, in normal circumstances. His lesson was salutary and important. He is right, I think, about disjunctions and negated conjunctions. Believing that John is in the pub, I can’t consistently disbelieve “He’s either in the pub or the library”; if I have any epistemic attitude to this proposition, it should be one of belief, however inappropriate for me to assert it. Similarly for “You won’t eat those and live” when I know you won’t eat them. But it is implausible that the difficulties with the truth-functional conditional can be explained away in terms of what is an inappropriate conversational remark. They arise at the level of belief. Thinking that John is in the pub, I may without irrationality disbelieve “If he’s not in the pub he’s in the library”. Thinking you won’t eat the mushrooms, I may without irrationality reject “If you eat them you will die”. As facts about the norms to which people defer, these claims can be tested. A good enough test is to take a co-operative person, who understands that you are merely interested in her opinions about the propositions you put to her, as opposed to what would be a reasonable remark to make, and note which conditionals she assents to. Are we really to brand as illogical someone who dissents from both “The Republicans will win” and “If the Republicans win, income tax will double”?