 To illustrate, consider theological voluntarism—the view that the ultimate right-making feature of an action is that it accords with God’s will. And let’s consider the version that holds that God wills that we abide by the Ten Commandments. To consequentialize this non-consequentialist theory, we need to replace its account of the ultimate right-maker with one that holds instead that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that its outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative and that one outcome outranks another if and only if the agent refrains from violating the Ten Commandments in the one but not the other. This act-consequentialist counterpart theory yields the same set of deontic verdicts that this version of theological voluntarism delivers—e.g., that it’s obligatory to honor your parents and wrong to both lie and commit murder. But this counterpart theory is a version of act-consequentialism as opposed to theological voluntarism because it holds that the feature of lying that ultimately makes it wrong is, not that God wills us to refrain from lying, but that the outcome in which the agent lies is outranked by the outcome in which they neither lie nor violate any other commandment.