  One line of objection holds that no reasons derive from our desires. It seems plausible that they do only because desire is closely connected to something else, which often is a source of reasons: something like pleasure or enjoyment (Bond 1983, Millgram 1997, Scanlon 1998). Reasons that seem to derive from desires can arguably be more plausibly explained by pleasure, which can also serve to explain reasons that desire cannot explain: reasons deriving from pleasures that the agent does not actually desire. It may therefore be a better and more explanatory hypothesis that something like pleasure grounds our agent-relative reasons. However proponents of this kind of objection often take hedonic states like pleasure to be merely one instance of something possessing intrinsic value, and offer as rivals to HTR theories of reasons as based on intrinsic value (see the entry on   intrinsic vs. extrinsic value). 