 The NJC purports to specify a generally applicable sufficient condition of legitimate authority. An important feature of it is that it does not present the legitimacy of international law in an all-or-nothing manner, and this is so in two ways (Tasioulas 2010). First, it may be that some areas of international law (e.g., the law on the use of force) enjoy legitimacy, whereas others (e.g., international trade law) do not.  Second, it may be that some states are bound by a given area of international law, such as human rights law, whereas others are not.  This is because the former, but not the latter, would better comply with reasons that apply to them by being bound by that international legal regime, whereas others would not. This second possibility enables the Razian theory to accommodate the possibility of a justified exceptionalism in relation to the legitimate authority of international law. This is one potential template for defending familiar claims that the United States, for example, is not bound by norms on the use of force that properly bind other states because it should be free to use its immense capabilities to further the cause of justice around the globe in ways that other states cannot. But a similar argument for exceptionalism might be pressed in the case of weaker or poorer states in relation to international obligations—for example, pertaining to free trade or environmental protection—that are unduly burdensome for them.