 Stevenson provides a plethora of examples throughout his work to clarify the variety of ways in which beliefs, in their intermediary roles, may serve to strengthen or weaken attitudes (1944, especially Chapters V, VI, VIII). For example, suppose that Smith disapproves of policies that put a great burden on the poor and make little difference to the rich. They say of a proposed policy that it is good. Assuming model (P1), Smith’s claim is akin to the claim “I approve of this policy; do so as well.” Assuming model (P3a), their claim is akin to the claim “This policy does not put great burden on the poor while making little difference to the rich; hooray for this policy.” Jones might then, in appealing to the claim that the policy puts great burden on the poor and makes little difference to the rich, alter Smith’s attitude toward the policy either by directly contradicting a belief of Smith’s (assuming model (P3a)) or by leading Smith to accept that they do not approve of the policy, which again contradicts their belief (assuming model (P1)). Here the impact of Smith’s newly acquired belief on their earlier moral judgments is due to the logical relation between the beliefs. Next consider a case where Smith hasn’t really thought about the policy before. They might nevertheless be disposed, upon coming to believe that the policy puts a great burden on the poor while making little difference to the rich, to disapprove of the policy. Here the newly acquired belief would not contradict an earlier belief of Smith’s, but it might nevertheless have an impact, thanks to a suitable psychological relation, on their beliefs and attitudes. Other sorts of examples, discussed by Stevenson, of reasons for attitude revision without a logical relation to existing beliefs include appeals to authority, or to the genealogy of beliefs or attitudes (1944, 123–125).