 As with other ancient theories, this account of virtue can be called eudaimonist. Plato’s theory is best represented as holding that virtue, together with its active exercise, is the most important and the dominant constituent of happiness (580b–c). One might object that eudaimonist theories reduce morality to self-interest. We should recall however that eudaimonia in this theory does not refer primarily to a feeling. In the Republic, it refers to a state of the soul, and the active life to which it leads, whose value is multifaceted. The order and harmony of the soul is, of course, good for the soul because it provides what is good for each of the parts and the whole, and so makes the parts function well, for the benefit of each and of the whole person. In this way, the soul has the best internal economy, so to speak. Still, we should not overlook the ways in which order and harmony in the soul are paired with order and harmony in the city. They are both modeled on the forms. As a consequence, virtue in the soul is not a private concern artificially joined to the public function of ruling. Rather, the philosopher who imitates forms in ruling her soul is equally motivated to imitate forms in ruling the city. So, insofar as virtue consists in imitating the forms, it is also a state of the soul best expressed by exercising rule in the city – or at least in the ideal city. Eudaimonia, then, includes looking after the welfare of others.