 The psychological continuity criterion originally proposed by Locke and developed most famously by Parfit (1984) does well to account for moral responsibility and anticipation of the afterlife and survival but falls short on compensation and maximizing utility intrapersonally. The animalist or biological continuity criterion does not fare well in accounting for concern about moral responsibility, but it does much better on compensation and special non-derivative concern and other-regarding emotions I have for a certain limited network of people, all of whom bear certain sorts of special relations to me (DeGrazia 2005). These are not the only competitors though. Some might suggest, as do Tierney et al., that we can be pluralists about personal identity. Rather ‘empirical evidence and philosophical thought experiments indicate that judgments about personal identity are regimented by two different criteria, one in terms of psychological traits and one that largely conforms to biological criteria’ (Tierney et al. 2014, 198). Shoemaker (2007) goes further to settle for a wide-ranging pluralism in the face of the disunity of our practical concerns. But Shoemaker stops short of giving up on persons and person-related concerns in the hope that there is a theory (or theories!) of the relation between personal identity and our person-related practices and concerns. He says, ‘several concessions may be required, including admission, perhaps, of (a) the irrelevance of certain powerful and popular criteria of personal identity for (at least some of) our practices and concerns, (b) the ultimate disunity of these practices and concerns (such that multiple types of theories of the relation between them and the metaphysics may be called for), and/or (c) the possibility of different types of rational grounding—justification and rendering-possible—where justification may actually be off the table altogether for some practices and concerns’ (2007, 354).