 It seems, however, that primitivism about normativity as such commits one to primitivism about the normative properties and concepts. For it is of the nature of the normative properties and concepts that they are normative. So primitivism about normativity implies that any constitutive account of the nature of a normative property or concept would have an unanalyzable constituent, the second-order normativity property. To illustrate, consider the view that all normative properties can be reduced to some condition about reasons. Perhaps for an action to be wrong is, in part, for there to be reasons against it. But reasons are normative considerations, so the primitivist about normativity will say that the normativity of reasons is primitive. Generalizing, according to primitivism about normativity, any constitutive explanation of a normative property would have the normativity property as an unanalyzable constituent. It therefore seems that primitivism about normativity implies or at least supports a primitivism about the normative properties and concepts.