 Joel Feinberg (1987, 9) also defends a “presumption in favor of liberty.” Defined: “liberty should be the norm, coercion always needs some special justification.” While Benn worries about interference, and Feinberg about coercion, their presumptions are similar. Rawls (2001, 44) endorses a presumption against legal coercion, which also appears in his liberal principle of legitimacy. Rawls: “Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions” (Rawls 2005, xlvi). Rawls does not speak of coercion in this formulation. Yet he elsewhere claims that “political power is always coercive power” (68). Further, public justification should explain when citizens may coerce another (217). We can naturally read Rawls, then, as endorsing the Liberty Principle. Gaus (2011) probably provides the most extensive defense of the liberty principle to date (though see Vallier 2019).