 But experimental work has cast doubt on this claim, beginning with Darley and Goodwin (2008), and continued by James Beebe (2014) and others (Wright et al. 2013; Campbell &amp; Kumar 2012; Goodwin &amp; Darley 2010; Sarkissian et al. 2011; but see Sousa et al. 2021; for review, see Pölzler &amp; Wright 2019). Goodwin and Darley asked subjects to rate their agreement with statements drawn from the moral, ethical, and aesthetic domain, and asked subjects whether they agreed with the statement (for example, “before the 3rd month of pregnancy, abortion for any reason (of the mother’s) is morally permissible,”), whether they thought it represented a fact or an opinion or attitude, and whether, if someone were to disagree with them about the statement, at least one of the disputants would have to be mistaken. (We will say more about the authors’ use of disagreement as a proxy for realism in the following section.) In general, subjects rated moral statements as less factual than obviously factual statements (e.g. “the earth is at the center of the universe,”) but more factual than statements about matters of taste or etiquette. What is striking about these findings is not just that people are not straightforwardly realist, but that they seem to treat moral questions variably (Wright, Grandjean &amp; McWhite 2013): some are treated as matters of fact, others as matters of opinion. This pattern has been replicated in several studies, and persists even when subjects are allowed to determine for themselves which issues to assign to the moral domain, suggesting that subjects do not think moral claims are uniformly objective