 Not everyone agrees with Arpaly’s verdict on this case, however. Sliwa (2017) challenges the intuition that Huck is morally praiseworthy, arguing that praise is ordinarily bestowed only on those agents who intentionally do the right thing. Given that Huck doesn’t know what the right thing to do in his situation is, he can’t do the right thing intentionally (although he intentionally performs an action that is in fact right), because intentional action incorporates, quite generally, a “know how” requirement (Sliwa 2017: 128–30). Since in the case of morally significant actions the required know-how incorporates both non-moral and moral knowledge (2017: 131), this, on Sliwa’s view, supports the thesis that praise-/blameworthiness does require moral knowledge (and thus moral awareness). (Zimmerman 2008: 201 argues that Huck is actually blameworthy, given that he acts on the belief that his action is overall morally wrong.)