 Though the SW and Marburg school agree in their rejection of the copy theory, they take very different attitudes toward the distinction between intuitions and concepts, and toward the “given”. For the Marburg school, there is nothing given; the SW School argues only that knowledge is not a copy of the given, but requires a transformation of it. For the Marburg school, there is no distinction between intuitions and concepts; for the SW School, intuitions are irreducible to concepts. These two points are developed by Rickert. He holds that the content of a sensory consciousness, what is given in perception, is a “heterogeneous continuum” and an “unsurveyable manifold” (1915: 406–7; Ch.5, §5, “Konstitutive Wirklichkeitsformen und Methodologische Erkenntnisformen”). This multiplicity of content in perception can only be felt [Erlebnis, Gefühl], since it would be an infinite (and so impossible) task to express this content in conceptual form (1915: 139; Ch.3, section 1, “Das Erkennen als Vorstellen”). So cognition cannot be a reproduction, or mirror, of what is given; the concept cannot be a reproduction of the intuition. Rather, concepts are always general, and overcome the multiplicity of the content of sensory consciousness by leaving out content that is present in intuition (Rickert 1902: Ch.1, §1). This idea is further developed by Lask (1911). He argues that a theoretical sense (e.g., the sense of this or that sentence) is composed of matter and form, that the form of the sense is validity, while the matter is the “non-valid sensible”, or “alogical content”. This material matter, though it can be taken up into a concept as its matter, is not itself conceptual, or reducible or transformable into what is conceptual. The sensible content (i.e., the content of a sensory consciousness) is “something irrational” or “foreign to meaning”, and can only be passively taken in, felt, and intuited (Lask 1911: 415–417; First Part, §3). The sense of a sentence does not mirror or copy the sensory given: the sensory given is its matter. Lask summarizes the difference between the Marburg view and this conception as a distinction between “panlogicism” (the view that all content is conceptual content—the kind of content that is the subject matter of logic) and “panarchy of logos” (his view that all content, even sensory content, can be the matter for conceptual form, without being reduced to it) (Lask 1911: 426; Second Part, Ch.1, §3). 