  Other theorists resist pervasive context-sensitivity by appealing to shiftiness in extension without shiftiness in content. To obtain shiftiness in extension without shiftiness in content, these theorists relativize extensions of expressions to non-traditional parameters. Such views are often called relativist. For example, Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (2005) and MacFarlane (2011) argue for relativist theories of epistemic uses of ‘might’. On their views, ‘Susan might be in Boston’, when used epistemically, has the same content in all contexts, but the truth-value of this content varies not only from one possible world to another, but also from one body of knowledge to another within a single possible world. Lasersohn (2005) similarly argues that predicates of personal taste, such as ‘tasty’ and ‘fun’, do not vary in content from context to context, but do vary in extension with respect to judges, or standards of taste, within a single world. See also Stephenson 2007, Richard 2008, Cappelen and Hawthorne 2009.