 By following Confucius’s views on the genuineness of emotion in moral virtues, Mencius (372–289 BCE) develops a moral-psychological explanation of the heart-mind (xin 心) and its innate moral foundations with spontaneous arousal and motivational purity. He puts moral emotions at the center of his philosophy and argues that the affective genuineness of Confucian virtues emerges from innately given affective inclinations. His four moral sprouts (siduan 四端, the four moral-psychological foundations of Confucian virtues) are the heart-mind of pity and compassion (惻隱), shame and dislike (羞惡), modesty and compliance (辭讓), and approve and disapprove (是非) (Mencius, 2A6, 6A6). For example, one cannot bear to see the suffering of others and quickly develops empathic concern for them.  This naturally aroused affective inclination is the foundation of the Confucian virtue of benevolence (ren) (Mencius, 2A6). He often compares the cultivation of the moral sprouts to an agricultural process: the sprouts can grow naturally because of their inborn nature under the particular external conditions (such as water, soil, and nutrition) for their full maturation. From this onto-generative and innate viewpoint of moral emotions, one can see the moral-psychological connection between qing and emotions.  Even though no explicit connection between qing and emotions is made in the Mencius, the genuineness of the human mind in Confucian virtues such as ren (仁 benevolence), yi (義 righteousness), li (禮 ritual propriety), and zhi (智 wisdom) is traced back to the inborn nature or essence, (i.e, qing) of humanity that manifests itself in such emotional reactions as buren (不忍 not bearing to see others’ suffering) or ceyin (惻隱 pity and compassion).