  The distinction Moore is drawing on here between thought on the one hand and what is objective or real on the other is one that runs through his critique of idealism. An important early context in which he elaborates it is his discussion of meaning in his famous paper ‘The Nature of Judgement’ (1899), which comes largely from his 1898 Dissertation. Moore begins here by attributing to Bradley a quasi-empiricist view of meaning as abstracted from the total content of judgement. This is a mistake, but what is important is what follows: as against this view Moore holds that meanings, which he calls ‘concepts’, are entirely non-psychological. They come together in propositions, which are the ‘objects’ of thoughts and, as such, are to be sharply distinguished from any mental contents or representations. Indeed true propositions do not represent or correspond to a fact or real state of affairs; instead they just are facts. He put this point very clearly in a short entry written a year later on ‘Truth’: