 Roberts and Wood (2007: 219) characterize intellectual courage and caution as the virtues that dispose us to respond appropriately to perceived threats in our intellectual lives—courage disposing us to not be unduly intimidated, caution disposing us to not take inappropriate risks in achieving intellectual goods. For them, then, intellectual courage is analogous to Aristotelian moral courage, in that it disposes its bearer to respond well to threats, being neither too rash nor too fearful. Baehr (2011, chap. 9) likewise argues that intellectual courage is best construed as a disposition to respond well to threats to one’s epistemic well-being; he focuses in particular on the courage to inquire rather than the courage to believe or doubt. Drawing on Nietzsche, Alfano (2013a, 2019) explores a related kind of intellectual courage to inquire into the forbidden. He argues that such Nietzschean courage is needed to understand the most disheartening and shameful aspects of human nature, which people tend to whitewash or gloss over. On a different note, Alfano (2013b) emphasizes the importance of intellectual courage in publicly announcing what one knows or believes in the face of social and institutional pressure to conform or be silent. Such courage relates to the transmission of knowledge and the destruction of ignorance and error in one’s community rather than the seeking of knowledge for the inquirer’s sake. Having such a sense of when and how to speak one’s mind is a primary constituent of the virtue of being an effective whistleblower, an underappreciated exemplar of the current era (DesAutels 2009). Medina (2013) offers an account of subjects with exceptional intellectual courage, such as Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz in seventeenth century Mexico. Such heroes defy cognitive obstacles in contexts of epistemic oppression through inventiveness and imagination.