  This presents two very different kinds of intentional mental states. In the case of empirical knowledge we have a subject in the psychological state of believing that something is true of the world; his belief has a propositional object as its content as Bradley would call it. Since the goal is to correctly understand the world, the subject is committed to altering his belief set until it accurately represents the external physical world. By contrast, when I wish or desire to become a better person I must first have represented the self or person I wish to be under some description. This sort of mental state also has a propositional object; e.g., in the statement, “I wish that I were a more patient person” the italicized proposition following the “that” is the object of the mental state we call wishing. What we have here, in Bradley’s terminology is an ideal object which is the content of the wish. This is ideal because it is a mental representation of a state of affairs that does not exist at the point the wish is made.