 Further, a recent experiment examined whether people think that a kind in which a property is had only by one sex (i.e., where domain restriction to a subkind is possible) is a better satisfier of the generic than a kind in which half the members, regardless of sex, have the property (i.e., where no such restriction to a subkind is possible). If generics like “ducks lay eggs” are only accepted because people are implicitly restricting the domain to a subkind whose members generally possess the property, then they should show a preference for one of the possible distributions over the other. However, no such preference was found (Cimpian, Gelman and Brandone 2010). Khemlani, Leslie, and Glucksberg (2012) also report empirical evidence that further suggests that people do not understand these generics to involve domain restriction—in particular, that people are more likely to judge that an arbitrary duck lays eggs than they are to judge that an arbitrary duck is female (but see Lazaridou-Chatzigoga and Stockall (2013) for some evidence in favor of domain restriction). This pattern is difficult to explain if people only accept “ducks lay eggs” because of domain restriction. If one cannot appeal to domain restriction to handle “ducks lay eggs”, then such generics would appear to constitute counterexamples to this sort of approach.