 What is the payoff of such principles in terms of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction? Default principles allow one to draw the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction in much the same way that Nagel drew it but without thereby excluding particularists. An initial gloss of the distinction might go as follows. A given default principle will either include a free-agent variable in the statement of the consideration which is the reason or not. If it does then the reason is agent-relative; if not then the reason is agent-neutral. However, this is not quite right. For every statement of a reason will be a statement about an action which is a possible action for the agent for whom it is a reason. I cannot have reason to perform an action that only someone else could perform, after all. Since this sort of back-reference to the agent is entirely trivial, we must explicitly add to our definition that it is not sufficient to make a reason agent-relative. Otherwise, all reasons will implausibly come out as agent-relative for this trivial reason. Indeed, Derek Parfit already noticed this in his discussion, explaining that,