 Evidently, Philo felt no sympathy towards Epicureanism (Lévy, Ranocchia 2008), an exclusively materialistic doctrine which denied the existence of Providence and defined pleasure both as the first motivator of human actions and as the supreme good. As if this was not enough, Epicureans also described gods as taking human form, which was for Philo an indisputable case of idolatry. Nevertheless, his attitude towards Epicureanism is at times more complex than one might expect. In the first instance, his condemnation of Epicureanism is clear. In the same sentence at Post. 2, he castigates Epicurean impiety alongside Egyptian atheism. In De providentia as well we find strong elements of a refutation of Epicurean denial of Providence. And in Aet. 6–8, he draws a clear contrast between Epicureans who believe in the genesis and dissolution of worlds created by the chance of atomic collisions, and the Stoics, who despite being materialists themselves, claim that the world is single and governed by Reason. In addition, atomism becomes an allegorical instrument in the splendid exegesis of Moses killing the Egyptian (Fug. 148), where this episode becomes the symbol of the confrontation between the doctrines of unity and of extreme fragmentation. The Egyptian, who symbolizes pleasure, is buried in the sand, symbol of atoms. Nothing in all this is truly unexpected. More surprising, however, is the inclusion of the most complete exposition of the Epicurean version of oikeiôsis in Opif. 161, the doctrine of first adaptation to nature, probably of Stoic origin but also adopted by other schools. Moreover, despite many appearances, Philo does not consider pleasure an absolute evil. For him, it has a place in the divine program of Creation since it plays an essential role in procreation. The error lay with those who would transform a relative good into a perfect one.