 Some have argued that Sosa’s AAA-model is open to counterexamples. For example, Duncan Pritchard (2009a), echoing Jennifer Lackey’s (2007) broader criticism of credit views of knowledge, argues that Sosa’s view gives the wrong verdict in the fake-barn thought experiment (originally due to Carl Ginet; see Goldman 1976: 772–3). In this thought experiment, Henry and his son are driving through the country. Henry pulls over to stretch his legs, and while doing so regales his son with a list of currently visible roadside items. “That’s a tractor. That’s a combine. That’s a horse. That’s a silo. And that’s a fine barn”, he adds, pointing to the nearby roadside barn. But unbeknownst to them, the locals recently secretly replaced nearly every barn in the country with fake barns (they’re in “Fake Barn Country”). Henry happens to see the one real barn in the whole county. Had he instead set eyes on any of the numerous nearby fakes, he would have falsely believed it was a barn. Henry has a true belief because of his perceptual acuity, Pritchard says, so it counts as apt and Sosa’s view entails that Henry knows. But, Pritchard claims, it’s obvious that Henry doesn’t know. Pritchard (2008a: 445) raises an exactly similar objection to Greco’s theory of knowledge.