 In a similar vein, Kauppinen (2013; 2015) distinguishes between moral intuitions or appearances, which are constituted by (typically emotional) manifestations of sentiments we expect others to share, and moral judgments, which are (implicitly) beliefs about what would be permitted, required, or recommended by standards an ideal subject would endorse. As with other appearances, the existence of moral thoughts that are not judgments is clearest in cases in which they clash with judgment, such as when it appears to Huck Finn that it is wrong to reveal where Jim is, though he believes he ought to do so. Kauppinen maintains that moral seemings have a distinctive and diverse phenomenological and motivational character (in contrast to, say, mathematical intuitions), which is best explained by their being sentimental in nature. Motivational internalism is thus true of moral appearances, as Kriegel holds for moral alief.