 Let’s move away from the issue of reference and turn to the metaphysics of propositions. First, note that &lt;Socrates was wise&gt; is a “singular” proposition: a proposition that’s directly about some individual, Socrates, whereas &lt;Plato’s finest teacher was wise&gt; is a “particularised” proposition: a proposition that’s about Socrates, but not directly about them. [See the entry on  singular propositions.]  Frequently, propositions are taken to be complex metaphysical entities, entities with constituents and structure. [See the entry on  structured propositions.]  On this way of thinking, singular propositions are understood typically as constituted by individuals, specifically the individuals that they are (directly) about. Hence, a singular proposition about some, x, is constituted by x itself. By contrast, particularised propositions aren’t constituted by individuals, although they are structured entities with constituents. A particularised proposition about x isn’t constituted by x, but may be constituted by a property of x. On this view, &lt;Socrates was wise&gt;, for example, is constituted by Socrates himself, whereas &lt;Plato’s finest teacher was wise&gt; isn’t constituted by Socrates—but, perhaps, the proposition is constituted by some actual accidental property of Socrates, being the finest teacher of Plato or, indeed, having been the finest teacher of Plato. This way of thinking about (singular) propositions isn’t universal, but it’s part of a standard theory with many adherents (see Adams 1986; Williamson 2002; King 2007). In what follows, we refer to this view as the ‘neo-Russellian’ view of propositions.