 When exploitation is harmful and nonconsensual, issues of both moral weight and force are relatively unproblematic. Whatever the added moral importance of the gain to \(A\) from the harm to \(B\), it is certainly at least prima facie wrong for \(A\) to harm \(B\) and it seems that the state is at least prima facie justified in prohibiting or refusing to enforce such transactions. But exploitation that takes place in the context of mutually advantageous and consensual transactions presents a more difficult set of problems. First, regarding the issue of moral weight, it might be thought that even if a transaction between \(A\) and \(B\) is unfair, there can be nothing seriously wrong about an agreement from which both parties benefit, particularly if \(A\) has no obligation to enter into any transaction with \(B\). At the very least, it seems difficult to show how a mutually advantageous (but unfair) interaction can be morally worse than no-interaction at all since, ex hypothesi, there is no party to the transaction for whom it is worse. In the recent literature on exploitation, this thought has been formulated more precisely as the “non-worseness claim”: