 One might be tempted to infer on this basis that God must have the perfections of all lesser beings in the same mode as they exist in those beings. Suárez rejects this inference. Following other theologians, he distinguishes between absolute and secundum quid perfections. Absolute perfections are those that can inhere without conflict or opposition in the same thing. These, then, belong to the very idea (or “formal concept”) of God. By contrast, the secundum quid perfections can be incompatible with one another and can be hypothetical in the sense that they presuppose some imperfection in that in which they inhere (for example, sensory perception seems to involve the imperfection of being unable to know the qualities of things perceived in an unmediated way. So, we could not say that God “sees” in the sense we see). So, God has that perfection “eminently”, which means that his creative essence has the capacity to communicate to or cause these perfections in beings (for example to communicate the capacity of vision to us) (DM XXX.1.8).