 (5) So Quine does have an account of epistemic normativity after all, and thus a response to the normativity objection to (his version of) NE. And yet, one might see that response as inviting once again the charge of self-defeat. For example, one might wonder why it is truth, or prediction—rather than pleasure, say, or monetary gain—that is the epistemic end. Is that a result of science, discovered a posteriori (compare Foley 1994: 249)? A friend of TE is likely to see it, rather, as a conceptual truth that is knowable, intuitively, a priori. Similarly, one can wonder whether natural science per se really does underwrite the putative empiricist “watchword”. Much recent developmental psychology, for instance, seems to suggest that at least some empirical “knowledge” (or empirical “theories” or “assumptions”) is native, rather than sensorily acquired (see Samet and Zaitchik 2014 for an overview).—Not that such a contrary finding, or theoretical disagreement on the matter within the relevant sciences, would itself pose a problem for Quine’s general approach to NE. The relevant point, rather, is that the matter and disagreement in question are theoretical, and that it is not immediately clear whether it is something that can be settled without the help of “old-fashioned” methods such as armchair reflection, some of it perhaps a priori, on the relevant data and issues. (The present worry could be developed along other lines—e.g., that natural science presupposes that truth or prediction is the end, that the senses are what give us information about the world, etc. This would take us back to worries about circularity. As we’ve already seen, there is inter-play between the concerns to which NE gives rise.)