  The most important limitation on the application of precedent is that the decision in an earlier case is only binding in later cases where the facts in the later case are the ‘same’ as those in the earlier case. It is agreed on all sides that if two cases are the same then the precedent applies, whereas if they are different it does not. What makes two cases the same, however, is a matter of considerable debate, and goes to the root of the question of the nature of precedent in legal reasoning. In saying that two cases are the same, it cannot be that they are identical. It is obvious that no two situations are identical in every respect: they must differ at least in having occurred at different times and/or different places. In practice the differences between any two cases will be much more significant than this, and yet they may—legally speaking—still be the same. For this reason, theorists often speak of two cases being the same in ‘all relevant respects’. Which of course simply raises the question of what makes two cases ‘relevantly’ the same.