 Another way for the meaning holist to mitigate worries about objectivity is to adopt a version of the “contextualist” approach also mentioned in  3.2.2.  On that view, since only some of one’s beliefs are relevant to a term’s meaning in any context, one’s other beliefs can turn out to be false when evaluated from that context. However, while this would allow for some false beliefs, one might worry whether it goes far enough. Beliefs that speakers in a context didn’t agree on could turn out to be false, but other inferences, inferences that intuitively seem fallible, turn out to be effectively analytic within the relevant contexts. For instance if both my interlocutor and I believe “All sugar comes from sugarcane” in a context where that belief is relevant (we are, for instance, asked “Name a product that comes exclusively from a single type of plant”) it would seem as if my answer “sugar” would have to be correct on the contextualist version of meaning holism, which it doesn’t seem to  be.[30] 