 The Repugnant Conclusion may seem to rely on a certain view about welfare. It treats welfare on an additive scale, where low numbers, if added to themselves often enough, must become larger than any initial larger number. This is like the Archimedean property of the real numbers: For any positive numbers x and y, there is a natural number n such that nx is greater than y. Any finite number of lives in population A can therefore be outweighed by a sufficiently large number of lives in Z because the gain in the quantity of lower values outweighs the loss of certain higher values. However, some theorists—including Parfit—have suggested that this axiological assumption is mistaken. (Parfit 1986, 2016; Griffin 1986; Rachels 2001; Crisp 1988, 1992; Glover 1977; Edwards 1979; Lemos 1993; Skorupski 1999; Klint Jensen 1996; Portmore 1999; Riley 1993, 1999, 2008, 2009). The idea is that one type of good α can be superior to another type of good β, in the sense that any amount of α is better than any amount of β or that some amount of α is better than any amount of β. Suppose that what happens as we move down the alphabet from the high-quality population A to the low-quality population Z is that the best things in life are gradually lost. For instance, as Parfit has suggested, the first step from A to B involves the loss of Mozart’s music; in the move from B to C Haydn’s music is lost; in the move to D Venice is destroyed; and so on down the alphabet. All that is left in the final move to Z is “muzak and potatoes”. The claim is that the lives in the beginning of the sequence involve goods that are superior to the goods involved in the lives at the end of the sequence. The loss of the most worthwhile things in life cannot be compensated for by any gain in the quantity of muzak and potatoes. Consequently, whatever the number of people in population Z, there will be less welfare, or less valuable welfare, in this world as compared to population A and thus the Repugnant Conclusion is blocked.