 Unlike judgments of the good, judgments of the beautiful do not presuppose an end or purpose [Zweck] which the object is taken to  satisfy.[2]  (This is closely related to the point that their universality is not based on concepts). However, they nonetheless involve the representation of what Kant calls “purposiveness” [Zweckmässigkeit]. Because this representation of purposiveness does not involve the ascription of an purpose (in an expression widely used by commentators, it is “purposiveness without a purpose”), Kant calls the purposiveness which is represented “merely formal purposiveness” or “the form of purposiveness”. He describes it as perceived both in the object itself and in the activity of imagination and understanding in their engagement with the object. (For more on this activity, see the discussion of the “free play of the faculties” in  Section 2.2;  for more on the notion of purposiveness, see  Section 3.1.)  The Third Moment, in particular §14, is the main evidence for Kant’s supposed formalism in aesthetics; for more on Kant’s formalism, see  Section 2.4.