 Although by allowing for purely internal explanatory conditions, this strategy offers a way to deal with response-dependent and necessarily empty terms, and promises a way of distinguishing analyticities from mere beliefs, there are still several further potential problems it faces. The first is that merely appealing to a “basic explanatory” condition for the use of a word doesn’t distinguish misuses and metaphors from etymologies, derived idioms and “dead metaphors”: saying “Juliet is the sun” can be explained by the use of “sun” to refer to the sun, but so can “lobbying” be explained by the use of “lobby” for lobbies of buildings (where politicians often met), and “the eye of a needle” by the shape of an animal eye. In these latter cases, the words seem to be “frozen” or “dead” metaphors, taking on meanings of their own. While they are explained by original “basic” uses, they are no longer “governed” by them.