 The idea that we know our mental states through acquaintance with them is usually associated with Russell (1917), but such accounts trace their lineage at least to Descartes (see the entry on  knowledge by acquaintance vs. description).  According to these accounts, our awareness of our mental states is sometimes peculiarly direct in both an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. It is epistemically direct in that I need not rely on awareness of something else in order to be aware of my mental state. It is metaphysically direct in that no event or process mediates between my awareness and the mental state itself. By contrast, my awareness of last night’s rain is epistemically indirect in that I achieve it only through being aware of something else (such as the wet pavement). This awareness is metaphysically indirect in that various factors, including the wet pavement and perhaps my visual experience thereof, mediate between my awareness of the rain and the rain itself.