 Some have sought a third way between paternalism and the liberty tradition. The proponents of this third way describe their view as ‘libertarian paternalism.’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2008; Sunstein 2013). Libertarian paternalism aims to be responsive to our well-documented shortcomings at pursuing our own interests while also assuaging the liberty tradition’s concerns about paternalistic measures that disincentivize, restrict, or eliminate choice. ‘Nudges,’ understood typically as interventions in choice architecture, are the focus of libertarian paternalism. And public health policy and liberal governments have increasingly employed nudges to influence health behaviors in desirable directions. Libertarian paternalism endorses interventions by planners (such as public health authorities) in the environmental architecture in which individuals decide and act in order to make it easier for people to behave in ways that are in their best interests (including their health), provided two conditions are satisfied (Thaler and Sunstein 2003; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). First, individuals are steered by these interventions in ways that make them better off, as judged by themselves. Thus, in libertarian paternalism, there is no attempt to contravene the will of individuals, in contrast to what some hold to be a necessary feature of paternalism. Second, the interventions must not overly burden individuals who want to exercise their freedom in ways that run counter to their own welfare. Thaler and Sunstein suggest, for example, that salads rather than French fries could be made the default “side” on restaurant menus, with diners free to request fries if that remains their preference. By nudging people to eat salads, public health outcomes would improve, but this intervention does not objectionably interfere with individual liberty.