 There is a danger here of misinterpreting the B-theory. While the B-theory doesn’t posit temporal passage, it does posit succession. Relatedly, the traditional project of squaring our temporal experience with the B-theory is about explaining away an illusion of temporal passage, not about explaining away an illusion of temporal succession (see the SEP entry on the  experience and perception of time).  Since the B-theory posits succession (a B-relation), an experience of succession is non-illusory, on the B-theory. This makes trouble for Leftow’s appeals to the B-theory. After all, Leftow holds that a QTE being’s life, in which all times are experienced at once, is what a non-illusory experience of B-time would be like (Leftow 1991: 122). In other words, the thought is that an experience of temporal succession is illusory, on the B-theory.