 Easwaran and Fitelson then object that there are situations in which Evidential Dominance does not entail Probabilism. For instance, suppose that a trick coin is about to be tossed. Your evidence tells you that the chance of it landing heads is 0.7. Your credence that it will lands heads is 0.7 and your credence that it will land tails is 0.6. Then you might think that your credences match your evidence, because you have evidence only about it landing heads and your credence that it will land heads equals the known chance that it will land heads. However, it turns out that all of the credence functions that accuracy dominate your credence function (when accuracy is measured by the Brier score) fail to match this evidence: that is, they assign credence other than 0.7 to Heads. Thus, Evidential Dominance does not entail that your credence function is irrational.  Figure 2  illustrates this result. Pettigrew (2014a) responds to this objection on behalf of the accuracy argument for Probabilism.