 It is still an open question which definition of TRL-validity we should prefer, if we want it to include a semantical definition of what it means for a future contingent to be true, and if we want it to ensure the validity of (T3) and (T3′). In addition to the two solutions mentioned above, we may consider a use of a TRL-function that appears to bring us very close to Molina’s notion of middle knowledge mentioned in section 1 (see Øhrstrøm 2014). The idea is to let the evaluation of the truth-value of a proposition depend on two moments, \(s\) and \(t\), instead of just one (see MacFarlane 2003; MacFarlane 2014; De Florio and Frigerio 2020). We may speak of the truth-value of a proposition at the moment \(t\) from the perspective of moment \(s\). Whereas \(t\) is the moment of evaluation, \(s\) is the “context of utterance” or at least a moment at which the statement in question is imagined to be considered.