 The supervaluationist is also under pressure to reject semantic principles which are intimately associated with the application of logical laws. According to Alfred Tarski’s Convention T, a statement \(`S\rsquo\) is true if and only if \(S\).  In other words, truth is disquotational. Supervaluationists say that being supertrue (being true under all precisifications) suffices for being true. But given Convention T, supertruth would then be disquotational. Since the supervaluationists accept the principle of excluded middle, they would be forced to say \(`P\rsquo\) is supertrue or \(`\neg P\rsquo\) is supertrue (even if \(`P\rsquo\) applies a predicate to a borderline case).  This would imply that either \(`P\rsquo\) is true or \(`\neg P\rsquo\) is true. (Williamson 1994, 162–163) And that would be a fatal loss of truth-value gaps for supervaluationism.