 There have been several responses to the intuition deniers, but perhaps the most prominent response to is that the arguments of intuition deniers depend on an implausibly strong conception of the notion of intuition (e.g., Chalmers 2014; Devitt 2015; Weinberg 2014). Once we focus on a less demanding notion of intuition, it’s plausible that philosophers often rely on intuitions as evidence for philosophical theses (Devitt 2015). Indeed, some have argued that for classic examples like Gettier cases, it’s hard to see how the argument works if it doesn’t rely on intuitions (see, e.g., Brown 2017; Sytsma &amp; Livengood 2015: 92–93) Experimental philosophers have also argued against intuition deniers on experimental grounds, noting that a recent study found that over 50% of philosophers agree with the statement “intuitions are useful for justifying philosophical claims” (Kuntz &amp; Kuntz 2011; see Sytsma &amp; Livengood 2015: 91).