 Brito’s position is clearly articulated in his reply to these objections. In fact, whatever is predicated of a thing is predicated on the basis of something that is either essential or accidental to it. If being is not predicated essentially, then it must be predicated by means of an accidental attribute. But according to Brito accidents have  being,[9]  therefore step 2 stands. Moreover, if being belongs to the essence of some \(x_{n}\), which is not the first cause, then it must belong to the essence of any \(x_{n}\), which is not the first cause; therefore, step 3 also stands. And no \(x_{n}\) can be the first cause, because, Brito tells us, being is an intrinsic and formal disposition of things, which the first cause cannot be (QMet: IV.2; cf. Donati 2013: 348). In other words, the predication of being cannot be based on something that is neither essential nor accidental; and whoever claims that it is based on something accidental will be committed to an infinite regress. Consequently, being is predicated essentially of things, i.e., it belongs to them essentially.