 Johann Friedrich Herbart became Kant’s successor in Königsberg in 1808, where he remained until going to Göttingen in 1833, but he was no orthodox Kantian. His major work, the two-volume Psychologie als Wissenschaft neu gegrundet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik, und Mathematik of 1824–1825, sought to establish psychology as a science, based on experience and metaphysics. Using some rather fanciful mathematics he endeavoured to show how memory works and how repeated stimuli of certain kinds cause the mind to learn to perceive, for example, lines, parallel lines, intersecting lines, and surfaces. There are no innate ideas, in Herbart’s opinion; visual space is constructed from experience, most significantly by means of the conceptual act of inferring continuity in spatial processes. And concepts are generated by clusters of memories, upon which logic then operates independently of their origins. This was Herbart’s way of avoiding grounding logic in psychology.