 Philosophers largely agree that feelings of gratitude—the feelings that partly constitute a beneficiary’s being grateful—are positive and agreeable feelings (Fitzgerald 1998; Bruton 2003). Some philosophers claim that an act of beneficence should incite feelings of joy and pleasure in the grateful beneficiary—and not just because of the benefit, but because he has benefited as a result of someone’s benevolence toward him (Camenisch 1981; Card 1988; McConnell 1993; Seneca On Benefits). Still others claim that gratitude entails a certain affection for the benefactor (Bruton 2003). These generalizations may not apply to gratitude in all cases, however. As Manela (2016b) notes, feelings of gratitude can sometimes be quite negative (i.e., painful or disagreeable): a beneficiary whose benefactor sacrifices terribly in conferring her benefit on him should probably feel grief or sadness, rather than joy or pleasure, insofar as he is grateful to her. And the proper response to a benefit from a benefactor one finds loathsome need not amount to affection.