 The deontic Phenomenologists seek to ground the notion of obligation independently of any notion of value or volition. On their view, the experience of obligation is prior to all acts of evaluation, all choices, all projects, and all dictates of reason, and it reveals itself in the experience of other persons (the Other). The deontic view grounds ethics in intersubjectivity, adopting a “second-person perspective” in which encountering the “face” of the Other is the ground of obligation (Levinas 1961; 1974; Løgstrup 1956; cf. Darwall 2006; see the entry on  Emmanuel Levinas).  The subject encounters an ethical transcendence in encountering the face of the Other insofar as the face is expressive (Levinas 1961 [1969: 51])—the “revelation” (1961 [1969: 73]) or “epiphany” (1961 [1969: 194])—of the Other. My original ethical access to the Other disrupts my subjectivity; the Other “speaks” to me and calls me out of my subjectivity. The Other, in short, is encountered as a summons and a command, and the only appropriate form of encountering the Other, therefore, is to respond. Only to the extent that I acknowledge this summons and command do I live in a world with the Other and thereby become a person—a moral agent—myself. The Other and I exist in an asymmetrical relation wherein the Other’s ethical superiority outweighs my egoism, unsettles my conscious intentionality, and contests my freedom in such a way that I must respond. On this view, moral agency begins with neither my feelings and their correlative values nor my (constructive) freedom, but with the recognition that my freedom is arbitrarily limited by my responsibility to the Other. The experience of the Other is thus from the beginning an experience of obligation.