 So if \(a\) can only exist if \(b\) exists for \(a\) to be ontologically dependent on, and \(b\) can only exist if \(c\) exists for \(b\) to be ontologically dependent on … and so on ad infinitum, either the whole infinite sequence of things exists, or none of them do. And if the whole infinite sequence exists, there is no explanation (from within the sequence at least) as to why anything exists at all. However, there is an explanation for each particular thing as to why it exists: it exists because the next thing in the sequence does. If Bliss and Priest are correct, then whether or not an ontological infinite regress is vicious or benign depends on our explanatory ambitions: are we attempting to explain an (infinite) collection of particular existence facts: that this thing exists, that that thing exists, etc., or are we attempting to explain the global fact that things exist. Exactly the same infinitely regressing ontology can be vicious or benign depending on one’s theoretical lights. Notice the similarity to the discussion in section 1.3 of Bradley’s and McTaggart’s regresses: once again, whether or not there is something inherently objectionable to an infinite regress may depend on our theoretical ambitions. Bliss (2019) argues that Metaphysical Foundationalism appears to be motivated by an explanatory demand that everything that is apt for explanation be explained in terms of facts that do not require an explanation, but that this explanatory demand begs the question in favor of Foundationalism.