 As we have seen, Hartshorne explicitly endorses as a consequence of the doctrine of divine omnipresence that the world is God’s body, and Swinburne is initially willing to accept a “limited embodiment.” But some philosophers have been loath to accept divine embodiment as a consequence of omnipresence. Charles Taliaferro, for example, while endorsing this overall account of omnipresence, notes that the basic actions human beings perform “can involve highly complex physical factors…[including] many neural events and muscle movements, whereas with God there is no such physical complexity” (Taliaferro, 1994). Taliaferro then adds that this immediacy in the case of God’s action is precisely a reason to say that “the world does not function as God’s body the way material bodies function as our own.” Edward Wierenga adds a second objection. He holds that as Hartshorne and Swinburne develop accounts of God’s power and knowledge, God would have the same knowledge of and control over what happens in empty regions of space as he does with respect to those regions occupied by material objects (Wierenga, 2010). In other words, Hartshorne’s and Swinburne’s accounts of omnipresence, unlike that of Aquinas, do not interpret God’s presence as presence in things. But it would be implausible to count a thing as part of God’s body on the basis of his knowledge of and power over the region of space that thing occupies, when God’s knowledge and power would extend in the same way to that region if it were unoccupied. So it seems as though one could accept a version of the traditional account of divine omnipresence without having to conclude that the world is God’s body.