 Of course, things are different for the earnest consequentializer. It would be a problem if they produced an act-consequentialist counterpart theory that was gimmicky. But, arguably, the result of earnest consequentializing isn’t gimmicky given that it employs the Coherentist Procedure rather than the Footian Procedure. Of course, when the earnest consequentializer accommodates, say, our intuition that it’s wrong for Abe to break his promise even to prevent both Bert and Carl from breaking theirs, they do so by insisting that Abe ought to prefer the outcome in which he keeps his promise and Bert and Carl break theirs to the outcome in which he breaks his promise and Bert and Carl keep theirs. But the motivation for this move isn’t the ad hoc one that making it allows them to accommodate this intuition. Instead, the earnest consequentializer motivates this move on independent grounds: agents bear a special responsibility for their own agency and, thus, for their own promises. Thus, an agent should, other things being equal, blame themselves more harshly for breaking one of their own promises than for letting two others each break one of theirs. And this motivation should appeal even to non-consequentialists. For non-consequentialists, such as Bernard Williams, have powerfully argued that agents have a special responsibility for their own actions, a responsibility that they don’t bear for what they allow others to do. In any case, this thought that agent’s bear a special responsibility for their own agency can motivate the earnest consequentializer’s claim that agents should prefer, other things being equal, the outcome in which two others violate an agent-centered restriction to the outcome in which they themselves violate that restriction—see Otsuka 2011: 42; Portmore 2011: 100–103; and Williams 1973: 93–100. And, so, there needn’t be anything gimmicky about the way in which the earnest consequentializer motivates these sorts of moves in accommodating our commonsense moral intuitions.