 The Ābhidharmikas, on the other hand, did not think of ‘person’ as a useful pragmatic device or skillful means but emphasized that it is nothing but a conventional designation, a mere name for a group of psychophysical aggregates, ultimately the collections of dharmas The Abhidharma position has been classified by Siderits as Reductionism. Parfit claims that on the Reductionist view, “persons do exist. But they exist only in the way in which nations exist. Persons are not, as we mistakenly believe fundamental. This view in this sense is more impersonal” (1984, 445). So-called Abhidharma Reductionism about persons was first championed by Mark Siderits in his classic paper “Buddhist Reductionism” (1997, see also Perett 2002). More recently, this interpretation has been challenged in literature. Chadha (2021) argues that Vasubandhu’s Abhidharma is best construed as an Eliminativism about persons. Vasubandhu’s argument against the Pudgalavādins is based on the causal efficacy principle: everything that is real or substantial (dravya) is causally efficient, having specifiable cause-and-effect relations with other entities (see, for example, Gold 2015). Everything else is a conceptual construct, a mere convention (prajñapti), and thus should be rejected as only conventionally real. Vasubandhu’s uses the same principle to argue against the self as posited by the Hindu philosophers (in particular the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika). Selves too, according to Vasubandhu, are only conventionally real.