 There is some disagreement among philosophers about whether R’s intention to benefit Y must be R’s only motive in φ-ing. Most philosophers allow that R may have other motives for φ-ing, noting that our motives are almost always mixed (see, e.g., McConnell 1993). Some philosophers argue, however, that the presence of certain intentions might render a particular act of beneficence less than gratitude-worthy. Weiss (1985) argues that whatever her other motives, R must not benefit Y with the intention of gaining standing to demand a return in the future, as this would render R’s φ-ing a sort of lending, rather than a gratitude-worthy act of beneficence. Berger (1975), McConnell (1993) and Manela (2015) also argue that such an intention might reduce or eliminate the amount of gratitude owed to R.