 Dworkin is not alone in this concern. Other liberals and feminists have questioned MacKinnon’s focus on pornography as the key site of women’s oppression when it seems that many other non-sexually explicit materials plausibly also endorse and perpetuate a view of women as sex objects, albeit perhaps in less graphic and explicit forms. (Perhaps this lack of explicitness makes them more insidious, and hence of more, rather than less, concern.) Pornography may sexualize women’s inequality, but advertising and romance novels plausibly glamorize and romanticize it respectively and hence may celebrate, authorize and legitimize women’s inequality in the same way as pornography (e.g., Cocks 1989; Coward 1984; Valverde 1985; Kappeler 1986; Skipper 1993). Indeed, some of these other representations may be especially worrying, not simply because they may be more pervasive, but also insofar they may condition women to be complicit in their own subjection. MacKinnon’s focus on the graphic sexually explicit material that celebrates women’s inequality may thus seem arbitrary in the absence of evidence that the sexually explicit subset of material is an especially significant cause of women’s inequality.