 Assuming that Mary’s belief is true, and she gets to the party, it might seem natural to say that the latter success occurs because her belief is true, which might seem to pose a problem for deflationists. However, truth-involving explanations of particular instances of success like this don’t really pose a genuine problem. This is because if we are told the specific content of the relevant belief, it is possible to replace the apparently explanatory claim that the belief is true with an equivalent claim that does not appeal to truth. In Mary’s particular case, we could replace i) the claim that she believes that the party is being held at 1001 Northside Avenue, and her belief is true, with ii) the claim that she believes that the party is being held at 1001 Northside Avenue, and the party \(is\) being held at 1001 Northside Avenue. A deflationist can claim that the appeal to truth in the explanation of Mary’s success just provides an expressive convenience (including, perhaps, the convenience of expressing what would otherwise require an infinite disjunction (of conjunctions like ii)), by saying just that what Mary believed was true, if one did not know exactly which belief Mary acted on) (cf. Horwich 1998a, 22–3, 44–6).