Between intentional realism and eliminativism lie various intermediate positions. Daniel Dennett (1971, 1987) acknowledges that intentional discourse is predictively useful, but he questions whether mental states really have representational properties. According to Dennett, theorists who employ intentional descriptions are not literally asserting that mental states have representational properties. They are merely adopting the “intentional stance”. Donald Davidson (1980) espouses a neighboring interpretivist position. He emphasizes the central role that intentional ascription plays within ordinary interpretive practice, i.e., our practice of interpreting one another’s mental states and speech acts. At the same time, he questions whether intentional psychology will find a place within mature scientific theorizing. Davidson and Dennett both profess realism about intentional mental states. Nevertheless, both philosophers are customarily read as intentional anti-realists. (In particular, Dennett is frequently read as a kind of instrumentalist about intentionality.) One source of this customary reading involves indeterminacy of interpretation. Suppose that behavioral evidence allows two conflicting interpretations of a thinker’s mental states. Following Quine, Davidson and Dennett both say there is then “no fact of the matter” regarding which interpretation is correct. This diagnosis indicates a less than fully realist attitude towards intentionality.