  Egan (2011) raises problems for intuitive ways of diffusing this dilemma, settling instead on the idea that making epistemic sacrifices for our ethical values may simply be worth it. Others have been more unwilling to accept that implicit bias does in fact create an unavoidable ethical-epistemic dilemma (Mugg 2013; Beeghly 2014; Madva 2016b; Lassiter &amp; Ballantyne 2017; Puddifoot 2017). One way of diffusing the dilemma, for example, is to suggest that it is not social knowledge per se that has costs, but rather that the accessibility of social knowledge in the wrong circumstances has cognitive costs (Madva 2016b). The solution to the dilemma, then, is not ignorance, but the situation-specific regulation of stereotype accessibility. For example, the accessibility of social knowledge can be regulated by agents’ goals and habits (Moskowitz &amp; Li 2011). Readers interested in ethical-epistemic dilemmas due to implicit bias should also consider related scholarship on “moral encroachment” (e.g., Basu &amp; Schroeder 2018; Gardiner 2018).