 There is, however, a related, although perhaps more subtle point, that arises for certain ethical theories. Utilitarianism, for example, entails that all particular moral facts depend on mental facts about happiness and unhappiness. This means that – assuming a normative fact is mind-dependent just when it depends on mental facts – utilitarianism is by definition a theory on which all particular moral facts are mind-dependent. (The theory does not imply that the fact that it itself is true is mind-dependent.) But surely it would be a mistake to think that utilitarianism implies that all particular moral facts are mind-dependent in the sense at issue in meta-ethical debate about realism! And utilitarianism is not unique. Many other moral theories hold that that which makes right actions right (and good actions good, etc.) is purely mental. Consider a view on which all moral evaluations depend on the intentions of the actor, for example. So we need a solution to this puzzle – an account of the nature of mind-dependence (in the sense relevant to the meta-ethical debate) that doesn’t commit such theories one way or the other on whether particular moral facts are mind-dependent (in that sense).