 Although eliminative materialists have traditionally appealed to something like the idea that our folk conception of the mind is a theory, as suggested by the theory-theory, it does not actually  require  that our commonsense mental notions are embedded in a theoretical framework used for explaining and predicting. Virtually any sort of embedding conceptual framework could be proposed in support of the first step of the eliminativist argument. In fact, although it is seldom recognized, the only thing eliminative materialism actually requires is the relatively weak assumption that we have mental concepts (i.e., concepts of mental states and processes) and that those concepts assign certain properties to those mental states and processes. Even opponents of the theory-theory will typically allow that we possess  some  sort of conception of mental states like beliefs or pains and that such a conception (at least tacitly) assigns to their corresponding mental entities a variety of intrinsic, relational, intentional, phenomenal, causal, and temporal properties. Anyone who denies this would be denying that we possess notions of mental states – a highly implausible view.