 Not just any legal order will do, though. Rather, many natural duty theorists of political obligation argue either that the law must be crafted according to democratic procedures or that it must not violate certain individual rights, or both, if those it addresses are to have a duty to obey it. Christiano, for instance, argues that against a background constituted by diversity, cognitive bias, and fallibility, agents can be sure that their fundamental interest in judgment will not be unjustifiably set back only if political power is exercised within institutions that publicly realize equality, i.e. democratic ones. Likewise, Waldron defends the authority of a majority-rule decision procedure on the basis of its “commitment to equality – a determination that when we, who need to settle on a single course of action, disagree about what to do, there is no reasonable basis for us in designing our decision-procedures to accord greater weight to one side than to the other in the disagreement” (Waldron 1999, p. 117; see also Lefkowitz 2004). Even if a person does not believe that the particular scheme of distributive justice realized in the law treats her justly, she can recognize that the process whereby that scheme was created, and can be modified or eliminated, does treat her as an equal. Daniel Viehoff also appeals to the egalitarian character of democratic procedures to justify a moral duty to obey the law, arguing that they best realize an ideal of relational equality in which agents forbear from using any power advantages they may enjoy to determine the terms of their morally necessary coordination (Viehoff 2014; see also Kolodny 2014; Viehoff 2019). Finally, Stilz argues that law omnilaterally imposes obligations on all only if it expresses a general will. It does the latter if and only if it “first, defines rights (protected interests) that apply equally to all; second, it defines these rights via a procedure that considers everyone’s interests equally; and third, everyone who is coerced to obey the law has a voice in the procedure” (Stilz 2009, p. 78). The latter two conditions, she maintains, can only be met by a democratic procedure. Unsurprisingly, some theorists remain unconvinced by the forgoing arguments for democracy’s essential contribution to the justification of political obligation (see, e.g., Huemer 2013; Frye and Klosko 2017).