 This distinction cuts across the deontology/consequentialism/virtue ethics distinctions. A monistic moral theory of right action takes there to be a single right-making feature of actions, while pluralist views take there to be more than one. According to one sort of hedonistic act utilitarian ethical theory, there is a single fundamental descriptive property—an action’s utility, understood as the net balance of pleasure versus pain it would bring about—that explains why some actions are wrong (they fail to maximize utility) and others are not. This kind of monistic theory is opposed by such pluralist theories as Ross’s ethics of prima facie duty, according to which there is a multiplicity of basic right (and wrong)-making features; Ross identified seven: fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-maleficence. How might considerations of moral phenomenology be brought to bear on this dispute?