In a series of works, Hartry Field provided an ingenious strategy for the nominalization of science (Field 1980, 1989). As opposed to platonist views, in order to explain the usefulness of mathematics in science, Field does not postulate the truth of mathematical theories. In his view, it is possible to explain successful applications of mathematics with no commitment to mathematical objects. Therefore, what he takes to be the main argument for platonism, which relies on the (apparent) indispensability of mathematics to science, is resisted. The nominalist nature of Field's account emerges from the fact that mathematical objects are not assumed to exist. Hence, mathematical theories are false. (Strictly speaking, Field notes, any existential mathematical statement is false, and any universal mathematical statement is vacuously true.) By devising a strategy that shows how to dispense with mathematical objects in the formulation of scientific theories, Field rejects the indispensability argument, and provides strong grounds for the articulation of a nominalist stance.