 Many find this implication of luck egalitarianism to be objectionable, with Elizabeth Anderson (1999: 296) calling it “the problem of abandonment of negligent victims”. Some luck egalitarians respond that their view, properly understood, is not committed to this implication. For example, Alexander Cappelen and Ole Norheim (2005) and Julian Le Grand (2013) suggest that differences in option luck—i.e., differences in how the voluntary choices of people play out—are themselves unjust, and so policies should be implemented to ensure that the lucky help the unlucky, such as taxes on cigarettes with the revenues used to provide care to smokers who develop lung cancer. Eric Cavallero (2011: 393–396) takes a stronger line, arguing that luck egalitarianism provides no support for holding individuals accountable for the outcomes of health behaviors. Cavallero (2011: 393) distinguishes between socially detectable and socially undetectable risky behaviors, with smoking an example of the former and poor stress management an example of the latter. He argues that it is not necessarily more fair, by luck egalitarian lights, to only hold people responsible for the former behaviors than to simply refrain from holding people responsible for their choices (Cavallero 2011: 395).