 Again, there are many ways the consequentialist might respond. As with the demandingness objection, perhaps the most common response is to argue that something resembling ordinary rules and practices can be justified on the basis of consequentialist considerations. The classic version of this response dates back to Mill’s Utilitarianism (1992 [1861]). If institutions of justice are to be given a general justification, Mill argues, this justification must find its ultimate grounding in utility to society; for what else could explain why justice is valued at all, other than the fact that it serves and protects our interests? But since a justice system will only succeed in this role if it is governed by common principles of justice – principles including, for instance, that only the guilty should be punished, and that the punishment ought to be proportional to the crime – it follows that such principles are not opposed to consequentialism at all. Rather, at the deepest justificatory level, consequentialism and the demands of justice coincide. (See also Neilsen 1972)