Let us look a bit more closely at the posited initial agenda-setting stage of the Canberra programme. Upon closer examination, it is not clear that this makes any essential appeal to analytic knowledge.  Defenders of the Canberra plan characteristically explain their strategy in terms of “Ramsey sentences” (e.g., Jackson 1998: 140). Suppose \(T(F)\) is the set of relevant everyday assumptions involving some philosophically interesting concept. For example, F may be the concept belief, and the assumptions in T may include “characteristically caused by perceptions”, “combines with desires to generate actions”, and “has causally significant internal structure”. Then the Ramsey sentence corresponding to \(T(F)\) is “\(\exists!\Phi (T(\Phi))\)”.[12]  For the concept belief, this would say: there is some unique kind that is characteristically caused by perceptions, combines with desires to generate actions, and has causally significant internal structure.