 Fred D’Agostino (1996) argues that the PJP admits many variants. (We characterize the variants through values in the PJP.) We have reasons to favor a range of interpretations of the PJP. For example, public justification appeals to idealization. But we have grounds to idealize radically, moderately, or not at all. (Macedo 1990 makes these points.) Unfortunately, the case for idealizing, but not idealizing too much, is complicated and involves conflicting desiderata. True, conflicting desiderata are common in any theoretical domain. Still, D’Agostino worries that conceptions of public justification arise from incompatible motivations, and theorists lack conceptual resources to weigh these considerations against one another. In his final book, Gaus (2021) argues that even his earlier evolutionary model of public reason (Gaus 2011) would not lead to convergence on rules in many cases; but with diverse agents in a free and interactive model of rule choice can converge on rules more often.