 This makes who is disabled a social construction—dependent on the attitudes and commitments of a particular, self-identified group of people in contemporary society, the “disability rights movement”, composed of self-identified disabled and nondisabled members. It thus raises the concern that a disability movement might seek justice for the wrong people. Couldn’t some of those people complain that they should be included in the aims of that movement, precisely, because they are disabled? Barnes responds in two ways. The first is to note that she appeals to the rules for judgment-making, rather than judgments themselves; some people might not actually be included in the disability rights movement—say, because of internal prejudices on the part of those within the movement—but if this is inconsistent with the reasons for including others, then the excluded people will count as disabled too, on Barnes’ account. Still one might ask, what if the rules themselves were bad rules, wrongly but consistently excluding some people form the ambit of the struggle against ableism? Barnes, in response to this, rigidifies, insisting that we judge disability relative to the rules of the actual disability movement, even when we are imagining situations where that movement should use different rules than it actually does.