  Nevertheless, we might make the “utopianism” charge stick by showing  that the Republic is wrong about human nature. This version  of the criticism is sometimes advanced in very sweeping terms:  Plato’s psychology is “too optimistic” about human beings because it  underplays self-interest, say. In these general terms, the criticism  is false. Socrates builds his theory on acute awareness of how  dangerous and selfish appetitive attitudes are, and indeed of how  self-centered the pursuit of wisdom is, as well. In fact, it might be  easier to argue in sweeping terms that the Republic’s ideal  city is too pessimistic about what most people are capable of, since  it consigns most human beings to lives as slaves (433c–d, cf.  469b–471c) or as citizens who are slavishly dependent upon others’  ruling (590c–d). Still, more specific criticisms of Plato’s  psychology may well be tenable, and these might even show that the  Republic is too optimistic about the possibility of its  ideal city.