 Concerning the first issue the non-identity-problem can be relevant: how can individuals today have a just claim to compensation owing to what was done to others in the past when the (potential) claimants may not exist today had past people not suffered these harms (Morris 1984; Kumar &amp; Silver 2004; Kershnar 2004: 70–75; Meyer 2004b and 2013)? For  example,[16]  do African Americans, whose ancestors were subjected to the terrible injustices of being kidnapped in Africa and subsequently enslaved, have a just claim to compensation? (See, e.g., Bedau 1972; Boxill 1984 [1992]; Brooks 1999: parts 6 and 7; Soyinka 1999: 44–69; Fullinwider 2000; Lyons 2004b; Miller &amp; Kumar [eds] 2007) Let us set aside a host of specifically legal questions concerning, for example, the statute of limitations and liability. Let us also assume that it is sometimes possible to identify with certainty direct descendants of enslaved people. Consider the case of Robert, who has been identified as one such person (see Fishkin 1991: 91–93). People can claim compensation for harms they suffered. As a descendant of enslaved people, has Robert been harmed owing to the injustices suffered by his ancestors?