 Earlier we noted how Lopes challenges the hedonist on her own terms, objecting that she cannot adequately explain why we seek out objects of aesthetic value, given that aesthetic pleasure is at least sometimes an essential by-product of our seeking after something else (2018, 84–86). Lopes’s deeper challenge, however, targets the hedonist’s very terms. Aesthetic considerations rationalize a very great variety of aesthetic acts, according to Lopes: appreciating objects of aesthetic value is one such act, but so too is hanging a poster one way rather than another, selecting this book rather than that one for a book club, building out a garden this way rather than that, conserving one video game rather than another, pairing this dish with this wine rather than that one, and so on ad infinitum (2018, 32–36). If a theory of aesthetic value is to accommodate such a vast range of aesthetic acts, without singling out any one as more central than the others, it will have to conceive of aesthetic normativity as a species of some very general kind of normativity. Lopes, accordingly, conceives of aesthetic normativity as a species of the most generic form of practical normativity; that aesthetic acts ought to be performed well follows from the premise that all acts ought to be performed well for the simple reason that they are acts (2018, 135–137). As Lopes puts it: “Aesthetic values inherit their practical normativity from a basic condition of all agency—agents must use what they have to perform successfully” (2018, 135). Just which competencies an aesthetic agent may call upon to perform successfully on any given occasion depends on the particular role they happen to be playing in the particular social practice in which they happen to be performing (2018, 135). It is from the fact that all aesthetic activity necessarily takes place within the domain of some particular social practice that the network theory of aesthetic value takes its name (2018, 119).