 The viability of this theory rests on a particular metaphysics of personhood. One might think, contra Markosian and Mooney, that the woman in the story is one being, the mummy is a second being (even though composed of many or all of the same parts), and the man who follows is a third being. Similarly, one may wonder whether numerically distinct Persons can each be numerically the same as one god. The theory implies the falsity of the principle that for any x and y, if they are different Fs, then x is an F, y is an F, and x≠y. One might also question the theory’s way of dealing with apparent differences between the (numerically identical) Persons; any differences of the form the “the Father is F but the Son is not F” get analyzed as meaning “the Father is the same Person as someone who is F and the Son is not the same Person as someone who is F”. Does the original claim really mean what the analysis says?