 The necessity of consent is often taken for granted by philosophers. But this can be questioned. For instance, viewing sexual activity and pleasure as casual might render consent unnecessary in some cases (Benatar 2002). On the “casual view” of sexual pleasure, sexual pleasure is like other pleasures and may be enjoyed like them, subject to the usual moral constraints. If so, liberals are correct to defend promiscuity and casual sex as morally permissible, but might be unable to explain the wrongness of pedophilia or the special wrongness of rape, because if sexual pleasure is casual it would be difficult to see why pedophilia is wrong, and why the wrongness of rape is as bad as we think it is; perhaps it would be as bad as forcing “somebody to eat something” (Benatar 2002: 196). Arguing that children cannot consent to sex, so pedophilia is wrong, assumes that sexual pleasure is serious, otherwise children’s consent would not be necessary. Indeed, a parent might want to instill in their child the ability to be sexually experienced, so might coerce the child into sex on occasion, much like parents coerce their children into activities deemed good for them (Benatar 2002: 195–196). Thus, consent might not always be necessary. Briefly put, if sexual activity is trivial, sexual consent would not be important (or as important as we think).