 Schwitzgebel (2012) elevates this pluralism into a kind of negative account of introspection. Introspective judgments, he says, arise from a shifting confluence of many processes, recruited opportunistically, none of which can be called introspection proper. Just as there is no single, unified faculty of poster-taking-in that one employs when trying to take in a poster at a psychological conference or science fair, there is, on Schwitzgebel’s view, no single, unified faculty of introspection or one underlying core process, nor even a few dedicated mechanisms or processes. Instead, the introspector, like the poster-viewer, brings to bear a diverse range of cognitive resources as suits the occasion. Although, he says, a process wouldn’t be worth calling “introspective” unless the introspector aimed to reach a judgment about their current or very recently past conscious experience, using at least some resources specific to the first-person case and that exhibit some relatively direct sensitivity to the target state, this limitation does not imply the existence of any dedicated introspective processes. Defenders of less extreme versions of pluralism that are compatible with the existence of several dedicated introspective processes include Prinz (2004), Hill (2009), Coliva (2016), and Samoilova (2016).