 In the first chapter of his treatise on logic (De logica, chap. 1, pp. 2–7) Wyclif maintains that: (1) a categorematic term is a dictio to which a mental concept, sign of a thing, corresponds in the soul. (2) Categorematic terms are divided into common (namely, general expressions), like ‘man’ and ‘dog’, and discrete (namely, singular referring expressions), such as personal and demonstrative pronouns and proper names. (3) Common terms originally and primarily signify common natures — for instance, the term ‘man’ originally and primarily signifies the human nature. (4) Categorematic terms can be divided into substantial terms, such as ‘man’, and accidental terms, such as ‘white’. A substantial term signifies a common nature proper to a set of individuals (of which the term is the name) without connoting any accidental property; while an accidental term signifies (but we would rather say: ‘referes to’) a common essence, proper to a set of individuals, and also (we would add: connotes) an accidental property, that is, a property which is not constitutive of the essence referred to. (5) Categorematic common terms can be divided also into abstract and concrete. According to Wyclif, a concrete term, like ‘man’, is a term which signifies a thing that can have both simple and personal supposition at once. On the contrary, an abstract term is a term which signifies only a common nature without connoting anything else, like ‘humanity’ and ‘whiteness’. It is worth noticing that in defining concrete terms Wyclif a) plainly attributes the capacity for suppositing to things; b) does not clarify the metaphysical composition of such things signified by concrete terms; and c) describes the twofold supposition of concrete terms as a sort of signification. (6) Finally, categorematic terms can be divided into terms of first and second intention. A term of first intention is a sign which signifies without connoting the properties of being-individual or being-universal which characterize categorial items. For example, ‘God’ and ‘man’ are terms of first intention. On the contrary, a term of second intention is a term which connotes such properties and refers to a common nature without naming it. ‘Universal’ and ‘primary substance’ are terms of second intention.