 All of these points connect in turn to a basic, underlying question of how just are the society’s background economic structures. If society’s economic structures are just in other respects, then it may seem reasonable to expect each citizen who is able to work to do so. In a context of otherwise just social arrangements, then this seems part and parcel of fair social cooperation. But what if the background structures of the economy are actually unjust in other respects? For example, perhaps society’s educational institutions fail to secure sufficient equality of opportunity, unfairly leaving some citizens with limited job opportunities. Or perhaps the reward structure is unequal to an unfair extent, leaving some workers with unfairly low pay for the work they do. In this context, it can be argued that the underlying obligation to work, as an expression of fairness in social cooperation, does not in fact hold for those citizens who suffer unfair disadvantage. This point is made by Tommie Shelby in his discussion of the obligations of the Black ghetto poor in the USA: