 For instance, the raising of interest rates is typically thought by economists to have the dual effects of suppressing inflation and suppressing employment. To get to a recommendation that the Central Bank should reduce interest rates involves not only empirical views about the relative sizes of the inflation and unemployment effects and their long-term impact on growth, etc. but also normative views about the relative moral importance of inflation, employment and growth. For economists, these normative views on economic policies come under the rubric of ‘normative’ economics, while philosophers would typically categorize them under ‘distributive justice’. But the rubrics are not important as basically the same area is covered under different names—the normative evaluation of economic policies, structures, or institutions. (To avoid confusion it should be noted that the distributive justice tradition includes principles which do not use ‘justice’ per se, such as utilitarianism, but which are moral principles relating to distribution just the same.) The evaluations often look different because economists most commonly use utility as their fundamental moral concept while philosophers use a wider variety of moral concepts, but the task in which they are both engaged is very similar. What is most important to understand here is that positive economics alone cannot, without the guidance of normative principles, recommend which policies, structures, or institutions to pursue. Distributive justice theories, such as those discussed in this entry, aim to supply this kind of normative guidance. 