 Langton and Lewis 2001 have responded to this objection by claiming that being such that there is a cube is less natural than both being a cube and being accompanied by a cube, since (I) being such that there is a cube can be expressed as the disjunction ‘being either a cube or accompanied by a cube’, (II) disjoining unrelated properties always reduces naturalness, and (III) being a cube and being accompanied by a cube are unrelated properties. As Marshall 2012 fn. 35 points out, however, this response is far from convincing. First, it is not clear why (II) is meant to be true given Lewis’s favoured conception of naturalness above, or what other notion of naturalness it might be true of. Second, even granting (II) is true, it is not clear what it is for two properties to be unrelated in the sense that is at issue in (II). As a result, it is not clear why being a cube and being accompanied by a cube are meant to be unrelated.