 This theory successfully justifies the exercise of jurisdictional authority—indeed, the argument that we are subject to authority because it is required by justice is probably the most compelling justification of state power on offer. However, there are difficulties for this theory in explaining and justifying why that authority is held over particular areas of the earth. It is a short step from this type of argument to appeal to a principle of proximity to mark out a domain in which people are unavoidably interacting with one another, and then explain why people who are proximate must be under the same authority, because likely to fall into disputes (Waldron 2009). However, since there are many possible domains of possible interaction, the argument does not tell us which territorial unit we should join in cases where we stand midway between one group of proximate people who are in the process of creating state A, and a second group who are creating state B; and some members of our group seek to create state C (Miller 2011). It’s clear that we should join a political community, so that we are not in a lawless condition, and indeed it appears that all the contenders might be justified in compelling us to join their political community, but it is indeterminate about which political community ought to exercise rightful authority over us. Kant’s argument avoids discussing this dilemma only by appealing to considerations which fall outside of the Kantian theory itself: he points out that people tend, as an empirical fact, to be naturally grouped along linguistic or religious lines, and that membership in these cultural groups helps to define particular jurisdictional domains (Kant PP: I, first supp., para. 2). This empirical assumption helps Kant to escape what might appear to be the cosmopolitan logic of his account: without appeal to that purely contingent fact of people’s preference to associate politically with others who are religiously or culturally similar, it seems that the logic of his account is universal. Although Kant himself offered various reasons for opposing a world state (Kant MM: II; 53–61) it is not clear that these reasons are consistent with the logic of his theory. 