 Another line of response to the challenge focuses on the details in the patterns of variation, arguing that the revealed diversity is often superficial or philosophically toothless (Sosa 2009), or that disagreement suggested by the presence of conflicting intuitions would usually disappear if the individuals from different cultures could discuss cases or provide justifications for their intuitions (Deutsch 2010). Debates about one such response, which has become known as the expertise defense, consider in detail the possibility that some instances of variation are innocuous. Some people’s intuitions, specifically those people with special expertise or training, are more sensitive to philosophical issues. Thus, not only should differences between lay people and experts to be expected, but, continues the argument, the intuitions of the experts deserve more evidential weight in philosophizing (Devitt 2011; Williamson 2011; also see Horvath &amp; Koch 2021). This defense, claim its critics, relies on what appear to be questionable empirical assumptions about experts and their intuitions (Weinberg, Gonnerman, et al. 2010; Schwitzgebel &amp; Cushman 2015; Wiegmann, Horvath, &amp; Meyer 2020; Horvath &amp; Wiegmann forthcoming). One response that is particularly intriguing for those interested in cognition and cultural variation is that the intuitions of experts—trained philosophers—seem to vary quite dramatically according to their linguistic background (Vaesen, Peterson, &amp; Van Bezooijen 2013). These debates continue. No one, however, has argued against the idea that reflection on cultural diversity in worldviews, values, conceptualizations, cognition, or intuition can be philosophically valuable in ways that go far beyond their relevance to debates about methodology.