 It is a common complaint against emotivism that it precludes the possibility of moral arguments that are valid in a non-trivial sense. An argument is formally valid if and only if, no matter how the non-logical vocabulary is interpreted, the premises cannot be true and the conclusion false. But if the premises of a moral argument are not truth-apt—if they are semantically incapable of truth or falsity—then all moral arguments, no matter how obviously “illogical” they may appear, will be trivially valid, since the premises cannot be true! We can avoid this absurdity by making explicit what the standard definition of validity presupposes—that an argument cannot be a candidate for validity unless the premises and the conclusions are both truth-apt. But if we do that, moral arguments cease to be candidates for validity, no matter how logically impeccable they may appear to be. Stevenson (1944: 154–159) accepts this conclusion as a consequence of his theory, but to the rest of us it seems a very large dead rat to swallow.