 In the last paragraph of (1950a), Church briefly states two arguments that he obviously views as cementing the falsehood of Carnap’s analysis, even if English is taken to be the language with such and such fixed semantical rules. He first observes that if Carnap’s proposal is discussed in German rather than English, then it will not be synonymous with the English version! The one version involves an English sentence while the other a German sentence. Church’s assumption appears to be that a correct analysis of (2) should be language independent. Next, he observes that even if (3) logically entails (2), a person might not see the entailment, and so not draw the inference, leading her to believe (3) and yet not believe (2). Is Church’s assumption here that if (3) were a correct analysis of (2), then understanding and believing it should entail understanding and believing (2)? If so, this would conflict with Church’s own way of dealing with the Paradox of Analysis. Moreover, there is arguably an outright inconsistency between Church’s solution to this paradox and his solution to the Mates puzzle, which we discuss in  supplement C.  Church’s criticism of Carnap’s notion of synonymy is discussed in  supplement E.