 Recent representational approaches sometimes especially emphasize the normative dimension of belief. That is, they emphasize the idea that it is central to a mental state’s being a belief as opposed to some other mental state (e.g., a supposition, an imagining, a desire) that it is necessarily defective in a certain way if it is false. Shah and Velleman (2005) argue that conceiving of an attitude as a belief that P entails conceiving of it as governed by a norm of truth, that is, as an attitude that is correct if and only if P is true. Engel (2018) argues that among propositional attitudes, belief is the only one whose “correctness condition” is truth, distinguishing it from other closely related mental states, such as acceptances and epistemic feelings. Burge (2010) argues that the “primary constitutive function” of believing is the production of veridical propositional representations. A related literature addresses whether belief is essentially subject to a norm of truth (Wedgwood 2002; McHugh and Whiting 2010; Gluer and Wikforss 2013).