 An early version of this view is developed by Freedman (1963) in statistics; see Wasserman (1998: sec. 1–3) for a minimally technical overview. The self-corrective property concerns the long run, so it invites the standard, Keynesian worry that the long run might be too long. For replies, see Diaconis &amp; Freedman (1986b: pp. 63–64) and Kelly (2000: sec. 7). A related worry is that a long-run norm puts no constraint on what matters, namely, our doxastic states in the short run (Carnap 1945). A possible reply is that the self-corrective property is only a minimum qualification of permissible priors and can be conjoined with other norms for credences to generate a significant constraint on priors. To substantiate that reply, it has been argued that such a constraint on priors is actually stronger than what the rival Bayesians have to offer in some important cases of statistical inference (Diaconis &amp; Freedman 1986a) and enumerative induction (Lin forthcoming).