 The target of epistemological evaluations in classical India is not belief but rather cognition, which, however, like belief in the West, is viewed as propositional. Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas, and others address the issue of how a proposition-laden cognition is known to be true, or false, for that matter. Against Mīmāṃsakas in particular, Gaṅgeśa advances an “extrinsicality” position. Although presumptive presentations of “fresh news” through any of the sources—perception and the others—are naturally and automatically taken to be veridical, according to Gaṅgeśa’s Nyāya, it takes a separate cognitive act to determine whether a cognition is knowledge or “non-knowledge.” An awareness, an “experience” (anubhava, a term used technically in the system), defined as what a person takes to be presentation of news—i.e., takes automatically to be new information—is presumptively knowledge but on occasion is either false or not produced by a genuine knowledge source, perception, inference, or testimony (analogy is, for Gaṅgeśa, restricted to learning the meaning of words). According to Mīmāṃsā, certification is intrinsic to the apparent presentation. Gaṅgeśa’s refutation centers on an alleged phenomenology of doubt and knowing that one knows. If the Mīmāṃsaka position were correct, it would not be possible to doubt the veridicality of, for example, a perception that is indeed an instance of knowledge, both veridical and produced in the right way. But it is possible, he says.