 One choice point is where to locate potential variation in degrees. One option would be in the contents of the experiences, another would be in the mental relation we bear to contents or to the world in having an experience (variation in principle could be located in the vehicles of experiences as well or somewhere else). A further choice point is about how to understand variations in degrees of experiences. A tempting option is to piggyback on probabilistic theorizing about credences or degrees of belief (but bear in mind that in principle experiences could be degreed without being degreed in a probabilistic way). The idea here is to cash out the idea that experiences are degreed in a similar way to how philosophers cash out the idea that credences are degreed (without necessarily saying that experiences simply are credences). So just as you might have a higher credence that the 4-sided die will land 4 than the 6-sided die might land 4, perhaps you also have a higher visual credence that there is a snowman out there when the fog is lighter, as opposed to when the fog is heavier. Now, how to understand credences themselves is open to dispute, where again dimensions of variation might be located in differing mental relations to the content that the die will land 4, or potentially instead in different contents concerning 1/6 probabilities as opposed to 1/6 probabilities. Also, even if credences are themselves best understood in probabilistic terms, that is not yet to say that credences are best understood specifically in Bayesian terms. So degreed views of experience aren’t forced to commit specifically to Bayesian views of perception (for more on probabilistic views of perception, often focusing more on the processes leading to perception rather than what is generated by those processes, see Hohwy 2013, Rescorla 2015, Siegel 2020, or Vance 2021). Understanding degreed experiences along the lines of credences opens a wide menu of options. 