 Later work (including Frege’s own) revealed the inadequacy of this picture, revealed that some indexicality, for instance, is ‘essential’ in John Perry’s phrase, to the thought expressed. I can utter ‘it’s hot now’ truly without knowing where, when or even who (if sufficiently disoriented or out my head) I am. Those who are not utterly sceptical, as radical contextualists are, of systematic theories of meaning, will amend Frege’s view to a tripartite one. A sentence’s truth value, in a particular context, is determined by its informational content, by contextual circumstances related to, ‘fitted to’, the utterance by aspects of the speakers’ practice, and finally by the mind and language-independent world. The contextual circumstances need not figure in the sense or informational content of the utterance; thus a specification of them may include dates and locations, though this is not part of the sense of ‘it’s hot now’ (compare Kaplan’s character versus content distinction, especially the second sense of ‘content’ discussed in his 1989 (fn 28: 503)). 