 Notice that in both cases these are relationships or patterns of the sort that traditional accounts of explanation attempt to capture. As these examples bring out, there is no necessary incompatibility between the project of trying to formulate an account of explanation that satisfies traditional goals and an interest in the psychology of explanation. It may be that subjects find certain sorts of information explanatory or understanding-producing because certain structural features of the sort that traditional accounts attempt to characterize are present in that information—indeed this is what the Lombrozo and Lien and Cheng papers suggest. Thus, we should distinguish the project of investigating the empirical psychology of explanation (which can be pursued with a variety of different commitments about how to best theorize about explanation) from the more specific claim that the characterization of what it is for an explanatory relationship to hold between explanans and explanandum must be given in “psychologistic” terms, in the sense that this requires irreducible reference to psychological facts about particular audiences such as the vagaries of what they happen to be interested in. 