  It will prove most perspicuous to hold two related but distinct claims as constitutive of fitting attitude accounts. First, FA theories reduce values to a fundamentally different sort of normative notion, involving what one ought, or has reason, to feel. The first tenet of the view, then, is the reduction of the evaluative to the deontic, or normative reduction for short. This is to say that values such as the good and the funny are to be understood in terms of what one ought, or has most reason, to feel. This point is explicitly noted by Chisholm (1986: 53): “This way of defining intrinsic value, then, makes use of the concept of requirement,” in order to provide “a way of reducing the concepts of the theory of value (‘axiology’) to those of ethics (‘deontology’).” It is important not to understand ‘deontic’ to refer specifically to moral obligation. As Ewing (1948: 132) observes, when we speak loosely of what we ought to feel, this “‘ought’ really covers two different concepts, the concept of fittingness and the concept of moral obligation.” It is the former notion with which FA analysis is primarily concerned. I will follow the recent trend of explicating fittingness in terms of what we have reason to feel rather than what we ought to feel. But the crucial point is that fittingness, the fundamental normative notion of FA theory, is distinct from other forms of endorsement of an attitude, for instance as prudent or morally obligatory. This is no minor point since—as we shall see in discussing the wrong kind of reason problem—the theory is doomed to failure unless it can draw this distinction (D'Arms and Jacobson 2000b).