 Space limitations preclude detailed examination of other debates about practical reasons. We shall close the entry with a brief description of a relatively new debate about reasons for action that derives from work in the social sciences. The debate relates to work in experimental psychology (some of it dating from the 1970s, e.g., Nisbett and Wilson 1977) that claims to identify our “real reasons” for acting. Briefly, experiments have shown that factors such as the way items are presented in a situation of choice influence people’s choices without their being aware of this influence. For example, in some of these experiments, when faced with a choice among what in fact are identical options, agents tend to choose the item on the right. This appears to be in fact the result of a right-hand bias in most humans. However, since people are not aware of this bias, when asked to justify their choice, agents cite reasons concerning some alleged superior feature of their chosen option. These and other phenomena, such as implicit bias (which occurs when agents display bias based on race, gender, etc. in their behaviour, while explicitly denying that they endorse such bias) and others, seem to show that agents are motivated by reasons they are not aware of, and in ways that they are not aware of, even after careful reflection on their reasons and motivations. The general claim, then, is that these phenomena undermine many of our ordinary and philosophical assumptions about our reasons for acting, for they show, it is said, that agents are often ignorant of their real reasons for acting, and as a result they often “confabulate” when explaining and attempting to justify their behaviour (see Hirstein 2009). These conclusions, if right, would appear to threaten fundamentally the authority we seem to enjoy about our own reasons for acting, as well as the explanatory power of the ordinary explanations of action that cite the agent’s reasons for acting.