 At the same time he is also open about the fact that the formal apparatus developed in the syllogistic is not exclusively analyzed for the sake of studying its properties as a logical system. In fact, on multiple occasions Avicenna tells us that the various tools developed for instance in the Qiyās are used in the sciences, or offers remarks on theoretical questions by specifying the default interpretation in the context of scientific reasoning. This is the case (just to mention a few significant examples) in the discussion of reductio ad absurdum and conditionals with impossible antecedents and consequents (Qiyās V.4–5); in his account of descriptional necessity as the canonical reading of necessity propositions (Burhān II.1, Qiyās II.2, Nağāt 123); in the acknowledgment that premises and conclusions of scientific syllogisms may be categorical as well as hypothetical propositions (Qiyās V.1, Burhān II.6); when he contends that certain hypothetical syllogisms are less used in the sciences (Nağāt 82); when he draws connections between the two areas (Qiyās VI.5, Burhān I.7: induction and qiyās muqassam; Burhān IV.1: if-question and conditional reasoning); or in maintaining the conditional character of certain principles in the particular sciences (Burhān II.7) (Strobino 2017).