 D. Black realizes that al-Fārābī’s first three conditions for certainty seem to evoke the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge as “justified true belief”, an essential and debated notion in contemporary epistemology. However, as D. Black herself notices, in al-Fārābī the justification condition, that is, ‘having good reasons or sufficient evidence to believe something,’ is replaced by the knowledge condition and, in this sense, knowledge itself becomes a necessary ingredient within certainty, and therefore is insufficient for raising a belief to the status of absolute certainty. For this reason, certainty for al-Fārābī requires two conditions from the knower: (1) to know that a proposition x is true, and (2) to know that she knows. This is very close, as D. Black notices, to what contemporary epistemology calls “second order-knowledge” (Black 2006: 19–21). 