  Truth adds nothing substantive to the content of beliefs, according to Ramsey. He claims that the meaning of truth is ‘perfectly obvious, that anyone can see what it is and that difficulty only arises when we try to say what it is, because it is something which ordinary language is rather ill-adapted to express’ (1929c, 9). Because of this, Ramsey’s view is generally interpreted as a redundancy theory of truth (Sahlin 1990, 56–59; Dokic and Engel 2002, 18; Hookway 2005, 56–58), a kind of minimalism or deflationism about truth similar to the views put forward by Aristotle and Frege (cf. Sahlin 1990,  56), and later on by Tarski, Wittgenstein, Quine (cf. Hookway 2005, 57), Field and Horwich (cf. Koslow 2005, 106).