 Most philosophers find this view extremely hard to believe. Indeed, a lot of philosophers would say that it is simply confused, or incoherent. But, in fact, thin-truth-ism is not incoherent. A better way to formulate the problem with the view is as follows: in giving up on the standard criterion of ontological commitment, thin-truth-ists seem to be using ‘true’ in a non-standard way. Most of us would say that if there is no such thing as the number 3, and if ‘3 is prime’ is read at face value (i.e., as being about the number 3), then it follows trivially that ‘3 is prime’ could not be true. Or more generally, most of us would say that if there is no such thing as the object a, then sentences of the form ‘a is F’ cannot be literally true. This, of course, is just to say that most of us accept the standard criterion of ontological commitment discussed above, but the point here is that this criterion seems to be built into the standard meaning of words like ‘true’. Indeed, this explains why the standard criterion of ontological commitment is so widely accepted.