  The philosophical movement of social epistemology supports this perspective. It understands knowledge to be primarily a social achievement (see entry for Social Epistemology). Moral knowledge may be still more deeply social than is generally recognized, even among those who grant that justifying moral beliefs involves a social process of interactive reasoning within a cognitively diverse group. When moral consistency reasoning is part of the social justification process, the reasoning entails efforts to eliminate emotional inconsistencies in thinking (Campbell and Kumar 2012). In that case moral knowledge, if it were achieved, would be embodied not only in the beliefs of those seeking knowledge, but also in their motivations and feelings. Indeed, given the cognitive basis of moral emotions, it is possible for a society to know through their feelings of guilt that they have done morally wrong even when they believe otherwise for ideological reasons, parallel to the case of the women who cannot shake her feelings of resentment for being unfairly passed over for promotion in favour of a male colleague when she believes her feelings cannot justified given the lesser social status of women (Campbell 2007).