 One easily recognizes Heyting’s effort to explain Ex Falso as much as possible along the same lines as other implications, namely, by providing a concrete construction that leads from the antecedent to the consequent. In its attempt to provide, “in a sense”, a construction, the explanation is clearly not of the same kind as Kolmogorov’s stipulation from 1932. But it does not fit into Heyting’s original interpretation of logic in terms of intentions directed at constructions and the fulfillment of such intentions either. For to fulfill an intention directed toward a particular construction we will have to exhibit that construction; we will have to exhibit a construction that transforms any proof of \(p\) into one of \(q\). But how can a construction that from the assumption \(p\) arrives at a contradiction, and therefore generally speaking not at \(q\), lead to \(q\)? It will not do to say that such a construction exists “in a sense”. A construction that is a construction “in a sense”, which Heyting helps himself to here, is no construction.