 However, matters are not quite so simple. To start, it is possible for those with no training in moral philosophy to have a solid handle on the moral dilemma with which they are dealing. And at the same time, some say, having a philosopher, one who is an expert in moral theory, as a clinical ethicist does not guarantee that the ethics consult will be of high quality. Knowledge of moral theory within the clinical ethics realm is not always clearly helpful, and its possible benefits are not without accompanying drawbacks. First, if used too strictly, and adhered to too inflexibly, moral theories can hamper moral imagination and intuition, and obscure access to the insights of, for example, common morality. Second, those in command of a wide range of moral theories might be tempted to draw upon the moral theory that actually justifies a course of action already preferred or even settled upon, rather than use what is deemed in advance to be the best moral theory to work through what is the justifiable course of action (or what are the best action options). Third, moral theories can mislead, by, for instance, being used to frame cases in ways that emphasize irrelevancies. And fourth, without quite advanced knowledge and skill, ethical theories may easily be misunderstood and used improperly. An example here would be taking Kantian moral theory to mandate no person ever being treated as a means (Magelssen, Pedersen, &amp; Førde 2016). The message here is that knowledge of moral theory can sometimes actually be an impediment to good clinical ethics.