 For Nozick, a paradigmatic natural moral right is the right not to be subjected to (unprovoked) killing. Correlative to this right is the moral side constraint to which all individuals are naturally subject not to engage in the (unprovoked) killing of others. As Nozick understands this right, it forbids A’s (unprovoked) killing of B even if A can prevent W from killing X, Y, and Z only by killing B. Although it may in some sense be less bad for B to be killed than for X, Y, and Z to be killed, A remains bound not to kill B. A may not prevent the wrong that W will do in killing X, Y, and Z by killing B. For Nozick, rights express the moral inviolability of individuals; and B would not be morally inviolable—nor would any of us be—were B open to use by A even for the purpose of preventing the violation of the rights of X, Y, and Z. Not even the minimization of the violation of the right against being killed can justify the violation of that right.