 With respect to the psychological sources of human behavioral plasticity and cultural diversity, Evolutionary Psychologists tend to construe human minds as “massively modular” (though the conception of a “module” involved in this kind of claim is typically more liberal than the one made famous by Fodor 1983; see Samuels 1998, 2000; Sperber 2001; Barrett &amp; Kurzban 2006; Carruthers 2006; Robbins 2009 [2017]). Human minds share a number of distinct, genetically inherited dispositions, each shaped by the selective pressures generated by the adaptive problem it evolved to handle. Each disposition can produce a circumscribed range of behaviors to deal with its associated adaptive challenge, but not all the behaviors made possible by those dispositions are manifested by every human or every group. Rather, patterns of behavior are shaped and constrained by the character of mental modules, but are also explained in part by appeal to external circumstances, with different environments acting to select or evoke different subsets of behaviors from the range already “contained in” and made available by these universally shared psychological dispositions (compare Plato Meno). Proponents point out that on this view, evoked behaviors can persist even as the environment that originally evoked them changes or disappears. For example, once a behavioral phenotype is initially expressed it can be effectively locked in by a process of developmental canalization (D. Wilson 2009; Witherington &amp; Lickliter 2016). Proponents also stress that the view does not imply that all behaviors and differences between groups are adaptive. For example, the claim that the comparatively higher incidence of teen pregnancies in lower income groups is an adaptive response evoked by conditions of poverty remains a matter of controversy and empirical investigation (Johns, Dickins, &amp; Clegg 2011).