 A competitor of the likelihood ratio as a measure of evidentiary strength is an even simpler notion, the probability \(\Pr(E \pmid H)\). It is tempting to think that, whenever \(\Pr(E \pmid H)\) is low, \(E\) should be strong evidence against \(H\). Consider an example by Triggs and Buckleton (2014). In a child abuse case, the prosecutor offers evidence that a couple’s child rocks (a movement pattern) and that only 3% of non-abused children rock, \(\Pr(\textsf{child rocks} \pmid \textsf{no abuse})=.03\). If it is unlikely that a non-abused child would rock, the fact that this child rocks might seem strong evidence of abuse. But this reading of the 3% figure is mistaken. It could well be that 3% of abused children rock, \(\Pr(\textsf{child rocks} \pmid \textsf{abuse})=.03\). If rocking is unlikely under either hypothesis—which means the likelihood ratio