  In introducing the views of the personalists, Vasubandhu draws a  distinction between the substantive and the conceptual view of the  self. Thus, if ‘person’ (pudgala) is taken to  designate a substantive entity that is separate from the bundle of  the five aggregates and unconditioned, then that cannot be the  Buddhist view (per contra that is the Brahmanical view of  the self). On the other hand, if the notion of ‘person’  designates a collection of aggregates, then it is admissible to talk  about persons being conventionally real (for detailed discussions of  Vasubandhu's critique of the personalist view see Duerlinger 1993,  2003). Drawing on some contemporary discussions in the philosophy of  mind, Siderits (2003: 89–96) makes a good case for taking the  Pudgalavādins as proposing something analogous to the notion  that persons non-reductively supervene on the aggregates.