In response, proponents of the standard theory (and of representational theories of mind) usually argue as follows. First, it is pointed out that the standard theory does not require that the agent considers the relevant mental contents in conscious deliberation or reasoning. This reduces the information-processing demands to a significant degree. Second, it is argued that the standard theory is compatible with explanations of habitual actions in terms of motor schemata (or motor intentions). Motor schemata are not represented in the contents of personal-level mental states, and they are usually recruited automatically in the service of personal-level goals and intentions. The utilization of motor schemata further reduces the required processing load. Third, it is pointed out that most instances of skilled coping do not occur in an intentional vacuum, as it were. They are, rather, usually constrained by and often integrated with the agent’s long-term goals and intentions. Given this, it seems that a full explanation of skilled coping must, at some point or level, make reference to representational mental states after all. (For more on this see Clark and Toribio 1994; Antony 2002; Rey 2002; Adams 2010; Clarke 2010b; Schlosser 2018.)