 These questions as to what holds structured propositions together and gives them their structure, and how/why proposition have truth conditions turns us to other recent work within the neo-Russellian approach. While adopting more or less the same view as Salmon and Soames on the semantic values of different kind of words (though claiming to be strictly neutral on the question of what the semantic values of names and predicates are), Jeffrey C. King [1995, 1996, 2007, 2009] develops a view as to what binds the constituents of propositions together and how/why propositions have truth conditions. He holds that propositions are not n-tuples and that a complex relation binds together the constituents of a proposition and provides the proposition with its  structure.[8]  Further, King is motivated by the idea that propositions cannot be the kinds of things that by their very natures and independently of minds and languages have truth conditions. Hence, a radical feature of King’s view is that we speakers of natural languages endow propositions with their truth conditions, as a result of which he calls his account a naturalized account of propositions.