 For some while now, aestheticians and philosophers of art have paid attention to thick aesthetic concepts such as garish, delicate, and balanced, in addition to thin(ner) concepts such as beautiful and ugly. Some of these discussions go back to the 1950s, predating the post-Williams debate in ethics, but concern some of the same issues even if they don’t use the label “thick” (Beardsley 1982 and Sibley 2001; see also Burton 1992 and Zangwill 1995). Also relevant is the recent attention to “dual character concepts” (section 1) in art (Liao et al. 2020). Discussions of thick aesthetic concepts often mirror discussions in ethics about whether thick terms are evaluative as a matter of truth-conditions or only pragmatically (recent examples includes Bonzon 2009, Zangwill 2013, and Stojanovic 2016). Of particular interest and potentially broader significance is the emerging exploration of whether also thin aesthetic terms might be plausibly treated as only pragmatically evaluative (Sundell 2016).