 R.G. Collingwood (1939) was an early advocate of taking questions seriously. In the decades since the publication of Collingwood’s autobiography the topic of questions has regularly received attention from linguists, logicians, and philosophers of language, but few have joined Collingwood (1939, 36–37) in suggesting that propositional logic be replaced by a logic of question and answer in which neither question nor proposition is more basic. Instead, most work on questions in the philosophy of language and in formal semantics fits squarely within a reductive paradigm inspired  by (if not perfectly reflective of) Frege in which propositions, declarative sentences, and assertion have primacy. The primacy of the assertoric is especially evident in the work of many who write on the semantics of what Belnap and Steel (1976) call elementary questions and who regard any such question as being identifiable with a set or function involving the propositions that are the question’s answers. Only relatively recently, an alternative to this reductive paradigm, taking up Collingwood’s suggestion to replace classical logic with a logic of questions and propositions in which neither question nor proposition is seen as more basic, has gained traction under the heading of inquisitive semantics (Ciardelli et al. 2018).