  Some of the objections raised against disjunctive theories are directed at the specific arguments proposed in support of different versions of disjunctivism. For discussion of objections to the arguments proposed by Hinton and McDowell, see sections 3.1, and 3.2; and for objections to arguments proposed by Martin see sections 3.3 and 3.4. For objections to disjunctivist accounts of hallucination, see section 5. Some arguments against certain versions of disjunctivism are directed against what are taken to be some of the metaphysical commitments of the naïve realist account of veridical perception. For example, Pautz (forthcoming) argues that naïve realism about veridical perception carries commitments about the metaphysical status of observable qualities, such as colour, that are undermined by empirical science. This section discusses arguments aimed at a more general level, against the disjunctivist’s denial that veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations are mental events of the same fundamental kind, and in favour of the view that there is common element to veridical perception, illusion and hallucination.