 Picciuto (2011) points out, however, that Kriegel’s form of self-representational theory still permits a mismatch between the first-order and higher-order components of the integrated state. For there seems to be nothing in the structure of the account to rule out the possibility of a first-order analog content green becoming integrated with the higher-order judgment I am experiencing yellow, for example. In order to avoid this difficulty, Picciuto (2011) proposes an alternative form of part-whole self-representational theory. (See also Coleman, 2015; Timpe, 2015.) He does so by appropriating, and deploying for a novel purpose, the idea of a quotational phenomenal concept, originally introduced by Papineau (2002) and Balog (2009) as part of their defense of physicalism against the arguments of Chalmers (1996) and others. Picciuto’s idea is that the relevant sort of complex self-representational state will consist of a first-order perceptual content combined with a higher-order concept like experience that embeds, or ‘quotes’ that very perceptual content. Given this structure, it will be impossible that there should be a mismatch between the two. For the higher-order component of the complex state is not a judgment about the experience component (which would permit them to be mismatched) but rather a concept that quotes the experience component.