 Consider next the related suggestion that spatio-temporal relations are internal relations between, variously, space-time points, regions or events (Simons 2010: 207–8, 2014: 312–4; Simons 2016: 2010: 207–8; Heil 2012: 147; Lowe 2016: 109–111). General relativity makes serious trouble for this suggestion. The thinking behind the suggestion is that it belongs to the essential natures of space-time points, etc., that they bear the catalogue of spatio-temporal relations they do. In philosophy of physics, the view is called “metrical essentialism”, the doctrine that points have their metrical properties and relations essentially (Maudlin 1988). From metrical essentialism it follows that the mere existence of a point, etc., already suffices to determine that it inhabits this network of spatio-temporal relations. Hence, it is argued, there is no need to admit spatio-temporal relations, or at least consider spatio-temporal relations as ontological additions to the furniture of the Universe. But, as well as the a priori concerns already aired, this argument for refusing to admit spatio-temporal relations as ontological additions is encumbered by the a posteriori difficulties of the metrical essentialism it presupposes.