 Many have resisted the extreme position defended by Godwin, Singer, etc. If nothing else, such positions are quite clearly incompatible with the apparent existence of morally admirable partiality. (Williams (1981) holds that even to consider sacrificing one’s wife for the sake of impersonal justice constitutes a kind of moral error in its own right.) Moreover, despite the fact that the ultimate evaluation is made on the grounds of perfectly general properties, it is not entirely clear that the objects of the evaluation really are being treated as equals, in the relevant sense – the fact that the chambermaid’s life is to be sacrificed for the overall good at least suggests that her standing as a moral being is not really being taken into account, and that the suggested understanding of moral impartiality is therefore deficient. Deontological prohibitions on using people as mere means to an end may be seen as expressing a commitment to a kind of impartiality in which everyone is seen to be equally in possession of a kind of worth that grounds inviolable rights against certain forms of treatment. Such prohibitions are compatible with what Kant referred to as imperfect duties to provide benefits to others, though they place limits on what may be done while fulfilling those duties.