 Van Inwagen’s main focus is on authoritative texts like the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed. But we noted earlier a second sort of reason for adopting a view on which any necessarily existing abstract objects depend on God. That second sort of reason is perfect-being theology. Again, the line of reasoning is that a being who is such that necessarily existing abstracta depend on it is greater than a being on whom they don’t depend. And God is the greatest possible being. It is clear what van Inwagen would say at this point: It’s not possible for necessarily existing abstract objects to depend on anything. Thus, being an x such that necessarily existing abstracta depend on x is not a great-making property. That this isn’t a great-making property is the sort of thing the theistic Platonist needs to say to the perfect-being defender of divine grounding of necessarily existing abstracta. It must be that these things can’t depend on God or anyone else. (One may or may not adopt Inwagen’s particular argument that they can’t.)