 A second and perhaps better response would be to reject (4) in one of the ways canvassed by W. M. Grant (2012). Here are two ways that appear promising. On what Grant calls the Belief Model, God’s knowledge is a species of true belief, but God’s beliefs are not intrinsic states of God. They are not mental acts or episodes. Beliefs are relational. To have a belief is to be related to a proposition, where propositions are not contents of belief states, but abstract entities that exist independently of the subjects who believe them. For God to believe that Oswald killed Kennedy is for God to stand in a relation to a proposition without it being the case that there is anything intrinsic to God that grounds his standing in the belief relation to the Oswald proposition as opposed to any other proposition. Believing, at least in the case of God, is an external relation, not an internal relation grounded in an intrinsic feature of the believer. Various objections can be brought against this Belief Model of divine cognition, but if they can be turned aside, then (4) falls and the pentad is solved.