 Some defenders of special obligations have tried to draw upon claims about personal identity to support their views (see especially David Brink). If defenders of what is known as psychological reductionism are right, then me now is co-personal with me later as a result of the psychological relationship existing between me now and me later. Me later bears many psychological connections (either direct or indirect) to me now, and those connections form a causal chain from me now to me later. But these connections can also exist in the interpersonal case, e.g., I can share traits with my friends and this sharing of traits may be due to the interaction between us. If the relation of ‘identity’ between me now and me later supports reasons of prudence, we might suppose that the similar relation in the interpersonal case supports reasons of special obligation. Of course, this account requires far more development. Why suppose that we do in fact have reasons of prudence? Why suppose that similarity of relation grounds similarity of reasons? These questions need to be answered before any appeal to the metaphysics of personal identity can be used to ground special obligations.