 What ought the women to do in the two cases? In case (1) the obvious answer is that the mother ought to undergo the treatment since her child will thereby get a better life. However, when we turn to case (2), it is problematic to appeal to the improved life of some child as the reason for taking action (i.e., postponing the pregnancy). If the woman postpones her pregnancy, then the child that is brought into existence will not be identical to the child she would have had, had she decided to become pregnant while she was ill (it will not be the same ovum and sperm that meet). Hence, the alternative for the child brought into existence during the mother’s illness is non-existence, and to claim that it would have been better for this child if the mother had postponed pregnancy is tantamount to claiming that the child’s non-existence would have been better for the child. Assuming that the child would have a life worth living, this seems wrong if not nonsensical. Indeed, in case (2), there are two hypothetical children and whether or not the mother postpones the pregnancy, neither child will have a “better life” as a result of the mother’s action. For both hypothetical children, the alternative is nonexistence. If the mother postpones her pregnancy while ill, the first child wouldn’t exist, and if she doesn’t postpone, the second child wouldn’t exist. (For a discussion, see Narveson 1967, Parfit 1984, appendix G; Adler 2012; Bykvist 2007c, 2015; Arrhenius &amp; Rabinowicz 2015, McMahan 1981, 2009, 2013; Rabinowicz 2009; Holtug 2010; Fleurbaey &amp; Voorhoeve 2015). 