 It should not then be surprising that one of the most sophisticated classical Indian treatises dealing with perception, Kumārila’s (c. 7th  century CE) Pratyakṣapariccheda (a portion of Ślokavārttika pertaining to the fourth sūtra of Mīmāṃsā-sūtra), discusses the nature and validity of perception without any consideration of its role in the ascertainment of religious and moral truth; in fact, the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra itself characterizes perception as not being a means of knowing righteousness (Dharma). It is true that epistemological debates in classical Indian philosophy arose in the religio-philosophical context; however, there is plenty of evidence on record to show that classical Indian philosophers were haunted by the very same epistemological concerns that have troubled the minds of Western philosophers through the ages. The controversial classical Indian epistemology issue—whether perception is conceptualized or not?—continues to be debated in the Western and Indian philosophy journals even today. That said, what makes this historical inquiry significant is that the epistemological issues in classical Indian philosophy are introduced against the backdrop of radically different metaphysical and ethical presuppositions.