Some sentences, it is natural to think, have neither singular nor plural truthmakers (see Lewis 2001). For example, a negative existential sentence such as ‘There are no unicorns’ is made true, it seems, not by what exists, but by what fails to exist: it is true for lack of any falsemakers. And whether a (contingent) predication such as ‘the ball is red” is made true by the ball in question will depend on how the notion of sufficiency is understood (see  Supplement to §3.3).  Truthmaker maximalists hold that every truth (or at least every contingent truth) has a truthmaker. Typically, truthmaker maximalists will introduce states of affairs or facts to serve as the required truthmakers: totality states of affairs can serve as truthmakers for negative existentials (see Armstrong 2004: 72–5); the state of affairs of the ball's being red, not the red ball itself, is the truthmaker for ‘the ball is red’ (see Armstrong 1997: 115–6).  There is a danger here that truthmaking could be trivialized: could any true sentence S be said to have the state of affairs that S as its truthmaker? Typically, truthmaker maximalists avoid such trivialization by holding to a sparse theory of states of affairs. For example, a disjunctive sentence ‘S or T’ is not made true by a disjunctive state of affairs: there are none. Rather, the truthmakers for S (if any) and the truthmakers for T (if any) are separately truthmakers for the disjunction ‘S or T’. In any case, truthmaker maximalism is not required for the truthmaker approach to ontological commitment. What matters, rather, is that the truthmakers and the ontological commitments of a theory are aligned.