 In the case of imprecise credences, it is much less straightforward to define the measures of accuracy. Indeed, there are a number of powerful results that seem to show that there can be no measures that satisfy some basic plausible conditions (Seidenfeld, Schervish, &amp; Kadane 2012, Schoenfield 2015, Mayo-Wilson &amp; Wheeler 2016). To see how these work, note that one of the central motivations for representing an agent’s credences using imprecise credences is that there are often situations in which our evidence seems to demand that our credences are not captured by a single precise credence function. When our evidence is complex, mixed, and ambiguous, we might well think only an imprecise credal state is an appropriate response. However, as these various results show, if your accuracy measure satisfies certain plausible conditions, then for any imprecise credal state, there is a precise one that is at least as accurate as the imprecise one at all worlds. But if that’s the case, Veritism says that it would be just as good to have the precise state as the imprecise one. But that goes against the requirements of our evidence. Jason Konek (2019, section 3) offers a response to these impossibility results on behalf of the epistemic utility theorist who wishes to use imprecise credences to represent agents. 