  Our divergent reactions to these three examples point to something  distinctive about the judgment that one course of action is better  than another. (Better overall, or better all things  considered, that is—not simply better in some respect.) Such  judgments appear to enjoy a special connection to the agent’s actions which other judgments do not possess. We are puzzled by Joseph’s  choice precisely because we expect people’s actions—at least  when freely undertaken—to reflect their overall assessment of  the merits of the alternative courses of action before them. We  expect their actions, in other words, to reflect that special  judgment. And Joseph’s—at least as reported  above—doesn’t. When judgment and action are said to have  diverged in this way, we are often sceptical: we question whether the agent really held the course of action not taken to be better. And  even when we accept the description of the case, we find such action  somehow puzzling, defective, or dubiously intelligible, in a way that action contrary to one’s judgments of financial wisdom (for example)  is not. We can conclude that the particular judgment contrary to  which Joseph acts—the judgment that one course of action is  better than another—has what we can vaguely term a special  character, in comparison with other judgments such as that one course of action is healthier than another.