 For Ortega, framing the social world as a horizon connotes, as it did for Husserl, the context in which the experience of human interaction (among “I”, and “We” and “Other”) occurs. The various “I’s” constitute the fundamental units of the structure and content of the social world. “Husserl says very well”, Ortega recalled, “the meaning of the term man implies a reciprocal existence of one for the other, hence, a community of men, a society” (Obras, VII: 148). As we saw previously, in describing reality, Ortega postulated the distinction between things (i.e., plants, stones and animals) and man through the fact that things exist and man lives. By dint of the unique qualities of human existence, the individual possesses an essence that is peculiarly one’s own, which means that humans are not only split off from nature—plants, stones, minerals and the like. All individual human acts, for Ortega, are directed toward some object and, as such, the actions of the individual are manifested in accord with the nature of the objects toward which they are directed and in accord with their physical, spatial context. If the object is a stone, the individual’s actions would be unilateral; however, if the object is an animal, an individual discovers that his or her actions would be manifested toward an anticipated reaction by the animal to which they are directed: