 There have been a number of different responses to this problem. Some (e.g. Loewer 2002, 2007, Antony and Levine 1997, Burge 1997, Baker 1997) suggest that it arises from an overly restrictive account of causation, in which a cause must “generate” or “produce” its effect, a view which would count the macroscopic properties of other special sciences as causally irrelevant as well. Instead, some argue, causation should be regarded as a special sort of counterfactual dependence between states of certain types (Loewer 2002, 2007, Fodor 1990, Block 1997), or as a special sort of regularity that holds between them (Melnyk 2003). If this is correct, then functional role properties (along with the other macroscopic properties of the special sciences) could count as causally efficacious (but see Ney 2012 for dissent). However, the plausibility of these accounts of causation depends on their prospects for distinguishing bona-fide causal relations from those that are clearly epiphenomenal, and some have expressed skepticism about whether they can do the job, among them Crane 1995, Kim 2007, Jackson 1995, Ludwig 1998, and McLaughlin 2006, forthcoming. (On the other hand, see Lyons (2006) for an argument that if functional properties are causally inefficacious, this can be viewed as a  benefit  of the theory.)