 Scott Williams has constructed a similar theory, which he calls a “Latin Social” account. In common with Leftow’s “Latin” theory and Hasker’s “Social” theory (see sections  1.5,  2.4), Williams says that there is one “concrete instance or trope of the divine nature” which is a constituent of each Person. Each Person is also constituted by an incommunicable attribute, begetting (Father), being begotten (Son), and being spirated (Spirit) (Williams 2017, 324). He understands each Person to be “an incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature” (326). In his view any person is a person “ontologically and explanatorily prior to any cognitive acts of volitions that that person in question has or might have” (Williams 2017, 327; cf. 2013, 2019). And for him, the Persons are persons. Each Person is essentially numerically the same essence as the one divine essence, while being a numerically different Person from the other two Persons. Thus, the account involves irreducible relations of kind-relative numerical sameness. But the divine Persons are not (absolutely) numerically identical to one another, and each is not (absolutely) numerically identical to the divine essence. This divine essence is like an Aristotelian first substance in that it exists on its own (not in another) and in being a concrete particular, but unlike first substances it is communicable, in other words, it can be shared by non-identical things, the divine Persons (Williams 2017, 326). The term “God” can refer to any of the Persons, or to the divine essence. The term “Trinity” is a plural-referring term which refers to the plurality of the divine Persons (Williams 2013, 85). (See section  5.1.)