 The elaboration of a possible-worlds formal semantics that might be suitable for this purpose, however, requires differentiating between familiar minimal-change semantics, where the world remains the same except for specified changes, and a maximal-change semantics, in which everything can change except for specified properties, which is the ingredient that seems to be required to satisfy the constraints of scientific inquiries as opposed to conversational discourse (Fetzer &amp; Nute 1979, 1980). In the 1950s and 60s, however, Nelson Goodman (1955) and Karl Popper (1965) were attempting to sort out the linkage between dispositions, subjunctives, and laws from distinctive points of view. Hempel’s commitments to extensional logic and to Humean constraints would lead him to endorse an account of laws that was strongly influenced by Goodman and to embrace a pragmatic account that was both epistemically and contextually-dependent.