 Let us turn now to virtue reliabilist accounts of knowledge. How do virtue reliabilists propose to understand knowledge in terms of epistemic competences? There are a variety of slightly different proposals in the literature (J. Greco 2009, 2010; Sosa 2007, 2015; Turri 2011). However, virtue reliabilists typically understand knowledge as involving some sort of explanatory relation between having a true belief and the exercise of an epistemic competence. For instance, Sosa (2007) holds that S knows p if and only if S aptly believes p, where S’s belief is apt if and only if it is correct because of the exercise of an epistemic competence (see also J. Greco 2009, 2010 for a closely related account). More recently, Sosa (2010, 2015) defends a similar account couched in terms of “manifestation”: knowledge is belief whose correctness manifests the agent’s epistemic competence (see Turri 2011 for a similar account).