 In a trio of early articles, Foot argues against then prevailing views on the nature of moral judgments and sketches an alternative positive view. The views she argued against were known as emotivism and prescriptivism, both versions of noncognitivism. On these views, moral judgments feature a special attitudinal component, a pro or con attitude that is absent from straightforward descriptive claims. What the judgments are about is irrelevant to whether they count as moral judgments. In “Moral Arguments” (1958), Foot memorably presents these views as offering a “private enterprise theory of moral criteria”, which highlights the way in which these views take the individual’s attitude as settling the question of the scope of morality (1958 [VV 108]). In this line of argument, she demonstrates a commitment to a Wittgensteinian approach and takes up some of Wittgenstein’s views. The idea that terms must have public criteria and cannot be given arbitrary meaning by the individual speaker is among these commitments, along with the approach to investigating terms by way of a ‘grammatical investigation’. That is an attempt to ground our understanding of words in an examination of how we in fact use them when we are practically engaged, which often gets lost when doing philosophy.