 ‘On the So-Called Relative Truths’ (henceforth: Relative Truths) is a work of fundamental importance for the development of the idea of absolute truth in Poland. Scholars have deemed its impact to have reached as far as Tarski's work on truth (Wolenski &amp; Simons 1989). It certainly influenced the 1910–1913 discussion on future contingents which involved Kotarbiński, Leśniewski, and Łukasiewicz, which served later as metaphysical foundation for Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic (Woleński 1990). Twardowski's position is distinctive and interesting because it is a non-platonistic theory of absolute truth, though it is difficult to say exactly what place it occupies with respect to Leśniewski's nominalistic or to Tarski's platonistic approach (for these labels see Simons 2003: section 2.) One of the reasons why it was important for Twardowski to defend an anti-relativistic notion of truth was that relativism jeopardizes the possibility of constructing ethics as a science based on principles (on Twardowski's ethics, see Paczkowska-Łagowska 1977).  This aspect is important because Twardowski is usually characterized not as a builder of systems, but as championing ‘small philosophy.’ This is correct, in some sense, but it should not make one mistakenly think that there is no unity sought in Twardowski's thought, or that his works are separate small occasional contributions without overarching ideas in the background governing their development.