 But how are we to understand this “appearing” of an object “through” the doxic appearances? What, precisely, is the relation between the first-order and second-order “phenomena”? In the places where he explicitly mentions sensibility in the concrete, psychological sense (Natorp 1913b: 193), Natorp conceives it as never conveying or “giving” the mind an object, ready-made. Rather, “what” sensibility gives is so entirely indeterminate and uncoordinated that it cannot even be called a manifold; whatever the chaos of sensibility may be, Natorp conceives it as nothing more than a task (Aufgabe), problem, or demand (Forderung) for objectivity, that is,  objectivation.[30]  Since no thing (no object) is ever given in sensibility, any object is only ever constructed, and can only be known qua construction, viz. as an instance of its constituting law. 