 The temptation to take meaning and information to amount to pretty much the same thing is a result of the following idea. The idea is that the word ‘cat’ denotes the property of being a cat, and that it means cat because it expresses the concept cat, and the concept cat means cat. The concept cat means cat because it carries the information \(\langle\)cat\(\rangle\), and cat carries the information \(\langle\)cat\(\rangle\) because its instances or tokenings are caused, by and large, by cats. This is a nice idea. By tying meaning and information together and telling a causal story about them, we have a naturalistic story to tell about the information that we get from our environment, and hence a naturalistic story to tell about meaning. Such information-transmitting causal relationships are information channels—causal connections that facilitate the flow of information between the source of information and the receiver. We should take care to note this story is telling an informationally semantic story about sub-propositionally located pieces of information such as the predicate ‘cat’ and paradigmatic uses of singular terms. As such it sits outside of the domain described by the theories of semantic and strongly semantic information described above. In spite of this, we will see that a refinement of this story turns on tracking accuracy, if not truth itself.