 Modes of action are similarly general. Talk about the relation between actions \(A\) and \(B\) is talk about the relation between two general ways of acting. When \(A\) is actually taken, then it is a particular token of the type of action \(A\) and it stands in a distinctive relation with other modes of action with which it is compatible and still other modes of action with which it is not. By framing his logic as a logic of modes of action, Royce could include both categories of commonly understood actions (walking, talking, reading, judging), but was also able to include any sort of persistent being by seeing a being as a process involving distinctive characteristic actions in relation to general categories or modes of action. An apple is a thing that acts like an apple; a mountain is a thing that acts like a mountain; a fine pinot noir is thing that acts like a fine pinot noir. The power of this approach is that the objects of logic are necessarily understood as ongoing activities that both close off possibilities and open new ones with each action.