 Ultimately, however, this response may seem less than entirely satisfactory by itself. If the choice of a conceptual space is merely a matter of taste then we may be forced to embrace a radical kind of incommensurability. Those who talk \(h\)-\(r\)-\(w\)-ese and conjecture \({\sim}h \amp r \amp w\) on the basis of the available evidence will be close to the truth. Those who talk \(h\)-\(m\)-\(a\)-ese while exposed to the “same” circumstances would presumably conjecture \({\sim}h \amp{\sim}m \amp{\sim}a\) on the basis of the “same” evidence (or the corresponding evidence that they gather). If in fact \(h \amp r \amp w\) is the truth (in \(h\)-\(r\)-\(w\)-ese) then the \(h\)-\(r\)-\(w\) weather researchers will be close to the truth. But the \(h\)-\(m\)-\(a\) researchers will be very far from the truth.