 The enormous importance Vives attaches to the exploration of the emotions is reflected in the fact that he describes the branch of philosophy that provides a remedy for the severe diseases of the soul not only as “the foundation of all morality, private as well as public” (III, 299–300), but also as “the supreme form of learning and knowledge” (I, 17). Emotions (affectus sive affectiones) are defined as “the acts of those faculties which nature gave to our souls for the pursuit of good and the avoidance of evil, by means of which we are led toward the good and we move away from or against evil”. He stresses that the terms “good” and “evil” in this definition mean, not what is in reality good or evil, but rather what each person judges to be good or evil (III, 422). Therefore, the more pure and elevated the judgment, the more it takes account of what is genuinely good and true, admitting fewer and less intense emotions and becoming disturbed more rarely. Immoderate and confused movements, on the other hand, are the result of ignorance, thoughtlessness, and false judgments, since we judge the good or evil to be greater than it really is (III, 425).