 However, such a framework does not provide a complete moral theory of intergenerational relations and especially not in the context of decisions on the existence, number, and identity of future people. There are concerns for future people that cannot be accounted for by rights-based considerations (Jonas 1979; Heyd 1992 and 2009a; De-Shalit 1995: ch. 1; Meyer 1997; Thompson 2009; Scheffler 2013: 60–63, 72–73,80–81; Sanklecha 2017a, 2017b). First, consider the notion that it is important that there be future people at all. However, a person-affecting intergenerational sufficientarianism will account for the asymmetry of our procreational duties (see  §2.2):  On the one hand, prospective parents should refrain from procreation out of regard for the child(ren) they would have if the life of their child(ren) would fall below the relevant sufficientarian threshold. On the other hand, people have no obligation to procreate out of regard for the interests of possible future children. Possible people have no right to be brought into existence (and we do not have the correlative obligation to procreate).