 Given Śaṅkara’s absolute nonduality, how can he explain the world’s emergence in the first place? Later Advaitins developed cosmogonic defenses to neutralize philosophical rivals, including theories of māyā as a creative material cause equated with beginningless ignorance. Whether or not we can accurately read such theories into Śaṅkara is contested by academic and traditional scholars (see Comans 2000: 263–7; Doherty 2005; and Satchidanandendra 1964 [1989]). The more pertinent point though is that Śaṅkara does not require a definitive cosmogonic story of world causation for his philosophical goal of knowing brahman. He employs cosmologies as models that map the empirical order in order to point back obliquely to nonduality as already present as one’s most primitive self-existence. These models may be dropped after serving their purpose (see, e.g., GKBh 4.4.2; BrSūBh 3.2.21, 2.1.27, and 4.3.14). Furthermore, an airtight philosophical causal account for a less-than-real world is not possible. One strength of his position is a remarkable flexibility in accommodating contemporary scientific cosmologies. It is more accurate to read Śaṅkara as ambivalent towards the world. His approach is analogous to a dream character attempting to discover the waking ground of their dreamscape. Analyzing the dream’s causation and illusoriness may be part of a method, but is not the goal. The dream’s illusoriness is only seen upon awakening and recognizing the dream’s waking foundation.