 Relatedly, a now well-replicated result in experimental epistemology concerns laypersons’ judgments in “fake-barn” style Gettier cases (e.g., Ginet 1975; Goldman 1976). In fake-barn cases, referred to also as “environmental luck” cases by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2007, 2015), the unsafety of the subject’s target belief is entirely down to her being situated in an epistemically risky environment (e.g., an environment with near-by error possibilities). Whereas a common position in mainstream epistemology is that a belief falls short of knowledge provided it is unsafe—viz., if too easily the belief would have been incorrect (see, e.g., Pritchard 2005, 2007; Engel 1992; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Greco 2010; cf, however, Sosa 2007a, 2010; Hetherington 2013; Baumann 2014), studies in experimental epistemology have pressed back against this orthodoxy. For example, experiments by Colaço et al. (2014), Turri, Buckwalter, and Blouw (2015), and Turri (2016b) reported that participants were more inclined than not to attribute knowledge in fake barn cases (with a majority of 80% of participants registering this view in Turri 2016b).