 Wyclif thinks that the items directly falling into any categorial field are simple accidental forms, therefore he distinguishes between relations (relationes) and relatives (relativa or ad aliquid) – these latter being the aggregates formed by a substance, a relation, and the foundation (fundamentum), of the relation. Accordingly, the relationship between relation and relatives is, for him, similar to the ones between quantity and what is quantified, and quality and what is qualified. The relation is the very cause of the nature of the aggregates (that is, the relatives) of which it is a constituent; yet, unlike the other accidental forms, relations do not directly inhere in their substrates, but are present in them only by means of other accidental forms, that Wyclif, following a well established tradition, calls ‘foundations of the relation’. In his view, quantity and quality only can be the foundation of a categorial relation (ibidem, pp. 61–62).Thus, according to Wyclif’s description, in the act of relating one substance to another four different constitutive elements can be singled out: (1) the relation itself (for instance, the form of similarity); (2) the foundation of the relation, that is, the absolute entity in virtue of which the relation at issue is present in the two substances correlated to each other (in this case, the form of whiteness which makes the two substances at issue similar to each other); (3) the subject of the relation (or its first extreme), that is, the aggregate compound of (a) the substance which denominatively receives the names of the relation (in our example, the substance which is similar to another, say Socrates) and (b) of the foundation of the relation ; (4) the second extreme (of the relation), that is, another aggregate compund of a substance and its own foundation, that the subject of the relation is connected with, (in our example, a second substance which is, in its turn, similar to the first one, say Plato).