 The above is but one example of the difficulties inherent to the interpretation of Aristotelian elements in Philo’s corpus, at least regarding cosmological and metaphysical problems. Things are perhaps clearer concerning Aristotle’s influence on Philo’s ethics. The term mesotès (middle way), which has special importance in Aristotelian ethics, is used by Philo once, in Migr. 147. In this passage, the Alexandrine argues that the “royal road” is the middle way. But this assertion is not an unrestricted sign of approval of Aristotle’s ethics. In the desert, there is no way at all—and the desert was the exact place where Israel received the Revelation and achieved its liberty. The middle way may play a positive role in reining in debauchery, but for Philo, it has no absolute value. In Leg. 3.20, Laban asks Jacob why he fled instead of remaining faithful to the doctrine that recognizes the goods of the body and external possessions. Here is evidence of Philo’s refusal to accept Aristotle’s doctrine of the three kinds of goods. In Det. 8, it is said that corporeal and external goods are assets in name only, and in Somn. 2.9, he criticizes those who upheld the tripartition of human goods and contrasts them with those for whom virtue was the only good. To summarize, Philo could occasionally borrow some elements of Peripatetic doctrine, but he never believed them to be an expression of higher truth. He reveals a particular sort of coherence with regard to Aristotelianism: it consists in demonstrating through exegesis that Aristotle’s prudent philosophy could not entirely coincide with the Bible’s spiritual wisdom.