 All of these versions of actualism face a second possibilist objection: they prescribe bad behavior that the agent can easily avoid (Wedgwood 2009  [OIR];  Ross 2012: 75–76). For example, Procrastinate can easily avoid ⟨declining to review the paper⟩ by ⟨agreeing to review the paper⟩ and, once Procrastinate ⟨agrees to review the paper⟩, she can easily ⟨write the review⟩. Nevertheless, all of these versions of actualism maintain that Procrastinate should ⟨decline to review the paper⟩ rather than ⟨agree to review the paper⟩. Other extreme actualist-possibilist scenarios highlight the force of this objection. Suppose that the following act-set is the best one available to a mass murderer M at \(t_1\): ⟨kill no  one⟩ at \(t_1\) and ⟨kill no one⟩ at \(t_2\).  Suppose, however, that the best immediately available option for M is ⟨killing someone at \(t_1\)⟩ because of the truth of the following two counterfactuals: “if M were to ⟨kill someone⟩ at \(t_1\), then M would ⟨kill no one⟩ at \(t_2\)”, “if M were to ⟨kill no one⟩ at \(t_1\), then M would ⟨kill ten people⟩ at \(t_2\)”. Possibilists claim that M should ⟨kill no one⟩ from \(t_1\)–\(t_2\) and thus that M should ⟨kill no one⟩ at \(t_1\). Actualists, however, claim that M should ⟨kill someone⟩ at \(t_1\). Contextualist actualism at least allows one to say that although ⟨killing someone⟩ at \(t_1\) is obligatory, doing this violates M’s obligation to ⟨kill no one⟩ from \(t_1\)–\(t_2\). Goldman and Sobel’s versions cannot accommodate this appeasing judgment.