 Presumably, not all groups which are appropriate sites of moral responsibility should be blamed. How, if at all, can groups which are appropriate sites of collective moral responsibility, in general, avoid blame in particular cases? While, as Andrés Garcia (2021) argues, collective moral responsibility is not itself inherently unfair in ways that early critics such as H. D. Lewis (1948) claimed, it can be unfair in particular cases. In some of these cases, its unfairness will be a matter of a group’s not having made a sufficient contribution to the harm for which it is being blamed. In other cases, it will be a matter of the group’s not having known what was going on. In these latter cases, we confront the possibility that the group can make a plea of ignorance to avoid blame in the way that individuals do. A plea that as Smiley (2016) points out, needs to be assessed with various standards of fairness in mind.