 Defenders of conceptual analysis, it is true, commonly proclaim the modesty of their ambitions. Indeed, Frank Jackson specifically chastises conceptual analysis in its “immodest role,” namely when “it gives intuitions…too big a place in determining what the world is like” (1998, pp. 43–44): “There is nothing sacrosanct about folk theory. It has served us well but not so well that it would be irrational to make changes to it in the light of reflection on exactly what it involves, and in the light of one or another empirical discovery about us and our world” (Jackson 1998, p. 44). The question is, having conceded this much, what remains? Conceptual analysis, as Jackson conceives it, becomes hard to distinguish from banal descriptive sociology of the Gallup-poll variety. (Jackson even says he advocates, when necessary, “doing serious opinion polls on people’s responses to various cases” [1998, p. 36].) Such a procedure might deliver some insight about what some people, at some time, in some place, think about “mind” or “law” or “justice,” but Replacement Naturalists wonder what philosophical import any of this data could have, since it is bounded not simply by time and place, but also by ignorance. Yet, as Ian Farrell (2006) has argued, such a procedure may serve an important theoretical purpose, even if its claims are vulnerable to revision.