 Responses to content externalism divide into several kinds. The first type of response simply regards externalism as insufficiently supported by the kinds of arguments developed by Putnam and Burge, either because their conclusions are non sequiturs or because the arguments are deficient in some other way. In this vein, Boghossian (1997), for example, devises the case of “Dry Earth”, a planet whose inhabitants (who are our intrinsic duplicates) are under the illusion that there is a clear, colorless liquid flowing out of the faucets and filling the lakes and oceans. According to Boghossian, externalists are committed to implausible claims concerning the content of Dry Earthlings’ thoughts about this illusory liquid. (Segal [2000] endorses a variation on this argument from Dry Earth; see Korman [2006] and Pryor [2007] for externalist replies.). Crane (1991) argues that in Burge’s example, there is no reason for thinking that Jane has different concepts in the two situations, as her dispositions remain exactly the same. Crane thinks that in both situations, Jane lacks the concept of arthritis, but possesses the concept of tharthritis. Burge was, therefore, mistaken in attributing to Jane in the actual world the belief that she has arthritis in her thigh. Georgalis (1999) takes a similar view, as does Wikforss (2001).