 Science is a complex epistemic and social practice that is organized in a large number of disciplines, employs a dazzling variety of methods, relies on heterogeneous conceptual and ontological resources, and pursues diverse goals of equally diverse research communities. Philosophers of science have often aimed to find order in this complexity through methods of unification and reduction. Pluralism, as an explicit program in philosophy of science, emerged from an increasing frustration with the limitations of unifying frameworks in the light of the disunified reality of scientific practice. As philosophers of science increasingly highlighted in the 1970s and 1980s, scientific theories often do not reduce (Fodor 1974), there is not one universal scientific method (Feyerabend 1975), not only one fundamental scientific ontology (Dupré 1981), and successful science requires not only epistemic but also social diversity (Harding 1988). While scientific pluralism has often been framed in opposition to the unity of science and “the ancient notion of philosophy as unified knowledge” (Cat 2012), pluralist philosophy of science has become a broad platform for negotiating post-positivist philosophy of science in the light of epistemic and social diversity. The literature on scientific pluralism has therefore increasingly moved from a simple contrast between monism and pluralism to debates about different ways of articulating pluralism (Ruphy 2016). This article explores this “plurality of pluralisms” (Wylie 2015) through four main areas of the debate about scientific pluralism: “Theories, Models, and Explanations”, “Practices and Methods”, “Ontologies, Classifications and Concepts”, “The Social Organization of Science”.