  Henry can thus undoubtedly be considered a voluntarist (Müller 2007), even though with regard to the more “radical” voluntarists, such as Walter of Brugge, he does not confine himself to interpreting the role of reason as that of a mere “advisor”, but instead as that of a cause (albeit a causa sine qua non): without the prior knowledge of the intellect (characterized by the same kind of freedom as voluntas), the will cannot desire anything. In other words, for Henry the intellect and the good that it proposes are not the sole or necessary origin of the motion of the will, as is affirmed, on the other hand, by those interpreters closer to Aristotle. Nevertheless, by presenting the objects that this faculty can freely choose, reason is the conditio sine qua non of the action of the will itself, which otherwise would be prey to sensible appetites and the determinism of the passions. Moral action is therefore performed both by the intellect, which presents the kinds of good to choose, and by the will, which freely chooses one of these, yet without being forced to opt for that which is judged best by reason (Teske 2011; Leone 2014).