 Even though theoretically cognitivism is an option for representationalism, adopting it would seem to violate the spirit of strong representationalism. It all depends on how one would like to develop the cognitivist line. One option is to say that the affective aspect of pain is not qualitative or phenomenological. We are under the illusion that it is because we are hard-wired to cognitively and behaviorally react to the sensory content of pain in a certain way. This option has the advantage of preserving strong representationalism: if affect is not qualitative, there is no pressure to treat it as representational — cf. Tye (1996, pp. 111–16 and 134–36; 1997, p. 332–3). But if it is admitted that affective aspect of pain is as qualitative as its sensory content, then cognitivism comes as a compromise for strong representationalist because it admits that not all phenomenal character is representational. This latter option may lead to representational-cum-functionalist approaches to pains and other affectively non-neutral experiences in that the sensory content of an experience may be given a purely representational account while its affective dimension may be a matter of functionally processing this content for setting motivational parameters (on the assumption that cognitive attitudes can be captured functionally).