 One way of understanding views like this is that the function of morality is to prevent failures of rationality. In the next section we will discuss how game theory has been used to analyze the relationship between morality and prudential rationality. In the more recent literature, though, there is growing consensus that the role norms of social morality play is not necessarily to constrain our instrumental reasoning so that we can overcome failures of prudential rationality, but rather to transform mixed-motive games like the prisoner’s dilemma into coordination problems where mutually advantageous outcomes are more stable and easier to arrive at. A classic example of this approach is Bicchieri (2006). Like Ullmann-Margalit, Bicchieri characterizes norms in terms of our commitment to certain courses of action, and also emphasizes the importance of sanctions in this context. However, Bicchieri draws a distinction between social norms and other types of norm, and argues that what distinguishes the former from the latter is the conditional nature of our commitment to them. In particular, compliance with social norms is grounded in both an individual’s (i) empirical expectation that a sufficiently large percentage of the population conforms to the norm, and (ii) her normative expectation that a sufficiently large percentage of the population expects others to conform to the norm. Only when both of these expectations are satisfied will an individual comply with a social norm. Because some individuals will be more sensitive to the expectations of others, or more inclined to want to see a particular norm complied with, though, the relevant expectations may vary between individuals. Only when expectations are satisfied for a sufficiently large number of people, then, will the norm succeed in transforming a social dilemma where mutually advantageous outcomes are unstable into a more easily solved coordination problem. And while it might seem strange at first glance to suggest that norms we are only conditionally committed to are the lynchpin of social morality, given the significant role social dilemmas play in preventing us from living well together, this shouldn’t be surprising. For a more thorough discussion of these issues see the entry on  social norms.