 In economics, risk aversion is usually related to money. Let X represent a lottery ticket with a 50 per cent chance of winning € 100, and suppose that you consider this ticket to be worth € 30. We then have \(EU(X) = u(100)/2\), and \(CE(X) = u(30)\). This means that \(u(30) = u(100)/2\). If this is a consistent pattern, then the utility of money, as illustrated in a diagram with amounts x of money on the x axis and their utilities \(u(x)\) on the y axis, will be represented by a concave (hill-like) curve. Similarly, if a risk affine behaviour will be represented by a convex (valley-like curve). Provided that the utility function u is twice continuously differentiable, this can be expressed more precisely in the form of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion/affinity, according to which the agent’s risk aversion at any point x is equal to \(-u''(x)/u'(x)\). Hence, a person with the utility function \(u_1\) is more risk averse at a point x than one with utility function \(u_2\) if and only if  \[-{u_1}''(x)/{u_1}'(x) &gt; -{u_2}''(x)/{u_2}'(x)\]  (Arrow 1965; Pratt 1964). The Arrow-Pratt measure has the advantage of being invariant under transformations of the utility function that preserve the preference relation that it represents (i.e. it is invariant under multiplication of the utility with a positive constant and addition of an arbitrary constant). On the other hand, it can be questioned on philosophical grounds whether risk attitudes can be adequately represented by variations in the utility of money. It can be argued that cautiousness and the utility of money are two separate issues and that they should therefore have independent representations.