 We can see here that Kant seeks to reconcile freedom and natural necessity by means of “transcendental idealism.” Indeed, the question of whether natural necessity rules out freedom is a “transcendental problem,” and only transcendental philosophy can solve it (A535/B563, A557/B585). The appeal to transcendental idealism is controversial, of course. Some scholars of Kant’s ethics understand him to be making a metaphysical (or ontological) claim when he distinguishes between noumenal and phenomenal worlds (e.g. McCarty 2009). Others understand Kant to be distinguishing between only different standpoints we take, identifying the noumenal world with the practical standpoint that we take when we think of ourselves as autonomous, responsible beings, and the phenomenal world with the theoretical standpoint we take when we think of ourselves as part of the natural, deterministic, empirical world (see Beck 1960: 191–94; Korsgaard 1996a, esp. chs. 6–7). Both raise concerns. Many find the notion of two worlds metaphysically cumbersome (at best); but others question whether the two standpoints approach is robust enough for Kant’s purposes. (See Irwin 1984, esp. 37–38; Allison 1990; Guyer 1992: 103–107; and Wood 2005a: 99–100.)