 Motivating a non-negligible prior \(P(D)\) for design is especially challenging in the framework of the ur-probability solution to the problem of old evidence because it constrains the background evidence to facts that do not entail the existence of life. Collins argues that if we focus only on a limited class of constants \(C\), the background evidence that we can use to motivate the prior \(P(D)\) is allowed to “includ[e] the initial conditions of the universe, the laws of physics, and the values of all the other constants except C”. But appeals to the sacred texts of religions cannot be used to motivate the ascription of a non-negligible ur-prior \(P(D)\) because they presuppose, and thus entail, the existence of life. Notably, as pointed out by Monton, “[i]n formulating an urprobability for the existence of God, one cannot take into account Biblical accounts about Jesus” (2006: 418). According to Monton (2006: 419), proponents of the argument from fine-tuning for design may, however, try to motivate a non-negligible ur-prior \(P(D)\) by resorting to arguments for the existence of God that are either a priori, e.g., ontological argument, or appeal only to very general empirical facts that do not entail that the conditions are right for life, e.g., the cosmological argument. According to Swinburne (2004: ch. 5), the hypothesis of traditional theism is a simple one and, as such, warrants the ascription of a non-negligible prior.