 if the First is indivisible in its substance then the existence by which it is circumscribed [yanḥâzu] from existences other than it cannot be other than [the existence] by which it exists [is mawjûd] in itself, and therefore it is circumscribed from what is other than it through a unity which is its essence [i.e., through a unity which it is, not through a unity distinct from itself]. For one of the meanings of unity is the specific existence [wujûd  khâṣṣ][54]  by which each being is circumscribed from what is other than it: this is that by which every being is called one inasmuch as it exists [is mawjûd] in respect of the existence which specifies it, and this is the meaning of “one” which is coextensive with existence. So the First is one in this way too, and is more deserving of the name and meaning of “one” than any one other than it.