 Both the foundational status and the inevitability of sexual difference has become a key point of contention between sexual difference theorists and intersectional theorists whose work is anchored particularly in black feminist thought (Crenshaw 2019, Hill Collins and Bilge 2016 ), but also in contributions from theorists of bodily abilities and trans theorists. (Garland-Thomson 2002, Bettcher and Garry 2009, Koyama 2006) These theorists challenge the priority of sexual difference, in our accounts of embodied subjectivity, and the possibility of providing generic accounts of what such difference consists in. What counts as being a man or a woman, what life opportunities result from gendered positionality, and how these factors are internalized to form our lived experience of being gendered, is mediated by the other categories which intersect with gendered ones. Being a “black man/woman”, or “gay man/woman”, or “trans man/woman” (themselves categories which also mediate each other and are mediated further by, for example, nationality, religion, age, class and our positioning on the ability/disability axis), each has a different content from being a “white, straight, middleclass, cis gendered, able bodied woman or man”. The normative ideals attached to the concepts are different, though also overlapping. These positionalities have consequences for our life opportunities both economically and in the wider social realm, which the structural data make evident. And all of this has consequences for our lived subjectivity, how we experience our bodies, our sense of ourselves as male or female, amongst other identifiers. 