 The second standard objection to traditional dispositional accounts of belief is to note the loose connection between belief and behavior in some cases—for example, in a recently paralyzed person, or in someone who wants to keep a private opinion (e.g., a Muscovite who believes, in 1937, that Stalin’s purges are morally wrong), or in matters of very little practical relevance (e.g., an American homebody’s belief that there is at least one church in Nice). Again, the traditional dispositionist seems faced with a choice between oversimplifying (and thus mischaracterizing some people’s dispositions) and loading the dispositions with potentially problematic or unwieldy conditional antecedents (e.g., she’d get the umbrella if her paralysis healed; he’d speak up if the political climate changed). On the other hand, however, the demand for an absolutely precise specification of the conditions under which a disposition will be manifested, without exception, may be excessive. As Cartwright (1983) has noted, even perfectly respectable claims in the physical sciences often hold only ceteris paribus or “all else being equal”.