 The main divide among Theory-Theorists concerns how the Theory of Mind is acquired—i.e., it concerns where this body of knowledge comes from. According to the Child-Scientist Theory-Theory (Gopnik &amp; Wellman 1992; Gopnik &amp; Meltzoff 1997), a child constructs a Theory of Mind exactly as a scientist constructs a scientific theory: she collects evidence, formulates explanatory hypotheses, and revises these hypotheses in the light of further evidence. In other words, “folk” laws and principles are obtained through hypothesis testing and revision—a process that, according to proponents of this view, is guided by a general-purpose, Bayesian learning mechanism (Gopnik &amp; Wellman 2012). On the contrary, the Nativist Theory-Theory (Carruthers 2013; Scholl &amp; Leslie 1999) argues that a significant part of the Theory of Mind is innate, rather than learned. More precisely, Nativists typically consider the core of the Theory of Mind as resulting from the maturation of a cognitive module specifically dedicated to representing mental states