 Epictetus’s conception of emotional adjustment is not that one should be “unfeeling like a statue” (3.2.4). Even the wisest person may tremble or grow pale at some sudden danger, though without false assent (fragment 9). More importantly, there are affective responses it is right to have. “It is fitting to be elated at the good”; that is, at the goods of soul (2.11.22; 3.7.7), and one should also experience the aversive feeling he calls “caution” (eulabeia, 2.1.1–7) when considering potential bad choices. Gratitude toward god is also affective in nature (2.23). In addition, it is appropriate during the period of ethical training to experience the pain of remorse as a stimulus to ethical development (3.23.30–38; see Kamtekar (1998)).