Here, two of the three people have the same strict preference ordering. Reckoning the collective preference by pairwise majority decision, it is easy to see that the result is the ordering of this majority: ABC. Consider now a domain made up entirely of such profiles, in which most of the three voters share the same strict preferences. On such a domain, pairwise majority decision always derives an ordering and so it satisfies SO. This social welfare function is nondictatorial as well provided the domain, though restricted, still retains a certain variety. In the above profile, voter \(3\) strictly prefers \(B\) to \(A\). Both of the others strictly prefer \(A\) to \(B\), though, and that is the social preference: with this profile in the domain, \(3\) is no dictator. Pairwise majority decision satisfies  D if each of the voters disagrees in this way with both of the others, in some or other profile.[10] It always satisfies WP and I. On such a domain, we have now seen, this aggregation procedure satisfies all of Arrow’s non-domain conditions. Such a domain is Arrow consistent.