 In order to reasonably reject a principle, I must have some objection to it. This objection may begin with some direct harm I suffer as a result of the principle. So far, if the harm involved is pain or suffering, contractualism mirrors utilitarianism. However, the fact that a principle impacts negatively on me is not sufficient. To know whether I can reasonably reject the principle, I must also ask how it impacts on others. If a principle imposes a certain burden (b1) on me, but every alternative imposes a greater burden (b2) on someone else, then b1 does not give me a reason to reject the principle. If I am reasonable, then I withdraw my objection when I see that your reason is more pressing. (By contrast, it would make no sense to say that a utilitarian has ‘withdrawn her pain’ because she has noticed that someone else’s pain is greater.) So we conclude that the principle imposing b1 on me cannot be reasonably rejected. And we reach this conclusion without having to aggregate anything.