 One way in which this idea has been developed is the so-called “it from bit” theory (see again Wheeler 1990). In David Chalmers’ words, this approach “stems from the observation that in physical theories, fundamental physical states are individuated as informational states” (Chalmers 1996: 302). Physics is silent on what accomplishes the specified functional roles, so “any realization of these information states will serve as well for the purpose of a physical theory” (Chalmers 1996: 302). The “it from bit” approach is particularly appealing to Chalmers as a philosopher of mind committed to qualia being intrinsic, non-reducible properties, because it allows for a simple unification: we need intrinsic properties to make sense of conscious experience, and we need intrinsic properties to ground the informational states that make up the world’s physics. If we claim that all the informational states are grounded in phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties, we “get away with a cheap and elegant ontology, and solve two problems in a single blow” (Chalmers 1996: 305). The cell states in a CA fit the bill: if we interpret them as proto-phenomenal properties, we obtain the intrinsic structure of some sort of computational neutral monism (for an historical introduction, see the entry on  neutral monism).