 Volitionists argue that the intuitive thought that responsibility requires awareness, pursued to its ultimate consequences, subverts ordinary judgments of blameworthiness. So, in order to respond to the revisionist interpretation of the EC, that intuitive thought needs to be reexamined. Responses to revisionism vary according to how much they are willing to depart from it. Some philosophers agree that responsibility requires awareness, but argue that the requisite awareness doesn’t necessarily involve an occurrent belief concerning the action’s overall wrongness  (sect. 3.1,  ‘Weakened internalism’). Other philosophers claim that, while awareness of wrongdoing is required for culpability for actions, such awareness isn’t required when it comes to assessing culpability for ignorance itself  (sect. 3.2,  ‘Ignorance and epistemic vices’). A third group maintains that the required awareness concerns only the factual aspects of one’s action, not the moral ones, at least not conceived in a de dicto way  (sect. 3.3,  ‘Quality of will’). Finally, some philosophers contend that in certain cases awareness isn’t required at all: agents can be blameworthy for fully unwitting acts provided that certain other conditions are met  (sect. 3.4,  ‘Capacitarianism’). Despite their differences, what these positions have in common is the goal of denying the akrasia requirement on blameworthiness.