 While a few early arguments against deflationism focus on the role of truth in explanations of the success of science (see Williams 1986 and Fine 1984a, 1984b for deflationary responses to Putnam and Boyd on this), according to Field (1994a, 271), “the most serious worry about deflationism is that it can’t make sense of the explanatory role of truth conditions: e.g., their role in explaining behavior, or their role in explaining the extent to which behavior is successful”. While few theorists endorse the thesis that explanations of behavior in general need to appeal to the notion of truth (even a pre-deflationary Field (1987, 84–5) rejects this, but see Devitt 1997, 325–330, for an opposing position), explanations of the latter, i.e., of behavioral success, still typically proceed in terms of an appeal to truth. This poses a prima facie challenge to deflationary views. To illustrate the problem, consider the role of the truth-value of an individual’s belief in whether that person succeeds in satisfying her desires. Let us suppose that Mary wants to get to a party, and she believes that it is being held at 1001 Northside Avenue. If her belief is true, then, other things being equal, she is likely to get to the party and get what she wants. But suppose that her belief is false, and the party is in fact being held at 1001 Southside Avenue. Then it would be more likely, other things being equal, that she won’t get what she wants. In an example of this sort, the truth of her belief seems to be playing a particular role in explaining why she gets what she wants.