 What comes to be a stock example of analogical knowledge according to Nyāya is elaborated in Nyāya-sūtra commentaries and textbooks preceding Gaṅgeśa, who fills in details. A subject \(S\) inquires of a forester about a gavaya, which is a kind of buffalo, having heard the word ‘gavaya’ used among her schoolmates but not knowing what it means, i.e., not knowing to what ‘gavaya’ refers. Questioned by \(S\), the forester replies that a gavaya is like a cow, mentioning certain specifics as also some dissimilarities. To simplify, Nyāya philosophers say that the forester makes an analogical statement (“A gavaya is like a cow”), whereby, according to Gaṅgeśa, our subject \(S\) now knows in general what the word means. But \(S\) does not yet know its reference, which he deems its principal meaning. Later encountering a gavaya buffalo, \(S\) says, “This, which is similar to a cow, is the meaning of the word ‘gavaya’,” a statement which expresses \(S\)’s new knowledge. Every instance of knowledge has a source, and this one has been generated by upamāna, “analogy.” Gaṅgeśa writes (2020: 1207):