 Christensen argues that the agent-specificity of self-doubting higher-order evidence requires the subject to “bracket” her first-order evidence in a way that other defeating evidence does not. He thinks this means that in no longer using the evidence to draw the conclusion, she will not be able to give her evidence its due (Christensen 2010a: 194–196). In contrast, in the case of the red light and other cases not involving self-doubt, once the redness of the light is added to the evidence, discounting the appearance of the cloth doesn’t count as failing to respect that evidence because one is justified in believing it is no longer due respect as evidence of redness. However, arguably, the difference is not that the self-doubter must fail to give the evidence its due. In the higher-order self-doubt cases we have seen the undercutting evidence does not give the subject reason to believe the evidential relation she supposed was there is not there. It gives reason to think that she doesn’t know whether the evidential relation is there, even if it is. If it isn’t then in bracketing her first-order evidence she isn’t failing to give it its due; it isn’t due any respect. Because self-doubting defeating evidence concerns the subject’s knowledge of the evidential support relation and not the relation itself it appears weaker than typical defeating evidence. However it is potentially more corrosive because it doesn’t give the means to settle whether the evidential relation she endorsed is there and so whether the first-order evidence deserves respect.