 A variety of different strategies have been employed in arguing for such respect claims. For example, the concept of moral recognition respect is sometimes stripped down to its essentials, omitting much of the content of the concept as it appears in respect for persons contexts. The respect that is owed to all things, it can be argued, is a very basic form of attentive contemplation of the object combined with a prima facie assumption that the object might have intrinsic value (Birch 1993). Another strategy is to argue that the true grounds for moral worth and recognition respect are other than or wider than rationality. One version of this strategy (employed by P. Taylor 1986) is to argue that all living things, persons and nonpersons, have equal inherent worth and so equally deserve the same kind of moral respect, because the ground of the worth of living things that are nonpersons is continuous with the ground of the worth for persons. For example, we can regard all living things as respect-worthy in virtue of being quasi-agents and centers of organized activity that pursue their own good in their own unique way. I