 Are these decisive problems for defining disability in terms of welfare? Much depends here on what we intend to do with definitions of disability. If the goal is to capture ordinary usage, a welfarist view may be on the right track. It might account, for instance, for the broad appeal of slogans like “deafness is not a disability” and euphemisms like “differently abled”; these expressions, on this view, would be ways of emphasizing some of the substantive evaluative intuitions behind the affirmative model, that most conditions we call disabilities are not so bad absent prejudice. That said, disability scholars and activists have tended to be skeptical of such expressions, on the grounds that they undermine efforts to see disabled people as a politically salient group with similar experience of ableism and strong reason to work together for justice, rather than to simply commiserate. If a definition of disability should advocate in favor of usages that produce a better or more just world, this might be a reason to reject Kahane and Savulescu’s view, in favor of one that allows people to be disabled due to prejudice and/or in the absence of harms to well-being. Or at least, this will be so if the social and/or affirmational models of disability have the moral and political advantages proponents advertise for them.