 It might be argued that the urgency of this question, or even its very intelligibility, is merely a symptom of a frame of mind from within which meaning seems impossible, and that our proper task is to leave this confused frame of mind behind (e.g., McDowell 1992 [1998: 272, 274]; 1998a: 57–58). However, this line of reasoning might be taken to presume that a question is urgent or intelligible only if it is in principle possible to offer a reductive answer to it, that constructive philosophy is necessarily reductive philosophy. Verheggen argues that the rejection of reductionism does not commit one to quietism. As she sees it, non-reductionism can be constructive; it can revolve around advancing and defending positive claims (Verheggen 2000, 2003). Even though the project of providing necessary and sufficient conditions for meaning is hopeless, the non-reductionist can still aspire to articulate necessary conditions that aren’t “even remotely trivial” (Myers and Verheggen 2016: 3), and to draw illuminating connections between meaning and other irreducible phenomena. Through a creative reconstruction of Davidson’s triangulation argument, Verheggen argues that interaction with a second individual and aspects of the shared world is a necessary condition for one’s having a language and thoughts (see chapter 1 of Myers and Verheggen 2016). The constitution of the standards of correctness that govern language and thought necessitates that the individual be aware of the possibility of being mistaken, an awareness that can only be grounded in linguistic interactions with another individual and features of the world. Thus, the triangulation argument is taken by Verheggen to reveal the hopelessness of the reductive ambition, insofar as it shows that we cannot offer an account of the constitution of the standards of correctness that govern language and thought without presupposing that a commitment to those standards is already in place. (See also Sultanescu and Verheggen 2019 for an account of the Davidsonian answer to Kripke’s sceptical challenge and Verheggen 2017a for an account of the Davidsonian answer to Wittgenstein’s paradox.) William Child also defends a variety of non-reductionism, one that “does not give merely pleonastic answers but aims to say something genuinely informative” (Child 2019a: 97). He does so by relying on Wittgenstein’s remarks on meaning and rule-following.