 It is hard to see how, according to this definition, there could be beautiful objects if there did not exist certain human dispositions; and, obviously, there can be human dispositions only if there are human beings. Bolzano’s definition seems therefore to make beauty ontologically dependent on the existence of human beings as possible beholders of beautiful objects. This makes Bolzano’s aesthetics in a certain sense subjectivist. By taking Bolzano’s definition to be a conditional definition in today’s sense, we could avoid this consequence; but in this case beauty would not be defined for a world without human beings, and in such a world there were no beautiful objects. Bolzano himself, however, did not draw such conclusions from his definition, but quite on the contrary: He claimed explicitly that there would be beautiful objects in the world even if no human being existed (Bolzano 1843b,  67). Be that as it may, Bolzano does by no means advocate an extreme form of subjectivism in aesthetics. For him, the beauty of an object depends also, and even primarily, on certain inner properties, in particular on certain regularities of the object itself which give rise to its possible effects on the beholders. This puts Bolzano’s basic aesthetic view in a middle position between extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism. In any case, Bolzano’s essay on the concept of the beautiful includes a quite subtle psychological analysis of phenomena that are relevant for aesthetics and play an important role in today’s aesthetic research.