 The combination question concerns in what way the evaluation and non-evaluative description involved in thick terms and concepts relate. Calling something selfish normally conveys that it is bad, but not just any bad action can qualify as selfish; selfish acts must involve the agent giving greater priority to some of her own interests over others’. (Those interests may be different in different circumstances: one can be emotionally selfish, financially selfish, and so on.) Separabilists hold that thick concepts are a combination of distinct non-evaluative concepts and other (usually thin) evaluative concepts. Philosophers who accept Thin Centralism typically accept Separability. And philosophers (often the same ones) who reject Shapelessness or aim to avoid the anti-disentangling argument also typically accept Separability. But as we’ll see, Separability commits you to neither Thin Centralism nor Shapelessness. While some philosophers writer as if Separabilist views were essentially non-cognitivist (Dancy 1995; Kirchin 2010), cognitivists can well accept Separability (Elstein and Hurka 2009; Smith 2013). Separabilist views are sometimes called “reductive” (Kirchin 2010; Roberts 2013a; Harcourt and Thomas 2013). A word of caution about this label is that Separabilist views needn’t be reductionist in the sense of reducing evaluative properties to non-evaluative ones. By contrast, Inseparabilists hold that the meanings of thick terms and concepts are both evaluative and descriptive but cannot be divided into distinct contents; talk of “combining” evaluation and non-evaluative description is liable to mislead if it suggests putting together distinct elements (Dancy 1995: 268). Thick concepts are a distinct kind of fundamental evaluative concepts. Accordingly Inseparabilist Views are often called “non-reductive”, or views on which thick concepts are “irreducibly thick”. Philosophers who accept Thick Centralism typically accept Inseparability, and those who accept Inseparability typically accept Shapelessness and express sympathy for the anti-disentangling argument. (As we’ll see, these views needn’t cluster as neatly as is sometimes assumed.)