 One way to represent values would to be treat them as preferences using the tools of neoclassical economics. Ideally we would reduce these values to a single scale via a utility function. However, this is possible only if these values are commensurable (orderable on single scale). Some have argued that not all values can be so ordered. For example, suppose you have to decide whether to be a lawyer or clarinetist (Raz 1986: 342). Neither seems better than the other and they do not seem to be of equal value. Thus, we cannot rank them on a single scale. Nevertheless, if values are commensurable and we can measure them through people’s willingness-to-pay for them or willingness-to-be compensated for their loss, then they can be represented by a utility function. Multi-criteria analysis does not make these two assumptions (Arrow &amp; Raynaud 1986). Rather, the preferred method is determining a set of non-dominated alternatives (Moffett &amp; Sarkar 2006). Suppose have a set of criteria \(K = \{\kappa_i \mid i = 1, 2,\ldots, n\}\) and a set of feasible alternatives \(A = \{\alpha_j \mid j = 1, 2,\ldots, m\}\) (for details, see Sarkar 2005: 196–203). We will further assume that each criterion \(\kappa_i\) induces a weak linear order \(\leq^*\) on \(A\); that is, for any two \(\alpha_m, \alpha_n \in A, \alpha_m \leq_i^* \alpha_n\) or \(\alpha_n \leq_i^* \alpha_m\) or both. Let \(w_{im}\) be the value of the \(m\)th alternative according to the \(i\)th criterion. We can say then that an alternative \(\alpha_m \in A\) is non-dominated by another alternative \(\alpha_n \in A\) with respect to \(K\) if, and only if: