 Self-Deception and Tension: A number of philosophers have complained that deflationary account fails to explain a certain ‘tension’ supposed to be present in cases of genuine self-deception (e.g., Audi 1997; Bach 1997; Nelkin 2002; Funkhouser 2005; Fernández 2013). This ‘tension’ involves some sort of psychic or behavioral ‘conflict’. Self-deceivers are said to experience ‘doubts’, ‘suspicions’, and the like regarding p, and to display ambiguous behavior some pointing toward belief that p and some toward ~p. Since deflationary approaches deny that self-deceivers reject the dual belief requirement, specifically, denying that self-deceivers need to hold that ~p, it seems difficult for such approaches to explain why self-deceivers would struggle with doubts or display behavior at variance with their false belief that p. Regarding the former, deflationary theorists accept the possibility that self-deceivers may ‘suspect’ or think there is a significant chance that ~p (Mele 2001, 2009, 2010). Clearly, a person who believes that p and suspects that ~p may experience tension, moreover, such attitudes combined with a desire that p help explain certain sorts of avoidance behavior highlighted by critics. For his part, Mele things self-deception may often involve tension, but it certainly need not, that is, some self-deception is tension free. While Lynch (2012) does not think tension is necessary, he accepts the idea that it is characteristic of self-deception, and can be accounted for by construing self-deception as involving an unwarranted degree of confidence that p, rather than wholehearted belief that p as Mele does. On Lynch’s version of deflation, self-deceivers will encounter and appreciate evidence that casts doubt their assumption that p. This appreciation serves to motivate “attempts to deal with it (by, for example, trying to explain it away)” and explains the doubts regarding p critics have identified.