  Recall that both Reid and Butler objected to Locke's account of  personal identity, in part, because they thought it had absurdly  revisionary implications for our practices of moral responsibility.  So rather than give up those practices, they said, we would be better off giving up Locke's theory. On this view, our normative commitments provide an important check on our theories of personal identity. Nevertheless, the  consideration about moral responsibility is only one of many  objections both critics run against Locke. They also launch purely  metaphysical objections as well, the thought being that Locke's view  fails both on its own terms and in light of its absurd normative  implications. So actually, while our normative commitments provide  an important consideration that the theory of personal  identity should account for, it remains open that such commitments  could be overridden or revised, depending perhaps on the independent  plausibility of the theory in question.