 Another purported functional difference between imagination and belief concerns their characteristic connection to emotions. If the liar truly believes that his pants are on fire, then he will be genuinely afraid of the fire; but not if he merely imagines so. While belief evokes genuine emotions toward real entities, imagination does not (Walton 1978, 1990, 1997; see also related discussion of the paradox of fictional emotions in  Supplement on Puzzles and Paradoxes of Imagination and the Arts).  This debate is entangled with the controversy concerning the nature of emotions (see the entry on  emotion).  In rejecting this purported functional difference, philosophers also typically reject narrow cognitivism about emotions (Nichols 2004a; Meskin &amp; Weinberg 2003; Weinberg &amp; Meskin 2005, 2006; Kind 2011; Spaulding 2015; Carruthers 2003, 2006).