 Some philosophers make a distinction between natural revelation and natural theology (e.g., King 2012; Helm 1982: 22–26; Wolterstorff 1995: 24–25). According to Helm, for something to qualify as divine revelation it must be immediate, and the human recipients must be passive. Since natural theology includes the activity of inferring knowledge of God from publicly available evidence, natural theology is not a species of natural revelation, Helm argues. It is unclear, however, why God could not reveal himself in a way that requires inferential activity on the part of the recipients, and many thinkers make no distinction between natural revelation and natural theology (Davies 2009: 36; O’Collins 2016b: 287). In the context of this entry, however, it is necessary to exclude traditional natural theology from treatment, and “natural revelation” will therefore be understood in accordance with Helm’s restrictive definition. The major focus, however, will be on special  revelation.[3]