 Zalta’s theory is based on the distinction made by Meinong’s student, Ernst Mally, between two kinds of predication: exemplification and encoding (Mally 1912, Zalta 1983, 1988). The idea is to maintain the Meinongian claim that the round square is a genuine object while avoiding contradicting oneself. Russell argues that since the round square is round and square, and since if an object is square it is not the case that it is round, it follows that the round square is such that both it is round and it is not the case that it is round, which is a contradiction. Parsons avoids the contradiction by refusing the inference from ‘x is square’ to ‘it is not the case that x is round’, where ‘x’ ranges over all objects. In contrast, Zalta accepts the inference for all objects and avoids the contradiction by refusing to interpret the predication, ‘is round and square’, of the round square as exemplification. He instead interprets it as encoding; the round square encodes roundness and squareness. Encoding squareness is not incompatible with encoding roundness, even though exemplifying squareness is incompatible with exemplifying roundness. Predication as understood as encoding follows a different logic from predication as understood as exemplification. The crux of Zalta’s theory is encapsulated in the following two principles: