  The versions of the threshold view that see the capacity for autonomy as the relevant threshold can be challenged by approaches that cast the requirements of the capacity for autonomy as being so minimal that any individual capable of generating independent interests in his deteriorated state counts as autonomous. On such approaches, conflicts between earlier interests grounded in autonomy and later interests no longer so grounded become impossible, and the claim of authority of the earlier autonomous self over the current non-autonomous self loses its bite: the threshold of autonomy is so low as to cease to mark any contestable difference in authority. Seana Shiffrin's response to Dworkin can be interpreted as a view of this sort (Shiffrin 2004). Shiffrin sees a key point of autonomy in the ability to exercise one's own will: the ability to control one's experiences through the enactment of one's own choice. Shiffrin emphasizes that so long as an individual has this ability, its exercise calls for protection, and this is a crucial part of what we protect when we respect autonomy. On this picture, so long as an individual is able to make choices, have preferences, exhibit a will, etc., there is a rationale for catering to his current interests, and so his current interests have authority to override interests espoused in the past.