 Descartes claims that his final solution to the sceptical problem makes it “impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of.” We’ve seen that the sticking point in the account is indirect doubt. Descartes rejects that we could overcome the problem via uninterrupted clear and distinct perception: “my nature is also such that I cannot fix my mental vision continually on the same thing, so as to keep perceiving it clearly; and often the memory of a previously made judgement may come back, when I am no longer attending to the arguments which led me to make it.” At such moments of inattention, an indirect doubt remains possible, so long as we can make sense of the evil genius scenario, or any other scenario wherein we have a defective cognitive nature. It thus seems that a final solution to the problem would need, somehow, to make it no longer possible to make sense of the relevant sceptical scenarios. Indeed, the interpretation has it the sceptical scenarios become self-evidently incoherent. We come to have an utterly basic apprehension that we’re the creation of an all-perfect creator who would not allow us to be deceived about what we clearly and distinctly perceive.