 Thus, despite the plausibility of the claim that manipulation bypasses the target’s capacities for rational deliberation, using this claim to define manipulation faces serious challenges: If we take “bypassing” very literally, then the account seems to miss many examples of genuine manipulation. But if we loosen our understanding of “bypassing reason” so that it applies to any non-rational form of influence, then it seems to count as manipulative many forms of influence that do not seem manipulative. And if we fix that problem by adopting a conception of reason according to which appeals to the emotions are not ipso facto non-rational, then we are left with the original problem of determining which appeals to the emotions are manipulative and which are not. Perhaps there is a way to characterize “bypassing reason” that can undergird a plausible definition of manipulation in terms of bypassing reason. But the most obvious ways to define “bypassing reason” face serious problems.