 The view that the evaluations normally conveyed by T-utterances are conveyed by the same mechanism as semantic or truth-conditional content in general is, however, controversial. Utterances can communicate information that doesn’t contribute to their truth-conditions, and in  section 4.2  we’ll see several ways they can do so, either in virtue of other linguistic conventions or conversational principles and mechanisms. If we use the label “semantic” narrowly to refer only to truth-conditional properties of utterances, and use the label “pragmatic” broadly to cover the other ways for utterances to convey information, then the view that thick terms are globally evaluative as a matter of the truth-conditions of T-utterances may be called the “Semantic View” and the views according which thick terms convey global evaluation through some other mechanism of information transfer may be called “Pragmatic Views”. (To avoid confusion, also bear in mind that “pragmatic” is often used more narrowly to refer only to features of utterances that are explained by conversational principles rather than linguistic conventions.)