 In contradistinction with the gods, the soul receives a plethora of negative traits: it is imperfect, intermittent, it leans towards matter; and while the causes of Order and Beauty exist in full communion with the gods, the soul can never be given more than a mere share of it (Reply to Porphyry I, 6–7 [SS-2013: 15.14–17.7]). The immutability of this celestial hierarchy is striking, and foreshadows the later works of Hierocles, Proclus, and pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Although the soul’s versatility—its ability to “make use of varied forms and life-principles”—allows it to attach itself to superior beings and lay claim “to receiving perfection as an angelic, immaculate soul” (Reply to Porphyry II, 2 [SS-2013: 51.10–52.11]), on closer reading it appears to be unable to escape its condition by virtue of its own essence: its ascent is never complete (it is an endeavor, ephesis or henōsis, with a suffix expressing verbal action) and it presupposes, moreover, the gods’ “goodwill and illumination”. Porphyry had previously drawn a similar distinction between demons that are so “by essence” (kat’ ousian) or by mere “relation” (kata skhesin), the latter being those humans who, by virtue of their excellent life, are allotted demonic status. On the other hand, the human soul is also unable to be relegated to the rank of animals via metempsychosis (cf. the title of one of Iamblichus’ psychological works preserved by Nemesius of Emesa, On the Nature of Man, chap. 2, p. 35.7–11 Morani). Some points, however, remain unclear, such as how exactly Iamblichus’ generic distinction between human souls and “divine” ones would fit within such a structure; or what we are to make of the souls of exceptional, even semi-divine characters such as Pythagoras or the theurgists. Similar preoccupations underlie Frs. 82 and 83 In Timaeum [D-1973], interpreting Timaeus 41d.