 The central idea is that God’s causal activity with regard to the production of a body is an “all or nothing” affair, in the sense that if God produces the body, God produces it with all of its specific modes or properties. In other words, though God need not create a body, as long as he does create or conserve it, he cannot do so without bringing about its specific spatial properties or modes. Why, we might ask, is this the case? Even if one grants that there can be no abstract or general Cartesian body, as it were—that is, a body that is extended in general without any specific spatial properties or modes—such that even God could not create such a body in the abstract, the concurrents could still wonder, why is it the case that the cause that gives the esse to a given body must also be the cause that produces its specific modes and properties as well? It is here that the CCC thesis provides the missing link. For if conservation is but continuous creation, in the sense that the character and degree of dependence is identical in the two cases, then insofar as there was total dependence at creation, there would have to be total dependence in conservation. Occasionalism with regard to bodies would follow. Given that God has a monopoly over producing both the body itself and its modes, no other cause is operative in bringing about any aspect of the world. Conservation is but continuous creation.