 I note that some so-called “experimental philosophers” have recently questioned the thesis that judgments of taste aspire to correctness on the basis of empirical evidence about those who make judgments of taste (Cova &amp; Pain 2012). But it is not clear that the empirical evidence that they cite supports that skeptical thesis. For the evidence is just that that the experimental subjects tick boxes that ask directly about correctness in judgment. But in psychological experiments there is a requirement on the opacity of the point of an experiment to the experimental subjects. Furthermore, people often wax philosophical in a way that is out of step with their actual conceptual practice. For example, some beginners in introduction to moral philosophy classes claim that all moral views are equally correct, and that it is very bad to think otherwise. People who think in a certain way may be defective in self-knowledge, just as those who take part in social rituals may not be able to describe those rituals (see Zangwill forthcoming for critical discussion). We should also bear in mind that the skeptical thesis would also be very surprising given that it departs from not just centuries but millennia of reflection on our aesthetic lives. The answers to questionnaires about correctness in judgment do not reveal the deep nature of people’s thoughts.