 In the Logic, however, things are different because of the oft-cited sense in which thought is prior to language. Well formulated mental propositions can, in principle, be thought wordlessly—a linguistic sentence will rarely mirror the form of a thought with perfect accuracy. This means that to affirm a verbal proposition is not always to have a clear and distinct perception of it. In a generally Cartesian theory of the mind, what is plausibly called “entertaining” or “suspending judgment” on a proposition does not require a mental act apart from affirming or denying. Suppose one thinks the proposition, P, but simultaneously thinks much more clearly the proposition, “I should investigate the truth of P”, or the proposition Q where Q is incompatible withP. Those states of mind seems to answer at least as well to the description “merely entertaining P” as does a special mental act of entertaining or “suspending judgment on” P. The authors could even claim that one never does merely entertain a proposition P without the further concomitant judgment that P is to some extent doubtful, or that it would be rash to act on P without further investigating whether P is true, etc.