 The particularism/methodism divide connects naturally to other wider issues of interest in epistemology. First, a strong methodist starting point, such as the starting point from Descartes and Hume, implies a foundationalist approach to the structure of justified belief and knowledge. That is, Descartes and Hume opt for foundationalism by way of taking the particular methodist starting point that they do. Second, the particularism/methodism divide might well be such that other epistemological problems of interest are special cases of this problem. For example, James Van Cleve (1979) and Sosa (2009) both regard the Cartesian Circle as closely connected with the Problem of the Criterion in this way. Third, while the Problem of the Criterion in epistemology is typically formulated in connection with the project of analyzing knowledge, the philosophical problems associated with methodism or particularism (and which might be our proper starting point) apply, mutatis mutandis, to projects in epistemology that investigate other epistemic phenomena of interest, including, e.g., epistemic justification, understanding, intellectual virtues, and the like. And, as a point of philosophical method, the problem might also be appreciated as a philosophical problem about philosophical method, one that extends beyond epistemology to other kinds of philosophical analyses (for discussion see Fumerton 1995, 2008).