 An interpretation of the threshold as an element of a sufficiency conception of intergenerational justice is not mandatory, but seems plausible (as discussed in  §4.4):  the threshold can be interpreted as a sufficiency standard that is defined in terms of absolute, non-comparative conditions (defined by a certain level of well-being and not comparing the well-being levels of people) and which all people have a priority claim to achieve (Shiffrin 1999: 123–124; McMahan 1998: 223–229; Page 2006: esp. 90–95, 170–173; Casal 2007: 298–299; Meyer &amp; Roser 2009: 226–243; Huseby 2012; Shields 2016: 34–35; Meyer &amp; Pölzler forthcoming). Whether one and the same threshold is applicable to all decisions is controversial. Whether we wrongfully inflict non-comparative harms on a person by causing this person’s existence is often considered a special case for which a particularly low threshold is relevant: we cause such harm by bringing a person to existence only if this person’s postnatal potential of development and his life span are drastically reduced (Kavka 1982: 105–106) and especially so if the person experiences pain (C. E. Harris 1991: 65–66; Schöne-Seifert &amp; Krüger 1993: 257–258; Merkel 2001).