 Self-determination theories of territory have the same overall shape as nationalist theories, but they seek to avoid the difficulties of assuming culturally homogeneous nations by ascribing territorial rights to a ‘people’ understood as a politically-organized rather than cultural group. Anna Stilz (2019: 10) argues that her account is built on three pillars: a property-like right of occupancy; the value of ‘basic justice’, conceptualized in Kantian terms of the requirements of an ‘omnilateral will’; and the value of collective self-determination. Margaret Moore (2015: 66) appeals to the first and third: that a state holds territorial rights (by acting as a vehicle of self-determination” for a group; and that the group must “legitimately occupy” the territory. Although Moore does not emphasize basic justice as a requirement for holding territorial rights (though she claims it is necessary for legitimate governance), she argues that there are functional and justice reasons why the state should be organized territorially—to secure equal treatment for all citizens of the state, justice, and the rule of law. Stilz deploys more Kantian language, to describe her commitment to justice, but this isn’t central to her theory of territory, in the sense that it does not help to define the boundaries of particular territories, nor does this argument contribute to the justification for particular territories.