 Russell (1903: §218) attributed an enormous importance to this issue and attacked it repeatedly. Despite this, it has been pretty much neglected until the end of last century, with only few others confronting it systematically (e.g., Bergmann 1992; Hochberg 1987). However, Fine (2000) has forcefully brought it again on the ontological agenda and proposed a novel approach that has received some attention. Fine identifies standard and positionalist views (analogous to two approaches defended by Russell at different times (1903; 1984); cf. Orilia 2008). According to the former, relations are intrinsically endowed with a “direction”, which allows us to distinguish, e.g., loving and being loved: Abelard loves Eloise and Eloise loves Abelard differ, because they involve two relations that differ in direction (e.g., the former involves loving and the latter being loved). According to the latter, relations have different “positions” that can somehow host relata: Abelard loves Eloise and Eloise loves Abelard differ, because the two positions of the very same loving relation are differently occupied (by Abelard and Eloise in one case and by Eloise and Abelard in the other case). Fine goes on to propose and endorse an alternative, “anti-positionalist” standpoint, according to which relations have neither direction nor positions. The literature on this topic keeps growing and there are now various proposals on the market, including new versions of positionalism (Orilia 2014; Donnelly 2016; Dixon 2018), and primitivism, according to which differential application cannot be analyzed (MacBride 2014).