  The same may be true in non-phonological domains too. The notion that at least some of the capacities responsible for syntactic learning  are non-language specific is suggested by analogous results about the non-species specificity of recursive rule learning and generalization — an ability that Chomsky has recently suggested forms the core of the human language faculty. (Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch 2002; see  below, 3.4 for further discussion.) Other species, notably cotton top tamarins, seem capable of learning simple recursive rules (Hauser,  Weiss, and Marcus 2002). In addition, Hauser and McDermott 2003  argue that musical and syntactic processing involve similar  competences, which are again seen in other species. Together, these  findings suggest that there are aspects of the human ‘language  faculty’ that are neither task-specific nor species-specific.  Instead, language learning and linguistic processing make use of  abilities that predate language phylogenetically, and that are used  in humans and in animals for other sorts of tasks. (See e.g., Hauser, Weiss, and Marcus 2002 for an account of recent work on rule  learning by cotton top tamarins; see Hauser and McDermott 2003 for  the suggestion that aspects of musical and syntactic processing  involve similar competences, which are again seen in other species.)  Rather than viewing the human mind as being innately specialized for  language language learning, it seems at least as reasonable to think  of languages as being specialized so as to be learnable and usable by the human mind; of this, more in §3.4 below.