 Suggested Reading: For a way into the general debate about vagueness, try Keefe and Smith (eds.) (1997), and the separate entry on  vagueness.  Stalnaker (1988) is a particularly nice discussion of vague persistence.  Issues discussed in this section are covered in more detail by Hawley (2001, chapter 4). Temporal parts accounts of vague persistence are defended by Sider (2001, section 4.9) (Sider presents a distinctive argument which will be discussed in  section 8)  and Heller (2000); these are criticised by Lowe (2005). Romerales (2008) compares perdurance and stage theory on this front. Endurantist worldly vagueness is defended by van Inwagen (1988; 1990b) and discussed by Cowles (1994), Garrett (1991), and Hirsch (1999). The classic argument against worldly vagueness in identity can be found in Evans (1978) and Salmon (1981). Heller (1996) objects to worldly vagueness of all kinds. Hudson (2000) defends an epistemicist temporal parts theory. Williamson (1994, chapter 9) discusses an epistemicist account of vague objects. Haslanger (1994) considers multitudes of coinciding endurers, and Sosa (1987; 1999) looks kindly upon the idea, as does Kurtsal Steen (2010). Further discussion can also be found in the separate entries on  ordinary objects  and on  identity. 