Those who voice this criticism sometimes couple it with another: that the equality that is morally compelling is equality of status as a free and equal person in democratic society, not any sort of distributive equality guaranteeing that all should have the same or be treated the same. On this view, fair shares of resources need not involve initial equal opportunity for resources or welfare or any other sort of advantage. Rather, distributive justice requires that the distribution of resources across members of society should not subvert the status of all as free and equal. All should have opportunity to participate in democratic society on a footing of equality (Scheffler 2003, 2005; Anderson 1999); for critical response, see Tan 2008). Moreover, the moral imperative of sustaining equal opportunity to be a full participating member of society is not dampened or extinguished when members of society behave in ways others regard as imprudent or unvirtuous or undeserving. Being a responsible member of society might be a good thing but one's moral entitlement to equality of status is not conditional on good behavior.