 Another explanation of the projection data is due to Brent Kyle. It comes in two pieces. The first concerns (4a). When you say someone is not happy, you only say that they lack the quality of being happy, not that they are unhappy. But normally, in the absence of an explicit note to the contrary, we tend to interpret the claim that someone isn’t happy as conversationally implicating (conveying, suggesting) that they are unhappy. It should then be equally plausible that not chaste similarly conversationally implicates unchaste. Since those who find chaste objectionable should also be reluctant to imply that anyone is unchaste, this would explain why chaste-objectors are reluctant to utter (4a). So what about (4b–d)? To be a chaste-objector you must have concluded that things aren’t good simply for showing a certain kind of sexual restraint. If the Semantic View is true, it follows that nothing can be chaste. But each of (4b–d) implies that the speaker considers it a live possibility that Isolde is chaste. No wonder, then, that chaste-objectors are reluctant to assert (4b–d). Since these explanations focus on truth-conditionally irrelevant implications of  (4a–d),  they are compatible with the Semantic View (Kyle 2013a: 13–19). In appealing to two distinct types of implicature, this piecemeal explanation is less parsimonious than Pragmatic Views which make do with just one mechanism, but whether that makes the explanation worse overall is a complex question up for debate. (For this methodological issue, see  section 3  of the supplementary document  “Additional Debates about Thick Concepts and Their Significance”.)