 How exactly presuppositions of utterances are related to their truth-conditions is a complex topic. Perhaps A’s utterance can be true even if the presupposition is false: you can’t regret something you never did. Either way, linguists largely think that the presupposition isn’t part of the truth-conditions of A’s utterance, but only part of the “common ground” of the conversation. Among writers on thick concepts, Allan Gibbard and Gopal Sreenivasan speak of the evaluations conveyed by T-utterances as presuppositions, but without developing the view in detail (Gibbard 1992; Sreenivasan 2001: 26). More detailed and sophisticated developments can be found in Cepollaro and Stojanovic (2016) and Cepollaro (2020). An open question about this view is whether the relevant presuppositions are better understood pragmatically, as conveying the speaker’s beliefs about the conversation’s common ground, or semantically, as something that expressions carry as part of their meaning. A worry about presuppositional views is that the evaluations normally conveyed by objectionable thick concepts have no prospect of being added to the common ground of the conversation when some addressees find them objectionable, whereas presuppositions not already in the common ground are expected to be added to it unless challenged. Resources for addressing both of these issues might, however, be available in the complex and subtle contemporary work on presupposition in linguistics (cf. Cepollaro 2020: ch. 4). 