  There is a vast literature on the Third Man argument, initiated by the groundbreaking analysis of the reasoning in Vlastos (1954). (See, among others, Sellars (1955), Vlastos (1955), Geach (1956), Vlastos (1956), Cherniss (1957), Peck (1962), Moravcsik (1963), Strang (1963), Vlastos (1969), Cohen (1971), Teloh and Louzecky (1972), Peterson (1973), Goldstein and Mannick (1978), Mann (1979), Mates (1979), Pickering (1981), Teloh (1981, 158–167), Waterlow (1982), Prior (1985, 64–75), Curd (1986), Sharvy (1986), Penner (1987, 251–299), Scaltsas (1989), Malcolm (1991, 47–53), Meinwald (1992), Scaltsas (1992), Fine (1993, 203–241), McCabe (1994, 84–87), Schweizer (1994), Frances (1996), Allen (1997, 152–167), Hunt (1997), Rickless (1998), Pelletier and Zalta (2000), and Rickless (2007, 64–75).) Most commentators agree that the reasoning relies on at least three principles: One-over-Many, Self-Predication, and Non-Identity (about which more anon). (Allen (1997, 163) accepts that the reasoning relies on the claim that the large is large—an instance of Self-Predication, but denies that the argument, when generalized to forms other than the large, relies on Self-Predication.) They also agree that the reasoning generates an infinite regress of forms of largeness, and that the argument could be generalized to generate an infinite regress of forms corresponding to any predicate. But commentators differ over why Plato takes the regress to be vicious or problematic, and what Plato would have recommended as a way of avoiding the absurdity generated by the reasoning.