 Dilemma, too, receives extensive treatment from him. This type of argument had been widely studied in antiquity. The basic structure is a disjunction of propositions, usually in the form of a double question in an interrogation, which sets a trap for the respondent, since whichever horn of the dilemma he chooses, he seems to be caught up in a contradiction and will lose the debate (“If he is modest, why should you accuse someone who is a good man? If he is bad, why should you accuse someone who is unconcerned by such a charge?”, Cicero, De inventione 1.45.83, cited by Valla Repastinatio, 1:321; DD 2:332). It was also recognized that the respondent could often counter the dilemma by duplicating the original argument and “turning it back” (convertere) on the interrogator, using it as a kind of boomerang (“if he is modest, you should accuse him because he will be concerned by such a charge; if he is bad, you should also accuse him because he is not a good man”). Alternatively, he could escape the dilemma by questioning the disjunction and showing that there is a third possibility. There were many variations of this simple scheme, and it was studied from a logical as well as a rhetorical point of view with considerable overlap between these two perspectives.