 Despite several surprising similarities, Kant and Hume clearly disagree on the basic question of whether pure reason, to use Kant’s expression, can be motivationally efficacious. Kant thinks it can, while Hume does not. However, one must interpret this disagreement with care. First, Kant’s account of respect makes clear that feeling or emotion is involved even when pure reason motivates action. The “affectivist” interpretation of respect, in particular, suggests that Kant and Hume may agree that reason cannot motivate action without the intervention of feeling. (For a similar point about the French and British moral rationalists Hume probably read, see Radcliffe 2019.) The crucial difference between them is that Kant believes pure reason capable of producing a motivationally efficacious feeling (respect), while Hume believes nothing of the sort. The opposition between them is even starker if the “intellectualist” interpretation of Kantian respect is correct. Second, Kant’s account of virtue makes it clear that feelings such as love and sympathy often play an important moral role in the motivation of human action. Indeed, feelings appear to be indispensable for human beings and should therefore be cultivated and strengthened through deliberate practice.