 Related to this analysis is Valla’s repudiation of what he presents as the scholastic view of the distinction between abstract and concrete terms, that is, the view that abstract terms (“whiteness,” “fatherhood”) always refer solely to quality, while concrete terms (“white,” “father”) refer to both substance and quality (Repastinatio, 1:21–30; DD 1:36–54). In a careful discussion of this distinction, taking into account the grammatical categories of case, number, and gender, Valla rejects the ontological commitments which such a view seems to imply, and shows, on the basis of a host of examples drawn from classical Latin usage, that abstract terms often have the same meaning as their concrete counterparts (useful/utility, true/truth, honest/honesty). These terms refer to the concrete thing itself, that is, to the substance, its quality or action (or a combination of these three components into which a thing can be resolved). Again, Valla’s main concern is to study the workings of language and how these relate to the world of everyday things, the world that we see and experience.