 Some advocates of Conceptualism (e.g., McDowell 1996, 1998; Ginsborg 2006b; Grüne 2009: 53–71) think that it is at least partially constitutive of intuition that it have correctness conditions. However, this view is also shared by nonconceptualist interpreters (e.g., Hanna 2005). In this way, both Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism typically agree that an intuition’s cognitive relation to an object depends on correctness conditions constituting its ‘content’ (in the contemporary sense), but disagree as to whether that content is conceptual.But, if Kant rejects the Content View, and so rejects the claim that it is in virtue of having content that intuition counts as related to an object, a central means for framing the dispute between Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism’s understanding of intuition is undermined.