  An important division among versions of reasons internalism is between what we will here call Motivation views and State views. According to Motivation views, the kind of motivational fact that reasons require is a fact about what the agent is or can be motivated (i.e. moved through her own volition) to do. According to State views, in contrast, the kind of motivational fact that reasons require is not actually a fact about motivation at all, but rather, that the agent has a certain kind of motivational attitude—a certain kind of psychological state which plays a role in motivation. These states are often taken to be desires, but can include other attitudes such as emotions, intentions, and aversions. Motivation and State views are often run together, but we shall see that they have importantly different implications. Motivation views do not, by themselves, require the presence of any particular kind of psychological state which does the motivating, and State views do not, by themselves, require that the motivating state which is present actually does any motivating.