 Even if these philosophical critics of the binding problem are right to suggest that a perceiver can typically experience several properties as belonging to a single object without the need for any special binding process to integrate the representations of those properties, it may nonetheless be true that, in some particular cases, attention does play a role in determining the way in which different streams of sensory information come to be combined. Even in these circumscribed cases, the question of how this binding-like role for attention should be characterized may raise its own philosophical difficulties. Several psychologists studying the integration of information from across different sensory modalities have found themselves running into such difficulties, claiming that the role of attention in integrated multisensory perception is ‘curious’, and ‘a paradox’, especially in cases that involve the perception of speech (Tiippana, Andersen and Sams, 2004; Macaluso et al., 2016). Philosophers who have interrogated the assumptions leading to the idea there is a general binding problem have not yet extended their critique to these more specific cases. A preliminary philosophical examination suggests that these may be cases in which the appearance of paradox derives from certain questionable assumptions about the predominantly bottom-up nature of perceptual processing, or from assumptions of a more metaphysical sort, concerning the localizable way in which attention’s causal influence is exerted (Mole, 2020).