 Finally, Herder’s ethical theory is important not only for what it includes but also for what it excludes. In particular, he shows little interest in the issue of free will, rarely if ever implying that such a thing exists or that it is a precondition of moral responsibility. (Freedom in the sense of a sort of autonomy, or flexibility, that exists within the limits of the laws of nature and merely amounts to a certain liberty from constraint by narrow instincts and political freedom are another matter; he is interested in these.) This position contrasts sharply with that of most modern moral philosophers, including both Hume and Kant, for example. However, it looks much less idiosyncratic if one takes a broader perspective and notices, for instance, that neither the early Greeks (e.g., Homer) nor the Chinese ethical tradition have had any conception of free will or any inclination to think that such a thing is required for moral responsibility. Indeed, I would argue that Herder’s position here, like that of those other traditions, turns out to be a great virtue, since the very conception of free will and of morality’s dependence on it, which has dominated western philosophy and religion since late antiquity, turns out to be misbegotten.