 While these discussions conclude the proper subject matter of natural theology, in the second half of the second volume Wolff additionally turns to critically examining various systems of atheism and radical thought. Significantly, among the views discussed is Spinozism, and indeed his treatment is considerably detailed (spanning §§671–716 of the second volume), likely reflecting the fact that Wolff had himself faced a persistent accusation of supporting Spinoza on the part of his Pietist critics. In contrast, however, with other discussions of Spinoza by philosophers of this period, Wolff’s does not trade in convenient caricatures or speculation concerning the real (immoral) motives behind Spinoza’s thought but hews closely, if critically, to the text of the Ethics. Wolff scrutinizes Spinoza’s definitions, particularly of God, substance, attribute, mode, and finite thing (which he contrasts with their proper definitions in the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy), and proceeds to show how these figure into Spinoza’s account of extension (NT: II, §§688–93), doctrine of bodies (§§694–6), claims of the uniqueness and necessary existence of substance (§§697–706), and his faulty account of infinite thought as composed of an infinite number of finite thinking things (§§707–8). Wolff’s discussion proved rather influential, with Mendelssohn echoing and developing it, and the accuracy of Wolff’s characterization of Spinoza was also a point of discussion in the famous Pantheismusstreit (cf. Beiser 1987: 103).