 And yet, Stein doesn’t simply identify the act of value-feeling and the feeling-state; instead, she distinguishes the two aspects in order to accommodate cases in which a value is disclosed but precisely doesn’t affectively impact me (“leaves me cold”), or doesn’t elicit a corresponding emotion (see 1922: 133–136[159–163]; cf. Vendrell Ferran 2017). Thus, emotions are disclosing not only evaluative properties but also something about the appropriateness and the depth of the felt evaluation, or the emotional experience as such. When I have a feeling (e.g., joy over x), what is disclosed to me is not only the evaluative property (joyfulness) of x but that and how x matters to me or impacts me in a certain way (as meriting a joyful response from me). A contemporary equivalent of this view can be found in Bennett W. Helm’s account of emotions. According to Helm, 