 Certain problems arise in accounting for how something which in itself is incorporeal can be present in an extended body, as the soul apparently is. Porphyry resolves this by saying that the soul is not locally present in the body but is present to it by a certain disposition or inclination towards the body (Sent.3; 4). In a passage preserved in Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, he says that when something intelligible enters into a relation to some place or to a thing in a place, it is by a misuse of language that we say that it is there. Because its activity is there, we speak of the place when we should speak of the relation to it and the activity. When one should say “it acts there” we misleadingly say “it is there” (Nem. 3, 112–114; cf. Sent. 28). From Porphyry’s “inquiry” (zētema) about the relation preserved by Nemesius we further learn that the embodied soul’s relation to the body is a case of “unfused union” (asynchytos henōsis), (3, 1–185; Dörrie 1959: cap. 2). This implies a relationship that amounts to a fusion in which the two ingredients, however, retain their identity and can in principle be separated. Here, perhaps typically, Porphyry makes use of Stoic theories about mixtures but comes up with an account that does not essentially depart from Plotinus (see Emilsson 1994: 5357ff.). In Against Boethus (a Peripatetic philosopher of the 1st century B.C.), fragments of which are preserved by Eusebius, Porphyry argues that a distinction must be made between the soul as the form of the body, what makes the body alive, and the soul as an intellective, transcendent entity, which is its essential nature. This latter soul is immortal and Boethus makes the mistake of confusing the two (see Karamanolis 2006: 91–98 and Trabattoni 2020).