 Vallentyne defines a contraction of a world as “a world ‘obtainable’ from the original one solely by ‘removing’ objects from it.” (211) As a special case of this, an \(x-t\) contraction, where \(x\) is an object and \(t\) a time, is “a world ‘obtainable’ from the original one by, to the greatest extent possible, ‘removing’ all objects wholly distinct from \(x\), all spatial locations not occupied by \(x\), and all times (temporal states of the world) except \(t\), from the world”, as well as all laws of nature from the world. (211) Vallentyne claims that \(F\) is intrinsic iff, for any thing \(x\), for any time \(t\), and for any worlds \(u\) and \(w\) such that \(u\) is an \(x-t\) contraction of \(w, x\) has \(F\) at \(t\) at \(u\) iff \(x\) has \(F\) at \(t\) at \(w\). In short, a property is intrinsic to an object iff removing the rest of the world doesn’t change whether the object has the property. Vallentyne’s account classifies identity properties, like being Obama, as intrinsic. It is therefore best seen as an account of interiority. The account also classifies all indiscriminately necessary properties as intrinsic. It is therefore arguably most charitably interpreted as an account of metaphysical necessitation interiority