 Like Whewell and Herschel, Popper appeals to the predictions a theory makes as a way of separating the illegitimate uses of the method of hypothesis from its legitimate uses. But while Whewell and Herschel pointed to predictive success as a necessary condition for the acceptability of a theory that had been generated by the method of hypothesis, Popper focuses in his solution to the demarcation problem not on the success of a prediction but on the fact that the theory made the prediction at all. Of course, there was for Popper an important difference between scientific theories whose predictions were confirmed and those whose prediction were falsified. Falsified theories were to be rejected, whereas theories that survived testing were to be ‘tentatively accepted’ until falsified. Popper did not hold, with Whewell and Hershel, that successful predictions could constitute legitimate proof of a theory—in fact Popper held that it was impossible to show that a theory was even probable based on the evidence, for he embraced Hume’s critique of inductive logic that made evidential support for the truth of theories impossible. Thus, one should ascribe to Popper a commitment to predictivism only in the broad sense that he held predictions to be superior to accommodations—he did not hold that predictions confirmed theory more strongly than accommodations. It would ultimately prove impossible for Popper to reconcile his claim that a theory which enjoyed predictive success ought to be ‘tentatively accepted’ with his anti-inductivism (see, e.g., Salmon 1981). 