 Inflationism is the most widely endorsed strategy for dealing with occurrent thoughts, at least in cases of thoughts that do not seem to have wide contents (see  6.3 below  for the latter). Strawson (1994, 2008), Siewert (1998), Horgan &amp; Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson &amp; Graham (2004), and Pitt (2009) all hold that occurrent thought has a phenomenology that is rich and determinate enough to fix its intentional contents. Horgan &amp; Tienson (2002), Horgan, Tienson &amp; Graham (2004), and Pitt (2009) also argue that the difference between beliefs, desires, and other kinds of attitudes is phenomenally constituted. The case for this approach rests on the  arguments for cognitive phenomenology  we discuss above. 