 Mozi’s argument, in this passage, does not seem to prove the existence of an emotion of universal love and mutual caring. Instead, the argument attempts to prove the importance of impartiality and the necessity of an emotional dedication for the universal love. It is a rational justification that calls for a reciprocal and universal viewpoint where one should take equal interest for oneself and others. In this context, one can suspect the psychological reality and practical effectiveness of Mozi’s universal love. The main theoretical challenge is to explain the motivation of impartial caring on the basis of a reasoning that impartial caring is morally justified and a rationally right thing to do (Graham 1989: 31–32; Nivison 1996: 84; Virág 2017: 61–62). Can the affective motivation of jian ai come out of a rational argument or doxastic moral justification? Although one does not need to distinguish rationality and emotionality of jian ai and can accept the diverse forms of moral motivation (Fraser 2011; Robins 2012), Mozi’s approach to emotion is clearly different from that of Confucians, such as Confucius and Mencius. The Confucians believe that natural or genuine emotional states can align themselves with moral will and ideal virtues through the process of self-cultivation, learning or other mental practices. Mozi seems to focus primarily on reasoning and rational justification for jian ai, although he does not completely reject or devalue the affective elements of jian ai and the various means of its cultivation. According to him, jian ai makes rulers kind, ministers loyal, and fathers compassionate, and the gentleman carefully examining it and diligently practicing it (Mozi, 16.2; Johnston 2010: 165).