 Hartry Field also holds that belief in certain propositions can be “default reasonable”, that is, justified but not on the basis of evidence. He seems to think that if a belief’s being “default reasonable” were sufficient for its being a priori justified, too many beliefs would count as being a priori justified. That’s because he thinks, for example, that “People usually tell the truth” is default reasonable but not a priori justified. So he adds the requirement that an a priori justified belief cannot be empirically defeasible (Field 2000: 119–120; cited in Casullo 2012c: 318–320). But we have seen above that paradigm cases of a priori justification can be defeated by empirical considerations (see above,  sec. 3).  So by adding the requirement of no empirical defeat, Field’s view will imply that there are no a priori justifiable propositions. On the other hand, if he drops that requirement, he faces the same problem as Harman in drawing the boundaries of a priori justification too broadly.