 It is hard to see, however, how there could be a univocal and reasonably well defined notion of ‘normality’ that would deliver clear verdicts on what the ‘normal’ or ‘default’ values of variables are, and hence would deliver an objectively ‘correct’ set of models, all of which deliver the same verdict for the same situation (Blanchard and Schaffer 2017: §§2 and 3). Blanchard and Schaffer argue that ‘default-relativity’ does not solve some of the problems it was supposed to solve; more importantly, however, they argue that the alleged cases of isomorphic causal models are not really genuine cases in the first place: they arise because one (or both) of the relevant models falls foul of the independently-motivated criteria for ‘aptness’ (see  §5.3  above). For example, one such criterion is that the variables not be allotted values ‘that one is not willing to take seriously’ (Hitchcock 2001: 287). But the case of the gardener and the Queen violates that criterion: the possibility of the Queen watering my flowers is, precisely, one that we do not take seriously. In other cases, they argue, the isomorphism results from deploying ‘impoverished’ models: models that fail to include enough variables to adequately represent the ‘essential causal structure’ of the situation being modelled (Blanchard and Schaffer 2017: §3).