 But, for now, let us examine why the notational consequentializer thinks that the first premise is true. It’s because they have high hopes for what’s known as the Footian Procedure (Portmore 2011: 112), a procedure for generating an act-consequentialist counterpart theory for any plausible target non-consequentialist theory. To follow this procedure, we simply combine act-consequentialism’s view that an act is permissible if and only if its outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative with the assumption that an act’s outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative if and only if it is F, where “F” stands for whatever feature of actions that the target non-consequentialist theory takes to be the ultimate right-maker (e.g., “showing the proper respect for humanity” in the case of Kantianism). In other words, we generate a ranking of outcomes as follows: we rank the outcome of every act that the target non-consequentialist theory takes to be permissible above the outcome of every available alternative that the target non-consequentialist theory takes to be impermissible. What’s more, if the target non-consequentialist theory allows that some acts are morally better than others in that we have more moral reason to perform them than to perform those others, then we rank their outcomes above those of the others, and we do so by whatever degree the target non-consequentialist theory takes them to be morally better. Because, on this procedure, whether one outcome outranks another on the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory just depends on whether the act that would produce the one is, on the target non-consequentialist theory, morally better than the act that would produce the other, it guarantees that the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory delivers, in every possible world, the same deontic verdicts that the target non-consequentialist theory yields.