 Prichard’s earliest work does seem to treat rightness or obligatoriness as a property of the action to be done, or rather, as a property of the action once it is done. By 1932, however, as discussed in section 3 above, he had moved to the view that obligation is a property of the agent, not of the act at all. There is some sign in his published paper of that date that he had not yet extended the new view to include rightness, i.e. that he had come to distinguish rightness, which remained a property of the act and not of the agent, from obligation or obligatedness, now appearing as a property of the agent. For he writes ‘While the truth could not be expressed by saying ‘My setting myself to do so-and-so would be right, because I think it would have a certain effect’ – a statement which would be as vicious in principle as the statement ‘Doing so-and-so would be right because I think it would be right’ – there is nothing to prevent its being expressible in the form ‘I ought to set myself to do so-and-so because I think it would have a certain effect’ (99–100). With this distinction the property of obligatoriness vanishes altogether, though rightness remains, grounded in the familiar combinations of the (objective) nature of the situation and some definite relation in which the agent stands to others or to himself. However, if this was Prichard’s view at the time, no trace of it appears later, and Ross appears not to have noticed it at all (see his account of the argument of Prichard’s 1932 paper in Ross 1939, ch. 7). And this is just as well, because it is very unsettling to be told that one can have an obligation to do an action that is in fact wrong.