 Philosophers who espouse this position thus deny thesis ii of the regress argument (according to which ignorance is culpable only if it derives from a benighting act performed in awareness of its wrongness) and, consequently, also deny thesis iii (that responsibility requires occurrent and de dicto beliefs about the action’s overall wrongness), but only regarding benighting acts. So they in effect posit an asymmetry in the epistemic requirements on blameworthiness: while blameworthiness for ordinary actions does require awareness of wrongdoing, blameworthiness for benighting acts and subsequent ignorance doesn’t (FitzPatrick 2008: 609; see Levy 2009: 741 for criticism of this asymmetry). A further consequence is that they accept thesis i (that blameworthiness for actions performed out of ignorance is always derivative) for all actions except for benighting acts (FitzPatrick 2008: 609 n.37; 2017: 32); and accept thesis iv as well (that both factual and moral ignorance can exculpate) (FitzPatrick 2008: 602; 2017: 35).