Hume's and Russell's accounts of memory are both versions of the RTM.  They differ, however, in two important respects.  First, Hume's account of memory sees the objects of memory as ideas.  But Humean ideas are not essentially propositional.  In fact, a propositional representation will have to be constructed from two or more ideas.  So inasmuch as we are interested in an account of memory belief, which is essentially propositional, we'll have to look elsewhere.  On the other hand, the “images” that are the primary component of Russell's view surely have propositional content.  Russell's second important point of departure from Hume concerns that which is distinctive of memory representations.  On Hume's account, memory images are distinguished by an intrinsic property; memory images are more vivid and forceful than images of imagination and less vivid and forceful than impressions.  Pace Hume, Russell takes the distinguishing feature of memory images to be relational: an image is a memory image if it is associated with a certain feeling or belief to the effect that the content of that image refers to an event in the past.