 So in order to possess in itself this non-numerical unity, the nature must have, in itself, some sort of being too, proportional to it (such that the real entity of the nature is diminished in proportion to the diminished real unity that it has). Scotus does not mean that the nature is some sort of universal ante rem; if there were no instantiations, there would be no nature, but once there are instantiations there is too some subject for instantiation (the nature), and this subject has some sort of being in itself. Indeed, this subject is in some sense prior (but not temporally prior) to its instantiations: while the identity of its instantiations depends on it, its identity does not depend on those of its instantiations. (It makes no difference to the identity of human nature whether or not I exist, though the reality of human nature certainly requires that at least one human being exist: see Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 34 (Scotus [OO], 7:404; Spade (1994), 64).) As instantiated, the nature receives the (accidental) modification of being numerically many in numerically many things.