 It might be retorted that Dharmakīrti’s idea of all awareness being “reflexive awareness” (svasaṃvedana) shows his internalism. But “reflexive awareness”—often termed “self-awareness” (even though for Buddhists it is emphatically not an awareness of a self and its states)—will not get us all the way to internalism about justification either. Following Williams (1998), Kellner (2010) and Arnold (2010), there seem to be to be two basic themes in the positions from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to Śāntarakṣita that all consciousness is non-conceptually reflexive: (1) that the mind perceives such and such objects as well as how it experiences those objects; it is thus non-conceptually aware of the objective and subjective aspects (ākāra), or appearances (ābhāsa), of all its states; (2) that reflexive awareness is a condition of sentience: an experience is not just a material process (like, say, digestion), but can lead to subsequent memory and conceptualization because it is non-conceptually  “auto-illuminated.”[33]  On both versions, however, while someone could be aware that she is now inferring P in reliance upon a reason Q, it is hard to see that her simple awareness of processes “going on in her head” would also mean that she herself would know that or why the inference was justified. Reflexive awareness is aware of whatever conscious processes are occurring, be they delusions or reliable. So, while a person would be aware of the brute fact that thoughts were occurring, their credentials are another matter.