 A third worry is voiced by Bratman (2012). He criticizes constructivists for imposing excessive constraints on rational deliberation, which eventually put agents in tension with their own pre-reflective normative judgments. As a consequence, reflective agents may find themselves holding incompatible (prereflective and reflective) judgments. For instance, one might be required to reflectively give up one’s loyalties and attachments because they do not cohere with one’s impartial duties, even though such loyalties shape one’s life. This is a problem even when the constitutive norm is a formal requirement of consistency, as it is for Street. Furthermore, if the input judgments include attitudes such as love and caring, which are not necessarily responsive to intersubjective pressures, agents may end up endorsing reflective judgments that are not aligned with their unreflective judgments. This objection points to a difficulty for constructivism insofar as it adopts constitutive strategies, but it also indicates the importance of the temporal dimensions of rational agency (James 2012; Ferrero 2009, 2010b; Smith 2013: 315ff). Relatedly, s new significant line of research develops varieties of constructivism that take into account the predicaments of contingency,the possibility normative revisions (Baldwin 2013, Richardson 2018), moral progress (Arruda 2016), and concrete forms of normativity (Gledhill and Stein 2020).