 But, as consequentializers have shown, other act-consequentialist theories can. One is Schefflerian utilitarianism (see Portmore 2011: 93–7). It holds that an act is permissible if and only if there is no available alternative whose outcome outranks its outcome both in terms of utility for others (other than the agent, that is) and in terms of egoistically-adjusted utility, where egoistically-adjusted utility includes everyone’s utility but adjusts the overall total by giving the agent’s utility ten times the weight of each other’s. Schefflerian utilitarianism implies that you are permitted to either take the two tablets yourself (as this would produce the most egoistically-adjusted utility) or give the two strangers one tablet each (as this would produce the most utility for others). What’s more, Schefflerian utilitarianism allows that in the previous case you can either take the aspirin to alleviate your own severe headache (as this would produce the most egoistically-adjusted utility) or give it to the stranger to alleviate their mild headache (as this would produce the most utility for others). Thus, Schefflerian utilitarianism is an act-consequentialist theory that accommodates both agent-favoring options and agent-sacrificing options. Still, it is a rather simplistic theory, and one that seems both arbitrary in setting the egoistic multiplier at ten and ad hoc in its appeal to a dual ranking of outcomes solely as a means to avoiding counterintuitive implications. But consequentializers have tried to come up with ever more sophisticated consequentialist theories that seek to address these issues—see, e.g., Portmore 2011: chaps. 5–6.