 Clearly, much remains to be discussed regarding the impact mechanism has come to wield in philosophy of neuroscience over the last decade. But while mechanism has become the most dominant general perspective in the field, work in other areas continues. Michael Anderson defends the relevance of cognitive neuroscience for determining psychology’s taxonomy, independent of any commitment to mechanism. The most detailed development of his approach is in his (2014) book, After Phrenology, based on his influential “neural reuse” hypothesis. Each region of the brain, as recognized by the standard techniques of cognitive neuroscience (especially fMRI), engages in cognitive functions that are highly various, and form different “neural partnerships” with one another under different circumstances. Psychological categories are then to be reconceived along lines suggested by the wide-ranging empirical data in support of neural reuse. A genuine “post-phrenological” science of the mind must jettison the assumption that each brain region performs its own fundamental computation. In this fashion Anderson’s work explicitly continues philosophy of neuroscience’s ongoing interest in localizations of cognitive functions.