 David Lewis (1988) undertakes a thorough response to the knowledge argument. Among Lewis’s many considerations, there is one that seeks to enforce a connection between phenomenal information per se and epiphenomenalism. According to Lewis’s argument, even if one says that phenomenal events are identical with physical events, and even if one says that phenomenal events produce physical effects in violation of physical laws, one will still be led to a form of epiphenomenalism if one says there is phenomenal information that is irreducibly different from physical information. To put the argument in ruthlessly summary form, let \(V_1\) and \(V_2\) be two possibilities for the phenomenal information that one acquires by, and only by, tasting Vegemite. Suppose that \(P_1\) is a physical state produced by the taste of Vegemite. That the taste of Vegemite has this physical effect is a piece of physical information. But this same physical information is compatible with two possibilities, (a) \(V_1\) is related by a law, \(L_1\), to \(P_1\); and (b) \(V_2\) is related by a different law, \(L_2\), to \(P_1\). Now, either of these possibilities is compatible with all the physical information we have; i.e., their difference makes no physical difference. Thus, that the phenomenal information in the taste of Vegemite is, say, \(V_1\) rather than \(V_2\) can make no difference to anything physical, i.e., \(V_1\) is epiphenomenal. Lewis’s point here is not to argue for or against epiphenomenalism; rather, he assumes epiphenomenalism is false, and uses the fact that the hypothesis of phenomenal information leads to it as an argument against that hypothesis.