 In the case of metaepistemological error theory, two prominent defenses are due to Jonas Olson and, with some qualifications, Bart Streumer (2008, 2013, 2017). Olson’s tack is a kind of “reverse” of Cuneo’s parity strategy; that is, Olson (2011, 2014) first takes himself to have established metaethical error theory on independent grounds, and then argues from here via a parity premise, for metaepistemological error theory. Two ways to press this rationale will be to either reject moral error theory (e.g., Finlay 2008) or to challenge Olson’s use of a parity premise (see Côté-Bouchard &amp; Littlejohn 2018 for criticism). Streumer, by contrast, embraces metaepistemological error theory by defending, in the first instance, a kind of universal metanormative error theory (Streumer 2008, 2017) which, if correct, would imply metaepistemological error theory—including, importantly, the thesis that there are no epistemic reasons for belief. Some critics of error theory, such as Nishi Shah (2010), have challenged the stability of such an epistemic error theory by appealing to considerations to do with the alleged inescapable character of epistemic norms. A different line of criticism of epistemic error theory insists that—by the theory’s own lights—one has no reason to believe it (compare here with Putnam’s (1981: 121) critique of Protagorean relativism as a position a proponent ought to think her opponent has no reason to believe). Whether this second line of criticism against the epistemic error theorist holds water remains contentious in two ways; for one, it is contested whether, if epistemic error theory implies that there is no reason to believe the theory, this should be held as a mark against the theory (for relevant discussion see Hyun &amp; Sampson 2014; Rowland 2012; and Streumer 2013); secondly, it is contentious whether it is possible to genuinely believe the epistemic error theory, regardless of whether, were one to believe it, one could have an epistemic reason for doing so. On this second point, see, along with Streumer (2013), Lillehammer and Möller (2015) and Olson (2016).