  So far we have been focusing only on the medieval discussion of paradigmatic relational situations—that is, relational situations conforming to the analysis suggested in Aristotle’s Categories. But as we indicated earlier, it is clear from some of Aristotle’s later works, most notably the Metaphysics, that he thinks not all relational situations can be made to conform to it. Thus, in Metaphysics V, he suggests that there are some relational situations in which substances are related, not by a pair of accidents, but by a single accident belonging to just one of them. Here he cites the example of intentional relations: if Simmias is thinking about Socrates, this is to be explained in terms of nothing but Simmias, Socrates, and an accident of Simmias. For the sake of convenience, we shall hereafter refer to relational situations that do not conform to the Categories paradigm as ‘non-paradigmatic relational situations’.