  Having completed his examination, Ramsey concluded that we can know nothing whatever about the classification of the constituents of atomic facts. But when he came to reprise his argument a year later in “Universals and ‘the Method of Analysis’” (1926b), Ramsey adopted the more modest conclusion that whilst we cannot know a priori the forms of the atomic facts we may yet know them a posteriori: “When I wrote my article I was sure that it was impossible to discover atomic propositions by actual analysis. Of this I am now very doubtful, and I cannot be sure that they may not be discovered to be all of one or another of a series of forms which can be expressed by \(R_1(x)\), \(R_2(x,y)\), \(R_3(x,y,z)\), …. This I admit may be found to be the case, but no one can as yet be certain what atomic propositions there are, it cannot be positively asserted; and there is no strong presumption in its favour, for I think that the argument of my article establishes that nothing of the sort can be known a priori” (1926b, 31) (see Methven 2018 for discussion of the relationship between Ramsey 1925b and 1926b).