 A turning point in the rendition of mathematical objects as mental objects is to appeal to the notion of nafs al-ʾamr to describe the ontological status of mathematical objects and to clarify the nature of the truth-makers of mathematical propositions. The phrase ‘nafs al-ʾamr’ literally means the thing itself. But its technical content is hard to capture in translation. Although this phrase also appears in Avicenna’s writings, it is probably Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) who used the phrase for the first time in a technical and theory-laden sense. Different philosophers have understood this phrase as referring to different things including divine knowledge, the Active Intellect, the realm of ideas, etc. (Kaş 2021; Spiker 2021). The significance of the theory of nafs al-ʾamr for the philosophy of mathematics is that it may enable us to preserve judgment-realism even without object-realism. Some philosophers (e.g., Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, d. 1413) have used this theory to show that although mathematical objects are merely estimative (wahmī) and have no mind-independent existence, mathematical judgments are certain (yaqīnī), and their truth-values are mind-independent. In other words, regarding mathematics, judgment-realism can still be defended even when object-realism is rejected (Fazlıoğlu 2014; Hasan 2017).