 In sum, a number of proposals are offered for how one can distinguish universal wholes from integral wholes. But perhaps no single proposal is universally embraced because of the bewildering variety of items that are integral wholes. An obvious solution would be to reduce the number of items that can be integral wholes or integral parts. And as we have seen already, some philosophers in fact do this in certain cases, as when Abelard eliminates temporal wholes. However, based on what we presently know, no medieval thinker attempts anything like a systematic eliminative project in mereology as such. (Thus, while Ockham, for instance, famously undertakes a comprehensive and severe eliminative project in ontology, he does not attempt to develop a systematic theory of what can and what cannot be a part. Rather, for him, the question whether “part” is being used either properly or figuratively tends to arise within a specific context and the resolution often appears to be developed on a case by case basis.) 