 There are a number of possible responses to this objection. First, a consequentialist might argue that any genuinely impartial moral theory will make extreme demands of agents—at least, if we understand the concept of impartiality correctly. This strategy faces a serious difficulty: namely, it at least seems to be the case that certain non-consequentialist moral theories – in particular, deontological theories – also incorporate impartial elements in a fundamental manner, and yet make demands on the moral agent which are considerably less extreme than those of consequentialism. Thus, while some consequentialists (e.g. Brink 1989) have argued that the truth of consequentialism can be logically derived more or less directly from the requirement that morality be impartial, this seems to be a mistake (Scheffler 1992, 105–109). Of course, it is open to the consequentialist either to deny that deontological moral theories are genuinely impartial (Kagan 1989; Scheffler 1982, 1985), or to argue that, properly understood, any plausible ethical theory will be seen to make demands comparable to those made by consequentialism (Brink 1989, Ashford 2000). Both of these strategies, however, face difficulties; as we will see in section 4, there is in fact a very strong case in favor of viewing at least some deontological theories as genuinely and fundamentally impartial – a case which nevertheless does not prohibit us from viewing such theories as less demanding than their consequentialist rivals.