 Third, the intuitive contrast between thick and thin terms as terms that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description classifies as thick not only paradigmatic thick concepts in the style of cruel, courageous, and kind, but also “respect-relative” evaluative concepts, pejorative terms, and more. The claims “This is a good knife” or “Charlie is good with children” ascribe ways of being good in certain non-evaluatively described respects. Not just any good thing can be a good knife; it must also be a knife, and knife is a non-evaluative concept. Similarly, speaking of people as “krauts” or “wingnuts” involves evaluating them negatively on the basis of, respectively, their nationality and political affiliation, and calling someone a jerk involves evaluating him (it usually is a he) negatively for having certain sorts of non-evaluative features that make a person unlikeable. But it is controversial whether paradigmatic thick concepts work in the same way as concepts for specific ways of being good and pejoratives. It is also unclear whether “affective” terms such as admirable and contemptible are substantially similar to paradigmatic thick terms and concepts. Finally, some philosophers investigate “dual character concepts” (for an overview and references, see Reuter 2019). These are supposed to be similar to thick concepts in involving both description and evaluation, but distinctive in that their descriptive and evaluative dimensions, while related, are independent. For instance, there is a sense in which a person may count as an artist if certain descriptive conditions, such as making sculptures for a living, are met. But there is also a sense in which a person may count as an artist if she satisfies norms concerning what an artist should be or do. A person may count as an artist in one sense but not the other. This might be regarded as evidence that artist encodes two independent dimensions of content, which are weighted differently in different contexts of use. One alternative analysis of such different uses of words like artist is that these words are polysemous. In that case they would stand for different concepts in different occurrences, rather than one concept with multiple dimensions of content. The relationship between dual character and thick concepts may thus depend on what notion of concepts we work with. This issue has rarely been addressed in detail in the literature on thick concepts. Either way, questions arise concerning whether dual character concepts and thick concepts are normative or evaluative in the same kind of way and whether some concepts might be both thick and dual character. Some suggest that empirical investigation can shed light on the nature of dual character concepts and their relation to thick concepts (Reuter 2019; Liao et al. 2020). 