 The noncognitivist views Foot attacks depend on a pair of assumptions that Foot dismantles in her article “Moral Beliefs” (1959). The first assumption is that what counts as evidence for an evaluative conclusion in no way depends on what anyone else counts as evidence. Foot thinks this would only be possible if the meaning of a term such as ‘good’ possesses a separate evaluative component, independent of any consideration of the proper object of things deemed good. The second assumption is that anyone can refuse to draw an evaluative conclusion in the face of what others regard as definitive evidence. For example, one guided by this assumption might admit that there are grounds for calling Jones courageous, in that he defended his family against a fearsome attacker, but refuse to praise Jones for his courage. In that case, one might say he is ‘courageous’ only in a descriptive, inverted commas sense, avoiding the evaluative commitment that this description usually entails. Together, these assumptions erect a wall between factual judgments and evaluative judgments, a wall which Foot proceeds to demolish.