 In this regard, he thinks Collin’ position is that of a logical determinist, and so close to that of Spinoza. O’Higgins claimed that it was possible that Collins did not understand the Spinozistic implications of his position (Collins 1717 [1976: 45 note 114]). O’Higgins seems to be suggesting that Collins, if he read Spinoza’s  Ethics, might have been confused by the book, even though Collins had also read the critiques of Spinoza by Pierre Bayle and G. W. Leibniz. Agnesina counters that even if Collins had not read the Ethics, he had read the critiques of Spinoza by Bayle and Leibniz and that these critics of Spinoza had clearly spelled out the implications of the kind of logical determinism that Collins seems perfectly willing to adopt (Agnesina 2018: 120–125). One problem with taking Collins to be a logical determinist is that Collins is a compatibilist, thus regarding freedom as freedom from outside obstruction. But it would seem that while compatibilism is possible under causal determinism; it is not under logical determinism. But, Hobbes too claimed to be a compatibilist and had the same kind of tendencies towards logical determinism that Collins has.