 There is a third proposed type of foundation for Bayesian epistemology. It appeals to a kind of doxastic state called comparative probability, which concerns a person’s taking one proposition to be more probable than, or as probable as, or less probable than another proposition. On this approach, we postulate some bridge principles that connect one’s credences to one’s comparative probabilities. Here is an example of such a bridge principle: for any propositions X and Y, if X is equivalent to the disjunction of two incompatible propositions, each of which one takes to be more probable than Y, then one’s credence in X should be more than twice of that in Y. With such bridge principles, a Bayesian may argue from norms for comparative probabilities to norms for credences, such as Probabilism. See Fishburn (1986) for the historical development of this approach. See Stefánsson (2017) for a recent defense and development. For a general survey of this approach, see Konek (2019). This approach has been extended by Joyce (2003: sec. 4) to justify the Principle of Conditionalization.