 Van Cleve elaborates on the dispositional interpretation in two ways. First, noting that Reid is drawn to the view that SQs are unknown causes, he suggests that although it was not available to Reid, a second order dispositional account might accommodate the conflicting texts: to have a SQ is to have a property P such that P would cause certain sensations in circumstances C (Van Cleve 2016: 109). Second, he notes that if SQs are dispositions manifested by human responses, they are relational properties, whereas PQs seem to be intrinsic. He argues that the latter is borne out under a test of intrinsicality along lines proposed by G.E. Moore (Winkler 2016: 225–31 challenges this; Van Cleve 2016: 240–44 is his response). From this, Van Cleve concludes that Reid’s P/SQ distinction rests on a metaphysical foundation (Van Cleve 2016: 110–12).