 States of affairs are the objectual correlates of propositional attitudes like assumptions and judgments. Judging always is judging that something is or is not the case. That which is or is not the case is the state of affairs the mental attitude is directed towards. States of affairs are the referents of declarative sentences as well as of perfect nominals (perfect nominals are linguistic constructions that contain a gerund and can syntactically act as names, e.g., “the rose’s being red”, cf. Vendler 1967). The German expression for state of affairs is Sachverhalt, which apparently was introduced in the Brentano School around 1888 by Carl Stumpf (Rojszczak &amp; Smith 2003: 165; Meinong’s equivalent reads “objective [Objektiv]”, Salice 2009). The term has its roots in jurisprudence (Smith 1978a) where it is used to express the “juridical ‘status’ in the sense of ‘status rerum’ (state or constitution of things)” (Smith 1988: 25). This is conducive to how early phenomenologists use the term Sachverhalt: objects or things have an ontological structure, and this is a structure of states of affairs. (When this structure involves a value-property, then phenomenologists sometimes talk of a “state of value” [Wertverhalt]).