 In his Introduction, Sherwood gives two definitions for ‘mode’, depending on whether the term is being used broadly or strictly: “Broadly speaking, a mode is the determination of an act, and in this respect it goes together with every adverb”, while strictly speaking we count not all adverbs as modes but only those which determine the inherence of the predicate in the subject (Kretzmann 1966, p. 40).  Thus, on the broad conception of ‘mode’, both “Socrates is necessarily running” and “Socrates is swiftly running” count as modal statements, but on the narrow conception, only the former does. The six modes are ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’, ‘contingent’, ‘impossible’, and ‘necessary’, though “the first two do not distinguish a modal proposition from an assertoric statement” (Kretzmann 1966, pp. 40–41). The other four modes give rise to properly modal propositions, and in statements expressing these propositions, the associated modal adverbs are ‘possibly’, ‘contingently’, ‘impossibly’, and ‘necessarily’.  Each of these modal adverbs is a syncategorematic term; and in the Syncategoremata, Sherwood devotes an entire chapter to necessario (‘necessarily’) and contingenter (‘contingently’).