  Beyond arguing that space and time are ideal systems of relations,  Leibniz also defends a number of less central theses that help to  flesh out his positive conceptions of space and time. For our  purposes it might be worth quickly calling attention to three of the  most significant. First, although he takes space and time to be ideal systems of relations, Leibniz nonetheless insists that they are  conceived of as infinite. In doing so he takes a characteristically  intermediate position, partially siding with most early moderns in  rejecting the notion of an imaginary space surrounding a finite  cosmos, but also partially siding with earlier medieval thinkers in  affirming that “Since space is itself an ideal thing …  space out of the world must needs be imaginary [but] … The  case is the same with empty space within the world; which I also take to be imaginary” (Fifth Paper, paragraph 33; G  VII.396/Alexander   64).[33]  Second, Leibniz maintains that although the existence of empty space  is possible – logically speaking, two bodies could exist at a  spatial distance with nothing between them – nonetheless it is  morally certain that the actual world is a plenum. For, as we have  already noted in connection with his critique of atomism, Leibniz  maintains the existence of empty space would be inconsistent with  God’s decision to create the best of all possible worlds. Third, in  spite of his critique of Newton, Leibniz affirms that space and time  are continuous, homogenous, and infinitely divisible (although not  actually divided to infinity). He holds that the ascription of such  properties to space and time is only possible once they are  recognized to be ideal, or “imaginary,” and in this way  Leibnizian space and time are further distinguished not only from  Newtonian absolute space and time, but also from extended Leibnizian  bodies. 