 Mark Wynn (2013, 27–33) points out that in James’s discussion of religious emotion, it is not the gut reaction that is primarily felt, but a sensory awareness of “the world” under a certain description. In other words, religious feelings are instances of what Peter Goldie (2000) calls “feeling-towards”. And in still other words, the James of The Varieties of Religious Experience isn’t a Jamesian in the standard sense. As Wynn points out, it doesn’t follow from religious emotions’ not being primarily gut reactions that gut reactions are not involved in their phenomenology; but their involvement would be in the nature of a feedback loop or integrated non-focal awareness. I would also add that, while gut sensations are frequently included in the phenomenology of emotions, they may not be necessary or universal.  James himself, in a postscript to his 1884 article, cites the case of a 15-year-old shoemaker’s apprentice who, being entirely without bodily sensations (though otherwise aware of the world around him), nevertheless exhibited shame, grief, fear, and anger, as his situation warranted. In acknowledgment of the possibility of emotions without bodily sensations, the Jamesian neuroscientist Antonio Damasio (1994) posits the existence of an “as-if” bodily feedback loop in the brain to provide for the “somatic markers” required, on the theory, by emotions.