 On a different approach, fundamentally different right-making principles and rationales regarding consent apply in domains like medicine, sex, and the marketplace, as might be indicated by the variety of approaches to consent between these domains. For example, in most commercial transactions, unlike in the medical sphere, there are no legal requirements to disclose all relevant information and to verify that it is understood (Miller and Wertheimer 2010, 80; Joffe and Truog 2010, 351), perhaps indicating that fairness matters there more than autonomous decision-making. Likewise, whereas once we consent to sell a car or to support a political candidate (by signing a contract or casting a vote) our consent is not retractable, invasive medical intervention is usually considered illegitimate once a previously consenting patient or research participant expresses a change of mind—as though the point of consent in the medical arena were not simply autonomous authorization but ongoing control (compare Pateman 1990, 79 on the wrongness of forcing sexual interaction even within otherwise consensual marital relations). Finally, if A mishears B’s consent to sex as refusal yet proceeds with sexual advances, a third party who understands the full picture has strong reasons to stop A’s advances (pace Alexander 2014, 105). But if a physician mishears a patient’s consent to medically beneficial treatment as refusal yet proceeds to it, it is far less clear that a third party who understands the full picture should thwart the treatment. The point of medical care is, after all, not defeated by discordance of attitudes in quite the same way that the point of sex is. One possible conclusion from this variety is that the very point of requiring informed consent, and hence what is fundamentally required and when, vary between domains.