 There are also those who, inspired by the ancient Greek tradition, turn to the “good for” relation as the underpinning of all value to defend the claim that the capacity to value confers special status on those who have it. According to Theunissen (2020), whatever is genuinely good for human beings is of value in the sense that it generates reasons to act accordingly. The capacity to value is good for human beings (is beneficial to them regardless of anyone’s attitude or opinion about it) and that explains this capacity’s special value (p. 127). A daunting challenge for this view is to explain – without slipping into circularity by claiming that humans have a special moral status – why the “X is good for humans” relation confers value on X while, in general, the “Z is good for Y” relation (e.g., a rabbit is good for itself) does not confer analogous value on Z.