Another reason for refusing to allow predicates to carry ontological commitment parallels Quine's reason for refusing ontological commitment to names: just as there can be empty names, there can be empty predicates. (An empty predicate is not a predicate with the null set for its extension; it is a predicate with no extension.) If I introduce the name ‘Herman’ stipulating that it refers to the one and only monster under my bed, I introduce an empty name; and sentences containing ‘Herman’ should not thereby be ontologically committed to monsters.  Similarly, if I introduce a predicate ‘whish’ stipulating that it expresses a biological kind property that applies to whales and fish but excludes rabbits and rhinoceri, I introduce an empty predicate; and sentences containing ‘whish’ should not thereby be ontologically committed to any biological kinds.  Parallel problems admit of parallel solutions: we can eliminate predicates in favor of second-order variables, and take ontological commitment, if any, to be carried by the second-order variables rather than the predicates. (But we cannot make our second-order language too austere: we need to have some non-logical descriptive vocabulary to express the (non-logical) content of the theory.) The charge of ontological bias against Quinean criteria is simply shifted: why allow first-order variables to carry ontological commitment, but not second-order variables?