There is a more fundamental and more interesting problem with the position – one that is endemic to much literature on legal interpretation. The position moves without argument from a claim about linguistic meaning to a conclusion about the correct method of legal interpretation. Even if it were true that a text meant whatever the speaker meant or intended to communicate, it would not follow that legal interpretation should seek the speaker’s communicative intention. Substantive argument is needed to derive claims about legal interpretation from claims about language and communication. As set out above, there are powerful reasons for thinking that legal interpretation seeks at least a provision’s contribution to the content of the law. (Even if it seeks the overall best resolution of disputes, it must still ascertain a provision’s contribution, given the importance of the law to the resolution of disputes.) A provision’s contribution to the content of the law may be something other than its linguistic meaning, such as the objectified legal intention, the best justification for the enactment of the provision, or a complex function of multiple factors.[22] And there are strong reasons for rejecting the general proposition that the legal impact of an action is constituted by the actor’s communicative intention (see Greenberg 2011a).