 The phenomenological strand of philosophical analysis influenced by thinkers like Husserl and Heidegger remains focused on immediate, first person report (for example, self-experience in psychosis (Parnas &amp; Sass 2008), disordered temporal experience (Fuchs 2005, 2013), delusional states (Parnas &amp; Sass 2008; Gallagher 2005, 2011, 2013), and affective disturbances (Ratcliffe 2008; Ratcliffe &amp; Stephan 2014; Jacobs et. al. 2014)). In these traditions neither psychology nor psychopathology are empirical sciences in the usual sense because they involve distinctive forms of explanation. Arising within nineteenth century social science, the hermeneutical approach involving meanings calls for Verstehen (understanding), a distinctive, interpretive way of apprehending human action. (See Jaspers 1913 [1963]; Phillips 2013,Wiggins &amp; Schwartz 2011; Spitzer &amp; Uehlein 1992.) These differences of approach bring differing orientations towards fundamentals, and writing following German and French traditions has been placed in contrast to the “Anglo-empiricist” approach judged more influenced by empirical science, and showing greater emphasis on objectivity and measurement (Mullen 2011).