 Why, then, is Descartes dismissive of the stated objection, indicating that it shouldn’t “bother” us? His remarks indicate that he takes the possibility in question as simply a further iteration of Evil Genius Doubt – “I see that you are still stuck fast in the doubts which I put forward in the First Meditation.” Whether a deceiving God is really possible, it’s something Descartes has argued to be unimaginable for perfect knowers, i.e., for successful graduates of the Meditations – “it is impossible to imagine that he [God] is a deceiver.” On a plausible reading, therefore, Descartes is dismissive of the objection not on metaphysical grounds of absolute impossibility, but on epistemic grounds of indubitability: the “alleged ‘absolute falsity’,” noted in the objection, should in no way “bother us” because our conviction is “so firm that it is quite incapable of being destroyed.”