 Pickard-Cambridge further argues ideal utilitarianism provides the best explanation of the strength of a promise (1932b, 159–163). Ross agrees some promises are more binding than others. A promise to visit a sick friend is stronger than the promise to attend the theatre with friends (FE 100). He suggests the former is stronger because of the value of what is being promised (FE 100). An explicit promise is more binding than a casual promise and more recent promise is more binding than an older promise. Ross says this is because the manner in which and the time at which a promise has been made ‘intensify the promiser’s awareness of its existence and the promisee’s expectation of its fulfilment’ (FE 101). These responses seem to play right into the hands of the ideal utilitarian: the promise is more binding when more value is at stake and when the promisee’s expectations (and possible disappointment) are greater, all of which are goods the ideal utilitarian claims we need to balance in deciding what we ought all things considered to do.