 We have seen in the preceding section that Phenomenologists understand a feeling’s or moral emotion’s apprehension of a value as tied to the perception of an entity under a certain aspect or under a certain description, for example, the boys’ torturing the cat. The moral emotion, in other words, apprehends the boys’ torturing the cat as wrong. The as—what Phenomenologists often call the “hermeneutic as”—demarcates the entity and the value-aspect under which it is experienced. Focusing attention on the aspect or description under which the object is experienced, the subject recognizes it as a feature of the object or as belonging to the object and, conversely, recognizes that the object is as described or has the feature in question. In short, the as points to an is or a has; seeing the torturing as wrong points to the judgment that the torturing is wrong. It is the attending to the aspect and the explicit recognition of it as an aspect that produces the judgment affirming the relation between the entity and the aspect. The judgment thus introduces a new sense beyond what is contained in the moral emotion. There is an affirmation of the distinction between and the unity of the entity and its aspect, that is, an explicit affirmation of the object’s being a certain way and as having value on the ground of its being that way (Husserl 1900–1901 [2001: 2:278–280, 286–289]). There is a shift from seeing the boys’ wrongfully torturing the cat (that is, seeing their torturing the cat as wrong) to seeing that the boys’ torturing the cat is wrong. The shift is from an attributive mode of experience to a predicative one. (Husserl 1900–1901 [2001: 2:273]), and the boys torturing the cat is now explicitly brought under the concept “wrong”.