 This tactic can be readily generalised so as to distinguish two dispositions, the simple disposition whose stimulus condition and manifestation are the event of being struck and the event of breaking, respectively, on the one hand, and the complex disposition whose stimulus condition and manifestation are the event of being struck in the absence of finks, reverse–cycle finks, maskers, and mimickers and the event of breaking, respectively, on the other. The simple counterfactual conditional associated with the first disposition (namely, ‘if \(x\) were struck it would break’) is false in the examples of reverse-cycle finks and maskers and true in the examples of finks and mimickers but the ascription of the first disposition (namely, ‘\(x\) is disposed to break when struck’) correspondingly has the same truth value in each example; meanwhile, the ascription of the second disposition (namely, ‘\(x\) is disposed to break when struck in the absence of finks, reverse–cycle finks, maskers, and mimickers’) is true in the examples of reverse-cycle finks and maskers and false in the examples of finks and mimickers but the simple counterfactual conditional associated with the second disposition (namely, ‘if \(x\) were struck in the absence of finks, reverse–cycle finks, maskers, and mimickers it would break’) correspondingly has the same truth value in each example.