 The simplicity of a dialetheic theory of truth, then, is claimed as an additional further feature. The two most prominent such theories to date are presented in Priest 1987, and Beall 2009. In the former, the truth predicate \(Tr\) for the relevant formal language, modelling the behaviour of truth in English, is simply characterized by the unrestricted T-schema, \(Tr\langle A\rangle \leftrightarrow A\), which, as stressed by many philosophers, is an overwhelmingly intuitive—perhaps even analytic—principle concerning truth. It is admitted that some sentences—notably, the Liars—are truth value gluts, that is, both true and false (the construction may also sustain sentences which are both true and not true, although not all dialetheias need be of this kind); and no hierarchy of metalanguages or further epicycles are needed.