 Proponents of  (KNA)  and  (TNA)  tend to concede that unlucky assertions (and Gettiered assertions) are intuitively appropriate, and that lucky assertions are intuitively inappropriate. Their standard defense strategy is to invoke some distinctions that explain away their incorrect predictions. Williamson (2000: 256–257) suggests that making unlucky and Gettiered assertions is reasonable, and this is why assertions like  (32)  usually don’t warrant criticism. However, here the prediction that uttering  (32)  is reasonable is made by general observations about rationality, and not by  (KNA)  itself. If  (KNA)’s  job is to tell us which assertions are appropriate and which are not, it is not clear how these observations really help its case, since there are other norms (such as  (JNA))  that are able to make this prediction without appeal to independent epistemic standards.