  Second, Defeat has been denied by focusing on how things seem to the subject. Plantinga (2000a) has argued that there is a sense of justification that is simply doing the best that one can. Plantinga notes that despite all the controlled variables an important asymmetry remains even in cases of peer disagreement. In cases where I believe \(P\) and I discover that my peer disbelieves \(P\), often \(P\) will continue to seem true to me. That is, there is an important phenomenological difference between the two peers—different things seem true to them. Plantinga claims that given that we are fallible epistemic creatures some amount of epistemic risk is inevitable, and given this, we can do no better than believe in accordance with what seems true to us. So, applied to cases of peer disagreement, even upon learning that my peer disbelieves \(P\), so long as \(P\) continues to seem true to me, it is rational for me to continue to believe. Any reaction to the disagreement will contain some epistemic risk, so I might as well go with how things seem to me. A similar defense of Steadfast Views which emphasizes the phenomenology of the subject can be found in Henderson et al. 2017.