 One way we might sidestep concerns about the parental status of gamete donors is to argue that parental responsibilities can be transferred to others. If such transfers are possible then presumably gamete donors do so when they make their gametes available to others. That such transfers are at least sometimes possible is a view that is held by many (O’Neill 1979; Bayne 2003; Fuscaldo 2006; Benatar 1999). Those who defend the transferability of parental responsibilities argue that parents often transfer some of their responsibilities to others, such as school teachers, nannies, and doctors. So long as gamete donors have reason to believe that those to whom the responsibilities are transferred will do an adequate job, such transfers are unproblematic. On this view, we ought to treat gamete donation as a comprehensive transfer of responsibilities that is no different in kind from these other commonplace transfers of responsibility. However, accepting the transferability of parental responsibilities does not imply that current practice is morally permissible. We might think that many gamete donors fail to take the necessary steps to ensure that their biological offspring will be adequately reared (Benatar 1999). 