 Here is a framing of the phenomenon that follows Wittgenstein’s (1953): There are two importantly different kinds of uses of “I”—uses of “I” as subject and uses of “I” as object. There’s a certain distinctive sort of error that’s possible in the second case but not in the first. Consider uses of “I” as object, as when I find myself, for one reason or another, in a tangle of bodies, mistakenly take another person’s arm that I see to be mine, and judge, based on the arm’s visual appearance, “I have a broken arm”. (Perhaps I am participating in a game of Twister gone horribly wrong.) In this case, my judgment is wrong, and in particular it’s wrong because, though I’ve correctly perceived that the arm I’m looking at is broken, I’ve misidentified whose arm it is. In uses of “I” as subject, such as when I feel a pain and judge, “I am in pain”, my judgment can’t be wrong in the same way. Maybe I can be wrong about whether that sensation is a pain, but I can’t be wrong about whose sensation it is. Judgments employing “I” as subject are characterized as immune to a particular type of error: they are immune to errors through misidentification.