 One very fundamental, original, and attractive principle that he develops here is what might be called pluralist cosmopolitanism, in contradistinction to the homogenizing cosmopolitanism of the tradition. Cosmopolitanism already had a long history by Herder’s day that reached back to (Cynicism and) Stoicism in the pagan Greek world. That tradition had usually championed a homogenizing form of cosmopolitanism, i.e., a form of it that grants equal ethical respect to all human beings only on the basis of an assumption that they all share much in common psychologically, especially in their moral values. In particular, Herder’s Enlightenment predecessors, including Kant, had held such a position. Moreover, this version of cosmopolitanism continues to be predominant among moral philosophers and worthy organizations such as the United Nations to this day. There is a huge problem with this form of cosmopolitanism, however: its assumption that human beings all share a great deal in common psychologically, especially in moral values, is false (and attempting to make it true would require massive coercion). Herder recognized this problem, but he did not throw out the baby of cosmopolitanism with the bathwater of homogenization. Instead, he developed a distinctive pluralist form of cosmopolitanism: a commitment to equal moral respect for all human beings despite, or even in part because of, the diversity of their psychologies, and in particular their moral values. This position is prominent in the Letters for the Advancement, for example. It also undergirds Herder’s strong stance against imperialism and colonialism in This Too a Philosophy of History, the Ideas, and the Letters for the Advancement.