A textualist could respond by suggesting that we stipulate fictional assumptions about the speaker or the situation. In this way, we could construct counterfactual-based contents. Plainly, we would get diverse such contents depending on which stipulations we make (see Alexander 2011, 91–93). For example, one might ask what a reasonable person would have taken the speaker’s communicative intention to be if the text of a provision had been uttered by one rational speaker in ordinary conversation with the goal of communicating a message. It is important to note that, as stated, the answer to this question will likely be indeterminate – that is, without more specification of, for example, the reasonable person’s beliefs about the speaker and the conversational context, there will be no fact of the matter as to what the reasonable person would have taken the speaker’s intention to be. Moreover, fleshing out the counterfactual situation in a specific way, rather than indefinitely many others, needs to be justified. Why should legal interpretation be concerned with what a reasonable person would take a speaker to intend under this particular set of fictional assumptions? (See Greenberg 2020, 116–124, for extended discussion of the options available to textualism and difficulties with those options.)