DRT is a representational theory of interpretation. In the DRT framework, sentences have meanings, if at all, only in a derivative sense: a sentence prompts the hearer to modify his DRS, and it is DRSs that have a truth-conditional interpretation. Thus, a sentence causes a DRS Ki to be transformed into a DRS Ki+1 (usually, though not invariably, the process will consist in adding information to Ki), and at a remove there is an associated transition at the semantical level, from Ki’s interpretation to Ki+1’s.  Hence, if we could cut out the representational middleman, we would have a theory that defines sentence meaning in dynamic terms, as a transition from one semantic object to another. Thus arises the question of whether or not the representational level can be dispensed with. Kamp (1981) claimed that representations were essential to his ur-version of DRT, which was a subset of our basic DRT, but in the meantime he was proved wrong by a slew of dynamic theories that recast classical DRT in purely semantical terms: Barwise (1987), Rooth (1987), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1989, 1991), Muskens (1996), and many more. However, Kamp’s claim still holds for various extensions of classical DRT, like the theories of presupposition and attitude ascription discussed in the foregoing.