 One might suspect, however, that Choi’s thought experiment will backfire on the ground that we can envision an analogous case for dispositions: an object \(S_t\) only differs from a fragile glass in that the first, not the second, has an intrinsic property that would cause it to lose \(M\) if it were struck, where \(M\) is the type of microstructure \(S_t\) has in common with the fragile glass. \(S_t\) does not satisfy the counterfactual conditional that it would break if struck under the standard conditions. But is \(S_t\) not supposed to have almost all intrinsic properties in common with a fragile glass, most importantly, the microstructure \(M\)? This might lead one to think that \(S_t\) is fragile, from which it follows that even the ascription of fragility does not entail the corresponding counterfactual conditional. In response, though, Choi (2005b, pp. 499–502, 2012) urges that \(S_t\) is not fragile.  He has thus defended (a ceteris paribus version of) Entailment from Mellor’s objections by invoking intrinsically finkish properties.