 Moore made several other uses of the principle of organic unities, including in response to an argument of Sidgwick’s for hedonism. Sidgwick had claimed that there would be no value in a world without consciousness and, more specifically, pleasure, and had concluded that pleasure must therefore be the only good (1907: 113, 399–401). Given Principia Ethica’s view about the value of beauty, Moore there rejected the premise of Sidgwick’s argument, but he also argued that, even granting this premise, Sidgwick’s conclusion does not follow. It may be that pleasure is a necessary condition for any value, but that once pleasure is present, other states such as the awareness of beauty or personal love increase the value of the resulting whole even though alone they have no worth (1903: 92–94/1993: 144–45; also 1912: 240–46/1947: 148–51/1965: 103–06). And of course this was precisely his later view. Another application of the principle was in explicating claims about desert. Moore endorsed the retributive view that when a person is morally vicious it is good if he is punished, and he expressed this view by saying that although the person’s vice is bad and his suffering pain is bad, the combination of vice and pain in the same life is good as a whole, and sufficiently so to make the situation on the whole better than if there were vice and no pain (1903: 214–15/1993: 263–64). This is in fact a point where Moore’s holistic formulation of the principle is positively appealing. The alternative variability view must say that when a person is vicious, his suffering pain switches from being purely bad to being purely good. But this implies that the morally appropriate response to deserved suffering is simply positive, for example simple joy, which does not seem right; the better response mixes satisfaction that justice is being done with sorrow at the infliction of pain, as Moore’s holistic view implies.