 Bargaining solutions, such as Nash’s, might identify outcomes that agents would be rational to agree upon, but are these distributions also fair? One concern is that they take the pre-bargaining status quo as given. Yet, the context that leads up to a transaction might play some role in what kinds of outcomes are fair. For example, suppose in our phone sale case that \(B\) is selling her phone because her hotel room was burgled while on holiday. \(B\) needs money now and the only item of value remaining in her possession is her phone. So, while \(B\) might, if given more time, be able to sell her phone for much as much as $1000, \(A\) is the only buyer she can find on short notice. \(B\)’s desperation lowers her reservation price and, consequently, alters the Nash solution as well. It isn’t necessarily the case that the outcomes of bargains resulting from circumstantial pressures are unfair, but when these pressures result from identifiable injustices, as in \(B\)’s case, the bargaining outcome appears unfair. This contextual insensitivity to the sources of bargaining power undermines the sufficiency of bargaining solutions as criteria for fair transaction.