 The notion of multimodality has become of interest to philosophers only recently (Bennett and Hill, 2014; O’Callaghan 2020). Unfortunately, there is already little agreement in philosophy on the way to individuate the modalities themselves, let alone on how to understand multimodality. One crucial question is whether these multisensory effects show that vision plays only a causal role in fixing the spatial content of bodily experiences or whether bodily experiences are constitutively multimodal (Vignemont 2014). One may also ask whether some features can be represented only thanks to multisensory integration (Briscoe forthcoming). A final question is whether multimodality comes at the cost of bodily IEM. If bodily self-ascriptions are grounded not only in the body senses, which secure IEM, but also in vision, which does not always guarantee IEM, then can one still claim that bodily self-ascriptions are immune to error?