  Another line of argument with a similar upshot proceeds from minimalism of the sort we have already canvassed. Deflationism about truth or truth-aptness can be used to argue that there is no room for non-cognitivism of the sort that succeeds in vindicating much of moral practice. If there is no more robust understanding of truth conditions than can be secured by minimalism about truth conditions, it will be difficult for the quasi-realist non-cognitivist to make the distinctive negative semantic claim – that moral judgements are never true and not the kind of thing that can be true or false. Simple moral sentences may be truth apt if all there is to having truth conditions is to meet minimal requirements of having a meaningful use, being in the right mood, and combining grammatically with other sentences to yield more complex embeddings.  Furthermore, if the minimalist strategy extends to beliefs, so that all there is to being a belief is to be a state of mind expressible by such minimally truth–apt sentences, moral judgements will be beliefs. The quasi-realist program to vindicate as much of ordinary moral practice might thus endanger non-cognitivism when carried to this extreme. Success would leave us with no way to distinguish plausible non-cognitivism from cognitivism.