  Philosophers who agree with a conception of events as particulars typically distinguish different sorts of such particulars. A classic typology distinguishes four sorts: activities, accomplishments, achievements, and states (Ryle 1949; Vendler 1957). An activity, such as John’s walking uphill, is a homogeneous event: its sub-events satisfy the same description as the activity itself, which has no natural finishing point or culmination. An accomplishment, such as John’s climbing the mountain, may have a culmination, but is never homogeneous. An achievement, such as John’s reaching the top, is a culminating event (and is therefore always instantaneous). And a state, such as John’s knowing the shortest way, is homogeneous and may extend over time, but it makes no sense to ask how long it took or whether it culminated. Sometimes accomplishments and achievements are grouped together into a single category of performances (Kenny 1963). Sometimes achievements have also been called events tout court and all other events have been grouped together into a broadly understood category of temporally extended entities, called processes (Ingarden 1935); the word ‘eventuality’ may then be used as a label covering both categories (Bach 1986).