 Kant accused Leibniz, along with Spinoza, of ‘taking appearances for things in themselves’ (KRV A264/B320). One can see his point with respect to water droplets as noted, but it is nevertheless a somewhat mixed-up claim. As Kant understood him, in failing to distinguish between intellectual representation and sensory perception, Leibniz believed we saw aggregates of monads as empirical objects. But Leibniz distinguished sharply between the everyday perceptual world of living beings and inanimate objects and the invisible monadic order. Unextended monads were non causally interacting but enjoyed (in a confusedly omniscient manner) the universal pre-established harmony of perceptions, while empirical humans perceived individually subvisible empirical objects such as animalcula and fine powders through causal mechanisms in a confused manner (GM III:546–7; AG IV:426). But Leibniz was not clear about how the unextended monads projected into a visible world and neither were his later commentators. After his critical turn, Kant had decided that “things in themselves” that compose external reality are not perceived at all. They are not in causal contact with us, though they affect us in such a way that we experience a sensory world structured according to the categories of time, space, causality and objecthood. The impact driven, push and pull of the appearances therefore did not, in Kant’s view, preclude the possibility of the origination of free actions by a noumenal subject. 