 Beginning in the 1970s, Kahneman and Tversky conducted a series of experiments showing various ways that human participants’ responses to decision tasks deviate from answers purportedly derived from the appropriate normative standards (sections  2.4  and  5.1).  These deviations were given names, such as availability (Tversky &amp; Kahneman 1973), representativeness, and anchoring (Tversky &amp; Kahneman 1974). The set of cognitive biases now numbers into the hundreds, although some are minor variants of other well-known effects, such as “The IKEA effect” (Norton, Mochon, &amp; Ariely 2012) being a version of the well-known endowment effect  (section 1.2).  Nevertheless, core effects studied by the biases and heuristics program, particularly those underpinning prospect theory  (section 2.4),  are entrenched in cognitive psychology (Kahneman, Slovic, &amp; Tversky 1982).