 Situation theory focused on constraints early on, with constraints thought of most usefully as conditionals. Situation theory builds its semantic theory on an Austinian theory of truth—where an utterance \(u_s\) of a declarative sentence \(s\) is putting forward a claim that is about some type of situation \(x\), such that \(x\) is of some type \(\phi\) (Barwise 1993: 4). Austin (1950) calls the type \(\phi\) the descriptive content of \(s,\) with \(\phi\) specifying the type of situation (or event or thing etc.) in the world that is being described. He calls the situation \(x\) itself the demonstrative content of \(s\). In other words, \(\phi\) describes the content of \(s\), and \(x\) is the content demonstrated by \(s\)—which is just to say that it is the part of the world about which the utterer of \(u_s\) is speaking when they utter \(s\).