 Included amongst Ramsey’s axioms are some obvious coherence conditions, such as that preferences ought to be transitive; as well as less obvious conditions, e.g., that for every pair of worlds \(\omega_1\), \(\omega_2\), there’s a \(\omega_3\) whose utility is exactly halfway between that of \(\omega_1\) and \(\omega_2\). There has been very little empirical investigation into Ramsey’s axioms, primarily due to the widespread opinion that his representation result has been superseded by the results of Savage (1954) and later decision theorists (see, e.g., Fishburn 1981). However, Ramsey’s assumption that there exists an ethically neutral proposition (needed for the definition of equal differences in utility to make sense) has attracted substantial critical discussion. Ramsey provides his readers with no reasons to believe that even one ethically neutral proposition exists, still less that their existence is a precondition for the consistency of partial beliefs. For discussion, see (Sobel 1998), (Bradley 2001), (Eriksson &amp; Hájek 2007), and (Elliott 2017). 