 On another kind of interpretation, the troubling passage appealing to a “great propensity” does not mark a relaxing of epistemic standards. Instead, Descartes is extending the implications of his discussion of theodicy in the Fourth Meditation to encompass further cases of natural belief – such beliefs deriving from our God-given cognitive nature. It was noted above  (Section 5.2)  that Descartes thinks the divine guarantee of the C&amp;D Rule follows, in part, from the fact that God wouldn’t allow us to be mistaken if the assent is a natural consequence of our God-given cognitive nature. Suppose Descartes holds that there are further cases in which an all-perfect God would not allow us to be in error, in part because the beliefs in question arise naturally from our God-given cognitive nature. And suppose the further cases involve a natural propensity to believe which cannot be corrected by our cognitive faculties. Given these assumptions, the resulting rule for truth would look something like the following: