 Moral perception includes moral experiences that crucially involve the use of one’s perceptual faculties, ocular and auditory being the most obvious. An example of visual moral perception is seeing someone gleefully torture a helpless animal and experiencing that action as morally wrong. Hearing someone utter a deliberately insulting remark and recognizing it as such is an example of a moral experience grounded in auditory perception. Understood more narrowly (and quite literally) moral perception, as understood by its defenders, involves (what appears to one as) an instantiated moral property (i.e., an instance of a moral property possessed by an object of moral evaluation) being presented in one’s perceptual experience, as when one’s visual perceptual experience presents the injustice of a perceived action (see, for example, Audi  2013).[2]  Moral perception, so understood, is to be distinguished (at least prima facie) from spontaneous, perceptually grounded moral belief as when one sees someone slap a small child triggering the belief that the slapping was morally wrong. Arguably, the content of one’s visual experience need not include the presentation of the property wrongness. (For further discussion of this issue, see  section 2.1.)