  The key idea in Warmbrōd (1981a,b) is that the accessibility sphere in the basic strict analysis should be viewed as a parameter of the context. Roughly, the idea is that \(R(w)\) corresponds to background facts assumed by the participants of a discourse context. For example, if they are assuming propositions (modeled as sets of possible worlds) A, B, and C then \(R(w)=A\cap B\cap C\). The other key idea is that trivial strict conditionals are not pragmatically useful in conversation. If a strict conditional \(\mathsf{A\strictif C}\) is asserted in a context with background facts \(R(w)\) and \(\mathsf{A}\) is inconsistent with \(R(w)\)—\({\llbracket}\mathsf{A}{\rrbracket}^R_v\cap R(w)={\emptyset}\), then asserting \(\mathsf{A\strictif C}\) does not provide any information. If there are no \(\mathsf{A}\)-worlds in \(R(w)\), then, trivially, all \(\mathsf{A}\)-worlds in \(R(w)\) are \(\mathsf{C}\)-worlds. Warmbrōd (1981a,b) proposes that conversationalists adapt a pragmatic rule of charitable interpretation to avoid trivialization: