 These distinctions can accommodate a number of epistemic and metaphysical pluralist accounts including different versions of taxonomical pluralism. These range from the more conventional and contingent (from Elgin 1997 to astronomical kinds in Ruphy 2016), the more grounded in contexts of practices (categorization work in Bowker and Star 1999 or quantitative kinds in Cat 2016 and in the life sciences and chemistry in Kendig 2016 ) and the interactive (Hacking’s interactive kinds in the human sciences) to the more metaphysically substantive. From a methodological standpoint, to the distinctions above we can add the distinction between descriptive and evaluative attitudes to pluralism, and contrast them further with the activist approach (defended by Chang in Chang 2012) encouraging plurality where productive (Chang focuses on the experimental reactivation of historically abandoned programs). As Neurath’s discussion of unity suggested, also discussions of pluralism are matters of social epistemology, with social and political correlates and consequences, for instance regarding issues of toleration and democracy.