 Recently, van Riel (2014) has argued that the idea that reduction is relevantly tied to identity generates a puzzle: Intuitively, identity seemingly contradicts the directionality, or what is sometimes called ‘asymmetry’ of reduction. More precisely: if a reduces to b, then b does not reduce to a. But how can this be if for a to reduce to b, it is required that a=b? The suggested solution is that ‘_reduces to_’ generates hyper-intensional contexts, and that this is best explained by the idea mentioned above: For a to reduce to b, two conditions must be satisfied: (i) a=b and (ii) ‘a’ expresses a conceptual content that relevantly differs from the conceptual content expressed by ‘b’. Another option would consist in giving this a pragmatist reading as in (Van Gulick 1992, 2010), or giving up on the idea that identity is required for (property-)reduction.