 Nisbett and colleagues’ work may represent a potent counterexample to any theory maintaining that rational argument tends to convergence on important moral issues; the evidence suggests that the North/South differences in attitudes towards violence and honor might well persist even under the sort of ideal conditions under consideration. Admittedly, such conclusions must be tentative. On the philosophical side, not every plausible strategy for “explaining away” moral disagreement and grounding expectations of convergence has been  considered.[30]  On the empirical side, this entry has reported on but a few studies, and those considered, like any empirical work, might be criticized on either conceptual or methodological  grounds.[31]  Finally, it should be clear what this entry is not claiming: any conclusions here—even if fairly earned—are not a “refutation” of all versions of moral realism, since there are versions of moral realism that do not require convergence (Bloomfield 2001; Shafer-Landau 2003).  Rather, this discussion should give an idea of the empirical work philosophers must encounter, if they are to make defensible conjectures regarding moral disagreement.