 Hyperintensional conditions make of course for finer distinctions among entities than the other criteria we considered. Accordingly, the former are often called “fine-grained” and the latter “coarse-grained”, and the same denominations are correspondingly reserved for the entities that obey the conditions in question. Coarse- or fine-grainedness is a relative matter. The extensional criterion is more coarse-grained than the intensional or causal/nomological ones. And hyperintensional conditions themselves may be more or less fine-grained: properties could be individuated almost as finely as the predicates expressing them, to the point that, e.g., even being \(P\) and \(Q\) and being \(Q\) and \(P\) are kept distinct, but one may also envisage less stringent conditions that make for the identification of properties of that sort (Bealer 1982: 54). It is conceivable, however, that one could be logically obtuse to the point of believing that something has a certain property without believing that it has a trivially equivalent property. Thus, to properly account for mental content, maximal hyperintensionality appears to be required, and it is in fact preferred by Bealer. Even so, the paradox of analysis raises a serious issue. One could say, for example, that being a circle is being a locus of points equidistant from a point, since the latter provides the analysis of the former. In reply, Bealer distinguishes between “being a circle” as designating a simple “undefined” property, which is an analysandum distinct from the analysans, being a locus of points equidistant from a point, and “being a circle” as designating a complex “defined” property, which is indeed identical to that analysans. Orilia (1999: §5.5) similarly distinguishes between the simple analysans and the complex analysandum, without admitting that expressions for properties such as “being a circle” could be ambiguous in the way Bealer suggests. Orilia rather argues that the “is” of analysis does not express identity but a weaker relation, which is asymmetrical in that analysans and analysandum play different roles in it. The matter keeps being discussed. Rosen (2015) appeals to grounding to characterize the different role played by the analysans. Dorr (2016) provides a formal account of the “is” used in identity statements involving properties, according to which it stands for a symmetric “identification” relation.