  Two lines of response are open to the internalist here. One, proposed by Mark Schroeder (2007b) in defense of the Humean Theory of Reasons, denies that internalism is genuinely incompatible with the inescapability of some moral or prudential reasons. If there are some actions that would serve any possible desire (or, on an alternative internalist account, that any agent would be motivated towards under the relevant counterfactual conditions), then the internalist can accommodate reasons that any agent has no matter what they are like: such reasons are massively overdetermined. In this way the internalist can seek to reconcile Moral Rationalism with Moral Absolutism (see section 1.2). The idea is that even if internalism is true, it might still be the case that we all have reasons to avoid moral wrongdoing, no matter what we are like—because reasons to avoid moral wrongdoing are generated from any set of desires or dispositions.  While this solution is formally available, it remains to be seen whether it can plausibly generate the robust set of moral and prudential reasons posited by ordinary intuitions, and it appears reasonable to be pessimistic on this count; plausibly there are actual or possible sets of desires and dispositions that would not support any reasons to avoid breaking promises made to those powerless to retaliate, or to confess to one’s crime for which somebody else has already been convicted, for example.