 This view had been already supported in the Tractatus super librum Predicamentorum, where, in commenting on the third chapter of the Categories, Burley had also pointed out that the body which is traditionally seen as a part of the human composite is an aggregate (aggregatum) of prime matter and the general form of quantity, and therefore not properly speaking part of the substance. Rather, it is part of the macro-object (obiectum sensus), namely the whole aggregate compounded by the substance and all of its accidental forms (TsP, ch. de regulis praedicationis, ed. Conti, p. 24). On the contrary, those authors who admit a plurality of substantial forms in the primary substance must concede that the body which is part of the substance is a composite (compositum) of prime matter and the imperfect substantial form of corporeity (corporeitas; see TsP, ch. de regulis praedicationis, ed. Conti, pp. 24–25).