 The processes of production of sensory awarness vary with modality and with the type of thing perceived, earthen, watery, etc., universal or particular, a group of things, something external or internal, and in ways peculiar to perceivers. Neverthelesss, there are commonalities, especially when it comes to the questions of epistemology, most prominently that innumerable instances of knowledge are sensorily produced. But awareness produced by the senses is not how Gaṅgeśa defines perceptual knowledge. If what was considered an instance of knowledge is discovered to be in fact a false belief, then we say in English that there was no knowledge in the first place, only a belief that was considered true and warranted. The same logic holds for Gaṅgeśa’s ‘pratyakṣa’: if what was considered a perceptual awareness is discovered to be in fact non-veridical, then it is said that there was no perception in the first place, only an awareness that was considered veridical and produced by an organ of sense.