 There is something compelling about Wittgenstein’s observation. The three alternatives he outlines (while being clear they are not exhaustive) describe different kinds of situation in which we might well agree that Moses did not exist. While one could claim that the sentence is ambiguous, with an interpretation analyzed in each of these ways at least, this is not what Wittgenstein has in mind. This is a good thing, since “Moses did not exist” cannot literally mean that the Israelites did not have a single leader, as it is certainly conceivable that Moses existed but did not lead the Israelites (Kripke 1980: 66–67). Instead, we must treat his alternatives in the manner already suggested for the components of a cluster theory: as conditions that are neither strictly necessary nor inevitably sufficient, but which instead count as factors in favor of the nonexistence claim, interacting with an open-ended set of other factors both for and against. Perhaps, indeed, Wittgenstein himself held this view in an inchoate way: