 Within the framework of the theory of eternal creation, Albalag deals with another problematic issue, which also links to al-Ghazali’s refutations of philosophers in Tahāfut al-Falāsifah: the nature of divine causation, whether it is voluntary or involuntary. In this treatise, Al-Ghazali maintains that volition is a fundamental characteristic of acting causes; “the agent must be willing, choosing and knowing what he wills ” (Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, third discussion: 135). Causes that act by necessity, that is, without willing or choosing, fall in the category of natural involuntary causes. Proceeding from this conception of agency, Al-Ghazali asserts that the conception of divine causation that philosophers espouse deprives the deity of volition. Again, the theory of eternity is brought into focus. Necessity is a key postulation of the scheme of eternity. Philosophers, according to al-Ghazali, hold the perpetual procession of the universe from God to be necessary in the same manner that the connection between “the sun and light” is necessary (Tahāfut, third discussion: 135; cf. Tiqqun n.23: 24). In opposition to al-Ghazali, Albalag broadens the conception of agency to include both involuntary natural and voluntary causes. However, he emphasizes that a natural cause is insufficient to produce an effect. It must primarily be moved by a voluntary agent. In the empirical world, natural causes bring forth effects inasmuch as they are being moved by close or remote voluntary agents. In this connection, Albalag states that “in this way all material effects are related to God and it is said of Him that He is their Maker”, vaguely indicating that God is the ultimate voluntary cause in the universe. Other than articulating the God-world causal relationship in terms of motion, Albalag barely explains the nature of divine will or the manner in which it causes the perpetual production of the universe.