 Finally, it should be noted that not all conditional sentences primarily aim at giving either necessary or sufficient conditions. A common case involves what might be called jocular conditionals. A friend of Octavia’s mistakenly refers to “Plato’s Critique of Pure Reason” and Octavia says, “If Plato wrote the Critique of Pure Reason, then I’m Aristotle”. Rather than specifying conditions, Octavia is engaging in a form of reductio argument. Since it is obvious that she is not Aristotle, her joke invites the listener to infer (by contraposition) that Plato did not write the Critique of Pure Reason. Another case is the so-called concessive conditional, where the antecedent does not appear to be a condition on the consequent of even an inferential kind. Suppose we plan on having picnic and hope it will be sunny. But even if rain comes, we will still go. In such a case it does not seem plausible to maintain that the threat of rain provides any condition at all on accepting the consequent. Such concessive conditionals do not admit of contraposition (Crupi and Iacona 2022, and compare Gomes 2020). Others have argued that in cases where a conditional construction does not appear to be putting forward any genuine conditions, these are “nonconditional” conditionals (Geis and Lycan 1993)—in other words they may just be disguised affirmations.