 Taking the view that Dutch Book vulnerability indicates a form of inconsistency has the advantage that it makes clear the sort of irrationality involved in cases of Dutch Book vulnerability, and avoids the implausible claim that rationality always requires avoiding Dutch Book vulnerability.  However, the view faces a difficulty in that the Dutch Book vulnerability for those who violate other proposed norms of probability seems less clearly a matter of inconsistency, as will be suggested in the following sections.  Those who understand DBAs as proceeding directly from Dutch Book vulnerability to the claim of irrationality, without the intermediate conclusion that Dutch Books indicate inconsistency, must qualify what is to count as Dutch Book vulnerability and the sort of irrationality that is at stake.  Pettigrew (2020) suggests that the relevant sort of Dutch Book vulnerability is a sure loss in every world that is epistemically possible for the agent, and that the conclusion to draw from this is that someone who is so vulnerable is epistemically irrational. Insofar as it is epistemic rationality that is of concern, this formulation has the virtue of not counting the person who could be made to lose money in every metaphysically possible world, on the basis of having less than full confidence in some metaphysical truths, as subject to a proper Dutch Book and so irrational.  But, this still leaves questions about what is to count as epistemically rational, and how in general this lines up with Dutch Book vulnerability.  Questions remain too about whether the pragmatic basis of the Dutch Book argument offers appropriate grounds for defending probabilistic norms of epistemic rationality, and this has spurred interest in alternative nonpragmatic justifications of such norms.  See Pettigrew (2019). 