 The foregoing discussion shows that the epistemological debate between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas regarding the nature of perception rests on, and brings to the fore, their metaphysical disagreement about the nature of universals. The Naiyāyikas are realists about universals; universals are objective features of the world that impress themselves upon minds; they are not mere figments of our imagination. The Naiyāyikas hold that particulars are qualified propertied wholes and we directly perceive them as they are, without any kind of manipulation or imposition; we do not impose universals on property-less real particulars, rather we find stable, durable, relational wholes in reality that do not require any imposition or manipulation. They argue that there is no evidence of a world of bare particulars, as claimed by the Buddhists. Therefore conceptual or determinate perception does not involve distortion of reality; rather it presents things as they really are. To see a piece of sandalwood as it really is, we do not need to see the sandalwood as a colorless, odorless pure particular; indeed, since the piece of sandalwood is really brown and really fragrant, to see it as a propertied whole is to see it as it really is.