 This applies a fortiori to geometry which Stumpf, unlike Kant, refuses to ground on the concept of intuition insofar as it is an analytic a priori science, like any other branches of mathematics. The position he advocates in 1906 is therefore not different from the one he advocated thirty-five years earlier in his habilitation thesis. (Ewen, 2008, p. 157ff.) As an a priori science, one could say that mathematics is actually presupposed by all other sciences as Stumpf suggests in referring positively to Auguste Comte’s hierarchy of the positive sciences. (C. Stumpf, 1906a, p. 88) For, according to Comte, the hierarchy between sciences within his classification presupposes that all sciences, from physics to physiology, logically depend on mathematics, that is, the most simple science, and is the most autonomous with regard to all other sciences. In this regard, Stumpf here adopts a position akin to that of Brentano who followed Comte’s criteria on the matter of the classification of sciences, with the important difference being that psychology replaces sociology within Brentano’s system of sciences and that the field of psychical functions is, according to Stumpf, independent from all other sciences. (D. Fisette, 2015d; 2018b)