Others, yet, press the disappearing agent objection in order to motivate a dual standpoint theory. According to dual standpoint theories, agency cannot be explained from any theoretical standpoint or metaphysical framework. Agency can only be understood from a practical and normative standpoint (Nagel 1986; Korsgaard 1996; Bilgrami 2006, for instance). Arguably, this view has its roots in Kant’s account of practical reason (see the entry on Kant and Hume on morality). Usually, dual standpoint theories do not reject metaphysics as such, and they often provide a metaphysical framework of their own. But they reject both reductive and non-reductive theories of agency, and they reject, in general, the notion that we can have a metaphysical account of what the exercise of agency consists in. They align themselves naturally with non-causal theories of reason explanation (see section 2). Both views tend to emphasize the normative and irreducibly teleological nature of reason explanation and, hence, agency. Dual standpoint theories have received relatively little attention in the philosophy of action. To many, it seems that such views are deeply unsatisfactory precisely because they refuse to face a central question in the metaphysics of agency: how can agents exercise control over their actions in a world in which all movements can be explained in terms of event-causation? It seems that this is in need of explanation, and it seems that this requires a metaphysics of agency (see Bishop 1989; Schlosser 2010). Nelkin (2000) has questioned the coherence of dual standpoint theories on the basis of an argument for the claim that they entail commitments to contradictory beliefs about free will.