 We run into an analogous problem with the question of the common nature’s entity. Scotus persistently refuses to reduce it to the entity of the particulars to which it belongs: as we saw in the previous section, this entity “has true real being outside the soul.” But it nevertheless somehow belongs to the entity of the particulars: as we have just seen, “Such unity [viz. less-than-numerical] is real, and what such unity belongs to is of itself formally one by numerical unity.” Setting aside the particular and the haecceity, we might wonder how many entities there are. Perhaps the entity of the common nature is nothing over and above the entity of the nature in the particular. But perhaps not. So it seems to me that it is hard to come to an assessment of the strength of Scotus’s realism, since it is hard to come to an appraisal of his view on the reality of the common nature.