 Reply 1: No requirement to give advice. The meta-normative claim on which the objection seems to rely is the following: For a norm to hold, there must be specific advice available to those who violate that norm concerning how to improve their behaviour. Bronfman’s objection begins with the observation that, for any specific advice that one might give to a non-probabilistic agent concerning which credence function she should adopt in favour of her own, there will be inaccuracy measures that satisfy Joyce’s conditions, but don’t sanction this advice; indeed, there will be inaccuracy measures relative to which that advice is very bad. Thus, Joyce’s accuracy argument violates the meta-normative constraint. But, the reply submits, the meta-normative claim is false: for a norm to hold, it is sufficient that there is a serious defect suffered by those who violate the norm that is not shared by those who satisfy the norm; it is not also required that there should be advice on which specific action an agent should perform to improve her behaviour. And Joyce’s argument satisfies this sufficient condition. An agent ought to satisfy Probabilism because non-probabilistic credence functions suffer from a serious epistemic defect (namely, being accuracy dominated) that does not beset probabilistic ones. And this fact is “supertrue”, so to speak: that is, it is true on any precisification of the notion of accuracy that obeys Joyce’s conditions on an inaccuracy measure.