 It is equally obvious that if one has at hand a notion of model-theoretic validity for a formalized language which is based on a minimally reasonable notion of structure, then all logical truths (of that language) will be model-theoretically valid. The reason is simple: if a formula is not model-theoretically valid then there is a structure in which it is false; but this structure must then model a meaning assignment (or assignments) on which the formula (or its logical form) is false; so it will be possible to construct a formula with the same logical form, whose non-logical expressions have, by stipulation, the particular meanings drawn from that collective meaning assignment, and which is therefore false. But then the idea of formality and the weakest conception of the modal force of logical truths uncontroversially imply that the original formula is not logically true. Using another terminology, we can conclude that model-theoretic validity is complete with respect to logical truth.