 A different set of concerns centers on the moral responsibilities of gamete providers. Since in most jurisdictions gamete providers must waive all parental claims over their genetic offspring, it has been widely assumed that they do not have moral parental responsibilities. Several philosophers have, however, argued that gamete donation is morally dubious, precisely because providers take their parental responsibilities too lightly (Benatar 1999; Nelson 1991; Moschella 2014). The argument can be challenged in at least two ways. First, we might challenge the claim that gamete providers typically treat their parental responsibilities too lightly by transferring or alienating them (Bayne 2003, Page 1985), especially in the case when gamete donation occurs in a context in which assisted reproduction is regulated and would-be gamete recipients are screened. Second, one could argue that in the broad nexus of persons responsible for creating a child through assisted reproduction, the contribution of gamete providers is not especially morally significant (Fuscaldo 2006). (See the entry on  gamete donation and sale.)  However, recent critics have argued that gamete donors morally cannot transfer or alienate their parental responsibilities because these involve maintaining particular relationships which cannot be transferred (Weinberg 2016; see also Brandt 2017).