 It should also be noted that even though the notions of essential dependence defined above are no doubt more fine-grained than the modal-existential notions, there may be reasons to think that even they are not sufficiently fine-grained for all purposes (as argued in Koslicki 2012). To illustrate, consider Fine’s well-known discussion of Socrates and the singleton set that has Socrates as its sole member. To use Fine’s terminology, we could say that it is part of the constitutive essence of Socrates’s singleton set that it has Socrates as its sole member, whereas it is not part of the constitutive essence of Socrates to be the sole member of Socrates’s singleton set. But as Koslicki (2012: 195) points out, this is really just to say that Socrates’s singleton set ontologically depends on Socrates whereas Socrates does not ontologically depend on Socrates’s singleton set. The relevant notion of dependence appears to be built into Fine’s notion of essence and, similarly, the notion of essence assumed by Fine (and many other “neo-Aristotelians”) is already built into (EDC).