 As always heretofore, we posit \(h = \forall x(raven(x)\rightarrow black(x)),\) \(h^* = \forall x(raven(x)\rightarrow blite(x)).\) We then consider the set up where \(k = raven(a) \wedge ex_{t\le T}(a),\) \(e= black(a),\) and \(P(e\mid k)\lt 1.\) Various authors have noted that, with Bayesian relevance confirmation, one has that \(P(h\mid k)\gt P(h^*\mid k)\) is sufficient to imply that \(C_{P}(h, e\mid k)\gt C_{P}(h^*,e\mid k)\) (see Gaifman 1979, 127–128; Sober 1994, 229–230; and Fitelson 2008, 131). So, as long as the black hypothesis is perceived as initially more credible than its blite counterpart, the former will be more strongly confirmed than the latter. Of course, \(P(h\mid k)\gt P(h^*\mid k)\) is an entirely commonsensical assumption, yet these same authors have generally, and quite understandably, failed to see this result as philosophically illuminating. Lacking some interesting, non-question-begging story as to why that inequality should obtain, no solution of the paradox seems to emerge. More modestly, one could point out that a measure of relevance confirmation \(C_{P}(h, e\mid k)\) implies (i) and (ii) below.