 Correspondingly, the overriding concern with a Grounding-based account is that primitive Grounding alone fails to shed any substantive light on determination, instead simply registering the common supposition that determinables metaphysically depend on determinates in a way conforming to certain stipulated formal features. This concern is a case-in-point of the more general concern raised in Wilson (2014), according to which Grounding is too abstract to shed any useful metaphysical light on its own. Some proponents of Grounding attempt to provide more substance to a Grounding-based account of determination by deriving or modeling the claim that determinables are Grounded in determinates, but whether these attempts succeed is unclear; see, e.g., Schaffer’s (2016a,b) suggestion that determination can be modeled using the apparatus of structural equations (à la Pearl 2000 and Spirtes and Scheines 1993), and reasons to resist that suggestion offered by Koslicki (2016) and Wilson (2016).