 The third argument, particular to man, is from the aspect of the intellectual soul. He [Isaac] said that the intellectual soul is separate and distinct from matter, and that the heavenly bodies, insofar as they are material, lack the power to act upon it through anything. And because one could object that a separate power can act upon the intellectual soul by compelling it to act or to receive an action, and to will at times or not to will at times, he bolstered his utterances in this third argument by saying that if human accidents came about through necessitation and decree, then the propositions of our Holy Law would be destroyed; and all its commandments and prohibitions would be in vain; and it would not be proper for the righteous man to receive reward for his good deeds, nor would it be proper to punish the wicked, since all their actions would be necessitated. Isaac took this support from the statements of Moses the Egyptian and the other early theologians who spoke about this matter. (Minḥat Qenaot, Chapter 2)