 Recognizing temporal aspects of reductive explanations found in biology alongside other representational issues like intrinsicality, both of which are not captured by a focus on mereology alone, strengthens the argument in favor of talking about different kinds of reductionism rather a unified account of reduction or overarching dichotomies of “reductionism” versus “anti-reductionism” (or “holism”). Once we incorporate distinctions about different types of reduction (ontological, epistemic, and methodological), the different interpretations of these types (e.g., theoretical versus explanatory epistemic reductions), the different representational features involved (spatial, temporal, etc.), and the distinct biological topics to which philosophers have applied them (e.g., development or functional anatomy), any single conception of reduction appears inadequate to do justice to the diversity of phenomena and reasoning practices in the life sciences. The multiplicity and heterogeneity of biological subdisciplines only reinforces this argument and suggests to some that we should move beyond reductionism entirely.