 Most medieval philosophers tackle the Problem of the Many Men in another manner. Albert of Saxony, for example, resolves the puzzle by claiming that nothing which is a part of something else can be a numerically distinct existing being (Quaes. in Arist. Physicam I q. 8, 131–32; Sophismata 46, 25vb; cf. Fitzgerald 2009). Socrates’ body less the finger is not a distinct thing, let alone a human, since it is a part of Socrates. Therefore, there are not many distinct men present where we thought that there was only Socrates. If that appears to be an argument by stipulation, the reader might find William of Sherwood’s elaboration on this strategy helpful (Syncategoremata (O’Donnell ed., 61)). William concedes that, because Socrates-less-the-finger is perfected by a human soul, it can in a certain respect be said to be a human being. But in this respect Socrates and Socrates-less-the-finger are perfected by the same soul and if one wants to count humans, one counts human souls. Thus, Socrates and Socrates-less-the-finger are not numerically distinct humans. On the other hand, if Socrates-less-the-finger is considered as a part of something larger that is also perfected by the same soul, then in this respect Socrates-less-the-finger is numerically different from Socrates, but it is not a human being. Considered in terms of its being a part, Socrates-less-the-finger is a part of a body of a human being, and a body of a human being is not a human. Hence, we count too many humans only if we ignore these different respects under which the premises of the argument can be made true.