 More recent philosophical engagement on these topics tends to take a more varied and often nuanced view about the relationship between language and thought that distinguishes between different kinds of thinking. Elisabeth Camp finds evidence that while some animals think in compositional representational systems, such systems lack other properties of language and are not propositional in structure (Camp 2009a). This is in contrast to Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought (LoT) hypothesis, according to which all thought has a language-like structure and can be had by animals who do not use language (Fodor 1975). On Camp’s view, animals lack propositional thought, but some animals still have conceptual thought because they have systematically recombinable stimulus-independent representational capacities—a flexible capacity to represent different aspects of the world, including abstractions (Camp 2009b). Other philosophers argue that the evidence suggests both that animals lack concepts and that they think, providing evidence for nonconceptual mental content (e.g., Beck 2012; Peacocke 2001; Schellenberg 2013, 2018). Contemporary philosophers are also interested in investigating the kinds of rational thought processes that animals might engage in, including logical reasoning (Burge 2010), causal reasoning (Bermúdez 2006), or statistical reasoning (Rescorla, 2009, 2017).