 One issue for the Intellectualist interpretation is that it seems to make the success conditions of the Deduction too easy. If Kant’s project in the Deduction is to show that all intuition, or perhaps more generally “everything that may ever come before our senses” (B160) must stand under the categories (Guyer 2010a; Allison 2015: 407–408), then it cannot be the case the intuition is defined in terms of its dependence on the intellect. If intuition were so defined, it would be unclear why anything more than a trivial inference would be needed to show that intuition depends on the intellect. To avoid this Intellectualism must advocate either for a reading of “intuition” that allows for at least two different senses of the term (Sellars 1968: ch. 1) or a “re-reading” of Kant’s initial presentation of the nature of sensibility and the intuitions it provides (Longuenesse 1998: ch. 8; Bauer 2012; Conant 2016).