 Al-Ghazālī attacks the philosophers’ view of causal necessity in nature in order to safeguard the Muslim belief in miracles and divine omnipotence (al-Ghazālī IP: 165). These tenets of faith are incompatible with Avicenna’s account of God. As mentioned earlier (in  §3.1),  Avicenna considers God’s immutability to entail that his knowledge, volition and action are immutable. He also denies that God knows particular things, except in a universal way (Avicenna MH: 288; Marmura 1962; Adamson 2005). So, according to Avicenna, God cannot act otherwise than he does; furthermore, he cannot plan or execute any particular event. So, God cannot cause a miracle by altering his action so as to interrupt the course of nature. Furthermore, God cannot cause a miracle by planning and executing a grand series of particular events, which includes a deviation from the course of nature. On the contrary, God serves as the ultimate explanation of order and stability in the universe, including in the realm of nature. Likewise, Averroes’ mature view, which describes God as an ultimate final cause of motion, who is neither a creator, nor an efficient cause of earthly events, is obviously incompatible with the view that God can cause miracles.