 According to the Mādhyamikas, the pragmatic usefulness of person-talk is important as a catechetic device for teaching the doctrine to the uninitiated. The Buddha’s talk about persons and other continuing entities in the sūtras is aimed at ordinary people who, due to ignorance are beset with the false view of a self. As Vincent Eltschinger puts it, “these preliminary and merely provisional teachings are meant to offer a transition between the adhesion to worldly beliefs and the intuition of universal emptiness” (2014, 470). The Prāsaṇgika Mādhyamikas not only deny the inherent existence of persons at the ultimate level but also deny the inherent existence of persons at even the conventional level. In doing so the Prāsaṇgikas take themselves to be faithful to the original teachings of Nāgārjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka. Nāgārjuna denies both that the person is the same as the psychophysical constituents to which the Buddhist Reductionists try to reduce it and that it is other than those constituents in the way that the Hindu Non-Reductionists claim. Nāgārjuna warns: “Beyond good and evil, profound and liberating, this [doctrine of emptiness] has not been tasted by those who fear what is entirely groundless.” In contemporary terms, Madhymaka position can be likened to minimalism (Perrett, 2002). As Johnston argues in “the particular case of personal identity, minimalism implies that any metaphysical view of persons which we might have is either epiphenomenal or a redundant basis for our practice of making judgements about personal identity and organizing our practical concerns around this relation” (Johnston 1997, 150).