 James of Viterbo is thus part of a group of thinkers in the history of philosophy for whom the intellect itself, as opposed to extra-mental objects or their proxies in the soul, is the main causal factor not only of the production of acts of knowledge but of their conceptual content as well. Indeed, for James, that content is already present in the soul in the form of general and specific “fitnesses” or “aptitudes.” The aptitudes are innate (naturaliter inditae, “always present in [the soul]” (Quodl. I, q. 7, p. 92, 422–423), ready to be actualized in the presence of the appropriate triggering factors. Few other scholastics were ready to espouse such an extreme form of innatism, which some scholars have likened to the theory innate ideas of the Early Moderns (Solère 2018a).