  Two ways in which distinguishing can be made less idiosyncratic are these: (a) to argue that the later court is restricted to making a modification which the earlier court would have made if confronted with the current facts (cf. Raz 1979, 187–8), i.e., that distinguishing is a form of reinterpretation of the original ratio; or (b) to argue that there is a presumption against distinguishing (Schauer 1989, 469–71; 1991, 174–87).  Each of these approaches echo forms of legal reasoning found in statutory construction. The first, in asking what the earlier court would have done, assimilates the task of distinguishing to that of determining the law-maker's intent behind their ruling.  This is parallel to the practice of interpreting statutes in terms of legislative intent. The alternative approach of there being a presumption against distinguishing parallels the creation of exceptions to statutory  rules.[8]