 A name or term is attached naturally to this—while our language is in some sense conventional, actualities are described by particular names independently of the way we accord these names to objects. Xu’s example in the above passage of “long” demonstrates this. When we describe a particular object as “long”, we use an already existent term, with an independent meaning, to describe a particular actuality. The connection between this name and the actuality of an object is determined independently of our determination. We can choose to correctly use the term “long” to describe the object or incorrectly use the term “short”, but the latter term does not match the actuality of the long object (setting aside here the issue of the issue of the conventional or comparison-relative nature of concepts such as long and short). A name, according to Xu, follows or it attached naturally to a particular actuality, and to improperly use a name (to call the long thing “short”, for example) is to damage the nature (xing 性) of that name. Its nature is damaged due to improper associations based on incorrect use. When we use the term “short” to describe things that are long, this throws people into confusion concerning the term “short” as well as the term “long”. We can no longer clearly describe the actualities of things, because of the obfuscation of associations. Using the term “short” will after time become unable to express the actuality, as its application to things without the actuality corresponding to the name will become part of the accepted or expected usage of the name, and the name will lose its proper meaning. “Short” will come to mean “long” to some, “short” to others, and “an open question as to long or short” to many as well.