 (1) Sensory feelings: On the most basic level, we have “feeling impressions” or “sensory feelings” (Gefühlsempfindungen, sinnliche Gefühle), such as itching, bodily pain, or the pleasure of the taste or texture of food (1917: 65–66[48–49]). Stein holds a version of intentionalism regarding bodily sensations (Crane 1998, 78–88). This is the thesis that pain and other sensory feelings have properly speaking intentional objects and present parts of the body of the emoter under certain aspects to her. What is thus intentionally given to the emoter as an object, however, is not some “pain-object” but its bodily-felt location. Stein characterizes such sensory feelings also as “bodily localizable sensations” (leiblich lokalisierte Empfindnisse; 1917: 58[42]). Accordingly, the pleasure of a taste or texture is “felt where the food is tasted” or “where the piece of fabric touches my skin” (1917: 65[48]. Moreover, Stein attributes to these low-level feelings an intrinsic relation to the self. In sensory feelings, “I experience my affective sensitivity (sinnliche Empfänglichkeit) as the highest and most outer layer of my I” (1917: 118[100]). This concerns one of the core tenets of Stein’s phenomenology of affectivity: Different layers of affectivity have different “I-depths” (Ichtiefe), or different ways and degrees in which emoters are impacted by affective experiences (1917: 119–124[101–105]).