 Shifting focus from proximate to ultimate considerations seems to add little clarity. While some theorists hold that our species possesses an evolved psychological system dedicated specifically to morality (Joyce 2007; Mameli 2013; Stanford 2018; cf. Kitcher 2011), others remain skeptical. They argue instead that the evidence better supports the view that humans have an evolved psychological system dedicated to norms in general, but there is nothing about the mechanisms that underlie it, the adaptive pressures that selected for it, or the norms that it can come to contain that would support a distinction between moral norms and non-moral norms (Machery &amp; Mallon 2010; Davis &amp; Kelly 2018; Stich forthcoming). On this view, rather, the human norm system evolved to be able to deal with, and can still acquire and internalize, a wide range of norms, including epistemic norms, linguistic norms, sartorial norms, religious norms, etiquette norms, and norms that might be classified by a contemporary westerner as moral. Indeed, the claim has been taken to support a historicist view of morality itself, according to which the practice of distinguishing some subset of norms and normative judgments as moral, and thus as possessing special status or authority, is a culturally parochial and relatively recent historical invention (Machery 2018).