 The notion of a perfectly natural, or fundamental, property or relation suggests an appealing approach to analysing intrinsicality. Consider the non-intrinsic property of being an uncle. It is appealing to think that the reason this property fails to be intrinsic is that it can be analysed in terms of more fundamental relations, such as being a sibling of and being a child of, in a manner that reveals how something being an uncle is at least partly a matter of how it is related to things that aren’t part of it. In particular, it is plausible to think that the reason being an uncle is non-intrinsic is that for \(x\) to be an uncle is for \(x\) to have a sibling that has a child, where this child fails to be part of \(x\). More generally, it is plausible that, if being \(F\) is a non-intrinsic property, then the fact that it is non-intrinsic can be revealed by analysing being \(F\) in terms of more fundamental properties and relations in a manner that reveals how something being \(F\) may partly be a matter of being related to a non-part or may be partly a matter of how non-parts are. If this is true, then it has the following two consequences. First, it follows that every fundamental property is intrinsic (since it being non-intrinsic cannot be revealed by analysis in terms of more fundamental properties and relations. Secondly, and even more importantly, it follows that whether a property is intrinsic should be analysable in terms of how that property can be analysed in terms of the fundamental properties and relations. 