 On another version of the view, although we do not have empirical evidence for the proposition that we are not in a skeptical scenario, we do have a kind of justification for it which does not rest exclusively on the fact that if we didn’t then we wouldn’t be justified in believing anything. Stewart Cohen 2010 has argued that our justification for believing that we are not in a skeptical scenario derives from the rationality of certain inferential rules (see also Wedgwood 2013). One such rule justifies us in concluding (defeasibly) that there is something red in front of us if we have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of us. Now, we can use that rule “online”, when we do in fact have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of us, or “offline”, assuming for the sake of argument that we have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of us to see what follows from it. According to the rule in question, it follows (again, defeasibly) that there is something red in front of us. We can now cancel the assumption by concluding (defeasibly) with the following conditional: if I have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of me, then there is something red in front of me. Notice that this conditional is incompatible with one specific skeptical hypothesis: the hypothesis that (for whatever reason) I have an experience with the content that there is something red in front of me but there is nothing red in front of me.