 The potential problem that this Moorean view about truth presents for deflationism might best be expressed in the form of a question: What is the difference between the Moorean view and deflationism? One might reply that, according to deflationary theories, the concept of truth has an important logical role, i.e., expressing certain generalizations, whereas the concept of goodness does not. However, this doesn’t really answer our question. For one thing, it isn’t clear that Moore’s notion of truth does not also capture generalizations, since it too will yield all of the instances of (ES). For another, the idea that the concept of truth plays an important logical role doesn’t distinguish the metaphysics of deflationary conceptions from the metaphysics of the Moorean view, and it is the metaphysics of the matter that the present objection really brings into focus. Alternatively, one might suggest that the distinction between truth according to Moore’s view and deflationary conceptions of truth is the distinction between having a simple unanalyzable nature, and not having any underlying nature at all. But what is that distinction? It is certainly not obvious that there is any distinction between having a nature about which nothing can be said and having no nature at all.