 The example of the doctor suggests that the price of Humeanism is a rather extreme form of skepticism: in many situations a Humean agent will have no non-trivial full beliefs at all. That criticism is developed extensively in Rott (2017) and Douven and Rott (2018). The doctor also illustrates how the Humean proposal allows arbitrarily small perturbations of partial beliefs to be reflected as huge differences in full beliefs. Suppose the doctor is slightly more confident that Job will not survive a month, i.e. her survival probabilities decrease as \(\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{8} - \epsilon, \frac{1}{16}, \frac{1}{32}, \ldots.\) Now the doctor can believe that Job will be dead in two months without running afoul of the Humean thesis.