 On their “biocultural” view, it is not just that human rationality allows significant scope for autonomous moral reasoning that can lead to greater inclusivity (as discussed in section 2.4 above), but that our evolved moral psychology itself contains the seeds for such a shift (though it equally contains the seeds for potential moral regression). They key idea is that our evolved moral nature is neither inherently tribalist nor inherently inclusivist, but contains both dispositions; their expression, however, is conditional on the particular socio-institutional environmental conditions that obtain (or are at least perceived to obtain). In some conditions tribalistic dispositions will be engaged, while in other conditions inclusivist dispositions can dominate. This is their “adaptive plasticity” model of evolved human moral psychology, according to which evolution has disposed us to think and behave in certain ways under one set of (perceived) conditions, and in very different ways under another set of (perceived) conditions—this having been fitness-enhancing in our evolutionary history. In particular, our tribalist tendencies are activated when “cues of out-group threat” are perceived (whether real or not), involving competition, disease, undermining of in-group cohesion, and so on; by contrast, our inclusivist tendencies are activated when such cues are less abundant or salient.