 Note the inclusion of identity; the Mohists use tong variously much in the way the copula “is” functions in English. What is obvious from the explanations they provide of these terms is that, however much their stock illustrations appeal to acts of perception, the Mohists are using their technical term tong much more broadly than mere perceptual likeness. They include identity, as noted, as when two names refer to the same thing or have the same extension (gou “dog” and quan “canine” were typical examples). Moreover, not only may two horses appear alike perceptually (being of the same shape or having four legs), but a hand may be “the same as” Mozi (being a part of Mozi) or the same as another part of Mozi, the hardness and whiteness of a stone may be the same in partly constituting the same object (“as together”), and Mozi may be “the same as” a human (in that he is “of the kind” human). These examples make it evident, moreover, that tong was intended to cover both mereological and member-set relations (cf. Fraser 2007). Such relations are obviously not always symmetrical, and while there is no direct evidence that the Mohists were perplexed by the specific problem posed above, it is evident that their own definitions provided them with various means of response.