 This bluntly concretist formalism would seem to face insuperable problems: for example in the shape of the ‘concretely undecidable’, those short theses with unfeasibly long proofs or disproofs mentioned above in connection with Goodman and Quine’s nominalism. Weir’s attempt to address such problems takes as its basis a fairly common ‘post-Fregean’ or ‘neo-Fregean’ perspective on language. Frege, at least early in his career, held that the truth value of a sentence is determined by two factors, the Sinn, the sense, literal meaning or informational content, of the sentence; and the way the world is. Indexicality and wider context relativity of sentences he initially supposed could be met by assuming speakers who uttered and grasped such sentences took them as elliptical for more complete utterances whose sense fixed, in combination with the world, a unique truth value.