  Many authors have pointed out that there appears to be no fundamental difference between selling organs and other widely accepted practices, particularly selling one's own ‘risky labour’ (work that involves a risk of harm that is the same as or greater than that involved in organ donation) (Harris 1992; Brecher 1990, 1994; Wilkinson &amp; Garrard 1996). Furthermore, common forms of ‘risky labour’ (coal mining, deep-sea diving, fire fighting, military service in a just war, etc.) are often more dangerous than selling a kidney, but are regarded as heroic, rather than condemned; it is seen as just and proper to reward those who do these things. This difference in attitude cannot be justified in terms of the good consequences that ‘risky labour’ produces, since the consequences of an organ sale (often, saving a life) may be just as good or better. Therefore, it is inconsistent to allow people to be paid for ‘risky labour’ while not allowing them to be paid for their organs. Savulescu (2003, 138) makes the point as follows: