How might a defender of the truthmaker account respond?[35] It won't do to claim that the notion of ontological commitment targeted by the truthmaker account doesn't include the missing implicit commitments.  For one thing, the truthmaker criterion will let in those implicit commitments that pass the sufficiency test, and there seems to be no principled reason for admitting these implicit commitments, but not the others. More importantly, excluding implicit commitments does not sit well with the chief motivation for a truthmaker account, viz., that ontological commitments should reflect fundamental ontology; for commitments are no less fundamental for being implicit. The mismatch between the notions of ontological commitment and truthmaking—that the ontological commitments of a theory are entities whose existence is necessary, given the truth of the theory, whereas the truthmakers of a theory are entities whose existence is sufficient for the truth of the theory—seems to be a serious problem for a truthmaker account of ontological commitment, at least as presented above.