 There are four concepts of human activity which are commonly called ‘art’, but which according to Collingwood, should be sharply distinguished from what he calls ‘art proper’. The implication is that those things are improperly so-called, that is, are commonly but wrongly called art. Since today the tendency in aesthetics is to insist that all things called ‘art’ are rightly so-called, it is important emphasize this fact; the Institutional Theory of Art, and the Theory of Mass Art, would no doubt be viewed by Collingwood as pernicious linguistic confusions. But in fact it is worse than this. Art proper is often found within the context of those other things; even particular works of art (proper) may at the same time be instances of those things. Furthermore, it is not as if ‘art’ once had the true meaning appertaining to art proper, and then got extended to these other things; the word has always been more or less subject to at least some of these confusions. The task, then, is to distinguish the concept from those of many other competing related human activities, and to claim that it alone deserves to be called art.