 Two things informed contemporary philosophers’ initial characterization of imaginative resistance. The first is the curious asymmetry Hume detected between imagining morally and nonmorally deviant content. The second is the blurring of the division between what is actual and what is fictional when it comes to depictions of moral deviance (see Moran 1994, Walton 1994, Gendler 2000, Currie 2002, Matravers 2003). Gendler identifies “the puzzle of imaginative resistance” as “the puzzle of explaining our comparative difficulty in imagining fictional worlds that we take to be morally deviant” (2000: 56). She further elaborates on the puzzle by pointing out the relative restrictions imposed on the author’s authority to make things true in the world of the morally deviant fiction: even though the author seems to exercise a great deal of freedom when it comes to depictions of such things as flying cars and talking mice, it is rather puzzling that this freedom seems to be taken away or restricted once the author describes, let’s say, female infanticide or slavery as morally correct. In these cases, she claims, we experience a “doubling of the narrator” (2000: 64). We regard the moral justification of female infanticide or slavery not as true in the story but as merely something that the narrator thinks. It is as if we want to respond to the narrator by saying “That’s what you think”. What is puzzling is that in these special cases we become so aware of narrators themselves that it undermines the whole practice of producing and consuming fiction.