 A third influential ‘subject account’ of collective intentionality was propounded by Philip Pettit (2001a,b, 2003, 2009). The theory of group agency Pettit has since expounded jointly with Christian List (see List &amp; Pettit 2011) is not specifically tailored to this issue or voiced in the respective terminology; the reconstruction in the following thus concentrates on a brief account of Pettit’s initial statement of his view, as it is (in argument and terminology) more explicitly stated within a framework that overlaps with other conceptions of collective intentionality. In contrast to other accounts, Pettit’s does not start from an analysis of joint action or collective intentional states, thus treating the issues of joint agency and group agency as distinguishable (cf. Pettit &amp; Schweikard 2006). Instead, he approaches the issue of whether groups can be subjects of (or have) intentions directly by asking whether they can fulfill general conditions of agency. And he claims that not only can groups fulfill such conditions, but that such groups fulfill them as collective units of agency whose attitudes may be discontinuous with the attitudes of their members (cf. Pettit 2002 and 2003).