This approach to intentionality mobilizes Sellars’s functionalist treatment of meaning.  Attributing a thought (hope, regret, desire …) that p to someone is a complex affair. In the first instance, such an attribution locates the relevant state of the person “in the logical space of reasons.”  This is to place the state-type of the person within a vast network of possible intentional state- and action-types related to each other by normative relations of inference, exclusion, relevance, and propriety.  But actual intentional state-types must be embodied in physical tokens, so attributing an intentional state to someone effectively attributes to that person as well a behavioral control system that is so structured that something analogous to theoretical and practical inference goes on within it and, in this case, has a •p• active in it in the appropriate way. Being active “in the appropriate way” within someone’s behavioral control system will include participating in patterns of dispositions to infer and be inferred from other intentional states that mirror the patterns of relationships in the logical space of reasons, as well being tied to sensory input and to output activities in appropriate ways.