 This weak person-affecting view stands in contrast to a strong person-affecting view according to which an act or action harms a person only if the same person is worse off than she would otherwise at that time have been. Both the weak and the strong person-affecting views differ from impersonal views according to which the value of states of affairs is not reducible to their effect on the interests of actual people. Currently living people ought to choose to bring about the state of affairs in which more of the morally relevant values will be realized irrespective of who the people are who will live. Many theorists claim that a plausible understanding of intergenerational ethics must be impersonal or must combine person-affecting and impersonal considerations (see especially J. Harris 1992: 94–95; Singer 1998; Buchanan et al. 2000: 249; Harman 2004: 101–102; McBrayer 2008: 304; Holtug 2009: 71–92; McMahan 2009: 49–68; Temkin 2012: 313–362; Williams &amp; Harris 2014: 347; Heyd’s interpretation of Parfit 2011 in Heyd 2014; Parfit 2017). The differences between the person-affecting and impersonal understandings will come to the fore in  Section 2.2  and  Section 3  on intergenerational duties that reflect what is owed to future people as a matter of justice as well as in  Section 4.6  on the limits of a rights-based account of intergenerational ethics.