 Tsongkhapa argues that another distinctive feature of the Consequence school is its recognition of the existence of “disintegration as an entity” (zhig pa’i dngos po) to account for causality (Hopkins 2003, 934–35). The impetus for the theory that disintegration is a distinct entity is to provide an account for causality in the absence of substance. Tsongkhapa argues that an entity’s disintegration—which many other Buddhist philosophical systems take to be a non-entity—is just as real as any positive entity, and so itself is as causally efficacious as any other entity or event. While attributing causal power to disintegration is an attempt to preserve a non-substantialist theory of causality, this theory invites other problems, such as the reification of absence (i.e., treating emptiness as a “thing”), which has been a frequent target for critics of the Geluk tradition.