 A different take on these two landscapes, which lines up more closely with Sosa than with Zagzebski, is due to Christoph Kelp (2021a), who construes epistemology as the theory of inquiry. According to Kelp, we should “take inquiry (or finding out about things) as the starting point for epistemological theorizing” (Kelp 2021a: 2). Whereas Sosa takes constitutive attempts at knowing—viz., belief and judgments—to have have aims internal to them (with inquiry itself best understood a wider kind of activity within which we make these attempts), Kelp takes inquiry itself to be a kind of activity with an aim, where the particular aim of a given inquiry depends on the type of inquiry it is. For Kelp, knowledge is the constitutive aim of inquiry into specific questions (e.g., whether Frege ever met Russell) and understanding is the constitutive aim of inquiry into general phenomena (e.g., the UK’s exit from the European Union, the rise of the Roman Empire, etc.). While Kelp doesn’t attempt to analyze either knowledge or understanding reductively, he offers non-reductive “network” analyses for both knowledge and understanding which are meant to elucidate the nature of knowledge and understanding in terms of their place in inquiry.