 The other paradox of material implication is that according to Hook all conditionals with true consequents are true: from \(B\) it follows that \(A \supset B\). This is perhaps less obviously unacceptable: if I’m sure that \(B\), and treat \(A\) as an epistemic possibility, I must be sure that if \(A, B\). Again the problem becomes vivid when we consider the case when I’m only nearly sure, but not quite sure, that \(B\). I think \(B\) may be false, and will be false if certain, in my view unlikely, circumstances obtain. For example, I think Sue is giving a lecture right now. I don’t think that if she was seriously injured on her way to work, she is giving a lecture right now. I reject that conditional. But on Hook’s account, the conditional is false only if the consequent is false. I think the consequent is true: I think a sufficient condition for the truth of the conditional obtains.