 At this point in the dialectic, internalists and externalists tend to produce additional arguments in an effort to overcome what seems an impasse. Externalists, for example, may invite us to consider cases in which a person judges it right to φ, while believing it would in fact be impossible to succeed in doing φ, or cases in which she thinks doing φ would markedly interfere with her welfare or would prevent her from obtaining something she dearly desires. Doesn’t it seem plausible that in such cases a person could judge it right to φ, while failing to be moved to φ? More generally, externalists argue that internalists cannot make sense of morality’s historical challenger—the skeptic who asks, “Why be moral?” Externalists may also offer arguments aimed at shifting the burden on to the internalist to establish that internalism is a conceptual platitude (Svavarsdottir 1999, 2006).