 This argument seems clearly valid; but this seems to rule out the idea that the belief reports here are about sentence tokens. For (a) in order to account for the validity of the argument, we have to take the two ‘that’-clauses to refer to the same thing, and (b) there is no sentence token that they could both refer to. First of all, they couldn't refer to any external sentence token (or, for that matter, any sentence type associated with any natural language), because (i) if the first ‘that’-clause refers to such a sentence, it would presumably be a Russian sentence, since Boris speaks only  Russian;[8]  and (ii) if the second ‘that’-clause refers to such a sentence, it would presumably be an English sentence, since Jerry speaks only English; and so (iii) the two ‘that’-clauses cannot both refer to the same external sentence token (or natural-language sentence type). And second, they cannot refer to any mentalese sentence token, because (i) if the first ‘that’-clause refers to such a sentence, it would presumably be in Boris's head; and (ii) if the second ‘that’-clause refers to such a sentence, it would presumably be in Jerry's head; and so (iii) the two ‘that’-clauses cannot both refer to the same mentalese sentence token. Therefore, it seems to follow that the ‘that’-clauses in the above argument do not refer to sentence tokens of any kind. And since these are ordinary belief ascriptions, it follows that, in general, the ‘that’-clauses that appear in ordinary belief ascriptions do not refer to sentence tokens.