 Earlier we said that a consideration has motivational primacy for an agent just in case the following three conditions are met: First, it is a type of consideration in light of which an ordinary adult agent would act in a wide array of cases; second, it is a sufficient reason for that agent; and, third it has deliberative weight for him. Eudaimonists believe that one’s good on the whole has motivational primacy. Indeed, they believe that one’s good on the whole has motivational primacy in a very robust sense. Eudaimonists hold that every act that an agent performs is, or should be, taken for the sake of his own happiness and that there is, or should be, no deeper practical justification for so acting. Reid maintains that eudaimonism thus understood is false. In many cases, agents do not act for the sake of their good on the whole. Nor, in many cases, should they do so. For one thing, appealing to one’s good on the whole is insufficiently action-guiding, since many agents simply do not have an adequate understanding of that in which it consists. For another, to make happiness the final court of appeal when deliberating is to undermine the rightful primacy of virtue.