  A concern regarding this line of thought is that whenever one acts, what one does should be justifiable to those who are affected or might be affected by one's choice. If what one does is justifiable, in principle anyone who is impinged on or ignored can be provided a justification of what is being done to them (or not being done to them), a justification they can accept and will accept if they sort through the relevant considerations and assess them rightly. In this sense, whenever individuals make choices, their choices involve the will of all those who are impinged on or might have been impinged on by one or another choice that might have been made. And for that matter, bystanders who could not have been affected in any way by what is done but who are aware that some individual is choosing some act or omission should also be able to discern a fully adequate justification for what is done. The involvement of the will of those one's action impinges on turns out to encompass the entire community of rational agents, all of whom should be able to see that what one does is rationally justified. So it is still mysterious how the involvement of the will of those coerced by the laws and public policies of a functioning state might be thought to trigger the application of special egalitarian justice obligations that do not apply except among those caught in the particular web of coercion.