 This account has given rise to opposing interpretations. Theodore Crowley (1950) saw in these passages the beginnings of late medieval nominalism that would find its expression in William of Ockham. Thomas S. Maloney (1985) challenged this reading and argued that the later Roger Bacon, like the earlier Bacon, was not a nominalist but an extreme realist. More recently, Chiara Chrisciani has argued that already in 1964, Camile Berube saw Bacon as the originator of the Franciscan doctrine of the direct intellectual perception of the singular. He also noted the link between Bacon and William of Ockham even though the path of influence was long and complex. She also correctly noted that for Bacon, we have a sense-perception of universals, one quite different from his contemporaries. Following K. Tachau and Y. Raizman-Kedar, Crisciani argues that the universals are materially embodied in the intellect. In a recent study, while agreeing with this position with respect to the material intellect, I argued that it needed qualification. Perhaps we should hold that there are elements of both ‘extreme-realism’ and proto-nominalism in this account in the Communia naturalium. In his important essay on individuation in the fourteenth century, Jorge J.E. Gracia (1991) argues for seeing this text and others as the beginning of the strict tradition of late medieval nominalism.