 Does (6) count as a metaphysical explanation? It might seem to, given a traditional conception of metaphysics as studying the “first causes of things” (see the entry on  metaphysics).  And yet, it appears to work solely thanks to certain causal facts. Both points can be reconciled with our framing so far. Whatever “metaphysical causation” might be, surely it is not causation of the ordinary sort that links sunlight to puddle evaporation over time, which is all that we meant to emphasize by characterizing metaphysical explanation as non-causal. And moreover, whether to classify all explanations offered in metaphysics as metaphysical explanations, rather than more narrowly as just those that derive their explanatory power partly from non-causal factors, is a matter of terminological decision not worth engaging with at length. Clearly there is some important difference between (1)–(5) as opposed to (6) in how they work, and that difference seems to have something to do with the non-causal ways in which they work. That is a topic worth investigating, not whether to use “metaphysical” in the broader way or the narrower one.