 Perhaps the most important problem for this view concerns the relevant understanding of seemings, or perceptual experience. It is clear that seemings must be non-belief states of some sort, as their epistemological role is to confer justification on basic beliefs, and the latter wouldn’t be basic if seemings were themselves beliefs. The “Sellarsian dilemma” is a famous argument, due perhaps as much to BonJour (1978, 1985) as to Sellars (1956), which claims that “experience” and “seemings” and the like are ambiguous in a way that undermines the epistemological role foundationalism requires of experiences. That role, of course, is to provide justification for beliefs without being themselves in need of it. (Sellars’s original argument is aimed at classical foundationalism, but I discuss it here, because it threatens any theory that has experiences justifying beliefs—by themselves and in the absence of background beliefs—and because most recent discussion of the Sellarsian dilemma occurs within the context of seemings internalism.) According to Sellars (1956), there is a kind of awareness of sensations that does not involve learning or the application of concepts, but this kind of awareness does not account for the justification of our appearance beliefs; one might well have this kind of awareness without having any idea what kind of experiences one is having (or any idea that there are such things as experiences!). There is another kind of awareness of our sensations that does involve the application of concepts and does entail knowledge and justification. But this awareness just is one’s knowledge of one’s experiences (i.e., one’s justified, true, unGettiered appearance belief). But that kind of awareness cannot then serve as a nondoxastic foundation that confers justification on beliefs without being itself in need of justification.