 Secondly, Avicenna breaks away from Aristotle in that he proceeds in establishing the existence of the First Principle from analyses of the conception of being rather than motion and moved objects (for Aristotle’s argument see Physics 7 &amp; 8). In order to establish the Necessary Existent, Avicenna proceeds from a conception of being that Albalag, following Averroes, dismisses as spurious (for Averroes see al-kashf: 14). His discomfort with this conception has to do primarily with the fact that it is alien to Aristotle. But Albalag additionally speaks of errors and absurd implications, especially in the science of metaphysics, that follow from Avicenna’s method of distinguishing two types of necessary existents, i.e., that which is necessary in itself and that which is necessary by another. One implication pertains to the nature of separate intellects. Assuming that anything which is not necessary in itself involves two modes, necessity and possibility, as Avicenna holds, then separate intellects would also involve both necessity and possibility. This, however, absurdly clashes with the essential nature of separate intellects as immaterial beings, since possibility must reside in a substratum (Tiqqun n.8: 14,  n.29: 27).