This consideration shows one can describe a concept of deontological justification according to which only synchronic considerations matter. Its theoretical use will be akin to the use of the parallel synchronic notion of ethical duty fulfillment and responsibility.  Suppose I owe you a hundred dollars and am in a position to repay you.  But instead of doing paying my debt, I spend my money frivolously and become once again broke.  Looked at synchronically, my present inability to pay apparently makes my failing to pay excusable. I can't give you what I don't have, and if ‘ought’ implies ‘can,’ then it's not the case that I ought to pay you.  I daresay that you won't be impressed by this line of defense, should I be foolish enough to use it. This shows that synchronic deontological concepts are dubious philosophical significance.  So there is no significant refuge for the synchronic theory of the justification of memory belief in deontologism. 