 Aizawa has also replied to a number of the challenges to the standard multiple realizability argument scouted in  section 2  above. After separating three distinct arguments in Bechtel and Mundale (1999;  §2.3  above), Aizawa (2009) sets his critical sights on their Central Argument, which argues against multiple realization from the existence and continued success of brain mapping studies. He argues that Bechtel and Mundale misrepresent the actual nature of these studies, and more generally of the methods employed in functional localization studies. Working with exactly the scientific examples Bechtel and Mundale discuss (mostly from the functional neuroanatomy of vision), Aizawa argues that claims about psychological functions do not play the specific role in these studies that Bechtel and Mundale insist. So the success of these studies does not imply the falsity of multiple realization. Later in that paper Aizawa challenges two of Bechtel and Mundale’s key assertions. He denies that if psychological properties were multiply realized, then functional taxonomy of the brain would have to be carried out independently of psychological function. And he denies that multiple realization rules out comparisons of brains across different species. Hence all the premises of Bechtel and Mundale’s Central Argument are false. Aizawa (2007) criticizes Bickle’s (2003) argument that a unitary realization of memory consolidation across species has been found at the level of molecular mechanisms, despite widespread neural differences in these brains at higher levels of neuroscientific description  (§2.3  above). According to Aizawa, the protein components of these evolutionarily conserved molecular mechanisms, and the NNA sequences coding for them, are themselves multiply realized across species. Aizawa (2013) presented numerous scientific examples of multiple realization by “compensatory differences”. In such cases, changes to one or more properties that jointly realize a realized property G are compensated for by changes in others of the jointly realizing properties. Although his overall goal in this paper is to bring this form of multiple realization to wider recognition and study by philosophers of science, he uses the broader “Gillett-Aizawa framework” to argue that highly specific determinate properties, not just generic determinable properties, are multiply realized in this specific fashion. Such multiply realized determinate properties are indeed exactly similar across distinct realizations, and so answer the dilemma posed by Shapiro and others  (§2.4  above).