Buddhist thinkers are broadly committed to error theories about ordinary language use. As noted already, early Buddhists, in texts such as The Questions of King Milinda (Milindapañhā), argue for a kind of conventionalism: language which seems to refer to persistent whole objects, such as chariots and persons, does not, as such objects are taken to lack true existence. Later philosophical reflection, such as in the Commentary on the Treasury of Dharma (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya) of Vasubandhu (ca fourth to fifth century CE, see the entry on Vasubandhu), presents a kind of local fictionalism or reductionism, as the only truly existing things are atomic simples which exist momentarily. Thus, all language is, save for claims about ultimately real constituent parts, loose speech. Buddhist philosophy of language is famous for its “two truths” doctrine (see the entry on the theory of two truths in India), the notion that there is conventional truth and ultimate truth—but this gets deployed variously among the later schools such as Yogācāra and Madhyamaka (see Siderits 2003 and Garfield 2006).