  In his production Henry dedicates no less than 20 quodlibetal questions to an analysis of will and intellect, considered both in general and with particular reference to the human sphere (Macken 1975 and 1977). In Quodl. I, q. 14, the eminence of the will over the intellect is defended, taking into account the habitus, act and object of the two faculties. As in Pauline doctrine, the habitus of the will, which is love (caritas), is preferable to the habitus of the intellect, which is knowledge. Its act, which consists in desiring and loving God, is preferable to the act of reason, which is represented only by knowing God. The object of the will, the supreme Good, is more eminent than the object of the intellect, which is the truth, i.e. the good, of a given thing and is thus a subordinate good. In the next quaestio (Quodl. I, q. 15), however, Henry clarifies that the primacy of one faculty over another can be understood in a double sense: “primacy of essence” should be attributed to voluntas, whereas “primacy of action” should be attributed to ratio.