 We just noted that the epistemic dependence of one belief on another in the above examples seems to be a kind of inferential dependence. Epistemologists do tend to assume that all epistemic dependence between beliefs is inferential. But perhaps not all relations of epistemic or justificatory dependence between beliefs are inferential. When I form an introspective belief about a conscious or occurrent belief of mine -- e.g., my belief that I believe it’s raining outside -- perhaps (on some views) my second-order belief’s justification depends on my having the conscious belief that it is raining. Many would take such introspective beliefs to be “foundational”, akin to my justification for beliefs about my own present experiences. One way to make sense of this is that even if such beliefs depend for their justification on the first-order beliefs, they are foundational in the sense of not depending positively on the epistemic or justificatory status of other beliefs. (Notice that my belief that I believe that it is raining outside doesn’t depend for its justification on whether I’m justified in believing that it’s raining outside.) This suggests that we understand foundational beliefs as those that do not depend on the epistemic status of other beliefs, and non-foundational beliefs as beliefs that do so depend. And if we think that any dependence of a belief on the epistemic status of another belief must be inferential, we get the neat result that foundational beliefs do not, but non-foundational beliefs do, depend for their justification on inferential relations to other beliefs. But is it possible for a belief to depend on the epistemic status of other beliefs, but in a non-inferential way? We will briefly illustrate how some accounts might accept the possibility of non-inferential epistemic dependence between beliefs further below, when we discuss coherentism and reliabilism. However, aside from such cases, we will treat “foundational/nonfoundational” justification and the “noninferential/inferential” justification as interchangeable.