  To apply (HCP) and (HPP) we need a conception of harm. Most views are comparative: we are harmed by some event if and only if that event renders us worse off in some way relative to some baseline. One challenge is to identify the relevant baseline. Are we harmed by an event if we are worse than we would have been if things had been different? If so, different how? Are we harmed if we are worse off than we were immediately beforehand? Or should we focus not on the position we were or would have been in, but on the position we should have been in morally speaking (Holtug 2002; Tadros 2016, 187–200)? A second challenge is to determine in what way we must be worse off. The wider our answer to this question, the more likely it is that harm principles collapse into their supposed rivals. Some say we are harmed when our interests are set back (Feinberg 1984, 31–64). But it is plausible to think that we have interests in avoiding disgust, annoyance, and dismay. Many people are disgusted, annoyed, or dismayed by what they take to be morally wrongful. On an interest-based view, they are also harmed. Any harm principle that uses this notion of harm thus threatens to permit criminalization of much conventional immorality (Devlin 1965). A narrower view has it that we are harmed only if our future prospects are reduced, because we are deprived of valuable abilities or opportunities (Raz 1986, 413–414; Gardner 2007, 3–4; Simester and von Hirsch 2011, 36–37). Disgust, annoyance, and offence need not—and often do not—have this effect. So they need not be—and often are not—harmful. But as blinding pain also need not reduce one’s prospects in life, it is arguable that this view avoids collapse only at the cost of underinclusion (Tadros 2016, 179–180).