A related challenge concerning the role of conscious intentions stems from Wegner’s model of apparent mental causation. According to this view, conscious intentions provide mere “previews” of our actions: they precede our actions, but they do not cause them (Wegner and Wheatley 1999; Wegner 2002). Wegner provided evidence of dissociations between the sense of agency and the actual exercise of agency, and he argued that the model of apparent mental causation provides the best explanation of the data. This view has been strongly criticized for conceptual ambiguities and argumentative flaws (see also section 4.5). One common objection is that the fact that the sense of agency can come apart from the exercise of agency is perfectly compatible with the assumption that conscious intentions tend to cause the intended actions. (See Bayne 2006; Mele 2009a; for a reply to Wegner’s inference to the best explanation see Schlosser 2012a.)