  One might here point to God's power to punish or to His role in our creation. But neither consideration seems to establish legitimate authority on its own. In general, at least, the mere fact that one has the power to enforce one's commands does not establish those commands as legitimate, nor does it ensure that one has a right to punish those who fail to conform to one's commands. Similarly, in general, the mere fact that one created something does not establish that one properly has absolute control over what one has created.  Of course, room remains to argue that there is something special about God's power, or about His role as creator, that makes his commands distinctively legitimate. What is needed is an account of what is special. And, in this context, it needs to be an account that explains how God's commands, as opposed to the commands that others might issue, have an authority. Moreover, if appealing to God is to solve the metaethical puzzle posed by Euthyphro, the account offered must not itself rely on, or presuppose, the sort of transcendent standards we have been attempting to explain.