 The force of this argument depends chiefly on the strength of the third premise. Not everyone is convinced, to put it mildly (Fodor, 2000; Samuels, 2000; Woodward &amp; Cowie, 2004). First, the premise exemplifies adaptationist reasoning, and adaptationism in the philosophy of biology has more than its share of critics. Second, it is doubtful whether adaptive problem-solving in general is easier to accomplish with a large collection of specialized problem-solving devices than with a smaller collection of general problem-solving devices with access to a library of specialized programs (Samuels, 2000). Hence, insofar as the massive modularity hypothesis postulates an architecture of the first sort—as evolutionary psychologists’ ‘Swiss Army knife’ metaphor of the mind implies (Cosmides &amp; Tooby, 1992)—the premise seems shaky. 