 Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2002; 2007; 2016) has developed an account of innateness that builds on the older idea of ‘poverty of the stimulus’ (Section 1.5). He restricts his account to psychological traits, where the problems of assessing the relative weight of genetic and environmental causes can be avoided, “by focusing on the informational content of the stimulus relative to the resultant cognitive capacity” (2002, 263). In Khalidi’s view, it is possible to judge the informational complexity of certain representational states, such as a belief or cognitive skill. It is also possible, according to Khalidi, to assess the amount of environmental information available to the organism during development. The discrepancy between the amount of available information and the complexity of the belief or skill determines its degree of innateness. A complex belief that develops in an informationally impoverished environment is highly innate on this view. Such beliefs are sometimes described as being “triggered” by the environment, as opposed to being learned (Fodor 1981). Hence, Khalidi dubs this the ‘triggering’ account of innateness: “An innate cognitive capacity is one that has a disposition or tendency to be triggered on the basis of an environmental input that is impoverished by comparison to the resultant cognitive capacity” (Khalidi 2009, 506). Because of its limited range of application this is not intended as a general  definition of innateness. Rather, the triggering account is intended as an explication of how cognitive scientists currently use the term.