 The original intentionality objection is also, at least partly, deflected. In this amalgamated process, that combines things going on both inside and outside Otto’s skin, there is original intentionality aplenty. Otto has to read what he scans on each page, and his seeing will have original intentionality. He will have to understand what he sees, and this understanding will also have original intentionality. Therefore, the overall process is not at all devoid of original intentionality (Menary 2006, 2007). It can, however, can be objected that this original intentionality is confined to segments of the process that are located exclusively inside Otto’s skin (Adams 2010). A response to this objection might take two forms. One is to accept the claim, and argue that it does not matter. In this vein, one might point to that the fact that it would be extremely implausible to require that every internal part of a cognitive process, understood neuro-physiologically or computationally, must possess original intentionality. A retinal image, for example, might possess original intentionality of a sort. The visual representation into which this image is progressively transformed by constructive operations on the part of the brain would, probably, possess original intentionality. But those constructive operations would not (Rowlands 2010). The other option is to deny the claim. This would require showing that at least some things that are not located in or at the skin possess original intentionality. Rowlands (2006), for example, argues that this is true of what he calls pre-intentional actions or doings. The debate is ongoing, and it is not clear whether there is an answer that would convince both parties.