 Most semantic theories of vagueness and treatments of the sorites conceive of the application of a vague term as indeterminate in a certain range of cases. Specifically, in a sorites series for vague predicate ‘\(\Phi\)’, it is said to be indeterminate—there is “no fact of the matter”—which value is the last \(\Phi\) value. The indeterminacy is usually thought to be manifested in the predicate’s possession of (possible) borderline cases. Borderlines are variously conceived as neither definitely (or determinately) \(\Phi\) nor definitely not \(\Phi\), or as such that the sentence ‘x is \(\Phi\)’ is neither true nor false, or neither super-true nor super-false, or neither true to degree 1 nor false to degree 1, for  example.[7]  The shared idea seems to be that the regions of borderline cases in a sorites series for ‘\(\Phi\)’ constitute the predicate’s blurred boundaries; and that because the series contains these indeterminate values, the major premise (or one or more conditional premises) of the paradox is either less than true or flat-out false. In what follows we review some of the major semantic treatments of the paradox.