 First, one may make a stronger assumption about the objects of moral knowledge. Of special interest is the possibility that we can know general truths about morality even while such general truths fall short of counting as moral principles. For example, while particularists will deny that there is any exceptionless moral principle to the effect that pain is bad, many sympathetic to particularism would agree that, as a general matter, pain is bad and that we can know this. On a deflationary reading, one might treat the claim that pain is bad as a useful heuristic, a reminder that pain has often been bad in the past and may well be so in the future (Dancy 1993). Alternatively, that pain is bad might capture an interesting metaphysical fact about pain; its default status is the status of being bad. We can understand default status in terms of an explanatory asymmetry. When pain is not bad there must be something that explains why it is not, but when pain is bad there needn’t be any further explanation of what makes pain bad (Dancy 1993, 2004). Finally, one might try to invest such generalizations with real explanatory power while insisting they remain exception laden. That pain is bad is a kind of defeasible generalization, where this amounts the claim that pain is bad in a privileged set of worlds (Little 2000; Lance and Little 2004; for critical discussion of each of these possibilities, see Stangl 2006).