 In large part in response to these difficulties with cost-benefit analysis and treating maximization as the relevant principle, scholars in public health ethics have defended alternative principles of distribution. These principles mirror familiar debates in the literature on distributive justice. Although some theorists argue for some form of equality in the distribution of health-related resources (Marmot 2005; Wilkinson 2005), including equality of opportunities (Daniels 2004, 2008), much of the literature is taken up with debates between prioritarianism and sufficientarianism. Defenders of prioritarianism claim that while the overall goal of distribution should be the promotion of the health of the population, extra weighting or priority should be placed on the distributing resources in ways that promote the health needs of those who are worst-off (Parfit 1997; Ottersen et al. 2008; Ottersen, Mæstad, and Norheim, 2014). How to conceptualize who the worst-off are for purposes of public health policymaking remains contested territory. By contrast, those defending sufficientarianism maintain that a preferable distributional principle for health resources is helping to ensure that all persons experience or can achieve a certain threshold of health or health capabilities (see Nussbaum 2006; Powers and Faden 2006; Fourie and Rid 2017). On this view, a world in which everyone reaches a threshold for health capabilities or health states is more just than a world in which average population health exceeds that threshold but some subgroups do not reach it. A challenge here is conceptualizing and then operationalizing how much health or health capability counts as sufficient.