 Another distinctive feature of enactivism is its anti-representational stance (Varela et al., 1991; Hutto &amp; Myin 2013; Gallagher 2017). For example, Hutto (2012) has proposed that “we let go of the idea that emotions represent situations in truth-evaluable ways” (2012: 4), suggesting that emotions do not represent core relational themes. For instance, fear does not represent that there is danger at hand, and anger does not represent that there has been a slight against me or mine. Hutto’s (2012) main concern with respect to ascribing representational powers to emotions is that such powers are posited despite not having explanatory value (see Hufendiek 2018 for discussion). Specifically, Hutto (2012) follows Ramsey (2007) in assuming that a mental state counts as a representation only if it is consumed by other systems in light of what it says or indicates, and concludes that emotions fail to play this larger explanatory role in the cognitive economy of the organism and should therefore not be considered representations.