 In his discussion of the question, “utrum magis universalia sint nobis prius nota quam minus universalia vel quam singularia [Is what is more universal more known to us than what is less universal, or than singulars]?” (fol. 9va–b), Burley deals once again with the problems of the intelligibility of singulars and the object of our knowledge. The question arises from the passage in the Physics (I.1, 184a23–24), where Aristotle affirms that our knowledge must proceed from what is universal to what is particular (or singular). According to Burley, it is false that what is more universal is known by us before (prius nota) what is less universal, as Thomas Aquinas had taught. Anyone who holds this, he argues, implicitly assumes that the passage from ignorance to perfect cognition (notitia perfecta) is mediated by the knowledge of all the substantial forms of the object in question, from the more general to the more particular. But this assumes that in order to know something, it is necessary to know everything that can be predicated of it. This seems false to Burley, since it is openly contradicted by experience: e.g., a person can know that the animal standing in front of him is a horse, and what a horse is, without knowing all the other universal forms that are predicated of it (fol. 9vb). A cognition of the latter kind is almost impossible, for it would be necessary to acquire systematic knowledge of all animal species and of any possible grouping they could form—something that no human being can achieve (fols. 9vb–10ra). Nor is Burley convinced by Ockham’s interpretation of this passage in the latter’s commentary on the Physics (cf. Expositio in libros Physicorum Aristotelis I, c.1, §2, O.Ph. IV, 24–25), according to which the Aristotelian principle applies only to complex knowledge and referring to humanity as a whole, although for each of us taken singularly the contrary is true, because the object of our simple and exhaustive knowledge (notita incomplexa perfecta) is the singular. Burley contends that what is true for individual human beings must also be true for humanity as a whole, and therefore that at the level of human species as well, the knowledge of what is less universal comes before the knowledge of what is more universal (cf. fol. 10rb). 