 A worry some have raised about NJT is that although able to vindicate the claim that we have reason to act as the authority requires, it seems unable to vindicate the claim that we have an obligation to do so. As we have seen, authorities are normally thought to have the moral power to impose obligations over us, or at least the right to coerce us to act as they require. Experts, by contrast, lack such power. Refusing to comply with their directives, no matter how foolish, doesn’t give them the standing to demand compliance or to sanction us if we refuse. One of the main objections raised against NJT is that it blurs the distinction between being subject to someone’s authority and merely receiving advice from an expert (Perry 2005; Himma 2007; Darwall 2013: chs. 8–9; Tadros 2020; but see Raz 2010). A further objection is that Raz’s view fails to pay sufficient attention to the procedural aspects of the justification for political authority. We normally think that it’s important that the decisions of political authorities are the product of fair-democratic procedures, but a purely instrumental justifications seems insensitive to this sort of consideration (Waldron 1999; Shapiro 2002; Hershovitz 2003; Christiano 2004; Viehoff 2011).