 Nonetheless, while he is best-known for taking psychology—and, what’s more, behavioristic psychology (“neural receptors and their stimulation rather than sense of  sensibilia”[14]  (Quine 1992: 19))—to be the successor to TE, Quine has a very broad conception of science. Science for Quine includes humble, everyday common sense thinking, after all. Further, while he sometimes speaks of one discipline replacing another, Quine also expresses his idea in terms of the “rubbing out” (1969b: 90) or “blurring” (1995: 257) of disciplinary boundaries such as that between epistemology and science. Finally, given his rejection of analyticity, his consequent rejection of the a  priori,[15]  and his holism about both meaning and confirmation, it is quite unclear how Quine could maintain any hard and fast distinction between philosophy and science (Gregory 2006: 660). For these reasons, it is unclear whether the entirety of traditional philosophical methods per se would—or could—be excluded from a respectable Quinean  epistemology.[16]  Unfortunately, Quine himself does not provide a clear and direct account of what, notwithstanding the rejection of the a priori, might indeed remain of TE and its method within “epistemology naturalized”.