 (2) Some of Zeno’s paradoxes concerning a particular—though, perhaps, the most basic—kind of transition, that is, local motion: a moving arrow is both where it is, and where it is not. In any given instant, argues Zeno, it cannot move to where it is, since it is already there, and it cannot move to somewhere else, because there isn’t time for it to get there. The orthodox way out of the paradoxical situation, as formulated, e.g., by Russell 1903, has it that motion is the mere occupation of different places at different times. But one could argue that this is denial of the phenomenon itself, that is, of the actuality of motion: Russell’s solution entails that motion is not an intrinsic state of the (allegedly) moving thing, for, at each instant, the arrow is not moving at all. Can a going-somewhere be composed by an (even continuum-sized) infinity of going-nowheres? An alternative, dialetheic account of motion, which takes at face value the aforementioned Hegelian idea that “Something moves, not because at one moment it is here and another there, but because at one and the same moment it is here and not here, because in this ‘here’, it at once is and is not”, is exposed in Priest 1987, Ch. 12.