 Therefore, \(S\)’s questions would concern only the distinct grounds of employment: “What is a gavaya like? On what grounds does one employ the word ‘gavaya’?” Since the one asked (viz., the forester) would not be able to show immediately, directly (sākṣāt), what it is to be a gavaya buffalo, he would talk about similarity, indirectly indicating it (i.e., indicating what it is to be a gavaya buffalo). And then later, when an individual has been seen by \(S\) who remembers the meaning of the analogical statement, she acquires the knowledge: “This thing qualified by what it is to be a gavaya is the referent of the word ‘gavaya’.” \(S\)’s knowledge is of a particular that is the grounds for the employment of the word. It is the result of analogy (as a knowledge source).