 And so a mysterian move suggests itself: We are justified in maintaining both that God is simple and that God is free despite the fact that after protracted effort we cannot make logical sense of this conjunction. If we have good arguments for both limbs of what appears to be a logically contradictory dyad, it could be that the contradiction is merely apparent. The fact that the conjunction — God is simple and God is free — appears to us, and perhaps even necessarily appears to us, to be or rather entail an explicit logical contradiction is not a compelling reason to reject the conjunction. It is a reason, perhaps even a good reason, but not a rationally compelling one. For it may be that our cognitive architecture saddles us with irremediable cognitive limitations that make it impossible for us to understand how God could be both simple and libertarianly free. The mysterian is not a dialetheist: the mysterian does not claim that there are true contradictions. Like the rest of us, the mysterian eschews them like the plague. The mysterian point is rather that a proposition’s non-episodic and chronic seeming to be a contradiction does not suffice for its rejection. For it may well be that certain truths are inaccessible to us due to our mental limitations and defects, and that among these truths are some that appear to us only in the guise of contradictions, and must so appear in this life. The religious mysterian can bolster the point by referencing the Fall.  Sin, after all, may be expected to have noetic consequences. Of course, Dolezal’s mysterian move cannot be reasonably made unless the extant attempts to reconcile simplicity and freedom are failures. That they are failures is not difficult to believe. So mysterianism is up and running despite its own problems. What might these be? 