 The arguments from efficiency and growth do not, as such, say anything about the distribution of income and wealth that is achieved in a market economy. A situation can be Pareto efficient while at the same time being extremely unequal (cf. e.g., Sen 1973). Sometimes one finds additional pro-market arguments to the effect that the wealth created by markets automatically “trickles down” to the poorer layers of society. This can happen, for example, when the rich buy goods or services the production of which creates employment for the poor (as argued by Smith in 1976b [1759] IV.I.10], or when innovations first made for luxury goods are later adopted in the mass market. It is not clear, however, under what conditions this happens. As a matter of fact, market economies exist in egalitarian and less egalitarian societies. Surrounding institutions play a major role in determining the degree of inequality that results from them. One can argue, however, that well-designed markets can contribute to making the pie of a national economy larger than it would otherwise be, and that the additional wealth can be redistributed through taxation or other measures. Then markets, in combination with other institutions, can potentially be justified vis-à-vis non-market-institutions by their distributive effects, for example along the lines of Rawls’ “difference principle”. According to this principle inequalities can be justified if they are “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society” (1999, 5–6). If one chooses this justification for markets, the design of institutions and the degree to which income and wealth should be redistributed depend not only on one’s normative position, but also on one one’s assumption about which regime in fact makes the poorest members of society best-off. Such an instrumental defense of markets can be found in many theories of what Freeman (e.g., 2011) calls the “high liberal” (in contrast to the “classical liberal”) tradition.