 The possibility of non-reductive intentionalism may be evident in another important way, particularly relevant to sense experience. Reductive intentionalism may seem to require that phenomenal character necessarily supervenes on intentional content—or on this plus “intentional mode” (where that encompasses sensory modality). Or, as one might put it, for any phenomenal difference there must be a difference in what properties something is represented to have, or a difference in the cognitive mode (or in sensory modality—e.g., visual or tactile) through which it is represented to have them. But a nonreductive intentionalism is not committed to such a strong thesis. For one may allow that various differences in phenomenal character are sufficient for differences in intentional features, while holding that there can be differences in character without differences in what something is represented to be, or in mode/modality of representation. Such would be the case, for example, if one argued (like Block 1990) that two visual experiences could represent the same objective color property on account of sharing appropriate causal linkages to the physical environment, even though subjectively the experience of color differed—there was a difference in “mental paint”—in virtue of some internally contrived inversion of what it was like for one to experience color on the two occasions. Independently of such views about the metaphysics of color and visual representation, one might maintain (like Siewert 2005) that the subtle but ubiquitous differences in the subjective character of experience that come with shifts between what is less and what is more “attended-to” in the visual field often cannot be justifiably matched to represented differences in “what properties look to be where”. Both views appear incompatible with reductive intentionalism. But both are consistent with the idea that the phenomenal character of visual experience brings intentionality with it—for example, in making things in your environment look to you shaped, sized, or positioned either accurately or inaccurately.