 Whether grounding is indeed hyperintensional may depend on how grounding claims are best understood. Where “… grounds…” is a sentential operator, the cases discussed had best be captured hyperintensionally. “(Socrates and Plato both exist) grounds (The set {Socrates, Plato} exists)”, for example. Things may work differently if we take “… grounds…” as a two-place predicate applying to facts or occurrences: “The fact that Socrates and Plato both exist grounds the fact that {Socrates, Plato} exists” expresses a relation between two objects, and we might be able to preserve the truth of this statement by substitution of any other ways of referring to each of those objects. One complication is that one might take these expressions picking out facts to themselves have constituents designating propositions: “the fact that Socrates and Plato both exist” may have the logical form the fact that A, where that \(A\) is the proposition that Socrates and Plato exist. Interpreted that way, the expression is functioning hyperintensionally after all, since the necessarily equivalent proposition that {Socrates, Plato} exists cannot be substituted into that expression without changing the truth-value of the relevant grounding claims. Finally, one could take the primary way of expressing grounding relations to be by talking about objects in general, e.g., about Socrates and Plato grounding the set {Socrates, Plato} (Schaffer 2009). On this third approach it is natural to think that any other ways of designating those objects could be substituted salva veritate so that the grounding-between-objects predicate is extensional; though see Jenkins (2011) for a hyperintensional object-theoretic grounding approach that does not allow this substitution salva veritate.