 It will be useful to consider briefly why one might suppose there are any normative facts – where a normative fact would be, again, on our usage of the term “fact”, a worldly state of affairs involving the instantiation of a normative property, such as the fact that torture is wrong. One reason to think that such entities exist can be derived from reflection on our normative thought and talk. We think, for instance, that torture is wrong just as we think that torture is (unfortunately) widespread. We think these things are true, and, intuitively, for a sentence or proposition to be true is for it to be accurate to the facts. This gives us reason to think that our thoughts about torture commit us to the existence of the normative fact that torture is wrong just as they commit us to the existence of the fact that torture is widespread. Moreover, our thought that torture is wrong seems on its face to ascribe wrongness to torture, just as our thought that torture is widespread ascribes being widespread to torture, so these thoughts seem to commit us to the existence of the property wrongness, just as they commit us to the existence of the property being widespread. In short, it seems that our normative thoughts commit us to the existence of normative facts and properties. As we will see, however, the idea that there is this commitment would be denied by philosophers who accept one or another form of normative anti-realism – non-cognitivists or expressivists, “quietists”, cognitive anti-realists, and at least some constructivists. And anti-realists of another kind, error theorists, agree that our moral thought and talk commit us to the existence of normative facts and properties, but they think this commitment is false. They think there are no such things. We will discuss these anti-realist positions in what follows.