  Another view is that the state massively coerces individuals residing within its claimed jurisdiction and does not to the same extent massively coerce those outside its territorial borders. The imposition of this massive coercion on individuals inside a nation is a presumptive violation of their autonomy, which demands a strong justification if state coercion is to be rightly deemed legitimate, morally permissible. It is plausible to suppose the required justification must include acknowledgement that the state must organize society so that egalitarian principles such as the Rawlsian difference principle are satisfied. The plausibility of this claim increases once one notices that the state might enforce any of a wide range of conceptions of property and criminal law and tort, and selecting one rather than another conception to enforce will be to the advantage of some citizens and the disadvantage of others. Hence the requirement is triggered to the effect that the coercive scheme must be justifiable in particular to the one who fares worst under the scheme. This in turn points either to a strong insistence on equality or the difference principle (Blake 2001 and Miller 1998), but the case for the insistence is limited in scope by the jurisdiction of the coercive scheme.