 Quine thought it curious that the ontological problem was so simple as to be put in three monosyllables: “What is there?” He famously answered this simple question equally simply: “Everything” (Quine 1948). Parsons rejects Quine’s claim that every object exists, and asserts that some objects do not exist. Parsons proposes a theory of all objects, both existent and non-existent (Parsons 1980). He uses the word ‘actual’ as a synonym for ‘existent’, so he rejects (1), (2), and (3), but accepts (4) and (5) as trivialities. It would be a mistake to classify him as an actualist simply because he accepts (5). On the contrary, he has much in common with possibilists in claiming that some objects are not actual, that is, in denying (2). He, however, admits only one sense of existence and claims that some objects do not exist in that sense. If this sole sense of existence corresponds to the possibilist conception of existence relativized to any domain of discourse smaller than the largest available domain, then Parsons is in agreement with possibilists. But if it corresponds to the possibilist conception of existence relativized to the largest available domain, then Parsons’ ontology goes beyond that of possibilists. There is good evidence that the latter is the case, for Parsons’ ontology, as a typically Meinongian ontology, includes the round square and other impossible objects, which the possibilist ontology does not include. Lewis’s discussion (Lewis 1990) of how the non-Meinongian should understand “noneism”, which is the view that some things do not exist, held by another Meinongian, Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan), is helpful in this connection. For differences between Routley’s theory and Parsons’, see Parsons 1983. A sympathizer of Routley, Graham Priest, uses dialetheism (the thesis that some contradictions are true) and paraconsistent logic, along with the (possible- and impossible-) worlds framework, to bolster noneism (Priest 2005, 2016).