  Since this naïve realist account of phenomenal character cannot be applied to hallucination, those who propose it are committed to the claim that the kind of phenomenally conscious experience that occurs when one veridically perceives the world does not occur when one is hallucinating. These naïve realists can accept that veridical perceptions of numerically distinct objects can have the same phenomenal character, but they deny that veridical perceptions and hallucinations have the same phenomenal character. They must then say that hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishible from veridical perceptions do not have the kind of phenomenal character that introspective reflection suggests. Some disjunctivists allow that some hallucinations that are subjectively indistinguishible from veridical perceptions have no phenomenal character (e.g., Fish 2008 and 2009; and see also Sturgeon 2006 and 2008), but this is not a commitment of all disjunctivists about phenomenal character. (For further discussion, see section 5.1)