 If we take mathematical objects as pure mental or estimative (mawhūm) objects that are constructed by the mechanism of abstraction and have no extramental reality, then it is hardly justifiable that mathematics and/or mathematical models on their own can give us reliable knowledge of the extramental world. It should come as no surprise that those who endorse a non-Platonic, non-literalist account of the ontology of mathematics will find this science less certain and perhaps less valuable than sciences like physics and metaphysics. That is why some contemporary scholars, who have read Avicenna as defending a purely abstractionist account of the ontology of mathematics, argue that for him, mathematics is less useful and inferior to the other two sciences (Hasan 2017: 225–26; Fazlıoğlu 2014: 11–13). This rendition of Avicenna’s view is of course problematic if we take him as a literalist regarding the nature of mathematical objects. Motivated by similar concerns, Averroes believes that the fact that the realm of mathematical objects is detached from the extramental reality makes mathematics play a less significant role in human perfection than physics and metaphysics (Endress 2003: 150).