 Finally, a few words about the fourth topic mentioned above: how our views of consciousness and intentionality might affect the kind of value we recognize. What kind of value do we see in experience? It will not be unusual to think it has for us a non-instrumental (and in that sense “intrinsic”) value. One way to make this explicit: consider what goods you think your own experience brings you, which you could conceive of getting without it—in an experience-less, “zombified” state. Would you still much rather have experience than not, even on the condition that without it, all the goods you think it provides that could be had without it, were in fact available? An answer “yes” seems to indicate you accord conscious experiences some kind of non-instrumental value. Another question: do you think something very bad has happened if your own or another person’s existence is terminated, even if you (or they) are replaced with an exact duplicate? If you say yes, does the badness of such an extinction-plus-replacement scenario remain, presuming that prior to it, the person’s consciousness has already been totally and permanently extinguished? Suppose you say no—the truly terrible part to this story comes at the stage where one is utterly and forever “zombified”; after that, nothing of significant non-instrumental value remains to be destroyed by the envisaged replacement. This suggests that for you the kind of irreplaceable value you accord particular persons is essentially tied to the non-instrumental value experience has for you (Siewert 1998, 2014, 2021). Intuitive responses to such scenarios appear to bring to the surface convictions about the kind of non-instrumental value consciousness has (and conscious beings have) for us. But how should we relate this to our views about consciousness and intentionality?