  There are also questions about whether the arguments from conflict  establish exactly three parts of the soul (and see Whiting 2012). Some worry that the  discussion of Leontius does not warrant the recognition of a third  part of the soul (but see Brennan 2012), and some worry that the appetitive part contains  such a multitude of attitudes that it must be subject to further  conflicts and further partitioning (and see 443e with Kamtekar 2008). Answering these  questions requires us to characterize more precisely the kind of opposition that forces partitioning , in accordance with the principle of non-opposition (compare Reeve 1988, 124–31; Irwin 1995, 203–17; Price 1995, 46–48; and Lorenz 2006, 13–52), and to examine more carefully the broader features being attributed to the three parts of the soul (on appetite, e.g., compare Bobonich 2002, Lorenz 2006, and Moss 2008).