 American pragmatism constitutes a philosophical tradition with rich pluralist resources, ranging from James’ (1909) commitment to pluralism as a metaphysical claim about the fundamental structure of reality to Dewey’s pluralist case for the epistemic and social benefits of disciplinary diversity and coordination. Dewey’s “Unity of Science as a Social Problem” (1938 [1988]), published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, illustrates the complex relations between pragmatism, unity of science movement, and scientific pluralism (Reisch 2005). Dewey emphasized that “in the house which science might build there are many mansions” and understood unity of science as a coordination challenge of a plurality of scientific fields “in common attack upon practical social problems” (1938/1955: 34 [1988: 276]). While North American philosophers of science increasingly embraced analytic philosophy in opposition to earlier philosophical traditions (Schliesser 2013), the pragmatist roots of philosophers like Nagel challenge a simple divide between monist and pluralist phases of philosophy of science (Pincock 2017; Schliesser 2020).