 To perform illocutionary acts A, B, and C is therefore one thing; to represent the performance of illocutionary acts, A, B, and C, quite another. The latter doesn’t entail the former, as the above example shows. In addition, even if the performance of an illocutionary act is necessarily intentional in one respect—and Beardsley says that “only intentional text production can generate illocutionary actions” (II: 195)—it doesn’t follow that the performance of illocutionary act x requires, as a condition for its performance, the intention to perform x. I can inadvertently insult or warn someone. Some illocutionary acts are defined in terms of an intention, of course—lying, for instance, is defined in terms of the intention to deceive—but that doesn’t mean lying is defined in terms of the intention to lie. That would be circular. And it also doesn’t mean that representing the act of lying requires the intention to deceive. Storytellers frequently represent the act of lying without having any such intention. A person could intend to lie, or intend to represent the act of lying, of course, but those are different matters.