 (Slow-switching is a relevant alternative here, since it is assumed that Oscar actually is slow-switched.) Now as one might expect, each of the premises have been challenged by various compatibilists. Regarding (a), some reject the suggestion that even if p was known at t1, remembering p does not imply knowing it at t2 (Bernecker 2010, ch. 3). But even if remembering implies knowing, there are other ways Oscar can lose knowledge besides forgetting (Brueckner 1997a; Burge 1998, n. 18). For instance, suppose Oscar knows he is driving through a countryside with at least one barn, but some defeating condition is introduced (e.g., he enters Barn Façade County). Then, he may no longer know at t2 that there is a barn in his environs, even if he truly believes it. That’s because, although nothing has been forgotten, a defeating condition exists at t2 that was absent at t1.