 Crimmins and Perry offer a way of insisting that the objects of many of our attitudes are singular propositions while still denying the substitution principle. They can thus accept all of the auxiliary principles and claims used to generate Frege’s puzzle (i.e., Disquotation, Converse Disquotation, the principle of Rationality, etc.) and, like Frege, deny that the co-reference of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ licenses their inter-substitution in (1), while still claiming that ‘Superman’, as it occurs in (1), and ‘Clark Kent’, as it occurs in (2), are directly referential. The view seems to give us all that we could want: It respects our Fregean intuitions about truth-values without the sins of accepting a sense/reference distinction for singular terms like proper names, demonstratives, and indexicals. (The view is further developed and refined in Crimmins 1992a,b and 1993.)