 When agents have common knowledge of the game and their Bayesian rationality only, one can predict that they will follow a rationalizable strategy profile. However, rationalizability becomes an unstable solution concept if the agents come to know more about one another. For instance, in the Chicken example above with \(\alpha_i \gt 2/3, i = 1, 2\), if either agent were to discover the other agent’s beliefs about her, she would have good reason not to follow the \((s_2,s_2)\) profile and to revise her own beliefs regarding the other agent. If, in the other hand, it so happens that \(\alpha_1 = 1\) and \(\alpha_2 = 0\), so that the agents maximize expected payoff by following the \((s_2, s_1)\) profile, then should the agents discover their beliefs about each other, they will still follow \((s_2, s_1)\). Indeed, if their beliefs are common knowledge, then one can predict with certainty that they will follow \((s_2,s_1)\). The Nash equilibrium \((s_2,s_1)\) is characterized by the belief distributions defined by \(\alpha_1 = 1\) and \(\alpha_2 = 0\).