 A different line is taken by Donnelly’s relative positionalism, according to which positions are a kind of “relative property” (Donnelly 2016). Donnelly takes being north as an example of a relative property: a property because it is had by one thing but only relative to something else, in this case a location. Her basic idea is that corresponding to each n-ary relation R is a package of relative properties (as many as n factorial properties) such that when n things instantiate R they instantiate these properties relative to one another (Donnelly 2016: 91). It is a distinctive feature of the view that by positing for each relation a bespoke package of relative properties which models the logical character of the relation in question, relative positonalism is able to handle relations of arbitrary complexity, including symmetric and partially symmetric relations (Donnelly 2016: 88–96, Dixon 2019: 56–67). By contrast, the onto-thematic role approach doesn’t provide a once and for all recipe for positing roles but takes this to be a matter to be settled by systematic “ontological investigation” into the character of relations as we find them (Orilia 2014: 296–301 but see objections from MacBride 2014: 11–12, Ostertag 2019: 1492–5).