 In view of recent scholarship, though, it appears highly doubtful that Ockham’s purpose really was to use nominal definitions to eliminate all simple connotative terms from mental language. For one thing, as Spade had remarked himself, Ockham never systematically engages in explicit attempts at such semantical reductions, which would be quite odd if this was the central component of his nominalism. Furthermore it was shown that Ockham did in fact hold that there are simple connotative terms in mental language. He says it explicitly and repeatedly, and in a variety of texts from his earlier to his later philosophical and theological  writings.[29]  The secondary literature, consequently, has now gradually converged on the view that, for Ockham, there is no synonymy among simple terms in mental language, but that there can be some redundancy between simple terms and complex expressions, or between various complex expressions. If so, nothing prevents a simple connotative concept to coexist in mental language with its nominal definition.