 The table shows a strong normative slant by including good in one column and bad in the other. In contrast, while Philolaus posits the first two opposites in the table, limit and unlimited, as first principles, there is no suggestion in the extant fragments of Philolaus that limit was good and unlimited bad. Opposites played a large role in most Presocratic philosophical systems. The Pythagoreans who posited the table of opposites differed from other early Greek philosophers not only in the normative view of the opposites but also by including strikingly abstract pairs such as straight and crooked and odd and even, in contrast to the more concrete opposites such as hot and cold, which are typical elsewhere in early Greek philosophy. Similar tables of opposites appear in the Academy (Aristotle, Metaph. 1093b11; EN 1106b29 referring to Speusippus; Simplicius in CAG IX. 247. 30ff.), and Aristotle himself seems at times to adopt such a table (Metaph. 1004b27 ff.; Phys. 201b25). Later Platonists and Neopythagoreans will continue to develop these tables (see Burkert 1972a, 52, n. 119 for a list). The table of opposites thus provides one of the clearest cases of continuity between early Pythagoreanism and Platonism. Zhmud argues that the table has little to do with early Pythagoreanism and is largely a product of the Academy (2012: 449–452), but Aristotle’s discussion of it in connection with Alcmaeon clearly shows that he regarded it as belonging to the fifth-century and it is implausible to suppose that he confused the work of his contemporaries in the Academy with Pythagorean ideas that were developed over a century earlier. It may well be that the similarity between this Pythagorean table of opposites and later Academic versions led to the Neopythagorean habit, starting already in the early Academy, of mistakenly assigning the fundamental pair of opposites in Plato’s late metaphysics, the one and the indefinite dyad, back to Pythagoras (see on Neopythagoreanism below).