  Disjunctivists maintain that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are mental events (or states) of different kinds.  However, we need further clarification of what this claim amounts to, for there is an understanding of this claim that it may be open to a non-disjunctivist to accept as well. For example, the non-disjunctivist can accept that the terms ‘veridical perception’ and ‘hallucination’ mark useful distinctions between perceptual experiences that may, in certain contexts, be of explanatory significance. So the non-disjunctivist may agree that there is a sense in which veridical perceptions and hallucinations can be thought of as perceptual experiences of different kinds. For similar reasons the disjunctivist can agree that there is a sense in which veridical perceptions and hallucinations can be thought of as experiences of the same kind. For disjunctivists do not in general deny that veridical perceptions and hallucinations can have anything in common.