 It will help to bring out the contrast being invoked here if we consider two properties distinct from a supposed property of being true: the property of being a game and the property of being a mammal. Consider the games of chess and catch. Do both of these have the property of being a game? Well, in one sense, they do: they are both games that people can play. On the other hand, however, there is no common explanation as to why each counts as a game (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §66). We might then say that being a game is not a substantive property and mean just this. But now compare the property of being a mammal. If two things are mammals, they have the property of being a mammal, but in addition there is some common explanation as to why they are both mammals – both are descended from the same family of creatures, say. According to one development of deflationism, the property of being true is more like the property of being a game than it is like the property of being a mammal.