 The nonidentity problem raises the issue of whether historic injustices can properly be said to harm, or make things worse for, people who exist today (Sher 2005; Herstein 2008; Cohen 2009; Smilansky 2013). According to the nonidentity problem, historic injustices – including, e.g., U.S. slavery and the Holocaust – lead to the very existence of many of the people whom they have also caused to suffer in various ways. People conceived well after the events themselves take place are thus not, according to the nonidentity problem, victims of those events at all, but rather, if anything, their beneficiaries. “[H]ow can any person have a claim to compensation for a wrong that was a condition of her existence?” (Cohen 2009, 81) If we think that the taking of funds from presumptively innocent existing and future people so that those funds can be paid in compensation for historic injustices to still other existing or future people can be justified only to the extent that those other people really are victims – really have been harmed or damaged or made worse off – then we seem forced to conclude that such takings cannot themselves be justified. (See also the entry on    intergenerational justice.)