  Once we shift our attention away from the Bayesian formalism and focus on the fact that we are looking for an account of the cognitive/computational machinery that processes inputs and generates complex structural analyses of the world—think here of the subsystem that generates theory of mind representations of interacting agents in terms of goals, rationality, cooperation, desert, and so on—then it becomes clearer that the burden on the Empiricist is much greater.  She must not only explain where the representation types come from, she must also account for the cognitive processing over these representation types. So even if there were a satisfactory Empiricist account of how the infant sorts inputs into the categories agent, hinderer, and so on, we still need a separate account of where the cognitive machinery that operates over these types comes from.  Without that, the infant will have a static typology with no way to anticipate the dynamics of the situation. Here, then, the Empiricist seems to have two choices.  She must make the case that the machinery involved is either (i) generic and domain-independent, or (ii) domain-specific, but itself the product of higher-order learning.