 Pragmatic accounts of metaphysical explanation hold that whether something counts as an explanation or not is context-dependent. This goes deeper than thinking that explanatory information is context-dependent; that there are pragmatic constraints on how much, how little, or what kind of explanatory information to request or give in a particular conversation is fairly widely accepted. It also goes deeper than noting that which relation the term “explains” picks out differs from context of utterance to context of utterance (since, perhaps, one takes the term “understands” to be context-sensitive in this way, and one takes the conferral of understanding to be necessary to explanation). The thesis is rather the far more controversial one that metaphysical explanation is itself a context-sensitive phenomenon in the sense that the factors relevant to evaluating the truth of a statement of metaphysical explanation, once the context of utterance has settled that statement's truth-conditions, involve facts about actual or possible (types of) explanation givers or receivers, such as facts about their interests, conceptual proficiencies, background knowledge, and the like.