On one construal of Forbes’ argument, haecceitistic differences are unintelligible and therefore objectionable because all identity facts must be grounded in facts about the qualitative character of the world. Accordingly, Forbes’ argument requires a commitment to the sufficiency of qualitative facts to account for all facts about the identity of individuals. Such a commitment rules out haecceitistic differences, but raises questions about the tenability of the relevant constraint on identity facts. What, if anything, can be taken to ground the facts about the identity of qualitative properties? And, if there are at least some ungrounded identity facts, what precisely makes bare identity facts objectionable? (On Forbes’ argument, see Bricker (1988), Yablo (1988), and Mackie (2007).) And, while the denial of bare identities is not strictly equivalent to the denial of haecceitism, it is plainly a very small step from the former to the latter. Accordingly, some commentators have raised concerns that an argument for anti-haecceitism from the denial of bare identities is tantamount to begging the question. More generally, if one accepts the ban on bare identity facts, the challenge arises of explaining how all identity facts might be grounded in qualitative facts without doing violence to our modal intuitions.