 Some commentators try to make sense of the free play by appealing to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience, for example to the kind of experience involved in appreciating an abstract painting, where the subject might imaginatively relate the various elements of the painting to one another and perceive them as having an order and unity which is non-conceptual; see for example Bell (1987: 237) and Crowther (1989: 56). (Filieri 2021 illustrates the free play through the example of an artwork which is representational rather than abstract.) Others try to find a place for it in the context of Kant’s theory of the imagination as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason. Two contrasting accounts along these lines are offered by Guyer, who identifies the free play with the first two stages of the “three-fold synthesis” described by Kant in the first edition Transcendental Deduction (Guyer 1979 [1997: 75–76]), and of Makkreel (1990: 49–58), for whom the free play is an activity of schematizing pure concepts without the involvement of empirical concepts.