 The only other way one might find the regress troubling is if one holds that bodies have ‘absolute’ places, in the sense that there is always a unique privileged answer to the question ‘where is it’? The problem then is not that there are infinitely many places, but just that there are many. And Aristotle might have had this concern, for in his theory of motion, the natural motion of a body is determined by the relation of its place to the center of the universe: an account that requires place to be determinate, because natural motion is. (See Sorabji 1988 and Morrison 2002 for general, competing accounts of Aristotle’s views on place; chapter 3 of the latter especially for a discussion of Aristotle’s treatment of the paradox.) But supposing that one holds that place is absolute for whatever reason, then for example, where am I as I write? If the paradox is right then I’m in my place, and I’m also in my place’s place, and my place’s place’s place, and my …. Since I’m in all these places any might seem an appropriate answer to the question. Various responses are conceivable: deny absolute places (especially since our physics does not require them), define a notion of place that is unique in all cases (arguably Aristotle’s solution), or perhaps claim that places are their own places thereby cutting off the regress! 