 The answer to this question requires first answering another question: what are intuitions? As noted above, Bealer distinguishes between physical intuitions, such as the intuition that a house undermined will fall (1998: 207, 211, 213; 1992: 102, 104), and rational intuitions. Here are several of Bealer’s examples of rational intuitions from (1998): if P, then not not P (207); if P or Q, then it is not the case that both not P and not Q (210); that Gettier situations are possible (207: 211–12); that phenomenal colors are incompatible (211); that if spatial region x is a part of spatial region y and spatial region y is part of spatial region z, then spatial region x is part of spatial region z (212). At one point Bealer says that the difference between a physical and a rational intuition is that a rational intuition “presents itself as necessary”, but he immediately goes on to say that he does not know exactly how to analyze this notion. A proposal he offers is the following: if x (rationally) intuits P, then it seems to x that P and also that necessarily P. But later he says that in Gettier cases there are rational intuitions about the situation described being possible (1998: 206, 207, 211–12), and he explicitly says, “Without possibility intuitions, philosophy would be fatally flawed” (1998: 212; my italics). It seems that what Bealer holds is that a rational intuition that P is one where it either seems that P and also necessarily that P, OR it seems that it is possible that P. As we have seen, Malmgren argued that in Gettier cases the relevant intuition is that it is possible that a person in the relevant circumstances have a justified true belief but lack knowledge. Bealer’s remark about an intuition’s presenting itself as necessary was only meant as a way of contrasting the physical intuition that a house undermined will fall with some other rational intuitions. For Bealer, rational intuitions involve modal seemings, either about what is necessary or possible.