 When you make a constitutive attempt to attain aptness on a question whether p, and especially when you inquire in the endeavor to put yourself in a position to make such a constitutive attempt and to do so aptly, both what you do in so inquiring, and what you do in making your constitutive attempt can be assessed either gnoseologically or in the broader way of intellectual ethics where anything goes, anything that bears on the desirability and appropriateness of such an attempt or such an endeavor. Gnoseological assessment can be of constitutive attempts to attain aptness or of endeavors to put oneself in a position to (aptly) make one’s constitutive attempt by actually answering the question aptly. Either way, the assessment is telically constrained by the gnoseological aims of attaining aptness of alethic affirmation, of correct (true) answer. Practical values are mostly irrelevant to such assessment, whether it is assessment of inquiry or assessment of constitutive attempts to answer a question knowledgeably. (But this is not to rule out that practical values might still be relevant at a deep global level. For example, they may still bear on the very norms and standards properly set by epistemic communities for when reliability is high enough to sustain long-term belief storage, beyond the time when one can be expected to retain the operative reasons for the storing of that belief.)