 This might already seem like a problem to some: a true theory of rationality should not (arguably) undermine our justification for believing it. And taking it a step further, it can look like the theory is either paradoxical or incoherent. If HOD can call for its own rejection (in the cases where belief in HOD is itself undermined), how can it give us coherent directions? Suppose Sam’s higher-order evidence targets two beliefs simultaneously: his belief about some proposition P, and his belief about HOD itself. HOD tells him to reduce confidence in P. But since HOD is undermined as well, it is arguably also telling him not to reduce confidence (or to reduce confidence to a lesser degree). These recommendations are incompatible, yielding the worry that HOD is internally inconsistent. On the other hand, the worry about paradox arises when we consider what happens when Sam begins to revise his beliefs. Once HOD is undermined, suppose Sam no longer believes it, and goes back to revise the beliefs that he formed on its basis. But his last application of HOD was what led to his doubting HOD—so if he “undoes” that step, he’ll believe HOD again! But then his belief in HOD will be undermined by his higher-order evidence, and the loop will start over. (For further discussion see Elga 2010, Weatherson 2013, Christensen 2013 and 2021a, and Bradley 2019. See Roush 2009 for discussion of a related phenomenon.)