  Hare is much impressed by what we vaguely referred to above as the  “special character” of evaluative judgments: judgments,  that is, such as that one course of action is better than  another, or that one ought to do a certain thing. Such  evaluative judgments seem to have properties that differentiate them  from merely “descriptive” judgments such as that one  thing is more expensive than another, or rounder than another  (Hare 1952, p. 111). Evaluative judgments seem, in  particular, to bear a special connection to action which no  purely descriptive judgment possesses. Hare’s analysis, then, takes  off from something like the data we rehearsed earlier. Hare goes on  to develop these data in the following way. He begins by identifying, as the fundamental distinctive feature of evaluative  judgments—that which lends them a special character—that  evaluative judgments are intended to guide conduct. (See,  e.g., Hare 1952, p. 1; p. 29; p. 46; p. 125; p. 127; p. 142, pp. 171–2; Hare 1963,  p. 67; p. 70.) The special function of evaluative judgments is to be action-guiding: that is, if you will, what evaluative  judgments are for. Hare then puts a more precise gloss on  what it is for a judgment to “guide conduct”: an  action-guiding judgment is one which entails an answer to the  practical question “What shall I do?” (Hare 1952,  p. 29; see Hare 1963, p. 54 for the terminology “practical   question”).[3]  What is it that an action-guiding judgment must entail? That is, what constitutes an answer to the question “What shall I do?”  Hare holds that no (descriptive) statement can constitute an answer  to such a question (Hare 1952, p. 46). Rather, such a  question is answered by a first-person command or  imperative (Hare 1952, p. 79), which could be  verbally expressed as “Let me do a”  (Hare 1963, p. 55).