 He suggests instead that we achieve reference to abstract (and other objects) by means of a sufficiency operator, \(\Rightarrow\), which he takes to be a strengthening of the material conditional. He starts with conditional principles of the form “if \(Rab\), then \(f(a) \! =\! f(b)\)” (e.g., “if \(a\) and \(b\) are parallel, then the direction of \(a\) = the direction of \(b\)”) and takes the right-hand side to be reconceptualization of the left-hand side. He represents these claims as \(\phi \Rightarrow \psi\), where the new operator ‘\(\Rightarrow\)’ is meant to capture the intuitive idea that \(\phi\) is (conceptually) sufficient for \(\psi\), or all that is required for \(\psi\) is \(\phi\). For \(\phi\) to be sufficient for \(\psi\), sufficiency must be stronger than metaphysically implies but weaker than analytically implies (see Linnebo 2018, 15). The notion Linnebo considers is a ‘species of metaphysical grounding’. Hence, sufficiency statements allow us to conceptualize statements mentioning abstract objects (or other problematic objects) in terms of metaphysically less problematic or non-problematic objects.