 Allais (2009: 393–4; 2015: ch. 7) has argued against both the first and second points, pointing out that if we take Kant’s definition of intuition (and likewise of concepts) seriously, then we must be able to identify an independent contribution of sensibility to cognition—viz. singular and immediate representation of an object—lest we fail to make sense of Kant’s division between intuition and concept (cf. Kolb 1986; Falkenstein 1995: 63). Relatedly, others have remarked on the oddness of denying the possibility of articulating the distinct contribution made by sensibility given that Kant goes so far as to organize the structure of argument in the first Critique around the distinction between those contributions made by sensibility (the Transcendental Aesthetic) and those made by the understanding (the Transcendental Logic, and in particular, the Analytic) (e.g., Bird 2006: 127; but cf. Bauer 2012; Conant 2016). The claim of “blindness,” it is thus argued, should not be interpreted as so extreme as to render unintelligible fundamental aspects of Kant’s architectonic, or of his repeated statements concerning the individual cognitive roles of the faculties of sensibility and understanding.