Second, it is not entirely clear why self-frustratingness (or purpose-frustratingness) is an indicator of injustice. In other words, whenever the Kantian test bites, why would this tell us anything about the just or unjust nature of a maxim and the actions that fall under it?[17] Answering this question is even more crucial for those who—contrary to us—view the publicity test as a necessary and sufficient condition for permissibility. What we need then is an account of the “intrinsic connection” between self-frustratingness and injustice—in the same way as one may ask why, for contractualists, there should be a significant connection between justice and the hypothetical agreements of fairly-situated individuals. Such an account is not provided by Kant, who claims about the principle that “like an axiom, it is indemonstrably certain” (1795 [1923: 382]). One sound suggestion is Luban’s (1996: 191). Imagine that making the maxim of my action public would frustrate my ability to reach this maxim’s very goal. This can be taken as a sign of the injustice of this maxim only if the frustration-generating mechanism is at least in part based itself on morally justifiable grounds. But if publicizing a doctrine generates distrust from a real audience merely because of people’s attraction for simplicity or non-demandingness, the frustration flowing from such a distrust might hardly be considered relevant to the assessment of the maxim’s (in)justice.