 Moral emotions, both positive (e.g., gratitude, respect, admiration) and negative (e.g., shame, guilt, indignation) are mental states of moral significance that often have, when occurrent, a robust, arguably complex, phenomenal character. In the empirical literature, for example, one finds experimental studies of the differences in people’s experiences of envy compared to  jealousy,[3]  of guilt compared to  shame,[4]  as well as studies of people’s experiences of gratitude, of generosity, of disrespect, and other emotions. Note that if, as many theoreticians of emotion suppose, moral judgments are embedded in these emotions (or some instances of them), then the phenomenology of moral emotion will overlap with the phenomenology of moral judgment. For theorists who liken the emotions to perception, the phenomenology of moral emotion will overlap with the phenomenology of moral perception. Of course, for many theorists, the phenomenology of moral emotion will intersect both moral perception and moral judgment.