 According to a famous part of Principia Ethica, one of those goods is the existence of beauty. Arguing against Sidgwick’s view that all goods must be states of consciousness (1907: 113–15), Moore asked readers to imagine a beautiful world with no minds in it: is this world’s existence not better than that of a horribly ugly world (1903: 83–85/1993: 135–36)? In answering yes, he anticipated some strands in present-day environmental ethics, which likewise hold that there can be value in features of the natural environment apart from any awareness of them. But he did not insist on this view. Later in Principia Ethica he said that beauty on its own at most has little and may have no value (1903: 202, 203/1993: 250, 251), and in Ethics he implicitly denied that beauty on its own has value. There he held, as Sidgwick had, that all intrinsic goods involve some state of consciousness and perhaps even of pleasure (1912: 239–41, 249/1947: 147–49, 153/1965: 103–04, 107). But his first book had defended the contrary view.