 A parallel can be found in ethics: Suppose we claim that being good consists in being pleasurable. The concept of being pleasurable can be completely non-ethical and naturalistic, but the claim “Being good consists in being pleasurable” is ethical—and so, if Moore and others are right, nonnaturalistic. Is there, then, “a straight or substantive explanation of intentionality”? The correct answer will parallel that for the question, “Is there a straight substantive explanation of being good?” If ethical hedonists are right and being good consists in being pleasurable, then there’s a straight, substantive explanation of being good in the sense of a naturalistic explanation of the property that being good consists in. But the claim “Being good is being pleasurable” isn’t itself naturalistic. If Ayer was right, it amounts to “Hurrah for all and only what”s pleasurable. (Gibbard 2018: 770)