 Second, as Kaufman (2006: 186–90) describes it, Boyle maintains that the MAs of snow in the actual world are de re identical to the MAs of snow in a world without perceivers, but Boyle wants to say snow is cold in the actual world and only fit to be cold in the perceiverless world. This is problematic because it seems there is no respect in which they could be different. Kaufman suggests a solution along the following line. Because CT states that a body gains or looses a quality if its relatum begins or ceases to exist and Boyle recognizes a difference between a body’s having a quality and someone’s knowing that it does, he maintains that a body has a dispositive quality in virtue of how someone thinks of its MAs. That is, under the condition that animals are, or are assumed to be, absent from the world, a corpuscularian may reasonably think of the MAs of snow as being fit to manifest cold were they to operate on a competent perceiver. That marks the difference between the MAs of snow in a perceiverless world and in the actual world, yet in the latter snow is not cold. On this interpretation, dispositive qualities are beings of reason with a foundation in things (Kaufman 2006: 190).