 This dual preoccupation with justice as rectitude, and justice as civic virtue, seems to suggest that together Athens and Jerusalem give us a comprehensive approach to politics, as both practice and ideal. Drabinski and Fred Moten have questioned this universality (Drabinski 2011: 165–196), and with it the category of “being-Jewish”, in favor of an emphasis on the passivity intrinsic to a multiplicity of human situations, including race, ethnicity, and gender. Moreover, as Moten cautions, passivity can be readily observed in our relations to things rather than persons. He thus adds that the Bible and the Greeks, although often presented as “the whole world”, thereby become a teleological reflection that expresses an unacknowledged European malaise, wherein the non-European receives the status of a mere object (Moten 2018: 9, 11). Attributing this to the transcendence toward-the-world of phenomenological intentionality, which shares some of the blind spots of the colonial enterprise, Moten discusses the object-like passivity of being on the receiving end of multiple racisms, including Levinas’ own “unintended racism”. If we take his concern seriously, then passivity as a category of being-human strains against being attributed to Jews alone. In turn, this raises the philosophical-anthropological question of situational passivities, the very idea of humanity, and those “beings” that inhabit worlds unacknowledged by the European tradition (Moten 2018: 17). While this is a critique of Levinas, Moten also invites us to expand the latter’s anthropological category of being-Jewish, and to ask ourselves what kind of politics might flow out of such an  expansion.[47] 