  In Quodlibet III, q. 1, dating from 1286, Godfrey considers the argumentation offered for each of these positions. First he presents the theory that distinguishes really between essence and existence in language that reflects the terminology of Giles of Rome. Thus he refers to existence both as “something” (aliquid) and as a “thing” (res) that is added to essence. He then presents a number of arguments in support of this view which seem to be taken from Giles, especially from his Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia, q. 11. One of these is reminiscent of the first part of Aquinas’s much discussed reasoning in De ente et essentia, c.  4, which begins from the fact that one can understand what something is without knowing whether it actually exists. However, Giles’s presentation (and Godfrey’s repetition) of the argument makes a stronger claim. One can understand what something is and also know that it does not exist. But because nothing can be understood with the opposite of itself, essence and existence must be really distinct.  After presenting a series of arguments against this theory and refuting the arguments he had initially offered in support of it, Godfrey resolutely rejects any real distinction between essence and existence.  For him they are identical, and differ only in the way they signify, just as the concrete noun “a being” (ens), the abstract noun “essence” (essentia), and the verb “to be” or “to exist” (esse) differ in their mode of signifying, but designate one and the same reality (PB 3.304 [brief version]; Wippel, 1981, 45–66).