 Another rejoinder starts from the observation that actual associations between family, friends, and fellow citizens are typically approximations of moralized ideal types. That is, considerations of fairness, respect, care, and reliance are part and parcel of our concepts of parent, sibling, friend, and citizen. Thus, the invocation of unfairness, disrespect, or neglect to rebut the claim that one has a duty to Ø because one occupies the role of sibling or citizen need not involve an appeal to some moral principle external to the relationship. Instead, it may involve an appeal to a principle internal to the relationship; that is, to a moralized conception of what it is to be a sibling or citizen. This line of argument entails that obligation-generating associations exist only where they realize the relevant ideal-type to a sufficient degree; all genuine associations or relationships are, necessarily, good or valuable associations. Thus, an associative theorist who adopts this line of argument has a ready response to the allegation that she is committed to the conclusion that exploited or oppressed citizens have a duty to obey the law: since they have no genuine political association or common citizenship with their oppressors, they have none of the duties that flow from such a relationship when it exists.