 (B) It is a matter of dispute whether nonbelief provides evidence for atheism independently of evil. Those in favor of independence invite us to imagine a world with no pain, suffering, or moral vice/wrongdoing. No one in such a world would appeal to evil as evidence for atheism, but someone might appeal to nonbelief as evidence for atheism (van Inwagen 2002, 2008; Schellenberg 2010a). Those in favor of dependence tend to define “evil” more broadly. For example, they might say that evils are just bad states of affairs, whether pain, suffering, or moral vice/wrongdoing, on the one hand, or nonbelief, on the other hand (Kvanvig 2002; Evans 2010). Alternatively, they might argue in an Augustinian spirit that, since evil just is a lack of a good that should exist, and since belief in God’s existence is a good that should exist, nonbelief is an evil. One can also affirm that nonbelief is evidence for atheism in the absence of evil while still thinking that the evidential value of nonbelief in this world must account for its interaction with the existence of suffering (Anderson and Russell forthcoming). Indeed, one might argue that the interaction is this: if God has a reason to allow evil, then God has a reason to allow something to act as a defeater for belief in God’s existence (Dumsday 2016).