 Polger and Shapiro wrap up the book by absolving their identity theory, which rests on their treatment of multiple realizability, of some mistaken charges. They argue that their account is not ontologically eliminativist about psychological kinds, because none of their three types of arguments against multiple realization—“unificationist” arguments which find relevant commonalities in the realizing kinds, “heuristic, abstraction, and idealization” arguments that characterize practices in contemporary cognitive science, and their plump for taxonomic “kind splitting”—leads to any kind of troubling eliminativist conclusion. And by adopting James Woodward’s (2003) “interventionist difference-making” account of causal explanation, Polger and Shapiro deflect the charge that their identity theory undermines the legitimacy of psychological explanations, and thus rules out any autonomy for psychology vis-à-vis neuroscience. Such a charge, they insist, rests on an overly stringent and misguided understanding of scientific explanation. Identity theorists can be and should be pluralists about scientific explanation. Neuroscientists can appeal to neural causes, psychologists and cognitive scientists to mental causes. Since both can cite causal invariances at their respective levels, both offer genuine explanations. Despite the mind-brain identities, psychology remains a methodologically autonomous science. (Their defense of psychology’s autonomy resembles Woodward’s recent more general defense of a general kind of explanatory autonomy, see Woodward forthcoming.)