 Objection from Fallibility. An interesting challenge is articulated by Stevenson himself, regarding our judgments of ethical fallibility. The question here is whether Stevenson’s emotive theory allows us to “provide a proper place” for “our willingness to acknowledge that our judgments must often be held open to correction, as distinct from being proclaimed in a manner implying that we have said the last word” (1968, 203). We need (1) an account of expressions of ethical fallibility, and (2) an explanation for why it makes sense to acknowledge our fallibility, given the emotivist account of the phenomenon. So, first, what does an expression of ethical fallibility amount to, on the emotivist view? Stevenson suggests that just as we may acknowledge fallibility in belief by saying “Many things that I believe to be the case may not be the case,” we may also acknowledge fallibility in attitude by saying “Many things that meet with my approval may not be right” (1968, 206). The function of this sort of acknowledgement is to indicate that the speaker is “prepared, on further reflection,” to change their mind, which creates “hope for two-way discussion” and allays fears to the effect that the audience would be expected to listen to the speaker as their “disciples” (1968, 207–210). This preparedness to revise one’s attitudes is a matter of expecting that there are reasons for approving or disapproving that one has yet to consider (1968, 214–215). On Stevenson’s account of such reasons, it would then be a matter of thinking that there may be considerations such that ought to influence one to revise one’s attitudes. Stevenson’s brief remarks on the topic do not provide us with a detailed account of fallibility judgments, but it is suggestive of a later and much discussed proposal by Blackburn (1998, 318; for discussion, see Egan 2007 and, e.g., the literature cited in Bex-Priestley 2018).