 If cultural property belongs to a cultural group, then this seems to require some grasp on who constitute the members of the group (Young 2007: 112). However, defining cultural group membership is a notoriously difficult task (Killmister 2011). For one, it confronts problems concerning cultural essentialism (discussed in  section 4.2.3  below). But moreover (and relatedly), it presents questions concerning cultural continuity over time (Appiah 2006: 119). On what basis, for instance, can the contemporary nation of Egypt claim the art and cultural artifacts of ancient Egypt as their cultural property, given the profound cultural differences between contemporary and ancient Egyptians? The same question can be raised for many of the cultural property claims made by contemporary nations. However, although there may not be strict cultural identity (in the sense of sameness) between cultural groups over time, due in part to the dynamic nature of culture, one might question why this kind of strict identity should be thought so important. For instance, we might instead appeal to cultural lineages, analogous to the links of psychological connectedness that some think can secure a relevant understanding of personal identity over time (Parfit 1984; entry on  personal identity).  For instance, an overlapping chain of practices, traditions, norms, and beliefs could be used to justify the claim that a culture at t1 is “the same culture” as the culture at t0, even if it has undergone significant changes. Indeed, one might think that a degree of change is in fact essential for the preservation of cultural identity over time (Coleman 2006: 167). Granted, this may lead to a plurality of cultural descendants that would make cultural property claims difficult to adjudicate in practice, but it is worth noting that the assumption in favor of a strong understanding of cultural identity over time as a necessary condition for cultural property remains largely undefended in the literature.