 In reply, some have argued that although it is true that, normally, acceptance is required in order to incur fair-play obligations, this is not the case when it comes to the sort of “presumptively beneficial” goods that states provide. Since goods like security and order are necessary for any acceptable life, we can presume that everyone would pursue these benefits, if doing so were necessary to receive them. Failing to do so would be irrational after all (Klosko 1991, 2005; see also Arneson 1982; Dagger 1997, 2018). The problem with this argument is that we often make choices that are irrational in this sense but—leaving aside cases where paternalistic interference might be justified—this is normally enough to shield us from incurring the costs associated with making the reasonable choice. Although it might be irrational not to buy a particular life-insurance policy, if I refuse to do so, you’re not allowed to provide me with the policy and expect me to pay for it. Why think that refusing to accept the benefits provided by the state should not protect us in the same way from incurring the costs attached to them? After all, these obligations are meant to rule out attempts to take advantage of the members of a cooperative scheme by exploiting their sacrifices and reaping the benefits produced by the scheme without bearing any of the costs associated with their production. But if I don’t accept the relevant benefits because, perhaps foolishly, I fail to appreciate their value, I am not trying to take advantage of anyone.