 We must turn, then, to those cases where the optimific rule consequentialist principles do instruct us to provide the smaller benefits to many others. Here, the convergence argument must deny that the solitary individual can reasonably reject the optimific principles. This is where Parfit’s ‘improvements’ on contractualism are vital to the convergence argument. As originally formulated, contractualism departs from utilitarianism by allowing the individual to reject the optimific principles whenever they place a greater burden on her than her favoured principle places on any other single individual. Proponents of the convergence argument will favour instead a more impersonal formulation. While the individual’s own complaint is left undiminished, other people can now reject her principle on impersonal grounds—precisely because it fails to maximise everyone’s well-being. Faced with these impersonal reasons, the single individual cannot reasonably reject the optimific principles.