 Finding no satisfactory definition of grounding in the works of others and declaring himself unable to define the concept of grounding (or rather of a ground), he says that he is inclined to regard it as simple (§202). In accordance with his methodology, he tries to at least partially characterize the notion by stating a number of theses about it that he considers to be true. To begin with, he claims that only true propositions stand in the relation of ground to consequence. Perhaps unwisely, he assumes uniqueness: “there is only one objective ground [for a given truth]” (TS IV: §528; cf. §206). In many cases, the ground consists of a collection of truths. The parts (members) of this collection are called partial grounds, the collection the complete or total ground. Similarly, Bolzano distinguishes between the total and merely partial consequences of a given ground. In modern terms, we would take the relation he describes to be one that holds between two sets, an option not open to Bolzano because, on his understanding, a collection must contain at least two parts.