 Of course, it’s possible that one of the three answers mentioned above is correct for some kinds of success, while another of the three answers is correct for other kinds of success. Consider, for instance, the difference between the kind of success involved in having a state that is fitting (for instance, holding a belief knowledgeably), and the kind of success involved in having a state that is valuable (for instance, holding a belief the holding of which is beneficial). Perhaps the constitutivist can explain the former kind of success better than the consequentialist can, but the consequentialist can explain the latter kind of success better than the constitutivist can. Of course, if and when the demands of these different kinds of success conflict, the agent will face the question of how to proceed. Much recent work in epistemology has attempted to adjudicate that question, or to interrogate the assumption of possible conflict that gives rise to it (see, for instance, Marušić 2015, McCormick 2015, and Rinard 2017a and 2019b).