 Of course, the seriousness with which the theistic voluntarist takes divine aseity and sovereignty is also the source of problems for the view. If God could have failed to make the number 2, in what sense is 2 a necessary being? One might try to weaken the voluntarist view, by claiming that 2 is only weakly necessary: God had to create it, but it is possibly…possible that it not exist. All worlds that are accessible to the actual world have 2 existing in them. But some of these worlds have a somewhat-different divine will relative to the existence of 2 (maybe God somewhat-reluctantly wills the existence of 2 in them). And possible relative to those sorts of worlds (or relative to worlds possible to those worlds, etc.) are worlds in which God doesn’t will that 2 exist. The key here is that the claim: Necessarily, 2 exists comes out true on this picture; 2 exists in every possible world relative to the world of evaluation (the actual world). But there are possibly…possible worlds in which God doesn’t will the existence of 2. The voluntarist can say that abstracta depend on the will of God, and yet really do exist necessarily (just don’t say in every possible world,  full stop (see Plantinga 1980: 95 ff. for further discussion)).