 Once Rawls took the “burdens of judgment” and reasonable pluralism seriously, that is once he “politicized” justice in his later work, it became much less plausible to talk about convergence on a shared wide equilibrium that might contain moral truth. Comprehensive philosophical views, including those about moral truth, were barred from playing a role in seeking the political reflective equilibrium involved in overlapping consensus. Even if we converged in an “overlapping consensus” on a conception of justice, individuals and groups would be able to claim they are fully justified in accepting that conception of justice only if it cohered with the perspectives of their distinct wide reflective equilibria. It became more important for Rawls to suggest how claims about justice could be “objective” without presupposing moral truth. These developments in Rawls's account thus appear to move him farther away from those who would seek to give a realist account of moral truth. Thus when Arras (2007) concludes that reflective equilibrium cannot be a theory of truth, he does not disagree with Rawls, as noted earlier. More challenging is his conclusion that reflective equilibrium fails to provide a basis for intersubjective agreement if we take seriously the importance of giving reflective equilibrium a global scope, since starting points are so different. 