  While some scholars of Leibniz's thought have suggested this, it does not get at the full story of Leibniz's metaphysical system.  The distinction that Leibniz draws is one between a real unity and a phenomenal unity, or as he also puts it, between a unum per se and a unum per aggregationem. Leibniz's favorite comparison in the case of the latter is to a rainbow: bodies, for example, fail to have intrinsic unity, but we do represent them as being single and unified objects much as we represent a rainbow as being one thing when it is in fact merely the result of the refraction of light through innumerable water droplets. But just as the rainbow results from the presence of genuine unities, the water droplets (to continue the metaphor, even if this is not true when speaking with Leibniz in metaphysical rigor), so do the bodies of the natural world result from the genuine simple substances.  Put differently, the simple substances ground the phenomena of bodies in the world. This relation between the phenomena and the underlying simple substances is what Leibniz means when he talks about “well-founded phenomena” [phenomena bene fundata].  But insofar as the bodies of the natural world are well-founded phenomena – that is, insofar as they are grounded in the simple substances – they are not simply phenomena as in Berkeley's philosophy. (This view is also not uncontroversial.  To compare Leibniz with Berkeley, see the entry on  Berkeley.)  