Whether and how category-determining mental states are constrained: Theories inspired by structural linguistics (Saussure 1916, Jakobson 1931, Chomsky 1965) hold that the mind limits the possible variations among categories, and that a person’s categories are linked with one another. According to Lévi-Strauss, kinship structures are governed by universal rules, so only a limited number of forms of kinship are human possibilities (Lévi-Strauss 1945). Some recent psychological theories of categorization see humans as having specialized neural circuits for processing different categories of objects (see Carey &amp; Spelke 1994, Capitani et al. 2003, Mahon &amp; Caramazza 2009). Other theories propose constraints on the mechanisms by which categories are constructed by the mind (Kant 1781/1787, Cohen 1871). Still other theorists regard the mental construction of social categories to involve generic mental processes (Piaget 1926, Mandler 2004).