 Recall the example of the lottery. Let \(W=\{w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_N \},\) where \(w_i\) is the world in which the \(i^{\text{th}}\) ticket is the winner. No matter how many tickets are in the lottery, a Humean agent cannot believe any ticket will lose. Suppose for a contradiction that she believes \(W\setminus \{w_1\}\), the proposition that the first ticket will lose. Now suppose she learns \(\{w_1, w_2\}\), that all but the first and second ticket will lose. This is compatible with her initial belief, but her updated degree of belief that the first ticket will lose must be \(1/2\). That contradicts the Humean thesis. So she cannot believe that any ticket will lose. In this Lottery situation the agent cannot fully believe any non-trivial proposition. This example also shows how sensitive the Humean proposal is to the fine-graining of possibilities. If we coarsen \(W\) into the set of possibilities \(W=\{w_1, w_2\}\), where \(w_1\) is the world in which the first ticket is the winner and \(w_2\) is “the” world in which some other ticket is the winner, the agent can believe that the first ticket will lose without running afoul of the Humean thesis. 