 Many studies of Fechner are one-sided, emphasizing one side of him at the expense of the other. Older scholarship tended to focus on his metaphysical side, especially his panpsychism (see, for example, Adolph 1923; Bruchmann 1887; Pastor 1901a,b; Wille 1905; and Wentscher 1924: 18–72). In reaction to such work, a more recent book by Michael Heidelberger finds “the heart of Fechner’s philosophy” in his non-metaphysical side, and it stresses his “non-reductive materialism” as the main achievement of his philosophy (2004: 73–74). While Heidelberger’s work is an important corrective to older scholarship, it still makes the same mistake: it too is one-sided. It is unconvincing because it drastically underplays Fechner’s panpsychism, which it simply dismisses as “one of his most notorious ideas” (2004: 3). Though odd by contemporary standards, panpsychism was Fechner’s general worldview, and its exposition and defense would preoccupy him for much of his life. It is also deeply misleading to describe the heart of Fechner’s philosophy as any form of materialism, even if it is a “non-reductive” kind. Fechner not only had a deep aversion to materialism, but he also insisted that belief in the existence of matter is only the reification of an abstraction. There are indeed passages, which Heidelberger duly cites, where Fechner describes his philosophy as “very materialist”; but in those very same passages he also describes his philosophy as “very  idealist”.[1] 