 The possibility of jointly unfulfillable obligations initially seems to imply the possibility of obligation dilemmas, i.e., scenarios in which all of the options available to an agent over time result in a failure to fulfill at least one obligation. But this is not the case given the assumption taken for granted in the actualist-possibilist debate: that agents have control over the truth-value of certain counterfactuals. In other words, agents can perform certain acts, and if they were to do so, then certain counterfactuals that are in fact true would instead be false. For example, Procrastinate can ⟨agree to review the paper &amp; then write the review⟩. If she were to do this, then the following counterfactual that is false would be true instead: “If Procrastinate were to ⟨agree to review the paper⟩, then she would ⟨write the review⟩”. Moreover, if this counterfactual were true, then Procrastinate would not be obligated to ⟨decline to review the paper⟩. This is because, in this counterfactual scenario, what would follow from ⟨declining to review the paper⟩ would be worse than what would follow from ⟨agreeing to review the paper⟩. 