  This runs counter to the usual way of thinking according to which there are individuals in spacetime whose existence is independent of each other and that facts about the identity and diversity of these individuals are determined independently of their relations to each other (Stachel 2006 calls this ‘intrinsic individuality’). It is widely held that relations between individuals cannot individuate those same individuals: “relations presuppose numerical diversity and so cannot account for it”. The argument is that without distinct individuals that are metaphysically prior to the relations, there is nothing to stand in the irreflexive relations that are supposed to confer individuality on the relata. The issue was famously discussed by Russell (1911), and see also MacBride (2006). Ladyman and Ross (2007), Saunders (2006) and Stachel (2006) argue that facts about the identity and diversity of fermions are not intrinsic obtain only in virtue of the relations into which they enter. On this view the individuality of quantum particles is ontologically on a par with, or secondary to the relational structure of which they are parts. Stachel (2006) calls this ‘contextual individuality’ and he extends this to spacetime points (see 4.3 below).