 Guala also argues (2016: ch. 14) that his monist rules-in-equilibrium approach can resolve normative disputes, such as those in relation to same-sex marriage. On his unified account, he claims, realism can be preserved, e.g. marriage does not depend non-causally on our intentions, but yet same-sex marriage is allowable. In this connection Guala relies on the type/token distinction and argues that while institution tokens solve particular coordination problems, institution types are identified by their functions, e.g. same-sex unions fulfil the functions of marriage. However, the conservative view, e.g. of the Catholic Church, would simply dispute that same-sex marriages do serve the same essential functions, e.g., the function of procreation. Moreover, this manoeuvre does not seem to address adequately the normative questions that now arises at the level of functions. What function or functions ought marriage serve? What moral constraints are there on specific social arrangements that might otherwise serve those functions, e.g. polygamy? Here it is a background assumption that while the function or functions that an institution should have depends in part on the functions that it in fact has, one cannot simply read off the former from the latter. A corrupt police force might have the enrichment of most of its officers as one of its de facto functions but it would not follow from this that this was a legitimate function.