 Another kind of two-norm view comes from Miriam Schoenfield (see her 2015b and 2018). Schoenfield interprets judgments about rationality, in cases like Aisha’s, as plans. She points out that we can evaluate plans in (at least) two different ways: by looking at what will happen if they are followed perfectly, and by looking at what will happen if they are made. If you need to leave the house at 10:30, but are habitually running late, “leave the house at 10” might be the best plan to make, even if “leave the house at 10:30” is the best plan to follow. This is similar to DiPaolo’s suggestion in that the difference between the best plan to make and the best plan to follow depends on a person’s (predicted) rational shortcomings: the best plan to make is one that takes these shortcomings into account in a particular way. However, Schoenfield’s view is not that higher-order evidence only has rational import for non-ideal agents; rather, it has the import it has for anyone who rationally believes that they are non-ideal.