 That concern is shared by List and Pettit (2011, 170–85). While they hold that group agents as group persons should possess rights, they also subscribe to value (or “normative”) individualism, the view that something is good only if it is good for individual human beings or non-human sentient beings (182). On their view, value-individualism provides reason not to abandon group rights (as Hartney, 1991, alleges) but to curtail the scope of those rights. Group persons should have only rights that will redound to the benefit of individual persons, be they members or non-members of the group. Given the well-known dangers posed by asymmetries of power between groups and individuals, we should accord groups a more limited set of rights than we accord individuals, though we have no reason similarly to curtail the responsibilities we assign groups. (For other views on value-individualism and the curtailing of group rights, see Hindriks 2014; Pasternak 2017; Rafanelli 2017; Smith 2018).