 Sextus’ (ca. 160–210 CE) epithet, Empiricus, indicates that he belonged to the empiricists, a medical school (cf. Svavarson 2014 for a brief conspectus of Sextus’ philosophy). The empiricist medical school argued against rationalistic tendencies in medicine (Frede 1990; Allen 2010). Rationalism in medicine aims to give causal explanations as a basis for therapies. Empiricism, on the contrary, confines itself to observation and memory. Somewhat confusingly (considering his name), Sextus discusses differences between Pyrrhonism and empiricism, and says that skepticism is closer to medical methodism than to empiricism (Allen 2010). On the whole, it may be safest to think of Sextus as rejecting medical rationalism as well as other trends within medicine that by Sextus’ lights are dogmatic. Methodism follows appearances, and derives from them what seems beneficial. No explanations are attempted, no underlying substances postulated, and no regularities assumed—these are some of the rationalistic methods that both methodism and empiricism argue against. Methodism also makes no statements to the effect that such explanations cannot be given, or that underlying substances and regularities do not exist, as Sextus says empiricism does (SE PH 1.236–241). Beyond the fact that Sextus was a doctor and wrote on medicine (M 7.202, M 1.61), his philosophical thinking seems shaped by engagement with medical writers. Scholars have long been interested in the relationship between medicine and skeptical arguments that pertain to be therapeutic (Voelke 1990). More recently, scholars explore ways in which medical writings, in particular by Galen, inform Sextus’ thinking, even on specific issues such as how to conceive of and solve sophisms (Schmitt, forthcoming). It has also been argued that the skeptics’ application of the modes should be interpreted in light of the methodological commitments of non-rationalist medicine (Sienkiewicz 2019, 2021).