  These arguments are presented in two very different ways in our two sources. In Sextus’ account (followed above), they are presented as explicitly dialectical arguments, relying on clearly marked Stoic views, and leading to the conclusion that the Stoic sage will have no beliefs. In the report of Cicero in Academica 2, however, we are informed that Arcesilaus was in some way committed to premises and conclusions of both arguments: that is, he agreed that condition [c] of the Stoic definition of the cognitive impression could never be met, and hence that nothing can be known; and he maintained premises [5] and [6] of the second argument, and hence concluded that assent to any impression was irrational (Academica 2.66–7 &amp; 2.77). This historical interpretation of Arcesilaus’ skepticism is supported elsewhere in Cicero’s dialogues, where we find histories of philosophy that have Arcesilaus following Socrates and Plato (and Presocratic philosophers such as Democritus, Parmenides and Empedocles) in concluding that nothing can be known by perception or reason, and hence adopting a method of argument that would lead others to refrain from all assent (De oratore 3.67 &amp; Academica 1.43–6; see also Plutarch Against Colotes 1121f).