 The former, (i), is rejected because whatever is impressed in a material power immediately becomes material, and hence the impression of a disposition in the image cannot make the essence immaterial (QDA-1974-III: 218). The latter account, (ii), in turn, is rejected because either the result of the removal remains in the phantasia—a material power—and we end up again with the same problem as (i), or the result is transferred to the possible intellect and we end up with a problematic transfer of an accidental form from one subject to another—from the organ of the phantasia to the soul (QDA-1974-III: 230). An accident only has being in a substance; hence, if the transfer of accidents from one subject to another were possible, one would need to posit a time t where the accident has no supporting substance, which is impossible. Brito’s own account is that the agent intellect functions as a ‘light’ that enables the essence in the image to trigger a corresponding act of intellection without any removal, impression, or transfer of a form. Brito explains his point by means of an analogy with seeing milk’s whiteness: thanks to the action of light, the milk’s whiteness is seen, without other features of the milk being seen, e.g., its sweetness; but the action of light on the milk involves neither the impression of a disposition on the milk’s whiteness (namely, visibility) nor a real removal of the whiteness from the sweetness (QDA-1974-III: 237). In fact, the milk’s whiteness is in itself potentially visible and the action of light does nothing more than to make it actually visible. The same goes for the agent intellect: it makes the essence in the image, which is in itself potentially intelligible, be actually intelligible.