 A similar contrast between Hume and Kant can be found in their respective accounts of moral motivation. Hume famously claims that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (T 2.3.3.4). The claim is not that reason has no role in human action, but rather that its role is entirely subordinate to passion. Hume offers three main arguments for this claim in A Treatise of Human Nature. There is considerable debate about how these arguments work, the precise nature of Hume’s famous anti-rationalism, and whether his position changed from the Treatise to the second Enquiry. (See, e.g., Milgram 1995; Radcliffe 1997 and 2018; Cohon 2008: chapters 2 and 3; and Irwin 2008: chapter 26.)