Assessing Kuhn’s significance presents a conundrum.  Unquestionably he was one of the most influential philosophers and historians of science of the twentieth century. His most obvious achievement was to have been a major force in bringing about the final demise of logical positivism.  Nonetheless, there is no characteristically Kuhnian school that carries on his positive work.  It is as if he himself brought about a revolution but did not supply the replacement paradigm.  For a period in the 1960s and 1970s it looked as if there was a Kuhnian paradigm ‘historical philosophy of science’, flourishing especially in newly formed departments of history and philosophy of science.  But as far as the history of science and science studies more generally are concerned, Kuhn repudiated at least the more radical developments made in his name.  Indeed part of Kuhn’s fame must be due to the fact that both his supporters and his detractors took his work to be more revolutionary (anti-rationalist, relativist) than it really was.