 Given the widespread literature revealing how seemingly error-prone humans can be when reasoning about probabilities (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, &amp; Tversky 1982), the proposal that Simpson’s Paradox can be explained by appeal to an error in probabilistic reasoning is plausible. Yet Bandyopadhyay et al. do not specify what this error is. Or, more specifically, they do not propose a valid form of reasoning that reasoners are mistakenly appealing to when falling prey to the paradox. The fact that people expect that the ratios in subpopulations to be preserved in the combined population just shows that people are tricked by the paradox. It does not illuminate the underlying mistake that they are making when they are tricked. In this sense, Bandyopadhyay et al. do not answer their second question. They also, by their own admission, do not provide a general answer to (iii). They view this as a virtue of their account, since they believe that discussions of (iii) ought to be divorced from discussions of (i) and (ii).