 Phenomenology does not only function as an approach to reveal and critique our relationship with technology, as suggested by Heidegger, Dreyfus and Borgmann. Don Ihde (1990, 1995, 2002, 2010) has used the resources of phenomenology to give a rich and subtle account of the variety and complexity of our relationship with technology—what he refers to as a postphenomenology of technology (Ihde 2009, 2010; Selinger 2006). With postphenomenology Ihde wants to move away from ‘transcendental’ (and often dystopian) grand narratives of the technological to a more grounded empirical analysis of the human/technology relationship. This move to the empirical is often described as the ‘empirical turn’ in the philosophy of technology (Achterhuis 2001). Postphenomenology is a relational ontology, which proposes that the subject/object (or human/technology) relation is not just interactional but also co-constitutive (Rosenberger and Verbeek 2015). Moreover, this co-constitutive relation is fundamentally mediated. There are no direct relations between subject and object—only ‘indirect’ ones in which technologies often function as mediators, not to connect but to co-constitute. As such, the human-world relation is typically a human-technology-world relation. In this relation, there are no pre-given subjects or pre-given objects (which then connect through some form of mediators). Rather mediation is the original source from which a specific subjectivity and objectivity emerges, or become enacted, as part of specific situated doings. Ihde defines this originally mediated nature of existence as embodiment (Ihde 2011). Postphenomenology aims to describe the varieties of subjectivities/objectivities that emerge through different embodiments. What sort of subjects do we become (and what does the world become) through the embodiments of the microscope, the telescope, self-driving cars, the computer screen, and so forth?