  Similarly, Reid affirms Butler's objection and then adds a few of his own. One is that Locke's criterion implies the contradictory position that someone could both be and not be identical to some past stage,  an objection illustrated by the Brave Officer Case. Suppose that as  he is stealing the enemy's standard, a forty-year-old brave officer  remembers stealing apples from a neighbor's orchard when he was ten,  and then suppose further that when he is eighty years old, a retired  general, he remembers stealing the enemy's standard as a brave  officer but no longer remembers stealing the neighbor's apples. On  Locke's account the general would have to be both identical to the  apple-stealer (because of the transitivity of the identity relation:  he's identical to the brave officer, who himself is identical to the  apple-stealer) and not identical to the apple-stealer (given that he has no direct memory of the boy's experiences) (Reid 1785,  114–115).