  One significant recent source of motivation for disjunctivism (common to the views proposed by Martin, Campbell and Brewer) is the suggestion that we should moving away from representationalist accounts of the way in which our minds are intentionally directed upon the mind-independent world when we perceive it. Influential in this regard is Charles Travis’s work on perception. Travis (2004 and 2013), who cites Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia as an important influence, argues that perception is not representational. He offers a critique of a representationalist view that is committed to the following claims: (i) Experiences have representational contents and can be true / false—veridical /non-veridical; (ii) the representational content of an experience is something that the subject can take at face value, and accept, or decline; (iii) the experience having this content isn’t a matter of the subject taking / judging things to be a certain way; and (iv) the way our experience represents things to be is something we can appreciate and recognize. According to Travis’s alternative view of perception our senses confront us with what is there, they bring our surroundings into view, but there is nothing in a perceptual experience to make it count as having some one representational content as opposed to countless others. In making out, or trying to make out what it is that we are confronted with, we may go wrong, and make false judgements, but when we are misled in this way, this is not because our senses non-veridically represent to us that the world is a certain way. On the assumption that we are not confronted with the mind-independent world when we hallucinate, this sort of view naturally leads to a disjunctivist view of perceptual experience. (For discussion of these issues, see Raleigh 2013, Shahmoradi 2016, and Wilson 2018).