 Many accounts of generics are framed in terms of some or other type of quantification over possible worlds (Dahl 1975, Delgrande 1987, Schubert and Pelletier 1989, Asher and Morreau 1995, Krifka et al. 1995, Pelletier and Asher 1997, Greenberg 2003, and others). Often, these possible worlds are employed to capture the intuition that generics tell us something about what is normal for members of a kind (see Nickel 2008, 2016). For example, it is natural to think that a generic such as “tigers are striped” tells us something about normal tigers; the only exceptions to it are those tigers who are albino, and so, one could argue, in some respect out-of-step with the norm for the kind. Similarly, “dogs have four legs” may strike us as true because the only dogs that do not have four legs either have birth defects or have met with misfortune.