 Hempel applied “Nicod’s criterion” to this example, where Nicod had proposed that, in relation to conditional hypotheses, instances of their antecedents that are also instances of their consequents confirm them; instances of their antecedents that are not instances of their consequents disconfirm them; and non-instantiations of their antecedents are neutral, neither confirming nor disconfirming. Applied to the raven hypothesis, this means that, given a thing named “\(c\)”, the truth of “\(Rc\)” and “\(Bc\)” confirms it; the truth of “\(Rc\)” and “\(\neg Bc\)” disconfirms it; and the truth of “\(\neg Rc\)” neither confirms nor disconfirms it, but remains evidentially neutral, regardless of the truth value of “\(Bc\)”. To these highly intuitive conditions, Hempel added that, since logically equivalent hypotheses have the same empirical content, whatever confirms one member of a set of logically equivalent hypotheses must also confirm the others, which he called “the equivalence condition”.