 Another manifestation of interest in the notion of judgment has been the exploration of connections between Kant’s account of aesthetic experience and judgment in the third Critique and his theory of cognitive judgments in the first Critique. Bell (1987) and Ginsborg (1990a) both argue that, for Kant, the possibility of aesthetic experience to be, in some sense, a condition of the possibility of cognitive judgment; Makkreel (1990), from a more Continental, and specifically hermeneutical perspective, also argues for deep connections between Kant’s aesthetics and his account of cognition. Kukla (2006) collects together a number of essays exploring the relation between Kant’s aesthetics and his theory of cognition; the introduction to Kukla 2006 offers some historical perspective on the increased interest in Kant’s aesthetics as playing a systematic role in Kant’s epistemological program. Hughes (2007: ch. 5) argues that Kant’s views in the Critique of Judgment are necessary for a full understanding of Kant’s account of synthesis in the first Critique and for the Transcendental Deduction of the categories in the first Critique. Ginsborg (2006) and Geiger (2020) both argue for a connection between the possibility of aesthetic judgment and that of the acquisition of empirical concepts. Breitenbach (2021) proposes that aesthetic judgment and cognitive judgment share a “common core” of imaginative reflection which helps account for scientific creativity. Makkai (2021: ch. 1), while sympathetic to the idea that Kant’s aesthetics makes a contribution to his view of cognition, argues that several attempts to make out the connection, including those of Bell (1987) and Allison (2001), rest on a mistaken construal of Kant’s notion of judgment. Rather than endorsing the idea that aesthetic judgment is somehow presupposed by cognition, she proposes that they are parallel, both having a basis in reflective judgment (Makkai 2021: ch. 4).