  Some of those are explored in the debate regarding so-called faultless disagreements (e.g., Kölbel 2003 and McFarlane 2014, ch. 6). On a view which is inspired by the more general position known as “assessor relativism”, the propositions that constitute the contents of moral beliefs are the same independently of who the believer is. But the truth-values of those contents nevertheless vary depending on the standards of those who assess them (e.g., Kölbel 2004; and Schafer 2012). That view allows its advocates to remain faithful to their relativist inclinations and still construe Jane’s and Eric’s dispute as concerning one and the same proposition which is affirmed by Jane and rejected by Eric. It also allows them to claim that, for any spectator of the case, at most one of Jane’s and Eric’s statements is true (since both cannot be true relative to the same standards). This leaves them with a conception of a moral disagreement which has at least some semblance to the realist one. (For further discussion and criticism of the pertinent account of disagreement, see Dreier 1999; and Francén 2010.)