 The notion of an exoteric Leibnizian philosophy is often associated with Bertrand Russell’s influential interpretation of Leibniz. Russell infamously claimed that the difference between Leibniz’s public and private writings is so significant that they effectively comprise two distinct philosophies: a theologically imbued fantasy designed to please royalty, and his true philosophy, derived from austere logical principles, that he revealed to a select few of his correspondents (Russell 1945). In recent decades Russell’s view has been rejected; nearly everyone agrees that there is much more continuity between Leibniz’s public and private works than Russell was willing to admit (see Curley 1972 for a critique of Russell’s view). And as we will see, the distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric does not involve a simple classification of his works depending on whether or not they were published. In order to attain a more accurate understanding of Leibniz’s distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric we must turn to his views on the ideal form that metaphysics should take.