 Such distinctions require the use of moral qualities and quantities, which are respectively affective and estimative modes. The latter involve the valuation of persons, things, or actions in terms of their social status or esteem, their price (economic value), or their desert (as in punishment and reward) – all of which are inexact, comparative, and subject to alteration or adjustment (i.e., moral imposition is an ongoing process) (Seidler 2018). Moral qualities, in turn, affect (have an effect on) persons and are either formal (e.g., titles) or operative, with the latter subdivided into passive and active varieties. Passive operative qualities enable someone “rightly to have, suffer, admit, or receive something” (DJN I.1.20), while active operative qualities are those by which we can morally affect or move others, as it were. (See Auer 2008, for an association with Hohfeld.) They are divided into the more familiar notions of power/authority (potestas), obligation (obligatio), and right (ius) – which constitute the moral dynamics of social life. All such notions or entities, it is important to keep in mind, are imposed or assigned rather than given or found; the scheme is fundamentally ‘positivistic’.