 Many philosophers have seen Kant’s aesthetics as having significance for domains of philosophical enquiry outside both aesthetics and the study of Kant. An important example is Cavell (1976: ch. 3), who connects the subjective universality which Kant ascribes to judgments of beauty with the appeal made, in ordinary language philosophy, to “what we should say” (see especially 94–96). This connection is explored further in Baz (2016) and Makkai (2021), both of which draw on Cavell for their understanding of the philosophical significance of Kant’s account of judgments of beauty. Somewhat relatedly, Bell (1987) draws a connection between Kant’s view of aesthetic judgment and Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations; Ginsborg 2011 invokes Kant’s aesthetic theory as a basis for a response to the skepticism about rules and meaning which Saul Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein (Kripke 1982).