 An important thing to note is that even if Stipulative Fiat is untenable, we needn’t give up on GG. GG only requires that there be some explanation of how derivative representations relate to fundamental representations; it does not require that this explanation be of a particular kind, much less that it consist in nothing but an act of stipulation (Toon 2010: 77–78). Ruyant (2021) has recently proposed what he calls “true Griceanism”, which differs from the original account in that it involves a non-trivial reduction of scientific representation to more fundamental representations (complex sequences mental states and purpose-directed behaviour) in a way that is also sensitive to the communal aspects of practices in which the models are embedded. This is a step into the direction indicated by Toon. More generally, as Callender and Cohen note, all that it requires is that there is a privileged class of representations and that other types of representations owe their representational capacities to their relationship with the primitive ones. So philosophers need an account of how members of this privileged class of representations represent, and how derivative representations, which includes scientific models, relate to this class. When stated like this, many recent contributors to the debate on scientific representation can be seen as falling under the umbrella of GG. Indeed, As we will see below, many of the more developed versions of the accounts of scientific representation discussed throughout this entry invoke the intentions of model users, albeit in a more complex manner than Stipulative Fiat.