 Other philosophers, by contrast, have endorsed a version of the relationship-based view with respect to our moral duties to humans and non-human animals, holding that we have special obligations to the former, and not to the latter, in something like the way we have special obligations to distant relatives. When Bernard Williams writes, “There are certain respects in which creatures are treated one way rather than another simply because they belong to a certain category, the human species,” he is not merely describing but endorsing the view that species membership is relevant, at least for human beings (Williams 2008, 142). Similarly, T.M. Scanlon sees his contractualism as justifying the significance of such ties, writing that “The mere fact that a being is ’of human born’ provides a strong reason for according it the same status as other humans. This has sometimes been characterized as a prejudice, called ‘speciesism.’ But it is not prejudice to hold that our relation to these beings gives us reason to accept the requirement that our actions should be justifiable to them. Nor is it prejudice to recognize that this particular reason does not apply to other beings with comparable capacities, whether or not there are other reasons to accept this requirement with regard to them” (Scanlon 1998, 185). (See also Diamond 1991, 2018.)