Philosophers have also been interested in the relation between touch and other sensory modalities. It seems plausible to think that touch, unlike vision, does not have a full, 3-dimensional sensible field in external space. Instead, touch seems confined to the limits of the body, and so the tangible field is, unlike in the other modalities, defined by the limits and extent of the surface of the body. Fardo et al (2018) offer a plausible empirical model for how this limited surface could generate rich spatial awareness. This supposed difference in the nature of their spatial awareness marks a clear structural difference between touch and vision, even when they represent the same sets of objective features. Similarly, one could claim that touch also differs from the other senses in always involving bodily awareness (O’Shaughnessy 1989). Externally–directed touch awareness on such a view would only be made possible against a background of bodily awareness. This sort of view has been labeled “the template view” (Scott 2001).