 Two additional problems, already identified in Block’s essay, have been much discussed since. First, conceptual role semantics seems to lead to a very extreme holism. If all or nearly all of the inferential relations between mental representations are included in their conceptual role, then it seems that a change in the meaning of any representation will also change the meanings of all or nearly all the others, and also that nearly any change in belief will result in a change in the meaning of one’s representations. We ordinarily think that there is an important difference between changes of belief and changes of meaning, but it is hard to see how to capture this difference within conceptual role semantics. Second, conceptual role, as understood by Block and others, may seem too “syntactic” to constitute a conception of content at all. In particular, conceptual role does not naturally give rise to an account of truth conditions. As Block puts it, “is narrow content really content?” Block himself regards conceptual role as a determinant of content, and leaves it an open question whether it is also a kind of content. But if conceptual role is not actually a kind of content, then it does not satisfy all of the original motivations for introducing a notion of narrow content.