 Within the bottom-up camp, further divisions apply. For some, it is correct to say that the delusional belief explains the experience. Others claim that the delusional belief is an endorsement of the experience. According to the explanationist account (Maher 1999; Stone and Young 1997), the content of experience is vaguer than the content of the delusion, and the delusion plays the role of one potential explanation for the experience. For instance, in the Capgras delusion, the young woman’s experience would be that of someone looking very much like her father but not being her father. The delusion would be an explanation of the fact that the man looks like her father, but his face feels strange to her: the man must be an impostor. In persecution, the experience would be that of people behaving with hostility towards us, and the delusion would be an explanation why they behave with hostility: they intend to cause us harm. This account leaves it open that the same experience could be explained differently (i.e., without any appeal to the delusional hypothesis).