 Aumann’s “no disagreement” theorem has been generalized in a number of ways in the literature. Cave 1983 generalizes the argument to 3 agents. Bacharach 1985 extends it to cases in which agents observe each other’s decisions rather than posteriors. Milgrom and Stokey, 1982 use it crucially for their no-trade theorem, applying no disagreement to show that speculative trade is impossible. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis 1982 generalize the argument to a dynamic setting in which two agents communicate their posterior probabilities back and forth until they reach an agreement – this particular take on the agreement theorem has been characterized in terms of dynamic epistemic logic by Dégremont and Roy, 2009 and applied to cases of epistemic peer disagreement by Sillari 2019. McKelvey and Page 1986 further extend the results of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis to the case of \(n\) individuals. (See also Monderer and Samet 1989 and, for a survey, Geanakoplos 1994.)