 Śaṅkara employs another theory, the limitation theory (avaccheda), to help explain the individuation of consciousness. This theory counters potential problems arising from the reflection theory, such as assuming a genuine duality of mind and consciousness, or that consciousness undergoes causation and entry, or that it actually resides locatively in the mind. The limitation theory explains that just as we mistakenly perceive nondual space as delimited by an object—for example, a pot delimiting a pot space—so too do we misunderstand non-dual consciousness as delimited by the mind (see GKBh 3.3–9). The pot space is not a genuine limiting property of space because space is not divisible by the pot form. The pot space is an appearance. It is merely an as though limiting property, a conditioning adjunct (upādhi) that we superimpose on to space to account for particular functions (e.g., containing a liquid). So too, do people mistakenly assume the mind-body-sense complex possesses consciousness and that consciousness is intrinsically intentional. In reality, the mind-body-sense complex is merely an upādhi that does not possess or limit nondual consciousness.