 The mere existence of these international instruments does not, of course, establish that the ascription of human rights to groups is either conceptually coherent or morally defensible and, for the most part, drafters of UN human rights documents have studiously avoided any suggestion that human rights might be other than individually held. For many commentators, human rights are necessarily and only the rights of human individuals; groups may possess rights but they will not be human rights (e.g. Donnelly 2013, 45–54; Graff 1994; Griffin 2008, 256–76; Jovanović 2012, 166–195; Miller 2002; Nickel 2007, 163–167; Nordenfelt 1987; Waldron 1993, 339–69). Others insist that some goods that are fundamental to human well-being are collective in nature and an adequate theory of human rights would accommodate that reality and recognise group as well as individual human rights (e.g. Beitz 2009, 181–186; Casals 2006; Crawford 1988; Felice 1996; Freeman 1995; Holder 2006; Jones 1999b, 2013; Kymlicka 2001, 69–90; Malik 1996; Mende 2018; Thompson 2015).