 The indifference of quiddity to any kind of determination truly establishes the correspondence between reality and knowledge: it is exactly because quiddity is in itself neither real (i.e. extra-mental) nor mental that it can be present both in reality and in the mind, accompanied by the determinations of either individuality or universality: in concrete reality there is x in its particular existence, while in the mind there is x with its possible multiple predication. In this respect, the consideration of quiddity in itself—which corresponds to the thing in itself as expressed by its definition—transcends both levels of existence (external and mental) and in one passage is equated to the “divine existence” (wuǧūd ilāhī) of something that depends on God’s providence (Ilāhiyyāt, V, 1, 204, 16–205, 4; for the possible reference to Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī’s discussion of Alexander’s essentialism, see Rashed 2004; Menn 2013; Benevich 2018, 2019; cf. Black 1999). Quiddity is in fact the ‘reality’ of the thing and is always identical to itself (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 31,2–9, 36,4–6). Recently scholars have analyzed the question of the reality and the being of quiddity from both a logical (Benevich 2018) and an ontological perspective, highlighting the point that the discussion of the universals plays a crucial role in understanding Avicenna’s theory of quiddity in itself (Janos 2020; cf. de Libera 1999; Marmura 1992). The crux of the matter lies in the notion of mental existence. Clearly through consideration one ascribes properties to quiddity and in that respect quiddity is existent or realised (see e.g. Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 32,12). Consideration (iʿtibār) should therefore be conceived as grantinga kind of existence, although not as a composition of essence andexistence (for the mereological interpretations of quiddity, see DeHaan 2014 ; Benevich 2018 ; Janos 2020). 