 However, these accounts of harmful appropriation are subject to philosophical objections. For instance, we might grant that misrepresentation can be harmful, but deny that such a harm has anything to do with appropriation per se: misrepresentations promulgated by cultural insiders can be harmful, too (Young 2008: Ch. 4). Thus the argument that misrepresentation is harmful does not establish that cultural appropriation itself is harmful. In reply, one might note that while misrepresenting oneself and being misrepresented by others could be equally harmful, that does not entail that they constitute the same kind or degree of wrong. Moreover, we might question whether it is important to demonstrate that cultural appropriation is a sui generis kind of wrong: indeed, given that harmful cultural appropriation seems to depend on background conditions of social inequality, we might think it would be unsurprising if a fitting explanation of its wrongfulness overlaps substantially with the explanation of other wrongs that depend on social inequality (Matthes 2016a).