 So far, then, natural causality seems to have no place in the experiential life of subject. However, as Stein already claims in her Empathy-book (1917: 66–68[49–51]) and elaborates throughout the Beiträge, a different form of causality is at work on the experiential level. The causally efficacious experiential states in the psychic life of individuals are so-called “life-feelings” (Lebensgefühle) and a subject’s “life-power” (Lebenskraft; a term that originates in Hermann Lotze (1843), but that we also find in Theodor Lipps (1883), from whom Stein probably takes the term). Life-feelings are, broadly speaking, best understood as the affective dispositions of a psychophysical organism that bring about certain cognitive, conative or affective states. They determine the very way a subject is aware of and experiences these states. They also determine one’s own bodily awareness, i.e., one’s “bodily attunement” (leibliche Befinden; 1917: 87[70]). Stein characterizes life-feelings as the “momentary state (Beschaffenheit) of the I—its life-disposition (Lebenszuständlichkeit)” (1922: 22[22]). If this disposition is sedimented, it becomes a subject’s life-power (ibid.; see  sect. 2.2;  see Betschart 2009). Typical examples of life-feelings are weariness, freshness, vigor, and irritability. Such psychic-bodily dispositions “effectuate” (wirkend) experiential changes in “one’s feeling disposed (Sichbefinden)” and in turn “influence the whole course of the co-occurring experiences”. If I feel weary, “everything that emerges in various fields of sensation will be affected by it”, colors will appear colorless, sounds toneless, etc. (1922: 16[15]; see also 1922: 65[75]; 75[86]).