 An opposing view is defended in Ginsborg 1997b, which draws on Kant’s characterization of purposiveness as the “lawfulness of the contingent as such” (FI VI, 20:217; see also FI VIII, 20:228; Introduction V, 5:184; and §76, 5:404) to argue for a univocal conception on which purposiveness is understood as normative lawfulness. Zuckert also lays emphasis on Kant’s identification of purposiveness as the “lawfulness of the contingent” (2007a: 5–7), but rejects Ginsborg’s view that this in turn amounts to normative lawfulness as such (2007a: 84n28); on her view, the lawfulness of the contingent is to be understood as “the unity of the diverse” (2007a: 5) or the “form of unity of diversity as such” (2007a: 15). The normative conception of purposiveness is also criticized by Teufel (2011), who argues that Kant held an etiological and non-teleological conception of purposiveness: on Teufel’s view, an ascription of purposiveness to an object makes an ontological claim to the effect that the object is the outcome of a rational, conceptually guided process. Breitenbach (2017) and Fisher (forthcoming)  agree with Ginsborg in emphasizing Kant’s characterization of purposiveness in terms of the lawfulness of the contingent, but without endorsing Ginsborg’s interpretation of the lawfulness as normative.