  The difficulty is, though, that P1 and P2—however  attractive—together imply that an agent never intentionally  does b when he judges that it would be better to do  a (if he takes himself to be free to do either). And this  certainly looks like a denial of the possibility of incontinent  action. No wonder, then, that so many have been tempted to say that  akratic action is impossible! Looking carefully, however, we can see  that P1 and P2 do not imply the impossibility of incontinent actions as Davidson has defined them. For Davidson  characterizes the agent who incontinently does b as holding, not that it would be better to do a than to do b,  but that it would be better, all things considered, to do  a than to do b. Is the “all things  considered” just a rhetorical flourish? Or does it mark a  genuine difference between these two judgments? If these are two  different judgments, and one can hold the latter without holding the  former, then incontinent action is possible even if P1 and P2 are true.