  In his classic monograph on the concept of truth “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” (Polish original version, Tarski 1933; German translation with an added postscript, Tarski 1935; English version of the German text, Tarski 1983b), Tarski will present a method for constructing definitions of truth for classical quantificational formal languages. When one succeeds in applying this method to a particular formal language, the end result will be the construction of a predicate in a metalanguage for that language whose essential properties will be that it will be constructed out of non-suspicious mathematical vocabulary and that it will be intuitively satisfied precisely by the intuitively true sentences of the object language. At the same time, Tarski shows how, in terms of the defined notion of truth, one can give intuitively adequate definitions of the semantical notions of definability and denotation, and he indicates how it is possible to define the notion of truth in a structure in a way analogous to the one used to define  truth.[1]  That allows him to conclude that the acceptability and rigor of the “recent methodological studies” (of Löwenheim, Skolem, Gödel and Tarski himself, among others), have been vindicated (cf. Tarski 1983b, p. 266).