 Intelligence and reason are not two powers; “reason” and “reasoning” in a narrow sense can be regarded as the extension of one’s “intelligence” (one’s capacity for intelligent insight into the data of experience) into the propositional work of reasoning towards judgment, and “reason” (ratio) in a broader sense refers to this whole capacity, only analytically divisible into aspects or phases. So too, practical reason is not a distinct power. Rather, one’s capacity to think about the way things are can be (and naturally, that is effortlessly and normally, is) “extended” (Aquinas’ metaphor) to thinking intelligently and making reasonable and true judgments about what to do. Thinking and judging of the latter kind is practical, that is, intends to terminate in choice and action (in Greek praxis, in Latin actio). “Practical reason” sometimes refers (i) directly to such thinking, sometimes (ii) to the propositional content or structure which such thinking has when it is done well – and thus to the propositions that pick out what kinds of action one ought to be judging pursuit-worthy, undesirable, right, wrong, etc. – and sometimes (iii) to the capacity to engage in such thinking by understanding such propositions and being guided by them.