 Soames begins with the notion of the mental act of predication, which he takes to be primitive. However, by way of illustration, if an agent perceives an object o as red, and so has a perceptual experience that represents o as being red, the agent predicates redness of o. Similarly, if an agent “thinks of” o as  red[19],  or “form[s] the nonlinguistic perceptual belief that o is  red”.[20]  For Soames, predicating redness of o does not amount to believing that o is red. To believe that o is red, one must predicate redness of o and do something like endorse the predication. It is hard to say precisely what predicating amounts to since the notion is primitive for Soames. An agent predicating redness of o is an event token. Of course there may well be many event tokens of agents predicating redness of some object o by an agent perceiving it as red, an agent thinking of it as red and so on. Soames claims that the proposition that o is red is the event type of an agent predicating redness of o. Other more complex propositions are identified with events types of agents performing sequences of primitive mental  acts.[21]  Soames doesn’t say what he takes events (types or tokens) to be. But since he thinks that propositions are structured entities with constituents, he must think that event types are structured entities with constituents. Presumably, the proposition that o is red—the event type of an agent predicating redness of o—has o and redness as constituents. 