 Resolute choice deviates from sophisticated choice only under certain conditions that are not fulfilled by Ulysses, given his inexplicable change in attitudes. Defenders of resolute choice typically defend decision theories and associated preferences that violate the Independence axiom/Sure-Thing Principle (notably McClennen 1990 and Machina 1989; see also Rabinowicz 1995 and Buchak 2013 for discussion), and appeal to resolute choice to make these preferences more palatable in the sequential-decision context (to be discussed further in  Section 6.2  below). According to resolute choice, in appropriate contexts, the agent should at all choice points stick to the strategy that was initially deemed best. The question is whether this advice makes sense, given the standard interpretation of a sequential decision model. What would it mean for an agent to choose against her preferences in order to fulfill a previously-selected plan? That would seem to defy the very notion of preference. Of course, an agent may place considerable importance on honouring previous commitments. Any such integrity concerns, however, should arguably be reflected in the specification of outcomes and thus in the agent’s preferences at the time in question. This is quite different from choosing out of step with one’s all-things-considered preferences at a time.