 Pratt argues that some dynamic qualities are common to both music and the subjective experience of emotions. Thus, the agitation we hear in fast-paced, wayward music is an external, objective counterpart of the subjective, internal sensation we experience when we feel agitated. This correspondence between psychological states and perceptual features of external objects is what grounds the description of the latter in emotional terms. Pratt’s view, conveyed in nuce by his slogan “the music sounds the way the emotions feel”, shares with Langer’s theory the idea of an isomorphism between the structure of music and the phenomenology of emotional life. However, Pratt does not conceive of music as a sign of the emotions, as their correspondence in terms of dynamic structure does not imply any representational relation from the former to the latter (Pratt 1954: 290). This claim, along with Pratt’s separation of musical emotions from those it arouses in the listener, gives his view a clear formalist slant. The persuasiveness of Pratt’s hypothesis is ultimately dependent on whether we can produce clearer evidence for the structural correspondence that is central to the account (criticism of Pratt’s view is found in Budd 1985: chapter 3, and S. Davies 1994: chapter 3; Green [2007: 206] advances a theory of expressiveness that partly vindicates Pratt’s intuition).