 A number of commentators have taken the dilemma, or considerations related to it, to be fatal to Kant’s view that judgments of beauty make a legitimate claim to universal validity: see for example Meerbote 1982, cited above, and Guyer (1979: 284–288; although Guyer offers a more positive assessment, see his 2003b: 60n15). Others have argued that Kant’s view can be saved by drawing on considerations not mentioned in the official argument of the Deduction. As noted below  (Section 2.8),  Kant draws a close connection between our capacity for aesthetic judgment and our nature as moral beings, and even though Kant himself does not appeal to this connection in the deduction of taste, some commentators, including Elliott (1968), Crawford (1974), Kemal (1986) and Savile (1987), have taken moral considerations to constitute the ultimate ground of the legitimacy of judgments of beauty. Another strategy drawing on considerations outside the Deduction itself has been to appeal to Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas (see  Section 2.6),  which is ostensibly part of his theory of art, rather than his core theory of taste. This strategy is adopted in Savile 1987 and Chignell 2007; Chignell’s view differs from Savile’s in that it does not make any appeal to moral considerations. Finally, some commentators have held that while the argument of the official Deduction at §38 is unsuccessful in avoiding the dilemma, the version of the argument offered at §21, which appeals to the notion of a “common sense”, is more effective; see in particular Rind (2002) and Kalar (2006: ch. 5).