 While appeal to tacit consent is most familiar in the context of attempting to ground special political obligations, one could also use this notion in order to ground, for example, special obligations to friends. Again, however, one would have to show that friendship is a context that meets the conditions as described by Simmons, and it seems implausible to suppose that it is. Further, however, some would have a further objection to construing obligations of friendship as contractual: such a model seems to misconstrue the nature of friendship as involving, as Aristotle claimed, concern for the other for the other’s own sake. Whether or not one can accommodate obligations of friendship (or obligations of parents to care for their children) as grounded on tacit consent, it seems quite clear that, for example, familial obligations, such as those of children to parents, do not involve anything like a promise or contract, either express or tacit. Again, as with option (i), option (ii) does not go far toward accommodating the range of special obligations recognized by commonsense morality.