 An illustrative case for this altruistic characterization of supererogation is the understudied issue of whether governments can act supererogatorily (for an exception, see Weinberg 2011). Weinberg examines all the possible objections to such a possibility, primarily in terms of the government’s exclusive role to implement justice, but still wishes to leave the door open for some possible governmental acts which go beyond duty — such as throwing a block party or investing money in the preservation of the historical legacy of the nation. But these examples are not intuitively clear cases of government supererogation and even if they were, they would always be entangled (as the author admits) with questions of the way the money for these projects was collected and now spent (which is typically a matter of justice). Furthermore, if the definition of supererogatory action consists of a condition of beneficent intention or altruism (like in Heyd), governments cannot be considered as agents able to show these attitudes. For they are impersonal institutions. For that reason it is dubious whether governments, or other institutions like the courts, can show forgiveness since their function is to do justice and promote the good according to the law rather than break the rules from an altruistic intention. And of course it is hard to see how the government can “sacrifice itself” or its own interests for the sake of another individual or state.