 Brito also puts forth the most developed account of the thirteenth-century logic of intentions (for Brito’s logic, see Pinborg 1967, 1971, 1975a; Ebbesen 1998a). His logic of intentions considers the subject matter of logic to be second  intentions[6]  (intentiones secundae), which are best understood as qualified fundamental concepts (first intentions). A first intention is the first intellectual apprehension of a thing—the unqualified concept that only grasps what a thing essentially is. A second intention, in turn, is a first intention qualified according to one of the several modes of being that things have. For instance, the concept of man can be understood as a substance because its content is the substantial form of individual men, or it can be understood as a species because its content actually informs several individuals at the same time, etc. (QsP; see Ebbesen &amp; Pinborg 1981–1982: 307).