 The philosopher who probably did the most singlehandedly to promote the recrudescence of interest in Dewey’s thinking after this period of relative marginality, Richard Rorty, found in his work an historically-minded questioning of epistemological foundations and aspirations to a God’s-eye point of view that of course provided fodder for Rorty’s own project. Yet, in relation to political philosophy, Rorty’s skeptical postmodern liberal ironism glossed over the detailed architecture of Dewey’s ethical and political theory, and made very little both of Dewey’s own naturalistic confidence in the mutually supportive and progressive character of scientific method and democracy. Even among those philosophers who have been keen to draw on the pragmatist tradition as a resource for more positively elaborating a political theory than Rorty was inclined to there are important figures, such as Cheryl Misak, who seek foundations for their view elsewhere, notably in Peirce’s view of the precondition of belief, and express doubts about what they see as Dewey’s less clearly grounded ethical commitments. However, others such as Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam and Philip Kitcher more wholeheartedly identify with, and try to develop, the commitments of Dewey’s pragmatic naturalism, in thinking through the relationship between scientific inquiry, ethics and democracy. In part, recent increased engagement with Dewey’s political philosophy from philosophers across a range of traditions, including epistemic democrats, such as Elizabeth Anderson, and Frankfurt School critical theorists, such as Axel Honneth, flows from an interest in developing a fuller understanding of democracy as a method of social learning. Dewey’s political philosophy remains an important reference point and source of inspiration for thinkers who seek to explore radical forms of democratic liberalism.  