 If we limit Pyrrho’s contribution in this way, what difference does it make? There is still the question whether the statement about the nature of things is about how things are in themselves or about our inability to grasp them. But in this case, all the mention of sensations and opinions, of their truth or falsehood, and of what we should say belongs to Timon, not to Pyrrho. And this opens the possibility that the main philosophical outlook expressed in the Aristocles passage, whether one reads it metaphysically or epistemologically, is Timon’s construction, building on a single idea of Pyrrho’s that may have been rather less broad in scope or ambitious in character. In particular, as we shall see, much of the other evidence on Pyrrho seems to depict him as focused on questions of value, questioning our characterizations of things as good or bad and doubting whether our views on such matters are stable or reliable. His statement of the “indifferent” nature of things, as reported in the Aristocles passage, may also have been of an evaluative kind: things do not really — or, we cannot tell whether things really — have the positive or negative evaluative qualities we accord them.