 In fact the commitment already emerges from (Necessitarian-T) if the necessitation relation it embodies is conceived as internal in the following sense: “An internal relation is one where the existence of the terms entails the existence of the relation” strung out between the terms; otherwise a relation is external (Armstrong 1997: 87). Armstrong argues that the relation of truth-making has to be internal (in just this sense) because if it weren’t then we would have to allow that, absurdly, “anything may be a truth-maker for any truth” (1997: 198). But then nothing but propositions—conceived in the self-interpreting sense—can be truth-bearers that are internally related to their truth-makers. Any other candidate for this representational role, as we’ve already reflected—a token belief state or utterance—could have been endowed with a different representational significance than the one it possesses. So the other eligible candidates, by contrast to propositions, aren’t internally related to what makes them true.