  Sher’s response to the objection is radically different from McGee’s or McCarthy’s. She suggests that “logical terms are identified with their (actual) extensions,” so that \(\dq{\#}\), \(\dq{\%}\), and \(\dq{\neg}\) are just different notations for the same term. More precisely: if these expressions are used the way a logical constant must be used—as rigid  designators[19]  of their semantic values—then they can be identified with the operation of Boolean negation and hence with each other. “Qua quantifiers, ‘the number of planets’ and ‘9’ are indistinguishable” (Sher 1991, 64). But it is not clear what Sher can mean when she says that logical terms can be identified with their extensions. We normally individuate connectives intentionally, by the conditions for grasping them or the rules for their use, and not by the truth functions they express. For example, we recognize a difference between \(\dq{\and}\), defined by 