 Others raise more general questions about the relation between philosophical method and feminist and anti-racist politics. For example, Alice Crary, taking on the general relation between philosophical method and feminist politics, finds that Fricker’s neutral philosophical methods and concepts of reason (2007) are not sufficiently radical to support feminist politics (2018). Tina Fernandes Botts (2018) and Jana Cattien (2019) both criticize analytic feminists’ highly abstract level of analyzing race and gender as well as their use of similar models for both. Instead, specific lived experiences of marginalized people need to figure more centrally in our thinking (Botts 2018). Cattien argues that what is at stake politically is obscured by analytic feminist metaphysicians (including their normative assumptions) and that they need “to be able to take themselves as objects of a politically charged critique” (2019: 733). For example, she finds Haslanger’s (2012) analysis that places all races on one conceptual plane can’t do justice to “white complicities in perpetuating racist power relations” (2019: 720).