  It might now be objected that this disjunctivist response still introduces a common element to veridical perception and causally matching hallucination that screens off the explanatory role that the naïve realist assigns to her distinctive account of the phenomenal character of veridical perception. Both a veridical perception of an F and a causally matching hallucination possess the negative epistemic property of being introspectively indiscriminible from a veridical perception of an F. So why doesn’t this screen off any explanatory role that the naïve realist might assign to the phenomenal properties that she claims only a veridical perception can possess? Martin’s response is to suggest that the property of being indiscriminible from an F has an explanatory potential which is dependent on the explanatory potential of being an F.  So the property of actually being a veridical perception, and having the phenomenal properties that only a veridical perception can possess, can still be regarded as having a crucial explanatory role to play.