 In the context of the analysis of the constitution of individual perceptual objects, the spatio-temporally structured “field of pre-givenness” (Husserl 1939, p. 74) against whose background the object stands out contrastively (ready to catch the perceiver’s attention) counts as primarily passive (cf. Wu 2021, sec. 58). This field is structured by “syntheses of association” between (hyletic adumbrations of) similar and dissimilar elements (cf. Wu 2020, p. 189). These associative syntheses are such that (in the case at issue) one of those elements, e.g. a colored three-dimensional (and thus non-hyletic; cf. Lee 1993, p. 99) dot, serves as sensual “stimulus” by “instinctively driving” (Husserliana Mat., vol. VIII, p. 326) the perceiver to attend to it unwillingly, thus passively “affecting” the perceiver (Husserliana, vol. XXXIII, pp. 275f; cf. Yamaguchi 1982; Lee 1993; also cf. Mensch 1997; and Brudzinska 2020, containing a detailed comparison with Freud). If the stimulus then catches the subject’s attention, it can subsequently be “explicated” perceptually according to its objectual determinations, in which case the subject enters “the first main stage of the striving for knowledge, i.e. the pre-predicative or receptive stage” (Wu 2021, p. 190). Thus, passivity precedes receptivity, which in turn precedes the second main stage, i.e. the “predicative” stage – the level of the “spontaneity” of judgement (cf. Wu 2021, p. 191). Both of these stages (the receptive and the spontaneous one) constitute the level of cognitive “activity”. At the second stage, the processing of mental files such as “individual notions” (see Section 4 above), guided by the subject’s “will to knowledge” (Husserl 1939, p. 92), is located. In Experience and Judgement Husserl calls the perceptual acts motivating predicative file entries (i.e., habitual yet variable empirical beliefs) “explications” of perceptual objects (cf. Husserl 1939, ch. 2). Such explications are founded in “attention as a tendency of the ego” “toward the intentional object” (Husserl 1939, p. 85). (For the multifarious use of the term “attention” in Husserl cf. the introduction to Husserliana, vol. XXXVIII, p. XXXII; see also the entry on “Aufmerksamkeit” in Gander 2010, pp. 36ff, and the secondary literature cited there, as well as Breyer 2011, ch. V, and Wehrle 2013, ch. I.)