  Skinner was no triumphalist about neuroscience.  Neuroscience, for him, more or less just identifies organismic physical processes that underlie animal/environment interactions.  Therein, it rides evidential or epistemic piggyback on radical behaviorism’s prior description of those interactions.  “The organism”, he says, “is not empty, and it cannot adequately be treated simply as a black box” (1976, p. 233).  “Something is done today which affects the behavior of the organism tomorrow” (p. 233). Neuroscience describes inside-the-box mechanisms that permit today’s reinforcing stimulus to affect tomorrow’s behavior.  The neural box is not empty, but it is unable, except in cases of malfunction or breakdown, to disengage the animal from past patterns of behavior that have been reinforced.  It cannot exercise independent or non-environmentally countervailing authority over behavior.