 Curiously, the paradox attracted little subsequent interest until the late 19th century. Marxist philosophers in the neo-Hegelian tradition, like Plekhanov (1908 [1937: 114]), cited the paradox as evidence of the failure of “customary” logic and the utility of the ‘logic of contradiction’. In this way some Marxists sought to establish the triumph of the dialectic. Meanwhile, in Anglo-American philosophy, formal logic regained its central place, and its classical formalisation left no room for the vagueness of natural language. Vagueness and the associated paradox were seen as lying beyond the scope of logic and so posing no challenge to it. However, since the demise of the ideal language doctrines of the latter half of the twentieth century (see  §3.1),  interest in the idiosyncrasies of natural language, including its vagueness, has greatly increased. 