 As we have seen above, all conceptions of public reason involve a certain amount of idealization. The persons to whom rules must be justified are not persons as they actually are, with all their prejudices, biases, and irrational beliefs. Instead, the constituency of public reason is typically idealized on both moral and epistemic dimensions. Critics of public reason sometimes object to this idealization (Enoch 2013; Enoch 2015; Raz 1990). The objection is best presented in the form of a dilemma. On the one hand, if the degree of idealization is kept to a minimum, then public reason may result in anarchy, or may fail to deliver minimally acceptable results; for example, rules prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race or sex may not be justifiable to only modestly idealized parties. On the other hand, if the degree of idealization is very substantial, this creates two different worries. First, it’s no longer clear in what sense the resulting rules are justifiable to the real persons bound by the rules. The whole apparatus of public justification might seem superfluous (Van Schoelandt 2015); it would be simpler and more accurate to simply present certain principles or reasons as true, and declare that anyone who refuses to acknowledge their truth is making an error. Second, and relatedly, too much idealization may implausibly entail that almost all real persons are excluded from the constituency of public reason (Enoch 2015, 122–23). The dilemma is nicely summarized by Raz: