 The collectivist perspective is especially useful when an entire discipline enters a stage of crisis: its members become convinced that a significant proportion of findings are not trustworthy. A contemporary example of such a situation is the replication crisis, which was briefly mentioned in the previous section and concerns the reproducibility of scientific knowledge claims in a variety of different fields (most prominently: psychology, biology, medicine). Large-scale replication projects have noticed that many findings which we considered as an integral part of scientific knowledge failed to replicate in settings that were designed to mimic the original experiment as closely as possible (e.g., Open Science Collaboration 2015). Successful attempts at replicating an experimental result have long been argued to provide evidence of freedom from particular kinds of artefacts and thus the trustworthiness of the result. Compare the  entry on experiment in physics.  Likewise, failure to replicate indicates that either the original finding, the result of the replication attempt, or both, are biased—though see John Norton’s (ms., ch. 3—see Other Internet Resources) arguments that the evidential value of (failed) replications crucially depends on researchers’ material background assumptions.