  According to William, the freedom of the will consists in the fact that the will “can neither be forced in any way to its proper and first operation, which is to will or refuse, nor prevented from the same; and I mean that it is not possible for someone to will something and entirely refuse that he will it or to refuse to will something, entirely willing that he will it” (OO I, 957aA). In other words, William defines force and prevention of the will in terms of higher-order volitions and refusals: for the will to be forced is for it to refuse to will X and nonetheless be made to will X, and for it to be prevented is for it to will to will X and be made to refuse X. In a number of works, William argues that neither force nor prevention of the will is possible: if someone refuses to will X, this must be because he takes X to be bad and thus he must refuse X rather than will it; and if someone wills to will X, this must be because he takes X to be good, and thus he must will X rather than refuse it.