 A fourth response to the arguments for content externalism involves accepting the force of those arguments but limiting their significance. According to this type of response, externalism is true of only one type of content, or of content understood in one particular way. The kind of content susceptible to Putnam/Burge-style considerations is wide or broad content. But there is, some have argued, another type of content—narrow content—that is immune to these kinds of arguments. In the years immediately following the publication of Putnam (1975), it was common to think of narrow content as phenomenal content (see, e.g., Fodor 1981, 1982; McGinn 1982). The motivation for this is the idea that even if the contents of you and your twin’s beliefs vary, there is still something that you and your twin have in common. You both believe, for example, that the colorless, odorless, transparent, potable etc. liquid in front of you is wet. This strategy faces at least two problems. First, it conflicts with Burge’s claim that his type of counterfactual earth argument applies to all concepts known by observational means, a category which includes properties such as being colorless, being odorless, etc. Second, even if the first objection can be avoided, it is not clear that we can purge these phenomenal specifications of content of all concepts immune to twin earth style considerations (for example, the concept of liquid as employed in the above specification) whilst retaining sufficient resources to adequately specify the content of the belief.