  If, however, this is Leibniz's view, then it might seem that we have a problem: the specific essential properties of an individual are few; the individuating essential properties are many; and the specific essential properties are in fact so few that they do little work. Yet, it should be emphasized that, for Leibniz, there is something very important about drawing a line between human beings and other animals: we are rational, while they are not; we are capable of morality, while they are not. This view comes out most clearly in Leibniz's New Essays, where he is trying to undermine Locke's deep anti-essentialism: “as we know the inner essence of man, namely reason, which resides in the individual man and is present in all men, and as we find among us no fixed inner feature which generates a subdivision, we have no grounds for thinking that the truth about their inner natures implies that there is any essential specific difference among men.” (A VI, vi, 325–26/RB 325–26) In other words, there are certain properties within us that necessarily differentiate us from all other species and those that differentiate us from all other individuals within that species. In this regard, Leibniz is a traditionalist, upholding a real, essential distinction between human beings and other creatures. Yet, insofar as he believes that all properties of an individual are essential to that individual, Leibniz is radical.