But what are worlds made of? Should we not at least assume Reality to be some kind of stuff that allows structuring with alternative versions as dough allows structuring with a cookie-cutter? Does there not have to be some substance for our versions to project structure onto? According to Goodman, this “tolerant realist view” that a plurality of worlds can be versions of a unique underlying Reality is also nothing but a useless addition. A Reality underlying the worlds must be unstructured and neutral, and thus serves no purpose. If there are many equally satisfactory versions of the world that are mutually incompatible, then there is not very much left that the “neutral Reality” could be. Reality would have no planets, no motion, no spacetime, no relations, no points, no structure at all. One can assume there is such a thing, Goodman seems to admit, but only because Reality is really not worth fighting for (or fighting against, for that matter). If we can tell true from false versions and explain why some are true versions and others false versions of worlds without assuming anything like an underlying reality, why assume it then? Parsimony considerations should lead us to refrain from postulating it.