 Not all actions are the result of explicit deliberation. There are various ways reasons for action might be at work in action, ways that might involve, say, views about the constituents of an end or views about what conduces to an end. Moral agents inherit a set of views that come to govern their actions without further deliberation. A reflective moral agent strives toward confirming for herself these inherited judgments, beliefs, and emotional attitudes regarding moral goods and moral actions, and on this basis, she adopts, rejects, or revises them. They thereby take on the character not merely of passively accepted moral beliefs but of justified moral convictions, and the agent realizes herself as a person having a particular set of convictions for which the appropriate evidence has been secured and which now defines her character. These convictions inform her subsequent judgments, valuations, and volitions, disposing her to act in determinate ways. Having over time already reflectively weighed the value of competing goods and the rightness or wrongness of various kinds of actions, a reflective agent, just as much as the agent who passively accepts beliefs, need not form a means-end argument or explicitly deliberate concurrently, but her awareness of her beliefs and actions as justified differs from that of the passively accepting agent.