 The Counterpossibles Question: Some philosophers question Williamson’s purported logical equivalence between counterfactual statements and modal statements (Berto, French, Priest, &amp; Ripley 2018; Jago 2021). Particularly, in order for  (NEC)  to hold, one has to accept that all counterpossibles (namely counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true. But this is controversial. Many have given arguments defending false counterpossibles based on modal semantics that include impossible worlds (e.g., Berto et al. 2018; Brogaard &amp; Salerno 2013; Jago 2013; Nolan 1997; Restall 1997). Questioning the truth of Williamson’s logical equivalences might constitute a challenge for the overall theory of modal knowledge, since, as we saw, (Epistemic Pathway) is partly based on (Logical Equivalence).