 Scotus famously attempted to explain the contingency of God’s eternal choice by distinguishing between the instants of nature in God’s mind that represent conceptual succession without separation or interval, for example, the instant of encountering opposite alternatives and the instant of choosing one of these. Future contingent propositions founded on God’s eternal choice are determinately true or false in such a way that they could be otherwise, independently of whether they are known or not to humans (Ordinatio I.38.2, 426) These ideas are not found in Scotus’s early questions on Aristotle’s De interpretatione that mostly follow Boethius’s views on future contingents, adding some more elaborated analyses of the structure of future-tense propositions: they may signify that it is true now that something will be or signify that something will be (Opus 2.1.7–9). See the translations and commentary in Buckner and Zupko 2014. 