 These problems are not the only problems that Śrīharṣa raises for various definitions of knowledge, but they are useful insofar as they give us a clear understanding of what he takes to be an adequate definition of knowledge. He seems to think that a definition of knowledge should give us a unified decision procedure which will allow us to correctly predict whether any particular awareness-episode is an instance of knowledge without appealing back to the notion of knowledge itself. Moreover, insofar as he appeals to our intuitions about cases, he also seems to assume that this decision procedure should respect (to some extent) our ordinary concept of knowledge. But one might respond to Śrīharṣa by pointing out that this approach only makes sense if we assume that the concept of knowledge is analyzable in terms of more basic concepts that do not refer back to knowledge. What if we deny this assumption and claim, with writers like Williamson (2000), that the ordinary concept of knowledge is unanalyzable in that manner?