 Another response to the purported threat of dwindling probabilities is suggested by Menssen and Sullivan (2007). They defend a basically Swinburnian inferential project, but criticize Swinburne for being insufficiently holistic, in a sense to be explained below (2007: 55–56). With respect to the argument about dwindling probabilities, they acknowledge that a complex proposition cannot have a greater probability than any of its constituent claims. However, they argue that in certain cases, the complex proposition “could still be more believable” (2007: 61). For example, the claim that “there is a heavenly body beyond Uranus that is perturbing its orbit” is more complex than the weaker claim that “there is a heavenly body beyond Uranus”. Nevertheless, scientists did not first attempt to prove the weaker claim, and then went on to prove the stronger (more complex) claim. Instead, they established the truth of the weaker claim by establishing the truth of the stronger.