 These traditions sometimes share common features, sometimes challenge features of other traditions, sometimes try to make links with other traditions. Thus, traditions 1 and 3 share an epistemic and proof-theoretical background. Traditions 2 and 3 challenge the dialogical conception of logic of tradition 1 in order to bring about a framework in which meaning is not reduced to a formal approach, but is understood as setting out content. Recent works claim to answer this kind of challenge while still staying within tradition 1 (see  Section 3.2).  Other recent efforts have tried to link traditions 1 and 3: Prakken (2005), for example, focuses on logical analysis in the context of legal reasoning and non-monotonic reasoning; more recent and quite different perspectives explore substructural approaches to paradoxes in terms of natural argumentation and its treatment in a game-theoretical setting inspired by tradition 1 (French 2015; Dutilh Novaes &amp; French 2018; Dutilh Novaes 2020). The present entry focuses on the original work of Lorenzen and Lorenz (tradition 1) with its developments during the last decades. Historical remarks on the relations between logic and dialogues can be found in  the entry on logic and games,  and in Lorenz (2001).