A problem for negative coherentism (and hence for simple foundationalism) is that a belief that is unjustified when formed will become justified simply in virtue of being stored in memory.  Suppose that I come to believe, unreliably and for no reason at all, that President Kennedy loved green tea.  My belief is unjustified when I form it.  But when I come to have it and it becomes a memory belief, the conditions of its justification are now wholly different.  As long as I have no defeaters for my memory belief, the negative coherentist tells us, it is justified.  So the next day, when I believe that Kennedy loved green tea, my belief will be justified (since I possess no defeater for it).  And while it isn't quite as acute, the problem exists also for the other versions of foundationalism and coherentism. Take experiential foundationalism first; suppose it seems to me that I remember reading that Kennedy loved green tea but that in fact I've never read any such thing and that any historical belief I possess comes with a strong conviction (a “memory seeming”) that I acquired the belief by reading it in a very reputable publication. Then again, my forming the belief unjustifiably together with my epistemic vice of always believing that my history beliefs come from “very reputable” sources together turn an unjustified belief into a justified one. But this seems to be the epistemic equivalent of two wrongs making a right.  Notice that the same kind of case will show a similar difficulty for positive coherentism.  For a person who thinks his every history belief comes from a very reputable source and who believes that he has a given history belief, will have a system with which his belief that Kennedy loved green tea coheres. 