But, the view considered here naturally suggests a new strategy:  presenting a Transparency Account according to which the normativity of  instrumental coherence is merely apparent (Kolodny 2005, §5). According to the Transparency Account of rational requirements in  general, when we point out to people that rationality requires something  of them, we aren’t presenting them with some requirement of reason;  rather, we’re pointing out to them what they already think reason  requires of them.  And, so, when we point out to someone that  rationality requires they be instrumentally coherent with respect to  some end, we’re pointing out to them that (on the assumption that  Self-Monitoring is satisfied) they already think that reason requires  some specific change in their attitudes.  Of course, the instrumentally  incoherent agent could be mistaken in these thoughts; perhaps he thinks  reason requires him to intend the means when reason actually requires  that he abandon the end instead.  It is this possibility for false  belief that restricts us to saying that the normativity of rational  requirements is merely apparent.  