 According to cultural internationalists, each particular culture contributes to an overarching human culture, and thus everyone has an interest in cultural property (Merryman 1986; this view is often labeled “cosmopolitan” as well (Appiah 2006)). Proponents of cultural internationalism typically uses claims about the universal value of cultural heritage to argue against nationalist restrictions on its export and sale, as well as against many repatriation claims (discussed further in  section 3;  Merryman 1986, 1994; Appiah 2006). This position finds support in various aspects of international law and policy, including the Hague Convention of 1954 (Merryman 1986) and the criterion of “outstanding universal value” in the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention (Cleere 1996; Omland 2006). These claims about the universal evaluative scope of cultural property are often predicated on a metaphysical claim about the constitutive relationship between particular cultures and Human Culture: that it is precisely because each culture is a component of Human Culture that each individual culture therefore has a universal value in which everyone has a reasonable interest. However, even independently of the strength of this claim, one might think that individual cultures can secure a universal value in other ways. For instance, according to one line of argument, there are a diversity of grounds for valuing a particular culture (such as ancestry, citizenship, geography, study, etc.) such that most everyone could have a reasonable interest in a particular culture (Matthes 2015).