 Not surprisingly, many philosophers have questioned Chomsky’s position. The ensuing debate has helped to sharpen the crucial arguments and the extent to which nativist models should continue to command their central place in linguistic theory. (On the empiricist side, see Cowie 1999, Prinz 2002, and Sampson 2005; on the nativist side, see Laurence &amp; Margolis 2001 and Pietroski &amp; Crain 2012; see also the entry  innateness and language  and the entry  philosophy of linguistics).  For instance, one of Fiona Cowie’s criticisms of Chomsky’s poverty of the stimulus argument is that any induction establishes a conclusion that outstrips the available data; hence, going beyond the data in the case of language acquisition doesn’t argue for innate language-specific dispositions—or else there would have to be a specific innate disposition for every induction we make (for an earlier version of this argument, see Putnam 1967, Goodman 1969). Both Laurence &amp; Margolis (2001) and Crain &amp; Pietroski (2001) respond by teasing out the various ways in which the problem of language acquisition goes beyond general problems about induction.