 Śrīharṣa opens his defense of reflexivism with the following argument (KKh 41–42). Whenever a person undergoes a conscious mental occurrence, she neither doubts whether she is undergoing that mental occurrence, nor does she mistake that mental occurrence for a different one, nor does she become sure of its absence. So, the agent must have a veridical awareness that the relevant mental occurrence exists. Now, suppose conscious mental occurrences don’t constitute an awareness of themselves. Hence, an agent can only become awareness of such conscious mental occurrences by some other means, e.g., on the basis of some episode of higher-order awareness. If this were the case, then it would be possible for the first-order conscious mental occurrence to be present without there being any higher-order awareness of it. But then the agent could doubt or be mistaken about whether she is undergoing the relevant conscious mental occurrence. In order to block this conclusion, therefore, we must accept the conclusion that conscious mental occurrences constitute a veridical awareness of their own existence. An agent needs nothing further in order to know that such occurrences are ultimately real.