 This is not to say that these causal attributions, much less prudential judgments, are morally irrelevant: to the extent that social causation of disability disadvantage makes social institutions morally responsible for the limitations disabled people face, it may be unfair and disrespectful for society to ask disabled people to change themselves rather than changing itself to be more inclusive (Aas 2020). Moreover, “correcting” disability may (as the affirmational model reminds) us involve destroying valuable forms of life and reducing the vibrant diversity of human embodiment; or it may not do not enough to counterbalance the benefits of uniformity (Garland-Thomson 2012). Contra the sense that the social, medical, and affirmational models each come bundled with obvious policy consequences, it seems clear on reflection that there is much yet to do to understand just what these different explanations of disability imply as to how we should respond to it.