 A consequentialist adopting this strategy also presumably needs to show that human agents are capable of living up to the kinds of demands placed on us by consequentialism (or else to argue that it does not matter whether or not we are capable). As James Griffin writes, our “natural perhaps genetic partiality limits our will. Some acts fall just outside the motivational range of a normal human being. Since ought implies can, what lies outside natural human motivation does not even enter contention for being a moral requirement. Norms are not fashioned in a vacuum; they are cut to fit agents like us” (Griffin 1990, 129). While Kagan (1989) argues on behalf of consequentialists that available empirical evidence supports the view that humans, given sufficient information and vivid representations, can be brought to overcome their inherent tendencies to be partial, Griffin regards the evidence as insufficient, concluding that “complete impartiality is beyond human capacity” (Griffin 1996, 92).