 Causation is typically understood to have a temporal dimension. First there is event C and this event C subsequently leads to event E. Thus, when the ADT is sometimes referred to as the “Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory,” the term “causal” might suggest a diachronic picture in which there is, first, an X-“X” law which subsequently gives rise to the various Y-“X” laws. Such a diachronic interpretation, however, would lead to counterexamples for the ADT approach. Fodor (1987) discusses this possibility. Consider Pavlovian conditioning. Food causes salivation in a dog. Then a bell causes salivation in the dog. It is likely that the bell causes salivation only because the food causes it. Yet, salivation hardly means food. It may well naturally mean that food is present, but salivation is not a thought or thought content and it is not ripe for false semantic tokening. Or take a more exotic kind of case. Suppose that one comes to apply “X” to dogs, but only by means of observations of foxes. This would be a weird case of “learning”, but if things were to go this way, one would not want “X” to mean fox. To block this kind of objection, the theory maintains the dependency between the fundamental X-“X” law and the non-fundamental Y-“X” laws is synchronic. The dependency is such that if one were to break the X-“X” law at time t, then one would thereby instantaneously break all the Y-“X” laws at that time.