 Toward the end of his discussion of the natural law’s main principle, Pufendorf joins Hobbes in subsuming international (ius gentium) under natural law (DJN II.3.23) – which is critical for understanding both – and makes some distinctions that shape the rest of the work (Reibstein 1955, Seidler 2015). Like Grotius, he contrasts “matters which the natural law disposes by direct precept or prohibition from those that reason has persuaded men to institute on account of sociality, or that may be undertaken by virtue of a license flowing directly from these institutions – in which case they are said to have a reductive relation to the natural law” (DJN II.3.22; Pufendorf 1994a, p. 156; emphasis added). More formatively, he divides the law’s injunctions – loosely reflecting the divisions of the natural state – into those toward God (adversus Deum), toward ourselves (adversus seipsum), and toward other humans (adversus alios homines). The first category is treated separately in the pedagogically oriented DO (I.4), written while Pufendorf was fighting charges of atheism in Lund. However, DJN (II.4.3–4, III.4.4) folds it into the second group, particularly the law’s (i.e., God’s) command that we cultivate our minds by developing appropriate beliefs about God through careful consideration of the supposedly convincing arguments of natural theology – a strategy that recalls the difficulties noted above. The third category’s precepts regarding other humans are divided into absolute and hypothetical injunctions, the former obligating all men and women as such, whatever their status, and the latter – as in the direct/reductive distinction above – presupposing certain states or institutions introduced by them (DJN II.3.24). Hypothetical injunctions are also distinguished from positive civil laws that may appeal to them for justification, even if based on particular states’ advantage or specific legislators’ volitions. The three most important human institutions governed by hypothetical laws of nature are speech, dominion over things (property) and price (the valuation of things), and human sovereignty (including the civil state) – the subjects of DJN IV–V and VI–VIII. Book II concludes with three more chapters treating the various duties toward ourselves (II.4), the right and limits of self-defense (II.5), and the right of necessity (II.6).