 Model complexity can also be seen in the external plurality of models (thesis #2). Not all models are mathematical, or even ideally recast as mathematical. Non-formalized (i.e., non–state-space, non-set-/model-theoretic) models such as physical, diagrammatic, material, historical, “remnant,” and fictional models are ubiquitous across the sciences (e.g., Frigg and Hartmann 2012; for the biological sciences, see Hull 1975; Beatty 1980; Griesemer 1990, 1991 a, b, 2013; Downes 1992; Richards 1992; Winther 2006a; Leonelli 2008; Weisberg 2013). Moreover, computer simulations differ in important respects from more standard analytical mathematical models (e.g., Smith 1996; Winsberg 2010; Weisberg 2013). According to some (e.g., Griesemer 2013; Downes 1992; Godfrey-Smith 2006; Thomson-Jones 2012), this diversity belies claims by semanticists that models can always be cast “into set theoretic terms” (Lloyd 2013 In Press), are “always a mathematical structure” (van Fraassen 1970, 327), or that “formalisation of a theory is an abstract representation of the theory expressed in a formal deductive framework… in first-order predicate logic with identity, in set theory, in matrix algebra and indeed, any branch of mathematics...” (Thompson 2007, 485–6). Even so, internal pluralism has been interpreted as supporting a “deflationary semantic view,” which is minimally committed to the perspective that “model construction is an important part of scientific theorizing” (Downes 1992, 151). Given the formal and mathematical framework of the Semantic View (see above), however, the broad plurality of kinds of models seems to properly belong under a Pragmatic View of Models.