  (3) A third option takes as its basic minimal idea that the index modifies the whole event: \((a\)’s being red) holds at \(t\). A variant is to take the index as modifying the exemplification ‘relation’: \(a\) exemplifies-at-\(t\) redness. Versions of this position were urged by several contributors: Johnston (1987), Lowe (1987), (1988), Haslanger (1989). However, the problem for adverbial-style analyses anywhere is to provide enough semantics, enough logical structure for the event, to account for the logical implications of the sentences under analysis, as Davidson (1967) pointed out. So for example one has things like: \((((Fa)\) at \(t) \amp a=b)\) implies \(((Fb)\) at \(t)\); or \((((Fa)\) at \(t_{1}) \amp((Ga)\) at \(t_{2}) \amp(F\) is incompatible with \(G))\) implies not \(t_{1}=t_{2}\); or \((((Fa)\) at \(t) \amp((Gb)\) at \(t) \amp(F\) is incompatible with \(G))\) implies not \(a=b\). One thus cannot rest with a minimalist position. At least Lewis’ has the merit of providing a viable semantics, a direct parallel with counterpart theory in modal semantics. Of course, the basic ontology of Lewis’ favoured position was Dharmakirti’s though Lewis did not note that fact. More to the point, Dharmakirti’s strategy did not depend on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. The problem of contradictory attributions occurs even if the attributions are extrinsic, and Dharmakirti’s argument is a straightforward application of Leibniz’ law to things-at-a-time. If time-slices are admitted at all, and it is hard not to do so if they are sanctioned by relativity theory, then Dharmakirti’s argument goes through. 