 Yet, if Lewis were simply to drop the analytic entailment claim that gives probabilistically qualified sensory conditionals like \((S \amp A) \rightarrow(h)E\) a privileged semantic role, and rest content with the various consistent probability statements relating \(E\) to \(P\), \(S\), \(A\), and \(M\), the character of his empiricism would become puzzling. If the consistent relative probability statements in question are the probabilistically qualified subjunctive conditionals, \(“(P \amp S \amp A \rightarrow(h)E”\) and \(“(P \amp S \amp A \amp M) \rightarrow \text{not}(h)E)”,\) then the statements in question are empirical propositions justified by induction. The justification for them thus will presuppose prior knowledge of the truth of material object statements like \(P\) and \(M\), perhaps in the way Chisholm suggests, rather than explain why and how we can know such propositions solely on the basis of present and past experience of the given. On the other hand, if the relative probability statements are a priori analytic statements in their own right, then it is the total set of such statements that will constitute the empirical meaning of \(P\), statements like