  Now once we have Locke's relational account of identity in hand, we  can see what implications it will have for various normative issues.  Start with prudential rationality. On Locke's view, I am  appropriately concerned, both for the past stage of myself to whom my consciousness extends, but also to some future person – me  – to whom my consciousness will extend. This is the mechanism  by which I would be justified, for example, in anticipating the  afterlife, just in case at the resurrection there will be  someone to whom my present consciousness extends.  This person  would be me even though he might have a very different body than I  have now (Ibid., 44). It should be unimportant to me, on this view, what substance (body or soul) I find my consciousness  – myself – attached to. If, for example, my little finger were cut off and my consciousness adhered to it, “that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making part of itself, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its  own now” (Ibid., 46).