 Now consider \(P_3\), which is directly caused by \(P_2\) and which we will assume to cause (directly or indirectly) further behavior such as \(S\)’s utterance of “I am in terrible pain”. \(P_3\) is not directly caused by \(M\). Does it convey knowledge of \(M\)? If we answer negatively, on the ground that \(P_3\) is not directly caused by \(M\), we will be rejecting interactionism for virtually the same reason that epiphenomenalism is thought to be unacceptable. Since this is an extremely implausible stance, let us take it that \(P_3\) does convey knowledge of \(M\). But what property does \(P_3\) actually have that makes it a case of conveying knowledge of \(M\)? Epiphenomenalists will wish to point out that \(P_3\) does not have any property that contains information as to how it was caused. Looking backward from \(P_3\), so to speak, one cannot tell whether it was indirectly caused by \(M\) (as in the interactionistic Figure 2) or indirectly caused by \(M\)’s cause (as in the epiphenomenalistic Figure 1). There is, however, a property that \(P_3\) does have that is intuitively strongly connected to its conveying knowledge of \(M\) — namely, that it would not be occurring unless \(M\) had recently occurred. But \(P_3\) has this property on epiphenomenalist and interactionist views alike. Thus, if not occurring unless \(M\) has recently occurred is the property that is responsible for \(P_3\)’s conveying knowledge of \(M\), epiphenomenalists have as much right as anyone to claim that \(P_3\) conveys knowledge of \(M\), and they are not debarred from knowing what they claim to know.