 If God possesses will, then He must also possess wisdom, since deliberation and choosing assume knowledge of the thing that is willed. That is to say, the God-world relationship is based on will and wisdom. In discussing the nature of divine knowledge, Albalag displays an obsession with divine perfection. Thus, he differentiates between divine and human knowledge on the basis of type rather than rank, removing any ground for comparing them or inferring premises about God’s mode of apprehension and knowledge from the characteristics of human knowledge and cognition. This idea of the distinctiveness of divine knowledge, and, indeed all divine attributes, is best expressed in terms of Maimonides’ theory of equivocation. According to Maimonides, terms such as wisdom, power and will are predicated of God and creatures only equivocally. When predicated of God and other creatures, these terms are semantically dissimilar, sharing only the names rather than meaning (Guide I:56; cf. Tiqqun n.23: 24). Epistemologically speaking, moreover, they are not informative; constituting an artificial language, which we predicate of God owing to our inability to fathom and signify the corresponding characteristics in Him (Benor 1995; Stern 2013: 198–204).