 More recently, Hartry Field (1980 and 1989), Joseph Melia (e.g. 2000), Mark Balaguer (e.g. 1998) and Stephen Yablo (see especially 2000a, 2000b, 2001 and 2002) have defended fictionalism about mathematical discourse (see here the entry on  fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematics);  Bas van Fraassen (1980) has defended a version of fictionalism about scientific theories; Richard Joyce (2001, 2005), Mark Kalderon (2005a) and Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline West (2005) have defended moral fictionalism; Kendall Walton (1985, 1990 , 2000), Mark Crimmins (1998), Stuart Brock (2002), Mark Balaguer (1998a), Anthony Everett (2005), and Frederick Kroon (2000, 2004) have defended fictionalism about things like negative existentials, identity statements, propositional attitude reports, and fictional characters; Peter van Inwagen (1990) and Cian Dorr and Gideon Rosen (2002) have defended fictionalism about ordinary object discourse; Bradley Armour-Garb and James Woodbridge (2015) and Alexis Burgess and John Burgess (2011) have defended fictionalism about truth; and D.M. Armstrong (1989), Gideon Rosen (1990), John Nolt (1986), Seahwa Kim (2005) and John Divers (1999) have defended modal fictionalism (see here the entry on  modal fictionalism).  Needless to say, this is a just a sample of recent defenses of fictionalist views. The present entry will be more focused on fictionalism as a general strategy in philosophy than on fictionalism about specific discourses. For some recent overviews of fictionalism, see Kroon (2011), Caddick Bourne (2013), Divers and Liggins (2005), Sainsbury (2010), and the full-length book on fictionalism Kroon, McKeown-Green and Brock (2018). Important collections of texts on fictionalism are Kalderon (2005b) and Armour-Garb and Kroon (forthcoming). 