 It must be noted, though, that such a World-Stuff view is similar to some interpretations of elementary particle physics and quantum theory. Some scientists and philosophers of science do in fact argue that at bottom the world is not a world of things or objects (or not entities we would unqualifiedly apply ‘object’ to). Rather, the basic stuff is non-particular  mass-energy,  or evolving local quantum states (Arntzenius 2012 §3.14), or fields, wave-functions, or spacetime itself (Malament 1996, Wallace and Timpson 2007), or structures (Ladyman and Ross 2009), or a kind of physics-friendly materia prima (Esfeld et al 2017). Some argue that the only real entity is the space-time fabric, ordinary objects just being temporary warpings or disturbances in it. On such views both ordinary macroscopic objects and putative fundamental particles are only epiphenomenal entities or temporary manifestations in the electromagnetic or gravitational fields (or other entities), which are fundamentally non-individual—some kind of world stuff or spacetime and its features (for details, see the entry  identity and individuality in quantum theory).  So, one should not rule out such views tout court. But, given the flux and opacity of such views, the untestability of some of the theories which underly some of these views (e.g. String Theory), and the lack of scientific consensus on these issues, one should not quickly and whole-heartedly embrace the notion of fundamental non-particular stuff either. These views merit further examination, but their adequate demonstration in part rests upon succesful advancements in physics and, for a layperson, a clear understanding of these interpretations, each of which may not come anytime soon.