 There is thus a grammatical appearance that X exists or is a being (“X mawjûd”) through an accident of existence or beingness which inheres in X, or an act of finding X; and Fârâbî thinks that this appearance gives rise to serious metaphysical errors. His account of the logical syntax of being in the Book of Letters is designed to expose and root out these errors. In particular, it will function as a critique of anyone who wants to understand God as something like a Platonic form of being, so that other things would exist by participating in this form. (Averroes, later, will adapt Fârâbî’s account of the logical syntax of being to give a criticism of Avicenna’s distinction between essence and existence, see Menn 2011.) But Fârâbî also wants to give the ontological foundations for a positive metaphysical account of God, which he thinks Aristotle was aiming at in Metaphysics XII and which he will try to reconstruct in his Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Perfect City and his Political Regime (see  Section 4  below).