 Now if we compare the two diagrams representing the respective conceptions of the two viae, we can see just how radically Ockham’s innovations changed the character of the semantic relations connecting terms, concepts and things. In both viae, common terms are subordinated to common concepts, and it is in virtue of this subordination that they ultimately signify what their concepts represent. In the via moderna, a concept is just an act of the mind representing singulars in a more or less indifferent manner, yielding a more or less universal signification for the term. In the via antiqua, however, the act of the mind is just one item in a whole series of intermediary representations, distinguished in terms of their different functions in processing universal information, and connected by their common content, ultimately representing the common, yet individualized natures of their  singulars.[52]  Accordingly, a common term, expressing this common content, is primarily subordinated to the objective concept of the mind. But of course, this objective concept is only the common content of the singular representative acts of singular minds, their subjective concepts, formed by means of the intelligible species, abstracted by their active intellects. On the other hand, the objective concept, abstracting from all individuating conditions, expresses only what is common to all singulars, namely, their nature considered absolutely. But this absolutely considered nature is only the common content of what informs each singular of the same nature in its actual real existence. So, the term’s ultimate significata will have to be the individualized natures of the singulars. But these ultimate significata may still not be the singulars themselves, namely, when the things informed by these significata are not metaphysically simple. In the via moderna conception, therefore, the ultimate significata of a term are nothing but those singular things that can be the term’s supposita in various propositions, as a matter of semantics. By contrast, in the via antiqua conception, a term’s ultimate significata may or may not be the same things as the term’s (personal) supposita, depending on the constitution of these supposita, as a matter of metaphysics. The singulars will be the supposita of the term when it is used as the subject term of a proposition in which something is predicated about the things informed by these ultimate significata (in the case of metaphysically simple entities, the term’s significata and supposita  coincide).[53]