 The second type of apparent modal truth, however, is more challenging. Julius Caesar could have had a sixth right finger which was never burnt but which could have been burnt. This involves a nested possibility, which is troublesome to actualist representationism (McMichael 1983). To reveal the nesting clearly, let us articulate the possibility in question in a more pedantic and rigorous way. The following is possible: Julius Caesar had a sixth right finger such that (a) it was never burnt, and (b) the following is possible: it was burnt. The trouble for actualist representationism is that there is no obvious way to make sense of the pronoun ‘it’ in (b). The possibility of Julius Caesar having had a sixth right finger which was never burnt is, as before, easily representable by, say, the sentence, ‘Julius Caesar had a sixth right finger which was never burnt’. This means that the pronoun ‘it’ in (a) is unproblematic; it is replaceable by ‘Julius Caesar’s sixth right finger’. How about the pronoun ‘it’ in (b)? It should designate the sixth right finger Julius Caesar is said to have had within the scope of the first possibility operator. It should therefore be bound by the appropriate existential quantifier, just like the pronoun ‘it’ in (a). But unlike the pronoun ‘it’ in (a), the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) occurs separated from the quantifier by the intervening second possibility operator, ‘the following is possible’. This “quantifying in” from outside the possibility operator forces the sentence representing the possibility specified in (b) to retain the pronoun ‘it’: ‘it was burnt’. Thus, unlike the pronoun ‘it’ in (a), the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) is not eliminable in the representation of the possibility in question. But no part of the representation that is the possible world in question, or any other possible world, may serve as the object which the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) designates, as the pronoun needs to designate something that is said to be a human finger but no part of any such representation is said to be a human finger. Notice that Lewis has no corresponding difficulty here. On his theory, the modal statement in question is true if and only if at some possible world there is a counterpart of Julius Caesar who had a sixth right finger f such that f was never burnt and at some possible world there is a counterpart of f which was burnt. Julius Caesar, his counterpart, and the counterpart’s sixth finger f are all real objects, and the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) designates f. (Note that the pronoun ‘it’ in (b) does not designate the counterpart of f any more than ‘it’ in (a) does.)