 As already noted, Swain’s theory is intended to avoid Lehrer’s objection regarding superstitious-lawyer style counterexamples. The complicated line of reasoning is not a cause or causal overdeterminant of the lawyer’s belief that his client is innocent because the lawyer’s strong desire to believe that his client is guilty of the eighth murder prevents the complicated line of reasoning from causing the belief that his client is innocent. The degree of conviction the lawyer has in the complicated line of reasoning is sufficient for the lawyer to believe the complicated line of reasoning (once his strong desire to believe that his client is guilty is overridden by his strong faith (or rational belief, as the case may be) in the cards), but alone is not sufficient to override his strong desire to believe that his client is innocent. Swain argues that (DB) avoids Lehrer’s objection because the complicated line of reasoning pseudo-overdetermines the lawyer’s belief that his client is innocent (Swain 1981, p. 74 and pp. 86–87). We can see how this is to work by examining condition (2)(b) of (DPO). Suppose that the actual cause of his belief that his client is innocent (di) (namely, the lawyer’s belief about the result of the card reading) had not occurred, and that both the complicated line of reasoning (c) and the belief that his client is innocent (e) had occurred anyway. On this supposition, the lawyer’s strong desire to believe that his client is guilty of all eight crimes could not have occurred, because if it had it would have prevented the lawyer from believing that his client is innocent. Since the lawyer’s strong desire is the only thing that prevents the complicated line of reasoning from causing the lawyer’s belief that his client is innocent, the complicated line of reasoning would then have caused the lawyer to believe that his client is innocent. Thus, the complicated line of reasoning pseudo-overdetermines the lawyer’s belief that his client is innocent, and hence, on (DB), the lawyer’s belief is based on the complicated line of reasoning in Lehrer’s original example. So on Swain’s theory, the lawyer’s belief is based on the complicated line of reasoning, in accordance with Lehrer’s intuitions about the case. Contrary to Lehrer, however, Swain argues that there is a counterfactual causal connection between the reasoning and the lawyer’s belief that his client is innocent, thus providing a theory of the basing relation consistent with the intuition that the basing relation is best analyzed in terms of a reason’s causing a belief.