  At points it looks as though Hinton thinks that an extra commitment incurred by the common element theorist is an epistemic one. For example, Hinton considers the following objection that might be raised against his disjunctive approach: “If A-ing [i.e., seeing an O] and B-ing [i.e., having that illusion] did not have a worn-on-the-sleeve property in common, how could you take one for the other?” To which Hinton’s reply is, “Why should it just not seem that they had properties in common? Seeing a flash of light and having the illusion seem, but only seem, to have in common the property ‘when x occurs a flash of light occurs’” (1967, 225).  The implication here seems to be that Hinton is taking his opponent to be making a substantive epistemic assumption—that our inability to discern through introspection any differences between a hallucination and a perception must ultimately be explained by our positive ability to discern through introspection that they are events of the same kind. (For a critique of this assumption, see also Putman 1999).