 In his response to the fatalist argument, Epicurus largely follows Aristotle (at least as Aristotle is commonly interpreted). He agrees with Aristotle that some things happen of necessity, and some by chance, while others depend on us (Ep. Men. 133, NE 3.3 1112a30–32). And he also thinks that, if the Principle of Bivalence applied to all statements, everything would be necessary, and so he rejects it, saying that statements like “Philoctetes will be wounded” are neither true nor false before Philoctetes is wounded or not (Fat. 37, LS 20H). Unlike Aristotle (Int. 9 19a30–33), Epicurus rejects not only PB, but also the Law of Excluded Middle—the principle that every statement of the form “p or not-p” is necessarily true. So Aristotle thinks that the statement “either there will be a sea battle tomorrow, or there will not be” is true, while Epicurus does not. Rejecting the Law of Excluded Middle might seem strange—after all, doesn’t p or not-p exhaust all of logical space? But Epicurus apparently thinks that for the disjunction as a whole to be true, one of its disjuncts would have to be true, and he does not want to admit this, because then (per the fatalist argument) that disjunct would also be necessary (Cicero, Academica 2.97, LS 20I).