  The intuitive interpretation here is that two people faced with an item of value 2 must decide whether to fight for it (Hawk) or share it (Dove). If both play Dove, then they split it. If one plays Hawk and the other Dove, then the Hawk gets the entire good. If they both play Hawk, then they again split it, but its value is reduced by half to reflect the cost of fighting. This game has no coordination equilibrium. However, consider the following strategy for recurring instances of the game: “If you are already in possession of the relevant item, then play Hawk; otherwise, play Dove.” It is an equilibrium for both players to play this strategy. (More technically, following Skyrms (1996), we might regard this strategy combination as a correlated equilibrium.) Sugden argues that such an equilibrium might emerge as a convention among agents who repeatedly play Hawk-Dove. But the equilibrium is not a convention according to Lewis’s definition. If I play my end of it, I do not prefer that other people do likewise. I prefer that others play Dove. Thus, the equilibrium lacks one of the main characteristics emphasized by Lewis: a preference for general conformity over slight-less-than-general conformity.