 A final important question concerns how considerations about the nature of time ought to impact the ways that we reason about time. For example, if it turns out that a B-theory is true, and there is no metaphysically important difference between the past and future, then should we adopt a more neutral attitude about events in our personal past and future? Epicurean philosopher Lucretius famously suggested that if there is no substantive difference between the times in the past before we came to exist and the times in the future after we die, we should care much less about the deprivation that death will bring. But we may think that even if the B-theory can describe everything that is metaphysically important without positing an important difference between the past and future, there is still an indispensable psychological importance to the past/future distinction that rational agents honor. Still other A-theorists argue that while there is an important metaphysical distinction between the past and future, the distinction has no normative importance.