  A curious feature of recent discussions is that Hume’s critique of reported miracles has itself come under heavy fire and is now viewed in some quarters as requiring defense. For a range of views on the matter, see Levine (1989: 152 ff), who maintains that Part 1 contains an argument but that the argument is a failure, Johnson (1999), who argues that Part 1 is confused and unclear and that various attempts to clarify it have failed to elicit a compelling line of argument, Earman (2000), who argues that Part 1 is an “abject failure,” Fogelin (2003), who aims to rehabilitate Hume against the critiques of Johnson and Earman in particular, and Millican (2013), who argues vigorously that the interpretation of Hume’s argument offered in Earman (2000) is flawed in multiple ways. Millican (2011) offers a sympathetic reconstruction of Hume’s critique in the wider context of Hume’s other metaphysical and epistemological work.