 For Lotze, the paradox has an immediate upshot: that the ‘is’ of predication be expunged from logic. Grammatical appearances notwithstanding, the basic form an assertion takes is that of an identity statement or of its negation. This, however, renders him incapable of making sense of (what Jones called) “significant assertion”. The content of an assertion, if it is not to be an absurdity (A is not A), must be a triviality (A is A). (Lotze vaguely hints at a pragmatic account of the apparent significance of what he counts as trivialities, remarking that, perhaps, “what we mean by them will eventually justify itself.”) As we shall see, Jones does not depart from Lotze’s austere conception of logical form: an affirmative proposition S is P states an identity, and is true just in case the extension of S = the extension of P. However, she is able to graft a notion of intensional content onto Lotze’s logical skeleton, thus avoiding his paradoxical conclusion that, despite appearances, all positive assertion is analyzed in terms of A is not A.