 Whether one finds the argument from inductive risk persuasive, it is clear that ethical and sociopolitical values are brought into the science itself by various scientists (see entry on  scientific objectivity).  Conservation biologists such as Paul Ehrlich, E. O. Wilson, Thomas Lovejoy, etc. often advocated ethical values as scientists in order to raise awareness regarding ecological degradation and its effects on species including our own (Takacs 1996). Supposing that there are epistemic and moral values in conservation biology, what are the specific ones present? One way to taxonomize those values is through Helen Longino’s work (Longino 1990) (see entry on  feminist epistemology and philosophy of science).  She draws a distinction between constitutive and contextual values in science. Constitutive values are those that are essential to the scientific inquiry. For example, if Kuhn is correct that accuracy, simplicity, and scope are values and they are essential to scientific methodology, then these would be constitutive values. You simply cannot do science without them. Contextual values are those that are accidental to science; they come from the personal, social, and cultural context in which science occurs. It worth noting the epistemic/non-epistemic values distinction is related to but distinct from the constitutive/contextual value distinction. For example, one might argue honesty is a constitutive ethical value of scientific inquiry (Pennock 2019). Likewise, one might argue that certain scientists have differing contextual epistemic commitments (Segerstråle 2000). 