 An important difference between Moore and Moore* is this: whereas the logical negation of Q8 does not explain the evidential statement E8 (“My experience is in all respects as of a hand held up in front of my face”) adduced in support of P8, the logical negation of Q8* — i.e., Not-Q8* — explains E8 to some extent. Accordingly, since Not-Q8* provides a potential explanation of E8, is it intuitive that E8 is evidence (perhaps very week evidence) for believing Not-Q8*. It is easy to conclude from this that s cannot acquire justification for believing Q8* via transmission through Moore* upon learning E8. For it is intuitive that if this were the case, E8 should count as evidence for Q8*. But this is impossible: one and the same proposition cannot simultaneously be evidence for a hypothesis and its logical negation. By formalizing intuitions of this type, White (2006) has put forward a simple Bayesian argument to the effect that Moore* and similar variants of Moore are not transmissive of  justification.[14]  (See Silins 2007 for discussion. For responses to White, see for instance Weatherson 2007, Kung 2010 and Moretti 2015). 