 Aristotle’s teleological worldview seems to give way, in Theophrastus’ Metaphysics, to a conception of the universe as an organism, according to which the cosmos is a single, complete and coherent entity compared to a living creature. The key Theophrastean term for the relationship between intelligibles and sensibles is “connection” (sunaphē), which is to be understood as a particular kinship characteristic of entities that are inseparable parts of a continuous whole, bound by some “partnership” (koinōnia) of a hierarchical but also reciprocal nature. Hence, by claiming that the universe is a single system subject to one set of laws, Theophrastus questioned Aristotle’s division between the sublunary and the celestial spheres as well as Plato’s tendencies towards dualism. Most importantly, since his unified and coherent cosmos is thought of as an ensouled and divine being, whose movement becomes the product of forces inherent in its different parts, Theophrastus did not think there is need for any additional principle. In other words, it seems that Theophrastus preferred to locate the cause of the movement of the heavens in the heavens themselves, rather than in their desire for something else, and he thus abandoned the Prime Unmoved Mover postulated by Aristotle. But although it is generally agreed that Theophrastus deviated in this respect from Aristotle, it has also been argued that Theophrastus may have been mainly interested to point out the need to supplement this postulate with explanations of perceptible movements, since the Unmoved Mover could never by itself determine all of them in full. Besides, it has also been pointed out that Aristotle did not himself believe in an Unmoved Mover of the heavens throughout his career, and other Aristotelians, for instance Alexander of Aphrodisias, continued later to question whether an Unmoved Mover actually plays an essential part in the movement of the heavens (see Sharples 1985a; Lefebvre 2015; Berti 2015).