 Infinitism, the claim that infinite evidential chains can provide justification to their members, is the answer to Agrippa’s trilemma that has received the least attention in the literature. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that infinitism has to deal with what might seem like formidable obstacles. For instance, it seems that no one actually has an infinite number of beliefs. To this objection, the infinitist is likely to reply that actually occurring beliefs are not needed, only implicit beliefs that are available to the subject in order to continue constructing his inferential chain if called upon to do so (by others or by himself). The plausibility of this reply depends on whether good sense can be made of the notion of implicit belief and the notion of an implicit belief’s being available for a subject. A second apparently formidable problem for infinitism has to do with the fact that the mere appeal to a new belief, regardless of its epistemic status, cannot provide justification to the belief we started out with. In other words, infinitism seems to run afoul of the following principle: