 Such presumed meanings are the result of rational, communicative behaviour and arise through three assumed heuristics: (1) ‘What isn’t said, isn’t’; (2) ‘What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified’, and (3) ‘What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal’, called Q, I, and M heuristics (principles) respectively. Levinson’s GCIs, unlike their Gricean progenitors, can arise at various stages in utterance processing: the hearer need not have processed the whole proposition before arriving at some presumed meanings. Also, unlike Grice’s GCIs that are taken to be speaker’s intended meanings, Levinson’s presumptive meanings seem to be hearer’s meanings, obtained by the hearer as a result of the assumptions he or she made in the process of utterance interpretation (see Saul 2002 and Horn 2006 for discussion). On the other hand, like Grice’s GCIs, they are cancellable without contradiction.