  There will, then, be enterprise elements even in states in which the civil character predominates. An actual state must have, in addition to rules of association, some way to recognize, alter, and apply those rules. Civil association, in other words, requires legislative and judicial institutions and an apparatus of “ruling” (policing, licensing, conscripting, and the like). Such institutions are needed to anchor the idea of civility in the real world. The government of an actual state will occupy buildings, keep records, and collect taxes. And as a necessary part of governing it will sometimes pursue substantive policies, attempt to produce particular outcomes, issue specific orders or commands, and concern itself not only with classes of persons but with named individuals. These powers can be, and often are, misused, but they must be available if the rule of law is to be more than “a logician’s dream” (OH 149). But there is a difference between the conceptual presuppositions of civil association and the conditions for realizing it in the circumstances of a particular state. In civil association the persona of the legislator, judge, or administrator is defined by the obligations of lex. A legislator is not an advocate for policies. A judge is not an arbitrator between interests, nor is an administrator the implementer of a collective project. What is to be legislated, adjudicated, and implemented is noninstrumental law, lex, not policies to advance the substantive purposes of a state conceived as a corporate enterprise. In any actual state these roles—legislator and policymaker, judge and arbitrator, ruler and manager—may not be sharply distinguished. But in the mode of civil association, they are distinct.  