 Because the proposal is likely to bring to mind specificationist claims about practical reasoning, some compare and contrast is in order.  Specificationism is built around the observation that, frequently enough, one’s ends are not concrete or definite enough to launch questions about how to attain them; first, the content of one’s goals must be filled in and firmed up enough for that to be possible.  For instance, and borrowing a low-key example from Bernard Williams (1981a, 104), if our objective is to be entertained this evening, and so far that’s all we have settled, we have to decide what sort of entertainment it will be, before we can consider steps we might take.  Therefore, there must be a mode of practical thinking that does that job.  (For an overview of the specificationist back and forth, see Millgram, 2008.)  But where the aim of specificationist deliberation is to arrive at a sufficiently concrete rendering of an objective, at which point it ceases, and calculatively structured action, more or less as we saw it rendered by Vogler, resumes, in dialectical activity, the clarification of the activity and of how it is desirable is ongoing, rather than a preliminary.  You find out what the rewards of this friendship are by participating in it, and the longer you are someone’s friend, the more nuanced and the deeper your appreciation of what it brings to your life becomes.  When it’s just an evening’s entertainment, figuring out what we want it to be doesn’t usually turn up as part of entertaining ourselves; in the activities that constitute friendship, however, it is grounds for complaint when one of the participants ceases paying attention to the emerging shape of the friendship itself.  The deliberative baton is not simply handed over to means-end reasoning; rather, although one is moved to one after another after another goal-directed action, those actions are themselves part and parcel of further comprehending just what the dialectical activity in which they arise is.