 Alternatively, one can argue against Dennett that (14) and (15) are not really part of the common sense concept of pain (Conee 1984, Kaufman 1985, Guirguis 1998). Indeed when we are told the complete details of what is going on in RD cases, there is no tendency to conclude that pains turn out not to exist. Rather, in such cases we realize that pain phenomenology may be complex: what appears to be a simple and homogenous phenomenology in casual introspection turns out to have a complex structure in close and trained inspection (challenging a strict reading of (15)). Then what the RD cases show is that the affective aspect is not essential for an experience to be classified as pain. Indeed such a conclusion was urged by early introspectionist psychologists long before the discovery of reactive dissociation. So we learn that the identity of pain goes with its sensory aspect rather than its affective aspect (as, indeed, Ploner’s 1999 case study seems to show). Surprising, yes, but nothing like a major conceptual confusion. But part of Dennett’s overall point should be granted in any case: the limit of what can be conceptually revised or abandoned as a result of scientific developments may be much closer to home than we ordinarily tend to think.