The analysis of remembering that Martin and Deutscher offered was not particularly in the spirit of the times.  More common was the view of Norman Malcolm, who explicitly eschewed a causal condition because he thought that if one were included, it would follow that anytime someone remembered something, she would have to have beliefs about the neurophysiology of memory.  (Martin and Deutscher correctly point out that the claim that the concept of “remembering” includes a causal component has no such implication.)  The non-causal accounts of Malcolm, Gilbert Ryle, and R.F. Holland tend to require only previous experience and a lack of a current, independent source of information about the event, perhaps (as in the case of Malcolm) with the additional claim of the following counterfactual dependence: without the previous experience the subject would not be having the current representation.  Again, Martin and Deutscher put their collective finger on a problem with such accounts. One might have the relevant experience, lack a current source and still not be remembering. For example, it might turn out that the current apparent memory is causally unrelated to the original source.  Even if we add Malcom's counterfactual component to the account, there can still be cases in which a person has the current present experience only because of the earlier experience, but the chain that leads from the earlier experience to the present is not of the right sort for memory.