The Fregean approach to ontological commitment differs from orthodox Quinean approaches most obviously in its emphasis on singular terms as opposed to quantifiers and variables. But this may reflect more a difference in their accounts of singular terms than a substantial difference in their accounts of ontological commitment; both approaches, after all, focus on the referential apparatus of the language. Quine eliminated all singular terms prior to assessing ontological commitment: definite descriptions were eliminated via Russell's theory of descriptions; names were eliminated in favor of predicates satisfied by at most one thing.  This allowed Quine to sidestep issues arising from ostensibly empty names (see §1.2 above). Frege, on the other hand, took singular terms to be the locus of commitment to objects. In Frege 1892, he writes: “when we say ‘the moon’ … we presuppose a reference”. Singular terms, then, are ontologically committing in this sense: they presuppose reference to objects. This applies no less to empty names that in fact fail to refer. Frege writes: 