 That said, there is trouble lurking in Hoffman’s suggestion. Descartes very clearly says that ideas are the items in his ontology that possess objective reality, and they possess it by their very nature. (AT VII 42; CSM II 29) If the Sun, for instance, or any of the simple natures that constitute the Sun, are the items that possess objective reality, then the Sun or the simple natures that constitute it are ideas. But the Sun, or the simple natures that constitute it, also presumably possess formal reality, which is the kind of reality a thing possesses insofar as it is a real or actual thing. If by “real” Descartes in part means exists independently of a finite mind, as Wahl and Lennon contend, then the Sun, or the simple natures that constitute it, insofar as they possess formal reality, exist independently of the finite mind. This would entail that ideas can and do exist independently of the finite mind. But this runs counter to Descartes’ ontology. For further examination of the Representationalist and Direct Realist interpretations, which includes a critical look at Hoffman’s suggestion, see (Smith 2010a). 