 A second objection to traditional conceptions of moral impartiality finds fault with the traditional tendency to define impartiality in negative or abstract terms – in terms, that is, of which elements must be absent from the psychology of the agent, or which we must pretend are absent in the process of idealization. M.C. Henberg, for instance, claims that most if not all procedural accounts of impartiality confuse it with disinterest or impersonality, and thus, ultimately, with indifference. (It should be noted that many impartialists are quite explicit about the link between morality, impartiality, and the lack of emotion; Baier (1958), for instance, writes that “the moral point of view [is] that of an independent, unbiased, impartial, objective, dispassionate, disinterested observer” (201; see also Firth 1952).) Similarly, Richard Brandt argues that it is a mistake to define moral impartiality with reference to an ideal observer who is defined as (among other things) disinterested; for after all, “it is not clear that a purely disinterested being would support a moral system at all” (Brandt 1979, 227). While Brandt’s complaint is particularly directed at the ideal observer theory of (Firth 1952), this objection seems to apply much more broadly; it is obvious, for instance, that Rawls’s veil of ignorance is designed precisely to prevent the contractors from acting in an interested manner.