 There is a considerable variety of views concerning the identity conditions for relations. Distinguish, for example, a “coarse-grained” conception, according to which relations are identical just in case they are necessarily equivalent, i.e. identical just in case, as a matter of necessity, they are exhibited by the same pairs, triples... of things, from a “fine-grained” conception, according to which relations are identical just in case they have the same analysis in terms of simpler relations (Bealer 1982: 2–3, Menzel 1993: 62–4). Another approach conceives relations as the same just in case they confer the same causal powers on the pairs, triples... of things related by them. A further approach to relation identity says that, for example, the dyadic relations R and S are identical if their corresponding relational properties (bearing R to a, bearing S to a etc.) are identical, where properties in general (which, recall, are unary) are identical just in case, according to this view, they are “encodings” of the same “abstract object”. The sense of abstract object here is a specialised one: roughly speaking, an abstract object encodes a property by encapsulating what it is to exhibit the property in question (Zalta 1988: 51–52). Even though these different conceptions of the existence and identity conditions for relations yield different results in different cases it is important to also bear in mind that they need not invariably be seen as competing. It may be that they provide different notions of relation relevant to different purposes, for example, whether we are interested in relations because of their role in causation, semantics, intentionality and so on (Lewis 1986: 55–59).