 However, the Epicureans need not have such concerns about the Principle of Bivalence. If the Stoics are right, neither the Principle of Bivalence nor causal determinism would rob us of freedom, since action and deliberation can still be effective even if the Principle of Bivalence holds and causal determinism is true. However, if one is not convinced by the Stoics, then Carneades’ position seems more cogent than Epicurus’. To secure our ability to shape the future, what matters is our ability to control our actions in a way that is not causally predetermined—Carneades’ “voluntary motion of the mind”—whereas positing a random atomic motion to falsify a logical principle is beside the point. And if the swerve has no direct role either in the production of action or the formation of our character, it is unclear what Lucretius might be referring to when he says that the swerve saves us from “internal necessity”.