 There are other limits to the Quinean analogy (Leiter 2001a, pp. 284–285; Greenberg 2011 disputes other aspects of the analogy, while Leiter 2011 replies to some of Greenberg’s objections). First, the American Legal Realists end up presupposing a theory of the concept of legality in framing their arguments for law’s indeterminacy (Leiter 2001a, pp. 292–293); thus, while they may believe that the only fruitful account of adjudication is descriptive and empirical, not normative and conceptual, they themselves need a concept of law that is not—at least on the arguments considered so far—empirical or naturalized. As one critic of Replacement Naturalism notes: “the naturalist is committed as a conceptual matter to the existence of a test of legality…. The naturalist is thus in the same boat with every other analytic philosopher of law” (Coleman 2001, p. 214). The analogy with naturalized epistemology, in other words, must be localized to the theory of adjudication, and not the whole of jurisprudence. Of course, it remains possible for the Replacement Naturalist to argue for the requisite concept of legality on precisely the empirical grounds noted in the previous section (“Replacement Naturalism I: Against Conceptual Analysis”). But as it stands, the analogy to Quine’s attack on foundationalist epistemology warrants no radical abandonment of traditional conceptual analysis across the board.