 Dispositionalism is a stark contrast to categoricalism, maintaining that all properties have dispositional essences. The dispositionalist charges that the categoricalist’s appeal to the internal or self-contained nature of a property as its essence is unintelligible unless it is somehow related to the causal or nomic powers of its instances. On dispositionalism, as noted earlier, a given property endows all of its instances with the same dispositions, no matter what circumstances they are situated in. Dispositionalism then necessitates a diametrically opposing view of laws of nature to the one necessitated by categoricalism—more to the point, the one necessitated by quidditism. Because the property of being negatively charged has the essence characterised in terms of the disposition to attract positively charged particles and repel negatively charged particles, on dispositionalism, all negatively charged particles are necessarily so disposed. This entails that Coulomb’s law, which describes how charged particles interact with one another, is metaphysically necessary (see Corry 2011 for a criticism of this reasoning). In general, the dispositionalist typically maintains what Hildebrand (2014) calls ‘Descriptive Non-Humeanism’, the view that laws of nature are just universal descriptions of dispositional essences of properties; and they are metaphysically necessary because their truth is ensured by the dispositional essences of relevant properties in all the possible worlds where those relevant properties exist. (This point is made by Swoyer (1982), Ellis (2001), Kistler (2002), and Bird (2005a, 2007a); see Mumford 2004 for the claim that dispositionalism obviates the need for laws and see Bird 2007a, chapter 9 for a criticism of this claim; see Chalmers 1999 and Fine 2002 for the claim that some of natural necessities, e.g., conservation laws, cannot be accounted for by dispositionalism.) Dispositionalism is hoped to provide a comprehensive and unified metaphysical grounding for natural modalities in general that may serve as an alternative to Humeanism. For some attempts at it, see Williams &amp; Borghini 2008, Martin 2008, Jacobs 2010. Handfield (2008a) does not take dispositionalism and Humeanism as incompatible and explores the possibility of combining them to construct what he calls ‘Humean dispositionalism’. Simpson (2017), however, criticises this combination as being half-baked.