 In the social choice literature (Brams 2005; Brams &amp; Taylor 1996) it is common practice to use cake cutting as a metaphor for a division of a single heterogeneous good. Dividing a piece of land at inheritance would be an example. The cake has different toppings that cannot all be cut into pieces with the same composition: it may have candied cherries on top that someone likes but another person abhors, and so on. A cake division is simply fair if each of \(n\) players feels she received at least \(1/n\) of the cake, according to her individual valuation of its parts. A procedure may be simply fair without ruling out the possibility of hard feelings. A cake division is called envy-free if each person feels that nobody else received a larger piece. A sure sign of a division being envy-free is that nobody wishes to trade pieces with anyone else. It turns out to be very hard to design cake cutting procedures that are both fair and envy-free. The I cut, you choose procedure is fair, and it is envy-free simply because the rest of the cake is a single piece, so there is no possibility for envy. See the entry on  economics [normative] and economic justice  for philosophical discussions of envy-freeness.