 To conceptualize a simple God it seems we must assign him to some familiar category or other. But how is this possible if, as DDS implies, God is utterly sui generis and unique in his very mode of uniqueness? It might not be possible at all, in which case silence might be the most appropriate response. But let’s not give up just yet. Vallicella (1992) suggests that God is assimilable to a self-exemplifying property, a Platonic Form. Hughes goes nominalist with his idea that God is something like a singleton set. Mann assimilates God to a property instance or trope. Hugh McCann, rejecting Mann’s view, proposes that we think of God as a concrete state of affairs. Such are to be distinguished from abstract states of affairs. Contrast Booth’s assassinating Lincoln with Booth assassinating Lincoln. Both are states of affairs, but only the former is concrete in the sense of causally active/passive. Whereas the former is an act (act-token), the latter is an act-type. The former was causally efficacious; the latter is disbarred from causal efficacy by its ontological category. McCann’s proposal, then, is that God be thought of as a concrete state of affairs along the lines of Michaelangelo’s creating of the Sistine Chapel’s ceiling.