  A third line of attack offered by Leibniz against the Newtonian  conception of space and time draws on another principle familiar from Leibniz’s metaphysics, namely, the Principle of the Identity of  Indiscernibles (PII). In the present context we may understand  the PII as ruling out the possibility of two things being distinct,  but not distinct in virtue of some discernible property. It thus  suggests that where we cannot identify a recognizable difference  between two things or possibilities, those two are in fact only one  – that is, as Leibniz puts it, that “To suppose two  things indiscernible, is to suppose the same thing under two  names” (Fourth Paper, paragraph 6; G VII.372/Alexander 37).  Armed with the PII, Leibniz argues once again that the apparent  possibility of absolute space and time can be undermined. For on the  supposition of absolute space, the world oriented in one way with  respect to space would have to be a distinct possibility from the  world oriented in another way with respect to absolute space. But,  according to Leibniz, two such purported possibilities would be  indiscernible since no being – not even God or an angel – could recognize any difference between them. Leibniz thus concludes  that since the supposition of absolute space leads to a violation of  the PII, the supposition itself must be rejected. By essentially the  same reasoning, Leibniz argues similarly that the apparent  possibility of absolute time is also inconsistent with the PII and so too must be rejected as chimerical or confused. 