 RI is a very interesting thesis. It seems to yield dramatically simple solutions to (at least some of) the puzzles about identity. We appear to be in a position to assert that young Oscar and old Oscar are the same dog but nonetheless distinct “temporary” objects; that Oscar and Oscar− are the same dog but different dog parts; that the same piece of clay can be now (identical to) one statue and now another; that London and Londres are the same city but different “objects of thought,” and so forth. Doubts develop quickly, however. Either the same dog relation satisfies LL or it does not. If it does not, it is unclear why it should be taken to be a relation of identity. But if it satisfies LL, then it follows, given that Oscar and Oscar− are different dog parts, that Oscar− is not the same dog part as Oscar−. Furthermore, assuming that the same dog part relation is reflexive, it follows from the assumption that Oscar− and Oscar− are the same dog (and that LL is in force), that Oscar and Oscar− are indeed the same dog part, which in fact they are not.