 (3) Communal content: That individual intentions are jointly directed upon the same object means also that they have a “content of communal experience” (Gehalt des Gemeinschaftserlebnisses) (1922: 116[137]): “a unity of sense.” (1922: 117[138]). The unitary sense does not exclude, however, fine-grained individual variations in the experiential content. All that is required of the individuals is that their experiences have the same “core of sense” (Sinnkern) (1922: 117[136–137]; 138–139[164–165]). This allows for “manifold” individual “experiential coloring” (Erlebnisfärbung) (1922: 113[134f.], 115[136]). On the other hand, individuals’ experiences are just as much colored by the fact that they don’t have the respective experience privately, but precisely as members or “in the name of” (1922: 114[134]) the community. This “reciprocal feedback” (Rückwirkung; 1922: 132[157]) or coloring of the personal by the communal can be best understood counterfactually: Individuals would not have the (same) experiences they have if they were not members of a given community, or were there no community (at some time or another). And there is a normative dimension to this unity: shared intentionality has conditions of fulfillment that are determined by what is an appropriate intentional response, given (a) the specific intentional object and (b) the specific community at stake (see Szanto 2015a):