 The cogency of this argument for the irrationality of envy depends, of course, on the plausibility of its claims about well-being. If people do in fact systematically care about the possessions of others, and regard themselves as worse or better off accordingly as they stack up against their selected comparison class, some subjectivist accounts will license taking this concern as itself a part of these subjects’ well-being—in which case, some envy will be fitting. Whereas most objective accounts of well-being either treat it as a measure of primary goods, or supply content restrictions on the desires whose satisfaction contributes to well-being which would exclude desires like the envious preference. One recent defense of the claim that envy is sometimes fitting relies on the idea that being excellent in various domains of human achievement contributes to well-being and yet is essentially a comparative matter (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2005). If such excellences, or other positional goods, are granted to contribute in themselves to well-being, then it appears that envy will be fitting whenever a rival’s diminution with respect to the relevant positional good improves the Subject’s position.