 It might seem that Aristotle’s response implies a vicious regress. My present action is caused by my present character plus my other psychological states, such as my beliefs. In order to be responsible for this action, I must be responsible for the state of character that in part causes it. Aristotle responds that my past voluntary actions caused my present character, and so I am responsible for it. But if I must be responsible for these actions in order to be responsible for the character state that they cause, we ask in turn whether I am responsible for the character states that caused these actions, and so on and so forth, until we are drawn back to factors of heredity and environment which I am not responsible for. In response to this problem, some scholars have proposed that Aristotle believes that some character-forming actions are not caused by my past states of character (Kane (2014), who attributes such a view to Aristotle and uses it as inspiration for his own view), or that he believes there are some breaks or “fresh starts” in the causal process leading to my present character, so that it cannot be drawn back to past factors that were not in my power (Furley 1967; Bobzien 2000). But it is difficult to see how positing causal breaks would help make the process of character formation more under the control of a person, and in any case, Aristotle apparently is not aware of this supposed problem with his response. Instead, he seems to think that, as long as we need to refer to a person’s past actions in order to explain how they came to be the sort of person they are, this suffices for showing that they helped form their own character and it is was up to them who they became.