 Even if it would offend strong anti-psychologists, it is not the suggestion that epistemologists make “free use” of empirical psychology that is so radical; it is the suggestion that psychology can and should replace epistemology. (As we’ll see in  Section 3.2  below, in later writings Quine cites other sciences as being relevant to epistemology naturalized as well. But that does not affect the present discussion.) In terms of the features of TE laid out above  (Section 1.1),  Quine appears here to be rejecting  (a)–(c)  altogether: epistemology—“or something like it”—is recast as wholly a posteriori, descriptive, and anything but autonomous. As to  (d),  the traditional concern with finding an adequate response to the skeptic, Quine, in later writings, responds with the claim that “skeptical doubts are scientific doubts” (1975: 68):