 Let’s consider the criteria in turn. With respect to surface features, both clinical delusions and beliefs in conspiracy theories appear implausible to those who do not endorse them, and in some circumstances quite unusual and bizarre as well. It is their alleged epistemic irrationality, though, that seems to play the central role in the comparison. It is commonly assumed that clinical delusions and beliefs in conspiracy theories are neither well supported by evidence nor responsive to counterevidence. As we saw, there is a variation in these features when they are applied to delusions, and similarly when they are applied to beliefs in conspiracy theories. In the case of delusions, the unusual experience we have may be considered prima facie evidence for the delusional hypothesis; and in the case of conspiracy theories, if we belong to a group that has been marginalised and excluded, then our previous experience with the authorities may legitimise our mistrusting them as sources of information (Levy 2019).