 The first topic addressed in Hegel’s Phenomenology is consciousness, beginning with the well-known discussion of sense-certainty and the this. The next topic is self-consciousness, which begins with the famous discussion of mastery and servitude. It here becomes clear that the self-consciousness in question is that of what is sometimes called “modern subjectivity,” focusing on the first-person singular pronoun I – but equally, in this case, on the second-person singular you and the first-person plural we. Here Hegel follows in the footsteps of the Fichtean conception of recognition. But Hegel also adds an essential element of struggle, conflict, and competition depending on inequalities between I and you, or, more generally, among the members of any community of self-conscious human beings (we). This element is indebted to Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (1755), to which Kant’s conception of “unsocial sociability,” introduced in Ideas towards a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim (1784), is also indebted. The difference between Kant and Hegel, in this respect, is that such ideas arise only in the context of Kant’s practical philosophy, while they arise at the beginning of the discussion of self-consciousness in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Or, to put it another way, while Kant distinguishes between theoretical and practical reason, only then to build a bridge between them in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology initiates the development of a unified conception of reason as such, at once both theoretical and practical.