 Expectedly, each part of this definition has raised controversy and criticism. If perception is a cognition (and non-erroneous), then it is a state of knowledge, rather than a means to knowing! How does that constitute a primary means of knowledge? Some Naiyāyika commentators, Vācaspati Miśra (c. 900–980 CE) and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (c. 9th century CE) among them, suggest that the sūtra is to be understood by adding to it the term ‘from which (yataḥ),’ since the preceding sūtra-s indicates that Gautama’s formulation of this sūtra was intended to define an instrument of knowledge. Another issue has been the interpretation of the word ‘contact’. In what sense are the eye and the ear, the sense organs for vision and auditory perception, respectively, in contact with their objects? Here a careful look at the term ‘sannikarṣa,’ generally translated as contact, helps resolve the issue; ‘Sannikarṣa’ literally means ‘drawing near,’ and can be interpreted as being in close connection with or in the vicinity of. Thus perception is that which arises out of a close connection between the sense organ and its object.