 Pacherie (2008) develops the feedback-comparator model into an account of the phenomenology of agency that postulates three integrated feedback loops at three different levels of intention: the level of distal (or future-directed) intention, proximal (or present-directed) intention, and motor intention. These are levels of action specification in which progressively more detailed representations of the action are generated, at the later stages in response to perceptual and proprioceptive feedback. Pacherie’s main thesis is that the component representations of the stages in the process of action specification are strongly interconnected with the components and contents of the phenomenology of agency. At the level of proximal intentions, for instance, the model explains how the conceptual information that is inherited from the distal intention is integrated with perceptual input and situational constraints. Concerning the sense of agency, the model distinguishes between the awareness of what (the goal), awareness of how (the means), the sense of intentionality, the sense of initiation, the sense of situational control, and the sense of motor control. Shepherd (2017) argues that the components in the phenomenology of agency are so richly integrated that they can be regarded as fused in the total experience.