Jason Stanley (2005a) attempts to block Lewis’ move to EC and defends fallibilism against the worry that concessive knowledge attributions are incoherent. According to Stanley, CKAs are not just odd-sounding: in most cases, they are simply false. But this does not impugn fallibilism. If the odd-sounding utterances Lewis cites stated the fallibilist idea, the latter portion thereof (‘S cannot eliminate a certain possibility in which not-p’, e.g.) would expresses the thought that the subject’s evidence does not entail that p—hence, the negation every proposition contrary to p.[22] According to Stanley, however, this is not the best reading of such statements of epistemic possibility. Stanley reads the cited part of CKAs—‘S cannot eliminate a certain possibility in which not-p’—as saying this: it is possible for S that not-p. And he reads that statement as saying: what S knows [versus, as per fallibilism, S’s evidence] does not, in a manner that is obvious to S, entail the denial of not-p. (Cf. DeRose 1991, 1999; and Hawthorne 2004, 24–28.) The latter claim does contradict the first part of CKAs, which says that p is known; for p does obviously entail the denial of not-p. So the sentences Lewis cites are self-contradictory. But they do not capture the fallibilist idea after all.