  Second, rational egoism might be challenged by some views of personal identity.  Say half of my brain will be transplanted to another body A.  My old body will be destroyed.  A will have my memories, traits, and goals.  It seems reasonable for me to care specially about A, and indeed to say that A is identical to me.  Now say half of my brain will go in B and half in C.  Again B and C will have my memories, traits, and goals.  It seems reasonable for me to care specially about B and C.  But B and C cannot be identical to me, since they are not identical to one another (they go on to live different lives).  So the ground of my care is not identity, but rather the psychological connections through memories, etc.  Even in the case of A, what grounds my care are these connections, not identity: my relation to A is the same as my relation to B (or C), so what grounds my care about A grounds my care about B (or C) — and that cannot be identity.  (To make the point in a different way — I would not take steps to ensure that only one of B and C come about.)  If so, I need not care specially about some of my future selves, since they will not have these connections to me.  And I do have reason to care specially about other people who bear these connections to me now.