  The “externalist turn” toward downplaying the role of an  agent’s better judgment and emphasizing other psychic factors instead is connected to a second way in which some theorists writing after  Davidson have dissented from his analysis. Davidson, as we saw,  viewed akratic action as possible, but irrational. The weak-willed  agent acts contrary to what she herself takes to be the balance of  reasons; her choice is thus unreasonable by her own lights. On this  picture, incontinent action is a paradigm case of practical  irrationality. Many other theorists have agreed with Davidson on this score and have taken akrasia to be perhaps the clearest  example of practical irrationality. But some writers (notably Audi  1990, McIntyre 1990, and Arpaly 2000) have questioned whether akratic action is necessarily irrational. Perhaps we ought to leave  room, not just for the possibility of akratic action, but  for the potential rationality of akratic action.