 Virtues and vices have an absolute or relative character, and can be possessed absolutely (simpliciter) or in a certain respect (secundum quid). There are highest—i.e., most perfect—degrees of intensity of our moral virtues, but there are no absolutely greatest degrees, like Platonic ideas. In Kilvington’s opinion, people are never absolutely generous or virtuous. The ultimate perfection, i.e., the highest degree of moral virtue, is the product of a person’s natural dispositions, socializations, and moral acts. But since people relevantly differ, each of us is virtuous in our own way. So too, the highest degree of moral virtue is unique in each of us. In Kilvington’s opinion, if someone is prudent in the highest degree, they must have all the other virtues in the highest degree as well (Michałowska 2011a: 488–92).