 Here is one topical example of how this might happen. Some feminists object to pornography on the grounds that it harms women. Others claim that pornography may not always be harmful to women and may even sometimes be liberating and beneficial. It seems that there is genuine disagreement here. But is there? Not necessarily. For the two sides might mean different things by “pornography.” Suppose that feminists who object to pornography are defining “pornography” as sexually explicit material that subordinates women. So, pornography, for them, is that subset of sexually explicit material that in fact harms women. This definition makes it definitionally true that pornography, wherever it exists, is bad for women. Those who defend pornography, however, may be using “pornography” to mean simply sexually explicit material aimed or used primarily for sexual arousal (regardless of whether it is harmful to women). There may thus be no genuine disagreement here, for both sides might agree that sexually explicit material that harms women is objectionable. They might also agree that there is nothing objectionable about sexually explicit material that does not harm women (or anyone else). If different parties are using “pornography” in different senses they may be talking past each other, perhaps without realizing it.