  In contrast to cognition and volition, which are “eccentric” and directed towards the “outer,” feeling or affectivity [Gefühl or Empfindung] is the awareness of inwardness or interiority. Yorck writes: “The essence of the inner [des Innen] is feeling [Empfindung]” (ST, p. 71). At the limit, feeling is object-less and an immersion in subjective life. As Yorck explains, feelings are only secondarily attached to objects. Pain or pleasure, for instance, has no “representational content” [Vorstellungsinhalt]. Yorck writes: When “I feel, I stay within me” (ST, 71)—chez moi, bei mir. Feeling is only minimally projective. However, since polarity permeates all psychological functions, Yorck is quick to recognize “a relation” to the other, for there is no “inner” without an “outer.”[12]  But the centre of feeling or affectivity is the sphere of one's own, pure interiority, not as representation, but as something felt. Therefore, it is the actual seat of “all things personal” [alles Persönliche], the innermost centre of personal life (ST, p. 85). It is the “central” and immediate pulse of life, antecedent to the objectifications by cognition and volition (ST, p. 14). Yorck writes: “The relation of self to feeling is more immediate” than the subject's relation to representation (ST, p. 99). Since the personal is something felt in the interiority of one's life, and not something thought or represented and projected outwards, Yorck concludes that self-relation is not cognitive in the first place; it is not “knowledge” (ST, p. 72). Therefore, Yorck also finds it a misguided effort “to grasp natural and historical communities by means of representation,” because it misses the felt personal attachment, which alone lends reality to the historical connectivity and relation (ST, p. 72). Already in the Correspondence, Yorck had stated that “historical reality is a reality of feeling [Empfindungsrealität]” (CR, p. 113). 