 Imagination plays a role in the acquisition of knowledge. Many philosophical arguments call on imagination when they appeal to metaphysical modal knowledge (see the entry on  epistemology of modality;  the papers collected in Gendler &amp; Hawthorne (eds.) 2002; and Kung 2016 and Strohminger &amp; Yli-Vakkuri 2017 for overviews). The kind of thought experiments that are regularly used in scientific theorizing is also plausibly premised on imaginative capacities (see the entry on  thought experiments).  As already discussed, people use imagination to understand the perspectives of others  (section 3.1).  Moreover, people often make decisions via thinking about counterfactuals, or what would happen if things had been different from how they in fact are (see the entries on  causation  and  counterfactual conditionals).  However, the phenomenon of transformative experience has recently called into question which kind of imaginary scenarios are truly epistemically accessible. (For a representative collection of papers that explore different epistemic roles of imagination, see Kind &amp; Kung (eds.) 2016a.)