  An increasingly popular way to look at the relation between laws and their instances is taking instances as grounding laws. No individual instance of a law can fully ground the law, but a conjunction of instances does more fully ground the law. Another plausible way of viewing the relation between laws and their instances is to see laws as grounding their instances (Emery 2019). Because the grounding relation is non-symmetric, both of these views cannot be true. The way out of this dilemma is one that illuminates the debate about explanation in an interesting way. Consider that while (P &amp; Q) is a full ground for Q, it seems wrong to claim that (P &amp; Q) explains why Q (Roski 2018). This is because the content of the explanandum (what is to be explained) is embedded in the content of the explanans (what is intended to do the explaining), and something cannot explain itself (or be an essential part of an explanation of itself). Notice that this formulation exposes the problem: if the explanans includes the explanandum as part of its content, it makes the explanation devoid of understanding. Ones audience would have to already have had an understanding of the explanandum. Successful explanations are not circular, so anyone taking laws as grounds for their instances ought not to think that the grounding relation is explanatory. The point here is not to show that grounding is not an explanatory relation, but rather to show that laws of nature are not suited to explain their instances. Circularity also infects the DN model of explanations. As the authors of the DN model pointed out: