 The second challenge is to state precisely how processes relate to space and time. Does a commitment to a process metaphysics imply a certain metaphysics of time? Do processes in some fashion constitute space and time, as Whitehead postulated? Or are they occupiers of spatiotemporal regions like perduring entities, just not static (and thus, for example, providing better support for presentist accounts of time than classical substances)? Upon a closer look, the distinction between “perdurance” and “endurance” (Mark Johnston, David Lewis), which is commonly (though perhaps not quite correctly) linked to W.E. Johnson’s distinction between occurrents and continuants, sits badly with a process ontology. For ‘activity-like’ processes (e.g., snowing) somehow seem to take time just as perduring entities do, yet are “wholly present” at every time at which they exist, just like enduring entities or continuants. Several authors thus have pointed out that processes behave like  continuants.[23]  As mentioned above in section 3, this opens up a new solution path for the problem of persistence, but it also calls for a clear account of how ongoing developmental and activity-like processes are situated in time and space, and how they relate to extended temporal and spatial regions. Moreover, if processes relate to space and time in ways that does not allow for individuation in terms of spatiotemporal location, how else do we individuate processes? Should we take our bearings from scientific practices of individuating particular processes (Pemberton 2018) or can we, at least for some types of processes, lay down general conditions to determine which processes are parts of particular process individuals (Kaiser 2018)? For those who take processes to be (abstract or concrete) “type-like” non-particulars the question of individuation can be addressed in the same way in which we individuate types, namely, by classificatory taxonomies that, among other criteria, relate to the way in which processes occur in space and/or time.  [24]