What, then, distinguishes a (psychological) concept from other mental contents, like sensations, imaginings, or memories? Because the soul is, ex hypothesi, a tabula rasa, there are neither original concepts (like Kant’s categories) nor faculties of concepts (like Kant’s Understanding or Reason): “all concepts are things that have come to be” (SW VI: 120; cf. esp. SW VI: 129, ff.). The incipient concept must therefore find its origin in the psyche’s attempt to preserve itself, that is, its inherent simplicity, in the face of an outside disturbance. A representation in the process of coming to be is called a sensation (Empfindung) or perception (Wahrnehmung) (SW VI: 120). Upon entering consciousness, it is immediately subject to inhibition by other, already present representations. When, under certain circumstances, it returns to consciousness, the representation is called an “imagining [Einbildung]”, and, as we saw in our discussion of representational reproduction, when this reproduced imagining connects with a series of fused (temporal) representations, it may become a memory (SW VI: 121).