 The most basic distinction relevant here is that between norms for action and norms of  being.[6]  Norms of being are often associated with evaluations; they tell us that a certain state of affairs ought to obtain, i.e., is valuable or good in a certain sense. Norms for action, on the other hand, tell us what to do. Both can either be prima facie (or pro tanto) or categorical (cf. Ross 1930 [1987]). Prima facie norms or evaluations can be overridden or outweighed (by other norms, obligations or evaluations), categorical ones cannot. Both norms of action and values can also be categorized by provenance: There are the norms of morals, etiquette, and prudence, the laws of the state, and the rules of games. Analogously, values of different kinds can be distinguished. The normativity of meaning/content typically is construed in terms of norms for action.