 Spohn’s theory of causation is first expounded in terms of ranking functions which model the epistemic states of some agents. However, it should be noted that Spohn (2012: Ch. 14) aims to spell out the objective counterpart to ranking functions. He seeks to objectify ranking functions by saying what it means that a ranking function represents objective features of the world. The notion of truth may serve as an introductory example. Given \(w\) is the actual world, a ranking function \(\kappa\) is an objective representation of this world iff \(\beta(A)&gt;0\) for all propositions \(A\) such that \(w\in A\). (Proposition \(A\) is construed as a set of possible worlds; \(\beta\) is the belief function of \(\kappa\), as defined above.) This explanation, however, does not yet capture modal and causal features of our world. And so Spohn goes on to explain how modal and causal properties—defined by a given ranking function \(\kappa\)—can be understood as objectives features of the world. The details are intricate and complex. They are spelled out in (2012: Ch. 15); the basic ideas are summarized in Spohn (2018). Suffice it to say that Spohn’s objectification of ranking functions is not only a promising attempt for an objective account of causation and modality, but also a way to resolve the tension between an epistemic and non-epistemic theory of causation.