 Goodman’s discussion is a brief one and, on our reading at least, leaves open a number of questions. Should we admit as relevant any considerations beyond observed patterns of inference, such as properties of long-run convergence to the truth, and so on? To whom does “we” refer to when Goodman speaks of “the particular…inferences we actually make and sanction”? Experts? The human population at large? Should we be circumscribing the class of relevant inferences to those judgments that one might want to call “considered”? These are important matters to settle. Indeed, a certain combination of answers to these—entailing that the justification of normative theories of reasoning hinges entirely on their ability to systematise “immediate and untutored” inferential dispositions observed in the general population—notoriously led Cohen (1981) to endorse the startling claim that, since normative and descriptive models are borne of the very same data set, behavioural evidence is in principle incapable of establishing human irrationality. For further discussion of this general topic, see for instance Stich (1990: Ch. 4), Stein (1996: Ch. 5), Stanovich (1999: Ch. 1), and Thagard  (1982).[23] 