 Externalist arguments (of the sort mentioned in Section 4) have also been taken to support the separation of the “qualitative” from meaning and content (hence the separation of consciousness from intentionality). For it has been sometimes assumed that the phenomenal character of one’s experience is “fixed internally”—i.e., it has no necessary relation to the nature of particular substances in one’s external environment or to one’s linguistic community. Thus if externalist arguments (like those of Putnam and Burge) show that neither meaning nor content is “in the head”, phenomenal consciousness cannot imply any intentionality or content. Putnam (1981) himself drew such a conclusion, and much like Ryle, took the stream of consciousness to comprise nothing more than sensations and images, which (recalling Frege) are to be set apart from thought and meaning. Without denying important differences in the views just mentioned, it seems reasonable to suppose that together they helped entrench in analytic philosophy a conception (sometimes welded to the term “qualia”) that confines consciousness, in the experiential/what it’s like sense, to sensations and sensory images—and thus segregates it from thought, concepts, and “propositional attitudes”—hence from intentionality. (For a recent defense of this tradition, see Papineau 2021.)