 Supp has squared the circle: she gets the intuitively right answer to both questions. In this she differs from both Hook and Arrow. Supp’s way of assessing conditionals is incompatible with the truth-functional way (they answer Question 2 differently); and incompatible with stronger-than-truth-functional truth conditions (they answer Question 1 differently). It follows that Supp’s way of assessing conditionals is incompatible with the claim that conditionals have truth conditions of any kind. \(\mathbf{p}_A (B)\) does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition. Suppose it did measure the probability of the truth of some proposition \(A*B\). Either \(A*B\) is entailed by “\(A \supset B\)”, or it is not. If it is, it is true whenever \({\sim}A\) is true, and hence cannot be improbable when \({\sim}A\) is probable. That is, it cannot agree with Supp in its answer to Question 2. If \(A*B\) is not entailed by “\(A \supset B\)”, it may be false when \({\sim}(A \amp{\sim}B)\) is true, and hence certainty that \({\sim}(A \amp{\sim}B)\) (in the absence of certainty that \({\sim}A)\) is insufficient for certainty that \(A*B\); it cannot agree with Supp in its answer to Question 1. 