 Carnap’s arguments for the rejection of ontology are presently widely rejected. However, several philosophers have recently attempted to revive some parts or others of Carnap’s ideas. For example, Stephen Yablo has argued that an internal-external distinction could be understood along the lines of the fictional-literal distinction. And, he argues in (Yablo 1998), since there is no fact about this distinction, ontology, in the sense of (O2), rests on a mistake and is to be rejected, as Carnap did. On the other hand, Thomas Hofweber has argued that an internal-external distinction with many of the features that Carnap wanted can be defended on the basis of facts about natural language, but that such a distinction will not lead to a rejection of ontology, in the sense of (O2). See (Hofweber 2005) and (Hofweber 2016). Hilary Putnam, for example in (Putnam 1987), has developed a view that revives some of the pragmatic aspects of Carnap’s position. See (Sosa 1993) for a critical discussion of Putnam’s view, and (Sosa 1999) for a related, positive proposal. Robert Kraut in (Kraut 2016) has defended an expressivist reading of the internal-external distinction, and with it some Carnapian consequences for ontology. And most of all, Eli Hirsch and Amie Thomasson have defended different versions of approaches to ontology that capture a good part of the spirit of Carnap’s view. See in particular (Hirsch 2011) and (Thomasson 2015). For various views about the effects of Carnap on the contemporary debate in ontology, see (Blatti and Lapointe 2016).