 By contrast, the ‘dispositionalist’ camp argues that the occurrentist interpretation of the EC is too strict and would let too many intuitively blameworthy wrongdoers off the hook. For one, if one forgets a relevant piece of information and as a consequence does something wrong—if, say, one forgets about the dietary restrictions of the infant one is babysitting and then feeds her food to which she is allergic—one seems to be, absent excusing conditions, blameworthy (Peels 2011: 580; see also Husak 2011). Crucially, however, lack of occurrent belief concerning the relevant information doesn’t seem to be one of those excusing conditions (Amaya &amp; Doris 2015: 267). Also, if the occurrentist position were right, one could shield oneself from blame simply by avoid thinking about the moral status of one’s action, and that’s implausible (Guerrero 2007: 74; Timpe 2011: 23; Robichaud 2014: 150; Levy 2014: 31). These considerations lead to the position that tacit, dormant, dispositional, or unconscious beliefs can, at least in many cases, amount to the kind of awareness that is required for moral responsibility (see  sect. 3.1  below for more arguments in favor of this position).