 The final pair of topics concern the world (cosmology) and God (natural theology). Regarding the former, Wolff identifies the world as the “series of changeable things that are next to one another and follow one upon the other” (GM §544 [2019: 120]). As such, the world is a composite consisting of ultimately simple substances, though Wolff declines to identify them as Leibnizian monads as he hesitates to ascribe representational states to the constituents (“elements”) of matter (GM §§598–9). Things and events in the world are nonetheless connected to one another in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason, and Wolff concludes that all events are certain as a result (GM §561). Concerning God, Wolff argues that He must exist inasmuch as our own evident existence requires a necessary being to serve as its sufficient reason, which necessary being must also be independent, eternal, and simple (GM §§928–936); it cannot, therefore, be the world (a composite) nor our own soul (a being dependant on the world), and so can only be God (GM §945). In addition to these attributes, God must have an understanding, through which He distinctly represents all that is possible, and a free will inasmuch as He chooses that world which pleases Him most to make actual (GM §980).