 Many of the views just canvassed share a common theme: normativity is explained in terms of the mental states, events, or attitudes of individuals or collections of individuals. (We’ll call these “mental states” for short.) Many other views – including some of those just canvassed – think that there is some important sense in which the normative facts are independent of mental states. This debate can be (and often has been) traced back all the way to the Euthyphro, where Socrates considers whether what is pious is determined by what the gods love, or whether it’s the other way around (see Berker 2018; Wright 1992). This debate has come to be known as the debate over the mind-dependence of normativity. Normative realists have generally been taken to be committed to mind-independence (see, e.g., Shafer-Landau 2003; McGrath 2010; Enoch 2011), although we have attempted to remain neutral on this point by distinguishing “mind-independent realism” from “basic realism”, which is compatible with mind-dependence (see Cuneo 2007).