 What’s different in difference cases is interesting centered beliefs—it’s a difference in states of believing P for interesting centered propositions P. In the case of John and David and the bear, John and David are both belief-related to inhabiting a world in which John is being attacked by a bear while David looks on, but only John is belief-related to being attacked by a bear, while only David is belief-related to being an unattacked witness to a bear attack. This case highlights how “self-locating” belief isn’t just about geographical self-location. On Lewis’s framework self-locating beliefs relate individuals to properties of the form, being such-and-such, as opposed to properties of the form, inhabiting a world in which so-and-so person is such-and-such. For example, having written the Treatise, rather than inhabiting a world in which Hume wrote the Treatise. (Annoying complication: we need to qualify and restrict to values of such-and-such where it’s a condition that’s not necessarily satisfied by all individuals in a world at all times if it’s satisfied by any individual in that world at any time.)