 Schroeder et al. sketch what they describe as caricatures of four possible theories of moral motivation, which they label instrumentalist, cognitivist, sentimentalist, and personalist, and argue that “theories of morally worthy motivation that best fit the current scientific picture are ones that owe much more to Hume or Aristotle than to Kant”  (72).[14]  According to the instrumentalist, “people are motivated when they form beliefs about how to satisfy preexisting [intrinsic] desires” (74), which lead in turn to the formation of nonintrinsic desires to take specific actions aimed at satisfying their intrinsic desires. When a person has an intrinsic desire, D, and comes to believe that φ-ing will satisfy D, she comes to desire (nonintrinsically) to φ. On the instrumentalist view, commonly called “Humean,” the specifically moral character of motivation comes from an intrinsic desire to do what one judges to be right. In contrast to the instrumentalist, the cognitivist holds that moral motivation begins, not with desires, but with beliefs about which actions are right. Such beliefs motivate independently of preexisting intrinsic desires. Morally worthy action arises not from desires, at least not in the first instance, but from moral judgments (76). The sentimentalist sees the emotions as playing a central role in moral motivation, and for an action to be the result of moral motivation, certain emotions must cause that action. The right kind of emotions are things like compassion or sympathy (77). Finally, the personalist sees the source of moral motivation in morally good character, more specifically, in the virtues. “Good character involves knowledge of the good, wanting what is good for its own sake, long-standing emotional dispositions that favor good action, and long-standing habits of responding to one’s knowledge, desires and emotions with good actions” (77). Moral action begins when a person’s sensitivity to moral patterns and moral heuristics (such as that lying tends to be bad) leads her to judge that an action would be good, which engages her long-standing emotional dispositions and habits, thereby resulting in moral motivation. 