 Dawkins never lost his fascination with vehicular adaptations, a fascination that his critics denigrate as Panglossian adaptationism. He filled his books with adaptationist scenarios, some more firmly supported by data than others; however, from the perspective of the structure of evolutionary theory, he held that replicators are much more important than vehicles. For example, Dawkins argued at some length that adaptations are always for the good of replicators, not vehicles (Lloyd 1992) [see the entry on  units and levels of selection].  Vehicles exhibit these adaptations, but ultimately all adaptations must be explicable in terms of changes in gene frequencies. Thus, it comes as no surprise when Dawkins (1994: 617) proclaims that he “coined the term ‘vehicle’ not to praise it but to bury it”. As prevalent as organisms might be, as definite as the causal roles that they play in selection are, reference to them can and must be omitted from any perspicuous characterization of selection in the evolutionary process. Although Dawkins is far from a genetic determinist, he is certainly a genetic reductionist. Whether reductionism itself is good or bad is a moot question (Sarkar 1998).