 There are at least the following two “kinds of goodness” that seem to be naturalistically unproblematic, and, generalizing, there seem to be two kinds of naturalistic normativity. First, where K is a functional kind, a good K is one that performs the function well. A good toaster does well at toasting bread. A good printer is one that prints well. And the criteria for performing well are naturalistically specifiable in line with the purpose of the relevant kind of thing. Second, where K is a biological kind, the things needed by Ks in order to flourish are good for Ks. Water and sunlight are good for oak trees, for example. And for a K to flourish is for it to do well at living the kind of life for which it is suited. It is good for a cheetah to be able to run fast. It is good for an oak tree to produce abundant acorns. These ideas have been used and extended by several philosophers, including Philippa Foot (2001) and Judith Thomson (2008) in developing theories of normativity.