 While frameworks of scientific pluralism were largely formulated in the second half of the twentieth century, the linguistic fragmentation of post-war philosophy led to relatively isolated national discourses about scientific pluralism. For example, scientific pluralism in West Germany emerged as a core topic in philosophy of science (Diemer 1971; Landgrebe [ed.] 1972; Ströker 1971) in the wake of the positivism dispute of the 1960s (Adorno et al. 1972) and became widely embraced by critical rationalists in the tradition of Popper who positioned pluralism as a crucial component of non-dogmatic fallibilism and of science in an open society (Spinner 1968; Albert 1970). In contrast, critical theorists challenged the pluralism of critical rationalists as propagating a free market of ideas that actually excludes emancipatory conceptions of science (von Bretano 1971) and falsely assumes neutrality while failing to reflect on its own normative assumptions (Habermas 1970 [1990]). In the United States, the articulation of scientific pluralism as an explicit program for philosophy of science has often been related to Patrick Suppes’ presidential address “The Plurality of Science” at the 1977 Philosophy of Science Association (Suppes 1978; see also Galison &amp; Stump [eds.] 1996; Kellert et al. [eds.] 2006a). Suppes’ address indeed marks an important point in the development of pluralist philosophy of science, both because it synthesized a growing discomfort with unificationist agendas in North America and because it articulated a pluralist program that later grew into the Stanford School of Philosophy which included the works of Nancy Cartwright, John Dupré, Peter Galison, and Ian Hacking, among others.