The possibility of such a reply notwithstanding, it is also natural to ask at this point whether the notion of feasibility considered in complexity theory might also be vague in a manner which could render it susceptible to the sort of soritical argument envisioned by Dummett (1975). Note, however, that our discussion thus far suggests that the notion of feasibility in which strict finitists have been interested is a property of individual natural numbers. This is out of keeping with the way we have seen that this notion is treated in complexity theory. For instance, in order to employ the Cobham-Edmond’s Thesis to judge whether a problem \(X\) is feasibly decidable, we consider the order of growth of the time complexity \(t(n)\) of the most efficient algorithm for deciding \(X\). From the perspective of complexity theory, feasibility is thus a notion which applies not to individual natural numbers \(n\), but either to time complexity functions of type \(\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}\) or their rates of growth.