 Facts are also introduced in order to stop a regress of instantiation. Take the particular a and the property of being F and assume that they can exist independently of each other. Given this assumption, there must be a relation that “ties” them together to a’s being F. If the required “tie” is a genuine relation, a regress, usually called Bradley’s regress, ensues: we need to introduce another relation that ties the first relation to a and being F, and so on. Facts are supposed to prevent Bradley’s regress (see Armstrong 1997: 115 and 118; Hossack 2007: 33). How? Relations that tie particulars and properties together are “explained away” in terms of facts that contain particulars and properties: if a instantiates F-ness, it does so because the fact that a is F exists. The existence of this fact guarantees that a is F. Facts are just instantiations of universals by particulars (see Armstrong 1997: 119). Hence, we arrive again at the result that the obtaining/non-obtaining distinction does not apply to facts.