 We might want to rely on the priority view for specifying the threshold of harm. On this interpretation, future people are in a harmed state unless they are as well off as such a prioritarian view requires. There are at least two problems in understanding the threshold as an element of a prioritarian understanding of intergenerational justice: First, the priority view is likely to entail excessive intergenerational requirements. Present actions or inactions can improve the well-being of many future generations to at least some extent. Moreover, the number of future people will likely be very large and depends in part upon currently living people’s decisions and actions. Hence, according to prioritarianism, we ought to sacrifice more of our present well-being for the sake of future generations than seems plausible. It might even be the case that we are required to incur significant costs for the sake of only minuscule future benefits (as in this way we might maximize the weighted sum of benefits for future persons (see Rawls 1999: 287; Wolf 2009: 373; Meyer &amp; Roser 2009: 233–235). How likely it is that the priority view has this implication will also depend upon the strength the view gives to the priority of the worse off who are (very) badly off. Of course, the priority view will not have this implication if (whatever currently living people do) all future people were to enjoy levels of well-being that are higher than those of all or most currently living people.