 The second response is that  (13)  asserts the existence of a set \(R\), but that \(R\) isn’t in the range of the quantifier \(\forall{x}\). This prevents us from instantiating the quantifier \(\forall{x}\) with respect to \(R\), which means that we cannot draw the fatal conclusion that \(R\) is a member of itself just in case it isn’t. However, this response entails that the quantifier \(\forall{x}\) cannot be chosen to range over absolutely all sets; for if it could be so chosen, we would not be able deny that \(R\) is in this range of quantification. This means that the universe of sets has a certain inexhaustibility: whenever we have formed a conception of quantification over some range of sets, we can define a set which isn’t in this range (Dummett 1981: ch. 15 and 1991: ch. 24; Glanzberg 2004; Parsons 1977). However, this response has been criticized for being, at best hard to state, and at worst self-refuting (Boolos 1998b: 30; Lewis 1991: 68; Williamson 2003: sect. V). (See also Rayo and Uzquiano 2006 for a number of essays discussing whether absolutely general quantification is possible.)