 Clearly, if we are going to measure closeness to truth by counting true and false consequences, some true consequences should count more than others. For example, \(h\) and \(r\) are both true, and \({\sim}h\) and \({\sim}r\) are false. The former should surely count in favor of a claim, and the latter against. But \({\sim}h\rightarrow{\sim}r\) is true and \(h\rightarrow{\sim}r\) is false. After we have counted the truth \(h\) in favor of a claim’s truthlikeness and the falsehood \({\sim}r\) against it, should we also count the true consequence \({\sim}h\rightarrow{\sim}r\) in favor, and the falsehood \(h\rightarrow{\sim}r\) against? Surely this is both unnecessary and misleading. And it is precisely counting sentences like these that renders Popper’s account susceptible to the Tichý-Miller argument.