 A more promising objection targets the idea that associative obligations are non-voluntary. This is certainly true if by “non-voluntary” we mean that we don’t necessarily choose to enter the relationships and the practices that are meant to generate the obligations. While it might be unclear whether we can choose to become friend with someone (as opposed to our friendship forming spontaneously), we normally don’t choose to enter our family. Still, it is possible for parents to disown their children and for children to deny their parents, under certain conditions. When the attitudes of reciprocal trust and affection that are meant to support these relationships disappear, the accompanying obligations are significantly weakened, and possibly extinguished. This has led some to argue that associative responsibilities are best understood as “quasi-voluntarist”. Although they are not premised on a choice to enter the relationship with which they are associated, they are conditional on the relationship being endorsed, if only in the minimal sense that we could have stepped out of it, had we wished to (Renzo 2012; but see Dagger 2018: 79–82). But once we go down this road, we are faced, once again, with the worry afflicting voluntaristic accounts, such as those that appeal to consent or fairness. If endorsing our membership in the political community is a condition for having the role obligations associated with such membership, then anyone who fails to do so lacks political obligation.