 Goldman and Jordan (2013) maintain that ST has a good answer to both questions. To begin with, they argue that it is implausible to attribute to infants such sophisticated meta-representational abilities as the ability to represent others’ false beliefs. Thus, Goldman and Jordan favour a deflationary view, according to which infants are sensitive to others’ false beliefs, but do not represent them as such. In particular, they propose that rather than believing that another subject S (falsely) believes that p, infants simply imagine how the world is from S’s perspective—that is, they simply imagine that p is the case. This—Goldman and Jordan say—is a more primitive psychological competence than mindreading, since it does not involve forming a judgment about others’ mental states. This brings us to Goldman and Jordan’s answer to the question “why do children pass the verbal false belief task only at four?” Passing this task requires fully-fledged mindreading abilities and executive functions such as inhibitory control. It takes quite a lot of time—around 3 to 4 years—before these functions and abilities come online.