 Another problem some have seen with any version of Rational Reflection is that it ultimately doesn’t allow the subject to remain unsure what degree of belief it is rational for her to have. It forces her to match her first-order degree of belief to a specific value, namely, a weighted average of the degrees of belief that she thinks it might be rational to have. It collapses her uncertainty about what is rational to a certainty about the average of the possibilities and forces her to embrace that precise value. This doesn’t allow a kind of mismatch or akrasia that might be the right way to respond to some higher-order evidence, where one is confident that q and also thinks it likely that the evidence supports a lower confidence than one has but is unsure what that lower confidence should be. Maybe one should not defer to the higher-order evidence in this case, because one is not sure what its verdict is (Sliwa &amp; Horowitz 2015). See the higher-order calibration approach below for a way of representing this uncertainty that can give a justification for thinking that matching to averages is rational.