 Her criticisms of Descartes intertwine three distinct philosophical positions. First, she takes up the position of Aristotelian virtue ethics, in objecting that Descartes’s very liberal account of virtue, which requires only the intention to do good, does not require that one’s good intentions are realized in actions that are actually good. That is, she notes that Descartes makes virtue impervious to fortune or moral luck. She, however, goes beyond the canonical Aristotelian position to maintain that even our ability to reason is subject to luck. (This position helps to illuminate her view on the nature of the human mind. See the discussion in section 3.2 above.) Elisabeth also takes up a classically Stoic position, insofar as she objects to the way in which Descartes’s account of virtue separates virtue from contentment. She objects that Descartes’s account of virtue allows for the virtuous agent to make mistakes, and she does not see how an agent can avoid regret in the face of those mistakes. Insofar we regret when even our best intentions go awry, we can be virtuous and fail to be content. While it is unclear whether her objection is a psychological one or a normative one, she does maintain that achieving contentment requires an ‘infinite science’ (4:289) so that we might know all of the impact of our actions, and so properly evaluate them. Without a faculty of reason that is already perfected, on her view, not only will we not be able to achieve virtue, we also will not rest content. (See Shapiro 2012 for an interpretation of these remarks. Perler (2021) situates this discussion within a contemporary framework of internalism and externalism and argues that Elisabeth replaces Descartes’ internalist conception of happiness with a more complex conception that takes both internal and external factors into account.) On her view, not only the right use of our rational faculties but also the right conditions for using them are required for obtaining happiness.