 Green says that reality and the system of appearances are equally dependent on each other (PE §36) and warns against the misunderstanding of idealism that results from thinking that it reduces facts to ideas (PE §37). In the discussion of the possibility of bare sensations, he does not deny that they would be facts but insists that they would be facts that would not exist for consciousness (PE §§48–9). This suggests, not the metaphysical claim that facts are mind-dependent, but the epistemic claim that only structured experience can be the basis of knowledge. However, this epistemological claim is much less radical than the metaphysical claim. Nor is it clear how it is inconsistent with Kantian dualism; it appears to reaffirm Kant’s claim that we can only have knowledge of appearances and not to deny that there are things-in themselves. Perhaps Green’s claim is only that we are unable to say anything about things-in-themselves, even to say of them that they exist, without bringing them in relation to a conscious subject (PE §40).