  As with his philosophy as a whole, Schopenhauer takes his point of departure in aesthetics from Kant, praising him for deepening the subjective turn in philosophical aesthetics and thereby putting it on the right path (WWR I, Appendix, 560–61. Note: page references to vol. I refer to the Cambridge edition translation; references to vol. II to the Payne transl.).  Like Kant, he held that the phenomenon of beauty would only be illuminated through a careful scrutiny of its effects on the subject, rather than by proceeding in the pre-Kantian objectivist fashion, searching out the properties of objects—such as smoothness, delicacy and smallness—which putatively give rise to the feeling of the beautiful. But the subjective turn is as far as Kant’s aesthetic-methodological merit extends, according to Schopenhauer: it is too indirect, due to Kant’s primary method in philosophy, the transcendental argument.