 What does Vasubandhu mean by saying that persons are only conventionally real? The term person is just a collective term for a group of aggregates, ultimately collection of physical and mental dharmas, just as milk is a term for a collection of tropes—such as whitishness, liquidness, and potability. For Vasubandhu, only dharmas or tropes exist ultimately or substantially. All other things exist in name only. Siderits explains the idea thus: ‘The point about “chariot” and “person” is that they are opaque enumerative expressions: when taken at face value they seem to denote individual entities, only further analysis shows them to be ways of referring to a plurality of entities in a certain arrangement’ (2019: 313). So, persons, chariots and pots are conceptual fictions. Siderits adds, ‘The idea here is that the enumerative term “pot” represents a concept that has proven useful for creatures with certain interests (in this case, for storage) and certain cognitive limitations (such as the inability to track all the many parts)… . Now conventional truths do typically guide one to successful practice. This would be difficult to explain if the truth-makers for conventionally true statements consisted of nothing but mere conceptual fictions. Thus conventionally real entities are said to supervene on ultimately real entities’ (2019: 314–15). The idea of conventional realities like persons being useful fictions was introduced in Siderits (1997) as a faithful interpretation of Abhidharma. Recently, this too has been contested (Chadha 2021). Some conventional entities may well be useful fictions, for example, chariots, armies and nations. But persons cannot be on that list. Persons inherit the work of the selves, so they are just as dangerous as selves. The Buddhist Eliminativist about selves cannot and should not condone persons.