 But is it true that if the \(F\)-ness of each \(X\) is dependent on the next \(X\) in the sequence being \(F\), and if this goes on without end, that we cannot explain why any \(X\) is \(F\)? Schaffer claims that in the case of an infinite regress of ontological dependence, with each entity depending on the next in the chain, and no independent entities, being would be “infinitely deferred, never achieved”. Why think this? The idea seems to be that a dependent entity only has the being it has on condition of something else having being. If \(A\) is ontologically dependent on \(B\) then the existence of \(A\) is a promissory note, only paid if \(B\) itself exists. But if \(B\) is ontologically dependent on \(C\) then the existence of \(B\) is a promissory note, only paid if \(C\) exists … and so on, so that if this process never stops, the promissory note is never paid, in which case, allegedly, the existence of all these things could never get off the ground in the first place.