 A later reaction, starting around the mid-century, rejected both non-naturalism and non-cognitivism and explored versions of naturalism, including a neo-Aristotelian version that grounds all ethical demands in a conception of human flourishing, or of the development of a human nature understood in quasi-biological terms (Anscombe 1958; Foot 2001); this view implicitly denies the autonomy of ethics. Here a specifically ant-Moorean claim was that predicative uses of “good,” as in Moore’s “aesthetic appreciation is good,” are ungrammatical, since the only legitimate uses of the word in English are attributive, as in “good knife,” “good pickpocket,” and, most relevantly to the neo-Aristotelian view, “good human being” (Geach 1956; also Thomson 1997). But, despite being made at the high-water mark of ordinary-language philosophy, this claim about English grammar seems plainly false: the language has always allowed predicative uses of “good,” from the King James translation of Genesis – “God saw the light, that it was good” (cited in Butchvarov 1989: 17) – to everyday phrases such as “It is good that …” Moore’s moral philosophy cannot credibly be dismissed as resting on a crude linguistic error (see also e.g. Pigden 1990; Zimmerman 1999; Kraut 2011: 173–83). One strand in this later reaction, like others influenced by Wittgenstein, rejected the calculating side of Moore’s consequentialism, which identifies right and wrong acts by adding up the goods and evils in their consequences. Moral judgements, some argued, can’t be codified or theorized in this way but instead call for ethically trained and sensitive insight into particular situations as particular (e.g. McDowell 1979). Even apart from that there was, in many circles, skepticism about the supposed extravagance and dogmatism of Moore’s substantive claims about the good – such as his specific valuing of aesthetic appreciation and personal love – and a preference for the allegedly more modest view that what is good in people’s lives is just the fulfilment of whatever desires they have. By the 1960s, it seems fair to say, many of Moore’s views were thought deeply problematic and his moral philosophy as a whole was not considered an especially live option. It was still thought important to read Principia Ethica, or at least its first chapter, as having initiated the sequence of developments that led to the then-current views. But from the standpoint of many of those views, Moore’s general approach to ethics was at key points misguided.