 In the work of Anderson and Belnap the central systems of relevance logic were the logic \(\mathbf{E}\) of relevant entailment and the system \(\mathbf{R}\) of relevant implication. The relationship between the two systems is that the entailment connective of \(\mathbf{E}\) was supposed to be a strict (i.e. necessitated) relevant implication. To compare the two, Meyer added a necessity operator to \(\mathbf{R}\) (to produce the logic \(\mathbf{NR})\). Larisa Maksimova, however, discovered that \(\mathbf{NR}\) and \(\mathbf{E}\) are importantly different — that there are theorems of \(\mathbf{NR}\) (on the natural translation) that are not theorems of \(\mathbf{E}\). This has left some relevant logicians with a quandary. They have had to decide whether to take \(\mathbf{NR}\) or \(\mathbf{E}\) to be the system of relevant entailment. If \(\mathbf{E}\) is chosen, then perhaps it is not reasonable to say that entailment is just relevant implication together with logical necessity. It may be that entailment and implication are related in some other way.