 “Illeity” thus points to an indeterminate place or source, the sheer dignity of the other who faces me, or the other always already motivating my saying. Yet despite this, Levinas sometimes extends illeity to the possibility of my receiving justice from other people. He writes, “thanks to God [Il] … I am approached as an other by the others” (OBBE: 158). But, of course, even if universal justice is “thanks to God”, this God is not part of being (OBBE: 162)—a claim familiar to both negative theology and to Maimonides’ ultimate approach to God through human action. Levinas is fully aware of the paradox he introduces into “illeity”. And he clearly knows the theological reversion to praxis that Maimonides proposes at the end of his Guide of the Perplexed: “The only positive knowledge of God of which man is capable is knowledge of the attributes of action”   (Fagenblat 2010: 113).[43]  As Levinas puts it, “to know God is to know what must be done” (DF: 17). It is not to know some being or even to erect a regulative idea. The dignity and force of illeity thus share an important connection with what we might call our enacting God through responsibility to the other or through justice. Another word for this is “holiness”, whether this comes from me in the form of the Saying or from the others as justice toward me.