 Yet another argument rests on the importance of preferences for choice. When agents choose from an  alternative set, then preferences should be choice guiding. They should have such a structure that they can be used to guide our choice among the elements of that set. But when choosing e.g. from \(\{A,B,C\}\), a preference relation \(\succ\) such that \(A\succ B\succ C\succ A\) does not guide choice at all: any or none of the alternatives should be chosen according to \(\succ\). The transitivity of preference, it is therefore suggested, is a necessary condition for a meaningful connection between preferences and choice. A critic, however, can point out that preferences are important even when they cannot guide choices. Take e.g. preferences over lottery outcomes: these are real preferences, regardless of the fact that one cannot choose between lottery outcomes. Further, the necessary criteria for choice guidance are much weaker than weak transitivity (Hansson 2001, 23–25; compare also versions of decision theory in which transitivity fails, e.g. Fishburn 1991). Last, the indifference relation does not satisfy choice guidance either. That does not make it irrational to be indifferent between alternatives. Thus, choice guidance can be an argument for the normative appropriateness of transitivity only under certain restrictions, if at all (For further discussion, see Anand 1993). 