 For example, Asaṅga tells us that it would be permissible to tell a lie to save another sentient being from being killed or seriously harmed. If someone takes up with bad friends, it would be permissible to criticize those friends to him, a case of divisive speech, in order to protect him from being corrupted by them. It would be permissible to overthrow a wicked king or remove a corrupt temple administrator from office. If a thief steals items belonging to the monastic community, it would be permissible to steal them back in order to protect him from the severe bad karma of consuming those items. In fact, if a bandit is planning to murder a large number of spiritually advanced beings, it would be permissible to kill the bandit preemptively, thus saving him from the terrible torment of aeons in the hells. In all such cases, according to Asaṅga, these acts, if done with the right kind of motivation, would result in much merit for the one who carries them out. (Tatz trans. 1986, 70–73)