 Finally, rather than attacking the argument itself, one might instead argue that, while it is sound, the conclusion is not really a significant one.  For what matters is not whether there is some evidence relative to which it is unlikely that theism is true.  What matters is whether theism is improbable relative to our total evidence.  But, then, suppose that we introduce some different observations—\(O^*\)—such that it seems plausible that \(O^*\) is more likely to be the case if theism is true that if the Hypothesis of Indifference is true.  For example, \(O^*\) might be some proposition about the occurrences of experiences that seem to be experiences of a loving deity.  The question then is whether the appropriate revision of the first substantive premise is plausible.  That is, do we have good reason for thinking that the following statement is true: