 While not everyone agrees as to the role of mathematics in the above explanations, or whether they are explanations, it is clear that one of the reasons why philosophers are especially interested in such explanations is that they appear to be counterexamples to the claim that all explanations in the natural sciences must be causal. The dominant accounts of scientific explanation (see Salmon 1984, Cartwright 1989, Woodward 2003, Strevens 2008, and Woodward 2014 for an overview) in the natural sciences have been causal accounts: to provide an explanation of a scientific fact is to provide its cause or the mechanism yielding the fact (on mechanistic explanations see Woodward 2013, Andersen 2014, and Craver and Tabery 2016).  The last two decades has witnessed major contributions in the study of non-causal explanations in the sciences (for a recent volume devoted to the issue see Reutlinger &amp; Saatsi 2018). And since many of the non-causal explanations that have been discussed in the literature are mathematical explanations, this area of philosophy of science is fueled by concerns related to the nature of scientific explanation. 