 Finding themselves dissatisfied with Kaplan’s proposal here, other direct reference theorists have opted for different responses to the problem of names with multiple bearers. For instance, both Francois Recanati (1997) and Michael Pelczar and Joe Rainsbury (1998) have suggested that names ought to be treated on the model of indexicals, a sort of term that we will consider in more detail shortly. Briefly though, the suggestion runs: there is one and only one name ‘David Cameron’, but context makes clear to which individual a particular utterance of this name refers. In effect, the proposal preserves something of the causal theory—by allowing that baptisms and passings-on of names are the right sort of thing to determine the set of possible referents associated with a name at any given time—while appealing to some further feature of the context to do the work of selecting an individual from this set. One lingering problem is that, in contrast to the pure indexicals like ‘I’ or ‘here’, it is less than clear what aspect of the context might serve to make this selection. Things get worse still once we consider contexts in which multiple people bearing the same name are all present and being talked about in the course of a single utterance (e.g. “David was Prime Minister, now retired in disgrace, whereas David is a plumber in good  standing.”).[6]  One possibility would be to posit that proper names function more like the demonstratives ‘this’ and ‘that’ than they do any of the pure indexicals. Alternatively, one might posit that proper names themselves denote only the property of bearing the relevant name, but that singular reference emerges when proper names are supplemented with a determiner like ‘that’ or ‘the’ to form a determiner phrase like ‘that David’ or ‘the Michelle’ (see Burge (1973) and Graff Fara (2015), respectively; see also the entry on  names  for more on such ‘predicativist’ views). In languages like English, of course, these determiners would turn out to be mostly silent. Still, one might take it that positing silent determiners is a price worth paying for coherent story about the reference of names (or definite noun phrases containing names, as the case may be) that is compatible with the claim that two individuals can genuinely share a name.