 This norm does not imply that \(S\) ought to believe everything that is true, and hence does not put impossible demands on \(S\). However, as noted in the discussion of  \((\ME_1)\)  above, the question arises whether \((\NB_2)\) suffices to provide any real constraints on \(S\)‘s belief formation. If \(p\) is true it does not follow that \(S\) ought to believe \(p\), and if \(p\) is false it merely follows that it is not the case that \(S\) ought to believe \(p\)—not that \(S\) ought not to believe \(p\) (Bykvist &amp; Hattiangadi 2007:  280).[46]  In response, normativists have made the same move as in the case of meaning, and suggested that the “ought” in  \((\NB_1)\)  is replaced with a “may” (Whiting 2010: 216–217; 2013: 125). It has been objected that this is too weak since it undermines the fundamental role of the norm of truth when it comes to explaining other evidential and inferential norms (Bykvist &amp; Hattiangadi 2013: 113–114) and to accounting for some key feature of doxastic deliberation (Sullivan-Bissett &amp; Noordhof  2020).[47]