 McKinsey’s  (LO)  is, in one sense, in agreement with possibilism because an agent’s primary obligation is identical to a possibilist obligation. Moreover, even though (LO) can generate jointly unfulfillable obligations, (LO) agrees with Jackson and Pargetter’s contextualist actualism that if, in the terminology of (LO), an agent fulfills her primary obligation, then it’s not the case that the agent violates any non-primary obligations because the agent simply does not have any non-primary obligations. For example, if Ben refrains from pressing any button, then according to (LO) it’s not the case that Ben had a secondary obligation to press the first button, and thus no non-primary obligations are violated. McKinsey’s (LO) is, in a sense, also in agreement with (non-contextualist) versions of actualism. For example, Procrastinate’s obligation according to non-contextualist versions of actualism is to ⟨decline to review the paper &amp; not review the paper⟩, and, according to McKinsey, this is Procrastinate’s secondary obligation because this act-sequence is the second best maximal act-sequence (or a part of the second best maximal act-sequence) that Procrastinate can perform over time. 