 Maximalists have objected to omnism on the grounds that it, in conjunction with (2) and (3), entails a contradiction (Portmore forthcoming: ch. 4). Given omnism, S is obligated to ⟨drink a Coke⟩ because performing that act is S’s best option. S’s ⟨drinking a Coke⟩ entails S’s ⟨drinking a soda⟩. So, given (2), S is also obligated to ⟨drink a soda⟩. However, recall that this case illustrates principle (3). If S were to ⟨drink a soda⟩, S would ⟨drink a Pepsi⟩. Given this, ⟨drinking a soda⟩ would not result in S performing her best option. So, omnism also entails that it is impermissible for S to ⟨drink a soda⟩. Hence the contradiction. Omnism combined with (2) and (3) entail both that S is obligated to ⟨drink a soda⟩ and that it’s impermissible for S to ⟨drink a soda⟩. To avoid this contradiction, omnists must give up (2) or (3). Omnists such as Jackson and Pargetter have given up (2).