 The primary methodological problem is that arguments for and against the memory criterion tend to rely on thought experiments involving memory swapping and other such cases. Moving away from these far-out cases, some philosophers have preferred to consider the implications of real memory disorders. Craver (2012; cf. Craver, Kwan, Steindam, &amp; Rosenbaum 2014), for example, has argued on the basis of cases of episodic amnesia such as that of the well known patient KC (Rosenbaum et al. 2005) that memory is not a presupposition of selfhood. Others have preferred to build on cognitive psychological theories of autobiographical memory. Schechtman (1994, 2011), for example, has argued that memory does not and need not provide simple connections between discrete past and present moments of consciousness, maintaining that what matters, as far as the sense of personal identity is concerned, is the way in which autobiographical memory summarizes, constructs, interprets, and condenses distinct moments from the personal past to produce a coherent overall narrative (cf. Goldie 2012). Approaches such as Schechtman’s appear to involve a change of subject, from personal identity as such to the subject’s sense of personal identity. This shift is explicit in Klein and Nichols’ (2012) examination of the role of autonoesis in underwriting the sense of personal identity—the sense that one now is the same person as someone at an earlier time. Roache (2016) has questioned Klein and Nichols’ interpretation of the clinical case on which their argument depends, and the debate over the relationship between autonoesis and the sense of personal identity is ongoing (Fernández forthcoming; Klein 2016b).