 The claim that the explanations for indivisibility and distinction are the same gains some plausibility from an analogy with the distinction between different specific differences in relation to a genus – an analogue that Scotus evidently regards as less controversial, and more familiar to his readers. A specific difference distinguishes two different species of a genus from each other. A specific difference is something indivisible in such a way that is explanatory of a species’s indivisibility into further species (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 177 (Scotus [OO], 7:478; Spade (1994), 103–104)). Equally, an ultimate specific difference is “primarily diverse” from any other, in the sense that such a specific difference “has a concept that is absolutely simple” (and thus cannot even overlap with the concept of any other such difference) (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 183 (Scotus [OO], 7:481; Spade (1994), 105)). It does not seem overly puzzling that a specific difference could perform these two functions: the absolute conceptual simplicity of any ultimate specific difference seems to entail both distinction from every other specific difference, and its possessing the relevant sort of indivisibility. And Scotus believes that these sorts of consideration can help explicate the function of a haecceity relative to individuation too. That is to say, he believes that something wholly devoid of common (shared) content – a haecceity – can explain not only indivisibility into further particulars, but also distinction from all other particulars (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 5–6, n. 177 (Scotus [OO], 7:478; Spade (1994), 103–104); n. 183 (Scotus [OO], 7:481; Spade (1994), 105)).