 Stuart Rosenbaum (2015, 23, 41) claims that ‘integrity is the heart of morality to most people’, and that pragmatism alone can accommodate that centrality. He (2015, 24) argues that pragmatist conceptions render integrity more than ‘useful in efforts to understand the moral life.’ For Rosenbaum (2015, 27), ‘The idea of integrity, focussed through the lens of pragmatism, enable a cohesive way of thinking about the many and diverse moral dimensions of life.’ He (2015, 22) maintains that the idea of integrity does not ‘play any distinctive role’ in utilitarian, deontological, or virtue ethics; and he laments (2015, 22, 28–33) what he sees as the baleful historical influence of Platonism in misdirecting moral philosophers’ attention away from ordinary peoples’ actual moral concerns. For Rosenbaum (2015, 34, 65), integrity is not an a priori ideal, but provides for a context-sensitive, working theory of morality. A person’s integrity consists of their autonomy, their commitment to community values and traditions, and their commitment to the ideals of self and community (2015, 87f.). ‘Being a person of integrity is doing one’s best given one’s values and the social and cultural conditions of one’s environment (2015, 106). Thus Rosenbaum is in agreement with Williams that integrity lacks determinate content; but he differs in qualifying the italicized declaration that integrity ‘has no moral content of its own, no essence or ontology of its own, apart from the cultures, societies, and psyches that may realize it’ (2015, 20; cf.88). So it is that, although he sees universal applicability in this concept of integrity, and indeed in aspects of integrity-based morality more widely, Rosenbaum (2015, 103f.) is able to contemplate the possibility that even a suicide-bomber may be a person of integrity.