 These eliminativist positions are the minority (for discussion see E. Jackson 2020); more common are positions that either regard belief or credence to be more fundamental than the other, or that neither is more fundamental than the other (i.e., belief-credence dualism—see Staffel 2019; Buchak 2014; E. Jackson forthcoming; Weisberg 2020). Non-eliminativists who deny dualism typically defend either that (i) credence is a species of belief (or can be explained in terms of or otherwise reduced to belief), or that belief is a species of credence (or can be explained in terms of otherwise reduced to credence). The former kind of position is usually described as the “belief-first” position (e.g., Moon &amp; Jackson 2020; Holton 2008; Easwaran 2016; Moon 2018; Carter, Jarvis, &amp; Rubin 2016), the latter as the “credence-first” position (e.g., Wedgwood 2012; Greco 2015; Weatherson 2005; Lee &amp; Silvia 2022).