  Sinnott-Armstrong would say that in order for the undercutting defeater (the 1st stranger’s comment) to be defeated by the factory worker’s claim that the stranger is a trickster, the factory worker’s comment must provide McCoy with a reason to think that his belief was formed reliably. But, Ballantyne and Thurow claim, all that has happened is that the original, non-inferential justification has been restored. “Whatever initially made B justified continues to justify B once the defeater has been defeated.  McCoy’s belief that the widget is red is justified by his perceptual experience or seeming” (414). The same can be said of moral intuitions. I may regard my moral belief as justified by an intuition with the same content if I am justified in believing that potential undercutting defeaters have been defeated (or are absent). In such a case I have an inferential argument for the justification of my moral belief, but that does not mean that I have an inferential justification for my moral belief. All that has happened, is that the original, non-inferential justification (provided by the intuition) has been restored.