One problem with this view, at least as a defense of the modal quantifier account, is that it requires an invidious distinction between different sorts of analytic entailment; for, although ‘∃x Parent(x)’ is not committed to children according to the modal quantifier criterion, ‘∃x Bachelor(x)’ is committed to males. The chief problem, however, with accepting a criterion that omits implicit ontological commitments is that it undermines the philosophical use of the criterion. Surely, the implicit ontological commitments of the theory must be included in tabulating the ontological costs of a theory. Enjoining the theorist to “make all implicit ontological commitments explicit” does not solve the problem because the theorist may not know, and may be in no position to know, the implicit commitments of her theory. Such ignorance, however, does not make the theory less costly. It seems, then, that the problem of extrinsic properties—and, more generally, the problem of capturing implicit ontological commitment—provides a genuine counterexample to quantifier accounts of ontological commitment.