 Proponents of the first version of this strategy, e.g. Millikan (1996) and Neander (1996), insist that common Swampman intuitions are irrelevant because they are incorrect. They argue that it may be natural to think that a possible being like Swampman would have intentional states, but that this intuitive verdict is in fact false. The analogy with an a posteriori analysis of the nature of water is thought to be helpful here. Following Kripke and Putnam, many have been persuaded that the term “water” and the concept WATER have referred to H2O exclusively, even before it was known that water is H2O, because there was deference to an unknown nature that explained the superficial properties by means of which we usually recognize instances of the liquid. On this view, it was (in 1700) natural to think that there could be water without H2O, although this was not, in fact, metaphysically possible, given that water is H2O. Along similar lines, it can be argued that a Swampman that has intentional states is only an apparent, but not a genuine metaphysical possibility, and that common Swampman intuitions thus do not undermine standard teleosemantic theories of content. (Note that the claim here is not that Swampman is metaphysically impossible, but only that a Swampman with intentional states is.) 