 In other contexts, Albalag argues, in opposition to al-Ghazali, that divine agency is neither natural nor voluntary, but an intermediary type that lies beyond human understanding. This, however, does not mean that God has no will. The truth is that God has a capacity that constitutes for Him what will constitutes for human beings. The exact nature of this capacity, which human beings call will, is obscure, even though demonstration establishes that it exists. Nonetheless, considering the defining criteria of the conception of divine perfection, it is inferred that this capacity shares no features with empirical will. Unlike empirical will which follows from a stimulus and seeks to fulfill a desire, divine will is self-sufficient. While empirical will is temporal, originates with a stimulus and perishes as soon as the desire is fulfilled, divine will, consistently with the eternal and immutable nature of God, is eternal and immutable, being characterized as a benevolent and immutable capacity to eternally “choose” the best of two opposite things: 