 Either proposal would solve the problem with utilitarianism. If mind-dependence (in the sense relevant to the meta-ethical debate about realism) is a matter of whether normative principles are grounded in mental facts, then utilitarians are free (as far as their utilitarianism goes) to endorse either the mind-dependence or the mind-independence of the moral. Utilitarianism just says that the particular moral facts are grounded in mental facts, but does not commit one way or the other on the grounding of the Principle of Utility. Similarly, if mind-dependence is a matter of metaphysical (as opposed to normative) grounding of particular facts in the mental, then utilitarianism can (and should) be read as the claim that moral facts are normatively grounded in happiness facts. Utilitarianism is silent on the further claim that moral facts are metaphysically grounded in happiness facts (or any mental facts whatsoever), which leaves it open to the utilitarian to either affirm or deny the mind-dependence of moral facts – i.e., to either affirm or deny mind-independent moral realism.