 In the literature, there is quite a range of theoretical claims about unified consciousness. We have looked at some of them. The first group concerned diverging models: the subsumption, co-consciousness, single phenomenal content, and joint consciousness models and related taxonomies. Then we looked at the unity thesis, claims about limits to and disorders of unified consciousness, claims about unity over time, and claims that there need not be a whole number of centres of consciousness and that partial unity is possible. In  Section 2,  we said that we’d return to the issue of whether unified experiences has or does not have experiential parts (EP vs. NEP), the issue that underlays subsumption. EP and NEP are the topics of Sections  7.1  and  7.2.  Near the end of  Section 4,  we said that we would return to the claim that unified consciousness requires links among conscious contents. We will take up this issues in  Section 7.3.  Finally for this Section, we will examine a claim that we have not discussed so far, what is usually called the co-ownership thesis  (Section 7.4)  