 The issues surrounding attention’s relationship to the voluntariness of action are parallel to some of the issues surrounding attention’s relationship to the consciousness of perception. It seems natural to think that attention is necessary for the voluntary performance of finely tuned behaviours, much as it seems necessary for the conscious perception of fine detail. But it does not seem natural to think that we must be paying attention to the execution of every act that we voluntarily perform, any more than it seem natural to suppose that we must pay attention in order to be consciously perceiving anything at all. A case could therefore be made, on commonsense grounds, for claiming that attention figures in the production of some but not all voluntary behaviours. One can imagine this view being challenged by a theorist who claimed that attention is necessary for any action to be voluntary, arguing that there is an illusion (analogous to the refrigerator light illusion) that gives us the mistaken impression that our inattentive acts are voluntary too. As in the case of attention and consciousness, there is a methodological puzzle (with epistemologically deep roots) about the sort of evidence that could settle this issue. This may be a topic for future research. While resisting the idea that attention is either necessary or sufficient for an act to be voluntary, Denis Buehler has argued that there is a central role for attention in the explanation of flexible goal-directed behaviour (Buehler, 2019). In cases where that behaviour involves the exercise of a skill, Alex Dayer and Carolyn Jennings have argued against the idea that any simple account of attention’s role in it can be given, claiming that a theory of attention’s role in skilled performance must instead be ‘pluralist’ (Dayer &amp; Jennings, 2021).