 Other attitudes like hoping, fearing, supposing, imagining display hyperintensional features (Wansing 2017). One may be led to the general conclusion that thought is hyperintensional: our intentional states can treat necessarily equivalent contents differently. Lois Lane can wish that Superman is in love with her without wishing that Clark Kent is in love with her, although (if Barcan Marcus and Kripke are right) it is impossible for Superman to be other than Clark Kent. We can suppose that \(75 \times 12 = 900\) without supposing Fermat’s Last Theorem. Even intentional states involving perceptual experiences, like seeing, seem hyperintensional: you can see that Mary is eating an ice cream without seeing that Mary is eating an ice cream and John is either eating chips or not (you may not be seeing John at all). But \(A\) is logically equivalent to \(A \land (B \lor {\sim}B)\) in classical logic and even in many weaker logics (Barwise &amp; Perry 1983).