 One problem with the entire program was raised by C.H. Langford (1942) and discussed by G.E. Moore (1942 [1968], pp. 665–6): why should analyses be of any conceivable interest? After all, if an analysis consists in providing the definition of an expression, then it should be providing a synonym for it, and this, then, should be wholly uninformative: if brother is analyzed as the presumably synonymous male sibling, then the claim Brothers are male siblings should be synonymous with Brothers are brothers, and thinking the one should be no different from thinking the other. But, aside from such simple cases as brother and bachelor, proposed analyses, if successful, often seemed quite non-obvious and philosophically informative. The proposed reductions of, say, material object statements to sensory ones (even where successful) were often fairly complex, had to be studied and learned, and so could hardly be uninformative. So how could they count as seriously  analytic?[6]