 P1  is built into (this version of) our case.  P2  follows from  P1,  assuming that Aisha’s body of total evidence grows monotonically over the course of the story.  P3  is plausible, and would nicely explain our verdict at the beginning of the story: that, before she receives her higher-order evidence, Aisha should believe G.  P4  follows from  P2  and  P3.  And  P5  is the intuitive verdict that many epistemologists share about cases like Hypoxia. (Though see Henderson forthcoming, Staffel forthcoming, and Steglich-Peterson 2019 for alternative views on which higher-order evidence does not require suspension of judgment, but still has a rational effect.) So if  P5  is right, this means that Aisha is required to disobey an epistemic rule which applies to her current situation: she must suspend judgment in a proposition that is entailed by her evidence, rather than believe it.