 Benson is careful to point out that a requirement of normative competence should not be conflated with a strong substantive conception of autonomy in which the theory places direct normative constraints on the contents of the preferences of autonomous agents. Even on Wolf’s position, in which normative competence is the ability to track objective moral norms, normative competence is nevertheless a capacity. It does not require that the content of agents’ preferences correspond to the content of the applicable norms. As Benson puts it, “normatively competent persons can choose what is unreasonable or wrong or value what is bad, because competence lies some distance short of perfect evaluative perception or responsiveness” (Benson 2005a, 133–4). However, there are controversial issues raised by normative competence accounts. The first is that of the status of the moral and other norms that are employed to explicate normative competence. Wolf’s claim that there are objective moral reasons that rational agents have the capacity to track is controversial despite being a well-known and widely supported position. Benson’s normative standpoints are not derived from objective moral reasons but rather are intersubjective standpoints—those derived from “persons or institutions to which the agent is concretely connected”. The problem here, as we have seen, is that such standpoints may be oppressive to the group in which the agent is a member. Indeed, as a result of internalized oppression, the agent may competently deploy these standards to evaluate her own actions. It seems, for example, that the eighteen-year-old student is competent to evaluate her actions using oppressive norms such as “beauty is a component of self-worth”. She is normatively competent with respect to the prevailing set of intersubjective norms (those of the oppressive ideology). If the student is to be characterized as lacking autonomy, she must be judged lacking in normative competence from some other normative standpoint—but where does this other standpoint come from on Benson’s account? A final difficulty for normative competence accounts is the charge that they conflate autonomy with moral responsibility. In the case of JoJo, for example, although it is plausible that the comprehensiveness of his socialization absolves him from full moral responsibility for his acts, it may be too quick to conclude that his acts are not the product of his own (autonomous) agency. The wish to maintain a conceptual distinction between responsibility and autonomy has led Benson to revise his early normative competence approach (Benson 1994, 665).