 Dworkin somewhat obscured his brilliant argument by melding the vice of thinking that legal philosophy is a matter of disclosing the agreed way of using the word ‘law’ (see section 6.1 below) with the vice of thinking that the content of the law of a jurisdiction is determined by agreement over the use of the words in which it is formulated. Pierluigi Chiassoni has recently isolated the second vice and called it the ‘container-retrieval’ theory (Chiassoni 2019, 113). On the container-retrieval theory, legislative language is filled up with content by linguistic conventions as to the application of the words in which it is expressed. The task of applying legislation is the task of identifying those cases to which its words conventionally apply. On that approach, Garner v Burr was rightly decided if English speakers were disposed in 1951 to apply the word ‘vehicle’ to a chicken coop on wheels. If they were disposed to withhold the term, the case was wrongly decided. And if they had no shared disposition either way, then there was a gap in the law, and the Court of Appeal had to fill it. In any case, the content-retrieval theorist is, as Dworkin suggested, doomed to conclude that competent lawyers cannot disagree in good faith as to what law has been made.