The game in Figure 1 is an example of a game in strategic form. There are two players, Ann and Bob, and each has to choose between two options: \(\Agt = \{Ann, Bob\}\), \(S_{Ann} = \{u, d\}\) and \(S_{Bob} = \{l, r\}\). The value of \(u_{Ann}\) and \(u_{Bob}\), representing their respective preferences over the possible outcomes of the game, are displayed in the cell of the matrix. If Bob chooses \(l\), for instance, Ann prefers the outcome she would get by choosing \(u\) to the one she would get by choosing \(d\), but this preference is reversed in the case Bob chooses \(r\). This game is called a “pure coordination game” in the literature because the players have a clear interest in coordinating their choices—i.e., on \((u, l)\) or \((d, r)\)—but they are indifferent about which way they coordinate their choices.