 Against this background, we may distinguish two questions. First, we might ask whether guidance by principles constitutes a superior strategy for acting well as compared to guidance by particular judgments untutored by principles. One familiar way to understand the superiority of a strategy is in terms of its reliability at leading an agent to act rightly and for morally good reasons (McKeever and Ridge 2006; Väyrynen 2008). Second, we might ask whether guidance by principles enables us to secure morally valuable goods (or avoid significant moral evils) that would otherwise be out of reach. If particularism tells us to eschew guidance by principles and if doing so comes with significant costs, then, to use Brad Hooker’s phrase, there is something “bad” about particularism (Hooker 2000, 2008). Similarly, if generalism tells us to use principles and this has serious costs, then there is something bad about generalism.