  Martin argues that in order to capture adequately the respect in which the phenomenology of visualising an F has some correspondence with the phenomenology of having a visual experience of an F, we should accept the dependency thesis—the thesis that to visualise an F is to imagine a visual experience of an F. He then argues that the truth of the dependency thesis should lead the intentionalist and the naïve realist to make different predictions about the phenomenology of visualising. Martin argues that if the dependency thesis is correct, then the intentionalist should hold that when we visualise, we imagine a mental state (i.e., a visual experience) that represents the world to be a certain way and that has a distinctive kind of functional role. We may, as part of our imaginative project, suppose that the imagined situation contains the objects and features represented by the imagined visual experience, but, argues Martin, the intentionalist should predict that (a) when one visualises something, e.g., an apple, the imagistic character of one’s visualising should itself be neutral with respect to whether or not one is imagining a scene that contains an apple, and (b) something other than the putative object of experience (i.e., the apple) should be available to introspection. The representational properties of the experience one is imagining should be revealed to one as such.