 Another argument for PIT involves appeal to brain in a vat scenarios (see Loar 2003a and Horgan, Tienson &amp; Graham 2004). A brain in a vat duplicate is an exact physical duplicate of a normally embodied human brain that is kept in a vat of life-sustaining liquids and is hooked up to a computer that delivers to it the same kinds of stimulation its embodied twin receives. It intuitively seems that a brain in a vat would have a mental life “matching” that of its embodied twin. The brain in a vat and its twin would have matching perceptual experiences, perceptual judgments, and beliefs. For example, when the embodied twin believes that she is lying on the beach sipping a frappé, the brain in a vat twin believes that they are lying on the beach sipping a frappé. However, while the normal subject’s belief might be true, the envatted subject’s beliefs, and many other of their mental states, would be false or non-veridical.