 Lange responds to Herbart by arguing that, while the synthesis of representations (in Kant’s sense) can be explained psychologically, the reasons why that synthesis are necessary and apply to objects are not reducible to psychology. However, Lange does argue that the natural and the normative explanations of necessity are compatible, and that this explains our access to normative conclusions. As Ernst Schröder points out, “In striving for our goals, we can thus take comfort in the belief that under certain knowable conditions the objective necessity that we are searching for will always also become subjective. Namely, if we are talking about the unification of unmediated contradictions, then both formal necessities will always occur together. In this context, F. A. Lange remarks very aptly, ‘The law of non-contradiction is the point at which the natural law of thought comes into contact with the normative law’” (Schröder (1890), 11–13, citation from Lange (1877), 27–28).