 The notion of limiting identification in chance is similar to the concept of limiting convergence to a probability estimate in  Reichenbach’s pragmatic vindication.  Translated to our example, Reichenbach considered inductive rules that output an estimate of the true bias value \(p,\) and required that such a rule converges to the true value, in the sense that for every every bias value \(p\), and for every threshold \(0\lt t \lt 1\), there is a sample size \(n\) such that for all larger sample sizes, with probability 1 the rule outputs an estimate that differs from the true value \(p\) by at most \(t\). In statistics, a method is called consistent if with increasing sample size, the method’s chance of conjecturing a correct answer converges to 100% (see the link in the Other Internet Resources section below). The terminology is unfortunate in that it suggests to philosophical readers a connection with the consistency of a formal proof system. In fact, the statistical concept of consistency has nothing to do with deductive logic; rather, it is a probabilistic analogue of the notion of identification in the limit of inquiry that is the main subject of this entry. 