 But this far from exhausts the options, and Scotus considers a number of non-qualitative theories too. In addition to the two theories discussed above, to the effect that things just are individuals (either through the nature itself, or through the negation of division), he considers a view according to which existence individuates, and two views according to which the explanation for individuation is matter, respectively matter as such, and matter + extension. Actual existence, perhaps a prima facie plausible non-qualitative or non-essential feature of a thing, is rejected by Scotus as an individuator on the grounds that existence as such – as opposed to the things that exist – does not seem to be different from case to case: in itself, it seems wholly undifferentiated (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 61 (Scotus [OO], 7:418–419; Spade (1994), 72–73)). Nothing about existence seems irreducibly particular in the way required. Indeed, Scotus supposes that there is a sense in which existence is posterior to the haecceity: the whole hierarchy of division into individuals is antecedent to questions of those individuals’ existence (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q, 3, n. 65 (Scotus [OO], 7:420; Spade (1994), 73–74). But that is another story.