  (2) if the precedent court's own characterisation of its ruling is abandoned, there is no coherent way to settle on the ‘material facts’ (Stone 1964, 267–80, 1985, 123–9). Take the case of the recipient of trust property transferred in breach of trust. A key aspect of the facts is that the recipient did not pay for the property. But why is this ‘material’?  If the court's own reasoning is put to one side, is it because no consideration was given (so had a token been provided that would have been sufficient); or that inadequate consideration was provided (so more than a token would be necessary); or that a reasonable price was not paid; or that the price was not what the beneficiary would have been willing to accept for the transfer; or that the price is not the best which the trustee could have obtained on the open market?  All of the preceding descriptions of the facts are true, but which is ‘material’?  The requirement for any of them would invalidate the transfer. 