 To accommodate such commonsense intuitions, consequentializers have typically appealed to an evaluator-relative ranking of outcomes, one where the agent’s ranking differs from that of, say, some bystander (see, e.g., Sen 1983—but see Dougherty 2013 and Setiya 2018 for an approach that doesn’t appeal to evaluator relativism). Whereas the bystander has no good reason to prefer Abe’s breaking his promise to two others’ breaking theirs, Abe has a good reason to prefer two others’ breaking their promises to his breaking his promise in that Abe has a special responsibility for his own promises, a responsibility that he doesn’t have for ensuring that the others keep theirs. Thus, given an agent’s special responsibility for their own agency, Abe should rank the outcome in which he keeps his promise and two others break theirs above the outcome in which he breaks his promise and two others keep theirs. And, so, the act-consequentialist can accommodate the intuition that breaking a promise is wrong even if breaking it would produce just as much good as (or even more good than) keeping it.