 Muslim thinkers have no consensus regarding the epistemic status of the principles of mathematics and the cognitive mechanisms through which we assent to the truth of these principles. For example, it can be shown that, according to Avicenna, every basic proposition of mathematics is included in either awwalīyāt (primary data) or fiṭrīyāt (or, more completely, muqaddamāt fiṭrīyāt al-qiyās, which is translated to ‘data with built-in syllogisms’ by Gutas (2012)). ‘The whole is greater than the part’ and ‘four is even’ are two of the most famous examples, respectively, of awwalīyāt and fiṭrīyāt. According to Avicenna, awwalīyāt have no middle terms and, therefore, no syllogism can be made to demonstrate them. They are too basic and obvious to need a proof (or to be provable at all). As soon as we grasp all the concepts from which an awwalī proposition is constituted, we immediately assent to the truth of that proposition. These propositions are self-evident and necessary. No one can have a rational doubt about them. Unlike awwalīyāt, fiṭrīyāt have middle terms and must be proved. However, the syllogism through which a fiṭrī proposition must be established is so simple that as soon as the minor term (i.e., subject) and the major term (i.e., predicate) are grasped, the middle term appears in the mind and the truth of that proposition is assented to. For example, immediately after grasping the concepts four and even, the concept divisible-by-two appears in our mind and we can affirm the fact that ‘(every) four is even’ through the following syllogism (Mousavian &amp; Ardeshir 2018):