 A different topic that has only recently begun to receive sustained attention concerns perspectival diversity. Theories of public reason are explicitly designed to address the fact of reasonable pluralism or disagreement, but the disagreement is often assumed to be only about normative or ethical matters. But persons’ diverse perspectives can also lead to disagreement regarding how to categorize or describe the world. Different parties to a dispute might all agree, for example, that gratuitous harm is wrong, but disagree about whether hate speech constitutes harm, or disagree about whether certain creatures are capable of suffering harm. Without a shared account of the world, it might seem the project of public reason faces grave difficulties. Even if certain moral or political rules can be publicly justified, our understanding and application of these rules might radically diverge given sufficient perspectival diversity regarding what the world looks like. Gerald Gaus and Ryan Muldoon confront this challenge for theories of public reason in recent work (Gaus 2016; Gaus 2017; Muldoon 2016). Both suggest that perspectival diversity is not necessarily an obstacle to be overcome, but can also deliver important epistemic benefits. But both also suggest existing accounts of public reason, which often emphasize the importance of persons or citizens sharing a common perspective, are ill-suited to realizing these benefits.