 The negative claim is supported by at least two lines of thought. The first ascribes the common belief in the resemblance of SQs and their ideas to a misguided metaphysical theory implicit in a common way of speaking: “Flame is denominated Hot and Light … from the ideas [it produces] in us” (E 2.8.16). But, Locke argues, fire causes ideas of both heat and pain and we have no more reason to think heat resembles something in the fire than that pain does (E 2.8.16). Many scholars take the remark about use of language to say we give the same names to sensations and the qualities that cause them (e.g., Ayers 1991: 63–4), but although this might account for the assumption that ideas are in substances, which Locke indulges, it hardly explains belief in idea-quality resemblance. Jacovides (2007b) convincingly argues that the usage to which Locke refers is paronymous, i.e., the name of one thing is given to something which has a certain relation to the one but with a change of ending. Locke speaks of the names of general ideas of kinds of things in this way; e.g., we are denominated “human” from the abstract idea, humanity (E 3.8.1). In Essay 2.8, ideas produced by SQs are almost always given names of abstract ideas: “sweetness”, “warmth”, etc. Jacovides suggests Locke’s point is that the paronymous use of names of ideas of SQs may convey that there is something in objects that gives them their colors, etc. The second argument against resemblance questions why warmth, etc. is supposed to resemble something in bodies but pain is not (E 2.8.16).