 To pick up the thread again: now, K fails if knowledge entails CR but not if knowledge entails SI, but it may not be possible to underwrite K merely by replacing CR with SI, since some other condition for knowledge might block closure. We can underwrite closure if we assume that believing p on “safe” grounds is sufficient for knowing p, but this assumption is dubious. As we have understood safety, we can believe things on safe grounds without knowing them. An obvious example is any necessary truth: because it holds in all possible worlds we can safely believe it for any reason. For another example, recall the red barn case discussed earlier: despite the many fake blue barns in the neighborhood, my red-barn percepts are safe indicators that the object in front of me is a barn and that it is a red barn, so no objectionable juxtaposition (such as I know there is a red barn but not there is a barn) occurs, but some theorists will insist that, in the circumstances sketched, I know neither that the object is a barn nor that it is a red barn. 