  Because consciousness is assumed to be private or subjective, it is often taken to be beyond the reach of objective scientific methods (e.g., Nagel 1974). This claim might be taken in either of two ways. On the one hand it might be taken to bear on the possibility of answering the Distribution Question, i.e., to reject the possibility of knowledge that a member of another taxonomic group (e.g., a bat) has conscious states. On the other hand it might be taken to bear on the possibility of answering the Phenomenological Question, i.e., to reject the possibility of knowledge of the phenomenological details of the mental states of a member of another taxonomic group. The difference between believing with justification that a bat is conscious and knowing what it is like to be a bat is important because, at best, the privacy of conscious experience supports a negative conclusion only about the latter. To support a negative conclusion about the former, one must also assume that consciousness has absolutely no measurable effects on behavior, i.e., one must accept epiphenomenalism. But if one rejects epiphenomenalism and maintains that consciousness does have effects on behavior then a strategy of inference to the best explanation may be used to support its attribution. Moreover, if particular conscious states have particular effects on behavior, then this strategy might be pursued to elucidate some specific features of the conscious experience of other animals, even if some aspects must remain out of reach because of our inability, as humans, to fully grasp what it would be like to experience them. More will be said about this in the next section.