 On the other hand, once matters of meaning and mental content are taken into account, co-intensionality might seem too weak, for it makes a property \(P\) identical to any logically equivalent property, e.g., assuming classical logic, \(P\) and (\(Q\) or not \(Q\)). And with a sufficiently broad notion of logical necessity, even, for example, being triangular and being trilateral are identical. However, one could insist that “trilateral” and “triangular” appear to have different meanings, which somehow involve the different geometrical properties having a side, and having an angle, respectively. And if being triangular were really identical to being trilateral, from the fact that John believes that a certain object has the former property, one should be able to infer that John also believes that such an object has the latter property. Yet, John’s ignorance may make this conclusion unwarranted. In the light of this, borrowing a term from Cresswell (1975), one may move from intensional to hyperintensional identity conditions, according to which two properties, such as trilaterality and triangularity, may be different even if they are co-intensional. In order to implement this idea, Bealer (1982) take two properties to be identical iff they have the same analysis, i.e., roughly, they result from the same ultimate primitive properties and the same logical operations applied to them (see also Menzel 1986; 1993). Zalta (1983; 1988) has developed an alternative available to those who admit two modes of predication (see  §1.4):  two properties are identical iff they are (necessarily) encoded by the same objects.