Probabilities may be taken to represent doxastic attitudes in the sense that they specify opinions about data and hypotheses of an idealized rational agent. The probability then expresses the strength or degree of belief, for instance regarding the correctness of the next guess of the tea tasting lady. They may also be taken as decision-theoretic, i.e., as part of a more elaborate representation of the agent, which determines her dispositions towards decisions and actions about the data and the hypotheses. Oftentimes a decision-theoretic representation involves doxastic attitudes alongside preferential and perhaps other ones. In that case, the probability may for instance express a willingness to bet on the lady being correct. Finally, the probabilities may be taken as logical.  More precisely, a probabilistic model may be taken as a logic, i.e., a formal representation that fixes a normative ideal for uncertain reasoning. According to this latter option, probability values over data and hypotheses have a role that is comparable to the role of truth values in deductive logic: they serve to secure a notion of valid inference, without carrying the suggestion that the numerical values refer to anything psychologically salient.