  In the matter of the free will debate the ordinary people believe neither side. Against Determinism they hold that they can and often do initiate actions—and on this point Bradley portrays the ordinary person as accepting the thesis now called “agent causality.” What is omitted by the Determinists are explanations of behavior which appeal to the reasons of the agent, thereby ignoring Aristotle’s notion of final causality, or purposely reducing it to efficient causality. The Indeterminist presents herself as the friend of freedom but when she claims that people are so free that they could choose any act at any time the ordinary people object. They think it often possible to predict what someone will do, because she has a formed moral character and can be counted on to act a certain way when faced with moral questions. Moreover, the ordinary person thinks character is developed by the choices people make and the kind of life they have led. Bradley notes, however, that character is malleable to a degree and it is often difficult to determine the extent to which someone’s character is more or less fixed and resistant to change. Those matters aside, the key result of the discussion of moral responsibility is the portrayal of moral agents as not only acting in the world in ways that shape that world—especially the social world—but also in ways that shape the agent’s moral character. From the perspective of morality both the act and the doing of it are equally important.