 A second way to deflate the dialectical force of ethical supervenience is to grant that explaining it is a good thing to do, but deny that this is a particularly weighty consideration in the context of theory-choice (compare Enoch 2011, 147–8). The issues here are far from clear, but it is worth emphasizing two costs to this reply. First, as Gideon Rosen (2020) points out, embracing brute ethical supervenience is inconsistent with the essentialist account of modality discussed above. (Recall that according to this account, all necessary truths are explained by facts about essences). Because the essentialist account is one of the most powerful and well-developed accounts of modality, embracing inconsistency with it offers up a significant hostage to metaphysical fortune. Second, the avoidance of brute necessary connections seems to be a central part of metaphysical methodology. Even if modal structure is not the most fundamental metaphysical structure, it is typically treated as a good guide to such structure (Kment, 2015). It is hard to see why this would be so unless necessary connections disclosed some deeper explanatory relationship. This suggests that the philosopher who wishes to find in ethics an exception to this principle may need to provide a clear methodological reason for doing so.