 One general distinction concerns respect simply as behavior and respect as an attitude or feeling that may or may not be expressed in or signified by behavior. When we speak of drivers respecting the speed limit, hostile forces respecting a cease fire agreement, or the Covid-19 virus not respecting national borders, we can be referring simply to behavior which avoids violation of or interference with some boundary, limit, or rule, without any reference to attitudes, feelings, intentions, or dispositions, and even, as in the case of viruses, without imputing agency (Bird 2004). In such cases the behavior is regarded as constitutive of respecting. Where respect is conceived of as a duty or an entitlement, a certain kind of behavior or treatment may be all that is owed. Similarly, respect as a tribute could be just a certain mode of behavior, such as bowing or standing in silence. In other cases, however, we take respect to be or to express or signify an attitude or feeling, as when we speak of having respect for someone or of certain behaviors as showing respect or disrespect. Here, actions and modes of treatment count as respect insofar as they either manifest an attitude of respect or are of the sort through which the attitude is characteristically expressed; a principle of respect is one that necessarily must be adopted by someone with the attitude of respect or that prescribes the attitude or actions that express it (Frankena 1986; Downie and Telfer 1969); a moral virtue of respect involves having the attitude as a settled aspect of one’s way of being toward appropriate objects. Most discussions of respect for persons take attitude to be central. In what follows, I will focus chiefly on respect as attitude. There are, again, several different attitudes to which the term “respect” refers. Before looking at differences, however, it is useful first to note some elements common among varieties.