 Stein conceives of such empathetic acts as a sui generis type of intentional experience directed at the experiential life of other persons. Empathic acts are sui generis; they are neither composed of nor reducible to other types of intentional acts (Stein 1917: 16–20[8–11]). They are also distinctive in the way they present their object and content: even though the intentional experiences of the other are not first-personally “lived through” in empathy (or, in phenomenological jargon, “originarily” (originär) or “primordially” given to the empathizer), empathic acts are experienced first-personally. In that sense, empathy is an originary intentional act, however, it presents non-originary (nicht originär) contents (1917: 15–16[7–8]; 51[34]). And yet, the non-originary contents given to me are not non-originary simpliciter, but rather the originary contents of another subject (1917: 24[14]; 28[17]). It is due to this peculiar nature of intentional presentation of another’s experiences that empathy always preserves a self-other differentiation, and, indeed, involves an awareness of such on the part of the empathizing subject (1917: 27–29[16–18]).