Applying to any view that says people should have the same or enjoy the same condition or be treated the same, the leveling down objection applies to equality of opportunity views. As characterized in this entry, formal equality of opportunity just insists on no wrongful discrimination, but the leveling down objection denies that it would be in any respect noninstrumentally morally better to discriminate equally across a group of people who do not merit this treatment as opposed to discriminating against some but not all in the group. The leveling down objection applies straightforwardly to FEO and to level-the-playing-field or luck egalitarian distributive justice doctrines. (On the leveling down objection, see Parfit 2000; Holtug 2010: chapter 7, and for criticism, Temkin 1993: chapter 9.) However, this claim is just a suggestion in the absence of some proposed metric for determining how to rank possible deviations from FEO and luck egalitarian doctrines. The hunch to be confirmed is that for any plausible measure, the result will be that this version of equality will say that there is something to be said in favor of moving close to equality (of opportunity) by making better offs worse off without offering any improvement in the condition of worse offs. The counterclaim will be that there is no respect in which leveling down improves the situation.