 At least two lines of response come to mind. One reaction to Harman’s skeptical challenge is to take issue with his way of setting up the problem. In particular, we might reject his explanation of the provenance of our intuitions to the effect that logic has a normative role to play in reasoning as stemming from a mistaken identification of deductive logic and theories of reasoning. It might be thought, for instance, that Harman is led to exaggerate the gulf between deductive logic and theories of reasoning as a result of a contestable—because overly narrow—conception of either logic or reasoning, or both. Advocates of broadly logical accounts of belief revision (belief revision theories, non-monotonic logics, dynamic doxastic logic, etc.) may feel that Harman is driven to his skepticism out of a failure to consider more sophisticated logical tools. Unlike standard first-order classical logic, some of these formalisms do make explicit mention of beliefs (and possibly other mental states). Some formalisms do seek to capture the dynamic character of reasoning in which beliefs are not merely accumulated but may also be revised. Harman’s response, it would seem (Harman 1986: 6), is that such formalisms either tacitly rely on mistaken assumptions about the normative role of logic or else fall short of their objectives in other ways. But even if one disagrees with Harman’s assessment, one can still agree that such formal models of belief revision do not obviate the need for a philosophical account of the normativity of logic. That is because such models do typically tacitly rely on assumptions concerning the normative role of logic. An account of the normativity of logic would thus afford us a fuller understanding of the presuppositions that undergird such theories.