 One question for this approach is whether the “hinge commitments” operative in religious or other contexts are cognitive or not. Some interpreters of Wittgenstein, like Rupert Read and Alice Crary, hold that the forms of words to which Wittgenstein refers in On Certainty lack any application and so are nonsense. A different reading, advanced by, inter alia, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, holds that the hinges are not empty propositions because they are not propositions at all; rather, they are phenomenological descriptions of “the mindless, animal certainty with which we move about in the world” (67). On neither account is Wittgenstein taken to be advancing a form of “ersatz foundationalism” (Read, 312), according to which certain beliefs are properly basic. Nor does either reading entail that there is a set of substantive propositions available for being appropriately held “on faith” – i.e., that there is something to be fideistic about. One way of holding together Pritchard’s quasi-fideism with Moyal Sharrock’s interpretation of Wittgenstein might be to regard so-called religious faith as an orientation, rather than as propositional – i.e., as expressing a practical understanding of reality within which the “believer” lives and moves and has her being.