 An obvious response to the challenge set by Wood and Spekkens is to simply reject the assumption of faithfulness. But this should not be taken lightly; the intuition behind the faithfulness assumption is basic and compelling. When no statistical correlation exists between the occurrences of a pair of events, there is no reason for supposing there to be a causal connection between them. Conversely, if we were to allow the possibility of a causal connection between statistically uncorrelated events, we would have a particularly hard task determining which of these uncorrelated sets could be harboring a conspiratorial causal connection that hides the correlation. The faithfulness assumption is thus a principle of parsimony—the simplest explanation for a pair of statistically uncorrelated events is that they are causally independent—much the same way that Spekkens’ (2005) definition of contextuality is, too (see  §3.2);  indeed, Cavalcanti (2018) argues that contextuality can be construed as a form of fine-tuning.