 Daubert’s position raises the question as to what properties qualify states of affairs proper and what properties qualify states of affairs as cognized. For instance, Daubert holds that there are no negative states of affairs, but only negative Kenntnisverhalte (cf. Schuhmann 1987—based on a somewhat similar approach, Ingarden, too, denies the existence of intentionality-independent negative states of affairs, see 1964 II/1; Chrudzimski 2010). Analogously, Pfänder (1921: 72f) argues that, when it comes to giving an account of impersonal judgments, these have impersonal states of affairs as their correlates, but the incompleteness that characterizes such states of affairs has no place at the level of reality, i.e., at the level of “the objects in their objectual state” (a position which, again, is in agreement with Daubert, Schuhmann 1998: 184).