 He points out that reasoning is often, indeed typically, enthymematic in the following way. Jill reasons: “Jack broke his crown, but he is an Englishman; therefore, he will be brave.” She does not employ any suppressed premise. She merely thinks: ‘but he is an Englishman; therefore, he will be brave’. The thought occurs to her in a way that carries conviction with it, and she thinks it intending the inference signaled by ‘therefore’ to be valid. Grice suggests that it is a necessary condition of reasoning from \(A\) to \(B\) that one intend that there be a formally valid (and non-trivial) argument from \(A\) to \(B\). Grice devotes a good deal of attention to the question of what to add to this necessary condition in order to obtain a sufficient condition. He emphasizes that we typically reason with the intention of producing reasons relevant to some end, and he sees this intentional activity as involving the exercise of the ability to make reason-preserving transitions between sets of thoughts or beliefs (or intentions or whatever). A transition is reason-preserving if and only if necessarily, if one has reasons for the initial set, then one also does for the subsequent set. Like any ability, the ability to make reason-preserving transitions may be impaired. Good reasoning consists in an unimpaired exercise of the ability to make reason-preserving transitions; reasoning--good or bad--is an exercise that is not too impaired. As Grice says, “[T]o explain what reasoning is (and maybe what the term ‘reasoning’ means), it is necessary in the first instance to specify what good reasoning is, and then to stipulate that ‘reasoning’ applies to good reasoning and also to sequences which approximate, to a given degree, to good reasoning; the idea of good reasoning is, in a certain sense, prior to the idea of reasoning.” 