 Similar remarks are made by Graham Priest (2014, 186), who asks us to imagine an infinite sequence of objects, \(a_0\), \(a_{-1}\), \(a_{-2}\), … etc. Each of these can be in one of two states: active or passive. For each \(n \le 0\), if \(a_{n-1}\) is passive it does nothing, but if it is active it instantaneously makes \(a_n\) active as well; and the only way for \(a_n\) to become active is that \(a_{n-1}\) makes it so. Given this set-up there are only two possible options: each object in the chain is active, or each is passive. But both are logically possible options: the fact that each object is only active if the next object makes it active (and this sequence continues without end) gives us no reason, says Priest, to reject the possibility of them being all active. The active status of each object would be accounted for, by the active status of the previous one. First we explain the active status of \(a_0\): it is explained by the active status of \(a_{-1}\). Then we have a completely different thing to explain: the active status of \(a_{-1}\): it is explained by the active status of \(a_{-2}\) … and so on. All such facts get explained and since, Priest argues, it is a different fact being accounted for each time, this regress is not vicious. But echoing Bliss, Priest admits that something is not explained. He says (ibid., 187) “[W]hat an infinite regress will not explain is why the whole regress is as it is … the state of each \(a_n\) is determined by the state of \(a_{n-1}\), but there is nothing in this story to explain why the whole system is in the all active state, as opposed to the all passive state. If there is such an explanation, it must come from elsewhere.”