  One might wonder here if there is any genuine connection to the will of the normative consenter and so whether this really does shore up the voluntarist view.  But a further issue that might be raised here is whether Estlund has genuinely identified the fallback point of invalidated consent and non-consent.  Perhaps the proper description of the fall back point is neither consent nor non-consent. A person who has consented to something deeply immoral doesn't thereby refuse consent to that action, the person simply has failed to do anything morally productive.  Perhaps the idea in the case of the seriously immoral non-consent is that the person has simply not done anything morally productive. What happens in both cases is that the previous moral situation of the agent remains in place.  In the nullified consent case you still have an obligation not to do what you consented to do and in the nullified non-consent case you still have an obligation to do what you refuse to consent to do. This would suggest that the decision between consent and non-consent has here no normative effect: whatever the agent decides, the previous moral situation remains in place.  Hence there is a kind of symmetry that holds here between the two cases.  It is just that the default position is neither consent nor non-consent.  The one implication this might have is that one may ask the person again until he agrees, whereas normally if a person refuses to consent to something you must leave them alone. 