 It is also worth noting that the first premise above attributes understanding to “the system”. Exactly what Strong-AI supposes will acquire understanding when the program runs is crucial to the success or failure of the CRA. Schank 1978 has a title that claims their group’s computer, a physical device, understands, but in the body of the paper he claims that the program [“SAM”] is doing the understanding: SAM, Schank says “...understands stories about domains about which it has knowledge” (p. 133). As we will see in the next section (4), these issues about the identity of the understander (the cpu? the program? the system? something else?) quickly came to the fore for critics of the CRA. Searle’s wider argument includes the claim that the thought experiment shows more generally that one cannot get semantics (meaning) from syntax (formal symbol manipulation). That and related issues are discussed in section 5: The Larger Philosophical Issues.