 Burley identifies secondary substance with the quale quid and primary substance with the hoc aliquid, but quale quid and hoc aliquid are what are signified by general and discrete nouns, respectively, of the category (EP, ch. de substantia, fols. 25vb–26ra). Therefore, he argues that secondary substances are metaphysical entities existing outside our minds that are necessary conditions for our language to be meaningful, as general names would be meaningless if they did not signify something that both exists in reality, and have the peculiar feature of being common to (i.e., present in) many individual things. Only by associating general names with such objects as their proper significatum did Burley think we could explain how a general name can stand for many things at once and name all of them in the same way. According to him, a general name supposits for and names (appellare) a set of individual things only through the common nature or universal which it directly signifies and which is present in that set of individuals (EP, ch. de substantia, fol. 26ra). Since common natures connect general names with their extensions by determining the class(es) of the things to which they are correctly applied, and since they are what general names stand for when they have simple supposition (see De puritate, tr. 1°, pars 1a, ch. 3, pp. 7–9), they are actually the intensions of general names—or rather, the hypostatizations of these intensions, seeing that they are independent entities existing outside our minds. On the other hand, from a merely ontological point of view, universals and particulars are connected by the relation of instantiation, so that primary substances are tokens of secondary substances, since each particular instantiates its associated universal and is recognizable as a token of a given type by virtue of its conformity to it and its likeness to other particular substances (EP, ch. de substantia, fol. 26ra–b). Therefore, in Burley’s system, common natures (i.e., universals) and particulars (or simple objects) are related both as intensions to extensions and as types to tokens. A certain type or universal is nothing but the intension of a general name when it is considered in relation to the extension itself, and conversely, the extension of a general name (i.e., a class of individuals) is nothing but the set of tokens of a given type considered in relation to the simple expressions that name them. Thus, the relation holding between the intension and extension of a term is the same as between types and tokens. It is a sort of categorization, which can be described in terms of the elaboration and acquisition of patterns of identification. Moreover, since Burley now admits two kinds of mental universals, the first of which is an act of understanding and the second of which is the object of the former (i.e., its semantic content apprehended by the mind), the intension and the extension of a general term (i.e., the universal nature and the individuals which instantiate it), considered together, are the significatum of the general term, while the concept habens esse obiectivum in intellectu provides its sense, or cognitive meaning. Therefore, according to Burley’s final view, the sense/significatum dichotomy is not equivalent to the intension/extension dichotomy, the latter being a sub-division of the former. This result makes his theory of meaning very similar to the one developed recently by R. Cann (Formal Semantics, Cambridge 1993; see especially pp. 10–12; 215–224; and 263–69).