  Has something gone wrong? We started with the  unexceptionable-sounding thought that moral and evaluative judgments  are intended to guide conduct; we arrived at a blanket denial of the  possibility of akratic action which fits ill with observed facts. But if we are disinclined to follow Hare this far we should ask what the  alternative is, for it may be even worse. For Hare, the answer is  clear: our only other option is to repudiate the idea that moral and  other evaluative judgments have a special character or nature, namely that of being action-guiding. For we should recall that Hare presents all his subsequent conclusions as simply following, through a series  of steps, from that initial thought. “The reason why actions  are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the  function of moral principles is to guide conduct,” Hare  continues in the passage quoted earlier (Hare 1952, p. 1). For  Hare, then, the only way to escape his “Socratic”  conclusion about weakness of will would be to give up the idea that  evaluative judgments are intended to guide conduct, or to “have [a] bearing upon our actions” (Hare 1963, p. 169; see also Hare 1952, p. 46; p. 143; p. 163;  pp. 171–2; and Hare 1963, p. 70; p. 99).