 Just as with finite games, players’ preferences must be specified for studying equilibria in potentially infinite games. In lack of outcome nodes or final moments to attach preferences to, these are naturally thought of in terms of players’ goals, expressed as properties the game’s histories should satisfy. Such goals can be local propositional facts true at some particular moment. But goals can also concern global properties of histories such as avoiding or reaching the same position some specified number of times, or more abstractly, achieving safety or fairness in some appropriate sense. All such properties can be specified in temporal logics. For the case of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), the ‘Boolean games’ of Gutierrez, Harrenstein, and Wooldridge (2015) have developed the temporal goal based approach in depth. Notably, this framework validates a logical version of the ‘folk theorem’ for iterated games, cf. Osborne &amp; Rubinstein (1994): Under natural conditions on goals, iterated games can have novel equilibria not supervenient on the base game’s Nash equilibria. Further significant uses of temporal logics connect game theory with belief revision theory (Battigalli &amp; Bonanno 1999; Perea 2012; Stalnaker 1998).