 Contemporary democratic theory remains divided on jury theorems. Broadly speaking, the field distinguishes between instrumental and procedural arguments for democracy (Dworkin 1987; List &amp; Goodin 2001; Anderson 2009). Recent years have seen increasing interest in instrumental, and especially epistemic arguments. But even among epistemic democrats (early proponents are Cohen 1986; Coleman &amp; Ferejohn 1986; see Schwartzberg 2015 for an overview), the merits of jury theorems are controversial. Some epistemic democrats regard jury theorems as central tools for justifying democracy (e.g., List &amp; Goodin 2001; Landemore 2013; Dietrich &amp; Spiekermann 2013a; Goodin &amp; Spiekermann 2018). Others disagree. Henry S. Richardson (2002), for example, rejects Condorcet’s independence assumption. David Estlund instead rejects Condorcet’s competence assumption (Estlund 2008: ch. 12) and dismisses Condorcet’s Jury Theorem as providing “too shaky a basis” (Estlund 2008: 223). Elizabeth Anderson also objects to Condorcet’s implausible assumptions and conclusions (Anderson 2006).