 Indeed, we can find resources in Stein’s work for developing, as Svenaeus (2018) suggests, a notion of “sensual” and “emotional” empathy, and empathy, at least typically, has some “sensual basis” (cf. 1920/1924: 164–165; 1917: 108[92], 127[109]). And yet, there is nothing to suggest that we should characterize Steinian empathy generally as a “feeling”, even if one were to distinguish (non-intentional) feelings from (intentional) emotions, as Svenaeus, albeit in different ways as Stein proposes (see  sect. 2.2,  Stein 1917: 117[98]). Rather, according to Stein, we need to properly distinguish the sensual basis, the perceptual and more complex cognitive components of empathic understanding, as well as empathy grasping another’s emotions and empathy grasping, say, another’s motivations or doxastic attitudes.