 The very idea of special revelation has often been viewed with suspicion since the Enlightenment (Abraham 2002). Why is not natural revelation enough? Why would God in addition need to reveal himself to certain people at certain points in history? A related critique takes issue with divine hiddenness. If God exists, why does he seem to be “hidden”, so that a revelation is necessary in the first place? Since objections of this kind concern the coherence of religious outlooks based on a purported “special” revelation, it is reasonable for defenders of revelation to appeal to the doctrines of their own religious tradition. Christian thinkers have traditionally explained divine hiddenness and the need for special revelation with reference to humanity’s fall into sin. Sin has cognitive effects, and revelation is typically seen as the epistemic aspect of salvation (O‘Collins 2011: 70–74). When God acts in history to save humanity, he reveals himself and what he is doing. Nevertheless, as a result of the Enlightenment critique, nineteenth century theologians started to downplay special revelation. Instead, they emphasized what could be ascertained about God on the basis of 