 Smith (1992: 1103–4) traces state affairs like entities back to Aristotle and medieval philosophers. Important contributions to the theory of states of affairs were made in particular in Austro-German Philosophy. Stumpf (1907: 29–30) claimed that the notion of states of affairs was introduced in Franz Brentano’s lectures on logic (1870–1885). Brentano distinguished between a mental act, its content and its object. When I think of Hesperus, my thinking, the act, has a particular content in virtue of which it is directed on the planet, the object. In his logic lectures Brentano extended this distinction to judgements (Brentano 1870ff:13.020 [6]): when I judge that Hesperus is a planet, my judging has a content and an object: the object is what is judged (“das Geurteilte”). Stumpf (1907: 30) called the content of a judgement “Sachverhalt”. This term is now translated as “state of affairs”.  However, Stumpf’s states of affairs are rather close to thoughts or propositions (see also Smith 1992, 1105). For example, Stumpf (1907: 30) likened states of affairs to Bolzano’s sentences-in-themselves. Sentences-in themselves are supposed to be either true or false. This suggests that states of affairs were also conceived as truth-value bearers by Stumpf.