 Admittedly, no one has pre-theoretical judgments about the ranking of outcomes in the abstract. But these are evaluative rankings, and arguably such evaluative rankings concern what the agent ought (or what it is fitting for the agent) to desire/prefer (see Portmore 2011: 59–62 and 112–114). Hence, the earnest consequentializer holds that the judgment that one outcome outranks another is just the judgment that the agent ought (or that it is fitting for the agent) to prefer the one to the other. And we clearly have judgments both about which outcomes an agent ought to prefer and about which outcome it would be fitting for them to prefer—but I’ll talk only of what they ought to prefer in the remainder. Many would, for instance, judge both that, if my child has fallen into the sea, I ought to prefer that she does not drown and that, if Sergio can rescue only one of two groups of people drowning, I ought to prefer that Sergio rescues the group that includes my child even if the other group is somewhat larger. And these judgments seem to be independent of our judgment about what Sergio ought to do, for we may judge that, although Sergio ought to save the larger group, I ought, nevertheless, to prefer that Sergio saves the smaller group—that being the group that includes my child. And, in some instances, the Coherentist Procedure may call for revising such pre-theoretical judgments. For suppose that the target non-consequentialist theory holds that my turning in my daughter to police is morally better than my refraining from doing so but our pre-theoretical judgment is that I ought to prefer the outcome in which I refrain from turning her in to the outcome in which I turn her in. In that case, the act-consequentialist counterpart theory must either deny that my turning her in is morally better than my not doing so (and, thus, give up being perfectly co-extensive with the target non-consequentialist theory) or reject the intuitive judgment that I ought to prefer the outcome in which I refrain from turning her in to the outcome in which I turn her in. But, even so, it could be that the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory is more intuitively plausible than both utilitarianism and standard versions of non-consequentialism.