 Another distinctive feature of Olivi’s theory of the freedom of the will is that he criticizes Anselm of Canterbury’s asymmetric notion of freedom, according to which the will is free only when it conforms to the normative standard of justice. Olivi argues that the ability to sin is a part of freedom and that the ability to choose between alternatives—including vices—is part of the definition of freedom (Summa II q. 41, pp. 696–702, q. 57, 359; Kent 2017; Bobillier 2020, pp. 178–79). Moreover, Olivi argues fervently against the view that the will is a power for opposites only with respect to a future instant. In order to be truly free, the will must, in the same instant it wills ‘A’, be capable of willing ‘not-A’. Olivi’s conception seems to have been the source of John Duns Scotus’ revolutionary theory of synchronic contingency (Dumont 1995), and although Scotus is better known as an early proponent of libertarian freedom, his view is heavily indebted to Olivi. Indeed, it is arguable that Olivi deserves credit as the founder of this conception of freedom of the will.