 Others have not gone this far, arguing rather that while exclusivists need not abandon religious belief in the face of unresolved conflict, they must, or at least be willing to, hold their exclusive religious beliefs more tentatively (with less confidence). Philip Quinn argues, for instance, that acknowledged epistemic parity necessarily has a negative (epistemically humbling) impact on the level of justification for any religious belief system. Such parity does not necessarily reduce justification below a level sufficient for rational acceptability. But for those proponents of a religion who are “sufficiently aware of religious diversity, the justification that the [religion] receives from its sources is a good deal less than would be the case were there no such diversity” (Quinn 2005a, 137). James Kraft agrees, arguing that when individuals acknowledge that those with whom they disagree are equivalently informed and capable and have made no obvious mistakes in reasoning, their confidence in their perspective is rightly reduced (Kraft 2007)