 An ontologically more parsimonious counterpart to this first position was developed by Daubert. In his theory of judgment, Daubert draws a distinction between two notions. First, he calls “states of affairs” complex entities which exist independently of intentionality, e.g., the being-red of the rose (cf. Schuhmann &amp; Smith 1987; Schuhmann 2004c). In addition to states of affairs, he also identifies so-called “states of affairs as cognized” (Kenntnisverhalte), which are described as intentionality-dependent entities. (Although using different terminology, Pfänder, too, seems to have had a similar distinction in mind in 1921 when he speaks of “the objects in their objectual state” (das Selbstverhalten der Gegenstände) and of “states of affairs” as entities which are “projected or outlined” (entworfen) by judgment and which are “completely dependent” on judgment, Pfänder 1921: 40f, 253.)