 Some claim that a potentially relevant consideration here concerns ontological commitment (Correia 2010). All other things being equal, if one way of formulating grounding claims has fewer ontological commitments than another, then the former is preferable to the latter. Suppose that the connectivist’s connective is understood to be non-committal, so as not to commit us to a grounding operation. And suppose that the predicationist’s predicate is understood to commit us to a grounding relation between facts. In this case, it may be that connectivism has an advantage over predicationism—this depends on whether there are countervailing considerations (e.g., the connective treatment may be relatively cumbersome to work with). But note that the predicationist, of course, might claim that their predicate is non-committal (nominalists, for example, dispute that relational terms commit us to properties and relations), and perhaps there are reasons to think that the connectivist’s connective commits us to a grounding operation. The moral is that we need to establish which terms are committal before any claims of minimizing commitment can be made. (Also, note that, with respect to the potential commitments of predicationism, we may have different attitudes about relations and facts—you might be happy to countenance facts but not relations or vice versa.)