  Philip’s Summa de bono represents a significant innovation in medieval philosophical work. His use of the good as an organizing principle is a departure from the explicitly theological structure of other well-known texts of the time including Peter Lombard’s Sentences and William of Auxerre’s Summa aurea.  Philip is certainly concerned with theological issues; Aertsen points out that in the prologue, Philip explicitly mentions the need to provide a philosophical response to the Manichean heresy as part of his justification in developing an account of the good (Aertsen 2012). It is also true that Philip discusses the difference between God’s goodness and created goodness. Nevertheless, these theological notions do not provide the intellectual framework for Philip’s discussion. Unlike the Sentences or Summa aurea, Philip devotes no significant sections of his work to topics such as God’s nature, the Incarnation, or the sacraments. Whereas often William’s or Lombard’s examination of a philosophical issue arises in the context of a larger theological issue, this is not generally the case for Philip. For example, in William’s Summa aurea, the issues of human action and its freedom arise within a discussion of Adam’s fall in the Garden. William raises these issues here because he recognizes that holding Adam responsible for his sin requires that Adam acted freely. Philip places his treatment of free action within an examination of human psychology. It is not until after he discusses the character and the powers of the human soul that he gets around to examining theological issues such as the origin and the immortality of the soul.