 In a second experiment, Royzman and colleagues explored the possibility that participants’ responses to Nichols’ disgust sensitivity questionnaire might have been influenced by their recent judgments about the disgusting transgression. When they administered the disgust sensitivity questionnaire two weeks before participants were asked about the disgusting transgressions, they found that disgust sensitivity was not correlated with responses to questions about whether the action would be wrong under a range of counterfactual circumstances—if there were no social norm against it, for example, or if it occurred in another country where it was thought to be OK. Royzman and colleagues call judgments that don’t vary under these counterfactual circumstances socially transcendent, and they argue that social transcendent judgments should be taken to be the fundamental component of the moral/conventional task. They found that social transcendence correlated only with ratings of current harm, and not with disgust sensitivity. These experimental findings are, of course, a direct challenge to Nichols’ “norms with feeling”  view.[20]  What seems to be responsible for “non-conventional” responses on the moral/conventional task used in Royzman et al.’s experiments is not affect, as Nichols’ theory would urge, but a judgment that someone is harmed.