  This account is set against the background of a more general account of virtue. Driver defends a consequentialist account of virtue where traits are virtuous when they, in general, produce good effects (Driver, 2001). This view of virtue makes it easy to accommodate morally virtuous traits that involve epistemic defects since some epistemic defects might turn out to produce better effects in the long run.  Accounts of virtue inspired by Aristotle,  however, make virtue a matter of practical wisdom which makes moral virtue incompatible with epistemic defects. It’s important to note that while Driver’s early work makes modesty require ignorance, the weaker claim that moral virtue is compatible with ignorance is enough to make problems for Aristotelian accounts of virtue (see Driver 1999). Accuracy accounts of modesty and humility are largely responses to Driver that are typically motivated to deny the idea that moral virtue can require, or even be compatible with, ignorance and false belief.