 In Physics 2.3, Aristotle says that the causes include the primary principle of motion and coming to rest. In Arabic philosophical works, the terms “agent” (al-fāʿil), “active” (al-faʿʿāl) and “efficient” (al-fāʿilah) refer to this type of cause. Generally speaking, the philosophers consider the circle of agents to encompass natural bodies, created intellects and God. They regard God as a creative agent in the sense that his activity presupposes nothing outside of him, not even matter. Most of the philosophers see creation as an eternal act, not a temporal one. Al-Kindī (800–870) is exceptional in defending creation in time. Ibn Rushd (1126–1198), known to English speakers by his Latinized name, Averroes, is also exceptional: in his mature works, he rejects creation as incompatible with Aristotelian texts and principles. In his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lam, for example, he interprets Aristotle’s God as an ultimate final cause of motion, not a creative agent (Genequand 1984). Arabic philosophical accounts of God as a creative agent are partly derived from Neoplatonic texts (Wisnovsky 2002; Kukkonen 2010). No doubt these accounts are also influenced by a cultural context in which the term “agent” is associated with God and with the divine power to create. Still, it is important to note that the philosophers attempt to demonstrate their accounts of God as a creative agent, often in novel ways. So, they cannot be said merely to follow tradition or culture on this issue.