 In Western discussions of this topic, feelings are very often associated with some physical change, such as a quicker heartbeat or a change in the chemical make up of the brain. For this reason, emotions are very often regarded as providing some link between the mental and the physical. Śāntarakṣita mentions this link between feeling and physical changes in TS 1960. He claims that phlegm (balāsa) and other bodily changes are not responsible for love, hatred or perturbations through sexual arousal because there is no observed concomitance between them. While this claim might be true with regard to phlegm, it is obviously false with regard to other physical changes, especially changes in the brain. However, it would be wrong to completely dismiss Śāntarakṣita’s argument simply because he turned out to be wrong about this empirical claim. After all, the argument raises important questions about the status of mental phenomena, such as love and hatred. This becomes clear when we think about the other question mentioned earlier: why does Śāntarakṣita distinguish between perceptions on the one hand and love and hatred on the other hand based on the existence or non-existence of external objects? While Śāntarakṣita often adopts an idealist position compatible with the Yogācāra standpoint in the Tattva-saṃgraha, he seems to switch to a realist position in this case which is compatible with a Sautāntrika standpoint. The best explanation for this switch is that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are arguing against Lokāyata philosophers (materialists), who do not share the Yogācāra outlook on reality. This means that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla try to find common ground with these philosophers and therefore share their assumptions about the mind-independent existence of an external world. Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s argument then is that even with this assumption in place, it does not follow that all cognitions are dependent on or even identical with the body. According to them, the Lokāyata philosophers would have to draw a distinction between perceptions on the one hand and love and hatred on the other hand, and while they might be able to account for perceptions they are not able to account for love and hatred.