 In addition to their implications for the metaphysics of memory, external and collective memory may have novel implications for epistemology (Carter &amp; Kallestrup 2016; Clark 2015; Michaelian &amp; Arango-Muñoz forthcoming). Most research on the epistemology of memory, however, reflects the traditional concerns of individual epistemology, including the viability with respect to memory knowledge of broad families of epistemological theories, such as internalism and externalism (Madison 2017), and of particular theories within those families, such as foundationalism (Senor 1993), coherentism (Olsson &amp; Shogenji 2004), and reliabilism and virtue epistemology (Shanton 2011), as well as the relevance to memory of issues such as scepticism (Baldwin 2001; Moon 2017) and epistemic circularity (Alston 1986). Other research on the epistemology of memory tackles concerns specific to memory. As Frise (2015, Other Internet Resources) points out, there are unresolved debates over the problem of forgotten evidence (Harman 1986), the problem of forgotten defeat (A.I. Goldman 1999), and the problem of stored beliefs (Moon 2012). There are also ongoing debates over the alleged analogy between testimony and memory (Barnett 2015; Dummett 1994) and the question whether memory is a generative or a merely preservative source of knowledge (Frise forthcoming; Lackey 2005; Matthen 2010; Salvaggio forthcoming). Issues in the epistemology of memory, of course, interact with issues in the metaphysics of memory, but, as there is a separate entry on the epistemology of memory, these interactions will not be explored here in any detail.