  Some philosophers (Pollock 1985, King 2007) have argued that principles like (A) have two readings, one clearly acceptable but useless to the Easy Arguments and the other useful to those arguments but false.  The two readings correspond to two ways of understanding talk of truth with respect to possible worlds.  One way for something to be true with respect to a world requires the truth-bearer to exist in the world and be true there.  Another way is for the truth-bearer to “correctly describe” the world, where this does not require existing in the world.  Pollock gives the example of a picture depicting the non-existence of all pictures.  The picture could correctly depict a situation even though the situation it depicts is one in which the picture itself does not exist.  Similarly, the Medieval philosopher Jean Buridan discusses the example of an utterance of ‘there are no negative utterances’.  This utterance correctly describes a certain possible situation even though that situation is one in which the utterance would not exist. Following Adams (1981), we may call the former way of being true with respect to a world truth in a world and the latter truth at a world.  The conceptualist may claim that propositions can be true at worlds without being true in them, by analogy with the examples from Pollock and Buridan.  A proposition like &lt;there are no propositions&gt; is true at certain possible worlds but true in none.  Since we do not want to say that such propositions are necessary, we must understand necessity as truth at every possible world.  Correspondingly, to preserve the connections between entailment and necessity, we must understand entailment in terms of the entailed proposition being true at every world at which the entailing proposition is true.  Given all this, we can distinguish two readings for Assumption A: