 Reasonable assignments of \(P(R\mid D)\) depend on how exactly the designer hypothesis \(D\) is spelled out. According to Swinburne, the most promising candidate designer is “the God of traditional theism” whom he characterizes as “a being essentially eternal, omnipotent (in the sense that He can do anything logically possible), omniscient, perfectly free, and perfectly good” (2003: 107). Swinburne argues that we can be at least moderately confident that the God of traditional theism, if he exists, “will bring about an orderly, spatially extended, world in which humans have a location” (2003: 113; note that Swinburne operates with a generalized, non-biological concept of “humans”). Hence, according to Swinburne, life-friendly conditions, conditional on the existence of the God of traditional theism, do not have very low probability, i.e. \(P(R\mid D)\), plausibly, is not many orders of magnitude smaller than \(1\). According to Rota (2016: 119f.), even if we assign to \(P(R\mid D)\) a value as low as \(1\) in a billion, this suffices for the fine-tuning argument for a divine designer to be strong, simply because, in view of the fine-tuning considerations, life-friendly conditions in the absence of a designer are so utterly unexpected. A similar point is made by Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018).