 The first, raised by Fodor (1990b), is the problem of locally co-instantiated   properties.[19]  Fodor’s example is the familiar case of the frog that snaps at anything that is suitably small, dark and moving and thereby feeds itself (see   section 3.2).   For the sake of the argument, Fodor makes the (unrealistic) assumption that the property of being small, dark and moving and the property of being a fly are always co-instantiated in the frog’s environment, such that all flies are small, dark, moving things, and vice versa. According to Fodor, if it was adaptive for the frog to snap at flies then it was equally adaptive for it to snap at small, dark, moving things. Hence, when we look at the frog’s detection device, we can equally well say that the function of the device is to detect flies and that its function is to detect small, dark, moving things. So, if we try to determine the content of the representation by reference to the function of the detection mechanism, the content remains indeterminate. We can choose to describe the function one way or another but if the content depends on how we choose to describe the function it is not a naturalized content. Note that the candidate contents there’s a fly and there’s frog food and there’s a small, dark moving thing each license different assessments concerning misrepresentation. If the frog is representing the stimulus as a fly, for instance, it will misrepresent a small, dark, moving non-fly as a fly. If it represents the stimulus as a small, dark, moving thing, this will not be the case.