 In later work, the embeddedness of cognition in a wider network of social, affective, and practical activity is highlighted to an even greater extent, and is further considered in the context of debates over universalism and relativism (or the contrast between “science” and “worldviews”) (e.g., AIntro9–11). Put simply, Hartmann embraces a nonreductive naturalistic interpretation of humankind, recognizing cognition as an adaptive embodied transcendent act embedded in the context of other acts and ontological relationships in the natural and social worlds (ELO). This perspective, including his interpretation of Kant explained above, means that our concepts of categories are human products, and are attempts to grasp stable ontological principles. As such our attempts can be inadequate. Principles themselves may have nonrational elements, since they are transcendent objects too. The partial identity between cognitive and ontological categories is rooted in being, rather than the mind alone, and persistent problems arise from human interaction with the world and each other.