Well, it is important that the low-stakes claim be true, since that preserves our intuitive anti-skepticism: if you cannot know on the basis of ordinary, non-entailing evidence such as what is printed in the flight itinerary, we will have to deny very many of our ordinary claims to “know” (Ibid., 59). But, it is argued, the ‘high stakes’ denial seems right too—that is why the relevant (paired) cases constitute a puzzle. And EC allows us to preserve the sense that in such cases each of the two speakers is speaking ‘properly’, and “the presumption that what is properly said is true” (DeRose 2005, 181). Whereas, if we take John and Mary’s stricter standard to be too demanding—if their denial of “knowledge” to Smith is false—then, not only must we reject the feeling that what they are saying is in some sense correct, but it is “hard to see how Mary and John should describe their situation”: