 This, however, is a relatively technical objection. Further reflection suggests that there may be an underlying appeal to the intentions of the teacher. Let us revisit the learning story. Suppose that during the learning period the subject is trained to use “X” as a mental representation of dogs. Now, let the student graduate from “X” using school and immediately thereafter see a fox. Seeing this fox causes a token of “X” and one would like to say that this is an instance of mistaking a fox for a dog, hence a false tokening. But, consider the situation counterfactually. If the student had seen the fox during the training period just before graduation, the fox would have triggered a token of “X”. This suggests that we might just as well say that the student learned that “X” means fox or dog as that the student learned that “X” means dog. Thus, we might just as well say that, after training, the graduate does not falsely think of a dog, but truly thinks of a fox or a dog. The threat of running afoul of naturalist scruples comes if one attempts to say, in one way or another, that it is because the teacher meant for the student to learn that “X” means dog, rather than “X” means fox or dog. The threatened violation of naturalism comes in invoking the teacher’s intentions. This, too, is an objection to be found in Fodor (1984).