 To resist the this conclusion, a disjunctivist might insist that Moore*, relative to s’s support for P8 supplied by s’s seeing that P8, does not always instantiate the disjunctive template, in particular because condition (b) is not necessarily fulfilled (cf. Lockhart 2018.) By appealing to a distinction drawn by Pritchard (2012), one might contend that (b) is not necessarily fulfilled, because s, though unable to perceptually discriminate between seeing that P8 and merely hallucinating it, may have evidence that favors the hypothesis that she is in the first state.  For Pritchard, this happens — as we have seen — when s sees that P8 in good epistemic conditions and the skeptical conjecture that s is having a hallucination of a hand has not been epistemically motivated. In this case, s is in position to come to know Q8* by inference from P8 even if she is unable to perceptually discriminate one situation from the other. 