 This research leads to philosophical issues. Does brain activity alone cause these experiences, or does meditation or a psychedelic drug merely disrupt our normal state of consciousness thereby enabling new experiences to arise that are not caused by brain activity itself? If the former, can the alleged cognitive content of mystical experiences be discounted because mystical experiences are reduced to “merely brain events”? If the latter, does the same brain state underlie different meditation and psychedelic-enabled experiences? If so, the situation is the opposite of the “multiple realization” problem in philosophy of mind: multiple experiences are connected to the same brain state. So too, the question remains of whether neuroscientists are actually studying mystical experiences at all by studying neural activity correlated with them. (See Jones 2018, 2016, chap. 9.) Concerning psychedelics, the most important question is whether the mystical experiences enabled by psychedelics are mere hallucinations that are no more cognitive than the LSD-induced distortions of perception. Another important question is whether the experiences enabled by the drugs are the same as “natural” mystical experiences or only pale copies. And does the fact that such experiences can be touched off fairly consistently by drugs with the proper dosage and a conducive “set and setting” for the participant mean that the experiences are only products of the brain? Or do the drugs only set up new conditions in the brain enabling new experiences to occur that are not caused by brain activity? (See Smith 1964 and 2005; Letheby 2021; Jones 2019.)