 In reply to (3), Ross contends, initially, if Anne has ‘a very delicate sense of honour’, she ought to consider paying the poor man on account of her carelessness in agreeing unconditionally in the first place (FE 97). This is not plausible. There is no reason to enrich an already rich person merely because of carelessness (of this sort). Ross further argues what is promised is not that Anne pay $100.00; rather, what is promised is she pay a poor man $100.00, and since the man in question is no longer poor, there is therefore no need to fulfil the promise (FE 97–98). But what drives this interpretation of the promise? The ideal utilitarian may say the reason we interpret the promise this way is doing so is on balance beneficial. Furthermore, the ideal utilitarian can argue that even without thinking of this interpretation of the promise we still believe we have no or only very weak reasons to pay, and that they can offer the best explanation of this fact. They can also explain why this is (as Ross notes) a somewhat difficult issue to decide: there are utilitarian reasons on either side.