 Philosophers have long been interested in the genealogy of morals (Nietzsche 1887), and the subsequent rise of the fields of cognitive science, Evolutionary Psychology, and empirical moral psychology has brought with it a surge of interest in evolutionary debunking arguments of morality. These have sparked a great deal of philosophical debate, but it has been slow to seriously integrated cultural evolution or the contemporary cognitive science of culture into the discussion (Kelly 2017). Critics have pointed out that debunkers have rarely paid close attention to the details of scientific accounts of the evolution of morality, even though some of the premises of their debunking arguments seem to rely on such details, including details about the cultural roots of many components of our moral minds (Cline 2015; Braddock 2021). Others have similarly traced out how empirical inaccuracies in the premises of debunking arguments undermine their conclusions (Machery &amp; Mallon 2010; Sterelny &amp; Fraser 2017; A. Levy &amp; Levy 2020).