 Both a critical level form of utilitarianism (Broome 2014) and, alternatively, a sufficientarian approach (Huseby 2010) have elements in common with pluralism yet may seem to balance values against one another in a more transparent way. Both views seem to provide solutions to the nonidentity problem without generating the most extreme forms of the repugnant conclusion. A difficulty for the former view is that it generates the result that a world where many people have lives below the critical level but still worth living is worse than a world where many people have lives far worse than a life worth living (Arrhenius calls this the “sadistic conclusion”; see Arrhenius 2000). An obstacle for the latter position is that it fails to explain why things are morally worse – and, indirectly why an act is wrong – in a case where the future person who is the subject of our concern has a “good life” (Huseby 2010, 205) but still seems clearly to be a victim of a prior act we consider clearly wrong. Consider, e.g., a child who has a good life but who has been made to be blind as a result of an act performed by the child’s parents prior to conception. And suppose that the parents themselves tethered their choice to produce a child to their choice to produce a child they have blinded in that way; suppose that is, that the child would not have existed, or at least probably would not have existed, had the parents not performed the act under scrutiny. We may well consider the act under scrutiny wrong. But a sufficientarian approach seems to block that result.