 This is where Scotus brings in his well-known doctrine of the two affections of the will (see especially Ordinatio 2, d. 6, q. 2; 2, d. 39, q. 2; 3, d. 17, q. un.; and 3, d. 26, q. un.). The two affections are fundamental inclinations in the will: the affectio commodi, or affection for the advantageous, and the affectio iustitiae, or affection for justice. Scotus identifies the affectio commodi with intellectual appetite. Notice how important that is. For Aquinas intellectual appetite is the same thing as will, whereas for Scotus intellectual appetite is only part of what the will is. Intellectual appetite is just one of the two fundamental inclinations in the will. Why does Scotus make this crucial change? For the reason we’ve already discussed. He doesn’t see how intellectual appetite could be genuinely free. Now he can’t deny that the will involves intellectual appetite. Intellectual appetite is aimed at happiness, and surely happiness does have some role to play in our moral psychology. But the will has to include something more than intellectual appetite if it’s going to be free. That something more is the affectio iustitiae. But one can’t fully understand what the affectio iustitiae is until Aquinas and Scotus are compared on a further point.