 Whether or not moral education theories succumb to these objections (cf. Drucker 1986; Shook 2004; Shafer-Landau 1991; Dagger 2011), there is another non-retributive alternative available to moral responsibility skeptics: an incapacitation account based on the right of self-defense analogous to the justification for quarantine. This is the approach favored by Pereboom and Caruso, and it draws on a comparison between treatment of dangerous criminals and treatment of carriers of dangerous diseases (Pereboom 2001, 2013b, 2014a, 2017a; Caruso 2016, 2017, forthcoming-a; Pereboom &amp; Caruso forthcoming). In its simplest form, it can be summarized as follows: (1) Moral responsibility skeptics claims that criminals are not morally responsible for their actions in the basic desert sense; (2) plainly, many carriers of dangerous diseases are not responsible in this or in any other sense for having contracted these diseases; (3) yet, we generally agree that it is sometimes permissible to quarantine them, and the justification for doing so is the right to self-protection and the prevention of harm to others; (4) for similar reasons, even if a dangerous criminal is not morally responsible for his crimes in the basic desert sense (perhaps because no one is ever in this way morally responsible) it could be as legitimate to incapacitate him as to quarantine the non-responsible carrier of a serious communicable disease.