If we allow all kinds of compounds equally, we arrive immediately at the result that by our new criterion no two different expressions have the same meaning. Consider the expressions “bachelor” and “unmarried man”: “is a bachelor but not an unmarried man” is a bachelor description that is not an unmarried-man description. Hence, by Goodman’s criterion, the secondary extensions of “bachelor” and “unmarried man” differ because the primary extensions of at least one of their compounds do. Since the same trick can be pulled with any two expressions, Goodman is left with the result that no two different expressions are synonymous, but he is ready to bite this bullet. P-descriptions that are not Q-descriptions are easy to construct for any P and Q (provided these are different terms) and these constructions might well be relatively uninteresting. If only such uninteresting constructs are available to make a difference in secondary extension, P and Q, despite being not strictly synonymous, might be more synonymous than a pair of predicates for which we are able to find interesting compounds (as in the case of “centaur” and “unicorn”). This turns sameness of meaning of different terms into likeness of meaning, and synonymy and analyticity into a matter of degree.