 He holds that perception of ideas of sensation and reflection are not voluntary. So, perception can hardly be free. In respect to judging, he claims that we judge in terms of how things appear to us and that we can’t change these appearances. In respect to the will, he claims that there are two questions to be considered. One is whether we are at liberty to will or not. The second is whether we are at liberty to will “one or the other of two or more objects”. In respect to the first question, he claims that Locke made a mistake in holding that people are at liberty to will because they can suspend willing. So, Collins holds that Locke’s answer to the first question would be affirmative. Collins claims that suspense of willing is as much an act of will as any other. So, his answer is negative. In respect to the second question, Collins argues for a value determinism that makes the answer to the second question negative as well. In defining willing, he remarks: “Willing or preferring is the same with respect to good and evil, that judging is with respect to truth or falsehood”. So, if something seems better than the alternatives we will choose it. Collins is thus a moral determinist who holds that we must do what seems best to us. In giving his negative answer to his second question, Collins is also rejecting the claim that we could have done otherwise in cases where we have decided which of the alternative choices is best (Collins 1717: 31–40 [1976: 69–73]). Collins then proceeds to consider cases where we can see no difference between the objects we are to choose among, e.g., which of two eggs we will take. Collins’ response is that: