 American pragmatism, Neo-Kantianism, and early positivism not only illustrate the diverse historical roots of scientific pluralism but also its complex historical connections with logical positivism and the unity of science movement. A simple contrast between positivist unity and post-positivist disunity has also been challenged in other areas of the history of philosophy of science. For example, Neurath has become widely recognized (Cartwright et al. 1996) as a core organizer of the unity of science movement who embraced a pluralist mosaic view of science rather than a reductionist physicalism (e.g., Neurath 1935). Furthermore, Carnap’s (1950) pluralism of conceptual frameworks has seen a new wave of popularity debates about both ontology and conceptual engineering (Blatti &amp; Lapointe [eds.] 2016; Dutilh Novaes 2020).