 Further, and more importantly, McDowell’s distinctive uncodifiability claim, which rests on this view of rationality, looks to be too general to underwrite a specific thesis like mental anomalism. This becomes apparent when one asks why the very same features that he is insisting are true of our conception of rationality aren’t also true of the key concepts that figure in explanations of the physical world. Surely our concepts of physical reality outstrip any particular conception we have at any given time, and the possibility of mistaken application is built into them. And scientists are in the same position as interpreters in terms of the possibility of new evidence and its bearing on how previous evidence was understood. So far this looks to be nothing more than a combination of a completely general point about concepts together with the familiar problem of induction, which plagues all empirical enquiry. McDowell’s assertion that “someone who aims at explanations of the ideal-involving kind must be alive to the thought that there is sure to be a gap between actual current conception and ideal structure in his own case as well as others” (McDowell 1985, 392) doesn’t appear to uniquely pick out any particular explanatory framework. It therefore cannot tell us anything distinctive about the metaphysical status of psychology.