 In 1945, Schutz published an essay, “On Multiple Realities,” that extended the theory of The Phenomenology of the Social World and anticipated later essays applying that theory. While he reiterated earlier views about levels of activity, Bergsonian tensions of consciousness, and the structure of the social world, his work took a decidedly pragmatic twist, emphasizing “working” (Wirken) as involving bodily movements as opposed to the covert performances of mere thinking. In manuscripts in the 1930s and after The Phenomenology of the Social World, Schutz had already turned in this pragmatic direction. In “On Multiple Realities,” he enlarged upon the “world of working” by demonstrating how reflection dissolves the self unified in lived action into partial, role-taking selves and by expanding Mead’s idea of the “manipulatory sphere” to include worlds within “potential reach,” either restorable (from the past) or attainable (in the future). This “world of working” constitutes the paramount reality, organized in its interests in the face of the fundamental anxiety that derives, as it did for Heidegger, from the inescapability of one’s own death. Following Husserl’s views on how consciousness can modify its stances toward reality and de-ontologizing James’s sub-universes of reality, Schutz developed the notion of various finite provinces of meaning. One enters any of these provinces, such as those of phantasms, dreams, the theater, religious experience, or theoretical contemplation, by undergoing different types of epoché, analogous to the phenomenological prototype, as when one slips into a daydream, falls asleep, watches theater curtains open, commences a ritual, or assumes the scientist’s role. Each province contains its distinctive logical, temporal, corporal, and social dimensions, and movement between the provinces only becomes paradoxical (e.g., asking how phenomenologists are able to communicate their private findings publicly) if one conceives the provinces as ontological static realms to which one transmigrates as a soul to another world. Rather the provinces are permeable, and one adopts the attitudes of scientist or religious believer within the world of working as if it were seen through by another viewpoint, all the while that its communicative activities subtend these other provinces. There is something paradoxical, though, about describing one’s dreams or theorizing about religious experience since to give an account one must absent oneself from the province for which one accounts, and Kierkegaard’s notion of indirect communication and various postmodern critiques of theory address themselves to just such paradoxes.