 Interpretivism offers a moral explanation of how institutional practice shapes legal rights and obligations. It is possible to offer an alternative explanation that is moral in character, without embracing certain other claims characteristic of interpretivism. Focusing on the mechanism through which institutions can change people’s normative situation, Greenberg (2014) and Hershovitz (2015) claim that legal rights and obligations are a subset of the moral rights and obligations that obtain in virtue of the actions of legal institutions. Greenberg claims that the subset is composed of those moral rights and obligations that obtain in the ‘legally proper way’. Which way is legally proper is to be understood in light of a normative constraint constitutive of law: that law is supposed to improve the moral situation. When legal institutions improve the moral situation, e.g. by taking action that secures coordination, the resulting moral obligations are legal obligations. But when the actions of legal institutions give rise to obligations to resist or undo or otherwise mitigate what the institutions did (an obligation to repeal legislation, shelter the persecuted, and so on), the resulting obligations do not trace to the action of institutions in the proper way (Greenberg 2014, Schaus 2015). By contrast, Hershovitz argues that we should not be overly concerned with the boundaries of the legal. As we saw, the question about the boundaries is a matter of the first importance for theories on which legal rights and obligations are created through some special nonmnoral mechanism but need not be consequential for theories that appeal to no such mechanism (see  section 5). Developing a point from Dworkin, Hershovitz argues that the idea that there is an existing body of law, which comprises all and only those rights and obligations in force in a given system, plays no role in legal practice (Hershovitz 2015, crediting Dworkin 1978). He argues that the better view is that the practice of legal institutions has a variety of normative consequences, moral and prudential. We might use ‘legal’ as a label for some of those, depending on our purposes: for example, to mark the source of an obligation or the institution that gets to enforce the obligation (Hershovitz 2015).