 On closer inspection, however, Husserl actually draws upon two different versions of the epoché when introducing this method in Ideas, which versions he does not separate as clearly as one might have hoped: the “universal epoché” on the one hand, and a weaker “local epoché” (as one could label it) on the other. The former version (as described in Ideas) seems to require the phenomenologist to put all his existence assumptions regarding the external world into brackets at once, at any point, whereas the weaker version merely requires him to bracket particular existence assumptions. The weaker version underlies the introducing of the notion of noema in Ideas in connection with examples like the perceptual hallucination (a concept not applicable within the universal epoché; see Overgaard 2004, p. 23) of a blooming apple tree (Husserliana, vol. III/1, pp. 204 ff): Husserl here in fact only brackets the existence of particular real objects (Beyer 2000, pp. 140–148). By contrast, the sole function of the universal epoché in Ideas seems to be to establish the “residuum” thesis, according to which the realm of “pure consciousness” exists independently of the external world. His argument for this thesis in Ideas, referring to the possibility of “world annihilation”, is flawed, however (see Beyer 2000, pp. 138 ff; 2007, pp. 76ff) and, as Erhard (2014, fn. 718) has observed, Husserl later discovered the relevant fallacy himself (cf. Husserliana, vol. XXXIX, 256f). 