 This remark could be taken as the essence of legal moralism. The basic core of legal moralism, as we have seen, is a two-part structure, compounded of a wrong and a set of countervailing and potentially defeating factors, such as liberty and privacy. From within legal moralism there are controversies over how morality should itself be conceived and controversies over how the first part of the structure should be conceived—all moral wrongs or only a subset of them?—and the second part—which countervailing factors, for example, make the list? And what, if anything, unifies them? While Raz’s remark may serve as a pithy statement of legal moralism, Raz himself rejected legal moralism, in favour of a version of the harm principle. Mill’s original harm principle was based on a monistic utilitarianism. There remain adherents of such a utilitarianism, but more influential today is some version of value-pluralism, such as Raz’s liberal perfectionism. The derivation of the harm principle from such pluralistic premises, is as we have seen, a far from straightforward task. Adherents of the harm principle also manifest a strong divide between those who broadly inherit Mill’s principled anti-moralism without his anti-paternalism, such as Hart and Raz and those who inherit both Mill’s principled anti-moralism and his anti-paternalism, such as Feinberg. Into the mix comes Rawlsian public reason. Like one kind of legal moralist, there is an emphasis on steering the justification of legal coercion to the citizens subject to the coercion themselves and from this an aspiration to develop a “module” of political practical reasoning, the public reason of all subjects of a given legal system independent of the comprehensive ethical or religious commitments of some of their number. For the proponent of public reason it is the “zeal to embody the whole truth” that is anathema (Rawls 1999: 132–133). To legal moralists such as Moore, the moral truth, with due sensitivity to the countervailing factors, should rather be the point. The idea that the law has sometimes no limits to hold back the moral truth—which of necessity must lie in the mouth of some (fallible) human—can induce a feeling of vertigo. Perhaps the question ultimately turns on whether there is a genuine alternative.