 where each term \(\Cr(A \mid B_i)\) is governed by the Ratio Formula because \(\Cr(B_i)\) is nonzero by design. An important consequence of this approach is that, when one chooses a different sequence of propositions to approximate \(B\), the limit of conditionalizations might be different, and, hence, a credence conditional on \(B\) is, or ought to be, relativized to how one presents \(B\) as the limit of a sequence of approximating propositions. This relativization is often illustrated with what’s called the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox; see Rescorla (2015) for an accessible presentation and discussion. Once the mathematical details are refined, this approach becomes what’s known as the theory of regular conditional  probability.[5]  A Dutch Book argument for this way of assigning conditional credences is developed by Rescorla (2018).