 Moral approbation, then, comprises three elements: moral judgment, affection, and feeling. Reid is clear that the moral judgments in question are not general ones that concern the first principles of morals, but particular judgments that concern whether someone has behaved well or badly or exemplifies a virtue or vice. The affections that accompany them are, in turn, dispositions “to do good or hurt to others,” which have a de re structure since they have “persons, and not things” [i.e., propositions] as their immediate object (EAP III.iii.iv: 107). Finally, Reid accepts a minimalist account of the feelings that comprise moral approbation. Feelings such as pleasure and pain, in Reid’s view, have no intentional object; they are not about anything. Rather, they are, as it were, adverbial modifiers of mental states and events: one esteems another pleasurably or disapproves of another painfully. By distinguishing approbation from feeling, Reid clearly rejects the position according to which (what we today would call) desires are to be identified with feelings of one or another sort.