 Second, the requirement of fidelity to auditory content may be challenged by questioning the phenomenological claim that motivates it. The move would consist in suggesting that sounds do not have the strong spatial property of locatedness, but the weaker property of directionality. The distinction between two senses of “locatedness” in relation to sounds can be traced back to Malpas (1965), based on ordinary language arguments, and is echoed in Urmson (1968) and Hacker (1987: 102 ff.); cf. O’Shaughnessy (1957). Locatedness in the strong sense specifies an address for the sound, e.g., by specifying both directionality and distance from the hearer (thus including egocentrical directionality as a component), or by locating sounds in allocentric space (e.g., a siren from the boat at Pier 3). According to a weaker sense of “locatedness”, sounds would only be perceived as “coming from” a certain direction, without any information about the distance they travel. Now surely this is not the general case. Although in some cases (e.g., the decrease in amplitude of a sine wave) it may be difficult or impossible to tell, say, whether what we hear is a soft sound nearby or a loud sound far away, in most cases the distinction is perfectly available to the subject, as we noticed earlier when we introduced the notion of distal volume: someone screaming in a distance is never confused with someone speaking low near you ear. Indeed the issue of the locatedness of sounds is the subject matter of specialized branches of cognitive science (Blauert 1974; Bregman 1990; Schnupp, Nelken, &amp; King 2011; Grimshaw &amp; Garner 2015).