  ‘Quasi-Realism’ is Simon Blackburn’s name for this sort of non-cognitivism, and especially his own version of expressivism. Yet other sophisticated non-cognitivists, notably Allan Gibbard, have been happy to work under the quasi-realist banner (Gibbard 2003, 18–19).  What especially distinguishes the quasi-realist project is an emphasis on explaining why we are entitled to act as if moral judgments are genuinely truth-apt even while strictly speaking they are neither true nor false in any robust sense. Thus it is a commitment of a quasi-realist that normative judgments are in an important way different from most (other) paradigm descriptive judgments – enough  so to render problematic their status as either true or  false – and yet that a justification is nonetheless available for our practices of treating them as if they were in fact so. What exactly this comes to is hard to say without discussing some of the special problems for non-cognitivism in general, since it is precisely in offering solutions to those problems that the quasi-realist carries out his program. Thus we will revisit the position later on in the context of these problems.