 Under his conception ‘existences’ are, one might say, ‘bundles’ of particularized qualities. But he did not consider ‘substance’ as a sort of substrate in which universals are particularized, as many defenders of tropes do: the ‘thing’ is according to him a mere ‘unity’ of elements, “not something over and above them. which has them, but their unified existence” (SI, 155). He also expressed this by saying that the universal “covers the whole nature of the substance” (SI, 349), as “the particular does not have the universal in it and something also besides the universal to make it particular” (SI, 336, see also Joseph (1916a, 23)). It contains nothing besides the particularization of the universal: “the particular is not something that has the quality, it is the particularized quality. This animal is particularized animality” (SI, 713). Likewise, “the differentia cannot be separated from the genus as something added on to it” (SI, 359), the species are just the forms that the universal, as genus, takes (SI, 335). Stout, citing Cook Wilson with approval, put it thus: “square shape is not squareness plus shape; squareness itself is a special way of being a shape” (Stout 1930, 398). (The view harks back to Aristotle, Met. I 8 1058a21–26, see also on this point Joseph (1916a, 85–86), Wisdom (1934, 29), Prior (1949, 5–6) and Butcharov (1966, 147–153)).