 Many other classical theorists accepted the view that sense data are non-mental. Broad (1923) and Price (1932) were realists who acknowledged both sense data and material objects. Broad explored a “critical scientific realism” by elaborating the notion of sense data (or, in his terms, “sensa”) from Russell and others. His position was in some ways similar to traditional representative realism, but Broad denied that sensa are themselves mental states, in the sense of being dependent on the mind for their existence (1923: 265–266), and, further, he denied that physical objects are inferred from sensa. Rather, sensing sensa induces an underived belief in mind-independent physical objects, a belief that is not reached by inference and cannot be justified by inference (1923: 268). Broad agreed with Russell’s point that, in ordinary perceptual consciousness, sense data are not manifest but may become so through an act of attention. He rejected the picture that we first focus on sensa and then explicitly infer objects and their properties from them; rather, we “pass automatically”, by a primitive feature of our psychology, from sensa (perhaps unnoticed) to judgments about objects and their properties (1923: 246–248).