 Finally, if metaphysical explanation is deductive-nomological (or “covering law”), it seems that there is no room for explanations of rare or one-off phenomena in terms of the mechanisms that ground (or cause) them, even in cases where, had a similar mechanism occurred, it need not have given rise to a similar phenomenon (e.g., Taylor 2016). According to Trogdon (2018; see also Anscombe 1971), it seems likely that some explanations are one-off in this sense, from which it would seem to follow that, even if some or most metaphysical explanations turn out to be deductive nomological, this cannot be true of all of them. For an argument against this conclusion—on the grounds that laws of metaphysics can be indeterministic and that (like indeterministic laws of nature) they can hence help explain rare events—see Wasserman (2017).