 Since the hypothesis that Turiel hoped to establish is that children distinguish moral judgments from judgments about social convention, he also needed an account of the distinctive features of judgments about social convention. Here too, he sought guidance in the philosophical literature, though his palette was more limited. There are occasional references to Lewis’s Convention, and to other authors, but much of his discussion of convention relies on the work of his Berkeley colleague, John Searle (1969) (see, for example, Turiel 1983: 37–38). Social conventions, on Turiel’s account, are typically local—they differ in different places and at different times. So if a young participant judges that an action is wrong at her school, and if she takes the action to be a transgression of a social convention, then she will not insist that it would be wrong in other schools or at other times. Social conventions are also alterable, since people or their leaders can decide to change them. Thus if a participant views a transgression to be a violation of a conventional rule, she will agree that it would not be wrong if an appropriate authority were to change the rule. The function of social conventions, according to Turiel, is to facilitate social coordination. So if asked why a transgression of a social convention is wrong, a participant will typically focus on the factors that sustain social coordination and the consequences of disrupting it.