 Both universalizability and categoricalness are “formal”—they do not impose any constraints on the content of moral rules or moral judgments. But Turiel also held that there are substantive features that moral judgments share. Moral judgments, he maintained, deal with issues linked to harm, justice or rights. Thus if an experimental participant has made a genuinely moral judgment and is asked to explain why the behavior in question is wrong, she will typically appeal to the harm that has been done, or to injustice or the violation of someone’s rights. Though Turiel found inspiration for his focus on harm, justice, and rights in the philosophical literature he  favored,[7]  his choice of these features was largely motivated by his constructivist account of how children acquire moral beliefs. In simple “prototypical” cases, he maintained, the child can see that the behavior has harmful consequences, and that leads the child to recognize that the behavior is wrong.