 Second, scientific pluralism has been embraced as a framework for negotiating the epistemology rather than the metaphysics of science (Kellert et al. [eds.] 2006a). Many epistemological debates reflect the increased integration of philosophy with history and social studies of science. Challenging a sharp divide between an abstract “context of justification” and a historically contingent “context of discovery” (Schickore &amp; Steinle [eds.] 2006), scientific pluralism can often be understood as an attempt to reconcile systematic philosophy of science with the historization of scientific knowledge production from Bachelard’s (1934 [1986]) and Fleck’s (1935) historical epistemologies to Kuhn’s (1962) historical challenges of a unified scientific method. The institutionalization of both “integrated history and philosophy of science” (Arabatzis and Schickore [eds.] 2012) and “philosophy of science in practice” (Ankeny et al. 2011) reflects how much of this integration of historically contingent plurality and systematic philosophical analysis has become mainstreamed in philosophy of science.