 Unsurprisingly, Ross says ‘[t]his sense of our particular duty in particular circumstances, preceded and informed by the fullest reflection we can bestow on the act in all its bearings, is highly fallible, but it is the only guide we have to our [actual] duty’ (RG 42). We never know, then, what we actually ought to do in a certain situation. Instead, we have a ‘considered opinion’ or ‘probable opinion’ regarding what we ought to do in a particular situation (RG 19, 30, 31, 33; FE 189, 190, 191; OJ 122, 123, 127). In the end, the decision regarding what to do simpliciter, to use Aristotle’s phrase, ‘rests with perception’ (RG 42; OJ 127; Aristotle1109b23, 1126b4). It is important to note all of the responsibilities have a valence, positive or negative, and this valence persists even when a responsibility is outweighed by weightier responsibilities. So if one’s break a promise one owes compensation to the person to whom one has made the promise (RG 28).