 The problem, of course, is to explain how God can be both Being esseand something that is ens. This is unintelligible to the discursive intellect.  Either Being is other than beings or it is not. If Being is other than beings, then Being cannot itself be. That would imply that God, who must be Being itself to be absolute, cannot be. If, on the other hand, Being just is beings taken collectively, then God could only be a being among beings and not the absolute reality. To the discursive intellect the notion of self-subsistent Being is contradictory. For the idea here is that Being itself is a being, a very special being no doubt, but nonetheless a being, something that is. One response to the contradiction is simply to deny divine simplicity. That is a reasonable response, no doubt. But might it not also be reasonable to admit that there are things that human reason cannot understand, and that one of these things is the divine nature? “Human reason can see that human reason cannot comprehend the quid est of God.” (Stump 2016, 205)