 Furthermore, our capacity for deliberative choice allows us to shape our own characters, and Aristotle thinks that we need to be able to do so in order to be responsible for the actions that flow from those characters. In NE 3.5, Aristotle considers an argument against our responsibility for our actions that proceeds from psychological determinism. It goes as follows: let us suppose that a careless person exceeds the speed limit because they did not notice the sign posting the limit. Aristotle says that the law rightly punishes such cases of ignorant wrongdoing, because the person is responsible for his own negligent ignorance, just as in the case of the ignorant drunkard. But, the objection goes, some people just are careless; they’re simply the sort of people who aren’t going to take care (NE 3.5 1114a3–4). So it’s not up to them not to be careless. More generally, people do what they do because they believe it gets them what is good. But what seems good to a person is not under their control; instead, it is determined by their character (NE 3.5 1114a30–1114b12). If I choose to poison my mother, it’s because I believe that doing so will be good for me. But I did not choose to believe that wealth is so incredibly important for my well-being, and the interests of others and considerations of justice so negligible, that getting lots of money through undetected murder would be good for me. As Plato says in his dialogue the Timaeus, nobody is willingly evil. Instead, through some combination of poor natural endowments and poor education, neither of which the evil person had under their control, they become vicious. So they are not to blame for their vice; rather, those who nurtured them are to blame (Tim. 86d-87a).