The ontological problem is also dissolved by the deflationary nominalism. Clearly, deflationary nominalism has no commitment either to mathematical objects or to a modal ontology of any kind (including possible worlds, abstract entities as proxy for possible worlds, or other forms of replacement for the expression of modal claims). The deflationary nominalists not only avoid the commitment to mathematical objects, they also claim that such objects have no properties whatsoever. This means that the deflationary nominalist's ontology is extremely minimal: only concrete objects are ultimately assumed—objects that are ontologically independent of our psychological processes and linguistic practices. In particular, no domain of nonexistent objects is posited nor a realm of genuine properties of such objects. By ‘genuine properties’ I mean those properties that hold only in virtue of what the objects in question are, and not as the result of some external relations to other objects. For example, although Sherlock Holmes does not exist, he has the property of being thought of by me as I write this sentence. This is not, however, a genuine property of Sherlock Holmes in the intended sense.