 Scheler’s most important contribution to the analysis of collective intentionality is largely negative. Joint intentionality is not, Scheler holds, a combination of individual intentionality with a structure of reciprocal awareness, whatever the structure and kind of the reciprocal awareness in question may be. From his analysis emerges the view that when people share an attitude, it is not the case that each participant has an attitude of his or her own, but that the intentional attitude at stake here is really one and the same, so that many minds are in a numerically identical state. The most conspicuous examples Scheler discusses are the experience of grief which parents, without thinking of each other, share at the deathbed of their child (Scheler 1954 [1912]: 145), and the chillingly positive account of the shared national enthusiasm (the August Madness) at the outbreak of World War One (Scheler 1982 [1914]: 272ff.). Without mentioning his source, Martin Heidegger follows roughly Schelerian lines in his discussion of more innocent examples in (1996 [1928/29]). The idea is that collective intentionality is not a combination of individual intentionality and reciprocal attitudes, but irreducibly collective (for a recent re-statement of this point see Searle 1995: 27). A problem of irreducibility-claims of this sort, however, is that it is hard to believe that the participants in a collective intentional attitude do not represent, in some way, each other, even if they need not have occurrent beliefs or conscious empathetic experience. A participant’s intention represents the others as co-intenders in some way, or so it seems (Searle seems to concede this point in Searle 2010: 15). An important question to consider is whether the relation between the co-intenders is of the cognitive, normative, or rather of the affective kind. Tuomela &amp; Miller (1988) and Michael Bratman (1999) argue that the participants have to know what the others are up to, Alonso (2009) argues that they just have to rely on them, while Gilbert (1990) claims that they have to normatively expect others to do their parts. Schmid (2013) argues that the attitude in question is trust, and that this combines cognitive and normative components. The question of how participants in collective intentionality “represent” each other becomes particularly pressing if it is assumed that basic cases of shared intentionality are developed at an age where infants do not have a theory of mind, such as in Michael Tomasello’s (2009) view.