 These general criteria are hardly enough to resolve all of our questions about the basis for kind distinctions, however. Kinds are discriminated from other things by citing or  “presenting”  (jǔ 舉) distinctive features shared by their members. These features must be selected carefully. If we choose features that are not genuinely relevant or comparable, then the distinctions we draw will be specious (B76). If we cite features shared by individuals of more than one kind, we will fail to distinguish the kinds correctly and reliably. The Mohists call the use of such specious or unreliable criteria “wild presenting” (kuáng jǔ 狂舉, citing features “crazily” or “arbitrarily”). As canon B66 explains, we cannot recognize the differences between kinds of things correctly if we cite features that different kinds both have (as oxen and horses both have teeth and tails) or features that only some but not all of one kind have (as some but not all cattle have horns). 