 How are grounding and fundamentality related? Here we focus on fundamentality with respect to facts, as opposed to, say, entity or theory fundamentality. There are two general types of fundamentality, relative and absolute. As for relative fundamentality, the general idea is that some facts are more fundamental than others. A simple grounding-theoretic account of relative fundamentality is this: for each fact among \([P],\) \([P'],\) … to be more fundamental than \([Q]\) is for \([P],\) \([P'],\) … to ground \([Q]\). Turning to absolute fundamentality, the idea is that some facts are fundamental full stop. On one familiar conception of absolute fundamentality, to be absolutely fundamental is to enjoy a distinctive form of independence (Bennett 2017: Ch. 5). One way for a fact to be independent is for it not to be grounded by other facts. This suggests a simple grounding-theoretic account of absolute fundamentality: to be absolutely fundamental it to be ungrounded (Schaffer 2009).