  Explaining “degree of belief in \(q\) given \(p\)”, Ramsey says “It roughly expresses the odds at which [the subject] would now bet on \(q\), the bet only to be valid if \(p\) is true” (1926a, [FM] 180). Ramsey was aware that the link between degrees of belief and betting behaviour is imperfect (1926a, [FM] 170). Here the message is that a conditional degree of belief is to a conditional bet, as an unconditional degree of belief is to an unconditional bet. For a bet on \(q\), you ask yourself, which is more likely and by how much, \(q\) or \(\neg q\)?  For a bet on \(q\) given \(p\), you ask yourself, which is more likely, and by how much, \(p \:\&amp;\: q\), or \(p \:\&amp;\: \neg q\)? If you judge \(p \:\&amp;\: q\) much more likely than \(p \:\&amp;\: \neg q\), you have a high degree of belief in \(q\) given \(p\). Equivalently, under the hypothesis or supposition that \(p\), you judge it to be likely that \(q\).