 How do grounding and necessity interact? Let \([P],\) \([P'],\) … (metaphysically) necessitate \([Q]\) just in case any (metaphysically) possible world in which the former obtains is a world in which the latter obtains. The broad consensus is that necessity isn’t sufficient for grounding—it’s not the case that if \([P],\) \([P'],\) … necessitate \([Q]\), then the former ground the latter. (B. McDaniel 2019, however, argues that a restricted form of necessitation is sufficient—as well as necessary—for grounding.) Consider a necessary fact such as [\(2+3=5\)]. While this fact might have grounds, facts about, say, German Expressivist art aren’t among them; yet the latter necessitate the former. Also, there are cases in which the direction of necessitation and grounding come apart. Plausibly, [{Beijing} exists] necessitates [Beijing exists], yet presumably the later grounds the former rather than the other way around.