Second, open voting in parliament may not only give room to pressure from your actual electors, it may also lead to pressure from those who did not actually vote for you or from well-organized lobbies defending some specific interests. This is probably one of the concerns today in many countries. Publicity allows the electors to use the threat of non-reelection in full knowledge of what a representative actually did. Still, it allows as well other actors to do so, who may neither be the representative’s actual electors, nor lobbies acting in the name of the general interest. Though employers and landowners may not pressure employees and landless people anymore, lobbyists representing the former do pressure the MPs elected by the latter, with comparable results. This indicates how pressure made possible through publicity may effectively force representatives to take directions that do not fit with the view of the public interest defended by those who elect them. Pressure is a double-edged sword. This may call for at least mixed systems, a proposal to which we shall return shortly. It may even justify taking more seriously the possibility of vote anonymity in parliament, provided that the number of votes for and against each proposal be known anyway.