 Doesn’t there have to be at least logical coherence among the contents? As we just saw, Hurley (1998) makes this claim, as does Baars (1988). Hurley, for example, argues that we cannot believe mutually inconsistent things when we are conscious of both in a single unified experience. Could the disconnect among unified conscious states extend to them actually being inconsistent with one another? Contrary to Hurley and Baars, the evidence suggests that it could. Suppose that one sees a stick immersed in water as being bent but feels it to be straight or knows that this is an illusion. Here, one’s conscious perception that it is bent conflicts with one’s conscious belief that it is not bent, yet these states are unified in one consciousness (Bayne 2000). Tye (2003: 38) does not consider this illusion to be an example of incoherence. He holds that here touch corrects vision, making the stick appear to be straight, and so belief renders the appearance mere appearance. That claim is controversial. Bayne (2004: 227) discusses another example, inverting spectacles, more plausibly. These glasses render one’s visual contents inconsistent with one’s tactile contents, yet consciousness of the visual contents remains unified with consciousness of the tactile contents. 