 Richard offers a similar solution to Kripke’s puzzle. In Kripke-style cases, the attributor is conscious of the misidentification, and so it is plausible to claim that there is a context-shift. (Insofar as we grant that something like restrictions on correlation functions are part of context, that is.) The speaker is conscious of the fact that her uses of ‘London’ in representing Pierre’s beliefs are not completely univocal, as she first uses them to represent his “Londres”-beliefs and then to represent his “London”-beliefs. But in Richard’s case, the speaker need not be conscious of the misidentification and hence will not recognize any shift in the context. She will take her utterances of (39) and (41) to be part of a single communicative exchange in which no context shifts have been needed, precisely because she (that is, Sally) takes (39) to concern one person’s beliefs and (41) to concern another person’s beliefs. So, there are reasons to think that our intuitions concerning the truth and falsity of (39) and (41) do not rely on implicit context-shifting.