 Soteriou (2018) claims that both versions of the event theory are too strict about what they count as sounds: the Located Event Theory counts as sounds only monadic events happening at material objects; the Relational Event Theory, instead, admits only relational events that are bearers of acoustic properties. Soteriou challenges the assumption that sounds are one kind of thing and suggests that the sounds we hear are both pure audibilia (such as the barking of a dog), which are events or act-types bearing acoustic properties that can also be disconnected from their material causes and cannot exist in a vacuum, and events or act-types that can lack acoustic properties (footsteps), which are perceivable by means of modalities that are different from audition, and can exist in a vacuum. Soteriou’s “simple view” or “catholic view” (2018: 48) moves from the necessity of rejecting the idea of considering the experiences of echoes and recorded sounds as illusory experiences or distortion of space and time, which is how he thinks both event theories regard them in order to be consistent. The event theories classify the experiences of echoes and recorded sounds as illusory for the sake of preserving the idea that, usually, sounds are the bearers of acoustic properties located where we experience them to be located, namely distally. That is because if sound is something located at its own source and the echo seems to be a sound not perceived at its source, then we are hallucinating a sound. When hearing recorded sound, we experience and illusion since the bearer of the acoustic properties that we actually hear to be distally located is distinct from the “original” bearer of acoustic properties (2018: 44). Soteriou suggests that when hearing echoes or recorded sounds, even though we do not hear event-like individuals distally located, we do not have an illusory experience since what we hear are pure audibilia. Soteriou’s proposal has the merit of broadening up the range of the audible, but it might encounter some worries because of the non-univocal characterization of what sounds are. For example, a challenge to this view is to explain, on the one hand, how pure audibila are connected to the physical causes and, on the other hand, how collisions or non-audible act-types “acquire” acoustic properties that make them audible.