 One way of replying to this challenge that may not require endorsing non-cognitivism with respect to animal minds is to allow that non-rational minds may well have some way of representing the world, but posit that rational minds constitute an altogether different kind of mind than their non-rational counterparts. On this view, rational and non-rational animality are conceived as two completely different species of animality whose generic similarity does not require that there share any of the same fundamental mental capacities (Herder 1772 [2002: 81–87]; Hegel 1830/1991: §2; McDowell 1996: ch. 6; Boyle 2012, 2016, 2017; Conant 2016; Land 2018). On this view, “rational” does not specify some characteristic among others of a creature, but rather its “distinctive manner of having characteristics” (Boyle 2012: 410). Thus rationality “transforms” the manner in which a rational creature has other kinds of mental state (e.g., experience and desire) and is not merely added to an otherwise independently characterizable stock of the creature’s mental powers.