 Such a recognition is not nearly broad enough to cover the inadequacy of the harm-within-the-risk approach. The basic problem with the test is that it ignores all the issues traditionally adjudicated under the concept of legal cause. The test is blind not only to freakishness of causal route in the intervening cause situations, blind not only to the distinction between antecedent versus after-arising abnormalities so crucial to resolution of the thin-skulled man kind of issue, but the test also ignores all those issues of remoteness sought to be captured by Sir Francis Bacon’s coinage “proximate causation”. Even where there is no sudden “break” in the chain of causation as in the intervening cause cases, there is a strong sense that causation peters out over space and time. Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon may well be a necessary condition for your reading of this essay, but so many other events have also contributed that Caesar’s causal responsibility has long since petered out. The logical relationship at the heart of the harm-within-the-risk test—“was the particular harm that happened an instance of the type of harm whose risk, foresight, or intention made the defendant culpable?”—is incapable of capturing this sensitivity to remoteness. As such, the harm-within-the-risk test is blind to the basic issue adjudicated under “legal cause”. The harm-within-the-risk test asks a question that well serves justice-oriented theories of torts and criminal law, but it asks it in the wrong place and in substitution of other questions needing an answer for desert to be assessed.