 The main count on the other side of the argument is that many goods that matter to human beings are collective in nature and many that are already well-established objects of individual human rights have collective dimensions. Consider, for example, collective acts of worship or other shared expressions of religious faith, or provision for a minority’s language in public documentation and public signage. If these collective goods are objects of human rights, those rights would seem to be of necessity group rights. UN documents sometimes seek to avoid that conclusion by distinguishing between the possession and the exercise of human rights. Individuals may exercise some human rights “in community with others” rather than individually but the rights they exercise together will still be rights they possess individually. But that distinction can be difficult to maintain (Jones 2018, 2020). If, for example, a population engages in an act of collective self-determination, that act is not intelligible as the simultaneous exercise of so many individually-held rights of individual self-determination; the act is a collective act with a collective outcome and the right to perform it can only be a group right. Similarly, a right to perform an integrated act of worship as an integrated act makes sense only as a group right. Individuals may possess individual rights to participate in the collective act but the right to stage the act of worship as a collective act will be a group right. If, with the Vienna Declaration (1993, Part II, para. 22), we deem the human right to freedom of religion to include the right of religious communities that their sacred sites shall not be desecrated, that too would seem inescapably to be a group right.