 There is a different form the dispositionalist view of colors has more recently taken, and which has many philosophical defenders, e.g., Bennett (1971), Dummett (1979), McDowell (1985), McGinn (1983), Peacocke (1984), Johnston (1992), and Levin (2000). These philosophers reject the claim that the dispositionalist view is in conflict with any commonsense view of color. It is held by some that dispositionalism can be defended as an analytic thesis, concerning the meaning of color terms; it is held, or implied, by others that possession of the concept of color is neutral on the precise nature of the colors, a nature which consists in being dispositional. One virtue of this account is that, if it is correct, there is no need to agree that science is in conflict with our intuitive notions of color, or that it shows that ordinary color talk is mistaken, or in need of reconstruction. Another virtue would be that it would explain what seems to be an important feature of color concepts, as opposed to primary quality concepts: that in order to grasp, fully, color concepts, it is necessary to have color experiences. (It is interesting that, as Adams (2016) points out, Aristotle’s account of color rejects this assumption: For Aristotle, the function of vision is to detect colors, perceiver-independent colors.)