 Smith tries to get around this problem by adding to (Necessitation-T) the further constraint that a truth-maker for a given truth should be part of what that truth is about: “roughly: it should fall within the mereological fusion of all the objects to which reference is made in the judgment” (1999: 6). His suggestion is that a typical contingent judgement p not only makes singular reference to the objects whose antics it describes but also “generic reference” to the events, processes and states that are associated with the main verb of the sentence that is used to express the judgement in question. So, for example, the judgement that John is kissing Mary incorporates not only singular reference to John and Mary but also generic reference to all kisses. Smith identifies the projection of a judgement with the fusion of all these things to which it refers (singularly or generically). He then defines what is to be a truth-maker in terms of this notion: