 The text, and in particular the B160–1 note, gives rise to a number of interpretive issues for Kant’s overall position. One is whether here Kant countenances a kind of unity in our representations that is not a result of categorical synthesis, but is instead is independent of the categories. Hermann Cohen (1871/1987, 1907) and Eric Dufour (2003) are strict categorical conceptualists about any such unity, while Martin Heidegger (1929/1997) argues that there is a unity that is accounted for by the productive imagination independently of the categories; (Lorne Falkenstein 1995, Michel Fichant 1997, Robert Hanna 2008, 2011, Stephanie Grüne 2011, Dennis Schulting 2012b, James Messina 2014, Colin McLear 2015, and Jessica Wilson 2018 also defend nonconceptualist positions on this score; see McLear 2014, 2020 for overviews). Longuenesse (1998) contends that unity-yielding synthesis is always a function of the understanding, but that there is a kind of synthesis of the understanding that does not involve the categories, while it yet anticipates them. Messina (2014), McLear (2015), Onof and Schulting (2015), and Wilson (2018) argue that there are multiple kinds of unity for Kant, and while some require categorical synthesis, others do not. In particular, they maintain that space as intuited by us has a unity that Onof and Schulting (2015) call unicity, which consists of its singularity, its infinity, and its mereological inversion, i.e., a metaphysical structure involving parts ontologically depending on the whole, by contrast with the whole ontologically depending on parts, as is the case for material objects generally (here see Desmond Hogan 2021). Intuitive awareness of space as featuring unicity does not, on their account, require categorical synthesis.