  On the first point, as we saw, it is controversial whether Aristotle’s conclusion that the firmest belief is a belief in PNC carries with it the presupposition that PNC is true, a presupposition that is needed for his own project of first philosophy. On the third point, Aristotle discusses views about perception and change that lead people to say that they reject PNC. On the second point, Aristotle shows that those who say that they reject PNC do not really do so, or, if they do, they will be giving up intelligible discourse and action, and—one might add—they will be living in a world of mere sophistry and power. It is controversial how much of an essentialist or indeed realist view one must accept if one accepts PNC, but it is clear that PNC is essential for the project of an Aristotelian science. Without it, Aristotle notes, beginners in philosophy who are interested in the truth would be off on a wild goose chase (Metaph IV 5 1009b36–8). Acceptance of PNC, then, may also have ethical and political implications.