 Gongsun Long’s disputation is perceived as plainly not fitting “reality” (shi, also the “stuff” spoken of). It is an exercise in cleverness, a kind of trick performance in which the disputer attempts to make a case for a claim that everyone knows does not fit its object. Harbsmeier has rightly emphasized this point in arguing that further attention to Gongsun Long’s social and historical context is needed if we are to understand the white horse sophism properly (1998: 300–301). He suggests that Gongsun Long probably belonged to a class of entertainers at Chinese courts who performed various skills or tricks. His was to prove, over any and all objections, that a white horse is not a horse. His sophistries may have been intended primarily as a kind of light entertainment, not as expressions of a principled philosophical position. They touch on philosophical issues, such as discriminating the same and different, but there is no reason to expect them to demonstrate cogent reasoning based on a coherent semantic or logical theory. The truth may be just the opposite: They could have been intended to be whimsical and amusing, even comical. The “White Horse” dialogue may be a record of the sort of arguments Gongsun Long would offer in his performances. 