Battigalli &amp; Siniscalchi (2002) develop an epistemic analysis of forward induction reasoning in extensive games (cf. also, Stalnaker 1998: sec. 6). They build on an idea of Stalnaker (1998, 1996) to characterize forward induction solution concepts in terms of common strong belief in rationality. We discussed the definition of “strong belief” in Section 2.4. The mathematical representation of beliefs in Battigalli &amp; Siniscalchi (2002) is different, although the underlying idea is the same. A player strongly believes an event \(E\) provided she believes \(E\) is true at the beginning of the game (in the sense that she assigns probability 1 to \(E\)) and continues to believe \(E\) as long as it is not falsified by the evidence. The evidence available to a player in an extensive game consists of the observations of the previous moves that are consistent with the structure of the game tree—i.e., the paths through a game tree. A complete discussion of this approach is beyond the scope of the entry. Consult Battigalli &amp; Siniscalchi (2002); Baltag et al. (2009); Battigalli &amp; Friedenberg (2012); Bonanno (2013); Perea (2012, 2014); and van Benthem &amp; Gheerbrant (2010) for a discussion of this approach and alternative epistemic analyses of backward and forward induction.