Discussions of legislative intentions often fail to distinguish between these different kinds of intentions. It is especially common to conflate legal, application, and communicative intentions. A legislature might intend a legal rule that requires (all and only) persons with contagious diseases to be quarantined for two weeks (a legal intention). The legislature might also intend that a particular disease that is in fact not contagious, e.g., psoriasis, be included within the quarantine (an application intention). These two intentions are in conflict with each other, so it is important for an intentionalist to be clear about which one is the relevant one. Similarly, a lawmaker may intend to use a particular sentence to communicate a particular content in the service of creating a complex legal norm, not recognizing that the intended communication is ill-suited to accomplish the legal intention (Greenberg 2011a, 241–50). One might think that it would require carelessness to make a mistake about whether a particular communicative content is well-chosen to effectuate a given legal intention, but in complex statutes, the way in which information conveyed sentence by sentence relates to the creation of an intended legal norm is not straightforward (see citations to recent empirical work below).