 There is consensus that normative reasons are facts (Raz 1975; Scanlon 1998), though the consensus is not universal. The question is complicated by disagreement about what facts of any kind are: are they concrete or abstract entities? Is a fact the same as the corresponding true proposition, or is the fact the “truth-maker” of the proposition? Are there any facts other than empirical facts, e.g., logical, mathematical, moral or aesthetic facts? For instance, it has been argued, notably by John Mackie, that there are no moral facts. Mackie argued against the existence of moral facts partially on the grounds that they would be metaphysically “queer”. He held that, if there are any moral facts, they would have to be both objective and necessarily motivating to those who are aware of them, and he claimed that it was wholly implausible that anything could have such properties (Mackie 1977). If Mackie is right that there are no moral facts, then either moral reasons are not normative reasons; or at least some normative reasons namely, moral reasons, are not facts.