 Whether “roughly equal” or “on a par” imply comparability is a matter of some debate. “Roughly equal” and “on a par,” for example, are intransitive, so to recognize them as distinct comparative relations would require us to reconsider the transitivity of comparative relations (Hsieh 2007). Some authors suggest that one of the three standard comparative relations obtains between all items that are claimed to be incomparable, roughly equal, or on a par (Regan 1997). In the case of “on a par,” Joshua Gert and Erik Carlson have argued that it can be defined in terms of the three standard comparative relations (Gert 2004; 2015; Carlson 2010). Gert’s suggestion is developed further by Wlodek Rabinowicz who provides a Fitting Attitudes account of value relations (Rabinowicz 2008; 2012). The Fitting Attitudes account typically analyzes goodness in terms of a normative component and an attitudinal component. By acknowledging that there can be two levels of normativity, requirement and permissibility, the account leaves room for both parity and standard value relations. X is better than Y if and only if it is rationally required to prefer X to Y, and X and Y are on a par if and only if it is rationally permissible to prefer X to Y and also rationally permissible to prefer Y to X. Interestingly, preferences and the lack of preferences together with the two levels of normativity can be combined in 15 different ways. This means that the fitting attitudes analysis provides the conceptual space for 15 possible value relations.