 Perhaps the most basic division in play is evaluative, i.e., whether the emotion is good or bad. This was hardly an innovation. But early modern philosophers came to understand that division in two different ways – either an emotion is directed at good or evil as an object, or the emotion itself is affectively good or bad, pleasurable or painful. Many distinctively modern theories subsumed the former under the latter: both the naturalistic theories of Hobbes and Spinoza, on the one hand, and the moral sense theories of Hutcheson and Hume, on the other, held that we project the value of the object from the affective quality of the emotion, although Hume allows for complications in how we experience the valences of a passion as belonging to self or other, using such mechanisms as sympathy and comparison. Some authors also identified neutral emotions: ‘wonder’ is a common example, deriving largely from Descartes, although anticipated in Sir Kenelme Digby’s Two Treatises (1644).