 Some truths are hard to recognize as they are highly specific, and thus unlikely to hold. Recognizing that global temperature will rise may be easy, but recognizing that it will rise by 2.3 Degrees Celsius is hard. Whenever some choice alternative (and thus its correctness) is highly specific, competence in jury models is threatened. Suppose a climate panel must form a belief about the proposition \(p\) that global temperature will rise by 2.3 degrees. Someone’s competence given \(p\) (more generally, given facts that entail \(p\)) can easily fall below \(\frac{1}{2}\), because correctly recognizing \(p\) is hard. Indeed, the available evidence might be compatible with a temperature rise close to, but distinct from 2.3 degrees. The other effect of \(p\)’s high specificity is that competence given not-\(p\) (more generally, given facts that entail not-\(p\)) can become very high, because not-\(p\) is a very unspecific and thus “credible” proposition. The lesson is that highly unbalanced choice alternatives—a highly specific alternative against a highly unspecific alternative—bring the competence assumption of the Conditional Jury Theorem to fall.