 Affective Attitudes. Suppose further that you not only perceive the child falling on the street, but you also become acquainted with the negative (dis-)value of the child falling on the street. In this case, you could emote according to that disvalue by feeling disquiet about or concern for the child. This example illustrates two further insights about our mental life secured by early phenomenology. First, it illustrates the possibility of becoming acquainted with value-properties: these are higher-order properties like being dangerous, beautiful, elegant, morally blameworthy, pleasurable, commendable, etc., which supervene on properties of other kinds, but do not reduce to them. The specific kind of act that gives access to value-properties is called by phenomenologists “feeling” (Fühlen) (see Brunswig 1910: 182; Geiger 1928: 36f; Reinach, 1912/13 [1989: 295–301]; von Hildebrand 1916: 203ff, Pfänder 1933: 24; Scheler 1913/16: 271f; on this notion, see also Mulligan 2010: 235f). Even if affectively colored, feeling is not an affective attitude, but belongs to the family of presentations or cognitions and thus shares the main features exemplified by acts of this kind. In particular, this act secures a receptive, non-conceptual, and intuitive access to value-properties. Interestingly, feeling’s sensitivity can be cultivated through time: this enables subjects to better discriminate values and, thereby, to achieve epistemic excellence in the appreciation of the goods that exemplify values (see Schapp 1930: 11f).