 However, Russell believed that judgments about what is right or what ought to be done can be given an analysis which gives them a sort of ersatz objectivity and hence the possibility of truth. If Dmitri has a reasonably determinate conception of the good, that is, a coherent set of opinions about which things are good and which bad, then although Dmitri’s opinions themselves are neither true nor false—since, despite appearances they are not really opinions at all but optative expressions of Dmitri’s desires—it can nevertheless be true or false that X is good in Dmitri’s opinion, that is, good-according-to-Dmitri. “Oh to be in England, now that April’s here!” is neither true nor false, but if I say it sincerely, it will in fact be true that I desire to be in England. Similarly, if Dmitri says that “Bungy-jumping is good” what he says won’t be true, since really it is in the optative mood, but if he says it sincerely, it will be true that Bungy-jumping is good-in-Dmitri’s-opinion, or good-according-to-Dmitri. Thus although there are no facts of the matter about which things are good or bad, there are facts of the matter about which things are believed by this or that person to be good or bad. Furthermore—and this is the crucial point—there are facts of the matter about whether a given action or a given policy is likely to promote what somebody-or-other believes to be good. Since Hitler believed that victory over Britain would be good, there was a fact of the matter about whether bombing London as opposed to bombing the RAF’s airfields would be likely bring about the states of affairs that he desired. As it turned out, the policy he pursued did not produce results that were best-according-to-Hitler. Hence if Hitler had adopted a consequentialist reading of “ought”, and had indexed it to his own requirements, “I ought to bomb London” (as said by Hitler) would have been false. And its truth or its falsehood would have been a factually arguable question.