 Abstractionist realism seems more straightforward than fictionalism in a number of ways, so fictionalists, particularly platonist fictionalists, risk being victims of their own success and collapsing into a kind of realism. (Nolan 1997a p 272 mentions this worry.) Rosen 1990, particulary on pp 328–9, mentions some motivations for a fictionalist to not be an abstractionist. Turp 2011 discusses a similar challenge: on many accounts of the ontology of fiction, fictional worlds would themselves be some sort of existing abstract object, of the sort that a fictionalist who wishes to reject abstractionism seems committed to rejecting. Finally, Dombrovszki 2017 endorses the existence of the possible worlds postulated by a modal fiction: in his “hybrid modal fiction” possible worlds are creatures of fiction but nevertheless exist (much as so-called “fictional realists” hold that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional object that exists). If Dombrovszki is right, this is not so much a threat from abstractionism as an opportunity to be a modal fictionalist and a realist about possible worlds at the same time.