 An idea that plays a large role in Kant’s discussion of the subjective universality of the judgment of taste is that of disinterestedness; and so the idea should not be overlooked. Kant makes two claims: (a) that pleasure in the beautiful is “disinterested”; and (b) that only pleasure in the beautiful is “disinterested” (Kant 1790, 5: 204–210 [2000: 90–96: 42–50]). These claims are important for Kant’s project, for Kant connects disinterestedness with the claim to universal validity of the judgment of taste. Before we go any further, it is crucial to recognize that the German word “interesse” has a special meaning in eighteenth century German, and it should not be confused with similar sounding English words or even contemporary German words. For Kant, an interesse means a kind of pleasure that is not connected with desire; it is neither grounded in desire, nor does it produce it.