 To see why this strategy might be appealing, we can consider an analogy with perception. (A similar analogy with action is also possible.) Consider the perceptual state of someone looking at an apple. We can characterize this state in terms of what the person sees, just as we can characterize Oscar’s belief state in terms of what he believes. In this case, our subject sees an apple, so one way to characterize her perceptual state is as “seeing an apple,” just as one way to describe Oscar’s belief state is as “believing that water is wet.” However, we can easily construct scenarios in which our perceiver is in exactly the same narrow state, but does not see an apple — perhaps because everything except the apple’s facing surface has been cut away. We can easily find a content of the subject’s perception that is a content of the very same perceptual state but which characterizes it more narrowly: the subject sees the facing surface of the apple, and it is by virtue of seeing the facing surface that she sees the apple as a whole. Characterizing the perceptual state as “seeing the facing surface of an apple” is a narrower characterization in a very simple sense: if we consider alternative situations in which the subject is intrinsically exactly the same, but her environment is different, we will observe that in every situation in which she sees an apple, she also sees its facing surface, but that there are additional situations in which she sees the facing surface but does not thereby see an entire apple. Similarly, if we consider Oscar’s belief that water is wet, we notice that a Twin Earth-like scenario provides a situation in which he is in the very same cognitive state but does not believe that water is wet. So we look for other contents of his belief, other things he believes, that characterize his state more narrowly. In this case we notice that in every situation in which he is in exactly the same intrinsic state and believes that water is wet, he also believes that the colorless, odorless liquid called ‘water’ is wet, but not conversely. So this latter belief seems to characterize his intrinsic state more narrowly than does the content “water is wet.”