 One aspect of Wundt’s hierarchy of method and knowledge deserves special attention, namely the place of logic in the sciences. Like almost all the similarly titled tomes produced by the German mandarins, Wundt’s Logik (in two, later three 600-page volumes in four editions) molders away in research libraries. Its contents are for the most part unrecognizable as “logic” in any contemporary sense. What most philosophers meant by “Logik” in Wundt’s day was the rules and procedure of inference governing the sciences, where this often included lengthy treatments of the actual scientific application of these rules. What we would expect to find in a book called “Logik” today, viz., symbolic or mathematical logic, was called at that time “Logistik”, and was considered by some a mathematical (that is, merely formal) game unworthy of philosophy’s scientific (that is, substantive) role (cf., e.g., Natorp 1910: 4–10). Thus we should not be surprised to read Wundt, too, declare logic’s task to be the justifying and accounting for “those laws of thinking active in scientific knowledge” (L I: 1).