 Both premises of this argument are controversial. The second premise, that phenomenology is narrow, is rejected by phenomenal externalists (Lycan 2008, §14), while the controversial character of the first premise, that there is intentional content that is entirely determined by phenomenology, can be seen in the fact that its proponents have advanced it as a departure from orthodoxy. Defenders of phenomenal intentionality have supported both premises by appeal to brain-in-vat scenarios. Suppose that alien beings synthesize a structure identical to your own brain, and connect it to a computer-controlled apparatus that provides inputs to this brain-like object which maintain its similarity to your brain over a substantial period of time. (See Horgan, Tienson and Graham 2004 for further details. This fairly elaborate brain-in-vat scenario avoids some of Burge’s objections (Burge 2003, pp. 443–445) to Loar’s less-fully-described version (Loar 2003).) Defenders of phenomenal intentionality find it intuitively plausible that by virtue of its physical similarity with your brain, the brain-like object will also share your phenomenology, supporting the narrowness of phenomenology; and that the brain-like object will, by virtue of sharing your phenomenology, also share many of the contents of your mental states, supporting the existence of phenomenally-determined intentionality. (For these two uses of the brain-in-vat scenario, see Horgan, Tienson and Graham 2004, p. 302. For additional arguments for the existence of phenomenal intentionality, see Kriegel 2013, §2.1. Criticisms of phenomenal intentionality may be found in Bailey and Richards 2014 and Werner 2015.)