 How plausible this variety of foundationalism is will depend on the variety of epistemic justification it is concerned with.  For example, if one is committed to a strong truth-connection and thinks that a belief that is justified must be in some significant sense likely to be true, then adopting either of the above versions of foundationalism is out of the question. For there is no necessary connection between a belief's being stored and recalled (with or without a memorial seeming) and its being likely to be true.  This isn't to say that memory is not generally reliable.  But its reliability is at best conditional: miracles aside, an agent's recalled beliefs will be likely to be true only if her belief-forming (as opposed to preserving) processes are generally reliable.  So the simple foundationalist will see herself as giving conditions for an internalistic variety of justification that minimizes the connection between a belief's being justified and its being true.  