  Second, there is the communitarian view, advanced by philosophers  like Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, that all proper  conceptions of the self are dependent on social matrices. In order to understand the self, we must view it both in its relation to the good and in its relation to other selves, for two reasons. First, we have  an indispensable ability both to have certain moral intuitions and to articulate the grounds of those intuitions, and this ability  presupposes the existence of what Taylor calls evaluative frameworks, frameworks also presupposed by our concept of personhood. So crucial  to understanding who I am is understanding where I stand in moral  space: my identity is bound up in, and at least partially constituted by, my strong attachments to a community that provides the evaluative framework within which I am able to articulate what is good and  valuable. Thus, to ask about a person abstracted from his  self-interpretations is to ask “a fundamentally misguided  question” (Taylor 1989, 34).