 Interpersonal disagreement is of two broad kinds: disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude. Very roughly, the idea is to distinguish between disagreement that involves opposed or incompatible beliefs and disagreement that involves opposed or incompatible attitudes: “the former is concerned with how matters are truthfully to be described and explained; the latter is concerned with how they are to be favored or disfavored, and hence with how they are to be shaped by human efforts” (1944, 4). Stevenson’s discussion of disagreement in attitude has been highly influential as a starting point for attempts to find an account of disagreement that would suit non-cognitivist, expressivist, or contextualist views in metaethics (see, e.g., Blackburn 1998, 69; Gibbard 2003, 65–71; Dreier 2009; Ridge 2013; Toppinen 2013, 272–280; Finlay 2017).