 Crucially, for Stein, emotions can be “rationally” appropriate, and “right” or “wrong”. What makes emotions subject to rational and normative correctness-conditions is, once again, their “being anchored in the I”. Stein considers someone who is “‘overcome’ by the loss of his wealth, i.e., impacted in the core of his I”. The irrationality then consists of an “inversion of the hierarchy of values” or even “a loss of emotionally sensitive insight (fühlende Einsicht) into higher values and the lack of correlative personal layers”. (1917: 120[101]). Another example is somebody who enjoys her aesthetic enjoyment itself more than the disclosed aesthetic values of an art-piece (1917: 121[102]). Finally, there is another type of inappropriateness that perfectly fits into Stein’s overall account, but which doesn’t presuppose endorsement of the theory of value hierarchy or problematic forms of value-realism (see below): Thus, some have suggested distinguishing the moral, practical and prudential appropriateness of emotions from their “fittingness”. Roughly, an emotion E of a subject S is fitting if E’s target has the evaluative features which E pertains to affectively present to S (d’Arms and Jacobson 2000; cf. Mulligan 2017; De Monticelli 2020). Put differently, an emotion is fitting, if it picks out those evaluative features of the target that really matter to the emoter herself. Fittingness is an essentially subject-relative notion. It doesn’t concern any objective (axiological or moral) properties. Consider Stein’s example again: if the loss of wealth really matters to the ruined stock-broker, her utter despair will indeed fit, notwithstanding the moral status of speculative money; if she, on the other hand, actually has long hoped that she rids herself of the burden of spending the rest of her life in figuring out ways of investing her capital, then her utter despair over the loss will be unfitting.