 The second view about the relationship between thick and thin is that they differ only in degree, not in kind. Samuel Scheffler suggests this view in objecting to Bernard Williams’s claim that thick and thin differ in kind. He observes that there are many evaluative terms that are hard to classify as either thick or thin, such as just, fair, impartial, rights, autonomy, well-being, and consent. They are less rich in non-evaluative content than terms such as cruel or tactful, although richer than good or right. But if descriptive thickness is a matter of degree, then perhaps a binary division of evaluative concepts into thick and thin is an “oversimplification” (Scheffler 1987: 417–8). We might instead think of the distinction in terms of a continuum of descriptive thickness or specificity, where Scheffler’s examples lie between paradigmatic thick and thin terms. On the thin end we might either allow that some thin terms are purely evaluative and treat them as a limiting case, or we might hold that even the maximally thin concepts are a little bit thick. Those holding the latter view have advocated either Thin Centralism (Smith 2013) or Thick Centralism (Chappell 2013), but the latter view, unlike the former, seems compatible also with the No Priority View.