 Michael LeBuffe has argued that the central passages on which most scholars have developed their interpretations should not be read as proposing a theory of consciousness; rather, these passages are focused on “the epistemological status of certain elements of conscious experience.” Nevertheless, he does recognize that Spinoza requires a theory of consciousness and raises a particular problem for Garrett’s interpretation. On Garrett’s interpretation, the power of a mind and the power of its constituent ideas could diverge. That is, there could be a very powerful mind (which is conscious to a high degree) whose ideas are relatively less powerful (of which the mind is conscious to a very low degree). That is, on Garrett’s view, it is possible for a more powerful mind (as a whole) to have ideas all of which are less conscious than the ideas in a less powerful mind, in which case it would be odd to describe the more powerful mind as having a higher degree of consciousness (LeBuffe 2010, 557). LeBuffe argues to the contrary that Spinoza does not characterize the power of a mind (as a whole) in terms of its level of consciousness.