 Those who think that acting for a reason requires merely treating something one believes as a ground, e.g., using it as a premise in one’s reasoning, reject this characterisation of acting for a reason—Dancy (2011 and 2014) is an example. But defenders of the knowledge condition complain that Dancy’s remarks are off-target. For their point is that there is a notion of acting for a reason—arguably, the central notion—that involves the idea of acting guided by a fact. This notion requires not mere belief but knowledge of the fact that is a reason. Others have argued that it is, however, possible to accept that there is this distinctive, central notion of acting for a reason but still deny that an agent needs to know a fact in order to act guided by it. Dustin Locke (2015), for example, argues that it is possible for someone to act guided by a fact that he does not know. Locke uses so-called “fake-barn” cases to make his point against the knowledge condition. These cases are due to Alvin Goldman (1967) who developed them in his defence of his theory of knowledge. Suppose that a man is driving in the countryside and sees a barn. Unbeknown to him, he’s driving in “fake-barn country”, which is littered with fake barns: barn façades designed to look like real barns. The widely held consensus is that a person in a fake-barn situation who, on seeing a real barn, forms the belief that there is a barn, does not know that there is a barn, even though he has a justified true belief to that effect. Locke uses this sort of case to argue that a person in this situation could, for instance, drive towards a barn guided by the fact that there is a barn over there, without knowing that there is. If so, Locke claims, the agent acts for the reason that there is a barn over there, since he is guided by that fact. Nonetheless, he doesn’t know that there is a barn. (For further discussion of practical reasoning, the knowledge condition and fake-barn situations see Hawthorne 2004, Brown 2008 and Neta 2009.)