 Second, the semantics of counterfactuals. The so-called “Stalnaker-Lewis semantics” for counterfactuals assumes that a counterfactual such as “If it were rainy today, I would take an umbrella” is true if, and only if, all of the closest possible worlds in which the antecedent is true are possible worlds in which the consequent is true. This semantics for counterfactuals allows the substitution of logically equivalent sentences in the antecedent of a counterfactual. For example, if the counterfactual “If it were rainy today, I would take an umbrella” is true, so is “If it were rainy and windy today or rainy and not windy today, I would take an umbrella” because “It is rainy today” and “If it is rainy and windy today or rainy and not windy today” are true in the same possible worlds. Fine (1975: 453f; 2012: 230f) argues that the substitution principle should be given up in the light of puzzling consequences. But certainly one can substitute some sentences in the antecedent of a counterfactual. Which ones? Fine suggests replacing Stalnaker-Lewis semantics for counterfactuals with a semantics in which possible states take pride of place. Instead of a plurality of possible worlds there is a space of possible states that involve particulars and ways they can be. Assertoric sentences refer to states of affairs and only those sentences that refer to the same state of affairs can be substituted in the antecedent of a counter-factual (Fine 1975: 454).