 This is particularly evident in Baumgarten’s treatment of freedom and immortality, where Wolff’s position on each was targeted by his Pietist critics. By way of addressing the Pietist objections to Wolff’s moral intellectualism and his reduction of freedom to mere spontaneity, Baumgarten offers an enriched empirical psychology, one that considers the influence of expectations of the future (and a future life) as motives, that allows that immoral action can proceed not only from ignorance but also from less lively cognition of the good, and that explicitly distinguishes spontaneity from freedom proper (Schwaiger 2011: 82–92). On the topic of immortality, the Pietists had likewise objected to Wolff’s emphasis on the human soul’s preservation of its cognitive capacities in the afterlife, which state seems for Wolff to be disconnected to the human’s cultivation of virtue and piety in this life. Baumgarten seeks to rectify this by arguing that in addition to preserving its cognitive capacities in the afterlife, the soul will also retain its moral capacities including freedom, and that its condition of blessedness or damnation in the life to come will be a direct function of its moral condition (1739: §§782, 791; Dyck 2018).