 A second important difference is closely related to the first. For Kant the moral is distinguished from the non-moral not only by a special form of obligation but also by its elevation above the rest of life. Morality itself has a unique status or “dignity”, as does the rational being from whose autonomous will the law springs (G 4:435). The proper response to both is a correspondingly unique form of reverence or “respect”, which morality demands equally from each of us. Kant believes that in the moral domain we take ourselves—often only implicitly—to be “persons”, elevated above mere “things” such as machines or other animals. One of our chief moral concerns is to protect this status, which requires respecting the rational autonomy at its source and avoiding behavior or patterns of thought and desire that dishonor or degrade persons by treating ourselves or others as mere things. This concern looms large in Kant’s conception of morality, and it has a profound influence on his approach to moral philosophy (Anderson 2008). We see it, for example, in his discussions of respect for persons and his characterization of ethical virtue as “love of honor” (cf. Denis 2014). We see it also in the priority given to duties to self (cf. Denis 2010a), as well as Kant’s claim that a person throws herself away and makes herself an object of “contempt” when she lies to herself or grovels before others, for example (MM 6:420). Hume does not see things this way. For Hume, the domain of morality is not particularly pure, special, or elevated. It sometimes shows us at our most benevolent or most magnanimous, but morality is continuous with the rest of life, including politics and the pursuit of wealth and status in modern commercial society. Moral virtue is undoubtedly pleasing to us, sometimes powerfully so, but it does not command a unique form of respect or reverence. Neither do the rules and ideals of morality, which spring from the same propensities, ideas, and passions that drive the rest of human behavior. Notions of honor and dignity may figure into Hume’s view of morality but they are far from central. Morality has us far more concerned with promoting pleasure and utility.