 In this sense, one way in which some personal relationships goods are relevant is because of their role in self-formation and, more or less directly, in the acquisition of self-respect. Not only care ethicists (Held 1993), but also contemporary philosophers influenced by Hegel have noted this; the latter elaborated on the Hegelian idea that we gain self-consciousness only through a process of mutual recognition. This insight has been applied to various contexts. The child’s subjectivity is shaped within her the relationship with her primary care-givers—including her identity alongside various categories such as gender and her future (in)ability to relate to others as equals, in non-dominating ways (Benjamin 1988). Through relationships in which they receive other people’s recognition, individuals gain self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem (Honneth 1992, 1995: ch. 5). If this is correct, and if the social bases of self-respect is a primary good—as Rawls (1971) definitely believed—this is another reason to think that access to some personal relationship goods is a matter of justice.