 Obviously, this analysis is epistemic, just as Hume’s analysis of causation in the mind as well as Ramsey’s and Spohn’s analyses are. Condition (ii) is needed because this condition is not implied by the requirement that the inferential path between \(C\) and \(E\) is forward-directed. (Such an implication does not hold because, strictly speaking, forward-directedness of the inferential path means that no inferential step is backward-directed.) The problem of instantaneous causation is addressed in Andreas (2019), at least for some causal scenarios. Andreas and Günther (2020) deliver rigorous solutions to a number of causal scenarios, including overdetermination, early and late preemption, switches, and some scenarios of prevention. Singular causal relations without a regular connection among \(C\)-type and \(E\)-type events are not addressed.