 For instance, the question about what it is that we seem to attribute to or locate in our body parts when we claim to have pains in just those parts is answered, on one version of the theory, by saying that we literally locate mental objects with phenomenal qualities in those parts. But pains, even by the standards of sense-datum theories, are mind-dependent objects, and many have taken this to imply that pains are internal to one’s consciousness or experience, and are epistemically transparent to their owners partly because of this (Perkins 1983,  2006).[8]  If they were literally in physical space, does this mean that one’s mind spatially extends or overlaps with one’s body? Alternatively, shouldn’t it be possible for others, at least in principle, to “come across” these pains, that is, access and interact with them physically? It is one thing to say that there is no logical inconsistency about pains literally being in physical space, but it is another to make the view plausible. The latter requires giving positive arguments showing why our intuitions to the contrary might mislead us here.