 A further issue concerns the role of social and ethical values in climate model construction. Winsberg (2010, 2012; Biddle &amp; Winsberg 2009) argues that such values influence climate model construction (and thereby results) both by shaping priorities in model development and via inductive risk considerations, e.g., when deciding to represent a climate system process in one way rather than another, in order to reduce the risk that the model’s results err in a way that would have particularly negative non-epistemic consequences. He contends that social and ethical values operate in climate model construction whenever there are no decisive, purely epistemic grounds for considering one model-building option to be the best available. Parker (2014a) disputes this, pointing to the importance of pragmatic factors, such as ease of implementation, local expertise and computational demands. Intemann (2015) argues that social and ethical values can legitimately influence climate model construction, including via the routes identified by Winsberg, when this promotes democratically-endorsed social and epistemic aims of research. 