 The new, propositional version of the paradox has not figured prominently in the subsequent development of logic and set theory, but it sorely puzzled Russell. For one thing, it seems to contradict Cantor’s theorem. Russell writes: “We cannot admit that there are more ranges [classes of propositions] than propositions” (1903, 527). The reason is that there seem to be easy, one to one correlations between classes of propositions and propositions. For example, the class \(m\) of propositions can be correlated with the proposition that every proposition in \(m\) is true. This, together with a fine-grained principle of individuation for propositions (asserting, for one thing, that if the classes \(m\) and \(n\) of propositions differ, then any proposition about \(m\) will differ from any proposition about \(n)\) leads to contradiction. 