 Unlike in the case of Argument 1, the connection to the A-theory here is not straightforward. There is certainly a sense in which (4′) is true on the B-theory, even though there is, on the B-theory, no change in the fundamental temporal facts. At each time, that time is present—not in the absolute, metaphysically privileged sense of the A-theory, but in a relative, perspectival sense. Each time is present at itself, just like each spatial location is here relative to itself. Moreover, on a standard B-theoretic account of tensed language (e.g., Mozersky 2015; but see Torre 2010 for an alternative account), at each of those times, a temporal subject S can know, and have a true belief about, what time it is. At noon, S believes that it is noon; that belief is made true by a tenseless fact, such as that S holds the belief at (a time simultaneous with) noon. At 12:01, S believes truly that it is 12:01, where this belief is made true by another tenseless fact, such as that this later belief is held by S at (a time simultaneous with) 12:01, and so on.