 A major challenge for the sensorimotor approaches is to account for dissociations between perception and action. Such dissociations have been found for vision, leading Milner and Goodale (1995) to propose a dual model of visual processing: the ventral pathway is dedicated to conscious perception whereas the dorsal pathway is dedicated to visuomotor transformation perception. Dissociations have also been reported in the case of bodily awareness. For instance, patients with numbsense have no tactile awareness, but retain a surprising ability to point to where they were touched (Paillard et al., 1983; see also Anema et al. 2009 for further dissociation). The rubber hand illusion as well indicates that bodily know-how can be at odds with bodily experiences: participants accurately grasp the stimulated hand with their opposite hand at its real location, and not at the illusory location that they report (Kammers et al. 2009). Proponents of the enactive view may have difficulties accounting for this type of results, which indicate that sensorimotor knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for bodily experiences (Vignemont 2011). However, perception-action dissociations are less problematic for the dispositional view (Mandrigin forthcoming).