 How might a constructive empiricist reply? As noted in §1.4 above, constructive empiricism is to be regarded as the best interpretative account of the activity of science that renders it consistent with the empiricist’s own standards of rational activity. It is, as van Fraassen (1994) says, what allow us to “make sense of those activities which we all agree are part of science” (190). As such, it is not beholden to scientists’ own professed aims in the activity the scientists undertake. Even if scientists—alien or human—regard themselves as being principally concerned with truth, or problem-solving, or predictive utility, none of those aims could be achieved without science being at least minimally aimed at empirical adequacy for its theories. Positing empirical adequacy as the aim of science, then, allows the constructive empiricist to best and most modestly make sense of the activity of science. The variability of particular scientists’ individual or collective aims does not undercut the singular and important role empirical adequacy plays in how we might philosophically best interpret science and its many disparate activities.