 In response, some authors argue that in such a competition among various possible deities for one’s belief, some are more probable than others. Although there may be ties among the expected utilities—all infinite—for believing in various ones among them, their respective probabilities can be used as tie-breakers. Schlesinger (1994, 90) offers this principle: “In cases where the mathematical expectations are infinite, the criterion for choosing the outcome to bet on is its probability”. (Note that this principle is not found in the Wager itself, although it might be regarded as a friendly addition. Askell 2018 proposes a similar principle.) Are there reasons, then, for assigning higher probability to some Gods than others? Jordan (1994a, 107) suggests that some outlandish theistic hypotheses may be dismissed for having “no backing of tradition”. Similarly, Schlesinger maintains that Pascal is addressing readers who “have a notion of what genuine religion is about” (88), and we might take that to suggest that Cargile’s imagined Gods, for example, may be correspondingly assigned lower probability than Pascal’s God. Franklin (2018, 41) writes that “[Pascal's] rhetoric is addressed to real agents, namely ”men of the world“ in the Paris of 1660” for whom “the spectrum of religious theories to which they attached grounded subjective non-zero probability consisted of just Catholicism and atheism”. Saka (2018, 190–191) replies to various authors who relativise the Wager to Pascal's intended audience that “Pascal's peers knew of Greco-Roman paganism, Judaism, Islam, new-world paganism, and multiple brands of Protestantism; they knew of alleged Satanism … and they knew, from their acquaintance with the foregoing, that still other religions could readily be hypothesized.” But still there is the issue of what probabilities should be assigned to alternative deities. Lycan and Schlesinger 1989 give more theoretical reasons for favoring Pascal’s God over others in one’s probability assignments. They begin by noting the familiar problem in science of underdetermination of theory by evidence. Faced with a multiplicity of theories that all fit the observed data equally well, we favor the simplest such theory. They go on to argue that simplicity considerations similarly favor a conception of God as “absolutely perfect”, “which is theologically unique in that it implies all the other predicates traditionally ascribed to God” (104), and we may add that this conception is Pascal’s. Conceptions of rival Gods, by contrast, leave open various questions about their nature, the answering of which would detract from their simplicity, and thus their probability.