 Different facets of the general problem of epistemic opacity are stressed within the vast philosophical scholarship on the role of modelling, computing and simulations in the sciences: the implications of lacking experimental access to the concrete parts of the world being modelled, for instance (Morgan 2005; Parker 2009; Radder 2009); the difficulties in testing the reliability of computational methods used within simulations (Winsberg 2010; Morrison 2015); the relation between opacity and justification (Durán &amp; Formanek 2018); the forms of black-boxing associated to mechanistic reasoning implemented in computational analysis (Craver and Darden 2013; Bechtel 2016); and the debate over the intrinsic limits of computational approaches and related expertise (Collins 1990; Dreyfus 1992). Roman Frigg and Julian Reiss argued that such issues do not constitute fundamental challenges to the nature of inquiry and modelling, and in fact exist in a continuum with traditional methodological issues well-known within the sciences (Frigg &amp; Reiss 2009). Whether or not one agrees with this position (Humphreys 2009; Beisbart 2012), big data analysis is clearly pushing computational and statistical methods to their limit, thus highlighting the boundaries to what even technologically augmented human beings are capable of knowing and understanding.