 Price’s illuminating discussion of Hume’s notorious attack on the credibility of miracles is informed both by his interest in probability theory, and by his good sense. Hume’s argument, in a nutshell, is that there can never be sufficient reason to believe in a violation of a law of nature because we know, a priori, that any evidence from testimony for the occurrence of a miracle will be outweighed by our evidence from long experience that such things do not happen. Our confidence in the reliability of testimony and our confidence in some generalization being a law of nature have the same source: experience. But whereas we have often found testimony to be false, the experiences on which our belief in a law of nature is founded are exceptionless. If there were exceptions, we would conclude that we were not dealing with a law of nature. So we always have more evidence that a miracle did not occur than that it did. Hume presents us with a characteristic fork. If what is reported would violate a law of nature, then we should not give credence to the report. If what is reported is merely uncommon, then we might have sufficient evidence to believe it, but the event would not be miraculous.