 However, all these “solutions” to the truth-maker objection share a common feature: the past entities that propositions about the past seem to be about don’t exist, given presentism. Marie Curie doesn’t exist, yet &lt;Curie existed&gt; is about Curie. There are no dinosaurs, yet &lt;there were dinosaurs&gt; is about them. Our “aboutness” intuitions tell us that propositions about the past should be made true by past entities, but they simply cannot be, given presentism. Whether the truth-makers we posit exist now, or exist outside time, the kind of entities that we posit won’t be up to the task. If we respect the aboutness constraint (on truth-maker theory), and cannot shake off this objection, we will likely be inclined to give up on solving the objection by attempting to locate the required truth-makers. (There are some exceptions. E.g., Ingram 2019 develops a Bigelow-style response and argues that the putative truth-makers, uninstantiated thisnesses, do satisfy aboutness intuitions.)