 Here is another way to make the point. We already know that, according to ST, visualizing is implemented by the reuse of the visual mechanism. In the above passage, Goldman adds that the reuse of the visual mechanism is initiated, guided and controlled by imagination. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to all cases of high-level simulation processes. For example, in imagining hearing, imagination “gets in control” of the auditory mechanism, takes it off-line, and (re)uses it to generate simulated auditory experiences. Goldman (2012b, Goldman &amp; Jordan 2013) supports this claim by making reference to neuroscientific data indicating that the same core brain network, the so-called “default network”, subserves all the following self-projections: prospection (projecting oneself into one’s future); episodic memory (projecting oneself into one’s past); perspective taking (projecting oneself into other minds); and navigation (projecting oneself into other places) (see Buckner &amp; Carroll 2007 for a review). These different self-projections presumably involve different high-level simulation processes. However, they all have something in common: they all involve imagination-based perspectival shifts. Therefore, the fact that there is one brain network common to all these self-projections lends some support to the claim that there is one common cognitive mechanism, i.e., imagination, which initiates, guides, and controls all high-level simulation processes. 