  In any case, eliminativism does not require that there be relations without relata, just that the relata not be individuals. French and Krause (2006) argue that quantum particles and spacetime points are not individuals but that they are objects in a minimal sense, and they develop a non-classical logic according to which such non-individual objects can be the values of first-order variables, but ones for which the law of identity, ‘for all x, x is identical to x’, does not hold (but neither does ‘x is not identical to x’). There is no unanimity about the difference between individuals, objects and entities among philosophers but one neutral way of putting the issue is to ask whether there are only individual objects in the logical sense of object as the value of a first-order variable, or whether there are individuals in some more substantive sense (for example, being subject to laws of identity, or being substances). Jonathan Bain (2013) argues that critics of radical ontic structural realism have implicitly relied on a set-theoretic notion of structure and that a category theoretic formulation of ontic structural realism is useful in explicating the structure of physical theories, in particular, general relativity.