  In two recent papers the reconciliatory approach is rejected in favor of defenses of paraconsistency, although not precisely along the lines laid out by Hyde. On Hyde’s account, a is tall and a is not tall can both be true when a is borderline tall (say, 5′11″) while the full or reduced conjunction of these statements, a is tall and (a is) not tall, will be false, given the standard supervaluationist approach. Alxatib &amp; Pelletier, however, find the opposite judgments among a majority of the subjects of their study, who accept the conjunction while rejecting the individual ascriptions of truth. In addition to reinforcing the view of gappy and glutty theories as mirror images, Alxatib &amp; Pelletier present their results as evidence against the neo-classical vagueness-as-ignorance position of Bonini et al. (1999), a position which also has difficulty accounting for the paucity of subjects choosing the “can’t tell” option in the surveys. Like the assertability-based pragmatic theory of borderline contradictions proposed by Kyburg, Alxatib &amp; Pelletier (2011: 321) offer a Gricean explanation for subjects’ endorsement of the truth of apparent contradictory statements—a is tall and not tall when a is just short of 6 feet tall—which yields (in just this case) a subvaluationary interpretation on which the speaker is taken to convey the borderline status of a’s height. Their central finding (2011: 298–9) is that theories admitting truth-value gaps like that of Hyde (1997) or the paraconsistent logic of Priest 2006 fare better in accounting for the full range of interesting data presented in their experiments—and those of Ripley 2011. 