 Subsequent evidence suggested that an action mirror mechanism—that is, a cognitive mechanism that gets activated both when an individual performs a certain goal-directed motor action and when she sees another agent performing the same action—also exists in the human brain (for reviews, see Rizzolatti &amp; Craighero 2004, and Rizzolatti &amp; Sinigaglia forthcoming). In fact, it appears that there are mirror mechanisms in the human brain outside the action domain as well: a mirror mechanism for disgust (Wicker et al. 2003), one for pain (Singer at al. 2004; Avenanti et al. 2005), and one for touch (Blakemore et al. 2005). Given the variety of mirror mechanisms, it is not easy to give a definition that fits them all. Goldman (2008b) has quite a good one though, and we will draw from it: a cognitive mechanism is a mirror mechanism if and only if it gets activated both when an individual undergoes a certain mental event endogenously and when she perceives a sign that another individual is undergoing the same (type of) mental event. For example, the pain mirror mechanism gets activated both when individuals experience “a painful stimulus and … when they observe a signal indicating that [someone else] is receiving a similar pain stimulus” (Singer et al. 2004: 1157).