 Margot Strohminger (2015) uses practical examples of modal knowledge to challenge the idea that we cannot perceive possibility. For example, at least in some instances we seem to be able to see that we can climb a tree (even if we have not yet climbed it), or that we can reach a certain mug (even though we have not yet tried). In Strohminger’s view, one literally perceives the possibility, rather than seeing something first and then making a (possibly tacit) inference on the basis of what one sees. Importantly, a defense of the pure perception of possibility requires a view of perception where something more than low level properties, such as color and shape, are present in perception. One class of views on which perception provides more than just low-level properties are affordance theories, due to Gibson (1979). On an affordance view, one may hold that possibility is part of what we perceive. For example, Iris sees that the door knob can be turned.