 Analogously, disagreement in attitude occurs when two or more people have attitudes—e.g., desires, plans, or intentions, or other states whose general nature is that of being for or being against something (1948b, 2)—that cannot all be jointly satisfied (had, felt, etc.) and there is a desire, need, or attempt to coordinate those attitudes. Importantly, disagreement in attitude is to be distinguished from disagreement about attitudes, which is a kind of disagreement in belief (1948b, 3; see also 1944, 9–10). If Smith and Jones desire to dine together, but Smith desires to dine at a restaurant where there is music, while Jones desires to dine at a quiet restaurant, they disagree, in a quite ordinary sense of the term, about where to dine (1944, 3). This kind of disagreement, as Stevenson notes, “springs more from divergent preferences than from divergent beliefs, and will end when they both wish to go the same place” (1944, 3). For Stevenson, disagreement in attitude is a very common phenomenon: