For instance, Mukula Bhaṭṭa, the aforementioned philosopher of aesthetics, distinguishes between secondary meaning that is qualitative and secondary meaning that is free from qualities. The qualitative includes metaphorical cases such as “The person is an ox,” where the stubbornness of the person and the ox are understood to be shared qualities. In contrast, cases like “The village is on the Ganges” are typical of those that are free from qualities. Here, the word “bank” is understood so as to avoid the interpretation that the village is floating on the river itself—but there are no properties shared between the village and the Ganges (or the bank). In point of fact, Mukula argues that a speaker may intend different secondary meanings with the same utterance type, since another reason someone might utter the sentence is to communicate that the village and the Ganges do share qualities—the holiness of the Ganges river could be attributed to the village due to proximity. In this way, the Ganges sentence could exemplify a different utterance, one where there is “semantic imbuing” of the qualities of the river to the bank (Keating 2019:55, 117–126). Thus whether a speaker intends or does not intend a secondary meaning becomes relevant to its characterization. Finally, both the qualitative and quality-free varieties may differ in terms of how closely related the primary and secondary meanings are. Mukula describes highly conventional language use as cases of “absorption”—for instance, using the term “ruler” for to someone who is not from the ruling class (so not strictly a ruler), but who performs the functions a ruler does (such as protecting of people). In contrast, metaphors such as “The person is an ox” are not absorption, but superimposition, since some difference is understood. (See Keating 2019, Cuneo 2020, and McCrea 2008 for further discussion of Mukula and Ānandavardhana on these topics.)