 Why might someone find a noncausal theory of free will appealing? An historically important motivation for such views concerns the nature of causation. Once upon a time, all causation was thought to be deterministic. If that were right, then any nondeterministic theory of free will would have to be noncausal. Not until the 20th century did the idea of nondeterministic or probabilistic causation become popular. Once it did, this motivation for noncausal theories of free will was lost. Why, then, do some theorists still insist that free actions must be uncaused?   One argument advanced for that conclusion is an argument from luck. The idea, in brief, is that if an action is caused (even nondeterministically) by prior events, then it cannot have been up to the agent whether that action was performed. If the causation is nondeterministic, it will simply be a matter of luck, a matter of nature’s “role of the dice” (Ginet 2014: 24) whether the action occurs. Such an argument from luck poses a problem for event-causal libertarian theories, and agent-causal libertarian theories face a similar problem. We discuss responses available in defense of these theories below, in sections 2.2, 2.3, and 3.2.