 Many theorists agree that an antecedent injustice is necessary for exploitation. For example, Hillel Steiner’s account of exploitation holds that exploitation occurs when \(A\) gains more from an interaction, and \(B\) gains less, than they would have were it not for the existence of a prior injustice (Steiner 1984). So, for example, if \(A\) hires \(B\) as a laborer and is able to pay \(B\) a low wage of $2 per hour only because \(A\) (or someone else) has previously unjustly deprived \(B\) of alternative sources of labor, then \(A\) has exploited \(B\). If, on the other hand, the explanation for \(B\)’s earning only $2 does not involve injustice—if \(B\) simply does not have very valuable skills, or if there is a large supply of (not unjustly) unemployed laborers, then a $2 wage, no matter how insufficient it might be to meet \(B\)’s needs, and no matter how much more \(A\) could afford to pay, is not exploitative. Like Roemer’s account, Steiner’s has the advantage of being a structural account. Indeed, the two bear much in common. Roemer’s account is focused on “macro” issues pertaining to the distribution of property in society, while Steiner’s focuses on “micro” issues regarding how individuals treat each other within the framework created by that distribution (Ferguson and Steiner 2016: 545–546).