 Adopting either the diachronic or the subjunctive-historical notions of harm  (I  and  II,  above) or both excludes, firstly, the possibility of our harming future people when we choose among long-term policies with significantly differing consequences for the quality of life of future people, and, secondly, the possibility that we harm persons by bringing them into existence if they will have a life worth living. But if we adopt the threshold notion of harm at  ((III)  above), future people can be said to be wronged by our choice of a policy that harms them, notwithstanding the fact that the existence of the specific people who are said to be harmed is causally dependent on our decision to pursue this  policy.[10]  According to (III) parents could act in light of an interest on the part of their would-be child in never existing at all: if the child were to be born, it would have a life below the relevant threshold. The subject of harm is the person when she is brought into existence in a harmed state. That she would not be worse or better off than she otherwise would have been is irrelevant for determining that she is or will be in a harmed sub-threshold state (see  §2.2).