  Before examining two attempts by Clarke to avoid any limitations on the scope of divine liberty, consider whether it is in God's power to choose contrary to what he judges to be best. Clearly, God cannot choose to do evil. But to choose contrary to what is judged to be best is evil or morally wrong only if choosing to do what is judged to be best is morally obligatory. To claim that it is morally obligatory ignores the real possibility that choosing what is best is supererogatory, beyond the call of duty. There are choices which are good to make but not required as our duty. It would be a mistake, therefore, to infer God's inability to choose to act contrary to what he judges to be best from his inability to choose to do evil. Nevertheless, it does seem to be logically impossible for perfect goodness to choose to act contrary to what is best. And this seems to be Clarke's own view of the matter. Thus he declares “that though God is a most perfectly free agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and wisest in the whole” (1738, 120-121). To choose otherwise, he thinks, is to act contrary to perfect wisdom and goodness.