 It’s worth mentioning one final fact about the blamer that can complicate a blaming interaction, though this one fits less well into the framework we’ve been exploring because it’s not something that makes blame inappropriate so much as it is something that makes blame unheard. We have in mind an idea introduced by Vanessa Carbonell (forthcoming), which she dubs “claimant injustice”. According to Carbonell, claimant injustice “…occurs when social prejudices or structural inequalities undermine a moral agent’s ability to engage in felicitous moral address—to make moral claims, to call out wrongdoing, to judge or condemn others for their action, to hold responsible, to seek redress, to blame or punish, to participate in any of the social practices associated with the participant and vicarious reactive attitudes” (forthcoming: 16). The idea here is that the very power to engage in moral address is something that requires a social context where the blamer is recognized as (and believes themselves to be) a valid source of moral claims, but this context can be absent for members of marginalized groups, thus rendering them unable to hold members of dominant groups responsible. Thus it may be that yet another fact about the blamer—the fact that they are marginalized—can render blame infelicitous. (See Hornsby 1995 for related discussion.) Again, it’s not that their blame is dismissed so much as simply not heard as moral address in the first place.