 Strikingly, a series of studies suggest that people do attribute knowledge in certain cases in which they would not be willing to attribute belief (Myers-Schulz &amp; Schwitzgebel 2013; see also Murray et al. 2013; Rose &amp; Schaffer 2013; Buckwalter et al. 2015; Shields 2016). In one study, participants were given a vignette about a student taking a history test who faces the question: “What year did Queen Elizabeth die?” She has reviewed this date many times, but at that one moment, she is flustered by the pressure and can’t recall the answer. She therefore decides just to guess, and she writes down ‘1603.’ In fact, this is the correct answer. When given this vignette, experimental participants tended to say that (a) the student knows that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 but to deny that (b) she believes that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 (Myers-Schulz &amp; Schwitzgebel 2013, drawing on a vignette from Radford). Similar effects have been obtained for numerous other cases (Murray et al. 2013; Rose &amp; Schaffer 2013; Buckwalter et al. 2015; Shields 2016).