 Perhaps we can avoid this alleged circle. The linchpin of Della Rocca’s charge of circularity is his contention that “Descartes’s reason for saying that we should assent only to clear and distinct ideas is that such ideas are guaranteed to be true and ideas that are not clear and distinct are not guaranteed to be true” (2011, 97). Though Descartes can be read in this way, the texts support the following alternative understanding of the broader argumentative narrative. In the First Meditation, the meditator initially resolves that he should withhold assent to anything which is “not completely certain and indubitable” (AT 7:18, CSM 2:12). Early in the Third Meditation, having reflected on the epistemic impressiveness of the cogito, the meditator discovers that all, but only, clear and distinct perceptions are utterly assent-compelling. As a practical consequence, his initial resolve effectively implies that he should assent only to clear and distinct perceptions – not because of presupposing the conclusion of the eventual proof of the C&amp;D Rule, but because these are the only perceptions to which he can’t but assent. This provides a practical answer to Della Rocca’s question, concerning why we should “not assent to ideas that are not clear and distinct and why is there no such obligation not to assent to clear and distinct ideas.” It is in the Fourth Meditation that the meditator purports to demonstrate the divine guarantee of the C&amp;D Rule. However, no step of that demonstration presupposes that clear and distinct perceptions have already been established as true; i.e., the conclusion of the demonstration is not, as Della Rocca contends, “based on the claim that clear and distinct ideas are guaranteed to be true.” Rather (as we saw in  Section 5.3),  the conclusion purports to be based on an analysis of the respective contributions of the intellect and the will, to judgment formation. Summarizing the key steps: