 We have looked at two responses to BKCA. The relevant alternatives response implausibly denies the second premise. The Moorean response denies the first premise without explaining how we could possibly have the knowledge that the first premise claims we don’t have. Another prominent response, contextualism, avoids both of these objections. According to the contextualist, the precise contribution that the verb “to know” makes to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which it occurs varies from one context to another: in contexts in which the BIV hypothesis is under discussion, an agent counts as “knowing” a fact only if she can satisfy some extremely high (typically unachievable) epistemic feat, and this is why (1) is true. But in contexts in which the BIV hypothesis is not under discussion, an agent can count as “knowing” a fact even if her epistemic position vis-à-vis that fact is much more modest, and this is why (3), taken in isolation, appears false.