 Before concluding this section on matter, it is worth returning to point (iii) above, where it was clained that matter is a metaphysical constituent of things and is necessary for explaining change, receptivity of accidents, and individuation. Therefore, all created things must have matter and form in their constitution, as befits the position of universal hylemorphism. But, whereas things that are subjected to generation and corruption are made out of natural or physical matter (materia physica)—matter in the proper sense (proprie)—spiritual things also have matter, but in the common sense (communiter) of metaphysical matter (materia metaphysica). This matter is the subject of the spiritual form (DOS 265; QLIIS 82) and is defined as potential being (QLIIS 14). Matter in this sense explains individuation (DOS 266–269) as well as change (other than substantial change) that takes place in spiritual substances (DOS 320). (For Kilwardby’s view in the context of Thirteenth Century debates on matter, see Donati 2013)