 Miodrag Jovanović (2012) provides another interest-based account of group rights but of a rather different sort. Current international and domestic systems of law ascribe rights to groups, such as rights of self-determination and rights designed to protect their cultures. Jovanović seeks to explicate those rights by uncovering the “normative moral standpoint” implicit in them. That standpoint, which he himself endorses, is, he argues, “value-collectivism”: “the view that collective entities can have inherent value, which is independent of its contribution to the well-being of individual members” (2012, 6). In other words, we should understand the legal rights attributed to a group as grounded in the irreducibly collective value of the group, a value that is not reducible to the value of the group for the several individuals who constitute its members. Jovanović does not ascribe those rights to every sort of group recognised in law. In particular, he does not ascribe them to juristic persons, such as business corporations and trade unions. Rather, he ascribes them only to groups that possess a pre-legal existence and identity, such as national, ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. It is the irreducibly collective interests of those groups that, on his account, legal group rights should aim to protect and promote.