 Another line of argument exploited by weakened internalists denies that the content of the requisite awareness must involve a belief in the action’s overall wrongness. For instance, Guerrero (2007: 78) argues that if an agent is unsure whether the action she is planning to undertake is permissible or not, and so admits the possibility that it might well be wrong, she can be blameworthy for carrying it out even in the absence of clear-eyed akrasia and even if her ignorance (which is manifested here as lack of certainty) is blameless. (Thus Guerrero, unlike other weakened internalists, deny thesis i of the regress argument, since in his view ignorant wrongdoing can be culpable in the absence of culpable ignorance.) This is because there is an independently plausible moral principle that urges restraint in the face of uncertainty regarding the potential harms that our actions might bring about (2007: 79). Similarly, Nelkin and Rickless (2017a: 121–2) claim that being aware of doing something that poses a risk of forgetting relevant information can anchor responsibility for unwitting wrongdoing, even in the absence of an akratic decision to assume the risk.