 We present Chwe’s model following (Chwe 1999) and (Chwe 2000). Suppose there is a group \(P\) of \(n\) people, and each agent has two strategies: \(r\) (revolt, that is participating in the collective action) and \(s\) (stay home and not participate). Each agent has her own individual threshold \(\theta \in \{1, 2,\ldots, n+1\}\) and she prefers \(r\) over \(s\) if and only if the total number of players who revolt is greater than or equal to her threshold. An agent with threshold 1 always revolts; an agent with threshold 2 revolts only if another agent does; an agent with threshold \(n\) revolts only if all agents do; an agent with threshold \(n+1\) never revolts, etc. The agents are located in a social network, represented by a binary relation \(\rightarrow\) over \(P\). The intended meaning of \(i \rightarrow j\) is that agent \(i\) ‘talks’ to agent \(j\), that is to say, agent \(i\) knows the threshold of agent \(j.\) If we define \(B(i)\) to be the set \(\{j \in P : j \rightarrow i\},\) we can interpret \(B(i)\) as \(i\)’s ‘neighborhood’ and say that, in general, \(i\) knows the thresholds of all agents in her neighborhood. A further assumption is that, for all \(j,k \in B(i),\) \(i\) knows whether \(j \rightarrow k\) or not, that is, every agent knows whether her neighbors are communicating with each other. The relation \(\rightarrow\) is taken to be reflexive (one knows her own threshold).