 The second account of the sense of agency is based on a feedback-comparator model of motor control. According to this model, the motor control system uses copies of motor commands in order to generate predictions of the ensuing bodily movements. Those predictions (so called “forward models”) are then used for comparisons between the predicted and the intended trajectories of movements, and for comparisons between the predicted and actual trajectories (based on information from sensory feedback). The model holds that a sub-personal system of motor control uses those predictions and comparisons in order to adjust and fine-tune the execution of bodily movements (Wolpert and Kawato 1998; Frith et al. 2000; Haggard 2005). It has been suggested that this system may also play a crucial role in the generation of the sense of agency. On this view, positive matches in the comparator system generate a sense of agency, whereas mismatches generate error signals that disrupt the sense of agency. This model can explain a wide range of phenomena concerning the sense and control of agency (Frith et al. 2000; Blakemore et al. 2002). More recently it has been argued, however, that this comparator model provides at best a partial explanation of the sense of agency (Haggard 2005; Bayne and Pacherie 2007; Gallagher 2007; Synofzik et al. 2008).