 Barnes presents two Bayesian thought experiments that purport to establish virtuous predictivism. In each experiment an evaluator Eva faces two scenarios—one in which she confronts Peter who posts an endorsement probability for T without appeal to N-supporting observations (thus Peter predicts N) and another in which she confronts Alex who posts an endorsement probability for T on a basis that includes observations that establish N (thus Alex accommodates N). The idea behind both thought experiments is to make the scenarios otherwise as similar as possible—Barnes makes a number of ceteris paribus assumption that render the probability functions of Peter and Alex maximally similar. However it turns out that there is more than one way to keep the scenarios maximally similar: in the first experiment, Peter and Alex have the same likelihood ratio but have different posteriors for T. In the second scenario they have the same posteriors but different likelihood ratios. Barnes demonstrates that Eva’s posterior probability is higher in the predictor scenario in both experiments—thus vindicating virtuous predictivism (2008: 69–80).