 The prima facie wrongfulness of cultural appropriation becomes weightier if we think that beyond causing mere offense, it can cause what Joel Feinberg terms profound offense: “an offense to one’s moral sensibilities…[that] strikes at a person’s core values or sense of self” (Young 2005: 135). Nevertheless, even if cultural appropriation is profoundly offensive, and thus there is a prima facie reason for thinking it is wrongful, one might still think that it can be morally permissible all things considered because of other morally relevant features of the act, such as its social value, the value of freedom of expression, the time and place of the act, the extent to which it is tolerated by group members, and how reasonable the offense is (Young 2005). Given the diversity of values and sensibilities, the potential for profound offense is substantial across many domains of social life. While it will be debatable under what circumstances the aforementioned features defeat the prima facie reasons for thinking that profoundly offensive appropriation is wrong, the range of cases in which it is often thought that profound offense is outweighed by other values suggests that cultural appropriation will often be morally permissible, all things considered (Young 2005: 138). Indeed, one might think that cultural appropriation is an essential aspect of cultural development, and in fact a beneficial aspect of cultural creativity and exchange (Young 2008; Rogers 2006; Heyd 2003).