 Debate about corporate moral agency and moral responsibility rages on in important new work (Orts &amp; Smith 2017; Sepinwall 2016). One issue that has received sustained attention is choice. Appealing to discursive dilemmas, List &amp; Pettit (2011) argue that the decisions of corporations can be independent of the decisions of their members (see also Copp 2006). This makes the corporation an autonomous agent, and since it can choose in the light of values, a morally responsible one. Another issue is intention. A minimal condition of moral agency is the ability to form intentions. Some deny that corporations can form them (S. Miller 2006; Rönnegard 2015). If we regard an intention as a mental state, akin to a belief or desire, or a belief/desire complex, they may be right. But not if we regard an intention in functionalist terms (Copp 2006; Hess 2014), as a plan (Bratman 1993), or in terms of reasons-responsiveness (Silver forthcoming). A third issue is emotion. Sepinwall (2017) argues that being capable of emotion is a necessary condition of moral responsibility, and since corporations aren’t capable of emotion, they aren’t morally responsible. Again, much depends on what it means to be capable of emotion. If this capability can be given a functionalist reading, as Björnsson &amp; Hess (2017) claim, perhaps corporations are capable of emotion (see also Gilbert 2000). Pursuit of these issues lands one in the robust and sophisticated literature on collective responsibility and intentionality, where firms feature as a type of collective. (See the entries on  collective responsibility,  collective intentionality, and  shared agency.)