 If there is some question whether perception is possible without an intellect and conceptual capacities, the issue is even more fraught with respect to intuition, and this is indeed where much of the contemporary discussion has focused (e.g., Sellars 1968: ch. 1; McDowell 1996; Hanna 2001: ch. 4; Hanna 2005; Ginsborg 2008; Allais 2009; Grüne 2009; Friedman 2012; Tolley 2013; McLear 2015). Moreover, since intuition is the most basic object-related representation, if Kant construes intuition as inextricably linked with conceptual representation then he would clearly also be committed to thinking so of perception and experience. Conversely, however, if Kant denies any intrinsic connection between intuition and conceptualization he is nevertheless free to argue that conceptual capacities play an important role at the level of perception or experience.