 According to the identity theory (Heil 2003; 2012; Jaworski 2016; Martin 2008; G. Strawson 2008; see also N. Williams 2019), every property is both dispositional and categorical (or qualitative). The main problem here is how to characterize the distinction and relation of these two “sides”. Martin and Heil suggest that they are two distinct ways of partially considering one and the same property, whereas Mumford (1998) explores the possibility of seeing them as two distinct ways of conceptualizing the property in question. Heil claims that the qualitative and the dispositional sides need to be identified with one another and with the whole property. Jacobs (2011) holds that the qualitative side consists in the possession of some qualitative nature by the property, whereas the dispositional side consists in that property being (part of) a sufficient truthmaker for certain counterfactuals. Dispositional and qualitative sides may also be seen as essential, higher-order properties of properties, as supervenient and ontologically innocent aspects of properties (Giannotti 2019), or as constituents of the essence of properties (Taylor 2018). In general, the identity theory is between Scylla and Charybdis. If it reifies the dispositional and qualitative sides, it runs the risk of implying some sort of dualism. If it insists on the identity between them, it runs the opposite risk of turning into a pure dispositionalist theory (Taylor 2018).