 Mandelbaum used the example from the previous section (his example) to argue against Rossian atomism (although the atomism/holism terminology had not yet been introduced as labels for the pertinent distinction). As we explained, if Ross’s atomistic view is correct, the fact that one has a chance to express gratitude is a morally relevant consideration that favors lying about your co-worker’s competence. In not acting on this consideration, one ought to feel some remorse (having failed to comply with a prima facie duty), remorse being a proper reaction to wrongness. However, if, upon contemplating this scenario and projecting into it, one imagines experiencing regret at being in this difficult situation, but not remorse, this signifies that one takes considerations of gratitude to be irrelevant in deciding what to do in this case. Mandelbaum argues that “the essential aspect of the situation” (1955: 78) is that one has been asked a legitimate question, and the person asking it is either unaware of one’s personal tie with the co-worker or expects one to put it aside in answering the question. Viewed this way, considerations of gratitude are not relevant in the situation one confronts. Mandelbaum further reports that he imagines feeling regret at being in such a situation, but not remorse for telling the truth.