 The extent of the misreading of incommensurability as implying incomparability is even more dramatic in Feyerabend’s case. A far cry from claiming that incommensurable theories cannot be compared, Feyerabend explicitly and repeatedly argued that incommensurable alternatives actually offer a better means of comparing the merits of theories than the mere development of commensurable alternatives (Feyerabend 1962, 66; cf. Oberheim 2006, 235ff.). He illustrated this point with an example of a crucial experiment between incommensurable theories. He argued that even though the central concepts of statistical and classical phenomenological thermodynamics are incommensurable, it was still possible indirectly to stage a crucial experiment between them (Perrin’s confirmation of Einstein’s quantitative predictions of Brownian motion). This was the centre piece of Feyerabend’s argument for pluralism. The argument turns on the claim that this refutation of classical phenomenological thermodynamics could not have been conducted without the development of statistical thermodynamics, which is an incommensurable alternative. Feyerabend concluded that some observations can only be interpreted as refutations of an existing theory after an incommensurable alternative has been developed with which to interpret them (cf. Oberheim 2006, 240–245). His unorthodox image of scientific progress is delineated as an increase in a set of incommensurable alternatives, each forcing the others into greater articulation (Feyerabend 1965c, 107; 1975, 30; cf. Oberheim 2005; Oberheim 2006, 260ff.).