 Disregard for the role of emotion in political life has long been a policy in the history of philosophy, in particular because emotionality—like care—is frequently associated with women and racialized others. However, women philosophers have insisted on the importance of this intersection (for example Hall 2005, Krause 2008, and Nussbaum 2015). Building on the contributions of feminist care ethicists and difference feminists who worked to show the significance of positive affects typically associated with femininity—such as love, interest, and care—in ethical encounters (see Held 1995, Tronto 1993), other thinkers worried that this appraisal merely reified a false (gendered) dichotomy between reason and emotion, mind and body. Instead, early work by Alison Jaggar (1990), Elizabeth Spelman (1989 and 1991), Genevieve Lloyd (1993), Elizabeth Grosz (1994), and others argued that reason is both embodied and emotion-laden, and that emotion is an important resource for epistemology in particular. Building on this work, feminist political theorists have argued that understanding the role of emotion and affect is crucial for understanding a number of important political phenomena: motivation for action (Krause 2008), collective action and community formation (Beltrán 2009 and 2010, Butler 2004 and 2015), solidarity and patriotism (Nussbaum 2005 and 2015), as well as vulnerability (Fineman 2013), racism and xenophobia (Ahmed 2015, Anker 2014, Ioanide 2015). Meanwhile, others examine the political significance of specific emotions, for instance: shame (Ahmed 2015), precarity and grief (Butler 2004), anger (Spelman 1989, Lorde 1984), fear (Anker 2015), and love (Nussbaum 2015). 