 then this calls into question the licitness of metaphysicians’ heavy reliance on the distinction in furthering their descriptive and prescriptive projects. This does not mean that these metaphysical views are not worth arguing for, or entertaining, but that the particular ways they have been argued for could reasonably be doubted by one we could call a ‘Mass/Count Skeptic.’ A Mass/Count Skeptic is one who thinks that the mass/count distinction is a red herring with regards to laying out either a descriptive or prescriptive metaphysics, since the undeterdetermination of (metaphysical) theory by (linguistic) data in this matter is acute. This does not mean that one should not engage in metaphysical arguments about stuff vs things, but perhaps the mass/count distinction is not as firm a foundation as many have thought. After demonstrating some of the preceding kinds of considerations, Pelletier says