 There is empirical work which militates against the standard criteria put forward for differentiating mass and count, and also questions the over-reliance of researchers on their own intuitions about the distinction (Kiss et al, 2017). Reflection upon recent empirical evidence in language-acquisition has led some researchers to tentatively conclude that particular nouns themselves, whether mass or count, “do not encode full conceptual criteria for individuation, but instead encode partial criteria that are filled out pragmatically, by contrasting alternative descriptions of objects and their parts” (Srinivasan and Barner 2020, p159). But it would be irresponsible to suggest that there is just ‘nothing to’ the mass/count distinction, nor any universal or near-universal distinguishing features (See Chierchia 2010 p.4). One can maintain that while there are different mass and count senses, that nevertheless, all nouns are both mass and count, as we see defended in Pelletier 2012b. (For challenges to this, see Kiss et al 2021b). Yet others argue that it is not the distinction between mass and count that matters so much, rather what matters is the more general distinction between being +COUNT and +NON-COUNT (Laycock 2006b &amp; 2006c, Rothstein 2010, Wiese 2012, and see chapter 1 of Massam 2012 for other proposed replacements to, or more general alternatives to, the mass/count distinction).