 A prominent defender of an inclusive view—David Pitt—takes the question to concern, crucially, whether thought has its own “proprietary and distinctive” phenomenal character (Pitt 2004). His affirmative answer to this has been glossed by saying there is a special sort of “non-sensory phenomenology”. (See also Michelle Montague’s 2016 formulation.) This has been taken to imply the phenomenal character of thought can be separated from that of sensory states in certain ways critics have found highly dubious. Tye and Wright 2011, for instance, assume that if there is indeed “cognitive phenomenology”, then there is an aspect to the phenomenal character of verbally expressed thought that would remain the same if all imagery and sense perception (including the verbal imagery involved in its expression) were removed from it—a phenomenological constant that would inevitably be shared by monolingual speakers of different languages expressing their thoughts intertranslatably. And they find this consequence quite incredible. Prinz 2011 assumes that if inclusive (what he calls “expansionist”) views were right, we should be able to engage in experiential thought independently of all sensory activity, much as we can enjoy experience in one sensory modality in the absence of another (as when we see without hearing). But, he says, we do not. Related criticisms appear in Pautz 2013 and 2021.