 From the early days, the presentation of a dichotomy (or a choice) between recognition and redistribution, or the cultural and the economic, was challenged by those who pointed out that the intersectional politics of gender, sexuality, and race had always been engaged and understood through the structures of capitalism (Butler 1997; Upping the Anti 2005; Walters 2018). Given how many contexts these debates must generalize, it is hard to see how one can draw any conclusions about the merits of a thing called “identity politics” over and above any other kind. Nonetheless, in the post-2016 political world, after the Brexit referendum in the UK and the election of Donald Trump in the US, as well as following the rise of nationalist and/or austerity right parties in many other countries, recrimination from diverse political perspectives has again focused on the alleged over-emphasis on “identity politics.” The decline of class-based politics, the growth of economic inequality, and the disaffection of working-class white men, critics suggest, was neglected by both political party leaderships and grassroots organizers, in favor of campaigning around issues attaching to feminism, queer politics, and anti-racism. For example, Francis Fukuyama argues that the twentieth century was the century of the economic in politics—a contest between a left defined through workers’ rights, social welfare, and robust redistribution, and the right’s drive to reduce government by shrinking the public sector and selling publicly owned services and replacing them with private market delivery. By contrast, he suggests, the twenty-first century has seen the left focus “less on creating broad economic equality and more on promoting the interests of a wide variety of marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities, immigrants and refugees, women, and LGBT people. The right, meanwhile, has redefined its core mission as the patriotic protection of traditional national identity, which is often explicitly connected to race, ethnicity, or religion” (Fukuyama 2018, 91). This allegedly renders the left less able to address trending inequality, and redirects its focus to “cultural issues,” and validating interiority and achieving recognition—all of which racist nationalists can easily co-opt: