 How, on this view of conceptual activity in judgment, is the conceptualization of sensory material in intuition supposed to work? According to one prominent interpretation—call this ‘judgmentalism’ (Land 2015b)—intuition requires a judgment on the part of the subject, that things are experientially thus-and-so (Strawson 1970; Carl 1992: 165). However, this interpretation of Kant generates some straightforward problems (Grüne 2009: §2.2; Land 2015b). First, Kant’s conception of judgment seems to require predication (and in this sense concepts are predicates of possible judgments). However, a sensible synthesis carried out by concepts does not seem equivalent to the making of a judgment, rather it seems that Kant has in mind something like the formation of a sensory image (e.g., B154, B162). Indeed, in a 1791 letter Kant explicitly denies that intuitions are related to objects via an act of judgment or, relatedly, by the subsumption of the intuition under a concept (C 11:311). Second, Kant emphasizes that there are two distinctively different kinds of synthesis—viz. the “intellectual” synthesis generative of conceptual judgment, and the “figurative” synthesis generative of experience (in Kant’s sense of “experience”; see B151). If the judgmentalist view were correct, then it is difficult to see how Kant could maintain such a distinction between varieties of synthesis. Third, there is at least a prima facie circularity to the judgmentalist account, which construes conceptual judgment as a necessary condition of the generation of intuition, and Kant’s account of concept formation, which construes all concepts (even the a priori categories) as the result of reflection, which itself presupposes sensory intuition (Ginsborg 2006b; Grüne 2009; Anderson 2015: ch. 13).