 The primary source of the disagreements just mentioned is a further disagreement, as to what it takes to count as an action. On one view, intentional actions are centrally characterized by their stepwise or nested internal structure; on another, by their being authored or owned; on the third, by their location in a practice; on a fourth, by entailing an evaluation of one’s reasons.  (In one variant, we saw, those evaluations are entailed by ‘dialectical activity’, contrasted with mere action, and characterized by ongoing reconsideration of its point and nature.)  As we have seen, some of these characterizations come with supporting arguments, and this is a dramatic advance on the state of play as of about two decades back; however, the norm in this subfield is still to omit explanations of why arguments for competing conceptions of action are incorrect. In a famous essay that kicked off discussion of a different topic in practical reasoning, Robert Nozick observed that advocates of the alternative responses to Newcomb’s Problem were prepared to explain why they thought their own position correct, but not what was wrong with arguments for the other alternative; such a posture is unsatisfactory, and Nozick emphasized that in such debates ‘it will not do to rest content with one’s belief ... nor will it do to just repeat one of the arguments, loudly and slowly’ (Nozick 1997, p. 48).