 There is yet another way in which the class of harms to be considered in proportionality assessments might be expanded: the effects of revolutionary war against “lesser tyranny” on valid norm compliance might also be included. Suppose the valid norm is that governments are not to be tyrannical, that they are not only to refrain from killings, maiming, and enslavement, but are also to respect civil and political rights, including especially the right to democratic government, primarily because rights to physical security are best realized in democracies. Suppose also that because of weak international institutions, the best prospect for enforcing a norm of good government is the threat of revolution against governments that violate the norm. Under these conditions, it would be problematic to restrict proportionality assessments to immediate, direct harms, ignoring the effects on the enforcement of important norms of justice. Most but not all contemporary discussions of proportionality ignore the possibility of justifying violence for the sake of norm enforcement, because they elaborate on intuitions stimulated by one-off consideration of cases viewed in isolation, rather than taking into account the effect of particular actions on patterns of behavior persisting over time (Fabre 2012, Rodin 2011). And because they largely ignore institutions, they do not consider the requirements of effective international norm enforcement under conditions in which international institutions for enforcement are weak. 