 Though the term ‘reconciliation’ can be used to pick out an entire range of phenomena, theorists will often make an argument for somehow privileging one point on the scale. Some scholars attempt to fix the definition of reconciliation for a particular relational context by looking to the nature of the relationship in question. For example, it may not make sense to talk about spouses as reconciled unless there is a reestablishment of trust, love and intimacy. Spouses may get over their anger and resentment. They may cooperate successfully in raising their children together. But if trust, love and intimacy are not restored they have not reconciled as spouses. Similarly, in order to define what is necessary for the reconciliation of parties as members of a moral community (Radzik 2009), a political community (C. Murphy 2010), or the international community (Barry 1980), we might look to the ideals that appropriately define those relationships. In the South African debate, some commentators linked their conception of reconciliation to the moral value of ubuntu (Tutu 1999, Krog 2008). Ubuntu is frequently summarized through the Zulu saying, “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu,” which can be translated as “a person depends on others to be a person” (see, for example, Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, who are more critical of the relevance of ubuntu in post-apartheid South Africa).