 A different type of rule first looks at the options’ possible utility values in each state, before aggregating over states; this is what Hare’s (2010) deferentialism requires. To find out if an option O is permissible under deferentialism, we consider how it fares if we, in each state, make the assumptions most favorable to it. First, “regiment” the utility functions in \(\cU\) so that there’s some pair of consequences \(\{x, y\}\) such that \((\forall u \in\cU)(u(x) = 1 \amp u(y) = 0)\); this allows only one representative utility function for each possible completion of the decision-maker’s preference. Next, take all the possible “state-segments”—the possible utility assignments in each state—and cross them together in every possible arrangement to get an “expanded” set of utility functions (for example, this will contain every possible utility function in \(E\) coupled with every possible utility function not-\(E\)). Then \(A\) is permissible iff \(A\) maximizes expected utility relative to some utility function in this expanded set.