Keep in mind that it won’t be enough to state a reason to be disposed  to be instrumentally coherent.  It doesn’t follow from one’s having a  reason to have a disposition that one has a reason to manifest that  disposition on every particular occasion.  And so pointing to a reason  to be disposed to be coherent wouldn’t yield a reason to be  instrumentally coherent as such.  (As we’ll see in  §4.4,  a similar problem confronts the Kantian constitutivist view that  continued instrumental incoherence threatens our status as agents.   Since our agency isn’t at risk with every instance of instrumental  incoherence, this account won’t yield a reason to be instrumentally  coherent on every particular occasion; it would only provide a reason to  do so when one’s incoherence is extreme enough to threaten one’s status  as an agent.)  Furthermore, it is not clear what reasons there are to  be disposed to be instrumentally coherent.  It might be thought that  being disposed to be instrumentally coherent will make one more likely  to conform to reason over the long run.  But given that instrumental  coherence may just as soon be gained by revising one’s attitudes against  reason as in conformity to reason, one might doubt that this is so   (Kolodny 2008b).