 Yet the very talk of “legal phenomena” may invite a different kind of objection to the proposed naturalization of jurisprudential questions. For how is it, one might wonder, that the social scientist knows these are legal phenomena he is explaining, and not phenomena of some other kind? Does that not already presuppose an analysis of the concept of law? (Cf. Coleman 2001, pp. 213–214.) It is not obvious, though, why a shared language and dictionaries (or even an explicit definition of terms, as, for example, Newton deploys at the start of Principia Mathematica) won’t often suffice to get empirical science off the ground. It is not that empirical science needs conceptual analysis to tell this explanatory story, it’s rather that after the fact the philosopher may be able to offer some greater reflective clarity about the concepts invoked in the explanatory story. To the extent a conceptual analysis helps, it helps after we discover which way of cutting the causal joints of the social world works best, according to the naturalist.