 With these putative features of moral and conventional judgments in hand, Turiel proceeded to construct an empirical test to determine whether an experimental participant’s judgment about a transgression is a moral judgment or a conventional judgment. The test begins with a brief vignette describing a hypothetical transgression. Since Turiel was interested in determining whether young children could distinguish moral transgressions from conventional transgressions, the transgressions typically involve events that would be familiar to kids. Participants are then asked a series of questions aimed at determining whether they think the action described is wrong, whether they think the wrongness of the action is “authority independent”, and whether they would universalize the judgment, making the same judgment if the transgression occurred at another place or time. These questions can be asked in a variety of ways depending on the age of the participants and the goals of the study. In the jargon favored by Turiel and other social domain theorists, the responses to these questions are called “criterion judgments”, and criterion judgments are crucial in determining whether the participant takes the transgression to be moral or conventional. If the action is judged to be wrong, authority independent, and generalizable, the participant is classified as having viewed the transgression as moral, while if it is judged to be wrong, authority dependent, and not generalizable, the participant is classified as having taken the transgression to be conventional (Turiel 1983: 52; Smetana 1993: 115). Participants are also asked to explain why the transgression is wrong, and responses are assessed to determine whether they invoke harm, justice or rights, or whether they invoke factors, like social coordination, tradition, custom, appeal to authority, or the likelihood of punishment, that Turiel maintains are the sorts of justifications to be expected if participants view the transgression as conventional. Turiel calls these responses “justification categories” (Turiel 1983: 52–53,  66–68).[8]