 It is certainly true that manipulators often keep their true intentions hidden. Iago wants Othello to think that he intends to be his friend, rather than the agent of his destruction. Exaggerating the benefits of doing what the manipulator wants, while understating the advantages of other options (tactic 2 on our list) probably works best, if at all, if the target falsely believes that the manipulator intends to provide objective advice. However, there are other examples of manipulation where the intent does not seem to be hidden. The intent of a teenager nagging for a new cellphone is quite transparent—to get the parent to provide the new phone. Similarly, when adolescents engage in peer pressure to get a fellow to smoke, their intention—to get the target to smoke—is quite transparent. Targets of guilt trips often—perhaps typically—know exactly what the guilt tripper intends to get the target to do. Perhaps anticipating these worries, Whitfield allows manipulation to occur when the manipulator has merely achieved “plausible deniability” about his true intentions. It is not entirely clear, though, whether this feature allows the theory to escape the problem of forms of manipulation like nagging and peer pressure. It is certainly not obvious that such tactics only work, or only count as manipulation, if their users can plausibly deny their intentions.