 A powers-based approach to determination faces two main concerns. One is that the view requires endorsement of a controversial “causal theory” of properties, on which these are (following, e.g., Shoemaker 1980) essentially and exhaustively constituted by their powers; for if properties have non-causal quiddities (primitive identities, which float modally free of powers), satisfaction of the proper subset condition on powers won’t guarantee that determinables are ‘nothing over and above’ determinates (see, e.g., Melnyk 2006: 141–43 and McLaughlin 2007), since the status of the determinable’s ‘quiddity’ is not thereby treated; nor will it explain Determinable inheritance, since satisfaction of the condition on powers is compatible with the absence of the determinable quiddities. Here it is worth noting that while certain proponents (e.g., Clarke, Shoemaker, Clapp) presuppose a causal theory of properties, such a commitment may be dispensable: since non-causal quiddities are scientifically inaccessible and besides the point of solving the problem of higher-level causation  (see §5.2),  their presence or absence is irrelevant to the status of determination (and more generally, realization) as a relation between broadly scientific properties (see Wilson 2011).