 Grounding. The metaphysical debate about the nature of grounding and metaphysical explanation has taken an interest in Bradley’s regress from a different perspective. Here, the main Bradley-inspired issue has been whether or not it should be one of the requirements for a metaphysical explanation that it “must ground out”. The problem with Bradley’s regress in this context is that it appears to be committed to an infinite chain of facts, each one ontologically dependent on the subsequent one for its explanation. This is the situation described positively by Orilia (2006, 2007) above. The unity of a state of affairs Fa is explained by appeal to another higher-order fact R&lt;Fa&gt;, and this one in turn is explained by appeal to a further fact R′&lt;R, &lt;Fa&gt;&gt;, and so on ad infinitum. However, Cameron (2008) has found such a dependence chain to be very problematic. He believes that there is a strong intuition in favor of there being “a metaphysical ground, a realm of ontologically independent objects which provide the ultimate ontological basis for all the ontologically dependent entities, and a realm of basic facts which provide the ultimate metaphysical ground for all the derivative facts” (Cameron 2008: 8).