 Let us turn much more briefly to strategies  (2)  and  (3).  The claim in (2) is that there were errors of interpretation in the feminist analyses of analytic philosophy and its antecedents that weaken the feminist critiques. In (3) it is that critics have gone too far in undermining fields of philosophy such as metaphysics or central notions such as rationality that we need to retain. Examples of both approaches (sometimes even in one paper) can be found in Louise Antony and Charlotte Witt’s A Mind of One’s Own, a collection of papers that focused on reason and objectivity in both the history of Western philosophy and various fields of contemporary philosophy (1993 [2002]). Those who propound claim (2) include Margaret Atherton and Louise Antony. Atherton (1993 [2002]) criticizes both Genevieve Lloyd (1984) and Susan Bordo (1987) for their interpretations of Descartes. Although Atherton’s piece is purely historical, it is relevant to our discussion because feminists of all persuasions who debate the merit of analytic philosophy acknowledge historical analyses, especially Lloyd’s extensive work on “the man of reason”. Louise Antony argues that Jaggar (1983) and Jane Flax (1987) mischaracterize the rationalist or empiricist traditions, and so miss the extent to which analytic philosophers have already rejected aspects of them. This leads feminists to misidentify analytic epistemology with empiricism and overlook more rationalistic possibilities (Antony 1993 [2002]).