 If this is right, the summary’s apparent ordinariness and dogmatic structure reflect only Philo’s systematic approach to ethical topics, not its methods or results: Philo did not propose a dogmatic ethics, but rather a systematic technique for structuring students’ moral values into a coherent way of life through their rational evaluation of arguments on either side. A philosophical approach to ethics of this kind allows students to use their ethical intuitions—the knowledge provided by their own experience—to revise and structure their conceptions of value, and, on that basis, critically evaluate their general social and political roles, and select the appropriate actions in a particular situation. An approach of this sort perhaps no longer seems striking or innovative, but if Philo adopted it in the early 80s BCE, it presented no less a challenge to Hellenistic ethics than his Roman Books did to epistemology. Two reasons to think that Philo did adopt this approach are, first, that it yields a conception of ethical knowledge that fits the epistemology of the Roman Books—a Philonian rational agent will have the sort of wisdom and happiness that is available to ordinary people, i.e., something quite unlike the illusory promise of inerrant knowledge and moral perfection promised by the Stoics. And, secondly, Philo’s student Cicero may have adopted something like a mitigatedly skeptical version of this approach both in his personal life (see Griffin 1989) and in his philosophical works on ethics (see Schofield 2002).