 As brought out above, one way out of the dilemma for a realist is simply to deny that the evolutionary influence on the content of our moral beliefs is as pervasive as Street claims. The realist can grant that where such influence does exist we cannot assume that it would have pushed our beliefs toward moral truth: it may accidentally have done so in some cases (e.g., influencing us to think we have obligations to care for our children) and it might have been distorting in others (e.g., influencing us to downplay obligations to those who do not belong to our in-group). But this is not a problem if we also have a culturally developed capacity for autonomous moral reflection and reasoning that allows us to attain moral knowledge despite the presence of some unreliable influences. Realists will claim that we don’t need natural selection to have given us moral beliefs that track moral truths, any more than we need this in science or philosophy: all we need is for natural selection to have given us faculties that we can develop, train and use in ways that reliably track moral truths, and enough freedom from evolutionarily given instincts that we can so exercise those faculties.