 Some pluralist frameworks articulate epistemological theses about the disunity of scientific theories—higher-level theories cannot always be derived from lower-level theories (Fodor 1974). Other pluralist formulations are more explicitly metaphysical in appealing to a “disorder of things” (Dupré 1993) and a “dappled world” (Cartwright 1999) that characterize the world and not merely scientific theories as disunified. The idea of a dappled world also extends antireductionism from vertical to horizontal levels. Reductionism fails not only in relating different levels of organization but also as a thesis stating that a law can apply to every phenomenon that falls in its domain. In physics for instance, Newton’s laws may apply successfully to orderly systems as the ones we set up in the highly-controlled environments of our laboratories (e.g., a harmonic oscillator), but it would partake of an article of faith to believe that Newton’s laws apply to any real-world system. Making instead the case for a “dappled world”, that is, a world displaying both nomologically ordered systems and unruly ones, Cartwright (1999) invites scientists to resist methodological inclinations for generality and reductionist approaches.