 Posner’s claim evoked great controversy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. (See, e.g., Symposium [1980].) Twenty years later, Kaplow and Shavell [2001] revived and revised Posner’s claim. The revision had two components. First, and most importantly, they chose welfarism generally rather than cost-benefit analysis in particular as the normative basis for adjudication. Welfarism requires that evaluation depend solely on the well-being of individuals. Cost-benefit analysis is thus a form of welfarist evaluation; but Kaplow and Shavell’s argument allows them to avoid various criticisms of cost-benefit analysis. Second, Kaplow and Shavell do not argue primarily for a normative theory of adjudication. Rather, they contend that evaluation of legal rules and institutions by scholars ought to be welfarist. They suggest, however, that judges by and large have the same evaluative obligation as the third-party analyst.