 Obligation skeptics about gratitude present several arguments against the possibility that grateful behaviors can be obligatory. The first, which we might call the vagueness argument, says that while beneficiaries may have an obligation to return a favor upon a benefactor at some point, the beneficiary has substantial latitude in deciding when and how to bestow his grateful favor (Camenisch 1981: 15–16; Fitzgerald 1998: 138). This latitude is consistent with his having a certain sort of imperfect obligation (McConnell 1993); but it does not amount to the sort of strict obligation had by a promisor or a debtor, who have little or no latitude in fulfilling their obligation by the agreed-upon time. In response to this, obligationists about gratitude (e.g., Manela 2015) have pointed out that there are indeed certain acts of gratitude that seem to admit of no latitude—specifically, acceding to a reasonable request from a benefactor in need or refraining from harming a benefactor in certain ways that might be permissible if done to a stranger (see  section 3.4.1).