 Although Floridi’s, and Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s stance on semantic information is not uncontroversial ( sans an informational pluralism that is), Floridi’s motivating intuition has some philosophical precedent. Firstly, it is unlikely that many are satisfied with Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s claim that “A self-contradictory sentence asserts too much; it is too informative to be true”. Secondly, with regard to logical truths having zero semantic information on Floridi’s account, recall that as Wittgenstein put it with typical bluntness—“All the propositions of logic say the same thing, viz nothing. They are tautologies” (Tractatus, 4.46, 6.1). One way to understand Floridi’s theory of strongly semantic information is as a theory of the information we get from and about our particular objective physical environment, as our physical environment is one about which contradictions and logical truths are typically maximally uninformative. Semantic conceptions of information designed to tell a naturalistic story about the content of our putatively referring terms have a rich history of their own in philosophy, and this is the topic to which we now turn.