 Other recent controversies concern the issue of whether it is a metaphysically fundamental feature of the objects of cognitive success that they are, in some sense, supposed to enjoy the kind of cognitive success in question. For instance, we might think that what it is for some group of people to constitute a laboratory is that the group is, in some sense, supposed to make discoveries of a certain kind: that is the point of bringing that group into collaboration in a particular way, even if the individuals are spread out across different continents and their funding sources diverse. But even if a laboratory is plausibly characterized by a norm to which it is answerable, is something analogous true of the other objects that can enjoy cognitive success? Is it, for instance, a metaphysically fundamental feature of a belief that it is, in some sense, supposed to be  knowledge?[6]  Or can belief be metaphysically characterized without appeal to this norm? Is it, for instance, a metaphysically fundamental feature of a person that such a creature is, in some sense, supposed to be  rational?[7]  Or can persons be metaphysically characterized without appeal to this norm? Similar disputes arise for the other objects of cognitive success: to what extent can we understand what these objects are without appeal to the kinds of success that they are supposed to enjoy?