 While these findings may not be enough on their own to establish global skepticism about moral responsibility, they represent a potential threat to our everyday folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents, since they indicate that the conscious mind exercises less control over our behavior than we have traditionally assumed. Even some compatibilists now admit that because of these findings “free will is at best an occasional phenomenon” (Baumeister 2008: 17; see also Nelkin 2005; Herdova 2016). This is an important concession because it acknowledges that the threat of shrinking agency (Nadelhoffer 2011) remains a serious one independent of the neuroscientific concerns discussed above. The deflationary view of consciousness which emerges from these empirical findings, including the fact that we often lack transparent awareness of our true motivational states, is potentially agency undermining and could shrink the realm of morally responsible action (see N. Levy 2014a; Nadelhoffer 2011; King &amp; Carruthers 2012; Sie &amp; Wouters 2010, Brink 2013; Caruso 2015a; cf. Vargas 2013; K. Levy 2015; McKenna &amp; Warmke forthcoming; Ciurria 2013; Mele &amp; Shepherd 2013). A major point of disagreement, however, is over whether consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility, and, if so, what role or function it must serve (cf. N. Levy 2014a; Shepherd 2012, 2015a,b,c; Searle 2000, 2001; Hodgson 2005, 2012; Sher 2009; Doris 2002, 2015; Nahmias 2002; Smith 2005, 2008; Sifferd 2016). 