 As the following section illustrates, the LI were not received without substantial criticism, but one element that was explicitly appreciated in Husserl’s line of argument was its anti-psychologism, which early phenomenological reading of this work put particular emphasis on. Husserl devoted extensive efforts especially in the first volume of the LI (the Prolegomena to Pure Logic) to show that the laws of logic and ontology are not psychological. Mental acts are intentional, i.e., they are directed towards objects and facts that transcend the mind: these objects and facts are not mere contents of consciousness and, thus, have a structure of their own, which is regulated by laws of their own. Early phenomenologists thought this idea provided the systematic basis for what could be qualified as an “objectivist” approach to philosophical problems (according to which ontology, logic, ethics and aesthetics are about entities with an ontological status of their own, see Conrad 1954 [1992: 81]; in a similar vein, Geiger speaks of a “turning to the object” in the LI, see Geiger 1933: 13). At the same time, the Prolegomena also questions what it means for mental experiences to be intentionally directed towards objects and asks for a clarification of the relationship between logic and psychology. The second volume of the book (Investigations in Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge) attempts to provide a solution to these and cognate questions by presenting an articulated theory of intentionality, which attracted a more critical reception in early phenomenology (partly because this theory was perceived as, to some extent, reneging on the anti-psychologist principles of the Prolegomena, see Conrad-Martius 1959: 177).