  But in the case of universal suspension, it seems that the view that it is irrational to hold unwarranted beliefs is held—at least in part—on the basis of a theoretical belief that knowledge is very important to acquire and that mere belief is to be avoided. Cicero, for instance, stresses that Arcesilaus agreed with Zeno that it is irrational to hold opinions, i.e., inadequately warranted assents (premise [6] in sect. 3, above); and Sextus suggests that he thought that individual cases of suspended belief—presumably in the light of inconclusive arguments—were good (Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.233). And the view that it is irrational to hold mere beliefs (that is, opinions) depends on a further set of epistemological beliefs about the nature of belief and knowledge. If Arcesilaus was not rationally committed to any set of assumptions about the nature and requirements of rationality or about belief and knowledge—which he ought not to be, given that he had argued against the various views on offer, and hence, ex hypothesi, suspended belief about them—it doesn’t look like he can believe that one ought not to take beliefs to be justified.