 Fârâbî’s analysis of the Greek word for being as a particle is important in his reconstruction of the syntax of Greek as something close to a logically ideal language, in his reconstruction of the underlying logical syntax of any language, and in his diagnosis of the misunderstandings that can arise when the grammatical form of an expression in some natural language fails to track its underlying logical form, as when the paronymous Arabic word mawjûd = “being” suggests that being is an accident. While Fârâbî gives what we can think of as an Arabic analogue to Aristotle’s discussion in Metaphysics V,7 of the many meanings of “being”, the Arabic analogue focusses on several features that the Greek original does not: the paronymous form of the word mawjûd, the difficulties that led the translators to draft the word mawjûd, literally “found”, into service as an equivalent to the Greek word for being, and the relation between mawjûd = “being” in the sense of “that which is”, and wujûd = “existence” or “being” in the sense of “the being of that which is”. Furthermore, while the use of mawjûd in the syllogistic arts to mean “being” is always a metaphorical extension from the original meaning “found”, and its use, Fârâbî also thinks that mawjûd = “being” has different meanings in different syllogistic arts, and in particular that it has a distinctive meaning in demonstrative science, contrasting with its meaning in dialectic, and that the paronymous form of the word, while it has some justification in dialectic, is more seriously misleading in demonstrative science. Fârâbî thinks that bringing out the distinctive scientific meaning of “being”, and the distinctive logical form of the word “being” as used in demonstrative science, will show the path to a scientific treatment of being, based on distinctively scientific ways of investigating (for a given X) both the question whether X is and the question what X is.