 In many situations agents have control over certain propositional variables (Hoek &amp; Wooldridge 2005), for instance they can be responsible for traffic flow or they can veto a certain issue. Variables can also be shared (Gerbrandy 2006), an example being voting, where players share control over a variable whose realization is determined by a certain aggregation function, e.g., majority (Troquard, Hoek, &amp; Wooldridge 2011). These logics of propositional control specify what propositions agents have in their effectivity function. For instance, if agent \(i\) controls \(p\), then both \(p^{M}\) and \(\neg p^{M}\) are in his or her effectivity function. In a way these models are very special types of effectivity function, and what agents control can be seen as a choice, or a strategy, available to them.