  On the other hand, if FDS is not identical to EAS –  if, instead, she is a different person, or is at least a different  self – then it may not be so obvious what the conflict is after all, for FDS has made her preferences clear, and if she is  importantly distinct from the signer of the advance directive, then  there seems little reason why the interests of EAS are relevant at  all to FDS's life. But then again, FDS is not competent, and EAS, if  not identical to her, is at least akin to her closest relative, one  might think, in which case her earlier wishes perhaps ought to hold  sway after all (see Luttrell and Sommerville 1996). (But EAS and FDS  will be very psychologically different, we are supposing, so why  think they are closely related at all? Indeed, wouldn't FDS be more  closely “related” to her fellow end-stage Alzheimer's  patients? So why think EAS has any more right to make life-or-death  decisions about her than any of these others?)