 Hence, Peirce’s conception of depiction is not captured by the formula Goodman criticizes. But arguably the formula has some heuristic value, because it draws attention to some of the challenges a theory that explains depiction in terms of resemblance will need to address. Thus, according to Goodman, resemblance is a reflexive and symmetric relation, whereas representation is neither: an object resembles itself to the maximum degree but does not normally represent itself, and the object that a picture represents does not represent the picture, although it resembles the picture to exactly the same degree and in exactly the same respects as the picture resembles it. Furthermore, many pictures resemble other pictures, such as copies of them, more closely than they resemble their objects, but they do not represent those pictures. “Plainly” Goodman concludes “resemblance in any degree is no sufficient condition for representation”(1968: 4).