 Finally, Strawson considers Kant’s transcendental idealism, and though he is ultimately unsympathetic, he explores its interpretation with great care and considers why Kant might have adopted it. One issue which he presses is whether there is a coherent way to fit ourselves as objects into a framework of transcendental idealism, given Kant’s seeming view that real objects, things in themselves, are unknowable and beyond our experience. The rejection of transcendental idealism requires Strawson to scrutinize Kant’s arguments for it, and he very carefully and sympathetically analyses and rejects Kant’s arguments about space and time, and geometry, and also the argument, presented in the Antinomies, that transcendental realism generates contradictions. Strawson further abandons much of Kant’s talk of mechanisms of synthesis in the generation of proper experience. Much of Strawson’s discussion here relies on his particular interpretation of transcendental idealism, which has been heavily criticised, for instance in Matthews 1969.