 Viewed as logics that tell us which conditionals are consequences of a given set of conditionals, Adams’s logic coincides, over their common language, with Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s logics. That is, for every argument with a finite set of premises \(\Gamma\) and conclusion \(A\) of \(L_1\), \(A\) is a \(p\)-consequence of \(\Gamma\) iff \(A\) is a consequence of \(\Gamma\) according to Stalnaker’s semantics (see Gibbard 1980 for a  proof).[7]  However, the main limit of Adams’s logic is that it does not account for embeddings of conditionals (negated conditionals, disjunctions of conditionals, right-nested and left-nested conditionals). Nevertheless, the coincidence of the logics generated by possible worlds and probabilistic semantics suggests that Adams’ Thesis could be extended to the language \(L_2\) of arbitrarily complex conditionals. This hypothesis is known as Stalnaker’s Hypothesis, who formulates it in his 1970  article.[8]