 In this way, critical disability theory is an emancipatory and developing discourse (Goodley, Liddiard, &amp; Runswick Cole 2018: 206; Meekosha &amp; Shuttleworth 2009: 48). Thinkers use the method to both describe the socio-political constructions of disability and track the impacts of these constructions on oppressed persons, including but not limited to those to whom the concept “disability” attaches. Critical disability theory, then, necessarily refers to lived experiences and attempts to transform the circumstances under which oppressed subjects live through critical, intersectional analysis. Complicating this expansive approach, accountability to disabled persons is paramount to this work (Minich 2016). But, some call for accountability and simultaneously argue that critical disability theory should resist distinctions between disabled and non-disabled subjects. Nirmala Erevelles, for example, does not seek to claim “everyone is disabled” but prefers historically-embedded materialist accounts of disability at intersections among multiple categories of analysis, including “race, class, gender, nation, and sexual identity” (2014, cf. Erevelles &amp; Kafer 2010: 219). Similarly, Alison Kafer refuses a “fixed definition” of disability. She favors leaving open the boundaries of the concept of disability and, therefore, does not settle who counts as disabled. She uses Joan W. Scott’s notion of “collective affinity” to describe disability as a wide net, inhering in no particular persons, but rather describing disability as a complex set of features, attributed to individuals, that pathologize and oppress (2013: 11). At root, as Dianne Pothier and Richard Devlin argue, critical disability theory will claim that 