 One might question Green’s dualism and anti-naturalism. Particular episodes of conscious experience presuppose a subject of consciousness that is prior to and independent of those episodes of consciousness. However, this does not imply that the self is prior to and independent of all experience. Perhaps the self is a set or series of experiences. Green may seem to rule out this possibility, because he distinguishes between a succession of conscious states and consciousness of a succession of such states and claims that self-consciousness requires the latter, and not just the former (PE §§52, 55, 62–65). But if conscious states can take other conscious states as their objects, it is not clear why the self could not be a suitably diachronically ordered and interrelated set of conscious experiences. In any case, the need for a self that is the bearer of discrete self-conscious experiences does not preclude the self from being an object of consciousness, thought, or knowledge. Indeed, Green’s entire theoretical and practical philosophy turns crucially on the possibility of self-consciousness and its causal role in thought and action. As we will see, important aspects of Green’s views about moral responsibility presuppose that the self is not outside space and time but rather plays a fundamental causal role in responsible action.