Arguments for the claim that the standard theory does not account for important aspects of agency are usually driven by a focus on distinctively human agency. Once we shift our focus to non-human agents, and simpler organisms, a very different challenge emerges. When we turn to such agents, it seems that the standard theory is clearly too demanding. The view explains agency in terms of the agent’s desires, beliefs, and intentions. Usually, it is assumed that this is an explanation in terms of mental representations: in terms of intentional mental states and events that have representational contents (typically, propositional contents). It seems, however, that there are beings that are capable of genuine agency and that do not possess representational mental states. We can distinguish here between three claims (and three challenges). According to the first, there are non-human beings that are capable of agency and that do not possess representational mental states. Second, there are many instances of human agency that can and should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. Third, all instances of agency can and should be explained without the ascription of representational mental states. We turn to each claim in turn.