 If procedural rationality attaches a cost to the making of a decision, then ecological rationality locates that procedure in the world. The questions ecological rationality ask are what features of an environment can help or hinder decision making and how should we model judgment or decision-making ecologies. For example, people make causal inferences about patterns of covariation they observe—especially children, who then perform experiments testing their causal hypotheses (Glymour 2001). Unsurprisingly, people who draw the correct inferences about the true causal model do better than those who infer the wrong causal model (Meder, Mayrhofer, &amp; Waldmann 2014). More surprising, Meder and his colleagues found that those making correct causal judgments do better than subjects who make no causal judgments at all. And perhaps most surprising of all is that those with true causal knowledge also beat the benchmark standards in the literature which ignore causal structure entirely; the benchmarks encode, spuriously, the assumption that the best we can do is to make no causal judgments at all.