 By contrast with the Tarskian perspective on (T)/(ES), we can formulate the central theme of deflationism under consideration as the view, roughly, that the instances of (some version of) this schema do capture everything significant that can be said about applications of the notion of truth; in a slogan, the instances of the schema exhaust the notion of truth. Approaches which depart from deflationism don’t disagree that (ES) tells us something about truth; what they (with Tarski) deny is that it is exhaustive, that it tells us the whole truth about truth. Since such approaches add substantive explanations of why the instances of the equivalence schema hold, they are now often called inflationary approaches to truth. Inflationism is the general approach shared by such traditional views as the  correspondence theory of truth,  coherence theory of truth,  pragmatic theory of truth,  identity theory of truth, and  primitivist theory of truth, These theories all share a collection of connected assumptions about the alethic locutions, the concept of truth, and the property of truth. Inflationary theories all assume that the expression ‘is true’ is a descriptive predicate, expressing an explanatory concept of truth, which determines a substantive property of truth. From that shared set of presuppositions, the various traditional inflationary theories then diverge from one another by providing different accounts of the assumed truth property. On inflationary views, the nature of the truth property explains why the instances of (ES) hold. Deflationary views, by contrast, reject some if not all of the standard assumptions that lead to inflationary theories, resisting at least their move to positing any substantive truth property. Instead, deflationists offer a different understanding of both the concept of truth and the functioning of the alethic locutions. A deflationist will take the instances of (ES) to be “conceptually basic and explanatorily fundamental” (Horwich 1998a, 21, n. 4; 50), or to be direct consequences of how the expression ‘true’ operates (cf. Quine 1970 [1986], Brandom 1988, and Field 1994a).