 (2) Ought-Implies-Can-Constraint: One thing judges cannot do is what Dworkin’s Judge Hercules does. This is a familiar complaint about Dworkin’s theory, but naturalized jurisprudence gives it a principled foundation. The naturalistic jurisprudent eschews all normative guidance unusable by real judges; like his naturalized counterpart in epistemology, he does “not want to give merely idle advice, which humans [including judges] are incapable of following” (Goldman 1978, p. 510). Dworkin may give judges an “aspirational model” (to borrow Jules Coleman’s apt phrase), and the naturalistic jurisprudent need not dispute that; but Descartes gave us an aspirational model in epistemology as well, and that does not make his program any more adequate or relevant by the naturalist’s lights. (It would be attractive if we could take certain “clear and distinct” ideas, and build up all of knowledge from them.) The naturalist wants normative advice effective for creatures like us; demanding of judges Herculean philosophical ingenuity violates this constraint. Aspiration, the naturalist concludes, is not a fit aim of normative advice, which must, first and foremost, offer effective means to ends.