 A second objection against the Given, which might also be attributed to Kant, is that the mere occurrence of a sensory experience cannot justify any particular belief that is the causal result of that experience. Instead, sensory experience can only play its justificatory role against a background of concepts possessed by the experiencing subject (Sellars 1963: 170; McDowell 1998: 435–436). Though this position is often taken to support some form of Intellectualism (e.g., McDowell 1996; Ginsborg 2006b), it is also compatible with forms of Sensibilism that construe the conditions for empirical knowledge as resting at least in part on the possession of intellectual capacities, even if such capacities are not necessary for perceptual intentionality as such (e.g., Hanna 2001: 46–65; 2005: 256–257; Bird 2006: 193–207; Watkins 2008, 2012; Allais 2009: 392–394; Tolley 2013: 125–127; McLear 2015: 98–106, 2020a; Golob 2016a, forthcoming).