  A common claim in the philosophical literature about molecular genetics is that genes cannot be conceived at the molecular level. Of course, philosophers do not deny that biologists use the term gene, but many philosophers believe gene is a dummy term, a placeholder for many different concepts. Different responses to gene skepticism illustrate a variety of philosophical aims and approaches. One kind of response is to analyze explanations closely tied to experimental practice (rather than sweeping generalizations of a fundamental theory) in order to determine whether there are uniform patterns of reasoning about genes that could (a) be codified into clear concepts, and/or (b) used to establish the reference of the term. Another kind of response is to propose new gene concepts that will better serve the expressed aims of practicing biologists. A third kind of response is to implement survey analysis, rather than conduct traditional methods of philosophical analysis. A fourth kind of response is to embrace the (allegedly) necessary vagueness of the gene concept(s) and to examine why use of the term gene is so useful.