 There are some attempts to explain or come to grips with the impossibility results that do not easily fit into the two camps identified above or represent a combination of ideas from both. For an example of the latter, Wheeler (2012; see also Wheeler and Scheines, 2013) both suggest focusing on reliability conduciveness as opposed to truth conduciveness (camp 1) and question the assumptions, primarily independence but also the Content Determination Thesis, used in the derivation of the impossibility results (camp 2). Shogenji (2007, 2013) and McGraw (2016) are other complex and insightful attempts to deepen the Bayesian analysis and diagnose of those results. Specifically, Lydia McGrew argues for a shift in focus from the coherence of contents of reports to coherence of the evidence with an hypothesis \(H\) (which need not coincide with the conjunction of the report contents). If the conjunction of the members of a set of evidence supports some hypothesis \(H\), and if all members of that set are playing a role in that epistemic effect, then that set of evidence is, McGrew shows, indeed confirmatory of \(H\) and in that sense truth-conducive for \(H\) (McGrew, 2016). McGrew offers several proposals for how to spell out “coherence with \(H\)”.