 Flanagan (2017) identifies Mencius’ theory of the moral sprouts as the ancient precursor of moral modularity theory, an example of which is Haidt’s moral foundations theory. Just as Mencius held that there are in contemporary parlance automatic, affective-cognitive-conative (prompting to action) inclinations and intuitions (such as our alarmed and distressed reaction upon seeing a child about to fall into a well) that could develop into the moral virtues (such as ren or humanity), so Haidt theorizes that there are several such modules or “foundations” (Haidt’s look somewhat different from Mencius’, but one of Haidt’s modules is “harm/care or suffering/compassion”) that form moralities. Flanagan compares Mencius’ and Haidt’s theories, and finds that each possesses a different set of strengths and weaknesses. For example, Mencius’ theory correctly does not encourage us to think that the sprouts, which begin as automatic, intuitive reactions, remain that way. One of the other Mencian sprouts is the capacity to make distinctions between shi and fei (that’s it, and that’s not it, where the first has the connotation of approval and the second the connotation of disapproval), and this develops into the virtue of zhi or wisdom. It looks as if this sprout is the inborn capacity that forms the basis of analogical reasoning and other kinds of reflection that in fact go into the development of the other sprouts. For example, natural compassion can grow into the virtue of humanity only when we learn how to care for others and respond to their suffering in an appropriate fashion. Flanagan thinks this is the right kind of picture. If we are talking about moral development, what begins as automatic and intuitive should develop into something that is guided by knowledge, reflection and reasoning. By contrast, Haidt’s theory holds that the modules go all the way up, in the sense that they remain largely automatic and intuitive. On the other hand, Haidt’s theory shows a well-taken sensitivity to the possibility that the modules could take different forms in different cultures and societies, that some modules could receive greater emphasis in some moralities, and that in fact different moralities result from such variation in emphasis. 