 A dispositional sentence such as ‘Jones believes the earth is round’ is unlike a law-sentence insofar as it mentions an individual, Jones. But it is like a law-sentence insofar as its role is not (or not primarily) one of describing or reporting, or stating that some object has such-and-such an attribute or stands in such-and-such a relation with another object. Its “truth-maker”, to use a contemporary expression, has to be understood in terms of what would satisfy it as opposed to what it purportedly  describes.[14]  What would satisfy a law is not specified or mentioned in the law-sentence; similarly, what would satisfy a disposition is not specified or mentioned in the disposition-sentence. Nor could it be. What would satisfy ‘Jones believes the earth is round’ is an open-ended (infinite) list of inferrings, imaginings, saying, and doings (etc.) on the part of Jones (1949a, 44). (And note again, a propos of behaviourism, that if ‘imagining’ is construed in one of its ordinary senses, as something someone may be doing just by sitting, unmoving, with his hand on his chin, there is explicit reference to an irreducible-to-behaviour mental occurrence in this specification of what would satisfy the sentence as well as the explicit denial of the finiteness of the long list that would unpack the sentence by alluding to its satisfaction conditions.)