 Legal philosophers disagree about the proper characterization of the rule of law, their differing views occupying varying points along a spectrum from “thin”, or formal-procedural, to increasingly “thick”, or substantive, accounts (Waldron 2016; Tasioulas 2020a). “Thick” accounts of the rule of law identify it with something approaching all the requirements, formal-procedural and substantive, good law should satisfy; or all the requirements that make for legitimate law (Beyleveld &amp; Brownsword 2007); or all the demands of political justice (rights) that bear on law (Dworkin 2011); or else some favoured comprehensive catalogue of legally-relevant desiderata, such as compliance with democracy and human rights (Bingham 2010; Annan 2004). The thicker one’s favoured account of the rule of law, the more demanding a standard it sets for the international legal order. This has led some advocates of thick accounts to conclude that the rule of law does not apply to international law, since it imposes demands that cannot feasibly be made of international, rather than domestic, law.