 Before turning to various categories of hypothetical duties in Book III, Pufendorf examines several absolute requirements toward other humans. The first is the prime natural law directive – also found in Grotius and Hobbes – without which social life could not exist: that no one should injure another and, if they have, that reparation should be made (DJN III.1). Second, since injury can be done to others not only by damaging their bodies or things, but also their self-esteem, humans must show mutual respect and treat one another as natural equals: for “one cannot lead a social life with someone by whom one is not esteemed at least as a man, …” (DJN III.2.1; Pufendorf 1994a, p. 159). The basis of this requirement is not human nature regarded metaphysically (or transcendentally) as an absolute value, but a so-called equality of right or law (ius) consisting merely of our joint obligation (per natural law) to cultivate a social life (DJN III.2.2; (Fiorillo 2013a, Saastamoinen 2010, Haakonssen 2011). Human moral equality so conceived also leads Pufendorf to reject the notion of natural slavery, even though he allows its compatibility with certain kinds of contractual subjection in both pre-civil and civil society (DJN III.2.8–9). Third, beside observing the minimalist requirements not to injure or insult others, Pufendorf notes, one must also seek to benefit them, “so that I am glad that others who share my nature also live upon this earth” (DJN III.3.1; Pufendorf 1994a, p. 165). This introduces the important distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, the latter consisting of so-called duties of humanity which, though owed in the same sense as perfect duties, cannot be compelled. There are a number of interesting discussions here, addressing the right of passage “for legitimate reasons” (justas causas, DJN III.3.5), the duty of hospitality, and the right of immigration – some of which recur in the fuller treatment of international law at the end of DJN VIII. Duties of humanity often depend on special circumstances. Thus, Pufendorf could consistently approve of Frederick William’s liberal (and self-serving) pro-Huguenot immigration policy in Brandenburg while supporting Charles XI’s tighter restrictions in Sweden (KVS 1995e, pp. 472, 505; Habitu §54, 2002c, pp. 118–21). Moreover, in the immediate context, he disagrees with Vitoria (DJN III.3.9) by limiting the so-called right of commerce, including territorial access for such purposes, especially as it was used by Europeans in their conquest of America (Cavallar 2002, 2008; Hunter 2007a).