 An alternative to global reductionism is local reductionism (E. Fricker 1994). Local reductionism does not require hearers to be justified in believing the general reliability of testimony. It only requires hearers to be justified in trusting the reliability of the specific speakers whose current testimony is in question on a particular subject. This requirement is more easily satisfied than global reductionism. Local reductionism may still be too strong, however, but for a different reason. Is a speaker S trustworthy for hearer H only if H has positive evidence or justification for S’s general reliability? This is far from clear. If I am at an airport or train station and hear a public announcement of the departure gate (or track), am I justified in believing this testimony only if I have prior evidence of the announcer’s general reliability? Normally I do not possess such evidence for a given public address announcer. But, surely, I am justified in trusting such announcements.