 Factual detachment tells us that from \(p\), and a deontic conditional to the effect that if \(p\) then it ought to be that \(q\), we can conclude that it ought to be that \(q\). Deontic Detachment in contrast tells us that from it ought to be that \(p\) and if \(p\), then it ought to be that \(q\), we can conclude that it ought to be that \(q\). If we interpret a deontic conditional as a material conditional with an obligatory consequent (as in (3′) above), FD, but not DD is supported. Conversely, if we interpret deontic conditionals as obligatory material conditionals (as in (2′) above), DD, but not FD is supported. Although we have shown earlier that neither of these interpretations is acceptable, the contrast reveals a general problem. Unrestricted endorsement of both types of detachment is not tenable, since it leads implausibly to the conclusion that Jones is both obligated to tell (the neighbor he is coming) and obligated to not tell. Thus researchers tended to part company over which principle of the two to endorse (Loewer and Belzer 1983).