 Applying Hilpinen’s definition we capture two more particular judgements, in addition to those already mentioned, that seem intuitively acceptable: that \(C\) is closer to the truth than \(A\), and that \(D\) is closer than \(B\). (Note, however, that we have here a partial ordering: \(A\) and \(D\), for example, are not ranked.) We can derive from this various apparently desirable features of the relation closer to the truth: for example, that the relation is transitive, asymmetric and irreflexive; that the Truth is closer to the Truth than any other theory; that the tautology is at least as far from the Truth as any other truth; that one cannot make a true theory worse by strengthening it by a truth (a weak version of the value of content for truths); that a falsehood is not necessarily improved by adding another falsehood, or even by adding another truth (a repudiation of the value of content for falsehoods).