 Starting with Owen Flanagan’s Varieties of Moral Personality (1993), philosophers began to worry that empirical results from social psychology were inconsistent with the structure of human agency presupposed by virtue theory. In this framework, people are conceived as having more or less fixed traits of character that systematically order their perception, cognition, emotion, reasoning, decision-making, and behavior. For example, a generous person is inclined to notice and seek out opportunities to give supererogatorily to others. The generous person is also inclined to think about what would (and wouldn’t) be appreciated by potential recipients, to feel the urge to give and the glow of satisfaction after giving, to deliberate effectively about when, where, and how to give to whom, to come to firm decisions based on such deliberation, and to follow through on those decisions once they’ve been made. Other traits are meant to fit the same pattern, structuring perception, cognition, motivation, and action of their bearers. Famous results in social psychology, such as Darley and Batson’s (1973) Good Samaritan experiment, seem to tell against this view of human moral conduct. When someone helps another in need, they may do so simply because they are not in a rush, rather than because they are expressing a fixed trait like generosity or compassion.