 Two problems arise for the Platonist’s position.  First, how do cognizers come to be acquainted with such propositions?  Second, what explains how propositions represent things as being a certain way?  Platonists appear to have no answer to the epistemic question, and presumably accept representation as a primitive feature of propositions.  Type theorists, however, explain the relation between a cognizer and a proposition simply as an instance of the general relation between type and token.  Consider, as Dummett (1996, p. 259) does, one’s humming of a tune.  The tune is a species or type of musical performance capable of having multiple performances at differing times or locations, while the humming of it is a token act belonging to that type.  One might then see the relation of a proposition to a mental or linguistic act as one between the type of act performed and the performance of the act.