 Kant takes the terms “intuition” (Anschauung), “perception” (Wahrnehmung), and “experience” (Erfahrung) to designate different things (McLear 2014b: 771–772; Allais 2016: 2–5; Tolley 2016a: 86–91, 2019, 2020). For example, in the headings to the first three chapters of the Principles of the first Critique Kant distinguishes between the “Axioms of Intuition,” the “Anticipations of Perception,” and the “Analogies of Experience.” If Kant weren’t thinking that the terms “intuition”, “perception”, and “experience” designated distinct mental states, then it would be difficult to understand why he ordered a central part of his architectonic around them. All three are forms of representation of objects. Insofar as each is a conscious representations of an object they are all forms of “cognition” in the broad (though not necessarily the “proper”) sense of that term. Let’s look at each representational kind in a bit more detail.