 On Healey’s (2017, pp. 208–210) pragmatist approach, a claim assigning a quantum state does derive much of its content from inferences involving counterfactuals. The inference is to a counterfactual whose antecedent is (or supervenes on) a claim about magnitudes, and whose consequent specifies a probability as great as 1 for a different magnitude claim that is meaningful in these counterfactual circumstances. Healey could argue that the magnitude claims Lewis considers do not derive content from his corresponding counterfactuals, on the grounds that they do not materially imply those counterfactuals and so in quantum theory an inference from the claim to the counterfactual is not reliable. According to Healey’s inferentialist pragmatism, only reliable material inferences confer content. Magnitude claims about the trajectory of a molecule might be meaningful and true according to an alternative theory such as  Bohmian mechanics.  But in Healey’s pragmatist view (2012b, pp. 1547–8), even an imprecise claim about the location and velocity of a molecule is true only in a situation that can be modeled by decoherence of a kind that would block the inference to the counterfactual.