 Austin’s criticisms focus on language use, even while dissenting from Ayer that the issues are entirely terminological (Austin 1962: ch. 6). He focuses on the “argument from illusion” from Ayer (also citing Price), and complains that ordinary cases of perceptual relativity and variation, such as the elliptical-looking penny, are not normally taken to be illusions. In fact, as we have seen, many earlier sense-data theorists would agree. Austin has little to say about the Argument from Perceptual Variation from the classical discussions. He finds the penny example to be atypical because pennies have stable, sharply bounded shapes whereas many objects, such as cats, do not. In considering the Argument from Illusion, Austin (1962: 52) objects to the continuity premise, which we have just seen in Price: that if, in one case, we explain a mismatch between object and perception by introducing a special entity such as a sense datum, we must then accept that in phenomenally similar cases we can’t have direct, veridical perception. (The continuity premise remains in dispute today, see Crane &amp; French 2015 [2021].) More generally, sense-data theorists had argued that in describing elliptical appearances gained from a penny, one adopts a special sense of “see” that (1) does not require that an elliptical material object exists, but (2) does affirm that an elliptical sense datum exists (1962: ch. 3). Austin’s denial that something elliptical must be seen in such cases draws on ordinary language. But Price and others distinguished different senses of perception words advisedly; Austin fails to engage their reasons more directly. Further, he does not consider theorists who say that we perceive material things as a result of sensing sense data (e.g., Broad 1923: 248).