 Beginning in the 1980s, a number of scholars argued that the economic account of negligence fails to capture the most basic and familiar feature of a tort action of any kind, the fact that it is a private action that one person brings against another. The core argument is that instrumental accounts are unable to explain the characteristically private and transactional nature of tortious wrongdoing and so unable to explain the nature of the remedy appropriate in response to it. In a negligence action, the plaintiff comes before the court complaining of a wrong that the defendant has done to that plaintiff in particular. Unlike the pervasive harms of anticompetitive behavior that are regulated in US antitrust law, the plaintiff has a particular complaint against the defendant, namely, that the defendant’s carelessness was a violation of that very plaintiff’s right to security of person and property. As Ernest Weinrib formulates the point, economic analysis proposes separate explanations of why the defendant pays someone and why the plaintiff receives payment from someone, without explaining why the defendant owes compensation to the plaintiff in particular; each party faces separate incentives that make no reference to the other (1995). Jules Coleman develops the same general line of argument in slightly different terms: the familiar structural features of tort law—the fact that a particular plaintiff recovers from a particular defendant for a wrong that that defendant committed against that very plaintiff—cannot be adequately explained by economic analysis, because it leaves out the law’s central focus on the fact that the defendant has wronged the plaintiff in particular, focusing instead on incidental factors such as “search, administrative, and transaction costs” (2001: 23).