 Although grounding is not a species of deducibility, Bolzano thinks that there are cases in which a truth is both deducible from, and grounded in, other truths. In some cases of this kind, he thinks, a relation of ground to consequence also holds among the variants of the original propositions, provided only that the resulting propositions are all true. He speaks of formal grounding in such cases (TS,§162). Later, he cites the following example: [Socrates was an Athenian and a philosopher] is both grounded in and deducible from [Socrates was an Athenian] and [Socrates was a philosopher] (wrt [Socrates], [Athenian], and [philosopher]), and the same holds, he clearly thinks, for all variants consisting of true propositions, e.g., [Nixon was a Republican and a crook], [Nixon was a Republican], [Nixon was a crook] (TS, §199; cf. §221, no.7; and, for another example of formal grounding, see §226, no.5).