 Even if some compatibilist reply proves that the Consequence Argument is unsound, this alone would not amount to a positive argument for compatibilism. It would merely mean that one key argument for the incompatibility of determinism and regulative control is untenable. But that is consistent with the incompatibility of determinism and regulative control. Indeed, some argue for this incompatibility without relying upon the potentially problematic assumptions about power necessity at work in the Consequence Argument (Fischer 1994; and Ginet 1990, 2003). Furthermore, even if the compatibilist could discredit all current arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and regulative control, it still behooves her to offer a positive argument demonstrating the compatibility of determinism and regulative control. Compatibilists wishing to defend regulative control, such Berofsky (1987, 1995, 2012), Campbell (1997), Nelkin (2011), and Vihvelin (2013), still have their work cut out for them.