 It would not be until post-Tractarian work that Wittgenstein would turn his attention to question of private objects in one’s own mind.  Regarding Russell, as Diamond sees it, his commitment both to private objects and their possibility/admissibility comes primarily from his views on knowledge by acquaintance in contrast to knowledge by description, an important part of which is his holding that “…the chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience. In spite of the fact that we can only know truths which are wholly composed of terms which we have experienced in acquaintance, we can yet have knowledge by description of things which we have never experienced” (quoted in Diamond [2000], p. 267). Further, according to Diamond, it is Russell’s understanding and use of quantification that he employs to provide a way to get around the problem of not being acquainted with the ‘private’ objects in the minds of others. While Bismarck knows by direct acquaintance the meaning of ‘This is excruciating’ said of his sensation, another can only say, ‘Bismarck’s sensation is excruciating’. However, this can be meaningful once we understand that the its meaning is to be analyzed in terms of, ‘Something is a sensation, had now by Bismarck, and it is excruciating’ (p. 273). Once she has identified the importance of the issue of privacy for Russell, and laid out the details of his position, she is primarily concerned to show how Wittgenstein’s views in the Tractatus (particularly on quantification, logical space, and there not being logical objects that serve as the referents of terms such as ‘some’ and ‘all’) undermine Russell’s position on quantification and private objects in other people’s minds. Further, she argues, briefly, for the importance of there being a ‘private language argument’ in the Tractatus along two main lines. First, she takes it to be important for our understanding of Wittgenstein’s work and its development (and here her argument is firmly in line with her Pyrrhonian and resolute reading of the Tractatus and its continuity with Wittgenstein’s later work). Second, she takes it to have implications for Michael Dummett’s way of framing the realism and anti-realism issue, especially as it relates to the Tractatus. Against Dummett, she sees the Tractatus as putting forward an anti-realist position, “…at any rate about other people’s private objects” (p. 284).