 Although the early Husserl inherited an idealized utilitarianism from Franz Brentano, later in his career he favored a view that “absolute loves” generate “absolute oughts” (Husserl 1919–20 [2012: 146]; 1916–35 [2014: 391–392]). For example, a mother’s love for her child demands that she protect her child from harm even when sacrificing her child is a lesser good for the aggregate and even when saving her child leads to harm for others. The central idea is that an objective value can become an “individual, subjective value of love”, i.e., that “the same value can be infinitely more ‘significant’ for one person than another” (Husserl 1919–20 [2012: 146n.]). Such absolute loves—we can also think of them as commitments—unconditionally bind that subject to honor those commitments regardless of what any purely objective, consequentialist calculation might require (Husserl 1916–35 [2014: 391–392]). These commitments motivate an agent to adopt an ethical life-project and to undertake the actions necessary to realize that project, a project that is “the deepest ground of [her] personal identity and individuality” (Melle 1991: 131; 2002:  243–244).[21]  This view is consistent with and an extension of “weak” value-realism. The “absoluteness” of the imperative is relative to the committed subject; the imperative, in Kantian terms, is a hypothetical imperative binding only on those who satisfy the condition of being so committed (Drummond 2018b: 141–42).