 While many will accept that the conceptual problem is the first problem we encounter in connection with others, others go further and claim that once one addresses the conceptual problem there is no room for the epistemological one. This is because our way of thinking and talking about mind will have application to others built into it from the start. It has been pointed out that to say what is required for grasp of a concept is not yet to show that that concept is  instantiated.[13]  It can be said in reply that it is a particular proposed solution to this conceptual problem that may be thought to make the epistemological question otiose. As we can see with Strawson’s proposal, the idea is that we break down the gap between mind and behavior and understand what one experiences when one sees another’s behavior as itself requiring mental state attributions to the other. Some can only see in this proposal a retreat into behaviorism. Others, however, insist that this is not the case—at least if behaviorism is understood as a reductionist thesis. It is not reductionist to hold that behavior is expressive of another’s mental life; genuinely expressive behavior is held to be distinguishable from ‘mere behavior’ (cf. Austin 1946).