 This approach is also evident in Valla’s analysis of the proposition of which a syllogism or argument consists. Propositions are traditionally divided according to quantity (universal of particular) and to quality (affirmative and negative). Quantity and quality are indicated by words that are called signa (markers, signs): “all,” “any,” “not,” “no one,” and so forth. In Book II of the Repastinatio, Valla considers a much wider range of words than the medieval logicians, who had mainly worked with “all,” “some,” “none,” and “no one”. To some extent, his aim is not unlike that of the dialecticians whom he so frequently attacks, that is, to study signs of quality and negation and how they determine the scope of a proposition. But for him there is only one proper method of carrying out such a study: examining carefully the multifarious ways in which these words are used in refined and grammatically correct Latin. Not surprisingly, Valla criticizes the square of contraries—the fourfold classification of statements in which the distinction between universal and particular and that between affirmative and negative are combined. A similar critique of the rather arbitrary restriction to a limited set of words is applied to the scholastic notion of modality (Valla Repastinatio, 1:237–244; 2:491–497; DD 2:126–43). Scholastics usually treat only the following six terms as modals: “possible,” “impossible,” “true,” “false,” “necessary,” and “contingent.” Latin, however, is much more resourceful in expressing modality. Using criteria such as refinement and utility, Valla considers terms such as “likely/unlikely,” “difficult/easy,” “certain/uncertain,” “useful/useless,” “becoming/unbecoming,” and “honorable/dishonorable.” This amounts to introducing a wholly new concept of modality, which comes close to an adverbial qualification of a given action.