 Further criticisms emerge when we attempt to say something informative about what constitutes non-actual knowledge of what is actually the case. If there is such non-actual knowledge, there is non-actual thought about an actual situation. So the non-actual thinker somehow has a concept of an actual situation. But how is it possible for a non-actual thinker to have a concept that is specifically about situations in this the actual world. It will not do for the thinker to express the thought ‘actually \(p\)’, since ‘actually’ will designate rigidly only situations in her own world. Moreover, since there is no causal link between the actual world \(w_1\) and the relevant non-actual world \(w_2\), it is unclear how non-actual thought in \(w_2\) can be uniquely about \(w_1\) (Williamson, 1987a: 257–258). Therefore, it is unclear how there might be non-actual knowledge about what is actually the case.