 Answering these questions in the next section will drive us yet deeper into Spinoza’s modal metaphysics. First, however, Garrett’s account faces an independent worry (Curley and Walski 1999, Huenemann 1999). Return to the relationship between [iii] and [iv]. There is supposed to be a significant difference between the manner in which the collection of finite modes follows from God as a whole and the manner by which any particular member of that collection follows from God. However, if the entire collection of finite modes follows indirectly from God’s absolute nature, won’t that entail that each individual member of the series also follows from God’s absolute nature? Imagine trying to cover the collection of objects on my desk in coffee without making it the case that each object on my desk is covered in coffee. This seems impossible, as there is nothing more to the collection of things on my desk being covered in coffee than each and every thing on my desk being covered in coffee. Even worse, it is hard to see how the entire series of finite modes could have the property following from God’s absolute nature if no member of the series has that property.