The third part (pp. 49–68) serves as an introduction to the detailed and reasoned solution of the problem that Sharpe proposes in the following section. With the exception of the opening pages (49–50), which are devoted to the identification of the entities designated by the term ‘universal’ (see § 5 below), this part consists of an examination of eight opinions on the problem of universals. Most of them are anonymous. Sharpe does not appear to be interested in criticising this or that particular author, but rather in giving an overview of the most important doctrines that have developed on universals since the middle of the 13th century, and thus providing a background against which to situate and characterise his own position. A further confirmation of this attitude is given by the order in which the eight opinions are presented, which is not a chronological but a systematic order. The first opinion (pp. 50–51) – anonymous – is that of Buridan (or of his school). According to Sharpe, this opinion adopts the thesis of the denial of the existence of universals in rerum natura and that of the rejection of simple supposition, even in the anomalous formulation given by Ockham. The second opinion (p. 52), also anonymous, but qualified as very famous, is Ockham’s: universals are signs of things that are naturally produced in our intellect and referring to several individuals at once. The third opinion (p. 55), according to which universals only have esse obiectivum in the soul, is that of Aureol, as Sharpe himself declares. The fourth (p. 58) is that of the moderate realism of the 13th century. According to this view, universal forms exist outside the soul, but only in potency in individuals, and become actually universal by the intervention of our intellect, by means of the process of abstraction. Sharpe attributes its authorship to Averroes and lists Albert the Great and Giles of Rome as its most famous proponents. The fifth opinion (p. 60) is that of Plato, in the traditional formulation given in the Middle Ages: universals exist in things or ex parte rei, and are incorruptible forms completely separate from and independent of their singulars. The sixth (p. 62), anonymous, could be the opinion of Scotus or a Scotist. If it is indeed Scotus, it should be noted that Sharpe does not characterise his position in its generality, but only captures some particular aspects. He reports that, according to the proponents of this view, universals exist ex parte rei and are those forms, signified by the abstract terms of language (such as ‘humanity’), that constitute the very essences of singulars. The seventh opinion (p. 63), anonymous, is Burley’s: universals are the essential forms present in the singulars, from which, however, they are really distinct. The eighth opinion (pp. 65–66), also anonymous, is that of Wyclif, for whom universals (1) exist extra animam and in act in individuals, with whom they are really (realiter) identical and formally (formaliter vel secundum rationem) distinct, and (2) can be signified by concrete terms, such as ‘homo’ (‘human being’), by abstract ones, such as ‘humanitas’ (‘humanity’), by compound expressions, such as ‘homo communis’ (‘universal-man’) or ‘species humana’ (‘human species’), and by infinitive expressions such as ‘hominem esse’ (‘being a man’).