 Candidate \(A\) takes the majority position, agreeing with a majority of the voters on each issue, and candidate \(B\) takes the opposite, minority position. Under the natural assumption that voters will vote for the candidate who agrees with their position on a majority of the issues, candidate \(B\) will win the election (each of the voters 1, 2 and 3 agree with \(B\) on two of the three issues, so \(B\) wins the election 3–2)! This version of the paradox is known as Ostrogorski’s Paradox (Ostrogorski 1902). See Kelly 1989; Rae and Daudt 1976; Wagner 1983, 1984; and Saari 2001, Section 4.6, for analyses of this paradox, and Pigozzi 2005 for the relationship with  	the judgement aggregation literature (List 2013, Section 5).