 Each of these varieties of naturalism has applications in legal philosophy. Within legal philosophy, replacement forms of M-naturalism hold that: (1) conceptual analysis of the concept of law should be replaced by reliance on the best social scientific explanations of legal phenomena, and (2) normative theories of adjudication should be replaced by empirical theories. These views are associated with American Legal Realism and Brian Leiter’s reinterpretation of Realism. Normative M-naturalists, by contrast, inspired and led by Alvin Goldman, seek to bring empirical results to bear on philosophical and foundational questions about adjudication, the legal rules of evidence and discovery, the adversarial process, and so forth. Finally, S-naturalism has featured most prominently in the writings of the Scandinavian Legal Realists (long predating the resurgence of naturalism in Anglophone jurisprudence), whose ontological S-naturalism led them to employ a familiar range of naturalism-motivated explanatory strategies, including naturalistic reduction of legal concepts and non-cognitivist accounts of important aspects of legal discourse. S-naturalism also can serve, and sometimes has served, as a motivation for Legal Positivism in the Anglo-American jurisprudential tradition. More recent forms of S-naturalism, associated with a revival of a kind of natural law theory defended by David Brink and Michael Moore (among others), apply the “new” or “causal” theory of reference to questions of legal interpretation, including the interpretation of moral concepts as they figure in legal rules.