 While the Stoics think that vicious people are responsible for what they do, and that wrongdoing merits censure and punishment, they reject retributive punishment, punishment that seeks to set back a person’s interests as fitting payback for the wrong they have done. Like god, the virtuous person wishes to harm none and to benefit all. We should regard ourselves as akin to all human beings, and we should seek to benefit as many people as we can (Cicero Fin. 3.62–8, LS 57F). Punishment is a fitting response to wrongdoing, but right punishment is rehabilitative, a loving correction of the person punished (Alexander, On fate ch. 35, 207,5–21, LS 62J). The model here is akin to parental discipline. If my sons are squabbling, and one of them angrily hits the other, I might send him to time-out, deprive him of dessert, and ground him for a week. But I do not do so because I want my son to suffer or I think he had it coming to him. Instead, while my son might find the punishment painful, I inflict the punishment because I think that the discipline will be good for him, that it will help him realize that he has done something wrong and that he needs to change himself. In their theory of punishment, as in much of their ethical theory, the Stoics are following the lead of Plato, who also rejects retributive punishment in favor of rehabilitative punishment. (See in particular Protagoras 323d-324d and Gorgias 472d-479e.) Plato, however, rejects retribution in part because he believes that all wrongdoing is due to ignorance of what is good. Hence, he thinks, nobody does wrong willingly, and nobody is deserving of retributive punishment.