 Second, the moral assumptions about promising that the view imports appear questionable. Proponents of the promise-conception endorse what Raz (2014) calls the “bare reasons” of promising. The view entails that an act of promising generates a moral reason to keep one’s promise that is independent of (a) the moral desirability of the promised acts, (b) whether or not the promisee relied on the promise and might be harmed or disappointed by its breach, and (c) the value in having a mechanism that allows us to bind ourselves. Of course, this “bare” reason to keep one’s promise might be overridden by competing considerations. Additionally, a promise may not generate reasons unless certain conditions are satisfied, including conditions related to the promisor’s freedom from coercion (for the legal analogue of this moral requirement, see R2: §175), their capacity to promise (cf. §§14, 15, 16), and the promise’s content falling within certain moral bounds (compare with the illegality doctrine: §178). Still, provided key enabling conditions are met, the promise-conception proposes that even bare promises—promises whose breach will not undermine anyone’s trust or cause any reliance-based harms—generate moral obligations. But it is puzzling why such obligations should arise. The puzzle is clearest if obligations are grounded in people’s interests. It is difficult to say what interest might support the duty to keep a bare promise, since the ordinary interests that might be in play—associated with reliance and expectations—have been excluded by construction. Thoughts like these led David Hume to worry that promissory obligations purport to “arise[] from our mere will and pleasure” and to compare such obligations to the mystery of transubstantiation, insofar as both involve intentions that purport to “change[] entirely the nature of an external object, and even of a human creature” (A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. III, Pt. 2, Ch. v).