 Of course, the notion of a just politics has meant different things according to the form the State takes, whether totalitarian, authoritarian, or  liberal.[44]  Given his evocations of a pluralist or multilayered existence in Totality and Infinity (TI: 19, 80, 306), Levinas’ argument that justice is marked by the trace of responsibility seems to accord relatively well with liberal theories of political justice and sovereignty. As is well known, Anglo-American theorists of sovereignty and politics emphasize that individuals live in multiple social associations, which impose a host of responsibilities on them. A pluralistic socio-political existence diminishes the emphasis on sovereignty as concentrated in the State alone. Be that as it may, Levinas’ notion of a trace of responsibility within justice does not explain how other people, not just I, can be said to be ethically “invested” by responsibility. That I receive justice from them thus remains “thanks to God”. Moreover, what is true of ethical systems may well be true of political ones. That is, following his comprehensive comparison of Levinas’ philosophy with contemporary theories of ethics, Morgan admits: 