 The maximin proportionate gain solution, on the other hand, is both individually and population monotone, but is not reapplication stable. While the proportional solution is individually monotone, population monotone, and reapplication stable, but not scale invariant. Ultimately, then, much like  Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem  and related results have cast doubt on whether there exist uniquely best procedures for aggregating preferences or making collective decisions, there is not a single solution concept for bargaining problems that is clearly best. That said, the application of bargaining theory to philosophical analyses of the social contract has been useful insofar as it has provided a framework for illustrating what features of a social contract a theorist regards as valuable, and for identifying what the tradeoffs associated with these features might be. So, for example, one might conjecture that the reapplication stability properties associated with the Nash and proportional solution concepts would allow a social contract based upon one of them to be better suited to forestalling conflict in the face of social change. This is because such a contract would be renegotiation-proof with respect to changes in the benefits of cooperation that might arise in the future, e.g., as a result of an influx of new members in society or the discovery of new technologies for resource development. But this stability would have to come at the price of either using a privileged representation of agent’s payoffs, or accepting that the parties to the contract will not necessarily be made better off if they are given more to bargain over. And while this tradeoff may ultimately be justified, the important point is that any tradeoff the contract theorist makes commits her to a certain set of normative judgments, and game theory can help clarify what these are. For instance, many game theoretically minded philosophers have contended that any account that privileges certain representations of agents’ utilities cannot avoid incorporating certain moral judgments into these utilities (Sen 1980; Moehler 2018).