 Consider, then, an act A that is performed at a possible world w and yields at w positive but low wellbeing levels for one or more people who will but do not yet exist at w. Suppose that wellbeing levels are low in virtue of the fact that act A performed at w causes those people to endure pain, misery, disease, deprivation or limitation. And suppose that those low wellbeing levels cannot be justified (on the ground, for example, that they save many existing people from still lower wellbeing levels) and that we are accordingly convinced that act A is wrong. Kavka’s precariousness-of-existence point tells us that in many such cases the very future people – call them the “A-people” – who endure low wellbeing levels also “owe their very existence” to that act A. Perhaps an act B existed as an alternative for the agents at the time just prior to choice. And perhaps B strikes us as more benign than A in the sense that B would have yielded higher wellbeing levels for whatever future people may happen to have existed had B been performed in place of A. The problem is that in many cases – and it takes just one to produce the relevant problem case, the counterexample against the person-based intuition – performing B in place of A would also have changed (or very probably would have changed) the timing and manner of the conceptions that take place at w. That means that act B would not have made things better for the A-people but rather would have caused the A-people – each and every one of them – to have (very probably) been left out of existence altogether. The pain, misery and so on that A imposes on the A-people is, in other words, unavoidable if those particular people are ever to exist at all. The same point holds for any other seemingly more benign act as well. Assuming that the A-people are not so miserable that never existing at all would have been better for them than their existence in w in fact is, we now find it very hard to see how A has harmed, or made things worse for, or been bad for, the A-people in any “morally relevant way” (Parfit 1987, 361–63, 374).