 As is well known, the distinction between concepts and intuition is also fundamental to Kant’s thought. Whereas intuitions are singular, immediate representations, concepts are general, mediate ones (Engstrom 2006). Each item represents properties, objects, or states of affairs, but they do so distinctly. Unfortunately, there is no consensus on the right way to understand this  idea.[4]But  roughly speaking, intuition represents some X—where X might be an object, a property, or perhaps even an event—as one represents X in perception. Thus it represents X as, for instance, that  there.[5]In  contrast, a concept represents X—where, again, X might be a property, an object, or perhaps even an event—by placing X within one or more classes. Suppose that I want to represent my desk, at which I am sitting right now. To represent my desk in intuition is to represent it as something I point to, as that there. This does not indicate, of course, that this is a desk, my desk, a piece of furniture, made of wood, etc., but it does pick out a particular, something with a spatial location relative to me and to other things (like the carpet on the floor). It does so immediately at least in the sense that it makes use of no other representation. To represent my desk with a concept is to represent it as a desk, or as a piece of furniture, or as a wooden thing, etc. From Kant’s point of view, this is to represent my desk mediately at least in the sense that the concept, &lt;desk&gt;, represents an object through other concepts, such as  &lt;furniture&gt;.[6]  It is also important to remember that in representing my desk through intuition, i.e., in representing it as a thing with some spatial location but not yet qua desk, I am perceiving the desk but not judging it to be a desk (or anything else). In order to judge that there is a desk in front of me, or indeed, in order to judge that there is something in front of me, I require concepts and the complex machinery discussed in the famous Transcendental Deduction, a key section of the Critique that arrives after the arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic have been presented. Intuition alone is akin to perception--it plays a role in judgment, but it is not itself akin to  judgment.[7]