 Many authors note that the challenges of stability must be addressed not only by institutional design, but also by ensuring that citizens have an ‘overarching loyalty’ or ‘federal spirit’ to the federation as whole in addition to loyalty toward their own member unit (Franck 1968, Linz 1997, Burgess 2012). The legitimate bases, content and division of such a public dual allegiance are central topics of political philosophies of federalism (Norman 1995a, Choudhry 2001). Some accept (limited) appeals to considerations such as shared history, practices, culture, or ethnicity for delineating member units and placing certain powers with them, even if such ‘communitarian’ features are regarded as more problematic bases for (unitary) political orders (Kymlicka 1995, Habermas 1996, 500). Debates about the existence of a ‘European demos’ and the need for a common ‘European identity’ merit more careful scrutiny (Habermas 1992). The appropriate consideration that voters and their member unit politicians should give to the interests of others in the federation in interlocking arrangements must be clarified if the notion of citizen of two commonwealths is to be coherent and durable. Several of these challenges are especially acute for ‘ethnic federalism’ when the member units are delineated along ethnic lines: Any ‘internal minorities’ of other ethnicity risk persecution, the prospects of an overarching loyalty are dimmer, and ethnic nationalism may fuel secessionist movements (Selassie 2003)