 The days of bioethics conceived of as high theory were short lived, however, and the reasons plentiful. For starters, there is the question of which moral theory should prevail. Even if one has no problem choosing a moral theory in the first place, one is bound to have difficulty in successfully defending that choice of theory against its alternatives (Magelssen, Pedersen, &amp; Førde 2016: 27). The intractability of the debates between utilitarians and deontologists, say, should give anyone pause when staking out her positions on bioethical matters with the guidance of her preferred moral theory. This is one thing for the academic bioethicist. But it is quite another for the clinical ethicist (for instance) to attempt to settle the moral matter at hand through recourse to (say) Kant’s categorical imperative. Not only is she likely to be surrounded by non-philosophers (where recourse to the intricacies of such high flying moral theory is liable to fall flat), but we must ask why the public to whom she might be accountable should be subject to her preference for Kantianism. The same would hold true for the bioethicist working in the public policy arena.