  For yet another approach, which denies that Vaihinger has or needs a general account of how contradictory fictions can be fruitful, see (Fine 1993, 9–11). On this reading, Vaihinger is interested only in surveying actual scientific practice, and revealing that, as a matter of fact, it does make fruitful use of real fictions; the question of how this is possible is beside the point. There is something to this characterization of Vaihinger’s procedure, which trades more in examples than in general pronouncements. However, it will also be difficult for proponents of this reading to explain passages like these: “This purpose [of thought] can only be that of facilitating conceptual activity, of effecting a safe and rapid connection of sensations. What we have to show, therefore, is how fictional methods and constructs render this possible” (PAO 52, emphasis added); “the philosophy of as if shows that and why these false and contradictory representations are still useful” (1921a, 532, emphasis added). Here, Vaihinger seems to indicate that his purpose is not just to enumerate instances of useful fictions, but to explain how and why they are useful.