 Note that, just as with some of the examples considered in  §12,  this conclusion does not seem to follow on the pure setting interpretation of the interventionist account. One can, after all, set up an equation \(Y = X\) with a candidate variable \(X\), taking the values 0 and 1, according to whether some object is a kitten or lizard and a candidate effect variable \(Y\), taking the values 0 and 1 according to whether that object is warm-blooded or cold-blooded. Then setting \(X\) to 0 rather than 1 changes whether \(Y= 0\) or 1, and if this is sufficient for causation, being a kitten rather than a lizard causes warmbloodiness rather than coldbloodiness. If one thinks, that there is something defective or problematic about these causal claims, this requires, within an interventionist framework, a richer conception of what is required for causation than what is suggested by the setting conception of intervention. A similar point applies to the other examples described in this section. 