 There are three things here: the nature in the particular, the haecceity, and the particular itself. Each of these is numerically one (and thus numerically distinct from the corrrelative items in any other particular). The haecceity is ‘primarily’ numerically one, because its numerical unity is a basic feature of its. The particular is per se numerically one because it includes the component in virtue of which it is numerically one. The nature in the particular is denominatively numerically one. Denominative predication obtains in the case that the predicate is true of the subject as the result of the subject’s possession of some further, accidental, feature. Thus, qualifying the predication as “denominative” in this way does not make the predication any less real. Being accidentally numerically one is a case of being numerically one, not of being non-numerically one, and what Scotus is really trying to say is that the nature in this particular is indeed really (though accidentally) numerically one. Note that the denominative numerical singularity of the nature in the particular is still compatible with the common nature’s being numerically one in some other particular, and this is because the nature in itself (not as in this or that particular) is less-than-numerically one (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 34 (Scotus [OO], 7:404–405; Spade (1994), 64)).