 Although there are few explicit and systematic treatments of hope (elpis) in ancient Greek philosophies, they nevertheless contain important approaches to the nature of hope and its role in the good life and practical deliberation (Gravlee 2020). Ambivalent evaluations of hope can be found in many texts. On the one hand, hope is often seen as an attitude of those who have insufficient knowledge or are easily swayed by wishful thinking. It thus has a negative reputation (Vogt 2017) as an attitude that (at least potentially) misleads actions and agents. Even Solon focuses on empty hopes (see Lewis 2006: 85; Caston and Kaster 2016). On the other hand, hope is praised as a response to despair, e.g., in the dialogues of Thucydides, who advances a nuanced view of the potential dangers and advantages of hope (Schlosser 2013). An ambivalent evaluation of hope is also reflected in Hesiod’s version of the tale of Pandora. When all the evils had escaped from Pandora’s jar, famously, only hope (elpis) remained (“Works and Days”, §90). This seems to suggest that hope can also sustain human agency in the face of widespread evil. It must be noted, however, that there are many competing interpretations of why elpis remained in the jar (Verdenius 1985): Was it to keep hope available for humans or, rather, to keep hope from humankind? Is hope consequently to be regarded as good (“a comfort to man in his misery and a stimulus rousing his activity”, Verdenius 1985: 66) or as evil (“idle hope in which the lazy man indulges when he should be working honestly for his living”, Verdenius 1985: 66)? These different interpretations of Pandora’s myth are taken up throughout the history of Philosophy (especially among existentialist authors, see  section 2.5).