 Scotus’s modal metaphysics incorporates many ideas similar to those in the early medieval model developed by Abelard and the nominales, such as the denial of the necessity of the present, the distinction between immutability and necessity and the universal validity of bivalence. Giving up the Thomistic view of the atemporal presence of the flux of time to God, Scotus explains God’s knowledge of the truth-value of future contingent propositions as his knowing which of the possible scenarios will be actual and which will not (Lectura I.39.1–5, 44). The definite truth-values of the propositions about possible future events do not make them necessary, many of these being acts of the will which as a free cause chooses between alternatives without being determined. (See Vos et al. 1994; Söder 1999; for some discussions of Scotus’s view of the free acts of the will, see Dumont 2001; Normore 2003: 141–145; Langston 2010.) 