 Does the principle of double effect explain the permissibility of switching a runaway trolley away from a track with five people on it and onto a track containing only one person? This is an alleged application of Double Effect in which it seems clear to many people that if one were to switch the trolley, the harm to the one person would not be intended as part of one’s means of diverting the trolley from the five. Of course, if the harm to the one is rightly described as a merely foreseen side effect of switching the trolley, then this alone does not show that it is permissible to cause it. However, if the proportionality condition is satisfied, and if the agent attempts to minimize the harm or to identify alternative means of saving the five and fails, then these factors together might seem to imply that the principle of double effect can be invoked to explain the permissibility of switching the trolley. Moreover, Double Effect seems to explain the impermissibility of pushing someone onto the track in front of the speeding trolley in order to stop it and protect the five on the track ahead. In both scenarios, a person would be killed as part of saving the five; the difference in permissibility seems to depend on whether the death of that person is a means or a side effect of saving them.