 Sympathy allows us better to understand others’ needs, helps us to communicate our concern for them, and can act as an additional incentive to facilitate our promotion of our happiness helping others. Such sensibly-grounded feelings can work with rationally-grounded feelings to motivate action. We may cultivate sympathetic feelings from respect for the law, and then find these feelings prompting us to act in certain ways. In this context, where the focus is on virtue, Kant sounds closer to Hume than he is often taken to be. Indeed, according to one prominent interpretation, careful consideration of this and other relevant material highlights at least a few “deep affinities” between Kant on Hume on motivation and practical reason (Guyer 2008: 164). Yet the affinities should not be overstated. Kant’s view of sympathy is appreciative but wary, and sympathy for him does not play the prominent role it plays for Hume. (On Kant’s view of the upsides and downsides of sympathy, see Sorensen 2018. Cf. Sayre-McCord 2015 on sympathy’s role in Hume’s theory of moral judgment.)