 A second version of eliminativism is associated with Peter van Inwagen (1990), who defends the view that living objects are the only composite objects. This view is closely related to nihilism, but has one notable advantage—it allows for the existence of human persons. For example, in the case of Dion and Theon, van Inwagen will say that Dion exists at the beginning of the story, since the activity of the relevant simples constitutes a life (the life of Dion). But van Inwagen will deny that Theon exists, for the activity of the relevant simples only constitutes a part of Dion’s life at that time. Of course, the activity of those same simples constitutes a life after Dion’s right foot is removed, at which point the simples come to compose Dion. More generally, van Inwagen denies the existence of what he calls “arbitrary undetached parts”: