 A similar suggestion concerning cognitive penetrability and its potential impact on the nonconceptual status of the penetrated states is explored by Macpherson (2012, 2015). One of her favorite examples comes from Delk &amp; Fillenbaum (1965), who demonstrate that familiarity with exemplars of a standardly colored category, e.g., familiarity with (red) apples or (yellow) bananas, influences the perceived color of instances of that category. In a more recent study, Hansen et al. (2006) obtained the same effect by presenting subjects with a picture of a banana on a uniform grey background and asking them to adjust the color of the fruit until it appears grey. Their results show that “…subjects adjusted the banana to a slightly bluish hue--its opponent color--in order for it to appear neutral gray. At the point where the banana was actually achromatic, at the origin of the color space, it still appeared yellowish.”(p. 1367) In this case, it appears that one’s knowledge of bananas ‘penetrates’ one’s experience of bananas. She calls this form of cognitive penetration, cognitive penetration ‘lite’, where possession of some concepts may causally influence the type of experience one undergoes. Yet she argues that in these cases, though the token-experience of the banana’s color is influenced by one’s prior knowledge – one undergoes a deeper yellow type of experience – it is an experience-type that one who does not have concepts pertaining to such colors can nonetheless undergo.