 On this conception of divine attributes, Albalag examines Avicenna’s theory of divine knowledge, as reproduced by al-Ghazali in the Maqāṣid, according to which “God knows particulars in a universal fashion” (Maqāṣid: 118). Avicenna’s theory of divine knowledge has been subject to different interpretations (Marmura 1962: 299–312; Adamson 2005: 257–278; Belo 2006: 177–199). For Albalag, it simply means that God’s knowledge is universal. Since this way of articulating divine knowledge implies a correspondence between divine and human knowledge, Albalag naturally rejects it and scolds al-Ghazali for diffusing improper doctrines about God. In opposition, he insists that God’s knowledge is opposite in characteristics, not merely superior in rank, to human knowledge: it is neither particular nor universal, it is atemporal, indivisible, absolutely actual and self-sufficient, being exclusively dependent on the mode of self-intellection which is peculiar to God and separate intellects (Tiqqun n.42:  76).