 As these criticisms indicate, Kant’s mature thinking vehemently rejects sentimentalism’s approach to the foundation of morality. Yet the influence of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume lingered long after Kant came to believe that morality’s true foundation lies in the autonomy of the will. In his notes, Kant remarks that while moral sense theories cannot justify our moral judgments, or provide the standards that should guide them, such theories do offer compelling empirical explanations of how we actually judge action (NF 19:117 #6626). In the same vein, he suggests that even if one rejects moral sense “as a principle for the judgment of moral action,” one might still accept it as a theory “of the mind’s incentives to morality” (M 29:625). Kant also continues to endorse some version of his earlier claim in Observations that some of our feelings indicate a “susceptibility of the soul which… makes it fit for virtuous impulses” (OFBS 2:208). We see this in the Metaphysics of Morals, for instance, where Kant claims that moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and self-respect all “lie at the basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty” (MM 6:399; see Guyer 2010). The lingering influence of sentimentalism can also be seen in his emphasis on the obligation to “sympathize actively” with others, and in the claim that we have “an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural (aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them…. For this [compassion] is still one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish” (MM 6:457).