 Philosophers of religion are a half-exception to the rule. They did and do continue to speak of evil, at least when discussing the “problem” thereof. (See the entry on  the problem of evil.) If pressed, though, they typically admit that this is because the great framers of the problem—Augustine, Aquinas, Leibniz, Bayle—used the term (in Latin or French), and then proceed to gloss it generically as, in Michael Tooley’s words, “any undesirable states of affairs” (2002 [2019]). Philosophers of religion in the broadly Continental tradition are less likely to assimilate evil to more general or anodyne notions in this way, and more likely to discuss the nature of evil as opposed to the “problem” it raises for theism (e.g., Kearney 2001 and Matuštík 2008).