 One early hypothesis (R.A. Wilson: 2005: 74–79) is that the function of these metaphors is to crystallize agency, bringing about a focus on the causal agency of biological individuals by assimilating them to our paradigm of agents, human agents. This crystallization thesis forms part of Wilson’s tripartite view of organismic living agents (R.A. Wilson 2005: ch.3) that draws on the homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds (Boyd 1999, R.A. Wilson, Barker, &amp; Brigandt 2007). A second view is that the cognitive metaphor applies when behaviors and processes are goal-directed, behavior is flexible, and there is exhibition of adaptation, and the metaphor earns it keep through the parallels between rational choice theory and evolutionary theorizing (Okasha 2018). Okasha is concerned to articulate the scope and limits of the cognitive metaphor in evolutionary biology, taking organisms as his paradigm agents. A third view is that the use of psychological predication of the activities of cells, neurons, and bodily systems is not metaphorical but should be taken literally (Figdor 2018). Figdor’s literalism is a response to what she views as an anthropocentric perspective that assumes that human cognition is the standard against which other uses of psychological ascriptions should be judged. Finally, a fourth view is that appeals to the nature of subjectivity and point of view are key here (Godfrey-Smith 2019; see also Godfrey-Smith 2016c). Godfrey-Smith takes understanding the evolution of subjectivity to be central to advancing responses to “explanatory gap” arguments in the philosophy of mind, implying the graduated nature of cognition itself.