 The Stoics say that actions like my seeking treatment for cancer, which are brought about by fate through the animal, are “in the power” of the animal, but they deny that we are free to choose between opposite actions—seeking treatment or not seeking treatment (Alexander, On Fate ch 13, 181,13–182,20, LS 62G). The Stoics believe Carneades is wrong to think that we need such a power to choose between opposite actions in order to stave off the fatalist argument and avoid its conclusion that the future is inevitable and we are powerless to do anything to shape it. Even if my action of seeking treatment is causally determined, and I do not have the ability not to seek treatment, seeking treatment can still lead to the cure of my cancer, a cure that would not have happened if I had not sought treatment. Like Aristotle, who was not willing to give up the idea that we effectively deliberate about our actions, the Stoics posit that I can effectively and rationally deliberate about what to do, even if the outcome of my deliberation and the actions that result from it are both causally determined. If I am in an unclear situation, considering the pros and cons of various actions is rational and will likely lead to a better decision than acting impulsively. Consider an example where I am offered a job, and I think things through before deciding to accept it. I had to go through the process of deliberation to reach that fated outcome; it’s no more true that I would have accepted the job whether or not I deliberated about the offer than it is that I would have recovered from cancer whether or not I sought treatment. So in the original fatalist argument, the Stoics would reject the premise that if it is true from eternity that an event will occur, then that event is necessary, in the sense of inevitable or beyond our power to effect, and they also reject Carneades’ assertion that events that have been causally determined from eternity are necessary in that sense.