 Not only is the theodicy used to explain the kinds of error God can allow, it serves to clarify the kinds of error God cannot allow. From the latter arises a proof of the C&amp;D Rule. God can allow errors that are my fault, but not errors that would be God’s fault. On occasions when my perception is clear and distinct, my assent is involuntary and thus not a result of a misuse of my freewill. In such cases, assent is a necessary consequence of my cognitive nature – a point made in many passages, as we’ve seen: “our mind is of such a nature that it cannot help assenting to what it clearly understands” (AT 3:64, CSMK 147). Since, on occasions of clarity and distinctness, my assent is the unavoidable consequence of my God-given cognitive nature, God would properly get the blame if those judgments resulted in error. Therefore, they are not in error; indeed they could not be. That an evil genius might have created me casts doubt on my clear and distinct judgments. That, instead, an all-perfect God created me guarantees that these judgments are true. A clever strategy of argument thus unfolds – effectively inverting the usual reasoning in the problem of evil: