 The claim that when one genuinely perceives the world one is directly aware of mind-independent objects and their features is not distinctive of the naïve realist account. For example, someone who holds an intentionalist account of experience can also accept this claim. According to this view our perceptual experiences are mental states with intentional contents that represent the world as being a certain way, and when one has an experience with a veridical content, in the right circumstances, one is directly aware of mind-independent objects in one’s environment. (Advocates of such intentionalist accounts of experience include Searle (1983), Harman (1990), Tye (1992, 1995, and 2000), Burge (1993 and 2010), Dretske (1995), Byrne (2001), and Pautz (2010)). Many have argued that this sort of theory can adequately accommodate the phenomenological aspects of experience that a naïve realist might point to—e.g., the apparent presence to mind of mind-independent objects and their features—without being committed to the idea that hallucinations fail to have the phenomenal character that they introspectively seem to have.