  To recap the argument thus far: it is the function of evaluative  judgments like “I ought to do a” to guide  conduct. Guiding conduct means entailing an answer to the question  “What shall I do?” An answer to that question will take  the form “Let me do a,” where this is a  first-person command or imperative. Therefore evaluative judgments  entail such first-person imperatives (Hare 1952, p. 192).  Now in general, if judgment J1 entails judgment  J2, then assenting to J1 must involve assenting to J2: someone who professed to assent to J1 but who disclaimed  J2 would be held not to have spoken correctly  when he claimed to assent to J1 (Hare 1952,  p. 172). So assenting to an evaluative judgment like “I  ought to do a” involves assenting to the first-person  command “Let me do a” (Hare 1952,  pp. 168–9). We should inquire, then, what exactly is  involved in sincerely assenting to a first-person command or  imperative of this type. Just as sincere assent to a statement  involves believing that statement, sincere assent to an  imperative addressed to ourselves involves doing the thing  in question: