  The motivation for adopting an FA theory becomes clearer when one moves from a single case, especially the paradigmatic good of pleasure, to other good things. Consider a plausible list of intrinsic values: pleasure, beauty, friendship, and knowledge. Though this isn't monistic hedonism, it's a very modest pluralism on which there are four distinct goods instead of one. Someone might wonder what these things have in common, in virtue of which they are good. Of course there may be no answer, if it is just a brute fact that there are four intrinsic goods, which resemble each other simply in having the property of goodness. But another sort of response suggests itself. Perhaps what unifies these goods is something about human attitudes. Maybe pleasure, knowledge, beauty, and friendship are all desirable or admirable things, where this means not that we can desire or admire them but that we should (ought, have reason to) do so, in virtue of facts about human nature, the inherent qualities of those attitudes, and natural facts about the objects. Were we lone but rational wolves, we would have no use—and hence no fitting desire—for the friendship of other wolves, and no reason to admire lupine loyalty or the other traits requisite for friendship. Hence the response-dependency thesis makes values anthropocentric, in that they depend on human capacities and dispositions, and would be of no inherent interest to rational beings who lacked those propensities. If this seems problematic with respect to good and bad, it may seem much more plausible when it comes to the funny and the shameful.