 In the second edition of his History, the claims quoted in the previous paragraph have been removed. After giving a brief summary of Kant’s appeal to a “fact of reason” and his argument for freedom, Lange does not go on to suggest that Kant may be making the mistake of all metaphysicians. Rather, he writes: “So far Kant’s doctrine of freedom is perfectly clear and—apart from the question of the a priority of the moral law—invulnerable” (Lange 1873–75, 2:229). What follows is a new discussion of Kant’s conception of our freedom and worries about our freedom being apparently restricted only to the noumenal realm. Lange does return to declarations in favour of constructing ideals, but gives no further explanation of how we are supposed to find ethical ends, or a moral law, that guides the construction of these ideals, nor, for that matter, what problem in specific lies behind the above mentioned “question of the a priority of the moral law” (Lange 1873–75).