 The implications drawn from these experiments have been criticized on several grounds. In some cases, there are technical criticisms of methods or statistical analyses (see Dennett, 1991 for critique of Libet’s conclusions, and S. Walter’s 2014 discussion of the Wegner and Wheatley (1999) experiment). The force of the work led by Haynes is mitigated by the fact that predictions of behavior from several seconds before its occurrence, while statistically significant, are far from perfect. Many other points have been made (see Nahamias, 2008; Mele, 2014; Shepherd, 2017; Baumeister et al., 2018). Two basic criticisms are offered by many writers. First, many of the experimental conditions involve meaningless setups (ouija-like boards, for example) or meaningless decisions (e.g., when to move a finger or which of two buttons to press) that bear little resemblance to real-life decisions (e.g., whether to accept a job, or go to a particular place for a vacation) where people bring substantive reasons and personal preferences to bear. These oddities and simplifications may be thought to render ineffective psychological mechanisms that would be operative in more realistic cases and that would forestall illusions about the relation between our consciously entertained reasons and our behavior. Second, the fact that there are some cases in which unconscious influences have a noticeable effect on our behavior does not show that we are never, or even not usually, acting in a manner that would be rational, given our particular longstanding beliefs and preferences.