 Frege (1884 [1980], §§5,88) and others noted a number of problems with Kant’s “containment” metaphor. In the first place, as Kant (1787 [1998], B756) himself would surely have agreed, the criterion would need to be freed of “psychologistic” suggestions, or claims about merely the accidental thought processes of thinkers, as opposed to claims about truth and justification that are presumably at issue with the analytic. In particular, mere associations are not always matters of meaning: many people in thinking about Columbus may automatically think “the discoverer of America,” or in thinking about the number 7 they “can’t help but also think” about the numeral that denotes it, but it’s certainly not analytic that Columbus discovered America, or that a number is identical with a numeral. Moreover, while it may be arguably analytic that a circle is a closed figure of constant curvature (see Katz, 1972), someone could fail to notice this and so think the one without the other.