 Several European thinkers who were influenced in one way or another by concepts of the phenomenological movement, but were not necessarily members of the movement, became dissatisfied with the alleged solipsistic standpoint of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in the Formal and Transcendental Logic. Ortega was one of these thinkers, although he did not explicitly express any dissatisfaction with what he perceived as the solipsistic implications of the transcendental idealism in the latter work until twelve years later. As indicated earlier, Husserl expressed dissatisfaction as well in his Crisis, saying that his transcendental epoché may have been misread by others. Indeed, Husserl insisted that his efforts attempted to point away from the solipsistic path of the “Cartesian way”. In two lectures delivered at the Sorbonne in 1929, Husserl introduced ideas which transformed his earlier position on transcendental phenomenology from a world of isolated ideas into a world community of intersubjective individuals. The observations and insights made in the lectures were amplified later in his Cartesian Meditations (1933) and Crisis. In these later writings, Descartes’ ego lost its abstract, absolute status as it became correlative to the world of experience (1933 [1964: 1–8, 157]; 1936 [1970: 154–55, 188, 257–63]). In his Notes on Thinking (1941), Ortega found Husserl’s approach to the problem of genesis of reason to be “tantamount to being absolute”, particularly where Husserl expounded his “genetic phenomenology” as “consciousness of” reality, thereby designating “consciousness of itself” as being “immediate to itself”. He criticized further the analysis and definitions of reason given by Husserl in Formal and Transcendental Logic as not incorporating “the themes of humanity, life and the functional character of reason”. Accordingly, “the phenomenological attitude as formulated in Formal and Transcendental Logic is diametrically opposed to the attitude that I call living reason”. He opposed this tendency toward transcendental idealism in Formal and Transcendental Logic but refused to completely reject phenomenology (Obras, V: 545).