 One sort of phenomenological argument appeals to the difference between experiences of regret and remorse. Assume (along with those who marshal this argument) that it makes sense to regret finding oneself in circumstances involving difficult moral choices, while it makes sense to feel remorse about having acted wrongly. Suppose, then, that in the past a co-worker had intervened to save your job from a vindictive administrator who unjustly wanted you fired for personal reasons not related to how well you did your job. Now, some years later you both find yourselves in new positions. You are asked by a supervisor your opinion of your co-worker’s suitability for their current position and your honest opinion is that they are not suitable. On Ross’s ethical theory, both the prima facie duty of gratitude and the prima facie duty of fidelity apply to this situation and one must choose which of them is most stringent in these particular circumstances. Suppose you choose to answer truthfully about your colleague’s job performance. Besides the regret you feel about finding yourself in this difficult situation, on Ross’s view, whichever choice you make, it is fitting for you to feel some remorse for not having complied with the prima facie duty of gratitude, which was in force when you made your decision. By contrast, on a monist theory like hedonistic utilitarianism where the only right-making feature of actions is their utility, it is not fitting to feel remorse if being truthful in this circumstance brings about a higher degree of utility than lying. In choosing to truthfully express one’s opinion, one does not leave undone a duty that was in force, even if overridden. Thus, on a monistic view, the conflict is only apparent, while on a pluralist view it is genuine. The argument, then, is that a pluralist view accommodates people’s experiences of remorse (not mere regret) in such circumstances, thus making sense of agonizing moral decisions (as Michael Gill 2012 labels such cases) as they are normally experienced (see also McNaughton 1988: chap. 13).