 That Jayarāśi postdates Akalaṅka is evident also from the fact that, in his Ascertainment of Perfection (Siddhi-viniścaya), Akalaṅka refers to ‘heretics’ (nāstika) and to the materialist tradition, which maintains that the world is composed of the four elements, but at the same time accepts only one valid cognitive procedure (pramāṇa), namely perception (pratyakṣa), not even inference (anumāna), and therefore cannot demonstrate such element-based structure of the universe, or alternatively entertains a possibility that there are no valid cognitive procedures at all (pramāṇâbhāva) or finds problems with defining what perception is (pramāṇa-lakṣaṇânupapatti; SVi 4.12, p. 272.3–5). These are clearly the forerunners of the ideas elaborated by Jayarāśi, however at the time of Akalaṅka they are still in an undeveloped form, and clearly the Jaina philosopher does not refer to Jayarāśi. However, his commentator Anantavīrya (SViṬ, p. 277.6–278.22) immediately recognizes in these nascent ideas the elaborated system of Jayarāśi, retroactively projecting them onto Akalaṅka’s passage, and refers to Jayarāśi and his treatise by name.