 An alternative utilitarian response to the claim that utilitarianism conflicts with certain ordinary moral judgments is to dismiss these judgments as pre-theoretical views—whether they are referred to as “intuitions” or “considered judgments” that probably result from cultural indoctrination and thus reflect superstition, bias, and mere historical accident. On this view, neither moral intuitions nor judgments should have evidentiary credentials and should play no role in moral theory construction or justification. Indeed, the prominent 20th-Century utilitarians Richard Brandt (Brandt 1979) and Richard Hare (Hare 1973) argued against Rawls, simply making “coherent” a set of beliefs that have no “initial credibility” cannot produce justification, since coherent fictions are still only fictions. Indeed, the conditional that Rawls describes under the process that we solicit considered moral judgments, namely that people be calm and have adequate information about the cases, do not by themselves do anything to assuage the utilitarian worries. Brandt (Brandt 1990) reaffirms his early criticism when he claims that considered judgments lack “evidential force” regarding a moral order and therefore coherence in reflective equilibrium has only a kind of persuasiveness that comes from coherence among many elements being more convincing than the conviction that comes from any of its parts.