 Such a definition may be extensionally accurate, and many philosophers would not hesitate to endorse it. But others have doubted that it captures what it \(is\) for a proposition to be nomically necessary (Fine 2002). Nomic necessity is a special modal status enjoyed by all and only the propositions that are metaphysically necessitated by the natural laws. Now, if \(P\) is metaphysically necessitated by the laws without itself being a law, then it may seem plausible to say, in some sense, that \(P\) has that special modal status because \(P\) is metaphysically necessitated by the laws. But the reason why being metaphysically necessitated by the laws confers that special modal status on \(P\) is presumably that the laws themselves have that modal status and that this modal status gets transmitted across metaphysical necessitation. But if we now ask what makes it so that the laws themselves have that special modal status, (7) does not seem to give us the correct answer: the special necessity of the laws doesn’t consist in the fact that they are metaphysically necessitated by the laws. Hence, (7) cannot be a correct general account of what constitutes that special modal status.