 A standard example is plurality rule: here, for any profile \(\langle R_1, R_2 , \ldots ,R_n\rangle\) and any \(x, y \in X\), \(xRy\) if and only if \(|\{i \in N\) : for all \(z \ne x\), \(xP_i z\}| \ge |\{i \in N\) : for all \(z \ne y\), \(yP_i z\}|.\) Informally, alternatives are socially ranked in the order of how many individuals most prefer each of them. Plurality rule avoids Condorcet’s paradox, but runs into other problems. Most notably, an alternative that is majority-dispreferred to every other alternative may win under plurality rule: if 34% of the voters rank \(x\) above \(y\) above \(z, 33\)% rank \(y\) above \(z\) above \(x\), and 33% rank \(z\) above \(y\) above \(x\), plurality rule ranks \(x\) above each of \(y\) and \(z\), while pairwise majority voting would rank \(y\) above \(z\) above \(x\) (\(y\) is the Condorcet winner). By disregarding individuals’ lower-ranked alternatives, plurality rule also violates the weak Pareto principle. However, plurality rule may be plausible in ‘restricted informational environments’, where the balloting procedure collects information only about voters’ top preferences, not about their full preference rankings (Goodin and List 2006).