 In his later work, Political Liberalism (Rawls 1993), Rawls abandons the suggestion that all people might converge in the same, shared wide reflective equilibrium that contains his conception of justice. This important change comes about because of what Rawls calls “the burdens of judgment.” Complexity, uncertainty, and variation in experience lead human reason, when exercised under conditions of freedom, of the sort protected by the principles of justice as fairness, to an unavoidable pluralism of comprehensive moral and philosophical views. (The need to find agreement in the form of an overlapping consensus of views arises domestically under conditions of liberty and the burdens of judgment and is evidenced further by the different perspectives that we might get from a global view of issues.) This unavoidable fact of reasonable pluralism makes one key feature of justice as fairness untenable, namely the account Rawls gave of the stability of his preferred conception of justice. A further feature of Rawls's late work is his clear eschewal of any account of truth, so the fact that wide equilibrium is offered as an account of justification, not truth, makes it compatible with the refusal to discuss moral truth (see Little 1984).