 Byrne (2001) and Thau (2002) appeal to the notion of the way the world seems to a subject. Very briefly, as Byrne puts it: “if the way the world seems to him hasn’t changed, then it can’t be that the phenomenal character of his experience has changed” (p. 207), where by “phenomenal character” in the context Byrne means sensory qualities. Suppose a subject has two consecutive experiences that differ in qualitative character. If she is “competent” in the sense of having no cognitive shortcomings (in particular, her memory is in good working order) and is slightly idealized in one or two other ways, she will notice the change in qualitative character. If so, Byrne argues, the way things seems to her when she has the second experience must differ from the way they seemed to her while she was having the first. For suppose that consecutive experiences are the same in content. Then the world seems exactly the same to the subject during both. She “has no basis for” noticing a change in qualitative character either, and by the previous premise it follows that there was no change in qualitative character (p. 211). The argument generalizes in each of several natural ways, and Byrne concludes that experiences cannot differ in qualitative character without differing in representational content.