 Even if it is true that we routinely rely on abductive reasoning, it may still be asked whether this practice is rational. For instance, experimental studies have shown that when people are able to think of an explanation for some possible event, they tend to overestimate the likelihood that this event will actually occur. (See Koehler 1991, for a survey of some of these studies; see also Brem and Rips 2000.) More telling still, Lombrozo (2007) shows that, in some situations, people tend to grossly overrate the probability of simpler explanations compared to more complicated ones. Although these studies are not directly concerned with abduction in any of the forms discussed so far, they nevertheless suggest that taking into account explanatory considerations in one’s reasoning may not always be for the better. (It is to be noted that Lombrozo’s experiments are directly concerned with some proposals that have been made for explicating abduction in a Bayesian framework; see Section 4.) However, the most pertinent remarks about the normative status of abduction are so far to be found in the philosophical literature. This section discusses the main criticisms that have been levelled against abduction, as well as the strongest arguments that have been given in its defense.