 Let’s begin with the generic name “Alice”. Consider the range of individuals to which it applies. Unlike the range of “bachelor”, this set is not united under a brief definition, but consists of all the various people (including Alice Cooper), and perhaps things, referred to by (occurrences of) the name “Alice”. A natural view, then, is that the individual referential relationships are what’s basic here, and any generalization concerning a generic name’s range of application is based on them, rather than the other way around. According to this view, there is no general meaning of the name, responsible for determining to whom it correctly applies. While one could articulate a (complex) condition that correctly sorts Alices from non-Alices on some basis other than those referential relationships (for instance, a disjunction consisting of each Alice’s unique time and place of birth), it is clear that any such condition would be a superstructure built atop of those relationships, rather than being, with any plausibility, their originating source.