 The explanandum in question is the property of being normative, one might say. But we need to bring this into sharper focus. The error theory contests the idea that there are normative properties and normative facts. Certain other anti-realist theories might agree with the error theory that there are not any normative facts – understood as worldly states of affairs – but, as we will see, might not deny that there are normative truths. And all of these theories, as well as realist theories, would agree that there are normative concepts and normative claims and judgments. As we said before, the main area of debate among these theories concerns whether there are worldly normative properties and facts. Nevertheless, our question in this section is about the possibility of providing a naturalistic explanation of normativity. Normative properties and facts (if there are any) instantiate the property of being normative, but so do normative concepts, normative claims, normative judgments, and normative truths (if there are any). The explanandum of the question we are asking, then, is this property of being normative. Is it possible to provide a naturalistic explanation of this property?