 Given these two senses of “actuality”, Spinoza’s original claim in Part 2 that the “actual being” of the human mind is an idea of an “actually exist[ing]” body can also be understood in two ways. First, it can be understood as a claim about what it takes for a human mind to begin existing in time, as we have done in 2.2.1: any human mind starts to actually exist in a durational sense when the nexus of bodily causes in nature generates a new body, which then begins to be variously affected or changed by external causes. The infinite intellect, in its indefatigable omniscience, begins to represent these affections or changes. The relevant “part” of God’s omniscient idea (see 2.1.2) is a new, temporally existing human mind. More plainly put, a human “infant” is born, with “a body capable of very few things, and…a mind…conscious of almost nothing” (E5p39s).