 This duty is often conceived as a positive duty, for example as a duty to do our part in saving others from the dangers of the state of nature by supporting just institutions (Wellman 2005). But this view seems problematic if we accept that the dangers of the state of nature are primarily the product of a range of coordination problems which are generated by the fact that we live next to each other without being subject to the same political authority. These are not dangers that we can save others from by subjecting ourselves to the political authority; these are dangers that we expose others to if we live next to them without being subject to the political authority (Renzo 2008). If so, the duty to support just institutions is best understood as grounded in a negative duty not to threaten others, rather than in a positive one. Political authority is necessary to neutralize the threat we pose to each other when we live in physical proximity while lacking mechanisms to set and enforce shared norms (Kant 1797; Renzo 2011; but see Steinhoff 2016).