 In fact, in light of the above-mentioned ambiguity in the concept of depiction, hence of the fundamental distinction between a relational and a non-relational sense of “picture of,” we should emphasize how much is left out of Goodman’s attempted account of the concept. Notice how pictures may or may not represent something, i.e., relationally; yet, insofar as they have depicted content, they all are, non-relationally, O-pictures, or P-pictures, etc., that is, pictures with an O, or P, etc. content. Such non-relational sense of depiction is indeed the one a theory of depiction ought to investigate (cf. Budd 1993), and Goodman’s general claims on the syntactic and semantic characteristics of pictorial (vs. verbal, or musical, or diagrammatic, etc.) symbol systems do not seem able to encompass the fundamental question about such a notion, hence in a sense the fundamental question for any theory of pictorial representation (cf. Giovannelli 1997). To illustrate, Goodman’s account offers suggestions on what makes a symbol a picture of a dog rather than a verbal description of a dog; at a very general level, the account has also something to say on what makes a symbol a dog-picture rather than a dog-description. Yet, the fundamental question for a theory of depiction is what it means that a picture is a dog-picture, i.e., a picture with a dog as its depictive content, a picture in which competent viewers see a dog, instead of, say, a cat-picture, i.e., a picture in which competent viewer see a cat. For better or worse, perceptual theories of depiction offer an answer to that question; yet, no real competing answer is to be found in Goodman. As mentioned, why some type of marks have become correlated with a certain kind of depictive content (hence presumably prompting a visual perception of such content when looking at the picture) is a matter of entrenchment; and that, in turn, is a question for the anthropologist and the historian, not the philosopher, according to Goodman.