 These strategies of argument have all occasioned criticism. One may doubt whether commonsense really does support the requisite interpretation of the idea on which the theories ground their appeal (i.e., the idea that conscious states are states we are conscious of) (Prinz 2012; Siewert 1998, 2013b). One may even doubt whether that idea should be endorsed on any construal; according to Dretske 1995, conscious states are not states we are conscious of, but states we are conscious with. The metacognitive interpretation of “what it’s like” locution has also been criticized (see Byrne 2004; Siewert 2013b; and Stoljar, forthcoming), as have some of the above appeals to explanatory value (Siewert 1998, 2012). And one may doubt whether reflection supports the sorts of self-attributions posited by the theory. With respect to the higher-order thought theory: whenever I feel pain, does it in fact occur to me that I am in pain in Rosenthal’s sense (a sense in which one can be in pain without feeling anything)? With respect to the inner sense view: when I feel nauseated, do I find there is some way the feeling is sensed, distinguishable both from how I feel, and from what I think about it (Siewert 1998, 2012b)?