Another issue to do with moral reasoning has to do with uncertainty, insofar as we can be uncertain of our moral judgements and this will affect how we reason with them. Michael Smith (2002) argues that non-cognitivists have insufficient resources to distinguish variations in moral certainty from differences in both the perceived importance of what is being judged right or wrong and in the stability of such judgements under the influence of new information. The gradable dimensions of desire seem to be strength and stability. If strength is used to represent importance and stability to capture stability of judgements in the face of new information desires will lack a dimension to represent the certainty with which the moral judgement is held. Cognitivists, by contrast, can allow perceived importance to be captured by a further belief – the belief that the matter is of a certain importance. So they can let certainty just be a matter of credence and robustness in the face of new evidence be just what it seems. Non-cognitivists, as usual, won’t just concede the point.  Rather they will explain how their theories have the resources to make the needed distinctions. Lenman (2003c) is an early response in this vein. And Sepielli (2012) argues that any view with enough structure to solve Frege-Geach can also make the relevant distinctions. Still, there has not yet been a lot of work by non-cognitivists on credence as applied to moral judgements. Staffel (forthcoming) is thus an important development, offering an account of credence for non-cognitivists and responding to Smith’s argument along the way. 