 Cook Wilson believed that all statements are ‘categorical’, arguing away ‘hypothetical judgements’ with the claim that “in the hypothetical attitude”, we apprehend “a relation between two problems” (SI, 542–543 &amp; Joseph (1916a, 185)). In other words, conditionals do not express judgements but connections between questions. This view was elaborated by Ryle into his controversial stance on indicative conditionals as ‘inference-tickets’ in ‘‘If’, ‘So’, and ‘Because’’ (Ryle 1971, vol. II, 234–249). Ryle compared conditionals of the form ‘If p, then q’, to “bills for statements that statements could fill” (Ryle 1971, vol. II, 240) and he rejected the form ‘If p then q, but p, therefore q’, claiming that in some way the p in the major premise cannot for that reason be the same as p asserted by itself. This, of course, runs afoul of Geach’s ‘Frege Point’ (Geach 1972).