 Of course, it is perfectly possible to hold a relationship-based view of partiality to special relations while rejecting the claim that membership in the same species constitutes the relevant sort of relationship—just as many who think being A’s friend grounds special obligations toward A might reject the view that belonging to the same ethnic group as A does so as well. (The challenge, as always, is to explain what kinds of relationships do ground obligations, and which do not. (Kolodny, 2010a) provides some helpful discussion and defends a proposal for where and how to draw the line.) By the same token, a commitment to the idea that legitimate special obligations (those to friends, for instance) are grounded by some version of the individuals view leaves it quite open precisely which qualities of one’s friends do the grounding, and just how the grounding relation is conditioned by the existence of the friendship. Merely knowing, then, that someone holds the relationship view, the individuals view, etc, does not in itself tell us much about whether they endorse obligations to non-humans. Still, their ultimate view on that matter, whatever it might be, will inevitably be influenced by their position regarding the nature and grounding of special obligations and other forms of partiality. The of justifying partiality toward intimates and relatives, then, is by no means an abstract or inconsequential one, as our views on such matters bear on such larger questions as who gets included in, and who ends up excluded from, the community of moral considerability.