 Although exploitation requires unfairness, it also seems to involve more than unfairness. As Wolff puts it, “somehow, there just seems to be more to exploitation than unequal exchange” (1999: 107). Benjamin Ferguson has argued that exploitation is best characterised by a two factor account, such that \(A\) exploits \(B\) in a transaction iff \(A\) gains unfairly from \(B\) in the transaction and \(A\) believes, or ought to have believed, that the gains he receives wrong \(B\) (2020: 535). Ferguson argues that this two-factor account solves two problems for existing accounts of exploitation. The first, which we have already seen, is the scope problem: if exploitation is merely tantamount to unfair transaction, then it seems that the scope of exploitation is too broad. The second problem is the blame problem. Ferguson argues that the best accounts of transactional fairness entail that unfair transactions are pervasive: the next transaction that you or I engage in is likely unfair. However, in most transactions we don’t know which party is gaining too much and which party is gaining too little. This epistemic consequence of pervasive unfairness means that we have no reason to blame either party of the transaction. Yet, blame typically accompanies charges of exploitation. To say that \(A\) exploits \(B\) is to say that \(A\) has done something for which he can be blamed.