 Boghossian challenges Equal Validity under two guises: constructivism and relativism (see  §1.2),  in the service of defending a realist position he terms “absolutism”. Importantly, though, the version of metaepistemological realism that Boghossian contrasts (under the description of “absolutism”) favorably to constructivist and relativist anti-realism goes beyond the kind of minimal realist position described above. Boghossian’s absolutism involves—additionally—a package of theses about the status of epistemic principles, which he defines as “general normative propositions” that specify conditions under which a particular type of belief is justified (Boghossian 2006: 85; 2001: 38 fn. 3). Included in this package are the theses that (i) there is an objective fact of the matter as to which epistemic principles are true; (ii) there is a uniquely correct set of epistemic principles, which all rational agents are bound by; and that (iii) if there are objective facts about which epistemic principles (and which particular epistemic judgments) are true, these facts should be knowable: it ought to be possible to arrive at justified beliefs about them (2006: 77).