 George Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) (hereafter “PHK”) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713) (hereafter “TD”) have encouraged this interpretation of Locke’s doctrine of SQs. According to Berkeley, the philosophers’ doctrine of P/SQs states that extension, size, motion, etc. inhere in mind-independent material substance and cause ideas that resemble them, whereas colors, tastes, etc. are ideas that cannot resemble anything without a mind. In his view, philosophers are right about SQs and wrong about the status of PQs. He opposes the doctrine because it promotes a form of materialism. The distinction figures in his idealist, anti-materialist argumentation as a philosophically reputable means by which the admitted mind dependence of SQs can be used to leverage that of PQs. One tactic is to claim that arguments supposed to show that color, etc. cannot exist without a mind can be used against PQs, too, where the arguments in question are his own perceiver relativity considerations (TD [2008: 167–70]; PHK [2008: 88]). This is paired with the contention that we cannot abstract the idea of a PQ from all ideas of SQs, e.g., the sensory idea of a figure cannot be separated from all other visual or tactual qualityies. Either both exist in the mind or neither does (PHK [2008: 70–1, 86]; TD [2008: 115–6]) Many subsequent philosophers wrongly assume that Berkeley’s report of the philosophers’ distinction applies to Locke’s doctrine of qualities (see Stroud 1980; M. Wilson 1982 [1999]])