 The Knowledge Argument became the subject of intense philosophical discussion following its canonical formulation by Frank Jackson (1982). However, there are numerous precursors of this argument in the literature. Precursors of the Knowledge Argument typically involve at least one of two strategies which are familiar from Jackson’s formulation. The first is to appeal to what Daniel Stoljar &amp; Yujin Nagasawa term the knowledge intuition: the intuition that no amount of knowledge of the physical information or physical facts concerning certain experiences can by itself suffice for knowledge of what these experiences are like, i.e., knowledge of their qualitative character or distinctive qualia (2004, 2–3). The second is to make use of thought experiments which are similar to Jackson’s famous example of Mary. These thought-experiments typically involve a being who has complete knowledge of the physical information or physical facts concerning certain experiences, but who (it is claimed) lacks knowledge of what those experiences are like.