 Such a hodgepodge of answers sheds little light upon the concept of intention, her quarry. Thus, she shifts methods. She emphasizes that in every case of doing something intentionally, you don’t need to observe yourself in order to know that that’s what you are up to. For example, you know that you are reading this encyclopedia entry, and you know this not because somebody told you, nor did you merely infer it, nor did you see yourself in a mirror reading it. Rather, you know it in some distinctive way, what later writers will call a ‘first-personal’ way. Anscombe calls this knowledge of one’s own intentional actions “practical knowledge”, which is likewise obscure. But she concludes that “the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ can only be understood if we first understand ‘practical reasoning’” (INT, 57). Thus it is only by grasping what it is to reason practically that we will understand what practical knowledge and the concept of intention are.