 In the first place, the problem of the soul’s indivisibility had aroused an important debate within Aristotelianism. Aristotle himself had already denounced at the end of Book I of his De Anima the absurd consequences of considering that the soul has parts understood as substantially different: if the soul is the principle that unifies the body, it can in no way be divisible itself; if not, we should have to find another superior principle and so on to infinity. Notwithstanding this assess, there is no doubt that Aristotle also spoke of the different functions exercised by the soul through its different faculties: thus, it was inevitable that the unity of the soul reappeared once again. This issue had been widely discussed since the Middle Ages but remained still debated among many Renaissance Aristotelians. The subtleties (distinctiones) in the interpretation of the thought of Aristotle became increasingly complex, giving rise to an intricate tangle of arguments and counter-arguments difficult to follow even for the experts (see Di Napoli 1963: 339 ff.; Schmitt 1983: 13–42; Bianchi 2003a: 133–172).