 However, the case of cognitive acts is different. Olivi carefully avoids committing to real extramission of vision, and he argues that perceptual acts take place in the powers of the soul, not in the perceived object (Summa II q. 58, p. 482; Silva &amp; Toivanen 2010). The virtual extension of the soul’s attention is not real, not even in some special nonphysical sense. When Olivi explains that the extension is ‘virtual’, he means to contrast it with ‘real’. He explicitly denies, for instance, that this virtual extension involves “any real emission of its essence” (Summa II q. 73, p. 61). Elsewhere, considering the claim that “our mind is where it fixes its intention,” he says that “these words are metaphorical, for we are not there really or substantially, but only virtually or intentionally” (Summa II q. 37 ad 13, p. 672). On this basis it is fair to say that the soul does not actually perform any action at a distance, although its attention can be directed to distant objects. Accordingly, Olivi’s view is best described as an intentional theory of cognition (Perler 2002; Toivanen 2013a).