 But the point of defining goodness in terms of what we desire to desire is not to give us a reason to pursue or promote what we desire to desire—rather, it is supposed to explain why something’s being good gives us a reason (or at least, a motive), to pursue or promote it. Russell is not advocating the pursuit of what we desire to desire: he is trying to provide an analysis of “good” which helps to make sense of the fact that we tend to pursue and promote (what we believe to be) good things. (We do it because to be good just is to be something which we desire to desire, and hence something which, sometimes at any rate, we will actually desire.) In other words, (i′) “Things which we desire to desire are good” is meant to be a barren tautology—barren in terms of practical consequences, that is, though, hopefully, philosophically illuminating. It does not provide (and is not intended to provide) a reason for action. But in that case, the antecedent of (1.3″)—that the belief that “Things which we desire to desire are good”, provides a reason for action—is false, so far as Russell’s analysis is concerned. Thus even if the conditional (1.3″) is true, it does not support the consequent—that “good” does not mean “what we desire to desire”. The Barren Tautology Argument is therefore impotent against the desire-to-desire theory.