The truthmaker account of ontological commitment—like the quantifier account, but for an entirely different reason—has a problem with capturing implicit commitment. The problem arises because the truthmakers for a theory, but not the ontological commitments of a theory, are entities whose existence is sufficient for the truth of the theory. The problem afflicts both the truthmaker criterion for particulars, and for kinds. Indeed, assuming truthmaker necessitarianism, it follows from the former criterion that a theory is ontologically committed to a particular only if the existence of the particular is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the theory; it follows from the latter criterion that a theory is ontologically committed to a kind only if the existence of some members (or other) of the kind is both necessary and sufficient for the truth of the theory. But the examples of implicit commitment considered in §1.7.4 and §1.7.5 suggest that sufficiency is not required for ontological commitment. The truthmaker account, like the quantifier account, undergenerates commitments.[34]