 However, the Infinitist may also simply deny that anything remains unexplained in such a regress. Peter Klein (1998, 2003) holds not only that there can be an infinite regress of justifications, but indeed that it is necessary for \(S\) to be justified in believing that \(p\) that \(S\) have available to them an infinite number of propositions such that the first of these, \(r_1\), is a reason for \(p\), the second, \(r_2\), is a reason for \(r_1\), the third, \(r_3\), is a reason for \(r_2\), and so on ad infinitum. The regress objection seems to presuppose that \(r_1\) is a reason for \(p\) in virtue of (at least in part) \(r_2\) being a reason for \(r_1\), etc. (See e.g., Gillett 2003, 713.) In which case, so the objection goes, the justificatory chain could not get off the ground, and nothing would be justified. But Klein (2003, 720–723) denies that \(r_1\) is a reason for \(p\) in virtue of \(r_2\) being a reason for \(r_1\). There must be a reason, \(r_2\), for \(r_1\), and there must be a distinct reason for \(r_2\), \(r_3\), and so on. Each of these infinitely many propositions are justified, but each one’s being justified, says Klein, does not hold in virtue of any other being justified. The Infinitist demands that there is an infinite justificatory sequence, but that in itself is silent as to what justification consists in. The Infinitist can simply hold that there is some feature \(F\) such that for \(x\) to be a reason for \(y\), \(\langle x,y \rangle\) has to have \(F\), and that \(\langle r_1,p \rangle\) has \(F\), and \(\langle r_2,r_1 \rangle\) has \(F\), and so on. That feature could be the first element increasing the objective probability of the second, or something else entirely (ibid., 722). The point is, it needn’t involve the second element itself being justified, and thus the Infinitist need not accept that the justification of \(p\) from \(r_1\) is inherited from the justification of \(r_1\) from \(r_2\), and so on. In Hale’s terminology, the explanation of the justification of a proposition by appeal to another justified proposition is a non-transmissive one: while one must appeal in the explanation to a proposition that is in fact justified, the fact that it is justified plays no role in that explanation. Thus there is, arguably, no reason to think that the regress of epistemic justification is vicious even if you demand an explanation for why any of our beliefs are justified in the first place.