 While most contemporary liberal views follow these arguments in replacing Bloch’s metaphysical foundations of hope with moral justifications, defenders of “unjustifiable” political hope, such as Richard Rorty, argue for the more radical claim that we cannot, as a matter of principle, provide any fundamental justification for the desirability of the outcomes that we hope for. As Rorty famously rejects the idea of a political philosophy that is based on privileged knowledge or insight, he argues that “liberal hope” (i.e., hope for the emergence and sustenance of liberal societies) similarly cannot be based on any foundations—such as knowledge about probabilities. Rather, it is an attitude by which those who have it express their commitment to certain forms of future interaction and their belief in their possibility. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty correspondingly contrasts two forms of liberalism: The “liberal metaphysician” expects social cooperation to be based on scientific or philosophical insight that penetrates individual idiosyncrasy and aims at the adoption of a universal, final vocabulary that then leads to solidarity. By contrast, the “liberal ironist” renounces the idea of a final vocabulary and instead assumes that only the contingent overlap between “selfish hopes” can be a source of the solidarity that grounds the commitment to liberal principles (Rorty 1989: 93). As Smith (2005) notes, Rorty does not intend to argue for unjustified hope (hope for which there is no adequate justification, although such justification is possible). Rather, he must refer to a form of hope for which the question of an ultimate justification does not arise, since it does not incorporate the idea that it is based on any such justification.