 West explains that, historically, rape law has seen two kinds of forced sex as consensual: first, the sex that a man forces on his wife (since she was thought to have “consented” permanently and irrevocably to sex by getting married); and second, submission or acquiescence in the face of a show of force and/or a threat of more violence to come. Furthermore, she points out, women are often portrayed in both pornographic and mainstream media as enjoying, and (the assumption is) therefore consenting to, forceful and even violent sex; such assumptions often derail rape cases, as when a defendant claims that the encounter was simply “rough sex” that was enjoyed by the victim. Underlying the inclusion of a nonconsent requirement over and above the force requirement, according to West, is the view that “women consent to forced sex all the time—so forced sex alone can’t be rape” (239). Cases of nonconsensual but unforced sex, on the other hand, include those in which the victim is induced to have sex through fraudulent misrepresentation (for instance, a doctor telling her that sex with him is necessary for her cure), and those in which she is coerced through nonviolent means (for instance, a professor telling her that she must have sex with him to pass the course). The tendency of the law to see such encounters as meaningfully consensual departs strikingly from how consent is understood in other areas; as West observes, “fraud or coercion that vitiates consent in nonsexual contexts constitutes either criminal or tortious activity” (240).