 It seems, then, that we must think that God is free. There seems to be no conflict between holding that God is free and that God is perfectly good. A free being may have a perfectly good set of desires, slate of character traits, and career of actions. It may even be true that every counterfactual about what that agent would freely do were circumstances somewhat different involves that agent’s agency being perfectly good. But there may be a conflict between holding that the agent is free with respect to issues of moral relevance – what has been called being “significantly” free (Plantinga 1979, p. 166) – and being necessarily perfectly good. For many hold the view that freedom of action involves a capacity to act otherwise – that if an agent is free with respect to φ-ing, then it is possible that A φs and it is possible that A refrains from φ-ing. But if freedom involves the possibility of acting either way with respect to matters of moral relevance, then a free being cannot be necessarily perfectly good. For there is no possible world in which a necessarily perfectly good being acts wrongly; but for every significantly free being there is a possible world in which that being acts wrongly.