 It seems as if one could move towards a notion of truth by utilising the condition that there is nothing opposing an initial impression that things are a certain way – in the water case, no news report, no adverse lab results, and so forth. This would still be a notion of truth as something possessed fallibly. But the sceptic can now speak of identifying some things as true (rather than as simply plausible) and others as the contrary (2.111). Carneades at any rate is not trying to provide an equivalent of the Stoic notion of infallible truth-possession. His ‘unimpeded’ condition is a refinement designed to give a criterion of reasonable action in the absence of such a notion. What one can do, using Carneades’ method, is start with the impression of something’s being the case and approach, but never reach, a position of certainty. It is a question of increasing the likelihood of correctness, not eliminating completely the possibility of error.