 Bradley has two reservations about the morality of the community. First, there are some ways of realizing or perfecting oneself that appear to have nothing to do with morality proper or with society, which raises a question about the limits of morality, about whether the demands of self-realization go beyond the moral obligation to perfect oneself as a member of society. Does the artist have an obligation to perfect her talents? If so, is this a moral obligation? Bradley notes that it seems reasonable to say that we will not realize ourselves if we fail to develop our talents and abilities and he even feels some temptation to call this a moral obligation—or at least an obligation of some sort—while at the same time admitting that there are spheres of activity that are or should be free of obligation, where we are left to our own devices. In saying this he is admitting that individualism is not totally wrong, for even members of a community remain individuals pursuing their own separate plans and projects, albeit within the framework of the community’s social and political institutions and its normative understandings and commitments. The second reservation is that the reflective individual may come to feel that her society is wrong in some respect or is in what Bradley calls a “rotten” condition. While it may not be clear what ‘rotten’ would mean or how one would determine whether a society was in this condition or not, it is clear that change can be urged if we discover a contradiction in the moral views of our society. For example, if the constitution claimed all are equal before the law yet specific laws denied benefits or access to the institutions of the state to some group, then we would have a contradiction. Denying same sex partners the opportunity to marry and enjoy whatever rights and social benefits that go along with that status may be relevant contemporary example. Given this possibility, there has to be some scope for revising social rules and political institutions, which means one would be opposing society’s moral values and in doing this, more or less opposing oneself in that one’s moral perspective has been inherited from members of that society, from the ancestors. In this case the opposition between the subjective self and the superior moral self identified with the community breaks out again, which then becomes the impetus to a change in moral values.