 From a contemporary fallibilist perspective on introspection, we should not then be surprised at its failures or take them to be decisive against pleasure’s being a single experiential kind, as Sidgwick did. And even if it is not, the possibility of its containing a limited heterogeneity remains (Labukt 2012, §3.3 below). Neither should it be surprising that introspectionist psychologists (n. 3, ¶ 3) and philosophers failed to agree on whether pleasure has one phenomenal feel, a diversity, or none at all and that bodily sensations (which are not similarly resistant to inspection) may show up instead. If diligent introspection of some kinds tends to make momentary feeling cognitively inaccessible, then such introspection will often be a worse guide than untutored experience about it. Rather than relying exclusively on introspection (and unknowingly on the naive or trained intuitions and prejudices that may shape reports of it) we should bring the totality of our evidence to bear, drawing on psychology and biology as well as direct experience, as the best philosophers before the heyday of modern empiricism and introspectionism did.