 This move faces difficulties parallel to those faced by error theories (Boghossian 1989, 1990; Hattiangadi 2007: chapter 4, 2018; Miller 2011, 2020). The non-factualist about meaning proposes that we construe ascriptions of meaning as having a purpose or function different from that of stating facts. But, insofar as a sentence is regarded as having a function, there is an intelligible distinction between correct and incorrect uses of that sentence; in other words, the sentence is rule-governed. That the notion of correctness in these cases cannot be identified with truth or warranted assertibility makes no difference to the applicability of a generalised version of the extensionality condition, which we outlined in  section 2.  Thus, suppose that ‘\(S\)’ is a sentence that has a non-descriptive semantic function. Consider these two specifications of the conditions in which uttering ‘\(S\)’ is correct, where \(R_1\) and \(R_2\) would confer different correctness-values on utterances of ‘\(S\)’: