 A further much discussed measure is that proposed in Fitelson (2003). It is based on the intuition that the degree of coherence of a set \(E\) should be “a quantitative, probabilistic generalization of the (deductive) logical coherence of \(E\)” (ibid., 194). Fitelson takes it to be a consequence of this idea that a maximum (constant) degree of coherence is attained if the propositions in \(E\) are all logically equivalent (and consistent). This is in accordance with \(C_1\) but not with \(C_2\), which as we saw is sensitive to the specificity (prior probability) of the propositions involved. Fitelson, who approached the subject from the standpoint of confirmation theory, proposed a complex coherence measure based on Kemeny and Oppenheim’s (1952) measure of factual support. A further innovative idea is that Fitelson extends this measure to take into account support relations holding between all subsets in the set \(E\), whereas Lewis, we recall, only considered the support relation holding between one element and the rest. The degree of coherence of a set, finally, is defined as the mean support among the subsets of \(E\). An alleged counterexample to this measure can be found in Siebel (2004) and criticisms and proposed amendments in Meijs (2006). The reader may wish to consult Bovens and Hartmann (2003), Douven and Meijs (2007), Roche (2013a) and Shippers (2014a) for further coherence measures and how they fare in relation to test cases in the literature, and Koscholke and Jekel (2017) for an empirical study of coherence assessments drawing on similar examples. The latter study indicates that the measures by Douven and Meijs and by Roche are more in line with intuitive judgement than other established measures. Some recent works have focused on applying coherence measures to inconsistent sets, e.g., Schippers (2014b) and Schippers and Siebel (2015).