 On perceptualist views, emotions are the closest thing we have to acquaintance with value – for example, as Adam Pelser puts it, “to experience something as funny just is to be amused by it” (2014: 112). Just as colour-blind people may know on the basis of testimony that an object is red without being acquainted with its redness, a person who is incapable of awe may learn from others that something is sublime while lacking an acquaintance with or direct access to its sublimity (ibid.). Analogous claims have also been defended about the nature of desire, which is held by many to be a non-doxastic appearance of the good (Stampe 1987; Oddie 2005; Tenenbaum 2007; Sinhababu 2017). Perceptualists tend to hold that the distinctive feature of emotional perception is that the content is evaluative, which in turn is often thought to explain the special phenomenology. However, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni (2015) have recently argued that the evaluative character of emotions should be understood in terms of bodily attitudes rather than evaluative content (for criticism, see Mitchell forthcoming). (For more on debates about the nature of emotion, see the  entry on emotion.)