 However, it had been assumed that since Carnap required a framework to be in place for any kind of rational discourse to be possible, the choice of frameworks itself must be simply a matter of personal whim, at the level of Hume’s declaration that there is no rational argument for me to prefer the relief of a pain in my little toe to the prevention of some world-engulfing catastrophe. This problem of the irrationality of framework choice (George 2012) or—put another way—the supposed infinite regress in the selection of meta-frameworks for the choice of framework (Richardson 2007; Steinberger 2016; Carus 2017) has been discussed recently from various angles. It is a special case, in the way Carnap is still usually seen, of the supposedly more general impossibility, for Carnap, of bringing reason to bear on normative choices, since in his view all reasoning seems to presuppose internality to a framework. 