 Judged against this account of egoism, characterisations of Stirner as a “nihilist”—in the sense that he rejects all normative judgement—would also appear to be mistaken. The popular but doubtful description of Stirner as a “nihilist” is encouraged by his explicit rejection of morality. Morality, on Stirner’s account, involves the positing of obligations to behave in certain fixed ways. As a result, he rejects morality as incompatible with egoism properly understood. However, this rejection of morality is not grounded in the rejection of values as such, but in the affirmation of what might be called non-moral goods. That is, Stirner allows that there are actions and desires which, although not moral in his sense (because they do not involve obligations to others), are nonetheless to be assessed positively. Stirner is clearly committed to the non-nihilistic view that certain kinds of character and modes of behaviour (namely autonomous individuals and actions) are to be valued above all others. His conception of morality is, in this respect, a narrow one, and his rejection of the legitimacy of moral claims is not to be confused with a denial of the propriety of all normative or ethical judgement. There is, as a result, no inconsistency in Stirner’s frequent use of an explicitly evaluative vocabulary, as when, for example, he praises the egoist for having the “courage” (265) to lie, or condemns the “weakness” (197) of the individual who succumbs to pressure from their family.