 It is important to stress the dramatic difference between Gordon’s Radical Simulationism and Goldman’s Three-Stage Model. According to the latter, mental simulation events causally contribute to representing other people’s mental states, but the mindreading event proper is always constituted by a judgment (or a belief). Moreover, Goldman maintains that the ability to form such judgments requires both the capacity to introspect one’s own mental states (more in this in  section 4.4)  and possession of mentalistic concepts. None of this is true of Radical Simulationism. Rather, Gordon proposes that, in the large majority of cases, it is the very mental simulation event itself that constitutes a representation of someone else’s mental states. Furthermore, since such mental simulation events neither require the capacity for introspection nor possession of mentalistic concepts, Radical Simulationism entails the surprising conclusion that these two features play at best a very minor role in mindreading. A testable corollary is that social interaction often relies on an understanding of others that does not require the explicit application of mental state concepts.