 Let us now consider those aspects of Dignāga’s treatment of the syllogism which are at the center of this debate. One reason to think that Dignāga would accept as a good syllogism one failing to be deductively valid might be his inclusion of the word observed (dṛṣṭa) in the example statement. In other words, one might think that Dignāga would accept as a good syllogism one in which, even though it is not the case that whatever has H has S, it is the case that whatever is observed to have H has S: that is to say, the major premiss pertains only to observed cases of H, and not for every case of H. However, no such syllogisms are accepted by Dignāga. Indeed, the addition of the word observed (dṛṣṭa) does not permit attributing such an idea to Dignāga, for the word is added, not to the major premiss’s subordinate, relative clause, but to its main clause. Thus, what the major premiss says is not that every observed instance of the reason (H) is an instance of the property to be established (S), but rather that every instance of the reason (H) is observed to be an instance of the property to be established (S). Moreover, if the word observed (dṛṣṭa) has a factive sense, that is, a sense which presupposes the truth of the clause into which the word is inserted, as do several of its English translations, for example, noticed, known, then the word in the statement leaves the truth conditions of major premiss unaffected.