 Other maximalists and optimalists, often those wary of facts, posit (non-transferrable) tropes as truth-makers for contingent predications (Martin 1980; Mulligan, Simons, &amp; Smith 1984: 295–304, Lowe 2006: 186–7, 204–5) Tropes, in the non-transferrable sense, are particular instances of properties that are existentially dependent upon their bearers. For example, the particular golden colour g of Harry’s coat is a non-transferrable trope because g could not have existed except as the colour of his coat. Since g is non-transferrable, this trope only exists in circumstances where Harry’s coat is golden; hence g’s eligibility to be a truth-maker for the statement that Harry is golden. (If g was transferrable, then g could have existed in circumstances where whilst borne by Harriet, Harry bore another black trope d; so if g is transferrable it isn’t eligible to be a truth-maker for the statement that Harry is golden.) But Lewis’ reasoning can be easily extended to show that non-transferrable tropes cannot serve as the truth-makers for contingent statements without contradicting Humeanism. If trope g is a property that Harry bears rather than a part of him, then g is wholly distinct from Harry. Nevertheless, the existence of g necessitates the existence of Harry even though they are distinct (MacBride 2005: 121). Alternatively if g is a part of the bundle of tropes that constitute Harry, if g is non-transferrable, then the existence of g necessitates the existence of some other distinct tropes that are also parts of this bundle. So Humeanism is violated either way.