 Once this distinction is drawn, it becomes possible to reject metaphysical analysis without rejecting analysis altogether. We can allow logical analysis to provide us with “unambiguous”—or at least clearer—formulations of the proposition we want to analyse. This may be sufficient to elucidate its logical form or to remove certain confusions to which it may give rise. This is what Max Black (1933), for example, advocated in a reply to Stebbing that he also read to the Aristotelian Society a few months later (see Beaney 2003). We can also allow “partial” metaphysical analyses. We might “reduce” propositions about the decisions of committees, for example, to propositions about the activities of its constituent members, which may be enough to explain the decisions that were made without having to further analyse what it is to be a member of a committee or indeed what it is to be a person (rational or otherwise). The correctness or usefulness of an analysis is relative to our purposes in seeking it. This purpose-relative approach to analysis was the one that Stebbing herself came to adopt. (For more on the debates about analysis in the 1930s, see Baldwin 2013; Beaney 2003, 2016.)