 Hempel observed that universal generalizations of the form, “\((x)(Fx \supset\) Gx)”, are true if and only if logically equivalent generalizations of the form, “\((x)(\neg Fx \vee Gx)\)”, are true. But if “\(Fx\)” stands for an uninstantiated property, such as being a vampire, then, since “\(\neg Fx\)” is satisfied by everything, regardless of the attribute “\(Gx\)”, “\(\neg Gx\)”, etc., that hypothesis—and its logical equivalents—are not only universally confirmed but even qualify as “laws”. This is not surprising, from a logical point of view, since extensional logic is purely truth functional, where the truth value of molecular sentences is a function of the truth values of its atomic constituents. But it implies that an empirical generalization that might be true of the world’s history may or may not be “lawful”, since it could be the case that its truth was merely “accidental”. Hempel’s endorsement of Goodman’s approach to select generalizations that support subjunctive conditionals, therefore, was not only consistent with the tradition of Hume—who believed that attributions of natural necessity in causal relations are merely “habits of mind”, psychologically irresistible, perhaps, but logically unwarranted—but circumvented a disconcerting consequence of his explication.