 In one widely recognized form of feminist transphobia (found in the work of trans-exclusionary radical feminists such as Janice Raymond), trans women are portrayed as not “real” women and as threats to feminist movements (Bettcher 2006, 2007; McKinnon 2018). However, there is another strand of feminist theory that has a distinct relationship to trans issues, and (importantly for present purposes) it is a lineage of feminism that draws heavily on Continental figures such as Butler. While there is no doubt that Butler’s work has been foundational in trans studies as well as in queer theory (Gerdes 2014; Salah 2007), it is also the case that her work has been critiqued for its selective use of trans experience (Prosser 1998; Namaste 1996; H. Rubin 1998). Critics point out that trans identity tends be affirmed in Butlerian queer feminist discourse when it can be used to demonstrate the actual constructedness of gender, or its lack of ontological necessity, but also that some trans identity is portrayed as problematically essentialist when accompanied by claims to “really be” a man or a woman and/or demands for medical transition (Valentine 2012). While Prosser and Rubin both critique this rejection of claims to gender realness from a phenomenological perspective (and Prosser (1998) from a psychoanalytic framework as well), Namaste (1996) focuses on the institutional reality of gender that is often sidelined in these debates. In response, Jack Halberstam has argued that, while Prosser’s frustration with a selective use of trans identity in queer and feminist theory is understandable, there are still significant problems with the normativity inherent in the idea of gendered realness (2005).