 Another view that rejects the idea that a justified belief must be founded on evidence says that all of our beliefs are prima facie justified so all of them are what one might call “default reasonable”, that is, justified barring reasons to reject them (this is what Gilbert Harman (2001) calls “general foundationalism”). On some accounts of a priori justification, namely those that hold that a priori justification is justification independent of empirical evidence, general foundationalism would imply that all of a person’s beliefs are prima facie (or weakly) a priori justified since that justification would stem merely from the fact that the person believes them, not from any empirical evidence that supports them. On this view, and contrary to initial appearances, there is really no difference in the way the propositions at the start of this essay are prima facie justified since they are all weakly a priori justified if you accept them. The general foundationalist view might add that, if some are all things considered less justified than others, it is because of the relationships between them. Coherence considerations account for all things considered justification and are what upset initially equal prima facie justification. Further, this view has the implication that you could be prima facie justified in believing extremely bizarre propositions, say, beliefs about what happens on the planet Gliese 581d, a planet scientists have judged may be “friendly to life” (Russell 2012: 100), even though you have no empirical or testimonial evidence to support your beliefs about this alien planet. You may, but need not, also believe that the Gliesians are in touch with you (but not others) via telepathy because you are “the chosen one”. Insofar as you have no defeating evidence, you could even be all things considered justified in believing all those things about the Glieseans, despite having no evidence to support your beliefs. But it seems that a coherent set of beliefs about Gliese 581d would not provide a priori justification of all of them even if it provided some sort of justification for them. That would be drawing the boundaries of the a priori too broadly.