 Unsurprisingly, ethical issues associated with the use of nuclear weapons would eventually receive extensive attention in the philosophical literature. Much of this work focused on how nuclear ethics raises problems for utilitarian or deontological approaches to ethics, especially the question of whether it’s acceptable to threaten great evil so that it might be avoided. And, while most of the philosophers working in this area made little use of game theory, many of the questions they addressed were framed by the important work of Gregory Kavka, Russell Hardin, and a few others who made extensive use of both formal and informal game theoretic tools (see, e.g., Kavka 1987; R. Hardin 1983; Gauthier 1984; MacLean 1984). In particular, this work helped identify a number of paradoxes associated with MAD and other theories of deterrence, clarified the case both for and against unilateral disarmament, and would have implications for more general debates about rationality (especially debates concerning the nature of intentions and whether modularity is a demand of rationality).