 The will always represents the goal under a positive value-property: the conative attitude is fit if the goal (the state of affairs to be brought about by the action) indeed exemplifies the represented value-property and if alternative goals exemplify properties that are of lower rank (that is why elements like premeditation, preferences and, more generally, the experiences by which we grasp the goal’s value-property have moral relevance, see Reinach 1912/13; von Hildebrand 1916). Phenomenologists put the category of the will (rather than that of desire) at the heart of intentional agency. In contrast to a widespread tendency of tracing the will back to wishes or desires (see Frankfurt 1971), phenomenologists argue that willing is a sui generis experience (Scheler 1913/16: 143f, Löwenstein 1933). One of the main differences between willing and desiring is that the former, but not the latter, entails the disposition of forming a decision or intention (Entschluss or Vorsatz): just as the belief that p (but, say, not the assumption that p) entails the disposition of asserting p, so wanting that p (but not desiring that p) grounds the disposition of intending that p (von Hildebrand 1916: 36, Salice forthcoming A).