 Kripke (1980: 66–67) argues that, so long as our cluster consists only of properties commonly attributed to the bearer of the name, as on Strawson’s account, it is conceivable that none of its members applies to the referent. His case is buoyed by examples where experts posit or even identify a historical figure behind a popular legend, and treat the historical personage, who might share none of the attributes of the legendary one, as the true referent of the name. We might respond by applying Strawson’s method to the community of experts, rather than the general populace where the legend holds sway, as it would then succeed in picking out the historical figure. However, the general observation is that no group is incorrigible. Even those experts could turn out, it seems, to be wholly wrong in their descriptions of the name’s referent (as revealed, perhaps, by a new wave of experts).