Conventional intentions exist and can be identified when the relevant sources, such as committee reports, floor debates, and the like, identify rationales for the relevant legislation. Of course, when the sources identify conflicting rationales, the existence of conventional intentions becomes problematic. More fundamentally, however, there are well-known objections to treating conventional intentions as consequential. As critics of the use of legislative history have emphasized, it is relatively easy for legislators to insert ostensible purposes for legislation into the legislative history (see Scalia 1997, 29–37; Scalia and Garner 2012, 376–78; Easterbrook 1990, 448–49; 1994, 65). Such rationales are often offered with extraneous motives, such as to defeat the legislation by making its purposes seem unacceptably broad or to increase the chances of passage by making the purposes seem unexceptionable. There is no reason in general to take such proffered rationales as representative of the attitudes of members of the legislature, and they are not part of what is voted on by the legislature. Probably for this kind of reason, conventional intentions are assigned a relatively minor role by most contemporary theorists of legal interpretation. For a critique of reliance on conventional intentions, see Eskridge 1994, 18–21.