 Although methodology is the focus in this entry, it is nevertheless important to ask to what extent there is value in identifying feminist philosophy by method (see Garry 2018). The field of academic feminist philosophy has developed, even flourished, across most all philosophical fields and topics since the 1970s—in spite of backlash and lingering resistance harbored in some quarters. Feminist philosophers have taught and mentored multiple generations of students who themselves generate new directions in feminist philosophy; feminist dissertations, publications, and organizations have increased; feminists drawing on many different philosophical methods learn from and cite each other; practitioners of fields such as feminism, critical race theory, trans and queer theory, critical disability theory, decolonial theory, and others, understand the importance of engaging across and integrating work in these fields. Many feminist philosophers, especially from more recent generations, simply go about their work without concerning themselves with labels of philosophical method. In this context there are reasons to downplay differences in method. In addition, it makes sense not to emphasize philosophical method if it unnecessarily limits the appeal of someone’s work, especially in interdisciplinary or transnational feminist contexts. Nor would one want a focus on method to be accompanied by a lack of open-mindedness or a sense of “superiority”.