 With these definitions in place we can now return to the Luck Pincer and see how libertarian and compatibilist accounts fare against it. Libertarian accounts famously face the problem of explaining how a decision or action can be free, given the libertarian demand for indeterminacy immediately prior to directly free action. Moral responsibility skeptics and compatibilists alike have long argued that such indeterminacy makes the action unacceptably chancy, in a way that is responsibility-undermining (see, e.g., N. Levy 2009a, 2011; Mele 1999a,b, 2006; Haji 2002, 2004, 2005, 2014; van Inwagen 2000; Pereboom 2001, 2014a; for some replies see Kane 1999; Clarke 2005b; Mele 2017). And it is argued that this applies to both event-causal and agent-causal versions of libertarianism (see Mele 2006; Haji 2004, 2016; N. Levy 2011). The kind of luck that is problematic here is present chancy luck, since the agent’s putatively “free” decision is chancy (i.e., the same decision would fail to occur in many nearby possible worlds), significant, and the circumstantial factor outside of the agent’s control (i.e., the indeterminate event(s)) occurs just prior to the decision. 