 Although Dawkins finds it desirable to replace genes with replicators in his general characterization of the evolutionary process, he says very little about this more general notion in The Selfish Gene. Only one chapter (11) is dedicated to “memetic” evolution. Instead, as we saw, he discusses the special case of genes as replicators. The primacy of the genetic perspective in the characterization of replicators is claimed by some (Griesemer 2000b) to be one of the chief weaknesses not only in Dawkins’ discussions but also in the work of his successors [see the section below on  Reproducers].  Hull and his colleagues (Hull, Langman, &amp; Glenn 2001) claim to be providing a general notion of replication, adequate to handle all different sorts of replication, when too often we are simply reading peculiarities of genetic replication into our general analysis of replication.