  Representationalists usually resist P1. But there are other options. According to Shoemaker, the flaw in the argument is not P1, but rather P3. In addition to representing colors, Shoemaker thinks that visual experiences represent other (“colorlike”) properties that we do not have words for in English, and which he calls appearance  properties.[41]  On this view, both Invert and Nonvert’s experiences represent the tomato as red. However, Invert’s experience also represents the tomato as having a certain salient appearance property (call it ‘\(AP_{G}\)’), while Nonvert’s experience represents the tomato as having a certain salient appearance property \((AP_{R})\). It is this representational difference between Invert and Nonvert that accounts for the phenomenological difference between their experiences. One may, then, view Shoemaker’s main argument for appearance properties as proceeding from P1, P2, and representationalism (i.e., not-C2), to the conclusion that P3 is false.