 Departing sharply from traditional, non-naturalistic treatments of norms, Laudan addressed the is-ought problem head-on by advancing an important and influential, pragmatic “normative naturalism” whereby the acceptable norms are those best supported by successful historical practice—where, again, success is as we judge it today. On this view, norms have empirical content. They are winnowed from the history of successful practice, again a broadly Deweyan idea (e.g., Dewey 1929). At Virginia Tech Laudan and colleagues initiated a program to test the individual norms present in various philosophical models of science against the history of science (Laudan 1977: 7; Donovan et al. 1988). Like every major philosophical proposal, this one came under critical fire, in this case, e.g., for isolating individual methodological rules from their historical contexts and for reverting to a traditional, positivistic, hypothetico-deductive model of testing. In short, critics complained that Laudan’s metatheory of rationality did not match his first-order, problem-solving-progress theory of rationality. And professional historians did not welcome this invitation to cooperation, since the project implied a division of labor that regarded philosophers as the theoreticians proposing rules to test, while the historians were relegated to fact-grubbing handmaidens doing the testing. To be fair, as a historicist philosopher, Laudan himself had done a good deal of historical work.