 In section 5 we considered the modal version of the first set of issues and saw how one's account is connected to larger issues in the metaphysics of modality. Similarly, one's account of the temporal problems is connected to larger issues in the metaphysics of time. Recall the possibilist solution from section 5. The temporal analog of possibilism is eternalism, according to which what exists at a time is but a proper subset of what exists simpliciter. (Works that defend eternalism include Heller 1990, Lewis 1986, Mellor 1981 and 1998, Quine 1963, Sider 1997 and 2001, Smart 1955, and Williams 1951.) The eternalist maintains that, although Socrates does not presently exist, he does exist simpliciter and so is available to be the constituent of (9), even at times at which he does not exist. (9) is true, then, because Socrates is in the domain of a past time but not in the domain of the present time. 