 This entry is organized around research whose focal point is the psychology distinctive of normative cognition. However, any discussion of norms and norm-guided behavior will involve, tacitly or otherwise, some picture or other of agents and the characteristics that make them responsive to normative influence. Some begin with analytic formalizations of the kinds of agents and mental states assumed by common sense folk psychology, and use these formalizations, along with various refinements, to account for different norm related phenomena. These fall beyond the scope of this entry, but see especially Bicchieri, Muldoon, and Sontuoso (2018) for an overview of such approaches (also see Bicchieri 2006, 2016; Brennan et al. 2013; Conte, Andrighetto, &amp; Campennì 2013; Hawkins, Goodman, &amp; Goldstone 2019; cf. Morris et al. 2015). It is also worth noting that cognitive-evolutionary approaches are sometimes presented as importantly different from classic rational choice approaches to human decision and social behavior (Boyd &amp; Richerson 2001; Henrich, Boyd, et al. 2001, 2005). Whether these are genuinely distinct alternatives remains unclear (Elster 1991, cf. Wendel 2001), but those who make the case typically point to a growing body of evidence that suggests humans rarely approximate the unboundedly rational, purely self-interested agents of classical economics (Gigerenzer &amp; Selten 2001; Kahneman 2011, cf. Millgram 2019, Other Internet Resources).  To illustrate, participants in one-time, anonymous cooperation games have been observed to routinely cooperate, even when they are made explicitly aware of their anonymity and the fact that they will play the game just once (Marwell &amp; Ames 1981; see Thaler 1992 for a review). Those sympathetic to cognitive-evolutionary approaches to norms have an explanatory template for this kind of finding ready at hand, and will construe participants’ behavior as motivated by their norm systems and the pro-social norms that they have internalized.