 Suppose there is no other cause of \(M\), and no other cause of \(P_2\). Then every \(M\) will be followed by \(P_2\), yet the cause of \(P_2\) will be adequately found in \(P_1\). It is true that, under the assumptions stated, the counterfactual, “If \(M\) had not occurred, then \(P_2\) would not have occurred” holds; but then, so may “if the barometer had not fallen, the storm would not have occurred.” The moral to be drawn is that causation may imply that certain counterfactuals hold, but the holding of counterfactuals is not enough to show causation.  Thus, it is true that some of our actions would not have occurred, under normal conditions, unless we had had certain mental events. But this fact cannot show that those actions are caused by our mental events (rather than being caused by the physical causes of those mental events).