 Traditionally, liberals defended the freedom of consenting adults to publish and consume pornography in private from moral and religious conservatives who wanted pornography banned for its (alleged) obscenity and morally corrupting influence on consumers. In more recent times, however, the pornography debate has taken on a somewhat new and surprising shape. Some feminists have found themselves allied with their traditional conservative foes in calling on the state to regulate (some) pornography—although the primary focus of feminist concern is not obscenity, but rather on (alleged) harms to women. And some liberals have joined pro-censorship feminists in suggesting that the harms that violent, degrading and misogynistic pornography causes to women’s social standing and opportunities may be sufficiently great to justify legal regulation of it. Many others, both liberals and feminists, remain unconvinced. They are doubtful that pornography is a significant cause of sexual oppression, or that the “blunt and treacherous” instrument of the law is the best solution to pornography’s harms. As we shall see, debates over whether and how (some) pornography is harmful, and what should be done about harmful types of pornography, are very much alive (Altman and Watson 2018; McGowan 2019; Mikkola 2019).