 Categoricalism and dispositionalism are two extremes of a large spectrum of possible positions on the essences of properties. For instance, philosophers like Swoyer (1982), Ellis &amp; Lierse (1994), Ellis (1999, 2001, 2010), and Molnar (2003) maintain that some properties are essentially dispositional but others, most notably spatio-temporal properties, are not, in which sense they are dispositional essentialists but not dispositionalists. Another alternative that has lately gained considerable ground is what is called the ‘powerful qualities view’. The view is that every property is in some sense both dispositional and qualitative (Here ‘qualitative’ is used interchangeably with ‘categorical’). It was pioneered by Martin and Heil (Armstrong, Martin &amp; Place 1996; Martin 1997; Martin &amp; Heil 1999; Heil 2003, 2005) and further developed by Engelhard (2010), Jacobs (2011), Ingthorsson (2013), Carruth (2016), and Taylor (2018a, 2018b). A big challenge for this view is to give a satisfactory account of exactly how one and the same property is both dispositional and qualitative (Armstrong 2005). A popular response to this challenge is that “the qualitative and dispositional are identical with one another and with the unitary intrinsic property itself” (Martin 2008, p. 65). However, given that there is a strong inclination to think that the dispositional nature of a property is distinct from, if not incompatible with, its qualitative nature, there is no doubt that more details are needed in order to render this view a fully respectable competitor. Some attempts at it have been made by Jacobs (2011), Ingthorsson (2013), and Taylor (2018b).