 On the face of it, KQML provides the actualist with a powerful alternative to SQML. However, one might well question its actualist credentials. Specifically, despite the invalidity of the actualistically objectionable principles BF, CBF, and \(\Box\textbf{N},\) it is questionable whether KQML has escaped ontological commitment to possibilia, for the following reason. KQML provides us with a formal semantics for (constant-free) modal languages \(\scrL_\Box\) and, in particular, an account of how the truth value of a given formula \(\varphi\) of \(\scrL_\Box\) is determined in an interpretation by the meanings assigned to its semantically significant component parts, notably, the meanings of its predicates.  As noted above  in our exposition of SQML, truth-in-a-model is not the same as truth simpliciter. However, given an  applied modal language  \(\scrL_\Box,\) we were able to define a notion of modal truth simpliciter for formulas of \(\scrL_\Box\) in terms of truth in an intended interpretation, an interpretation \(\calM\) for \(\scrL_\Box\) comprising the very things that the language is intuitively understood to be “about”. Thus, when \(\calM\) is an intended SQML interpretation, the things it is about are the honest-to-goodness actual and merely possible individuals in the domain \(D\) of \(\calM\) and the honest-to-goodness possible worlds of \(W\). In particular, if our applied language is one in which \(\Diamond\exists \sfx\, \sfB\sfx\) is meant to express that Bergoglio might have had children, \(D\) will include at least some of his merely possible children and \(W\) will contain a world in which some of them are, in fact, his children and hence concrete and, hence, in which they are actual in the sense of  A!Def.  There is thus, more generally, for each world \(w \in W,\) the set \(D_w\) of things in \(D\) that are actual in \(w\). Note, however, that, in light of this, we can transform \(\calM\) into a KQML interpretation \(\calK_\calM\) simply by defining a function \(\mathit dom\) that, for each world \(w \in W,\) returns exactly the set \(D_w\). However, that is simply a formal modification that affects the evaluation of quantified formulas at worlds; it does not alter \(\calK_\calM\)’s ontological commitments, which are still exactly those of \(\calM\). But there seems no other way to construct a notion of an intended Kripke interpretation that will yield the right truth values for propositions like  (2).  From this perspective, the invalidity of BF, CBF, and \(\Box\textbf{N}\) in KQML—in particular, their falsity in an intended Kripke interpretation \(\calK_\calM\)—results from a simple adjustment of the semantical apparatus with no substantive change in the metaphysics. So instead of a genuinely actualist alternative to the possibilist commitments of SQML, KQML appears to remain no less steeped in them—the denizens of other worlds that are not in the domain of the actual world simply fail to be actual in the sense of  A!Def.  Of course, this metalinguistic fact cannot be expressed in \(\scrL_\Box\)—even if one adds the actuality predicate to \(\scrL_\Box,\) due to the quantifier restrictions in the semantics of KQML, the assertion that there are things that aren’t actual, \(\exists \sfx\, \neg \sfA!\sfx,\) will be false in \(\calK_\calM\) at every world. But that does not make the possibilist commitments of \(\calK_\calM\)  disappear.[63]