 The basic strategy deployed here to deal with both preemption and symmetric overdetermination bears an obvious similarity to Lewis’s quasi-dependence solution to the late preemption problem. Lewis resorts to quasi-dependence because the shattering of the bottle (e) does not counterfactually depend on Suzy’s throw (c), thanks to what would have happened had she not thrown (viz, Billy’s rock would have shattered the bottle instead). e quasi-depends on c, however, because of the fact that in a possible world with the same laws where the intrinsic character of the process from c to e is the same but Billy doesn’t throw, there is the required counterfactual dependence. ‘Freezing’ variables that are not intrinsic to the c-e process at their actual values (in late preemption cases) – e.g. freezing BH at 0 – turns roughly the same trick. The core difference is that Lewis’s solution involves appealing to the truth of a perfectly ordinary counterfactual (“If Suzy had not thrown, …”) at a possible world where some actual events (e.g. Billy’s hit) don’t occur, while the structural-equations solution involves appealing to the truth of a counterfactual with a special kind of antecedent (“Had Suzy not thrown and Billy’s rock still not hit, …”). Hitchcock calls these ‘explicitly nonforetracking’ (ENF) counterfactuals. (Similarly for symmetric overdetermination, where we ‘freeze’ BT at 0 – this time a non-actual value – to recover counterfactual dependence between Suzy’s throw and the shattering.)