  A third metaphysical category with which events have sometimes been contrasted is that of properties. If events are individuals, then they are not properties, at least insofar as properties are construed as universals. Individuals exist or occur whereas universals recur. However, some philosophers have taken very seriously the intuition that in some cases events may be said to recur, as when we say that the sun rises every morning (Chisholm 1970; Johnson 1975; Brandl 1997, 2000). If so, then it is natural to think of events as being more similar to properties than to individuals, similar enough to justify treating them as a kind of property—e.g., as properties of moments or intervals of time (Montague 1969), properties of cross-world classes of individuals (Lewis 1986a), or properties of sets of world segments (von Kutschera 1993). For instance, on the first of these accounts, the event of the sun’s rising is the property of being an interval during which the sun rises. As a characterization of event types, this would be uncontroversial and would allow one to construe particular events as tokens of the corresponding type. (One such construal would correspond to the above-mentioned conception of events as property exemplifications.) But to conceive of events as universal properties is to go beyond this uncontroversial fact and to reject the existence of event tokens altogether, even when it comes to “particular” events such as the unique rising of the sun that we witnessed this morning. Rather than an instance of the universal sun rising, such an event would be a universal in its own right, albeit a universal of such a restricted sort and of such a degree of singularity as to be instantiated only once.