 Hanks (2015, p. 27) allows that propositions are mind-independent and objective entities which do not depend for their existence on having any tokens, just as one might think about a difficult type of dive that has never been performed.  Thus, while Hanks’ view appears to be a rejection of a traditional Platonism about propositions, it seems nevertheless to accept a Platonism about types by untethering their existence from their tokens.  (Compare to Dodd’s (2007) defense of Platonism about types.)  Soames (2014a,b) also allows for untokened types, but only those whose constituents have been referred to or predicated in other propositions.  For Soames, a proposition p may exist in w even if no token of p has been performed in w.  For Soames, if in w a predicative event has occurred in which an agent predicates n-place property R of n objects, and in w events of referring to or thinking of objects o1...on have occurred, then the proposition that is the type of act of predicating R of o1...on exists (even if R has never been predicated of o1...on in w).  Still, it would seem that there can be truths in a world about objects that have never been thought of or referred to in that world.  In response to this, Soames claims that a proposition need not exist in a world w in order to be true in w.  In support of this, Soames appeals to other, albeit controversial, cases in which an object can have a property despite not existing.  For instance, Socrates can have the properties of being referred to or being admired despite no longer existing.  Thus, Soames’ accommodation of our intuitions concerning propositions that have never been thought appears to involve a rejection of Actualism.