 Now we inquire into the foundations of the PJP. Why should anyone accept it? The set of proposed normative foundations has increased with time. Classically, public justification rests on respect for persons as free and equal. (See Larmore 2008; for criticism, see Eberle 2002, Gaus 2011 and Van Schoelandt 2015). Others ground the PJP in an analysis of the nature of rationality and morality (Habermas 1996). One dominant view bases the PJP on requirements of justice (Rawls 2005: Quong 2013). Some draw on the value of civic friendship. (See Lister 2013, Ebels-Duggan 2010, Leland and van Wietmarschen 2017, van Wietmarschen 2021, Neufeld 2022. For criticism, see Billingham 2016.) Gaus adopts a PJP because he argues that publicly justified rules avoid authoritarianism and fit with the reactive attitudes (for criticism, see Tahzib 2019, Taylor 2018). At a deeper moral level, these rules preserve moral relations between persons. (Gaus 2011, Vallier 2022. For criticism, see Enoch 2013 and Enoch 2015.)