 The two most familiar forms of higher-order theory postulate the existence of a pair of distinct mental states: a first-order perceptual or quasi-perceptual state with a given content, and a HOT or HOP representing the presence of that first-order state, thereby rendering it conscious. Either one of these states can occur without the other, although there may be a reliable causal relation between them, such that certain types of first-order perception (e.g. attended outputs of the temporal-lobe visual system) regularly cause higher-order representations of themselves to be formed. In recent years, however, a cluster of different proposals have been made that would reject this independent-state assumption. Rather, the relationship between the conscious state in question and the higher-order state is said to be constitutive, or internal. To some extent, this view is inspired by Brentano (1874/1973) and the phenomenological tradition, including Sartre (1956). (See Kriegel 2006, 2018; Kriegel and Williford 2006; Zahavi 2004; Miguens et al. 2016.) We can refer to these as ‘self-representational’ higher-order theories. (Kriegel initially coined the term ‘same-order monitoring theory’ but this was potentially misleading).