 Michael Bergmann (2006: chs. 1 and 2) argues, however, that if to avoid regress we drop the strong access requirements that are so dear to some internalists, we also lose the motivation for the view. As Bergmann sees it, the attraction of internalism is its claim to be able to construe justification in such a way that it gives a subject with a justified belief a certain assurance from the subjective perspective, an assurance that externalist views (discussed below) don’t offer. According to Bergmann, even acquaintance with truth bearers, truth makers and a correspondence holding between them doesn’t carry with it assurance unless it is accompanied by a justified belief that all these relations obtain. And this will take us again on the road to regress. Bergmann’s challenge is serious and the traditional acquaintance theorist who rejects the strong access requirement will need to convince you that acquaintance with the correspondence between a fact and a thought that P can make a difference to the subject’s perspective on the truth of P without needing justification for thinking that the fact corresponds to P (see Hasan 2011 for a reply along these lines). Alternatively, the internalist might attempt to convince you that the regress that comes with accepting the strong access requirement is not vicious after all (see Fales 2014).