 However, Warren’s attempt to solve the error problem can be questioned. The error problem arises as a result of the fact that the following two possibilities are consistent with Jones’s possession of disp. First, Jones means addition by ‘+’ and is responding correctly to the relevant queries. Second, Jones means some quus-like function and is responding incorrectly. What Warren thus needs is a characterisation of normal situations such that the latter possibility is ruled out. Thus, what is required is a characterisation of normal situations such that, when those situations obtain, we are entitled to be nearly certain that Jones will answer with the sum, and that in answering with the sum Jones is responding correctly. The trouble is that there is an infinite range of functions \(F_1\),…, \(F_n\) that have different extensions from the addition function. If Jones means some function \(F_i\) among them, and if she answers with the sum, she would be answering incorrectly. Thus, the normal situations have to be such that their obtaining ensures that Jones means by ‘+’ none of the functions in this open-ended and infinite set. The question that drives Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s objection is: how could this be achieved other than through the inclusion of a clause in the characterisation of normal situations to the effect that Jones means addition by ‘+’ (or at least, that Jones means a function with the same extension as addition)? How could the obtaining of a non-semantically characterised set of situations have the effect of excluding every member of an open-ended and infinite set of semantically or intentionally characterised states of affairs (Jones means \(F_1\) by ‘+’, Jones means \(F_2\) by ‘+’, and so on ad  infinitum)?[13]