   Moreover, since we’ve already seen  (§4.1)  that it is possible for a chancy and indeterministic process to produce a non-random sequence of outcomes, and such a sequence would not be random, we also have a counterexample to claim (i). Claim (i) could be saved if we made a more robust claim about what could happen under indeterminism. There is a sense in which, while it is possible that a fair coin could land heads an infinite number of times, it would not. That is, the counterfactual ‘If I tossed the coin an infinite number of times, it wouldn’t land all heads’ is apparently true. There is some question whether the counterfactual really is true; Lewis (1979a) and Williams (2008) argue that it is, while Hawthorne (2005)  argues that it is not. But if it is, the way lies open to defend a modified counterfactual version of P2: