 Both Lycan (1996) and Rosenthal (2005) are sanguine in the face of this objection. Each allows that targetless higher-order representations are a possibility (albeit rare, perhaps), and each opts to say that the subject in such a case is phenomenally conscious. But each denies that this is a problem for their account. Lycan, for example, insists that it is surely possible that it might seem to someone that she is feeling pain when really no relevant first-order representation of pain is present. (He suggests that the effects of morphine, which leaves patients saying that their pain feels just as it was, but that they no longer care, might constitute such a case.) And surely such a person would have a phenomenally conscious experience as of pain. Rosenthal, likewise, uses pain as an example. He points to cases of dental patients who initially experience pain in the dentist’s chair despite the fact that the relevant nerves are completely destroyed. It seems that their fear, combined with the noise and vibration of the drill, causes them to mistakenly think that they are feeling pain. (When the drilling is stopped, and their dead nerves are explained to them, they thereafter experience only the sound and the vibration.) So this would be a case in which a HOT about experiencing pain is alone sufficient to induce a phenomenally conscious experience as of being in pain. A critic, however, might respond that the illusion is caused, instead, by a vivid imagining of pain, rather than by a HOT about feeling pain. Alternatively, if a HOT is causally involved it might be that a top-down expectation of pain causes a first-order experience of pain, as opposed to being constitutive of the feeling of pain. It might be that introspective anticipation of pain causes the pain in the first-place. (Note that this seems perfectly possible, since it is the opposite of well-known placebo effects of expectation in reducing pain.)