 A second line of objection against Papineau’s account of desires is that it leaves desire content highly indeterminate. My desire for food, for instance, usually gives rise to a whole chain of events: the occurrence of certain bodily movements, the ingestion of food, the uptake of nutrients and, ultimately, the enhancement of my biological fitness. Arguably, all of these events could be characterized as “effects which it is the desire’s biological purpose to produce”, so it may seem that the theory does not assign a unique content to my desire. In a later paper, Papineau (1998, 9) attempts to solve this problem by saying that a desire’s content is determined by its “specific function”, where the specific function of a trait is ‘‘the immediate effect it produces at the lowest level of description where it appears as an unanalysed component in the functional analysis’’ (Papineau 1998, 4; our   emphasis).[14]  This move rules out contents like I induce the uptake of nutrients or I enhance my biological fitness (for the desire that is, ex hypothesi, a desire for food), but it is controversial whether it succeeds in fully resolving the indeterminacy problem (cf. Schulte 2019, 164–168).