 We have seen that Bealer thinks that a rational intuition is a modal seeming: either a seeming to be true and necessarily true, or a seeming to be possible. In other places Russell (2017: 232) defines an a priori intuition as the psychological state people are in when some proposition seems true to them solely on the basis of their understanding that proposition. This definition of an a priori intuition allows us to distinguish between what Bealer called a physical intuition that a house undermined will fall, because it does not seem true to us solely on the basis of understanding what it says, and the intuition that if P, then not not P, or that if someone knows P, then she believes P and P is true. Unlike on Bealer’s account of rational intuitions, this account of intuition does not require that the propositions that are the objects of intuitions be modal. It provides a way of distinguishing a priori justifiable necessary propositions such as Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried males from empirically justifiable necessary propositions such as Necessarily, water is H2O since an intuition that the former proposition is true can be based solely on a person’s understanding it but an intuition that the latter is true must be based partly on understanding how things are in the external world. This account of intuition also allows that what are called synthetic a priori proposition (like  10a–14a)  can be the objects of a priori intuitions since they can seem true to a person solely on the basis of her understanding them.