 Proponents of the alternative view—that some thinking occurs in language—have pointed to the phenomenology of thought. It certainly seems as if we are thinking in language when we “hear” ourselves silently talking to ourselves (Carruthers 1996; see also Langland-Hassan &amp; Vicente 2018 on the nature and significance of inner speech). Another type of consideration that proponents of this view highlight is the finding that success on certain tasks (e.g., spatial reorientation that relies on combining landmark information with geometrical information) is selectively impaired when the linguistic system is engaged but not when comparable attention is given to non-linguistic distractors. The suggestion is that solving these tasks requires thinking in one’s natural language and that some of the crucial concepts must be couched linguistically (Hermer-Vazquez, Spelke, &amp; Katsnelson 2001; Shusterman &amp; Spelke 2005; Carruthers 2002; see also Gleitman &amp; Papafragou 2012 for a critical overview of a range of tasks where online processing has been thought to rely on linguistic representation).