One might wonder whether it is coherent to interpret all meaningful existence questions as internal: don't we need the concept of existence to introduce and meaningfully discuss the frameworks themselves, and their pragmatic virtues? Can it be frameworks “all the way down”? But, for purposes of this article, it suffices to ask how the notion of ontological commitment fits in to Carnap's scheme. One might expect Carnap to tie talk of ontological commitment to external questions, and reject it accordingly: if it is cognitively meaningless to say that Ks exist in reality, then it is cognitively meaningless to say that a theory presupposes or assumes that Ks exist in reality.  But that is not what Carnap did. Rather, he endorsed Quine's quantifier account of ontological commitment, applying it internally; his only reservation had to do with Quine's use of the word ‘ontological’.[48]  For Carnap, a theory always comes packaged with a linguistic framework for interpreting the theory. To say that a theory is ontologically committed to Ks, then, is just to say that according to the rules of the framework-cum-theory, it is true that Ks exist. A philosopher can be said to “accept a kind of entities” when he introduces a linguistic framework that, first, introduces a general term satisfied by all and only entities of that kind and, second, introduces variables to range over all and only those entities (see Carnap 1950: 213).