 Logical pluralists maintain that there is more than one correct logic (see entry on  logical pluralism).  Now, there are perfectly uncontroversial senses in which several distinct logical systems might be thought to be equally legitimate: different logical formalisms might lend themselves more or less well to different applications, e.g., classical propositional logic may be used to model electric circuits, the Lambek calculus naturally models phrase structure grammars, and so forth. If “correct” or “legitimate” is merely understood as “having a useful application”, monists should have no complaints about such anodyne forms of “pluralism”. The monist may happily admit that there is a vast number of systems of logic that make for worthy objects of study, many of which will have useful applications. What monists must have in mind, then, is a more demanding sense of “correctness”. According to Priest, the monist takes there to be, over and above questions of local applicability, a core or “canonical” (Priest 2006: 196) application of logic. The canonical use of logic consists in determining “what follows from what—what premises support what conclusion—and why” (idem). It is only when the question is framed in these terms, that the full force of the opposition between monists and pluralists can be appreciated. The monist maintains that there is but one logic fit to play this core role; the pluralist insists that several logics have an equally good claim to playing it.