 Similarly, Jonathan Wolff has argued that “to exploit someone is to make use of their circumstances in a way which fails properly to acknowledge their standing as an end in themself” (1999: 113). He then points out that the different traditions in moral philosophy—Kantian, Aristotelian, and Utilitarian—offer different accounts of what it means to treat others as ends in themselves. Yet, on Wolff’s analysis, each of these accounts ends up returning to fairness. For example, Wolff argues that “A Kantian interpretation of the baseline for exploitation—motivated by taking a Kantian interpretation of what it is to be an end in itself—leads us to a ‘fairness’ norm. Kantian exploitation … is to use another person’s vulnerable circumstances to obtain their actual compliance with a situation that violates norms of fairness” (1999: 114). Both Wolff’s and Sample’s analyses of the relationship between exploitation, unfairness, and disrespect are plausible, but neither characterizes disrespect as an additional condition that limits the scope of exploitation. If we want to avoid the problems for purely distributive accounts that Elster and Ferguson raise, we require conditions that do more than characterise exploitation as a distributively unfair transactional outcome.