  When it comes to cases concerning agents who are disposed to act wrongly, actualists consider their possibilist counterparts to be overly idealistic by theorizing about our moral obligations without considering the moral imperfections that result in our failing to do the best that we can. According to actualists, the specific way in which our imperfections need to be considered is by taking into account the truth-value of certain counterfactuals of freedom, i.e., certain facts about what we would freely do if we were in some circumstances. The only counterfactuals that are relevant to our objective obligations are ones in which the circumstances in the antecedent are fully described (Jackson 1985: 178, 186; Jackson &amp; Pargetter 1986: 240). This is because strengthening the antecedent of a counterfactual, i.e., adding information to the antecedent, can alter the counterfactual’s truth-value (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973).