 Jackson and Pargetter (1986: 246–249) believe that incompatible prescriptions are objectionable only when they arise from the same set of alternatives. But their view never generates incompatible prescriptions out of the same set of alternatives. Out of the set of alternatives of ⟨agreeing to review the paper⟩ at \(t_1\) or ⟨declining to review the paper⟩ at \(t_1\), ⟨declining to review the paper⟩ is obligatory. But out of the \(t_1\)–\(t_2\) alternatives available to Procrastinate at \(t_1\), ⟨agreeing to review the paper and then writing the review⟩ is the obligatory option. Hence, according to contextualist actualism, as long as actualism does not prescribe incompatible obligations from the same set of alternatives, incompatible prescriptions are unproblematic. Still, one might object that their view is not action-guiding in the sense that their theory does not say whether the overriding obligation takes priority over the other obligations (cf. Jackson 2014: 636).