 Another influential understanding of “harm” is that initially proposed by Raz: “To harm a person is to diminish his prospects, to affect adversely his possibilities” (Raz 1986: 414; Gardner &amp; Shute 2000; Simester &amp; von Hirsch 2011; Edwards 2014, 2019). Harm is essentially understood not as a setback to interests, but a setback to autonomy. Autonomy is essentially understood as the ability to choose between an adequate range of valuable options, while in possession of the appropriate capacities to make such choices and while sufficiently independent of others. There are plainly numerous ways one can set back such autonomy. The problem of explaining why pain is harmful raises its head again. Many would take the infliction of pain on another to be harmful, without waiting to ask if the victim has suffered any setback in her ability to choose between an adequate range of valuable options, which surely, she will often not have done. And what of Devlin’s case of harm to animals? Devlin is likely to pop up at this point to repeat his view that the reason we criminalize cruelty to animals is that it is morally wrong and no potential defeating factor is strong enough to overturn that judgement for purposes of criminalization. There is no need to establish any harm in the first place. Hart, as touched on above, while accepting harm must be part of the story, offered the avoidance of “suffering” as the ground for criminalizing animal cruelty. Setback to autonomy or prospect-harm, however, looks like a non-starter, for animals, though beings that can be harmed, are not autonomous beings, at least on any standard account. Similarly, severely mentally disordered persons may in some cases lack the capacity for autonomy, but it is plain as day that they can be harmed, something the “setback to autonomy” or “prospect harm” conception seems ill equipped to account for (Stanton-Ife 2010: 157–162; Tadros 2011).