 Brito’s accounts of human freedom and moral responsibility heavily depend on Godfrey of Fontaines. Godfrey, a theology master, is the author of an important set of quodlibetal questions, where he offers a strongly intellectualist account of the psychology of human acts (or of free agency). After Aquinas’ death in 1274, two main notions of human agency were opposed, especially among theologians. On the one hand, voluntarist theologians proposed that intellect and will are the two main faculties of the intellectual soul, with the intellect being a cognitive power, and the will an active, or dynamic, power. Since the perfection of the will is greater than that of the intellect, will is the main agent of human action. Intellectual knowledge is only a condition sine qua non of free action. In other words, the intellect’s function is merely to present to the will the objects of action. On the other hand, as a critical response to voluntarism, intellectualism proposes that the intellect’s main function is to act responsibly. Thus, intellectualist theologians, such as Godfrey, hold that the intellect’s function is not only to present to the will the objects of action, but also to judge about the good and evil of possible actions. Moreover, voluntarist theologians consider will to be an active power, whereas the intellectualists consider it a passive one insofar as it is moved by the judgment it receives from the intellect. Accordingly, voluntarist theologians raise against the intellectualists the charge of determinism, since in the latter’s position, the will’s action would not be properly free. On the other hand, intellectualist theologians reject the voluntarists’ consideration of will as a cognitive power, as it would perform the intellect’s judgment about good and evil.