 On Nature 25, however, is extremely unclear. The better-preserved and clearer texts we have by the Epicureans that deal with their philosophy of mind, such as On the Nature of Things and The Letter to Herodotus (Epicurus’ summary of his physics) seem to support an identity theory of mind—that the mind is just a bodily organ (like the brain, but located in the chest), and that psychological states and events are the same as atomic states and events. The passages cited to support an “emergent self” do not obviously commit Epicurus to the position, and they can be read in a way that is consistent with an identity theory of mind. And even if Epicurus did believe in an emergent self that acquires causal powers that transcend the powers of the atoms, he would not need to posit the swerve. The “laws of physics” simply sum up the effects of a number of causal factors that determine how an atom will move, like its weight and its collisions with other atoms. If there really were an emergent and transcendent self, that self would add another causal factor that could move the atoms. There doesn’t need to be an antecedent indeterminacy to ensure that the atoms can be moved by the self. In his solution to the fatalist “lazy argument” (see section 1.3), Carneades says something along these lines: once we have a “voluntary motion of the mind” that obeys us, we do not need a random swerve to help ensure our freedom.