  Three of the objections to calling the Republic feminist say more about the contest over the label ‘feminist’ than  they do about Plato. First, some have said that feminism requires a  concern for women’s rights and have then argued that Plato is not a  feminist on the grounds that he shows no interests in women’s  rights. This particular argument is not quite to the point, for it  says nothing about Plato’s view of women per se. He is not  interested in women’s rights just to the extent that he is not  interested in anyone’s rights. Second, some have said that feminism  requires attention to what actual women want. Since Plato shows no  interest in what actual women want, he would seem on this view of  feminism to be anti-feminist. But the limitations of this criticism  are apparent as soon as we realize that Plato shows no interest in  what actual men want. Plato focuses instead on what women (and men)  should want, what they would want if they were in the best  possible psychological condition. Actual women (and actual men), as  we might put Plato’s point, are subject to false consciousness.  Third, some have insisted that feminism requires attention to and  concern for the particular interests and needs of women as distinct  from the particular interests and needs of men. Since Plato does not  admit of particular women’s interests and needs, he would not, in  this view, be a feminist (except insofar as he accidentally promoted  any supposed particular interests by, say, proposing the abolition of the private family). Again, however, this objection turns on what we  understand by ‘feminism’ more than on what Socrates is  saying in the Republic. There should be no doubt that there  are conceptions of feminism according to which the Republic  is anti-feminist. But this does not undercut the point that the  Republic advances a couple of plausibly feminist concerns.