 Cohen thought this interpretation of Kant was wrong, and he thought that influential objections to Kant depended on it. Cohen was especially concerned with Trendelenburg’s well-known “neglected alternative” objection to Kant’s claim that space and time are nothing but the forms of intuition. But Cohen was also concerned with J.F. Herbart’s (and in Cohen’s own time, Helmholtz’s) contention that Kant thought spatial representations were innate. Since Cohen thought both Trendelenburg’s and Herbart’s objections depended on a misinterpretation of Kant, he thought those objections failed. He responded to them by defending an alternative account of the relation between objectivity and the Kantian a priori (Köhnke 1991, 175–8; Patton 2005). (See Biagioli 2014 and Biagioli 2018 for a broadly sympathetic account of Cohen’s response to Helmholtz in particular; Hyder 2013 offers a defense of Helmholtz on geometry against Cohen’s criticisms of him.)