 According to (Necessitarian-T) and other related views, the property a truth-maker x has of making a given proposition P true is an essential feature of it. Why so? Because x is supposed to be something the mere existence of which suffices for the truth of P; it couldn’t have existed without P being true (Armstrong 1997: 115). But Lewis’ proposal is to treat essentialist attributions about truth-making in the same relativistic spirit that counterpart theory treats every other modal attribution (2003: 27–32). Think of Harry qua golden Labrador, i.e., under the counterpart relation of being a golden Labrador. All his counterparts selected by this relation are golden. So every world in which Harry or one of the counterparts exists is a world in which “Harry is golden” is true. In other words, Harry qua golden is truth-maker for the proposition that Harry is golden. But this doesn’t commit us to necessary connexions between distinct existences—to a dog that couldn’t have failed to be golden. In another context it will be just as legitimate to talk about Harry in a different way, as Harry qua dog. In that context his counterparts will include dogs that aren’t golden. So Harry qua dog will be the truth-maker for the statement that Harry is a dog, but not the statement that he is golden.