 Guala has propounded an account of institutions he refers to as the rules-in-equilibrium approach. This account, as its name suggests, seeks to unify the rules-based conception of institutions and the view that institutions are the equilibria of strategic games (Guala 2016). As such, institutions facilitate coordination and cooperation; indeed, that is their defining function. However, regularities in behaviour in accordance with an equilibrium strategy, e.g. everyone driving on the left, typically take the form of a rule, e.g. ‘Drive on the left’. Therefore, according to Guala, essentially institutions are rules that people are motivated to follow, i.e. rules backed up by a system of incentives and expectations that motivate people to follow these rules. Accordingly, and in contrast with collective acceptance accounts (see section 3 below), there is no need to posit joint intentions or the like in order to ensure the rules in part constitutive of an institution are followed—or otherwise to provide the ‘glue’ that holds an institution together. 