 Giles’ account of knowledge is indebted to Aquinas, but, again, reveals many original features. In the first place, he insists on a strictly causal interpretation — be it direct or via a medium — of the cognitive process, both at the level of sensory and intellectual acts. Secondly, the Augustinian master doesn’t conceive of the role of “intelligible species” or formales expressiones as he often writes, as essential to the process of cognition in itself. As Giorgio Pini (2016) has shown, the intelligible species is necessary only when the object cannot be present in the intellect directly. Admittedly, this direct presence is possible only in the beatific vision (after death) and most probably in the cognition angels have of themselves. For human knowledge in this life, on the contrary, intelligible species fulfill a necessary function, as causal proxies, as Pini (2016) writes, mediating between the object and the cognitive power. Difficulties for Giles’ account emerge especially when it comes to defining the ontological status of the species. The interpretation of cognition in terms of causation seems in fact to imply, according to Giles’ own presuppositions, that the species belongs to the same kind of the thing it represents. On the other hand, the intelligible species is in the intellect, and this presence is explained in terms of inherence of an accident (the species) in a substance. Giles himself is aware of this difficulty, since in one passage he claims that such species are in themselves neither substances nor accidents. They can, however, be “reduced” to the kind to which the represented thing belongs.  Pini (2016) is right in pointing out that Giles’ answer seems to raise more problems than it can solve.