  One final argument used by reductive realists to motivate their position is worth mentioning here. This argument has to do with the nature of relational change. Almost all medievals accept the intuitively plausible view that things can acquire (and lose) relations without undergoing any real (as opposed to merely Cambridge) change.  Thus, Socrates can come to be shorter than Simmias solely in virtue of a change in Simmias’s  height.[19]  As reductive realists such as Ockham often point out, this fact about relational change admits of a ready explanation on their position, since Socrates’s relation is nothing over and above Simmias’s and Socrates’s heights, the latter of which never changes. By contrast, the same fact appears to pose a serious challenge for the non-reductive realist. For if Socrates’s relation is something distinct from Simmias’s and Socrates’s heights, then apparently Socrates must acquire something new when Simmias’s height increases. But then, contrary to the original intuition, the non-reductive realist must say that Socrates undergoes a real change after all.