 Cynthia Gayman (2011) and Erin C. Tarver (2013), for example, have argued that women’s constitution as subjects in a social milieu of oppressive gender relations ironically opens the possibility for change and subversion. Tarver’s argument proceeds by bringing a Deweyan account of habit to bear on Judith Butler’s theory of gender as performative, whereas Gayman puts Dewey in dialog with Foucault. Specifically, Gayman combines a Foucaultian account of the gendered subject with a Deweyan insistence that critical investigation happens “by recognition of a problem, which in turn provokes the kind of reflexive activity leading to recognition that what is, does not have to be” (2011, 67). Because the individual is constituted through her interactions and transactions with others in the world, the recognition of problems necessarily occurs through everyday experiences and interactions. It is not that others are themselves problems; rather, the encounters in our world that cause us to stumble provoke us to ask questions about how to proceed. They, as Gayman puts it following Foucault and Colin Koopman (2011), provoke a “problematization” (67). Thus, for Gayman, although patterns of gender subordination that women encounter as they become subjects in and through interaction with others in the social world must be resisted, “to be resisted they must be seen, that is, recognized in the first place, which means they must be  experienced , as well as  problematized” (75). Encounter with the other, which happens necessarily through experience, is therefore necessary for the development of feminist consciousness. 