  The particular phenomenological aspects of perceptual experience—transparency and immediacy—that the naïve realist and the intentionalist try to accommodate in different ways, are the following. Transparency: When one attends to what it is like for one to have a visual experience it seems to one as though one does so through attending to mind-independent objects in one’s environment and their features. Immediacy: Furthermore, our perceptual experiences are non-neutral about the actual presence of the mind-independent objects and features in our environment they are directed upon. They appear to have a coercive power and authority over our beliefs. Even if one believes that one is hallucinating, the phenomenal immediacy of the experience—its non-neutrality about the actual presence of mind-independent objects and features in our environment—is not thereby extinguished. Intentionalists can explain the transparency and immediacy of perceptual experience in terms of the idea that (a) perceptual experiences are mental states with intentional contents that represent the mind-independent world as being a certain way (hence transparency); and in terms of the idea that (b) such states play a distinctive kind of functional role in our mental economy (hence immediacy). This is not the account offered by the naïve realist. For the naïve realist, one’s experience relates to the world in a non-representational manner. According to the naïve realist, the transparency and immediacy of genuine perceptions are explained in terms of the idea that mind-independent objects and their features are constituents of one’s perceptual experience that determine, at least in part, the phenomenal character of that experience. The phenomenal transparency and immediacy of a hallucination is explained derivatively—in terms of its being introspectively indiscriminible from something it is not—a mental event with the phenomenal character of a genuine perception.