 Other intellectual virtues have received less attention to date, though not for lack of philosophical merit. These include intellectual generosity (Roberts &amp; Wood 2007: 293), epistemic temperance (Battaly 2010), open-mindedness (Adler 2004; Baehr 2011; Carter &amp; Gordon 2014b), intellectual perseverance (King 2014b), inquisitiveness (L. Watson 2015), and curiosity (Alfano 2013a; Whitcomb 2010). In a recent book, Cassam (2019) catalogues a range of epistemic vices. Some, such as closed-mindedness, are character traits. Others, such as wishful thinking, are better conceptualized as ways of thinking. Still others, such as epistemic malevolence and epistemic insouciance, are best understood as attitudes. Cassam characterizes the attitude of malevolence as a stance, which is a voluntarily-adopted policy to engage in certain types of conduct; by contrast, he characterizes the attitude of epistemic insouciance as a posture, which is affective and involuntary (in this case, a reckless and flippant disregard for truth, evidence, and expertise). These theoretical reflections have recently been bolstered by empirical work by Meyer, Alfano, &amp; de Bruin (2021), who who show that possession of the epistemic vices of indifference to truth (related to epistemic insouciance) and intellectual rigidity (related to closed-mindedness) predicts acceptance of fake news, conspiracy theories, and misinformation about COVID-19.