In addition to the focus on public meaning, as mentioned in the previous section, a characteristic position of the new originalists is an emphasis on – in their vocabulary – a distinction between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional construction.” As the new originalists draw this distinction, constitutional interpretation involves ascertaining the “public meaning” of the Constitution at the time it was ratified. (On “public meaning,” see section 4.2.) Constitutional construction, as defined by some of the new originalists, involves constitutional adjudication in cases where the original meaning “runs out,” “fails to provide a unique rule of law,” or does not “dictate a unique application”. Barnett 2013, 619; 1999, 645–46; Whittington 1999a, 7. In such cases, the new originalists think that “an act of creativity beyond interpretation” – “the construction of meaning” – is required. Whittington 1999a, 7. Solum (2010) and Barnett (2011) draw the distinction importantly differently, taking constitutional construction to be the ascertaining of the “legal effect” of a provision, including both its contribution and its application to particular cases (see Berman and Toh 2013 564–70).