 The usual way to understand the pleasure of freedom from pain and from distress is by way of the distinction between kinetic pleasures and katastematic, or what are, following Cicero, misleadingly called ‘static’ ones (Diogenes Laertius X 136). The name of the former implies motion and the name of the latter implies a state or condition. The reason the distinction is important is that freedom from pain and from distress is a state or condition, not a motion. Epicurus holds not only that this state is a kind of pleasure but that it is the most complete pleasure (Principal Doctrines III). Modern commentators have taken various approaches to explaining why this state should be considered a pleasure, as opposed to, e.g., the attitude of taking pleasure in the fact that one is free of pain and distress. After all, taking pleasure in a fact is not a feeling in the same sense as the pleasure of drinking when thirsty. Since the latter is usually taken to be an example of kinetic pleasure (and is associated with the pain of thirst), sometimes katastematic pleasure is said to be just kinetic pleasure free from pain and distress, e.g., the pleasure of satiety. A somewhat broader conception of katastematic pleasure holds that it is the enjoyment of one’s natural constitution when one is not distracted by bodily pain or mental distress. Finally, some commentators hold the pleasure of freedom from pain and from distress to be a feeling available only to the wise person, who properly appreciates simple pleasures. Since eating plain bread and drinking water are usually not difficult to achieve, to the wise, their enjoyment is not overwhelmed by fear (130–31). Accordingly, the pleasure they take in these is free of pain and distress. Of course, the wise do not have to confine themselves to simple pleasures; they can enjoy luxurious ones as well – as long as they avoid needing them, which entails fear.