 Popper (1959) points out that Jeffreys’ proposal, as it stands, contradicts the axioms of probability. Every member of LIN is also a member of PAR, where the coefficient, \(c\), is set to 0. Hence ‘Law, \(L\), is a member of LIN’ entails ‘Law, \(L\), is a member of PAR.’ Jeffreys’ approach assigns higher probability to the former than the latter. But it follows from the axioms of probability that when \(A\) entails \(B\), the probability of \(B\) is greater than or equal to the probability of \(A\). Popper argues, in contrast to Jeffreys, that LIN has lower prior probability than PAR. Hence LIN is—in Popper’s sense—more falsifiable, and hence should be preferred as the default hypothesis. One response to Popper’s objection is to amend Jeffrey’s proposal and restrict members of PAR to equations where \(c \ne 0\).