 On the other hand, more recent work on quantifiers suggests that the divergence had been exaggerated, in part because of how Frege’s idea of variable-binding was originally implemented. Consider again the proposition that some boy sang, and the proposed logical division into the quantifier and the rest: \(\exists x [\textrm{Boy}(x) \land \textrm{Sang}(x)]\); something is both a boy and an individual that sang. This is one way to regiment the English sentence. But one can also offer a logical paraphrase that more closely parallels the grammatical division between ‘some boy’ and ‘sang’: for some individual \(x\) such that \(x\) is a boy, \(x\) sang. One can formalize this paraphrase with restricted quantifiers, which incorporate a restriction on the domain over which the variable in question ranges. For example, ‘\(\exists x{:}B(x)\)’ can be an existential quantifier that binds a variable ranging over the boys in the relevant domain, with ‘\(\exists x{:}B(x) [S(x)]\)’ being true iff some boy sang. Since ‘\(\exists x{:}B(x) [S(x)]\)’ and ‘\(\exists x [B(x) \land S(x)]\)’ are logically equivalent, logic provides no reason for preferring the latter regimentation of the English sentence. And choosing the latter does not show that the proposition expressed with ‘Some boy sang’ has a structure that differs from grammatical structure of the sentence.