 Few philosophers were satisfied with Hintikka’s attempt to revise our ordinary use of the term “consistent” as he presented it in Knowledge and Belief.  However, he and others soon provided more popular ways of dealing with logical omniscience. In the 1970s responses to the problem of logical omniscience introduced semantical entities that explain why the agent appears to be, but in fact is not really guilty of logical omniscience. Hintikka called these entities “impossible possible worlds” (1979; see also the entry on  impossible worlds  and Jago 2014). The basic idea is that an agent may mistakenly count among the worlds consistent with its knowledge, some worlds containing logical contradictions. The mistake is simply a product of the agent’s limited resources; the agent may not be in a position to detect the contradiction and may erroneously count them as genuine possibilities. In some respects, this approach can be understood as an extension of the aforementioned response to logical omniscience that Hintikka had already outlined in Knowledge and Belief.