 Another area of investigation focuses on the distinction between norms that are thought to be moral and norms that aren’t (see also Machery and Stich 2022 for the cross-cultural work on the moral/conventional distinction). Buchtel et al. (2015) have shown that the Mandarin translation of “immoral” applies to a surprisingly different set of behaviors than “immoral” in English: the former primarily applies to behaviors viewed as uncivilized, the latter often to harmful behavior (see also Dranseika, Berniūnas &amp; Silius 2018). Berniūnas (2020) extends this research to the Mongolian translation of “moral.” Asking people to classify norms as moral and non-moral, Levine and colleagues (2021) have also shown that religious affiliation influences what counts as moral: religious Jews and non-believers have a very narrow moral domain, while Christians and Muslims tend to have a broad moral domain; surprisingly, Hindus fail to distinguish moral from non-moral norms (see also Dranseika, Berniūnas &amp; Sousa 2016). This kind of findings has led Machery (2018) to propose that morality is a cultural invention that is not found in every culture (see also Stich 2018).