 Not all Phenomenologists adopt the axiological approach to moral theory. Heidegger (1927 [2010: 97]), for example, was dismissive of then-prevalent theories of value, and he turns instead to freedom and “authenticity” to characterize ethical subjectivity. By “authenticity”, he means a subject’s taking responsibility for and ownership over the choices she makes that give meaning and value to her life. She thereby lifts herself out of the moral complacency that characterizes agents who passively accept traditional and cultural conceptions of what “one” does (Loidolt 2018: 703–704). It is disputed whether Heidegger thus commits himself to a “decisionism”—that is, the view that a subject chooses who she will be without recourse to reasons or evaluative standards (cf., e.g., Tugendhat 1979, Okrent 1999)—or a “deep deliberation”—the view that the subject chooses who she will be in a critical reflection on her own identity (see Crowell 2007, 2013; Burch 2010).