 It is characteristic of modern moral thought to see impartiality as a requirement of, if not a fundamental component of, morality. However, while nearly every moral theory requires some forms of impartiality in at least some contexts, and forbids some forms of partiality in at least some contexts, there is little general agreement beyond that. One straightforward thought is that to act morally is simply to act from the standpoint of impartial benevolence. Many writers have simply assumed that to assert the importance of impartiality in the context of morality just is to accept the idea of acting from such a perspective. It is generally agreed that some sort of close connection obtains between morality and impartiality. Indeed, the phrases ‘moral point of view’ and ‘impartial (or ‘impersonal’) point of view’ are sometimes used interchangeably to refer to the imagined impersonal perspective from which, it is supposed, moral judgments are to be made (Baier 1958, chapter 8; Harsanyi 1982; Scheffler 1982, 1985; Smith 1976 [1759]; Wolf 1992; see also Blum 1980, Chapter 3). As noted above, however, the word ‘impartial’ is a general term with many particular species; it follows that the phrase ‘impartial point of view’ is itself ambiguous. At most, it might be that the moral point of view constitutes one sort of impartial point of view.