 Herbert Simon and I.J. Good were each among the first to call attention to the cognitive demands of subjective expected utility theory, although neither one in his early writings abandoned the principle of expected utility as the normative standard for rational choice. Good, for instance, referred to the recommendation to maximize expected utility as the ordinary principle of rationality, whereas Simon called the principle objective rationality and considered it the central tenet of global rationality. The rules of rational behavior are costly to operate in both time and effort, Good observed, so real agents have an interest in minimizing those costs (Good 1952: 7(i)). Efficiency dictates that one choose from available alternatives an option that yields the largest result given the resources available, which Simon emphasized is not necessarily an option that yields the largest result overall (Simon 1947: 79). So reasoning judged deficient without considering the associated costs may be found meritorious once all those costs are accounted for—a conclusion that a range of authors soon came to endorse, including Amos Tversky: