 For within the free will debate, compatibilists are not alone in accepting the existence of certain types of luck. Many libertarians assume that our actions are caused by prior events (not themselves in our control) in accordance with probabilistic laws of nature (see, for example, Kane 1996, 1999, Nozick 1981). Given this view, it is natural to conclude that if determinism is false, there is at least one kind of luck in what sort of person one decides to be and so in what actions one performs. That is, there is luck in the sense that there is no explanation as to why a person chose to be one way rather than another. At the same time, Kane, for example, denies that there must be luck in the sense that one’s choices are flukes or accidents if determinism is false. In Kane’s view, what is important is to be free from luck of the second kind. For even if one’s action is not determined, it can still be the case that the causes of one’s action are one’s own efforts and intention. And if one’s action is caused by one’s own efforts and intentions, then one’s action is not lucky in the sense of being a fluke or accident. But while this shows that one’s actions can be free of luck of an important kind, it still leaves unaddressed luck of a third kind, namely the kind at issue in the moral luck debate: the dependence of agents’ choices on factors beyond their control. And it appears that on the libertarian view in question, our choices are indeed subject to luck of this sort. (See Pereboom 2002 and 2014 for a discussion of the similar burdens shared by compatibilists and this sort of libertarian.) Only the agent-causal libertarians discussed above offer an account that aims specifically at eliminating a type of moral luck. (See Levy 2011 for an argument that no account of free will can avoid challenges concerning luck.)