Is this a good objection? On the face of it, it might seem not. With respect to SA above, for example, the two premises are individually quite plausible, the argument appears valid, yet the conclusion seems very implausible. So, “something plausible has to go” (DeRose 1995, 2; emphasis added). Thus, that EC is not an entirely no fault view might mean, as Timothy Williamson has argued (2005b, Section II), that considerations of charity per se do not favor it. But why think that the contextualist’s error theory is problematic? This is one of the ways in which Cohen has responded to concerns about EC’s error theory (2014, 82–83).[16] DeRose (2006; 2009, Chapter 5; see too Montminy 2009) replies along similar lines: if you present a group of subjects with SA, for instance, and ask them whether the conclusion contradicts an ordinary claim to “know” such a thing, some will say “yes”, and some will say “no”. If EC turns out to be true, then many are blind to that, and so on. So, whichever view turns out to be right, EC or Invariantism, a substantial portion of ordinary speakers are afflicted by “semantic blindness” (Hawthorne 2004, 107).