 Suppose the plaintiff is to prove two separate claims, \(A\) and \(B\), according to the governing standard of proof, say, preponderance of the evidence (which the legal probabilist may interpret as the requirement that the facts be established with greater probability than .5). If the plaintiff has proven each claim with probability .7, the burden of proof should be met. And yet, if the two claims are independent, the probability of their conjunction is only \(.7\times.7=.49\), below the required threshold. Arguably, common law systems subscribe to a conjunction principle which states that if \(A\) and \(B\) are established according to the governing standard of proof, so is their conjunction. Probability theory—the criticism goes—cannot capture this principle. This is the so-called conjunction paradox or difficulty about conjunction. It was originally formulated by Cohen (1977) and has enjoyed great popularity every since (Allen 1986; Allen and Stein 2013; Allen and Pardo 2019; Haack 2014; Schwartz and Sober 2017; Stein 2005).