 Many virtue epistemologists agree that, in very general terms, knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. Different theories spell out “non-accidentally” differently, but among many practitioners a common understanding of that key term seems to have emerged. Simply put, to know is to believe the truth because of your intellectual virtue (e.g., Sosa 1991: 277; Zagzebski 1996: 271–2, Riggs 2002: 93–4; Lehrer 2000: 223; Greco 2003: 111; Turri 2011). In recent years, some practitioners influenced by the knowledge-first approach have suggested reversing the direction of analysis by starting with competences to know and then understanding belief as potentially-defective knowledge (Miracchi 2015, Kelp 2017). Either way, practitioners hold that there is a tight connection between knowledge, on the one hand, and the exercise of intellectual virtue or competence, on the other hand.