 Public reason liberals take criticisms of radical idealization increasingly seriously. (See Gaus 2011, 232–260 and Vallier 2014, 145–180.) If these criticisms are successful, one might reconsider returning to justificatory populism. However, there may be a third option: moderate idealization. Moderate idealization assigns reasons based on some standard of adequate information and reasoning. Yet it falls short of full information and perfect reasoning. The moderate idealization theorist argues that we can go too far in separating idealized belief-value sets from citizens’ dingy, real-world belief-value sets. We will eventually sever the tie between them. And, as Wolterstorff insists (2007, 153), the idealized person may have no reason to care about his counterpart’s recommendations. (Also see Enoch 2013, 164–170; for a reply, see Gaus 2015). The pull toward radical idealization must balance respecting citizens as they are. (This latter element will be crucial for maintaining stability; see 5.2.) Radical idealization may test the “strains of commitment” (Rawls 1971, 155–9) in demanding that citizens cognitively struggle to see what reasons they have. But moderate idealization may prove acceptable to most ordinary citizens. Moderate idealization is an appropriate acknowledgment of the demands of the impartial perspective.