 It is normatively important whether some non-material care-giving, too, can be given outside relationships—for instance, whether robots can successfully be used to meet the psychological needs that are usually met by those who relate to us within caring relationships. Some argue that we should use robots to make certain kinds of emotional care-giving available—for instance, to ensure that elderly people living alone (usually in highly atomized societies) have access to robot-provided companionship (Aronson 2014). However, one can plausibly assume that no robot can provide genuine companionship, which requires access to another individual’s mind. (At least, as Brake (2017) notes, unless and until we will have developed true artificial intelligence.) The same is true for other personal relationship goods—attention, affection, sympathy, encouragement etc.—which are necessary to meet psychological needs. Therefore, of the senses of “care” outlined above, the most relevant for personal relationship goods is that of caring relationships (see also Brake 2017).