 Coliva (2008) objects that judgments cannot rationalize self-ascriptions of belief in the way the reasons theorist contends, because they are not suitably accessible. Her argument rests, in part, on a claim reminiscent of the self-interpretation view: that the phenomenology of a conscious thought—such as “things will look up”—does not indicate whether this is the content of a judgment or, instead, of a wish. McHugh (2012) responds on behalf of the reasons account, arguing that there is a “phenomenology characteristic of judging that p” that is present in cases where ordinary self-knowledge is possible (2012: 148). This dispute suggests that the prospects for the reasons account, as an account of self-knowledge of the attitudes, may depend in part on whether attitudes have “proprietary phenomenology” (Pitt 2004). (For more on that question, see the entry on  consciousness and intentionality.)