  Much the same point could have been made, of course, with reference to any algorithm which may be fed an input chosen by chance, and so may produce an outcome by chance, but where the output is highly compressible. (One way in which pseudorandom sequence generators are nice in this respect is that they are designed to produce highly compressible sequences, though non-obviously highly compressible ones). The other interesting thing about those algorithms which produce pseudorandom sequences is that they provide another kind of counterexample to the epistemic connection between chance and randomness. For our justification in thinking that a given sequence is random will be based on its passing only finitely many tests; we can be justified in believing pseudorandom sequence to be random (in some respectable sense of justification, as long as justification is weaker than truth), and justified in making the inference to chance via RCT. But then we might think that this poses a problem for RCT to play the right role epistemically, even if it were true. Suppose one sees a genuinely random sequence and forms the justified belief that it is random. The existence of pseudorandom sequences entails that things might seem justificatorily exactly as they are and yet the sequence not be random. But such a scenario, arguably, defeats my knowing that the sequence is random, and thus defeats my knowing the sequence to have been produced by chance (and presumably undermines the goodness of the inference from randomness to chance).