 Fine’s version of anti-positionalism has certain limitations, including the assumption that states arising from a single relation have a unique composition and that substitution operates on objects rather than occurrences of objects. Leo (2013) provides a more fully developed version of anti-positonalism that addresses these limitations from a more formal point of view. According to Leo, relational complexes are structured perspectives on states ‘out there’ in reality, relational complexes have occurrences of objects, and different complexes of the same relation may correspond to the same state. It is key to this approach that substitution is a primitive operation taking a complex and an assignment of objects to the occurrences of objects in the complex as input and returning another complex as output. For example, for the complex of Anthony’s loving Cleopatra, substituting Abelard for the occurrence of Anthony and Eloise for the occurrence of Cleopatra results in the complex of Abelard’s loving Eloise. Substitution is identified in terms of basic principles governing substitutions, in particular a composition principle, which forms the heart of an antipositional theory of relations (Leo 2013: 363; for further developments and defence of this version of anti-positionalism, see Leo 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2014, 2016).