 Baumgarten’s metaphysics is frequently characterized as inclining more towards Leibniz than to the “Leibnizian-Wolffian” philosophy; for instance, he makes explicit reference to monads in his presentation of ontology and cosmology, and concerning the pre-established harmony he accepts that it obtains between all substances (not just between soul and body) and does not qualify his endorsement of the system as Wolff came to do (Baumgarten 1739: §761–9; cf. Watkins 2005: 73–81 for discussion). While there is no doubt that Baumgarten adopts a fundamentally Leibnizian picture in his ontology, including the endorsement of the principle of sufficient reason, to leave it at this would be to ignore the important and fruitful role that his Pietist background plays in his philosophical thought (Look 2018). Indeed, Baumgarten’s originality as a thinker consists in his efforts to amend key planks of Leibnizian (and Wolffian) thinking in light of his underlying Pietist commitments.