 A final important source of challenges to metacognitive theories of consciousness concerns the fallibility of the posited representations. What should we say when your higher-order or self-representation misfires? If it misrepresents what sort of sensory state you are in, will the theory claim this makes you feel just as you do when actually in that sort of state? Will it say, for instance, that when one falsely thinks one is in pain what this is like for one is the same as what it’s like to actually feel pain? Some critics—Block 2011, Neander 1998—regard the problems raised by misrepresentation as profound. From a Brentanian perspective, however, the envisaged problem simply cannot arise. The inevitable affirmation of one’s conscious sensation infallibly affirms it as presented, and it cannot be presented as other than it is—and, since such judgment does not really categorize the sensation at all, it cannot miscategorize it. By contrast, contemporary accounts tend to allow that the relevant form of metacognition can represent you to be in a sensory state you aren’t actually in. They then seek to make acceptable what the theories imply—for instance, that the way one feels can be constituted out of false self-attributions of sensation, and that one can feel pain by being conscious of pain, though there is in fact no state of which one is thus conscious (see Rosenthal 2011; Weisberg 2011).