 This is a matter of the content of all legal systems. Where there is law there is also morality, and they regulate the same matters by analogous techniques. Of course to say that law deals with morality’s subject matter is not to say that it does so well, and to say that all legal systems create obligations is not to endorse the duties so created. This notion is distinct from Hart’s “minimum content” thesis according to which there are basic rules governing violence, property, fidelity, and kinship that any legal system must encompass if it aims at the survival of social creatures like ourselves (Hart 1961 [2012: 193–200]). Hart regards this as a matter of “natural necessity” and in that measure is willing to qualify his endorsement of the separability thesis. But even a society that prefers national glory or the worship of gods to survival will charge its legal system with the same tasks its morality pursues. Unlike the rules of a health club, law has broad scope and reaches to the most important things in any society, whatever they may be. Indeed, our most urgent political worries about law and its claims flow from just this capacity to regulate our most vital interests, and law’s wide reach must figure in any argument about its legitimacy. (A distinct argument, developed most fully by Raz (1994) and Gardner (2012a), is that law not only occupies itself with moral matters but makes moral claims over us. For criticism see Kramer 1999: 83–9; Duarte d’Almeida and Edwards 2014.)