 And the “transplant argument” may be less compelling than it appears (Snowdon 2014: 234). Suppose you had a tumor that would kill you unless your brain were replaced with a healthy donated organ. This would have grave side-effects: it would destroy your memories, plans, preferences, and other mental properties. It may not be clear whether you could survive such a thing. But it’s not obvious that you could not survive it either. Maybe the operation could save your life, though at great cost. We cannot confidently rule this out even if the new brain gave you memories, plans, and preferences from the donor. But if it’s not obvious that the brain recipient would not be you, then it’s not obvious that it would be the donor. A brain transplant might be metaphysically analogous to a liver transplant. The claim is not that this is obviously true, but just that it’s not obviously false. And in that case it’s not obvious that a person must go with her transplanted brain.