 Informed by these early inquiries into the inferential characteristics of occurrence types, analytical process ontologists have offered various criteria sets for the classification of occurrences and their relationships to other categories: some promote a division between ongoing (“processes”) and completed (“events”) occurrences, while others argue that ongoing occurrences should be distinguished further into non-developmental and developmental  processes.[8]  There is also considerable disagreement on how to categorize these occurrence types: are they concrete or abstract? Are they particular or general entities? Mourelatos also showed that the logical criteria of Vendler’s and Kenny’s classifications actually function in two ways: they can be used to distinguish various types of occurrences such as processes and events, but they also highlight inferential analogies between processes and stuffs on the one hand, and events and things on the other hand. Most analytical processists characterize processes (or which ever label is used for the basic category) as dynamic individuals that are concrete particulars or else are abstract general patterns. By contrast, heeding the inferential analogies in our reasoning about activities and stuffs, “General Process Theory” rejects the presupposition that concrete individuals need to be particulars: “general processes” (or “dynamics”) are introduced as a new ontological category of concrete, dynamic entities that are non-particular (i.e., possibly multiply occurrent in space and time), determinable, and “functionally individuated” (by contextually determined sections of process  networks).[9]  However, both particularist and non-particularist interpretations agree that processes cannot be individuated in terms of their spacetime location alone and cannot be identified with materially filled space-time regions, thus parting company with “four-dimensionalism,” (a position in contemporary ontology that is occasionally misunderstood as a process-based approach). Furthermore, while processists agree that processes combine and that they exhibit common features, there is disagreement on how to articulate such process combinations (e.g., by a special mereology), and whether the shared patterns of processes belong into a different category (as Whitehead suggested) or are themselves processes as well.