 For Kulvicki, even though the concurrence of these three assumptions does not imply that sounds have durations, the claim that sounds have a duration is still the best explanation of the three uncontroversial claims. Therefore, even though, he does not propose a way to completely undermine this argument, he suggests a way to weaken it at least. The dispositional view can account for the third auditory intuition—for which the time the events we hear take to occur is often coincident with the duration of the related auditory experience—emphasizing the role of mechanical stimulants. If we imagine the circumstance of a “long-lasting, broad-spectrum mechanical stimulant” (2014: 214) which thwacks the sounding object in a stable vibratory disposition, it is not surprising that we hear events for about as long as we hear sounds. Kulvicki himself recognizes that this is not a conclusive way of excluding that sounds have durations, but yet it is a way of weakening this claim.