 Coming to natural philosophy, Gregory of Rimini’s conception of the continuum has been the object of several studies (i.e., Maier 1949, 172–173, 176–177; Cross 1998; Sylla 2005, 260–268). According to Gregory, following Adam Wodeham, the continuum is not composed of point-like entities, but parts of the continuum are themselves magnitudes (Cross 1998, 96). Gregory also claims, this time against Wodeham, that the division of the continuum can actually be completed, so that it is composed of an actual infinity of potential extended parts (Cross 1998, 97–98). It is understood that each of these parts itself includes an infinity of parts (Cross 1998, 102). That said, a problem is to see how exactly the division of the continuum can be completed if any part of the continuum must be said to contain an infinity of parts. It has been argued that it is in connection with this issue that several scholars (following Maier 1949, 172–173) read Gregory as holding that there are infinitesimal parts in the continuum (Cross 1998, 103–104). Yet, in fact, the process is completed, not because one reaches something that cannot be divided, but because every part has been actually set apart from the others, including the ones it contains (Cross 1998, 103). It is in connection with its conception of a continuum composed of an actual infinity of parts, each themselves composed of an actual infinity of parts, that Gregory explains how an infinite can be greater than another by including it (Cross 1998, 105–106; Thakkar 2009, 631–632), thus answering Bradwardine’s objection on infinite parts and wholes (Thakkar 2009, 628–629).