  As we have seen, Aristotle himself anticipated many of the challenges that have since been raised against LNC. One more such challenge is posed by the ubiquity of doxastic inconsistency. Take the desires of Oedipus, for example. In seeking Jocasta as his mate, did he wish to marry his mother? Certainly he did on the de re reading: Oedipus's mother (Jocasta) is such that he wanted to marry her, although he would not have assented to the claim that he wanted to marry his mother. In a sense, then, “Oedipus wanted to marry his mother” is true (de re) and false (de dicto), but no violation of LNC is incurred, since these represent different propositions, the semantic distinction neutralized within the sentential form. But what of the de dicto reading itself: it is really false? After all, as a young boy Oedipus can be assumed (by some) to have exhibited the eponymous complex, according to which the falsity of the (de dicto) proposition that he wanted to marry his mother on a conscious level belies the truth of this proposition on an unconscious level. But this does not entail that he both wished and did not wish to “marry” his mother at the same time and in the same respect. Whether it concerns the unacknowledged incestuous conflict of the Theban king, the indecision of Zerlina's “Vorrei e non vorrei” response to Don Giovanni's invitation, or the unspecified ambivalence of the respondent in Strawson's exchange (1952: 7)