 Central to Broome’s argument is his controversial “collapsing principle” for comparatives: For any x and y, if it is false that y is Fer than x and not false that x is Fer than y, then it is true that x is Fer than y (1997, 74). Many counterexamples have been presented to show the implausibility of the principle (Carlson 2004, 2013; Elson 2014b; Gustafsson 2018). While there are attempts to defend the collapsing principle, or versions of it, (Constantinescu 2012; Andersson &amp; Herlitz 2018) the counterexamples make Broome’s argument less convincing. Another line of argument has consequently been developed in defense of the vagueness interpretation. It is argued that the vagueness interpretation is theoretically parsimonious since it is natural to accept the existence of evaluative vagueness and if it can effortlessly account for alleged examples of incomparability then there is no reason to accept the more mysterious notion of incomparability or to introduce more value relations beyond the standard trichotomous relations (Andersson 2017; Elson 2017).