  Second, says Holton, we need to attend to an important subclass of  our intentions to do something at a future time, namely  contrary-inclination-defeating intentions, or, as he later terms them (Holton 2003), resolutions.  Resolutions are intentions that are formed precisely in order to  insulate one against contrary inclinations one expects to feel when  the time comes. Thus one reason I might form an intention on Monday  to run five miles on Tuesday—as opposed to leaving the issue  open until Tuesday, for decision then—is to reduce the effect  of feelings of lassitude to which I fear I may be subject when  Tuesday rolls around. Then suppose Tuesday rolls around; I am indeed  prey to feelings of lassitude; and I decide as a result not to run.  Now I can be charged with weakness of will. Weakness of will involves, specifically, a failure to act on a resolution;  this is sufficient to differentiate weakness of will from mere change of mind and even from caprice (which is a different species  of unreasonable intention revision, according to Holton).