 According to Marsilius, the ten Aristotelian categories refer to things in reality which themselves are not signs of other things. These categories are names or concepts of primary intention, as he calls them. However, since there are also names which are used to refer to signs or to names of things and not to things themselves — such as the terms ‘genus’ and ‘species’, which are called names of secondary intention — there needs to be an additional category of secondary intention, beside the ten Aristotelian categories of primary intention. This category may be called the ‘category of signs’ (praedicamentum signi) or the ‘category of terms’ (praedicamentum termini), Marsilius  says.[10]  The existence of such a category does not refute the traditional number of ten categories, since the traditional categories, even though they are names or concepts themselves, do not refer to names or concepts, but to things in reality. In claiming such a category, Marsilius goes beyond John Buridan, who does not recognize it, and further elaborates a position already mentioned by Duns Scotus. Accordingly, for the metaphysician who considers ‘being as being’ (ens inquantum ens) there are only ten categories, whereas for the logician who deals with ‘concepts as concepts’ (intentiones per se ) there are more than ten. In the late Middle Ages, philosophers like John Eck attributed the view that there is an additional category called praedicamentum signi to Marsilius of Inghen and his followers, among whom was the Nominalist John  Parreut.[11]