 That said, it is nonetheless perfectly reasonable to exclude some deductively valid syllogisms as good syllogisms. Consider, for example, a syllogism whose conclusion is identical with one of its premisses. It is a deductively valid syllogism, though it is utterly unpersuasive. Dignāga, like any rational thinker, would not, and did not, accept as a good syllogism any syllogism in which the reason (H) and the property to be established (S) are the same property, even if such syllogisms have the same form as the canonical syllogism above. Excluding such circular syllogisms is fully consistent with the view that the syllogisms accepted by Dignāga are only deductively valid ones. (For extensive scholarly discussion of the role of examples in Buddhist arguments, see the collection of articles in Katsura and Steinkellner (eds) 2004.)