 After pursuing his undergraduate studies at UBA, Comesaña obtained his Ph.D. from Brown University under Sosa’s supervision, and is at present a professor at Rutgers University. In Buenos Aires, he was a founding member of the influential but now-defunct Grupo de Acción Filosófica (GAF). Having published on various epistemological issues (on which see  Section 3),  he has devoted some studies to skepticism. He has offered useful overviews of both the so-called Pyrrhonian problematic and skepticism in general (Comesaña 2006a and 2009a, respectively). He has also explored whether the contemporary theories of contextualism and contrastivism can help Pyrrhonists offer a philosophically satisfactory reply to the traditional objection according to which they are reduced to inactivity because action requires belief and they claim to suspend judgment regarding either philosophico-scientific beliefs or all beliefs whatsoever. Comesaña’s verdict is negative (Comesaña 2011).