 When we’re not dealing with self-location, it’s extremely natural to model communication by reading the “appropriate match” in this story as identity. On this model, assertion works as follows: I’m in some doxastic state that, for one reason or another, I’d like you to be in as well. So I encode my doxastic state linguistically somehow, and send the linguistic signal over to you. Then (if all goes well) you respond to the signal I sent by getting yourself into the same doxastic state that I encoded. This is a tractable, simple picture of communication, according to which linguistic communication (or at least this part of it) is a matter of transmitting doxastic states from speaker to hearer. Moss (2012) calls this the “package delivery” model, Egan (2007) calls it the “belief transfer” model, and Weber (2013) calls it the “FedEx” model. (Or rather, this is a generalization of the model described by Egan, Moss, and Weber, theoretically zoomed out to be neutral between Lewis and Perry. Egan, Moss, and Weber all presuppose a Lewisian picture in their papers.) The model is nicely visualized by the following cartoon from Weber (2013: 208):