 Newman too argues that some individual rights presuppose group rights (2011, 76-82). His general analysis of the relationship between individual and group rights is both nuanced and qualified (2011, Part II). As we have seen, he conceives right-holding groups as having rights grounded in their interests as groups, interests that are not reducible to the interests of their members taken severally. Even so, he insists that group rights must be consistent with the “humanistic principle”, which holds that what matters ultimately is the well-being of individual human persons. In that respect, he is, like List and Pettit (2011), a value-individualist and not, like Jovanović (2012), a value-collectivist. A group right cannot ultimately be in competition with the well-being of the group’s members. He formulates that requirement as “the service principle”: if the claims a group makes upon its members are to be legitimate, those claims must serve the interests of the group’s members. He pairs that with a “mutuality principle”: a right-holding group cannot act without regard for the well-being of outsiders, be they individuals or other groups. The service principle does not, however, translate into the familiar claim that individual rights must invariably displace group rights. People have interests both as individuals and as group members and sometimes their interests as members may matter more than their interests as individuals. Newman therefore cautions against supposing that compliance with his humanistic principle means that group rights must always take second place to individual rights.