 Nanay’s (2014) proposal, for instance, combines a broadly Dretskean version of informational teleosemantics with Nanay’s own modal theory of functions (Nanay 2010). Like Dretske, Nanay maintains that representing something consists in “having the function to indicate (carry information about)” it (Nanay 2014, 799). However, it should be noted that he restricts this account to “pragmatic representations”, which are defined as the representations that are most directly involved in the guidance of actions (Nanay 2014, 805). His account of content can thus be summarized as follows: for any pragmatic representation R, R represents that p iff R has the function of indicating (carrying the information) that p. This account of content is then combined with Nanay’s modal theory of functions which says, roughly speaking, that a (token) trait of an organism has the function to do X if doing X would contribute to the organism’s fitness. Accordingly, a rough formulation of Nanay’s theory says that a pragmatic representation R of an organism O represents that p iff R’s indicating (carrying the information) that p would contribute to O’s fitness (Nanay 2014, 804). 