 As Meinong takes objectives as ideal objects, he gives up Brentano’s definition of truth by means of evidence. Brentano rejects the correspondence theory of truth, on the grounds that (among other things) he does not see anything in reality that would correspond to true negative judgements such as “there are no unicorns” and defines truth of judgements by their evidence (Brentano 1930: 139 [82]); see entries on Brentano and Brentano’s Theory of Judgement). Meinong adopts a kind of identity theory of truth, which can be seen as a borderline case of a correspondence theory (Meinong 1915, §7; 1910, §13; see below 5.6). According to Meinong, the true negative judgement “there are no unicorns” has a subsistent objective as its corresponding object (the fact of the non-being of unicorns). If the objective in question does not subsist (has non-being) the judgement is false. However, though Meinong does not use the notion of evidence for a definition of truth, he holds it still relevant for a truth criterion because truth is a “proprium” of evidence (1915: 463), and evidence for certainty (and for presumption, respectively) makes truth (and probability, respectively) accessible to us. (A classical criticism of Meinong’s theory of evidence is Nelson 1908: 479–485.)