 Thus, there is a case that the moral virtues, including wisdom, are virtues of the will construed  broadly.[7]  The second feature is that the virtues are beneficial to their possessor or to others. As mentioned above, Foot in her early work embraces the view that the virtues necessarily benefit their possessors. She abandons that view in her middle period in favor of one in which the virtues are beneficial “in some general way” (1978 [VV 2]). The benefit of the virtues may go to both their possessors and to others, or else exclusively to others. Courage, temperance, and wisdom fall in the first category, benefiting both their possessors and others. She believes that charity and justice sometimes fall in the second category because they sometimes require their possessors to sacrifice everything (1978 [VV 3]). Justice, as she notes, poses the biggest problem for the idea that virtues necessarily benefit their possessors (1978 [VV xv, 3]). Yet, it is also unclear that justice necessarily benefits others, at least on any given occasion; surely there are cases in which we could benefit someone by means that infringe her rights, just as there are clearly occasions in which we can do great benefit for many others, but only by violating another’s rights. So, there are no doubt occasions on which the demands of justice require that we renounce certain benefits that we could otherwise provide to others. But Foot seems to think that overall, it is beneficial for a society to consist of just individuals. As she states, 