  Although Moore’s original version of the Open Question Argument today has few defenders, there have been a number of recent attempts to refashion it into a more compelling form. One popular version of the Open Question Argument, called the Normativity Objection (Scanlon 2014; Parfit 2011), sidesteps questions about the cognitive significance of moral and descriptive terminology and appeals to considerations regarding the natures of natural and normative facts. Moral facts tell us what is good in the world and what we have reasons or obligations to do. Natural facts—the kinds of facts that scientists study—are facts about the innate physical structure of the universe and the causal principles that govern the interaction of matter. Those are obviously just two different kinds of facts. Moral facts, because they are facts about goodness, reasons, obligations, and the like, are normative facts. But natural facts are not normative. In trying to give a naturalistic account of morality, naturalists forgot the most important thing: that moral facts aren’t purely facts about the way the world is; they are facts about what matters.