    In these validities, some see a plausible and attractive   logic (C.I. Lewis 1912, 1914). Others   see them as “so utterly devoid of rationality [as to be]   a reductio ad absurdum of any view which involves   them” (Nelson 1933: 271),   earning them the title paradoxes of strict   implication. Patterns 3 and 4 are more central to debates about   counterfactuals, so they will be the focus here. Pattern 3 clearly   follows from the core idea of the basic   strict analysis: the premise guarantees that there are no   accessible \(\phi\)-worlds, from which it vacuously follows that all   accessible \(\phi\)-worlds are \(\psi\)-worlds. Much the same is   true of pattern 4: if all the accessible worlds are \(\psi\)-worlds   then all the accessible \(\phi\)-worlds are \(\psi\)-worlds. Both 3   and 4 are seem incorrect for English counterfactuals. 