 By contrast, other versions of positionalism conceive of positions as unique to the relations in which they figure. Some positionalists of this stripe conceives of each position as being assigned a unique occupant (Gilmore 2013). But others whilst sharing the assumption that positions are unique to the relations in which they figure, also maintain that it is a mistake to assume that there is a 1-1 correspondence between positions and their occupants. So this version of positonalism conceives relations more liberally as having positions capable of being assigned several distinct occupants at once (see, for example, Armstrong 1997: 91, Yi 1999: 169; Fine 2000: 17, MacBride 2005: 588). Further sophistication is added by the idea that positions can be occupied by a number of things varying between fixed limits (Hazen&amp;Taylor 1992: 376, 390, Dixon 2018: 207) and by the suggestion that the assignment of things to positions should also be relative to a number to allow for one and the same thing to simultaneously occur more than once in the same position (Dixon 2018: 213–6).