 A precise account of when an agent lacks “reasonable alternatives” might help distinguish wrongful threats from permissible offers, given that offers, like threats, aim to influence behavior, and might be experienced by the offeree as leaving her no option but to accept. Several theorists have argued that baseline-improving offers can be coercive. On David Zimmerman’s (1981) view, an offer is coercive if its acceptance locks the offeree into a life situation that prevents her from seeking better alternatives than what the offeror proposes. Joan McGregor (1988) suggests shifting focus from baseline improvement to whether the offeror exercises power over the offeree within a relationship of dependence. On McGregor’s analysis, an offeror exercises power when she has control over a considerable harm that might fall on the offeree (see also O’Neill 1991; Pettit 1996). While the analysis may not quite fit the law’s concept of duress, it is arguably implicit in the common law’s unconscionability doctrine, which polices one-sided contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power. For a more detailed discussion of the distinction between offers and threats, see the entry on  coercion.