 These two innovations, though not trivial, do not affect the core of a non-naturalist metaethics. Some critics, however, charge that Moore did change that view fundamentally, and for the worse. They say Sidgwick’s non-naturalism was comparatively modest, holding only that there are truths about what people ought or have reason to do that we can know by reflection. Moore, the objection runs, supplemented this modest view with an extravagant metaphysics of non-natural properties inhabiting a dubious supersensible realm and a mysterious faculty of intuition that acquaints us with them. These additions opened non-naturalism to entirely avoidable objections and led, regrettably, to its widespread rejection by later philosophers (e.g. Mackie 1976: 323; Shaver 2000: 263–65; Phillips 2011: 29–30).