 Schaffer is a separatist (see  §3).  Causal and metaphysical explanation are in other words distinct from the relations (causation and grounding, respectively) they track, and it is important not to think that everything that is true about the explanation side of things must be true of the relation side of things (and vice versa). Schaffer does draw one rather substantive conclusion from the analogy between causation and grounding, however: that there is no distinctive notion of metaphysical (as opposed to causal) explanation. There is just explanation (simpliciter) and explanation can be backed by causation, grounding or whatever other relations are apt to back explanation (which, on his view, is the same as being apt to be modeled using structural equations). Similarly, A. Wilson (2018) thinks that a “major theoretical benefit” of regarding grounding as metaphysical causation is that this accounts, in a straightforward way, for the explanatory nature of grounding claims: grounding explanations are a type of causal explanation, and they work by identifying metaphysical causes. The result is a unified theory of explanation, at least of explanations that work by tracking some worldly relation (see  §4),  according to which all explanation is causal explanation.