 If we confine our attention to necessarily non-spatial objects, a definition of a possible object which corresponds to Parsons’ definition is easily available to Zalta: a possible (necessarily non-spatial) object is a (necessarily non-spatial) object such that some object could exemplify exactly the properties it encodes. In this sense, some object which encodes goldenness and mountainhood, among other properties, is a possible object but the object which encodes squareness and roundness is not. Julius Caesar’s entirely new finger satisfying (a) and (b) can be treated in the same way as the golden mountain. Complications similar to those which arise for Parsons’ theory do not arise for Zalta’s theory, for all properties are equally subject to encoding, including those properties Parsons regards as extra-nuclear. For a comparison of the two-kinds-of-property approach and the two-kinds-of-predication approach, see Rapaport 1985.