 Several authors agree with this line of thought, accepting both the setup of the clock case and Elga’s general line of thought regarding how it should be treated. These authors take the clock case to be one in which epistemic akrasia is rationally permissible after all, showing that any anti-akrasia norms must be formulated carefully. For similar discussion, see Horowitz’s (2014) discussion of the dartboard case (which is modeled after the unmarked clock). There, Horowitz argues that epistemic akrasia is rationally permissible when we expect the evidence to be “falsity-guiding”; though see Weatherson (2019: ch. 10), and Hawthorne, Isaacs, and Lasonen-Aarnio (2021) for arguments that this condition is too narrow. Sliwa and Horowitz (2015) present an alternative level-bridging principle, “Evidential Calibration”, and argue that, like New Rational Reflection, it can help differentiate between rational and irrational cases of epistemic akrasia, as well as rule out bootstrapping. Christensen (2016a) proposes what he calls the “Idealized Thermometer Model”, and makes similar points in its favor. Dorst (2020; see also his 2019) proposes another principle, “Trust”, which is a weakening of Rational Reflection. Dorst argues that Trust allows us to be uncertain about rationality, while still treating rationality as an expert; this vindicates the idea that we should defer to our evidence, and (following I. J. Good) that more evidence is always epistemically beneficial. All of these level-bridging principles take higher-order evidence into account, but also allow some instances of epistemic akrasia.