 Many standard accounts of the nature of law hold that law presumes and reflects a world-view in which the goal is to achieve a set of presumptively coherent and stable propositions.  Whether this aim is understood as “the rule of law” (see, e.g., the entry on  Friedrich Hayek),  as the “internal morality of law” (see, e.g., the discussion of Fuller in the entry on  natural law theories),  or as “the soundest theory of the settled law” (see, e.g., the discussion of Dworkin in the entry on  interpretation and coherence in legal reasoning),  or in other similar terms, legal systems embody comprehensive and generally long-standing conceptual systems. The coherence of any particular legal system can always be challenged, but on this approach an aspiration of any legal system is coherence. And (at a minimum) the appearance or illusion of coherence is maintained by requirements of consistency, including following precedent, treating like cases alike, and maintaining judicial impartiality.