 The third strategy available to a voluntarist defender of special obligations is to argue that while it is not the case that all special obligations are reducible to contractual obligations, nonetheless, all special obligations share the feature of voluntary assumption with contractual obligations. All special obligations, according to this account, are forms of voluntary commitments undertaken by the individual moral agent. While not all actions that constitute the undertaking of a commitment mimic those involved in the making of a promise or contract, they are all such that the agent can choose whether or not to perform them. Also, while promises and contracts are temporally discrete events, a commitment may be undertaken via a temporally extended series of events, each of which, in and of itself, has no moral significance: it is only the series taken as a whole that generates or grounds special obligations. While this strategy has the virtue of being able to accommodate obligations of friendship without distorting the nature of friendship, it, like the previous voluntarist options, holds out little hope of accommodating political or familial special obligations. At this point, the voluntarist is faced with a choice: either reject her initial commitment to voluntarism regarding special obligations or reject the commonsense claim about the extensive range of special obligations that we have.