 Most philosophers of science, however, have not embraced the idea that it is only lack of imagination which prevents us from finding empirical equivalents to our scientific theories generally. They note that the convincing examples of empirical equivalents we do have are all drawn from a single domain of highly mathematized scientific theorizing in which the background constraints on serious theoretical alternatives are far from clear, and suggest that it is therefore reasonable to ask whether even a small handful of such examples should make us believe that there are probably empirical equivalents to most of our scientific theories most of the time. They concede that it is always possible that there are empirical equivalents to even our best scientific theories concerning any domain of nature, but insist that we should not be willing to suspend belief in any particular theory until some convincing alternative to it can actually be produced: as Philip Kitcher puts it, “give us a rival explanation, and we’ll consider whether it is sufficiently serious to threaten our confidence” (1993, 154; see also Leplin 1997, Achinstein 2002). That is, these thinkers insist that until we are able to actually construct an empirically equivalent alternative to a given theory, the bare possibility that such equivalents exist is insufficient to justify suspending belief in the best theories we do have. And for this same reason most philosophers of science are unwilling to follow van Fraassen into what they regard as constructive empiricism’s unwarranted epistemic modesty. Even if van Fraassen is right about the most minimal beliefs we must hold in order to take full advantage of our scientific theories, most thinkers do not see why we should believe the least we can get away with rather than believing the most we are entitled to by the evidence we have.