 Many are sceptical. Anti-cognitivists think that, whether or not a work’s aesthetic or literary value would be enhanced by contributing knowledge. Echoing Plato’s famous charge in The Republic, Jerome Stolniz (1992) has argued that there is no proper domain of artistic knowledge: significant truths found in literary works are the proper subject of other areas of enquiry, not literature. Even if one does acquire beliefs from literary works, the works themselves don’t supply the warrant for the beliefs, and so can scarcely be said to yield knowledge.  Furthermore, to the extent that we do learn from literature it is either hard to articulate what we learn, or the truths turn out to be cognitively trivial; Pride and Prejudice (1813), for example, may teach us little more than the banal “Stubborn pride and ignorant prejudice keep attractive people apart” (Stolniz 1992: 193). Others have raised doubts about the ability of literary fiction to yield the kind of substantial practical knowledge that is often claimed for it. Reading Styron’s historical novel, The Confessions of Nat Turner (1967) may make us think we know what it was like to be a black slave in early nineteenth century Virginia, but it is surely more likely that exposure of this kind simply generates the illusion of knowledge (Harold 2016).