 A second metaepistemological answer to the question of what one is doing when filling in the schema “S knows that p if and only if ___ ” is that one is illuminating something about the concept (or concepts) expressed by that schema. This answer will be a familiar one for those who view philosophy, and so epistemology, as centrally engaged in conceptual analysis (F. Jackson 1998; cf., Williamson 2018; see also for discussion Balcerak Jackson 2013). What are we investigating when inquiring about concepts? According to Jackson, filling in the “S knows that p” would—if a matter of investigating concepts—be in the service of explicating our folk theory of knowledge by way of elucidating our concepts (F. Jackson 1998: 31–33; for discussion see Beaney 2003 [2021]: §5), or perhaps we are investigating what is involved in someone’s possession and/or deployment of a given concept (Sosa 2015: Chapter 1). Such a characterization, both of philosophy and by extension of epistemology, has been subject to sustained recent criticism from Williamson (2007, 2014, 2018). One common thread of argument Williamson adverts to draws an analogy between philosophy and physics. Physicists, who also complete English schemas, are not plausibly regarded as investigating words and concepts; by parity of reasoning, it is unclear why epistemologists (or philosophers generally) should be thought to be investigating merely words and concepts (rather than knowledge) any more than physicists are investigating words and concepts.