 The idea behind a logic of attitudes is to change the normal order of explanation to explain why normative sentences and attitudes bear the logical relations that they do to other sentences and attitudes.  As noted above, standard cognitivist accounts of a domain of discourse will explain the consistency or inconsistency of states of mind by citing the consistency or inconsistency of that state’s content, that is what it represents. The belief that dogs howl is inconsistent with the belief that dogs don’t howl because their contents (that dogs do or don’t howl) are inconsistent with one another.  And similarly for the sentences expressing those beliefs. Since noncognitivists don’t postulate such representational contents they can’t deploy that explanation.  But they might still be able to do justice to the fact that normative judgments and sentences stand in logical relations to one another if they can explain how the judgments themselves stand in certain logical relations to to one another and then go on to explain that the sentences are inconsistent just because they express judgments that are inconsistent. 