 Above it was mentioned that King [2007] and subsequent work endorsed three novel claims about propositions. Two of these are: (i) theories according to which propositions have truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain way by their very natures and independently of minds and languages are mysterious and to be rejected; (ii) an adequate theory of propositions must explain how\why propositions have truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain  way.[24]  It was also noted that Soames and Hanks follow King in this respect. In a sense, Speaks does too insofar as he feels the need to explain the “aboutness” or intentionality of some mental  states.[25]  So most recent literature has taken onboard King’s two claims above. Philosophy being what it is, however, there have been recent theorists who want to return to something like the classical theories of Frege and Russell, where propositions were thought to be mind and language independent abstract objects that by their very natures had truth conditions and so represent the world as being a certain way. On such a view, both of King’s claims are rejected. Propositions are precisely held to have truth conditions by their natures and independently of minds and languages; and it is denied that there can be any explanation of how/why propositions have truth conditions. Trenton Merricks [2015] defends such a view. According to Merricks, propositions are abstract, necessary existents that essentially represent the world as being a certain  way.[26]  He also holds that the fact that propositions essentially represent things as being a certain way is primitive. That is, this fact has no  explanation.[27]  Further, Merricks holds that propositions are simple: they have no  constituents.[28]  On this last point at least Merricks departs from the classical views of Frege and Russell on which propositions do have constituents. 