 In addition to objections directed specifically toward consequentialist or deontological conceptions of impartiality, there are also objections aimed at the very idea that impartiality ought to be viewed as fundamental to morality. Some would argue that impartiality, as conceived by traditional ethical theories, makes extraordinary and unreasonable cognitive demands on moral agents. This worry must be distinguished from the objection to consequentialist impartiality considered earlier, which claimed that the sacrifices demanded by consequentialist impartiality were unreasonable and excessive. The objection now being considered is not that impartiality asks the agent to give up too much, but rather that the cognitive feats demanded by these moral theories will exceed the capacity of the typical moral agent. Indeed, one popular version of this objection alleges that an agent will require an unreasonable amount of knowledge or cognitive ability simply to be able to identify what the demands of impartiality are (Friedman 1989; Walker 1991). Given the conception of the impartial point of view as a ‘God’s eye’ point of view, for example (Baier 1958), it seems questionable whether it is ever reasonable to expect a human moral agent to be able to occupy such a perspective. God, quite obviously, possesses far more knowledge than does any human being; moreover, God’s point of view is both objective and impersonal in ways that an individual human’s perspective cannot be. (As Margaret Urban Walker points out, it is often said that human beings have to live with their decisions, but it sounds very odd to say that of God (Walker 1991, 765).)