 As it has been observed repeatedly in the literature (cf., e.g., Burge 1986, Ruffino 2003), the stress Frege laid on the notion of a truth value was, to a great extent, pragmatically motivated. Besides an intended gain for his system of “Basic Laws” (Frege 1893/1903) reflected in enhanced technical clarity, simplicity, and unity, Frege also sought to substantiate in this way his view on logic as a theoretical discipline with truth as its main goal and primary subject-matter. Incidentally, Gottfried Gabriel (1986) demonstrated that in the latter respect Frege’s ideas can be naturally linked up with a value-theoretical tradition in German philosophy of the second half of the 19th century; see also (Gabriel 2013) on the relation between Frege’s value-theoretically inspired conception of truth values and his theory of judgement. More specifically, Wilhelm Windelband, the founder and the principal representative of the Southwest school of Neo-Kantianism, was actually the first who employed the term “truth value” (“Wahrheitswert”) in his essay “What is Philosophy?” published in 1882 (see Windelband 1915: 32), i.e., nine years before Frege 1891, even if he was very far from treating a truth value as a value of a function.