 In illusion, Gaṅgeśa says, the presentation of F-hood—silverhood, for example, in the illusion of “seeing” a piece of shell as silver, and saying, “Silver,” when it’s really mother-of-pearl—originates in things’ really being F, through previous knowledge of F-hood, real bits of silver in the world. The silverhood predication in the verbalization of the perception-like experience is available to become illusory predication content through previous experience of silver. It gets fused into a current perception-like event by means of a foul-up in the normal causal process through the arousing of a silverhood memory-disposition (saṃskāra) formed by previous experience of silver, or, possibly, by testimony. The content or intentionality of an illusion is to be explained causally as generated by real features of real things just as is genuine perception although they are distinct cognitive types. To repeat, genuine perception is factive; illusion is a perception-imitator (“You don’t really see Maitra because that’s Chaitra”).