  There are several important implications. Institutional practice is conceived in terms of actions and attitudes, not norms or communication of norms. We start at what people do and say and think. Assemblies draft, debate, amend, and enact statutes. Agencies develop and adopt regulations. Courts consider disputes, resolve them and issue opinions, including dissents, which offer reasons that support resolving the disputes in one or another way. In short, institutions and agents operating within them take actions, including the action of producing certain texts or utterances, and hold a variety of attitudes, whose role as determinants of legal rights and obligations is itself determined by the moral principles in play. The principles may assign a certain legal significance to the fact that some assembly produced a text with some linguistic content. It does not follow from the fact that the action of producing the text is legally relevant that the action constituted a norm with the same content. Nonhybrid interpretivism does not assume that institutional practice consists in communication of norms with its own logic that is logic of the law. It does not assume that the practice contains in itself the particular way in which enactments or decisions “are meant” to constitute obligations. How institutional actions constitute obligations (the metaphysical mechanism) a matter for theory. There is no special, privileged institutional perspective so no internal, perspectival notion of obligation.