Debates about the metaphysical status of haecceities are also bound up with more general debates about the nature of properties—e.g., whether properties are universals or tropes, in re or ante rem entities, sparse or abundant, and so on. But, regardless of one’s preferred view about the metaphysics of properties, haecceities do seem to have some distinctive features. Unlike most other properties, haecceities are not typically thought to be multiply instantiable—i.e., there is exactly one possible object that can instantiate being Napoleon—and, as commonly conceived, haecceities do not (without auxiliary assumptions) ground qualitative resemblance. So, if one holds that all properties must be multiply instantiable or ground qualitative resemblance, then one must either reject haecceities or opt for a disunified metaphysics of properties. (On some competing views of the metaphysical role of haecceities, see Diekemper (2015).)