  Critics have raised a number of concerns about this approach, in particular whether putative aliefs form a unified kind (Egan 2011; Currie &amp; Ichino 2012; Doggett 2012; Nagel 2012; Mandelbaum 2013). Others have proposed alternate conceptions of action-oriented dual attitudes. Brownstein and Madva (2012a,b; see also Madva and Brownstein 2018 and Brownstein 2018), for example, propose that implicit attitudes are comprised of F-T-B-A components: the perception of a salient Feature triggers automatic low-level feelings of affective Tension, which are associated in turn with specific Behavioral responses, which either do or do not Alleviate the agent’s felt tension. This approach shares with Gendler’s the idea that aliefs/implicit attitudes differ in kind from beliefs/explicit attitudes. Moreover, the difference between these putative kinds of states is not necessarily the agent’s introspective access to them. Gendler proposes that while paradigmatic beliefs update when the agent requires new relevant information, paradigmatic aliefs don’t. In contrast, Brownstein and Madva argue that implicit attitudes do update in the face of new information—this is the feed-forward function of “alleviation”—and thus can automatically yet flexibly modify and improve over time. Thus, for Brownstein and Madva, implicit attitudes are implicated not only in bias and prejudice, but also in skillful, intelligent, and even ethical  action.[7] But while implicit attitudes aren’t ballistic, information-insensitive reflexes, on Brownstein and Madva’s view, they also don’t update in the same way as ordinary attitudes. Brownstein and Madva draw the distinction in terms of two key features. First, implicit attitudes are paradigmatically insensitive to the logical form in which information is presented. For example, subjects have been shown to form equivalent implicit attitudes on the basis of information and the negation of that information (e.g., Gawronski et al. 2008). Second, implicit attitudes fail to respond to the semantic contents of other mental states in a systematic way; they appear to be “inferentially impoverished.” For example, implicit attitudes are implicated in behaviors for which it is difficult to give an inferential explanation (e.g., Dovidio et al. 1997) and implicit attitudes change in response to irrelevant information (e.g., Gregg et al. 2006; Han et al. 2006). Levy (2012, 2015)—who argues that implicit attitudes are “patchy endorsements”—makes similar claims about the ways in which implicit attitudes do and do not update, although he does not argue that these kinds of states are “action-oriented” in the way that Gendler and Brownstein and Madva do. Debate about these findings is ongoing (§2.3).