 Because we are expected to revise our beliefs at all levels as we work back and forth among them and subject them to various criticisms, this coherence view contrasts sharply with a variety of many foundationalist approaches to justification. In ethics, some foundationalist approaches take some subset of our moral beliefs as fixed or unrevisable. Other foundationalists at least claim that some subset of our moral beliefs are immediately or directly justified (perhaps even “self-evident”) or warranted (leaving aside the issue of revisability) and serve as the basis on which all other beliefs are justified. Still others take some subset of our beliefs as at least justifiable independently of any other moral beliefs, even if they are justifiable in light of either necessary or contingent views of the person or human nature or through appeals to the logic of moral discourse (Timmons 1987). Reflective equilibrium is unlikely to single out any such group of privileged or directly justified beliefs, distinguishing itself from all these forms of foundationalism. Rawls (1974) thought it highly unlikely, but not impossible, that moral principles could be formulated so compellingly (be “self-evident”) that we would favor them and their consequences over all our previously held considered moral judgments; he thus leaves foundationalism a slim possibility, a point seized on by some who are willing to ignore Rawls’s probability claim that such foundationalism is not probable at all. If we take this probability judgment seriously, then the warrant for a belief lies (with high probability) in its coherence with other beliefs and not in its resting on beliefs for which foundationalist claims are made. 