 More generally, suppose we call whatever theoretical posit captures the cognitive significance of names, sense, following Frege. The crucial point is that we need not conflate the linguistic meaning of a name with its sense (Kripke 1980: 59; Burge 1977). This is so even if we take a name to contribute its sense to the truth condition of an attitude report, as Frege also suggested. Remember, we understand meaning as something that (if present) determines or constrains the extension of a word. We have refrained from identifying meaning with a word’s contribution to the truth condition of a declarative sentence (what is usually called its semantic value). If we had, then it would follow, from the fact that names do contribute to truth conditions, that names have meanings; and we had wanted to frame the issue of a name’s meaning so that it didn’t have a trivial answer. Instead, we have left open whether a name’s contribution—sense or referent—is determined by its meaning, or else, in the absence of such a meaning, by extra-semantic factors, such as use.