  While the broad principles behind evolutionary medicine are relatively uncontroversial—we all are evolved organisms after all—philosophers of biology have been skeptical of particular claims about how our evolutionary history has shaped our vulnerability to disease. Some such claims have been particularly contentious, either because the nature of the disease itself is not well characterized (especially mental illness, for instance), or evidence in support of evolutionary “mismatch” with our ancestral environment is both scant and disputed. Particularly where alternative explanations may well involve attributing responsibility to, e.g., pollutants, or choices in lifestyle that are politically or socially sensitive, philosophers of science have been particularly skeptical. Some have argued that many arguments in evolutionary medicine make “adaptationist” assumptions, i.e., assumptions that a given trait is adaptive, or selectively advantageous, founded on at best “just so” stories (Valles 2011; see also Murphy 2006).