 To sum up, it appears that there is some prospect of placing all the conditions we have considered within a single structure of (Kantian) distinctions, first between unified consciousness of contents and unified consciousness of experiencing, then between conscious experience of individual objects and unified conscious experience of multiple objects. Thought insertion might pose a problem for this scheme. Patients experience thought insertion when they believe that some of their thoughts, experiences, emotions, and so on are not their own and have been ‘inserted’ into them from without. People suffering it are still aware of the ‘alien’ thoughts from the point of view of having them. The deficit is in something to do with thinking of these thoughts as unified with the rest of conscious life. Normally, we think of ourselves as the subject and agent of all our experiences. In thought insertion, the victim does not appear to himself to be either subject or agent of some of the experiences of which he is in fact the subject and agent (Mylopoulos 2015).