  Russell did not define here what he means by “neat logical properties”, but it is possible to understand what he had in mind by way of the examples he gave. He cited as “neat properties” of material objects that it is impossible for two material objects to occupy the same place at the same time, and that it is impossible for one material object to occupy distinct places in space at the same time (LA, 329; cf. AMi, 264–65; AMa, 385). Consider then the propositions “O1 is located at p1 at t1”, and “O1 is located at p2 at t1” where “O1” is the name of a physical object, “p1” and “p2” represent distinct locations in space, and “t1” the name of a certain instant in time.  Prior to analysis, such propositions appear to be logically incompatible atomic propositions. However, Russell explains that the logical necessities involved in cases such as these are due to the nature of material objects, points and instants as logical constructions. At a certain point in time, a physical object might be regarded as a class of sensible particulars bearing certain resemblance relations to one another occupying a continuous region of space. It is therefore impossible by definition for the same physical object to occupy wholly distinct locations at the same time. When analyzed, such propositions as “O1 is located at p1 at t1” are revealed as having a much more complicated logical form, and hence may have logical consequences not evident before analysis. We do not have here any reason to think that truly atomic propositions, those containing names of genuine particulars and their relations, are not always independent.