 The first condition addresses the Requirement of Directionality and ensures that \(A\) and \(B\) indeed enter into a representational relationship. On might worry that explaining representation in terms of representational force sheds little light on the matter as long as no analysis of representational force is offered. But Suárez resists attempts to explicate representational force in terms of a stronger relation, like denotation or reference, on grounds that this would violate deflationism (2015: 41). The second condition is in fact just the Surrogative Reasoning Condition, now taken as a necessary condition on scientific representation. Contessa (2007: 61) points out that it remains mysterious how these inferences are generated. An appeal to further analysis can, again, be blocked by appeal to deflationism because any attempt to explicate how inferences are drawn would go beyond “surface features”. So the tenability of Inferentialism in effect depends on the tenability of deflationism about scientific representation. Suárez (2015) defends deflationism by drawing analogies with three different deflationary theories about truth, Ramsey’s “redundancy” theory, Wright’s “abstract minimalism” and Horwich’s “use theory” (for more information of these theories see the SEP entry on  the deflationary theory of truth).  An alternative defence builds on Brandom’s inferentialism in the philosophy of language (1994, 2000), a line of argument that is developed by de Donato Rodríguez and Zamora Bonilla (2009) and Kuorikoski and Lehtinen (2009).