  One worry is that psychological continuity might substitute for identity.  Say F1 and F2 are psychologically connected because (for example) F2 has a memory of F1’s experiences.  Suppose that F3 has a memory of F2’s experiences but no memory of F1.  F1 and F3 are psychologically continuous, though not psychologically connected.  (Parfit’s view is that psychological connection and continuity both ground special care, if special care is grounded at all.)  In the cases above, A, B and C are continuous with me. An egoist might claim that continuity alone matters for special care; that fits the cases.  If so, I do have reason to care specially about all of the future selves I am continuous with, and do not have this reason to care specially about others with whom I am not continuous. (For this and other worries about Parfit, see Brink 1992, Johnston 1997, Hills 2010 111–116.)