 We’ll now consider two positions, Frondizi 1949 and Pereda 2000, each committed to holding that Latin American academic philosophy fails to be sufficiently original in the above sense. Frondizi’s commitment to this thesis is explicit: he concludes that based on the evidence, only 10% of philosophy ‘as such’ in Latin America is original. Since the works of non-academic philosophers are excluded from this evidence, as a result Latin American philosophy is devoid of significant history, theories, methods, and number of creative practitioners. Nuccetelli 2003 responds to this skeptical view by arguing that by contrast with academic philosophers in Latin America, the non-academic philosophers have offered the more original philosophical positions. Furthermore, in other parts of the world contributions by non-academics who did not practice philosophy for its own sake are often counted as philosophy, as exemplified by works of Hume, Bentham, Mill, Saint Simon, Marx and many others. If this is correct, then Frondizi’s criterion turns out to be too demanding. In addition, Gracia (2003) notes that in no other ethnic philosophy (more on this later) is originality considered a necessary condition for having philosophy