 This position was developed in Bateson’s later work with philosopher Matteo Mameli (Mameli and Bateson 2006; 2011; Bateson and Mameli 2007). Expanding on Bateson’s (1991) original list, they identify a total of twenty-six candidate definitions of innateness in the scientific and philosophical literature (Mameli and Bateson 2006). Many of these proposals are deemed unsatisfactory because “they appeal to unclear, unexplained, or controversial notions such as ‘genetic information’, ‘learning’, ‘developmental induction’, and ‘normal development’” (2006, 176). Other candidate definitions are rejected by Mameli and Bateson because they fail to pick out any trait whatsoever. For instance, no trait is (strictly speaking) genetically determined or unacquired. Other candidates are rejected because they apply to all possible traits. For example, every trait is (to some degree) genetically influenced or insensitive to the environment. By the end of their analysis, Mameli and Bateson arrive at a shortlist of just eight candidates. These “i-properties” (as they call them) are relatively promising definitions in that they suffer from no obvious conceptual or empirical shortcoming. Their shortlist of candidate definitions for “innate” are as follows: