 The influence of Kant was in the foreground, together with the interactions between ethics and aesthetics, when Weil’s claims about attention’s import were developed in the work of Iris Murdoch. Murdoch suggests that there are certain forms of attention that play an essential role in the exercise of the virtues (Murdoch, 1970, see Bagnoli, 2003, Mole, 2006). She implies that a capacity for these forms of attention can be cultivated through experiences of beauty. These themes have been taken up by Dorothea Debus, who places particular emphasis on Weil’s claim that it is full attention to which cardinal value is attributed (Debus, 2015). Antony Fredriksson and Silvia Panizza suggest that the aspects of attention that Murdoch takes to be important are seen with particular clarity if one adopts the perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s account of attention, in which the openness of the attentive mind is emphasized (Fredriksson &amp; Panizza, 2020). Nicolas Bommarito has developed an account of modesty along broadly Murdochian lines, as being a ‘virtue of attention’. He argues that this avoids epistemic difficulties that other accounts of modesty face, if they instead characterize modesty as requiring false beliefs about the extent of one’s strengths (Bommarito, 2013).