 By contrast, Crescas firmly held that God foreknows the particular events of people’s lives, and that these are causally determined, ultimately by God. He accepts the deterministic consequences of this view, because, like compatibilists today, he does not think them inconsistent with human striving to achieve ends and being punished for misdeeds. He distinguishes between what an agent does because of its nature and what it does because it is causally determined (the latter, he says, is possible in itself, but necessary through another). If humans became rich as part of their nature, then their efforts to make money would be in vain. But, given that this is not the case, the fact that their efforts are causally necessary does not make them futile: on the contrary, they belong to the chain of causes that results in becoming rich. Similarly, although, if I desist in the future from committing some crime it will be causally necessary that I do so, the punishment laid down for it is valuable because it (through its deterrent effect) is part of that causal  chain.[30]