 However, this objection fares no better than the first. For one thing, as Patrick Maher (1992) and Brian Skyrms (1993) have pointed out, a loss in one respect may be outweighed by a benefit in another. It might be, for instance, that some probabilistic version of abduction does much better, at least in our world, than Bayes’ rule, in that, on average, it approaches the truth faster in the sense that it is faster in assigning a high probability (understood as probability above a certain threshold value) to the true hypothesis (see Douven 2013, 2020, and Douven and Wenmackers 2017; see Climenhaga 2017 for discussion). If it does, then following that rule instead of Bayes’ rule may have advantages which perhaps are not so readily expressed in terms of money yet which should arguably be taken into account when deciding which rule to go by. It is, in short, not so clear whether following a probabilistically incoherent rule must be irrational.