 There are a variety of competing philosophical accounts of health (see  SEP entry on concepts of health and disease).  They can be distinguished in several ways: 1) some regard health as the mere absence of disease (e.g., Hofman 2005); others regard health as a form of well-being or flourishing, and treat the absence of disease as at most a necessary condition of health (e.g., Carel 2007 and WHO 1948); 2) some regard the concept of health as value-laden, or normative, in the sense that the good of health enters into its very concept (e.g., Engelhardt 1986; DeVito 2000); others regard health as value-neutral, or non-normative, defined by bio-statistical or other biological criteria (e.g., Boorse 1987 and Wachbroit 1998); 3) some see the value of health as instrumental, in the capacity of the agent or organism to achieve certain goals (e.g., Nordenfeldt 1995); others see its value as intrinsic as well, as good in itself (e.g., Becker 2005).