 A moment is intrinsically fleeting, gone as soon as it arises. I cannot prolong it or remain in it. But note also that, if this moment is not characterizable as “different” from any other moment, I also can never actually leave this moment: whatever subsequent moments may appear, they are non-different from this one. This non-difference is apprehended in the single upsurge of the unchangeable moment as its own internal sense of its difference from past and future moments: they are present there, in some form or other, precisely however vaguely or distinctly they are within that one experience, as inalienable aspects of that moment itself. The next moment, when new contents appear, will be experienced as more of or other expressions of the same moment. That moment, though radically impermanent, is thus also experienced as permanent and necessary, just like a “substance” in Spinoza’s sense: it can be conceived only as existing, since it just is its being conceived; and it can only be conceived as existing exactly as it does exist; it is infinite and indivisible, since whatever appears as its limit or divider is ipso facto internal to it, one more component of it, and the conception of only a “part” of it will simply be by definition a different moment; and by the same token, it cannot be acted upon by anything external to it, it is infinitely productive, and everything it produces is more of itself. The moment is both radically impermanent and radically eternal. More to the point, its impermanence is its permanence, its permanence is its impermanence—exactly the claims of Tiantai’s theoretical conclusions. I experience the eternity-temporality of this moment continuing to show itself in and as the neither-same-nor-different array of all other possible experiences, beings, ideas, moments. This is mode in which we find the direct experience of Buddhahood-as-all-sentient-beings, and all-sentient-beings-as-Buddahood.