 Granted, pace Guyer, that the claim is normative without being moral, further questions can be raised about its strength and character. Moran (2012) understands the demand as reflecting a sense of obligation or requirement, distinct from moral obligation, but stronger than that present in the case of empirical cognitive judgment. He reads Kant as drawn towards a view on which the beautiful object itself makes an unconditional demand on the viewer’s attention (of a kind made vivid in the narrator’s vow to the hawthorns in Proust’s In Search of Lost Time), although he also takes Kant’s denial of the objectivity of taste to debar him from endorsing such a view. A similar suggestion is made in Makkai (2010): she takes Kant to hint at the idea that the beautiful object is found to deserve, or call for, recognition as beautiful, where this implies a claim on the viewer which goes beyond any claim implicit in an objective judgment. Roughly, on the view suggested by Moran and Makkai, the claim implicit in a judgment of beauty is not merely the conditional claim that others, if they perceive the object, ought to judge it to be beautiful; it is the unconditional claim that others ought to perceive it and, in so doing, judge it to be beautiful. The idea that Kant takes us to be subject to a demand to attend to beautiful objects is also put forward in Kalar 2006, but Kalar understands that demand as one of two distinct normative demands made in the judgment of beauty: a non-moral demand to feel pleasure in the given object, and a further moral demand to attend to the object (2006: 2). Makkai (2021) develops further the view that the object has a claim on us (although she does not see it as a moral claim); Lopes (2021) seems also to assume such a claim.