 So, this is how, in Gordon’s story, I come to judge that Tom has the belief that Fido enjoys watching TV. In the context of the simulation, *I* asked *myself* (where both “*I*” and “*myself*” in fact refer to Tom) whether *I* believe that Fido enjoys watching TV. And *I* answered this question by answering another question, namely, whether it is the case that Fido enjoys watching TV. Given that, from *my* perspective, Fido enjoys watching TV (after all, from *my* perspective, Fido is a dog and all dogs enjoy watching TV), *I* expressed my belief by saying: “Yes, *I*, Tom, believe that Fido enjoys watching TV”. As you can see, in such a story, introspection does not do anything. (We will come back to the role of introspection in mindreading in  section 6.2).