 How does premise semantics aim to improve on the predictions of similarity semantics? It re-divides the labor between context and the semantics of counterfactuals to more accurately capture the intuitive truth-conditions of counterfactuals, and intuitive characterizations of how context influences counterfactuals. In premise semantics, context provides facts and law-like relations among them, and the counterfactual semantics exploits this information. By contrast, the similarity analysis assumes that context somehow makes a similarity relation salient, and has to make further stipulations like Lewis’ (1979) System of Weights  about how facts and laws enter into the truth-conditions of counterfactuals in particular contexts. This can be illustrated by considering how Tichý’s (1976) example (42) is analyzed in premise semantics. This illustration will use the Veltman (2005) analysis because it is simpler than Kratzer (1989, 2012)—that is not to say it is preferable. The added complexity in Kratzer (1989, 2012) provides more flexibility and a broader empirical range including quantification and modal expressions other than would-counterfactuals.