 If we now put aside their differences about logic’s resources and the appeal to intuition, there are other ways in which the Kantian and Fregean conceptions of logic differ.  Both MacFarlane (2002) and Linnebo (2003) point out that one of Kant’s central views about logic is that its axioms and theorems are purely formal in nature (i.e., abstracted from all semantic content and concerned only with the forms of judgments) and are applicable across all the physical and mathematical sciences (1781 [1787], A55 [B79], A56 [B80], A70 [B95]; and 1800, 15).  And Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative and prescriptive (something one can get wrong), and not just descriptive (1800, 16); they provide constitutive norms of thought (MacFarlane 2002, 35; Tolley 2008).  Indeed, Linnebo takes two theses, that logic is formal and provides laws that are constitutive norms of thought, to be distinctive of Kant’s conception (Linnebo 2003, 240).