 With the fourteenth-century theologian William of Ockham (1285–1347) we encounter some radically new developments on the topics of synderesis and conscience. While Ockham’s Franciscan predecessor John Duns Scotus had disagreements with Aquinas about the nature of the moral law, Scotus fundamentally agreed with the Dominican in viewing synderesis and conscience a habit and an act of the practical reason, respectively, whose jobs were to apprehend the basic principles of morality in the case of synderesis, and to apply them in the case of conscience (John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio 2, d. 39; Wolter trans. 1997: 162–163). Like Scotus, Ockham also agrees with Aquinas in several crucial respects. Where Ockham departs from Aquinas, and indeed with the entire scholastic tradition which preceded him, however, is in his abandonment of the concept of synderesis, and in his unique approach to the invincibly erroneous conscience.