  Considerations of human dignity could ground an objection to research in which the subject possesses the dignity-grounding capacities at the start of the research, but then has them eliminated or diminished during the course of the research. Such research would certainly be objectionable, but this cannot be the objection that Karpowicz et al. have in mind since they believe that non-humans do not have human dignity at the start of the research. Finally, considerations of human dignity could ground an objection to research in which, although the subject does not possess the dignity-grounded capacities at the start, the research brings it about that the subject comes to possess those capacities but also prevents it from having the significant opportunity to exercise those capacities. The problem in such a case is not, pace Karpowicz et al., the elimination or diminution of those capacities, but is rather the treatment of the subject after those capacities have been acquired. This objection overlaps with the objection implied by the Moral Status Framework, discussed in the next section. The difficulty for the human dignity version of this objection is to explain why the problematic feature of such research is best understood in terms of human dignity as opposed to moral status, autonomy, rights, and interests (Macklin 2003, DeGrazia 2007).