  Although Philip denies that the practical intellect and the will are separate powers, he argues for a distinction among the various apprehensive powers (McCluskey 2001). Thus, he sees a genuine distinction between the speculative intellect, the practical intellect, imagination, and the sensory apprehensive powers. This is because what is apprehended by each of these powers is different in nature. Philip denies that any such distinction is present among motive powers. Insofar as the appetite is moved by a sensory apprehension, we call it the sensory appetite. Insofar as the appetite is moved by the judgment of intellect, we call it the will. However, in reality, there is only one motive power to account for both of these sorts of desires, according to Philip. Philip’s position on the inseparability of practical intellect and will does not appear to have convinced his thirteenth-century contemporaries or near-contemporaries. Albert the Great in Summa de homine (circa 1245) addresses the arguments given by Philip for his position although as was the custom of the time with respect to one’s contemporaries or near-contemporaries, he does not refer to Philip by name. Albert rejects Philip’s position, but the fact that Albert examines the issue at all indicates something about the esteem given to Philip’s work.