 In the realm of jurisprudence, Ibn Rushd is famous for his position on the logical and epistemological value of juridical inferences, which in his view produce nothing more than opinion (ẓann). Even when confronted with the surprising insertion of the word for jurisprudence (fiqh) into the Arabic translation of the Prior Analytics 68b10, Ibn Rushd chooses totally to ignore it. In his juridical writings, he openly denies the accuracy of the term ‘syllogism’ (qiyās) for what jurists had become accustomed to calling their juridical inferences (al-maqāyīs al-fiqhiyya or qiyās sharʿī). When jurists speak of qiyās, it is important to recognize that the term bears quite a different meaning (Abridgement 299 {130–1}; Bou Akl 2019). In particular, contrary to what happens in the syllogism, the qiyās of the jurists does not have the power to deduce the unknown from the known. And even in those cases where Ibn Rushd seems to accept juridical inference, he does not make use of logical vocabulary, but instead deploys the terms used by most of the jurists before him. Rather than engage in a “syllogistification” of the juridical inference, he focuses on the semantic and linguistic origins of juridical rules. For Ibn Rushd, every science has its own characteristics; therefore, anyone who tried to study logic while studying jurisprudence would fail at studying both (Abridgement 123 {37–38}).