 Some philosophers claim that consequentializing a target non-consequentialist theory results in a gimmicky act-consequentialist counterpart theory—and, thus, one that’s implausible (see, e.g., Nozick 1974: 29). And, admittedly, the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory can seem gimmicky when we arrive at it via the Footian Procedure. In that case, the consequentializer just takes whatever features of actions that the target non-consequentialist theory holds to be intrinsically wrong-making and insists that they are instead features of outcomes that make them rank poorly. So, if the non-consequentialist theory holds that an act’s being a promise-breaking is, other things being equal, what makes it wrong, the consequentializer will hold instead that an outcome’s including a promise-breaking is, other things being equal, what makes it rank lower than one that doesn’t. And this move can seem ad hoc.