 According to Anderson (2004), the capacity for reciprocal accommodation with moral agents is a necessary (not sufficient) condition of having rights (pp. 287–9). This may appear to be a 5.3 type of view. However, unlike the capacities in 5.3, a rat, for example, might fail to have this mutual accommodation capacity vis-à-vis most humans, and so would not have the right to be killed by these humans; but the rat might nonetheless have this capacity vis-à-vis other moral agents (human rat lovers, angels, etc.), and so might be able to gain this right from these agents based on additional conditions. When this capacity for mutual accommodation is combined with membership in the human society (which does not require being a human), then, according to Anderson, this is sufficient for a relationship that grounds rights to non-interference and aid from human beings, though perhaps not as strong as those associated with FMS (p. 284).