 Alternatively, Skyrms showed how evolved attachments to particular places or things, and more importantly the ability to signal these attachments can help solve conflictual coordination problems like the Nash Demand Game. In particular, Skyrms (1996 [2014]: chap. 4) showed that by developing a primitive notion of property rights, agents involved in such games could correlate their behavior by playing Hawk at home and Dove away from home, and thereby avoid the sorts of interactions that lead to conflict or to both agents abandoning a resource. At the end of the day, though, the evolutionary game theory utilized by Skyrms can only lend so much support to a view like Gauthier’s. For one thing, the game Skyrms models assumes that agents have fixed types and cannot revise their claims in light of the claims made by others. Furthermore, it is one thing to offer an explanation of why a trait like fair division or constrained maximization would evolve, or to show why this might be beneficial to both individual agents and groups, but to show either of these is not necessarily to show that constraining one’s behavior is the rational course of action.