 Explanation is plausibly hyperintensional: “explains” can be flanked by expressions that cannot be substituted with necessary equivalents salva veritate. One pure mathematical truth can explain another, but not every mathematical truth explains every other, even if every pure mathematical truth is a necessary truth (Baron, Colyvan, &amp; Ripley 2020). Schneider (2011) argues that sometimes logical equivalents can explain each other, making a case that “because” is hyperintensional. \({\sim}{\sim}A\) is true because \(A\) is true, but not vice versa. If the correctness of explanations turns out to depend also on how the world is, rather than only on what suits our explanatory practices, these cases may be due to hyperintensional explanatory connections in the world. (How best to understand explanations, of course, remains a contentious philosophical question.)