 Recent debates about random drift are often entangled with debates over the purported purely statistical (non-causal) nature of evolutionary biology, but the issues are separable. There are issues concerning random drift that do not involve questions of statisticalism (as this article seeks to document), and there are issues concerning statisticalism that do not involve random drift (e.g., much of the literature focuses on natural selection rather than random drift). The statisticalist claim, generally traced to a pair of papers by Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew (2002) and Matthen and Ariew (2002), is essentially that evolution is a population-level phenomenon, and that although there are causes at the level of individual organisms (births, deaths, etc.), there are no causes at the population level, only a statistical summary of the individual events. Note that it is widely acknowledged that the models in evolutionary theory are statistical ones, so the distinctive statisticalist claim is that evolutionary biology is purely statistical. There are at least three alternatives to the statisticalist claim; one challenges the claim that evolutionary biology is a population-level phenomenon, arguing that it is constituted by causes at the level of individual organisms (e.g., Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004), a second defends the view that there are population-level causes (e.g., Millstein 2006; Shapiro and Sober 2007), while a third argues for causes at both levels (Pence 2017).