 Olivi develops his view in relation to two opposing views. According to the first view, there must be something real in the end-terms of these relations because otherwise they would not be real: “a relation that posits nothing in the related things is only a relation according to what is said (relatio secundum dici) […] but it is clear that the power of a king, or any real jurisdiction, or obligation, or subordination of some people are really actual even when none of us thinks or talks about them” (Summa IV q. 1, par. 7). The second view holds that relational properties such as dominium are radically different from natural properties, and that no ontological change takes place when, for instance, someone is crowned a king. Olivi seeks for a position between these two views, and he finds one when he argues that relations of this kind are based on rationes reales (see  § 2.1).  They are real relations in the sense that they do not depend on someone actually thinking of them but they do not entail any real (Aristotelian) ontological addition to the relata.