 There are two problems with this position. First, as Bermúdez observes, if it is to avoid bringing in mentalistic factors, it requires a physicalist account of color as a surface property, which has not been forthcoming (2000: 368, n. 14; 373). Second, if a physical surface-portion provides the immediate object of perception, then it provides the phenomenal content of our perception. When Moore endorsed surface-portions as immediate objects, he noted the problem that if a surface of a round penny (seen obliquely) is the object of perception, it should appear round. Since he held that it did not, he felt compelled to say that the sense datum appears elliptical but is round, thereby sundering the immediacy by bringing a separate “appearance” into the mix. A defender of NSD might counter Moore’s response by saying that the penny in fact looks round and slanted, so there is no disparity between physical surface-portion and phenomenal perception. But then Price’s objection arises. Price allowed for what is now called full shape constancy within a few feet of the observer: the round penny at a slant would appear round. But he noted that, beyond a few feet, constancy starts to break  down.[24]  This creates a problem for NSD: within the framework set out here, it would need to recognize “appearances” with content that differs from the actual structure of a surface-portion. This violates the intent of NSD, which is to establish an account in which the phenomenal content of perceptual experience is provided by the properties of the surface-portion itself, without needing to invoke appearances in addition to immediately perceived surface-portions.