 One such element is the work required to present empirical data in a machine-readable format that is compatible with the software and analytic tools at hand. Data need to be selected, cleaned and prepared to be subjected to statistical and computational analysis. The processes involved in separating data from noise, clustering data so that it is tractable, and integrating data of different formats turn out to be highly sophisticated and theoretically structured, as demonstrated for instance by James McAllister’s (1997, 2007, 2011) and Uljana Feest’s (2011) work on data patterns, Marcel Boumans’s and Leonelli’s comparison of clustering principles across fields (forthcoming), and James Griesemer’s (forthcoming) and Mary Morgan’s (forthcoming) analyses of the peculiarities of datasets. Suppes was so concerned by what he called the “bewildering complexity” of data production and processing activities, that he worried that philosophers would not appreciate the ways in which statistics can and does help scientists to abstract data away from such complexity. He described the large group of research components and activities used to prepare data for modelling as “pragmatic aspects” encompassing “every intuitive consideration of experimental design that involved no formal statistics” (Suppes 1962: 258), and positioned them as the lowest step of his hierarchy of models—at the opposite end of its pinnacle, which are models of theory. Despite recent efforts to rehabilitate the methodology of inductive-statistical modelling and inference (Mayo &amp; Spanos 2009b), this approach has been shared by many philosophers who regard processes of data production and processing as so chaotic as to defy systematic analysis. This explains why data have received so little consideration in philosophy of science when compared to models and theory.