 One will gather what I mean by proposition as soon as I remark that I do not call a proposition in itself or an objective proposition that which the grammarians call a proposition, namely, the linguistic expression, but rather simply the meaning of this expression, which must be exactly one of the two, true or false; and that accordingly I attribute actuality to the grasping of a proposition, to thought propositions as well as to the judgments made in the mind of a thinking being (existence, namely, in the mind of the one who thinks this proposition and who makes the judgment); but the mere proposition in itself (or the objective proposition) I count among the kinds of things that do not have any existence whatsoever, and never can attain existence. Our thinking of a proposition, our judgment that a thing is so and so, is something actual, which began at a certain time and will end at a certain time; the written signs, through which we record these propositions in some place or other are equally really existing things; the propositions themselves, however, do not exist in any time or place (Bolzano 2004a: 40–41). 