 Some critics argue that the idea of public reason—again particularly Rawls’s conception—is in some way unfair or unduly exclusionary. This complaint is most often made on behalf of those who would rely on religious arguments when deliberating about important moral and political questions (Eberle 2002; Greenawalt 1995; Smith 2010; Stout 2004; Vallier 2014; Weithman 2002), though the objection is also sometimes made more generally on behalf of those who are excluded from the constituency of public reason on normative grounds (Bohman 2003; Friedman 2000). There are many different versions of this objection, and the list that follows is not exhaustive. Put most forcefully, public reason is a sham: it purports to be an impartial or neutral method of moral or political justification, but it is, in fact, a form of sectarian secularism or modern liberalism masquerading as something more inclusive. A second, less strident, version of this objection points out that even those theories of public reason that are not explicitly secular will nevertheless make it more difficult, on balance, for religious citizens to justify their favored views. Public reason cannot help but tilt in a secular direction given its requirement that principles or rules be reasonably justifiable to all members of the community. Everyone can understand and endorse a variety of secular considerations, but there is no religious idea or argument that all reasonable people can accept, and thus public reason has an in-built bias against religious doctrines and those who believe such doctrines are relevant to moral and political argument. A third version of the objection queries why controversial religious arguments, claims about the good life, or metaphysical arguments, are excluded from playing a role in public reason, but controversial arguments about justice or individual rights are not similarly excluded. If, as the critic alleges, nothing can justify this asymmetric treatment of controversial arguments from different domains of inquiry, then the idea of public reason is unjustifiably biased against those who rely on religious, metaphysical, or perfectionist arguments. This objection is sometimes called the asymmetry objection (Brower 1994, 21–22; Caney 1995, 258; Sandel 1998, 202–210; Waldron 1999, ch. 7). A variant of this objection focuses on the claim that reasons must be “accessible” in order to qualify as public. The critics allege that, however the notion of accessibility is defined, there will be no clear grounds for declaring that many religious arguments are not accessible and thus nonpublic when compared to various apparently public non-religious arguments (Eberle 2002, 255–260). Fourth, some critics worry that Rawls’s moral duty of civility (see sect. 6 above) will either discourage some citizens from engaging in legitimate acts of religious expression and association, or at least will create a political atmosphere where religious arguments and those who espouse them are treated as less valuable when compared with purely “public” reasons and those who restrict themselves to such arguments (Vallier 2014, 59–64). Finally, some critics argue that public reason is not the only way, and perhaps not the best way, to show respect for others, or show civility, when engaged in moral and political dialogue. There are equally plausible conceptions of respect and civility which favor presenting others with the whole truth as we see it when engaged in moral or political debate, rather than restricting ourselves to shared or common reasons. If this is true, then those who ground their moral or political arguments only in religious or otherwise nonpublic reasons are not being unreasonable or disrespectful: they are simply following a different, but equally plausible, interpretation of what respect or civility requires (Eberle 2002; Pallikkathayil 2019; Stout 2004, 67–85; Weithman 2002).