 In light of these objections, several philosophers have fallen back on a version of the argument from gratitude with a weaker and more limited conclusion. Considerations of gratitude, they argue, might ground the claim that some subjects have some obligations of gratitude to the state. McConnell (1993) suggests that only those who have been benefited by the state, and not subsequently treated unfairly by it, might owe the state obligations of gratitude. As for the specific obligations these subjects owe to the state, they may not include the obligation to obey laws and decrees (cf. D’Cruz 2014); but they may include certain other obligations of wider latitude, e.g., to aid one’s own country in various ways, participate in civic organizations, vote, or volunteer for a year of national service (McConnell 1993: 207). Ingratitude to the state may also justify special punishment for treason, or for acts aimed squarely at the destruction of the state. Insofar as the state claims the right to compel every subject’s obedience to the laws, though, obligations of gratitude could not be the whole justification for political obligation generally (Klosko 1989: 358).