 Some scholars maintain that there is an intrinsic connection between mysticism and moral behavior, or even that mystical experiences are the source and only justification of a moral concern for others. This is because mystical experiences blur or erase the distinction between the subject and others (Stace 1960) and so remove the barrier to moral motivation, or because one’s sense of a “self” disappears entirely. Several scholars have argued, to the contrary, that at least some mystical doctrines are incompatible with morality (Danto 1987, Kripal 2002). Monistic mystical metaphysics eliminates all distinctions between one person and others — all is one — and so there is no recognition of real persons distinct from oneself toward whom one can exercise a moral concern. Hence, monistic mysticism precludes morality. Morality must be between “independently real persons” (Wainwright 1983, 211–212). David Loy (2002) argues that even if monistic morality is not incompatible with morality, it fails to reveal the best way to help people with compassion. Others argue that morality can get off the ground with the ability to conceptualize “the welfare of others” without the need to recognize others as ontologically distinct beings (Zelinski 2007).