Third, among some philosophers there was an increasing emphasis on regarding epistemic subjects, activities, and/or accomplishments, as deeply social in previously under-appreciated ways. (For some discussion, see Goldman and O’Connor 2019.) Included here is Richard Rorty’s (1979) “epistemological behaviorism”, as well as perhaps the first explicit statement of a “contextualist” epistemic theory by David Annis. Annis’ theory concerns justification, not knowledge, and it appeals to the subject’s context rather than the attributor’s. According Annis, while “man is a social animal…when it comes to the justification of beliefs philosophers have tended to ignore this fact” (1978, 215)—more specifically, they have tended to ignore the existence of “contextual parameters essential to justification” (ibid., 213): a person is justified in believing that p only if she can meet certain objections which express real doubts, where it makes a difference just who is expressing the latter (e.g., if the subject is being examined for an M.D. degree, it is important that the objector occupy the appropriate institutional role).