 A final question worth considering at this stage is whether propositions are representational entities at all.  Richard (2013) and Speaks (2014), for instance, each develop views of propositions which deny that they are.  Consider the view defended by Richard.  Sentences, beliefs, and the like represent things as being a certain way — snow as being white, for example.  Put another way, the sentence ‘Snow is white’ represents snow’s being white, where this is simply a way for things to be — a state of affairs or property that is either instantiated or not (but does not represent things as being any way, just as properties are not in general representational).  On this approach, the proposition expressed by the sentence is identified with the way that things are represented as being, not as something which has representational properties either primitively or in need of explanation by more fundamental acts of predication.  If an approach along these lines is correct, the type view appears to lose one of its central motivations.