 This is to require that one’s belief safely indicates its own truth. However, it is entirely possible to be so situated that one’s belief safely indicates its truth even though the requisite condition is not met for something that follows from that belief. The point can be illustrated with a version of the red barn case. Suppose that (on the basis of my red-barn percepts) I believe red barn: there is a red barn in front of me. Suppose, too, that there is indeed a red barn there. However (you guessed it) many fake barns are scattered through the neighborhood, all of which are blue, not red. In the close worlds in which I believe red barn, I am correct, so I meet the requisite condition for knowing red barn, which is that my believing red barn safely indicates its own truth. Now, red barn entails barn: there is a barn in front of me. But, according to the view on offer, the requisite condition for knowing barn is not that my belief red barn safely indicates that barn holds. What is required instead is that my belief barn safely indicates its own truth. Assuming that I would believe barn if I saw one of the blue fakes, then my belief barn does not safely indicate its truth.