 One challenge stems from the strongly negative emotional or moral connotations of the term ‘suicide’. Efforts to distinguish suicidal behavior from other behavior often clandestinely import moral judgments about the aims or moral worth of such behavior. That is, views about the nature of suicide often incorporate, sometimes unknowingly, views about the prudential or moral justifiability of suicide and are therefore not value-neutral descriptions of suicide (Paterson 2003, 353, Cholbi 2011, 17–20). For example, Hitler, most people contend, clearly died due to suicide, but Socrates and Jesus did not (though on Socrates, see Frey 1978). That the deaths of the morally villainous are more readily seen as suicides than the deaths of the morally admirable illustrates that suicide still carries a strongly negative subtext. A similar phenomenon is present within societal discourse concerning individuals near the end of life who seek medical assistance to die. Advocacy and professional organizations have largely succeeded in changing the terminology used in public discussions of such individuals from ‘assisted suicide’ or ‘physician-assisted suicide’ to ‘assisted dying’ or ‘death with dignity,’ despite the strong similarities between these acts and suicide of other kinds. (Friesen 2020, Reed 2020) Presumably, such groups have done so from the belief that the negative connotations of ‘suicide’ will reduce public support for the cause of legalizing medical assistance in dying.