 Let \(|A|\), a subset of \(W\), be the thin proposition expressed by \(A\). The thick proposition expressed by \(A\), [\(A\)], is its thin proposition \(|A|\) together with \(A\)’s subject matter, \(s(A)\). How does one get the subject matter of \(A\)? Yablo suggests assigning a positive subject matter, the division corresponding to “Why is \(A\) true?”; a negative subject matter, the division corresponding to “Why is \(A\) false?”; and to identify the overall \(s(A)\) with its positive and negative subject matters taken together. Worlds agree on the overall subject matter of \(A\) when either \(A\) is true, or \(A\) is false, for the same reasons at them. Yablo calls the reasons for \(A\)’s being true (false), \(A\)’s truthmakers (falsemakers). He suggests not to read them in a metaphysically loaded way, as chunks of reality whose obtaining necessitates truth, and advocates a “semantic” conception of truthmaking: truth/falsemakers are cells of divisions of \(W\), thus, just sets of worlds again, i.e., thin propositions.