  This view purports to account for our practical concerns in a far more adequate way than the previous accounts of numerical identity.  So it makes sense for me to rationally anticipate some future experiences only if they will be mine, where what makes them mine is that they will fit coherently and accurately into my own ongoing self-told story. What explains my special sort of concern for myself is that I'm in fact an extended narrative ego – not some present time-slice concerned about the well-being of some different future time-slice – and I'm constantly extending that narrative into the future, so my concern is global, a concern for the whole self I'm creating via this story, the whole self whose various parts are mine. And as for responsibility, the Narrative Criterion  implies that what makes some past action mine (for which I'm eligible for praise or blame) is that it flowed from my central values,  beliefs, and experiences, that there's a coherent story I may tell  uniting it to the other elements of my life. And a similar story may  be told to account for compensation (Schechtman 1996, 136–162).