 According to Lewis  (1986b:  60), “there are only just enough [perfectly natural properties] to characterise things completely and without redundancy”. This remark suggests that the perfectly natural properties constitute a minimal supervenience base for all truths: if \(R\) is a perfectly natural property, the result of replacing ‘perfectly natural property’ with ‘perfectly natural property distinct from \(R\)’ in  TSB  and/or  Qualitative Supervenience  is  false.[32]  Of course one way for this to be true would be for  TSB/Qualitative Supervenience  to already be false. But there is an idea in the vicinity that is logically independent of  TSB  and  Qualitative Supervenience,  namely that no perfectly natural property supervenes on all the rest. If we take the relevant sense of ‘supervene’ to be the one in play in  Qualitative Supervenience,  this amounts to: 