 The second and third aspects of the Phenomenological method are joined in the idea of descriptive analysis carried out in terms of a whole-part logic that (1) identifies the parts or aspects of the experience, its object, and the correlation itself, and (2) imaginatively varies the whole by thinking away different parts or aspects of the whole to determine which of them must be present for the experience or object to remain the kind of experience or object that it is. Stated more formally, imaginative variation systematically varies the whole under consideration (W) by trying to imagine it first without part A, then without part B, then without part C, and so forth. If W can be imagined without part A and still be considered a W, then A is a “piece” that does not belong necessarily and universally to Ws. If, by contrast, W cannot be imagined without part B, then B is a “moment” of W and belongs necessarily and universally to Ws. The existence of any W entails the presence of B (Husserl 1900–1901 [2001: 2:5–7]). The deployment of this methodology yields a priori truths regarding the necessary and universal features of the intentionality proper to different kinds of experiences.