 Jacovides (2007a: 108–110) suggests that epistemic concerns motivate Locke’s adherence to both parts of RT. As he sees it, Locke is worried that because ideas are the immediate objects of our knowledge, they may not represent external objects. So he thinks we should have a presumption against assuming that ideas of sensation resemble things without us. The pain analogy provides a reason in support of this presumption. However, Jacovides maintains, Locke thinks it is overcome in the case of PQs because they play a part in CT which is our most intelligible account of how things happen in the world. There is some truth to this general description, but it has no clear connection with Locke’s interest in RT. The presumption is not explicitly stated, as far as I know, and the epistemic worry about ideas is stated only in Essay 4.4 where RT is not mentioned.