 The principle has some intuitive force. Nolan thinks of it as a kind of unrestricted ‘comprehension principle’ for impossibilities. It tells something about which impossible worlds there are. There will be worlds which represent that water is not H\(_2\)O, that \(2+2=5\), and that snow both is and is not white. One might think that (NP) entails that ‘anything goes’ with regard to impossible worlds: that any logical principle (except \(A \vDash A)\) will be broken by some impossible world. If so, then (NP) delivers the open worlds mentioned above. However, to apply (NP), we need a single object-language sentence \(A\) which describes an impossibility. Logical laws, by contrast, are stated as relationships between multiple object-language sentences. So it is not clear that (NP) does its intended work.