 A third alternative approach that has gained some prominence in recent years is grounded in belief in free will scepticism, the view that human behaviour is a result of free will but of determinism, luck, or chance, and thus that the notions of moral responsibility and desert on which many accounts of punishment (especially retributivist theories) depend are misguided (see s. 5). As an alternative to holding offenders responsible, or giving them their just deserts, some free will sceptics (see Pereboom 2013; Caruso 2021) instead endorse incapacitating dangerous offenders on a model similar to that of public health quarantines. Just as it can arguably be justified to quarantine someone carrying a transmissible disease even if that person is not morally responsible for the threat they pose, proponents of the quarantine model contend that it can be justified to incapacitate dangerous offenders even if they are not morally responsible for what they have done or for the danger they present. One question is whether the quarantine model is best understood as an alternative to punishment or as an alternative form of punishment. Beyond questions of labelling, however, such views also face various lines of critique. In particular, because they discard the notions of moral responsibility and desert, they face objections, similar to those faced by pure consequentialist accounts (see s. 3), that they cannot in principle rule out disproportionate punishment, or that they are inconsistent with respect for persons and with human dignity (see, e.g., Smilansky 2011).