 Similarly, positions that might be grouped together as “nonconceptualist” according to the first frame are, on this frame, organized quite differently. For example, a variety of interpreters reject the position that pure intuition depends on a conceptual synthesis (e.g., Longuenesse 1998: ch. 8; Waxman 2014; Allais 2015: ch. 7; McLear 2015; Friedman 2015; Golob 2016a). According to the Conceptualism frame, one might thus think of these positions as all in agreement concerning a basic (and controversial) element of Kant’s view, and thus all as forms of ‘Nonconceptualism’. However, these positions in fact radically disagree concerning whether intuition is dependent on the intellect. Their disagreement hinges on the issue of the dependence of intuition on intellectual acts per se rather than on conceptual content or conceptual synthesis (for further discussion see  §5  below). So, according to the second frame, interpreters who consider intuition to depend on nonconceptual but still intellectual acts (e.g., Longuenesse 1998; Waxman 2014; Indregard forthcoming) will be put on the Intellectualist side while those who reject such dependence (e.g., Allais 2015; McLear 2015) will be put on the Nonintellectualist or Sensibilist side. Within Sensibilism there may be significant differences between how different interpreters construe the manner in which intuition gives an object for cognition, or in the manner in which perception and experience are generated from mental acts performed on intuition (compare, e.g., Allais 2017a and Tolley 2019), but all will agree on the fundamental point that intuition may be generated independently of any intellectual act.