 The adequacy of McGrath’s casino analogy is contested as well. Whereas in McGrath’s analogy the epistemic agent waits outside the casino until the remarkable outcome occurs and she/he is called in, “it is not as though we were disembodied spirits waiting for a big bang to produce some universe which could accommodate us”, as White puts it (2000: 268). Epstein (2017: 653) retorts that “it is also not as though we were disembodied spirits keenly observing [the universe] ɑ—our designated potential home—and hoping that it, in particular, would be able to accommodate us.” Epstein’s diagnosis is that the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge rests on the Requirement of Total Evidence in Bayesianism, which, according to him, is to be rejected in cases like these. Draper (2020) as well as Barrett and Sober (2020) defend the Requirement of Total Evidence and, in doing so, attack Epstein’s criticism of the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge. Bradley (2009) offers further casino analogies beyond those considered by Hacking, McGrath and White which, according to him, speak in favour of rejecting the inverse gambler’s fallacy charge, but White’s diagnosis continues to find support, e.g., by Landsman (2016). Friederich (2019a; 2021: ch. 4) suggests that the question of whether we can rationally infer a multiverse from fine-tuning for life is so different from questions encountered in more familiar contexts such as the casino scenarios that whether or not the inference from fine-tuning to a multiverse commits the inverse gambler’s fallacy may not have a determinate answer by the standards of accepted rationality criteria.