 In the subsequent chapter, Ch. 7, Bradwardine considers the problem of revenge in various guises. (See, e.g., the entry on the  Liar paradox,  and especially the section on  Expressive power and ‘revenge’.)  Take Socrates’ utterance of ‘Socrates utters a falsehood’, where Socrates utters nothing else. Bradwardine’s claim is that Socrates’ utterance is false, that is, that Socrates utters a falsehood. How can Bradwardine’s claim that Socrates utters a falsehood be true, while Socrates’ utterance of the same thing is false? The reason, Bradwardine replies, is that Socrates’ utterance is self-referential, and signifies not only that Socrates’ utterance is false but also, by (T2), that it is true (and so is false), whereas Bradwardine’s utterance is not self-referential (rather, it refers to Socrates’ utterance) and so not subject to (T2).