 Just as the rational status of practical akrasia has become contested (see section 3.2 above), however, some theorists have now argued that epistemic akrasia could in fact be rational. For example, Coates (2012), Weatherson (2019), Wedgwood (2011), and Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) have argued for the rational permissibility of some beliefs of the characteristic akratic form “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P.” This discussion has been shaped by a growing interest in higher-order evidence—that is, evidence about what one’s evidence supports. The notion of higher-order evidence complicates the picture of belief at work in arguments like Adler’s (2002) above. Defenders of the rationality of epistemic akrasia have argued that beliefs of the form “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P” can be rationally permissible when one has misleading higher-order evidence. In such cases, they contend, a person could have good grounds both for believing that P and for believing that her evidence doesn’t support the conclusion that P.