 Perhaps another reason for thinking that creatures have libertarian freedom is that there is normativity in nature – that there are things that are good and things that are bad, and things that creatures ought (or ought not) to do – but if there is normativity in nature, then there must be a robust (and libertarian sense) in which it is possible for creatures to abide by that normativity. But it is difficult to locate normativity in Cavendish’s system. She holds that the elemental bodies of nature have features like size, figure, motion, thought, and perception, but there is not a single passage in her corpus in which she includes normative features like goodness and badness. Instead she says things like that “Nature knows of notthing else but of corporeal figurative Motions” (Cavendish 1664, 333). In a piece entitled “No Judge in Nature,” she writes that “No Intreaty, nor Petition can perswade Nature, nor any Bribes can corrupt, or alter the course of Nature. Justly there can be no complaints made against Nature, nor to Nature.” (Cavendish 1653b, 5). There is certainly room for Cavendish to develop what we now call a naturalist meta-ethics, according to which normative claims just reduce to factors like the attitudes and preferences of subjects. She supposes that different humans have different preferences and desires, and that non-human creatures have preferences and desires also, and she could easily make sense of how different moral codes arise in different communities and subcommunities. But none of that is to suggest that she allows that there is such a thing as good or bad simpliciter or that she supposes that because there are things we ought to do, there are things that we have the libertarian freedom to do (or not  do).[41]