  Jakob Thomasius, Leibniz’s teacher in Leipzig, composed a work, Adversus Anonymum, de Libertate Philosophandi, devoted entirely to the refutation of the TTP and its underlying naturalism. Leibniz too seems to have regarded Spinoza’s views on right and law as more dangerous even than Hobbes’, for while Hobbes at least allowed conceptual space for a divine legislator, Spinoza did not (Laerke 2010, 125). Even relatively liberal natural lawyers like Lambert van Velthuysen (1622–1685) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694), regarded Spinoza’s treatment of right and obligation as fundamentally destructive. Velthuysen objects that, without a divine legislator, there is “no room left for precepts and commandments” (Ep. 42) in Spinoza’s philosophy. And Pufendorf maintains that Spinoza’s conception of right is defective in that it fails to produce a “moral effect” or to put others under obligations (Pufendorf 1934, 391; see Curley 1995).