  Third, Shafer-Landau’s approach seems to have the very odd consequence that certain forms of first-order monism are ruled out.  Shafer-Landau himself explicitly claims that his theory can be neutral on this front, and it would be unfortunate if his theory did have such striking implications for first-order theory.  Why do I say that Shafer-Landau’s theory seems to lead very quickly to the rejection of certain forms of monism?  Because on a standard view of tropes, a property (that is, a type) just is a resembling set of tropes.  In this context, whether a given property is moral or natural will depend upon whether the relevant sort of resemblance is one which is especially salient from the point of view of moral theory, on the one hand, or from the point of view of one of the natural sciences.  It could be relevant from the point of view of both such perspectives, but this would be for naturalism to be true, which, of course, is inconsistent with non-naturalism!  The main point is that for any naturalist view which holds that something is good if and only if it instantiates some particular single natural property (pleasantness, say), it would follow that the relevant sort of resemblance would be salient from the perspective of one of the natural sciences.  For all pleasantness tropes do resemble one another in a way which would be salient from the point of view of psychology (or possibly biology)—or at least, insofar as pleasantness is a natural property this is likely to be so.  In which case, a standard view of tropes would entail that the property itself is a natural one.  In which case, we would have a form of reductive naturalism.  So for this strategy to work, it seems that any form of first-order monism which holds that things are good if and only if they instantiate some single natural property, must be rejected.  Otherwise we end up with a form of naturalism, rather than non-naturalism.  Insofar as the non-naturalist (quite rightly) aspires to remain neutral on such first-order questions, this is a theoretical vice of the proposed explanation.