  Hahn and colleagues’ data do not determine, however, whether agents come to be aware of the content of their implicit biases through introspection, by drawing inferences from their own behavior, or from some other source (see Berger forthcoming for discussion). This is important for determining whether the awareness agents have of their implicit biases constitutes self-knowledge. If our awareness of the content of our implicit biases derives from inferences we make based on (for example) our behavior, then the question is whether these inferences are justified, assuming knowledge entails justified true belief. Some have suggested that the facts about implicit bias warrant a “global” skepticism toward our capacities as epistemic agents (Saul 2012; see  §3.2.2). If this is right, then we ought to worry that our inferences about the content of our implicit biases, from all the ways we behave on a day-to-day basis, are likely to be unjustified. Others, however, have argued that people are typically very good interpreters of their own minds (e.g., Carruthers 2009; Levy 2012), in which case it may be more likely that our inferences about the content of our implicit biases are well-justified. But whether the inferences we make about our own minds are well-justified would be moot if it were shown that we have direct introspective access to our biases.