 If Molinist subjunctive conditionals are replaced by these epistemic conditionals, a different, “epistemic” theory of creation and providence may be generated. God reasons suppositionally: suppose I do X, what am I in a position to know would result? He uses his knowledge of the epistemic conditionals to infer what he can, and then supposes further actions on his part, inferring further information. Importantly, some of these conditionals will describe human free decisions, for even on libertarian views of the will it is still possible sometimes to know what someone will freely do on the basis of other information about them. Sometimes God will come to a point where he cannot infer anything further because there just isn’t enough information, but sometimes he will be able to generate a complete history of the world in this manner, a complete plan or story of the world. Such complete plans or stories are the possible worlds that he will be able to ensure actually come about (by actualizing all the states of affairs he had supposed throughout the reasoning process); they are the feasible worlds on this account of providence. So, like Molinism, there are possible worlds that God cannot bring about, but (also like Molinism) he has quite a bit more control over the ones he can bring about than is allowed by open theism. The limitations on God are subtly different on this view than on Molinism. On Molinism the limitations are the simple facts about what free beings would do in any given situation, while on the epistemic account the limitations are the availability of evidence with respect to what free beings will do in any given situation.