 We now turn to a second source of doubts about the validity of historical claims to reparations. Injustices committed against people in the past may not give rise to claims to reparations today if such claims can be understood to presuppose an indefensible interpretation of property entitlements. Jeremy Waldron (Waldron 1992a; Waldron 1992b: 27; Waldron 2002, 2003, 2004a; Waldron 2004b: 37; Waldron 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Quist &amp; Veraart 2009; see also Lyons 1977) argues that the view that once we acquire entitlements they continue until we transfer or relinquish them is indefensible since there are reasons of principle (not only pragmatic reasons for, e.g., the statutes of limitations and the doctrine of adverse possession (see Marmor 2004: 326–329)) for holding that entitlements and rights are sensitive to changes of circumstances that typically occur in time. So-called “supersession” of claims owing to past injustices arguably might concern different types of claims and occur through changes in several types of circumstances, which have consequences for the (1) distributions of goods, (2) connections to specific objects, (3) group identity, and for (4) sovereignty (Meyer &amp; Waligore 2018).