  Or, as Bratman puts it, we very often reason about what it is  best to do as a way of settling the question of what  to do. (He calls this “evaluative practical  reasoning”: Bratman 1979, p. 156.) “One’s  evaluations [thus] play a crucial role in the reasoning underlying  full-blown action,” Bratman holds (p. 170), and to be  forced to deny this would be in his view “too high a price to  pay” (p. 159). As Alfred Mele similarly puts it,  “there is a real danger that in attempting to make causal and  conceptual space for full-fledged akratic action one might commit  oneself to the rejection of genuine ties between evaluative judgment  and action” (1991, p. 34). But that would be to throw the  baby out with the bathwater. If we want to resist Hare’s conclusions, we must do so in a way which steers clear of the danger to which Mele alerts us. We must navigate between the Scylla of extreme internalism and the Charybdis of extreme externalism.