 A second philosophical concern is that Maynard Smith and Szathmáry’s original idea looks a bit teleological, and in a way that likely raises the hackles of some scientists and philosophers (e.g., Dawkins 1986; Dennett 1995). The transitions in Szathmáry and Maynard Smith’s (1995) list all seem like necessary steps on the way to the evolution of humans, and cynically, one might wonder if their relation to the later appearance of humans is what makes the transitions “major”. Relatedly, one might wonder if the idea of major transitions comes a little too close to reviving pre-evolutionary thinking about the great chain of being. This also connects with traditional questions about evolutionary progress (Ruse 1997). While some of the concepts surveyed in this entry—especially passive trends and historical contingency—might seem like threats to the belief in evolutionary progress, the theory of major transitions coheres well with progressivist views about evolution.