 Analytic Modalities.  Armstrong argues that many  intuitive modal facts — notably, the impossibility of an object exemplifying more than one determinate of the same determinable  — can be understood ultimately as logical, or analytic,  modalities that are grounded in meaning rather than any primitive  modal features of reality. For example, intuitively it is impossible  that an object simultaneously exemplify the structural properties  having 2kg mass and having 1kg mass. The combinatorial  reason for this (cf. Armstrong 1989, 79) is that, for an object  a to exemplify the former property is simply for there to be a division of a into two wholly distinct parts, both of which  exemplify the latter property. Moreover, this division into parts is  entirely arbitrary, that is, for any part a1 of a exemplifying having 1kg mass, there is a (unique)  part a2 of a wholly distinct from  a1 that also exemplifies that property. It follows  that, if our 2kg object a itself also exemplifies  having 1kg mass, then, as a is a part of itself, there  must be a 1kg part of a that is wholly distinct from a. And that is analytically false, false “solely by virtue of the  meaning we attach to” the word ‘part’  (ibid.,   80).[54] 