 There is no doubt that Poincaré’s work has been very influential both in the sciences and in philosophy. It was already widely discussed at the time it was first presented — not only in France but also in Germany (e.g. Ferdinand von Lindemann (1904) and Emil Meunier (1919))— and his geometric conventionalism also greatly influenced the logical empiricists, who were linked to Poincaré’s follower Louis Rougier (Rougier 1920), one of the organizers of the 1935 Paris congress on scientific philosophy. Poincaré’s conventionalism was widely discussed again in the post-WWII literature on spacetime and relativity theory in the philosophy of science. His intervention in the philosophy of mathematics has been a source of great inspiration to critics of logicism and others. In the tradition of Kant and Mach, who excluded “metaphysical” speculations from philosophy of science, Poincaré is also considered to be one of the founders of this field as a discipline (Brenner 2003; Moulines 2006). Poincaré is considered the founder of structural realism and is thought to have held a productive middle of the road position on scientific realism (Worrall 1989). His discussion of scientific creativity has spawned a literature of its own and became a standard account of how scientific creativity works. His work on the stability of the solar system influenced the development of chaos theory and the classical concept of causality based on the fact that similar causes produce similar effects. Poincaré is one of the starting points for arguments showing the compatibility of ontological determinism and epistemological indeterminism. His famous recurrence theorem raised questions for statistical mechanics and his work on probability theory influenced the early work of Hans Reichenbach (Glymour and Eberhardt 2012).