 Fischer (2017) proposes a Theory-Based Epistemology of Modality, TEM, for extraordinary or philosophical modal claims. The basic idea is that we are justified in believing an extraordinary modal claim, \(m\), only if we are justified in believing a theory \(T\) from which \(m\) follows. For example, we are justified in believing that mind-body dualism is metaphysically possible only if we are justified in believing a theory \(T\) from which mind-body dualism follows. Importantly, Fischer holds that abductive methods for theory choice, such as using theoretical virtues like simplicity, are central to being justified in believing a theory. If the theory \(T\) from which one would be justified in believing that mind-body dualism is metaphysically possible is not the simplest theory, all else being equal, then one would not be justified in believing it, and thus not be justified in believing that mind-body dualism is metaphysically possible.