 Definitions of obligation aside, much also hinges on the precise question being asked. Some philosophers start with what we might call the broad question: whether gratitude itself is an obligation (Camenisch 1981: 10; Blustein 1982; Heyd 1982: 109–111; Meilaender 1984: 156; Swinburne 1989: 65–66; Wellman 1999b: 291). This question, however, is infelicitous. Gratitude is a complex phenomenon (see  section 2),  consisting of cognitive, affective and conative elements. Some of these elements may be obligations, others not—and the broad question is problematic insofar as it rules out this possibility. Another question philosophers sometimes use to begin an inquiry into the deontic status of gratitude is whether gratitude is a source of obligations (Carr 2013). This question too is misleading, since if any of the elements of the grateful response are obligatory, then technically, the source (cause or basis) of such obligations would be the benefactor’s φ-ing, not the beneficiary’s response itself. Rather than asking whether gratitude is an obligation, or whether it is a source of obligation, a more fruitful question to ask is whether there are obligations of gratitude (and, if so, what they are). This question allows for the possibility that only certain elements of the grateful response may be obligatory, the way promise-keeping is, and it does not obscure the fact that the source or root of such obligations would be a benefactor’s beneficence.