b. Jason Dana and his colleagues (2006) had dictators make their allocation decision using $10. They were told that recipients would be informed about what the dictator knew when making his choice. But before recipients actually were told anything, dictators were given another choice. They could keep $9 for themselves, $0 would go to the recipient, and crucially, the recipient would not learn anything about the dictator game at all. This exit option would thereby allow dictators to keep a large payoff while also knowing that they had not disappointed the recipient. And the dictator would not have to worry about appearing selfish by keeping most of the money (Dana et al. 2006: 196). Eleven out of 40 dictators (28%) ended up taking this exit option, with 2 of them initially planning to keep the $10 (2006: 197). The remaining 9 participants had planned on giving some money to the recipient, and now did not have to.