Originating in the work of feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan (1982) and the proliferation of scholarship stimulated by her insights, care theorists have emphasized patterns of moral reasoning that are allegedly characteristic of women—reasoning that prioritizes caring, relationships, and responsibilities—and contrasted them with modes of reasoning that privilege justice and rights, and which Gilligan and her followers have taken to be more characteristic of men.  (It should be noted here, however, that the specifically gendered contours of care and justice in this work have been challenged by those who see the difference as more to do with the forms of moral reasoning mobilized by socially and politically marginalized groups, women being one of these: see e.g., Cortese 1990). Care theorists distrust traditional moral principles and emphasize the necessity of values such as love, care, and responsibility to capture contextual subtleties and relational bonds that are overlooked within principle-oriented ethical frameworks.