  The upshot of this discussion is that chance is a process notion, rather than being entirely determined by features of the outcome to which the surface grammar of chance ascriptions assigns the chance. For if there can be a single-case chance of \(\frac{1}{2}\) for a coin to land heads on a toss even if there is only one actual toss, and it lands tails, then surely the chance cannot be fixed by properties of the outcome ‘lands heads’, as that outcome does not  exist.[2]  The chance must rather be grounded in features of the process that can produce the outcome: the coin-tossing trial, including the mass distribution of the coin and the details of how it is tossed, in this case, plus the background conditions and laws that govern the trial. Whether or not an event happens by chance is a feature of the process that produced it, not the event itself. The fact that a coin lands heads does not fix that the coin landed heads by chance, because if it was simply placed heads up, as opposed to tossed in a normal fashion, we have the same outcome not by chance. Sometimes features of the outcome event cannot be readily separated from the features of its causes that characterise the process by means of which it was produced. But the upshot of the present discussion is that even in those cases, whether an outcome happens by chance is fixed by the properties of the process leading up to it, the causal situation in which it occurs, and not simply by the fact that an event of a given character was the product of that  process.[3]