Just as there are shallow and deep notions of ontological commitment, so there are shallow and deep notions of truthmaking.  On the necessitation account of truthmaking, truthmaking is shallow: Socrates is a truthmaker for ‘Socrates exists’ and elephants are truthmakers for ‘elephants exist’, whether or not Socrates or elephants have real existence. On the grounding account of truthmaking, truthmaking is deep: only real existents can serve as truthmakers.  Clearly, if we pair a shallow interpretation of ontological commitment with a deep interpretation of truthmaking, then a truthmaker account of ontological commitment is off the table: the ontological commitments and the truthmakers of a theory will not be aligned.  In evaluating a truthmaker account, then, it must be supposed from the start that either both notions are taken to be shallow or both notions are taken to be deep. In what follows, both will be taken to be deep in accord with the truthmaker theorist's intentions.