 The discussion of the question of the relationship between religion and philosophy in the Tiqqun is complex and spans a number of contexts. On the one hand, Albalag states in the preface to the Tiqqun that there is no essential distinction between philosophy and the Torah except that the former, addressing the select few, conveys the truth in a demonstrative manner, while the latter, addressing the multitude, conveys the truth in a figurative language in accordance with their limited comprehension. By this means, Albalag seems to align with the understanding of religion as an imitation of philosophy which was founded by al-Farabi and adopted by many Muslim and Jewish philosophers, most significantly Averroes and arguably Maimonides (see al-Farabi The Book of Letters: 19–26; Maimonides Guide: preface; Averroes Decisive Treatise: 1–3, 7–10). Both philosophers not only maintain that religion and philosophy are compatible, but also accord philosophy a crucial role in arriving at the true meaning of Scripture (Maimonides Guide: preface; Averroes Decisive Treatise: 1–3, 7–10). Furthermore, Averroes sets forth a religious epistemology based on the principle that “truth does not oppose truth; rather, it agrees with and bears witness to it” (Decisive: 9). On this principle, contradictions between al-Shariʿah (Religious Law) and philosophy are viewed as mere apparent, rather than essential, contradictions that result from the literary form of Scripture—consisting in similes, metaphors and stories—which is directed to the multitude. Since al-Shariʿah cares for all people, “the red and black”, it conveys the truth in different methods in accordance with the diverse intellectual capacities of people and types of assent they are fit for (ibid, 8). Only those who are adept in science (al-rasiẖuna fi-lʿilm) can have access to the internal meaning of Scripture, which is designed according to the truth as it is, thereby attaining certain, demonstrative, assent to Scripture. Drawing on Averroes’ religious epistemology, post-Maimonidean philosophers, continuing Maimonides’ philosophical-religious  enterprise,[5]  undertook to interpret Judaism as “a philosophical religion” by giving principles of Judaism that appeared to be in conflict with philosophy naturalistic interpretations (for the concept of philosophical religion see Fraenkel 2012: 5). In a similar vein, Albalag engages in allegorical interpretations of some elements of the Account of the Beginning, stating, in an obviously apologetic tone, that “it is possible to extract the philosophical doctrine of eternal creation from the Torah” (Tiqqun n.30, 33). 