  There is one difficulty with this answer. The loss described by Hurka is not a moral loss, and so the regret is not moral regret. In Hurka’s example, the relevant loss is that A does not get any pleasure. The agent doing the choosing may be rational to regret this if she cares about A, or even if she just feels sorry for A, but there has been no moral loss, as ‘pleasure for A’ as opposed to pleasure itself is not a moral value. According to the view under consideration, pleasure itself is what matters morally, and so although A’s pleasure matters qua pleasure, the moral point of view takes B’s pleasure into account in just the same way, and there is nothing to regret, as there is more pleasure than there would otherwise have been.  Stocker and Williams would surely insist that the point of their argument was not just that there is a loss, but that there is a moral loss. The monist cannot accommodate that point, as the monist can only consider the quantity of the value, not its distribution, and so we are at an impasse.