  Toward the end of the introduction to his analysis of place,  Aristotle notes that “Zeno’s difficulty requires some  explanation; for if every thing that is is in a place, it is clear  that there will also be a place of the place, and so on to  infinity” (Arist. Ph. 4.1, 209a23–5). His  subsequent statement of the problem is even briefer but adds one key  point: “Zeno raises the problem that, if place is something, it will be in something” (Arist. Ph.  4.3, 210b22–3; cf. Eudemus fr. 78 Wehrli, [Arist.] De  Melisso Xenophane Gorgia 979b23–7, Simp. in  Ph. 562, 3–6). Zeno would appear to have argued as follows.  Everything that is is in something, namely a place. If a place is  something, then it too must be in something, namely some further  place. If this second place is something, it must be in yet another  place; and the same reasoning applies to this and each successive  place ad infinitum. Thus, if there is such a thing as place, there must be limitless places everywhere, which is absurd.  Therefore, there is no such thing as place. This argument could well  have formed part of a more elaborate argument against the view that  there are many things, such as that if there are many things, they  must be somewhere, i.e. in some place; but there is no such thing as  place and thus no place for the many to be; therefore, there are not  many things. This is, however, only speculation.