 Returning to Leibniz’s dialogue, Church pointed out that it contained an important assumption about logical form (which Church accepted): that there is some thing—whether a thought or another kind of thing—that is the logical subject of attributions of truth and falsehood as well as the logical object of attributions of assertion and belief, including attributions containing bound variables such as “there is something that Church asserts and Goodman denies”. Church was scathingly critical of those (like Goodman) who denied this assumption without also providing, in sufficient detail, their own corresponding analyses of attributions of assertion and belief. Church (1956b; 1973) noted that Scheffler (1954) was almost alone in offering such an analysis and defended the assumption by submitting Scheffler’s proposal to extensive criticism. Especially puzzling to Church was Scheffler’s willingness to admit that there is a philosophical problem about the existence of physical objects while also insisting, without argument, that there is a problem about the existence of propositions and sentence types that is different in kind.