  This game has two “pure” Nash equilibria: one in which both players go to Luigi’s, the other in which both go to Fabio’s. Intuitively, neither equilibrium is fair, since one player achieves a higher payoff than the other. The game also has a “mixed-strategy” Nash equilibrium: that is, an equilibrium in which each agent chooses his strategy based upon the outcome of a randomizing device. Specifically, the game has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which \(A\) goes to Luigi’s with probability \(\bfrac{2}{3}\) and \(B\) goes to Luigi’s with probability \(\bfrac{1}{3}\). \(A\)’s expected payoff from this equilibrium is given as follows, where “\(Prob(x, y)\)” denotes the probability that \(A\) goes to \(x\) and \(B\) goes to \(y\):