 There is an unusual view of the nature of particulars expressed in this passage. Dharmakīrti, following Dignāga, holds that the nature of a particular is one, unified. Sometimes he expresses this misleadingly by saying that a thing is “without parts” or “without aspects”, when what he probably means is that the different aspects of its nature are fused into one; they are inseparable, completely integrated. If one apprehends any part of the nature of a thing one must apprehend the thing in its entirety, because its nature is undivided. This is exactly what happens in perception, a thing is grasped completely. It is only inference (and other conceptual cognitions) we ascertain apohas which are not intrinsic properties of the thing nor aspects of their natures. Perception is always veridical owing to its direct link with real thing, provided that all of its causes are in place. Conceptual cognition or inference is characteristically erroneous insofar as it mistakes the general features that it abstracts from and superimposes on a particular for the thing in itself. Still, some conceptual cognitions are ‘correct’ in a sense. Kellner clarifies the sense in which they are correct is that they identify things correctly and can serve as a solid basis for successful action, whereas others are incorrect because they misidentify things and lead people astray – identifying a mirage as a reflection caused by sun’s rays is in this sense correct, whereas identifying it as a water body is false (2004, 2). In addition, Kellner clarifies that there is a kind of perceptual ascertainment, over and above sensory perception, which enables us to superimpose or ascribe features/properties of the object. We may superimpose them correctly or incorrectly depending on the environmental factors (lighting, distance, etc.) as well as the cognisor’s mind being focussed in ascertaining certain aspects of perceived reality (Kellner, 2004, 42). Concepts, in this Buddhist sense, are well-formed rules for identifying exclusions. Even though the Buddhists talks about the awareness produced by concepts as faint impressions, it is not meant to be taken in the sense of Hume’s ideas which are a blurry expression of the real thing. Rather, the point is that the concepts are constructed from abstracting general features of objects and then superimposing them back on the objects. General features or properties cannot be known in sensory perception as the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā opponets believe. Rather, as we see, general features can be correctly or incorrectly superimposed on the particulars in the perceptual or inferential ascertainments. They are correctly ascertained when they lead to successful action, incorrectly ascertained when they lead us astray.