 Another controversy over Aquinas’s writings on analogy concerns his explicit statements in some passages (notably in the Summa Theologiae) that one analogate is included in the definition of the other analogate or analogates. Specifically, the analogate of which the term is said in a prior way must be included in the definition of the posterior analogate or analogates, just as the definition of healthy food includes a reference to the healthiness of an animal. There are two grounds for the controversy. One is that Aquinas also explicitly denies (notably in the De Veritate) that the rule that one analogate appears in the definition of the others applies to cases of names said of God and creatures. Another ground is that it is simply difficult to see how the rule could apply to names said of God and creatures given Aquinas’s insistence (including in the Summa Theologiae) that these names are not said of God only by relation to creatures nor are they said of creatures only by relation to God. One proposed solution to the difficulty of fitting the definition of a name as said of God into the definition of a name as said of a creature draws on Aquinas’s doctrine of participation through agent causality. Although the reference to God in the definition of the creature is not direct or explicit, it occurs through our recognition that when humans are said to be good, this means that they have a participated goodness which must be caused by that which is goodness itself. The nature of this causal relation between God and creature explains the sense in which terms are said in a prior way of God. So as far as imposition is concerned, terms are given their signification on the basis of creaturely effects, and, before we learn about God, we may think that their prior use is to refer to creaturely perfections. However, when we come to know God as the first cause and fully perfect being, we recognize that their prior application is to God. The sixteenth-century Thomist Francis Sylvester of Ferrara proposes that the naming of the creature by reference to God involves a distinct act of imposition of signification upon a name from the original act of imposition. A merit of this approach is that it helps us to explain Aquinas’s insistence on the distinction between the analogy of many-to-one and the analogy of one-to-another. In the first case, both food and medicine are said to be healthy because each is related to something else, the health of an animal. In the second case, food is said to be healthy because of its relation to the health of an animal. Only the second kind of analogy applies to the divine names, for no non-metaphorical name that we apply to God can ever be explained in terms of something other than God. Our use of divine names has to reflect God’s absolute priority.