 God alone, among intellectual beings, has no further object of intellectual contemplation that might serve as his final cause. On the contrary, “the First Form thinks of nothing outside itself” (LongAnima III.5 {410}; EpiAnima 219 {93}; EpiMeta 4.158 {147}; LongMeta XII.51 {1700}). This helps account for God’s unique simplicity as a pure mind, always fully actualized by nothing other than God. It leads to questions, however, about the sense in which God can be said to have knowledge of the created world. This is “the most powerful doubt” regarding this conception of God (EpiMeta 4.159 {148}), and it threatens to lead to the view al-Ghazālī had branded as heretical: that God does not know particulars (Incoherence II.4 {587}). Ibn Rushd denies that he is committed to this consequence. God has knowledge of the created world in his own manner, neither in universal nor particular, not as if his thoughts are caused by the world, but rather as the cause of the world (Incoherence I.3 {226-7}, I.13 {462}; Ḍamīma 7; LongMeta XII.51 {1707–8}). The divine mind’s “thinking its own self is identical with its thinking all existence” (Incoherence I.11 {435}).