 Stout answered these criticisms in print (for a discussion see Nasim 2008, 30–40 &amp; 94–98). He argued that he had not been holding a view akin to Locke’s representationalism, claiming that the ‘representative function’ of his ‘presentations’ is of a different nature, more like a memory-image would represent what is remembered (Stout 1911, 14f.), but it is at first blush unclear what he meant by this. Against Cook Wilson’s first argument, he claimed that in his conception presentations and presented objects form an “inseparable unity” (Stout 1911, 22), this being, once more, unclear. At all events, both Stout and Russell, in his theory of ‘sense-data’ as ‘objects of perception’ (Russell 1912), insisted that the physical object and the representative are ‘real’. But one might say that this ‘objectification of the appearing as appearance’, does not annul Cook Wilson’s diagnosis of the difficulties inherent in that position. At least Russell was clearer about its implications, requiring a ‘logical construction’ of physical objects as functions of ‘sense-data’. One way to counter Cook Wilson on the absurdity of the locution ‘sensible extensions’ is to distinguish between ‘private’ and ‘public’ space, as Russell was to do in ‘The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics’ (Russell 1917, 139–171); as it is well-known, this postulation generates its own set of difficulties, e.g., the claim that space must have 6 dimensions (Russell 1917, 154). Russell on ‘sense-data’ was to become a favourite target for Prichard’s acerbic wit (Prichard 1915 &amp; 1928).