 However, even if the use of game theory in ethics has become more widespread, many moral and political philosophers remain skeptical of this trend. One worry voiced by skeptics is that game theoretic analyses often rely on simplifying assumptions that give us reason to doubt how relevant these analyses are to real world problems. For instance, individuals are rarely the selfish utility maximizers game theory so often assumes. This worry is misplaced for two reasons. First, most philosophers inclined to use formal methods in their work are acutely aware of the assumptions they rely on. This doesn’t mean that formal work never uses misguided models or assumptions, or that we shouldn’t look critically at the conclusions we draw from game theoretic analysis and other formal work like it. But when results are interpreted correctly they can be extremely helpful. For instance, when simplifying assumptions are made for the sake of computational tractability, they can provide a useful tool for narrowing down future lines of inquiry. And sometimes simplifying assumptions are made so that we might ask speculative questions such as whether rational utility maximizers could reason their way into morality, as is the case in the social contract tradition. Second, at the end of the day, formal models aren’t really so different from the thought experiments that are perhaps more familiar in philosophy. One advantage of game theory and other formal tools, though, is that they force the philosopher using them to be explicit about the assumptions they are making, and they often allow the adept practitioner to say something precise about where the action is and how various assumptions affect things.