 However, it can still be questioned whether by transposing these Lutheran considerations into the context of his own mechanistic materialism, Hobbes could do them proper justice; and of course, for Luther the philosophical issues surrounding such materialism were of little concern, and nor is his conception of God merely that of the kind of “first mover” that he is taken to be by  Hobbes.[8]  There is thus no place in Hobbes’s account for what we have seen is so distinctive to Luther’s, namely that there is a kind of spiritual comfort to be found in the abandonment of the idea of free choice, both in the way that the predestination that comes with it can make us more certain of God’s promises, and in the way it liberates us from the kind of anxiety we would feel if salvation depended on our proper exercise of this choice. Moreover, as discussed in Luther entry §4, Luther has arguments against free choice that are independent of any commitment to materialism, which rest instead on his claim that there can be no “neutral” normative space for the free will to exercise its choices as Erasmus had claimed: for it is either a good will which will see the good as its only option and so not be faced with any choice, or a bad will which thinks that the bad is also an option it should consider, but then qua will it is always turned away from the good and so has no choice in this direction  either.[9]  As others have noted, these deeper aspects of Luther’s position, which have nothing to do with Hobbes’s materialism, in the end make their respective approaches to these questions very different (see Damrosch 1979, Overhoff 1997).