 To understand Carneades’ position, we should distinguish between the truthmaker for a statement and the cause of an event. If I go to the doctor and recover from my cancer, the cause of my recovering from the disease is the doctor’s treatment, and the cause of my going to the doctor is my decision to do so. The truthmaker for the statement “Tim will recover from his cancer” is my recovering from the cancer, but the statement’s eternal truth doesn’t cause my future recovery. Once we make this distinction, then we should see that the principle of bivalence does not threaten our freedom. According to Carneades, our own voluntary actions are one of the causes of events. And these actions are under our control. The way Carneades puts it is that the cause of our actions is a “voluntary motion of the mind”, a motion which has an intrinsic nature of being in our power and of obeying us (Fat. 24–5, LS 20E). There is a truth beforehand concerning how I will act, e.g., that I will seek out treatment for my cancer. But my action of seeking out treatment is nonetheless under my control, and my seeking out the treatment is not necessary, as I have the ability not to seek out the treatment. (Consider here Carneades’ analogy with the past: just because there is a truth about how I did voluntarily act in the past, this does not imply that my past actions were not under my control, or that it was necessary that I act in the ways that I did.)