 The locus classicus of the second kind of Replacement Naturalism—the one deriving from an attack on foundationalism—is Quine’s “Epistemology Naturalized” (1969). The central enterprise of epistemology on Quine’s view is to understand the relation between our theories of the world and the evidence (sensory input) on which they are based. Quine’s target is one influential construal of this project: Cartesian foundationalism, particularly in the sophisticated form given to it in the twentieth century by Rudolf Carnap in Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1928). The foundationalist wants an account of the theory-evidence relation that would vindicate the privileged epistemic status of at least some subset of our theories: our theories (in particular, our best theories of natural science) are to be “grounded” in indubitable evidence (i.e., immediate sense impressions). Quine deems foundationalism a failure: the semantic part of the program is rendered unrealizable by meaning holism (theoretical terms get their meanings from their place in the whole theoretical framework, not in virtue of some point-by-point contact with sensory input), while the epistemic part of the program is defeated by the Duhem–Quine thesis about the underdetermination of theory by evidence (there is always more than one theory consistent with the evidence, in part because a theoretical hypothesis can always be preserved in the face of recalcitrant evidence by abandoning the auxiliary hypotheses that informed the test of the hypothesis) (see Kim 1988, pp. 385–386).