 Interestingly, Stevenson suggests that a point in favor of his non-cognitivist or emotivist view is that it allows us to recognize “the cognitive content of ethics [...] in its full variety”—that “an emotive conception of ethics, so often criticized for depriving ethics of its thoughtful, reflective elements, has actually just the opposite effect” (1950a, 60). The idea is a variation on Moore’s (1903) Open Question Argument: Let us suppose that being good may be identified, as a matter of conceptual or meaning analysis, with having some descriptive feature, D—being promotive of survival, say. If one now wishes to determine whether some action would be good, it turns out that one only needs to consider its impact on the instantiation of Dness. This may be part of what is cognitively relevant. But it is at least possible to deem all sorts of descriptive features as relevant to determining what is good. And so most non-emotive accounts (Stevenson grants that there are exceptions) will be too restrictive regarding what may be deemed to be cognitively relevant to ethics (1950a, 60–63). One type of non-emotive view that would escape this argument is Moorean non-naturalism, according to which moral judgments are beliefs concerning sui generis, non-natural properties. Stevenson applauds such views for recognizing “an added factor” to the meaning of moral language that “the purely scientific analyses of ethics are accustomed to ignore,” but takes them to unnecessarily intellectualize the “emotive meaning into an indefinable quality” (1944, 272).