 In order to support his contention that agents can be directly culpable for holding certain beliefs, Montmarquet (1999: 844) argues, against Zimmerman 1997, that agents can in fact directly control their beliefs by exercising direct control over the degree of care with which they form them. He offers the analogy of whistling carefully: one can directly control the care one exerts in whistling, but this doesn’t imply that the whistling itself is only indirectly in one’s control; on the contrary, one directly controls both. If the analogy holds, given that agents can directly control how careful they are in forming their beliefs, they can also directly control their beliefs themselves and so it would follow that agents can be directly blameworthy for forming beliefs carelessly and for the carelessly formed beliefs themselves. In response, Zimmerman (2002a; 2008: 183–9) points out a disanalogy between the cases of whistling carefully and forming beliefs carefully: while whistling is itself an action, believing something isn’t an action but a (mental) state, which can be the result of the action of taking care in forming beliefs. However, since we don’t have direct control over the results of our non-basic actions (taking care in forming beliefs being one of them), Zimmerman concludes that we lack direct control over our beliefs and so we can’t be directly responsible for them (2008: 188–9).