 To this second version of the objection to retributivist blame, retributivists may respond that although emotions associated with retributive blame have no doubt contributed to various excesses in penal policy, this is not to say that the notion of deserved censure can have no appropriate place in a suitably reformed penal system. After all, when properly focused and proportionate, reactive attitudes such as anger may play an important role by focusing our attention on wrongdoing and motivating us to stand up to it; anger-tinged blame may also serve to convey how seriously we take the wrongdoing, and thus to demonstrate respect for its victims as well as its perpetrators (see Cogley 2014; Hoskins 2020). What’s more, on the sort of communicative retributivist account sketched above, treating offenders as responsible agents involves pointing out when they have done wrong and expecting them to take responsibility for their wrongful actions. If taking responsibility for one’s wrongdoing requires that one acknowledge it as wrongdoing, commit to reforming one's behaviour, and begin to reconcile with one’s community by making reparation for the wrongdoing, then one might argue that emotions associated with self-blame (guilt, remorse) and others’ blame (anger, resentment) play a central role in such a process.