 One challenge arises from the prospect of systematic diversity in how different populations of people think about philosophical questions. The possibility of such diversity had been raised before (e.g., Stich 1990), but experimental philosophers have sought to provide evidence of such diversity. For instance, an early study reported differences between East Asian students and Western students on famous cases from epistemology (Weinberg et al. 2001). Another early study provided evidence for cultural differences in judgments about reference. East Asians were more likely than Westerners to have descriptivist judgments about the reference of proper names (Machery et al. 2004). Some studies have also found gender differences in intuitions about philosophical cases (see, e.g., Buckwalter &amp; Stich 2014; Friesdorf et al. 2015). In addition, there are systematic individual differences in philosophical intuition; for example, people who are more extraverted are more inclined to compatibilism about responsibility (Feltz &amp; Cokely 2009).