 What does “x exists simpliciter” mean? In this context, Meyer (2005: 214–5) tells us that if x exists simpliciter, then x exists either in the actual world, @, or else in some merely possible world. And, if x exists in @, then it exists in time, it exists temporally; x either has existed, exists now, or will exist. Thus, it seems that if we specify the meaning of “x exists simpliciter”, we must take it to mean either that x exists “outside time”, but somehow still in @, or else at some other world. But, perhaps controversially, Meyer (2005: 215) argues that neither of these ways of specifying the notion of “existence simpliciter” will give us a characterization of presentism, qua model of time. Presentism is a view about what exists in time; it’s not a thesis about what exists outside of time, nor is it a thesis about what exists at other possible worlds. (Recall, from the discussion of the implications of PA, above, that nothing exists outside time, for presentists; nothing exists that isn’t present. Hence, presentism concerns what exists within time since it implies that nothing exists without.)