 What he calls phenomenology in his two Academy treatises of 1906 is a field of study to which he dedicated many works, from his early work on the origins of space perception up to his 1926 book on vowels and phonetics. The field of phenomenology in Stumpf’s sense is limited to phenomena and their properties and is defined narrowly as the science of phenomena. The study of formations and of objects of thought in general belongs to the second neutral science which Stumpf calls “eidology,” an expression that he borrowed from Herbart. Stumpf first introduced the notion of formation (Gebilde) in 1902 in order to characterize the specific contents of functions or what he also calls the objective correlates of a psychical function. Formations are contents that enter into consciousness through carrying out specific functions in the sense that to every class and subclass of acts there corresponds a certain content specific to each and every act. All psychical functions, from the simplest to the most complex, have their specific contents: concepts, states of affairs and values, to name only the most important. For example the act of abstraction, which is responsible for the formation of concepts, notably the concept of space, has a concept as its own specific content. States of affairs are contents of judgment, and they are comparable to Meinong’s “objectives”, Husserl’s “objectivity” or to Bolzano’s “proposition in itself”; they play a central role in Stumpf’s logic as we shall see later. (G. Fréchette, 2015; A. Chrudzimski, 2015) These are “correlates” of thought and, in contrast to individual acts, they have an objective character. The objectivity of formations, however, is not to be understood in terms of intentional inexistence (Brentano) or in the sense of Platonic realism (Bolzano and Frege), because any formation is logically dependent of the act that produces it, and the existence of states of affairs is logically linked to that of the act of judgment. They are therefore abstracted in the sense that they cannot exist independently from the acts by which they are produced. The same rule can be found in the field of more complex functions such as emotions, desires, and voluntary actions, whose specific contents are values. The very possibility of a neutral science such as eidology shows that we can study values in themselves, independently of any function; yet Stumpf claims that it is not possible to dissociate formations from their original functions.