 In Wu’s handling of it, the idea that Neumann and Allport emphasized becomes part of a larger attempt to understand the essential connections between attention and agency (Wu, 2011b). For Wu, attention’s role in action is more fundamental than its role in perception. Stout is not the only precedent for this idea. The same connection was noted by William James when he claimed that “Volition is nothing but attention”, (see Section  1.5,  above). As with these earlier authors, Wu’s point is not just that, by treating attention as a purely perceptual phenomenon, we ignore many of its other instances. Instead Wu wants to suggest that any division we might attempt to draw between perceptual attention and the attentional selectivity required by agency would be an artificial one. Even the involuntary capture of attention by perceptually salient stimuli should, Wu thinks, be understood as involving a kind of readiness to act on the things to which we involuntarily attend (op cit, §3). Wu’s selection-for-action theory of attention is therefore intended as a step towards a unification of our philosophical account of ourselves as agents and our philosophical account of ourselves as perceivers.