 In addition to Moser’s theory, there are a variety of other possible causal theories of the basing relation which might be proposed. For example, one might eliminate the association condition, requiring only that the reason cause the belief in some appropriate way. One motivation for such a theory might be the view that one need not be aware of a reason for it to be the basis of a belief, as in the case of subliminal reasons. One issue here would be whether such subconscious states can be justifying reasons. Alternatively, one might hold that the reason need not sustain the belief, but only have caused the belief to come into existence. One motivation for such a view might be that one may justifiably believe things on the basis of reasons one has forgotten (Goldman 2001, pp. 214–216). For example, most people cannot remember on what basis they came to believe that tigers are native to Asia, but it seems obvious that such people are still justified in believing this. In such cases, the reason no longer sustains the belief—in fact, the reason is no longer possessed. Nonetheless, it might be argued, one’s belief that tigers are native to Asia is still based on the reason which originally caused it. On the other hand, one consideration against this view is the intuition that a belief cannot be justified if one possesses no reason for it. In addition, it may be argued that there are other ways of accounting for how a belief may be justified even if the original reason for it has been forgotten. For instance, one might reason as follows: “I can’t recall where I first learned this, but I feel sure it is true, and such feelings have proved to be reliable in the past. Hence, my belief that tigers are native to Asia is probably true.”