 It seems as if we could now define \(C\) to be a cause of \(E\) iff we can infer \(E\) from \(C\) in the context \(K\). But things are more complicated. The challenge is that the inferential path between \(C\) and \(E\) must also represent some active causal path, i.e., a sequence of events such that each event actually caused its successor (if there is one). In other words, we need some notion of an inferential path that corresponds to a causal path in the actual setting of events. Once such a notion is established, Bochman defines \(C\) to be a cause of \(E\) iff (i) we can infer \(E\) from \(C\) in the context \(K\), while (ii) we cannot infer \(E\) from the context \(K\) alone. The details of this inferential account are a bit intricate, and so we must refer the reader to Bochman (2018) to get a full understanding. There, we can also find rigorous solutions to a number of causal problems, including overdetermination, early and late preemption, and some scenarios of prevention. It is worth noting, finally, that Bochman presents his analysis as an inferential explication of NESS conditions.