 It would be an error to affirm that Philo despises and hates the body. Even if he is often very harsh towards it, he never forgets that when God created the first human being, He made him not only spiritually perfect, but also physically beautiful. He does not see any inconvenience in emphasizing the perfection of sensation or sexuality. It is said in Opif. 136 that the first human being was truly and really kalos kagathos, beautiful and good. It is strange to find in a Jewish biblical commentator the explicit expression of this Greek ideal of humanity. At the same time, it could mean that for Philo the Greek conception of this expression was an erroneous one, since it did not imply an immediate link with divine transcendence. God, Philo says, was a good technitès, both of the body and the soul. The beauty of the body is in Opif. 138 explained in specific Greek terms, symmetry, beauty of the flesh, and color. All these concepts can be found in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, but it does not mean that Philo uses them in the same way. In Philo, the body is not a principle of evil, though it can be used as an instrument of perversion when the human being focuses more on himself than on the powers of God. We find in Leg. 3.71, however, the assertion that the body is bad by nature, ponèron fusei. The meaning of the expression is perfectly clear, but it is also necessary to remember the context. Philo is commenting on Genesis 38:7, where it is said that God killed Er without any justified reason. According to Philo, “ER” means in Hebrew the flesh, the body which is a threat for the soul. But at the same time Philo specifies that to create the best things, God had to create less good things. This can lead to the conclusion that the ponèron fusei means not absolute but relative perversion since the body is necessary to demonstrate, by contrast, the beauty of soul. Creation is good by nature (fusei) and the body is an element of the Creation. The example of Issachar in Leg. 1.83 shows how necessary the body is for ethical progress. But at the same time, the knowledge of the body can be only phenomenological, while real research is ontological. This can explain Philo’s violent attacks on the body: it is a tomb (following the Platonic play on words comparing the body to a tomb), a nosèma (disease), a vase unable to contain its desire, and most frequently a burden of flesh. But all this verbal violence is addressed more to human error on the value of the body than to the body itself created by God.