   In addition to the sorts of facts discussed above, Russell raised the question as to whether a special sort of fact is required corresponding to propositions that report a belief, desire or other “propositional attitude”.  Russell’s views on this matter changed over different periods, as his own views regarding the nature of judgment, belief and representation matured.  Moreover, in some works he left it as an open question as to whether one need presuppose a distinct kind of logical form in these cases (e.g., PLA, 224–28; IMT, 256–57). At times, however, Russell believed that the fact that S believes that a bears R to b amounts to the holding of a multiple relation in which S, a, R and b are all relata (e.g. NTF, 155–56; TK, 144ff).  At other points, he considered more complicated analyses in which beliefs amount to the possession of certain psychological states bearing causal or other relationships to the objects they are about, or the tendencies of believers to behave in certain ways (see, e.g., IMT, 182–83; HK, 144–48).  Depending on how such phenomena are analyzed, it is certainly not clear that they require any new species of fact. 