 While associating collectives with moral blameworthiness is difficult, it is not, as we have seen, impossible. Indeed, by both reimagining moral blameworthiness in the context of groups and developing alternative notions of collective agency that allow us to locate such moral blameworthiness, we can move toward a coherent and empirically feasible practice of collective moral responsibility. Two recent efforts to defend collective moral responsibility appear to be particularly promising in this context. The first involves appropriating P. F. Strawson’s reactive attitudes model of moral blameworthiness for the purpose of showing how a collective might be construed as morally blameworthy qua collective. Gunnar Bjornsson and Kendy Hess (2017) pick up on Strawson’s approach in their own work on collective moral responsibility and ask whether corporations and other collective entities can have the requisite reactive attitudes to be held morally responsible for bringing about harm. They answer in the affirmative and argue that collective entities can have the capacities associated with guilt and indignation, as well as the relevant epistemic and motivational capacities to be blamed.