 With respect to how the beliefs are formed, there is no consensus. Some argue that the same models used to describe delusion formation can be invoked in the description of how beliefs in conspiracy theories emerge. For instance, for two-factor theorists, there is a first factor which is unusual experience in the case of delusion and epistemic mistrust in the case of beliefs in conspiracy theories. Then, there is a common second factor which comprises some reasoning biases and motivational factors (e.g., Pierre 2020). The first factor would explain the theme of the delusion or conspiracy. The second factor would explain why the belief is endorsed and maintained despite its prima facie implausibility. For researchers working within a predictive coding account, paranoia predicts difficulty in updating beliefs across the clinical-nonclinical divide, which suggests that some of the same mechanisms may be responsible for how people respond to uncertainties (Reed et al. 2020). Other researchers though deny that there is overlap in etiology, and point to the fact that no cognitive dysfunction needs to be postulated to explain the formation of beliefs in conspiracy theories (e.g., Oliver and Wood 2014). 