 This seems to give us a principled way to exclude some items from the universal whole Human Being and thus to distinguish it from the integral whole consisting of all human beings. For this seems to be right: only whole human beings are parts of Human Being. That is, Socrates and Cicero are parts of Human Being, but Socrates’ finger and Cicero’s head are not parts of Human Being, even though the latter are parts of the integral whole consisting of all human beings. Socrates and Cicero are parts of Human Being because Socrates is a human being and Cicero is a human being. The parts of Socrates and Cicero are not parts of Human Being because Socrates’ hand is not a human being and Cicero’s head is not a human being; whereas they are part of the integral whole consisting of all the humans, since Transitivity seems to hold for integral parts: if x is a part of y and y is a part of z, then x is also a part of z. (It should be noted, however, that some medieval authors were suspicious of an unrestricted form Transitivity, even for integral wholes. See Arlig 2013 for details.) There is also this: while it is true that some of the parts of the sum of all human beings will accept the predication of the name and definition of Human Being, if one examines the matter carefully, it turns out that the definition of the sum of all human beings is not the same as the species Human Being, for the sum of all human beings is not itself a rational, mortal animal.