 In analogy with the case of single-peakedness in preference aggregation, several less restrictive conditions already suffice for consistent majority judgments. One such condition (introduced in Dietrich and List 2010a, where a survey is provided) generalizes Sen’s triple-wise value-restriction. A profile \(\langle J_1, J_2 , \ldots ,J_n\rangle\) is value-restricted if every minimal inconsistent subset \(Y \subseteq X\) has a pair of elements \(p, q\) such that no individual \(i \in N\) has \(\{p, q\} \subseteq J_i\). Value-restriction prevents any minimal inconsistent subset of \(X\) from becoming majority-accepted, and hence ensures consistent majority judgments. Applied to the preference agenda, value-restriction reduces to Sen’s equally named condition.