Weak forms of essentialism have few consequences for haecceitism. Moreover, the thesis that individuals have their haecceities essentially is often taken as a prerequisite for a commitment to haecceitism, since the thesis sometimes called “extreme haecceitism” holds that haecceities are the only essential properties of individuals aside from perfectly general properties instantiated by all entities (e.g., being self-identical). According to extreme haecceitists, not only could Napoleon have been a poached egg, the world could have been qualitatively just as it actually is but such that a poached egg and Napoleon swap their respective qualitative roles. Extreme haecceitism is therefore among the most permissive views about de re modality and admits possibilities where you occupy the qualitative roles of a poached egg. For this reason, extreme haecceitism is typically (albeit confusingly) classified as a version of “anti-essentialism”, by virtue of denying that individuals have distinctive essences apart from their respective haecceities. (On anti-essentialism and extreme haecceitism, see Heller (2005), Stalnaker (1979), and Lewis (1986). See Mackie (2006) for a defense of “minimal essentialism”, according to which individuals have their haecceities and belong to their ontological categories like property or object essentially.) At the same time, extreme haecceitism is typically paired with a commitment to the necessity of identity and distinctness and therefore rules out possibilities according to which actually distinct objects are one and the same. A yet more permissive view about de re modality might abandon this commitment, taking even the identity and distinctness of individuals as accidental. (On whether anti-essentialism is best paired with the necessity of identity and distinctness, see Nelson (2006).)