 Pietroski (1992) also argues that Millikan’s theory provides implausible content ascriptions, thereby entailing implausible intentional explanations. His tale of the kimu is intended to press the point. The kimu are color-blind creatures, until a mutation arises which results in a mechanism that produces a brain state, B, in response to red. Those who inherit this mechanism enjoy being in state B, which leads them to climb to the top of the nearest hill every morning (to see the rising sun or some red flowers). The result is that they avoid the dawn-marauding predators, the snorf, who hunt in the valley below and, solely as a result of this, there is selection for the mutation. As Pietroski wants to describe the case, Bs have the content there is red (or there is something red), and the desires that interact with Bs are desires to see something red. The point of the story is that Millikan’s theory does not allow us to characterize the kimu in this way. On her theory, the kimu do not see a visual target as red or desire the sight of something red, given that it was not the mapping between Bs and red but between Bs and snorf-free-space that was crucial for the fitness of the kimu (and so for the selection of any relevant consumers of the representation). On Millikan’s theory, Bs mean snorf-free-space and there is no representation of red in a kimu’s brain.