 A recent trend presumes that the philosophy of science has been misconceived and requires “a naturalistic turn” as a kind of science of science more akin to history or to sociology than to philosophy. In studies published in the twilight of his career, Hempel demonstrated that, without standards to separate science from pseudo-science, it would be impossible to distinguish frauds, charlatans, and quacks from the real thing (Hempel 1979, 1983). Without knowing “the standards of science”, we would not know which of those who call themselves “scientists” are scientists and which methods are “scientific”, where the place of explanation remains central within the context of inference to the best explanation (Fetzer 2002). The philosophy of science, therefore, cannot be displaced by history or by sociology. Not least among the important lessons of Hempel’s enduring legacy is the realization that the standards of science cannot be derived from mere descriptions of its practice alone but require rational justification in the form of explications satisfying the highest standards of philosophical rigor.