 The second major view of the relationship of the parts of Hobbes’ philosophy to one another is what we can call the disunified view (for example, see Robertson 1886; Taylor 1938; Warrender 1957). Some of the motivation behind the disunified account seems to be a desire to free Hobbes from what is prima facie a case of deriving normative claims relating to the commonwealth in civil philosophy from descriptive claims related to human psychology and, ultimately, more general claims in natural philosophy (especially Taylor 1938). However, in its attempts to rescue Hobbes from a version of the so-called naturalistic fallacy, the disunified account fails to take seriously Hobbes’ claims about the unity of his philosophy. Furthermore, it neglects that many of Hobbes’ contemporaries (for example, Bramhall) saw Hobbes’ views in natural philosophy as having far-reaching consequences for other areas of philosophy.