 So while what travels (what’s expressed, what’s communicated) is the boring state, being in that boring state goes along with being in a particular interestingly self-locating state for the speaker, and with a different interestingly self-locating state for the addressee. Moss (2012), working in a Lewisian framework, puts it this way: a de se belief is, always, for any particular believer, going to be “equivalent given certainties” to some de dicto belief of theirs. (In the present framework, de se beliefs play the role of interestingly self-locating doxastic states, and de dicto beliefs the role of boring doxastic states.) What travels in communication is the de dicto belief, which is liable to be equivalent given certainties to one de se belief for speaker, and another for addressee. Note that this requires that there’s always, for every believer and every de se belief, a de dicto proxy belief available that’s equivalent to that de se belief for that speaker, given what the speaker is certain of. All decenterers must take on something like this substantive commitment to get their program off the ground (see Stalnaker 2008 and Moss 2012 for details). Stalnaker (2008) concedes that this approach requires countenancing haecceties (see entry on  haecceitism),  which not everyone will be comfortable with. (See also Weber 2015; Pagin 2016; and Torre 2018 for criticism of the commitment to the availability of non-self-locating proxies.)