 Although philosophers and cognitive scientists frequently propose to dispense with (one or another sort of) mental representation (cf., e.g., Stich, 1983, Brooks, 1991, van Gelder, 1995, Haugeland, 1999, Johnson, 2007, Chemero, 2009), this is universally accepted to be a revolutionary shift in thinking about minds. Short of taking on board such radical views, one will naturally want some explanation of how mental representations arise. In attempting such explanations, causal theories have been widely perceived to have numerous attractive features. If, for example, one use for mental representations is to help one keep track of events in the world, then some causal connection between mind and world makes sense. This attractiveness has been enough to motivate new causal theories (e.g. Rupert, 1999, Usher, 2001, and Ryder, 2004), despite the widespread recognition of serious challenges to an earlier generation of theories developed by Stampe, Dretske, Fodor, and others.