 Various attempts have been made to make Allais’ preferences compatible with some version of expected utility theory. A common response is to suggest that the choice problem has been incorrectly described. If it really is rational to evaluate $0 differently depending on which lottery it is part of, then perhaps this should be accounted for in the description of the outcomes (Broome 1991a). For instance, we could add a variable to the $0 outcome that \(L_1\) might result in to represent the extra regret or risk associate with that outcome compared to the $0 outcomes from the other lotteries (as done in  Table 4).  If we do that, Allais’ preferences are no longer inconsistent with EU theory. The simplest way to see this is to note that when we ignore the state of the world where the options that are being compared have the same outcome (i.e., when we ignore the last column in Table 4), \(L_1\) is no longer identical to \(L_3\), which means that the Independence axiom of von Neumann and Morgenstern (and Savage’s Sure Thing Principle) no longer requires that one prefer \(L_2\) over \(L_1\) only if one prefers \(L_4\) over \(L_3\).