 Let us examine this different sense of “feeling” or “sensation”. It does not seem to derive from ordinary use, which, we might suggest, would not in itself be a problem, as long as the implication threads of one understanding are not crossed with those of another. Consider the epistemologist’s notion of sense-data or sense-impressions which are posited as candidates for grounding knowledge or certainty in what is supposedly given in perception. Suppose this third understanding of sensation or feeling derives from sense-data or sense-impressions thus understood. Whatever the merits or demerits of this view, in order for sensations—now understood as sense-impressions or sense-data—to play this foundational role, we must be conscious of them. Curiously enough, however, we do not report them. Instead, we report what we see under different descriptions, which carry different luggage-loads. (Or, as Austin said, we report what we see under different descriptions which depend, in part, on how far we are willing to stick our neck out.) Someone who claimed to see something green might subsequently, when he learns of the presence of a cat, claim that what he saw was the eyes of a cat. The “luggage” that Ryle speaks of here includes the logical threads (including implication and evidence, etc.) that accompany certain descriptions rather than others. (There are more ways to be wrong, as Austin says, the more we stick our necks out.) We shall come back to this in the next section. But now we are investigating a third, new sense of “sensation” or “feeling” which derives, not from ordinary use, but from the (alleged) needs of epistemology. But what supports the idea that we see have such experiences?