 We can now turn to the question how cp-laws differ from universal laws. According to Lange, cp-laws are stable (sets of) propositions whose application is pragmatically restricted to the purposes of a scientific discipline. He elaborates this idea with respect to the laws in the special sciences, or inexact sciences as he calls them: “A set is stable for the purpose of an inexact science if and only if it is invariant under every counterfactual supposition of interest to the science and consistent with the set” (Lange 2002, 416). Lange tries to avoid the horns of the Falsity-or-Triviality-Dilemma by treating ‘ceteris paribus’ as a name for a set \(I\) of interfering factors. Notice that \(I\) does not list all the possible interferences which prevent the occurrence of \(B\) in ‘cp, all \(A\)s are \(B\)s’, but only those factors that are relevant (for a discipline). One can understand Lange in a way that he provides two  strategies[12]  to determine the members of \(I\): (A) the strategy of non-negligibility and (B) the strategy of intended interest of a science. Both strategies try to explicate a methodology that is implicitly used by scientists in a particular discipline (cf. Lange 2000, 170–174).