 A voting method is monotonic provided that receiving more support from the voters is always better for a candidate. There are different ways to make this idea precise (see Fishburn, 1982, Sanver and Zwicker, 2012, and Felsenthal and Tideman, 2013). For instance, moving up in the rankings should not adversely affect a candidate’s chances to win an election. It is easy to see that Plurality Rule is monotonic in this sense: The more voters that rank a candidate first, the better chance the candidate has to win. Surprisingly, there are voting methods that do not satisfy this natural property. The most well-known example is Plurality with Runoff. Consider the two scenarios below. Note that the only difference between the them is the ranking of the fourth group of voters. This group of two voters ranks \(B\) above \(A\) above \(C\) in scenario 1 and swaps \(B\) and \(A\) in scenario 2 (so, \(A\) is now their top-ranked candidate; \(B\) is ranked second; and \(C\) is still ranked third). 