 Now a view that claims that it does not matter whether, say, Martha or Vivek promotes the welfare of the world, but only how much the welfare of the world is promoted, is an agent-neutral view, in that it gives both Martha and Vivek the same, common aim: that all sentient beings should enjoy the best lives possible. In terms of such a view, Martha should, for example, abandon an opportunity to produce a small benefit for others if she can, thereby, create the conditions for Vivek to bring about a greater benefit for others. This kind of agent-neutrality is a central element of most consequentialist views, and plays a crucial role in generating many of their most frequently discussed implications. So ŚS 145–46, and other passages in the texts that are suggestive of agent-neutrality, provide evidence in favor of reading Śāntideva as an early consequentialist theorist. And even if we were to conclude that Śāntideva’s normative perspective is not a form of consequentialism, if we also conclude that it is fully agent-neutral, that will be enough to guarantee that it has much in common with many Western consequentialist theories.