 Jesse Prinz’s (2007) account of moral judgment can be classified as a hybrid state theory. The key to his view is his theory of emotions (Prinz 2004), according to which they are perceptions of patterns of bodily changes that represent what they are “set up to be set off by” – what it is their function to detect – just the same way as any other psychological states do on teleological theories of representation. For Prinz, a moral sentiment is a disposition to respond to certain actions with a range of self- and other-directed blame- or praise-constituting emotions, such as guilt, contempt, anger, and gratitude. A moral judgment consists in the emotion that results from activating a sentiment, such as anger at stealing or shame for fleeing. The anger represents stealing as being such as to cause disapprobation in the judge – that is, as morally wrong, according to Prinz’s relativist moral metaphysics  (see Section 4.1).  This means the judgment can be true or false (relative to a judge). It also motivates punishing the agent. Other emotions, and hence judgments, have different motivational effects – disgust may motivate to avoid the agent instead. An evident challenge to this view is thus the seeming possibility of our making non-emotional moral judgments, as well as having non-judgmental moral emotions.