 Alexander Pfänder is perhaps the first phenomenologist who, in his Phenomenology of the Will (1900), extensively discusses the notion of meaning something (Schuhmann 2004a). He originally describes this act as a presentation (Vorstellung), which is non-intuitive. According to this initial view, to mean something is to present (vorstellen) a (representing) content that symbolically (i.e., by means of a similarity or depictive relation, 1900: 25ff, see also Fischer 1905) refers to another (represented) content. For instance, you mean the Eiffel Tower, when you form a mental image (a representing content) of the Eiffel Tower (the represented content). Pfänder’s position would rapidly evolve in the following years, though. In a talk given at Munich’s Society for Psychology in 1898, he recognizes that presentations are always intuitive (anschaulich), whereas meaning acts do not have intuitive content. In this context, Pfänder gives the example of someone attending a lecture (1898: 61): if you understand the speaker, then you mean the same objects the speaker means or talks about. This act of meaning something should be distinguished from the act of presenting the words uttered by the speaker: the words are intuitively given to you, but their referents are not (or, at least, they are not required to be intuitively given in order for you to mean them). Therefore, the way in which you are directed to (or: you mean) the referents is different from the way in which you are directed to (or: you present) the words. Presenting something—but not meaning something—always requires the intuitive presence of their objects (either in perception or imagination). Pfänder develops this position in later works by increasingly emphasizing the differences between presenting and meaning something (see 1911a: 135). Contrary to his initial position of 1900, he then comes to consider the latter experience as an act of its own kind and no longer as a kind of presentation (1913, 19): the concept of a non-intuitive presentation is eventually held to be a contradiction in terms (1921: 140; 1933: 21f), and meaning acts, being defined by complete lack of intuitive content, are described as referring to an object only in a linguistic way (1973: 153). This last feature licenses the label of “thinking” as applied to meaning acts (or, at least, as one kind of thinking among others like questioning, conjecturing, assuming, inferring, etc., see 1921: 145f; 1933: 21).