 For instance, Wolf, in the context of an extended, nuanced case against value welfarism, argues that aesthetic hedonism cannot account for the fact that Middlemarch is a better novel than the Da Vinci Code,given that most people apparently like the latter better, presumably because it gives them greater pleasure (Wolf 2011, 54–55; see also Sharpe 2000, 326). The hedonist has a ready reply in the claim that all standard versions of hedonism are now epistemically qualified, that while most people may derive greater pleasure from the Da Vinci Code, a fully informed reader—that is, a reader who gives both texts a correct and complete reading—will not, assuming Middlemarch to be the better novel. But it’s not clear how much appeal to the epistemic qualification ultimately helps the hedonist. The anti-hedonist will want to know what best explains the fact that a fully informed reader will derive greater pleasure from Middlemarch (Wolf 2011, 55; D. Davies 2004, 258–259; Sharpe 2000, 325). Suppose we say that it owes to the fully informed reader’s grasping the superiority of Middlemarch’s structure, the higher quality of its prose, the greater subtlety and depth of its character development, and the greater penetration of the insights it affords (Wolf 2011, 55). Wouldn’t we then be saying that it owes to her grasping the greater aesthetic value of Middlemarch? Wouldn’t that be part of what a fully informed reader is fully informed about?