 Although McCann doesn’t say it, it seems to follow from his whole approach that God cannot be a member of any extant ontological category: he cannot be a universal or a set or a trope … or a concrete state of affairs. Indeed, if he is absolutely sovereign, then God must somehow be the creative source of the ontological categories themselves, how many they are and what they are, and not merely the source of the natures (essences) of the members of categories. God must transcend all categories. Taken to the limit, absolute sovereignty would seem to imply absolute transcendence— and absolute ineffability. Clearly, this is what the simplicity doctrine culminates in and is meant to preserve. So there is a tension here if not a contradiction: it cannot be true both that God is beyond all ontological categories and is a member of the category of concrete states of affairs. But if we are to have any conception of God at all, we must force him into some extant category or other, and for McCann the category of concrete state of affairs is the best we can do. One walks a tightrope when one attempts to avoid negative theology with its “nothing can be said positively about God.” Citing various texts of Aquinas, Eleonore Stump (2016, 195–198) shows that radical agnosticism about the divine nature is unwarranted. To know what God is not, one must have some knowledge of what God is. The claim that God is not a body, for example, rests on such affirmations as that God is the prime mover and is purely actual.