 Over the course of this expansion, the trace of responsibility is attenuated and conundrums arise concerning the well-being of others and conflicts within the community. These require deliberations about justice and fairness. For instance: what does justice for the other(s) mean? Should it above all concern the reparation of wrongs? Can responsibility for an other coexist with disinterested equity? Or is justice ultimately in service to the stronger and opposed to responsibility? Now, because it can clearly be interpreted as all these things, justice sometimes appears as intermediary between Levinas’ aforementioned ontology of worldly forces in conflict (or elementary being) and acts of responsibility. This would tally with Aristotle’s two conceptions of justice, first as political and second, as unbidden ‘decency’, tò epiekes, meaning to accept receiving less than one’s share. Aristotle himself defined the combination of the two as complete virtue (Nicomachean Ethics, 1130a, 119 and  1137b7–11).[18]  There would thus be an interesting precedent to Levinas’ question of the relationship between responsibility and justice in Aristotelian virtue ethics.