 As I read Hutcheson, then, his position is this: in passing moral approbation as such on an action I am not cognizing and ascribing any identifiable property of goodness, etc., in or to the action, and I am not cognizing or asserting any fact about the actual or possible reactions of any spectators to the action. I am simply feeling a unique sort of pleasure in contemplating the action, and I am expressing this feeling by my verbal utterance, perhaps also expressing (but not asserting) a conviction that others will feel this pleasure if similarly situated, and almost certainly intending to evoke similar feelings in my hearers. That is, my moral approbation as such is wholly non-cognitive, very much as it is on Ayer’s more recent view, except that Ayer does not bring in a unique unacquired moral sense as the source of the feelings involved. (Frankena 1955: 372)