  Whatever view of harm we take, we must also decide whether all harms count for the purposes of a given harm principle. People sometimes harm themselves, they are sometimes harmed by natural events, and harm is sometimes done consensually. Recall that if we endorse (HPP), we must decide whether the harm criminalization prevents is proportionate to the harm it does. Can we include all the aforementioned harms in our calculations? Or must we only include harm done to others without their consent (Mill 1859; Dworkin 1972; Feinberg 1986; Coons and Weber 2013)? Some point out that whatever law-makers’ aims, most criminal laws will prevent some non-consensual harm (Feinberg 1986, 138–142; Tadros 2016, 103). Be that as it may, whether we take into account other harms remains important: where the scales would otherwise point against criminalization, giving weight to a wider range of harms may tip the balance decisively in its favour.