 Bayesians that are unconvinced by the predictivist position are naturally led to dismiss TE and allow for the assignment of initial probabilities lower than 1 even to statements that were known all along. Of course, this brings the underdetermination problem back, for now \(k\) can still be concocted ad hoc to have known evidence \(e\) following from \(h \wedge k\) and moreover \(P(e\mid k)\lt 1\) is not prevented by TE anymore, thus potentially licencing arbitrary confirmation relations. Two moves can be combined to handle this problem. First, unlike HD, the Bayesian framework has the formal resources to characterize the auxiliaries themselves as more or less likely and thus their adoption as relatively safe or suspicious (the standard Bayesian treatment of auxiliary hypotheses is developed along these lines in Dorling 1979 and Howson and Urbach 2006, 92–102, and it is critically discussed in Rowbottom 2010, Strevens 2001, and Worrall 1993; also see Christensen 1997 for an important analysis of related issues). Second, one has to provide indications as to how TE should be relaxed. Non-TE Bayesians of the impermissivist strand often suggest that objective likelihood values concerning the outcome \(e\)—\(P(e\mid h \wedge k)\)—can be specified for the competing hypotheses at issue quite apart from the fact that \(e\) may have already occurred. Such values would typically be diverse for different hypotheses (thus mathematically implying \(P(e\mid k)\lt 1\)) and serve as a basis to capture formally the confirmatory impact of \(e\) (see Hawthorne 2005 for an argument along these lines). Permissivists, on the other hand, can not coherently rely on these considerations to articulate a non-TE position. They must invoke counterfactual degrees of belief instead, suggesting that \(P\) should be reconstructed as representing the beliefs that the agent would have, had she not known that \(e\) was true (see Howson 1991 for a statement and discussion, and Sprenger 2015 for an original recent variant; also see Jeffrey 1995 and Wagner 2001 for relevant technical results, and Steele and Werndl 2013 for an intriguing case-study from climate science).