 The discussion above shows that obeying the requirement of justice to refrain from offensively violating covenants can be rational, even though it may not appear to be rational in any particular instance. Like the inseparable goods strategy, then, the social sanctions strategy implies that the mistake the Foole makes is to misconstrue the games that characterize social interactions where morality makes demands on us. However, where the inseparable goods strategy suggests that the Foole ignores some of the goods intrinsic to moral conduct, the social sanctions strategy warns the Foole that the game they should be concerned with is not any particular interaction, but rather the indefinitely repeated series of social interactions in which they are inevitably engaged. That said, the strategy profile where every agent adopts \(h^{*}\) is not the only possible equilibrium of the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. In fact, there are an immense number of possible equilibria of such a game, many of which do not involve any individuals employing the \(h^{*}\) strategy, and not all of these lead to the cooperative outcome where all (or even most) agents keep their promises.