 According to the third objection to sufficiency, the quantifiers of first-order logic, properly understood, do not carry existential commitment; they are not “existentially loaded”. Indeed, calling ‘∃x’ the “existential quantifier” is a misnomer; it would be better to call it the “particular quantifier” in contrast with the “universal quantifier”. Ordinary language, on its face, supports the view that quantification need not be existentially loaded (see §4). For example, if we assert “some fictional detective is smarter than Sherlock Holmes”, we do not ordinarily take ourselves to be committed to the existence of fictional entities. Similarly, the objection claims, the straightforward translation of this into first-order logic using ‘∃x’ for ‘some’ should carry no existential import. One only gets existential import when one restricts the quantifier, explicitly or implicitly, with an existence predicate. Thus, the correct translation into first-order logic of “dragons exist” is not ‘∃x Dragon(x)’, but ‘∃x (Exists(x) and Dragon(x))’. The quantifier ‘∃x’, by itself, is neutral with respect to existence. (Pronounce ‘∃x’ “for some x”, not “there exists an x”.)