 If a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents were even possible, then possibly, at a time, \(t\), some omnipotent agent, \(x\), while retaining its omnipotence, endeavors to move a feather, and at \(t\), another omnipotent agent, \(y\), while retaining its omnipotence, endeavors to keep that feather motionless. Intuitively, in this case, neither \(x\) nor \(y\) would affect the feather as to its motion or rest. Thus, in this case, at \(t\), \(x\) would be powerless to move the feather, and at \(t\), \(y\) would be powerless to keep the feather motionless! But it is absurd to suppose that an omnipotent agent could lack the power to move a feather or the power to keep it motionless. Therefore, neither \(x\) nor \(y\) is omnipotent. This line of reasoning appears to reduce the notion of a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents to absurdity. If such a reductio ad absurdum is sound, then a plurality of coexistent omnipotent agents is impossible.