  Many theorists adopted this framework explicitly or implicitly, and it has influenced almost all subsequent analytic philosophical discussions of the topic. Subsequent sections will address the aspects of Nozick's analysis which have received the most attention and debate. The remainder of this section will highlight more quickly some of the less noticed ways that Nozick's analysis framed subsequent discussions. In particular, it sketches out how this analysis differs from the more traditional understanding of coercion, as seen in the classical political theorists above. In short, Nozick's account diverges from the more traditional approach in that (1) it associates coercion only with proposals (e.g., conditional  threats[6]),  and excludes direct uses of force or  violence[7];  (2) it insists that coercion takes place only when the coercee acquiesces to it; and (3) it makes coercion explicitly dependent on the coercee's choice to take or not take a specific action A, and mandates that a judgment about coercion must refer to facts about the coercee's psychology, such as her assessment of the consequences A-ing in light of the coercer's proposal. The overall effect of these differences is to focus the analysis of coercion on how the coercee is affected by it, rather than on what the coercer does, and what is required for him to do it successfully. (See Anderson 2008b.)