  In the same stretch of his commentary on Aristotle’s  Physics, Simplicius reports at length one of Zeno’s numerous arguments designed to show how the claim that there are many things  leads to contradiction. “One of these,” Simplicius says,  “is the argument in which he demonstrates that if there are  many things, they are both large and small: so large as to be  unlimited in magnitude, and so small as to have no magnitude. Indeed, in this argument he shows that what has neither magnitude nor  thickness nor bulk would not even exist. ‘For if’, he  says, ‘it were added to another entity, it would not make it  any larger; for since it is of no magnitude, when it is added, there  cannot be any increase in magnitude. And so what was added would just be nothing. But if when it is taken away the other thing will be no  smaller, and again when it is added the other thing will not  increase, it is clear that what was added and what was taken away was nothing’” (Zeno fr. 2 DK = Simp. in Ph.  139.7–15). After thus quoting this portion of the argument,  Simplicius continues: “Zeno says this because each of the many  things has magnitude and is infinite [reading apeiron  instead of ms. apeirôn], given that something is  always in front of whatever is taken, in virtue of infinite division; this he shows after first demonstrating that none have magnitude on  the grounds that each of the many is the same as itself and  one” (Simp. in Ph. 139.16–19). Soon after this,  Simplicius records the argument for unlimited magnitude he has  alluded to in the first part of the passage just quoted, as follows:  “Infinity in respect of magnitude he earlier proves in the same way. For having first shown that, if what is does not have magnitude, it would not even exist, he continues: ‘But if it is, each must have some magnitude and thickness, and one part of it must extend  away from another. And the same account applies to the part out  ahead. For that part too will have magnitude and will have part of it out ahead. Indeed, it is the same to say this once as always to keep  saying it; for no such part of it will be last, nor will one part not be related to another. Thus if there are many things, they must be  both small and large, so small as to have no magnitude, and so large  as to be unlimited’” (Zeno fr. 1 DK, = Simp. in  Ph. 140.34–141.8). 