  Consider Habermas’ similar use of social facts with respect to institutions. As with Rawls, for Habermas pluralism and the need for coercive political power make the constitutional state necessary, so that the democratic process of law making is governed by a system of personal, social, and civil rights. However, Habermas introduces a more fundamental social fact for the possibility and feasibility of democracy: the structural fact of social complexity. Complex societies are “polycentric,” with a variety of forms of order, some of which, such as non-intentional market coordination, do not necessarily have to answer to the ideals of democracy. This fact of complexity limits political participation and changes the nature of our understanding of democratic institutions. Indeed, this fact makes it such that the principles of democratic self-rule and the criteria of public agreement cannot be asserted simply as the proper norms for all social and political institutions, and this seems ideally suited to understanding how globalization limits the capacity of democracy to entrench itself. As Habermas puts it, “unavoidable social complexity makes it impossible to apply the criteria [of democratic legitimacy] in an undifferentiated way” (Habermas 1996, 305). This fact makes a certain kind of structure ineluctable; since complexity means that democracy can “no longer control the conditions under which it is realized.” In this case, the social fact has become “unavoidable,” and certain institutions are necessary for the social integration to which there is “no feasible alternative” (Habermas 2001 122).