 Suggested Reading: good introductions to the debate about temporal parts include Loux (1998, chapter 6), Haslanger (2003), McGrath (2007), Sider (2008), Effingham (2009), Balashov (2011), Effingham (2012), Goswick (2013), and Curtis and Robson (2016: chapter 7). Amongst the more recent contributions, Effingham (2009), Goswick, and Curtis and Robson are good on the basics; Effingham (2012) is more detailed and comprehensive; Balashov (2011) is more advanced, guided by relativistic physics. Lewis (1986a, p. 202) introduces the terms ‘endurance’ and ‘perdurance’, attributing them to Johnston. Sider (1997; 2001, section 3.3) discusses the difficulty of defining ‘temporal part’; see also Merricks (1999a), Hawley (2001, section 1.6) and McKinnon (2002). Wasserman (2016) argues that we often conflate the ontological question whether things have temporal parts with the explanatory question whether things persist in virtue of having those parts. Donnelly (2016) is a very helpful exploration of different attempts to define endurance – in terms of parthood, or location, or grounding. Lewis (1976, postscript B) tries to make the notion of a temporal part acceptable to endurantists; van Inwagen (2000) and Noonan (2003a) object, whilst Braddon-Mitchell and Miller (2004) respond. Perdurantists include Quine (1950; 1960), Taylor (1955), Lewis (1971; 1976; 1986a), Armstrong (1980), Noonan (1980), Robinson (1982), Heller (1984; 1990), Le Poidevin (1991), Jubien (1993), and Hudson (2001). Endurantists include Thomson (1965; 1983), Geach (1966; 1967), Chisholm (1976), Mellor (1980; 1981; 1998), Lowe (1983; 1998b), Simons (1987), Forbes (1987), Haslanger (1989a), van Inwagen (1990a; 1990b), Oderberg (1993), Merricks (1994), Fine (2008/2006), and Shoemaker (2015); Simons (2008) responds to Fine. Miller (2005b) defines ‘endurance’, see also Keinanen and Hakkarainen (2010), while Janzen (2011) defends endurantism. Melia (2000) eliminates processes in favour of enduring things. Johnston (1987) explores a mixed view, and so, differently, do Hofweber and Velleman (2011), Grygianiec (2016), and Brzozowski (2017, 2019). Parsons (2000) develops four-dimensionalism without temporal parts, and Miller (2009) develops this further. See also Daniels (2019). Other non-standard accounts of persistence include Giordani and Costa (2013), Miller (2013), Costa (2017), and Giberman (2019b). For stage theory see Sider (1996; 2001) and Hawley (2001); Varzi (2003) is a sympathetic discussion, whilst Balashov (2007) attempts a precise definition of ‘exdurance’ aka stage theory. Moyer (2008), Moss (2012) and Viebahn (2013) compare stage theory with perdurantism. More on stage theory: Stuchlik (2003), Hansson Wahlberg (2008), Wright (2010), Rychter (2012), McKeever (2017) and Giberman (2019a). Questions about how fine-grained temporal parts or stages must be are discussed by Le Poidevin (2000), Stuchlik (2003), Traynor (2013), Effingham (2013), Mazzola (2015), Kleinschmidt (2017), and Giberman (2019a); Leonard (2018) explores endurantism without temporal instants. Cahen (2017) discusses individuation for temporal parts.