 Which sense do we assign to “Hesperus” in (2)? From the perspective of a Fregean semantic theory, this question has the following answer. First, we distinguish the expression “Hesperus” from an occurrence of it in a non-customary syntactic position such as in (2). Secondly, we assign a non-customary sense to its occurrence in (2) so that this occurrence expresses not the customary sense of “Hesperus” (say, the first planet visible in the evening) but its indirect sense. Thirdly, we claim that this indirect sense determines the expression’s customary sense as the designatum of the non-customary occurrence (cf. Frege 1892a; Salmón 1993). However, such subtleties will require us to complicate the background logic. In this case, we have to prohibit the application of Leibniz law to indirect contexts; this is because names with the same customary designatum but different customary senses cannot be substituted salva veritate within contexts where they designate their customary senses. For example, (2) can be true while (2*) is false: