 The theory of sense data is a species of a genera of positions in perception theory, which make a distinction between an impoverished sense impression and the perception, affirmation, or judgment of a further entity, usually a material object. Although sharing this distinction, other species in this genus differ from sense-data theory in various ways, the most fundamental being that they do not posit an object having the properties of color and shape as found in conscious perception  (item 3).  Some views render perceived properties as appearances. One type of appearance theory holds that shape, color, and other perceived object-properties are intentional contents (intentionalism). Another type holds that experiences of shapes and colors are manners or modes of perceiving (adverbialism). Adherents of both types of theory reject the act-object analysis and so would reject item 8 of the Classical Notion; and, of course, they would also reject items 1 and 2. In another vein, some versions of naïve realism hold that we immediately perceive the surface of an object from a point of view and in three dimensions, and then augment the basic perception to include conceptualized object content (Noë 2004, Brewer 2011). At present, these various positions enjoy more favor than do theories that posit sense data as mental objects or as third things. Indeed, recent discussions in the philosophy of perception frequently use sense data as an example of a concept or an entity to be avoided (e.g., Fish 2010: ch. 2).