But what about Russell's view? Do Reid's objections hit the mark there too? It would seem that they do.  As we have seen, Russell's view is that remembering involves the having of an image together with a “belief-feeling” that what the image depicts is in the past.  On the assumption that we are at least generally reliable regarding which images we have previously experienced (that is, on the assumption that we don't have these memory feelings willy nilly), Russell's theory includes an unanalyzed component that includes the substance of memory.  Furthermore, Russell's theory is consistent with one's being mistaken about the pastness of the image. That is, images that are the products of imagination but which have a misleading air of familiarity to them, will count as memories on Russell's view as long as they are associated with a belief feeling.  Finally, inasmuch as the RTM theories of Locke and Hume can be fairly charged with aiding and abetting the skeptic, Russell's theory is guilty of the same.  To remember is to have an image and a belief feeling; demonstrating a reliable connection between these two and the past event one is said to be remembering looks to be just another instance of arguing from the current contents of one's mind to the truth of claims about the external world (in this case, about the way the external world was).