 Possibilist realism takes non-actual possible objects to be (real, genuine) objects; it takes their metaphysical status to be on a par with that of actual objects. When possibilist realists assert, “Non-actual possible objects exist”, their word ‘exist’ has the same linguistic meaning as when actualists assert, “Actual objects exist”. Possibilist realists believe that some domains of discourse with respect to which ‘exist’ may be understood include more than actual objects, whereas actualists deny it. Thus according to possibilist realism, to call an object non-actually possibly existent is merely to deny its inclusion in a particular realm—call it ‘actuality’—and affirm its inclusion in some other realm. That other realm is no less a realm of existence than actuality is a realm of existence. All realms of existence are metaphysically on a par with one another. Every token use of the existence predicate is to be understood with respect to some realm of existence, either explicitly or implicitly.