 Nevertheless, some philosophers reject these considerations for a variety of reasons (Zemach 1976, Mellor 1977, Searle 1983, ch. 8, Bach 1988; 1998, Crane 1991, Rosenberg 1994, Chomsky 1995; 2000, Segal 2000, Martinich &amp; Stroll 2007, ch. 5, Farkas 2008, Pollock 2015; see also Fine 1975). Other philosophers do not reject EXT as much as restrict it: They posit a kind of content—so called “narrow” content—which is determined independently of the environment (Block 1986, Loar 1988, Georgalis 1994; 1999, Chalmers 1996; 2002, Jackson 1998, Siewart 1998, Horgan &amp; Tienson 2002, Wikforss 2007, Mendola 2008; see also the entry on  narrow content).  As one illustration, two-dimensionalists characterize narrow content as a function that takes an environment as input and outputs the “wide” content of the concept in that environment, i.e., the content of which EXT is true (Chalmers 1996; 2002). And putatively, the problem with armchair self-knowledge does not arise with narrow content. (For more, see Fernandez 2004 as well as the entry on  two-dimensional semantics.)