 Upon closer look, however, some of the worries that afflict consent theories crop up here as well. For intuitively it’s only when the benefits produced by a cooperative scheme are accepted by its members that the existence of fair-play obligations is uncontroversial. If a scheme of cooperation simply thrusts benefits on people as the unavoidable fall-out of the cooperative activity of others—even very valuable benefits—it is doubtful that we have a duty to comply with the scheme. However, it’s unclear in what sense we can be said to have accepted the benefits provided by the state. After all, the central benefits of an effective legal system, including security and order, are the sort of non-excludable public goods that Simmons (1979: 138–139) calls “open benefits”. They are provided to all those living in the territory over which the state claims authority, regardless of whether the benefits in question are welcomed or not. Rarely can these benefits be avoided, and when they can, it’s only at great cost. More importantly, states typically claim the same type of authority both over those who accept the benefits and over those who don’t (Nozick 1974; Rawls 1964; Simmons 2001: Chapters 1–2).