 Sapaṇ cites the possibility that the basis for the idea of “existent virtue” is the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga, which does call the Dharmadhātu “virtue”, distinguishing it from the evils of cyclic existence, and using terms such as “natural virtue” and “absolute virtue”. Sapaṇ considers this passage merely figurative. It is like calling people whose hunger is sated, “desireless”—when of course they still have other desires. To call the Dharmadhātu “virtue” is only to refer to the absence of evil—to emptiness itself. But the Dharmadhātu is not itself the cause of well-being, which is how virtue was defined. If the Dharmadhātu caused well-being, all actions would be virtuous, since all things are contained within it. Sapaṇ gives a similarly figurative reading to the Uttaratantra’s discussion of an innately existent Buddhahood; it cannot mean this literally, he says, since otherwise it would be affirming a non-Buddhist belief in an eternal soul.