 As a non-reductive claim, it means that the phenomenal content of an experience is its intrinsic subjective phenomenal properties, which are themselves representational. One’s experience of the sky represents its color by instantiating phenomenal blueness. Among phenomenalists there is disagreement over whether non-conceptual representation requires complex structuring of phenomenal properties (Block and Peacocke, op. cit., Robinson 1994) or not (Loar 2003b). So-called “Ganzfeld” experiences, in which, for example, the visual field is completely taken up with a uniform experience of a single color, are a standard test case: Do Ganzfeld experiences represent anything? (It may be that doubts about the representationality of such experiences are simply a consequence of the fact that (outside of the laboratory) we never encounter things that would produce them. Supposing we routinely did (and especially if we had names for them), it seems unlikely such skepticism would arise.)