 We see the same kind of argument but at a less global and more local level in Kavka’s slave child case. In exchange for $50,000, a couple enters into a binding, enforceable contract with a wealthy man according to which the couple will conceive and bear a child who will be transferred at birth to the wealthy man as a slave (Kavka 1982, 100). The child is conceived and born pursuant to the contract – and, as a slave, suffers in various ways. We think what the couple has done is “outrageous” (Kavka 1982, 101). And we think that is so because of what the couple’s choice does to the slave child. But can the latter view be correct? Does the couple’s choice truly make things worse for, or harm, the slave child? Is there anything else the couple could have done instead that would have made things better for that particular child? The couple certainly had alternatives. They could have not entered into the contract and not taken steps to produce a child, and they could have not entered into the contract and still taken steps to produce a child. The former alternative, of course, would not have been better for the slave child. (We are still assuming that the existence is itself worth having.) But nor is the latter. For, had the couple produced a child but not under contract, the timing and conditions of conception would then (very probably) have changed and any better off child the couple might then have produced would (very probably) have been a distinct child, nonidentical to the slave child (Kavka 1982, 100 n. 15). The slave child, in other words, has no better alternative than what he or she has in fact been given as a slave. Once we appreciate that fact, it becomes hard to see how what the couple has done harms, or makes things worse for, or is otherwise “bad for,” the child. Kavka’s “pleasure pill” case parallels the slave child case (Kavka 1982, 98).