 More broadly, Dinnen and Brauner (2015) search for a single definition of information (be it semantic or not) and find the veridicality thesis to be obstructive. By contrast, Mingers and Standing (2018) argue for a single definition of information that supports the veridicality thesis. Allo (2007) preempts such concerns with an argument for an informational pluralism (analogous to a  logical pluralism,  see the entry) via a realist interpretation of semantic information itself. A realist interpretation of semantic information leads naturally to the question of how it is that semantic information can emerge from and be a part of the natural world—a question that is addressed in detail in Vakarelov (2010). The question of how it might be that information could be accounted for naturalistically has a rich history in philosophy, most notably in informational semantics covered in the following section.