 The primitivist about fundamentality does, however, face some challenges that are specific to fundamentality. Some of these challenges have been raised by Schaffer (2016a), targeting Wilson’s proposal. A potentially helpful clarification from Schaffer is the following: there is something primitive in each of the theories on offer, but the primitivist about fundamentality takes being-absolutely-fundamental as that primitive, whereas at least certain proponents of the relative independence  (RI)  view (such as Schaffer himself and, e.g., Rosen 2010) take the “linking notion” of grounding, being-relatively-more-fundamental-than-and-linked-to, as the primitive (Schaffer 2016a: 157). As Schaffer notes, one may also take both to be primitive, as Fine perhaps does. Schaffer argues that while absolute fundamentality can be quite easily defined in terms of grounding, as we’ve seen with (RI), it may not be so easy to define grounding in terms of absolute fundamentality.