 Assertively uttered in a context where there is a single table stacked high with books, (13) would seem to be true. Yet Russell predicts the opposite, so long as there is at least one additional table somewhere or other in the universe. Strawson’s alternative was to claim that there are genuinely referential uses of definite descriptions. Used in this way, definite descriptions will, like names and indexicals, contribute an object or individual to the content asserted by the utterance—so long, that is, as that object satisfies the relevant descriptive material. Otherwise, such tokens will still count as meaningful in virtue of being associated with coherent rules of use, but they will fail to refer. That, Strawson claims, means that the assertive utterances of which they are a part will fail to be either true or false. The contrasting category here is of a attributive use of a definite description, which is supposed to function more or less as Russell suggested.