 The clay-pot example falls short of adequately illustrating the two orders of reality. Śaṅkara’s more apt illustration is our phenomenal worlds of waking and dreaming, by which he can pump the intuition that there is no objective causation between the two states. For example, the dreamscape or an object like a dream clay-pot, is well founded in the dreamer’s cognition born of waking perceptual memory. This ontological dependence is asymmetrical. The dream pot depends on the memory of a waking pot cognition, but not vice versa; however, the dreamer cannot discover that causation solely from within the dream’s objective reality no matter how hard they reductively squeeze the dream pot. The dream pot’s ground is in the waking state, and discovering that waking reality simultaneously falsifies the dream world. After awakening, there is no dream to speak of, no level playing field for causation across the two orders. Similarly, discovering the metaphysical ground of the empirical universe transitions to the ultimate reality of nondual existence, in which there is no world of forms to question and no levels of hierarchy remaining. (See Ram-Prasad 2002 on Śaṅkara’s use of the dream analogy).