  Most commentators agree that Parmenides’ criticism of Socrates’ Paradigmatism depends (at least in part) on the construction of an infinite regress. But scholars are divided over the identity and structure of the regress: whereas some see the reasoning as basically indistinguishable from the Third Man argument (e.g., Owen (1953), Vlastos (1954), Cherniss (1957), Hathaway (1973), Lee (1973), Teloh (1981, 166), Spellman (1983), Prior (1985, 71–75), and Fine (1993, 211–215)), others see the reasoning as generating a regress of forms of likeness (e.g., McCabe (1994, 87–89), Schofield (1996), Allen (1997, 179–186), and Rickless (2007, 80–85)). (The main textual and thematic reasons for preferring the latter reading to the former are clearly described in Schofield (1996)—see also Gill (1996, 44–45). For a rejoinder to Schofield, see Scolnicov (2003, 67–68).)