 Second, Reinhold claims that the Elementary Philosophy presupposes “the wretched thing in itself” (Vermischter Schriften II, p. 359; RGS 5/2, 139) and cannot account for the objective matter of our representations. In the Elementary Philosophy, the “matter” of a representation is that through which the representation has objective reference (Beyträge I, p. 182f.; 2003: 124f.). It is supposed to be given in outer sensation by something distinct from the subject, namely a thing in itself (Versuch, pp. 244–255; RGS 1, 164–171). Since the thing in itself stands outside the synthetic unity of subject and object constitutive of representation, it cannot be represented. So, the material aspect of representation presupposes something that cannot be given in consciousness (the thing in itself) and that therefore stands outside the purview of the Principle of Consciousness. This is problematic because the Principle of Consciousness is supposed to be the first principle of philosophy; thus, the Elementary Philosophy cannot account for the ground of the objective matter of representation. Reinhold had attempted to deal with this issue by distinguishing between the thing in itself and the noumenon (which he sometimes calls “noumen”). While the thing in itself cannot be represented, we may represent the mere idea of the putative ground of objective matter, the noumenon (Fundament, p. 191n; RGS 4, 107n; Beyträge I, p. 216f; 2003: 151). By his conversion to the Wissenschaftslehre, Reinhold considered this distinction futile: the external ground of sensation cannot be posited in the noumenon, since the latter is a “mere product of reason” (Vermischter Schriften II, p. x; RGS 5/2, 4) and thus cannot account for the objectivity of the matter presupposed by consciousness (Vermischter Schriften II, p. 322f; RGS 5/2, 126).