Finally, one might also cast doubt on the general cognitivist  strategy being employed here, whether it appeals to Weak, Medium, or  Strong.  Many of the same questions that we’ve raised about instrumental  incoherence could be raised about rational requirements on belief,  including Belief Consistency and Closure.  There are analogues of the  Violation and Satisfaction Claims for these rational requirements that  would need to be defended and explained.   For example, Joseph Raz  questions whether the analogue of the Violation Claim for Belief  Consistency is even true (see Raz 2005b, §3; Raz 2005a, §5).  If one has  a set of beliefs that is inconsistent, then at least one of the beliefs  in that set is false.  But, Raz argues, it does not follow that there  is any revision in one’s beliefs that one ought to make.  (Reflection on  logical paradoxes, like the sorities paradox, shows that having an  inconsistent set of beliefs doesn’t imply that there is any belief in  the set that one ought to give up.)  Although Raz objects to the  cognitivist’s appeal to Belief Consistency in particular, similar  questions might be raised about the cognitivist’s appeal to Closure.