 Theories should not only investigate which specific capacities and methods are involved with modal knowledge, but also in virtue of what such capacities and methods yield the correct results. Mallozzi (2021e) accordingly distinguishes between descriptive and normative tasks with regard to modal reasoning and modal knowledge. The descriptive task involves identifying and describing the belief-formation processes and methods that subjects actually carry out in modal reasoning (for example counterfactual reasoning, or deductive inference). The descriptive task does not in itself involve answering the question of how the processes are truth-conducive. This question takes center stage in the normative task, which targets the correctness conditions for such processes and methods. More precisely, a chief normative task for the epistemology of modality is to elucidate what constrains such processes or methods, i.e., in virtue of what their outputs are correct or incorrect. As a normative inquiry, the epistemology of modality is centrally concerned with what Vaidya and Wallner (2021) call the Problem of Modal Epistemic Friction (PMEF). This problem concerns the normative restrictions on candidate capacities or methods. Take, e.g., imagination as a candidate mental capacity in our pursuit for modal knowledge. In order for us to be properly guided to modal knowledge, we cannot apply imagination in a completely unrestricted manner. If no restrictions would apply, we could imagine all sorts of impossible things like water without hydrogen, transparent iron etc. Hence, some restrictions, or “epistemic friction creators”, as Vaidya and Wallner call them, have to be in place. The PMEF asks what the epistemic friction creators are and how we come to know them or at least how we come to adequately deploy them in our application of various capacities and methods in order to be properly guided to modal knowledge.