  One reason to turn to this question may stem from recognizing the  difficulties various theories of numerical identity run into, both  metaphysically and in terms of fitting with our practical concerns  (Schechtman 1996, 26–70). But another may be the natural fit between  the characterization question and our practical concerns. So in  searching for an account of the rationality of anticipation, we seem  to be asking, “What makes those expected experiences  mine?” Or in searching for an account of the special concern we have only for ourselves, we seem to be asking, “What makes  those future states I'm specially concerned about  mine?” And the same seems true of responsibility and  compensation: “What makes those actions for which I'm  responsible, or those burdens for which I'm to be compensated,  mine?” And in each case, what makes some feature mine may be a non-numerical type of identity, the type of identity we are thinking of when addressing the familiar question of an identity crisis: “Who am I really?” This is the question of identity as proper attributability, an account of the nature of one's deep or true self and the various attributes genuinely belonging to it. (For early and influential discussion of proper attributability and identification, see various essays in Frankfurt 1988; for discussion of different theories of the deep/true self over the years, see Shoemaker 2015).