 Cordemoy employs a second argument for the distinction, one which, while much less rigorous than Descartes’, follows in spirit the argument from the Discourse on Method by appealing to doubt: “I even see that when I wish to doubt everything that I know when I think of bodies, I am not able at the same time to doubt my thought. For let it be false, if you will, that there are any bodies in the world; it cannot be that there are no thoughts, inasmuch as I would be thinking. How could I believe that my thought might be the same thing that I call ‘body’? I can suppose that there aren’t any bodies, and I cannot suppose that I do not think, the supposition itself being a thought. Thus I know firstly that the soul, or that which thinks, is different from the body” (1968, 153). Cordemoy goes on to argue along similar lines that he can be assured of the existence of his mind, but that the existence of his body, and all other bodies, must be taken as an article of faith.