  Even if the sparse conception fails to ground pluralists’ rejection of the existence of the universal truth property \(F_U\), a concessive response to the instability challenge is still available. Pluralists can make a strong case that the truth properties \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\) are more fundamental than the universal truth property \(F_U\) (Pedersen 2010). This is because \(F_U\) is metaphysically dependent on \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\), in the sense that \(F_U\) is introduced in virtue of its being one of \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\), and not vice-versa. Hence, even if the pluralist commits to the existence of \(F_U\)—and hence, to moderate metaphysical monism—there is still a clear sense in which her view is distinctively more pluralist than monist.