 The choice between the two modes of argument is tied to a further strategic choice. On the approach we are examining, theories of practical inference inherit their bindingness from the non-optionality of the associated conception of action. That entails that any such theory needs an answer to the question, ‘Given what is meant by “action”, why not produce activity of some other kind?’ To quickly canvass the forms this question takes for the theories we have on the table: Why shouldn’t I look for noncalculative control structures, and manage my activity by using them? What’s wrong with answering the question, ‘Did you really do (i.e., author) that?’ with, ‘Well, no, it just kind of happened?’ What’s wrong with engaging in activities that compete with each other or frustrate themselves – that is, with behaving as though you were a market on the inside, rather than a totalitarian state? Why shouldn’t I opt out of the game of Intendo, in something like the way I might decline a round of pinochle? (And if it’s simply not possible, how is it that I have to cope with people who seem to have opted out themselves?) Why bother with evaluating the reasons for my action? Isn’t the fact that I am responsive to them enough?   Why not detour around activities with the structure of friendship, philosophizing, and conversation?   Isn’t, say, harvesting an ongoing stream of sensual pleasures quite enough? Notice that we should not assume without argument that one or another mode of action must be nonoptional; if the pressures toward one or another form of action amount to less than practical necessity, pluralism about action might be the appropriate conclusion (Millgram 2010). 