 The notion of supervenience is covered in more detail in the separate entry on  supervenience  (see especially §3.5) but a brief mention is in order here, as supervenience has sometimes been conceived as a type of dependence. One reason for this is that when we assert that A supervenes on B, we might also say that A-properties ontologically depend upon B-properties. Take the typical example of the beauty of a work of art and the physical manifestation of that work of art. It would seem that if you wish to change the aesthetic properties of an artwork, you will also have to manipulate its physical manifestation. As a first pass, it looks as if the dependence at work here is generic existential dependence as defined by  (EDG),  so the aesthetic A-properties dependG for their existence upon some physical B-properties. However, supervenience in general is not so easily analyzed, as at least on one usual conception, supervenience is not irreflexive and hence not asymmetric (see Steinberg 2013). In other words, we can at least say that supervenience, as opposed to grounding, is not a strict partial order and hence not a relation of ontological priority. There are various ways to further specify the formal features of supervenience, and indeed to argue that it should not be considered as a form of dependence, but this is not a task that we can undertake here.