 Expressivism has also been motivated by some of the considerations that we explored in discussing arguments for the error theory. There is the idea that normative states of affairs would be metaphysically problematic – perhaps because, it might seem, states of affairs of this kind would have to have an intrinsic practical force that is unintelligible – or, it might seem, they would have to have an unintelligible intrinsic magnetism or repulsion. If this is correct, then, it might seem, it would be a mistake to postulate the existence of normative states of affairs. This reasoning can be contested, as we saw. But even if it is correct, it need not lead to an error theory. There is the alternative of taking our normative judgments to consist in conative attitudes, such as aversions or attractions, rather than to be beliefs that purport to represent normative states of affairs. Expressivism can seem in this way to make room for normative truths without postulating the existence of normative states of affairs.