 Unsurprisingly given the above, much has been made of the formal similarities between Leibowitz’s approach to mitzvoth and Kantian ethics. Both stress “worship lishmah” – or the categorical nature of both the ethical and halakhic imperative, neither of which can be instrumental means to ends beyond the respective duties themselves. It is just that Kantian ethics “worships” man “lishmah,” or as an end in himself, while religion worships God. Moreover, as with Kantian moral imperatives, the upshot of acting on religious imperatives for Leibowitz is autonomy. But while ethical action is autonomous for Kant inasmuch as it is a deliverance of our own practical reason, that very fact means that for Leibowitz ethical action is not an expression of human autonomy, but of our enslavement to our own nature. Recalling that for Leibowitz man is simply a part of nature like any other, when acting in accordance with that nature, man is “in effect, nothing but a robot activated by the forces of nature, just like the cattle grazing in the pasture, which are also ‘free from the Torah and Mitzvoth’; that is, from any law externally imposed” (Judaism, 21).