  The argument from divine perfection, like the argument from God’s simplicity, fails because God appears to possess some of his real properties contingently. Yet the question remains, could two gods be distinguished on the basis of a difference in their contingent properties? It is doubtful that the contingent properties we have discussed will serve our purpose. “Knowing that Jones exists” would (in a world containing Jones) be a property of any omniscient being existing in that world. And “Creates Smith” would (in a world containing Smith) be a property of any creator of that world. Perhaps all of God’s real but contingent properties are expressions of his perfect knowledge, goodness, and creative power. And perhaps it is impossible for two gods to exhibit different expressions of this in the same possible world: In any possible world, w, two omniscient beings would know the same things; being supremely good their appreciations and valuations of the things in w would presumably be identical; and each would be the creative ground of everything else that exists in w. If all of God’s real but contingent properties are expressions of his pure perfections and if, for any possible world, two gods couldn’t exhibit different expressions of those perfections in that world, then no possible world contains two gods.