 Responses run the gamut. Julian Dodd (2000) bites the bullet and argues that musical works are discovered, not created. Levinson (1980) famously proposes that composers create musical works by selecting among and indicating pre-existing abstract sound structures and preferred performance means. In western classical music, for example, these indications are embodied in the written score for the work, which guides the production of instances. However, abstract artifacts, by hypothesis, do not pre-exist the creative acts of authors, so they cannot be created by Levinson’s selection-and-indication process. A popular alternative involves the metaphysical relationship of existential dependence. On this view, repeatable works of art have a dependence base, typically consisting of an author’s mental and physical acts which bring an initial instance of the work into existence, subsequent copies of that instance that sustain the work, and an audience capable of appreciating and interpreting those instances. The work itself is an abstract artifact, dependent on, but existing separately from, these acts and instances. It begins when they begin and ends when they all cease or are destroyed. Nurbay Irmak (2021) argues that existential dependence allows for a non-causal type of creation. The artist engages in causal relations with concrete objects and by so doing non-causally creates the dependent abstract artifact. Lee Walters (2013), on the other hand, argues that some abstract objects can enter into causal relationships, so the process of creating an existentially dependent abstract artifact might conceivably qualify as ordinary causal creation.