 Perhaps a violation of a requirement of instrumental coherence is merely an indicator that an agent is not functioning well in the exercise of her rational capacities, where this evaluation doesn’t entail that she ought, or has reason, to be instrumentally coherent on any particular occasion (see Raz 2005a,b).  In holding this view, one could also say that there is value in being a properly functioning agent, and that this value is explained by the ways in which functioning properly as a agent tends to bring one into conformity with what reason requires.  But, it doesn’t follow from this that there is value in functioning properly, or that one has any reason to function properly, in every particular occasion.  (Similar things could be said about the value of having well-functioning perceptual capacities.)  For instance, when one has the unalterable intention to kill one’s boss (for more on unalterable ends, see   Section 1 of the supplementary document    Problems for Wide Scoping),  there is nothing valuable in one’s functioning properly, so far as instrumental rationality goes, on that particular occasion, and one would have no reason to do so (see Raz 2005a, especially pp. 10–13, and Bratman 1987). 