 The epistemic harms and wrongs that we’ve just mentioned occur frequently in the course of daily life, and they are typically constituted by some particular act that we perform (e.g., lending greater credence to the word of a man over that of a woman, or using rhetorical devices to insinuate things that one doesn’t know to be true). But some of these harms and wrongs are constituted not by any particular act, but rather by the procedures that give rise to those acts: for instance, when a research program in the life sciences implicitly assumes an ideologically-driven conception of human nature (see Longino 1990 and Anderson 2004 for fascinating case studies). And sometimes, the harms and wrongs might even be built into our practice of epistemic appraisal—perhaps even a tendency that is somehow constitutive of that very practice. Suppose, for instance, that it is constitutive of our practice of epistemic appraisal to count someone as knowing a fact only if they possess concepts adequate to conceptualize that fact. Whatever may be said in favor of our practice’s having such a feature, one of its effects is clear: those individuals who are cognitively most sensitive to facts for which adequate conceptual resources have not yet been devised (e.g., someone living long before Freud who is sensitive to facts about repression, or someone living in the nineteenth century who is sensitive to facts about sexual harassment) will find that the deliverances of their unique cognitive sensitivities are not counted as knowledge. And so, these same individuals will not be granted the same authority or credibility as other individuals, even when those latter are less cognitively sensitive to the range of facts in question. Recent work in feminist epistemology has helped us to gain an appreciation of just how widespread this phenomenon is (see the seminal discussion of epistemic injustice in M. Fricker 2007, and the development of that account in Dotson 2014).