 The Tiqqun, by contrast, points to a traditional conception of belief; one that amounts to simple acceptance of a given Scriptural doctrine or a set of doctrines as true without prior rational justification (Tiqqun n.30: 51). Simple belief can always be regarded as a source of certainty on account of prophetic authority and this appears to be the basic standpoint of the Tiqqun (for background on the conception of belief in Jewish thought see Wolfson 1942: 213–261; Kellner 1986; Rosenberg 1984: 273–307). Yet it is important to consider the implications that the Tiqqun’s extreme skeptical stance in regard to prophetic knowledge raises for this standpoint. The Tiqqun encompasses a number of significant remarks stressing the inaccessibility of the Torah's prophetic secrets to non-prophets —we will see below that the Torah has two layers of esoteric knowledge, prophetic and philosophical.  What remains is the layer of philosophical knowledge to which philosophers, as Albalag points out, could have access. Accessing this layer of knowledge essentially depends on allegorical interpretation of Scripture in terms of what was learned from demonstrative sciences (see below). This means that whatever assent Scripture evokes in a person who is well-trained in demonstrative sciences (i.e., a philosopher) will be of the type of reason-based, namely demonstrative, assent (cf. Averroes Decisive Treatise: 17–18). It would, thus, be beside the point to speak of “simple belief” (ʾemunah pashoṭah), unless we grant that simple faith attaches to the surface layer of Scripture. But this, again, would be implausible, since Albalag admits that this layer is addressed to the multitude of people who, “like animals”, lack rationality, rather than philosophers (Tiqqun n.30: 45; for further discussion see Guttmann 1945).