 In his Ordinatio I.3.1.4, Scotus finds Henry’s created exemplar/uncreated exemplar distinction insufficient for defeating skepticism. Scotus’ critique of Henry has two main foci: Henry’s appeal to mutability, and Henry’s need for an uncreated exemplar. First, Scotus finds numerous problems with Henry’s worries about change, and he argues that change as such does not prevent knowledge, and that even if it did, much of what we know is sufficiently stable to support our knowledge claims. In defense of his initial claim he argues, e.g., that our own mutability would make knowledge utterly impossible, if Henry’s views are correct. His second claim about change also receives support in various ways, most notably by his appeal to what he calls a nature (natura), which is (roughly) the essence of a thing. Here, he argues that since natures in themselves are immutable, and since each can have what Scotus calls an immutable relation to something else, we have sufficient grounds for stability-based certainty.