 Clearly,  RES-2  is a better definition of “mental simulation of” than  RES-1.  Hurley (2008), however, argued that it won’t do either, since it fails to distinguish ST from its main competitor, i.e., the Theory-Theory (TT), according to which mindreading depends on a body of information about mental states and processes  (section 5).  The crux of Hurley’s argument is this. Suppose that a token visual image V* resembles a token visual experience V and, in doing so, fulfils one of its functions. In this case,  RES-2  is satisfied. But now suppose further that visualization works like a computer simulation: it generates its outputs on the basis of a body of information about vision. On this assumption,  RES-2  still categorizes V* as a mental simulation of V, even though V* has been generated by exactly the kind of process described by TT: a theory-driven and information-rich process.