 Feest (2016) examines a case study involving debates about the Mozart effect in psychology (which, roughly speaking, is the effect whereby listening to Mozart beneficially affects some aspect of intelligence or brain structure). Like Collins, she agrees that there is a problem in determining whether conflicting results suggest a putative replication experiment is not a proper replication attempt, in part because there is uncertainty about whether scientific concepts such as the Mozart effect have been appropriately operationalised in earlier or later experimental contexts. Unlike Collins (on her interpretation), however, she does not think that this uncertainty arises because scientists have inescapably tacit knowledge of the linguistic rules about the meaning and application of concepts like the Mozart effect. Rather the uncertainty arises because such concepts are still themselves developing and because of assumptions about the world that are required to successfully draw inferences from it. Experimental methodology then serves to reveal the previously tacit assumptions about the application of concepts and the legitimacy of inferences, assumptions which are then susceptible to scrutiny.