 In this way, even though Śaṅkara assumes realism at the empirical level in terms of veridical cognition, he negates it metaphysically from the absolute level. This leads him to a position of non-realism (Ram-Prasad 2002). From the empirical standpoint, these two orders seem to exist simultaneously and possess an asymmetrical relationship—the world is dependent upon brahman for its existence, yet brahman has no dependence on the world even though immanent in it. Only from the absolute standpoint does empirical reality collapse into brahman. The ultimate reality perspective metaphysically devours the world, all of its causation, and even its status as an appearance. From the nondual standpoint there is only brahman. Brahman never undergoes genuine transformation (pariṇāma) into the world, just as a rope mistaken to be a snake does not actually transform into a snake. Nor is the snake separate from the rope.