 A view which is related to, but crucially different from, Contextualism goes under various names in the literature: “Subject-Sensitive Invariantism”, “Interest Relative Invariantism” or views which admit of “pragmatic encroachment” (see Fantl and McGrath 2002, 2007, 2009; Hawthorne 2003; and Stanley 2005). Whereas the contextualist thinks that the same sentence attributing justification can express different propositions depending on the context in which it is produced, the subject-sensitive invariantist thinks that the proposition expressed is invariant, but its truth-value depends on features of the subject which can vary (such as how important it is to the subject that the belief in question be true). Very roughly, a version of subject-sensitive invariantism has it that a sentence of the form “S is justified in believing p” invariantly expresses a proposition which entails that S’s justification for believing p is at least high enough for S to be rational in acting as if p is true. Notice that whether it is rational for S to act as if p is traditionally thought to depend on two things: the degree of justification S has for believing that p (or, perhaps more commonly in the context of decision theory, which degree of belief, or credence, S is justified in assigning to p), and S’s preferences. Thus, the more sensitive S’s preferences are with respect to whether p is true, the more justified in believing p S must be for the proposition that S is justified (tout court) in believing p to be true. For instance, if nothing much hangs, for S, on whether there is orange juice in the house, a faint memory of having seen some in the fridge might be enough for it to be true that S is justified in believing that there is orange juice in the house. On the other hand, if S is diabetic and needs to ingest some sugar quickly, that same faint memory might not be enough for that same proposition to be true. Notice the difference between Contextualism and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism: the contextualist might say that the same sentence (that S is justified in believing that there is orange juice in the house) expresses two different propositions (one true, the other false) depending on whether the conversational context includes the information that S is diabetic and needs to ingest sugar; the subject-sensitive invariantist, on the other hand, holds that the sentence in question always expresses the same proposition, but that very proposition is true in the first case but false in the second.