 This suggestion is in line with the third main response to epistemic situationism, which is to somehow offload some of the cognitive agency traditionally required of the individual onto the material, social, or political environment. For instance, Pritchard (2014) argues for a more modest version of VE that countenances the essential role of the environment in the acquisition of knowledge. Someone who is luckily placed in their material, social, and political environment will end up with more knowledge despite less exercise of cognitive agency than someone who is unluckily placed, even if the latter exercises heroic levels of cognitive agency. Epistemic situationism is thus reinterpreted as evidence for our inescapable epistemic dependence on circumstance. Alfano (2013b, 2016a) and Alfano and Skorburg (2017, 2018) connect the challenge of epistemic situationism with the literature in the philosophy of mind on embedded, scaffolded, and extended cognition inspired by Clark and Chalmers (1998; see also Sterelny 2010). The basic idea here is that when a cognitive agent is suitably integrated with natural objects, artifacts, and other agents in their material, social, and political environment, those externalia may be partially constitutive of the agent’s cognitive dispositions. Embedded cognition occurs in a mostly-stable natural environment; scaffolded cognition occurs in a mostly-stable artificial environment; outright extended cognition occurs in a dynamically-reactive environment. Within this taxonomy, Alfano and Skorburg (2018) argue that it is possible to improve the reliability of the recognition heuristic not by developing further internal cognitive resources (as Samuelson &amp; Church 2015 and Roberts &amp; West 2015 would have it) but by better structuring the informational ecosystem in which people find themselves—a suggestion that harmonizes with recent work on the epistemology of information and communication technologies such as the Internet (Bozdag &amp; van den Hoven 2015; Lynch 2016) and library sciences (Fallis &amp; Whitcomb 2009). Alfano (2016a) and Alfano and Skorburg (2017) argue that, in some cases, pairs of agents mutually constitute each other’s character by engaging in dynamic interactions with interlocking virtues. The literature on embedded, scaffolded, and extended epistemic virtues is a natural development of VE’s emphasis on intellectual agents and communities.