  Focused ethical debate has taken place regarding both insurer- and employer-based genetic discrimination. Insurance companies discriminate against applicants for health, disability, life, or even mortgage policies when genetic testing reveals them or a family member to be at risk of disease or disability. Discrimination takes the form of refusing coverage on the basis that the genetic susceptibility counts as a “preexisting condition,” charging high premiums for the policy, limiting benefits, or excluding certain conditions. The insurance industry argues that there is no principled reason to treat genetic information any differently from other medical information used in underwriting. They point to the problem of “adverse selection”: people who know themselves to be at high risk are more likely to seek insurance than people who know themselves to be at low risk, which threatens the market when insurers are deprived of the same  information.[50] If insurers are prohibited from soliciting genetic information altogether, they may decide to offer high-cost policies for those diseases for which testing is available under the assumption that all applicants are high risk. After all, insurers are in the very business of discriminating among individuals: arguably, fair and equitable underwriting requires that those belonging to the same risk class be treated the same (Meyer 2004; Pokorski 1994). In the U.S., where unlike other industrialized countries there is no publicly-funded system of universal health care, genetic discrimination is a particularly serious worry. The 1993 report of the ELSI Working Group's Task Force on Genetic Information and Insurance recommends against the use of genetic information as a basis for denying health care coverage or care and determining the cost of basic coverage, and calls for a voluntary moratorium on medical underwriting by insurance companies until a system of universal health care is  established.[51] Kitcher's major policy recommendation in his 1996 The Lives to Come is for a two-tiered health insurance system that provides universal basic coverage regardless of genetic profile or economic status, whether provided by a public health care system funded through progressive taxation or a private system committed to affordable premiums based on ability to pay. Norman Daniels (1994, 2004) responds to the contention of insurers that it is their business to discriminate by drawing a distinction between “actuarial fairness” and moral fairness and arguing that underwriting health insurance is unjust given health care's social function of protecting normal functioning to ensure equality of opportunity. The case for not permitting the use of genetic information in underwriting life insurance has been found morally less compelling by Daniels (2004), but access is actually more threatened given that the individual market makes up 10–15 percent of private health insurance policies but 71 percent of life insurance policies (Kass 1997). In fact, outside the U.S., where universal health care is available, it is life and other forms of insurance which have been at the forefront of debate, with philosophical arguments often appealing to the value of social solidarity in support of pooling risk (Launis 2003). One proposal is to prohibit underwriting for life insurance policies below a certain amount (Kass 1997).