 With regard to the proposition that some politician is deceitful, traditional grammar suggests the division ‘Some politician / is deceitful’, with the noun ‘politician’ combining with the quantificational word to form a complex subject. But on a Fregean view, grammar masks the logical division between the existential quantifier and the rest: \(\exists x [P(x) \land D(x)]\). With regard to the proposition that every politician is deceitful, Frege also stresses the logical division between the quantifier and its scope: \(\forall x [P(x) \rightarrow D(x)]\); every individual is deceitful if a politician. Here too, the quantifier combines with a complex functional component, albeit one that is conditional rather than conjunctive. (The formal sentence ‘\(\forall x [P(x) \land D(x)]\)’ implies, unconditionally, that every individual is a politician.) As Frege (1879) defined his analogs of the modern symbols used here, ‘\(P(x) \rightarrow D(x)\)’ is equivalent to ‘\(\lnot P(x) \lor D(x)\)’, and ‘\(\forall x\)’ is equivalent to ‘\(\lnot \exists \lnot\)’. So ‘\(\forall x [P(x) \rightarrow D(x)]\)’ is equivalent to ‘\(\lnot \exists x \lnot [\lnot P(x) \lor D(x)]\)’; and given de Morgan’s Laws (concerning the relations between negation, disjunction, and conjunction), \(\lnot \exists x \lnot [\lnot P(x) \lor D(x)]\) iff \(\lnot \exists x [P(x) \land \lnot D(x)]\). Hence, \(\forall x [P(x) \rightarrow D(x)]\) iff \(\lnot \exists x [P(x) \land \lnot D(x)]\). This captures the idea that every politician is deceitful iff no individual is both a politician and not deceitful.