 Doxastic theories of the basing relation hold that having an appropriate meta-belief to the effect that a reason is a good reason to hold a belief is sufficient for the belief’s being based on the reason. Such a theory appears to be a natural fit for certain kinds of epistemic internalism. For such an account, see Leite (2008). Some theories of the basing relation, such as those of Helen Longino and Robert Audi, state that such a meta-belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a belief’s being based on a reason (Longino 1978; Audi 1986). Such theories hold that if a belief is to be based on a reason, the reason must non-deviantly cause the belief, and an appropriate meta-belief must be present. Such theories tend to be vulnerable to the objections to causal theories of the basing relation as well as the objections—to be discussed shortly—to doxastic theories of the basing relation.