 Zimmerman’s response is to deny that there is an asymmetry, arguing that what “matters, according to possibilism, is what one can control” (2017: 128). In other words, both prudential cases and moral cases are treated symmetrically in the sense that what matters for any case, according to possibilism, concerns what is under an agent’s control. To illustrate, in contrast to this purely prudential case, consider a similar case in which Smith’s not boarding the plane will result in result in her friend, Fred, being deeply disappointed that he and Smith will not get an opportunity to catch up in person. In both of these cases, Smith’s control with respect to performing \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\) is exactly the same. So, according to Zimmerman, it doesn’t matter that, in either case, Smith would in fact \(\langle{\sim}B\rangle\) if she were to \(\langle A\rangle\); Smith is still obligated to perform \(\langle A \lamp B\rangle\), and, a fortiori, perform \(\langle A\rangle\). Zimmerman may be right that possibilists are not committed to treating moral and prudential reasons differently. However, by treating them symmetrically, it may still be true (as Goldman and Woodard suggest) that possibilists are committed to counterintuitive verdicts in certain prudential cases, as illustrated in Plane Tickets. 