 While hugely influential, Moore’s open question argument is far from unassailable. One influential response points out that it implausibly assumes any correct definition or analysis must be obvious. According to this response, the open question argument implausibly assumes the correct response to the paradox of analysis is to deny that any analysis could be both correct and informative (see entry on  analysis).  So, the open question argument is no longer taken as decisive. In addition, a majority of philosophers do not want to admit non-natural entities into their ontologies. Finally, many judge that non-cognitivist and anti-realist theories cannot really do justice to the status of morality. It therefore is no surprise that naturalist ethical theories, which hold that moral properties and facts just are natural properties and facts, gained prominence towards the end of the 20th century. One such view, analytic naturalism, directly contradicts Moore by holding that all ethical terms have naturalistic analyses. It might seem that a priori justification would play a prominent role in at least those naturalistic theories that offer analyses of moral terms, but as we will see, this is not so obvious (see entry on  moral naturalism).