 Vallicella (2016, 379) argues that the move from (a) to (b) smacks of a non sequitur absent some auxiliary premise. Let it be granted arguendo that for each concrete individual x there is a corresponding rich property R. And let it be granted that there are property instances. So, in addition to Socrates and wisdom, there is the wisdom of Socrates. Recall that this property instance is not to be confused with the abstract state of affairs, Socrates’ being wise.  From what has been granted it follows that for each x there is the rich property instance, the R-ness of x. But how is it supposed to follow that everything is a property instance? Everything instantiates properties, and in this sense everything is an instance of properties; but this is not to say that everything is a property instance.  Socrates instantiates a rich property, and so is an instance of a property, but it doesn’t follow that Socrates is a property instance.  Something seems to be missing in Mann’s argument. 