 Husserl’s phenomenology is guided by epistemological considerations, and his principal concern is to find a priori foundations for research in the sciences. Husserl believes that modern science, despite all methodological and technological sophistication, has failed to account for the basic epistemic foundation on which it relies. He maintains that this foundation may be discerned in consciousness—not, however, in any factual consciousness or ego, but rather in the transcendental ego and its a priori eidetic structures. He argues that phenomenological inquiry into these structures proceeds methodologically on the basis of what he refers to as the ‘epoché.’ The epoché is a universal suspension of the ‘natural attitude,’ that is, belief in the existence of objects. The epoché thereby allows us to redirect our awareness to objects in their appearance as such. In contrast with Cartesian methodological doubt, the epoché is not a doubt about the existence of mind-independent reality, but, instead, a ‘bracketing’ of our belief in existence that frees us to focus on a priori eidetic structures of appearance (see, for example, Husserl, Ideas I, §§ 27–32).