 Finally, one of the original moves that Olivi makes with his theory of the freedom of the will is that he proposes a novel interpretation of the notion of ‘personhood,’ i.e. the property of being a person (see Perler 2020; Piron 2007; Bobillier 2020, pp. 102–37). This notion is put to several uses in different contexts, but philosophically the most pertinent idea is that which he develops in relation to self-consciousness and the freedom of the will: “personhood is the same as per se existence, governing, free, and reflexively turned (or turnable) to itself in a possessive way—that is, possessing itself by a certain free reflextion” (Summa II q. 52, p. 200). To be a person, one must have two highly sophisticated abilities, namely a mind that provides self-awareness by turning reflexively towards itself (see below) and freedom of the will understood in terms of activity and self-movement. Some elements of Olivi’s innovative notion are more well-known from authors of much later periods, such as Descartes, Locke and Kant; but it was Olivi who first formulated this notion of personhood and used it in his metaphysical, epistemological and moral theories (Bobillier 2020, pp. 133–34).