 In this section, we consider the two accounts of epistemic disutility for credences given in the previous section and we combine them with decision-theoretic norms to derive epistemic norms. When we state the decision-theoretic norms in question, we state them in full generality. In practical decision theory, we evaluate acts: it is acts that have practical disutilities at worlds. In epistemic decision theory, on the other hand, we evaluate credence functions: it is credence functions that have epistemic disutilities at worlds. And in another context still, we might wish to use decision theory to evaluate some other sort of thing, such as a scientific theory (Maher 1993). So we want to state the decision-theoretic norms in a way that is neutral between these. We will talk of options as the things that are being evaluated and that have utilities at worlds. Options can thus be acts or credence functions or scientific theories or some other sort of thing.