 Linsky and Zalta (1994: §4) do not so much question the coherence of the possibilism-actualism distinction (under the bi-modal conception) as dissolve  it.[25]  Specifically, they show that, for all that the thesis  (\(\textbf{Act}^{*}\))  that, necessarily, everything is actual tells us, there is nothing to prevent avowed possibilists like  themselves[26]  from simply rejecting the idea that Bergoglio’s merely possible children “have a [mode] of being that is less than the full-fledged existence” that we enjoy, and insisting instead that they too are fully actual and, hence, exist as robustly as we  do.[27]  It’s just that we, by sheer happenstance, are concrete and they are not; we, that is, happen to exist in the spatio-temporal causal order and they do not. But things might just as well have been the other way ’round: existence-wise, we are all on an ontological par. There are thus no possibilia in the sense of  Poss  at all; necessarily, everything is actual, as per  \(\textbf{Act}^{*}\).  On this telling, then, Linsky and Zalta and their ilk all turn out to be fully-fledged actualists, their ontological commitments notwithstanding.