 The justification from E3 for P3 arguably fails to transmit across the inference from P3 to Q3 because of the satisfaction of the information-dependence template. For it seems true that s could acquire a justification for believing P3 on the basis of E3 only if s had an independent justification for believing Q3. But suppose that s’s justification for believing P3 is based not on E3 but on s’s seeing that P3. Let’s call Zebra* the corresponding variant of Zebra. Given the non-inferential nature of the justification considered for P3, Zebra* could not instantiate the information-dependence template. However, it is easy to check that Zebra* instantiates the disjunctive template. To begin with, (a) P3 entails Q3; (b) s’s justification for believing P3 is constituted by s’s seeing that P3, which is subjectively indistinguishable from the state that s would be in if it were true that (R) the animals in the pen are mules cleverly disguised so as to look like zebras; (c) R is incompatible with P3; and, trivially, (d) if Q3 were false R would be true. 