 Philosophers such as Bealer (1998, 1999a,b ), BonJour (1997), Pust (2000), Huemer (2001, 2005), Koksvik (2011), and Chudnoff (2013), have developed accounts of the a priori that appeal to intuition as the source of a priori knowledge and justification. Most of them take intuition to form a natural kind of seeming state that is non-reducible to either belief or inclinations to believe; rather it is sui generis. On the other hand, philosophers like Boghossian (1996, 2000), Jackson (2000); Hale and Wright (2000); and Peacocke (1999, 2000) have highlighted various ways in which appealing to understanding of meaning may contribute to explaining a priori knowledge and justification. Here we discuss a few accounts that directly connect the epistemology of the a priori with the epistemology of modality.