  It is unclear, however, whether these arguments and examples are  likely to sway those who take akrasia to be a paradigm of  practical irrationality. These dissenters stress the substantive  merits of the course of action the akratic agent follows. But  traditionalists may say that is beside the point: however well things turn out, the practical thinking of the akratic agent still exhibits  a procedural defect. Someone who flouts her own conclusion  about where the balance of reasons lies is ipso facto not  reasoning well. Even if the action she performs is in fact supported  by the balance of reasons, she does not think it is, and that is  enough to show her practical reasoning to be faulty. The defenders of the traditional conception of akrasia as irrational thus  wish to grant special rational authority (in this procedural sense)  to the agent’s better judgment, even if they admit that such a  judgment can be substantively incorrect. By contrast, the dissenters  “[do] not believe best judgments have any privileged  role” (Arpaly 2000, p. 513). We see again the  contrast between “internalist” and  “externalist” tendencies in the debates over weakness of  will.