 One reason why maintaining delusional beliefs may be seen as irrational is that the content of the delusions is often in tension with the content of our other beliefs, or with our behavior (Gerrans 2000, p. 114 and Young 2000, p. 49) . That is, when a delusion is introduced and maintained within our belief system, it creates inconsistencies and does not always drive the actions we would expect given its content. Here are some examples. In the course of the same interview, a woman may claim that her husband died four years earlier and was cremated and that her husband is a patient in the same hospital where she is (Breen et al. 2000, p. 91). In Capgras delusion, people may worry about the disappearance of their loved one, but also be cooperative and even flirtatious with the alleged impostor (see Lucchelli and Spinnler 2007). This suggests that delusions do not always give rise to appropriate action (Bleuler 1950; Sass 2001), although they must be reported either spontaneously or after questioning, or they could not be diagnosed as delusions. How can our apparent strong conviction in the content of the delusion be squared with our failure to act on it? One hypothesis is that the content of the delusion is not genuinely believed. Another hypothesis is that we genuinely believe the content of the delusion but do not convert it into action, because we fail to acquire or maintain the motivation to act on the delusion. This would be consistent with negative symptoms of schizophrenia, as Bortolotti and Broome 2012 argue. 