 Using ideas from mechanism design (Groves and Ledyard 1977; Hylland and Zeckhauser 1980), the economist E. Glen Weyl developed a voting method called Quadratic Voting that mitigates some of the above issues (Lalley and Weyl 2018a). The idea is to think of an election as a market (Posner and Weyl, 2018, Chapter 2). Each voter can purchase votes at a costs that is quadratic in the number of votes. For instance, a voter must pay $25 for 5 votes (either in favor or against a proposition). After the election, the money collected is distributed on a pro rata basis to the voters. There are a variety of economic arguments that justify why voters should pay \(v^2\) to purchase \(v\) votes (Lalley and Weyl 2018b; Goeree and Zhang 2017). See Posner and Weyl 2015 and 2017 for further discussion and a vigorous defense of the use of Quadratic Voting in national elections.  Consult Laurence and Sher 2017 for  two arguments against the use of Quadratic Voting.    Both arguments are derived from the presence of wealth inequality.   The first  argument is that it is ambiguous whether the Quadratic Voting decision really  outperforms a decision using majority rule from the perspective of utilitarianism  (see Driver 2014 and Sinnott-Armstrong 2019 for overviews of utilitarianism).   The second argument is that any vote-buying mechanism will have a hard  time meeting a legitimacy requirement, familiar from the theory of democratic  institutions (cf. Fabienne 2017).    