 Philosophically, Galileo has been used to exemplify many different themes, usually as a personification of whatever the writer wished to make the hallmark of the Scientific Revolution or of the nature of good science—whatever was good about the new science or science in general, it was Galileo who started it. One tradition of Galileo scholarship has divided Galileo’s work into three or four parts: (1) his physics, (2) his astronomy, and (3) his methodology, which might include his method of Biblical interpretation and/or his thoughts about the nature of proof or demonstration. In this tradition, typical treatments deal with his physical and astronomical discoveries and their background and/or who were Galileo’s predecessors. More philosophically, many ask how his mathematical practice relates to his natural philosophy. Was he a mathematical Platonist (Jardine 1976; Koyré 1978), an experimentalist (Settle 1967; Settle 1983; Settle 1992; Palmieri 2008), an Aristotelian emphasizing experience (Geymonat 1954), a precursor of modern positivist science (Drake 1978), or maybe an Archimedean (Machamer 1998a), who might have used a revised Scholastic method of proof (Wallace 1992; Miller 2018)? Or did he have no method and just fly like an eagle in the way that geniuses do (Feyerabend 1975)? Alongside these claims there have been attempts to place Galileo in an intellectual context that brings out the background to his achievements. Some have emphasized his debt to the artisan/engineer practical tradition (Rossi 1962; Valleriani 2010), others his mathematics (Giusti 1993; Feldhay 1998; Renn, et al. 2000; Palmieri 2001; Palmieri 2003; Peterson 2011; Palmerino 2016), his mixed (or subalternate) mathematics (Machamer 1978; Lennox 1986; Wallace 1992; Dear 1995; Machamer 1998a), his debt to atomism (Shea 1972; Redondi 1983), his use of Hellenistic and Medieval impetus theory (Moody 1951; Duhem 1954; Clagett 1959; Shapere 1974), or the idea that discoveries bring new data into science (Wootton 2015).