  Since the initial hypothesis is the theory of Forms, it is uncertain what Plato has in mind in mentioning hypotheses ‘higher’ than the theory or what sort of test he has in mind. The elenctic practice of Socrates would determine whether other accounts are consistent with one another. But that still leaves the question of higher hypotheses unanswered. One temptation here is to think that the teleological account of the Good is the higher/est hypothesis. While this may well be so, there are perhaps intermediate accounts between the full-blown teleology of the Good—an account that Plato steadfastly throughout his writings refuses to provide—and the initial statement of the theory of Forms and its corollary of participation (see Rowe 1993).  These intermediate stages might then be viewed as different accounts of the nature of Forms, the nature of particulars and of the participation relation itself. For instance, Aristotle might offer a different account of ‘Forms’ than Plato, one that espouses an immanent realism wherein some particulars might be said to have essential properties. Or, looking to the clever explanations that follow, where perhaps Forms of Fire and Heat, Cold and Snow or Three and Odd are linked, one might ponder whether Forms are indeed utterly simple or monoeidetic, in contrast to an account of Forms in which they may bear a special relation to their essence—Three is what it is to be three—and a different relation to another property, e.g. oddness. Seen in this light, the Theory of Forms in the Phaedo (and Republic) is hypothetical or provisional, awaiting a defense in which the nature of Forms, the role of the Good and the relations between Forms are examined.