  Acts of judgments are not the only kinds of realities to which truth or falsehood attach. Propositions can also be true or false and their meanings can be taken as a new point of departure for the sake of determining the transcendent object of knowledge avoiding a petitio principii (Rickert 1909, 197). The meaning of a proposition can be taken objectively and independently of empirical acts of thought. In this case, we can say of the proposition itself that is either true or false, without thereby referring to the feeling of evidence or necessity perceived by the subject of judgment. In propositional logic we are accustomed to assign a truth-value to a given proposition and in so doing we think of the truth-value as pertaining to the proposition itself and not to the immanent psychological act that affirms the proposition’s truth. This is the advantage of the objective path over the subjective path: “The subjective path led us to the object as a requirement (Forderung) and this requirement was then interpreted as a transcendent ought. The objective path leads us directly to a transcendent value, and this concept yields the form of the object in its purity for the first time. Value and ought do not coincide. The ought is not the pure value. It represents the unreal as a command and relates it to a subject from which it demands obedience, recognition and submission. This is a secondary and even misleading addition. Only the value which rests upon itself and holds valid as value […] is the transcendent object” (Rickert 1921a, 242).