 Hutton (2006), Sarkissian (2010) and Slingerland (2011) develop responses based on Confucian moral psychology and virtue ethics to challenges mounted by Gilbert Harman (1998–99) and John Doris (2002) to the viability of virtue ethics (as conceived in the Western tradition). A contingent of those working in Chinese philosophy have found that its insights into moral psychology resonate with recent findings in cognitive and social psychology and neuroscience (see Flanagan, 2017; Sarkissian, 2010; Slingerland, 2011; Wong 2015a, 2015b; Cline, 2015; Bruya, 2015; Seok, 2017). Besides the contributions of Confucian moral psychology, insights contained in Daoist texts such as the Zhuangzi resonate with recent findings in cognitive psychology and cognitive science concerning the intuitive, automatic and non-conscious operations of the mind and body (Slingerland, 2014; Bruya, 2015; Wong, 2017).