 A number of philosophers who are at least sympathetic to strict actualism have pointed out that, contrary to Adams, strict actualism does not entail  MSA—in  effect, the principle that a singular modal propositions cannot be true without existing—and, hence, that the still rather severe restrictions of A are unnecessary (Menzel 1990, 1993; Turner 2005; Mitchell-Yellin &amp; Nelson 2016). Moreover, they suggest that Adams’ own distinction between truth in a world and truth at a world provides the intuitive semantic foundation for this claim. Thus Menzel (1993: 132) notes that, just as we can consider a negated proposition to be true at a world where it doesn’t exist by considering it from our perspective in the actual world where it does, we can do the same for modal propositions. Turner spells out the idea as follows regarding an arbitrary de re modal proposition \(\Diamond \sfP\sfa,\) where \(a\) is an actually existing object that, in fact, has the property \(P\):