Yet while capability scholars initially seemed rather sure of their case against Rawls (Sen 1979a, Nussbaum 2006), a more recent wave of philosophical enquiry has highlighted how complicated the comparisons between Rawls’s theory of justice and the capability view are (Pogge 2002, Robeyns 2009, Brighouse and Robeyns 2010). One reason is that the capability metric is a general metric of well-being and well-being freedom, whereas the social primary goods metric emerges as one element of an integral and complex theory of political justice (rather than social justice more broadly, let alone the even wider category of moral evaluations). As Arneson (2010) rightly notes, the unit of assessment ideally should be the moral theory, and not merely one part of it, such as the metric of interpersonal comparison. Also, Rawls’s theory of justice is an ideal theory of justice, in contrast to the capability approach. This means that it is very hard to compare Rawls’s work on justice with the philosophical work on the capability approach, since their scope and theoretical aims are not the same. Moreover, Rawlsians have criticized the capability approach too, and not all of their critiques have been sufficiently rebutted (Freeman 2006; Kelly 2010; Pogge 2002, Richardson 2006).