 Of course—and this is the third point—we might well argue that these explanations provide no good reason, individually or collectively, for God to permit nonresistant nonbelief. That’s because the good states of affairs to which they appeal can be accommodated within a developing, positively meaningful, reciprocal, and conscious relationship with God, or because the benefits of such a relationship with God exceed the goods to which these explanations appeal, or because, more generally, this sort of relationship with God is the greatest good and so God wouldn’t pursue lesser goods at its expense (Bozzo 2019; Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002a; Schellenberg 1993, 1996, 2005a, 2005b, 2007a, 2015a, 2017a; McBrayer and Swenson 2012; Teeninga 2017, 2019, 2020; Trakakis 2007a).