 Feminist standpoint theory has been of lasting influence on pluralist frameworks in philosophy of science by contributing to a wide range of research programs that explore the knowledge of marginalized stakeholders and challenge dominant scientific perspectives as being grounded in the standpoints of dominant actors in scientific practice. For example, Wylie’s (2015) work connects standpoint theory with debates about indigenous knowledge in archaeological research. As also increasingly recognized in philosophy of science more broadly (Kendig 2020; Ludwig 2017; Weiskopf 2020; Whyte 2013), indigenous people are experts about local environmental and social systems while indigenous knowledge remains widely marginalized both in research and policy. By emphasizing the situated knowledge of indigenous people, philosophers of science have therefore more recently articulated accounts of epistemic injustice in science (Koskinen &amp; Rolin 2019) and explored the challenges of approaching epistemic plurality from a global perspective (Ludwig et al. [eds.] 2021; Zambrana &amp; Machaca Benito 2014). Harding’s work (2015) has connected standpoint theory to debates about post- and decolonial perspectives on science that emphasize that situated knowledge in the Global South remains largely marginalized in the mainstream of academic knowledge production (Mavhunga 2017; Mignolo 2010; Santos &amp; Meneses [eds.] 2009).