 In order to formalize this conception, he advanced the concept of a maximally specific predicate related to “Gi” in \(\mathbf{K},\) where, when “\(P(G, F) = r\)”, then, if the premises include a predicate stronger than “\(F\)”, say, “\(M\)”, which implies the presence of more properties than does “\(F\)”, then \(P(G, M) = r,\) where, as before, \(r = P(G,F).\) Thus additional predicates could be included in the explanans of an adequate scientific explanation, provided that they made no difference to the nomic expectability of the explanandum. Including the position of the moon or the day of the week a match is struck, for example, might be irrelevant, but his condition did not exclude them.  Wesley C. Salmon (1970), however, would pursue this issue by arguing that Hempel had embraced the wrong standard upon which to base explanatory relevance relations, where explanations, in Salmon’s view, strictly speaking, do not even qualify as arguments.