 A further departure from the earlier, relatively transparent conception of analysis is occasioned by Russell’s resolution of the set-theoretic version of his paradox. In this resolution one gives an analysis of a sentence whose utterance could not be taken to express any judgment. One argues that the sentence “{x: φx} ε {x: φx}” is nonsense because the contextual definitions providing for the elimination of class terms yield for this case a sentence that is itself nonsense by the lights of the theory of types (PM, 76). It’s (apparent) negation is, accordingly, also nonsense. In Principia, then, there is no very clear model of what is preserved in analysis. The best we can say is that Russell’s contextual definitions have the feature that a (sincere, assertive) utterance of the analysans is guaranteed to express the same judgment as the analysandum, if the latter expresses a judgment at all. 