 Since Goodman is offering a pragmatic solution for (what most would assume to be) a syntactical and semantical problem, it may be useful to consider whether or not there might be a more promising approach. In embracing Goodman’s approach, Hempel was modifying his conception of lawlike sentences as extensional generalizations which are restricted to purely qualitative predicates which make no mention of specific individuals, specific places or specific times, but which might, in special cases, reference samples or exemplars, such as the standard meter or the atomic clock (Hempel 1965d: 269, where he also mentions Popper’s notion of universal predicates). Goodman’s account does not actually capture the concept of laws but the rather restricted notion of hypotheses that have been projected and are supposed to be laws. Laws themselves, after all, exist even when they have not yet been discovered, as in the case of Archimedes’ principle before Archimedes, Snell’s law before Snell, and Newton’s before Newton. A more promising approach lay in the direction of universals in Popper’s sense, which are dispositions with subjunctive force, where laws can be characterized as unrestricted intensional conditionals.