 A challenge for Intellectualism is to explain how the modal condition on cognition may be satisfied if intuition is itself the outcome of some synthetic intellectual process (Gomes and Stephenson 2016; McLear 2016b: §4.3; 2016a: §8.5; cf. Parsons 1964, 1992b; Carson 1997). There are at least two issues here. The first is that it seems that such intellectual processes could supply only logical as opposed to “real” representational constraints. The second (and related issue) is that Kant’s emphasis on the “the testimony of experience from [the object’s] actuality” is at least some evidence for thinking that intuition—as the sensory component of empirical cognition or “experience”—provides the needed “real” constraint on cognition by giving proof of the real possibility of the subject matter of cognition. This real constraint intuition provides via its presentation of some actuality that grounds this possibility.