 Finally, as emphasized above, a concern with the pragmatics of explanation naturally connects with an interest in the “psychology” of explanation and this in turn suggests the relevance of empirical studies of sorts of information that various subjects (ordinary folks, scientists) find explanatory, treat as providing “understanding”, the distinctions subjects make among explanations and so on. Although there is a growing literature in this area, the most prominent philosophical advocates of pragmatic approaches to explanation have so far tended not to make use of it. In this connection, it is worth pointing out that this psychological literature goes well beyond the truisms found in philosophical discussion about different people finding different sorts of information explanatory depending on their interests. In particular, psychologists have been very interested in exploring general features or structural patterns present in information that various subjects find explanatory. For example, Lombrozo (2010) finds evidence that subjects prefer explanations that appeal to relationships that are relatively stable (in the sense of continuing to hold across changing  circumstances)[11]  and Lien and Cheng (2000) present evidence that in cases in which the explanandum \(E\) has a single candidate cause \(C\), subjects prefer levels of explanation/causal description that maximize \(\Delta p = \Pr(E\pmid C) - \Pr(E \pmid \text{not-}C)\).