 Another example is the “problem of evil” (Marcel, 1995, pp. 19-20). Marcel distinguishes between what philosophers refer to as the existential problem of evil (how a particular individual responds to an experience of evil in his or her own life), and the philosophical problem of evil (how a philosopher might think about the “problem” of evil—how evil is to be reconciled with the existence of an all-good and all-powerful God, for instance). He notes that the existential problem cannot be fully discussed at the philosophical level precisely because the experience of the questioner is left out. He notes that, “Evil which is only stated or observed is no longer evil which is suffered: in fact, it ceases to be evil. In reality, I can only grasp it as evil in the measure in which it touches me—that is to say, in the measure in which I am involved…being ‘involved’ is the fundamental fact” (Marcel, 1995, p. 19). In addition, the philosopher seeks solutions to the problem of evil that can be presented to everyone in a logically objective manner, so almost by definition these solutions cannot fully address the existential question. Marcel also proposes that sometimes philosophers can fall into the error of thinking that the philosophical problem should be the main way to approach the experience of evil, and as a result can fail to appreciate the necessity of helping people deal with the existential problem. In general, this failure is something we can observe in many different areas of primary reflection, including academic disciplines, which sometimes lose touch with the experiences that gave rise to the problems the disciplines are supposed to be addressing.