 However these metaphysical issues are resolved, it is clear that God is constantly, everywhere engaged with the world. Because “a thing’s existence cannot remain after the cessation of the action of the agent causing the effect” (ST 1a 104.1c), the created world must have not just an initial creative cause but also an ongoing cause that  conserves  it from moment to moment. Since God is necessarily perfect, the created world cannot be beneficial for God, and since a universe with a perfect being is itself already perfect, God’s goodness does not necessitate his creating anything at all. Moreover, since for everything God creates he could create something better (ST 1a 25.6c), there is no sense to be made of the idea of a best of all possible worlds. Accordingly, God is free to create otherwise than he did, and free even not to create anything at all: “Since God’s goodness is perfect, and he can exist without other things, … it follows that there is no absolute necessity that he will things other than himself” (ST 1a 19.3c). Still, creation has a purpose: God “intends only to share his perfection, which is his goodness” (ST 1a 44.4c). Among creatures, those beings who possess intellects—angels and human beings—are preeminent, in virtue of their capacity to love and understand their creator. Accordingly, the rest of creation is organized for their sake (SCG III.112). Ultimately, however, the purpose of the created world is to reflect God’s goodness and glory: “the whole universe, with its individual parts, is ordered to God as its end, inasmuch as, by a kind of imitation, the universe represents divine goodness for the glory of God” (ST 1a 65.2c). So it is that Aquinas takes everything in the created world to be subject to God’s providential order (§7). (For a broad study of Aquinas on creation see Kretzmann 1999.)