 Russell accepted this reply but forged a second objection that could not be dismissed in the same vein. Russell argues that since it is a principle of MOT\(^o\) that to every set of properties there is a corresponding object and since existence is treated as a property within MOT\(^o\), there must be an object that has exactly the following three properties: being golden, being a mountain, and being existent. If “\(G\)” stands for “is golden”, “\(M\)” stands for “is a mountain” and “\(\rE!\)” stands for “is existent”, this object is denoted by “\(\iota x\forall F(Fx \equiv F = G \vee F = M \vee F = \rE!)\)”. Thus, it follows from the principles of MOT\(^o\) that there is an existent object that is golden and a mountain. But it is an empirical fact that no golden mountain exists. Given the (apparently trivial) assumption that “\(b\) is existent” is equivalent with “\(b\) exists”, this is a contradiction.