 There are serious problems with the assumption of causal closure of the physical in Davidson’s framework (for discussion, see the supplement on  Causal Closure of the Physical in the Argument for Anomalous Monism).  It is difficult, however, to see how Davidson can move from the claim that mental events must instantiate non-mental, strict law properties to the claim that these properties must be physical without assuming closure. Why assume that only ‘physical’ properties are nomic? This raises interesting issues about the nomic status of other special sciences—the relevant ones here being biology and chemistry—but there do not appear to be explicit, conclusive resources in Davidson’s own thinking for addressing this. Yalowitz 1998a has, however, provided an interpretation of Anomalous Monism stressing Davidson’s views on causality and the nomic status of dispositions (see  4.3)  in which causal closure is derived from the cause-law principle, token-identity and the anomalism of causally defined properties. On this interpretation, the strict law properties that mental events must instantiate turn out to be physical because only physical properties are non-causally individuated—all special science properties are causally individuated, and all such properties are anomic.