 One position that can be traced back to some ideas in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (Wittgenstein 1969)—and, perhaps, also to Ortega’s Ideas y Creencias (Ortega y Gasset 1940)—is that evidential chains have to terminate in beliefs that are not properly said to be either justified or unjustified. This position, which we shall call “Positism” (not to be confused with “positivism”), shares many features with Foundationalism: for instance, both positists and foundationalists agree that inferential chains have to be finite and non-circular. But, whereas the foundationalist thinks that the starting points of inferential chains are beliefs that are justified by something other than beliefs, the positist thinks that the starting points of inferential chains are beliefs that are not justified by anything—they are posits that we have to believe without justification. Despite this difference between the positist and the foundationalist, the positions are structurally similar enough that analogues of the questions posed to the foundationalist can be asked of the  positist.[21]