  While an individual may not be to blame for continuing to believe as things seem to them, defenders of the Equal Weight View have claimed that the notion of epistemic justification at issue here is distinct. Sometimes doing the best one can is insufficient, and while some epistemic risk is inevitable, it does not follow that the options are equally risky. While your belief may still seem true to you having discovered the disagreement, other things that seem true to you are relevant as well. For instance, it will seem to you that your interlocutor is an epistemic peer (that they are in an equally good epistemic position on the matter) and that they disagree with you. Those additional seeming states have epistemological import. In particular, they give you reason to doubt that the truth about the disputed belief is as it seems to you. The mere fact that your belief continues to seem true to you is unable to save its justificatory status. Consider the Müller-Lyer illusion: