  It is plausible that objections of this kind will be effective against any nontrivial Counterfactual Motivation version of internalism. This problem has prompted some to switch from a Counterfactual Motivation model to a Counterfactual State model, and others to be more careful about specifying just what state they have in mind. The idea is that an agent S has a reason to do A only if, were she in certain counterfactual circumstances, she would desire S in her actual circumstances to do A (Smith 1994). Michael Smith calls this the advice model (in contrast to the example model), and it plausibly avoids the problems connected with the ‘conditional fallacy’ because it builds in sensitivity to the relevant conditions in the actual cases that generate the reasons. For example, if a fully rational version of Watson’s squash player were to contemplate the situation of his actual, less than fully-rational self, he would be aware of his actual self’s disposition to irrational anger, and would therefore want his actual self not to cross the court to shake the winner’s hand. The advice model may therefore yield the correct result that the actual player has a reason not cross the court. However, as Bedke (2010) emphasizes, this leaves an important puzzle about why each agent’s counterfactual, more fully rational self, would have desires about what her actual self does.