 Marie Kaiser (2015) seeks to recover a more general notion of ‘levels’ along the lines of the mechanistic account in a way that escapes the account’s restrictiveness. Kaiser’s focus here is to relax the conditions under which we consider something a level (2015: 183–185): First, instead of defining levels in terms of working components of mechanisms, she suggests to think of levels in terms of (biological) part-whole relations generally, that is, in a way that is not derived from the definition of a mechanism. Second, Kaiser suggests that a level can also include things that belong to the same “general biological kind” as some parts of the higher-level system in question (2015: 183–185): In this way, levels expand beyond the boundaries of an organism or mechanism. How this approach avoids the problems of general levels of organization discussed below (section 2.4) has not been explicitly spelled out. For further attempts at expanding or developing the notion of levels of mechanisms, see Bertolaso &amp; Buzzoni (2017) and Harbecke (2015).