 MacBride (2014) offers a purely semantic account of the felt asymmetry in terms of the interlocking mechanism of reference and satisfaction that explains the truth of a proposition. Whilst we can deduce from the truth of the proposition that p that p is the case, MacBride argues that we can’t (ultimately) explain its being the case that p in terms of the truth of the proposition that p because its being the case that p is already assumed by the truth of that proposition, that is, has already performed a role in the semantic mechanism whereby the truth-value is determined. By contrast, MacBride continues, its being the case that p isn’t determined by a semantic mechanism but by whatever worldly factors, if any, that gave rise to p’s being the case. Saenz (2018) replies that whilst reference and satisfaction may be used to explain that propositions are true, they still “do not, in any sense, account for the world ‘making it’ [sic] that propositions are some way” (a similar point is made by Mulligan et al 1984: 288, see sec. 3.5 below for further discussion). But Saenz risks begging the question by making the additional demand on the character of the felt asymmetry of truth and being that it consists in more than an asymmetric relationship between truth and being. Saenz holds that the felt asymmetry consists in the requirement that the world makes propositions true but whether we need to appeal to the idea of the world making propositions true in the first place is the point at issue. Finally, Liggins (2012) argues that the felt asymmetry between truth and being is best explained in terms of the asymmetry of grounding, although, as we have seen, the asymmetry of grounding is contested (see sec. 1.6 above for further discussion). 