  At this point, a short remark about the consequences of Mally’s value theory in regard to his deontic logic seems to be in order. His deontic axiom III is seen at least as “problematic” by all known critics so far. This axiom states the equivalence of the factual with the obligatory. This has been judged as problematic or even absurd because in modern meta-ethical discourse the is-ought gap is accepted as logical basis for all ethical deliberations, and, moreover, the collapse would mean that our actual world is a morally “ideal” one. Mally, however, broadens this view. To him, the ought is contained in the objects of reality. With ‘objects’ he does not refer to sensually perceived entities but to the more complex essence of objects (on Meinong’s object-theoretic basis). According to Meinong’s view on dignitatives (an expression not used by Mally, who refers to them as “Forderungen” in Mally 1926: 12, or Mally 1971: 243), a value constitutes an object of higher order. This value is complex and can only emotionally be grasped but it cannot be defined, nor even propositionally characterized. E.g., a donation to a charitable fund can be understood or felt as a morally good deed (Marek 2008: ch. 6.2).  Although this would not be a sensory perception of an object, to Mally it is the emotional impression or feeling that reveals the “essence of the object” considered. It is interesting to note that Mally must have been aware of some of the criticisms of his controversial axiom III (by Laird 1926 or Menger 1939), but it is not known if he ever defended it or at least tried to clarify his underlying value theoretical viewpoint.