 But the fact that the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theories are gimmicky (and, thus, ad hoc) is no objection to either notational consequentializing or pragmatic consequentializing. Such consequentializers will readily concede that these resulting theories are gimmicky. The notational consequentializer will argue that all extensionally equivalent theories are gimmicky representations of each other in that they are all just arbitrarily different notational variants on the same moral view. So, the fact that consequentializing produces gimmicky act-consequentialist counterpart theories is no objection to notational consequentializing. And it’s no objection to pragmatic consequentializing either. The pragmatic consequentializer is happy to admit not only that the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theories are gimmicky but also that they are, consequently, implausible. For pragmatic consequentializers reject the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theories that they construct merely for certain pragmatic purposes.