 Indeed, some philosophers have offered some empirical evidence that casts doubt on just how robust the data for the analytic might be. The movement of “experimental philosophy” has pointed to evidence of considerable malleability of subject’s “intuitions” with regard to the standard kinds of thought experiments on which philosophical defenses of analytic claims typically rely. Thus, Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001) found significant cultural differences between responses of Asian and Western students regarding whether someone counted as having knowledge in a standard “Gettier” (1963) example of accidental justified true belief; and Knobe (2003) found that non-philosophers’ judgments about whether an action is intentional depended on the (particularly negative) moral qualities of the action, and not, as is presumed by most philosophers, on whether the action was merely intended by the agent. Questions, of course, could be raised about these experimental results (How well did the subjects understand the project of assessing intuitions? Did the experiments sufficiently control for the multitudinous “pragmatic” effects endemic to polling procedures? To what extent are the target terms merely polysemous – see supplement, §3– allowing for different uses in different contexts?) However, the results do serve to show how the determination of meaning and analytic truths can be regarded as a far more difficult empirical question than philosophers have traditionally supposed (see Bishop and Trout, 2005, and Alexander and Weinberg, 2007, for further discussion).