 One obvious response is that the connection between meaning and use is not as strong as might be supposed. Nature might also sometimes play a role in determining meaning, e.g., in the case of natural kind terms; but for a predicate like, say, ‘thin’, it is unlikely that nature provides what our use does not. Williamson further responds by pointing out that the determination thesis at issue is really a supervenience thesis—meaning supervenes on use—and this thesis can be agreed to by epistemicists. Granted, the epistemicist cannot say exactly how meaning supervenes on use, and so cannot calculate the meaning or truth-conditions of an application of a vague term from facts about use. However, the response continues, this inability is something which all theorists ought to accept. To suppose that the epistemic theory must make good on this count is to place unreasonable expectations on the theory (see Williamson 1996 and Burgess 2001 for further discussion). 