 It should also be noted that Brady’s construction of inconsistent naive set theory opens the door to a revival of Frege-Russell logicism (briefly, that mathematics reduces to logic.) Logicism was widely held, even by Frege himself, to have been badly damaged by the Russell Paradox. If the Russell Contradiction does not spread, then there is no obvious reason why one cannot hold that naive set theory provides an adequate foundation for mathematics, and that naive set theory is deducible from logic via the naive comprehension schema. The only change needed is a move to an inconsistency-tolerant logic. Even more radically, Weber, in related papers (2010), (2012), (2013), has taken the inconsistency to be a positive virtue, since it enables us to settle several questions that were left open by Cantor, namely, that the well-ordering theorem and the axiom of choice are provable, and that the Continuum Hypothesis is false (2012, 284). Some of these come out provably both true and false; wherein Weber is concerned to advance proofs of the classical recapture, which is the project of showing that traditional results remain provable (2010, 72). This is invigorating new ground. Weber also showed something essential to this project, namely, that Cantor’s Theorem continues to hold; that is, it does not depend on overly-strong logical principles which are contested by paraconsistentists. Retaining Cantor’s Theorem is important in Weber’s view, since different orders of infinity remain available in inconsistent set theory.