 If this was a considered view, it made all occurrent volitions passions, whether free or not (see Hirvonen 2004; Perler 2017). Is Ockham speaking about passions or “pseudopassions”? King (2012) and Miner (2009) use this term in discussing Aquinas’s remarks on volitions as dispassionate passions. Since Ockham often employed Scotus’s account of pleasure and distress as the passions of the will, it is possible that his definition of passion was somewhat sketchy and not meant to introduce a new semantics for the term “passion” after all. However, Adam Wodeham, his younger colleague and collaborator, argues that volitions and nolitions are evaluative cognitions to which all human passions can be reduced because of the unity of the soul. An occurrent volition or nolition has a cognition as a partial cause to which the evaluation pertains. This cognitive account of emotions shows some similarities with the Stoic theory, but there seems to be no historical connection to it (Lectura secunda, prol. q. 1, secs. 2, 5–6; d. 1, q. 5, secs. 4–5, 11; cf. Knuuttila 2004: 275–282; a different interpretation in Pickavé 2012). 