  Buridan's quick answer to the sophism is that Socrates's proposition is false in the case at hand. But before moving on to his final answer, he first discusses a solution described as being held by some people, including  himself.[27]  This is that there is another condition, in addition to the requirement that its terms stand for the same thing or things, which a proposition must meet if it is to be true. A proposition must also signify or assert itself to be true (S 9.8, 7th sophism:  967).[28]  In her detailed analysis of this sophism, Fabienne Pironet has shown that the text in which Buridan defends this earlier view is his question commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, where it is expressed in terms of the traditional formula that “howsoever [a proposition] signifies, so it is [qualitercumque significat, ita est]” (QAnPo  I.10).[29]  Now Buridan holds that all propositions satisfy this condition trivially: “every proposition by its form signifies or asserts itself to be true” (S 9.8, 7th sophism: 967). The problem with self-referential paradoxes is that they also seem to signify that they are false. Thus, although the proposition ‘I say what is false [ego dico falsum]’ “signifies itself to be true in some fashion, nevertheless this is not so entirely, or howsoever it signifies [licet aliqualiter sic significat, non tamen totaliter vel qualitercumque ita est].  Therefore it is false” (QAnPo I.10).