 An important feature of Christensen’s view is that, although Aisha is subject to conflicting requirements, there is still a best epistemic response in her situation. (Christensen holds that the best response is to reduce confidence.) This raises a question: what determines which response is best? See Leonard 2020 for arguments against the dilemma view; Leonard defends a nearby view according to which there are conflicting norms, but it’s indeterminate (among a restricted set of possibilities) what Aisha should believe. Knoks (2021) defends a view along similar lines, arguing that Aisha’s situation is permissive (again, among a similarly-restricted set of possibilities). The possibility of dilemmas in epistemology raises several questions: how can epistemic requirements relate (or not) to notions of epistemic blame, and how can they guide our beliefs? See Hughes 2019 and 2021, e.g., for further discussion of these issues (though mostly focused on a different putative source of conflicting requirements); Hughes defends the position that we should accept epistemic dilemmas.