 Thus, we find again his regress argument against external relations, motivated by his assumption that such relations cannot relate; external relations are, he writes, no more than “mere abstractions” from relational facts and as such hold no relating power (Bradley 1926: 643). Internal relations are no improvement, and Bradley rejects as untrue any suggestions that he might have wanted to accept them (642). The true problem seems to be that “an actual relation […] must possess at once both the characters of a ‘together’ and a ‘between’, and, failing either of these, is a relation no longer” Bradley 1926: 644, 634). Thus, just as in his Appearance and Reality (1893), Bradley is demanding of relations that they fulfill both an “in-between role” (what I have called above a difference-making role) as well as the “together” role (what I have called the unifying role). Failing either of these roles amounts to not being a true relation, which in turn makes the presumed relational experience contradictory, for Bradley: