 Judgment aggregation rules violating collective completeness while satisfying (all or most of) the other conditions introduced above include: unanimity rule, where, for any profile \(\langle J_1, J_2 , \ldots ,J_n\rangle\), \(J = \{p \in X : p \in J_i\) for all \(i \in N\}\); supermajority rules, where, for any profile \(\langle J_1, J_2 , \ldots ,J_n\rangle\), \(J = \{p \in X : |\{i \in N : p \in J_i\}| \gt qn\}\) for a suitable acceptance quota \(q \in\) (0.5,1); and conclusion-based rules, where a subset \(Y \subseteq X\) of logically independent propositions (and their negations) is designated as a set of conclusions and \(J = \{p \in Y : |\{i \in N : p \in J_i\}| \gt n/2\}\). In the multi-member court example of Table 5, the set of conclusions is simply \(Y = \{r, \neg r\}\).