Apperception or “self-consciousness” seems naturally to involve the notion of the ego or “I”: for what could self-consciousness be other than a self or ego that has somehow turned its thought back upon itself, so as to be simultaneously subject and object of awareness? (SW VI: 169) Now Herbart believes that his account of apperception will reveal the substantial “I” to be but an illusion generated by the interplay among differential representational masses (SW VI: 141). Nevertheless, although there is no such thing as the “ego”, yet this does not mean that there is no phenomenon answering to the word, “I”. We constantly make use of the first-person singular pronoun, which somehow expresses a first-person awareness, an ego-consciousness, and this psychological state is clearly of central importance. Herbart tries to explain the ego (correctly conceived) in naturalistic terms, viz. as the evolution of representational masses from childhood to adulthood.