  John Dorp recognized that Buridan’s account depends on the claim that we can grasp generality directly, and that what makes a concept singular is not the absence of generality but the fact that the general has not yet been separated from the set of particular circumstances. Dorp rejected this account, and argued that we have no such singular term as a vague individual in our language. To cognize a thing as singular must involve cognition of particular circumstances, and the general concept ‘man’ cannot be part of the singular cognition. If we want to introduce vague singulars into our language, we will have to invent some special term, such as ‘a’, to signify Socrates together with a connotation of all the individual circumstances, and ‘a’ will then count as a vague singular. Dorp’s view was not adopted any more than was Buridan’s own.  For most later logicians, the vague singular was (contrary to Dorp) one type of singular term, but (contrary to Buridan) less properly singular than the proper name, on the grounds that it did indeed involve some generality. 