 Some philosophers (e.g., Dretske (1995), Tye (1995)) use this troublesome expression simply to mean a sensory quality, and this is one of the two meanings it has had in recent philosophy of mind. But in the fourth paragraph of this entry, the phrase was introduced in the context, “‘what it’s like’ for the subject to be in a particular mental state, especially what it is like for that subject to experience a particular qualitative property,” which indicates that there is another sense (4) in which (when the mental state does involve a sensory quality) the “what it’s like” is something over and above the quality itself. In fact, since this second “what it’s like” is itself a property of the quality, it cannot very well be identical with the quality. It is the property of what it is like to experience that quality; alternately, the relevant introspectible property of the experience itself. Let us now just speak of “what it’s like” (WIL) properties, meaning just this higher-order phenomenal sort.