 This conception of the emergence of new forms is what underlies Taurellus’s analysis of the structure of plants and animals. He ascribes soul and life only to the latter since only they possess sense and self-motion (PT: 350), but this should not obscure the fundamental analogy between the emergence of forms in plant and the emergence of forms in animals. In his view, what possesses life in the proper sense are higher kinds of forms—the souls of animals (PT). The organic body of an animal, constituted by a plurality of less noble substantial forms, possesses life only in a derivative sense, since it possesses active and passive properties that derive from the active and passive properties of the animal soul (PT: 352). But even if he follows the Galenic tradition in denying life to plants (VML: sig. B3r), he ascribes to each plant a substantial form that accounts for some of the activities of the organic plant body—activity that cannot be explained by the temperament of elementary qualities (VML: sig. G3r). Something analogous holds for plant seeds and animal seeds: They do not possess a soul but a natural form that is capable of generating plants and animals (VML: sig. B5r; TRA: 11). As Taurellus argues, it is necessary to postulate the existence of such natural forms because not all kinds of attraction relevant for operation of plants and seeds can be explained by the agency of elementary heat (VML: sig. B5v). Thus, even plant forms and seed forms possess new causal potencies that go beyond the causal potencies of the elements that function as the matter of the emerging form.