 The extension of duties of justice to duress or vulnerability caused by natural misfortune handles some cases that motive a rejection of the claim that antecedent injustice is not necessary for exploitation, but this move is less appealing for cases in which a person’s disadvantage is self-caused. Suppose that rather than \(A\) pushing her or the sea rocking her overboard, \(B\) jumped into the ocean on purpose. Suppose that she immediately regrets her decision and asks \(A\) for rescue. While we might accept that \(A\) may be permitted to charge her more for rescue in this case than in situations involving natural disadvantage, many still believe fairness places some limit on the gains \(A\) can extract. Consequently, as Wertheimer, Vrousalis, and Zwolinski have argued, it appears that \(A\) can still take unfair advantage of \(B\) despite the absence of any antecedent injustice. One might continue to resist by arguing that \(A\)’s self-harm constitutes an injustice to herself, yet such a position is difficult to maintain and would certainly stretch the ordinary understanding of the scope of justice.