  Because some theories of recognition are not only concerned with questions of justice but also with a formal theory of the good life designed to illuminate the social conditions of individual flourishing (or negatively, of social pathologies) this has sparked the critique that such approaches are too “sectarian” (Fraser 2003a, 30; similar Zurn 2000, 121): Any reference to the telos of a good life (or the specific idea of individuality or authenticity) proves to be a non-starter (or just eurocentric). In reply, proponents of such a broader account of social philosophy have insisted that the emphasis on a society that recognizes as many features of individuals as possible, hereby promoting their autonomy, does not prescribe how to live. It only spells out the intersubjective conditions which provide everybody with the chance to live the life they want to lead (be it autonomously chosen or not), namely in a social environment where this life is either adequately recognized or at least not looked upon derogatively (Honneth 2003a, 177).