 If we grant that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship, we seem to have a solution to the ship of Theseus paradox. By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim to being the original ship, \(O\). But this success is short lived. For we are left with the following additional paradox: Suppose that \(S\) eventuates from \(O\) by replacing one part of \(O\) one day at a time. There seems to be widespread agreement that replacing just one part of a thing by a new exactly similar part preserves the identity of the thing. If so, then, by the transitivity of identity, \(O\) and \(S\) must be the same ship. It follows that either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even a single part (or small portion) does not preserve identity (a view known as “mereological essentialism;” Chisholm 1973).