 Finally, some commentators have concluded, further, that an “adequate” idea must be contained in a mind insofar as it must also have been “adequately caused” – i.e., self-sufficiently or autonomously caused – by the mind in question, and as such counts as a true “action” of that mind, in Spinoza’s technical sense of these terms (E3def1–2). If that’s right, then adequate ideas must all be innate (LeBuffe 2010, E. Marshall 2013, J. Steinberg 2018a: ch.8). For having a cause external to the mind – for example, arising from experience – would be incompatible by definition with having been “adequately caused”. On such readings, what we might experience as an acquisition of an adequate idea (say, in a philosophy class) is in fact only a matter of becoming more conscious of it (J. Steinberg 2018a: ch.8; see 2.3).