 Second, the theory of intending as being embarked on intentional action explains the unity of what Thompson calls ‘naïve’ and ‘sophisticated’ rationalization. (For this argument, see Thompson 2008, pp. 97–9, 118–9, 132–4.) As well as explaining action by intention—‘He is doing A because he intends to do B’—we explain action by action—‘He is doing A because he is doing B’—intention by intention—‘He intends to do A because he intends to do B’—and intention by action—‘He intends to do A because he is doing B.’ On the face of it, moreover, ‘naïve’ explanations in terms of what someone is doing entail ‘sophisticated’ explanations that appeal to intention. At least when we are using the ‘because’ of rationalization, ‘He is doing A because he is doing B’ arguably entails ‘He is doing A because he intends to do B.’ The same point holds for what is explained: ‘He is doing A because…’ entails ‘He intends to do A because…’ If intending is being on the way to intentional action, these are all forms of explanation by, and of, such progress. So, again, it is no surprise that they are bound together in just the way that they appear to be.