 We might ask, in order to bring the differences between these views better out into the light, what our considered opinion is in cases in which a divine antecedent intention that A φ and a divine command that A φ pull apart. It is far from clear that it is a real option for God to command that A φ while not intending that A φ. Though this possibility is endorsed by Wierenga 1983 (p. 390) and is at least entertained in Murphy 1998 (p. 9), for God to issue such a command would be for God to command insincerely—something that many would be loath to allow. (See also Adams 1999, p. 260 and Murphy 2002, 2.5). But the other option appears unproblematic enough. God might intend for humans to act a certain way while not commanding them to do so. In such a scenario, one might ask, is obligation engendered? If yes, then it seems to count in favor of the divine will view (2); if no, then it seems to count in favor of the divine command view (1).