  Recent developments regarding moral consistency reasoning underline the role of emotion in moral reasoning (Campbell and Kumar 2012, 2013; Kumar and Campbell 2012, 2016; Campbell 2014, 2017 see also Wong 2002 on analogical moral reasoning). Return to Singer’s example of a man seeing a toddler about to drown in a shallow pond and knowing that the only cost of saving her life would be ruining his new suit. One can be expected to have feelings of strong disapproval toward anyone who did not try to save a child in any similar situation. Suppose, however, there is another situation, say one in which someone’s life is at stake and that person can be saved at no more cost than losing a new suit, say by giving funds for famine relief. If one does not feel as before about this new situation, then there should be a moral difference between them to explain the difference in emotional response, or else one is being morally inconsistent in one’s moral emotions. Moreover, this kind of moral inconsistency is morally culpable, revealing one not to be fully morally trustworthy as a moral agent. Singer argues, in fact, that one’s response to the opportunity to provide funds for famine relief (at least equivalent to the cost of a new suit) ought to be the same as in the pond case, since (he claims) there is no morally relevant difference. (He considers various candidates for difference but argues that thinking they are morally relevant results in further inconsistencies depending on the candidate.) When there are no relevant moral differences between two situations and the moral import of one’s response to them is different, both responses cannot be morally justified. Though Singer’s focus is on whether one’s moral obligation is the same, the logic of his argument would be the same whether the inconsistency is between moral beliefs or moral emotions. In general we are expected to be morally consistent in our moral beliefs and in our moral emotions.