 In addition, it seems in some cases we can have quite a firm view of our actual duty. Consider a situation in which you have to acts open to you. You are walking to work to chat with a student you have promised to meet. On the way there you see a child drowning in a pond and only you can save her. If you save her, you will not be able to meet your student; if you carry on to meet your student, the child will drown. So, either you break a relatively trivial promise to meet a student in your office hours or you save a drowning child. It seems clear to many that your actual obligation in this scenario is that you break the promise. True, it is likely that you cannot be certain of this but you can be as certain of this as you can be of any prima facie duty (for discussion, see Hurka, 2014, 124–125; Phillips 2019, 187–88; Price 1931, 344; Ross sometimes agrees; FE 191).