 Most contemporary philosophy of religion assumes either a framework of generic theism or the framework of Christianity. (While the present treatment largely reflects this focus from the literature on which it draws, it should be noted that this focus has been criticized on a number of fronts. (See, for instance, Knepper 2014, Draper &amp; Nichols 2013, Schilbrack 2014, Simmons 2019a, and Timpe &amp; Hereth 2019).) Discussions that assume the framework of generic theism often proceed along the lines of what Marilyn McCord Adams calls “a religion-neutral value theory”. Religion-neutral value theories seek both to avoid dependence on values specific to a particular religious tradition and to include only such value assumptions as would also be acceptable to an atheologian (M. Adams 1988: 127; for a criticism of such an approach, see Moser 2019). Philosophers who have adopted such theories have tended