 There are two respects, however, in which our initial formulation of the second claim needs to be refined. First, we should note that in most cases, a correspondence between representation and represented state of affairs is not strictly necessary to enable the consumer to perform its proper functions; it is only necessary if the consumer is to perform its proper functions “in the Normal way”. By this expression, Millikan refers to the way in which the consumer’s functions have generally been performed on those occasions that were crucial for the proliferation or preservation of this (kind of) consumer (Millikan 1984, 100; 1989b,   286–287).[10]  Hence, to identify the mapping that determines the contents for a given set of representations R1, …, Rn, we need to (i) look at those past occasions where ancestral consumers of the relevant kind made the type of fitness contributions that led to the proliferation or preservation of consumers of this kind, and (ii) ask which correspondence relationships between R1, …, Rn and other states of affairs obtained in these situations that help to explain how the consumers were able to make these contributions. In the case of the beaver splashes, e.g., we must look at past occasions where the ancestors of today’s beavers responded to splash signals in a way that made a crucial contribution to their fitness (which, we may assume, are situations where they responded by diving for cover), and ask which correspondence relationships between the signals and other states of affairs help to explain these fitness contributions. Presumably, these are precisely those correspondence relationships between signals and danger that we have identified above.