 In this section, we consider the conditions imposed on an epistemic disutility function when we treat it as a measure of the distance of an epistemic state from the goal of being actually or hypothetically calibrated (van Fraassen 1983; Lange 1999; Shimony 1988). We say that a credence function is actually calibrated at a particular possible world if the credence it assigns to a proposition matches the relative frequency with which propositions of that kind are true at that world. Thus, credence 0.2 in proposition \(A\) is actually calibrated if one-fifth of propositions like \(A\) are actually true. And we say that a credence function is hypothetically calibrated if the credence it assigns to a proposition matches the limiting relative frequency with which propositions of that kind would be true were there more propositions of that kind. Thus, credence 0.2 in proposition \(A\) is hypothetically calibrated if, as we move to worlds with more and more propositions like \(A\), the proportion of such propositions that are true approaches one-fifth in the limit. According to the calibration arguments, matching these relative frequencies or limiting relative frequencies is an epistemic goal. And they attempt to justify Probabilism by appealing to this goal and measures of distance from it.