  Thomson, following the two-step strategy outlined in Section 2.2, holds that goodness is the most fundamental normative concept, and that we can define different normative concepts in terms of goodness. For instance, “for \(F\) to be a virtue in a [kind] \(K\) is for it to be the case that (i) \(K\) is a goodness-fixing kind, and (ii) a \(K\) is as good a \(K\) as a \(K\) can be only if it has \(F\), and (iii) it is possible for there to be a \(K\) that lacks \(F\), and (iv) it is not nomologically impossible for there to be a \(K\) that has \(F\)” (Thomson 2008, 85). Thomson also defines notions of “better”, “correct”, “ought”, “reason”, and “defective” in terms of goodness (Thomson 2008).