 There is much more that can be said about the debate between EDT and CDT. For instance, if Cheryl knows that she is intervening, then she will not believe herself to be accurately described by the causal structure in  Figure 10.  Instead, she will believe herself to instantiate a causal structure in which the arrow from K to B is removed. In this causal structure, if P satisfies MC, we will have \(\Pr(w \mid B = b) = \Pr(w \mid \ido(B = b))\), and the difference between EDT and CDT collapses. If there is a principled reason why a deliberating agent will always believe herself to be intervening, then EDT will yield the same normative recommendations as CDT, and will avoid counterexamples like the one described above. Price’s defense of EDT (Price 1986) might be plausibly reconstructed along these lines. So the moral is not necessarily that CDT is normatively correct, but rather that causal models may be fruitfully employed to clarify issues in decision theory connected with causation.