More recent critics of the method of paraphrase see the search for paraphrase as fundamentally misguided. Sider (1999), for example, suggests that the project of discovering the ontological commitments of ordinary language should proceed by searching, not for paraphrases, but for underlying truths (see also Melia 1995 and Yablo 1999 for related critiques). Suppose some sentence in ordinary language that we use in describing the world is prima facie committed to Ks. Nonetheless, the attitude that we take to the sentence may be something weaker than believing the sentence true. In that case, our use of that sentence need not commit us to Ks, even if all acceptable paraphrases are committed to Ks. To get at our commitments, we should look, not to paraphrases, but to the truths that underlie the descriptive role of the sentence; our commitment is the commitment of those underlying truths. Roughly, we can say that the underlying truths are true propositions that would still have been true and would have been sufficient for the truth of the original sentence, if there had been Ks (see Sider 1999: 332–3). To illustrate with a simple example, consider the sentence: “the number of moons of Jupiter is sixty-seven”. Suppose a philosopher uses this sentence to describe the world, but does not want to accept its prima facie commitment to numbers. If, as seems plausible, the underlying truths for the sentence are just propositions stating what physical objects are in the vicinity of Jupiter and what their motions are, then the sentence is ontologically committed only to those physical objects, not to numbers. We may not know what these underlying truths are, or be able to express them in ordinary language. That matters not. For, unlike the method of paraphrase, the philosopher is under no obligation to provide the underlying truths in order to acquit herself of the prima facie commitments. She can justify her use of sentences that are prima facie committed to numbers as long as she holds that there are underlying truths, and that the underlying truths are not so committed.