 What about Hobbes’s other objection – in effect, that one could dream both (i) and (ii)? Descartes’ response: “A dreamer cannot really connect his dreams with the ideas of past events, though he may dream that he does. For everyone admits that a man may be deceived in his sleep.” (AT 7:196, CSM 2:137) Perhaps Descartes thinks the situation with dreaming parallels that of waking life: those who are sufficiently tired, or otherwise perceptually inattentive, “cannot really” perceive truths clearly and distinctly, though it may seem to them that they do. Whether in waking or dreaming, the Fourth Meditation theodicy has God allowing us to make judgment errors, provided that they are correctable. Descartes is committed to holding that when our perception is confused, we can in principle come to discover the confusion – even if not easily. When we lack clear and distinct perception, we are at fault (not God) for any resulting judgments, in part because we can discover that our perception is confused. Descartes needs it that the same principle holds even while dreaming. (And again, nearly the entirety of the Meditations unfolds under the supposition that, for all we know, we may presently be dreaming.) For the case at hand – i.e., the possibility of mistakenly judging that I’m awake, while in a dream – Descartes needs it that we could, in principle, discover that we’re mistaken. Apropos of condition (ii), therefore, is whether God has provided us a faculty by which to discover that we’re dreaming, on occasions when we wrongly believe ourselves to be awake. Evidently, Descartes thinks so, as he tells Gassendi: