 Hale (2002) draws an important distinction between two different architectures one can use in building an epistemology of modality. Necessity-first accounts hold that we first acquire knowledge of necessity and then arrive at knowledge of possibility by inferring what is consistent with what we know to be necessary. Possibility-first accounts, by contrast, hold that we first acquire knowledge of possibility from which we then generalize to knowledge of necessity. Most conceivability-based accounts  (§4.1)  implement a possibility-first approach. So do dispositionalist approaches as well as Roca-Royes’ similarity-based account, as they all prioritize possibilities  (§7).  Counterfactual-based accounts such as Williamson’s  (§4.2)  seem instead more neutral concerning the distinction. Finally, essence-based accounts  (§5)  are usually necessity-first. (For discussion see: Hale (2013), Roca-Royes (2017), and Fischer (2017)).