 A relatively recent trend in epistemology—experimental epistemology—(Beebe 2012, 2016; Beebe &amp; Monaghan 2018; Gerken &amp; Beebe 2016; Turri 2016a,b, 2018; Buckwalter 2012; Colaço et al. 2014; Carter, Pritchard, &amp; Shepherd 2019) uses the methodology of psychology, cognitive, and other sciences (e.g., digital humanities—see Alfano, Carter, &amp; Cheong 2018) to study (typically) patterns of knowledge, justification and other epistemic attributions. Results reported have at least two kinds of potential import in epistemology: first, results may be seen as bearing on what is or is not believed intuitively by people generally, and differentially on the basis of cultural and intellectual backgrounds (e.g., Weinberg, Nichols, &amp; Stich 2001; Colaço et al. 2014); second, and more ambitiously, such results may be taken to challenge or support the truth of epistemological positions that are generally held (Sosa 2007b: 99; see also for discussion Beebe 2016; Knobe &amp; Nichols 2017; Horvath &amp; Koch 2021; Turri 2016a).