 The phrase ‘conceptual problems’ should be understood very broadly. The conceptual work done by philosophers of biology in many cases merges smoothly into theoretical biology. It also sometimes leads philosophers to examine and criticize the chains of argument constructed by biologists, and thus to enter directly into ongoing biological debates. In the same way, the first kind of philosophy of biology we have described – the use of biological examples to work through general issues in the philosophy of science – sometimes feeds back into biology itself through specific recommendations for improving biological methodology. It is a striking feature of the philosophy of biology literature that philosophers often publish in biology journals and that biologists often contribute to philosophy of biology journals. The philosophy of biology also has a potentially important role as a mediator between biology and society. Popular representations of biology derive broad lessons from large swathes of experimental findings and theoretical work. Philosophers of science have an obvious role in evaluating these interpretations of the significance of specific biological findings (Stotz and Griffiths 2008). As two important examples, philosophers of biology have provided a great deal of clarity regarding creationism/intelligent design (Kitcher 1982; Ruse 1982; Pennock 2000; Sarkar 2007) and sociobiology/evolutionary psychology (Kitcher 1985; Buller 2006; Richardson 2010; Barker 2015). 