 Appealing to reflective common sense, philosophers have tried to illustrate how. We might refer to one range of cases they invoke as exploitation cases because they seem to involve one person taking unfair advantage of another, which is a hallmark of exploitation (Wertheimer 1996). To cite one such case, suppose that a mother of modest means cannot afford to give her children a good education. A rich person proposes to finance her children’s enrollment at excellent schools in exchange for her serving as his personal slave (Davis 1984: 392). The mother might understand the use he intends to put her to and for what purposes. Moreover, if we think of coercion as involving an agent threatening to make someone worse off than she would be if she did not interact with the agent, then the rich person would not count as coercing the mother into agreeing to his use of her. The account of using another but not merely as a means that we are considering might, therefore, imply that the rich person is not just using the mother in making her his personal slave. That implication strikes some as implausible.