  This view, like the others, faces many objections. One worry is that the plebiscitary theory licenses morally problematic secessions of the “haves” from the “have-nots:” well-off majorities in resource-rich portions of the state might divest themselves of obligations to redistribute wealth to their less fortunate fellow citizens. In response, Wellman might appeal to the viability proviso: a secessionist party may not secede with the commodities necessary for the continued functioning of the remainder state. If they are located in a region that has the greater amount of natural resources, for example, their right to secede is conditional on their willingness to share at least some of those resources with the citizens of the remainder state. On this view, richer groups may secede from poorer groups—however, the poorer group’s reliance on the resources held by the richer group establishes the terms by which the secession may occur (Wellman 1995: p. 145).