 But as Velleman has shown, given the standard understanding of intentions, it’s not clear that one can intend the entire activity; or if one can, it would seem incompatible with the activity being  shared.[25]  Intending is something I do to settle a deliberative issue: weighing several options, I decide on A-ing, and thereby intend to A. This suggests the Settling  Condition[26]  that I can only intend what I take to be up to me to decide or settle. It is a violation of a rational requirement to intend something I don’t think I can settle, and thus regard my ensuing plans and actions as likely coming to grief. Applying the point to collective action, to say that I intend for us to be dining together presumes that whether we’re dining together is something for me to settle. But the idea behind shared activity and intention is precisely that it’s not entirely up to me what we do. You have a say in the matter; at the very least what you do should be up to you (see also Schmid 2008). Our problem, then, is that shared activity would seem both to demand and to disallow one and the same intention on the part of each  participant.[27]