 Such facts and such rules would have to be such as to “serve to get us into language in the first place” (Stroud 1990b [2000: 94]). The demand is most strongly manifested in Kripke’s assumption that there must be an item that instructs or tells the speaker what to do with her expressions. Stroud claims that proper engagement with Wittgenstein’s remarks reveals this assumption to be misguided, for it embarks us on a regress (Stroud 1996 [2000: 180–185]). Once we recognize the misguidedness of the picture that Kripke assumes, we will no longer feel the force of the sceptical challenge, Stroud thinks. However, contra Stroud, it seems that the extensionality condition is all we need in order to pose a stripped-down version of the question that the sceptic is raising, namely, the question of what makes the standards of correctness that govern our uses of expressions and our deployments of concepts possible.