 Furthermore, even if normativism about meaning/content might exclude (fully) reductive naturalism about meaning/content, it should be noted that adopting normativism would not seem to be the only option for the anti-reductivist (cf. Mulligan 1999: 136f; Glüer &amp; Wikforss 2009: 63ff). What the normativist construes as norms or rules of meaning/content, principles such as  (CM)  or inferential rules such as modus ponens, might also be construed in a very different way: As, or in analogy with what Frege called “laws of truth” (Frege 1918 [1986: 30]). In the same vein, Husserl called the “laws of logic” “ideal” (Husserl 1913: 56)). These “laws” are neither prescriptions for thinking, nor nomological generalities of our psychology. Their “validity” or necessity is sui generis; if anything, it is what we might today call  metaphysical.[61]