 A series of studies by Marisa Carrasco and her collaborators have examined the influence of attention on the character of conscious experience. These have revealed that the phenomenal differences produced by shifts of attention include differences of perceived brightness, contrast, and saturation of colours, but do not include differences of hue (Carrasco, Ling &amp; Read, 2004, Fuller &amp; Carrasco, 2006). Ned Block has suggested that these perceived differences should not be thought of as differences in the content of experience, since to characterize them in that way would be to take it that attending to an item creates an illusion as to its brightness, contrast, etc.; a result which he takes to be implausible. Block therefore interprets Carrasco’s findings as indicating an aspect of experience that cannot be accounted for with a theory in which the phenomenal character of an experience is a function of that experience’s content (Block 2010).