 Much of this comparative work is also guided by hypotheses about the kinds of evolutionary pressures that selected for uniquely human cultural capacities and drove the dramatic expansion of relative brain size in the human lineage. For instance, one framing (Baimel et al. 2021; also see Muthukrishna, Doebeli, et al. 2018) pits this family of “cultural brain” hypotheses that focus on the adaptive challenges associated with social learning and handling cultural information against “Machiavellian intelligence” hypotheses (Byrne &amp; Whiten 1988 and Whiten &amp; Byrne 1997). These latter hypotheses see key selective pressures as stemming not from culture but from more competitive social dynamics that arise from antagonistic scheming among conspecifics (cf. Downes 2008 [2021]; Lewens 2008 [2020]). Another view holds that many of our particular cultural capacities are the product of cultural rather than biological evolution, cognitive gadgets that are assembled and passed along as part of a cultural inheritance rather than a genetic one (Heyes 2018a). On this account, what is unique about human brains is that they are innately equipped with a set of cognitive mechanisms for associative learning that are hypertrophied compared to other species, but are not genetically specialized for any particular domain or content. These general learning mechanisms, together with some number of attentional biases, are often used to acquire all manner of culturally inherited, domain-specific packages of skills, e.g., to play chess, to drive a car, to read and write, etc. These may also include skills that allow individuals to imitate others more adeptly, thus allowing them to learn to become better and more selective social learners (also see Dennett 2017).