Suppose, for the moment, that one could live with the world being well lost. There are still objections to the adequacy of the metalinguistic  criterion.[8]  First, there is the problem that, in making entailment purely formal, all interconnections between kinds have been lost: ontological commitment to bachelors won't carry with it ontological commitment to males; ontological commitment to elephants won't carry with it ontological commitment to animals. There are no constraints on the joint interpretation of ‘bachelor’ and ‘male’, or of ‘elephant’ and ‘animal’. One can get these connections back, however, by adding additional postulates to T, such as ‘∀x(Bachelor(x) ⊃ Male(x))’, or ‘∀x(Elephant(x) ⊃ Animal(x))’. (These might or might not be taken to be meaning postulates, or metaphysically necessary postulates; for Quine they would just be more theory.) This has the awkward result that the original theory T is not ontologically committed to males if it just contains ‘∃x Bachelor(x)’, or to animals if it just contains ‘∃x Elephant(x)’; only T with the postulates added is so committed. But perhaps one can live with that.