 Recent advances on revision theory, have contributed to prove the fertility of the approach (in a direction related to the last part of §6.4 of this entry): Gupta 2011 presents an application to the concept of strategic rationality in a certain type of finite games that is connected to a common way of understanding rational choice in strategic contexts. Although developed independently, Gupta’s stance is reminiscent of previous work by H. Gaifman about rationality being affected by paradoxes resembling the truth theoretic paradoxes like the liar paradox (see Gaifman 1999). An extension of this approach to the class of all finite games is presented in Bruni and Sillari 2018. The notable aspect of Gupta’s application is that it makes use of only the finite part of revision theory (i.e., it does not need the transfinite iteration of this construction), and it gets rid of the rule for dealing with stages corresponding to limit ordinals. This limit rule, which is essential to address the concept of truth, turned out to be the most critical aspect of the revision-theoretic approach to circular concepts from both the complexity, and the conceptual point of view (see Campbell-Moore 2019 for a recent, new approach to the topic).