 Though both philosophically intriguing and practically significant, procrastination has only recently received substantial attention as an important topic of philosophical debate. (Much of the debate can be found in a collection of papers on the topic edited by Chrisoula Andreou and Mark D. White (2010).) It has perhaps been assumed that procrastination is just a form of weakness of will and so, although there has been little explicit discussion of procrastination, most of the philosophical work necessary for understanding procrastination has already been done. But, as Sarah Stroud has argued (2010), this assumption is problematic, since there are cases of procrastination that do not fit with the traditional conception of weakness of will, which casts the agent as acting against her better judgment, or with the influential revisionary conception of weakness of will due to Richard Holton (1999), which casts the agent as acting irresolutely. Although the well-developed literature on weakness of will is an important resource in the study of procrastination, there is a lot more philosophical work that needs to be done, and the modeling work that seems to be most promising focuses heavily on the fact that procrastination is a problem faced by agents whose choices are spread out over time.