  Nozick (1969) raises another objection: Jeffrey's definition gives strange results in the Newcomb Problem. A predictor hands you a closed box, containing either $0 or $1 million, and offers you an open box, containing an additional $1,000. You can either refuse the open box (“one-box”) or take the open box (“two-box”). But there's a catch: the predictor has predicted your choice beforehand, and all her predictions are 90% accurate. In other words, the probability that you one-box, given that she predicts you one-box, is 90%, and the probability that you two-box, given that she predicts you two-box, is 90%. Finally, the contents of the closed box depend on the prediction: if the predictor thought you would two-box, she put nothing in the closed box, while if she thought you would one-box, she put $1 million in the closed box. The matrix for your decision looks like this: