 Is there something it’s like for us to think that is not exhausted by what it’s like for us to have merely sensory states? Here we come upon the issue that has lately emerged under the heading “cognitive phenomenology”. Or rather, we come upon one way of articulating an aspect of issues so labeled. Much of the challenge of this debate lies in properly framing it; different parties have done so in significantly different ways. As a start, and very roughly, we might distinguish views that include in phenomenal character the sorts of differences in thinking and understanding that go beyond the “purely sensory” and those that restrict phenomenal character in a way that excludes these. The latter philosophers hold that phenomenal character is exhausted by or reducible to non-cognitive, purely sensory differences, while the former say there is more to it than this—the “something more” found in thought. The articles in Bayne and Montague 2011 provide an array of perspectives on this issue. Chudnoff 2015 furnishes a detailed overview and assessment of the debate.