 Neither Cartesian rationalism nor English empiricism could replace Hegel’s philosophy with any philosophical position of comparable range. Hegel was right to emphasise system, but not as totality (a pretended solution to real problems), but in the form of a single logic. He was also right to see this logic as historical, but wrong to attempt to replace a “logic of things developing” with the notion of a “developing logic” (EMP, 80). Anderson summarises the position as follows. The only way to answer Hegel would be to drop the modern fixation with epistemological questions altogether and return to a Greek consideration of things. In addition to Greek directness, a true replacement for Hegelian idealism would incorporate three major components: a positive theory of the mind as feeling and as non-unitary, as much a part of spatial and temporal reality as any non-mental things and events; a true empiricism which recognised relations and generals as being as real (and as knowable) as the particulars related; and a conception of space and time as conditions of existence rather than of human knowledge as in Kant’s transcendental idealism. Anderson proposed to replace Hegel’s totality by developing a systematic realism which would incorporate the work of John Burnet on Greek philosophy, of Sigmund Freud on mind, of William James’ radical empiricism and of Samuel Alexander’s reworking of Kant’s transcendental aesthetic (EMP, 80). Anderson does not mention here another possible source for his direct realism, namely, Scottish common sense philosophy, but he does consider this in his Lectures on Thomas Reid of 1935 (LMP).