  Neither the theory of appropriation nor that of seeds in the mental  stream seem to offer a satisfactory account of non-mentation. The  limitations of the two views are clearly spelled out by Sthiramati  (see Ṭikā ad AKBh VIII, 33): First, in the case  of the Vaibhāṣikas, consciousness or the arising of  consciousness cannot have as its immediately antecedent and  homogeneous condition the cessation of consciousness for that  violates the causal principle itself, even assuming that body and  sensory systems provide a basis for this arising. Second, by claiming that consciousness can indeed arise from the body and its sensory  systems, the Sautrāntikas fall short of identifying the specific cause which assures (on the basis of the causal principle of the  homogeneity of the species) that consciousness arises at precisely  the right moment. Even assuming that mind and body seed each other  prior to the attainment of cessation, there is no causal mechanism to explain why a particular type of consciousness arises and not  another: in the absence of a cause that ensures the homogeneity of  the species, with just the body and its sensory systems as the basis, any type of consciousness could arise, rendering the causal process  random and arbitrary. The function of the causal principle of the  homogeneity of the species is precisely that of ensuring that, say,  when visual system and visible object come together, it is visual  consciousness rather than auditory or olfactory consciousness that  arises [for a detailed analysis of the complex issues surrounding the attainment of cessation, see Griffiths 1986, 66 and passim]. 