 The debate about whether the evaluations normally conveyed by thick terms are defeasible quickly gets complex and technical. (A fuller discussion of the defeasibility data and their explanation can be found in Väyrynen 2013: 66–95.) Sometimes the linguistic intuitions on which we rely in assessing competing explanations may also be less firm or not as widely shared as we would like. An additional complication is that some evidence about how people in fact reason with positive and negative thick terms suggests that evaluations are more easily defeasible for positive thick terms than for negative ones (Willemsen and Reuter 2020). Existing work largely assumes that positive and negative thick terms behave in largely the same ways. Asymmetrical valence effects would thus complicate matters for both Semantic and Pragmatic Views. How much they would do so depends on how deep a difference in meaning the asymmetry would reflect. Pascale Willemsen and Kevin Reuter (2020) propose that the valence effect is due to a difference in the social norms guiding positive and negative evaluative language, but the issue is under-explored. Another further issue concerns whether certain kinds of denials of T-utterances focused on the evaluations that they normally convey are better understood as instances of the truth-conditional negation that we learn about in logic classes, or of “metalinguistic” negation which targets aspects of utterances other than their truth-conditional content.