 As I have said, common sense morality seems to regard persons as having certain special obligations, in particular, special obligations to one’s friends, one’s family, those persons to whom one has made a promise, and one’s fellow citizens. As I indicated in the first section, appeal to these special obligations has often been used as a weapon against the consequentialist: persons have special obligations, consequentialism cannot accommodate such obligations, therefore consequentialism is false. As I have said, the consequentialist has attempted to show the ways in which she can justify our acting as though we have special obligations, but must deny that we actually have any non-derivative special obligations. The consequentialist can, at this point, join forces with any moral theorist who accepts natural duties while rejecting special obligations. Consequentialists and defenders of natural duties base the duties that they defend on some intrinsic feature of the state of affairs to be promoted or of the person to whom the duty is owed. They can then press the defender of special obligations to offer some account of the grounds of alleged non-derivative special obligations: why suppose that we have reasons to benefit some persons merely because of some special relationship that we stand in to those persons, our own status or position, or past actions that we have performed?