 Whereas pragmatic consequentializing and notational consequentializing will succeed only if the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory yields the same set of deontic verdicts that the target non-consequentialist theory yields, earnest consequentializing can succeed even without such perfect coextension (cf. Tenenbaum 2014: 233). After all, the success of earnest consequentializing requires only that the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory is better overall than both utilitarianism and standard versions of non-consequentialism; it doesn’t require that it can yield all the same deontic verdicts that any plausible non-consequentialist theory can. Given the earnest consequentializer’s goal of coming up with an act-consequentialist theory that is more intuitively compelling than both utilitarianism and standard versions of non-consequentialism, they eschew the Footian Procedure. For although employing the Footian Procedure ensures that the resulting act-consequentialist counterpart theory will be perfectly co-extensive with the target non-consequentialist theory, it doesn’t guarantee that it will be more intuitively compelling than that non-consequentialist theory. For it could be that the act-consequentialist would have to accept some very implausible rankings of outcomes to ensure its perfect co-extension with the target non-consequentialist theory. And, as we’ll see below, this is indeed what some philosophers have argued (e.g., Emet 2010 and C. Howard 2021).