 Field (2009b) argues for a different form of logical pluralism, one which leaves more room for normative conflict. Logical pluralism is not, for Field, the result of ambiguity in our notion of logical consequence. Rather, it has its source in non-factualism of epistemic norms. His non-factualism, in turn, is fueled partly by general concerns, partly by the nature of how we choose such norms. Among the general concerns Field (2009c) mentions are Hume-style worries about the impossibility of integrating irreducible normative facts into a naturalistic world view, Benacerraf-style worries about our ability to gain epistemic access to such facts, and Mackie-style worries about the “queerness” of such facts (i.e., that they not only appear to have no room within our scientific picture of the world, but that, furthermore, they are supposed to have a somewhat mysterious motivational pull to them). The latter issue of norm selection amounts to this. Given a set of epistemic goals, we evaluate candidate norms as better or worse depending how well they promote those goals. According to Field, we have no reason to assume that there should be a fact of the matter as to which choice of logic is the uniquely correct one; there will typically not be a unique system that best optimizes our (often competing) constraints.