 ST has a two-tier answer to the second reading of Gallagher’s challenge. First, human beings are very similar with regard to cognitive processes such as perception, theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning, etc. For example, there is a very high probability that if both you and I look at the same scene, we will have the same visual experience. This explains why, in the large majority of cases, I can reuse my visual mechanism to successfully simulate your visual experiences. Second, even though we are quite good at recognizing others’ mental states, we are nonetheless prone to egocentric errors, i.e., we tend to attribute to a target the mental state that we would undergo if we were in the target’s situation, rather than the actual mental state the target is in (Goldman 2006). A standard example is the curse of knowledge bias, where we take for granted that other people know what we know (Birch &amp; Bloom 2007). ST has a straightforward explanation of such egocentric errors (Gordon 1995; Goldman 2006): if we arrive at attributing mental states via mental simulation, the attribution accuracy will depend on our capacity to “quarantine” our genuine mental states, when they do not match the target’s, and to replace them with more appropriate simulated mental states. This “adjustment” process, however, is a demanding one, because our genuine mental states exert a powerful tendency. Thus, Gallagher is right when he says that, on some occasions, “if I project the results of my own simulation onto the other, I understand only myself in that other’s situation, but I don’t understand the other” (Gallagher 2007: 355). However, given how widespread egocentric errors are, this counts as a point in favour of ST, rather than as an argument against it (but see de Vignemont &amp; Mercier 2016, and Saxe 2005).