 Experimental results in epistemology raise metaepistemological questions. One such question concerns the extent to which facts about our patterns of using “knows” should inform epistemological theory (see  §3.2).  Another related metaepistemological question of relevance here asks what the role of intuition is in epistemological theorizing; this bears relevance to the extent that experimental results purport to be testing folk (and expert) intuitions about cases. A third metaepistemological question experimental results in epistemology encourage concerns the comparative weight we should give to folk judgments about cases. A well-known position on this question—viz., the expertise reply—(e.g., Williamson 2011; Ludwig 2007; Kauppinen 2007) maintains that philosophers’ judgments about cases will plausibly be more reliable than those of laypersons, given that the former’s training would lead them to be more sensitive to nuances of the cases assessed, as well as to be less likely to be less susceptible to irrelevant distorting effects (Egler &amp; Ross 2020: 1079). For criticism of the expertise defense, see e.g., Machery (2015) and Mizrahi (2015).