 What about additional theoretical applications of grounding? Returning to the application to physicalism discussed above, J. Wilson (2014) points out that, as there are importantly different approaches to grounding (ones disagreeing about, e.g., how grounding interacts with reduction, necessitation, and real definition—see  §4),  the bald grounding claim that the physical grounds the mental doesn’t on its own speak to even very basic characteristics of the mental-physical interface. A natural response, however, is to simply work in this context with an approach to grounding that is fleshed out to a degree that such issues aren’t left open (deRosset 2020; cf. J. Wilson 2016a). Still, questions about the theoretical utility of grounding-theoretic formulations of physicalism remain, including whether the nothing-over-and-above notion central to initial characterizations of physicalism is best captured in terms of grounding (Melnyk 2016; J. Wilson 2016b).