 Thus far, we have seen that synchronic actualist-possibilist cases suggest that, first and foremost, an agent has an obligation to perform a fully specific immediate act rather than a less-than-fully-specific immediate act. As a result, synchronic counterfactuals do not even partly determine an agent’s obligation to perform some fully specific immediate act. This still leaves open a question about the ability that an agent must possess in order to be able to perform some immediate (fully specific) act in the relevant sense. Goldman’s (1978: 195, 204–205) Ability 2, for instance, is a version of the conditional analysis of abilities. The conditional analysis of abilities remains suspect by some on the grounds that an agent does not have direct control over their desires. Given this, one may infer that facts about what an agent would do if she had different desires is irrelevant to her abilities (Lehrer 1968; Curran 1995: 82). Nevertheless, since many participants in the actualist-possibilist debate take for granted that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with facts about what an agent will do or would do under certain circumstances, a number of people have followed Goldman (1978) by taking the relevant kind of control to be one that does not hold fixed all facts about the agent’s psychological makeup. See, for instance, the views of Doug Portmore (2011) and Jacob Ross (2012).