 Tsongkhapa identifies three criteria for conventional truth. A conventional truth is what (1) is acknowledged by a conventional epistemic instrument, (2) is not undermined by another conventional epistemic instrument, and (3) is not undermined by an analysis of its ultimate nature (Tsongkhapa 2000, 627). The third criterion underscores an important point in Gelukpa philosophy: that an object’s emptiness of intrinsic existence (its ultimate status) does not undermine its status as a conventional truth. Whether or not this is successful, or if this is even possible, is a strongly debated philosophical question. The first two criteria reflect the commitment that what counts as true or real depends upon our epistemic resources, which themselves are mutually supportive, and which both support and are supported by the entities they reveal, as well as the fact that there is a difference between being correct and incorrect regarding conventional truth. Because of this commitment to a robust sense of conventional truth, their rivals in Tibet have charged the Geluk interpretation of the Middle Way with being realist (about the conventional truth) and nihilist (about the ultimate truth), or even an incoherent mixture—full of contradictions—of Dharmakīrti’s foundationalist epistemology with Candrakīrti’s antirealist ontology. The Geluk philosophy continues to be engaged in the debate about the unique role that epistemology plays within the antifoundationalist Consequence School (The Yakherds, 2021).