 But Einstein’s theories of relativity provided far more than the subject matter for these philosophical examinations. Logical empiricist philosophy of science itself was fashioned by lessons allegedly drawn from relativity theory in correcting or rebutting both neo-Kantian and Machian perspectives on general methodological and epistemological questions of science. Several of the most characteristic doctrines of logical empiricist philosophy of science—the interpretation of a priori elements in physical theories as conventions, the treatment of the necessary role of conventions in linking theoretical concepts to observation, the insistence on observational language definition of theoretical terms—were taken to have been conclusively demonstrated by Einstein in fashioning his two theories of relativity. As mentioned above, Einstein’s 1905 analysis of the conventionality of simultaneity in the special theory of relativity became a methodological paradigm for logical empiricism; it prompted Reichenbach’s own method of “logical analysis” of physical theories into subjective (definitional, conventional) and objective (empirical) components. An overriding concern in the logical empiricist treatment of relativity theory was to draw broad lessons for scientific methodology and philosophy of science generally, although issues more specific to the philosophy of physics were also addressed. Only the former are considered here; for a discussion of the latter, see Ryckman 2007.