 Exploitation therefore does not necessarily harm its victim in the sense of making her worse off than she would have been, had the exploiter never interacted with her at all. Rather, it makes its victim worse off than she should have been, had she been treated fairly. As with similar cases involving coercion, the precise details of our analysis thus depend on the relevant baseline against which we choose to compare \(B\)’s situation after the interaction. But these details probably do not matter much as far as our all-things-considered moral evaluation is concerned. Whether we choose to say that exploitation involves \(A\) making \(B\) better off, but not as much better off as \(A\) should have made \(B\); or whether we say that it involves making \(B\) worse off than \(B\) should have been, the final verdict is the same (Wertheimer 1996: 22–23).