 While these two problems might be fatal to simple teleological theories of content, it is clear that the theories which are currently at the center of discussion have ample resources to deal with them. On Neander’s causal-information theory, for example, the content of the frog’s sensory-perceptual representation is not indeterminate between there’s a small, dark, moving object, there’s a fly and there’s frog food (whether the relevant properties are locally co-instantiated or not). The reason is that the frog’s visual system was not selected for producing the relevant sensory-perceptual representation in response to objects of order Diptera (flies), or to objects with nutritional value (frog food). A frog’s visual system is not causally sensitive to an object’s nutritiousness, or to its membership in the order Diptera, and could not have been selected for a causal sensitivity it did not have (see   section 3.4).   The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for Millikan’s teleological theory, which entails that the frog’s representation has the content there’s frog food rather than there’s a fly or there’s a small, dark, moving object (see   section 3.2). 