 The rich body of theory just described has been highly controversial, both in detail and in its overall  architecture.[54]  However, the general thought that more natural properties are, ceteris paribus, easier to refer to than less natural properties can be considered separately from any program for analysing the notions of mental or linguistic content. Looking for a relatively noncommittal thesis in this vicinity, Dorr and Hawthorne  (2013)  suggest cashing out ‘easy to refer to’ in terms of a physical measure over nomic possibilities, of the sort that features in sciences like statistical mechanics (for more details see Dorr and Hawthorne  2014).  The thought is that ceteris paribus, the more natural a property is, the greater the measure of the set of nomically possible worlds where it is referred to (or where it is determinately referred to, or thought about, or something like that). For example: if there are intelligent beings elsewhere in the universe, there is a far greater chance that they have a word that means triangle than that they have a word that means three-to-five sided figure none of whose sides is more than one and half times as long as any other. This generalization is not tied up with any general theory of mental or linguistic content, although it does rest on the assumption that mental and semantic facts nomically supervene on physical  facts.[55] 