 One set of objections targets the inference from (1) to (2), arguing that even if the state benefits its subjects, it does not do so in a way that calls for gratitude (see  section 2).  Some might doubt, in the first place, whether a state, as a non-human entity, is capable of intentionally benefiting anyone. In response to this objection, A.D.M. Walker (1988) points out that we sometimes feel gratitude to schools or universities we’ve attended for what we take to have been their goodwill or benevolence toward their students. It might be doubted whether states can be the proper objects of obligations—that is, whether they are capable of having obligations owed to them. As Terrance McConnell (1993) notes, though, we seem to be able to owe obligations of repayment to corporations that have lent us money. Furthermore, the fact that institutions seem to be able to owe gratitude to individuals suggests that they should be capable of deserving it from individuals as well (McConnell 1993: 196).