 Such an interest in a deeper and richer internal psychology emerged most dramatically in the 1950s in the work of Noam Chomsky. In his (1957, 1965, 1968 [2006]) he began to revolutionize linguistics by presenting substantial evidence and arguments for the existence of an innate “generative” grammar in a special language faculty in people’s brains that he argued was responsible for their underlying competence to speak and understand natural languages. This opened up the possibility of a response to Quine’s (1960) scepticism about the analytic within his own naturalistic framework, simply freed of its odd behaviorism, which Chomsky and others had independently, empirically refuted (see Chomsky 1959, and Gleitman, Gross and Reisberg 2011, chapter 7). Some of it also dovetails nicely with ideas of Friedrich Waismann and the later Wittgenstein, as well as with important recent work on polysemy. But the program Chomsky initiated is complex, and its relation to the analytic quite controversial, and so discussion of it is relegated to the following supplement to this entry: