 Other authors have proposed more direct arguments for deriving the causal asymmetry from assumptions made in the foundations of thermodynamics, than the one developed by Albert and Loewer, arguing that we can derive the common cause principle and thereby the direction of causation directly from the assumption of initial probabilistic independence. For a large class of microscopic conditions the probabilistic independence assumption follows from the assumption of initial microscopic chaos (Horwich 1987; Papineau 1985). In particular, as Arntzenius argues, the probabilistic independence assumption will be satisfied for spatially separated microstates if we assume initial microscopic chaos (Arntzenius 1999 [2010]). There is also an active debate in the literature on how the causal and thermodynamic asymmetries relate to various epistemic asymmetries, such as an asymmetry of records or an asymmetry concerning our epistemic access to the past and to the future. For different accounts of the knowledge asymmetry and an asymmetry of records see Horwich 1987; Albert 2000, 2015; Loewer 2007; Frisch 2007, 2014; and Ismael 2016.