 If the pilot gives up the belief in F and she had been right about the evidential relation, then she will have been the victim of a misleading defeater. Misleading defeaters present well-known difficulties for a theory of justification based on the idea of defeat because Type II defeaters may be subject to further defeaters indefinitely. For example, if one had learned that the light illuminating the cloth was red via testimony, the defeat of one’s justification for believing the cloth was red would be defeated by good evidence that one’s source was a pathological liar. If we say that justified belief requires that there be no defeaters then that leads us to disqualify any case where a misleading defeater exists, and a subject will lose justification she might have had, even if the misleading defeaters are distant facts the she isn’t aware of. But if we refine the view to say that only defeaters for which no defeater exists will undermine justification then a subject will count as justified even if she ignores evidence that looks like a defeater for all she knows, because of the existence of a defeater defeater she doesn’t know about.  In general we will face the question how many and which of the existing defeater defeaters matter to whether we have a justified belief (Harman 1973; Lycan 1977).