 Some criticism addresses non-consequentialist arguments for classical-liberal feminism. These arguments say that, regardless of the consequences, women and men should be treated as self-owners with rights to property justly acquired and to freedom from coercive interference because this is what they deserve as ends in themselves, because this is what insight into natural law teaches, or because this is what their perfection requires (see  §2.5).  Critics contend that even if we concede the relevant classical-liberal premises—that women and men should be treated in ways they deserve as ends in themselves, or as natural law teaches, or in ways their perfection requires—it does not follow that the state should treat individuals merely as self-owners entitled only to property justly acquired and freedom from coercive interference. For example, egalitarian-liberal feminism suggests that treating individuals as ends in themselves requires legal measures to protect women’s personal and political autonomy—measures such as anti-discrimination law, workplace changes to accommodate caregiving responsibilities, and adequate material means (see  §1.1.4  and  §1.2.1).  Since classical-liberal feminism rejects such measures, egalitarian-liberal feminism suggests that it fails to treat women as ends in themselves. Also, that treating individuals as ends in themselves means treating them as entitled merely to protection from coercive interference is plausible only if one ignores the fact of human dependency. By the fact of human dependency is meant the fact that all human beings are utterly dependent on the caregiving of others for many years at the start of life, that many come to need the caregiving of others due to temporary or permanent disability later in life, and that many require caregiving when they become infirm at the end of life; and also, that those who provide caregiving for those who cannot care for themselves become dependent on others for support (Kittay 1995: 10). If human beings are dependent in these ways, then treating them as ends in themselves will, at least for some of the time, mean something other than merely leaving them alone. Failure to recognize this suggests that classical-liberal feminism assumes that there is a nonpolitical “realm of private life in which the reproductive and nurturant needs of human beings are taken care of” (Okin 1989: 75). Such an assumption makes it impossible to evaluate the justice of the arrangements under which caregiving is given and received and removes from our consideration the nature of obligations to, and entitlements of, members of society who require caregiving to survive and thrive. Some worry that one form of classical liberalism—libertarianism—seriously misunderstands the political relevance of caregiving because it construes one key caregiving arrangement, the parent-child relationship, as one of ownership (see Okin 1989: 80–85; see also Nozick 1974; Andersson 2007; and Jeske 1996). As Jennifer Roback Morse, herself a libertarian puts it: ”I think it is well to admit… that our inattention to family life and community responsibility has left libertarians open to the charge that we do not care very much about these matters” (Morse 2001: 28).