 Why does Kripke take the search for candidate meaning facts to fail? Recall that all my previous uses of ‘+’ are compatible with my meaning quaddition, which is what enables the sceptic to say that I meant that all along. One might complain that the challenge operates from a “ridiculous model of instruction” (1982: 15), which fails to take into account that to be a competent adder is to have internalized a general instruction or rule that is now “engraved on my mind as on a slate” and which “justifies and determines my present response” (1982: 15–16). But the sceptic will reply that the worry can be raised again with respect to the general instruction or rule, which is just as susceptible to being interpreted in a deviant way as the initial expression. Kripke then considers a variety of other candidates, which are the kernel of various philosophical theories, and argues, on behalf of the sceptic, that none of them fit the bill. Among the facts considered are my being disposed to produce the sum (1982: 22–32), my instantiating a machine whose operations embody the function of addition (1982: 32–35), the simplicity of the addition hypothesis (1982: 37–39), my having a distinctive experience “with its own special quale, known directly” through introspection (1982: 41), my having an image in mind that supposedly singles out addition (1982: 42), my being in a primitive, irreducible state of meaning addition (1982: 51–53), and my grasping an abstract entity, such as a Fregean sense, which singles out addition (1982: 53–54). None of them, Kripke argues, is successful in ruling out the skeptic’s hypothesis that I meant quaddition rather than addition.