 François Recanati (2007 and elsewhere) offers one prominent account, building on Evans (1982) and Lewis (1979). Recanati distinguishes between judgments whose contents do and do not contain an “identification component”. Here’s one way to capture the thought: When François has a de re thought about François —where the content of the judgment is, e.g., that François has a broken arm—that’s a thought with an identification component; the person represented as having a broken arm is explicitly represented, in the content of the judgment, as François. When François has a distinctively self-locating thought, the content of the judgment is something “identification free”—something corresponding to, for example, the property being in pain. In the latter case, there’s no danger of error due to misidentification, because there’s no identification-element in the judgment that can be the locus of misidentification. (See Recanati 1993 and 2007 for Recanati’s full story.)