 How then should we interpret the Second Replies passage, and how should we understand the absence of a truth condition? I suggest that the lack of a truth condition need not reflect an indifference about truth, as opposed to a view about how a concern for truth is properly expressed in an account of knowledge. We can understand Descartes as wanting a fully internalist account whereby all conditions of knowledge are accessible to the would-be knower. Putting the point another way, if the question of whether the conditions of knowledge had been met were answerable only by “God or an angel,” it would impose an unacceptably externalist element on the theory. On a justified belief rendering, his account of perfect knowledge is fully internalist; yet, with the addition of a truth condition, it is not – at least, not given a correspondence theory of truth, in the context of metaphysical realism. Importantly, then, in attributing to Descartes a justified belief account, we need not thereby attribute to him an indifference concerning truth. Rather, we can attribute to him the view that the way properly to express one’s concern for truth is by enforcing high justificatory standards. Again, from that same passage: