 In scenario 1, candidates \(A\) and \(B\) both have a plurality score of 6 while candidate \(C\) has a plurality score of 5.  So, \(A\) and \(B\) move on to the runoff election.  Assuming the voters do not change their rankings, the 5 voters that rank \(C\) transfer their support to candidate \(A\), giving her a total of 11 to win the runoff election.  However, in scenario 2, even after moving up in the rankings of the fourth group (\(A\) is now ranked first by this group), candidate \(A\) does not win this election. In fact, by trying to give more support to the winner of the election in scenario 1, rather than solidifying \(A\)’s win, the last group’s least-preferred candidate ended up winning the election! The problem arises because in scenario 2, candidates \(A\) and \(B\) are swapped in the last group’s ranking.  This means that \(A\)’s plurality score increases by 2 and \(B\)’s plurality score decreases by 2. As a consequence, \(A\) and \(C\) move on to the runoff election rather than \(A\) and \(B\).  Candidate \(C\) wins the runoff election with 9 voters that rank \(C\) above \(A\) compared to 8 voters that rank \(A\) above \(C\). 