 Having focused on the use of bargaining theory in philosophical analyses of the social contract, we will now briefly turn our attention to the relevance of evolutionary game theory to this task. Recall that evolutionary game theory is the formal approach to modeling how the distribution of traits in a population will evolve over time when those traits determine how the agents who possess them will interact. Gaus (2010) and Muldoon (2016) are two recent works that draw on informal evolutionary models in order to show how and why the terms of a social contract might evolve over time to accommodate a diverse polity. While, taking a more formal approach, Alexander (2007) explores how the equilibria that characterize prosocial norms in social networks evolve over time. It is the works of Brian Skyrms (1996 [2014], 2004), though, that have been the most influential in bringing evolutionary game theory to bear on the social contract.