 Moreover, as touched upon above in  section 2.2  and  section 2.5,  Phenomenologists go beyond mere description of the feelings or emotions as apprehending value to bring their analyses to bear on normative issues. While some, for example, Levinas, adopt a straightforward deontic approach, others who adopt an axiological approach also address the normative. Recall that for Scheler the feeling-apprehension of the ideal, a priori value motivates (in an unspecified manner) the awareness of a moral ought-to-do that will instantiate the value. Hence, we can think of such thinkers as deontologists. Others, however, who adopt a weaker version of value realism move in the direction of virtue ethics and an aretaic, rather than deontic, conception of “right” action. Husserl’s notion of “absolute loves” as generating “absolute oughts” is a case in point. The mother’s absolute love generates an “ought” in the sense that the mother feels she must do her “best” for the child. It’s the right action insofar as it is the best action available rather than a deontic demand. Drummond (2006, 2010), while claiming that respect imposes obligations upon an agent, nevertheless locates respect within a eudaimonistic, virtue framework, and Irene McMullin (2019) develops an account of the virtues that incorporates first-person, second-person, and third-person perspectives.