 P is a claim about what exists (what there is), absolutely and unrestrictedly. As a description of presentism, it’s both mainstream and minimal. That is, many would accept P, or its logical equivalents, as a statement of presentism (e.g., Hinchliff 1996: 123; Crisp 2004: 15; Hawley 2014: 48; Emery 2019: 963), but they would acknowledge that more needs to be said to articulate a complete theory. To flesh out the ontological thesis, P is often contrasted with two other ontological theses: an opposing view of time, eternalism (“past, present, and future things exist”), and an analogical view in modality, actualism (“only actual things exist”) (see, e.g., Adams 1986: 321; Hinchliff 1996: 123–4; Sider 1999: 326, 2001: 11–12; Noonan 2013: 219–20, 2019: 490–3). Theodore Sider, for instance, neatly articulates this apparent mainstream characterisation: