 However, since the late 1980s philosophers working on Kant have become increasingly interested in the notion of judgment in the third Critique. One way in which this interest has been pursued is through an exploration of the relation of Kant’s notion of judgment in the third Critique to his account of cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Logic. Longuenesse (1993 [1998]) maintains that there is a close connection between the “capacity to judge” [Vermögen zu urteilen] in that work and the faculty of judgment in the Critique of Judgment, a connection which she summarizes by describing the faculty of judgment as the “actualization” of the capacity to judge in relation to sensory perceptions (1993 [1998: 8]). According to Longuenesse, the activity of reflective judgment corresponds to the “comparison, reflection and abstraction” which Kant describes in the Logic (§6, 9:94–95) as responsible for the formation of empirical concepts, and which she understands as, in turn, a necessary condition of the application of the pure concepts of understanding to the manifold of sensible intuition (1993 [1998: 163–166 and 195–197]). Longuenesse’s view on this point is endorsed and elaborated in Allison 2001: ch. 1.