 His fundamental break with Aristotelianism, however, resulted from his rejection of the view that distributive justice distinctly aims at proportional allocation. For Suárez, the types of justice should be distinguished by the type of right which they oversee rather than by the ideal distributional pattern at which they should aim. Distributive justice oversees a right to the thing, rather than a right in the thing (a ius ad rem rather than a ius in rem). The ius ad rem was usefully defined by Austin as “a right of compelling you to pass me a right in rem” (Austin, 1869: 993). Unlike infringements of iura in rem, those of iura ad rem do not call for restitution. For example, if in a competition for public office, the best candidate is not chosen, he has an actionable claim against the appointment committee, but he cannot say that he has been deprived of something that was his.