 Rational Reflection (Elga 2013) maintains the idea that my degree of belief in q should be in line with that I think the maximally rational subject would have in my situation, but also highlights the fact that my determining what this value is depends on my identifying which probability function is the maximally rational one to have. I can be coherent while being uncertain about that, and there are cases where that seems like the most rational option. This by itself is not a problem because RR is consistent with using an expected value for the ideal subject, a weighted average of the values for q of the subjects I think might be the maximally rational subject. But it is not only I who may be uncertain about who the maximally rational subject is. Arguably the maximally rational subject herself may be uncertain that she is—after all, this is a contingent fact, and one might think that anyone’s confidence in it should depend on empirical evidence (Elga 2013).