 There are philosophical issues, independent of the cognitive unison theory, about the way in which partial or divided attention relates to full attention, and about whether a distinction should be drawn between the attention that is given to things by which we are merely distracted and the attention that is given to things on which we remain concertedly focused. Aaron Henry considers these questions as part of a more general enquiry into attention and control, using the notion of constitutive norms to provide an account in which distraction always does involve a certain sort of shortcoming, while nonetheless qualifying as a case of genuine attention, rather than merely being a defective approximation of it (Henry, 2019). Zachary Irving has suggested that the wandering of a distracted mind presents philosophical puzzles of its own, and has worked towards giving an empirically-informed account of mind-wandering that avoids these puzzles. His account takes such wandering to be attentive but unguided (Irving, 2016). Theories such as the Cognitive Unison Theory, in which attention essentially depends on the performance of an understanding-guided task, will need to find some alternative account of the phenomena that Irving identifies.