 A second criticism dismisses the formal-syntactic picture as speculation ungrounded in scientific practice. Tyler Burge (2010a,b, 2013: 479–480) contends that formal syntactic description of mental activity plays no significant role within large areas of cognitive science, including the study of theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning, and perception. In each case, Burge argues, the science employs intentional description rather than formal syntactic description. For example, perceptual psychology individuates perceptual states not through formal syntactic properties but through representational relations to distal shapes, sizes, colors, and so on. To understand this criticism, we must distinguish formal syntactic description and neurophysiological description. Everyone agrees that a complete scientific psychology will assign prime importance to neurophysiological description. However, neurophysiological description is distinct from formal syntactic description, because formal syntactic description is supposed to be multiply realizable in the neurophysiological. The issue here is whether scientific psychology should supplement intentional descriptions and neurophysiological descriptions with multiply realizable, non-intentional formal syntactic descriptions.