 A further approach to this underdetermination is to reject both packages and seek a third way. Thus Morganti has argued that both of the above metaphysical packages assume that everything qualitative about an object must be encoded in terms of a property that it possesses (Morganti 2009). Dropping this assumption allows us to consider quantum statistics as describing ‘inherent’ properties of the assembly as a whole. The (anti-)symmetry of the relevant states is then accounted for in terms of the disposition of the system to give rise to certain correlated outcomes upon measurement. This is presented as an extension of Teller’s ‘relational holism’ (Teller 1989), and relatedly, the notion of ‘inherence’ involves the denial of the supervenience of the properties of the whole on those of the parts.  However, as just indicated, it comes with a cost: that of admitting holistic dispositional properties and the metaphysics of these in the quantum context requires further development, as does the sense in which such inherent properties ‘emerge’ when systems interact. Earlier and along similar metaphysical lines, Lavine suggested that quantum objects can be regarded as the smallest possible amounts of ‘stuff’ and, crucially, that a multi-particle state represents a further amount of stuff such that it does not contain proper parts (1991; see also Jantzen 2019). Such a view, he claims, avoids the metaphysically problematic aspects of both the individuals and non-individuals packages. Of course, there are then the issues of the metaphysics and logic of ‘stuff’, but it can be argued that these are familiar and not peculiar to quantum mechanics. One such issue concerns the nature of ‘stuff’: is it our familiar primitive substance?  Substance as a fundamental metaphysical primitive faces well-known difficulties and it has been suggested that it should be dropped in favour of some form of ‘bundle theory’, as mentioned at the very beginning of this article. If the individual objects are understood to be bundles of ‘tropes’, where a trope is an individual instance of a property or a relation, and if this notion is broadened to include individuals whose existence depends on that of others which are not a part of them then, it is claimed, this notion may be flexible enough to accommodate quantum physics (Simons 1998; see also Morganti 2013). Another issue concerns the manner in which ‘stuff’ combines: how do we go from the amounts of stuff represented by two independent photons, to the amount represented by a joint two-photon state? The analogies Lavine gives are well known: drops of water, money in the bank, bumps on a rope (Teller 1983; Hesse 1963). Of course, these may also be appropriated by the non-individual objects view but, more significantly, they are suggestive of a field-theoretic approach in which the ‘stuff’ in question is the quantum field. 