 The first apparent contradiction arises because Arnauld maintains that we directly perceive extended objects and yet that we do so by means of ideas in our mind. The solution is that the perception, e.g., of the sun, is a real mode of thinking which essentially makes the sun present to the mind, and in virtue of which the sun deserves the extrinsic denomination ‘idea of the sun’ (p. 22). The second apparent contradiction arises from the Port-Royal theory of language. According to the Logic, language consists of sounds and visible characters which are signs of ideas. But signs are representations and “representing is not a mode of extension and therefore cannot modify an extended object such as a sound [or] a written word” (p. 19). The solution is that the idea which a word signifies “is connected to [the sign] only by a habit,” the habit, namely “of conceiving of a certain object whenever [the mind] perceives the symbol.” Consequently “the object is entitled to the name ‘sign’ on account of the state of some mind or minds. In other words, ‘sign’ is applied to the object by extrinsic denomination” (p. 19–20). The third apparent contradiction arises in Arnauld’s rejection of Malebranche’s position that “the soul actually becomes red, blue or yellow [and] when one smells a carcass the soul becomes formally putrid.” Arnauld agrees that colors and smells are modifications of the mind and not of extension. But this does not imply, Arnauld says, that “our soul should be called either ‘green’, or ‘yellow’, or ‘putrid’” (p. 23). Arnauld adds, “There are infinitely many names which suppose no modification in the thing to which they are given” (quoted by Pearce on p. 23 from Arnauld’s Ideas ). Pearce comments, “The application of a name that ‘supposes no modification in the thing to which [it is] given’ is extrinsic denomination.”