 To accommodate this sort of intuitions, some authors have proposed context-sensitive versions of  (JNA).  Gerken (2012, 2014, 2017) says that an assertion must be based “on a degree of discursive justification for believing that p that is adequate” relative to the conversational context. He also argues that the notion of justification is best understood in internalist terms: a speaker asserting p is justified only if they would be able to consciously articulate their reasons in support of p. McKinnon (2013, 2015) also defends a version of  (JNA)  that is context-sensitive. She argues that one may assert that p only if (i) the speaker has supportive reasons for p, and (ii) the relevant conventional and pragmatic elements of the context of assertion are present. On this view, the pragmatic features of the context have an effect on which epistemic support is needed. Pragmatic features can regard the stakes involved (how much depends practically on the truth of what is asserted) or pedagogical requirements (in case the speaker is a teacher who is required to teach what is rational to believe; McKinnon 2015: Section 4.4).