 It is somewhat difficult to distinguish the Mohists’ logical insights from their views on language in part because they made no attempt at investigating formal logic independently of their interests in analyzing the semantics of the terms of language (ming, or “names”). They developed a clear theory of inference, and supported this theory with versions of basic principles we would recognize today as central to the study of logic, but argued that the rules governing inference are partly determined by the semantics of individual terms and terms in combination, as opposed to rules merely operating on an argument’s logical form. It is also difficult to distinguish the Mohists’ attempts at offering a descriptive account of the content and function of language from their normative views about the roles names should be expected to play if they are to contribute to the elevation of human character and proper conduct in society. These normative views were held more broadly in early China, and they are especially clear in the writings of Xunzi, a Confucian scholar of the late Warring States period who attempted to assimilate the key insights of the Mohists on language and logic into a general Confucian theory of ethics (Lin 2011). In Book 22 of the Xunzi (“Correct Naming”), he explains: