 Lange (2007) starts his account of disease from a similar impulse, insisting that diseases play an absolutely essential role in explaining a patient’s symptoms. He argues that this explanatory role is characteristic of natural kinds elsewhere in science, and warrants thinking of diseases as natural kinds. Lange views diseases as natural kinds of incapacities. Stegenga (2018, ch.2.5), discussing Lange’s urging that we dissolve broader disease categories in favour of finer-grained biological descriptions, argues that we should see this as an eliminativist position, since it dispenses with the concept of disease altogether and replaces it with diverse successor concepts. Any theory of disease could advocate for descriptions at finer grains, while retaining a broad category, as Stegenga says, for education and public communication even if it has no real scientific application. The extent to which we should see a theoretical reform as eliminativist or merely very revisionist is hard to answer. In both cases we might secure an epistemic advance, but one might worry that our new vocabularies will deprive people of their ability to understand themselves by replacing a familiar vocabulary with a remote, scientific one tailored to the demands of experts. 