Truth-relativism with respect to utterances in area of discourse D is the claim that, following MacFarlane’s notable version of the view: the truth of S’s D-utterance u depends (in part) on a context of assessment; that is (and in short) what S asserts, u, gets a truth value—according to the truth-relativist’s D-semantics—only once the D-standard of the assessor is specified. Independent of the specification of such a standard, S’s u assertion lacks a truth-value much as, by comparison, indexical expressions such as “The barn is nearby” do not get a truth-value independent of contextual facts about the context of use (i.e. the context in which the utterance is made). And, as a further point of clarification here: while the contextualist can, no less than the relativist, recognize a “standards” or “judge” parameter, for the contextualist, its value will be supplied by the context of use, whereas the relativist takes it to be supplied completely independently of the context of use, by the context of evaluation (or, as MacFarlane calls it, the context of assessment).