 It is perhaps no accident that similar ambiguities are displayed in Western forms of consequentialism. There are very demanding forms of consequentialism, exemplified by Peter Singer’s argument for strong duties to contribute to famine relief (Singer, 1972). These forms typically focus on the good an individual could do on their own, regardless of whether others act similarly. When combined with the idea that others are no less morally important than oneself, these forms tend to justify very strong duties on the part of those with relatively plentiful resources to aid others. On the other hand, there are forms of consequentialism that construe the individual’s duties in terms of a generally applicable set of norms, the desirability of which is determined by the consequences of everyone or nearly everyone accepting them. Such forms of consequentialism, (e.g., for rule consequentialism, see Hooker 2000), tend to confirm more modest demands on the individual to aid others. Consequentialism may tend to oscillate between the pole of doing’s best in directly acting on equal concern for all others on the one hand and on the other hand acknowledging both practical and psychological limitations on the ability of (at least) most people to do so.