Finally, Hedda Hassel Mørch (2020a,b) has identified and reformulated an argument for panpsychism from the experience of causation. Hume famously argued that we do not experience the necessary connection between cause and effect. Mørch argues, contra Hume, that attention to experience does reveal a necessary connection between mental events of feeling pain and of trying to avoid, and uses this as the basis for an argument to panpsychism. William James (1911: 218) gives the gist of the argument as follows ‘… the concrete perceptual flux, taken just as it comes, offers in our own activity-situations perfectly comprehensible instances of causal agency … If we took these experiences as the type of what actual causation is, we should have to ascribe to cases of causation outside of our life, to physical cases also, an inwardly experiential nature. In other words, we should have to espouse a so-called “pan-psychic” philosophy.’ More generally Mørch (2020a,b,c) is a leading advocate of the ‘phenomenal powers view’, according to which conscious states necessitate their effects in virtue of how they feel.