 Averroes undertakes to defend positions closer to Aristotle against “innovations” by later Aristotelians. These innovations include al-Fārābī’s and Avicenna’s emanationist accounts of creation. While Averroes accepts emanation in his early writings, he denounces it with vigor in his mature works (Averroes MTE; Genequand 1984; Davidson 1992). He argues that God’s existence can be satisfactorily shown only via a proof from motion (Davidson 1987: 311–335; Twetten 1995; Kukkonen 2002). He also argues that, strictly speaking, God is not a creator: his causality is that of an ultimate final cause of motion. This is suggested in the Incoherence of the Incoherence, where he claims that God is an agent by way of final causality (Averroes ITI: 138). It is perhaps mostly plainly stated in his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lam (Genequand 1984). From this position, it follows that certain aspects of Avicenna’s accounts of the efficient cause are otiose: there is no need to revise Aristotle’s account of the efficient cause to encompass creative agents.