 We acknowledge our fallibility in science, it may be urged, because we are convinced that the universe, as studied by science, is in some sense “out there” to be described. … When we express beliefs about these facts, then, we are very far from being non-objective painters, who are free to make such designs as they will. Instead, we are realistic painters, intent on being faithful to what we are representing. Now it is our attempt to be faithful to the facts of the universe, it may be urged, that leads us to acknowledge our scientific fallibility. The facts may belie our beliefs, just as the objects that a realistic painter is painting may belie his picture. … But in ethics, the objection continues, so long as that discipline is conceived as involving an expression of attitudes, we have no such situation. We of necessity become non-objective painters rather than realistic painters, for we find nothing “out there” for our attitudes to represent. … And why, it may be asked, so long as we accept this conception of ethics, should we have any incentive to acknowledge our fallibility? (1968, 211–212)