 But even lacking a precise treatment for a predicative language, we can see that distinct, logically atomic necessarily true or false contents may be difficult to tell apart. Take “Mike is Mike”, \(m = m\), and “Mike is Jack the Ripper”, \(m = j\), which differ in informativeness. Given that Mike is Jack and the necessity of identity, \(|m = m| = |m = j| = W\); but also the subject matters will coincide: what makes both claims true is a fact about Mike, Mike’s being Mike. Nothing makes either false. “Hobbes squared the circle”, \(Sh\), and “Daniel Nolan squared the circle”, \(Sd\), concern different issues: one is about Hobbes’ mathematical (non)achievements, the other is about Daniel’s. But \(|Sh| = |Sd| = \emptyset\), and there’s no way to get truth/falsemakers as sets of possible worlds that will make \(s(Sh)\) and \(s(Sd)\) differ: no matter how one splits and groups possible worlds into sets, there will be no worlds available where Hobbes squares the circle or where Nolan does to begin with.