 Carrie Figdor (2010) challenges criticisms of multiple realization that appeal to neuroscience, citing explicitly the works discussed in  section 2.3  and  section 2.7  above. She undertakes to demonstrate not only the empirical plausibility of mind-brain multiple realization, but also to clarify the terms of the empirically-focused debate. Her scientific focus is on “localizationism”, especially the “brain mapping projects” using state-of-the-art functional neuroimaging (2010: 420). Concerning the terms of the empirically-focused debate, Figdor argues that none of the multiple realization hypotheses common to the philosophical literature is appropriate to this scientific endeavor. Instead she appeals to “degeneracy”, a concept from general biology meaning “the ability of elements that are structurally different to perform the same function or yield the same output”, a characteristic of complexity ranging from the genetic code to immune systems to populations (e.g., Edelman and Gally 2001). This is the notion, Figdor claims, that has been co-opted by cognitive neuroscientists to mean 