 William of Champeaux (c. 1070–1122) dealt with an argument against the compatibility between contingency and divine omniscience which was discussed in Augustine’s City of God (V.9). In response to Cicero’s De fato and De divinatione, Augustine refuted the claim that if events can happen in any way other than God has foreseen, then God can be in error. William stated that the antecedent of the argument is true but the consequent is false and therefore the consequence is not valid (Lottin 1959: 195; Marenbon 1997: 226–227). Peter Abelard (1079–1142/4), in discussing the same example, applied the systematic division between modal statements de sensu or in the compounded sense and modal statements de re or in the divided sense. (For Abelard’s modal terminology, see Glossae super Peri hermeneias XII.3–46. Later authors used the expression de dicto instead of de sensu.) Abelard’s analysis of Cicero’s argument was often repeated in medieval theology, since it was put forward in slightly modified form in Peter Lombard’s Sententiae (c. 1157), which became the standard medieval introduction to theology. Abelard states that when the proposition “A thing can be otherwise than God knows it to be” is read as a modal proposition de sensu (It is possible that a thing is otherwise than God knows it to be), the antecedent is false and the possibility of God’s error as a consequent would not be justified even if the consequence were valid. When the antecedent is read de re (A thing that is now somehow could be otherwise than God knows it to be), the proposition is true, but the consequent about God’s error is false, for if things were otherwise, God would know as they would be. This shows that the consequence is not well formulated. Following Abelard, Peter Lombard formulated the same view in stating that “Things cannot be other than as God foreknows them” is true in the compounded sense and false in the divided sense. The truth of the compounded sense saves God’s infallibility and the falsity of the divided sense expresses God’s freedom and the metaphysical contingency of the future (Peter Lombard, Sententiae I.38.2; Peter Abelard, Glossae super Peri hermeneias IX.86–99; Dialectica, 217.27–219.24). It is assumed here that when a temporally definite statement is true, its denial may be possibly true. 