 Dunlop is absolutely correct in saying that this is not Poincaré’s view. Rather, he says that we need arithmetic and further things in order to work in geometry. All that we take Poincaré to be saying is that we still need to add, subtract, multiply, and divide when we are doing geometry, but we will be doing more than what we do in arithmetic. The reason that we need a theory of magnitude before we can do geometry is because we measure things. The reason we need geometry in classical mechanics is because we are doing things like tracking the elliptical orbits of the planets. Thus, we also agree with Dunlop when she says that “Poincaré’s views of arithmetic and geometry cannot be reconciled by supposing geometry to be founded on arithmetical operations or principles” (Dunlop 2016, 306). We need arithmetic, plus group theory, plus the conventions in order to have metric geometry. There may be some authors who made reductionist claims, but it is not what we take from Friedman’s original presentation. Furthermore, the reductionist interpretation cannot be right when we get to the physical sciences, where there is clearly more content in the higher-level sciences—empirical content that could not possibly be reduced to mathematics.