 There are various ways to distinguish disabilities, on the one hand, from neutral characteristics like race and sex, on the other. The distinction can be easily made on a maximalist view of well-being which holds that life is presumptively better with more valuable capacities. In contrast to race and sex, disabilities, by definition, involve fewer valuable capacities, so they presumptively make life go worse. It is simply better to have more senses, more intelligence, and a greater range of motion, even if they do not make one happier, have limited practical value, and do not advance one’s specific projects. This view regards standard disabilities as among the most salient limitations to which humanity is subject. Less is always worse, although how much worse will depend on contingent circumstances. But many philosophers reject maximalism, in part because they balk at the implication that we should strive to acquire, and bear children who will possess, the greatest number and range of possible capacities. 