 Frankfurt’s coherentist interpretation is at odds with a number of textual and doctrinal considerations. Descartes writes to Mersenne that “the word ‘truth’, in the strict sense, denotes the conformity of thought with its object” (16 Oct 1639, AT 2:597, CSMK 139). The suggestion here is of some version of a correspondence theory. Also, on the most straightforward reading of the epistemic moves in the Meditations, Descartes is presupposing that at least some truths involve extramental metaphysical relations. Consider that Evil Genius Doubt is, fundamentally, a worry not about whether our various clear and distinct judgments cohere, but about whether they accurately represent an extramental reality – i.e., a doubt about “whether things do in reality correspond to our perception of them” (Replies 4, AT 7:226, CSM 2:159). Interestingly, Frankfurt himself came to renounce the interpretation: