 Loyalty is generally seen as involving particularistic, or special, obligations to the individual or groups to whom one is loyal and thus as a particularistic virtue (as contrasted with, say, the virtue of honesty, which is to be exercized toward all). Although Royce elevated “loyalty to loyalty” into a universalistic principle, there has been much debate concerning the relation between particularistic obligations, such as those associated with loyalty and gratitude (McConnell, 1983), and universalistic, or general, obligations owed to all by virtue of their humanity. Are particularistic obligations subsumable under universalistic ones or are they independently derived? If the latter, do they stand in permanent tension (obligations to the poor vs. obligations to one’s children)? How, if at all, are conflicts to be resolved? The discussion has its modern roots in Enlightenment ideas of equal respect and of what is therefore owed to all by virtue of their common humanity. Both consequentialism and Kantian universalism have some difficulty in accommodating virtues such as loyalty, and on occasion have eschewed the latter. As the consequentialist William Godwin notoriously asked: “What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my,’ that should justify us in overturning the decisions of impartial truth?” (Godwin, 1946, vol. 1, 127).