‘Abd al-Latif maintains that the action of God’s providence expresses itself both in the superior and in the inferior world; but if in the first case the relationship between divine providence and the superior world is immediate, in the second case it is mediated by the superior world. The relationship between divine providence and those who receive it, however, cannot be thought of as a causal relationship, since in this case “the noble would come into being because of the ignoble and the earlier because of the later” (Rosenthal 1975: 156), which is shameful, nor can this relationship be thought as purely accidental. Both situations are unsuitable for the First Principle, which cannot therefore exercise providence as its primary action, but cannot either be considered as that from which providence derives accidentally. ‘Abd al-Latif then affirms that the existence and the order of things derive from the existence of God, who is absolute good and returns to the image of fire which warms everything: God concedes to all existing things as much good as they, for their proximity to him, are able to receive. The bodies of the sublunary world are able to enjoy the potency which emanates from God and so they tend to move towards him. Among the existing things of the sublunary world, man has been given the capacity for reason, due to which he can carry out those actions that lead him to acquire the happiness appropriate to him. The same rational capacity allows him to know divine things and, in virtue of this knowledge, man is superior to all other things that come to being and pass away. At times, however, he uses this rational capacity to obtain, not the good and virtues, but vices. This can happen because providence allows man the capacity to be able to acquire virtues, but the success of this enterprise lies in the will and in the choice made by man himself.