 Second, it is a substantive question what constitutes an experiential way of having content. Tye (1995, 2000) has proposed that what makes a state have a content in the experiential way is that it has a certain functional role: it is ‘poised’ for a certain kind of use in the cognitive system; and in addition it has non-conceptual content (see  Section 6.2)  and is not individuated by any objects that it may represent. Another option is that what makes a state have content in an experiential way is that it has the appropriate sort of phenomenology (see Chalmers 2004). A third option is that the experiential way of entertaining content overlaps with the belief way of entertaining it—whatever exactly that is. This last option seems to underlie a very influential idea developed in Armstrong and Pitcher’s proposals, that experiences are belief-like in an important way. (Cf. Pendelbury’s discussion of sensuous belief in his 1986; Heck’s discussion of ‘assertoric force’ in his 2000; Martin’s discussion of ‘coerciveness’ in his 2002). These options are not exclusive.