 Constitution is identity, absolute identity. The relation between the piece of clay \(c\) and the statue \(s_1\) on day 1 is one of absolute identity. So we have that \(c = s_1\) on day 1, and for the same reason, \(c = s_2\) on day 2. Furthermore, since \(s_1\) and \(s_2\) are different statues, it follows (on the weak view) that \(s_1\ne s_2\). In addition, the piece of clay \(c\) constituting \(s_1\) on day 1 is (relatively) the same piece of clay as the piece of clay constituting \(s_2\) on day 2. (The identity is relative because we have distinct objects — the two statues — that are the same piece of clay.) It follows that no name of the piece of clay c can be a rigid designator in the standard sense. That is, no name of \(c\) denotes absolutely the same thing on day 1 and on day 2. For on day 1, a name of the piece of clay \(c\) would denote \(s_1\) and on day 2, it would denote \(s_2\), and \(s_1\) and \(s_2\) are absolutely distinct. Nevertheless, a name of the piece of clay may be relatively rigid: it may denote at each time the same piece of clay. Although no name of the piece of clay \(c\) is absolutely rigid, that does not prevent the introduction of a name of \(c\) that denotes \(c\) at any time (or possible world). (Kraut 1980 discusses a related notion of relative rigidity.)