 No naturalistic theory of content at this time yet makes perfectly clear how we think about democracy, virtue, quarks or even carburetors, and so this is not a problem that is peculiar to teleofunctional theories. However, it is sometimes argued that teleological theories of content have a special problem in this respect (e.g., by Peacocke 1992). The thought is that they may have some hope of working for contents that concern things that impact on fitness – food, shelter, mates, etc. – but that they are, in principle, unable to deal with contents that cannot have impacted on fitness, or not in any suitably selective way. Some contents cannot have impacted on fitness because they belong to the future or are non-existent. Others cannot affect fitness in any suitably selective way because, although they have an impact, their impact is too non-specific: for example, quarks have an impact but because they are omnipresent in our environment they cannot qualify as the content of a representation by virtue of some simple selectional story.