 A straightforward moral argument says it’s not fair to praise or blame a person for doing something that was, for her, unavoidable (for discussion see, e.g., Glover 1970: 70–3; Watson 1996; Nelkin 2011: ch. 2). A responsible agent is a proper target of the reactive attitudes, and unfairly or unjustly blaming someone, however expedient, would not be morally proper. One challenge for this defense of PAP is that fairness is itself entangled with the reactive attitudes (P. F. Strawson 1962; cp. Wallace 1994: 4.3). Thus, those who wonder whether praise and blame require alternatives are unlikely to be persuaded by the claim that fair targeting by the reactive attitudes requires alternatives—at least not without further argument. Someone questioning PAP, that is, is unlikely to be swayed by a moral appeal that seems only to reassert the principle.