 Like Cleanthes in Hume’s Dialogues, Price holds that belief in a Designer is immediate and irresistible. “This visible universe … is self-evidently, an exhibition of the power and wisdom of a powerful and wise cause” (R 285) But what of his moral qualities? Although in his introduction to the “Dissertation”, Price claims that a posteriori arguments also show the Designer to be good, in Chapter X of the Review, Price strikes a cautious note. There may be much more of good than bad in the works of that Designer, but we might wonder whether that is sufficient grounds for drawing conclusions about the Designer’s moral character. For a malicious being could produce happiness, and perhaps the Designer grants us happiness now only to frustrate our expectations in order to increase our misery later by contrast to our present state. Price himself thinks that, despite such possibilities, we are justified in inferring God’s goodness from his creation but accepts that such inferences are open to cavil. However, as a moral realist, Price does not need to rely on arguments from the distribution of good and bad things in the world. For if benevolence is, in itself better than malice, justice than injustice, and so on, and if an intelligent mind must both recognize and be guided by these thoughts, then we can know a priori that God is morally perfect.