 There are two distinctive features of Gillett’s account. As noted, the account ascribes fundamentally novel properties not to the bearer of the emergent property, but to the bearer’s components. Second, a realized structural property of the whole is nonetheless said to be the emergent property in virtue of its “nonproductively determining” the components’ coming to have those novel powers. It is tempting to think of this last as also ascribing a novel (albeit non-productive) power to the emergent property, although Gillett does not describe it in these terms. Note that Gillett’s account does not squarely fit the strong emergence classification given in this entry, insofar as he takes strongly emergent properties to be “realized by” lower-level properties, when standing in a complex relation; nonetheless, the account properly belongs to the present strong emergent classification to the extent that it is inconsistent with the causal closure of the microphysical realm.