 Given this putative tension between the attractiveness of act-consequentialism and the unattractiveness of its archetype’s implications, a potentially promising research project is to come up with a version of act-consequentialism that avoids utilitarianism’s counterintuitive implications. Given that many standard versions of non-consequentialism (including standard versions of Kantianism, virtue ethics, and theological voluntarism) avoid many, if not all, of utilitarianism’s counterintuitive implications, we could do this by constructing a ranking of outcomes that, when combined with act-consequentialism, yields the same (or nearly the same) deontic verdicts that one of these non-consequentialist theories delivers. This is to consequentialize that non-consequentialist theory. (Note that deontic verdicts are verdicts such as “right”, “obligatory”, “permissible”, “supererogatory”, “ought to be performed”, etc. Unlike evaluative verdicts such as “good” and “better”, which are directly normative only for what we should desire/prefer, deontic verdicts are also directly normative prospectively for what we should do/intend and retrospectively for whom we should blame/praise.)