 Perhaps paradoxically, given what was just said, the counterexample also illustrates a more important claim, that a speaker’s intention that ‘S’ mean m is a criterion for its meaning m, or at least very nearly so. This is because: (1) linguistic convention is a criterion for token sentence meaning, and a linguistic convention, as the example shows, is a function of overall community understanding, treatment, and belief. (2) A speaker’s intention is one component in such understanding, treatment, and belief, and thus is criterial for linguistic convention. In other words, since a speaker of a language is a member of the linguistic community in which he speaks, and since, as Beardsley himself holds, an intention that ‘S’ means m involves a belief that ‘S’ means m, the speaker’s intention figures into the overall function that determines the creation or maintenance of a convention. (3) The relation “is criterial for” is transitive, or at least very nearly so. If X’s being criterial for Y and Y’s being criterial for Z doesn’t entail that X is criterial for Z, it still lends some near criterial support for Z. More briefly but slightly inaccurately, the argument is that since a speaker’s intention that ‘S’ means m is criterial for the existence of a convention that ‘S’ means m, and the existence of a convention that ‘S’ means m is criterial for ‘S’’s meaning m, a speaker’s intention that ‘S’ means m is criterial for ‘S’ meaning m. A speaker’s intention must thus be regarded as having some evidential weight in determining his sentence’s meaning. As far as everyday discourse is concerned, then, the intentional fallacy is no fallacy at all, strictly speaking.