 Another view has it that type causal relations are more fundamental than token causal relations; what makes it the case that Chris’s smoking caused his cancer is, at least in part, that smoking causes cancer, Chris smoked, and he got cancer. This kind of view is defended by theorists like Hume (1739–40, 1748), Mill (1843), J. L. Mackie (1965), Hempel (1965), and Davidson (1967). These theorists begin by giving an analysis of causal relations between types of events, facts, or what-have-you. For instance: Hume says that what it is for the type C to cause the type E is for things of type C to be constantly conjoined with things of type E. This general regularity is then used to explain why it is that any particular thing of type C is a token cause of any particular thing of type E. Subsequent regularity and “covering law” theories add additional bells and whistles; but they retain the idea that a token causal relation between c and e holds in virtue of some broader regularity or law which subsumes the particular relationship between c and e.