 However, even granting the main elements of the swamping argument, there are moves that the reliabilist can make in response (see, e.g., Goldman &amp; Olsson 2009; Olsson 2011; Bates 2013; Roush 2010; cf. Brown 2012; Davis, &amp; Jäger 2012; Hovarth 2009; Piller 2009). For example, it is surely open to the reliabilist to argue that the greater instrumental value of reliable true belief over mere true belief does not need to be understood purely in terms of instrumental value relative to the good of true belief. There could, for instance, be all sorts of practical benefits of having a reliable true belief which generate instrumental value. Indeed, it is worth noting that the line of response to the Meno problem sketched by Plato, which we noted above, seems to specifically appeal to the greater practical instrumental value of knowledge over mere true belief.