 In the Fourth Moment of the Analytic of the Beautiful, at §20, Kant claims that judgments of taste rely on a “subjective principle” which “determines only by feeling rather than concepts”, and that such a principle must be regarded as a “common sense” (sensus communis) (§20, 238). He goes on at §21, in an argument often regarded as anticipating the Deduction of Taste at §38, to argue that we must assume a “common sense” as a condition of the universal communicability of cognition. But in order to make sense of the argument, we must be able to understand Kant’s notion of a “common sense”, and this proves to be challenging. In particular, if the common sense introduced at §20 is a principle for judging by feeling, then—assuming, with most commentators, that what Kant means by “feeling” is the feeling of pleasure—it seems implausible to suppose that it is a condition for claiming the universal communicability or universal validity of our cognitive judgments. For it seems that we do not need to feel pleasure in order to determine, in the case of a cognitive judgment, whether it is one that everyone else should share. This raises the question whether the notion of “common sense”—to which Kant also returns in §40—is in fact univocal, or whether, as proposed by Allison (2001: 153–154), there are two different species of common sense: one required for the universal communicability of judgments of beauty, and one required for the universal communicability of cognition.