 Are sounds properties or individuals? Among both proximal and distal theories, disagreement exists concerning the ontological category to which sounds belong. Philosophers traditionally have understood sounds as properties—either as sensible or secondary qualities, or as the categorical or physical properties that ground powers to affect subjects. Commonly, sounds are attributed to the medium that intervenes between sources and perceivers. More recently, however, some distal theorists have argued that sounds are properties of what we ordinarily understand as sound sources—bells and whistles have or possess rather than make or produce sounds. Pasnau (1999), for instance, claims that sounds are transient properties that are identical with or supervene upon vibrations of objects. Kulvicki (2008) argues against transience in an attempt to subsume sounds to the model of colors, and claims that sounds are persistent, stable dispositional properties of objects to vibrate in response to being “thwacked”. He distinguishes “having” a stable sound from “making” a sound on some occasion (manifesting the stable disposition). This account implies that sounds sometimes make sounds they do not have, and that they have sounds when silent. One also might ask whether events such as collisions and strummings, rather than objects, bear sounds. Leddington (2019) recently has defended such an account.