 The added phrase stresses that the essentialist thinks that it at least makes sense to ask of an object (“in itself”) whether it must have a particular property. Skeptics about essentialism have doubted the very intelligibility of such a question. Here is one prominent thought behind such anti-essentialism. (See Quine 1960, pp. 195–200.) Since it is necessary that seven plus two is greater than seven, when the number nine is referred to as ‘seven plus two’ it is essentially greater than seven. But, since it is not necessary that the number of planets is greater than seven, when the number nine is referred to as ‘the number of planets’ it is not essentially greater than seven. The point is supposed to be that it makes no sense to say of the number nine, independently of any way of referring to it, that it is or is not essentially greater than seven. Similarly, an anti-essentialist might say that when a person who is both a mathematician and a cyclist is thought of as a mathematician, being rational is essential to him, while being two-legged is not; but when the very same person is thought of as a cyclist, then although being two-legged is essential to him, being rational is not. Again, the point is supposed to be that it makes no sense to say of the very person who is the mathematical cyclist, independently of any way of thinking about him, that he is or is not essentially rational (or two-legged). According to the anti-essentialist, asking whether Andrew Wiles (who we may suppose is a cycling mathematician) could fail to be rational is like asking whether Andrew Wiles is taller than—both questions demand another relatum. Could he fail to be rational, relative to what way of referring to him? Is he taller than whom?