 The EC reformulation of GC takes a different view of whether rationality requires us to get it right about the first-order support relation or merely to get it right by our own lights, but this question is of course not specific to the topic of the relation of first-order and second-order evidence. For example, in a probabilistic account evidential support relations are dictated completely by conditional probabilities. In a subjective Bayesian version of this picture rationality requires one to have the confidence dictated by the subjective conditional probabilities that follow from one’s confidences in other propositions. In an objective version rationality would obligate one to have a confidence that is in line with the objective conditional probabilities. There are other ways of making out subjective vs. objective views of the relevant evidential support relations, and whether we should favor one or the other depends on more general considerations that could provide independent reason to favor one or the other view in the current debate about order relations.