 Although James’ insistence on the distinctness of ideas with respect to God’s essence is reminiscent of Henry of Ghent’s teaching, it is important to note, as has been stressed by M. Gossiaux (2007), that James does not conceive of this distinctness as Henry does. For Henry, ideas possess “being of essence” (esse essentiae); James, by contrast, while referring to divine ideas as things (res), is careful to add that they are not things “in the absolute sense but only in a qualified sense,” viz., as cognized objects (Quodl. I, q. 5, p. 63, 60). Thus, divine ideas for James possess a lesser degree of distinction from God’s essence than do Henry of Ghent’s. Nevertheless, because James did consider ideas to be distinct in some sense from God, his position would be viewed by some later authors—e.g., William of Alnwick—as compromising divine unity. (See Côté 2016) 