Another difference between Frege and Quine (but not all Quineans) is that Frege's account of ontological commitment applies directly to sentences of ordinary language. Quine's account applies only indirectly to sentences of ordinary language via the method of paraphrase, or, in what seems to be his “official” view, not at all. This difference leads to different, and more onerous, demands being placed on the Fregean. As already noted, the Fregean must discover syntactic criteria for identifying genuine singular terms in ordinary language. Quine never engaged in the corresponding project: finding syntactic criteria for identifying objectual quantifiers in ordinary language. As we saw in §4.2, that task is none too easy, and there is substantial disagreement even over basic cases. But, contra Quine, it is a task that must be carried out if quantifier approaches to ontological commitment are to have philosophical application.  Philosophers, after all, do not often speak or write in Quine's target language: first-order predicate logic. Quinean approaches—if they are to provide a theory-neutral criterion of ontological commitment applicable to ordinary language—are no less beholden to the syntactic priority thesis than Fregean approaches.