  On Dworkin's account of adjudication—at least when that account is understood as a coherence account (see subsection 3.1 above)—we find a different kind of answer to the question of why coherence has a special role to play in legal reasoning. As was noted in subsection 2.4, for Dworkin, in adjudicating cases, judges should seek to constructively interpret the law, i.e. to impose purpose on it in order to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong (see Dworkin 1986, chs.2 &amp; 3, and the entry on  interpretivist theories of law).  For Dworkin, the form or genre of law is to provide a convincing justification for the exercise of state coercion (see Dworkin 1986, passim;), and, as he regards both judges and legal theorists as engaging in constructive interpretation (see Dworkin 1986, p90), Dworkin further contends that any adequate jurisprudential account of law must explain how what it takes to be law provides a general justification for the exercise of the coercive power of the state (for discussion of this point, see Dickson 2001,  chs. 5 &amp; 6, Dickson 2004 and cf. the entry on  interpretivist theories of law).   In Law's Empire, Dworkin argues that such a justification can best be provided when the law is viewed as the organised and coherent voice of what he refers to as a ‘community of principle’ i.e. a community whose members accept that their fates are linked by virtue of the fact that their rights and responsibilities are governed by common principles. So for Dworkin, we must interpret law as coherent, in the sense of speaking with one voice, because by so doing, we understand law as the voice of a community of principle, and so as capable of providing a general justification for the exercise of state coercion (see Dworkin 1986).