 One consequence of pluralism, then, is that in a dispute between advocates of different logics both of which lay claim to being the correct logic in this sense—say, a dispute between a classical logician and an advocate of intuitionistic logic—neither party to the dispute needs to be at fault. Each logic may be equally legitimate. For this to be possible, it must be the case that even the canonical application of logic can be realized in multiple ways. Pluralists differ in the accounts they offer of this multiple realizability. One influential such account has been advanced by J.C. Beall and Greg Restall (2005). According to their account, several logics may be equally qualified to fulfill the core function of logic, because “logical consequence” admits of several distinct interpretations (within a specified range). Roughly, \(A\) is a logical consequence of a set of formulas \(\Gamma\) if and only if, in every case in which all of the members of \(\Gamma\) are true, so is \(A\). Depending on how we understand “case” in our definition—e.g., as Tarskian models (classical logic), stages (intuitionistic logic), situations (relevant logic), etc.—we arrive at different concepts of logical consequence.