 All these rejoinders on behalf of naturalism, however, are predicated on the assumption that we have a robust social-scientific account of law. Yet it is now plain we do not. (See, e.g., Leiter 2007, pp. 192 ff.) The best social-scientific accounts of adjudication, for example, boast predictive success that is so feeble (better than coin-tosses, but not much!) that their explanatory models, with their implicit concepts of law, earn no epistemic credence. When it comes to the “concept of law” itself, we may have nothing more than intuitions, however epistemically feeble, on which to rely. And perhaps they are not as epistemically feeble as the naturalist originally thought? Law, after all, is not a natural kind, but a complicated kind of social artifact, and it seems far more plausible that social artifacts will depend on folk intuitions and how people use language: so perhaps traditional conceptual-analytic methodology, of the kind H.L.A. Hart utilized in The Concept of Law, is the right one after all for its subject-matter (cf. Langlinais &amp; Leiter 2016)?