 However, and more importantly in the present context, is that Stalnaker-Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals has difficulties with backtracking counterfactuals and backward causation because if \(c\) occurs later than \(e\), the proposed method of truth evaluation assumes that \(e\) occurs in the relevant possible worlds in which \(c\) does not occur. In general, the assessment of a counterfactual conditional is carried out by assuming that the possible world must be identical with the actual world up to \(c\). Therefore, it is stipulated that the closest possible world is one in which everything happens just as in the actual world up to the time of \(c\)’s occurrence, which means, given \(e\) occurs before \(c\), that the possible world will include the occurrence of \(e\). But then it is necessarily true that there is never a possible world closer to the actual world which includes \(c\) but not \(e\). This creates a problem because we consider any causal connection between \(c\) and \(e\) as contingent. Rather we would expect that if we face a case of backward causation where both a present event \(c\) and a past event\(e\) occur, the following counterfactual would be true: “If \(c\) had not occurred, then \(e\) would not have occurred.” The truth evaluation of this counterfactual, if it were to represent backward causation, would require that the closest world without \(c\) is also one without \(e\). Nevertheless, the traditional theory does not allow such an evaluation.