  Minimalism is the version of deflationism that diverges the least from inflationism because it accepts many of the standard inflationary presuppositions, including that ‘is true’ is a predicate used to describe entities as having (or lacking) a truth property. What makes minimalism a version of deflationism is its denial of inflationism’s final assumption, namely, that the property expressed by the truth predicate has a substantive nature. Drawing inspiration from Leeds (1978), Horwich (1982, 182) actually coins the term ‘deflationism’ while describing “the deflationary redundancy theory which denies the existence of surplus meaning and contends that Tarski’s schema [“\(p\)” is true iff \(p\)] is quite sufficient to capture the concept.” Minimalism, Horwich’s mature deflationary position (1998a [First Edition, 1990]), adds to this earlier view. In particular, Horwich (ibid., 37, 125, 142) comes to embrace the idea that ‘is true’ does express a property, but it is merely a “logical property” (cf. Field 1992), rather than any substantive or naturalistic property of truth with an analyzable underlying nature (Horwich 1998a, 2, 38, 120–1).