 One common complaint about compatibilist accounts is that these proposals about what we are saying and what we believe are linguistically or psychologically implausible. For instance, when ordinary speakers are speaking loosely or restricting their quantifiers, they will typically balk when their remarks are taken at face value. (“There’s no beer anywhere in the world?”) But this sort of evidence seems just to be missing in the cases at hand. (“You think there literally are statues?” “There’s nothing at all with both fins and feathers?”) Others have criticized compatibilist strategies by pointing to limitations of their recipes for paraphrasing ordinary utterances. For instance, Uzquiano (2004: 434–435) argues that the standard eliminativist strategy of paraphrasing constructions of the form ‘there are Fs’ in terms of there being atoms arranged Fwise cannot be adapted to handle constructions like ‘some Fs are touching each  other’.[58] 