 It seems that Philo did his utmost to make the relation between God and the logos as complex as possible (Calabi 2008). As an example of these difficulties, in Leg. 2.86, God is said to be the supreme genus and His logos the second one. Other things, Philo adds, only exist in speech and sometimes amount to mere nothingness. In the third book of the same treatise (Leg. 3.175–6), the logos is defined as the “ti”, i.e., the all-encompassing genus in the Stoic system. To explain this definition, Philo specifies that God’s logos is the supreme genus of everything that was born. From a philosophical point of view, if somebody remains in the world of immanence, he can refer to the universal logos, and only to him. But to see the logos as the ultimate expression of the absolute is for Philo an absolute impiety. In fact, the logos is only God’s shadow, His image, the instrument by which He created the world, or in a more anthropomorphic way, His “first-born son” or His deputy (Agr. 51). In Fug. 109, the logos is said to be “the Son of God and Sophia”. The Pythagorean-Platonic model of Creation acting on undefined matter is thus both preserved and richly transformed.