 For example, van Fraassen, Giere, and also Mumford believe that there are no laws. Van Fraassen finds support for his view in the problems facing accounts like Lewis’s and Armstrong’s, and the perceived failure of Armstrong and others to describe an adequate epistemology that permits rational belief in laws (1989, 130, 180–181). Giere appeals to the origins of the use of the concept of law in the history of science (1999 [f.p. 1995], 86–90) and contends that the generalizations often described as laws are not in fact true (90–91). Mumford’s reasons are more metaphysical; he maintains that, in order to govern, laws must be external to the properties they govern, but, to be external in this way, the governed properties must lack proper identity conditions (2004, 144–145). Others adopt a subtly different sort of antirealism. Though they will utter sentences like ‘It is a law that no signals travel faster than light’, they are antirealists in virtue of thinking that such sentences are not (purely) fact-stating. Whether this Einsteinian generalization is a law is not a fact about the universe; it is not something out there waiting to be discovered. Reports of what are laws only project a certain attitude (in addition to belief) about the contained generalizations (Blackburn 1984, 1986, Ward 2002, 197). Ward takes the attitude to be one regarding the suitability of the generalization for prediction and explanation. 