 When feminist philosophers first considered the question of sexual difference in the Renaissance, they were writing in response to overtly misogynistic claims (in Marinella’s case, the claims of Passi), which centred on the physical, moral and intellectual failings of women. One question feminists then had to face was whether to concede the facts, and dispute the explanation, or to dispute the facts. The question was whether it was better (i) to concede that women might appear to be inferior to men in a variety of ways (to be, for example, more foolish or more focused on frivolous pursuits) but to dispute that nature made them such or (ii) to dispute that women were more foolish, morally weak, or physically incapable in fact. Marinella by and large adopts the second strategy, arguing that women in fact display in their behavior not ignorance, unreason, vanity or flightiness, but on the contrary all the moral excellences that their detractors accuse them of lacking. At the same time, she does believe that men have suppressed the abilities and limited the opportunities of women, particularly with respect to intellectual endeavours, and that is a reason to expect that women might not be able to speak for themselves—their souls cannot express themselves directly (Marinella 1601b, 80; Malpezzi Price and Ristaino 2008, 116). The suppression of women’s abilities, and the concrete suppression of their speech, justifies in Marinella’s view moving to consider the evidence of women’s bodies in order to understand their souls, and to argue for the superiority of women on that basis. Because the soul of a person operates through the body, the body manifests certain characteristics of the soul, and so stands to offer evidence of the character of the soul.