 Gould’s thinking about contingency has had significant impacts in both philosophy and biology. In philosophy, for instance, John Beatty (1995) argued that the contingency of evolutionary history implies that there are no distinctively biological laws, an argument that served as a touchstone for much of the subsequent debate about laws in biology (Brandon 1997; Mitchell 1997, 2000, 2002; Sober 1997; Giere 1999; Shapiro 2000; Woodward 2000, 2001, 2004; Elgin 2003, 2006; and Hamilton 2007; for important precursors to Beatty 1995, see Smart 1963; Ruse 1970; Cartwright 1983; van Fraassen 1989; and Rosenberg 1994). More recently, Beatty (2016) has argued that the contingency of evolutionary history is closely connected to narrative modes of explanation. His suggestion is that narrative explanations are especially well suited to historically contingent series of events. McConwell (2017) argues that the contingency of evolutionary history explains why we should be pluralists about biological individuality. In biology, on the other hand, Gould’s argument about contingency, particularly his thought experiment concerning rewinding and playing back the tape of history, helped to inspire research in long-term experimental evolution (e.g., Travisano, Mangold, Bennett, &amp; Lenski 1995). In addition to fueling interest in understanding the Cambrian explosion, Gould’s work also instigated something of a backlash from other scientists convinced that selection-driven convergence is the hallmark of evolutionary history (e.g., Conway Morris 2003). This debate concerning contingency and convergence sometimes also has theological overtones. Conway Morris has at least hinted that he sees convergentism about evolution as cohering especially well with theism. This contrasts with Gould’s well-known view that science and religion should be regarded as “non-overlapping magisteria” (Gould 1997).