 The consensus among 4E proponents is that psychiatry is wedded to a number of outdated philosophical positions, although there is not always agreement about what these positions are. Zoe Drayson (2009), for example, thinks that psychiatry is committed to old fashioned models of artificial intelligence that ignore embodiment, whereas other theorists (Davies 2016) think that psychiatry is too neglectful of the environment, or has the wrong picture of explanation and causation (de Haan 2019). Indeed, it is unclear whether any particular scientific research program derives from core 4E commitments. One might see the movement as what Godfrey-Smith (2001) calls a philosophy of nature or (in this case) a piece of philosophical anthropology (cf Gallagher 2017). As Godfrey-Smith puts it (2001, p.284–5) a philosophy of nature comes after science, and aims to describe and interpret the world as disclosed by science. One can see 4E as giving us a view of human nature that stresses the interdependence of person and environment and emphasizes the dynamic aspects of cognition, which is seen as a special kind of animacy. Because of this variety within the movement it is not easy to construct a core program for philosophical psychiatry that every scholar with some 4E attachments would accept, but there are recurrent themes that can be assessed here.