 The legal measures are relevant for punishment theorists for a number of reasons, but here we note just two: First, at least some of these restrictive measures may be best regarded as as additional forms of punishment (see Lippke 2016: ch. 9; Hoskins 2019: chs. 3 and 4). For such measures, we must ask whether they are (or can be made to be) consistent with the principles and considerations we believe should govern impositions of punishment. Second, even if at least some measures are not best regarded as additional forms of punishment, we should ask what justifies the state in imposing additional coercive measures on those convicted of crimes outside the context of the punishment itself (see Ashworth and Zedner 2011, 2012; Ramsay 2011; Ashworth, Zedner, and Tomlin 2013; Hoskins 2019: chs. 5–7). For instance, if we regard punishment as the way in which offenders pay their debts to society, we can argue that it is at least presumptively unjustified for the state to impose additional burdensome measures on offenders once this debt has been paid. To say that certain measures are presumptively unjustified is not, of course, to establish that they are all-things-considered prohibited. Various collateral consequences — restrictions on employment or housing, for example — are often defended as public safety measures. We might argue (see Hoskins 2019: ch. 7) that in some cases considerations of public safety can be sufficiently compelling to justify certain measures (for example, measures that bar people with convictions for child sex offences from working as teachers, or that bar fraudsters from working in jobs where they are responsible for other people's money). Public safety restrictions could only be justifiable, however, when there is a sufficiently compelling public safety interest, when the measures will be effective in serving that interest, when the measures will not do more harm than good, and when there are no less burdensome means of achieving the public safety aim. Even for public safety measures that meet these conditions, we should not lose sight of the worry that imposing such restrictions on people with criminal convictions but who have served their terms of punishment denies them the equal treatment to which they, having paid their debt, are entitled (on this last worry, see, e.g., Walen 2011:1264–66; Lippke 2016: ch. 9; Hoskins 2019: ch. 7).