 EBM began as a self-described Kuhnian scientific revolution of biomedicine—a fundamental change of worldview that is incommensurable with the previous one; a paradigm shift (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group 1992). The most fundamental dispute between advocates of the EBM movement and skeptics within the biomedical community is, in one sense, over the epistemic and power relationships between the two halves of biomedicine: biology and medicine. In biology, experimental methodologies and attempts to find generalizable population trends are valued highly; in clinical medicine, the single patient and the clinician’s accumulated (and ineffable) expert evaluation of them has long been valued very highly—much attention is paid to that individual patient’s contingencies (the particulars of their body and symptoms), with the clinician’s accumulated knowledge and know how being relied on when determining how to proceed. Evidence-based medicine is not a simplistic adoption of biology principles and their application to medicine; it is not the triumph of biology over medicine in biomedicine. Instead, EBM has helped to draw out deeper disagreements about what it means to do and use biomedical science well.