 Bayes’ Theorem |  belief, formal representations of |  conditionals |  confirmation |  decision theory: causal |  Dutch book arguments |  epistemic paradoxes |  epistemic utility arguments for probabilism |  epistemology |  epistemology: Bayesian |  Fitch’s paradox of knowability |  game theory |  induction: problem of |  justification, epistemic: coherentist theories of |  justification, epistemic: foundationalist theories of |  learning theory, formal |  logic: and probability |  logic: conditionals |  logic: epistemic |  logic: inductive |  logic: modal |  logic: non-monotonic |  Pascal’s wager |  preferences |  probabilities, imprecise |  probability, interpretations of |  rational choice, normative: expected utility |  reasoning: defeasible |  risk |  social choice theory |  statistics, philosophy of 