 Qualitative confirmation theories comply with the idea that \(h\) is confirmed both by \(e_{1} \wedge e_{2}\) and by \(e_{1} \wedge e_{2}^*.\) In the HD case, it is clear that \(h\) entails both conjunctions, given of course \(k\) stating that tigers, lions, and elephants are all mammals (an Hempelian account could also be given easily). Bayesian relevance confirmation unequivocally yields the same qualitative verdict. There is more, however. Presumably, one might also want to say that \(h\) is more strongly confirmed by \(e_{1} \wedge e_{2}\) than by \(e_{1} \wedge e_{2}^*,\) because the former offers a more varied and diverse body of positive evidence (interestingly, on experimental investigation, this pattern prevails in most people’s judgment, including children, see Lo et al. 2002). Indeed, the variety of evidence is a fairly central issue in the analysis of confirmation (see, e.g., Bovens and Hartmann 2002, Schlosshauer and Wheeler 2011, and Viale and Osherson 2000). In the illustrative case above, higher variety is readily captured by lower probability: it just seems a priori less likely that species as diverse as tigers and elephants share some unspecified genetic trait as compared to tigers and lions, that is, \(P(e_{1} \wedge e_{2}\mid k)\lt P(e_{1} \wedge e_{2}^*\mid k).\) By (SP) above, then, one immediately gets from the relevance confirmation view the sound implication that \(C_{P}(h, e_{1} \wedge e_{2}\mid k)\gt C_{P}(h, e_{1} \wedge e_{2}^*\mid k).\)