 Several objections have been raised against attempts to account for the contents of perception in terms of demonstrative concepts. First, for a capacity operative in perception to count as a genuine conceptual capacity it must be possible for that same capacity to be employed in thought. As such, it must be the case that such demonstrative concepts as are arguably involved in the content of perception are retained long enough for the possibility of their remobilization—they cannot be reserved only for the particular instance in which the sample is perceived. Although the appearance of the demonstrative concept expressible by the phrase ‘… is colored thus’ can exploit the presence of the red27 color chip and account for the person’s fine-grained experience of the chip, the demonstrative concept’s applicability cannot be limited to the presence of this sample. As McDowell says, the capacity for employing demonstrative concepts in perception is a recognitional capacity (McDowell 1994a p. 57, Brewer 1999 also holds that a conceptual capacity must be available in the absence of the sample to which it was initially applied). Kelly (2001a) calls this constraint ‘the re-identification condition’ on concept possession.