 In the social contract context we can think of the nonagreement point \(\bu_0\) as representing the State of Nature, and the feasible set \(\Lambda\) as representative of the various contracts parties might agree to. Each point \(\bu \in \Lambda\) that is weakly Pareto superior to \(\bu_0\) thus characterizes a social contract with a cooperative surplus (Gauthier 1986:  141).[2]  And, when a set of claims constitutes an equilibrium solution to the associated bargaining problem, this allows us to say that the parties to a contract all have good reason to comply with its terms. As we will see below, though, there are various approaches to identifying the most attractive equilibrium from a normative point of view. An advantage of using the Nash bargaining approach to modeling the social contract, then, is that this formalization helps to clarify the differences between these  approaches.[3]