 Motivated chiefly to provide a ground for intentionality, several decades later,  Alexius Meinong  (1904b [1960], 1907) famously postulated a rich class of non-existent objects to explain our apparent ability to conceive and talk about, not only creatures of myth and fiction, but impossible objects like the round square. Roughly, in Meinong’s theory, for any class of “ordinary” properties (konstitutorische Bestimmungen) there is an intentional object (Gegenstand) having exactly those  properties.[12]  Presumably, then, although he did not broach the issue of possible objects  directly,[13]  among these objects would be those having (perhaps among others) the property being a possible child of Bergoglio. However, importantly, although he broadly accepted Bolzano’s bi-modal division of being into concrete and subsistent  objects,[14]  Meinong ascribed no variety of being whatsoever to his intentional objects, not even the subsistence (Bestand) enjoyed by abstracta like mathematical objects and  propositions.[15]  Although strongly influenced by Meinong, the early Russell (1903) spurned the idea that intentional objects are being-less but not the objects themselves, save for impossibilia like the round square. Rather, he simply moved them all into the subsistent realm alongside the objects of mathematics, reserving the “world of existence” for “actual objects” in the spatio-temporal causal  order:[16]