 Third, Popper’s critique of Marxism has not, of course, gone unchallenged. The debate arising from, however, has in many cases tended to revolve around ideological rather than philosophical issues, which will be passed over here. However, there have also been some trenchant philosophical responses. Cornforth sees Marxism as a rational scientific discipline and Marxian thinking as “a rational and scientific approach to social problems” (Cornforth 1968: 6) of the kind which both Marx and Popper consider important. Consequently, he takes Popper to task for representing Marxism as a system of dogmas designed to close minds or pre-empt the operation of our rational faculties in addressing social issues. Against that view, he argues that it constitutes a way of thinking designed to open minds to the real possibilities of human life, and sees it as the philosophy best calculated to promote the ideals of the open society to which he, like Popper, subscribes. Hudelson (1980) argues that Marxian economics survives the Popperian critique of historicism and that, in any case, Marx did not hold many of the tenets of historicism identified by Popper. He also contends that Popper fails to show that there cannot be, and that we cannot know, laws of social development and that Marx did not in fact confuse trends and laws in the way that Popper suggests.