 To appreciate how Zalta achieves the goal of having a fine-grained theory of propositions, we begin by discussing how he views relations generally, since, as just mentioned, Zalta takes propositions to be zero-place relations (and properties to be one-place relations). Zalta holds that relations are “primitive entities”, by which he means that they are not to be explained or “defined” in terms of other entities/notions. But at least some relations are complex. For example, if we take a two-place relation (between objects) Rxy and “plug” one of its argument places with the object b, we get the one-place relation (property) Rxb (“bearing R to  b”).[34]  This one-place relation is complex, having b and R as parts. Similarly, if we take a three-place relation Sxyz and “universalize” the third argument position, we get a two place relation that we might represent thus: (z)Sxyz (“x and y (in that order) stand in S to everything”). Here again, the two-place relation is complex, having S and (something corresponding to) “universalization” as parts. Zalta’s idea is that properties, relations and individuals can be “harnessed together” to form new, complex relations. In his axiomatized theory of relations, Zalta introduces a comprehension schema for relations (see Zalta [1988] p. 46) that insures that all manner of complex relations will be available. To insure that all instances of the comprehension schema are true in all interpretations of his axiomatized theory, Zalta has these interpretations include the following group of “logical functions”: PLUGi, NEG, COND, UNIVi, REFLi, j CONVi, j, VACi, NEC, WAS and WILL. Roughly (and suppressing reference to worlds and times) PLUGi is a function that maps an n-place relation R and an object b to the n-1 place relation R′ such that &lt; o1, …, oi-1, oi+1, …, on &gt; stand in R′ iff &lt; o1, …, oi-1, b, oi+1, …, on &gt; stand in R. NEG is a function that maps an n-place relation R to an n-place relation R′ such that n things stand in R′ iff they don’t stand in  R.[35]  Thus the repeated application of these functions yields appropriate relations to make true the instances of Zalta’s comprehension schema for relations. For example, consider the following two instances of his comprehension schema (where ‘F′ is a variable ranging over one-place relations; ‘b’ is a name of an individual; and the other predicate letters are constants and so name particular  relations):[36]