  For Akiba (1999), however, paraconsistent subvaluation theories, like paracomplete supervaluation theories, should be recast in a modal light, by supplying an epistemic possibility operator Pos in the former case (reminiscent of the modalized accounts of the tetralemma explored in §5) and its dual, an abstract modal concept Akiba defines as Def (corresponding to necessary truth) in the latter.  Thus, while P &amp; ¬P remains a full-fledged contradiction, its modalized counterpart Pos(P) &amp; Pos(¬P) is coherent, and while P v ¬P is a valid instance of LEM, Def(P) v Def(¬P) is not: “Super- and subvaluation systems can be considered not really alternatives to classical logic but in fact just modal extensions of it.” Akiba’s key departure from Hyde’s approach is in rejecting the move to identify truth simpliciter with subtruth (or supertruth). 