 Remarks on Colour is a collection of remarks, composed by Wittgenstein during the last year and a half of his life. In these remarks he attempts to clarify the language we use in describing our experience and impression of colours, sameness of colours, saturated colours, light and shade, brightness and opaqueness of surfaces, transparency, etc. These reflections present us with a “geometry of colours,” though Wittgenstein makes it clear that due to “the indefiniteness in the concept of colour” (III-78) the “logic of colour concepts” (I-22) should be given piecemeal. When we consider colours “there is merely an inability to bring the concepts into some kind of order” (II-20). Philosophical attention should be given rather to such particularities as the blending in of white (as opposed to blending in yellow), “the coloured intermediary between two colours” (III-49), “ the difference between black-red-gold and black-red-yellow” (III-51), etc. The investigation is therefore directed not merely to colour phenomena and the language we use to describe them but also to philosophical methodology, in comparison with scientific inquiry, and to what is taken to be conceivable and what is not. It is also unique in reminding us of a hint, by Wittgenstein, that it was prompted by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Zur Farbenlehre (On the Theory of Colour, 1810)!