 There are two main readings of rights to do wrong. The first reading characterizes most rights as furthering the holder’s autonomy. Rights entitle their holders to make choices, and as Waldron (1993) says the importance of a person’s having choices would be diminished if she were forced to do the right thing. Even though the person has no (privilege-) right to perform an action that is wrong, it would nevertheless violate an important (claim-) right of hers for others to compel her not to do that thing. To take the speech example, we respect the autonomy of speakers when we allow them to speak unmolested—even when they do wrong by expressing themselves in disrespectful ways. (For a defense of this reading against objections from Galston and George, see Herstein 2012. On the existence and value of legal rights to do legal wrongs, see Herstein 2013.)