 The problems with Beardsley’s argument are significant enough to conclude that it needn’t be accepted. The question still remains, however, whether an author’s intention that ‘S’ means M is criterial evidence for its meaning M. That question can be asked independently of Beardsley’s argument, but on the assumption that his preferred theory of meaning is correct (thereby, as in much of the above, putting to the side general objections to speech act theory and speech act theories of meaning) or on the assumption that another theory of meaning is correct. As far as the question at issue is concerned, in other words, it probably doesn’t make much difference whether the Beardsley/Alston theory is correct, or some other theory is. In all likelihood, the result would be the same. But regardless of whether it would or wouldn’t, exploring alternative theories of meaning is impossible in this context, so only the Alston/Beardsley theory will be considered below.