 There is another topic concerning species that has recently been discussed in the philosophical and biological literature. This topic concerns the reasons biologists have for accepting or rejecting a species concept. Typically, biologists use such standard epistemic values as empirical accuracy or generality for accepting or rejecting a species concept. For instance, supporters of the Ecological Species Concept believe their concept is better than the Biological Species Concept because the Ecological Species Concept is more general – it applies to both sexual and asexual organisms whereas the Biological Species Concept only applies to sexual organisms (see Ereshefsky 2001 for discussion). Recently, some biologists have offered non-epistemic reasons (such as moral or social reasons) for accepting or rejecting a species concept (Frankham et al. 2012, Zachos et al. 2013, and Attenborough 2015). Before talking about how some biologists use non-epistemic reasons for choosing species concepts, let’s have a brief introduction to the issue of science and values in the philosophy of science.