 Contract law is based on the model (or idealization) of “voluntary exchange … between autonomous individuals” (Radin 2007: 196). Contracts are enforced on the assumption that parties possess the capacities necessary for informed and voluntary choice (R2: §15), while fraud, duress, and various forms of pressure in bargaining represent grounds for recission (R2: §§164, 175, 177). A preliminary question is why the law should be so concerned with freedom and autonomy in contractual exchange. As previously discussed, the rearrangement of private property might be justified on grounds of efficiency or general welfare (see  §1.3).  The law’s guiding principle could be hypothetical or reasonable consent—what parties would or should consent to—rather than actual consent. The importance of actual consent seems clear enough where exchange impinges on domains over which persons retain special sovereignty, including their own body and mind (Mill 1859; Hill 1991; Enoch 2017). But not every contractual exchange impinges on bodily or mental integrity, and the importance of actual consent to contracts at large is therefore not obvious.