 Another objection to Millikan’s theory is it yields content ascriptions that are overly specific, and thus implausible. Consider the fact that all sorts of circumstances could prevent a contribution to fitness: for example, an infected fly or a crow standing nearby could spell disease or death instead of nutrition for the frog (Hall, 1990). On this basis, Neander (1995) argues that Millikan’s theory has the unintended consequence that the frog’s representation has the content food that is not infected, when no crow is standing by … , etc. Millikan’s reply to this objection (cf. Millikan 2004, 85–86; 2009, 404) can be summarized as follows: the frog’s representation could only have this highly specific content if the representation’s producer, the frog’s visual system, had the function of producing states that mapped onto such a highly specific state. This, in turn, would only be possible if the visual system were sensitive to proximal states that carried the information that there is food that is not infected, not in the vicinity of a crow, etc. According to Millikan, however, there are no such proximal states, so the objection fails (for a critical rejoinder, cf. Martínez 2013a, 437–441). How this response relates to Millikan’s canonical statements of her position (e.g., in Millikan 1984, 1989b), and whether it indicates a departure from her original view, are questions that naturally arise at this point, but they will not be pursued further here. 