 Overall, such paradoxes as the Liar provide some evidence for the dialetheist’s claim that some contradictions are provably true, in the sense that they are entailed by plain facts concerning natural language and our thought processes. Extended Liar paradoxes like ‘This sentence is not true’ are spelt in ordinary English. Their paradoxical characteristics, dialetheists argue, are due exactly to the intuitive features of ordinary language: unavoidable self-reference; the failure of metalinguistic hierarchies, which only produce languages that are expressively weaker than English; and the obvious presence of a truth predicate for English, ‘is true’, which is characterized, at least extensionally, by either the Tarskian T-schema or rules amounting to the transparency of truth. For a sustained critical engagement with paraconsistent dialetheism as a solution to the semantic paradoxes, see Field 2008, part 5 (chapters 23–26).