 Savage did not explicitly discuss the probative force of the collective preferences of his peers in relation to Allais’ cases. He did however comment on the bearing of his own personal preferences, which Allais had famously elicited from him at a Paris symposium 1952 and which found themselves in violation of the recommendations of SEU . Granting that it would have been irrational for him to maintain both these preferences and a commitment to the normative adequacy of his axioms, he reported that further “reflection” inclined him to revise the former, judging these to have been in error, on par with a logical inconsistency in beliefs. This fact, he claimed, entitled him to retain his normative commitments (see Savage 1952:  101–103).[20]  Since it is easy to surmise that Savage took his own inclinations to be representative of those of the population at large, his comments have been widely taken to implicitly suggest an alternative experimental route to the testing of theories of rational choice. (See Slovic &amp; Tversky 1974 and Jallais &amp; Pradier 2005. This is also the view of Ellsberg, who offers, in Ch. 1 of his 1961 doctoral dissertation, reprinted as Ellsberg 2001, a worthwhile discussion of the issues of present interest, with Zappia 2016 providing a recent philosophically-oriented discussion.). This procedure would involve determining, not whether certain decision makers exhibit patterns of preference proscribed by the theory, but whether they still exhibit such patterns after reflection on their conflict with the theory’s basic axioms.