 The key point is simply that, in the sense of “ontological dependence” which fits quite naturally with the “neo-Aristotelian” account of substances as ontologically independent objects, the relationships defined by  (EDR),  (EDG),  (EDA),  and  (EDE)  will not serve the purpose, whereas that defined by  (ID) will. On this view, the sense in which a substance is an entity which does not depend “ontologically” upon anything other than itself is exactly the sense in which it does not depend for its identity upon anything else. This still leaves many interesting questions concerning ontological (in)dependence unanswered, notably the question of whether there is a fundamental level or layer of reality, consisting of one or more entities upon which all other existing entities depend ontologically in one way or another (for discussion, see Lowe 1998: 154–73; Schaffer 2003; Cameron 2008; and Paseau 2010).