 Some sensory judgments are clearly relational, as when we perceive one event A to be the cause of another B. To say that A is the cause of B is clearly to relate one event to another. Similarly, to say that A is a brittle thing is to say that A does or would stand in relations of a certain sort to other things with which it might come into contact. This shows that such relational judgments are products of the understanding and not proper sensory judgments. Pure sensory judgments would be simple and would not reflect the operation of the understanding. Perhaps they include only reports of current experience, such as “This thing appears red”. But Green believes that even these judgments are implicitly relational—“imply sequence and degree”—and require comparison of one element of experience with another (PE §46). To judge that something is a thing or substance in which properties inhere presumably requires assigning it some diachronic stability, however limited, and this requires seeing it as persisting through some changes—as a part of some series of events and not others. And to judge something red is to predicate a property of an object, but properties or universals are, for the empiricist, ideas formed by abstraction from our ideas of simple experiences.