 It appears that the first step in a reparative argument will be to establish that an object was unjustly acquired. Failure to do so would seem to undermine the reparative basis for a repatriation claim of such an object: if an object was not unjustly acquired, then a repatriation claim based on the reparation of an historical injustice does not appear to apply (Björnberg 2014: 464). This might be thought of as an additional burden faced in reparation-based repatriation cases in particular: more general arguments for reparation often involve compensation as opposed to restitution (Perez 2011; though notably not in the case of land claims (Simmons 1995)), since what is being compensated for is typically pain, suffering, and loss of economic opportunity. However, one might alternatively think that repatriation could be justified as part of a reparative obligation to a cultural group even if there is no justifiable claim to ownership of a particular object, but simply as a form of compensation for historical injustices against the group in general, especially given the inextricable relationship between these broader injustice and the more specific case of cultural property acquisition (Harding 1997: 739; Ypi 2013: 187; Thompson 2013: 90–91; Ypi 2017; Matthes 2017: 946–950). If this is correct, then the reparative approach has an important advantage over appeals to cultural property: it can avoid the problem of establishing unjust acquisition of a particular object.