 Classical descriptivists, like Frege and Russell, were perfectly willing to acknowledge that the descriptive content in question might vary—sometimes quite markedly—from one speaker to the next. Indeed, according to Russell, such contents may vary across time for one and the same speaker. Thus, while I might associate the name ‘Obama’ with the descriptive content the previous U.S. president, Michelle Obama might associate the same name with the descriptive content my husband. If Trump were to assume dictatorial powers, my identifying content associated with Obama might well change—perhaps to something like the last legitimate president of the United States. If Barack and Michelle were to divorce, Michelle’s identifying descriptive content would no doubt change as well—perhaps to my ex-husband. In all of these cases, the individual referred to by means of the name is determined (or, as it is often put, is ‘picked out’ or ‘fixed’) by the particular descriptive content the speaker associates with that name. Because the descriptive content in question is typically characterized by means of a definite description (an expression of the form the F), such theories are often (even if somewhat  misleadingly[2])  known as ‘descriptivist theories’ of proper names.