 In similar terms, some contemporary authors think of a disposition to have certain hopes as a democratic virtue that can be fostered or undermined by states. Moellendorf (2006) makes an argument to this effect that is restricted to societies transitioning from severe injustice towards justice: Because citizens need hopes to be motivationally capable to engage in the risky activities necessary to pursue societal change, and because hopes for a more just future can support their self-respect under unjust circumstances, institutions of transitional societies must supply the “institutional bases of hope”, such as possibilities for free political campaigning and open debate. Snow (2018: 414) argues that societies that do not offer citizens “secure attachment” create “worrier” citizens that are more likely to succumb to paranoid nationalism, whereas “carers” who are hopeful citizens are more likely to embrace a more inclusive national identity. More narrowly, Snow defines “civic hope” as an “entrenched disposition of openness to the political possibilities a democratic government can provide. Hope must include the belief that the ends of democracy are possible” (2018: 419) and argues—drawing on the pragmatist tradition (see section 2.6 above)—that this disposition is a virtue that contributes to the flourishing of their lives as citizens as well as of the state they live in.