 A further wrinkle in the debate about moral responsibility in the context of oppression is evidenced in subtle cases of sexism in which the agent is unaware of their sexism. An issue that nicely illustrates this phenomenon is that of implicit bias. This topic in moral psychology has recently gained a lot of attention and has showcased one of the ways in which philosophy can be enriched by empirical studies (see the entry on  implicit bias;  and Brownstein and Saul 2016a and 2016b). Jennifer Saul defines “implicit bias” as unconscious biases that affect the way we perceive, evaluate, or interact with people from the group that our biases ‘target’ (Saul 2013, 40). Saul points to psychological research that shows that most people, including those who profess to have egalitarian views and even those who are members of subordinate groups, harbor implicit biases against women and other minority groups. For example, Implicit Association tests, now taken by millions of people, that ask subjects to pair positive and negative adjectives with pictures of black and white faces, reveal that we are much quicker to pair black faces with negative adjectives than with positive ones (Brownstein and Saul 2016b, 1). Implicit biases are likely to cash out, without the agent’s conscious awareness, in ways that harm members of subordinate groups to which certain stereotypes are applied. Saul links the phenomenon of implicit bias to women’s underrepresentation in philosophy: in a tradition that is steeped in associating reason, objectivity, and philosophical thought with maleness, and emotion, subjectivity, and the non-philosophical with femaleness, it is likely that philosophers will display implicit bias against women when it comes to nonanonymous journal submissions, cvs for hiring, service loads, and classroom incivility (Saul 2013, 41, 43, 45).