 What about fundamental particles (assuming there are some)? They’ve got to go as well, if we assume they are objects. If there are in fact gluons and electrons which exist, are objects, and are particular things with identity and persistence conditions, then, if they are in fact simple they form the basis out of which we could construct the other objects. So, if non-individual world stuff is going to play a role, it seems that we must eliminate fundamental particles as well. This approach allows too much physics to be done from the armchair. (Other criticisms of views like Sidelle’s can be found in Denkel 1989, 1995; Laycock 1989; Steen 2011; Turner 2011; and meta-ontological criticisms of these kind of disagreements can be found in Eklund 2008. And, while not directly addressed in the following sources, a template for the criticism that these varying views about stuff vs. things may be a ‘disagreement without a difference’ can be found in Hirsch 2002 and Carnap 1950).