 Traditionally the semantic contents of sentences have been taken to be non-linguistic, or rather non-syntactic, items – propositions. What propositions are is highly contested, but most agree that a proposition carves the class of possibilities into two sub-classes – those in which the proposition is true and those in which it is false. Call the class of worlds in which the proposition is true its range. Some have proposed that propositions be identified with their ranges (for example, David Lewis, in his 1986). This is implausible since, for example, the informative content of \(7+5=12\) seems distinct from the informative content of \(12=12\), which in turn seems distinct from the informative content of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem – and yet all three have the same range: they are all true in all possible worlds. Clearly, if semantic content is supposed to be sensitive to informative content, classes of possible worlds will are not discriminating enough. We need something more fine-grained for a full theory of semantic content.