 We’ve now twice encountered arguments of the following form: “c caused e” is true, but “c* caused e” is false, so it must be that “c” and “c*” denote two different causal relata. In short: where there are differences in causation, there must be differences in the causal relata. Call this the causal differences argument. This argument was used to show that token causes cannot just be regions of spacetime—for then, the ball’s rotation and its heating would be one and the same event, but the ball’s rotation differs causally from its heating. It was again used to show that “Susan’s stealing the bike” must be a different token cause than “Susan’s stealing the bike”. This second example shows us that the style of argument can lead to a very fine-grained view of the causal relata. It is, after all, necessary that Susan steals the bike if and only if Susan steals the bike, so it looks like this style of argument leads us to draw hyperintensional distinctions between causal relata. Some may see hyperintensional distinctions between causal relata as a reductio, and conclude that something must be wrong with the causal differences argument.