 Discussions of what we owe to future people go back to ancient times (Auerbach 1995: 27–35) and ancient philosophy provides resources and insights for intergenerational ethics (Lane 2012). Important contributions within the utilitarian tradition include the analysis of the moral status of future sentient beings (see, e.g., Sidgwick 1907 [1981: 414]), of optimal savings (Ramsey 1928, see entry on  Ramsey and intergenerational welfare economics),  and of obligations of reproduction (Narveson 1967; see  §2.2).  Within a theory of justice we owe the first systematic account of obligations to future people to John Rawls (see  §4.4/§4.5).  Derek Parfit’s work has defined the problems of how we can and should relate to future people (see especially  §3).