 Gratitude is sometimes described as a reactive attitude—a term originally coined by P.F. Strawson (1974) to characterize certain natural responses we as humans have to the goodwill, ill will or disregard other persons evince for us. Resentment, for instance, is the fitting reactive attitude to a lack of goodwill, or presence of ill will, toward oneself from another person. For Strawson, the reactive attitudes also include vicarious attitudes—reactions to the ill will others evince toward third parties. The vicarious reactive analog to resentment, for instance, would be indignation. Reactive attitudes can be had toward oneself as well, as in the guilt a wrongdoer might feel upon committing a resentment-worthy act of ill will or disregard. What the reactive attitudes have in common, according to Strawson, is that they “rest on” and “reflect” expectations and demands for minimal levels of goodwill we make of others. In this way, the reactive attitudes are expressed in (and perhaps constitutive of) treating other agents as morally responsible. The reactive attitudes thus fundamentally differ from the “objective” attitudes we might take toward inanimate objects, or toward others’ behavior that does not evince any ill will. Such events and behaviors might make us angry or joyful; but only when they reflect a responsible agent’s goodwill or ill will as falling below or rising above a normative expectation is a reactive attitude, like resentment or gratitude, appropriate. To conceptualize gratitude as a Strawsonian reactive attitude, then, is to see it as the proper reaction to another person’s exceeding minimum expectations of goodwill toward oneself—a reaction which is the positive correlate of resentment (Strawson 1974: 6); the second-personal analog of praise and pride; and the participant or reactive analog of the objective attitudes of joy or appreciation.