 As a matter of fact, the Italian master does not always adequately distinguish between the concept of potency (potentia) as pure logical possibility (as it was taught by Duns Scotus) and that of potency as preformation, that is, a sort of latent pre-existence, in some other thing, of what will be actual/real but is not yet such. This last sense of potency is the one prevalent in Paul, who seems to use the logical sense only in theological contexts, in connection with the theme of divine omnipotence, which enables God to create many more species than He did (see QdU, conclusio decima). As a consequence, in the theory of potency and act of Paul of Venice, two different fields of investigation converge: the one related to the problem of changes of state and the one related to the analysis of the modal concept of possible. Nicoletti tends to trace back in some way the notion of (logical) possible to that of disposition to undergo a change. He therefore denies that there are possibilities that will never come into being (In Metaph., IX, tr. 1, ch. 2, fol. 342rb): “The opinion of those who claimed that something is possible even if it will never be was false” (Falsa fuit opinio dicentium aliquid posse esse quod tamen nullo modo erit). Yet, such a denial – he adds – is valid ony within the philosophy of nature; it must be rejected from a theological point of view ( ibidem).