 Relative to an arbitrarily chosen set of bodies, it is thus possible to refer to the abstract (generic) spatial extension of a portion of the plenum that different extended bodies successively “occupy”; and, presumably, by this process of abstraction the internal place of the entire plenum can be likewise constructed. Descartes takes a similar view of time, which is judged to be a generalized abstraction from the “durations” of particular bodies (where duration is an attribute of substance; Pr II 56–57; see Gorham 2007 for more on time in Descartes). Also like the Scholastics, Descartes rejects any form of atomism, which is the view that there exists a smallest indivisible particle of matter. Rather, he holds that since any given spatially extended length is divisible in thought, thus God has the power to actually divide it (Pr II 20). The material entities that interact in Descartes’ physics come in distinct units or corpuscles (see  Section 7),  which explains the “corpuscularian” title often attributed to his mechanical system, but these corpuscles are not indivisible.