 Transparency theorists can respond by arguing that the objection misconstrues the aim of these accounts. The objection charges that the account may not explain first-person access: how it is that, if you believe that p, you can know that you do. Transparency accounts may be intended to address a different question, namely, what kind of exclusively first-personal method could deliver self-ascriptions that constitute knowledge. And even if considering geopolitical matters produced a new belief that a third world war is likely, the inference that Byrne describes—from a third world war is likely to I believe that a third world war is likely—would arguably yield self-knowledge. Still, the objection exposes a possible limitation of transparency accounts. Because they cannot distinguish newly-formed judgments from previous dispositional beliefs, they cannot account for our apparent ability to knowledgeably answer the question “Do you believe that p?”, where that question concerns what one believes at the time the question is posed (Gertler 2011b).