 We will talk, for example, about John’s self-locating doxastic state when he’s disposed to sincerely say, “I am the messy shopper”—this is the state that marks him off as doxastically similar to others who are also disposed to say “I am the messy shopper” (and to search their own grocery carts for sources of mess), and as doxastically different from his pre-cottoning-on self. We’ll use “doxastic state” in a way that’s deliberately neutral between standing in the belief relation to a distinctively self-locating content, as Lewis would have it, or instead being in a particular Perry-style belief-state, such that different subjects, when in that belief-state, are thereby belief-related to different traditional propositions. We want to use “doxastic state” to talk about the cognitive states that Lewis and Perry both target with their theories, without taking a stand on who’s offering the right theoretical account of those states.