 Other philosophers appeal to the idea that when we say that a statement is true because a truth-maker for it exists, the “because” we employ is a connective (Künne 2003: 150–6; Hornsby 2005: 35–7; Melia 2005: 78–9; Schnieder 2006a: 29–37; Mulligan 2007). They think of this connective on the model of logical operators (“&amp;”, “∼” etc.) i.e., expressions that link sentences but without expressing a relation that holds between the states of affairs, facts or tropes that these sentences denote; but unlike “&amp;”, “∼” etc., “because” is not truth-functional. According to these philosophers, the truth-maker panegyrists have misconstrued the logical form of “makes true”. They have taken it to be a verb like “x hits y” when really it is akin to the connective “→” or “because” (Melia 2005: 78). There’s no need to introduce truth-makers as the special things that stand at one end of the truth-making relation with true statements at the other, no need to because it’s only superficial features of the grammar of our language that suggest there is a truth-making relation to stand at the ends of.