 One can state jury theorems that apply at once to several aggregation rules and choice problems, showing that almost nothing hinges on the classic focus on binary choice and majority rule (Pivato 2017). More concretely, List and Goodin (2001) analyse plurality rule over some finite set of alternatives  \(\mathcal{A}\).[25]  Adopting the simple standard of correctness (see  Section 5.1),  they show that the plurality outcome is asymptotically infallible under largely classical assumptions of independence, homogeneity, and competence. Interestingly, given a correct alternative \(a\in\mathcal{A}\), a voter’s probability of picking \(a\) is not required to exceed 0.5, but only to exceed the probability of picking \(b\) for each incorrect alternative \(b\in\mathcal{A}\backslash\{a\}\).