 How can nominalists proceed in developing an account of sentences like ‘3 is prime’? One strategy is to reject premise (1) and the standard criterion of ontological commitment discussed above. The most obvious way to do this is to endorse the following view: (a) simple mathematical sentences like ‘3 is prime’ should be read as being of the form ‘a is F' and as being about abstract objects (e.g., ‘3’ should be taken as denoting the number 3, which could only be an abstract object, and ‘3 is prime’ should be taken as being a claim about that object); and (b) abstract objects — in particular, mathematical objects like the number 3 — don’t exist (and the claim here is that they don’t have any sort of being whatsoever, so this is not a Meinongian view); but (c) sentences like ‘3 is prime’ are still literally true. Thus, on this view, a claim about an object a can be true even if that object doesn’t exist at all. Let’s call this view thin-truth-ism. Views of this general kind have been endorsed by Azzouni (1994, 2004), Salmon (1998), and Bueno (2005). 