 It is hard to deny that \(A\) exploits \(B\) in such a scenario, yet he does not believe the transaction is unfair, and so does not satisfy the belief-or-negligence condition. This counterexample can be addressed by modifying the proposition that \(A\) is required to believe. We needn’t require \(A\) to believe (or be negligent in failing to believe) ‘that the transaction is unfair’ but only the more general proposition ‘that the gains he receives wrong \(B\)’. Thus, Ferguson argues we can appropriately restrict the scope of purely distributive accounts and ascribe blame to exploiters if we understand exploitation as: \(A\) exploits \(B\) iff (1) \(A\) transacts unfairly with \(B\) and (2) \(A\) believes the gains he receives in the transaction wrong \(B\).