  Philosophers have proposed many different accounts of the autonomous agent’s special relation to her own motives. According to one prominent conception, which one might call “coherentist,” an agent governs her own action if and only if she is motivated to act as she does because this motivation coheres with (is in harmony with) some mental state that represents her point of view on the action.  The relevant mental state varies from account to account. According to one popular story, an agent’s point of view is constituted by her highest-order desires regarding which of her first-order desires moves her to act. (Frankfurt  1988c)[1]  According to another story, her point of view is constituted by her (contemporaneous or long-term) evaluative judgments regarding which actions are (most) worth performing. (Watson  1975)[2] Still another account adds that there must also be harmony between what the agent does and her more or less long-term plans (Bratman 1979 and 2007).  And others appeal to the relatively stable network of emotional states constitutive of “caring” (Frankfurt 1988f and 1999d, Jaworska, Shoemaker  2003)[3]  or to the agent’s character traits (Dworkin, R.), or to her most thoroughly “integrated” psychological states (Arpaly and Schroeder). 