 As a result, the “whole intricate network” of the empirically credible, Lewis notes, “will be constituted at bottom by linkages of ground and consequence, which is in general a one way relation” (Lewis 1946, 351). Disentangling the network would reveal particular linkages of prior probability relationships that would confer some degree of initial probability not just on what we recall of past experience but on simple generalizations from past experience and the expectations of future experiences and thus interpretations of experience these recollections inductively support, even in the hypothetical absence of (other) objective beliefs with which they are congruent. Moreover, the recollections that support them and form part of an overall congruent system must have some degree of credibility independent of each other and the rest. The improbability of independently probable congruent recollections all being true were the beliefs they inferentially support and that inferentially support them not true makes it unlikely that they are illusions of memory and increases the initial probability enjoyed antecedently by the recollections and what they support (Lewis 1946, 352–3). Spelling out the antecedent and independent probability constraints is tricky, to which Lewis devotes an extended discussion (Lewis 1946, 332–57). 