 In the exclusion objection, it appears that the dialetheist is being asked to ensure that the words she utters behave consistently—which is exactly what is at issue. (See Restall 2010 and the reply in Beall et al 2011 for one round of this sort of discussion.) A dialetheist goes on to question why one should think that commitment to an explosive logic is, in itself, a guard against contradiction, and therefore why dialetheists are supposed to be in special difficulty with respect to the exclusion question any more than a non-dialetheist. Filling in the details here will vary, but the reply, in short, is for a dialetheist as with anyone else, ‘just-true’ is just ‘true’ (Beall 2009, p. 54). For elaboration of a dialetheic solution to the ‘just true’ problem see Omori and Weber 2019. 