 Note that conscience does not simply move from the general to the particular with respect to concrete actions. It also moves from the general to the specific with respect to propositions themselves. As Potts points out, there are in fact two classes of deontic propositions: basic and derived (Potts 1982: 698). Consider the deontic proposition to obey God, which is basic, or maximally evident. Obviously, other more specific precepts can be derived from this very general one. Historically, for instance, from the basic deontic proposition to obey God the Jews derived the further, less evident but more specific deontic propositions to refrain from eating pork and to circumcise their sons. How did they come to know these more specific propositions? By means of a revealed commandment—via (divine) instruction, in other words (commentary on the Sentences 2.39: a. 2, q. 3, ad 4; Potts trans. 1980: 120). Although the distinction between basic and derived deontic propositions is Potts’, and although the case cited is an example of an erroneous conscience (Bonaventure argues that male circumcision and the prohibition on eating pork are no longer applicable), it accurately sums up Bonaventure’s distinction between propositions that are “very clearly evident” versus those that are “less evident”: