 A mental process is enacted if it involves, or is constituted by, a dynamic, interactive coupling of processes occurring inside the skin or skull of an organism and processes external to said skin or skull. Enactivism appears in a variety of forms. However, it is plausible to suppose that process-oriented extended mind coincides with at least some of them. In explaining the nature of conscious experience, for example, many forms of enactivism appeal to the ability of the experiencing organism to act on the world around. Abilities, perhaps, need not be extended. But some versions of enactivism also appeal to the exercise of these abilities. A common enactivist way of explaining the sense of phenomenal presence—the sense of being presented with a richly structured, detailed world—does not appeal to a representational structure that replicates this detail. If representations area involved at all, they give us merely the rough gist of the visual situation. The sense of richness and details results from the experiencing organism availing itself of the richness and detail in the world itself (O’Regan &amp; Noë 2001, Noë [ed.] 2002, Noë 2004). By acting on a rich and detailed world, therefore, the organism injects richness and detail into its experience. The organism’s experience of the richness and detail of the world is realized not by a representation but by a sequence of dynamic, coupled interactions with the external scene itself.