 One might reply here that P2 isn’t false (for the reason just given) because there are no non-present entities—presentists don’t think that there is something, Curie, that exists and isn’t present. To work through the details here, it’s important to start talking about what presentists accept in the domain of their most unrestricted quantifiers. That is, P2 isn’t false because there are no non-present entities in the relevant domain of quantification. Suppose that we read P2 in the following way: “for any x, if x has existed, exists now, or will exist, then x is present”. And, following Thomas Crisp (2004), presentists may read the quantifier “for any…” as “for any… within time” (depending on views about the existence of timeless entities). If we shift to this reading, it’s no longer obvious that P2 is false. It’s true that there once was an entity, Marie Curie, who doesn’t exist at all anymore. But it’s not clear that Curie must be within the relevant domain of quantification simply in virtue of having once existed. So, if we read P2 as “for any x (within time), if x has existed, exists now, or will exist, then x is present”—and we deny that there are any non-present entities—then P2 isn’t false (Crisp 2004: 18–20). And, if P2 isn’t false, then premise (3) is false, and the argument is unsound.