  Other theorists have proposed other accounts. Michael Devitt (1981) says that the referent of an utterance of ‘that’ is the item that stands in a certain causal relation to the utterance. Colin McGinn (1981) proposes that the referent of an utterance of ‘that \(F\)’ is the first \(F\) to intersect the line projected from the speaker’s pointing finger. Howard Wettstein (1984) says that the reference of ‘that’ is determined by the cues that a competent and attentive addressee would reasonably take the speaker to be exploiting. Marga Reimer (1991a, 199b) argues that demonstrative utterances can refer to objects that are not the targets of the speaker’s directing intentions, contrary to what she takes Kaplan (1989b) to be arguing. Kent Bach (1992a, 1992b) claims that the object to which a speaker refers with a demonstrative is fixed by certain of the speaker’s communicative intentions. Perry (2009, p. 60) argues that the referent of an utterance of a demonstrative is the object of a directing intention, and offers a rather elaborate theory of directing intentions that is inspired by some brief remarks from Kaplan. Jeffrey King (2012) argues that the semantic value of a demonstrative in a context is the object such that (a) the speaker intends it to be the demonstrative’s semantic value and (b) an attentive hearer would take it to be the speaker’s intended semantic value.