 As the taxonomy of  section 2 above  emphasized, whether moral principles are necessary for moral understanding or moral explanation is not the only debate between particularists and generalists. Distinct questions remain about the place and value of principles in guiding moral decision-making and action and in interpersonal justification. Generalists typically see a larger and more important role for principles to play in these contexts. Particularists typically find at least some sympathy with David McNaughton’s claim that moral principles are “at best useless and at worst a hindrance” (McNaughton 1988: 191). In considering this aspect of the debate, it is helpful to treat as common ground the idea that it is at least possible for an agent to be (in some sense) guided by a principle. This assumption has, of course, been challenged, most prominently by some readings of Wittgenstein’s arguments concerning rule-following (Kripke 1982). If guidance by principle were utterly impossible, then questions about the value and importance of principled guidance would be largely moot. For similar reasons, it is helpful to assume, at least provisionally, that an agent can eschew being guided by principles and yet still act rationally and for reasons and with some measure of consistency.