 Fârâbî also insists that the many arising from some sense of “one”, i.e., a many composed out of things that are each one in this sense, is not the many opposite to this sense of “one”, although he admits that in some cases the many arising from the one and the many opposite to the one are the same per accidens (#37–#49). As before, there are senses of “one” that do not have an opposite sense of “many”. There are also senses of “one” that do have an opposite sense of “many”, but where the many that arises from the one is not the same as the many that is opposite to the one. Thus the many arising from the one as a point (the one as what is indivisible although spatially located) is many points, while the opposite of the one as a point is a continuous extension. The many arising from the one as having-no-partner-in-its-species might be a plurality like a unique moon and a unique sun (or a unique phoenix), each without a partner in its distinct species, whereas the opposite of having-no-partner-in-its-species is having-a-partner-in-its-species. The opposite of the one as indivisible quiddity is a divisible quiddity; the many arising from the one as indivisible quiddity is several indivisible quiddities, which could be a divisible quiddity if, say, one of them is an unanalyzable genus and the others are successive unanalyzable differentiae of that genus, but the several indivisible quiddities need not be a single quiddity at all. But, beyond these examples, Fârâbî’s basic point is that, in the many arising from a one, the one is an essential constituent of the many, “a part by which its constitution [is]” (#62, p.75): and so it can no more be opposite to this one than a species can be opposite to its constituent genera and differentiae. And likewise, if a one, in some sense of “one”, is what it is by being a unit, a constituent of a many, then it cannot be opposite to that many, even if there is some other sense of “many” which is its opposite.