 An example of this criticism can be found at the moment when the existence of the common sense is rejected in the Antoniana (AM: I.371–373). This is the faculty responsible for processing the so-called common sensibles, that is, those common objects of perception which are co-incidental to the exclusive objects of each sense (i.e., motion, rest, number, figure etc.; see Aristotle, De Anima, III, 1–2). In opposition to Aristotle, Pereira argued that, if the common sense is an organic faculty, so that it perceives what has been previously perceived by the senses, it would make the latter unnecessary and we should be obliged to conclude that nature has created many organs to do what it could with fewer, which goes against its own principles. It is, therefore, better to maintain that it is the soul itself, as an indivisible unity, which perceives, judges and differentiates all the sensibles: the soul is present, in effect, in all parts of the living body and is affected in a similar way by all the sense organs.