  Many of the recent feminist analyses of epistemic injustice and epistemic ignorance combine to draw attention to another important feature of our social epistemic relations: trust and trustworthiness. Because of our epistemic dependence on each other, inquirers need to trust others for knowledge, and often must trust across social locations. Structural features of epistemic injustice and invested ignorance create challenges for determining how to trust responsibly (Grasswick 2014), and how to be a trustworthy knower for those situated differently from oneself. Medina provides account of how racial ignorance produces systematic distrust across racial lines (through racial insensitivity) and considers how one could become aware of such insensitivities (Medina 2016). Recent work on implicit bias explores just how difficult it can be for a knower to become aware of how they are perpetuating epistemic injustices (Brownstein and Saul 2016). How are we to respond to such challenging epistemic conditions? Feminists have taken different approaches. Daukas argues that within social networks of inquiry, being trustworthy is a central virtue (and requires being trustworthy in one’s own inquiry, and being a good judge of others’ trustworthiness) (Daukas 2006). Yet Frost-Arnold argues that trustworthiness is more complex; in some cases, taking on the role of a trickster by betraying the trust of the dominant might be epistemically virtuous on the part of the marginalized, when doing so disrupts the networks of trust that exclude the oppressed (Frost-Arnold 2014). Turning to the world of social media, Frost-Arnold also argues for the epistemic potential of a strategy of “hopeful trust,” wherein, in spite of the odds of experiencing testimonial injustice and other wrongs, a marginalized person posts about her interpretation of her experiences, in hopes of challenging the ignorance of the dominant (Frost-Arnold 2016). These works offer examples of how feminists tend to approach the role of epistemic trust and trustworthiness differently from other social epistemologists: by attending explicitly to the relevance of social positions and existing networks of trust wrought as they are with problematic features of epistemic injustice and invested ignorance that infect epistemic processes, and must be grappled with.