 It should be acknowledged that these conditions are quite restrictive, indeed more restrictive than many think appropriate. In particular, the first condition restricts access to voluntary euthanasia to those who are terminally ill. While that expression is not free of all ambiguity, for present purposes it can be agreed that it does not include those who are rendered quadriplegic as a result of accidents, or sufferers from motor neurone disease, or individuals who succumb to forms of dementia like Alzheimer’s Disease, to say nothing of those afflicted by ‘existential suffering’. Those who consider that cases like these show the first condition to be too restrictive (e.g., Varelius 2014) may, nonetheless, agree that including them as candidates for legalized voluntary euthanasia is likely to make it far harder in many jurisdictions to gain sufficient support for legalization (and so to make it harder to help those terminally ill persons who wish to die). Even so, they believe that voluntary euthanasia should be permitted for those who consider their lives no longer worth living, not just for for the terminally ill. The fifth condition further restricts access to voluntary euthanasia by excluding those capable of ending their own lives, and so may be thought unduly restrictive by those who would wish to discourage terminally ill patients from attempting suicide. There will be yet others who consider this condition to be too restrictive because competent patients can always refuse nutrition and hydration (see, e.g., Bernat, et al., 1993; Savulescu 2014). Though this is true, many competent dying persons still wish to have access to legalized medically assisted death, rather than having to rely on refusing nutrition and hydration, so that they may retain control over the timing of their deaths and avoid needlessly prolonging the process of dying.