 An alternative reading of Descartes’ comments on the eternal truths suggests still another interpretation. Jonathan Bennett has pointed out that in some of the key passages in question Descartes does not say that God can make contradictories true, but that we should not say that God cannot make contradictories true (Bennett 1994, 653–55). In such passages, for example in the already-cited 1648 letter to Arnauld, Descartes is not saying anything about God’s power but about us and what we ought not say. Presumably, he is just invoking his Fourth Meditation rule for judging in these passages, as he is very explicit that when we do metaphysics we ought not affirm what we do not clearly and distinctly  understand.[15]  Since we do not come close to understanding what it would be for one and two to add up to something other than three, and since we do not understand God’s being unable to do something, the prospect that God cannot make 1 and 2 not add to 3 is hopelessly confused. Accordingly, we ought not speak of it. The same analysis also applies to the important passage in the Mesland letter. Immediately after saying that God can make contradictories true together, Descartes takes it back: “… even if this be true, we should not try to comprehend it, since our nature is incapable of doing so.” Descartes’ claim that God can make contradictories true is something that we ought not affirm when doing metaphysics and thus something that should have no bearing on our interpretation of Descartes’ system.