 Should judgments of beauty be regarded as objective? Ameriks has argued (1982, 1983, 1998, 2000) that in spite of Kant’s claim that judgments of beauty are “subjectively grounded”, they are nonetheless objective in the same sense that judgments of colour and other secondary qualities are objective. Similar views are proposed in Savile 1981 and Kulenkampff 1990; see also the references offered by Ameriks at (2003: 307n.1). The claim is challenged by Ginsborg (1998), who defends the subjectivity of taste on the grounds that Kant does not allow that we can make judgments of beauty on the basis of hearsay, but must “subject the object to our own eyes” (§8, 5:215–216); a similar point is made in Hopkins 2001, and there is further discussion of aesthetic testimony in Gorodeisky 2009. Ameriks responds to Ginsborg’s challenge in his 1998; the objectivity of taste is defended further in Makkai 2010. Ginsborg offers further defence of the subjectivity of taste in her 2017; her approach is challenged in chapter 3 of Makkai 2021.