 where \(A \rightarrow B \prec A \not\rightarrow C \prec B \rightarrow C\) and we take \(A\) to be given. We can apply the defeasible rules \(A \rightarrow B\) and \(A \not\rightarrow C\). If we operate in a “greedy” way, we may apply \(A \not\rightarrow C\) to derive \(C\) before applying \(A \rightarrow B\), since \(A \rightarrow B \prec A \not\rightarrow C\). Now only \(A \rightarrow B\) is applicable. So we derive \(B\). Although the antecedent of \(B \rightarrow C\) is already derived, we cannot apply this rule for the sake of consistency.  Brewka and Eiter (2000)  argue against this greedy approach and in favor of deriving \(B\) and \(C\).  Delgrande and Schaub (2000)  argue that the example presents an incoherent set of rules. This is put into question in  Horty (2007)  where a consistent deontic reading in terms of conditional imperatives is presented which also challenges the procedural approach by favoring the conclusions \(B\) and \(C\). 