 However, the will theory’s account of the function of rights struggles to explain many rights that most think there are. Within the will theory, there can be no such thing as an unwaivable right: a right over which its holder has no power. Yet intuitively it would appear that unwaivable rights are some of the most important rights that we have: consider, for example, the unwaivable right not to be enslaved (MacCormick 1977, 197). Moreover, since the will theorist holds that all rights confer sovereignty, she cannot acknowledge that beings incapable of exercising sovereignty have rights. Within the will theory, it is impossible for incompetents like infants, animals, and comatose adults to have rights. Yet we ordinarily would not doubt that these incompetents can have rights, for example the right not to be tortured (MacCormick 1982, 154–66). Will theories also have difficulties explaining bare privilege-rights (such as in the Hobbesian state of nature), which are not rights of authority over others.