This leaves open several interpretations of the probability assignment as a strength of belief.  One very influential interpretation of probability as degree of belief relates probability to a willingness to bet against certain odds (cf.  Ramsey 1926, De Finetti 1937/1964, Earman 1992, Jeffrey 1992, Howson 2000).  According to this interpretation, assigning a probability of \(3/4\) to a proposition, for example, means that we are prepared to pay at most $0.75 for a betting contract that pays out $1 if the proposition is true, and that turns worthless if the proposition is false. The claim that degrees of belief are correctly expressed in a probability assignment is then supported by a so-called Dutch book argument: if an agent does not comply to the axioms of probability theory, a malign bookmaker can propose a set of bets that seems fair to the agent but that lead to a certain monetary loss, and that is therefore called Dutch, presumably owing to the Dutch's mercantile reputation. This interpretation associates beliefs directly with their behavioral consequences: believing something is the same as having the willingness to engage in a particular activity, e.g., in a bet. 