 Bridgman did not develop in detail his operationalist ideas in relation to any other science than physics, apparently content to leave that job to the specialists in the respective fields. Some other scientists and philosophers did take up Bridgman’s call for operationalist reforms, with interesting consequences. Now, it would be fair to say that operationalism did not change the practice of physics itself drastically from what it would have been anyway, and most physicists followed him only as far as he asserted what was common sense to them. The situation was perhaps similar in other physical sciences, too. For example, operational thinking has always been an important part of chemistry, sometimes explicitly so, for example in Lavoisier’s famous “operational” definition of a chemical element as a substance that has not yet been decomposed further. David Hull (1968) indicates that some key terms in biology has been criticised for not being operational, and calls for a nuanced view on the matter. Hugh Petrie (1971) laments that a positivist dogma originating from a misunderstanding of operationalism has had a negative influence on the social sciences. Moyer (1991, 393–394) records Bridgman’s influence on the University of Chicago economist Henry Schultz, and the strong and explicit operationalist orientation of Paul Samuelson’s early work. Paul Marshall (1979) argues, with particular attention to political science, that operationalism has left a methodological legacy in the social sciences lasting well beyond its decline within the philosophy of science.