 Caspar Hare (2010) introduces and discusses a problem relating to how rational choice theory can encompass risky actions involving outcomes that are on a par. If we assume that two outcomes, A and B, are on a par, it follows that a small improvement, or mild sweetening as Hare phrases it, to one of the outcomes would not break the parity relation. We can imagine two actions, X and Y. If we opt for X then we will either end up with a sweetened A in state 1 or a sweetened B in state 2, and the outcomes are equiprobable. If we opt for Y, we will end up with B in state 1 or A in state 2, and the outcomes are equiprobable. On the one hand, it seems as if we ought to opt for X since we will end up with a sweetened alternative, A+ or B+. On the other hand, it is difficult to say why X is better than Y. The outcome in state 1 is not better if we do X rather than Y since the outcomes, A+ and B, are on a par, and the outcome in state 2 is not better if we do Y rather than X since the outcomes, B+ and A, are on a par. The problem can be construed as a lottery where one lottery is deemed comparable with another, yet their outcomes are incomparable (see Rabinowicz, 2021b, for this axiological formulation of Hare’s problem). Hare argues that we should “take the sugar”, i.e., we ought to opt for X (see also Bader 2019). Inspired by a Fitting-Attitudes Analysis of value Wlodek Rabinowicz argues that even though outcomes may be on a par, it is possible for an action to be better than another (2021b). Others such as Schoenfield (2014), Bales, Cohen &amp; Handfield (2014), and Doody (2019) reach the opposite conclusion.