 In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that additional feelings also play a role in motivating virtuous conduct. He lists moral feeling, conscience, love of human beings, and respect (for oneself) as special kinds of feelings of which we are made aware only though consciousness of the moral law (MM 6:399). Kant describes these as “moral endowments” that “lie at the basis of morality” or the “subjective conditions of receptivity to the concept of duty” (MM 6:399). Since our compliance with duty presupposes our having these feelings, there is no duty for us to have them. However, because of their indispensability to human morality, there is a duty to cultivate them. Additionally, Kant clearly sees moral value in some sensibly-grounded (“pathological”) feelings (MM 6:456–57, 458; also M 29:626; NF 19:77 #6560). Speaking of sympathy, which is perhaps the best example of this sort of feeling, Kant says “it is… an indirect duty to cultivate the natural… feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means to sympathy based on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them” (MM 6:457).