 Suppose that \(A\) knows that, should he become vulnerable for whatever reason, \(B\) will be obligated to constrain \(B\)’s advantage over \(A\)—perhaps by selling \(B\) goods for less than the normal market price. Given this knowledge, \(A\) might be tempted to take a risky gamble, knowing that if it doesn’t turn out well, \(B\) will be obligated to partly subsidize \(A\)’s loss. In effect, \(B\)’s obligation toward \(A\) puts \(B\) in a position of vulnerability, a vulnerability that \(A\) has the potential to unfairly take advantage of. In other words, \(A\)’s obligation not to exploit \(B\) renders \(A\) vulnerable to exploitation by B! To avoid this difficulty, it seems necessary to limit the kinds of vulnerabilities that trigger the obligation to constrain one’s advantage, perhaps by ruling out vulnerabilities for which agents are themselves morally responsible.