 The categoricalist maintains it is categorical properties that we truly attribute to \(x\) when we apparently talk about \(x\)’s dispositions. What are those categorical properties? To this question, the categoricalist typically suggests that they are categorical causal bases, which rests on the assumption that all dispositions (more precisely, all of what we apparently consider as dispositions) must have categorical properties as causal bases. This is why the categoricalist is typically inclined to deny the possibility of bare dispositions. Conversely, the dispositionalist is not similarly pressed to say that dispositions must have causal bases, or at least, that all dispositions must have distinct causal bases. For this reason, some dispositionalists leave it an open question whether bare dispositions are possible or not but most of them, finding unattractive the idea of dispositions all the way down, go further to affirm the possibility of bare dispositions (McKitrick 2003b; Mumford 2006; Ellis 2001, 2002; Molnar 1999, 2003). Investigating the possibility of bare dispositions thus bears major significance for the debate between dispositionalism and categoricalism.