 Error theorists claim – roughly! – that all normative claims are false. As we indicated above, it’s hard to give an analysis, much less necessary and sufficient conditions, for a claim’s being normative. But error theorists need to get at least a little clearer about their target. For example, is “Either the sun is shining or you shouldn’t believe in aliens” a normative claim? It has a normative disjunct, after all. If this disjunctive claim is normative, then the error theorist is in trouble, since surely it can be true by virtue of the truth of its first (non-normative) disjunct, even if it’s not the case that you shouldn’t believe in aliens. To avoid the complication illustrated by this example, error theorists would be well-advised to set aside disjunctive normative claims (or at least to set aside disjunctions of a normative claim with a non-normative claim).