 Ross Cameron (2022) argues that when we have an infinite regress of ontological dependence or grounding, we might as a result of that regress lack an explanation of the existence or nature of the entities on the infinite chain, or of the facts on that chain. However, Cameron argues that this is not a reason to deny that such infinite regresses are impossible, and instead argues that we must pull apart the notion of metaphysical explanation from relations like ontological dependence and grounding, which he calls metaphysical determination relations. If \(E_1\) is ontologically dependent on \(E_2\), which is ontologically dependent on \(E_3\), which is ontologically dependent on \(E_4\) … and so on ad infinitum, there might be no metaphysical explanation for certain facts concerning the existence and nature of \(E_1\), \(E_2\), … etc., but, argues Cameron, this is compatible with each of the facts concerning those things being adequately grounded in reality, and hence with the reality of such an infinite sequence. Infinite regresses of metaphysical determination relations, argues Cameron, might require us to abandon certain explanatory goals, but this does not render them impossible.