 Street (2008) has replied to this proposed way out of the problem, in part, by noting that Copp’s strategy relies on his intuitions about what the moral truths are, as reflected in his society-centered moral theory. But those are precisely the intuitions of an evolved theorist, ex hypothesi influenced by the same evolutionary factors that influenced the moral beliefs in question. So of course we can expect there to be a decent alignment between our evolutionarily shaped moral beliefs and the moral truths described by a moral theory spun by the very same evolutionarily shaped mind. Such a move, she argues, therefore cannot really help the realist. It would be different if God independently (and convincingly) revealed to us what the moral truths are, so that we could then go check our moral beliefs against them and perhaps discover that they line up pretty well; but instead, all we’re doing is comparing our moral beliefs with a purported list of moral truths yielded by a theory we find plausible precisely because it is appealing to our evolved sensibilities (though see Locke 2014 and FitzPatrick 2014b for some complications here).