 Van Inwagen’s moderate skepticism draws attention to the issue of the scope of our modal knowledge. Which modal propositions are knowable, if any? We can ask whether a certain account targets knowledge of just one kind of modality, or more. Focusing on one kind of modality, we can also ask whether a given theory aims to account for our access to the whole range of (knowable) modal propositions (from the every-day ones to the philosophical ones, from those about abstracta to those about concreta, etc.), or merely to some of them. In the former case the theory might be labeled ambitious, in the latter, modest (see Wirling 2020). Some modest theories, for instance, aim to offer an account of ordinary modal knowledge, which involves what is possible and necessary for couches and cups, say; but they are either skeptical or silent about extraordinary or philosophical cases, such as whether the number 2 could have been the number 3 or whether there could have been philosophical  zombies—i.e.,  a creature that is physically identical in every respect to a human being but lacks all phenomenal consciousness.