 Part (2) of the above definition states that an agent must have a capacity (or an ability) to have certain attitudes and intentions. This allows one to sidestep the difficulties that have been posed for the conditional analysis of abilities (cf. Portmore 2011: 168). Part (3) states that the agent’s attitudes must be permissible. To illustrate, suppose that the only way in which Doug can ensure at 2 pm that he will eat a healthy meal rather than pizza at 6 pm is by having the irrational belief that his life depends upon eating a healthy meal at 6 pm. Since it seems that he is not obligated to have such a belief, it follows that, at 2 pm, Doug is not obligated to eat a healthy meal at 6 pm since there is no combination of intentions and permissible attitudes (as opposed to impermissible attitudes) that Doug can have at 2 pm, such that if he were to have them at 2 pm then he would eat a healthy meal at 6 pm (Portmore 2011: 164–165).