  Philosophers have generally criticized the theory that genes and DNA provide all the information and have challenged the use of sweeping metaphors such as “master plan” and “progam” which suggest that genes and DNA contain all developmental information. Critics have taken a number of different positions. Most seem to accept the notion that biological systems or processes contain information, but they deny the idea that DNA has a exceptional role in providing information. Some are content to argue that under various existing theories of information, such as causal theories or standard teleosemantic theories, information is not restricted to DNA. But others contend that understanding what genes do requires a new conception of biological information. One approach is to retreat to a narrow conception of coding specifically aimed at clarifying the sense in which DNA provides information for the synthesis of polypeptides, but not for higher-level traits (e.g.  Godfrey-Smith 2000). Another approach is to construct a new, broad conception of biological information and use this conception to show that the informational role of genes is not exclusive (Jablonka 2002).  A different approach is to abandon information talk altogether and explain the investigative and explanatory reasoning associated with genetics and molecular biology in purely causal terms.