 Avicenna is keenly interested in conditionals with impossible antecedents (sophisticated discussions are to be found in his account of a- and e-conditionals and in connection with reductio arguments) but only in the sense in which an impossibility may genuinely be derived from another impossibility, as it were, out of the meaning of the terms involved, not in the sense in which an arbitrary consequent may trivially be inferred from an impossible antecedent. The problem of explosion is recognized and rejected in post-Avicennan logic, starting with Ḫūnağī (d. 1248 CE). It seems reasonable to assume, even in the current state of our fragmentary knowledge of such a vast amount of material, that both Avicenna’s logic and post-Avicennan logic may generally be committed to an idea of logical consequence that could perhaps best be captured, in modern terms, by the intuition behind a relevantist approach to the notion of following. This is a feature that the Arabic tradition would share with certain strands of medieval Latin logic. In discussing the problem of conditionals with impossible antecedents in the post-Avicennan tradition (El-Rouayheb 2009 and 2010: xxxiii–xl) argues for an even stronger interpretation in terms of connexive  logic.[9]