  Kyburg (2000) offers a pragmatic explanation for why a is tall might be judged neither true nor false in a case of borderline tallness, or why a is tall and a is not tall might be judged true in the same circumstance. Without conceding gaps or gluts, she points to a disconnect between truth-value intuitions and assertability intuitions for a cooperative speaker aiming to be maximally informative. Of course, in some cases, the felicity of a is tall and a isn’t tall might simply reflect the awareness that different cut-off points apply depending on the relevant comparative class of entities (children vs. adults, male adults vs. male professional basketball players, etc.)—the instances foreseen by the Aristotelian rider. But in other cases, such a statement would indeed convey that a possesses a borderline degree of tallness, while simply affirming or denying the vague predicate—a is tall or a is not tall—would communicate too high or too low a degree. Just as speakers might a sentence might refrain from uttering, or classifying as true, a perfectly and “sharply” true sentence whose use would mislead the hearer—Snow is white or snow is purple—so too the assertion of a conjunction of opposites in borderline cases—a is tall and he’s not tall—might be preferred, despite its contradictory nature, to the misleading assertion of either a is tall or a is not tall in the same circumstance.