 Carnap was actually solely concerned with issues of justification. What mattered to him was to establish that everything that can be said in science about the world lends itself to the same type of justification, hence the unity of the domain of the sciences. His motivation for the reconstruction of all scientific sentences within a common linguistic framework was to abolish differences in terms of epistemic access, especially between the human and the natural sciences. As is well known, Carnap’s project was not successful. More generally, not much progress has been made since the heyday of logical positivism when it comes to the elaboration of a complete and unified account of empirical justification in science, notwithstanding the much-discussed prospects of the Bayesian approach (Earman 1992: x). Some philosophers challenge the very project of a universal inductive scheme (Norton 2003) and the debate mainly amounts to assessing the cogency of the quest for a unified analysis of inductive inferences.