 If moral goodness is rejected as a pure perfection, it does not follow that there is no sense in which perfect goodness is a specific perfection. After all, we might understand perfect goodness as the specific perfection of divine agency without taking the relevant standards to be the familiar welfare-oriented moral standards. God’s being perfectly good might involve God’s responding perfectly to value in a way appropriate for an absolutely perfect being to do so. It was a common notion in the medieval period to hold that God must love Godself but that God is not necessitated to act by the prospect of the well-being of humans or other sentient creatures. Thus God did not have to create at all, and needs no reason not to promote the well-being of creatures more than God in fact does. (This position is defended in Murphy 2017, 2019a, and 2019b, and in a very different way in Rubio 2017.) This position is compatible with the notion that God might place Godself under certain norms contingently, by promises, for example. But it would reject the notion that God is by nature subject to the same system of norms to which we humans are subject.