 If we wish to allow for basic justification, can we still give a principled explanation of why some forms of bootstrapping seem illegitimate (for example, the case of Roxanne)? This is an area of active research. One suggestion is that illegitimate forms of bootstrapping involve No Lose Investigations. Roughly, a No Lose Investigation into a hypothesis \(h\) is an investigation that could never, in principle, count against \(h\). (For suggestions along these lines, see Kornblith 2009; Titelbaum 2010; Douven &amp; Kelp 2013.) Another suggestion is that illegitimate forms of bootstrapping all involve epistemic feedback (Weisberg 2010). Suppose an agent believes premises \(p_1\) … \(p_n\) from which she infers lemmas \(l_1\) … \(l_n\), from which she in turn infers a conclusion \(c\). Epistemic feedback is present when the probability of \(c\) conditional on \(l_1\) … \(l_n\) is greater than the probability of \(c\) conditional on \(p_1\) … \(p_n\). Roxanne’s case can be understood in these terms. She first believes various premises about the gas gauge readings (e.g., The gas gauge read full at time \(t\); the gauge reads half-empty at \(t^*\)). She then infers various lemmas about the state of the gas tank (e.g., The tank was full at \(t\); the tank was half-empty at \(t^*\)). Finally, by conjoining these premises with these lemmas, she comes to believe the conclusion: The gas tank is reliable. The probability of this conclusion conditional on just the lemmas (that is, the beliefs about the state of the gas tank) is higher than the probability of the conclusion conditional on the premises (that is, the gas gauge readings). Perhaps by imposing a ban on either No Lose Investigations or epistemic feedback (or both), we can account for the intuition about Roxanne, while still allowing for basic justification. (For an overview of various responses to the bootstrapping problem, see Weisberg 2012.)