 Counterfactuals in the potential outcome framework interact with probability differently than counterfactuals in Lewis’s (1973b) framework. Suppose that Ted was exposed to asbestos and developed lung cancer. We are interested in the counterfactual: “If Ted had not been exposed to asbestos, he would not have developed lung cancer”. Suppose that the processes by which cancer develops are genuinely indeterministic. Then, it seems wrong to say that if Ted had not been exposed to asbestos, he definitely would have developed lung cancer; and it seems equally wrong to say that he definitely would not have developed lung cancer. In this case, Lewis would say that the counterfactual “If Ted had not been exposed to asbestos, he would not have developed lung cancer” is determinately false. As a result, the objective probability of this counterfactual being true is zero. On the other hand, a counterfactual with objective probability in the consequent may be true: “If Ted had not been exposed to asbestos, his objective chance of developing lung cancer would have been .06”. By contrast, in the potential outcome framework, probability may be pulled out of the consequent and applied to the counterfactual as a whole: The probability of the counterfactual “If Ted had not been exposed to asbestos, he would have developed lung cancer” can be .06.