 Why believe the argument’s premise that, if a statement has been true from eternity, then the event that it predicts is necessary? One common reason is the immutability of the past, that we cannot now do anything to change the past. This immutability is the reason the Stoic Chrysippus gives (against Cleanthes, who preceded him as head of the Stoa) for why the past is necessary (Fat. 14, LS 38E). And if the past is necessary, it might seem to follow that I cannot now do anything to change the past truth of statements about the future. Aristotle thinks that the present is also necessary, saying “What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not” (Int. 19a23–5). After all, if I am presently bleeding from a wound, while it might be possible for me either to bleed to death or not, and I might do something to make it the case that I don’t bleed to death, I cannot do anything to change the fact that I am bleeding right now. But then, the present truth of a statement about what will result from my wound may also seem to make the outcome necessary, as much as the past truth would.