 A second type of reason against the sufficiency of consent is harm. Setting aside harm to third parties, if sexual activity leads to harm to one or more of its parties, then consent is not sufficient. This view might be plausible especially when it comes to women, given that many women engage in consensual sex but motivated by nonsexual desires, such as not wanting to put their partner in a foul mood. The harm is psychological, especially to their autonomy (West 1995). This implies that prostitutes are harmed women because of their consent to undesired sex, an implausible implication. However, even if specific formulations of the view are implausible (such as West’s; see Soble 1996: 37–39, Wertheimer 2003: passim), this does not negate the claim that if sexual activity harms one or more of the consenting parties, the activity is wrong. Put this way, the argument sounds plausible: there is no good reason to deny that harmful sexual acts are wrong in that respect. One might object that this argument is paternalistic, telling people not to engage in sex when the sex is harmful (Soble 1996: 37–39). This objection is true in that harmful sex gives the participants a reason to not engage in it, although it cannot be used to argue that social or legal forces should prevent this action (Wertheimer 2003: 130–131).