 In this scenario, the entire case for supersession would seem to rest on the Lockean proviso and its alleged prohibition of claiming unowned stuff as property when there is not enough and as good left over for others. We say “alleged prohibition” for it is not at all clear that Locke’s words amount to such a prohibition. However, the supersession thesis fails even if we allow the prohibition. To see this, let us agree that the Ps and Qs are now joint owners of the waterhole and that the Ps cannot demand that the Qs depart leaving them the waterhole’s sole owners. Our agreement does not imply that we also agree that the Ps cannot demand reparations from the Qs for the damages that the Qs earlier wrongly caused them. That would be absurd because it implies that the Ps and the Qs had always been joint owners of the waterhole, but by assumption the Ps and Qs were not always joint owners of the waterhole. In particular, by assumption, the Ps were once the sole owners of the waterhole when the Qs attacked them and stole their water. This foregoing sketch is meant to parallel the case of the Europeans and indigenous peoples in New Zealand, Australia, and the Americas. For convenience, let us consider the Europeans and the Maoris in New Zealand. We concede that these two people are now the joint owners of the land mass of New Zealand. The Maoris cannot demand that land mass back as reparation because they are no longer its sole owners. They used to be its sole owners, but circumstances have changed and now they are only its joint owners. No one can demand that anyone leave. But that concession does not make the injustice of the European conquest two hundred years ago disappear into thin air. New Zealand may not now belong exclusively to the Maori, but it once did, and when it did, the Europeans did then injure them unjustly. If those injuries persist in the Maoris’ descendants because the European conquerors and their descendants did not pay or make reparations to the original Maoris, their descendants have rights to reparations against the Europeans’ descendants for their injuries, even if they do not have rights that the Europeans’ descendants leave New Zealand to them. To put the point in a different way, the fact that restitution is no longer possible and morally mandatory does not imply that reparations is not still possible and morally mandatory. Restitution, the return of a stolen item to its rightful owner, is often a part of making reparations to the victim of the theft, but as we stressed earlier it is neither necessary nor sufficient for such reparations. It is not sufficient because if I steal your bicycle and then return it to you, though I have made restitution I have not made reparations since the damages you suffer as a result of my theft may be more that the loss of the bicycle; and restitution the return of your bicycle may not cancel, undo or erase the damages you suffered as a result of my theft. And restitution is not necessary for reparations because while the loss or destruction of a stolen item may make its restitution impossible, it does not make reparation for the loss of the item impossible or obligatory. If the bicycle I stole from you is lost restitution is impossible. But it does not follow that reparations is impossible. I can still make reparations to you by providing you with the money to buy another  one.[4]