 Now, suppose we define the right act with respect to B, not as “that which, on the data, will probably produce the greatest balance of good over evil” but as “that which, on the data, will probably produce the greatest balance of what B believes to be good over what B believes to be evil”. The right rule of policy with respect to B will correspondingly be defined as the rule or policy that will probably, in the appropriate circumstances, produce the greatest balance of what B believes to be good over what B believes to be evil. Then, so long as B has a reasonably coherent set of ideals, the claim that a given act or policy is right or wrong with respect to B will usually have a determinate truth-value. Claims of the form “X is right wrt to B” will be either true or false, so long as the person (or group of persons) designated by B has a clear and consistent set of values. There will thus be a fact of the matter about whether X is right wrt to B which can be the subject of rational enquiry. And if “B” stands in for us (whoever “we” may be) and if we share a reasonably coherent set of ideals, then there will be a fact of the matter about whether X is right or wrong with respect to our ideals. Thus if there is agreement with respect to ideals and if we adopt a consequentialist conception of rightness, indexed, not to what is good, but to what we believe to be good, then we can have a rational debate—maybe even a scientific enquiry—about the rights and wrongs of actions, rules or policies, or at least about their rightness or wrongness with respect to us.