 However, one might insist that a necessary condition for inheritance is the existence of testamentary wishes concerning that inheritance, based on the presupposition “that respect for testamentary wishes lies at the core of the concept of inheritance (Young 2007: 115). Because it is rarely the case that demonstrable testamentary wishes regarding cultural property can be identified, one might think that inheritance is therefore unlikely to provide a basis for cultural property claims (Young 2007: 113–15; 2006: 18–20). However, an alternative approach starts by noting that it is generally assumed that children and spouses should inherit holdings even in the absence of testamentary wishes (Thompson 2002: 125; Butt 2009: 165). Thus, one might think that a parallel assumption should be made in the case of cultural property, especially if the alternative is the continued possession of the property by a community that unjustly acquired it from one’s own (Butt 2009: 166). In cases where an object is not already regarded as cultural property, inheritance might therefore also explain how the property of an individual can become the property of the state (Butt 2009: 166), or perhaps of a non-state cultural group.