 Few have been convinced by Davidson’s account. Can’t we act—intentionally and without self-contradiction—against an unconditional evaluative judgement? Or fail to intend in accordance with one? (McDowell 2010 is a recent critic of Davidson on this score; Chislenko 2020 argues that akrasia involves contradictory beliefs.) Davidson himself concedes that ‘A is better than B, all things considered’ entails ‘A is better than B’ if ‘all things considered’ means ‘all truths, moral and otherwise’ (Davidson 1970, p. 40). He may intend this to be trivial, counting that fact that A is better than B among the relevant truths. But it is both plausible and non-trivial to claim that A is better than B, in the relevant sense, if and only if the balance of reasons favours A over B, where the reasons are distinct from that evaluative fact. If it is possible to grasp this connection, to hold that the balance of reasons favours quitting, and still not intend to quit, Davidson’s theory must be false. (A consequence of this fact is the need to distinguish weakness as akrasia, or acting against one’s better judgement, from weakness as a failure of will; see Holton 2009, Ch. 4.)