 Sefer Tiqqun ha deʿot represents a significant development in the domain of Jewish thought in particular and philosophy in general. In a time when post-Maimonidean philosophers exerted efforts to enhance the philosophical-religious enterprise of Maimonides (as they understood Maimonides’ enterprise to be), Albalag highlights the shortcomings of that enterprise, advocating as an alternative the double truth doctrine. In application, however, this doctrine is strikingly restricted to a very narrow scope, while the superiority of philosophy as a source of true knowledge and certainty is made noticeable throughout the Tiqqun. Unlike the religious domain in which truth is qualified by degrees, the ultimate of which being exclusively accessible to prophets, and subject to human interpretations, truth in the philosophical domain is absolute. It can be obtained through demonstrative reasoning and learned from Aristotelian sciences. It is this understanding of philosophical truth that motivated Albalag to undertake scrutiny of the philosophical discourse in order to purge it from errors and reinstate correct Aristotelianism, as he understands it through the writings of Averroes, the Commentator. On the whole, Albalag’s enterprise marks an attempt to break away from some of the major Neo-Platonic trends that had characterized the Avicennian-Farabian interpretation of Aristotle.