 Ridge (2013, 41–45) contrasts Stevenson’s account of disagreement with what he calls a Stevensonian view. The former demands that in order for two persons to disagree at least one must be motivated to coordinate the relevant beliefs or attitudes, whereas the latter only demands that the two persons have, roughly, beliefs that cannot be jointly true or attitudes that cannot be jointly satisfied. The former account of disagreement may seem implausible. It seems that two persons may disagree, both in belief and in attitude, without even being aware of the existence of each other (Ridge 2013, 45–49). The latter option, the Stevensonian view—which has been the more influential one in later discussions of the idea of a disagreement in attitude—avoids this problem (Ridge 2013, 41–43). However, Stevenson’s view plausibly was the Stevensonian one. We may distinguish between disagreement as a kind of activity—having a disagreement—and disagreement as a state (Cappelen &amp; Hawthorne 2009, 60–61). While two people who are not aware of the existence of each other may be in a state of disagreement, they won’t be engaged in having a disagreement. Plausibly, Stevenson is operating with a distinction along these lines, and simply wishes to focus on disagreement in the sense of a kind of activity. This is understandable, given his focus on moral problems and on the ways of dealing with such problems. So, when Stevenson contrasts merely differing with having a disagreement (1944, 4–5 and 111) the contrast is plausibly meant to capture the contrast between merely being in a state of disagreement and having a disagreement. He writes, for instance: