 The implication is that identity would be the right way to conceive the given relation. And versions of the identity theory go back at least to Bradley (see, e.g., Bradley 1914: 112–13; for further discussion and references, see Candlish 1989; 1995; 1999b: 209–12; T. Baldwin 1991: 36–40), and to the founding fathers of the analytic tradition (Sullivan 2005: 56–7 n. 4). The theory can be found in G. E. Moore’s “The Nature of Judgment” (1899), and in the entry he wrote on “Truth” for J. Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology (1902–3; reprinted Moore 1993: 4–8, 20–1; see T. Baldwin 1991: 40–3). Russell embraced the identity theory at least during the period of his 1904 discussions of Meinong (see, e.g., 1973: 75), possibly also in his The Principles of Mathematics of 1903, and for a few years after these publications as well (see T. Baldwin 1991: 44–8; Candlish 1999a: 234; 1999b: 206–9). Frege has a statement of the theory in his 1919 essay “The Thought”, and may have held it earlier (Frege 1918–19: 74 [1977: 25]; see Hornsby 1997: 4–6; Milne 2010: 467–8).