  As debate has expanded over privacy and advancing technology, another recent anthology has made important contributions to the literature.  Privacy, Security and Accountability: Ethics, Law and Policy edited by Adam D. Moore (2016) ushers in a cogent articulation and defense of privacy even when privacy seems to conflict with other important values. For example, new technologies allowing increased data mining, re-identification of anonymized data sets, heat-sensing cameras, license-plate readers, predictive analytics and facial recognition technology can all expose information we thought was protected as private to become more public than we had ever imagined. These technologies and others can make us worry about the moral, legal and social foundations and interrelationships between privacy, security and accountability. Moore and his co-author for the “Introduction”, Michael Katell, use a control-based definition of privacy, that “A right to privacy is a right to control access to, and uses of, places, bodies, and personal information” (Moore, 3), urging that “the ability to control access to our bodies, capacities, and powers, and to sensitive personal information, is an essential part of human flourishing or well-being” (Moore, 5). Security basically provides individuals with control over their lives, projects and property, and to be free from unjustified interference from other individuals, corporations and governments. At this level, privacy and security seem to go hand in hand, reinforcing each other.  However, it is important to ask when external interference is justified, leading to conflicts between privacy and security. People may have different views about when an issue of national security, for example, is strong enough to override individual or group privacy concerns.  Kenneth Einar Himma defends a strong account, arguing that classical social contract theory implies that citizens submit to state authority to gain security, a value the state is morally obligated to protect. Thus armed services, police, intelligence agencies, public health institutions and legal systems provide security for individuals and groups (Moore, ch. 8).  But few would accept the extreme claim that security always overrides privacy, and in our “technologically enabled, fear-inspired environment, balancing the legitimate needs with cherished rights and competing values is an ongoing struggle for a deliberative democracy and society in general” (Moore, 7). While we can appreciate somewhat different categories of moral, social and legal accountability, just as we discuss moral, social and legal responsibility, we all understand it becomes clear that accountability can sometimes supersede privacy rights, and yet privacy rights can on other occasions override accountability in its multiple forms. As the authors in this volume note, there is good reason to conclude that privacy, security and accountability are all morally valuable.  Yet we may all wonder what the appropriate balance is between these different values when they conflict.