 The sort of modesty displayed in passages like the above is very characteristic of Feigl’s way of thinking. Just as in his discussion of the realism issue, he leaves it to the factual sciences to judge about the adequacy of his preferred philosophical position. His methodological outlook can therefore be characterized as “metascientific” (rather than metaphysical), in the sense that “a comprehensive reflection on the results of science as well as on the logic and epistemology of scientific method” (ibid., p. 349) is aspired to. However, the decision between global philosophical stances, like realism and phenomenalism or, as concerns the mind-body problem, monism and dualism cannot be decided by empirical means, but only by a “pragmatic justification” (ibid., p. 294). In the case of the identity theory, this pragmatic justification is, as has been pointed out before, guided by the principle of parsimony.