 Some doubt that acquaintance with some fact is sufficient, on its own, to justify belief in a corresponding proposition. To help see the motivation for this, consider inferential beliefs again. A justified belief that P cannot provide justification for believing every other proposition it entails, for it might be that the entailment relation is beyond one’s cognitive grasp, or the inference is not something one has made or is even able to make. (As already discussed in  section 1,  reflection on such cases might lead us to accept the second clause of PIJ.) Similarly, some acquaintance theorists argue that acquaintance with some fact cannot provide justification for a belief in the absence of an awareness of (or at least an ability to become aware of) the relevance of the fact to the truth of the proposition believed. For example, I may be acquainted with a very specific color or shape in my visual field, and also believe (correctly) that I am experiencing such-and-such a color or shape, but I might actually be really bad at identifying such specific features and my belief might be little more than a lucky guess. Suppose these theorists also accept a correspondence conception of truth according to which, roughly, a proposition is true just in case it corresponds to the facts or to the way the world is; they might add that to be fully justified in believing a proposition to be true one must be acquainted not only with the fact that makes the proposition true but also with the relation of correspondence that holds between the proposition and the fact. For example, in order to be justified in believing that I am experiencing fuchsia, I must be acquainted with (or at least be able to become acquainted with) the “match”, “fit”, or correspondence between my thought or belief that I am experiencing fuchsia and the fact that I am experiencing  fuchsia.[5]