  What kind of moral implications does human dignity have? Although it is common to invoke human dignity in condemning a wide range of nefarious and odious practices, proponents of human dignity are notoriously vague both on the general principles generated by human dignity and on how those principles tell against the activities in question (Macklin 2003). Part of the vagueness lies in the fact that proponents of human dignity frequently use language that implies that human dignity itself is the subject of the wrong (e.g.: “torture undermines human dignity”, “human cloning denigrates human dignity”), but if we instead understand such language as shorthand for saying that an individual with human dignity is wronged, and is wronged in a way relating to that individual’s dignity-grounding capacities, then the following moral implications seem plausible. If an individual with human dignity is uniquely valuable and worthy of respect because she possesses morally valuable dignity-grounding capacities, then there would be a presumption against interfering with the development, maintenance, or exercise of her dignity-grounding capacities. More strongly, there might even be a positive duty to support the development, maintenance, and exercise of her dignity-grounding capacities. The proponent of human dignity is also likely to hold that dignity-grounding capacities and the individuals that possess them have a kind of moral value not susceptible to utilitarian or, more broadly, consequentialist trade-offs. Hence, these presumptions will not be rebuttable merely by appeals to increased utility or value. This does not, of course, commit the proponent of human dignity to the claim that the presumptions are absolute, but it does mean that the presumptions will probably correspond to rights with a relatively high degree of stringency.