 Other deontologists have emphasized the importance of seeing morality as fundamentally interpersonal in nature. Paul Hurley (2009) argues that consequentialists misconstrue moral impartiality by interpreting it as fundamentally impersonal: “whereas the impersonal conception captures a form of equal concern for persons that is appropriate, in the first instance, for the evaluation of overall states of affairs as better or worse, this interpersonal conception of impartiality is relevant, in the first instance, to the evaluation of potential courses of action as right or wrong. […] Moreover, such a fundamental role for interpersonal impartiality in the moral evaluation of actions provides a rationale for the agent-centered restrictions and permissions that are central to ordinary morality.” (Hurley 2009, 179) Although this interpersonal standpoint does not offer an agent-neutral ranking of outcomes, and thus “generates agent-centered reasons and claims, reasons and claims to do and not to do, not to prevent or promote overall outcomes,” Hurley argues that it nevertheless captures a robust and substantial understanding of moral impartiality—an understanding, moreover, that fits our ordinary moral beliefs and practices and better accommodates the rational authority of morality than the agent-neutral impersonal framework endorsed by consequentialism. “If practical reason has a fundamentally interpersonal structure, then it is structured by an equal concern by each person for each other person. Each person has an independent rational significance that is reflected explicitly in reasons that others have not to interfere with them, and in claims that each person has not to be interfered with by any other person” (Hurley 2009, 220).