 A final worry for W. is that he is conflating the psychological phenomenon of SK with something merely linguistic or “grammatical” (Snowdon 2012). If an externalist wishes to explain how knowledge of content is possible, why would she appeal to a linguistic convention to illuminate the matter? It is clear, however, that W. never meant to forbid psychology from having its say (Wright 2015, p.54). But it is possible that our linguistic practices for crediting self-knowledge have mislead us about the psychological facts. An analogy with ethical expressivism is helpful on this score (cf. Wright 2015, p. 55) Instead of investigating the “real moral facts,” ethical expressivists try to account for moral discourse, precisely due to the suspicion that the discourse may not be grounded in bona fide facts of the relevant sort. Similarly, there may be a suspicion in W. that a robust psychological phenomenon of “armchair self-knowledge” simply does not exist. Nonetheless, it may be desirable for us to speak as if there was such knowledge, given our aims and interests more broadly.