 Finally, some feminists emphasize the practical value of phenomenological and pragmatic accounts of embodiment and the self for solving specific problems in the real world. Jennifer Hansen, for example, in her contributions to the philosophy of psychiatry, has emphasized the therapeutic value of a conception of the habitual body and the narrative self for the treatment of individuals with bipolar disorder. Though such individuals may experience self-distrust as a result of difficulty with seeing themselves “as consistent agents” (2013, 69) brought on by challenges with identifying with their past actions in either manic or depressive states, Hansen argues that clinicians can assist patients build a coherent sense of self by incorporating insights about habitual embodiment. Drawing on Grosz and Iris M. Young’s (2005) feminist phenomenology, as well as James’s account of habit as central to embodied selfhood, Hansen suggests that the habitual body’s capacity to engage with the world in consistent, goal-directed ways, despite doing so unconsciously, provides an inroad to a self-concept that is coherent. Although such habitual moments (of, for example, opening familiar doors or performing special learned skills like CPR) are often performed unconsciously, we can begin to notice and appreciate them “if others, such as a clinician, points them out to us” (2013, 72.) Although such recognition may seem a small step, they could be useful as patients begin to cultivate self-trust. Clinicians, moreover, may assist patients in recognizing that even seemingly rudimentary habits have significance in creating a sense of self: “Although the habitual body of a bipolar patient may not have a habitual moral character, she may, for example, have a habit of recycling” (72). The recognition of such habits could be beneficial in beginning to build self-trust. Traditional views of psychiatry may view individuals with bipolar disorder as incapable of “coherent” selfhood in the ordinary sense of the word, but Hansen shows that feminist phenomenological and pragmatic “accounts of embodiment show another way in which bipolar selves can be coherent: they cohere in habitual bodies” (73).