 Where do the Kyoto School thinkers stand with respect to such culture wars? To be sure, the Chūōkōron discussions in particular often asserted that modern Japan was uniquely suited to institute and represent the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” and this undoubtedly reflected a widespread post-Meiji Japanese conflation of political, industrial, and military development with cultural superiority. Nishida also felt that modern Japan was in a unique political and cultural position to host a fruitful marriage of East and West, and Tanabe went so far as to set the nation of Japan up as an archetype for others. In the Kyoto School’s wartime political writings, there indeed remains much grist for the mills of contemporary cultural critics, especially for those with hermeneutical blindfolds or purportedly perfect hindsight vision. Yet a critique of their political misadventures, as necessary as it is, may in fact reveal something more peripheral than central to the cross-cultural thinking of the Kyoto School. It is at least necessary to keep both eyes open: one ready to criticize and the other willing to learn.