 However, this viewpoint is often grounded in metaphysical and epistemic questions about what a theatrical performance is and how a spectator understands a theatrical performance of some kind (for example, as a literary performance or one that is actual and physical). This viewpoint is also often motivated by moral and social views, not just about performances but also about performers. But it is often not clear what relationship this viewpoint has to the actual practices of the art form (Puchner 2013: 548). So even if the motivations for the view can and should be criticized, the viewpoint often seems to be less “a prejudice” than a considered judgment resting on prior argued-for epistemic, metaphysical, or moral positions. And this leads one to wonder if there is anything special, or especially troubling, about the general social or moral problems associated with theater in these periods at all. In short, it is difficult to determine whether and when this animus is actually aberrant—and genuinely prejudicial—or if it is of a piece with standard examinations of social and moral effects of theatrical practices. That said, it is worth noting that suspicion of theatrical practices seems to be a persistently recurring and characteristic attitude within Western European philosophical, social, and political traditions.