But complications arise as soon as one tries to specify a theory's truth conditions: different accounts of truth conditions lead to different accounts of ontological commitment.  Moreover, theories couched in ordinary language do not wear their truth conditions—or their ontological commitments—on their sleeves. Thus, the need arises to find a criterion of ontological commitment: a test or method that can be applied to theories in a neutral way to determine the theory's ontological commitments. For example, perhaps the theory should first be translated into a canonical formal language, such as the language of first-order predicate logic, where truth conditions, and thus ontological commitments, are easier to specify. But whenever these translations are controversial, so will be the verdicts as to ontological commitment. And, even when translated into a formal language, such as the language of first-order predicate logic, different ontological standpoints may disagree as to the existential presuppositions of the theory. The notion of ontological commitment, introduced to help resolve disputes in ontology, becomes hostage to those very disputes. Strife over the ontological commitments of theories begins to appear inevitable.