 Russellian Monism (RM) gets its name from a view Bertrand Russell held in 1927 and that he himself called ‘neutral monism’. The key idea of this view is that the fundamental entities in micro-reality have intrinsic natures not specified in microphysics, natures made up of properties (known as quiddities), some of which are crucial to consciousness and conscious states. The standard reductive version holds that the relevant properties are themselves genuinely conscious properties (that is, qualia) of various sorts. Advocates include for example, Grover Maxwell (1978), David Chalmers (1995 and 1997), Dan Stoljar (2001 and 2006), Galen Strawson (2006), and Barbara Montero (2010). An alternative version of Russellian Monism has it that the relevant properties are only proto-phenomenal. On one interesting version of this view (panqualityism), these properties are not genuinely phenomenal since they are unexperienced but they are nonetheless of the same kind as the phenomenal qualities present in our experiences of pain or color (Coleman 2006, 2015). It is a consequence of this view that the latter qualities themselves are qualities of a sort that are only contingently experienced. What makes these qualities qualia just is the fact that they are experienced. 