 Many Confucians in the Daoxue (“Learning of the Way”) tradition also distinguished between “sensory knowledge” (wenjian zhi zhi 聞見之知) and the sort of knowledge that concerns or can be attributed to our virtuous nature (dexing zhi zhi 德性之知). These were distinguished in various ways by influential Daoxue Confucians. Zhang Zai thought that in the case of sensory knowledge, knowers always conceive the object of knowledge as external and separate from themselves, whereas in the latter sort of knowledge the knower and known are united. Zhang believed that sensory knowledge was both fallible and insufficient for many purposes (especially ethical purposes) but allowed that sensory knowledge is necessary as a means of acquiring knowledge of the virtuous nature, and perhaps also as providing warrants or justifications for the latter sort of knowledge (ZM 7:24–25; Angle &amp; Tiwald 2017: 112–114; Zuo 2019). The Cheng brothers adamantly opposed the view that knowledge of the virtuous nature “depends on” sensory knowledge (HNCSYS 25:317). But they seemed to think that this pertained to certain kinds of dependence and not others, because they continued to recommend that people read texts and undertake investigations of external things and affairs (Angle &amp; Tiwald 2017: 115–116). Some of the Cheng brothers’ immediate disciples entertained more explicitly innatist views of proper knowledge of the virtuous nature, suggesting that we find it solely through inward reflection and meditation (Angle &amp; Tiwald 2017: 216–217). But Zhu Xi thought innate intuitions were unreliable and thus politely declined to make any hard-and-fast distinctions between the two kinds of knowledge (Angle &amp; Tiwald 2017: 117–119). Zhu did, however, continue to think that the most transformative and motivational knowledge is in some sense knowledge of our own (virtuous) nature, whatever external means we may use to acquire it (ZZYL 10:161; Zhu 2019: 29).