 This suggests that Wolff’s concern is better understood as scepticism about whether it is justifiable to surrender one’s judgement wholesale to the law. Some philosophers have queried the intelligibility of this doubt; they say that it is of the nature of law that there is an obligation to obey it, at least in its central case (Fuller 1958 [2000: 100]; Finnis 1979: 14–15). Some go so far as to conclude that it is therefore absurd to ask for any ground of the duty to obey the law: law is that which is to be obeyed (McPherson 1967: 64). We need a way into this circle, and the best entrance is in specifying the nature of law in away compatible with various theories of its nature. Three features are especially important (drawing on Hart 1961 [1994: 193–200]; Raz 1975 [1990: 149–154]; and Lyons 1984: 66–68). First, law is institutionalized: nothing is law that is not connected with the activities of institutions such as legislatures, courts, administrators, police, etc. Second, legal systems have a wide scope. Law not limited to the affairs of small face-to-face groups such as families or clans, nor does it only attend to a restricted domain of life such as baseball. Law governs open-ended domains of large, loosely structured groups of strangers and it regulates their most urgent interests: life, liberty, property, kinship, etc. But although law necessarily deals with moral matters, it does not necessarily do so well, and this is its third central feature: law is morally fallible. This is acknowledged by both positivists and natural lawyers, whose slogan “an unjust law is not a law” was never intended to assert the infallibility of law.