 There is the claim that Malebranche’s account of consent remained essentially the same over the course of his philosophical career (see Kremer 2000, 206). However, there is some reason to think that this account in fact was subject to significant development. In the initial discussion of freedom in the Recherche, there is the suggestion that consent consists in our “determination” of our natural inclination toward the good in general (Malebranche [OC], 1:46). However, this suggestion conflicts with the claim in the very same text that it is God who directs our natural inclination toward particular objects prior to any free act on our part. Indeed, in his later discussion of freedom in “Eclaircissement I,” Malebranche held that our freedom consists not in an active turning of our natural inclination, but rather in the inactivity of our resting with a particular good (Malebranche [OC], 3:548). This view is further developed in the Traité de morale, which in the case of free action distinguishes between the force involved in the search for truth and the liberté that directs this search. Free acts of consent fall under the latter, whereas the former involves the dispositions of our free inclinations that God produces in us on the occasion of these acts (Malebranche [OC], 11:70). In contrast to his earlier suggestion that our free acts involve either a turning of our natural inclination or an inactivity coupled with such an inclination, Malebranche’s view here is that such acts are inactivities coupled with a distinct sort of free inclination. There are different answers to the question of whether this account serves to reconcile Malebranche’s occasionalism with his claim that we have genuine freedom of action; cf. Schmaltz (2005), which defends the coherence of Malebranche’s final position on this issue (in line with the earlier view in Laporte 1951), and Greenberg (2015), which argues that this position is not fully consistent.