 To deal with this, he introduces a monadic predicate operator \(G'\) to take object-level predicates to kind-level predicates. “Cats like themselves” would be formalized as “\(G'(\lambda x (\textrm{Like}(x, x))(c)\)”, which is to be understood as true iff the object level predicate “\(\lambda x (\textrm{Like}(x, x))\)” holds with sufficient regularity of the realizations of the kind. Carlson took no stand on what this sufficient regularity amounts to, other than to say that it is not the job of semantics to tell us when an item satisfies a predicate containing “\(G'\)”, anymore than it is the job of semantics to tell us when an item satisfies any predicate. Semantics tells us that “John is red” is true iff John satisfies “is red”, which in turn holds iff John is red. Semantics does not tell us whether John is red, nor how to go about determining whether John is red. Whether an item has a property is not a question for semantics.