 In contemporary philosophy of mind, Ryle is credited with having established an important connection between mental predicates and behaviour; but many of his successors (Place, Armstrong, Putnam, and Fodor) thought he misconstrued the nature of that connection. When strict physicalist positions were beset by objections from the multiple realisability of mental predicates, “token-physicalist” versions of functionalism (or “ontic-neutral” versions of the causal theory of mind) stepped up to the plate, and advertised that, in acknowledging behavioural outputs as well as stimulus conditions, they were retaining what was right about Ryle’s emphasis on behaviour (in the circumstances), but rejecting what they considered the “explanatory vacuity” of conceptual or definitional links between mental predicates and behavioural ones. These were replaced with causal links between the alleged referents of the mental terms and the action to be explained.