 So far in this entry, we have presented calibration accounts of epistemic utility and accuracy accounts as separate and incompatible. The condition on inaccuracy measures that Pettigrew proposes and that we consider in this section denies that. Rather, it claims that closeness to calibration in fact plays a role in determining the accuracy of a credence function; the difference between this approach and the calibration arguments of section  4  is that Pettigrew does not think that closeness to calibration is the whole story. Let \(\mathfrak{D}\) be a putative measure of the distance between two credence functions. That is, \(\mathfrak{D} : \mathcal{C_F} \times \mathcal{C_F} \rightarrow [0, \infty]\), and we’ll assume that \(\mathfrak{D}(c, c') = 0\) iff \(c = c'\). Now first we use this measure of distance to define a measure of the distance that a credence function lies from being perfectly calibrated at a world. Then, following a point already made above in our treatment of calibration arguments for Probabilism, we note that this, on its own, cannot define a measure of inaccuracy because it lacks a crucial feature that we demand of any such measure: it is not truth-directed. However, we then note how to supplement the measure of distance from calibration in order to give an inaccuracy measure that does have the crucial feature. And we claim that all inaccuracy measures are produced by supplementing a measure of distance from calibration in this way.