 In addition to the Gödelian and Searlean arguments covered briefly above, a third attack on “Strong” AI (of the symbolic variety) has been widely discussed (though with the rise of statistical machine learning has come a corresponding decrease in the attention paid to it), namely, one given by the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus (1972, 1992), some incarnations of which have been co-articulated with his brother, Stuart Dreyfus (1987), a computer scientist. Put crudely, the core idea in this attack is that human expertise is not based on the explicit, disembodied, mechanical manipulation of symbolic information (such as formulae in some logic, or probabilities in some Bayesian network), and that AI’s efforts to build machines with such expertise are doomed if based on the symbolic paradigm. The genesis of the Dreyfusian attack was a belief that the critique of (if you will) symbol-based philosophy (e.g., philosophy in the logic-based, rationalist tradition, as opposed to what is called the Continental tradition) from such thinkers as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty could be made against the rationalist tradition in AI. After further reading and study of Dreyfus’ writings, readers may judge whether this critique is compelling, in an information-driven world increasingly managed by intelligent agents that carry out symbolic reasoning (albeit not even close to the human level). 