 The effect of this complaint, like the previous one, is not to deny the claim that consequentialism is a deeply impartial moral theory, but rather to suggest that it incorporates the wrong sort of impartiality. Suppose, to take an example common in the literature, that consequentialism recommends that a person be convicted of, and punished for, a crime they did not commit, in order to prevent the public from rioting (Nielsen 1972). Such an action would, according to common intuitions, constitute a gross violation of justice; and it seems a weak reply to point out that the recommendation was arrived at through an impartial calculation – a calculation that took the interests of every individual (including the framed man) into equal account. For while the claim is, strictly speaking, true, there is nevertheless a clear and compelling case in favor of concluding that the framed person was not treated impartially, in the sense that ought to matter here. We expect a judicial system to allocate punishments in accordance with degree of guilt, not in accordance with the expected value to society of the consequences in each case; and the fact that both methods constitute forms of impartial decision-making does not imply that they are equally morally acceptable.