 It is worth noting, however, that Moore did not explain his open-question argument in the way many later non-cognitivists, who likewise endorsed the argument, would. Following Hume, they held that moral judgements are intrinsically motivating, so that sincerely accepting “x is good” requires a commitment or at least some motivation to pursue x if that is possible (e.e. Hare 1952: 81–93; Hare 1963: 22–29). But then no analysis of “good” in purely natural terms can succeed, since it cannot capture the term’s action-guiding force; nor can an evaluative conclusion be validly inferred from premises none of which have that force. Whatever the merits of this Humean explanation, Moore himself did not give it. The question whether moral judgements are intrinsically motivating is not one on which he expressed clear views or which he apparently thought important. In Principia Ethica he remarked in passing that we “hardly ever” think something good without having some attitude of will towards it, but he denied that this is true universally (1903: 131, 135–6/1993: 181–82, 186). Whether it is true universally, and what might follow if it is, is not something he seems to have thought it worth considering further.