 Platonists have tried to respond to this argument in a few different ways, but the most popular (and, it can be argued, the most plausible) response is to try to undermine the inference from (i) and (ii) to (iii) by explaining how (iii) could be false even if (i) and (ii) are true—i.e., how human beings could acquire knowledge of abstract objects despite the fact that they are causally isolated from such objects and, hence, do not have any information-transferring contact with such objects. This strategy of response has been pursued by Quine (1948, 1951), Steiner (1975), Katz (1981, 1998), Resnik (1982, 1997), Shapiro (1989, 1997), Lewis (1986), Linsky and Zalta (1995), Balaguer (1995, 1998a), and Linnebo (2006). The question of whether any of these responses succeeds is extremely controversial among philosophers of mathematics. Moreover, anti-platonists do not have any compelling argument for the thesis that platonists couldn’t provide the required explanation here—i.e., that they couldn’t explain how human beings could acquire knowledge of abstract objects without the aid of any information-transferring contact with such objects. Thus, to make a very long story short, it seems fair to say that the epistemological argument against platonism is, at best, controversial and inconclusive.