 Consider a descriptivist in the Strawsonian mold, one for whom an utterance of the name ‘N’ refers in accord with the plurality of the beliefs of the relevant experts. What are we to do with a name like ‘David Cameron’ then, which sometimes refers to the former British Prime Minister and sometimes to our mutual friend? We cannot simply aggregate all the relevant beliefs associated with this name, considered as an orthographic or phonological form, and then see who or what the plurality of those beliefs picks out. For that would leave us only ever able to use the name to refer to one or the other of these David Camerons, and that hardly seems like the right thing to say. It seems, therefore, that a descriptivist of this sort will have to think about names in some more fine-grained manner. Yet this will not prove easy. She cannot simply go back to appealing to the information the speaker happens to have to do the job—for we can easily imagine someone who has names for both David Camerons in her vocabulary, and yet lacks sufficient information to distinguish the one from the other.