 Possibility and necessity are thus to be explained by reference to semantic rules, not to some mind-independent modal reality. For example, according to Thomasson, the fact that necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried shouldn’t be explained in terms of some modal fact involving male humans that are bachelors; but rather in terms of the rules for correct application of the terms ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’; particularly, the rule that “One may only apply ‘bachelor’ where ‘unmarried’ may be applied”. Once (MN) is in place, for Thomasson we can then explain modal knowledge in a straightforward way. Speakers who can use the semantic rules correctly show implicit modal knowledge. Whereas, speakers have explicit modal knowledge when they develop the ability to explicitly convey in the object language and indicative mood the semantic rules: in our example, when they are able to express: “Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried”. Importantly, for Thomasson, we can still talk about modal truth. From the sentence “Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried” we can infer “‘Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried’ is true” by applying the (deflationist) equivalence schema “\(\langle p \rangle\) is true iff \(p\)” (see Thomasson 2021).