  The discussion of relational equality versus luck egalitarianism has stressed the relational equality critique of the luck egalitarian way of integrating personal responsibility concerns into the ideal of equality. There are other lines of potential conflict. What these are will turn on the particular versions of the ideals being considered. For example, consider versions of luck egalitarianism that affirm the idea that all should have equal opportunity for welfare as assessed over the life course. The advocate of views in the welfarist equality of condition family will worry that relational equality could be fully achieved world-wide even if in each society some people lead avoidably miserable and squalid lives and even if in some societies people on the average are far more likely to lead avoidably miserable and squalid lives than in other societies. In other words, the concern is that the relational equality ideal pays no heed to the moral imperative of bringing it about that people lead genuinely good lives, or have the opportunity to lead genuinely good lives, while ensuring that the opportunities for good are fairly distributed.