  Like the Justificationist View, the Total Evidence View lies somewhere between the Steadfast View and the Equal Weight View. The Total Evidence View claims that in cases of peer disagreement, one is justified in believing what one’s total evidence supports (Kelly 2010). While this might sound like something of a truism, central to the view is an additional claim about the relation between first-order evidence and higher-order evidence. Let’s first revisit the Equal Weight View. According to the Equal Weight View, in a peer disagreement where one individual has a 0.7 degree of belief that \(P\) and the other has a 0.3 degree of belief that \(P\), both peers should split the difference and adopt a 0.5 degree of belief that \(P\). On the Equal Weight View, then, the attitude that you are justified in adopting toward the disputed proposition is entirely determined by the higher-order evidence. The justified attitude is the mean between the two peer attitudes, which ignores what their shared first-order evidence supports. According to the Total Evidence View, this is a mistake – the first-order evidence must also factor in to what the peers are reasonable in believing. Such an incorporation of the first-order evidence is what leads to the name “Total Evidence View”.