 Rawls claims that his view of justice is constructivist, meaning that he appeals to some general claims about the nature of persons as well as some empirical facts about human behavior or institutions as part of the justification for the principles of justice (or the choice situation that leads us to pick them). G.A. Cohen (2008) criticizes constructivism, so understood, as not being capable of articulating the content of what justice itself requires and instead being suited only for selecting rules of regulation for society. The problem, he argues, is that constructivism combines considerations of justice with other considerations (both empirical and moral). As a result, it does not tell us what justice itself requires. Specifically, he argues that if considerations of justice plus other values and some empirical facts suggest that we should adopt certain rules to regulate our institutions, those rules cannot be principles of justice, since other considerations than justice contribute to our thinking that we should adopt them. A possible reply to Cohen is that his view about constructivism collapses into his controversial metaethical claim that principles of justice cannot rest on general facts about human behavior or anything else, if the other values that we consider are appropriately focused on determining what we think about justice. Then the other considerations that continue to play a role are appeals to empirical facts.