 Foot’s middle period views on the rationality of morality have spurred much debate. Her views of this period leave morality alarmingly unsupported: there is no reason to develop the desires that allow moral considerations in turn to provide us with reasons for action if we lack them. Prominent defenders of moral rationalism criticize Foot’s analogy with etiquette. Unfortunately, Foot’s actual position is sometimes misrepresented in the debate. It is sometimes thought that Foot adopts at this point a wholly conventional view of morality, by analogy with etiquette. Yet, Foot did not renounce her earlier view that morality has some determinate content, tied to facts about human life. Another feature of Foot’s middle period views that often gets overlooked is her continuous commitment to rationalism about self-interest: considerations of self-interest always provides reasons, regardless of one’s  desires.[4]  This means that she is not a consistent externalist, since not all reasons need to be accompanied by a desire that we might lack. Rather, she defends an externalism about the reasons generated by moral considerations only. So she does not, after all, think that all normative statements generate only hypothetical imperatives. Still, moral oughts are not supported by categorical imperatives of self-interest, according to Foot’s views at this point in her career.