 Rawls's proposal is that we can determine what principles of justice we ought to adopt, on full reflection, and be persuaded that our choices are justifiable to ourselves and others, only if we broaden the circle of beliefs that must cohere. Indeed, we should be willing to test our beliefs against developed moral theories of various types, obviously not all such views (as Arras 2007, Strong (2010) comment, Kelly and McGrath 2010), or we would never arrive at a conclusion, but at least against some leading alternatives. (We often do so in discussion or deliberation with others. How conclusive an argument or deliberation is may depend on what alternative views are considered or on who is included in the deliberation.) In effect, Rawls's (Rawls 1971) pair-wise comparison of justice as fairness with utilitarianism is just such an exercise at seeking wide reflective equilibrium. In a wide reflective equilibrium, for example, we broaden the field of relevant moral and non-moral beliefs (including general social theory) to include an account of the conditions under which it would be fair for reasonable people to choose among competing principles, as well as evidence that the resulting principles constitute a feasible or stable conception of justice, that is, that people could sustain their commitment to such principles. Rawls's argument is that justice as fairness, rather than utilitarianism, is what emerges in wide reflective equilibrium.