 Logical norms are naturally regarded as a species of rational requirements. If I believe a set of propositions and at the same time disbelieve an obvious logical consequence thereof my set of beliefs presumably exhibits a rational defect. Rational requirements are characterized by their demand for coherence: they demand either a particular kind of coherence among our attitudes or else coherence between our attitudes and the evidence. Niko Kolodny has dubbed the former “requirements of formal coherence as such” (Kolodny 2007: 229). They are formal in the sense that they concern logical relationships between attitude contents or the arithmetical relationships between the degrees of confidence we invest in those contents. The qualification “as such” indicates that an internal coherence among the attitudes is demanded to the exclusion of other epistemologically relevant factors (evidential considerations, for example). Requirements of this type, it has been argued (Broome 2000; Dancy 1977), take the form of wide scope principles. Hence, they do not generally prescribe a particular attitude, but are satisfiable in a number of ways. Or, to put it another way, they prohibit particular constellations of attitudes. For instance, Wo− proscribes states like the one just imagined, in which the agent believes all of the premises of a valid argument while disbelieving its conclusion. It may be satisfied, as we have seen, by either coming to believe the conclusion or by abandoning some of the premises.