 Yet, though I must experience both the Buddhahood and the non-Buddhahood as indivisible components of a single moment, never to be repeated in isolation, it is also true that both are non-different from every other instance of both Buddhahood and non-Buddahood in all other moments. Each is constantly extending itself in an infinity of forms, including in the forms of each other. For, as touched on briefly above, to be experienced as “occurring” at all, a present moment must also include within it some sense of the contrast to a gone past and a coming future, which thus must also be apprehended within it somehow. “Other” moments are present even in this moment itself “as” the sense of surpassed pastness and to-come futurity that are the necessary contrasts that constitute its own sense of presentness. The experienced pastness and futureness are thus necessary components of the present qua present, but like any other components, they are not genuinely distinct parts or aspects that can be detached from the total moment. This means not only that the present sense of pastness and futureness, like all the other components of the present moment, can only be experienced at the same time as all the other components of this single moment, and thus are absolutely non-same with anything in any past or future moment. But this also means, conversely, that they are non-different from the contents of every other moment, for the same reasons that the moments as wholes are non-different: there is no neutral medium in which to compare them. The distinctness of my present vague intimation of tomorrow and the actual events that come to take place tomorrow is as immanent to tomorrow as it is to the present: tomorrow’s experience of disconfirmation of today’s expectation is immanent to that moment tomorrow, and experience of this disparity necessarily includes both of the two disparate terms: yesterday’s expectation of the future is thus also an inalienable component of tomorrow’s single whole moment in which it is disconfirmed. Future moments when they do occur are neither the same nor different from the vague representation of the future in the previous moment; they might be seen as absolutely distinct (as in commonsensical views of an “imagined” as opposed to a “real” future), or conversely as further articulations of the previous vague intimation; but in fact the “vague intimation of future” in question has no fixed nature to be same as or different from, precisely because this element of the present moment, like all the other elements, is not really a distinct part or aspect existing beyond the moment in which it occurs, is not a durational entity at all, but merely an unrepeatable and indivisible component of a particular moment, neither same nor different from the other components of that moment. So we must say the future is neither completely different from the imagined future contributing to the composition of a past moment, nor completely identical to that imagined future—or if we prefer, both. Thus do we speak of the permanence-impermanence, the impermanence-permanence, not only of every moment, but of every component of every moment.