 There is an apparent tension, moreover, between the hedonist’s reliance on the epistemic qualification and her claim that pleasure rationalizes our aesthetic pursuits. Consider the less-than-fully-informed reader who overvalues The Da Vinci Code and undervalues Middlemarch. The epistemic qualification is designed to allow the hedonist to explain how this might occur: such a reader takes greater pleasure from The Da Vinci Code, and less (or lesser) pleasure from Middlemarch, than she would were she fully informed. The epistemic qualification, moreover, allows the hedonist to explain why the uninformed reader has aesthetic reason not to undervalue Middlemarch: she is missing out on pleasure that would be hers if only she gave Middlemarch a fully informed reading. But the hedonist struggles to explain why the uninformed reader has reason not to overvalue the Da Vinci Code. If The Da Vinci Code gives the reader greater pleasure when she overvalues it, not only has she no aesthetic reason to be fully informed, she has aesthetic reason not to be. It therefore seems that if pleasure rationalized our hedonic pursuits, we would take ourselves to have reason to experience aesthetic objects in whatever way maximizes our pleasure. To the degree that we instead take ourselves to have reason to experience aesthetic objects completely and correctly—to the degree that we instead take ourselves to have reason to experience aesthetic objects as having the aesthetic values they in fact have—suggests that pleasure is not the aesthetic good we’re after (Shelley 2011).