 Here Wittgenstein is using an analogy between language and music in the attempt to move away from a conception of linguistic understanding as an inner process (see Lewis 1977 and Worth 1997). In both language and music, as in art more generally, understanding is manifested in our ability to act in appropriate ways. For example, a criterion for the understanding of genre pictures could be the ability to describe or mime the actions that occur in them (Philosophical Grammar, III, 37). In the musical case, an obvious reaction that evinces understanding is the ability to competently describe or perform the music. More interestingly, Wittgenstein holds that the understanding of music is also manifested in our capacity to draw appropriate comparisons between music and extra-musical reality, particularly the linguistic domain—a musical phrase may be described as a question, or remind us of the intonation we use when we utter a certain sentence (Philosophical Investigations, §527; Zettel, §175; for discussion, see Budd 2008, 263–67).