According to Velleman (1992), Frankfurt’s observation that an agent may fail to identify with a particular motive points to a fundamental flaw in the standard theory. As it seems always possible that an agent “disowns” the mental attitudes that cause an action, those attitudes do not “add up to the agent’s being involved” (1992: 463). This shows, according to Velleman, that the standard theory captures, at best, actions that are defective. It fails, in particular, to capture “human action par excellence”, because it fails to account for the agent’s participation. Velleman rejects the appeal to irreducible agent-causation (see section 3.1), and he argues that this leaves only one strategy for solving the problem: we must find a mental attitude that the agent cannot disown and that is, therefore, fit to play the role of the agent. We must, that is, find a mental attitude that is the agent, functionally speaking. According to Velleman, the desire to act in accordance with reasons is fit to play this role.