There is a recent version of relativism according to which some of the views considered so far—for instance, Harman’s (1975) variety of moral relativism—will be regarded varieties of contextualism as opposed to bona fide relativism. This recent version—sufficiently distinct from the relativisms so far considered that it is deserving of attention in its own right—we are calling “New Relativism”, a variety of relativism that has arisen out of work in the philosophy of language in the analytic tradition, and for which the leading proponents have included Max Kölbel (2003, 2004), Peter Lasersohn (2005), Crispin Wright (2006) and, in particular, John MacFarlane (2005b, 2007, 2014); cf., Marques (2019). In this section we aim to (i) outline several features that individuate New Relativism; (ii) consider in turn motivations for (and objections to) several prominent strands of it; and, finally, (iii) conclude with some philosophical problems that face New Relativism more generally.