 Thomas Scanlon defends a restricted constructivist account of justification for a specific class of moral judgments of right and wrong (Scanlon 1998: 11–12, chapter 4, §7.2; 2008, 2014&gt;: 94–98). In contrast to Korsgaard and O’Neill, Scanlon rejects Kantian constructivism as a broad metaethical view about all normative truths. Part of his argument is that moral matters cannot be resolved by appealing to the bare structure of rationality (the constitutive norm of practical reason) and instead, need to be addressed by engaging in substantive arguments (Scanlon 2003b: 14–15, Scanlon 2014: 90–104), although this is something that many Kantians would concede. His aim is to elucidate the truth of claims concerning right and wrong in terms of their being entailed from the point of view of a certain contractual situation.