 There is some irony in the fact that philosophers of biology, who focus their attention almost exclusively on evolutionary biology, are critics of heritability. Heredity is a central component to evolutionary change and heritability analysis, particularly via the notion of realized heritability (see equation 5 above), is an important component of theoretical evolutionary biology. The critical attack on heritability arises against the background of nature/nurture debates (see e.g. Tabery 2014) and concerns over genetic determinism and is best understood as a critical appraisal of behavioral geneticists in psychology. There is growing interest among philosophers in critically assessing the notion of heritability in its evolutionary context. The notion of realized heritability is briefly discussed by Samir Okasha (2006) (See also Downes 2010) and by Sober (2008). Until recently, thorough discussion of the relations between heritability and other central concepts of evolutionary theory was pursued exclusively by evolutionary biologists (e.g. Lynch and Walsh 1998 and Rice 2004). Peter Visscher et al.’s (2008) review article is a nice introduction to much of the work in this area. Philosophers have now presented and defended some radical claims about heritability and heredity including the claim that evolution can occur without heredity (see e.g. Earnshaw-Whyte 2012 and Bourrat 2013). Focusing on heritability in the context of evolutionary theory is a productive area for philosophical research as evidenced by Bourrat’s (2014) examination of the role of heritability in the recipe approach to evolution by natural selection.