 The specific case that List and Pettit make for group agency is epistemological rather than ontological and cannot be reproduced here. Agency alone, however, does not make the case for group rights. A robot could be an agent but it would not bear rights since it would not possess the sort of agency required for personhood. List and Pettit adopt a “performative” conception of personhood, according to which being a person turns on what an entity can do rather than the stuff of which it is made. To be a person is to be “an agent who can perform effectively in the space of obligations” (173). It is to be capable of participating in a system of conventions, such as a system of law, in which the participator contracts and honours obligations to others and derives entitlements from the obligations of others. Group agents possess that normative capability and so should be accounted persons. As persons, they can and should be held morally responsible for their actions and be credited with rights, albeit fewer rights than we should ascribe to natural human persons (on which, see section 7 below).