 It was a crucial aspect of Fechner’s defense of atomism that it made no philosophical claims about the nature of matter itself. Its foundation lies simply with its explanation of empirical phenomena; it does not attempt to answer deeper philosophical questions about the possibility of matter and experience. As Fechner put it: the physicist does not worry about a philosophical analysis of matter anymore than a builder troubles himself about the chemical analysis of his brick and mortar (Atom: 72). The philosopher always claimed that the atomist did not go far enough in his analysis of matter, that he did not try to answer ultimate questions. What he fails to see, however, is that the physicist does not attempt to answer such questions; he is only trying to explain the data given in experience. From this modest empirical point of view, Fechner was willing to make significant concessions to the dynamicist: perhaps matter did ultimately consist in forces of attraction and repulsion (Atom: 72); perhaps the spaces between matter were ultimately filled, so that everything is continuous after all (Atom: 76). 