 These limitations make it hard to imagine what a motivated version of this form of the supervenience view would look like. We have to imagine a view of the following form. It is nonnegotiable that the state of affairs its being morally obligatory to φ is partially constituted by God’s commanding φ-ing. It is nonnegotiable that there is, apart from God’s commanding φ-ing, at least one state of affairs S that partially constituted its being morally obligatory to φ. It is nonnegotiable that S either obtains necessarily or at the very least necessarily obtains if God’s commanding φ-ing obtains (otherwise moral obligation would not supervene on divine command). And it is nonnegotiable that S not involve moral obligation. The only remotely plausible candidates for S that come to mind are normative states of affairs that fall short of the obligatory, for example, φ-ing’s being good (or virtuous, or praiseworthy). One might say, for example, that its being morally obligatory to φ is constituted jointly by God’s commanding φ-ing and φ-ing’s being virtuous. But it is unclear what motivation one would have for affirming such a position. It cannot be for the sake of making sure that God cannot impose a moral obligation to do something that is not virtuous: for, ex hypothesi, we know already that φ-ing’s being virtuous obtains whenever God’s commanding φ-ing obtains, for otherwise its being morally obligatory to φ would not supervene on God’s commanding φ-ing.