  Plato resolves the paradox by showing that there are different ways in which one might be said to ‘know’ something and that sometimes having a belief about F is adequate to begin an inquiry into F. In his famous question and answer with a slave about how to find the diagonal of a given square, Socrates argues that latent within the slave is an understanding of how to determine the diagonal (81–86b). The slave has various beliefs, some false and some true, about the way to discover the length of the diagonal. What is needed is only a set of prompts, here a set of questions, to elicit from the boy the knowledge that is latent within him. Socrates contends that he is leading the slave to recollect what he already knows. In the subsequent stages of the argument, Socrates distinguishes the sense in which a person can be said to merely have a belief about something (into which one might inquire), from the sense in which he can be said to know the same thing (97ff). For instance, suppose that Jones has looked at a map and determined how to drive from New York City to Chicago though he has not done so: just get on Interstate 80 and go west. On the other hand, suppose that Smith has actually driven numerous times from NYC to Chicago by getting on 80 and heading west. Both Jones and Smith have the same belief about how to get from NYC to Chicago and both will get there by acting on their belief. But only Smith has knowledge of the road, whereas Jones has a true belief. The truth of the belief is then not at issue. Rather, Smith has something more, some kind of justification, here based on experience, that distinguishes her from Jones: Jones has only a true belief about how to get there; Smith actually knows. Thus in the Meno, we have perhaps the first attempt to offer a justified true belief account of knowledge: Knowledge is a true belief tied down with an account (aitias logismos, 98a). The Meno, then, with its discussion of recollection, knowledge and belief sets the stage for the middle Platonic epistemology.