 Before finally turning to the question of what “objectivity” amounts to in this connection, let us notice that in Husserl’s eyes something like empathy also forms the basis of both our practical, aesthetical and moral evaluations and of what might be called intercultural understanding, i.e., the constitution of a “foreign world” against the background of one’s own “homeworld”, i.e., one’s own familiar (but, again, generally unreflected) cultural heritage (cf. Husserliana, vol. XV). Husserl studied many of these phenomena in detail, and he even outlined the beginnings of a phenomenological ethics and value theory (cf. Husserliana, vol. XXVIII, XXXVII). In this context, he formulates a “categorical imperative” that makes recourse to the notion of lifeworld, or environment, as follows: Always act in such a way that your action contributes as well as possible to the best (the most valuable) you recognize yourself to be able to achieve in your life, given your individual abilities and environment (cf. Husserliana, vol. XXXVII, pp. 251 ff). (This version of the “categorical imperative” stems from Husserl’s post-war lectures on ethics and value theory. Earlier versions differ significantly; for the development of Husserl’s thought on this and related issues, see, e.g., Melle 1991; Peucker 2008; Donohoe 2016, ch. 4; Drummond 2018; and Crespo 2021.)