 States of affairs contain particulars and properties; facts tie them. This similarity encourages the question whether a fact is nothing but a state of affairs that obtains (see Horwich 1990: 113 who takes true Russellian propositions to be facts). On this view the reason why it is redundant to say that a fact obtains is that a fact is just an obtaining state of affairs. However, the identification of facts with obtaining states of affairs creates problems for the theory of truthmaking. Assume that the fact that Socrates is wise is just the obtaining state of affairs Socrates’ being wise. The fact is supposed to make it true that Socrates is wise. But if the fact is just the obtaining state of affairs Socrates’ being wise, we need in turn something that explains why the state of affairs obtains. For it seems correct to say “The state of affairs Socrates’ being wise obtains because Socrates is wise”, but not “Socrates is wise because the state of affairs Socrates’ being wise obtains”. Hence, obtaining states of affairs cannot play the same role as facts. They cannot be truth-makers. The question “Why is it true that Socrates is wise?” cannot be conclusively answered by saying “Because Socrates’ being wise obtains”. This answer is in need of a further explanation of the same type as the one we were originally after.