 In late antiquity, this debate seems to have moved away from the radical solution of positing minimal physical parts or atoms—a view that seems to have had few advocates—into a puzzle about the possibilities of ‘bottom up’ explanation versus the need to regard emergent properties as ‘supervening’ and not mere products of the necessary material base. The term traditionally translated ‘supervene’ here—epigignomai—refers to the idea that forms are thought to come from a distinct source and inhere in suitable material, rather than to be produced by the material substrate: it does not exactly correspond to the technical notion of supervenience formulated in late-20th century philosophy of mind. The reasons for positing minimal thresholds for the supervenience of form in John Philoponus concern the inadequacy of material explanation because changes in the matter do not correlate numerically to—and hence cannot fully explain—changes in qualities, and not because of concerns about minimal parts (Berryman 2002).