 Accounts of hope as a virtue suggest that not all instances of hope can be described as “hope that p”, i.e., as propositional hopes that the standard definition and its successors aim to analyze. There are two kinds of non-propositional hope that are subject to debate (see Rioux 2021): First, as Lamb’s account suggests, we might have hope in a person, which Adrienne Martin calls “interpersonal hope” (Martin 2020). Second, it has been suggested that there is an attitude of indeterminate hope that is able to survive the loss of particular, determinate hopes. The distinction between “hope that” and hope without a determinate object has been introduced into the philosophical discourse by Gabriel Marcel and has recently been taken up (with or without explicit reference to Marcel) by otherwise different accounts. Joseph Godfrey calls hope without object “fundamental hope” and bases his account on an analysis of Bloch, Kant and Marcel (Godfrey 1987). Patrick Shade’s pragmatist theory distinguishes particular hopes and hopefulness as “an openness to possibilities that are meaningful and promising for us” (Shade 2001: 139). Jonathan Lear similarly describes “radical hope” as a sense of a future in which “something good will emerge” (Lear 2006: 94), even though all particular hopes were destroyed; and Matthew Ratcliffe takes such radical hope as an instance of “pre-intentional hope”, which is