 An objection of course is that there is something odd in saying that minds move or that they are spatial. There are plenty of figures in the history of philosophy who have posited the existence of entities that are not in space, even though these entities still in some way apply to, or are a part of, everyday objects. Most famous, perhaps, is Plato’s positing of the existence of numbers, perfect geometrical figures, and other universal entities. Here Cavendish and her opponents are presumably at loggerheads. There may be something odd about saying that minds move, she would insist, but there is something even more odd about saying that the entirety of person partakes of motion without their mind partaking of motion as well. She might grant that perhaps there are immaterial minds – and also numbers and geometrical figures, etc. – that exist in a non-spatial Platonic realm, but she would insist that these are not what we are referencing when we speak of the minds by which we deliberate on earth and have ideas. The latter minds travel with us when we move and are material. Cavendish is in effect imploring us to take seriously that the language of moving minds is only unusual against the background of an impoverished conception of matter.