 To desire is to want something to be the case (see the entry on  desire).  Standardly, the conative attitude of desire is contrasted with the cognitive attitude of belief in terms of direction of fit: while belief aims to make one’s mental representations match the way the world is, desire aims to make the way the world is match one’s mental representations. Recall that on the single code hypothesis, there exists a cognitive imaginative attitude that is structurally similar to belief. Is there a conative imaginative attitude—call it desire-like imagination (Currie 1997, 2002a, 2002b, 2010; Currie &amp; Ravenscroft 2002), make-desire (Currie 1990; Goldman 2006), or i-desire (Doggett &amp; Egan 2007, 2012)—that is structurally similar to desire?