 As the previous sections indicate, the specific interplay between different modalities (the way they are combined and which bridge principles hold) is crucial to provide an accurate representation and analysis of different philosophical concepts. In fact, in several occasions, the combination of different modalities have shed light on philosophical issues.  We will illustrate this for the concepts of abduction, knowability, ‘believing to know’, truthmakers and the interplay between assumptions and beliefs while keeping in mind an endless list of other philosophical paradoxes and problems that all arise in a multi-modal setting. (Among many others, see the Yablo paradox in Yablo (1985, 1993) as well as the SEP discussions on  deontic paradoxes  and on  paradoxes without self-reference.  See also the SEP analyses on the  knower paradox,  on  dynamic epistemic paradoxes  and on the  surprise examination paradox;  for the latter, see also a proposed solution in Baltag and Smets (2010  Other Internet Resources).)