 As we saw in the last section, misinformation can also pose epistemic threats to democratic functioning. With respect to internet misinformation, we might ask: do we have a right to protection against such misinformation? Is it morally acceptable, or even morally mandatory, for internet platforms, or government bodies, to protect public belief by regulating and limiting misinformation? There are deep political and moral issues here that we cannot possibly cover in this entry. But we will note a fundamental tension that is relevant. Free speech is protected in most democratic societies, but part of the defense of free speech by thinkers like Mill (1859 [1966]) is that it is crucial for freedom of thought. Once we recognize that human beliefs are deeply social, and do not always follow Descartes’ model of the individual, fully rational reasoner, we might acknowledge that some sorts of speech interfere with our freedom of thought, and in some cases we may need to decide to protect one in lieu of the other.