 In recent years, scholars have increasingly turned to a topic that is prominently discussed in the Aristotelian tradition, so-called akrasia or lack of control (for discussion of Seneca’s engagement with Aristotelian ideas in ethics and psychology, see Inwood 2014, 73-104). On the Aristotelian account, the akratic agent acts contrary to her correct reasoning and based on desire. This view seems recognizable to many. It captures that desire can seem overpowering, “winning” in a perceived struggle between reason and desire. Stoic psychological monism can appear colorless and unrealistic in comparison. It cannot accommodate the sense that reason and desire are in conflict. For the Stoics, each motivational state is a thought. What Aristotelians call akrasia is, on one early Stoic account, an oscillation between opinions (Müller 2014). For example, an agent thinks in quick succession “I’ll have another cookie” and “I won’t have another cookie”; her hand reaches out to take the cookie at a moment when she thinks the former. Recent Seneca scholars have asked whether Seneca adheres to the oscillation view of conflicted motivation, or whether his account is closer to Aristotelian akrasia. Sorabji argues that the Latin term “impotens” is Seneca’s translation of the Greek “akrates” (lacking control); he proposes that in Seneca all cases of anger are cases of akrasia (2000, 61). According to Gartner (2015), on the other hand, On Anger is fully in agreement with Stoic monism. Seneca’s analysis of anger involves tumultuous states of mind, but it does not involve the distinctive state of akrasia. Within the framework of Aristotelian theory, akrasia is worse than control (enkrateia) and much worse than virtue. Gartner notes that Seneca also cannot accommodate control, because control—just as akrasia—involves a distinction between reason and desire that is alien to Seneca’s framework. Other scholars pursue intermediate approaches. Rather than avoid the Aristotelian term akrasia, Müller (2014) discusses Seneca’s views on motivational conflict in terms of akrasia; but he ascribes distinctively Stoic views to Seneca. On his reading of Seneca’s tragedy Medea, Medea’s conflicted motivations exemplify the oscillation model. Maso (2018) emphasizes Seneca’s engagement with the corporeality of the soul, as the Stoics conceive of it. On his reading, On Anger develops a version of psychological monism that permits dualist imagery and that explains motivational conflict in part in terms of the physiology of inner turmoil (on the physiology of anger in On Anger, see also Riggsby 2015).