In contrast to agents like Homeowner and Driver, Falling Person is not plausibly morally responsible for the threat she poses, since she has been helplessly blown down the well by the wind. Despite her obvious causal connection to the threat to Victim’s life, the responsibility account holds that she is not liable to be defensively killed by Victim. Michael Otsuka supports this conclusion, arguing that since Falling Person is no more morally responsible for the fact that Victim’s life is in danger than a bystander, she has the same moral status as an innocent bystander. If killing bystanders is impermissible, then killing Falling Person is also impermissible (Otsuka 1994). The responsibility account yields a similarly restrictive verdict in the case of individuals who threaten as a result of temporary delusions or mental illness. Insofar as threateners are not morally responsible for their actions, they retain their usual rights against being harmed, even if they will otherwise kill other innocent people. The responsibility account thus permits killing a narrower range of threateners than the causal account, but a broader range than the culpability account.