 Another argument against behaviourist interpretations points to the apparent existence of preferences over alternatives that one cannot choose between – for example preferences for winning a certain prize of a lottery, or for particular configurations of Paradise. This contradicts the claim that preferences exclusively transpire from choices. One way to substantiate preferences over alternatives that one cannot choose between is to ask people what they prefer. Their answers can be interpreted as further choice evidence – as verbal or writing behaviour. This interpretation treats their answers on a par with all other forms of behaviour. Alternatively, their answers can be interpreted as introspective reports. This interpretation treats answers as agents’ privileged access to their own minds.  Furthermore, mentalists also distinguish between those agents who indeed have preferences as states of minds – e.g. humans, and maybe higher animals – and those agents who do not – e.g. machines, plants or institutions. The former category may choose on the basis of their preferences, and hence the above-discussed effort can aim at eliciting the preferences on which their choices are based. The latter category, despite their lack of states of mind, may nevertheless exhibit behaviour that can be interpreted as relational choice.