 On the first of these two points: proponents of the dynamical approach maintain that the spacetime structure of our world is what it is because of the dynamical laws of nature and their symmetries. That is, the dynamical laws are (at least, relative to spacetime) fundamental, and spacetime structure is derivative; in this sense, the view is (at least in some cases) a modern-day form of relationism (Pooley 2013, §6.3.2) – albeit of a very different kind from the relationist approaches considered up to this point. (Note, though, that this relationism is a corollary of the above explanatory contention of the dynamical approach; moreover, it is one which is applicable only to theories which fixed spacetime structure such as Newtonian mechanics or STR – and therefore not to theories with dynamical spacetime structure, such as GTR. For this reason, as already indicated above, proponents of the dynamical view are not to be identified naïvely with relationists.)