  There are various options for responding to the problem of finding a single meaning for ‘that’. One could stipulate that each context has only one demonstratum, and say that the content of ‘that’ in a context is the demonstratum of the context, but then insist that the content of a sentence containing multiple occurrences of demonstratives is determined not by a single context but by a sequence of contexts. Then (26) is true with respect to certain sequences of contexts that have different demonstrata. Second, one could distinguish linguistic meaning and character. ‘That’ has a single linguistic meaning, but this meaning does not determine reference in a context; linguistic meaning instead determines the characters of occurrences, and these characters determine reference in a context. Third, one could move to a theory that assigns contents to utterances rather than expressions. This might help because every utterance of (26) contains two utterances of ‘that’. There are other possibilities. For discussion, see Kaplan 1989a, 1999; Wettstein 1986; Taschek 1987; Braun 1996; Garcia-Carpintero 1998; Salmon 2002; Richard 2003.