 A final view of a priori justification according to which it does not rest on nonexperiential evidence holds that we are entitled to accept certain propositions on no evidence and that entitlement on no grounds or evidence is what a priori justification amounts to. To be entitled to accept, or trust, some presupposition is for it to be rational to accept or trust it, though this is supposed to be different from being justified in believing it. Crispin Wright proposes that the laws of logic and the presupposition that we are not now in the midst of a coherent and continuing dream, not now brains-in-a vat, etc., are rational presuppositions, some of which are standard presuppositions of science. That’s because certain “cognitive projects” (i) could not be pursued without presupposing those things, (ii) there is no evidence to think that those presuppositions are false (even if also none to think them true), and (iii) nothing will be lost, and something may be gained, by accepting these presuppositions (see Jenkins 2007). The gains and losses must not be pragmatic gains and losses such as gains and losses in happiness, prestige, accomplishments, wealth and the like. Otherwise all that would follow is that it is practically rational to accept the presuppositions. The gains and losses must be epistemic, that is, having to do with truth, or probable truth, or with evidence because Wright wants the rational acceptance of such presuppositions to be an answer to the skeptic about knowledge and epistemic justification.