 An important contrast between these views has to do with how the attributability of action is understood. Anscombian accounts construe the attribution of action as having to do with the special way in which you know what you’re doing – that is, without looking to see, the way other people have to (Rödl 2007, ch. 2, Small 2012). Since you just know what you’re doing, its being your action takes care of itself; whereas we’ve seen that in Korsgaard’s picture, action attribution is a task each agent has to take care of for himself, and arises out of meeting the exigencies of agency. If Kantian moral theory is to be nonoptional – something we can’t just turn our backs on – the noncalculative Kantian reasons must be nonoptional. If the noncalculative reasons are what it takes to have action that is authored, then the ownership of actions must be demonstrably nonoptional. That necessity, we have seen, is practical; that is, it’s the necessity of ‘gotta go, right now!’ But if that is the right way to reconstruct Korsgaard’s position, there is a final worry to register, one that we are not yet able to meet, but to which we will return briefly when the time comes to assess the state of play of the field we are surveying. 