 For Sen, the attempt to be impartial by opening conversation (and directing one’s own attention) to as many different perspectives as possible is closely related to aspirations to ethical objectivity: “to the extent that we look for ethical objectivity, the reasoning that is necessary has to satisfy what can be seen as the requirements of impartiality” (Sen 2009, 46). Objective moral reasoning, that is, requires a willingness to consider arguments and considerations presented by all members of the moral community, and this receptivity must ideally be extended to all on an equal basis. Such impartiality, as conceived by Sen, seems closely related to the virtue identified by Miranda Fricker as “testimonial justice,” the “specifically anti-prejudicial current that the virtuous hearer’s sensibility needs to contain in order that the hearer may not be led into perpetrating testimonial injustices” (Fricker 2007, 86). Testimonial injustices, as understood by Fricker, occur when people silence, ignore, or refuse to take seriously other people’s views and ideas for certain sorts of reasons—for instance, because they have been led by their acceptance of a stereotype to believe that people like the speaker are generally not worth listening to. (Thus Fricker describes the central case of testimonial injustice as an “identity-prejudicial credibility deficit” (28).) Moreover, Sen’s comments about impartiality suggest he would agree with Fricker that the relevant character trait “serves not one but two ultimate values: it simultaneously protects both truth and justice” (Fricker, 120).)