 This tension between these different approaches has led philosophers to engage in meta-theoretical analysis of how best to answer the question. Jonathan Birch argues that the debate about invertebrate consciousness can move forward if we adopt a theory-light approach over theory-heavy and theory-neutral approaches (Birch forthcoming). Eric Schwitzgebel (2019) argues that when we rely on a theory of consciousness in order to answer questions about consciousness in animals who are very different from us, such as garden snails, we inevitably beg the question, suggesting that any theory-first approach to such questions is not going to be helpful. To move forward on questions of consciousness in beings who are very different from the mammals, birds, and reptiles many naturally take to be conscious, Andrews (2020b) sketches a method she calls the Dynamic Marker Approach, which starts by identifying the properties that trigger human commitments to consciousness in familiar animals, and then derives further markers that can be used to identify consciousness in unfamiliar ones.