 A number of conclusions were drawn from these main points, and refinements were added. One consequence was that process reliabilism is a historical type of theory. For example, a reliable inferential process confers justification on a new belief only if the input beliefs (premises) were themselves justified. How could the justifiedness of these input beliefs have arisen? Presumably, their justifiedness arose because they were produced by earlier applications of reliable processes. Such a chain of processes must ultimately originate from one or more reliable processes that themselves had no doxastic inputs. Perceptual inputs are good candidates for such processes. So, on this approach, justifiedness is often a product of a history of personal cognitive processes. The historical framework of such a process theory contrasts sharply with more traditional epistemological frameworks, such as coherentism and (certain versions of) evidentialism. According to these more traditional theories, causal and historical relations play no role in determining justifiedness. (Though see, e.g., Goldberg 2012 and Fleisher 2019 for views that combine elements of coherentism and reliabilism; for views that integrate evidentialism and reliabilism, see  §4.2  below.) More generally, reliabilism marks an important break with “current time-slice” approaches, according to which the epistemic status of a belief at time t depends entirely on the subject’s mental states at t.