 Another problem with the idea of replication is that it is description dependent. Described finely, two objects can never be identical. The same applies to parents and offspring. This, in itself, does not represent a challenge to the replicator/interactor view. However, and more problematically, a coarser grain of description might lead parents and offspring to be regarded as copies of one another when a finer-grained description would show that they are not. Such a coarse-grained way of viewing evolutionary processes has been endorsed by some memeticists (see Boudry 2018; Dennett 2017 for explicit defences). However, without a principled way to choose which grain(s) of description ought to be used for the study of a particular evolutionary setting, the claim that replication is fundamental to evolution by natural selection in the context of other evolutionary processes occurring becomes arbitrary. This problem is a general one in evolutionary theory (see Bourrat, 2020), but is even more problematic in the context of cultural evolution where the line between genotype and phenotype is difficult to draw and multiple channels of transmission exist (Charbonneau &amp; Bourrat 2021; Bourrat &amp; Charbonneau 2022). 