 Some passages from Kant’s work seem to suggest that moral judgment requires no experience, no knowledge of human nature and local custom, and no emotional sensitivity. A rational being equipped with the correct formal procedure has all she needs. Yet such passages are misleading when read in isolation. This is not Kant’s view of how human beings do, or even should, make moral judgments (Wood 2008: 56). First, application of the CI typically requires auxiliary or subordinate “principles of application”, which must be taken from our empirical knowledge of human nature (MM 6:217). Second, Kant frequently emphasizes that no formal procedure could specify all the principles for applying higher-order principles. Principles of application help us apply higher order principles to concrete circumstances, but there is no substitute for experience and “judgment”, which is a knack or uncodifiable talent (A138/B172). The need for judgment explains why the practice of casuistry is “woven into ethics” (MM 6:411). Furthermore, the wider the duty, the more latitude for individual judgment and experience (MM 6:390). Finally, Kant believes that moral judgment requires emotional sensitivity and an understanding of social convention. For example, without these, one might be unable to determine whether a particular act of beneficence is more condescending than kind (MM 6:453), or to prevent friendly banter from sliding into disrespectful mockery (MM 6:467). Proper moral judgment in such circumstances requires attunement to the feelings of others, but also facility with the social conventions that shape the dynamics of personal interaction.