 In his early work, Paul Benson offered a normative competence conception of “free agency” that, he argued, was congenial to feminist interpretations of moral and political agency (Benson 1987; 1990; 1991). For our purposes, Benson’s proposal can be treated as an account of autonomy because the capacity for free agency is also thought of as a capacity for exercising agency that is one’s own. As Benson points out, both Gary Watson and Susan Wolf adopt versions of normative competence views. Watson claims that endorsement is insufficient for autonomy because doing “what one wants”—that is to say, doing what one has endorsed—is compatible with mere intentional agency and does not provide the further element required to guarantee autonomous agency (Watson 1975, 205; compare Buss 1994). Watson proposes that “if what I do flows from my values and ends, there is a…sense in which my activities are inescapably my own” (Watson 1996, 233; quoted in Benson 2005b, 103). This modification of the endorsement view, although it introduces values into the analysis of autonomy, suffers from the same objection as the purely procedural theories discussed in the last section. For if an agent such as the student mentioned above has so effectively internalized oppressive norms that she values them and treats them as her ends, then it is questionable whether they are genuinely her own.