 Ritzel’s proposal aligns with the idea, quite generally embraced by early phenomenologists, that presentations are non-conceptual, whereas Meinen is essentially conceptual. However, it also stands out for the following reason: Ritzel claims that, when it comes to meaning acts pointing at “empirical concepts” (an expression he adopts from Kant to express concepts based on sensorial experience, see Critique of Pure Reason A50/B74; 1916: 22), semantic reference works in the same way in which, on John Stuart Mill’s view, proper names denote individuals: just as proper names directly refer to individuals, so do “[empirical concepts] denote [nennen] their object directly [in direkter Weise]” (1916: 17). More precisely, what both cases have in common is that meanings of proper names or of terms of empirical concepts change if the objects they denote change. That is, the content of an empirical concept is identical with the kind that the concept refers to. In contrast to the traditional view about concepts, in these cases, it is not the intension (the content) of a concept that determines its extension, but rather the extension that determines the intension. On this point, Ritzel seems to anticipate the theory of direct reference and rigid designators (see Sowa 2007: 97).