 Ross suggests in addition the duties of fidelity, reparation, and gratitude are in general weightier than the duty to promote general good (RG 19, 30, 41–42; FE 77, 76, 90, 187). It takes substantial (net) surplus value to justify begging off on one of these duties (RG 34–35). Unlike the duty to promote general good, the duties of fidelity, reparation and gratitude rest on personal relations with others, generating special rather than general duties (FE 76, 186). It is important to Ross that we can stand in the obligation-generating relations ‘of promisee to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow countryman to fellow countryman, and the like’ (RG 19; also 22; FE 76; OJ 124, 126). The duties core to these relationships are in general weightier than the more general duty to promote the general good. Rival views, as noted, ignore these morally significant relations, or the ‘highly personal character of duty’, at their peril (RG 22). Finally, although he does not say it, his view would surely be the duty of non-maleficence is weightier than the duties of reparation, gratitude, and fidelity: it is (unless much is at stake) wrong to harm others in order to fulfil these duties.