 The apparent links between attention and demonstrative reference (see section  3.2)  and attention and knowledge of other minds (see section  3.3)  might be special instances of a more general connection between attention and the making of epistemic moves. A general connection of that sort may have been what Descartes had in mind when he suggested that attention to clear and distinct ideas is a necessary condition for those ideas to realize their special epistemic potential (see Section  1.1).  It might also be what Stewart had in mind when he suggested that “Some attention [is] necessary for any act of memory whatever” (see Section  1.4).  Kant’s anthropological writings also cast attention in a crucial epistemic role, as explaining the control that one can exert over representations in thought and in imagination, where this perhaps includes the kind of imagination that Kant takes to be involved in making one’s experiences into experiences of an objective spatiotemporal world (Merritt &amp; Valaris, 2017).