 If distinguishing between two areas of being—i.e., existence, which can be either mental or real, and the proper existence of the thing, i.e., its essence, quiddity, thingness (see Ilāhiyyāt I, 5 and VI, 2)—can be read as logical, its value is ontological, since the composition which is recognized in things concerns their being. Indeed, not only must the conceptual constituents that define the being of something be distinguished from the affirmation of its existence (as in gnoseology), but also the very essence of something must be metaphysically distinguished from its existence. Essence is not, so to speak, “ontologically neutral”. The essence or thingness of which Avicenna speaks is not simply the essence of the thing considered as such, regardless of its existence, but the thingness and hence the thing that, considered as such and regardless of its existence, reveals exactly the character or modality that its own existence has. If the analysis of a thing, i.e., of its quiddity or proper existence, does not inform me of its existence (by knowing what a thing is, I do not necessarily know if it is), this is because a thing is in itself only possible: it can be either existent or non-existent, and since it is in itself possibly existent, it is in itself non-existent. On the contrary, if the analysis of a thing—i.e., of its quiddity or proper existence—were to inform me positively of its existence (by knowing what a thing is, I also know that it is), this would be because a thing is in itself necessarily existent and therefore in itself existent (Lizzini 2003). Paradoxically, however, in the latter case, the “thing” in question is only necessary existence, it has no quiddity (or no quiddity beyond its existence) and is not, properly speaking, a “thing” (Bertolacci 2012a): in this case, in fact, what is revealed is the existence of the Necessary Principle, which is pure existence on condition of not and can therefore be conceived beyond essence and thingness.