 Here is one: argue that, despite appearances, coherence alone captures everything there is to scientific objectivity. For example, it might be argued that it is actually correct to permit a wide range of priors, for people come with different background opinions and it seems wrong—objectively wrong—to require all of them to change to the same opinion at once. What ought to be the case is, rather, that people’s opinions be brought closer and closer to each other as their shared evidence accumulates. This idea of merging-of-opinions as a kind of scientific objectivity can be traced back to Peirce (1877), although he develops this idea for the epistemology of all-or-nothing beliefs rather than credences. Some subjective Bayesians propose to develop this Peircean idea in the framework of subjective Bayesianism: to have the ideal of merging-of-opinions be derived as a norm—derived solely from coherence norms. That is, they prove so-called merging-of-opinions theorems (Blackwell &amp; Dubins 1962; Gaifman &amp; Snir 1982). Such a theorem states that, under such and such contingent initial conditions together with such and such coherence norms, two agents must be certain that their credences in the hypotheses under consideration will merge with each other in the long run as the shared evidence accumulates indefinitely.