 We have said that ‘lions are real’ means that some particular property or other—I will say, for the sake of brevity, the property of being a lion, though that is not strictly accurate, does in fact belong to something—that there are things that have it, or, to put in another way, that the conception of being a lion is a conception which does apply to some things—that there are things that fall under it. And similarly what “unicorns are unreal” means is that the property of being a unicorn belongs to nothing. Now, if this is so, then it seems to me, in a very important sense, ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ do not in this usage stand for any conceptions are all. The only conceptions which occur in the proposition ‘Lions are real’ are on this interpretation are, plainly (1) the conception of being a lion, and (2) the conception of belonging to something, and perfectly obviously “real” does not stand for either of these. (Moore 1918 [1959: 212]))