 As mentioned, there is widespread agreement that people frequently rely on abductive reasoning. Which of the above rules exactly is it that people rely on? Or might it be still some further rule that they rely on? Or might they in some contexts rely on one version, and in others on another (Douven 2017, forthcoming)? Philosophical argumentation is unable to answer these questions. In recent years, experimental psychologists have started paying attention to the role humans give to explanatory considerations in reasoning. For instance, Tania Lombrozo and Nicholas Gwynne (2014) report experiments showing that how a property of a given class of things is explained to us—whether mechanistically, by reference to parts and processes, or functionally, by reference to functions and purposes—matters to how likely we are to generalise that property to other classes of things (see also Sloman 1994 and Williams and Lombrozo 2010). And Igor Douven and Jonah Schupbach (2015a), (2015b) present experimental evidence to the effect that people’s probability updates tend to be influenced by explanatory considerations in ways that makes them deviate from strictly Bayesian updates (see below). Douven (2016b) shows that, in the aforementioned experiments, participants who gave more weight to explanatory considerations tended to be more accurate, as determined in terms of a standard scoring rule. (See Lombrozo 2012 and 2016 for useful overviews of recent experimental work relevant to explanation and inference.) Douven and Patricia Mirabile (2018) found some evidence indicating that people rely on something like ABD2, at least in some contexts, but for the most part, empirical work on the above-mentioned questions is lacking.