 Perception gets content not only from the object in connection with the sense organ but also from the classificational power of the mind or self. With the perceptual awareness, “That’s a pot,” for instance, the pot as an individual in connection with a sensory faculty is responsible for the cognition of a property-bearer, for what is called the qualificandum portion of the perception, without admixture of memory, but the sensory connection is not by itself responsible for the qualifier portion, the pothood, also identified as the “predication content” (prakāra, the verbalizable “way” something appears), the thing’s classification as a pot. The classificational power of the mind should not, however, be understood as innate so much as the product of experience over the course of a lifetime. Repeatable features of reality get impressed on the mind or self in the form of memory dispositions. That is, in perceiving a as an F, normally an F-saṃskāra formed by previous knowledge-source-produced bits of awareness of things F would be a causal factor. The perception’s own content includes the repeatable nature of the qualifier through the operation of this factor. We see the tree as a tree, and it is a tree in fact.