Do psychological processes themselves exist, according to the ontologically independence criterion? It may be argued that most psychological processes do exist, at least those we undergo rather than those we make up. After all, the motivation underlying the independence criterion is that those things we just made up verbally or psychologically do not exist. Having a headache or believing that there is a laptop computer in front of me now are psychological processes that I did not make up. Therefore, it seems that at least these kinds of psychological processes do exist. In contrast, imaginings, desires, and hopes are processes we make up, and thus they do not exist. However, the underlying motivation for the criterion seems to diverge, in these cases, from what is entailed by the criterion's actual formulation. For the criterion insists on the ontological independence of “our linguistic practices and psychological processes”. Since headaches and beliefs are psychological processes themselves, presumably they are not ontologically independent of psychological processes. Hence, they do not exist. This means that if the criterion is applied as stated, no psychological process exists. For similar reasons, novels, mental contents, and institutions do not exist either, since they are all abstract objects dependent on our linguistic practices and psychological processes, according to the deflationary nominalist (Azzouni 2010a, 2012).