 The traditional platonist conception is a realist one: abstract objects exist in just the same full-blooded sense that objects in the natural world exist—they are mind-independent, rather than artifacts of human endeavor or dependent on concrete objects in any way. But a number of deflationary, metatontological views, now established in the literature, are based on the idea that the problems traditional platonists face have to do with “some very general preconceptions about what it takes to specify an object” rather than with “the abstractness of the desired object” (Linnebo 2018, 42). These views suggest that abstract objects exist in some weaker sense. Various approaches therefore articulate what may be called the ways of weakening existence. One clear precedent is due to Carnap 1950 [1956], whose deflationary approach may go the furthest; Carnap rejects the metaphysical pursuit of what “really exists” (even in the case of concrete objects) since he maintains that the question “Do \(X\text{s}\) really exist?” are pseudo-questions (if asked independently of some linguistic framework).