 Suffice it here to underscore three more general points suggested by efforts such as Hindriks’. The first is that reliance on individual moral duties and other kinds of individually based incentives to create new (or newly recognized) collective entities does not undermine the integrity of forward looking collective responsibility, but instead makes the latter possible. The second is that the creation (or recognition) of these new collective entities is absolutely crucial in cases where we are faced, in Stephen Gardiner’s words (Gardiner, 2017), with “paradigmatically global, intergenerational and ecological problems such as climate change” (Gardiner, 2017, p. 22) that require an expanded community of both concern and action. The third is that when we step back and ask how these expanded communities of concern and action can be created, we confront the importance of thinking about individual and collective responsibility, not as mutually exclusive, but, at least in some cases, as mutually supportive in both theory and practice.