 However, to complicate matters, it appears that a universal cannot exist in the mind either. For, as Boethius says, the universal existing in the mind is some universal understanding of some thing outside the mind. But then this universal understanding is either disposed in the same way as the thing is, or differently. If it is disposed in the same way, then the thing also must be universal, and then we end up with the previous problem of a really existing universal. On the other hand, if it is disposed differently, then it is false, for “what is understood otherwise than the thing is is false” (Five Texts, Spade 1994, p. 23 (21)). But then, all universals in the understanding would have to be false representations of their objects; therefore, no universal knowledge would be possible, whereas our considerations started out precisely from the existence of such knowledge, as seems to be clear, e.g., in the case of geometrical knowledge.