  Rupert (2004) shares a similar concern, noting that the processes by which Otto and Inga locate MoMA differ so considerably that it makes no sense to treat them as of a kind—as within the domain of a single science. Additionally, Rupert argues, there is no good reason to regard the various implements that combine with brain activity to be constituents of a cognitive system rather than simply tools that cognitive systems use to ease the processing they require to complete some task. Instead of insisting that cognitive systems extend, Rupert asks, why not regard them as seeking ways to embed themselves among tools that make their jobs easier? An axe does not become part of a person when she uses it to chop down a tree, why does a notebook become part of cognitive system when a brain uses it to locate MoMA? A sensible conservatism, Rupert thinks, speaks in favor of seeing cognitive systems as embedded in environments that allow ready use of tools to reduce their workloads, rather than as constituted, in part, by such tools. The hypothesis that cognitive systems use tools “is significantly less radical” (2004, 7) than the hypothesis that tools are constituents of cognitive systems and would seem to provide adequate explanations for all the phenomena that initially motivated the idea of extended cognition.