 Other countries and geographic regions display an uneven distribution of belief and nonbelief, even though it is not as stark as it is in Thailand and Saudi Arabia (Pew 2012). According to Maitzen, even if we grant, just for the sake of argument, the success of some of the theistically friendly explanations of nonbelief in individuals, none of them explain the “geographic patchiness” of nonbelief. That’s because those explanations invoke motivations, attitudes, and dispositions that “do not cluster by country or culture so as to show up twenty times more often in Thailand than in Saudi Arabia” (Maitzen 2006: 184). After all, it’s not as though the Thai are twenty times more likely than the Saudis to be resistant to belief in God’s existence, or in need of prompting to recognize the wretchedness of life without God, or in need of the sort of risk that’s required of a passionate faith in God; it’s not as though the Thai are twenty times more likely than the Saudis, upon coming to believe in God’s existence, to be coerced into love, trust, and obedience, or disposed to act out of improper motives like fear of punishment, or be presumptuous in their relationship with God, and so on (2006: 180–185). Indeed, even if we grant, just for the sake of argument again, that there is great value in a diversity of belief and nonbelief in God’s existence, 