More moderate forms of normative moral relativism, positions that sometimes are characterized as moral pluralism, have been defended by David Wong (2006) and David Velleman (2013). Moderate moral relativists endorse the idea of diversity and plurality of ethical values and accept that such values are justified according to differing local normative frameworks, but they avoid a full blown “anything goes” relativism by maintaining that all such frameworks are ultimately answerable to conditions for human flourishing and other overarching universal constraints such as the value of accommodation (Wong 2006). (It should however be noted that while theses under the description of pluralism needn’t entail a commitment to relativism, some formulations of relativism (such as Boghossian’s 2006b), include, as an essential ingredient, a “pluralist” clause. Whether particular instances of moral pluralism entail moral relativism depends entirely on the details of relevant claim to pluralism).