 The contributions of Pfänder, Reinach, and Ritzel (among others) support a statement made by Conrad in his last publication according to which phenomenologists in Göttingen rejected Husserl’s claim that intentionality is the essential characteristic of perception and presentation (1968: 3). Indeed, despite differences in the details, the idea that intentionality is not a general, but a specific property that characterizes only a given kind of experience (acts of meaning something) seems to have been a widely endorsed view among early phenomenologists: authors like Daubert (see Schuhmann &amp; Smith 1985: 784—on Daubert’s view in relation to the nature of intentionality, see also Bower 2019), Geiger (1911a: 125, 139), Stavenhagen (1925: 164f; 1933: 38), or Brunswig (1910: 64f) mention this idea in their publications often without feeling the need to offer further justification. However, not all early phenomenologists concurred on this view: some of them refused certain implications of it, others refused the view altogether.