 Nevertheless, pure dispositionalism is affected by several problems. First, some authors believe that it is not easy to provide a clear-cut distinction between dispositional and would-be non-dispositional properties (Cross 2005). Secondly, it seems that the essence of certain properties does not include, or is not exhausted by, their causative roles: qualia, inert and epiphenomenal  properties,[14]  structural and geometrical properties, spatio-temporal properties (Prior 1982; Armstrong 1999; for some responses, see Mellor 1974 and Bird 2007; 2009). Thirdly, there can be symmetrical causative roles. Consider three distinct properties \(A\), \(B\) and \(C\) such that \(A\) can cause \(B\), \(B\) can cause \(A\), \(A\) and \(B\) can together cause \(C\) and nothing else characterizes \(A\) and \(B\). \(A\) and \(B\) have the same causative role. Therefore, in pure dispositionalism, they turn out to be identical, against the hypothesis (Hawthorne 2001; see also Contessa 2019). Fourthly, according to some, pure dispositionalism falls prey to (at least) three distinct regresses (for a fourth regress, see Psillos 2006). Such regresses arise from the fact that the essential causative role of a dispositional property \(P\) “points towards” further properties \(S\), \(T\), etc. qua possible effects. The essential causative roles of the latter “point towards” still other properties, and so on. The first regress concerns the identity of \(P\), which is never fixed, as it depends on the identity of further properties, which depend for their identity on still other properties, and so on (Lowe 2006; Barker 2009; 2013). The second regress concerns the knowability of \(P\) (Swinburne 1980). \(P\) is only knowable through its possible effects (i.e., the instantiation of \(S\), \(T\), etc.), included in its causative role. Yet, such possible effects are only knowable through their possible effects, and so on. The third regress concerns the actuality of \(P\) (Armstrong 1997). \(P\)’s actuality is never reached, since \(P\) is nothing but the power to give rise to \(S\), \(T\), etc., which are nothing but the powers to give rise to further properties, and so on. For responses to these regresses, see Molnar 2003; Marmodoro 2009; Bauer 2012; McKitrick 2013; see also Ingthorsson 2013.