 Cohen’s methodological rationalism is his commitment to, as recent commentators have put it, “the search for reasons” (Beiser 2018, 3), the assumption of “the intelligibility of being” (Renz 2018, 10), and the “attempt to ground knowledge in critically reflexive, hypothetical, and self-consciously revisable concepts subject to justification” (Nahme 2019, 8). Cohen’s is not a rationalism that accepts any substantive doctrine, principle, or axiom as indubitable or necessarily true. Rather, it is the methodological commitment never to accept any doctrine, principle, axiom, or any other representation as brute or unexplainable. Instead, for Cohen we must always seek reasons for those representations. In Cohen’s epistemology and philosophy of science, this commitment would culminate in his conception of “pure thinking,” that is, thinking that is free from the influence of anything external to it (see §5 below). In his mature ethics and political philosophy, it is expressed in his view that ethics and the laws that unify a community “must be seen as an appeal to justified reasoning...” (Nahme 2019, 252) (see §6 below). At the same time Christian Damböck (2017, Ch. 4) argues that there is a sense in which Cohen is an “empiricist,” by which Damböck means that Cohen insists that philosophy must attend to the facts of history and culture as it finds them. Ursula Renz (2018) argues that these two senses of “rationalism” and “empiricism” need not conflict with one another. 