 In reply, Pickup argues that metaphysicians who accept the possibility of extended simples also accept that such “can be heterogeneous: that they can have different properties at the different locations at which they exist” (429). Metaphysicians differ in how they try to show that this is possible (432–4). But according to Pickup, it is plausible that there are “fundamental distributional properties”. An example of a distributional property is an object being polka-dotted, which requires that it is one color some places and another color in other places. What is controversial is that such properties can be fundamental, that they can belong to the basic metaphysical structure of reality, rather than being explained as no more than various smaller items having non-distributional properties (430). Thus, we should not think that an extended simple which is heterogeneous both has and lacks a property, being F and not being F. Rather, we should think that it has a single distributional property of being F at some of its locations and not being F at others. If, for instance, an extended simple could be colored, it might be polka-dotted, where this is understood as a fundamental property, rather than, for instance, black in some spots and not-black in others. Thus, we avoid saying that one and the same object at a single time is and is not black (429–31).