 In addition to individuation, two other issues related to representation are germane: temporality and intrinsicality (Hüttemann and Love 2011). In most discussions of epistemic reduction, both theoretical and explanatory, no explicit distinction has been drawn between constitutional or spatial relations (arrangements) and causal or temporal relations (dynamics; but see Mitchell 2009, 2012). One source of the focus on spatial relations is the objection to reductionism from structural organization (Polanyi 1968; cf. Delehanty 2005, Frost-Arnold 2004, Schaffner 1993, ch. 9.2), which is related to the “context” objection  (Section 4.1).  Moreover, physical science models that serve as templates for thinking about reduction emphasize spatial composition questions rather than causal relations (Love and Hüttemann 2011). As Schaffner has remarked: “Biological theories are usually given in the form of a series of temporal (and frequently causal) models. In physics, time is usually eliminated by making it implicit in differential equations, whereas in biology a temporal process … is the rule” (1993, 83–4; cf. Kellert 1993, 93). Nagel presciently recognized differences between spatial and temporal organization in his discussion of teleological explanation (in part because he was reading the literature on explaining ontogeny by theoretical biologists; see  Section 2).