 Finally, Voltaire protests that there is something unseemly about the whole Wager: “That article seems a bit indecent and childish; that notion of gambling, of losses and winnings, does not suit the gravity of the subject” (Voltaire 1778 [1961, 123]). This does not so much support wagering against God, as dismissing all talk of ‘wagerings’ altogether. Schlesinger (1994, 84) canvasses a sharpened formulation of this objection: an appeal to greedy, self-interested motivations is incompatible with “the quest for piety” that is essential to religion. He replies that the pleasure of salvation that Pascal’s Wager countenances is “of the most exalted kind”, and that if seeking it counts as greed at all, then it is “the manifestation of a noble greed that is to be acclaimed” (85). Franklin (1998, 2018) regards Voltaire as caricaturing Pascal's Wager and missing his key point that “you must wager”. Franklin argues that given that the choice Pascal presents is unavoidable, it should be made on the basis of a rational calculation, and that his conclusion concerns action, not the truth of theism.