 There have been several important critical discussions of Lewis’s explanation of the temporal asymmetry of causation. (For some early discussions see Horwich 1987: Chap. 10; Hausman 1998: Chap. 6; Price 1996: Chap. 6.) One important criticism concerns the ‘asymmetry of miracles’ that is central to Lewis’s account of the temporal asymmetry of causation: a miracle that realises a counterfactual antecedent about particular facts at time t by having a possible world diverge from the actual world just before the time t is, Lewis claims, smaller and less diverse than a miracle that realises the same counterfactual antecedent and makes a possible world converge to the actual world after the time t. Adam Elga (2000) has argued that the asymmetry of miracles does not hold in many cases. 