  There are two problems facing this interpretation of ‘the reasonable’. The first is that it does not look to be supported by the evidence to which it appeals. Sextus, the source for the notion of ‘the reasonable’ as the criterion, says that Arcesilaus and his followers did not define a criterion and that, when they seemed to, they did so “a counterblast to that of the Stoics” (M. 7.150, Bury trans.). (Sextus’ later account of Arcesilaus in another work is also incompatible with his hypothesizing such a theory; see Outlines of Pyrrhonism 1.232–3.) And Cicero and Numenius, our other sources for the view that Arcesilas was committed to inapprehensibility and universal suspension, do not mention his adoption of a practical criterion—in fact, in both authors it is suggested that Arcesilaus did not offer a position on how one might live without assent, and that Carneades significantly revised the Academic position in this respect (Academica 2.32; Numenius fr. 27.14–32, cf.  Numenius fr. 26.107–11).