 Influenced by these developments in logic, many philosophers in the first half of the Twentieth Century thought analyticity could perform crucial epistemological work not only in accounting for our apparently a priori knowledge of mathematics, but also —with a little help from British empiricism—of our understanding of claims about the spatiotemporal world as well. Indeed, “analysis” and the “linguistic turn” (Rorty, 1992) soon came to constitute the very way many Anglophone philosophers characterized their work, particularly since such analyses of what we mean by our words seemed to be the sort of enterprise available to “armchair reflection” that seemed to many a distinctive feature of that work (see Haug, 2014). Many thought this project would also perform the more metaphysical work of explaining the truth and necessity of mathematics, showing not only how it is we could know about these topics independently of experience, but how they could be true in this and in all possible worlds, usually, though, without distinguishing this project from the epistemic one. Thus, Gilbert Harman (1967 [1999] begins his review of the topic combining the two projects: