 Another possibility is that the whole controversy is ultimately just a pseudo-disagreement (see especially Florio and Linnebo 2016, but also Parsons 1990; Shapiro 1993; Linnebo 2003; Rayo 2007; and Linnebo and Rayo 2012). If both parties agree that plural expressions have semantic values, and if both agree that commitments to objects are incurred only by singular first-order terms and variables, then perhaps it does not matter whether other sorts of terms and variables should be regarded as introducing their own distinctive kinds of ontological commitment. Some philosophers speak about a theory’s ideological commitments and not just about its ontological commitments. By this is meant the logical and conceptual resources that the theory employs. Perhaps philosophers would be well advised to focus more on the metaphysical and epistemological questions raised by a theory’s ideological commitments and worry less about whether these ideological commitments should be also regarded as introducing a distinctive kind of ontological commitment. After all, the notion of an ontological commitment is a theoretical one, not one that has any sharp content outside of philosophy. So perhaps we should regard the notion more as a means to the end of providing good philosophical explanations and less as a goal in itself.