 The research on remembering as mental time travel introduced above emphasizes the relationship between episodic memory and its future-oriented counterpart, episodic future thought, and there are potential links between mental time travel and moral responsibility. Levy (2014; cf. Vierra 2016), for example, has argued that deficits in episodic memory and episodic future thought in psychopathy (Kennett &amp; Matthews 2009; McIlwain 2010) imply that psychopaths cannot genuinely intend to harm others and that they therefore may not have full moral responsibility for their actions. Craver et al. (2016), however, argue that subjects with deficits in episodic memory and episodic future thought make moral judgements similar to those made by normal subjects, suggesting that more work needs to be done to establish a definitive link between mental time travel and moral responsibility.