 The third argument points to the fact that our epistemic situation does not allow us to relate to future people as individuals. Can our present actions nonetheless be constrained by rights of future generations that are based on interests other than existence as such, interests such as subsistence, etc.? This is possible only if attributing rights to people does not require us to make reference to individual persons (Herstein 2009: 1180–1182). However, third, lack of particular knowledge of future people as individuals does not stand in the way of attributing to them welfare rights, such as a right to subsistence.  [1]  The corresponding obligations do not depend on the particular identity of future persons. Rather, such obligations are grounded in the fact that future persons are human beings; that is, they share those properties of being human that permit and require us to relate morally to them as fellow humans who should be able to pursue their own well-being.