 Still, there are other reasons to surrender SK, and this would be one way to understand the lesson of the reductio. For instance, well-known Quinean arguments exist against apriori knowledge, though this is not the place to discuss these. (But see section 3 of the entry on  Quine.)  Ryle 1963, ch. 6 independently argued that self-knowledge is apriori; such knowledge was instead achieved via empirical observation of one’s own behavior. Yet many contemporary philosophers balk at this, since it at least underestimate the “authority” that Oscar usually has in judging his own mental states (compared to others’ judgments) (Boghossian 1989, pp. 7–8). On the other hand, given the psychological research mentioned above, a neo-Rylean view may provide just the right amount of first-person authority, to the extent that Oscar observes more of his behavior than anyone else (Ludlow &amp; Martin 1993; Martin 1994; McGeer 1996).