 One form of this worry is a version of what we referred to above as the problem of morally admirable partiality. The common-sense view is that it is permissible for an agent to be partial toward herself; that is, to treat her own projects and concerns as if they had special significance (Scheffler 1982). (From her point of view, of course, they do have special significance.) This sort of self-concern, then, constitutes a form of partiality which seems, from the vantage point of common sense, to be morally endorsed. Similarly, certain sorts of partiality directed toward other people – friends, family members, and the like – are also forbidden by consequentialist impartiality, but regarded as justifiable, and in many cases admirable, from the standpoint of common sense (Blum 1980, Cottingham 1983, Kekes 1981, Keller 2013, Slote 1985). A related concern focuses not on morality per se but on the needs and conditions of agenthood and personal flourishing. James Griffin, for example, writes that “Many prudential values involve commitments—to particular persons, institutions, causes, and careers. One cannot live a prudentially good life, one cannot fully flourish, without becoming in large measure partial. That partiality then becomes part of one; it is not something one can psychologically enter into and exit from at will” (Griffin 1996, 85). Bernard Williams argues that, in prohibiting an agent from seeing their own persona projects and commitments as no more significant than those of any other agent, consequentialist theories violate the integrity of agents and undermine any reason they might have for being moral (Williams 1973, 1981; cf. Hurley 2009). (It should be noted that Williams sees Kantian deontological theories as to some degree vulnerable to these objections as well.)