 Kind (2003) contends that the possibility of self-blindness does not directly threaten inner sense accounts. Even if Shoemaker is right that rational creatures will generally be capable of self-awareness, this conclusion is silent as to how such awareness occurs. So it does not rule out the possibility that it is achieved through inner sense. Gertler (2011a: ch. 5) argues that the inner sense theorist can block Shoemaker’s objection by stipulating that no creature qualifies as rational if it is self-blind. “No rational creature is self-blind” would then be a de dicto truth and, as such, is compatible with the inner sense account. Shoemaker’s challenge to inner sense views requires a stronger thesis, namely that the capacity for self-knowledge is a de re necessary characteristic of rational beings: that is, rational beings must be capable of self-knowledge in order to exist at all.