 An Essay on Metaphysics contains a general statement of Collingwood’s metaphilosophy and his view that metaphysics is not an ontological inquiry into pure being but a logical inquiry that takes the form of presuppositional analysis. While An Essay on Metaphysics explained, in the most general terms, what presuppositional analysis is, The Idea of History (1946) and The Principles of History (1999) seek to uncover the presuppositions governing historical inquiry into the past. Collingwood’s philosophy of history asks the question: “what are the presuppositions that govern the historical understanding of the past?” and “what does it mean to understand the past historically?” The nature of Collingwood’s concern with the past is not metaphysical. He is not advancing a theory concerning the nature of time, whether, for example, it is ever-present or a growing block. Nor is it primarily an epistemological concern with the question of how one acquires knowledge of the past, given that it is not available for observation, although he does address some epistemological questions. The nature of his concern with the nature of the past is first and foremost a conceptual concern with the question “What is the historical past? What does it mean to understand the past historically?”