 Like Dolezal, Eleonore Stump thinks of God as self-subsistent Being (esse). If God is absolutely simple, and not just simple in the uncontroversial sense of lacking material parts, then God must be self-subsistent Being. God is at once both Being and something that is. He has to be both. If he were Being (esse) but not a being (id quod est), he could not enter into causal relations. He could not do anything such as create the world, intervene in its operations, or interact with human persons. Such a God would be “religiously pernicious” (Stump 2016, 199). Indeed, if God were Being but not a being, then one could not sensibly maintain that God exists. For if Being is other than every being, then Being is not. (It is instructive to note that Martin Heidegger, the famous critic of onto-theology, who holds to the “ontological difference” of Being (Sein) from every being (Seiendes) ends up assimilating Being to Nothing (Nichts).) On the other hand, if God were a being among beings who merely has Being but is not (identically) Being, then he would not be absolutely transcendent, worthy of worship, or ineffable. Such a God would be “comfortingly familiar” but “discomfitingly anthropomorphic” (Miller 1996, 3). It is not clear that DDS is susceptible of a satisfactory articulation acceptable to most theists. There is no reason to be sanguine. But if such could be achieved then we would have a via media between the Scylla of negative theology according to which nothing can be truly said or known about God and the Charybdis of an anthropomorphic theology according to which “… God’s properties are merely human ones, albeit extended to the maximum degree possible” (Miller, 1996, 3).