 First of all, it should be noted that the Feder-Garve view, while not exactly an exercise in interpretive charity, is not without a basis in claiming that there is a deep similarity between Berkeley and the Critique (this point is brought out well in Beiser 2002: 49–52). First of all, Kant repeatedly claims that empirical objects are representations. For instance, in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” he writes that “what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility” (A30/B45) and in the “Fourth Paralogism” he writes: “external objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a species of my representations” (A370; see also A30/B45, A104 and A375n, A490, A498, A563). Since “representation” [Vorstellung] is Kant’s term for what Berkeley calls “ideas”, this seems at least perilously close to the Berkeleyan view that bodies are collections of ideas. Secondly, the A Edition is full of passages that can easily suggest a phenomenalist view of objects in space, such as: 