 Ross also suggests lying is wrong because it involves breaking an implicit promise ‘not to tell ties which seems to be implied in the act of entering into conversation’ (RG 21; FE 97). Again, this might capture some of what we think wrong with lying, but it may not provide the full account of what makes it wrong. Ross says when ‘we consider ourselves bound . . . to fulfil a promise, we think of the fulfilment of the promise as the bringing into existence of some source of pleasure or satisfaction for the person to whom we have made the promise’ (RG 162). When we consider ourselves bound to tell the truth we are not clearly of the view doing so will promote pleasure for the individual to whom we owe the obligation. Think here of being asked to provide an honest assessment of a student’s work. We think we ought to tell the truth, but this is not obviously accompanied by the thought doing so will bring into existence pleasure for the student.