 This brings us to the  Transitivity axiom,  which says that if an option \(B\) is weakly preferred to \(A\), and \(C\) weakly preferred to \(B\), then \(C\) is weakly preferred to \(A\). A recent challenge to Transitivity turns on heterogeneous sets of options, as per the discussion of Completeness above. But here a different interpretation of preference is brought to bear on the comparison of options. The idea is that preferences, or judgments of desirability, may be responsive to a salience condition. For example, suppose that the most salient feature when comparing cars \(A\) and \(B\) is how fast they can be driven, and \(B\) is no worse than \(A\) in this regard, yet the most salient feature when comparing cars \(B\) and \(C\) is how safe they are, and that \(C\) is no worse than \(B\) in this regard. Furthermore, when comparing \(A\) and \(C\), the most salient feature is their beauty. In such a case, some argue (e.g., Temkin 2012) that there is no reason why Transitivity should be satisfied with respect to the preferences concerning \(A\), \(B\) and \(C\). Others (e.g., Broome 1991a) argue that Transitivity is part of the very meaning of the betterness relation (or objective comparative desirability); if rational preference is a judgment of betterness or desirability, then Transitivity is non-negotiable. With respect to the car example, Broome would argue that the desirability of a fully specified option should not vary, simply in virtue of what other options it is compared with. Either the choice context affects how the agent perceives the option at hand, in which case the description of the option should reflect this, or else the choice context does not affect the option. Either way, Transitivity should be satisfied.