  The Moral Twin Earth thought experiment has led philosophers to explore other metasemantical options, besides Boyd’s causal theory, which realists may use to argue that they can accommodate the pertinent intuitions about when people are in a genuine moral disagreement. These options include conceptual role semantics (Wedgwood 2001) and David Lewis’ views on “reference magnetism” (van Roojen 2006; Dunaway and McPherson 2016; Williams 2016; see Eklund 2017 for further discussion). The general problem that those alternative suggestions are intended to solve can be indicated as follows. Horgan’s and Timmons’ argument suggests that the fact that a speaker’s use of “right” is regulated by a certain property is of limited relevance to the plausibility of viewing us as being in a genuine disagreement when discussing its application. What matters are instead the considerations pertaining to the social and psychological roles the term plays in the speaker’s community and in his or her deliberations. To accommodate the intuitions the moral twin earth thought experiment evokes (and to handle new scenarios that antirealists might come up with), what realists seem to need is thus an account to the effect that those very considerations are enough to secure co-reference. That is, the account must entail that the features that tempt us to interpret the speaker as being in a genuine moral disagreement with us are the same as, or at least reliably correlated with, the features on which co-reference is taken to supervene.