 Actual opposition to hedonism did not materialize until the present century (Sharpe 2000, Davies 2004), and most all of that during the past decade or so (Shelley 2010, 2011, 2019; Wolf 2011; Lopes 2015, 2018; Gorodeisky 2021a, 2021b). Why the opposition took so long to show up is a good question. It is tempting to think its answer resides in the obvious truth of the hedonist’s central premise, namely, that aesthetically valuable objects please us, at least in general. Anti-hedonists, however, have taken no interest in denying this premise. One useful way to think of the dialectic between hedonists and their opponents is to regard each as grasping one horn of an aesthetic version of the Euthyphro dilemma, where hedonists hold things to have aesthetic value because they please and anti-hedonists hold things to please because they have aesthetic value (Augustine 2005/389–391, De vera religione §59; Gorodeisky 2012a, 201 and 2021b, 262). Seen this way, the fact that aesthetically valuable things please tells not at all in favor of the hedonist; indeed, it is precisely this fact that the anti-hedonist thinks the hedonist cannot explain.