  Dretske grants that when mental event a initiates (“triggers”) a process ending in bodily movement b, a does so solely in virtue of its intrinsic makeup.  Nevertheless, a’s relational, intentional properties have a  causal role, for they can be relevant to the fact that a causes  b. Reasons are “structuring causes” of behavior: it’s because of what a indicates that it was “recruited” during the learning process as a cause of b. (Indication here is a matter of  reliable co-variation.) It’s because, for example, Lilian’s belief  indicates what it does—raising one’s hand (in these  circumstances) is a way to get the teacher’s attention—that it  was (together with the relevant desire) recruited as a cause of her  hand-raising. Relational, intentional mental properties thus become  causally relevant to behavior, because they are relevant to  structuring the very causal processes that, on Dretske’s view,  constitute instances of behavior.