 A related objection is that we can fail to act, or intend, in accordance with our evaluations. In a typical case of akrasia, I conclude that I ought to quit, but decide to continue smoking instead. Davidson (1970) replied to this by distinguishing ‘all things considered’ from ‘unconditional’ evaluative judgement. In ‘conditional’ or ‘prima facie’ judgements one takes some body of considerations, r, to support A over B. All things considered judgement is the special case of this in which r includes all the considerations one holds relevant. There is no inconsistency in judging that the sum of these particular considerations favours A over B while judging that B is better than A, perhaps in light of other facts one has not explicitly considered. Since it is the latter judgement that constitutes intention, one can act intentionally against the former. This is how Davidson makes sense of my continuing to smoke.