 The conception he developed in his next article (Carnap 1945b) was indeed logical in the Wittgenstein-Waismann sense, in that the relation between observation sentences and hypothesis was purely logical and analytic. To achieve this, a relativized principle of indifference was needed; unlike that of Laplace or Keynes, Carnap’s was entirely language-relative (framework-relative); it was no longer a quasi-metaphysical assertion about the nature of distributions, let alone about the statistical nature of the world, but a matter of constitutive definition. As in any other area of knowledge, Carnap thought it essential to define the framework before making assertions, so that we are all on the same page. (This logical or “structural” conception of probability and the relativized principle of indifference are explained in concrete detail in the supplement  Inductive Logic.)  This means that the value of a confirmation measure as applied to a hypothesis and the evidence for or against it is an analytical consequence (in the chosen language framework) of the logical and inductive method given by the framework.