 Quine addressed this issue, first, in his (1953 [1980a], chapter 3), and then in a much larger way in his (1960, chapter 2, and 1974) and related articles. In his (1953 [1980a]) he pressed his objection to analyticity further to the very ideas of synonymy and the linguistic meaning of an expression, on which, we saw, Frege’s criterion of analyticity crucially relied. His objection is that he sees no way to make any serious explanatory sense of them. He explored plausible explanations in terms of “definition,” “intension,” “possibility,” and “contradiction,”, pointing out that each of these notions seems to stand in precisely as much need of explanation as synonymy itself (recall our observation in §1.2 above regarding the lack of any formal contradiction in “Some pediatricans aren’t doctors”). The terms seem to be mutually definable in what seems to be a—viciously?—small “closed curve in space” (Quine 1953 [1980a], p. 30). Though they might be invoked to explain one another, they could not in the end answer the challenge of how to distinguish an analytic claim from simply a tenaciously held belief.