 [I]t can be said that God not always knows with the same certainty what came about and that which is going to come about. &lt;It is so,&gt; because God’s knowledge is equally certain with regard to future contingents as with regard to necessary events; however, it is possible for divine knowledge not to be certain with regard to God’s creatures, because a creature &lt;i. e., a human&gt; can know that (s)he is sitting with as much certainty as that a human is an animal. Still, one certainty concerns contingent and the other necessary things. Therefore, this consequence is false: ‘&lt;God&gt; knows with equal certainty that which happened and that which is going to happen’. Yet, it may happen that &lt;God&gt; does not know the things that are going to happen, and thus &lt;God&gt; may not know the things that happened. This conclusion, however, is true by virtue of God’s absolute power. And by virtue of God’s ordained power it does not follow that all events (past, future, and present) are equally known by God (DV: 182).