 Regarding the essence of moral virtue, Brito holds different positions in his two commentaries on the Ethics. In this change of position, Brito reveals an interesting use of theological sources. In the first commentary, he holds that will is the subject of justice, while the sensitive appetite is the subject of the remaining moral virtues (QEN; QE-2008: 276–279, 426–428). Here Brito roughly replicates Aquinas’ position (cf. Summa theologiae, II.II 58.4). However, in his second commentary, Brito adopts the rather Aristotelian position of Godfrey of Fontaines (Quodl.   XIV),[10]  according to which all the moral virtues are dispositions of the sensitive appetite. Thus, Brito opposes, on the one hand, Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, for whom all moral virtues are dispositions of the will, and, on the other hand, Peter of Auvergne, for whom all virtues exist both in the will and in the sensitive appetite.