 Some respond to such combination problems by appealing to a Leibnizian underrepresentation thesis (Pereboom 2011: 114–15), on which introspective awareness of phenomenal states fails to represent them as having microfeatures they do in fact have (Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, §30 [G IV, 458–59; IV, 574–75]; Pereboom 1991b, 2011: 9, n. 1; cf. Stoljar 2001: 276). Consider the version of the combination problem stated two paragraphs back, involving the constitution of phenomenal blueness. On the Leibnizian underrepresentation thesis, even if one introspects one’s experience as featuring only noncomplex phenomenal blueness, phenomenal blueness might in fact be constituted by an unrepresented array of (proto)phenomenal quiddities. To support that claim, one might draw an analogy to a macrophenomenal property that is constituted by other macrophenomenal properties. For example, a taste experience might appear simple and unconstituted even if in fact it is constituted by a combination of sweet, sour, salty, bitter, and umami (as Louis DeRosset has suggested in conversation; see Pereboom 2011: 115). Likewise, the response continues, perhaps all macrophenomenal features are constituted by (proto)phenomenal quiddities, or by quiddities and structural features, which introspection fails to reveal.