 The notion of a world-type-for-\(S\) \(Ls\) is to be understood in the following way. A world-type is “a set which is such that for any counterfactual of freedom, i.e., any proposition which can be expressed by a sentence of the form ‘If individual essence \(P\) were instantiated in circumstances \(C\) at time \(t\) and its instantiation were left free with respect to action \(A\), the instantiation of \(P\) would freely do \(A\)’—either that counterfactual or its negation is a member of the set” (Flint &amp; Freddoso 1983, p. 96). It may also be stipulated “that for any two members of the set, the conjunction of those two members is a member of the set as well” (Flint &amp; Freddoso 1983, pp. 96–97). Moreover, “a world-type is true just in case every proposition which is a member of it is true” (Flint &amp; Freddoso 1983, p. 97). In addition, it is presupposed that “for any free agent \(x\), there will be a set of all and only those true counterfactuals of freedom (or true negations of such counterfactuals) over whose truth-value \(x\) has no control” (Flint &amp; Freddoso 1983, p. 97). A set of this kind is referred to as the world-type-for-x. Finally, ‘\(Lx\)’ designates the true-world-type-for-\(x\).