 The topic arises when Charmides is praised for both external and internal good qualities, including sophrosune. Socrates assumes that Charmides must have some sense of what this virtue is, if he has it within him (158e). Charmides answers first that sophrosune is a kind of quietness and order (159b); indeed, he has a reputation for sophrosune because of his quiet and orderly good manners. This fails because sophrosune is among those things that are always kalon (fine), and quietness is fine only in certain contexts. The relevant condition on definition in this case is that of exclusion; the proposed explanation does not exclude things that are not sophron. Charmides’ second attempt fails by the same criterion: a sense of shame looks like sophrosune in some contexts, but it appears not always to be a good thing (160e–161b). His third attempt is plagiarized, probably from Critias, who may have heard it from Socrates: sophrosune is doing one’s own things (a phrase identical to that used in the Republic to define justice). Charmides is unable to explain what this means. Critias takes over, in order to defend his definition, and is led to gloss it as doing good things (163e).