 It is difficult to know whether this sort of ‘fragmentist’ account can really explain the phenomenology of our experience, however. For it still faces the objection that the objects of attention can be immensely rich and varied at any given moment, hence requiring there to be an equally rich and varied repertoire of HOTs tokened at the same time. Think of immersing yourself in the colors and textures of a Van Gogh painting, for example, or the scene as you look out at your garden—it would seem that one can be phenomenally conscious of a highly complex set of properties, which one could not even begin to describe or conceptualize in any detail. However, since the issues here are large and controversial, it cannot yet be concluded that actualist forms of HOT theory have been refuted. This is particularly the case when one considers such phenomena as change and inattentional blindness where subjects often do not even notice somewhat significant changes occurring in an image or video even within one’s focal visual field (Simons 2000; Simons and Chabris 1999).