 So far, so good for the Gricean. But just how general is her solution to the Humpty Dumpty Problem? Can she, for instance, account for a speaker who appears to be fully competent in a language like English, but who mistakenly believes that everyone else can simply read off  her referential intentions, directly? In other words, consider a speaker who believes that her listener can read her mind regarding her referential intentions, though nothing else, and only when she actually utters a demonstrative. Unless we rule out such a speaker as broadly incompetent in speaking English, it would seem that she can now succeed, according to the Gricean, in making a token of ‘this’ or ‘that’ refer to whatever she likes, on any occasion whatsoever. For this speaker can coherently intend for her listener to recover that object as the referent of her use of the demonstrative, partly in virtue of recognizing this very intention, and regardless of what that object is. In other words, given some strange enough background beliefs, the Gricean predicts that a speaker really can make a use of ‘that’ in an utterance like (9) refer to her picture of David Kaplan—regardless  of whether anyone short of a real clairvoyant would ever be capable of recovering this referent. So the Gricean strategy to block intentionalism’s collapse into Humpty Dumpty-ism won’t fully generalize.