 The special features of our relations to (remote) future people—especially the lack of particular knowledge, the impossibility of cooperation, and the permanent asymmetry of influence  (§1)—do  not stand in the way of attributing rights to them that ground corresponding duties owed by us  (§2  and  §3).  The fact that past wrongs are among the necessary conditions for the existence and identity of people currently alive is compatible with the view that these persons have rights to compensation owing to the impact of these past wrongs on their well-being, and that these rights can ground corresponding duties owed by their contemporaries (forward-looking understanding of the significance of past injustices)  (§5.1).  However, the Non-Identity Problem is not relevant for many indirect victims’ claims to compensation owing to past and historical injustices  (§5.2).  Even when we allow for the possibility of the ongoing impact of past injustices to be just today, namely owing to changes of relevant circumstances, we will have to investigate the extent to which the conditions for such a supersession of historical claims are met for each case. If supersession of historical claims occurs it might well be partial and and for the time being, and not full and final  (§5.3).