 The status of laboratory evidence is a major point of contention in philosophy of biomedicine disputes. “Bench science” is often used as a catchall term in EBM for a wide variety of laboratory evidence (biochemistry, pathology, digital models of drug metabolism, animal studies of a treatment, etc.), and that evidence is pushed to the very bottom of the evidence hierarchy (B. Clarke, Gillies, Illari, Russo, &amp; Williamson 2014). For example, green tea contains epigallocatechin gallate (EGCG), which seems to be effective at killing cancer cells in petri dishes and in mice (Eisenstein 2019). EBM supporters would be inclined to look down on inferences that green tea is therefore a wise anti-cancer home health behavior, until there is at least epidemiological evidence that green tea drinkers genuinely do have better cancer outcomes. Even then, EBM supporters would want to know if the anti-cancer effects are due to EGCG, some combination of multiple components of green tea, or perhaps just the relaxing social act of having a hot beverage. Biomedicine has always valued the sort of research that investigates EGCG in petri dishes, in mice, or other models used on the laboratory bench, but the dispute is over how reliable one takes that research to be for guiding real medical decisions (ought physicians tell patients to drink green tea?).