 The contraction also presumably responds to problem in Addison, this time to an apparent inconsistency in the conception of imagination itself. Addison opposes the pleasures of the imagination to the pleasures of sense, on one hand, and to the pleasures of the understanding, on the other (Addison and Steele 1879, no. 411). But he also defines the pleasures of the imagination as those arising from the visual representation of things, and allows that some of those pleasures—those he calls “the primary pleasures of the imagination”—arise from things present to vision (Addison and Steele 1879, no. 411). Thus it becomes hard to say what the opposition between the pleasures of sense and the pleasures of the imagination can amount to. It is presumably to relieve this tension that Burke recasts Addison’s distinction between primary and secondary pleasures of the imagination as a distinction between “the primary pleasures of sense” and “the secondary pleasures of the imagination” (Burke 1757 [1990, 22]).