 The worthy exegete of Aristotle’s writings must not fall wholly short of the latter’s greatness of intellect (megalonoia). He must also have experience of everything the Philosopher has written, and must be an expert (epistemôn) of Aristotle’s customary use of language (sunêtheia). His judgement must be impartial (adekaston), so that he may neither, out of misplaced zeal, seek to prove something well said to be unsatisfactory, nor, if some point should require attention, should he obstinately persist in trying to demonstrate that [Aristotle] is always and everywhere infallible, as if he had enrolled himself in the Philosopher’s school. [The good exegete] must, I believe, not convict the philosophers of discordance (diaphônia) by looking only at the letter (lexis) of what [Aristotle] says against Plato; but he must look towards the spirit (nous), and track down (anikhneuein) the harmony (sumphônia) which reigns between them on the majority of points. (Simplicius, In Cat. 7.23–32, translated by M. Chase, slightly modified)