 Sawyer, moreover, explicitly discourages those who interpret her (1998) as embracing the reductio as an anti-skeptical argument: “Remarks by others indicate that in general the question of whether externalist arguments yield apriori warrants for beliefs about environmental conditions is seen as synonymous with the question whether we have an apriori refutation of external world skepticism. I do not see the questions as synonymous” (2006, p. 150). Instead, Sawyer’s view seems similar to that of W., where speakers are given a prima facie (albeit quite defeasible) warrant when ascribing their own mental contents. Granted, Sawyer allows that given EXT, such a non-empirical warrant can be transmitted to  (3).[20]  But it is not the kind of warrant that suffices to undermine skepticism; the warrant is rather of the “thin” variety, noted at the end of section  2.3.  Nevertheless, although Sawyer’s view is not as radical as many have thought, she would face similar obstacles as W.