 Except among those who reject the notion of logical truth altogether, or those who, while accepting it, reject the notion of logical form, there is wide agreement that at least part of the modal force of a logical truth ought to be due to its being a particular case of a true universal generalization over the possible values of the schematic letters in “formal” schemata like \((1')-(3')\). (These values may but need not be expressions.) On what is possibly the oldest way of understanding the logical modality, that modal force is entirely due to this property: thus, for example, on this view to say that (1) must be true can only mean that (1) is a particular case of the true universal generalization “For all suitable \(P\), \(Q\), \(a\) and \(b\), if \(a\) is a \(P\) only if \(b\) is a \(Q\), and \(a\) is a \(P\), then \(b\) is a \(Q\)”. On one traditional (but not uncontroversial) interpretation, Aristotle's claim that the conclusion of a syllogismos must be true if the premises are true ought to be understood in this way. In a famous passage of the Prior Analytics, he says: “A syllogismos is speech (logos) in which, certain things being supposed, something other than the things supposed results of necessity (ex anankes) because they are so” (24b18–20). Think of (2) as a syllogismos in which the “things supposed” are (2a) and (2b), and in which the thing that “results of necessity” is (2c):