 Bosanquet’s first essays on metaphysics—“Is Mind Synonymous with Consciousness?” and “What Takes Place in Voluntary Action?”—focused on the nature of mind, and in 1893–94 he offered a course of lectures that became the basis of his book, Psychology of the Moral Self (1897). Opposed to the crude associationist and the ‘push and pull’ psychology of empiricists (such as David Hume, J.S. Mill, and Alexander Bain) who held that thought consists of disconnected, discrete data of the senses, and the ‘psychological habits’ that arise out of the contiguous relations of these data, Bosanquet argued that one cannot separate the human individual from everything makes up its world. It does not follow, however, that reality is not autonomous of individual consciousness. Bosanquet writes that “everything is real so long as you do not take it for more than it is” (Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 240, see Logic, Vol. 1, p. 273) (see Hamilton Grant 2015).