 Even a non-dualistic pleasure view might face difficulties stemming from understanding desire in terms of what it seeks (sexual pleasure). One problem is the difficulty of defining “sexual pleasure” (see below), which this view needs to do to be complete. But there might be additional problems. First, not all sexual desires are for sexual pleasure: a couple might have sex to have a baby, even though the act is pleasurable (Jacobsen 2017: 33; see also 1993). Second, our sexual partners would in principle be dispensable if there are other ways to attain the pleasure. This objection is not moral—that we use our sexual partners as mere instruments—but ontological: sexual pleasure cannot be the only or common goal to all sexual desires otherwise the agent would be indifferent between the available ways of attaining sexual pleasure. Since this is not true, sexual desire is not solely for sexual pleasure (Jacobsen 2017: 33).