 A different approach to the generality problem is to insist that a version of the problem arises for any adequate epistemology, not just reliabilists. A version of this “parrying response” has been developed by Juan Comesaña (2006), who argues that every account of doxastic justification needs to appeal to the basing relation. This is true even of evidentialist accounts: after all, evidentialists maintain that in order for a belief B to be doxastically justified, B needs to be based on a body of evidence that supports B. (More on evidentialism in  §4.2  below.) But, Comesaña argues, any attempt to characterize the basing relation will run into the generality problem, or something very similar to it. Moreover, Comesaña contends, if evidentialists are willing to simply take for granted some notion of basing in their theory, then there is no reason why reliabilists cannot follow suit, and deploy the basing relation in their solution to the generality problem.