 Here, the direction of valid inference is from ‘young doctor’ to ‘doctor’, as if the inference is governed by the (default) inference rule that licenses replacement of ‘young doctor’ with the less restrictive predicate ‘doctor’. One can say that the default direction of implication, from more restrictive to less restrictive predicates, has been inverted twice—once by ‘No’, and once by ‘every’. But one wants a systematic account of propositional structure that explains the net effect; see Ludlow (2002) for further discussion. Sommers (1982) offers a strategy for recoding and extending classical logic, in part by exploiting an idea suggested by  Leibniz  (and arguably Pāṇini): a relational sentence like ‘Juliet loved Romeo’ somehow combines an active-voice sentence with a passive-voice sentence, perhaps along the lines of ‘Juliet loved, and thereby Romeo was loved’; cp.  section nine.  But one way or another, quantifiers need to be characterized in a way that captures their general logical role—and not just their role as potential subjects of Aristotelian propositions—if impeccability is to be revealed as a matter of form. Quantifiers are not simply devices for creating schemata like ‘Every S is P’, into which general terms like ‘politician’ and ‘deceitful’ can be inserted. Instances of ‘S’ and ‘P’ can themselves have quantificational structure and relational constituents.