One such strand was the entertaining of the possibility of pluralism concerning epistemic standards. In one instance, this took the form of the claim, in response to skepticism, that there are two senses of ‘know’—one strong or philosophical, the other weak or ordinary (see, e.g., Malcolm 1952). So too, some of Wittgenstein’s (1953, 1969) claims about the relation between meaning and use and the multiplicity of “language games” opened the way for a more thoroughgoing semantic pluralism with regard to epistemic concepts and/or terms. Further, in a move foreshadowing contemporary contextualists’ methodology, there was the argument for pluralism from cases: based in part on everyday examples, Hector-Neri Castañeda suggested that “what counts as knowing” might depend on the situation (1980, 217), and Gail Stine claimed that “[i]t is an essential characteristic of our concept of knowledge that tighter criteria are appropriate in different contexts” (Stine 1976, 254).