 Finally, it must be noted that though I have spoken baldly of “emotions” above, there is, first, a consensus that we do not respond to music with fully-fledged emotions and, second, increasing sophistication in philosophical theories of emotions. Regarding the first point, our emotional responses to music lack many of the behaviors characteristic of the supposedly felt emotion. Some take our responses instead to be weaker versions of ordinary emotions (Davies 1994: 299–307), others take them to share some aspects of ordinary emotions, such as their characteristic affective states, but to lack others, such as a specific intentional object (Levinson 1982: 319–22; Radford 1989). A third option is that we respond to expressive music with “quasi-emotions”, that is, the affective components of fully-fledged emotions that we imagine to be fully-fledged (Walton 1990: 240–55). Apart from debate over which of these proposals most closely matches our experience, there is the question of how well each of them fits with the various solutions discussed above to the problem of our negative responses to music, and with empirical work on the emotions, which leads me to the second point: There is growing interest in both the variety of emotions and affective states more broadly, and non-cognitive aspects of, or alternatives to, cognitive theories of the emotions (e.g., Robinson 2005; Bicknell 2007, 2009; Cochrane 2010a,b; Budd 2011; S. Davies 2011a,b; Young 2014).