Now, if we allow incremental possible changes to the ways that Adam and Noah could have been and accept the transitivity of identity, we are committed to a finite series of incremental changes that ends in a possible world where Adam has all the qualitative properties Noah actually has and Noah has all the qualitative properties that Adam actually has. This is because the relevant iterated modal claim “Adam could have been such that he could have been such that he could have been such” is, by our initial assumption, true in virtue of one and the same individual, Adam, existing at different possible worlds. So, if Adam and Noah could be incrementally different and the individuals they could have been could also be incrementally different, we must accept that Adam and Noah could “swap” their respective qualitative properties. And, if so, there is a maximal possibility that differs from actuality only in haecceitistic terms—that is, it differs only in terms of which individuals instantiate which qualitative profiles.