 It was Gibbard (1981, pp. 231–4) who showed just how sensitive to epistemic situations Stalnaker’s truth conditions would be. Later (1984, ch. 6), reacting to Gibbard, Stalnaker seemed more ambivalent about whether conditional judgements express propositions. But he still takes his original theory to be a serious candidate (Stalnaker 2005, 2019), and this remains an influential theory. His work has inspired others to develop related theories: context-dependent theories are currently popular (see below, §4.3); the fact that Stalnaker kept the probabilistic considerations aside in his 1968 paper led others to develop the Ramsey test for all-or-nothing beliefs—see e.g. Gärdenfors (1986); and another close relative of Stalnaker’s semantics, due to Richard Bradley (2012), is discussed below in §5.