 Another kind of criticism came from the Neo-Kantians, most of whom wanted to completely divorce philosophy from psychology. In 1894 the Baden School Neo-Kantian Wilhelm Windelband delivered a lecture in which he claimed that psychology has no real relevance for the historical sciences and should be considered a natural science rather than a human science. Windelband sees psychology as searching for laws just as the natural sciences do and historical studies as interested in unique patterns. Thus he proposed that the natural sciences are nomothetic and the historical or cultural sciences ideographic. Dilthey in turn rejected Windelband’s distinction by showing that many natural sciences have ideographic elements and many human sciences such as linguistics and economics have nomothetic aims. Moreover, Dilthey argued that the description of singular historical data only becomes meaningful if understood in the framework of regularities: “What is most characteristic of the systematic human sciences is the connection of the general and the individual ” (1895–6/SW.II, 227). Not only is it the case that universal considerations are as important as ideographic specificity, but also the understanding of individuality is not possible without reference to some broader context.