 Here is the basic epistemological stance that Dharmakīrti inherited from Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. Just as there are only two kinds of objects of knowledge, real particulars and fictional universals, there are only two types of knowledge, or more exactly “sources of knowledge” (pramāṇa), viz., “perception” (pratyakṣa) and “inference” (anumāṇa). Perception is always purely non-conceptual and non-linguistic whereas inference is conceptual, linguistic  thinking[28]  that proceeds on the basis of good reasons. Particulars are the objects of perception and universals are the objects of inference—one sees specific shapes, colors, but when one thinks “red is a color” the subject and predicate terms range over several things. Perception has the special status of giving direct access to the real, whereas conceptual thought is, in an important way, distorted (bhrānta) because it “superimposes” universals that aren’t actually there in the particulars themselves.