  Generally, pluralists have not yet developed a response to the Quine-Sainsbury objection. And for some, this is because the real force of the Quine-Sainsbury objection lies in its exposure of the scope problem as a pseudo-problem (Dodd 2013; see also Asay 2018). Again, the idea is that traditional inflationary theories postulate some candidate for \(F\) but the applicability and plausibility of \(F\) differs across regions of discourse. No such theory handles the truths of moral, mathematical, comic, legal, etc. discourse equally well; and this suggests that these theories, by their monism, face limitations on their explanatory scope. Pluralism offers a non-deflationary solution. Yet, why think that these differences among domains mark an alethic difference in truth per se, rather than semantic or discursive differences among the sentences comprising those domains? There is more than one way to score a goal in soccer, for example (via corner kick, ricochet off the foot of an opposing player or the head of a teammate, obstruct the goalkeeper, etc.), but it is far from clear that this entails pluralism about the property of scoring a goal in soccer. (Analogy belongs to an anonymous referee.) Pluralists have yet to adequately address this criticism (although see Blackburn 2013; Lynch 2013b, 2018; Wright 1998 for further discussion).