 Another regress that arguably fits this pattern is McTaggart’s (1908) regress argument against the reality of the A-series of time. The A-series of time is the sequence of times one of which is present, others past, and others future. (As opposed to the B-series, which merely says that some times are before others, some after others, etc., without singling out any as being past, present, or future.) But, says McTaggart, the times that are past, were present; the time that is present was future and will be past; the times that are future will be present and will be past. McTaggart concludes that we end up attributing each A-property (is present, is past, and is future) to every time (and therefore to every event in time). But this is absurd, because the A-properties are incompatible: to have one is to have neither of the others. So we end up in contradiction: each time both has only one such property, and all such properties. McTaggart concludes that the A-series cannot be real.