 The logical treatment of contradiction attracted great interest, mainly in the groups of Campinas and Buenos Aires, although with different motivations. In Campinas, where one underlying interest was the possibility of modeling contradictory information in scientific practice, Newton da Costa focused on the mathematical concept of “pragmatic truth” (Mikenberg, da Costa, and Chuaqui 1986) with the purpose of showing that the logic of pragmatic truth is paraconsistent (da Costa, Bueno, and French 1998). In turn, Walter Carnielli and Marcelo Coniglio developed an approach in which the distinction between logic and philosophy is not straightforward. On the philosophical side, and following the path opened by da Costa, they focused on the so-called “logics of formal inconsistency”, a family of paraconsistent logics that can express the notion of consistency within the object language (Carnielli, Coniglio, and Marcos 2007). Carnielli also developed dialogical and epistemic approaches to paraconsistency (Rahman and Carnielli 2000; Carnielli and Rodrigues 2019).