 There are two standard objections to traditional dispositional accounts of belief. The first, tracing back at least to Chisholm (1957), assumes that the dispositionalist’s aim is to reduce or analyze facts about belief entirely into facts about outward behavior, facts specifiable without reference to other beliefs, desires, inner feelings, and so forth (see the entry on philosophical  behaviorism).  Such a reduction or analysis appears impossible for the following reason: People with the same belief may behave very differently, depending on their other beliefs, desires, and so forth. For example, a person who believes that it will rain will only be disposed to take an umbrella if she also believes that the umbrella will ward off the water and if she doesn’t want to get wet. Change the surrounding beliefs and desires and very different behavior may result. A dispositionalist attempting to specify the particular behavioral dispositions associated with, for example, the belief that it’s raining will then either get it wrong about the dispositions of some people (such as those who like to get wet) or will be forced to incorporate into her dispositional analysis conditional antecedents invoking the very ideas she is trying to analyze or reduce away—saying, for example, that the person who believes that P will behave in such-and-such a way if she also believes X and desires Y—apparently dooming the reductionist project. (It may be possible to avoid this objection by invoking a “Ramsey”-like approach to the reduction [see the section on Functional States and Ramsey Sentences in the entry on  functionalism  and Lewis 1972], but this type of analysis was not widely discussed until after traditional dispositional approaches to belief had gone largely out of fashion.)