 The most promising line of response denies that the series of finite modes is nothing above and beyond its individual members. Following others, I have been describing the entirety of finite modes as a “series” or “collection,” a label that naturally suggests that the properties of the entire collection will be posterior to and derivative from the properties of its individual members. Spinoza himself rarely refers to just the collection of finite modes with a single expression, though he sometimes includes them in his locution “the order of nature” and he describes them as a “series” twice, both outside the Ethics (C I/41 and C I/307). Regardless of the terminology, one might argue in a holist vein that the whole series is more than just the sum of its the members. Spinoza does sometimes suggest that wholes can be prior to their parts (Ep32, IIp13le7s), though other times he suggests that parts are always prior to wholes (Ip15). Whether the series of finite modes is more holist or atomistic, and whether, on a holist mereological account, one of the non-supervening properties of the whole series is following from God’s absolute nature, are still open interpretive questions. The soundness of this reply will likely turn on whether or not the collection of finite modes is itself an infinite mode, a point about which interpreters continue to disagree.