This is, indeed, what many economists in the early days of research on the ultimatum game predicted would happen, on the basis of standard game theoretic assumptions (Kahneman et al. 1986: S285–286; Pillutla and Murnighan 1995: 1409; Güth 1995: 329; Camerer and Thaler 1995: 210). In other words, given a concern to promote one’s own self-interest, the prediction is that minimal offers will be made in ultimatum games to maximize one’s take-home amount—which is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (Kahneman et al. 1986: S289; Forsythe et al. 1994: 348; Güth 1995: 331; Pillutla and Murnighan 1995: 1409, 2003: 248; Straub and Murnighan 1995: 345–346).