 Aristotle opens the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics by positing some one supreme good as the aim of human actions, investigations, and crafts (1094a). Identifying this good as happiness, he immediately notes the variations in the notion (1095a15–25). Some think the happy life is the life of enjoyment; the more refined think it is the life of political activity; others think it is the life of study or theoretical contemplation (1095b10–20). The object of the life of enjoyment is bodily pleasure; that of political activity is honor or even virtue. The object of the life of study is philosophical or scientific understanding. Arguing that the end of human life must be the most complete, he concludes that happiness is the most complete end. Whereas pleasure, honor, virtue, and understanding are choice-worthy in themselves, they are also chosen for the sake of happiness. Happiness is not chosen for the sake of anything else (1097a25–1097b5). That the other choice-worthy ends are chosen for the sake of happiness might suggest that they are chosen only as instrumental means to happiness, as though happiness were a separate state. However, it is more likely that the other choice-worthy ends are constituents of happiness. As a consequence, the happy life is composed of such activities as virtuous pursuits, honorable acts, and contemplation of truth. While conceiving these choice-worthy ends as constituents of happiness might be illuminating, it does, in turn, raise the issue of whether happiness is a jumble of activities or whether it requires organization – even prioritization – of the constituents.