 According to idealism (e.g., of a Berkeleyan sort), anything we know we know because some mental state of affairs obtains, and this is because, for such an idealist, there is no external world; empirical reality is internal to our minds. This view of course implies that truths we might know, and indeed any epistemic facts, will be trivially mind dependent, given that part of what it is to be an idealist is to deny that there is a mind-independent objective reality. Importantly, this kind of heavyweight anti-realist position is distinct from, and not implied by, indirect realist views in the philosophy of perception (e.g., F. Jackson 1977), which maintain that that we are only indirectly aware of the object of perceptual experiences by being aware of, e.g., sense-data. Indirect realism in the philosophy of perception is compatible with metaepistemological realism, while full-fledged idealism about empirical reality is not.