 A second reason for preferring the metaphysical definition is that the two main alternatives to it have undesirable implications. Defining “atheism” as naturalism has the awkward implication that some philosophers are both theists and atheists. This is because some philosophers (e.g., Ellis 2014) deny that God is supernatural and affirm both naturalism and theism. Defining “atheism” as the state of lacking belief in God faces similar problems.  First, while this definition seems short and simple, which is virtuous, it needs to be expanded to avoid the issue of babies, cats, and rocks counting as atheists by virtue of lacking belief in God.  While this problem is relatively easy to solve, another is more challenging. This additional problem arises because one can lack belief in God while at the same time having other pro-attitudes towards theism. For example, some people who lack the belief that God exists may nevertheless feel some inclination to believe that God exists. They may even believe that the truth of theism is more probable than its falsity. While such people should not be labeled theists, it is counterintuitive in the extreme to call them atheists. The psychological definition also makes atheists out of some people who are devoted members (at least in terms of practice) of theistic religious communities.  This is because, as is well-known, some devoted members of such communities have only a vague middling level of confidence that God exists and no belief that God exists or even that God probably exists.  It would seem misguided for philosophers to classify such people as atheists.