 According to this suggestion, constitutive rules tell us that, in a certain context \(C\) (for instance, a game of soccer), an action of type \(Y\) (for instance, scoring a goal) can be performed by means of performing an action of a different type \(X\) (for instance, kicking the ball into a netted box). According to Searle, constitutive rules play an important role in social ontology: “institutional facts” (facts concerning social statuses such as being money, having meaning, or being an assertion) can be explained in terms of collective acceptance of rules of this kind (cf. Searle 1995, 2010). Other accounts of social institutions in terms of rules constitutive of social statuses have stressed the normative consequences of having a such a status (cf., e.g., Ransdell 1971, Hindriks 2009).