 If, on the other hand, terms such as ‘Gollum’ refer to non-existent objects, then those objects could inhabit the outer domain of a dual-domain positive free logic. Dumitru (2015), for example, lays out such a dual-domain semantics for fictional discourse using free descriptions and compares it with a supervaluational approach that also uses free descriptions. In a such a dual-domain semantics, atomic formulas have their standard truth conditions: (G) is true just in case \(\langle\)Gollum, Gödel\(\rangle\) is a member of the extension of ‘is more famous than’. Moreover, if we allow quantifiers over that outer domain, then ‘Something is more famous than Gödel’ (where the quantifier ranges over the outer domain) does follow from ‘Gollum is more famous than Gödel’, though ‘There literally exists something more famous than Gödel’ (where the quantifier ranges over the inner domain) does not. Meinongian logics of fiction employ this strategy.