  All subsequent second wave strict analyses have ended up in similar territory. The dynamic analyses developed by Fintel (2001), Gillies (2007), and Willer (2015, 2017, 2018) assign strict truth-conditions to counterfactuals, but have them induce changes in an evolving space of possible worlds. These changes must render the antecedent consistent with an evolving body of discourse. While Fintel (2001) and Willer (2018) explicitly appeal to a similarity ordering for this purpose, Gillies (2007) and Willer (2017) do not. Nevertheless, the formal structures used by Gillies (2007) and Willer (2017) for this purpose give rise to the same question: which facts stay and which facts go when rendering the counterfactual antecedent consistent? Accordingly, at present, it does not appear that the strict analysis avoids the kinds of concerns raised for the similarity analysis in §2.5.1.