 (3)  is a so-called singular causal explanation, advanced by Michael Scriven (1962) as a counterexample to the claim that the DN model describes necessary conditions for successful explanation. According to Scriven,  (3)  explains the tipping over of the inkwell even though no law or generalization figures explicitly in  (3)  and  (3)  appears to consist of a single sentence, rather than a deductive argument. Hempel’s response (1965b: 360ff) is that the occurrence of “caused” in  (3)  should not be left unanalyzed or taken as explanatory just as it stands. Instead  (3)  should be understood as “implicitly” or “tacitly” claiming there is a “law” or regularity linking knee impacts to tipping over of inkwells. According to Hempel, it is the implicit claim that some such law holds that “distinguishes”  (3)  from “a mere sequential narrative” in which the spilling is said to follow the impact but without any claim of causal connection—a narrative that (Hempel thinks) would clearly not be explanatory. This linking law is the nomological premise in the DN argument that, according to Hempel, is “implicitly” asserted by  (3).