 Although the jury theorem is often invoked to demonstrate the epistemic merits of democracy (for recent discussions, see, e.g., Landemore 2012 and Goodin and Spiekermann 2018), its assumptions are highly idealistic. The competence assumption is not a conceptual claim but an empirical one and depends on any given decision problem. Although an average (not necessarily equal) individual competence above 1/2 may be sufficient for Condorcet’s conclusion (e.g., Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983; Boland 1989; Kanazawa  1998),[2]  the theorem ceases to hold if individuals are randomizers (no better and no worse than a coin toss) or if they are worse than random \((p \lt 1/2)\). In the latter case, the probability of a correct majority decision is less than each individual’s probability of a correct vote and converges to 0, as the jury size increases. The theorem’s conclusion can also be undermined in less extreme cases (Berend and Paroush 1998), for instance when each individual’s reliability, though above 1/2, is an exponentially decreasing function approaching 1/2 with increasing jury size.