 It is important to see that an agent could have more than one reason to promote any given state of affairs, some of those reasons being agent-neutral, others agent-relative. Consider Peter’s reasons to buy Mary a dinner that she will enjoy. If enjoyment or pleasure is intrinsically valuable, then Peter will reason R to buy Mary that dinner, where R is grounded or constituted by Mary’s enjoyment of the dinner. If Paul, like Peter, is casually placed so as to be able to provide Mary with that intrinsically valuable enjoyment, then Paul also has reason R to do so. But now suppose that Peter is Mary’s friend. Defenders of special obligations of friendship are likely to claim that Peter also has reason R* to buy that dinner for Mary, where R* is generated or grounded or constituted by his friendship with Mary. If Paul is not Mary’s friend, then he does not stand in the friendship relation to her, and so he will not have reason R* (or any reason of that type) to buy Mary dinner, regardless of his causal placement. Thus, Peter’s reason R* is an agent-relative reason, whereas R was agent-neutral.