 In a thought experiment, Gaṅgeśa imagines a child encountering a cow for the very first time (2020: 560). He argues that the child can grasp the concept of cowhood and, had she the right words, could say, correctly, “That’s a cow,” even though she has had no previous experience of cows. The cowhood predication content is supplied by what is called “indeterminate” cognition of the qualifier, a first stage, so to say, of the sensory information flow. According to Gaṅgeśa, such indeterminate cognition has to be positied to understand how we have, on the whole, workable concepts of things. The argument is that in a typical case of a first-time perceptual awareness of, for instance, a cow, there is a prior stage in the causal process that is an indeterminate cognition, indeterminate in that cowness is cognized but not as related to the particular cow, the qualificandum of the ensuing determinate perception. All other cases of cognition of an entity as qualified have a prior cognition of the qualifier as a causal factor. It is thus reasonable that the case of a first-time perception does as well. But since here clearly we do not have a mental disposition (saṃskāra) at work, indeterminate cognition has to be posited.