 Third, the requirement of awareness of consequences. In a natural description of the case, we would say that John is responsible for Mary’s breaking an arm, that is, that he’s blameworthy for the latter  event.[2]  Call this the consequence of John’s action. What kind of awareness is required for John to be blameworthy for it? The straightforward response is that he must have a belief about the event occurring as a result of his action (Zimmerman 1997: 420). However, there is disagreement about what the content of this belief must be. Some philosophers (Zimmerman 1986; Vargas 2005) think that it must be very specific, in the sense that the agent has to believe that an event of exactly the kind that occurred could result from her action, whereas others (Fischer &amp; Tognazzini 2009; King 2017: 272; Nelkin &amp; Rickless 2017a: 126) think that a belief with a more general content suffices. According to the former position, for John to be blameworthy for the consequence of his action he must have entertained the belief that Mary would (or might) break her arm as a result of her fall, whereas according to the latter position a belief that someone would (or might) be harmed is enough. It’s worth noting that the requirement of awareness of consequences is usually stated in terms of “reasonable foreseeability” rather than actual foresight (Vargas 2005; Fischer &amp; Tognazzini 2009; Sartorio 2017; cf. Zimmerman 1986; Nelkin &amp; Rickless 2017a). As will become patent later on, the dispute about how to understand this requirement is part and parcel of the broader dispute about whether the EC requires occurrent awareness  (sect. 2)  or, rather, the capacity to gain the requisite awareness (sects.  3.2,  3.4).