 Traditional epistemology—the epistemology of Plato, Hume, Descartes, and Kant—treats the acquisition and validation of knowledge on the individual level. The question for traditional epistemology was always how I as an individual can acquire knowledge of the objective world, when all I have to work with is my subjective experience. Perennial questions of individual epistemology remain, but the last few decades have seen the rise of a very different form of epistemology as well. Anticipated in early work by Alvin I. Goldman, Helen Longino, Philip Kitcher, and Miriam Solomon, social epistemology is now evident both within dedicated journals and across philosophy quite generally (Goldman 1987; Longino 1990; Kitcher 1993; Solomon 1994a, 1994b; Goldman &amp; Whitcomb 2011; Goldman &amp; O’Connor 2001 [2019]; Longino 2019). I acquire my knowledge of the world as a member of a social group: a group that includes those inquirers that constitute the scientific enterprise, for example. In order to understand the acquisition and validation of knowledge we have to go beyond the level of individual epistemology: we need to understand the social structure, dynamics, and process of scientific investigation. It is within this social turn in epistemology that the tools of computational modelling—agent-based modeling in particular—become particularly useful. (Klein, Marx and Fischbach 2018).