 Importantly, as a recent publication demonstrates, he strictly applies fundamental principles of logic, including a range of standard, classical laws of logic, such as: the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle,  the law of identity,  De Morgan’s laws,  Leibniz’s law (the indiscernibility of identicals), and other basic axioms of logic, including patterns of a priori reasoning whose validity is solely determined by their logical form and structure, and not necessarily by their empirical relevance or validation through empirical observation. At least on one occasion he also makes use of the fourfold division of logically possible alternatives of p, i.e. the tetralemma (catuṣ-koṭi) in an argument directed against the Buddhists (who themselves accept the tetralemma as a standard procedure): p, ~p, p∧~p, ~(p∧~p) (Balcerowicz (2019: 924–931). He also takes the conclusions derived from premisses through such reasoning based on logic principles and range of rules (formulated as laws of logic) as valid. Ergo, he accepts inference – but not anumāna – as legitimate means of arriving at truth, and these consistently remain beyond his criticism. This analysis sheds important light on the nature of his criticism of what was traditionally accepted in classical India as ‘inference’ (anumāna), which is deficient for two main reasons: its definitions formulated by philosophers are faulty, and its validity is rooted in empirical conditions. Indian anumāna is just a sub-theory of logic and should be understood as inference in a qualified sense and of a narrower scope, applied to empirically relevant claims, based on empirically observed regularities and advancing arguments involving the problem of induction; anumāna completely excludes deduction and all varieties of a priori reasoning and analytic judgements. What is termed anumāna should therefore be called ‘disputational inference’ or ‘debational inference’, in view of its origins in the context of debate. We can observe that Jayarāśi’s case does not present that of a genuine sceptic who would put to doubt the possibility of arriving at truth per se and would point to fundamental impossibility to know facts. His approach is not scepticism, which questions the epistemic principles he himself also employs. Instead, with the logical apparatus that rests in one domain the validity of which he takes for granted, Jayarāśi finds fault with another, quite different domain: that of the principles of traditional Indian epistemological and logical model, rooted in reasonings which are based on empirical observation and are not a priori (Balcerowicz (2019: 931–943).