 First of all, Mist and Horns clearly conform to the structure of standard Gettier cases; similar examples are also discussed by classical Indian philosophers such as Dharmottara, Kumārila, and Srīdhara (Matilal 1986: ch. 4; Ganeri 2007: ch. 5; Stoltz 2007). Even though Śrīharṣa doesn’t intend these examples to be counterexample to any “justified true belief” account of knowledge, he does seem to think that in order to rule out cases of this kind from the scope of knowledge, we need to impose an anti-luck condition on knowledge. And this is precisely the lesson that philosophers have drawn from the cases of epistemic luck described by Gettier (1963). What this suggests is that the kind of intuitions that Gettier and others were trying to elicit with such cases are not intuitions shared by a narrow group of Anglophone philosophers. This, in turn, casts doubt on arguments—offered by early researchers in experimental philosophy (Weinberg et al 2001; Weinberg 2007)—which sought to debunk Gettier intuitions by showing that they might just have been artifacts of a certain culture. The history of Indian philosophy in Sanskrit shows that even in classical India, Gettier phenomena were recognized as a potential problem for theories of knowledge that didn’t include any anti-luck condition. This, one might argue, should bolster our confidence in treating such intuitions as evidence in philosophical inquiry.