 Like the divine will, human free will is endowed with absolute and ordained power to perform good and bad deeds. Kilvington argues that God produces the substance of people’s volitional act, that is, their ability to make choices, and interacts with human free will to intensify good deeds and to produce certain degrees of these acts. He argues that if free will were solely responsible for the degree of its act, then someone could love God whether endowed with grace or not, and someone without grace could love God above everything else, which is absurd. God only contributes to the performance of good deeds, and evil deeds result from the choices of human free will alone, because “truly we are good because of God, and &lt;we are&gt; evil all by ourselves.”(Jung &amp; Michałowska 2022: 46) It is obvious, however, that even if humans perform good deeds, God does not have to take them into account or reward humans for their meritorious acts. People cannot be the primary cause of their reward, but they are the primary cause of their punishment because they voluntarily make wrong choices and perform evil acts. The capacity to sin testifies to the freedom of people to make free choices (see Jung &amp; Michałowska 2022: 51–52 )