 It was already noted above (see  section 2.3)  that the outcome-only definition of drift is often adopted by statisticalists, but not exclusively so; it can also be endorsed by a causalist who, e.g., believes that natural selection is a causal process but that drift is simply deviation from selective expectations. Perhaps surprisingly, it would also be possible for someone to endorse a version of the Causal Process Account of Drift and yet still accept the basic statisticalist premise—if one thought that drift should be understood in terms of indiscriminate sampling, and also thought that indiscriminate sampling should be understood in terms of causes at the level of individual organisms, then the evolutionary changes wrought by drift would just be be the statistical summation of individual level causes. In short, it would be a mistake to infer one’s position on the statisticalist debate from one’s definition of drift, although such slippage is common and the issues are in truth often entangled.