 In contrast to Russell’s position, Cartwright (1979: 420) claims that we do have a need and use for a causal vocabulary in science: “causal laws cannot be done away with, for they are needed to ground the distinction between effective strategies and ineffective ones”. One of the main contemporary accounts of causation, the interventionist account of causation (Woodward 2003; see also the entry on  causation and manipulability),  is an embodiment of Cartwright’s dictum. In a nutshell, the interventionist account claims that A is a cause of B if and only if manipulating A is an effective means of (indirectly) manipulating B. Causality in the present entry, unless specified otherwise, should be understood along broadly interventionist lines. According to accounts of quantum theory that hypothesize retrocausality, manipulating the setting of a measurement apparatus can be an effective means of manipulating aspects of the past. A broadly interventionist view of causality indeed underlies most contemporary attempts to harness the tool kit of causal modeling (see the entry on  causal models;  Spirtes, Glymour, &amp; Scheines 2000; Pearl 2009) in the foundations of quantum theory (Leifer &amp; Spekkens 2013; Cavalcanti &amp; Lal 2014; Costa &amp; Shrapnel 2016; Allen et al. 2017).