 As Fine then goes on to note, the property of singleton Socrates, namely, containing Socrates as a sole member, will presumably be part of the constitutive essence of {Socrates}. In contrast, the property of containing some member or another is only part of its consequential essence. It is evident that in cases of essential and identity-dependence, we are typically interested in the constitutive notion of essence, because it is presumably also a part of the consequentialist essence of Socrates that 2 = 2. So, using the consequentialist notion of essence to define essential and identity-dependence would quickly lead to problems not unlike the ones faced by the modal-existential account. Accordingly, in what follows, the various definitions should in the first instance be understood to concern the constitutive essence. But the problem that remains is that the distinction between constitutive and consequential essence itself is not always easy to make and it is inevitable that there will be some controversial cases (for discussion, see Fine 1994b). The examples used to illustrate the various forms of essential dependence should thus be taken with a grain of salt, as it is often not entirely clear what should be included in the constitutive essence of an entity. In any case, provided that this distinction can be made, the friend of the essentialist analysis of dependence has a clear advantage, given that they are able to express a broader range of dependence claims with the help of this distinction.