 Sen, as mentioned, identifies Rawlsian liberalism as one target of his concern. The idea of picturing society, as Rawls and other contractualists picture it, as guided by a hypothetical agreement between persons, each of whom is equally empowered to revoke the agreement, is to capture the idea that the rules governing society must in some sense be acceptable to all, and must embody, in some deep way, the ideal of equal respect. Sen’s complaint about the ’closed impartiality’ of such systems, however, draws our attention to the fact that this approach risks leaving those not party to the contract out in the cold. But surely it is plausible to think that a society, in order to be just, must not only treat (and avoid treating) its own citizens in certain ways, but must also respect certain rules regarding its behavior towards members of other societies. As Charles Jones (1999) writes, “Unlike Rawls … I see no reason to restrict our moral focus to the basic structure of any particular nation-state; on the contrary, if one’s concern is with the justifiability of the institutions which determine people’s life chances, there are compelling grounds for taking a wider view.” There are various responses open to Rawlsian theorists. Rawls himself suggests that we imagine a second veil of ignorance behind which representatives of various societies can meet in order to set fair and impartial ground rules for international relations. Much like justice within states, Rawls writes, “Justice between states is determined by the principles that would be chosen in the original position so interpreted. These principles are political principles, for they govern public policies toward other nations” (Rawls 1971; for relevant later developments see Rawls 1999b).