 Since motivating reasons are considerations that an agent takes to favour acting, and since the reasons that favour acting are facts, it might seem that motivating reasons are also facts or at least putative facts, rather than mental states. However, the view that they are mental states was, as noted earlier, the dominant view till the turn of the 20th century, and it is still very popular today. A seemingly compelling argument for adopting psychologism for motivating reasons is the following. For a reason to motivate you it must be a reason you have. This does not require that the reason should genuinely apply to you. But it requires that you “possess” the reason: you must know or believe the consideration that constitutes the reason. And this appears to support the view that reasons are mental states of agents, or facts about those states. The opponent of psychologism about motivating reasons can respond by noting that, while it is true that, for it to motivate you to act, you must know or believe the thing that constitutes a reason, that doesn’t imply that the reason that motivates you is your knowing or believing what you do. Rather your reason is what is known or believed: a (putative) fact. To put the point differently, motivating reasons are the contents of mental states but not mental states themselves. This argument about motivating reasons is not, therefore, decisive for psychologism. And in fact, there are several compelling arguments against psychologism.