 There is also a new body of work that extends game-theoretic modeling and simulation to questions of social inequity. Bruner (2017) shows that the mere fact that one group is a minority in a population, and thus interacts more frequently with majority than with minority members, can result in its being disadvantaged where exchanges are characterized by bargaining in a Nash demand game (Young 1993). Termed the “cultural Red King”, the effect has been further explored through simulation, with links to experiment, and with extensions to questions of “intersectional disadvantage”, in which overlapping minority categories are in play (O’Connor 2017;  Mohseni, O’Connor, &amp; Rubin 2019 [Other Internet Resources];  O’Connor, Bright, &amp; Bruner 2019). The relevance of this to the focus of the previous section is made clear in Rubin and O’Connor (2018) and O’Connor and Bruner (2019), modeling minority disadvantage in scientific communities.