 Charles Leslie Stevenson (1908–1979) was an American philosopher best known for his pioneering work in the field of metaethics (roughly: the study of the meaning and nature of moral language, thought, knowledge, and reality) and, specifically, as a central figure along with C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards (1923) and A. J. Ayer (1936) in the development of emotivism. Emotivism, a precursor to the metaethical expressivism today championed by Simon Blackburn (1993, 1998), Alan Gibbard (1990, 2003), and Michael Ridge (2014), among others, is typically understood as a theory of moral language according to which ethical sentences may be usefully compared to exclamative and imperative sentences (‘Hooray!’, ‘Be kind’) in that they are used to express a speaker’s affective or noncognitive psychological states (such as approval or disapproval). This contrasts with views according to which the primary use of such sentences would be to describe some action, person, institution, etc. Stevenson’s emotivism, however, was more than a theory of moral language, his account of moral language was but one part of a metaethical theory, grounded in moral and linguistic psychology. It was intended to clarify the nature and structure of a whole range of normative problems common to everyday life—ethical, aesthetic, political, etc.—as well as the methods typically used to resolve them.