 Neither objection is definitive, however. Although Beardsley discusses neither objection, the first can be deflated by noting that although, strictly speaking, the Mona Lisa is a kind, it has perceptual properties in that all of its instances do. In other words, since all instances of the kind have perceptual properties, instances-of-a-kind are near enough to kinds to allow kinds to have perceptual properties in an extended sense of the term, by a small conceptual courtesy. That’s close enough for government work (as the saying goes). Even if this response is acceptable, however, the question of what the perceptual properties of the Mona Lisa are, if two of its instances differ markedly in their perceptual properties (due, say, to exposure to sunlight), would remain an odd one. Not an unanswerable one, however. That question and others like it could be answered by taking the Mona Lisa to be, in effect, an etching, with the first of its instances as a reference point for others.