 Intuitive Metaphysical might pose a challenge to the ethical realist in light of one of at least two background ideas. First, some philosophers have argued that there are no necessary connections between “distinct existences,” a claim that is sometimes called Hume’s dictum. If Hume’s dictum is correct, then the ethical realist will be committed to the ethical not being distinct in the relevant sense from what it supervenes on. The metaphysical use of Hume’s dictum faces at least two formidable challenges. The first is to clarify the dictum in such a way that it is both interesting and a plausible candidate for truth. To see this, note that many non-identical properties are necessarily connected: for example, a surface’s being scarlet entails that it is red, but being scarlet is not identical to being red. Red and scarlet, then, must not count as distinct in the sense relevant to a plausible form of the dictum. This raises the question: what does distinctness amount to? If we use necessary connection as a criterion, then Hume’s dictum turns out to be a trivial way of tracking this way of using the word ‘distinct’. Second, Hume’s dictum is usually defended on directly intuitive grounds. This raises a deep methodological question: if we notice a conflict between Hume’s dictum and another intuitively plausible claim, why should we retain Hume’s dictum and jettison the other claim? (For helpful discussion of Hume’s Dictum, see Wilson 2010).