 Moore did not hold that all moral knowledge is intuitive. In the Principia he maintained that the utilitarian principle was analytic, hence, knowledge of this principle would not require a special intuition. But he later acknowledged that one cannot define “right”, because the open question argument can be used against definitions of “right”, including the utilitarian definition. (“This action produces the most good consequences, but is it right?” is an open question. Corresponding open questions count against efforts to define “ought”, e.g., “This action produces the most good consequences, but ought I do it?”) So Moore was driven to hold that the utilitarian principle was synthetic, and known a priori via intuition (Moore 1912). However, since Moore held that one ought to do what produces the most good, one would have to engage in empirical investigation of the consequences of various types of action to determine what one is obligated to do. So on Moore’s view, one would not simply intuit that one ought to keep promises or ought not to kill.