 Immanuel Kant’s analysis of teleology in the Critique of Judgment (Kant 1790 [2000]) also played an influential role in biology. According to Kant, humans inevitably understand living things as if they are teleological systems (Zammito 2006). However, on Kant’s view, the teleology we see in the natural world is only apparent; it is the product of our limited cognitive faculties (see section 3 of the entry on  Kant’s aesthetics).  But in addition, according to Kant, there is a certain non-machine-like character of organisms, evident in their ability to grow and reproduce, that leads to a type of mechanical inexplicability. Hannah Ginsborg (2004) argues that for Kant this impossibility of explaining organisms in solely mechanistic terms does not itself distinguish them from complex artifacts; but, she argues, Kant thought that the regenerative and reproductive aspects of organisms lead us to attribute a kind of natural purposiveness that is absent in artifacts, paralleling Aristotle’s justification for natural, immanent teleology. Kantian analysis of this sort shows up in early nineteenth century research in what would come to be called organic chemistry. Scientists at that time sought to determine whether living systems were nothing more than complex chemical systems, fully analyzable in terms of physical and chemical processes. Those researchers adopting a Kantian approach advocated a teleo-mechanist strategy to make sense of the goal-directed nature of living systems, which sought to treat the organism as both a means and an end and thus incorporated elements of both teleological and mechanistic explanation (Lenoir 1982). 