 Michael Dummett has turned this discussion of “use” into a metaphysical position. (See especially Dummett 1991; but this builds on Dummett 1977 [e.g., p. 682], and even Dummett 1973 [e.g., p. 377], as well as many of his other works.) The basic idea seems to be this: intuitionism as applied to logic urges meaning to be given by rules of how to use the connectives. Classical logic, on the other hand, assumes that there is a pre-given notion of reference and designation, employing notions like TRUE and FALSE. It follows, he says, that classical logic is going to be committed to a pernicious form of “meaning holism” that makes language learning impossible. (To some it seems counterintuitive that Dummett should think that classical logic with a meaning-presupposition of reference and denotation is committed to “total meaning holism”, when that is a more usual criticism of meaning-as-use theories. But that is indeed his view, as elaborated in Dummett (1975 [1978]), and elsewhere.) The doctrine that follows from this is called anti-realism by Dummett, and entails that there are no “realistic” facts or items that ground the correctness of logical operations. There is only the “learning of how the community uses the relevant terms”.