 Note that on Husserl’s view the will of a free agent, capable of following this imperative, is always already embedded in a “volitional context” predelineating the open “future horizon” of a “full individual life” that the agent is currently able to lead (Husserliana, vol. XXXVII, p. 252), thus qualifying as a dynamic intentional structure. This individual life corresponds to the agent‘s self-determination as an individual person (see Section 8 above). The valuings underlying this self-determination can be veridical, and thus suitable for motivating objectively valid evaluative judgments, because their correlates, i.e. values, are part of the ideal (but still intersubjectively constituted) spiritual world (Husserliana, vol XXXVI, pp. 217 ff). These values stand in hierarchical relations to each other, governed by laws to be studied in what Husserl calls formal axiology (ibid., pp. 226–232). Value-perception in the form of emotional valuing thus allows for a priori insights. It is such insights that determine the good will, in that the latter orients itself by the highest values the subject, on reflection, including a priori reflection, based on emotion, recognizes him- or herself to be able to realize in life, given his or her abilities and environment (for the present paragraph cf. Beyer 2013, sec. 1; for more detailed analyses of Husserl’s ethics and value theory see, e.g., Luft 2010, the contributions to Luft, ed., 2011 and the literature cited there, as well as the secondary literature cited at the end of the foregoing paragraph.)