 Non-cognitivists, of course, need to explain why it seems so plausible to see moral judgment as an expression of belief and as a matter of attributing properties to actions, institutions and characters.  And they need to explain why moral thought seems appropriately subject to the rules of logic, whereas the various attitudes that play central roles in the non-cognitivist accounts all seem to fall outside of that realm. Taking the challenge head-on, recent versions of expressivism, flying the banner of “quasi-realism,” have taken as a central project explaining, on non-cognitivist foundations, how and why moral language has all the trappings of being cognitivist and realist.  These views start with a picture of the world as having neither moral properties nor people believing in moral properties (though they have other beliefs), and then explain how a practice of thinking and talking about moral properties, moral beliefs, moral truth, and moral facts, might naturally and properly emerge. The central idea is that we can see our thought and talk as fundamentally a matter of our expressing our affective attitudes or commitments which gives rise to legitimate thought and talk about corresponding properties, beliefs, truths and facts. Two moves underwrite this idea. One is to hold that talk of properties, beliefs, truths and facts comes cheap: Once one holds sincerely that “Lying is wrong,” no additional commitments come with adding “Lying has the property of being wrong” or “I believe that lying is wrong” or “It is true that lying is wrong” or that “It is a fact that lying is wrong.” These are all, in effect, just different ways of saying the same thing.  And if, in the first place, sincerely saying “Lying is wrong” is a matter of expressing an attitude or a commitment then so too are these alternative ways of saying the same thing.  The second move that underwrites quasi-realism is that the question of whether the cognitivist and realist sounding discourse is legitimate is, itself, an evaluative question judged in light of one's attitudes and commitments.  There is, on this view, no independent standard of, say, “matching the world” that one can deploy without, in choosing that standard, expressing one's attitudes and  commitments.[10] 