 The final class of autosemantica for Marty consists of names and other expressions which serve to express presentations. He calls these “presentational suggestives” (Vorstellungssuggestive) and devotes a very extensive chapter of his main work to the treatment of them. (See Marty 1908, 383–489). He ascribes to these a communicative function just as he did to the other autosemantica. “As the direct purpose of a statement is to evoke in the interlocutor a certain judgment”, says Marty, “a presentational suggestive also and especially a name primarily in its proper usage aims at awakening in him a certain presentation, and as that primary intention is ultimately designated as the meaning of a statement, the analogue is called the meaning of the name” (Marty 1908a, 384 f.). The autosemantica which have such function (meaning in the wider sense) and are everywhere acknowledged as being able to stand as subjects in a predicative connection are called “names”, as exemplified by “a triangle”, “a rectangle”, “an equilateral triangle”, “a human being who has committed a crime”, “something red”, “something round”, “a red thing that is round”, and also infinitives such as “to get up early” and “to have one’s hands full”. As regards the presentational suggestives which are not names, Marty points out the usage of language in poetry and fiction (Marty 1908, 474 ff.). While the sentences used in such instances may resemble statements, for the most part they have the function of expressing and evoking presentations and are not actually statements. However, these whole sentences are peculiar insofar as the relevant presentations have contents of judgment as their objects. Such presentations of contents of judgment are on Marty’s view the acts of consciousness which Meinong erroneously identified as assumptions (Marty 1905).