 In the Symposium, we find yet another configuration of the relation between virtue and the forms, in which the non-rational parts of the soul disappear – or are sublimated. In Diotima’s discourse on eros, she argues that the real purpose of love is to give birth in beauty (206b–c). This idea implies two dimensions: inspiration by what is itself beautiful and producing beautiful objects. Although Diotima talks about the way these concepts work in sexual procreation, her real interest is in their psychological manifestations. For instance, the lover, inspired by the physical beauty of the beloved, will produce beautiful ideas. In turn, the beauty of a soul will inspire ideas that will improve young men (210a–d). Finally, Diotima claims that the true object of erotic love is not the beautiful body or even the beautiful soul – but beauty itself. Unlike the beauty of bodies and of souls, this beauty does not come to be nor pass away, neither increases nor decreases. Nor does it vary according to aspect or context. It is not in a face or hands but is itself by itself, one in form (211a–c). Since this paradigm of beauty is the true object of eros, it inspires its own particular product, i.e., true virtue, distinct from the images of virtue inspired by encounters with beauty in bodies and souls (212a–c). While this passage highlights the relation between eros and the form of beauty in motivating virtue, it is almost silent on what this virtue might be. We do not know whether it just is the expression of love of beauty in the lover’s actions, or its concretization in the dispositions of the lover’s soul, or another manifestation. Clearly, this account in the Symposium works without the elaborate theory about parts of the soul and their function in virtue, found in Republic I–IV.