 The theory of properties of terms shows a radical inconsistency, which has been explained as “the persistent hesitation of medieval logicians between the domains of connotation (universals) and denotation (individuals)” (De Rijk 1982, pp. 167–168). This inconsistency runs throughout Peter’s account of supposition, and comes to the fore most prominently in what he says about natural supposition (suppositio naturalis). The main problem is in what way the property of natural supposition is related to the term’s significatio, which was defined as the acceptance of a word for a thing (res). By this definition, the significatio of the term ‘man’ covers both its intension and extension, i.e., the universal nature of man and the individuals that have this nature in common. Suppositio naturalis, on the other hand, is described as “the acceptance of a common term for all those things that can share in a common universal nature”; for example, the term ‘man’ when taken by itself by its very nature stands for all the individuals that fall under it, whether they existed in the past, exist in the present or will exist in the future. From this definition and the example just presented it appears that the extensional features of significatio and suppositio naturalis overlap. The latter kind of suppositio has been explained by interpreters as the natural capacity of a significative word to stand for something.