  Early and influential theories posited that people hold two distinct attitudes in mind toward the same object, one implicit and the other explicit (Greenwald &amp; Banaji 1995; Wilson et al. 2000). “Explicit attitudes” are commonly identified with verbally reported attitudes, in this vein, while “implicit attitudes” are those that a person is unwilling or unable to report. Evidence for theories of dual attitudes stems largely from two sources. The first are anecdotal reports of surprise and consternation that people sometimes express after being informed of their performance on an implicit measure (e.g., Banaji 2011; Krickel 2018). These experiences suggest that people discover their putative implicit attitudes by taking the relevant tests, just like one learns about one’s cholesterol by taking the relevant tests. The second source of evidence for dual-attitude views are dissociations between implicit and explicit measures (§1.2). These suggest that implicit and explicit measures may be tapping into distinct representations of the same attitude-object (e.g., “the elderly”).