  Second, if we come to Skolem's Paradox with antecedent doubts about classical set theory—e.g., the kinds of doubts which lie behind some of the more sophisticated reconstructions of Skolem's original argument, the kinds of doubts which lie behind the more plausible versions of step 1 in the Skolemite argument, or the kinds of doubts about semantic determinacy which lie behind Putnam's model-theoretic argument—then we may well be able to parley Skolem's Paradox into some kind of interesting philosophical conclusion. Of course there will still be challenges here: we need to account for the status of the background theories in which we prove the Löwenheim-Skolem theorems, we need to explain the special significance of first-order axiomatizations of set theory, and we may need to explain how we can identify elements across various models of set theory. In principle, however, these kinds of sophisticated uses of Skolem's Paradox are not precluded by the technical solution to the paradox that was mentioned in the last paragraph. Nor should this fact be all that surprising: if we put enough philosophy into our analysis of Skolem's Paradox, then we should expect to get at least a little philosophy out.