 There are more elaborated examples of frameworks extending a given setting with modalities that ‘extract’ further information from the semantic model. One of them is evidence logic, introduced in van Benthem &amp; Pacuit (2011), and further developed in van Benthem, Fernández-Duque, &amp; Pacuit (2014) and Baltag, Bezhanishvili, et al. (2016). It follows the idea of representing the evidence the agent has collected, and looks at how this evidence gives support to further epistemic notions (e.g., knowledge and beliefs).  The semantics is given by a basic neighborhood model (Montague 1970; Scott 1970): a tuple of the form \(M = {\langle W, N, V \rangle}\) where W and V are a non-empty set of possible worlds and an atomic valuation, respectively (as in standard relational models), and \(N:W \to {\wp(\wp(W))}\) is a neighborhood function assigning, to every possible world, a set of sets of possible worlds (so \(N(w) \subseteq {\wp(W)}\) is w’s neighborhood). In evidence logic, the neighborhood function is assumed to be constant (i.e., \(N(w) = N(u)\) for any \(w,u \in W)\), and thus the model can be simply understood as a tuple \({\langle W, E, V \rangle}\), with \(E \subseteq {\wp(W)}\) the (constant) neighborhood. This neighborhood, intuitively containing the basic pieces of evidence the agent has collected, is required to satisfy two additional properties: evidence per se is never contradictory \((\emptyset \not\in E)\), and the agent knows her ‘space’ \((W \in E)\).