 Two other differences are important to note. First, Kant draws a bright line between moral and non-moral phenomena, such as prudence, politics, or aesthetics. Morality’s normative standards and the nature of its demands distinguish it sharply from the non-moral. For Hume, the line between the moral and non-moral is far blurrier. He frequently assimilates moral judgment to “taste” or judgments about beauty and deformity (Gill 2007), and he explicitly argues against the strict separation of moral virtues from other personal qualities such as a quick wit or even good looks (T 3.3.4–5). According to Hume, the strict separation of moral and non-moral virtues marks one way in which modern moral thought is inferior to ancient ethics. He also seems to suspect that it reflects an unhealthy fixation on responsibility and guilt inherited from Christianity (Darwall 2013: 8–9).