  But what is this objective content? The most explicit answer is to be found again in q. 7 of Quodl. X: “esse essentiae non proprie dicitur addi essentiae, quia non est essentia proprie nisi illo esse, sed potius dicitur addi aliquo quod est de propria ratione generis sui, quod cum ratione esse constituit essentiam compositam ex quod est et esse, quod est ipsum quo est” (“essential being is not said properly to be added to essence, since essence is none other than that being; rather it is said to be added to something belonging to the ratio of its genus, and this, together with the ratio of being, constitutes the essence composed of quod est and being, which is in itself the quo est,”; Quodl. X, q. 7, ed. Macken, p. 152, ll. 59-63). To return to the earlier example, we must now say that the essence of a stone is constituted by its being an essence (esse essentiae) and by its being a stone (that which belongs to the nature itself of a thing in that the thing belongs to a given genus: “aliquod quod est de propria ratione generis sui”). Henry likewise distinguishes between ratio praedicamenti and res praedicamenti (Quodl. V, q. 2). Ratio praedicamenti is being; it is the reason why every essence generally falls within the predicamental sphere. Res praedicamenti is instead the realitas of every essence; it is what makes essence belong to a given predicament. Without esse essentiae a thing (res) could never belong to the categories, nor could it ever be the object of meaningful scientific statements; yet it is that which is proper to each essence that places it within a given predicament.