 The rights-based account does not require that we compile a defined list of rights. We might take the more general view that each person has a right to be created with “due consideration for his or her humanity”; we can understand that life itself is a “predicament” for which one’s children need to be well-equipped (Velleman 2008, 266 and 276). A “child has a right to be born into good enough circumstances, and being born to [e.g.] a fourteen-year-old mother isn’t good enough” (Velleman 2008, 275). That a child was “glad to be born” doesn’t mean that that child has waived “his birthright” (Velleman 2008, 277). If we find this unclear, we might alternatively take the position that it is wrong to bring a child into existence when many of his or her rights as outlined in, e.g., the United Nations Convention, would be violated (Archard 2004, 403–20). Still another approach argues that future people come into existence with certain “claim rights,” or simply “claims” (Meyer 2016, 49) that can be defined in part in either sufficientarian (Meyer and Roser 2009) or egalitarian (Meyer 2016, 52–58) terms. Agents who fail to respect those claims fail to discharge a “duty” they owe “to the person who has the claim” (Meyer 2016, 49).