 Rather than illness attributions being made on the basis of any antecedent facts about the body, Mohammed Rashed and Rachel Bingham argue that the subjective experience of distress and the extent of impairment of the person’s day-to-day functioning is an intrinsic property of depression: conceptually such attributions are made on the basis of “consequences of the syndrome as they manifest for the subject” (Rashed &amp; Bingham 2014: 245). Similarly stressing intrinsic properties, others have emphasized that psychological symptoms may constitute a mental disorder, even as it is caused by biological or social factors. Thus, in the case of depression without evidence of known biomarkers, our intuitions suggest disorder would be attributed on the basis of psychological symptoms alone. Were known biomarkers present without evidence of any psychological symptoms, on the other hand, no attribution would be made. These intuitions may shift with time, it is recognized, so the assertion is limited to how most people and most psychiatrists now understand, define, diagnose, and treat, depression (Sinnott-Armstrong &amp; Summers forthcoming). But today at least, disorder would be attributed on the basis of the symptoms of depression with or without known biomarkers.