 Let’s consider how one might develop a more pragmatic philosophy of science. Some philosophers distinguish between epistemic and non-epistemic values (Kuhn 1977; McMullin 1982; Longino 1990, 1996; Lacey 1999; Laudan 2004; Douglas 2009, 2013; Steel 2010). The former concern truth and related notions like justification and explanation whereas the latter concern topics like equality, profit, health, safety, and the like. It can be very difficult to clearly distinguish between these two types of values and attempting to doing so can quickly take us into ethical and metaethical issues. Nevertheless, in the sciences, we have epistemic questions like “Do the theoretical terms of a model refer to existing entities?”, “Is this model approximately true or empirically accurate?”, “How accurate are the predictions of this model?” Likewise, we have non-epistemic questions like, “Is it easy to use this model?”, “Is this hypothesis accurate enough for our present purposes?”, “Can this theory provide results in a timely fashion?”, “Is the model relatively inexpensive to use?” (Elliott and McKaughan, 2014, 4–5). Thus, there seems to be both epistemic and non-epistemic values in science even if the line between them is hard to draw. Additionally, we often evaluate our theories and models with non-epistemic considerations As Ronald Giere has argued, “Scientists use models to represent aspects of the world for specific purposes” (Giere 2004, 742). These scientific representations are used for a variety of purposes. These purposes are not only epistemic; some are non-epistemic. Moreover, there are tradeoffs between epistemic and non-epistemic values or purposes. For example, we can increase the predictive accuracy of a model by increasing the number of adjustable parameters. However, this also increases the amount of work needed to measure those parameters, and it might be too costly. As a result, some philosophers of science argue that non-epistemic values can have more importance than epistemic values when they promote the aims of scientific inquiry (Elliott McKaughan 2014; Hicks 2014; Intemann 2015). 