  It is crucial to the latter two proposals that any given mixed atomic sentence \(p\) has its domain membership essentially, since such membership is what determines the relevant kind of truth. Sher (2005, 2011) deals with the problem of mixed atomic sentences differently. On her view, the truth of a mixed atomic sentence is not accounted for by membership to some specific domain; rather the ‘factors’ involved in the sentence determine a specific form of correspondence, and this specific form of correspondence is what accounts for the truth of \(p\). The details about which specific form of correspondence obtains is determined at the sub-sentential levels of reference, satisfaction, and fulfillment. For example, the form of correspondence that accounts for the truth of (39) obtains as a combination of the physical fulfillment of ‘the causing of \(x\)’, the mental reference of ‘pain’, and the moral satisfaction of ‘\(x\) is bad’ (2005: 328). No paraphrase is needed.