Additionally, one might raise questions concerning the rationality of responding to the violation of Closure in this context. Usually, if one discovers that one believes P, P→Q, but does not believe Q, the rational way to proceed depends upon one’s assessment of the relevant reasons for belief (where these are evidential, not pragmatic, reasons).  Let us assume, for simplicity, that P→Q is a fixed background belief.  If one thinks there are really strong reasons for believing P and not strong reasons for not believing Q, then it would be irrational for one to refuse to believe Q and instead to drop one’s belief that P.  Now, according to this cognitivist account, when I’m instrumentally incoherent, I believe (1) and (2) but not (3).  How should I proceed?  If I currently do not intend to M, and if, as Self-Knowledge holds, I’m infallibly aware of what I do not intend, then it seems that the evidence I have for my belief that I do not intend to M is really quite strong.  Let’s assume (2) is a fixed background belief.  In revising in light of my assessment of the evidence, it seems that the revision could only proceed in one direction: by modus ponens, coming to believe I will not E.  It would be irrational for me instead to proceed by modus tollens, ceasing to believe that I do not intend to M.  So, if we respond to violations of Closure in the usual way, we are left with the counterintuitive result that there is only one way to escape a state of instrumental incoherence: by abandoning the end.