 As we saw, according to Collingwood the distinction between the explanation of action and of events was a distinction between different forms of inferences or, as he put it in An Essay on Metaphysics, between the different senses that the term “cause” or “because” has in different explanatory contexts. Collingwood’s metaphysics of absolute presuppositions committed him to a form of explanatory pluralism in which different kinds of explanations do not compete because they answer different questions, which arise because of different presuppositions; the choice between one kind of explanation and another depends on whether they are fit for purpose, i.e., whether they satisfy the curiosity of the person who is asking the question. With the return of a more robust form of metaphysics, the suggestion that the choice between one type of explanation and another could be resolved by disambiguating which sense of causation needs to be invoked in order to satisfy the curiosity of the questioner came to be dismissed as an attempt to get away with ontologically light weight solutions to the problem of the relation between the science of mind and nature. The predominant problem in the philosophy of mind and action became that of how the mind can fit in the natural world, a question which presupposes the kind of metaphysics that Collingwood sought to leave behind.