 Let us look back at the paradoxes of identity outlined in §2 from the perspective of the weak view regarding relative identity. That view allows that absolutely distinct objects may be the same \(F\), but denies that absolutely identical objects can be different \(G\)’s. This implies that if \(x\) and \(y\) are relatively different objects, then \(x\) and \(y\) are absolutely distinct, and hence only pairs of absolutely distinct objects can satisfy RI. If \(x\) and \(y\) are absolutely distinct, we shall say that \(x\) and \(y\) are distinct ‘logical objects’; and similarly, if \(x\) and \(y\) are absolutely identical objects, then \(x\) and \(y\) are identical logical objects. The term ‘logical object’ does not stand for some new and special kind of thing. Absolutely distinct apples, for example, are distinct logical objects.