 With the publication of Stanley Cavell’s Must We Mean What We Say? (1969) and especially The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (1979), it turned out that such notions as ‘description,’ ‘ordinary,’ and ‘usage’ are not as innocuous as they had seemed. Cavell’s reading of Philosophical Investigations suggested a more radical emphasis on the particularity of contexts and blocked the way to any general description of “grammatical rules.” For Cavell, Wittgenstein’s idea that meanings are determined only within language games, i.e., only in particular cases, is the key to reading his philosophy. When ignored, we are bound to import an outside requirement into our investigation and thus, favoring a distilled and rigid account of our linguistic exchanges, miss (and misrepresent) their vividness: “As if the meaning were an aura the word brings along with it and retains in every kind of use” (PI 117).