 Several philosophers have argued that gratitude is best construed as a virtue (Meilaender 1984; Wellman 1999b). Virtues are morally positive character traits—stable dispositions to think, feel and act in certain ways under certain circumstances. Construed as a virtue, gratitude would be the stable disposition to respond to gratitude-worthy acts of beneficence with the beliefs, feelings and behavioral tendencies (outlined in  section 3)  that characterize the properly grateful response (Manela 2019). Conceiving of gratitude as a virtue has some plausibility. Like the concept of emotion, virtue as a concept seems well-suited to integrating the affective and motivational elements of the grateful response. Unlike emotions, though, virtues are dispositions, not episodes, so they can be possessed without being occurrent. Conceiving of gratitude as a virtue thus allows us to attribute gratitude to a beneficiary who may not be experiencing any grateful feelings, beliefs or motivations in a given moment. Moreover, construing gratitude as a virtue captures nicely the moral phenomenology of how we tend to respond to evidence of ingratitude. When we respond critically to a beneficiary’s act of ingratitude or lack of grateful feeling on some particular occasion, we are often criticizing his character rather than some specific action or inaction or decision on his part (Wellman 1999b: 285). Furthermore, gratitude fits nicely into Aristotle’s picture of virtue as a mean between an excess and a deficiency, with gratitude being a mean between the vices of arrogant, prideful or envious ingratitude, on one hand, and the obsequiousness or servility of overgratitude, on the other (see  section 3.5).  Construing gratitude as a character trait that straddles two vices has allowed philosophers to contribute to practical debates about teaching or training children to be properly grateful (see, e.g., Carr et al. 2015; Manela 2019). And construing gratitude as a character trait may provide a way for environmental ethicists to argue that we ought to be grateful to nature even if, strictly speaking, nature is not the sort of thing that can deserve gratitude (Hill 1983; cf. Manela 2018).