 The liberty of spontaneity, as just described, is perfectly compatible with causal necessity. There are two main reasons people often believe otherwise. First, we tend to conflate the two ideas of liberty. In cases where we enjoy the liberty of spontaneity, our experience suggests that we also enjoy something more. We recognize, of course, that “we were influenc’d by particular views and motives”, yet we find it difficult to “perswade ourselves we govern’d by necessity, and that ’twas utterly impossible for us to have acted otherwise” (T 2.3.2.1). This is because “[w]e feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing” (T 2.3.2.2). Yet the assumption that our will is subject to nothing is a mistake caused by the blind spots of introspection. An outside observer, whether a friend or a scientist, “can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper” (T 2.3.2.2).