 Paul is aware of the particular form of necessitarianism inherent in his approach to that issue; hence, he tries to mitigate its effects, in order to safeguard the contingency of human events as well as divine freedom, and to loosen, at the level of individuals, the rigid causal chain implied by his theory of potency, act, and prime matter. In the last part of his Quaestio de universalibus, where he expounds his conception of divine exemplarism (decima conclusio) and in his commentary on the Isagoge (cap. de specie) and in that on the Categories (cap. de substantia), where he speaks of individual substances, he states that (1) the properties and dispositions proper to individuals are not precisely determined, but vary randomly within a more or less wide spectrum of possibilities whose limits are fixed by the specific form (In Metaph., IX, tr. 1, ch. 2, fol. 341vb). And, (2) although reasoning as natural philosophers we should recognise that the models according to which God created things are finite in number and correspond to the types of things that actually exist, reasoning as theologians we come to understand that God did not create all possible species, but only some of them, because divine ideas as rationes (i.e., principles of knowledge and not models for creation) are infinite in number and correspond to the purely possible, i.e., to that whose notion is not contradictory (QsU, decima conclusio, ms. Paris, BN 6433B, fol. 135ra). This means, for example, that Socrates’ height, weight, and actions are not established a priori in their individual nature or measure, and neither is Socrates’ life, but their typical form is. As a human being, Socrates’ features and behavior cannot deviate from certain physical-biological parameters and certain laws, but the concrete ways of their realisation are not given a priori and determined by his individual substance. As a whole, human beings would actualise, i.e., make real, in time (if they had endless time at their disposal) all the infinite possibilities inherent in their nature (a sort of ‘weak’ principle of plenitude applied to species only), but no human individual as such (i.e., as an individual) is obliged by nature to actualise precisely those potentialities/possibilities that he/she makes real.