 This state of perceiving or conceiving of there being a reason is a belief of a unique and controversial sort. According to John McDowell (1978), it can explain a virtuous person’s action without the help of a related desire playing a causal role (although we can rightly attribute a desire to a person as a consequence of their being motivated by the perception of a reason). McDowell thus rejects the Humean Theory of Motivation  (premise 2  in the Argument from Internalism). His arguments are inspired by his reading of Aristotle rather than the Early Modern sentimentalist tradition. Roughly, a virtuous person sees situations in a distinctive way (McDowell 1979: 73), so that certain features, like someone’s need to know something, are salient to her, while other concerns are silenced, and thus do not stand out as calling for action. This ‘moral vision’ (Murdoch 1970) then suffices to explain what the agent does.