 Continental and analytic approaches to feminism differ primarily in the theoretical resources to which they appeal: analytic approaches typically take their starting point from the English-speaking world – Frege, Russell, Moore et al. – while continental approaches typically take theirs either from Germany – Hegel, Marx, the Frankfurt School et al. – or from France – Lacan, Kristeva, Saussure, Derrida et al. But feminist philosophers are rarely wedded to one tradition over the other; quite the contrary: their work presents a good case for the theoretical advantages of crossing the lines between analytic and continental philosophy and between the two branches of continental feminism. Indeed, feminists oriented by German philosophical traditions are often closer to those oriented by Anglo-American traditions than they are to those oriented by French ones. Moreover, both analytic and continental feminists look to the French philosopher, Simone de Beauvoir’s work and both find theoretical resources in the works of J.L. Austin and Michel Foucault. Although this entry distinguishes broadly analytic and broadly continental feminist traditions, it also tries to clarify intersections, overlaps and the ways in which analytic and continental feminists build on one another’s work. The entry focuses on three topics common to the two traditions: problems of who or what women are, issues pertaining to freedom and domination, and questions of epistemic injustice.