 Now, Burge is certainly right in claiming that many prominent teleosemantic theories are very liberal in attributing representational states. Millikan’s biosemantics, for instance, arguably entails that all living beings are representational systems. Shea’s theory is not quite as liberal, but it still seems to imply that many plants, protists and bacteria qualify as having representations (see   section 3.5).   Hence, it is no surprise that many proponents of teleosemantics seek to defend representational liberalism against Burge’s criticism. Artiga (2016), for instance, who endorses a radical liberalism along Millikanian lines, aims to show that Burge’s case against the explanatory value of representational characterizations of simple organisms begs the question against teleosemantics (for discussion, cf. Schulte 2019a), and he also gives a positive argument for the value of such characterizations in his   (2021).[23]  In a similar vein, Shea (2018) argues at length that his (moderately) liberal theory allows us to make sense of the explanatory role of content attributions in cognitive science. 