 One Phenomenological view of the nature of moral agency derives from Husserl (1908–9/1911/1914 [1988: 107]) who calls the (implicit or explicit) volitional intention that initiates and governs an action the fiat, the “let it be done”. The transition from the evaluation of the envisioned end as (apparently) good to the fiat is mediated by desire. The envisioned good disclosed by the feeling or emotional apprehension is taken as desirable, and the fiat directs the agent to that desirable good as something to be realized through a bodily performance. The fiat, in other words, intends the envisioned good as realizable and is inseparable from the action that realizes (or attempts to realize) it (Melle 1997: 180). At every moment of the action the volitional intention maintains itself both as a partially unfulfilled intention that is at the same time partially fulfilled (Melle 1997: 181), and the action ordered toward the satisfaction of the desire continues just so long as the fiat is operative.