 The seventh and final full chapter offers a critical reading of dialectics, filtered through both Alfred Adler’s psychology and G.W.F. Hegel’s philosophy. At stake in the chapter is recognition—recognition of blackness, of subjectivity, and therefore of humanity. This is one of the most enigmatic ideas in Black Skin, White Masks. Fanon is deeply critical of dialectical thinking, while at the same time drawing deep, important lessons from it. In particular, Fanon is concerned with how a dialectics of recognition might simply mean elevation of the Black person to a sense of humanity created by and modeled on white people. The entirety of the text, of course, has been dedicated to disputing that move and offering alternative ways of thinking about the future. So Fanon rejects the nascent, or sometimes explicit, conception of recognition that appeals to a pre-constructed idea of the human—suspicious, rightly, that such an idea is always racialized. And so too he is suspicious of any dialectical method that leaves a sense of measure intact—namely, a dialectical method that proceeds from a logic of recognition. Fanon resists at every turn the desire for recognition if that recognition proceeds from an inevitably colonial sense of standard or measure. Rather, in terms of Hegelian methodology, Fanon is interested in the risk of life at the center of Hegel’s dialectic, and how that dialectic both exposes the conceptual dependency of the colonizer on the colonized and how confrontation, the work of negation in dialectical thinking and struggle, aims to destroy pre-existing forms of relation. If those pre-existing forms of relation are destroyed, then a certain kind of revolution is possible, one in which the humanity of the colonized black person might emerge, on its own terms, for the first time. Fanon’s imagination turns to the future as unprecedented. What could blackness be after colonialism?