 What, though, about instinctual other regarding impulses such as parental affection, “mutual affection between the sexes” (as distinct from simple sexual attraction), and pity? Edwards is inclined to think that all except pity are forms of self-love. The important point, however, is that even if they aren't, actions motivated by them aren't truly virtuous. To see why consider pity. If truly virtuous actions are motivated by benevolence to being in general, then actions motivated by other regarding impulses which are ultimately directed to “some particular persons or private system” aren't truly virtuous (True Virtue, 1765; Edwards 1957–, vol. 8, 601). Now pity is directed to those in extreme distress whose suffering appears undeserved or excessive. Its object is therefore restricted to only part of being in general. Furthermore, since instinctual affections aren't “dependent” on “general benevolence,” they are in potential conflict with it. Pity, for example, may motivate a judge to act unjustly.