  Thau (2002, Ch. 5) holds a similar view, but there are some important differences. First, Thau’s argument does not turn on the need to secure spectrum inversion without misrepresentation, and instead deploys an adaptation of Jackson’s (1982) thought experiment concerning black-and-white Mary. (See the entry on  qualia: the knowledge argument.)  Second, because Thau is not concerned to ensure that neither Invert nor Nonvert is misperceiving the tomato, he does not try to argue that the tomato has both \(AP_{G}\) and \(AP_{R}\), leaving the question unexamined. Third, Thau’s argument for appearance properties commits him to the view that they cannot be named (222–5); Shoemaker is not so committed. Finally, Thau does not think, unlike Shoemaker, that colors are visually represented (211). According to Thau, beliefs about the colors of things are based on experiences that represent objects as having appearance properties. These beliefs are justified, Thau argues, because there is a correlation between an object’s having color \(C\) and its looking to have AP\(_{C}\) (235–6).