The usual discussions of omniscience treat it as a special case of knowledge, although, perhaps, with such additional features as being arrived at infallibly or through essential omniscience. A standard account of knowledge holds that it is justified true belief, plus a “fourth condition” to avoid counterexamples (see, for example, Chisholm 1989: 90–91). Perhaps, instead, knowledge is warranted true belief, that is, a true belief produced by ones noetic faculties functioning properly in circumstances in which they were designed to function (see, for example, Plantinga 1993). Or, according to another recent proposal, the “Knowledge First” view, knowledge is a general state not to be analyzed by satisfying some other conditions (see Williamson 2000); but even on this suggestion, knowledge entails belief and justification. Thus, on all of these views, knowledge involves belief—as did our discussion two paragraphs back of whether omniscience could include dispositional belief. For the most part, however, philosophers have not devoted much attention to the status of God’s beliefs or the nature of his justification. One exception is the claim of Alston (1986) that God’s knowledge is not divided into separate beliefs and that in fact God does not have beliefs. According to Alston, God has an intuitive, immediate awareness of all truth, which gives him knowledge without belief. For criticism of Alston’s view, see (Hasker 1988) and (Dickinson 2019).