 However, the objection goes, it is evident that our capacities for perceptual discrimination far outstrip our capacities for recognition. Regardless of how short the interval between two presentations of a specific shade it is reasonable to suppose that an organism is capable of perceiving the shade in all its fineness of grain without being capable of recognizing it as the shade presented earlier. There simply does not seem to be a dependence between our fine grained perceptual capacities and our memory capacities. But since the recognitional demonstrative concepts the conceptualist appeals to do depend on such memory capacities (according to the re-identification condition), it cannot be the case that our having such demonstrative concepts is necessary for our enjoying fine grained perceptual discriminations. (For discussion of empirical support for the claim that memory is coarser grained than our capacities for perceptual discrimination, see Raffman 1995. See also Kelly 2001a, Peacocke 2001a, 2001b, Tye 2006, Wright 2003, Dokic and Pacherie 2001 for arguments on similar grounds).