 Czolbe gets credit from Lange for facing up to the self-undermining nature of materialism, precisely because Czolbe takes as central the problem created by the above mentioned empirical arguments about the nature of nerve processes in sense organs. He takes this to be the problem that Feuerbach, Vogt, Moleschott, and others have not dealt with adequately (Czolbe 1855, vi; Lange 1873–75, 3:286). Indeed, Czolbe complains that the physiologists play right into the hands of the speculative, idealistic philosophers, because they do not think through the philosophical consequences of their physiological theories (Czolbe 1856, 27–28). The only way to defeat the speculative philosophers, Czolbe argues, is to insist that sensory qualities are mechanically propagated through the nerves without any change (Czolbe 1855, 14; 1856, 15–16, 27–28). His view appears to be that qualitative properties such as colours or sounds are transmitted directly from the outside to the inside. The suggestion is that colours and sounds exist independently of the subject. They are not generated by the nerves, rather, they are transmitted to the inside of the brain by the nerves. Of course, Czolbe was not ignorant of wave theories of light or sound, but claimed that the wave particle already is the colour or sound, which has only to be transmitted to the right spot in the brain in order for us to be conscious of it. As Lange mockingly emphasizes, the sound waves somehow involve the experience of their sound in themselves already (Lange 1873–75, 2:111). Czolbe appears to bite this bullet, and accepts Hermann Lotze’s description of his view, according to which