 Non-inferential justification of revelatory claims need not be construed as perceptual. Alvin Plantinga, while sympathetic to perceptual theories of natural revelation (2000b: 286–289; 2011: Ch. 8), has proposed a broader account involving both general and special revelation. He suggests that humans have a natural cognitive faculty which “in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God”. Those beliefs are “occasioned” by the circumstances—for example by the sight of a mighty scenery or a beautiful sunset—but they are not conclusions from them, not even “quick and sotto voce inferences”. However, the theistic beliefs thus caused could have positive epistemic status if the cognitive faculty that produces them is “functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth” (Plantinga 2000: 172, 175, 178). Beliefs generated by such a faculty—which Plantinga, following Calvin, calls a “sensus divinitatis”—would be “properly basic” in the sense that they are non-inferentially warranted as long as they are undefeated. 