  Martin (2004) offers a sketch of how a naïve realist might develop an account of partial hallucination. He suggests that rather than focusing on experiences per se, we can focus on the various aspects of an experience—“the different entities that one can experience and the ways in which they can appear to one” (2004, 81). We can then explain those aspects of a partial hallucination that are not genuinely perceptual in terms of “that aspect of experience’s indiscriminability from the corresponding aspect of a perceptual awareness of that element” (2004, 81). Martin also appeals to this idea in offering a suggestion as to what the disjunctivist should say about the experience of impossible scenes. His suggestion is that the disjunctivist should explain such experiences not by direct appeal to the idea of veridical perception of the impossible scene, but rather by explaining how an experience with each of the constituent elements is indiscriminable in that respect from a perception of that element. (For criticism of this proposal see Siegel 2004). One concern with this proposal is whether there may be some problem for the disjunctivist in thinking of such experiences as having a sort of hybrid nature, given that the disjunctivists think that perceptions and hallucinations are mental events with such different natures. (For an argument for the claim that accommodating certain illusions poses significant difficulties for the disjunctivist, see Smith 2010. See also Millar 2015).