 To explain this schema a bit more precisely, in its instances the ‘\(X\)’ gets replaced by a name of a sentence from the object-language for which the truth predicate is being defined, and the ‘\(p\)’ gets replaced by a sentence that is a translation of that sentence into the meta-language in which the truth predicate is being defined. For Tarski, the ‘if and only if’ deployed in any instance of (T) expresses just a material equivalence, putting his view at position \(\mathbf{E}\) in the chart from Section 1.1. Although this means that Tarski is not a deflationist himself (cf. Field 1994a, Ketland 1999, and Patterson 2012), there is no denying the influence that his work and its promotion of the (T)-schema have had on deflationism. Indeed, some early deflationists, such as  W.V.O. Quine  and Stephen Leeds, are quite explicit about taking inspiration from Tarski’s work in developing their “disquotational” views, as is Horwich in his initial discussion of deflationism. Even critics of deflationism have linked it with Tarski: Hilary Putnam (1983b, 1985) identifies deflationists as theorists who “refer to the work of Alfred Tarski and to the semantical conception of truth” and who take Tarski’s work “as a solution to the philosophical problem of truth”.