 The most frequently cited reason given for endorsing presentism—or, at least, treating it as worthy of serious critical consideration—trades upon some variant of the claim that it’s the “intuitive” or “common sense” view of time (e.g., Bigelow 1996: 36; Sider 2001: 11; Markosian 2004: 48; De Clercq 2006: 386; Tallant 2009b: 407; Ingram 2019: 39–43). Many friends agree, and more than a few foes concede, that there’s something compelling about the ideas that present things really exist, whilst past and future things don’t exist, and that some things begin to exist, and other things cease to exist (cf. Sullivan 2012: 153–65). Some who look to defend presentism will rest there with the bare claim that presentism is intuitive (etc.) and that this gives us reason to think that it’s true.