Second, what the agent has reason, or ought, to do or intend may depend not on what she believes her circumstances to be, but on something more “objective.” There are several possibilities.  What an agent has reason, or ought, to do, might be what the evidence (where this depends on something other than her attitudes) available to the agent suggests about her circumstances, what the evidence of the person making the reason- or ought-claim suggests about the agent’s circumstances, what the evidence of the person assessing the claim suggests about the agent’s circumstances, or all of the relevant facts about the agent’s circumstances. Consider the Objective Desire-Based Theory, which says that agents have reason, or ought, to do or intend just what, given what their circumstances actually are, would best satisfy their strongest, present intrinsic desires taken as a whole.  Suppose the agent’s strongest, present intrinsic desire is to drink a gin and tonic, and she so intends.  However, she mistakenly believes that the stuff in this bottle is gin, when it is in fact petrol.  So she believes that mixing the stuff with tonic is a means to drinking a gin and tonic. According to the Objective Desire-Based Theory, she does not have reason to intend to mix the stuff with tonic and drink it.  But if she does so intend, she might be said to have achieved a kind of rational coherence, both local and global.