 Thus Peter French (1984, 5–18) distinguishes between “aggregate collectivities” and “conglomerate collectivities”. An aggregate collectivity is a mere collection of individuals such as a crowd or the people standing at a bus stop or a statistical category such as middle-income earners. If we were to ascribe either moral responsibility or moral rights to an aggregate, those would be reducible, without remainder, to the responsibilities and rights of the several individuals who made up the aggregate. A conglomerate collectivity, by contrast, has a unified being since it is formally constituted as an organization with an internal structure, rules, offices and decision-procedures. (For a similar, but not identical, distinction between aggregates and organizations, see Copp 1984.) French’s examples of conglomerates include the Democratic Party, the US Congress, the US army, the Red Cross, university faculties and business corporations. Organizations of this sort have identities that are not exhausted by those of the persons in them; one person’s leaving and another’s joining does not yield a new organization. Thus, “what is predicable of a conglomerate is not necessarily predicable of all of those or any of those individuals associated with it” (1984, 13), including the rights and responsibilities we might ascribe to the conglomerate. French does not deny that the individuals in a conglomerate, such as a business corporation, will have rights and responsibilities relating to its activities; he denies only that the rights and responsibilities of the conglomerate can be distributed without remainder amongst those individuals. Thus, if the Gulf Oil Corporation buys or sells property, or joins a cartel, or is found causally responsible for environmental pollution and held morally responsible for cleaning it up, the Corporation as agent and as patient is not reducible to the individuals who are currently associated with it.