 Their differences notwithstanding, both the Sarvāstivāda and the Theravāda theories of causal conditioning are based on the notions that dharmas are psycho-physical events that perform specific functions, and that to define what a dhamma is requires one to determine what it does (Gethin 1992A, 150). It turns out, then, that the relative positioning of each dharma within a network of causes and conditions is, first and foremost, a means for its individuation. Only in a subsidiary sense is this network an analysis of causal efficacy. What reappears here is the categorial dimension of the dharma analysis qua a metaphysical theory of mental events in terms of sameness of conditional relations. Analogous to the space-time coordinate system that enables one to identify and describe material objects, the network of conditional relations may be seen as a coordinate system that locates within it any given dharma, implying that to be a dharma is to be an event that has a place in that web of relations—an idea reminiscent of Donald Davidson’s principle of sameness of causes and effects as a condition of identity of events (2001 119–120 &amp; 154–161). Two dharma instances of the same type would fit into the web of causal conditions in exactly the same way, but would then be distinguished as individual instances on the grounds of their unique degrees and modes of causal efficacy.