 The more general voting game satisfies the Schelling/Molander condition that utility of each player increases strictly with the level of cooperation only near the region where cooperation is effective. In figure 3 below the S-curves are bent so that this condition is met everywhere. In 3(a) the two curves still intersect twice. Bovens, which contains a very illuminating taxonomy of n-player games, labels this form the voting game and argues that it best represents situations described in the literature as tragedies of the commons. Note that if there is a value of x at which both curves lie above the equilibria, as there must be if the curves are upward sloping, then the equilibria here cannot be pareto optimal (as the lone equilibrium was in the simplest version of what was called the voting game above). Hence the tragedy. In graph 3(b) there are no intersections between the two curves. Thus the second of the Schelling/Molander conditions for a PD is also met: defection dominates cooperation. The final condition, that cooperation always raises the sum of utilities, is not so easily pictured, but, because the slopes of the two curves are positive, we can be sure that it will be met if the population is sufficiently large. 