 Objection from Moral Chaos. Stevenson grants that moral disagreement may sometimes be rationally irresolvable. Some might worry that if this is so, then moral chaos is likely to ensue. Taking this objection to heart, Blanshard goes as far as to claim that “[The general acceptance of strong emotivism] would, so far as one can see, be an international disaster” (1949). Stevenson could simply respond that even if true, this would not imply that his account of moral thought is false. However, he also suggests that such an objection arises from fear that cannot be assuaged by postulating some objective truth or robust moral properties awaiting to be discovered (e.g., 1944, 336 and 1950a, 68–70). Rather, such fear can be assuaged only when we have a clear, realistic understanding of the nature and complexity of moral disagreement and of the methods by which they can be, and often are, resolved: