 Many deontologists insist that consequentialism errs by failing to accord proper significance to the moral agent as an individual; in John Rawls’ words, consequentialism “does not take seriously the distinction between persons” (Rawls 1971, section 5). (Rawls has utilitarianism in particular as his target, but the point applies more widely.) Paul Hurley writes, “Morality enslaves us to the impersonal standpoint unless we recognize the independent moral significance of persons. Recognition of the moral significance that persons have independent of their impersonal moral significance is necessary both to secure the rational authority of moral requirements and to fend off enslavement of the agent to the impersonal standpoint by morality” (Hurley 2009, 178). And Samuel Scheffler suggests that “for human beings as creatures with values, the normative force of certain forms of partiality is nearly unavoidable. If that is right, then for morality to reject partiality in a general or systematic way would be for it to set itself against our nature as valuing creatures. And that, I believe, would make morality an incoherent enterprise” (Scheffler 2010).