 Arguably, discussions of reductionism in biology are becoming more rather than less philosophically interesting. This is a consequence of recognizing the diverse conceptual landscape carved out over past decades, one that is much larger than that conceived of when only Nagelian theory reduction was in view. Biological science is now more specialized than ever, but disciplinary proliferation brings with it issues relevant to any analysis of reduction: using the same terms differently, disparate methodologies, distinct explanatory norms, and divergent interests in “levels” of biological organization. It also includes an acknowledgment that certain enduring biological topics like development still engender difficult questions about reductionism and new fields of inquiry reinvigorate these discussions (e.g., synthetic biology’s appeal to molecular components as Lego-like building blocks in the  Registry of Standard Biological Parts).  Philosophers need to recognize that a criterion of adequacy on accounts of reductionism in biology involves interpreting why scientists make pronouncements about the failure of reductionism in different areas of life science (see, e.g., De Backer et al.  2010).[16] 