 Moore was similarly modest in his moral epistemology, saying several times, as Sidgwick also had, that by calling our knowledge of basic moral truths “intuitive” he meant only that it is not derived by inference from other knowledge; he likewise denied that moral intuition is infallible, saying that in whatever way we can cognize a true proposition, we can cognize a false one (1903: viii. x/1993: 34, 36). He did sometimes make bald assertions of self-evidence, as in his claim in Principia Ethica that it is “obvious” that the chief intrinsic goods are aesthetic appreciation and personal love (1903: 188/1993: 237) or in Ethics that it is “self-evident” that what is right is always what most promotes the good (1912: 1809–81/1947: 112–13/1965: 76–77), and some critics have found this baldness troubling. But the contrast with earlier non-naturalists such as Sidgwick should again not be overdrawn. Sidgwick arguably, too, gave most weight to intuitions about abstract moral principles (1907: 379–84), including one close to that which Moore cited in Ethics, and appealed to more concrete judgements only in ad hominem arguments against opponents. And Moore often argued in more complex ways. In Principia Ethica he defended his claim that beauty on its own is good by appealing to intuitions about a specific beautiful world, containing mountains, rivers, and sunsets (1903: 83–85/1993: 135–36), and criticized the view that only pleasure is good by arguing that it conflicts with several concrete things we believe, such as that there are bad pleasures (1903: 95/1993:146–47) and that a life of intensely pleasurable but illusory experiences would not be best (1903: 197–98/1993: 246–47; compare 1912: 52–53, 237–39/1947: 34, 146–47/1965: 22, 102). Moore likewise insisted that before we make judgements of self-evidence we must make sure that the propositions we are considering are clear (1903: viii/1993: 34); failure to do so, he argued, explains many of the existing disagreements about ethics. And he took note of common opinions to the extent of trying to explain away contrary views when he found them. Overall his approach to establishing moral truths was close to Sidgwick’s, appealing to intuitive judgements that can be made at different levels of generality and that must be brought into a coherent whole, though with the primary emphasis on abstract judgements. This is not to say his non-naturalism was beyond objection. Any such view holds that there are truths independent of natural and logical ones and knowable by some non-empirical means, and many find this pair of claims problematic. But Moore’s version of the view was arguably no more objectionable than others. If Sidgwick’s non-naturalism did not involve a problematic metaphysics and epistemology, neither did Moore’s; if Moore’s was hopelessly extravagant, so was a supposedly more modest one like Sidgwick’s.