  In order to grasp this difference, we need only consider the first two questions of Quodlibet VIII, in which Henry distinguishes between the purely speculative knowledge that God has of essences and His practical consideration of their possible actualization. Obviously, there is no real difference between these two forms of knowledge, since in God practical ideas exist only as “extensions” of speculative ideas. In other words, the very same rationes ideales that God constitutes in Himself, by considering Himself variously imitable by creatures, can be considered in scientia pratica as the possible effects of His actions (“quaedam operabilia”). The difference between these two forms of knowledge does not lie in the diversity of the object, but rather in the diversity of the aim; that is, in the fact that God can consider a thing as the result of a possible operation of His will. In this sense, God knows what will effectively be placed in act, not by considering an essence in itself (every essence is indeed indifferent to actual existence), but by considering the determination of His will in this regard.