Once again, contextualists claim that regarding the truth conditions of sentences using ‘know’ as context-dependent makes best sense of the flexibility in our “knowledge”-attributing behaviour. While, as we have seen, different specific versions of EC are possible, contextualists tend to agree that, in everyday cases, such as that just described, the increased practical importance of the subjects’ “getting it right” tends to raise the standards for the truth of a sentence of the form ‘S knows that p’. (Keep in mind, though, a point stressed in Section 2: namely, that just what an utterance of such a sentence expresses changes, in the ‘high stakes’ case, to some more demanding proposition—we do not have a fixed such proposition, with different standards for its truth applying in the more demanding context.) The result is that the “knowledge” denial (Mary and John’s claim) in the high-stakes situation may be true, without affecting the truth of the low stakes claim to “know” (by Smith himself). What reason is there, though, for adopting this way of resolving the apparent incompatibility between the two ‘knowledge’ utterances?