  Anthony Appiah rejects this kind of interpretation, on the grounds that such counterpossibles are unintelligible (2017, 11–17; cf. Wilholt 2014, 112). Instead, he suggests Vaihinger’s talk of useful contradictions is more fruitfully understood as referring to the use of multiple mutually incompatible models. In particular, the point is that we may find it useful to regard certain phenomena in one way for some purposes, but in another, incompatible way for other purposes. Even when it turns out to be useful to combine incompatible models for understanding one and the same phenomenon (or range of phenomena), Appiah suggests, Vaihinger need not be committed to a paraconsistent logic. Rather, drawing on (Cartwright 1999), he suggests that using a model does not involve drawing out each of its logical implications, but instead a kind of skill of “knowing which lines of inference one should and which one should not follow” (2017, 13). Moreover, because our main aim in using models is not ultimately to obtain the truth about the physical world, but to get around in it, there is no reason to avoid such inconsistency (2017, 14–17).