 As opposed to the Cārvāka-s and the Vedāntins, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-s, maintain that consciousness is a non-essential adventitious quality (āgantuka-guṇa) of the self because consciousness is present in the self only during its embodied existence. In their metaphysics, they enumerated different kinds of entities, viz. soul/self (ātmā), body (śarīra), sense organs (indriya), objects of experience (artha), knowledge (budhhi), inner sense (manas), etc. A summary account of these metaphysical entities shows that all these kinds of knowable objects are inter-related. Here, ātmā is the seer of all things, enjoyer of all things, knows and experiences. Body is the site of all sorts of experiences including enjoyment and suffering. The sense organs are the means of knowledge as well as enjoyment. Manas is the internal sense organ with the help of which we introspect our inner states. Volition (pravṛtti) is that which leads to physical and mental acts. Affection, aversion and stupidity are listed as faults (doṣa-s). Transmigration (pretyabhāba) means the series of births and deaths through which an individual soul travels until attaining liberation. Birth means connection of a soul with body, senses and so forth; death means their dissociation. Consequences of activities are mainly of two types: pleasure and pain. This is the Nyāya account of all possible experiences of soul. The means of release from the cycle of life and death is the correct knowledge of different types of entities which enables one to distinguish between self from not-self. This paraphrase from the first commentary (bhāṣya) of the oldest Nyāya treatise makes it evident that if the excellence of an individual lies in its knowledge, its sentience, its attempt to avoid painful existence – it cannot be an abstract essence – a soul minus its bodily entrapments. It has to be a self-body continuum immersed and engaged in meaningful pursuits of life in its journey towards emancipation – towards absolute cessation of all sufferings. Self, according to this school, cannot be individuated without a body and hence this view is again a version of liberal naturalism guaranteeing causality without over-determination among different kinds of entities material and non-material. 