 We have already discussed some kinds of metaphysical dependence that  (RI)  could apply to, such as grounding and mereological dependence. (RI) concerns the subset of those metaphysical dependence relations that are considered relevant to fundamentality, so here two philosophers could disagree about which dependence relations to include in that subset. Variations of this conception of fundamentality can be found throughout the literature and it is probably as close to a standard conception as we are likely to find (a few examples: Schaffer 2009: 373; Dixon 2016: 442; Bennett 2017: 105; see also Tahko 2015: Ch. 6; Bliss &amp; Priest 2018b). There are, of course, many differences between the various accounts. Variations of (RI) are standard enough to have been picked up by most of those critical towards this conception of fundamentality as well (Bliss 2013: 413; Morganti 2015: 559; Raven 2016:  608).[8]