 Here is one way of doing so. According to the BIV hypothesis, the experiences you would have as a BIV and the experiences you have as a normal person are perfectly alike, indistinguishable, so to speak, “from the inside”. Thus, although it appears to you as if you are a normally embodied human being, everything would appear exactly the same way to a BIV. Thus, the way things appear to you cannot provide you with knowledge that you are not a BIV. But if the way things appear to you cannot provide you with such knowledge, then nothing can give you such knowledge, and so you cannot know that you’re not a BIV. Of course, you already know this much: if you are a BIV, then you don’t have any hands. If you don’t know that you’re not a BIV, then you don’t know that you’re not in a situation in which you don’t have any hands. But if you don’t know that you’re not in a situation in which you don’t have any hands, then you don’t know that you’re not handless. And to not know that you’re not handless is simply to not know that you have hands. We can summarize this skeptical argument as follows: