 Those attracted by the idea that our knowledge of other minds comes about through perception often appeal to the following in defense of their position: we all acknowledge that we often claim to be in the position where we can just see that another is angry, in pain, and the like. These philosophers are careful to point out that we don’t always claim that this is the case and we do not claim it with respect to all mental states, but they hold that attention to such cases can teach us that the mental is not always “withdrawn from direct engagement with the world” (McDowell 1995: 413). Duddington writes that to say that knowledge of another’s mind can be direct and immediate is to say that there is no veil or barrier intervening between the knowing subject and what is known—it is not to say either that our knowledge here is complete or that there are no difficulties that stand in the way of our attainment of such knowledge (1919: 167; cf. McDowell 1982).