 Unlike early Mohist texts, the Dialectics nowhere appeals to Heaven as a justification or epistemic criterion for moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether or not the later Mohists actually abandoned the doctrine of  “Heaven’s intention”  (tiān zhì 天志). One possibility is that they set aside the doctrine after noticing the epistemic problems involved in contending that Heaven supports one set of ethical norms rather than another. One isolated passage seems to recognize that the moral appeal to Heaven’s intention as a standard of morality is effectively empty, as it could be twisted by a criminal to claim that since Heaven (tiān 天, also “nature”) has given him a criminal disposition, it is right for him to engage in selfish behavior (EC1). However, the passage in question is so obscure and corrupt that it cannot be interpreted with confidence. Another possibility is that the writers merely omitted the doctrine of “Heaven’s intention” without actually rejecting it, since their texts treat only the content of the ethical theory, not its foundations. Another, similarly late book of the Mozi, “Models and Standards” (Book 4), continues to appeal to Heaven as an ethical model, though that text may be the work of a different branch of Mohists. 