 Auriol responds to these challenges by distinguishing between real being (esse reale) and apparent being (esse apparens). This distinction has perplexed most readers of Auriol, and there is considerable disagreement about how to interpret it. Even so, it is generally agreed that real being is what the object has independently of any perceiver, and also that whatever it is that is meant by esse apparens, it is to be identified with a mental or sensory appearance of some sort. Some scholars (e.g., Tachau) read Auriol as a representationalist, which of course does little to solve the skeptical problem; others (e.g., Perler) see him as a direct realist. Whatever the answer in this particular case, Auriol is no skeptic. Not only does he believe that we can know external objects; we also know many self-evident propositions with certainty (logical truths, e.g.). For more on this aspect of Auriol’s thought, see Bolyard (2000).