 The distinction between sensation and intuition in Kant’s thinking is fundamental to his overarching conception of space and time. This is the case for several reasons, not least because one should avoid thinking that Kant takes us to have a sensation of space; we have, rather, an intuition of it (see Carson 1997). The distinction has many facets, but the basic idea is as follows. Sensations are subjective in the sense that they do not represent objects, they are modifications of the subject. A good example of a sensation would be an itch that I feel. Of course, an itch might be caused (e.g.) by some flour that fell on my nose while baking cookies, but the itch does not represent the flour, or indeed anything outside myself; the itch is simply what I feel. If we felt only sensations, we would lack representations of things other than ourselves, even if such things caused or helped to cause our sensations. Perhaps sensations would enable us to avoid injury or pain--one might, say, jump back when feeling heat from a fire. But without intuition, we would lack spatial awareness: that is, we would lack an awareness of things in spatial locations around us. In order to represent things other than ourselves, we require intutition, which Kant regards as a singular, immediate, objective representation (where sensations are merely subjective, as we have seen). In what sense is intuition an objective representation that is singular and immediate? That complex idea means, for starters, that intuition represents particulars, i.e., things with some spatial location vis-à-vis me and also other things. So when I feel an itch, I have a sensation; when I see the pile of flour in front of me next to the bowl on my counter, I have an intuition, a representation of something in space with a location relative to me and to other things. However, although intuition can represent flour on the counter next to the bowl, it does not represent it as flour. For that, one would require a  concept.[3] 