 In addition, the restricted nature of such properties makes it hard to see how to individuate a fictional entity. Thomasson gives sufficient identity conditions for fictional entities within a literary work: x and y are the same fictional object F if x and y are ascribed exactly the same properties in the work (1999: 63). But what do we say in the case of fictional objects that appear in different works? Thomasson admits that in this case one can only provide a necessary condition: x and y are the same fictional object only if the author of the second work \(W’\) is competently acquainted with x of the previous work \(W\), and intends to import x into \(W’\) as y (1999: 67). The reason why she thinks this cannot be a sufficient condition is that, no matter what the author’s intentions are, he does not succeed in importing x (an entity that appears in W) into \(W’\) as y if he attributes properties to y that are too radically different from the properties that were attributed to x in W (1999: 68). (There are other cases that show even more clearly how authorial intention can be thwarted. Thus, consider a case of a fusion of characters, in which an author intends to import into \(W’\) two characters x and y from a previous work W as a single character z. Clearly, given the transitivity of identity, z is not identical with either x or y, so the author fails in her attempt. Analogous problems arise in the converse situation of character fission: cf. Voltolini 2012.)