 Compatibilist accounts of the apparent counterexamples take the targeted revisionary views to be entirely compatible with the intuitions or beliefs that are meant to motivate CX2. Such accounts often take the form of assimilating recalcitrant ordinary utterances to some familiar linguistic phenomenon that is known to be potentially misleading. For instance, when an ordinary speaker looks in the fridge and says ‘there’s no beer’, she obviously doesn’t mean to be saying that there is no beer anywhere in the universe. Rather, she is tacitly restricting her quantifier to things that are in the fridge. Universalists often suggest that something similar is going on when ordinary speakers say ‘there are no trout-turkeys’ (or ‘there’s nothing that has both fins and feathers’). Speakers are tacitly restricting their quantifiers to ordinary objects, and what they are saying is entirely compatible with there being non-ordinary finned-and-feathered things like trout-turkeys. Universalists may then hold that the argument from counterexamples rests on an equivocation. If the quantifiers are meant to be restricted to ordinary objects, then CX2 is true, but CX1 is false: universalism does not entail that any ordinary things are trout-turkeys. If on the other hand the quantifiers are meant to be entirely unrestricted then CX2 is false; but in denying CX2 (so understood), one is not running afoul of anything we are inclined to say or believe or  intuit.[56] 