 The game-theoretical description of semantic games does not mention the activities of searching and finding; for such an abstract description it suffices to speak of the players making a move. Also, the characterization of truth and falsity as the existence of a winning strategy for player 2 and player 1, respectively, does not refer to efforts on the part of the players – say efforts to establish truth or to find witnesses. The truth or falsity of a sentence is a matter of ‘combinatorics’: it is an issue of the existence of a set of functions with certain properties (cf. Hintikka 1968, 1996; Hodges 2013). So what happened to the original philosophical conception according to which the meanings of quantifiers are tied to the activities of searching and finding? Hintikka’s idea is that asserting a sentence involving quantifiers is to make a claim about what can and what cannot happen when a certain language-game is played; using language involving quantifiers requires mastering the rules of the corresponding semantic games (Hintikka 1968: Sect. 8, 1996: 128, 2006a: 538). What is the content of such a claim in connection with the sentence \(\forall x\exists y R(x, y)\)? That whichever individual player 1 chooses from the domain for \(\forall x\), player 2 can find a witness individual for \(\exists y\). In other words, given a value for \(\forall x\) (which itself can be seen as the result of the search by player 1), if player 2 is allowed to search free from any practical constraints, she will find a value for \(\exists y\) so that player 2 wins the resulting play. Even though semantic games themselves can be defined without recourse to activities such as looking for or finding, these activities play an important conceptual role when the language user reasons about these games.