 Whether an attempt to intentionally hasten one’s death is coerced or not is relevant to whether that attempt is justified. But condition (c) may rest on an irrelevant distinction: Many of the reasons individuals have for intentionally hastening death arguably originate outside themselves much in the way that a coerced agent’s reasons originate outside themselves too. An extremely ill patient S may opt to take their own life rather endure severe and ongoing physical pain. But compare S to T, who opts to take their own life because of severe and ongoing physical pain caused by the choices of her torturer U. S and T seem to have the same kinds of reasons to intentionally hasten their own deaths, reasons originating outside themselves. According to condition (c), the crucial difference is that T is not engaging in suicide because T’s reasons originate in U’s decision to engage in torture, whereas S is engaging in suicide because S’s reasons do not originate in the will or decisions of another individual. Can the nature of an action depend upon whether the reasons that justify it originate in another person’s will or decisions? This does not seem obvious. Coercion does not seem to alter the action as such, even if it alters whether their actions are justified or blameworthy. A person coerced into singing is singing, no less than a person who sings of her own accord; a person coerced into withdrawing money from her bank account withdraws money from her bank account, no less than if she did of her own accord; etc. Condition (c) thus seems to impose on the definition of suicide a requirement that does not seem to apply to other types of action.