 Since Richard Montague (see especially Montague 1970, 1973) deserves much of the credit for demonstrating that language can be logically construed, let us reconsider the sentence structure in figure 1 and the corresponding grammar rules and vocabulary, but this time suppressing features, and instead indicating how logical interpretations expressed in (a variant of) Montague's type-theoretic intensional logic can be obtained compositionally. We slightly “twist” Montague's type system so that the possible-world argument always comes last, rather than first, in the denotation of a symbol or expression.  For example, a two-place predicate will be of type (e → (e → (s → t))) (successively applying to an entity, another entity, and finally a possible world to yield a truth value), rather than Montague's type (s → (e → (e → t))), where the world argument is first. This dispenses with numerous applications of Montague's intension (∧) and extension (∨) operators, and also slightly simplifies truth conditions. For simplicity we are also ignoring contextual indices here, and treating nouns and VPs as true or false of individuals, rather than individual concepts (as employed by Montague to account for such sentences as “The temperature is 90 and rising”). 