There is another argument for access internalism, one which stresses having reasons. This argument is presented as a case against externalist accounts of justification and it utilizes examples of subjects who are clairvoyant. In one such example we have a person, Norman, who arrives at his belief that the President is in New York City through some clairvoyance process, and we may presume that this belief is true. Norman's exercise of clairvoyance may generally yield true beliefs in Norman, not just about the President's whereabouts, and so clairvoyance, for him, is a reliable belief-forming process, and the externalist would have to count Norman's belief about the President's location as justified. Even so, one can plausibly say, Norman is irrational in “accepting beliefs whose provenance can only be a total mystery to [him], whose status is as far as [he] can tell no different from that of a stray hunch or arbitrary conviction” (BonJour and Sosa 2003, 32; quoted in Bergmann 2006, 12)