 Approached as unbidden passivity, of course, the existential category called Judaism raises the question of other passive ascriptions and their implications for the question of what it means to be a human being. If, by 1974, politics and the third party are largely synonyms for “humanity” for Levinas, then we must conclude that politics has, by extension, become more for him than the conflict and strife he described in his preface to Totality and Infinity (TI: 21–25). Politics would have to take seriously a pluralistic humanism, as well as the condition of passive ascriptions including racism. The implication is that one may sometimes have a choice, in one’s actions, about whether politics is indeed a war of all against all or the site in which traces of justice toward the other can be demanded. However that may be, some commentators have raised the concern that “humanity” for Levinas looks basically like Husserl’s rationalist ideal of humanity (Husserl 1954 [1970: 275], cited by McGettigan 2006: 16). This would be the humanity of Europe, and beneath that, one flowing out of the intertwined voices of “Athens” and  “Jerusalem”.[46]  To be sure, the Biblical prophets demanded justice (and repentance) from their wayward communities. But political justice requires a public space, an agora in which the agorein (public speaking) gives rise to categories of thought (kat’agorein means to accuse publicly).