 There has been an even more recent challenge to the received understanding of kin selection, favoring a group selection interpretation, which has been rebutted by those defending a strict separation between kin and group selection (Nowak, Tarnita, &amp; Wilson 2010; Hölldobler &amp; Wilson 2009; rebutted by Gardner, West. &amp; Wild 2011; Abbot et al. 2011). This view, has in turn, been rebutted by others (van Veelen et al. 2012; Allen, Nowak, &amp; Wilson 2013; E.O. Wilson &amp; Nowak 2014). Philosophers have offered a very useful analysis of these debates about kin and group selection (Birch &amp; Okasha 2015). The basic prediction of kin selection theory is that social behavior, especially social behavior that benefits others, should correlate with genetic relatedness. This is commonly expressed through Hamilton’s rule, rb &gt; c, where r is relatedness, b is the benefit that behavior offers the conspecific, and c is the cost to the actor (see Hamilton 1975 for an expansion to multilevel selection). The critics claiming that kin selection is a form of group selection, assert that Hamilton’s rule “almost never holds” (Nowak et al. 2010: 1059). That is, it almost never states the true conditions under which a social behavior will evolve by selection. Their opponents claim the opposite: that it is incorrect to claim that Hamilton’s rule requires restrictive assumptions, or that it almost never holds. On the contrary, they claim, it holds a great deal of the time (Gardner, West, &amp; Wild 2011).