 In a more recent article and in contrast to his previous view, Gauthier rejects the idea that the problem of grounding morality in rationality should be framed as a bargaining problem at all (2013). When the problem is framed in this way, the solution depends on assuming that the parties participating in the contract negotiations are all rational maximizers. Under his revised view, however, he neither sees the problem as a bargaining problem nor the parties as (constrained) rational maximizers; instead, he conceives of them as Pareto-optimizers. As Pareto-optimizers or rational cooperators, the parties seek to produce a Pareto-optimal outcome, which is an outcome where it is not possible to increase the payoff to one party without decreasing the payoff to another party. If it is possible to move to another outcome to increase the payoff accruing to one party without decreasing the payoff to another party, then the current outcome is not Pareto-optimal. It is important to note that this change is not meant to attach additional motives to the parties in addition to the motive of self-interest. Rational cooperation, according to Gauthier, provides an alternative conception of what constitutes rational action. Rational cooperators do not want to leave the additional benefits of cooperation on the table.  How do these changes solve the original problem of grounding morality in (this conception of) rationality? The answer is to calculate the payoffs for each outcome in terms of cooperative benefits or the absence of cooperative benefits. For example, the cooperative minimum is a payoff which provides one party with none of benefits generated through cooperation. In contrast, the cooperative maximum is the payoff which affords a single party all of the possible benefits generated through cooperation. The potential cooperative gain is the difference between these two. The actual cooperative gain is then the difference between its payoff and the party’s cooperative minimum. Next, the actual cooperative gain is then to be divided by the party’s potential cooperative gain. This generates the party’s proportionate gain, which shows the actual gain as a proportion of the party’s potential gain from cooperation. Each outcome is then represented as a proportionate gain from cooperation. Finally, the goal is to select that outcome generating the maximum minimum proportionate gain to any single party. This principle, which Gauthier calls maximin proportionate gain, selects a Pareto-optimal outcome that would be rational for parties to select. 