 One possible defense was sketched by Kelly et al. (2007), and developed in more detail by Kumar (2015, 2016) and Stich (2019). The core idea is that the term “moral judgment” can be viewed as a natural kind term. In his widely discussed paper, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Hilary Putnam (1975) argued that it is the job of empirical science to determine the essential features of natural kinds like water and gold, and that these essential features can be used to specify the meaning of the term denoting the kind. Devitt (1996) and Kornblith (1998), have provided insightful accounts of how this process works. Very roughly, their story goes like this. To begin, the scientist focuses on what seem to be intuitively obvious examples of the kind in question. She seeks to discover properties that are shared by most of these intuitively obvious examples, and that are absent in most things that, intuitively, are not members of the kind. If this process leads to the discovery of a cluster of properties that is present in most intuitive examples and absent in most cases that, intuitively, are not members of the kind, the scientist then hypothesizes that this cluster of properties are nomologically linked and that they are the essential features of the kind.