 Leibowitz’s view of mitzvoth has important implications for the relationship between ethics and religion in general and more specifically for the relationship between ethics and halakhah. Leibowitz does not deny that there is a genuine realm of ethical value, writing that both the theocentric (religious) and anthropocentric (Kantian) conceptions of value are “legitimate” (Judaism, 208). Leibowitz certainly recognizes that beyond the realm of halakhah “flourish many good deeds and events of grandeur and sublimity” (Judaism, 25). Generally for Leibowitz, halakhah is not all-encompassing and does not govern all behavior, as he makes explicit in his interviews with Michael Shashar where he asks rhetorically whether Judaism has a perspective on the decision whether to build a bridge over a particular river (Sihot, 91). For Leibowitz then, there are clearly other aspects of human life that are necessary, indeed valuable, and that need not be dedicated to the worship of God. If, therefore, one is acting for the sake of one’s fellow man, one must simply recognize that this is the performance of a noble ethical act, not a holy religious act. What Leibowitz stresses is the importance of not confusing the one with the other.