 Devlin’s account is a moral relativist one. He relativizes what is morally good to the beliefs of a given society (where “deeply felt and not manufactured”; Devlin 1965: 17). The attraction for Devlin of moral relativism was his belief that it would yield a morality generally of the society subject to it, without conceding “moral expertise” to any (elite) group of persons. He seemed to assimilate the “rationalist morality” he rejected to the views of an educated elite (Devlin 1965:  91–92).[8]  Since Hart’s critique, few have found the relativist aspect of Devlin’s account convincing (Hart 1963 [1982: 17–24]). Devlin’s view appears to exemplify what Bernard Williams styled as “vulgar and unregenerate” relativism (B. Williams 1972: 34, cf. Fricker 2013). Such relativism—as Williams paints it—is composed of three propositions: