 It is not universally agreed that dispositions are typically multi-track. Lowe (2010, pp. 10–11) insists that dispositions can’t be multi-track. A majority of metaphysicians, however, lean toward the multi-track character of dispositions. Being electrically charged, an electron is disposed to experience an electrostatic force \(F\) in response to being placed at a distance \(d\) away from an electric charge \(q\) but it is also disposed to experience an electrostatic force \(F^*\) in response to being placed at a distance \(d^*\) away from an electric charge \(q^*\). Similarly, it might be plausibly claimed that fragility is a multi-track disposition with many different stimulus conditions: \(x\)’s being struck, \(x\)’s being stressed, \(x\)’s being twisted, \(x\)’s being shaken, and so on. Indeed, whilst Cartwright’s (1999, pp. 59, 64) notion of capacity is akin to the notion of multi-track disposition (cf. Teller 2002, pp. 717–718), electric charge being a paradigm example of capacity in Cartwright’s sense, she maintains that capacities are real properties and that reference to capacities is essential in the operation of science: scientific laws are nothing but expressions of what capacities exist and how they work together. On Cartwright’s view, hence, not only do multi-track dispositions exist but it is their nature that science aims to unveil.