 Thomas Nagel (1974) argued famously that conscious experience is subjective, and thus permanently recalcitrant to objective scientific understanding. He invited us to ponder “what it is like to be a bat” and urged the intuitive judgment that no amount of physical-scientific knowledge, including neuroscientific, supplies a complete answer. Nagel’s intuition pump has generated extensive philosophical discussion. At least two well-known replies made direct appeal to neurophysiology. John Biro (1991) suggested that part of the intuition pumped by Nagel, that bat experience is substantially different from human experience, presupposes systematic relations between physiology and phenomenology. Kathleen Akins (1993a) delved deeper into existing knowledge of bat physiology and reports much that is pertinent to Nagel’s question. She argued that many of the questions about bat subjective experience that we still consider open hinge on questions that remain unanswered about neuroscientific details. One example of the latter is the function of various cortical activity profiles in the active bat.