 To determine the virtuous mean in any specific circumstance, John advances an essentially Ciceronian standard: “Discretion with regard to time, place, amount, person and cause readily draws the proper distinction” between virtuous and vicious actions. Indeed, one might understand John to advocate a sort of circumstantialist—though by no means relativist—moral theory, since discretion “is the origin and source of moderation in its widest sense without which no duty is properly performed” (FCP: 373). Attention to context is required, for John, to guide the determinations one ought to make of what constitutes virtuous behavior. Thus, it is clearly vicious to take a human life, yet as a form of punishment or as the result of a justly fought battle, it may be vicious not to take a life. This conception of virtue posits the identification of a morally correct action as a sort of moving target, rather than a fixed moral absolute that applies at all times and in all places. This seems to be the philosophical premise behind his argument that various activities that might be viewed as reprehensible in themselves may be morally justifiable when conducted in the proper measure. In Book One of the Policraticus, following a lengthy and scathing critique of hunting—a favorite pastime of the English aristocracy to whom he is writing—John reverses course: “The activity, however, is laudable when moderation is shown and hunting is pursued with judgment and, when possible, with profit” (FCP: 25). The same holds for the many other popular courtly “frivolities”. John’s overarching aim is to keep his audience mindful of that “moderation without which the good life is impossible” (FCP: 161), the very essence of which is the performance of the right act in the right way and in the right situation, in accordance with one’s best judgment. (For further discussion of this topic, see the supplement on  Practical Moderate Skepticism.)