 Some recent writers seek to expand the notion of social epistemology by incorporating moral or ethical elements. Miranda Fricker (2007) in particular has made significant contributions to this literature. Fricker introduces the notion of “epistemic injustice,” which arises when somebody is wronged in their capacity as a knower. An easily recognizable form of such injustice is when a person or a social group is unfairly deprived of knowledge because of their lack of adequate access to education or other epistemic resources. Fricker’s work also focuses on two less obvious forms of epistemic injustice. The first is testimonial injustice, which occurs when a speaker is given less credibility than she deserves because the hearer has prejudices about a social group to which the speaker belongs. The second kind is hermeneutical injustice. This occurs when, as a result of a group being socially powerless, members of the group lack the conceptual resources to make sense of certain distinctive social experiences. For instance, before the 1970s, victims of sexual harassment had trouble understanding and describing the behavior of which they were the victims, because the concept had not yet been articulated. Christopher Hookway (2010) builds on Fricker’s work and argues that there are other forms of epistemic injustice that do not involve testimony or conceptual resources