 Two further benefits of a feminist approach to bioethics have been set out, apart from how it might directly correct for the effects of a masculinist moral philosophy and bioethics. First, a feminist approach both attunes us to the effects of androcentric reasoning in the analysis of bioethical issues, and mitigates those effects. Second, it draws our attention to the gendered nature of many concepts key to bioethical analysis. For instance, in looking at the concepts of reason and emotion, a feminist approach helps us to see that the concepts themselves seem partly to be gendered concepts. Reason is, or at least traditionally has been, associated with the male, and emotion with the female. The same holds true with the distinction between the public and private spheres, with the public domain belonging to men, the private the women’s realm. But what’s more, we see that that which is associated with woman (emotion, for example) tends to be undervalued. As Margaret Little lays it out, traditional moral epistemology takes reason, and not emotion, to be critical to moral understanding. It is also important to notice the dualistic nature of the picture presented above. Just as men and women have traditionally occupied different spheres, so too have gendered concepts occupied fixed places on either side of a divide. The domestic sphere, for instance, is taken to have nothing instructive to offer the world of economic or political relations, or bioethics (Little 1996).