 Recently, there has been a debate about the usefulness of natural kind classification in philosophy of science. Some philosophers have argued that the concept of natural kinds should be eliminated on the grounds that it does not play a useful role in scientific classification. David Ludwig (2018) and Ian Hacking (2007a) have argued for eliminating the concept of natural kind altogether. The arguments here are twofold: firstly, the concept of natural kind is applicable to a heterogeneous set of practices of natural classification. The usage of the natural kind concept is so multifarious that it is misleading to practicing scientists if they use the natural kind concept in scientific classification. On these grounds, the concept of natural kind should be eliminated. Indeed Hacking (2007a, 229) does not mince his words: “Delete every mention of natural kinds”. The second, related, argument is on the grounds that there are so many different theories of natural kinds in the literature, of which some apply more readily to some scientific disciplines, while others seem to apply more readily in others. For example, the grounds for essentialism seem more warranted in chemistry, while Boyd’s HPC view seems more readily applicable in biology. Indeed, a homogeneous theory of natural kinds that would apply in all disciplines looks very unlikely. On these grounds, so the argument goes, the search for a unitary theory of natural kinds for all scientific classification is futile. Conix and Chi (2021) argue that these arguments for eliminativism do not provide a sufficient justification to eliminate the natural kind concept altogether. They argue that the notion of ‘natural kind’ plays another epistemic role in philosophical research, because it enables fruitful investigation into non-arbitrary classification.