 Roughly speaking, the representational approach to grounding has it that grounding is intimately tied to representation (Fine 2012a; Rosen 2010), while the worldly approach denies this (Audi 2012b; Schaffer 2012). While the representational/worldly distinction is somewhat hazy, we understand it to be orthogonal to the objective/subjective distinction. One way to sharpen the distinction between the representational and worldly approaches is as follows: on the former, the relata of grounding have concepts among their constituents; on the latter, this isn’t the case (Krämer &amp; Roski 2015; Correia 2017). So understood, the representational approach comes in two varieties: either facts are composed entirely of concepts or they’re a mixture of concepts and non-representational items like objects and properties. On the former view, facts are akin to Fregean propositions; on the latter view, they’re instead akin to ordered sets of concepts and non-representational items. (See Correia 2010 for a discussion of the distinction between the representational and worldly approaches where it isn’t assumed that grounding is a relation.)