 Carruthers (1996, 2009, 2011) raises a different problem for ST: no version of ST can adequately account for self-attributions of mental states. Recall that, according to Goldman (2006), simulation-based mindreading is a three-stage process in which we first mentally simulate a target’s mental state, we then introspect and categorize the simulated mental state, and we finally attribute the categorized state to the target. Since Goldman’s model has it that attributions of mental states to others asymmetrically depend on the ability to introspect one’s own mental states, it predicts that: (A) introspection is (ontogenetically and phylogenetically) prior to the ability to represent others’ mental states; (B) there are cases in which introspection works just fine, but where the ability to represent others’ mental states is impaired (presumably, because the mechanism responsible for projecting one’s mental states to the target is damaged). Carruthers (2009) argues that neither (A) nor (B) are borne out by the data. The former because there are no creatures that have introspective capacities but at the same time lack the ability to represent others’ mental states; the latter because there are no dissociation cases in which an intact capacity for introspection is paired with an impairment in the ability to represent others’ mental states.