 Fifty-plus years later the philosophical climate is more favorable to Moore. A number of philosophers now defend metaethical non-naturalism (e.g. Shafer-Landau 2003; Huemer 2006), either in versions they say are ontologically minimalist (Nagel 1986; Scanlon 1998, 2014; Parfit 2011, vol. 2: 464–87) or in ones they present as more robust (Enoch 2011), but all embracing some account of normative truth that separates it sharply from non-normative, for example scientific, truth. In addition, and of necessity, these current versions of non-naturalism share something close to Moore’s moral epistemology, his view that normative truths are known by a kind of direct insight or intuition, though the present-day views are often more explicitly fallibilist and coherentist than his sometimes appeared to be. Still, for many philosophers, Moore’s version of non-naturalist realism remains the best-known or canonical one. In normative ethics, too, there is increasing sympathy for accounts of the good with an ideal or perfectionist content and admiration for particular features of Moore’s own account, such as his valuing of personal love, his recursive principles (Hurka 2001) and his principle of organic unities. Moorean ideas are by no means the only ones alive in present-day moral philosophy; there are many alternatives, including many that reject, for example, his consequentialism and impartialism. One especially relevant strand in the recent literature, dating from the 1980s, says ethics needs the non-Moorean concept of “good for” mentioned above, which is associated with “well-being” and “prudential value” and also distinct from the agent-relative goodness Sidgwick used to state egoism. Here one view proposes to use this alternative concept in addition to the Moorean “good,” so what is simply good is wholly or at least largely what is good “for” individuals (e.g. Sumner 1996). Another, more radical view wants “good for” to entirely replace Moore’s “good,” so the former is the only ethically significant evaluative concept (e.g. Kraut 2007; Kraut 2011). (The argument here is not, as in Geach, that the Moorean “good” is ungrammatical; it is that, though linguistically unimpeachable, it makes no useful contribution to ethical thought.) But there have also been defences, against these views, of Moore’s “simply good” and his reductive or “locative” account of “good for” (e.g. McDaniel 2014; Rowland 2016; Tucker 2018; Hurka 2021). Often what present-day philosophers take from Moore is just an individual idea or argument rather than his theory as a whole (Regan 2003 is an exception). But whereas in the early 20th century Moore’s approach to ethics, and especially his metaethics, was dominant, at least in British moral philosophy, and whereas in the mid-century it was widely dismissed, it now represents, at several points, a valuable contributor to many lively ongoing debates.