 What is unclear is how any of the above makes the will’s volitions free. After all, by James’ own admission, the senses and the intellect are also formal self-movers, and yet they are not free. The difference is that whereas acts of sensation and intellection, given the self-motion of the senses and the intellect, will necessarily follow upon the motions of the organs of sense and the motion of the imagination, no act of willing according to James is necessitated by the efficient causality (in James’ sense of the word) of the intellect. Thus, although any act of willing must be preceded by an act of the intellect, no act of the intellect necessarily entails a particular act of willing. This makes the will the only power of the soul that is essentially free, though some other powers may be called free “by participation,” insofar as they are apt to be moved by the will. (Quodl. I, q. 7, p. 107, 935–944) 