 Before proceeding, we should note that some formulate grounding claims in such a way that all manner of things potentially ground one another, not just facts (Cameron 2008; Schaffer 2009; Wilhelm 2020). The theses of separatism and unionism are relevant here (see  §1.1).  Given unionism (grounding is explanationG), the restriction to facts seems quite reasonable. While it makes sense to say, for example, that [The truck exists] explains something, it’s unclear what it might mean to say that the truck itself does so (Raven 2015; Trogdon 2013a). But, given separatism (grounding is determinationG), the alternative view is a genuine option. We can coherently maintain that the truck determines its particular redness (a mode), and this, in turn, backs an explanation of the existence of the mode in terms of the existence of the truck.