  McIntyre holds, however, that it would be overstating the case to say that because weakness of will involves this procedural defect, it is  always irrational (McIntyre 2006, p. 290;  pp. 298–9; p. 302). She proposes rather that  practical rationality has multiple facets and aims, and that failure  in one respect or along one dimension does not automatically justify  the especially severe form of rational criticism which we intend by  the term “irrational.” For example, consider an agent who succumbs to contrary inclination of exactly the type expected when  the time comes to act on a truly stupid resolution. (Holton  gives the example of resolving to go without water for two days just  to see what it feels like: Holton 2003, p. 42.) There will  indeed be a blemish on this agent’s rational scorecard if he  eventually gives in and drinks: he will have failed in his attempt at self-management. But wouldn’t it be rationally far worse for him to stick to his silly resolution no matter what the cost?