 The bystander trolley case might seem to undermine the claim that the doing/allowing distinction is morally relevant. After all, it seems as if it is permissible for the bystander to do harm to one person rather than allow harm to five others. Derek Parfit (2017) uses the bystander trolley case in this way, arguing that considering such cases shows that the fact that a threat is heading towards one group of people rather than another gives no reason not to redirect the threat. However, as Kamm (2020) points out, even if the fact that a threat is heading to one group rather than another is not morally relevant in itself, it might supervene on other morally relevant features. Kamm asks us to consider a version of the trolley case where there are five people on each track. The bystander must choose between killing five and letting five die. If not harming had no priority over not aiding, then it would seem the bystander should be morally indifferent between these two options – but it is clear that they are morally required not to turn the trolley from five to five. As Kamm concludes, it seems that, if turning the trolley is permissible, it is not permissible because there are no differences between turning the trolley and not turning the trolley. Instead, it is permissible despite these differences. 