 Contemporary interest in the idea that there is a psychologically real and philosophically important distinction between moral judgments and conventional judgments can be traced to the work of psychologist Elliot Turiel. Starting in the 1970s, Turiel and his collaborators borrowed some ideas from philosophers who had written on the nature of morality and convention, and conducted a series of experiments demonstrating that young children react very differently when asked about prototypical moral transgressions, like one child hitting another, and prototypical conventional transgressions, like wearing pajamas to school. On the basis of this work, Turiel proposed and defended a definition of morality according to which moral transgressions involved harm, injustice, or the violation of rights. Other researchers, notably Richard Shweder and Jonathan Haidt, argued that Turiel’s definition “does not travel well”, because people in non-Western cultures treat a much wider range of transgressions as moral. This led to an ongoing debate about the extent to which moral cognition differs across cultures.