 As we have seen, Mohist semantics and epistemology are grounded in the notion of distinguishing things as “the same” (tóng 同) or “different” (yì 異). To predicate a general term of something is to distinguish it as similar to, or of a kind (lèi 類) with, other things denoted by that term. Knowledge and understanding are explained in terms of the ability to distinguish and name things correctly. In this theoretical framework, judgment amounts to the act of either grouping things together as “similar” or “the same” or distinguishing them as “different.” An assertion is in effect a claim that something is or is not “the same” or “of a kind” with something else. Thus argumentation or disputation—the process of supporting an assertion by citing other, established claims—is typically seen as a process of distinguishing whether two things are or are not “the same” or whether something belongs to a certain kind. 