 The motivation for these intermediate positions is not difficult to see. With such a strict division between momentary perceptual particulars and erroneous linguistic concepts, it is difficult to explain how we could ever arrive at anything like knowledge. This is where Dignāga’s doctrine of apoha is supposed to help. Although there are no real concepts and no linguistic universals, there are apparent universals that we mistakenly—but pragmatically—superimpose on real things. We create concepts not by identifying some real quality or similarity that is shared across distinct entities, but by ignoring most of their differences and “excluding” non-members of a set from a conceptual field, outside a pragmatically beneficial boundary. A key question that arises to challenge this possibility is, How can a fallacious boundary be pragmatically beneficial? Why, for instance, is a concept or a word recognized and shared by various people, if there is no real similarity among the objects to which it refers? The answer, which as I’ve said Sapaṇ gives more explicitly than any other thinker, is karma. The mistake of superimposing what is falsely taken to be a real general concept on an actually real particular which it is taken to represent works for beings that tend to see things the same way: