 In Strevens (2004), the kairetic account is essentially motivated by three types of problems. First, causation by conditions that are most of the time but not always sufficient to produce a corresponding effect. Second, problems of preemption. Third, the problem of how fine-grained the description of a cause should be. Consideration of these problems leads to a sophisticated and powerful analysis of causation, which is based on the notion of an explanatory kernel for an event. Such a kernel contains laws and propositions about events. Given the veridical causal model \(M\), the explanatory kernel for an event \(E\) is the causal model \(K\) such that (i) \(M\) entails \(K\), (ii) \(K\) entails \(E\), and (iii) \(K\) optimizes two further properties called generality and cohesion. Generality means that \(K\) encompasses as many physical systems as can be. Cohesion is a measure for the degree to which potential causal factors are active in all systems satisfying \(K\) (Strevens 2004: 171). Eventually, Strevens defines \(C\) to be a causal factor for \(E\) iff it is a member in some explanatory kernel for \(E\). Causes, in the kairetic account, are difference-makers with respect to the effect. If we were to take an actual cause out of an explanatory kernel for \(E\), the remainder of the kernel would not produce the putative effect \(E\).