 Burley now distinguishes a four-fold way in which something can be considered the first object of the intellect: by origin, by proportion, by intrinsic perfection, and by exclusion (primitate exclusionis)—the latter being the way a determinate object can be known by a certain faculty and by that faculty alone, excluding all others. The singular, and not the universal, is now considered the first object of the intellect by origin—which was obvious from what had been stated in the previous passages. Being, taken in its broadest generality, is the first object of the intellect by proportion, but now Burley explains that being, understood in this way, is equivalent to intelligible being. The first object of the intellect by intrinsic perfection is God. In this case as well, there is a rather marked difference from the De anima commentary in that Burley abandons the distinction between absolute and relative perfection (which had enabled him, once more, to introduce the universal as primary object of the intellect), and replaces the more impersonal and abstract Aristotelian first cause with God (presumably the Christian God). Finally, the universal is the object of the intellect by exclusion insofar as the intellect is the only faculty capable of knowing it. 