 Notice also that these problems are not just problems about belief. It’s awkward for the Simple Picture of belief that Hume and Heimson seem to have a common belief, but Hume’s belief is correct while Heimson’s is incorrect. Whatever’s in common to Hume and Heimson, it’s not standing in the belief relation to a common traditional proposition. Since Hume and Heimson are worldmates, any traditional proposition that one of them would be correct to believe, the other would be as well. It’s similarly awkward for a Simple Picture about desire that Hume and Heimson could equally well both want to be Hume (or to have written the Treatise), and if they did, Hume’s desire would be satisfied and Heimson’s would not. This means, because Hume and Heimson are worldmates, that their conative similarity can’t be a matter of both standing in the desire relation to a common traditional proposition. And once we’ve seen this trick, it’s easy to generate parallel examples for other propositional attitudes, and it’s easy to generate examples in which the attitudes in question aren’t as odd as Heimson’s.