 A second approach, derived from or inspired by Kant, sees moral status in terms of the respect demanded by the possession of one or more attributes, such as autonomy or moral responsibility (e.g., Korsgaard 1996). This approach regards the possession of an autonomous will as conferring dignity and demanding respect, so that a being with such a will must not be treated as a mere means, but as an end. This Kantian conception of full moral status is often regarded as a paradigm, in identifying an attribute that does not vary  continuously,[5]  and whose possession appears to have clear moral implications. The threshold for moral status set by many Kantian accounts is a high one. If those accounts regard the capacity for autonomy as the threshold for full moral status, and if they understand that capacity as grounding moral status in moral responsibility, then since “there is nothing for which we would hold human infants or severely cognitively disabled adults morally responsible, it is argued, such humans must lack Kantian moral status” (Kain 2009,  66).[6]  Even if humans need not be held morally responsible to enjoy full moral status, many would still lack the capacity for autonomy that seems essential on any Kantian account.