 For Auriol, then, the senses necessarily put the cognized object into esse apparens or intentional being; this is a condition of our perceiving. Moreover, Auriol makes clear in this context that this esse apparens is not a representation of the thing with its own real being; rather it is the thing itself merely placed in another type of existence. The esse apparens of a sensed object is merely that object as sensed. (See on this particularly Denery 1998, pp. 34–39.) Obviously, this corresponds to the theory we have already seen Auriol holds concerning esse apparens in intellectual cognition, and Auriol makes the correspondence explicit. To go from sensory perception to intellectual cognition, Auriol uses a common scholastic principle called by Philotheus Boehner “The Principle of Hierarchy” (Boehner 1949, p. 298): given two faculties, one lower and one higher (like sense and intellect), if the lower faculty can do something noble, then the higher faculty can certainly do the same. The activity of the senses, then, i.e. the fact that the senses put the object into esse apparens, since it is noble, shows that the intellect also puts its object into esse apparens. (Auriol’s theory of sensory perception is complicated by the fact that Auriol seems to claim that some of the illusory sensory experiences he mentions exist outside the mind, e.g., that the colored circle is “in” the air and not “in” the mind. For approaches to this complication, see Pasnau 1997, pp. 69–76; Denery 1998, pp. 36–37; Lička 2016).