 Luciano Floridi’s theory of strongly semantic information (2004, 2005), is a response to BCP motivated by the belief that something has gone essentially amiss with Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory. The suspicion is that their theory is based on a semantic principle that is too weak, namely that truth-values are independent of semantic information. Floridi’s proposal is that an approach according to which semantic information is factive can avoid the paradox, and that the resulting theory is more in line with our ordinary conception of what generally counts as information. The line of argument is that a theory of strongly semantic information, based on alethic and discrepancy values rather than probabilities, can successfully avoid BCP. Relatedly, see Bremer and Cohnitz (2004: chap. 2) for an overview of Floridi’s theory to be described below, and Sequoiah-Grayson (2007) for a defence of the theory of strongly semantic information against independent objections from Fetzer (2004) and Dodig-Crnkovic (2005).