  The property of being the ultimate cause of my existence appears to be an example. The property isn’t a (pure) perfection but, rather, a contingent expression of a (pure) perfection, namely, the exercise of creative power. (God is perhaps better or more splendid for exercising creative power, but he is not better or more splendid for having created me.) But neither is it a limitation or privation (though it is not, of course, a full or complete expression of the relevant divine perfection). Nor does it appear to be a mixed perfection. God’s instantiating a possible world containing me precludes his instantiating possible worlds which lack this interesting feature but entails no inherent limitation or defect in his creative abilities. At least one real property, then, is neither an imperfection, mixed perfection, or pure perfection; and at least one of God’s real properties isn’t a pure perfection. Both of the assumptions on which the argument is based are thus false.