 Fricker takes up two varieties of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. Her account of the former can be seen as a development of claims Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton (1998) made about silencing with reference to Catharine MacKinnon’s claim that pornography interferes with women’s freedom of speech (1993). Freedom of speech involves not simply the ability to make claims but, more importantly, the ability to have illocutionary effects in which one’s audience takes up those claims. MacKinnon focuses on the ability to refuse sex by saying no. Under the influence of pornography one’s audience may not recognize what one is trying to do with one’s words and may fail to take this no as a refusal. For Fricker, structural identity prejudices in general affect one’s credibility as a speaker and conveyor of knowledge. Her example is the way, in the screenplay of “The Talented Mr. Ripley,” Marge Sherwood is unable to communicate her suspicions about Ripley to her father-in-law, Herbert Greenleaf, because of the identity prejudices he holds about women. Assuming that women tend to respond emotionally instead of rationally to a situation, he downgrades her credibility and effectively silences her. The testimonial injustice here excludes Sherwood from the social practice of pooling information. 