  Davidson has certainly presented an arresting theory of practical  reasoning. But has he shown how weakness of the will is possible?  Most philosophers writing after him, while acknowledging his  pathbreaking work on the issue, think he has not. One principal  difficulty which subsequent theorists have seized on is that  Davidson’s view can account for the possibility of action contrary to one’s better judgment only if one’s better judgment is  construed merely as a conditional or prima facie judgment.  Davidson’s P1 and P2 in fact rule out the possibility of free  intentional action contrary to an all-out or unconditional evaluative  judgment.[11]  But it seems that such cases exist. Michael Bratman, for instance,  introduces us to Sam, who, in a depressed state, is deep into a  bottle of wine, despite his acknowledged need for an early wake-up  and a clear head tomorrow (1979, p. 156). Sam’s friend, stopping  by, says: