 An alternative to the simple argument is to suggest that there is a further notion of semantic correctness, one that is not co-extensional with that of  (CM)  but that is both essential to meaning and normative. Thus, it has been claimed that there is a crucial ambiguity in the notion of correct use (Millar 2004: 160). On the one hand, there is the notion of semantic correctness as in (CM); on the other hand there is the notion of correct use as in “using an expression in accordance with its meaning”. That the two do not coincide is clear from the fact that one may use an expression in accordance with its meaning, and yet make a false statement, as when one has a false belief about the world (McGinn 1984; Millar 2002; 2004: 160–175; Moore 1954/1955: 308; Sellars 1956: 166; Buleandra 2008: 180; Fennell 2013: 69, Reiland forthcominga). We must distinguish empirical mistakes from linguistic mistakes, it is argued, and it is essential that we are able to allow for both. Moreover, it is said, this further notion of semantic correctness is an essentially normative notion, one that has implications for what \(S\) ought to do or is obligated to do: if “green” means green for \(S\), then \(S\) ought to use “green” in accordance with its meaning. (This idea, too, goes back to Kripke who, at points, speaks of what I should do, if my use of the term is to be “in accordance with how it was meant” (1982: 30, 37).)