 Similarly,  (KNA)  seems well positioned to explain the oddity of asserting  (27)  merely on probabilistic grounds. Suppose that a (fair) lottery with a large number of tickets has been held; only one ticket has won. B has a ticket, but neither A nor B knows the result. A asserts  (27)  on merely probabilistic grounds. Although the probability that the ticket has won is very low (and one can get it arbitrarily low, short of zero, by increasing the number of tickets in the lottery), it is intuitively incorrect for A to tell  (27)  to B (Williamson 2000: 246–249). No probability short of 1 seems to authorize A’s utterance of  (27).  Since A does not know that  (27)  is true,  (KNA)  explains the unacceptability of A’s utterance.