 Beginning in the 1960s, however, skeptics have come to occupy a prominent place in debates over political obligation. As they see it, there is no general obligation to obey the law, not even on the part of the citizens of a reasonably just polity. The most thorough-going of these dissenters have been anarchists proper – that is, those who insist that states and governments are necessarily immoral institutions that ought to be abolished. Other skeptics or dissenters have concluded, though, that the anarchist proper is wrong about the need for the state but right about the lack of an obligation to obey the law. Like the anarchist proper, these “philosophical anarchists” hold that the state is illegitimate, but they deny that its illegitimacy entails “a strong moral imperative to oppose or eliminate states; rather they typically take state illegitimacy simply to remove any strong moral presumption in favor of obedience to, compliance with, or support for our own or other existing states” (Simmons 2001, p. 104; but note Huemer 2013, who regards philosophical anarchism as a second-best alternative that could prepare the way for anarchism proper).