 Several compatibilists have suggested that freely willed actions issue from volitional features of agency that are sensitive to an appropriate range of reasons (see Dennett 1984a; Fingarette 1972; Gert &amp; Duggan 1979; Glover 1970; MacIntyre 1957; Neely 1974; and Nozick 1981). Agents who are unresponsive to appropriate rational considerations (such as compulsives or neurotics) do not act of their own free wills. But agents who are responsive to some range of rational considerations do. This view has been artfully refined in recent years by Fischer (1987,  1994), and subsequently, Fischer and Ravizza (1998). (For a more advanced discussion of Fischer and Ravizza’s view, which many regard as the gold standard for contemporary compatibilism, see section B of the supplement  Compatibilism: The State of the Art.)  