From the methodological naturalist perspective, then, philosophical views are synthetic claims that answer to the overall tribunal of a posteriori observational evidence. The obvious objection to this view, however, is that it does not accord with philosophical practice. In particular, it seems in tension with the central role that intuitions play in philosophy. The typical way to assess philosophical views is arguably to test them against intuitive judgements about possible cases, not against a posteriori observational data. So, for example, the description theory of names is challenged by our intuitions about Kripke’s imagined counterexamples, the tripartite theory of knowledge by our intuitive reactions to Gettier cases, and so on. At first pass, this certainly suggests that philosophy is centrally concerned with the analysis of everyday concepts, not the construction of synthetic theories: it is using intuitions about possible cases to uncover the structure implicit in our concepts. The reliance on intuitions thus argues that, far from delivering synthetic a posteriori knowledge, philosophy uses a priori methods to deliver analytic conclusions.