 Another account that challenges the position that adaptive preferences automatically undercut autonomy is defended by Donald Bruckner (2007). Bruckner objects to Elster’s view of the “sour grapes” phenomenon that the fox’s preference change is irrational because it is not autonomous, occurring merely through a causal mechanism irrelevant to rationality (307). Bruckner argues that both adaptive preference change and adaptive preference formation are often rational. Adaptive preferences are like other preferences in that they guide a person’s deliberation and give her reasons for action (311). Bruckner gives the example of Veronica, who initially prefers to become an Olympic competitor in tennis, but after years of practice realizes that even though she is very talented at tennis, she will not achieve Olympic status, and so downgrades her aspirations and comes to prefer to be a local star, a change in preference that might occur behind her back and thus be non-autonomous (313). Bruckner believes that she should adapt her preferences thusly, as doing so would better promote her own subjective well-being. He argues that there should be a presumption in favor of the normativity of any of our preferences, even ones caused by factors out of our control, since any of an agent’s preferences are still her own and thus give her a reason to act (316). The real test, then, for deformed desires, ones formed in response to unjust social conditions, is whether they are truly the agent’s own, and so autonomously held. On Bruckner’s account, the agent’s not endorsing her new preference upon reflection makes her new preference not fully her own, and so irrational. Thus while one condition for the rationality of an adaptive preference for Elster is that it be autonomously acquired, for Bruckner, it is that the preference be autonomously retained (319). If the agent reflectively endorses her adaptive preference in a way that is responsive to her feasible set, and not simply her false beliefs about her feasible set, even though she limits her potential and lowers her sights, it is rational for her to retain this preference (319–320). Bruckner agrees with Nussbaum that certain moral and political conditions interfere with an agent’s repudiation of her limited desires, and urges that the agent’s adaptive preferences count as her own, that is, as autonomous, only if certain moral conditions are met, such as those proposed by Nussbaum’s capabilities approach that defends the provision of certain capabilities, liberties, and opportunities to all citizens (322–323). Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, unlike Bruckner’s view, invokes an objective notion of the good.