 One way to get a stronger eliminativist conclusion would be to argue that there is nothing posited in a scientific account of cognition that shares the central properties we attribute to folk psychological states, at any level of analysis. For example, Ramsey, Stich and Garon (1990) have argued that if certain  connectionist  models of memory and inference prove successful, then this would form the basis for eliminative materialism regarding states like propositional memories. Since some connectionist models store information in a highly distributed manner, there are no causally discrete, semantically evaluable data structures that represent specific propositions. It is not just that these models lack the sort of sentential, compositional representations assumed in more traditional (or “language of thought”) models. Rather, it is that in these networks there are no causally distinct structures that stand for specific states of affairs. Consequently, there do not appear to be any structures in these networks that might serve as candidates for beliefs and other propositional attitudes. This is noteworthy since many critics of eliminativism claim it is virtually impossible to imagine what a psychological theory would look like that doesn’t invoke propositional attitudes to explain cognition (Hannan, 1993). If Ramsey, Stich and Garon are right, certain connectionist models may, for the first time, provide us with a plausible account of cognition that supports the denial of belief-like states. More recently, Ramsey (2007) has argued that this earlier argument does not go far enough, insisting that connectionist models of this sort not only fail to invoke inner representations that are sufficiently similar to the posits of folk psychology, but that they don’t actually invoke inner representational states at all.