 In both cases the thesis opts for a position that is abstracted from the spatio-temporal framework, and thus adopts the broadly Platonic view. The postulation of freedom amounts to the postulation of a non-temporal cause, a causality outside the series of appearances in space and time (A451/B479). Similarly, in its efforts to argue for a “necessary being,” reason is forced (against its own argument) into a non-sensible realm. If there is a necessary being, it will have to be “outside” the series of appearances: “Either, therefore, reason through its demand for the unconditioned must remain in conflict with itself, or this unconditioned must be posited outside the series, in the intelligible” (A564/B592). The rational necessity of postulating such a necessary being or a causality of freedom satisfies the rational demand for intelligible explanation. Against this, the antithesis rightly notes that the conception of transcendental freedom, or a necessary being, again represents an attempt to abstract from “nature’s own resources” (A451–2/B479–80). Insofar as the antithesis denies the justification for doing this, of course, it is said to adopt a broadly Epicurean standpoint. The problem here, however, is that in refusing to move beyond “nature’s own resources,” the antithesis surreptitiously smuggles in spatio-temporal conditions as the basis for a universal ontological claim that nevertheless transcends all experience. If space and time were things in themselves, then of course the application of the demand for this unconditioned would be warranted. Kant’s view, however, is that space and time are not conditions of things in themselves.