 Different positive anti-realist accounts of determinate terms or concepts and their function are available. Berkeley endorses a schematic account, on which general terms/concepts indeterminately refer to determinate features—here, generality is placed in language or mind, rather than  world.[22]  Heil (2003) also endorses a schematic approach, offering a pragmatic account of the function of determinable terms, as reflecting that we happen to have perceptual systems suited for tracking certain inexact similarities between objects having (ultimately highly complex) determinate properties. That the ‘work’ determinable terms do consists in tracking inexact similarities between objects or determinates is a common theme in three alternative anti-realist accounts. First is Searle’s (1959) account, on which determinable terms are higher-order predicates of determinate  predicates.[23]  Second is Mill’s account of determinable predicates as 