 Of course, it is possible to introduce new theoretical terms (“concepts1”, “concepts2”, and “concepts3”) for the different theoretical posits made by the different approaches we have been considering (the ability view, the mental representation view, and the abstract object view), and then reconstruct the debate regarding these different approaches as a merely terminological disagreement about which of these terms we should use. But notice that it is possible to do the same thing even for clear-cut substantive debates. For example, we could introduce new terms for moral goodness as understood by deontologists (“good1”) and as understood by consequentialists (“good2”), and then reconstruct the debate about what moral goodness consists in as a merely terminological disagreement about which term we should use, “good1” or “good2”. Or we could introduce “human1” for humans as understood by standard evolutionary accounts (according to which humans have nonhuman primate ancestors) and “human2” for humans understood by creationists (according to which they don't), and reconstruct the debate between these different approaches as a merely terminological issue about which term we should use, “human1” or “human2”.  The danger, of course, is that this would drain the very idea of a merely terminological debate of its utility and obscure very real differences between different sorts of disagreements (e.g., stipulative vs. substantive) that would all end up counting as “merely terminological”.