 More generally, a number of scholars have focused on the relation between incomparability and the structure of social and political institutions. John Finnis, for example, takes the open-endedness of social life to render it impossible to treat legal or policy choices as involving comparable alternatives (1997, 221–222). Michael Walzer’s account of distributive justice also relates incomparability to the structure of social and political institutions. According to Walzer (1983), different social goods occupy different “spheres,” each one governed by a distinct set of distributive norms. What is unjust is to convert the accumulation of goods in one sphere into the accumulation of goods in another sphere without regard for that second sphere’s distributive norms. Underlying Walzer’s account, it seems, is a commitment to a kind of constitutive incommensurability. Given its connection to the possibility of plural and incompatible ways of life, the concepts of value incommensurability and incomparability also play a role in many accounts of political liberalism, including Joseph Raz’s account (1986) and Isaiah Berlin’s account (1969). The latter’s inquiry into the relation between incommensurable values and political institutions motivated much of the further inquiry into the topic.