 Theorists often posit mental representations that conform to COMP but that lack logical structure. The British empiricists postulated ideas, which they characterized in broadly imagistic terms. They emphasized that simple ideas can combine to form complex ideas. They held that the representational import of a complex idea depends upon the representational import of its parts and the way those parts are combined. So they accepted COMP or something close to it (depending on what exactly “constituency” amounts  to).[2]  They did not say in much detail how compounding of ideas was supposed to work, but imagistic structure seems to be the paradigm in at least some passages. LOGIC plays no significant role in their  writings.[3]  Partly inspired by the British empiricists, Prinz (2002) and Barsalou (1999) analyze cognition in terms of image-like representations derived from perception. Armstrong (1973) and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007) propose that propositional attitudes are relations not to mental sentences but to mental maps analogous in important respects to ordinary concrete maps.