 Dretske analogizes introspection to ordinary cases of “displaced perception”—cases in which one perceives that something is the case by way of directly perceiving some other thing (e.g., hearing that the mail carrier has arrived by hearing the dog’s barking; seeing that you weigh 110 pounds by seeing the dial on the bathroom scale): One perceives that one represents x as F by way of perceiving the F-ness of x. Dretske notes, however, two points of disanalogy between the cases. In the case of hearing that the mail carrier has arrived by hearing the dog’s bark, the conclusion (that the mail carrier has arrived) is only established if the premise about the dog’s barking is true, and furthermore it depends on a defeasible connecting belief, that the dog’s barking is a reliable indicator of the mail’s arrival. In the introspective case, however, the inference, if it is an inference, does not require the truth of the premise about x’s being F. Even if x is not F, the conclusion that I’m representing x as F is supported. Nor does there seem to be any sort of defeasible connecting belief.