 Most lawyer-economists adopt an overtly revisionary stance towards particular legal rules. Some argue that the law should be more solicitous of promissory reliance in the absence of consideration—especially reliance on pre-contractual representations—than orthodox contract doctrine allows (see, e.g., Bebchuk &amp; Ben-Shahar 2001: 427; Ben-Shahar 2004; Craswell 1996; Johnston 1999; Katz 1996). In addition, and independently, the economic approach rejects orthodox contract law’s categorical preference for expectation-based remedies. Such remedies may or may not support optimal reliance; but in either case, the promise-based idea of securing the promisee’s expectations “will not have played any role in the analysis leading up to [the] conclusion” about which remedy is optimal (Craswell 2000: 107).