 One of the main Philonian concepts, power, is all the more complex given the varieties in Philo’s prose when discussing it (Termini 2000). These variations were probably a means to avoid the implication that these powers had an ontological autonomy. Their nature, rather, is merely linguistic and functionalist. The number of God’s power is not fixed and their relation to the logos is evoked vaguely or not at all. From a philosophical point of view, the genealogy of dunamis is incredibly rich since each great Greek philosopher used it with his own semantic specificity. In the Bible, God is omnipotent but there is no systematic presentation of His powers. Just before the apparition of Middle Platonism, dunamis was present in Stoic doctrine, but with a more reduced range of meaning. The question of Philo’s source(s) on this point is very controversial, but the general structure is quite clear. His two main powers are the “creative power” (theos) and “regal power” (kyrios) (Cher. 27–8). The beneficent and the legislative powers are subordinated to them, but in Spec. 1.45, Philo uses a Platonic metaphor to assert that God is surrounded by a great number of powers who are like His bodyguards. Before trying to specify the relation between these powers and the logos, it is necessary to add that dunamis is not only a metaphysical term. It bears a psychological meaning as well, for example at Opif. 67 when Philo evokes the division of the soul in a context both Aristotelian and Stoic. In Leg. 1.11, the division is more clearly Stoic, with its seven traditional parts (the five senses, reproduction and speech) but at the same time, Philo seems to adopt a dualistic position, distinguishing a rational and irrational part of the soul. The main problem, in human psychology as with the divine powers, lies in their relation to the logos.