 Third, it might be that the effect is driven by moral judgment and doesn’t involve an error but nonetheless simply reflects a fact about how people use words, rather than a fact about their application of the corresponding concepts. Researchers often make inferences from facts about how people use certain words (‘intentionally,’ ‘happy,’ ‘knows’) about how people apply the corresponding concepts (the concept of intentional action, of happiness, of knowledge). However, it is also possible for factors to influence the use of our words without influencing the use of these concepts, and some researchers have suggested that this is the process at work in the present effects. For example, it has been suggested that these effects arise as a result of conversational pragmatics, with people trying to avoid the pragmatic implicatures that would be generated by making certain claims that are in fact literally true (Adams &amp; Steadman 2004). Alternatively, it has been suggested that the relevant words (e.g., ‘intentionally’) are actually associated with more than one different concept and that the impact of morality arises not because morality plays a role in any of these concepts but rather because it plays a role in the way people resolve the ambiguity of the word itself (Nichols &amp; Ulatowski 2007). On these sorts of views, people are not necessarily making a mistake when their use of language is impacted by moral judgment, but all the same, moral judgment is not playing a role in their more basic capacities to make sense of the world.