 The second problem is very similar to one that arises for philosophers attempting to provide an account of fallibilistic knowledge (i.e., knowledge that is less than certain). According to the standard account, the subject has fallibilistic knowledge that p when she knows that p on the basis of some justification j, and yet the subject’s belief could have been false while still held on the basis of j (see, e.g., BonJour 1985, p. 26; Lehrer 1990, p. 45). Alternatively, the subject knows that p on the basis of some justification j, but j does not entail the truth that p (see, e.g., Cohen 1988, p. 91; Fogelin 1994, pp. 88–9; Jeshion 2000, pp. 334–5; Brown 2018, pp. 15–21). The problem with the standard account, in either version, is that it does not allow for fallibilistic knowledge of necessary truths. If it is necessarily true that p, then the subject’s belief that p could not have been false, regardless of what her justification for it may be like. And, if it is necessarily true that p, then everything—including the subject’s justification for her belief—will entail or guarantee that p. Our attempt to account for certainty encounters the opposite problem: it does not allow for a subject to have a belief regarding a necessary truth that does not count as certain. If the belief is necessarily true, it cannot be false—even when the subject has come to hold the belief for a very bad reason (say, as the result of guessing or wishful thinking). And, given that the beliefs are necessarily true, even these bad grounds for holding the belief will entail or guarantee that it is true.