 Another distinct strand of discussion about reductionism is found in critical analyses of methodology and explanation from the perspective of  feminist philosophy of science  and studies of the  social aspects of science  (e.g., Fehr 2004, Longino 1990, 1996).  Feminist philosophy of biology  has related reductionism and pluralism to other philosophical, scientific, and social issues. One core idea in these discussions is that forms of reductionism are involved in mutually reinforcing feedback loops with other factors, such as socioeconomic status or expectations about gender (Keller and Longino 1996, Levins and Lewontin 1985). Thus, reductionism, whether ontological, epistemic, or methodological, can be understood as the manifestation of more diverse commitments (e.g., political ideology) than much of the philosophy of biology literature on reductionism would suggest—the history of biology points in this direction as well (see, e.g., Allchin 2008). This line of criticism also suggests that the interrelations between reductionism in biology and the social sciences should be treated more explicitly. Elisabeth Lloyd (2002) has argued that medical research should not be restricted simply to molecular biological investigation because higher levels of social organization that are culturally sanctioned have unrecognized causal effects on health. As the social sciences and medicine attempt to apply different life science reasoning strategies, similar philosophical issues predictably transfer, but with the potential for more socially damaging consequences.