However, it’s not clear why the skeptic would have to think of instrumental rationality as just another end she has.  Couldn’t she think of it instead as (or also as) a disposition that she manifests, or a capacity that she exercises, with respect to the ends that she accepts?  (If so, she would avoid the particular problem that confronts the character in the instrumental analogue of Carroll’s paradox, who merely accepts instrumental rationality as another end without applying it to her ends.)  And then couldn’t she request some philosophical explanation of why she should exercise that capacity?  That she already has the capacity is of course no barrier to posing such a question (Wedgwood 2005).  Indeed, as we’ve seen in §3.3, some philosophers have denied that we always ought, or have reason, to be instrumentally coherent; they’ve argued that rational requirements are only apparently normative, or are merely evaluative.