 In contemporary metaphysics, a surging number of philosophers express their allegiance to dispositional essentialism, the position that at least some properties have dispositional essences. Some of them go beyond this to take a stronger position, that all suitably qualified properties are essentially dispositional (Popper 1959; Harré 1970; Harré &amp; Madden 1975; Shoemaker 1980; Mumford 2004; Bird 2005b, 2007a; Chakravartty 2007; Whittle 2008; Tugby 2013, 2014; Yates forthcoming; For the most up-to-date exposition of this view, see Bird 2016). This position is known as dispositional monism or causal theory of properties. Alternatively it is simply named ‘dispositionalism’. The strongest version of dispositionalism is pan-dispositionalism which says that all properties in the broadest sense of ‘property’ have dispositional essences. But many philosophers hold a more nuanced position like Bird’s pure power theory which says that all sparse properties in Lewis (1986)’s sense—or, in Bird’s own terms, all fundamental ontic properties—have dispositional essences.