 Tang (2016) objects to the calibration approach on the grounds that a credence-forming process can be well-calibrated even though that process is insensitive to relevant evidence. In light of the perceived shortcomings of the calibration approach (and those of alternative scoring rules), Tang proposes a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism, where evidentialism can roughly be understood as the view that a belief’s justification is determined by how well it is supported by the believer’s evidence. According to Tang’s proposal, a credence of \(C(p)\) is only justified if it is based on some ground \(g\), such that the objective probability of the credence having a true content given \(g\) approximates \(C(p).\) More recently, Pettigrew (2021) has argued that these two approaches should not be viewed as competitors at all. Pettigrew suggests that we can develop a version of the calibration approach that makes reference to the agent’s evidence. Once we do, this version turns out to be extensionally equivalent to a version of Tang’s approach. Both Tang and Pettigrew’s approaches to this issue can thus be viewed as syntheses of reliabilism and evidentialism, to be discussed in more detail in  §4.2  below.