 The problem with this is that Russell’s “proposal” is not a very attractive one. One of the things we want to do with moral language is express our disagreements. Russell’s new-fangled “ought” would be unable fulfill one of the most important linguistic functions of the old-fashioned “ought”, namely to express that fact that people with different ends disagree (as we would now put it) on what ought to be done. In depriving people with different ends of the means to contradict each other Russell would be doing them a disservice. Moreover, Russell would be left with a peculiarly ramshackle meta-ethic. He would have a descriptive account of what “good” and “bad” do mean and a prescriptive suggestion about the about what “right”, “wrong” and “ought” ought to mean. There is no actual inconsistency in this but it does seem to be a bit anomalous. If the name of the game is to analyze the moral concepts, then it seems Russell’s analysis of “right” and “ought” is wrong. But if the name of the game is to reform the moral concepts, then why not subject “good” and “bad” to the same treatment, giving them the kind objectivity that Russell would evidently have preferred them to have?