 It is not at all clear whether Gödel, for instance, is committed to reducing the natural numbers to pure sets. A platonist can uphold the claim that the natural numbers can be embedded into the set-theoretic universe while maintaining that the embedding should not be seen as an ontological reduction. Indeed, on Linsky and Zalta’s plenitudinous platonist account, the natural numbers have no properties beyond those that are attributed to them by our theory of the natural numbers (Peano Arithmetic). But then it seems that platonists would have to take a similar line with respect to the rational numbers, the complex numbers, …. Whereas maintaining that the natural numbers are sui generis admittedly has some appeal, it is perhaps less natural to maintain that the complex numbers, for instance, are also sui generis. And, anyway, even if the natural numbers, the complex numbers, … are in some sense not reducible to anything else, one may wonder if there may not be another way to elucidate their nature.