 In the debate, all three construals can be found. Thus, it has been suggested that the intermediate scope interpretation best captures the intuition that if \(S\) means green by “green” she is thereby obligated to use the term in certain ways (under certain conditions), without (as on the narrow scope reading) implying that the obligation is conditional on \(x\) being green (Hattiangadi 2006: 225, fn 4). Another issue concerns the possibility of detaching. Some favor the narrow scope reading, since it allows one to detach the “ought”, and supports the intuition that the semantic obligation can only be discharged one way: in this case, by applying “green” to green objects (Bykvist &amp; Hattiangadi 2007: 283). Others prefer the wide scope reading, precisely because it does not allow one to detach “ought” and hence implies a more disjunctive obligation: \(S\) ought either to apply “green” to green objects, or not mean green by “green” (Gampel 1997: 228; Millar 2004: 168–169).