 Does it follow from this [that moral facts are contingent and not universal] that they [moral facts] are not knowable a priori? I don’t think so. After all, even when all the empirical information—that is, the information that we think of as ordinarily available to the senses—is in, we still have to determine which aspects of the present situation, as revealed to us in experience, count which way as reasons. That decision seems to take us beyond anything that the senses can inform us about…. Even if we have the benefit of previous experience [that in the past, the fact that I was dealing with someone in distress was a reason to go gently]…, the most we can get out of that is the recognition that her distress is probably a reason. Now this sort of knowledge would only be a posteriori if the evidence on which it is based is a posteriori. And that just returns us to the primary question here: in a case where we don’t have the benefit of previous experience, is the “process” by which we come to recognize that her distress is a reason, one that can be thought of as taking us from a posteriori knowledge (that she is in distress) to another a posteriori knowledge (that her distress is a reason to go gently)? And the answer seems to me to be no. If our decision that it is a reason is capable of counting as knowledge, then, it seems that it will have to be a priori knowledge that is at issue, since we only have two choices—a priori and a posteriori—and the latter is ruled out. (Dancy 2007) 