 Concerning the first criterion, many philosophers take it as a given that theorizing about moral responsibility must be constrained by our ordinary judgments and intuitions. So if an account of the EC clashes with those judgments and intuitions, that gives us a pro tanto reason to reject it and, conversely, being able to accommodate them is a point in its favor (Sher 2009: 17; Clarke 2014: 162; Schnall 2004: 308; FitzPatrick 2008: 610; Peels 2011: 578; Montmarquet 1999: 845; Arpaly 2015: 155). Other philosophers reject this “methodological conservatism” (Levy 2017) and take the opposite line of giving priority to what they take to be the correct theory of responsibility, even if it implies that a good many of our ordinary judgments and intuitions are misguided (Rosen 2004: 296; Zimmerman 2008: 205). In order to break the stalemate in the theory vs. intuitions dispute, some have advanced an error theory of intuitions of blameworthiness in cases of unwitting wrongdoing which, if correct, would entail that failing to accommodate them shouldn’t be hold against an account of the EC (Levy 2017; Talbert 2017b); while others have offered empirical evidence to support the very same intuitions (Murray et al. 2019). Yet other philosophers have presented empirical evidence concerning ordinary intuitions of praise-/blameworthiness in cases of moral ignorance that appears to support the quality-of-will theorists’ view that moral knowledge isn’t required for either (Faraci &amp; Shoemaker 2014). Thus, one way of settling the debate on the EC is to pursue this discussion on the preeminence, reliability, and content of ordinary intuitions about responsibility.