 From the position Kagyü takes, it is clear then, that it does not endorse Gelug’s position that the Prāsaṅgika has its own theory of the two truths which affords a unique framework within which a presentation of the definition and the defined example of the two truths can be set out. (See Yakherds 2021 vol. 1 for the Gelugpa critiques)Kagyü argues that the Prāsaṅgika’s project is purely for pedagogical and heuristic reasons, “for it seeks to assuage the cognitive errors of its opponents—the non-Buddhists, our own-schools such as Vaibhāṣika on up to the Svātantrika—who assert philosophical positions based on certain texts” (Mikyö Dorje 2006: 294). The non-Prāsaṅgika philosophical schools equate the definition of the ultimate with the defined example, and this is the malady that the Prāsaṅgika seeks to allay.  Therefore the Prāsaṅgika’s role, as Kagyü sees it, is to point out the absurdities in the non-Prāsaṅgika position and to show that the definition of the ultimate and the defined example are rather two separate issues, and that they cannot be identified with each other (Mikyö Dorje 2006: 294–95). The Prāsaṅgika does not, like Nyingma, entertain any position of its own, except for the purpose of a therapeutic reason, and for which “the Prāsaṅgika relies on the convention as a framework for things that need to be cultivated and those that are to be abandoned. For this, our own position does not need to base the linguistic conventions on the concepts of definition and the defined example. Instead [our position],” says Kagyü, “conforms to the non-analytical mundane practice in which what needs to be abandoned and what needs to be cultivated are undertaken in agreement with the real-unreal discourses of the conventional [truth]” (Mikyö Dorje 2006: 295).