 Commitment-making is central to some “mixed” accounts of assertion—that is, accounts that incorporate insights from different theories of assertion. For Peirce, commitment is central to assertion, but not alone in characterizing it. In his view, asserting also involves belief-expression: it “consists in the furnishing of evidence by the speaker to the hearer that the speaker believes something” (Peirce [CP]: 2.335). Furthermore, for Peirce assertion is necessarily accompanied by an intention to convince the hearer: “every assertion involves an effort to make the intended interpreter believe what is asserted” (Peirce [CP]: 5.547). In short, Peirce’s view is that in asserting that p, you attempt to convince your audience that p is true by providing them with evidence that you believe that p, thereby becoming committed to (i.e., accountable for) the truth of  p.[40]