 Peter Gildenhuys (2009) argues that the term “drift” is used to refer to causal influences over a population that have three features: they are non-interactive, non-pervasive, and indiscriminate (NINPICs). Thus, he endorses drift as indiscriminate sampling; the other modifications he makes to the view seem to stem from thinking that the Causal Process Account precludes drift and selection from co-occurring and from thinking the view needs to account for location (e.g., an organism being in the wrong place at the wrong time) as an irrelevant causal factor. In any case, he acknowledges that his account and the Causal Process Account probably agree in practice over what sorts of things should be characterized as constituting drift. Larry Shapiro and Elliott Sober (2007) also endorse the view that selection and drift are distinct processes, but Sober, at least, has backed off this view in a recent paper co-authored with Hayley Clatterbuck and Richard Lewontin (Clatterbuck, Sober, and Lewontin 2013). Like Gildenhuys, they seem to suggest that if selection and drift are distinct processes that they cannot co-occur, and they seem to think that the mere introduction of finite population size introduces drift.