 In contemporary analytic philosophy, Strawson’s (1959) notion of descriptive metaphysics most clearly focuses on what is reflected in data. The subject matter of descriptive metaphysics is what Strawson calls our “shared conceptual scheme”, a term indicative of a Kantian background (see entry on  Strawson).  Nowadays descriptive metaphysics is more commonly taken to have as its subject matter the ontology reflected in our shared intuitions or ordinary judgments (since metaphysics is generally taken not to be about representations or concepts, but things and their nature). Strawson contrasts descriptive metaphysics with what he calls “revisionary metaphysics”, which aims to produce a better structure of our thought (or a better ontology, as one may rather say). Strawson does not elaborate how “better” is to be understood; it may be meant to be metaphysics that better carves nature at its joints, provides a better foundation of the natural sciences, or is better able to meet whatever the standard a given revisionary metaphysician may have in mind.