 Indeed a number of theorists embraced this sort of approach that may be usefully called ‘mixed theories of pain’. These come in a variety of forms, sometimes motivated by different sets of concerns, and accordingly, emphasizing different aspects of pain. But the basic idea is that the nature of pain is complex consisting of at least two mental elements. Generally one element is characterized by using one or more of the following group of terms: sensory, perceptual, representational, discriminating, descriptive, or informational. The other is characterized by one or more of the following: affective, emotional, motivational, evaluative, directive, or imperative. So far we have been focusing on those theories that have emphasized the former aspect. Indeed this has been the overwhelmingly dominant style of theorizing — at least in the philosophical tradition. But in the last 10 years or so, there has been an increasing recognition of the fact that pain has an affective and motivational aspect which seems at least prima facie distinct from its sensory or perceptual aspect (see next section for some scientific evidence). As observed, most perceptual theorists and weak representationalists could, and as a matter of historical fact, did accommodate the affective aspect of pain to various degrees of success — mostly, by going cognitivist as described above. 