 To this, the dialetheist has various replies. Priest has argued that the logical operation of negation should be distinguished from the speech acts of denial and the cognitive state of rejection. So, contra Frege, assertion of a negation is not the same as denial. The idea is that exclusion is expressed via a primitive notion of rejection: to reject \(A\) is to positively refuse to believe that \(A\). That the notion is taken as primitive means, in particular, that it is not reducible to the acceptance of negation: it is a sui generis act. The linguistic counterpart of rejection is the speech act of denial. Then the dialetheist can rule out that \(A\) is the case by denying \(A\); and this does not amount to the assertion of \(\neg A\) (Priest 2006, Ch. 6). More simply, one can often express denials by uttering ordinary language negations: ‘not’ is, in this sense, pragmatically ambiguous. We will come back below to how, and why, rejection-denial may not be reducible to the acceptance-assertion of any negation.