 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Newcomb paradox demonstrates that backward causation is impossible. George Schlesinger (1980:75 ff.), for instance, imagines a perfect judge who is allowed to check the two boxes after the fortune teller has placed the money in the boxes, but before the player has made her choice. It is clear that if the perfect judge then informs the player about the content of the two boxes, we have a case where the fortune teller’s prediction causes the player to select both boxes as she is informed about the 1,000,000 dollars in box \(B\). Indeed this would be a clear example of Black’s case of bilking. But Schlesinger also argues that the same holds true, if the perfect judge merely knows it without informing the player. However, it is difficult to understand why this should be the conclusion. If we assume that the player has a free will and that the fortune teller is able to predict the result of the player’s choice, it seems most rational for the player to learn from experience and opt for box \(B\) only rather than being greedy and take both boxes. As long as the perfect judge is silent, his knowledge about the content of the two boxes seems not to be able to influence the player’s decision. Nor does the player’s possible knowledge of the existence of a perfect judge seem to have any effect on her decision, because this information does not add anything to the information she already has; namely, that the fortune teller has placed the money in the boxes before she makes her decision and that the fortune teller has never failed to predict the outcome in advance.