 Is there anything ultimately at stake in whether we call the appeal to constitutive norms realist, rather than constructivist? In addressing the question “Why does x count as a reason for doing y?” both realists and constructivists deploy unconstructed or underived elements. Non-naturalist realists say: “It just does”, it is “simply true” that facts such as x count as a reason for doing y, and “there won’t be any illuminating explanation of what makes them true” (Shafer-Landau 2003: 47, 48). In other words, realists take the normativity of reasons as a primitive feature that does not require any explanation and for which no further explanation will be useful. By contrast, naturalist realists hold that normative facts are just natural facts, which can be investigated by ordinary empirical methods, for example, facts about the responses of agents under idealized (naturalistically described) circumstances (see Smith 2012, 2013).