 The contributions of the Munich and Göttingen circles to the theory of intentionality generally converge on the idea that there are many primitive kinds of of-ness or about-ness, which are radically different from each other. This idea can be claimed to conflict with Husserl’s theory of intentionality as presented in his Logical Investigations: on a plausible interpretation of Husserl’s theory, “objectifying” acts (acts like thinking, perceiving, and imagining) come in several kinds, but they are all intentional in exactly the same sense, since they all instantiate the very same essence (accordingly, kinds of objectifying acts are “species” of the genus of “intention”, or “intentional act”, Hua XIX 380f, 432f, 625f). In what follows, the assumption of radically different kinds of intentionality is discussed in connection with two important distinctions drawn by early phenomenologists. The first, broached in  §2.1.1,  holds between acts of “meaning” something and acts of presenting something (e.g., acts of perception or imagination). The second, which is the topic of  §2.1.2,  contrasts the cognitive acts discussed in §2.1.1 with the doxastic, affective, or conative attitudes (position-takings or stances) that a subject can adopt towards objects and facts.