 Thus Russell’s explicit arguments for the “subjectivity of value” are objections to objectivism rather than arguments for a rival hypothesis. Moore’s theory is wrong since it presupposes non-existent non-natural properties of goodness and badness. But if naturalism is not an option, that still leaves two alternatives—some kind of non-cognitivism or an error-theory  (see §1).  Russell’s dominant view was to be a form of emotivism, and hence of non-cognitivism. But although emotivism was Russell’s dominant view from 1913 onwards, there were two significant wobbles. In 1922 he proposed a version of the error theory, anticipating J. L. Mackie by over twenty years. And in 1954 in Human Society in Ethics and Politics, he endeavored to inject a little objectivity into ethics by developing a form of naturalism. The first wobble is more interesting than the second, but neither should be neglected in an account of Russell’s ethics, even though Russell abandoned the theory of HSEP within weeks of publication, reverting to the emotivism of 1935.