 Victor Tadros (2013: 261) raises an important concern about this response to Hart's objection, namely that if a person were already suffering, then the situation might be made better if the person engaged in wrongdoing, thereby making the suffering valuable. One way to avoid this unwanted implication is to say that the negative value of the wrong would outweigh any increased value in the suffering, and that the wronging is still deontologically prohibited, even if it would somehow improve the value picture (see Alexander &amp; Ferzan 2018: 187–188). But this reply leaves intact the thought that something valuable nonetheless occurs if a suffering person commits a crime: her suffering at least now fits (see Tadros 2015: 401-403). Insofar as retributivists should find this an unwanted implication, they have reason to say that suffering is valuable only if it is meted out for a wrong done. This connection is the concern of the next section.