 For example, to use Lewis’s examples, suppose \(P\) is “a sheet of paper lies before me”. Its analytic entailments might include, “If \(S_1\) (I were to seem to see a sheet of paper before me) and \(A_1\) (I were to seem to move my eyes), then, probably, \(E_1\) (I would seem to see the sheet of paper displaced)”, as well as “If \(S_2\) (I were to seem to feel paper with my fingers), and \(A_2\) (I were to seem to pick it up and tear it), then, probably, \(E_2\) (I would seem to see or feel torn paper)”, and so on. On the other hand, suppose \(P\) is “There is a doorknob before me”. Its truth might then entail the truth of a complex set of conditionals like “If I were to seem to see a doorknob, and were to seem to reach out towards it and grasp it, then, probably, I would seem to feel something hard and round”, etc.