 Olivi’s radical voluntarism leads him also to treat Aristotelian akrasia in a special way: literally as weakness of the will that explains why the agent chooses agains his better knowledge. Genuine cases of akrasia (in which the person is not making an intellectual error, e.g., due to the influence of emotions) exist and they reveal the fundamental nature of the will, namely, that its freedom is not bound by intellectual judgments or emotional outbursts (Kent 1984, 184–205; Bobillier 2020, 239, 252–60). Olivi argues explicitly against the view he takes to be Aristotle’s, namely that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is action or necessarily turns into action. He emphasizes that since the will is absolutely free, the conclusion of the practical syllogism must be accepted by the will before it turns into action, and the will can always reject the conclusion, thus leading the agent to reconsider the situation at hand. Moreover, he thinks that when an akratic person chooses to perform a morally wrong action, he may be fully aware that it is against the moral law. In Olivi’s view, human beings are able to consider one and the same action from many angles at the same time; they can think simultaneously several universal premises and combine them freely with the particular premise, thus reaching contrary conclusions: this act of fornication is both morally blameworthy and pleasant, and I am free to choose whether I go for it or not (Summa II qq. 85–86, 186–91; ibid., q. 57, pp. 309–10; see Toivanen 2012).