 Values are always personal or interpersonal values, that is, values for an individual or a collective of individuals. In discussing moral values, Meinong attaches them not to an individual subject as such but to a collective subject, to the “surrounding totality” [umgebende Gesamtheit] to which the individuals in question belong — in the end up to the totality of mankind — (1894: 168ff, 205, 216–7), or, in a more personified form to the representative of social interests (1894: 187). The constitutive nature of values (and value-feelings, respectively) itself is indefinable or unanalyzable insofar as it cannot be derived from concepts like utility, happiness, pleasantness, biological needs or cost (1894, §§2–4; 1923, I, §§2–5). The value properties of an object are not its intrinsic, fundamental properties like common physical or psychological properties, they are higher order properties and external to the object, something dependent upon the underlying properties of the object and the subject.