 It’s an open question how a metaphysician with a hardcore commitment to following the dictates of language should adjust their methodology, at least as regards the mass/count distinction, given the foregoing. Suppose one wants to become more inclusive, and follow not merely the dictates of their own language (or even their larger language group), and instead decides to constrain and shape their metaphysical theories only by the most general aspects of shared human grammar, syntax, or semantics. Supposing that there even are some universal semantic features (or a ‘Universal Grammar’, a non-settled hypothesis), it seems that the mass/count distinction is not among them (again—not settled). Then it seems that the linguistically-guided metaphysician must accept either that a ‘metaphysically serious’ distinction between stuff and things cannot be maintained whatsoever, or, it can be. If it can be, it must be in some watered-down fashion. (E.g., maybe reality contains neither stuff nor things, but has beings which can be regarded either way—cf. Pelletier 2001). It may be that the most universal commonalities of all human language will not impose nearly as much structure or guidance as linguistically-guided metaphysicians would wish, at least as regards mass vs. count.