  By contrast, another element of recent scholarship highlights Gassendi's philosophical motivations and strategies in sensu strictu. In the years during and following the Second World War, Bernard Rochot began this trend by bringing to light numerous lesser-known texts as well as the manuscript background to Gassendist atomism. More recently, Fred and Emily Michael have called attention to empiricist sources and features of Gassendi's psychology and epistemology. Others offering assessments of Gassendi's views in similarly strict philosophical terms include Wolfgang Detel, Marco Messeri, and Antonia LoLordo. In this interpretive tradition, Richard Popkin elegantly poses the global character of the empiricism linking Gassendist philosophy and science. Popkin (1967) ties together two central facets of Gassendi's thought, proposing that the ‘constructive skepticism’ at the core of his epistemology is an attempt (among other things) to show how to have an atomist science—through inferences based on our data concerning appearances.