 In addition to the resolution of concepts, and their symbolic assignments, Leibniz envisages the formulation of logical rules for the universal characteristic. He claims that “it is plain that men make use in reasoning of several axioms which are not yet quite certain” (The Method of Certitude and the Art of Discovery (undated); G VII, 183/W 49). Yet with the explicit formulation of these rules for the logical manipulation of the symbols—rules which humans use in reasoning—we would be in possession of a universal language which would mirror the relations between the concepts used in human reasoning. Indeed, the universal characteristic was intended by Leibniz as an instrument for the effective calculation of truths. Like formal logic systems, it would be a language capable of representing valid reasoning patterns by means of the use of symbols. Unlike formal logic systems, however, the universal language would also express the content of human reasoning in addition to its formal structure. In Leibniz’s mind, “this language will be the greatest instrument of reason,” for “when there are disputes among persons, we can simply say: Let us calculate, without further ado, and see who is right” (The Art of Discovery (1685); C 176/W 51).