 Aside from an inclination to reciprocate a benefit, grateful beneficiaries should also be especially inclined to refrain from harming their benefactors (Walker 1980–1981). We can call this tendency grateful nonmaleficence (Manela 2015). Beneficiaries should be disinclined to harm anyone, of course, insofar as harming others is generally morally wrong. But there are circumstances in which harming others is not necessarily wrong; and in these circumstances, we might expect a grateful beneficiary’s special disinclination to harm a benefactor to make a difference in his behavior. Imagine that Y is a morally upstanding and successful businessman in a fair market, whose legitimate business activities have begun driving his nearby competitors out of business. Driving competitors out of business under such conditions certainly amounts to harming them, though this sort of harm is not necessarily wrong. Imagine, however, that Y discovers one of his vulnerable competitors to be R, a former benefactor who sacrificed greatly in performing an act of benevolence for him years earlier. It seems plausible that Y, insofar as he is grateful, should go out of his way to spare her from financial harm (perhaps, say, by refraining from marketing his products in her region). At the very least, if Y had no special compunction about driving R out of business, we would be hard-pressed to say he was fully grateful to her. A beneficiary, then, should be especially disinclined to harm a benefactor, and should perhaps refrain from harming her in certain situations where he might reasonably be willing to harm a stranger. 