 Of these, the argument from the fine-grained nature of perception has generated the most discussion. Opponents of the idea that perceptual content might be nonconceptual argue that the fineness of grain of perceptual experience can in fact be accommodated at the conceptual level. John McDowell, for example, suggests that the considerations Evans raises have force only if we limit the types of concepts expected to figure in the content of perception to such general concepts as red27, red29, etc., but, he argues, there is no reason to suppose that the conceptual content of perception needs to be limited in this way. Rather, the conceptual content of perceptual experiences is given by demonstrative concepts, such as that shade (McDowell  1994a).[8]  He claims that our conceptual capacities are capable of representing colors with the same fineness of grain with which they are perceptually represented. The information loss in the transition from perception to perceptual belief is not a sign that there are two different types of content in play, but should rather be understood as a transition from a more determinate type of conceptual content (e.g., that is colored thus) to a less determinate type of conceptual content (e.g., that is red).