 Founded by Epicurus in his “Garden” in Athens in the early third century BCE, and elaborated by, among others, the remarkable Latin poet Lucretius in the mid first century BCE, the various members of the Epicurean school did not see politics as a straightforward part of the good life or a fulfillment of the flourishing of human nature, though their views of its origins, nature, and largely instrumental value were complex (for an overview, see Robitzsch 2017). For his part, Epicurus himself (see the entry on  Epicurus)  is reported in his “Key Doctrines” to have held a contractarian view of justice for mutual protection from harm (reminiscent of Glaucon’s initial proposal about justice in Republic Book II, which itself seems to echo the nomos-phusis debate among the 5th c. BCE sophists). Justice serves utility (Alberti 1995): as Epicurus wrote, “If someone makes a law and it does not happen to accord with the utility of social relationships, it no longer has the nature of justice” (KD 36, LS 22B). The greatest utility is that of tranquility or security, which is the naturally desired end or goal. While, as Annas 1993: 298 argues, the individual Epicurean agent will be disposed to justice as part of the path to tranquility properly understood (“The just &lt;life&gt; is most free from disturbance…”, KD 36, LS 22B), nevertheless laws will be necessary to enforce obedience to the contract by most people, and indeed one should obey the laws in order to attain peace of mind (KD 34–35, LS 22A4–5).