According to some (e.g., Rysiew 2001, 485, 507), this last point of dissimilarity between Hofweber’s hidden relativities and that which contextualists allege intensifies concerns about the latter’s error theory. For it seems to imply a quite specific deficit in “our powers of semantic self-knowledge” (Neta 2003a, 408): to say that we conflate contexts (Cohen 2014, 82) is to say that we are mixed up about what our intentions, purposes, etc., are when we utter ‘knowledge’ sentences. That sort of thing does sometimes happen. (Neta—ibid., 407–408—describes one such case.) Still, and whether or not it constitutes a deficit in “semantic self-knowledge,” exactly, it would be good if we had some explanation as to why many have such a hard time coming to terms with the truth of EC when the context-sensitivity of other terms is fairly easily accepted. Cohen has tentatively suggested that considerations of value might explain this: