 Longino’s criteria illustrate the contributions of feminist empiricism to scientific pluralism beyond explicit concerns with gender by aiming to articulate a general framework for epistemic and value diversity as conditions of successful science. In fact, one of the common criticisms of Longino’s framework has been that it is not feminist at all but rather opens the door for arguments in favor of the inclusion of anti-feminist or otherwise anti-egalitarian voices in research (Crasnow 2013; Hicks 2011; Kourany 2010). As such, feminist empiricism has contributed to the development of a social epistemology of scientific knowledge production that addresses the complexity of epistemic and value plurality in practice (Grasswick &amp; Webb 2002; Solomon 2006a; Biddle 2007). For example, climate science has become a focus of debates both in relation to the role of values in theory choice and the role of dissenting opinions in scientific practice (de Melo-Martín &amp; Intemann 2018; Keller 2017; Lewandowsky, Cook, &amp; Lloyd 2018). Simple narratives about the epistemic benefits of plurality may fail to account for epistemically detrimental forms of dissent as exemplified by climate skepticism (Biddle &amp; Leuschner 2015). For scientific pluralists, hard cases such as climate skepticism indicate the need to carefully articulate what types of dissent, disagreement, and diversity are desirable in scientific practice (Dellsén &amp; Baghramian forthcoming; Hauswald 2017; Intemann 2011; Leuschner 2018; Rolin 2017).