 The notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is much more accepted today than it was 20 years ago and has become part of the standard repertoire in philosophy of mind. The notion’s increasing popularity not surprisingly has also led to an increasing amount of criticism. One line of attack has focused on what might be called the universality question. Is it truly the case that all conscious mental states involve pre-reflective self-awareness, for-me-ness, and a sense of ownership? Does the link hold by necessity such that it characterizes all experiences, however primitive or disordered they might be, or might it, for instance, be something that only holds true for a more limited group of experiences, say, normal, adult, experiences (Lane 2012; Dainton 2016; Guillot 2017; Howell &amp; Thompson 2017). Whether infantile or pathological or hallucinogenic experiences constitute relevant exceptions, i.e., experiences that lack pre-reflective self-awareness, for-me-ness and sense of ownership, is to a large extent dependent upon how robustly one interprets these notions. If pre-reflective self-awareness is interpreted simply as a non-inferential awareness of the experience one is having rather than as an awareness of some self-object, and if for-me-ness and sense of ownership are interpreted not as involving an awareness of the possessive relation between oneself and the experience, but rather as the distinct perspectival givenness or first-personal presence of experience, it is far from obvious that there really are exceptions to be found (Zahavi 2014, 2018, 2019). Some critics have also claimed that the sense of ownership is a by-product of reflective or introspective processes (e.g., Bermúdez 2011; 2018; Dainton 2007). They insist that there is nothing like a pre-reflective sense of ownership that is “something over and above the changing stream of thought, perception, volition, emotion, memory, bodily sensation, and so on” (Dainton 2007, 240; emphasis added). But as should already be clear, phenomenologists do not claim that pre-reflective self-awareness or the sense of ownership is something “over and above” experience, something extra that is added as a second experience. Rather, the claim is that it is an intrinsic feature of experience itself. In this respect, the phenomenological claim is as deflationary as the critics would want (Gallagher 2017a).