  On the RNB view, the Academic skeptic, at the start of her philosophical career, inherits a rational method of inquiry, as well as guiding views about belief and knowledge. But her inheritance is so far untested (at least by her). As she goes about putting it to work, she might at first believe that her method and its norms help her to get at the truth. But she then finds that by arguing in accordance with those norms she is wildly successful at combatting any and all positions. She therefore comes to suppose on rational grounds—which may include particular arguments against Stoic cognition, the inadequacy of all non-skeptical theories of knowledge, and her experiences in argument generally—that the norms cannot successfully guide her to truths. But she doesn’t quit her life of inquiry because her skeptical view of the inadequacy of her method depends on that very method; it makes little sense for her to act on a view that rejects its own grounds. Instead she continues to inquire, now treating her inherited norms and guiding views about belief and knowledge only as hypotheses rather than as given. On the RNB view, therefore, Arcesilaus’ skepticism was self-defeating only insofar as it could not justify abandoning reason.