 Finally, we find at the far end of the spectrum those who deny that acknowledged peer conflict does in fact require exclusivists to abandon their exclusivism or even reduce confidence in their exclusivistic perspectives. The key to this position is a distinction between personal (private) evidence and public evidence (evidence available to all persons involved in the dispute). It is granted that individuals will often find themselves in epistemic disputes with persons who are epistemic peers in the sense that they are (1) equally intelligent, thoughtful, and free from obvious bias and (2) equally familiar with all the relevant public evidence. But it is normally acknowledged that the final judgments made by participants in such disputes are not made solely on this public evidence. Such judgments are based also on personal beliefs to which only each participant has access. Jennifer Lackey notes, for instance, that individuals in an epistemic dispute have greater access to the reliability of their own belief-forming faculties than do their epistemic competitors (Lackey 2010). Ernest Sosa talks of a gulf between the private and public domains (Sosa 2010). Peter van Inwagen speaks of “incommunicable insight that the others, for all their merits, lack” (van Inwagen 1996). And the weight of this private evidence, it is argued, can make it reasonable for individuals to retain their beliefs (including exclusivistic religious beliefs) with the same level of confidence, even in the face of acknowledged peer disagreement in the public sense.