 In his holism about color terms, Sellars raised an objection that would engage Russell’s conception of atomic statements about sense data as epistemically basic (Russell’s psychologically and logically primitive hard data). Sellars (1956) constructs an elaborate myth of his own, in which our behaviorist ancestors must learn to treat thoughts as internal states of one another and subsequently to self-report their own thoughts (1956: §§47–59). He extends the story from the attribution of inner thoughts to one another to the positing of internal sensory impressions (1956: §§60–62). His view differs from Russell’s position in making the ability to be aware of red sense experiences depend on the acquisition of a sophisticated web of meaning and theory; this ability is not “given”. Nor, as Russell would have it, is the universal red needed for knowing that s is red, “easily acquired” (1912 [1997: 101]). Accordingly, there are no easily acquired color predicates to describe the sense data that ground knowledge. Sellars asserts that