 If Julius Caesar’s entirely new right finger satisfying (a) and (b) is to be a Meinongian object of Parsons’ theory, the best candidate appears to be a non-existent incomplete object corresponding to the set of properties, {being a finger, belonging to Julius Caesar’s right hand, being never burnt}. This set includes neither the property of being constituted by particles which do not (actually) exist nor the property of being possibly burnt. Both of these properties are extra-nuclear properties, hence ineligible to be included in a set to which (P2) applies. So (P2) does not confer them on the object corresponding to the set. How then does the object come to have the properties? It is not obvious how this question should be answered (Parsons 1980: 21, note 4, where Parsons says, “The present theory is very neutral about de re modalities”), but we should at least note that on Parsons’s theory, objects are allowed to have properties not included in their corresponding sets of nuclear properties: e.g., the round square, whose corresponding set only includes roundness and squareness, has the property of being non-existent and the property of being incomplete. Also, Parsons allows nuclear properties which are “watered-down” versions of extra-nuclear properties. So the set may include the “watered-down” versions of the two extra-nuclear properties in question and that may be enough. For more on these and related issues in Parsons’ theory, see Howell 1983, Fine 1984.