 The debate about the differences between delusion and self-deception has centred on whether delusions (just like ordinary instances of self-deception) are explicable from a folk-psychological point of view (Bortolotti and Mameli 2012; Murphy 2012, 2013). Murphy argues that delusions are diagnosed when folk psychology runs out of resources for understanding what we seem to report as a genuine belief. By contrast, self-deception does not challenge our folk-psychological generalisations, because our beliefs are expected to be influenced by our desires at least on some occasions (e.g., when stakes are high). Bortolotti and Mameli maintain that the gap between self-deception and motivated delusions (such as anosognosia) is narrower than the gap between self-deception and apparently nonmotivated delusions, but even in the latter case folk psychology can account for the delusional belief as an explanation (imperfect as it may be) of the delusional experience.