 Conscience, then, is partly innate and partly acquired with respect to the content of the natural law. But what is the relationship of such universal premises to the conclusions of practical reason? How does the agent proceed from a general knowledge of right and wrong to the application of this knowledge to concrete situations? After all, such universal premises are only useful to the extent that they can be applied. For Bonaventure, the habit of directing the agent toward applying the general principles of the natural law to specific actions, like the habit of immediately grasping deontic principles, is innate. But in order to apply this self-evident knowledge we must acquire further knowledge. For example, although we grasp a priori the truth that one should honor one’s father and mother, we have no innate knowledge that John and Mary are our parents and that it is they specifically who must be honoured as opposed to, say, Michael and Jane. Rather, this type of knowledge is derived from experience and instruction.