 The Located Event Theory proposes a metaphysical Ockhamization of the Mereological View (Casati, Di Bona, &amp; Dokic 2013), which cleans the metaphysical landscape up from entities which are not necessary. As a starting point, it is useful to distinguish between two components of sound sources: thing sources (such as keys or musical instruments) and event sources (such as collisions or vibratory events at the sounding object) (2013: 462). The Located Event Theory maintains an Identity View for which sound, instead of being a proper part of a distinct event that is its source, is identical with the event source. That is, the collision we hear is the sound we hear. The Identity View appears to simplify the metaphysical landscape depicted by the Mereological View (2013: 463). The metaphysical claim which grounds the Identity View is supported by considerations about the phenomenology of audition. These considerations suggests that we do not commonly hear sounds as part of larger events—at least when, with “larger events”, we refer to event sources. We hear sounds as a unified entity, and not as parts of larger events. The biggest price the Identity View has to pay is for some ordinary language statements to which we have to renounce, meaning that instead of saying “I heard the bang (produced by/and) the collision”, it would be more appropriate to say that we heard the collision. This is a disadvantage of the theory which is acceptable, though, if the advantage is to propose a plausible theory of sound (2013: 465).