  The gap between equal fundamental human worth and a substantive egalitarian ethic is exposed in Utilitarianism, chapter 5, when Mill avers that utilitarianism incorporates the fundamental principle of equality, that in the determination of what to do, each person's interests should count exactly the same as any other person's exactly similar interest. On this basis he denies that utilitarianism, the doctrine that one ought always to do whatever maximizes aggregate utility, comes into conflict with the recommendations for conduct of a justice norm of equality (Mill 1979). The utilitarian rule “everyone to count for one, nobody for more than one” is already a substantive egalitarian norm, which goes beyond the bare assertion of equal basic human worth. However, there are egalitarian doctrines that insist on equal treatment of persons in some more robust sense, which neither equal basic moral worth nor utilitarian equal counting necessarily delivers. Some egalitarians might hold that equal free speech rights or democratic rights for all should be upheld even if denial of free speech or voting rights in particular circumstances would lead to the greatest total of utility or happiness. Some egalitarians might hold that it would be morally better to bring about a situation in which there is somewhat less aggregate utility (human good) dispersed equally among all people than an alternative situation in which the utility total is larger but its distribution is extremely unequal across persons.