 Hutcheson saves his most biting criticism for Wollaston’s view, however. According to Hutcheson, there is no plausibility to be had that moral distinctions can be derived by the tendencies of our actions to signify truth or falsity. Depending upon what one understands to be “significance”, or how one understands Wollaston’s “[acting] as if things were so, or not so”, we would declare as immoral such benign acts as leaving one’s lights on at night, or traveling, as a noble, “without Coronets”, or walking in plainclothes despite being clergy, or writing plays or “Epicks” (Essay, 164–66). In addition, according to Hutcheson, Wollaston’s system cannot distinguish between degrees of virtue or vice. Assuming it makes some sense to say that particular actions signify truth or falsehood, this appears to be a binary property—it either does or does not. But virtue is scalar: some actions are horribly vicious, others are heroic, others are relatively morally insignificant (Essay, 170; see also  §2.2).  Ultimately, then, Hutcheson concludes that Wollaston (and every other rationalist he considers) is really smuggling in some sort of moral sense in disguise, whether this is by means of a reference to the “reasonableness” of particular actions, a reference to their “fitness” or reference to their “significance of truth or falsity”.