 Although it is not simply an epistemological notion, the way Davidson presents the idea of triangulation tends to be such as to bring its epistemological implications to the fore. This is especially true of the way Davidson develops the idea in ‘Three Varieties of Knowledge’. Since our knowledge of our own minds is not independent of our knowledge of the world nor of our knowledge of others, so we cannot treat self-knowledge as a matter of our having access to some set of private ‘mental’ objects. Our knowledge of ourselves arises only in relation to our involvement with others and with respect to a publicly accessible world – as well as a history of such involvement (this is indeed part of the point of the Swampman example). Even so, we retain a certain authority over our own attitudes and utterances simply in virtue of the fact that those attitudes and utterances are indeed our own (see ‘First-Person Authority’, [1984]). Moreover, because our knowledge of the world is inseparable from other forms of knowledge, global epistemological scepticism – the view that all or most of our beliefs about the world could be false – turns out to be committed to much more than is usually supposed. Should it indeed turn out that our beliefs about the world were all, or for the most part, false, then this would not only imply the falsity of most of our beliefs about others, but it would also have the peculiar consequence of making false most of our beliefs about ourselves – including the supposition that we do indeed hold those particular false beliefs. Although this may fall short of demonstrating the falsity of such scepticism, it surely demonstrates it to be deeply problematic. 