 Most linguistic semanticists, cognitive scientists, and anthropologists would agree that in some sense, language is a mirror of mind. But views diverge concerning how literally or non-literally this tenet should be understood. The most literal understanding, which we will term the logicist view, is the one that regards language itself as a logical meaning representation with a compositional, indexical semantics—at least when we have added brackets as determined by parse trees, and perhaps certain other augmentation (variables, lambda-operators, etc.) In itself, such a view makes no commitments about mental representations, but application of Occam's razor and the presumed co-evolution of thought and language then suggest that mentalese is itself language-like. The common objection that “human thinking is not logical” carries no weight with logicists, because logical meaning representations by no means preclude nondeductive modes of inference (induction, abduction, etc.); nor are logicists impressed by the objection that people quickly forget the exact wording of verbally conveyed information, because both canonicalization of inputs and systematic discarding of all but major entailments can account for such forgetting. Also assumption of a language-like, logical mentalese certainly does not preclude other modes of representation and thought, such as imagistic ones, and synergistic interaction with such modes (Paivio 1986; Johnston &amp; Williams 2009).