 There are at least two ways of trying to modify utilitarianism in the hopes of reconciling some portion of it with common moral opinion. One way is to keep its act-consequentialism but trade in its simplistic ranking of outcomes for a more sophisticated one. Consider, then, that utilitarianism (which, recall, is short for “Benthamite utilitarianism”) ranks outcomes according to quantitative hedonism: the view that the only things that ultimately matter in ranking outcomes are the intensities and durations of the pleasures and pains that they contain. Yet, it seems that many more things matter, including whether those outcomes are ones in which we violate people’s rights or affect the quality—and not just the quantity—of their pleasures and pains. And this has led to theories such as rights consequentialism (Sen 1982) and qualitative utilitarianism (Mill 1861), respectively. The other is to keep utilitarianism’s quantitative hedonism but trade in its act-consequentialism. For instance, whereas Bentham held that we should evaluate acts in terms of their own utilities, we could instead evaluate actions in terms of whether they accord with the code of rules that, if accepted by the vast majority of everyone everywhere, would produce more hedonic utility than the vast majority of everyone everywhere accepting some alternative code. And this has led to theories such as rule-utilitarianism. (Perhaps, there’s even a third way: holding that the outcomes that are to be ranked are to be individuated not only metaphysically but also presentationally, such that they themselves can be agent-relative—see N. R. Howard 2022.)