Besides dialetheists, some modern logicians, who need not be dialetheists, think that logic can be paraconsistent, i.e., that, contrary to classical logic, one contradiction need not lead to an explosion where anything goes.  While Aristotle is obviously not a dialetheist, it is not clear where he stands on the issue of paraconsistency in Metaph IV. Although Aristotle does claim that if his opponent rejects PNC across the board, she is committed to a world in which anything goes, he never argues that if (per impossibile) his opponent is committed to one contradiction, she is committed to anything, and he even considers that the opponent’s view might apply to some statements but not to others (Metaph IV 4 1008a10–12). However one understands these passages, in the Prior Analytics, Aristotle does commit himself to the view that syllogistic is paraconsistent (APr.  II 15 64a15). 