 This reply might cause Ross problems. If he says knowledge is not intrinsically valuable but intellectual activities are, he cannot say an activity of the mind is better when it issues in knowledge (FE 270; Shaver 2011, 134n34). Perhaps Ross will have to say intellectual activities leading to knowledge are better, not because knowledge is itself good, but because of its instrumental properties, e.g., knowledge might lead us to being most effective at promoting justice or virtue or pleasure. A fortiori the claim it is intellectual activities that are intrinsically good explains why some instances of knowledge are more important than others. Ross says ‘different instances of this [intellectual] activity are good in proportion as they are conducted according to these principles’ (FE 270; also RG 151–152), i.e., principles discovered by logic. Because, say, more philosophical or more general knowledge requires greater and more sophisticated use of ‘the principles discovered by logic’ (FE 270), it is better than knowledge of the sex lives of movie stars. The value of the intellectual activities explains the value of the knowledge.