 In a different series of articles (Stefánsson &amp; Bradley 2015, 2019), these authors again employ Jeffrey’s framework, but this time widen the domain of Des to include chance propositions (in addition to factual prospects), propositions like “the chance that I get $100 is 0.5”. They hold that a rational decision-maker can have a preference between various chances of \(X,\) even on the supposition that \(X\) obtains (she need not obey “Chance Neutrality”). They capture the idea of disliking risk as such by holding that even though a rational agent must maximize expected desirability, she need not have a \(\Des\) function of \(X\) that is expectational with respect to the Des function of chance propositions about \(X\) (she need not obey “Linearity”). For example, \(\Des(\text{“I get \$100”})\) need not be equal to \(2(\Des(\text{“the chance that I get \$100 is 0.5”})).\) (This does not conflict with maximizing expected desirability, because it concerns only the relationship between particular inputs to the \(\Des\) function, and does not concern the decision-maker’s subjective probabilities.). This proposal can also rationalize the Ellsberg preferences  (section 4.1),  because it allows the decision-maker to assign different probabilities to the various chance propositions (see also Bradley 2015).