 In general, two different approaches to explaining the primal sin have been offered. Because the philosophical work on the primal sin is conducted largely in dialogue with medieval figures, drawing on a complex moral psychology in which the faculties of the intellect and will play an essential role, I also discuss these two approaches in those terms. Put simply, there can be no sin without the involvement of the intellect and will (see McCluskey 2017: 21 and 100); the difference between the two approaches is whether they locate that sin primarily in the will or in the intellect. Voluntarists, on the one hand, hold that human beings act freely primarily in virtue of the faculty of the will, and thus explain the primal sin primarily in the misuse of that faculty. (Robert Brown notes that in the history of Christian theology, voluntarism is the dominant view; see Brown 1978). Intellectualism, on the other hand, holds that human beings act freely primarily in virtue of the role of the intellect, and thus that the primal sin must be explained primarily in intellectual terms.