 Walton’s general theory of make-believe is widely regarded as an important contribution to the philosophy of art. But his theory of depiction faces the same difficulty as other experiential theories in explaining how the shapes (or outline shapes) of the marks on the surface of a picture constrain the shapes (or outline shapes) of the objects they represent, or the imaginative games they invite spectators to engage in. Furthermore, some of Walton’s critics have denied that visual imagination is an essential feature of picture perception (Savile 1986); and others have denied that the concept of a visual game of make-believe can capture the experience of seeing in, on the grounds that Walton fails to integrate the “recognitional” and “configurational” aspects of the experience, or at least fails to integrate them in the right way. However, the force of this objection is blunted to some degree by the disagreement among Wollheim’s followers about the right way of explaining how the experience of seeing in is integrated. (For objections to Walton, see Wollheim 1998, 2003b; Budd 2008a; Nanay 2004. For Walton’s replies to objections, see Walton 2008b,c. For an alternative analysis of seeing in in terms of imagining, see Stock 2008. For different views about the “integration” of seeing in, see Abell &amp; Bantinaki 2010; Newall 2015; Voltolini 2015.)