  At the time that Ryle wrote ‘Systematically Misleading  Expressions’, he, too, assumed that every statement had an  underlying logical form that was to be exhibited in its  ‘correct’ formulation   [Quotations].  But when he gave up this assumption (for reasons indicated in the  supplementary section on   The Cambridge School of Analysis),  he did not give up the motivating idea of logical analysis—to  show what is wrong with misleading expressions. In The Concept of Mind (1949), for example, he sought to explain what he called  the ‘category-mistake’ involved in talk of the mind as a  kind of ‘Ghost in the Machine’. His aim, he wrote, was to “rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we  already possess” (1949, 9), an idea that was to lead to the  articulation of connective rather than reductive  conceptions of analysis, the emphasis being placed on elucidating the relationships between concepts without assuming that there is a  privileged set of intrinsically basic concepts (see the supplementary section on   Oxford Linguistic Philosophy).  