 Further, the multiverse conception leads naturally to the kinds of conclusions traditional Skolemites tended to favor.  Let a be a set in some model M (where M lives somewhere in the multiverse).  Then M has a forcing extension, M[G], in which a is only countable.  This provides a natural gloss on the Skolemite claim that “every set is countable from some perspective.” Similarly, the Skolemite's bias in favor of countability (see section 3.2) can be explained by the fact that, if a is countable in one model M, then it stays countable in all extensions of that model.  In contrast, uncountable sets can always be made countable by passing to an appropriate forcing extension.  For more on the multiverse, see Hamkins 2011 and Hamkins 2012.  For some criticisms, see Koellner 2013  (under Other Internet Resources).