 In a commentary on the article introducing ZD strategies, Stewart and Plotkin (2012) point out that more generous ZD strategies like GEN-2 had been relatively neglected by Press and Dyson. If Player One adopts GEN-2 in a 2IPD with traditional payoff matrix, then his payoff \(V(\bone,\btwo)\) will be \(2V(\btwo,\bone)-3\). Player Two then can allow Player One any payoff between the punishment value of one and the reward value of three, while ensuring that her own payoff is larger. Her highest paying response is \(\bCu\), which results in the average long-term payoff of three to both players. If she is willing to adopt a strategy that reduces her average payoff below the reward level, she will reduce Player One's by twice as much. Stewart and Plotkin (2012) report that a strategy like GEN-2 actually gets the highest score among nineteen strategies in a simulated IPD tournament like Axelrod's that includes TFT, GTFT, \(\bP_1\), GRIM and other strategies championed in previous writings. A version of EXTORT-2 gets the second lowest score. Significantly, the EXTORT-2 version won the second most “head-to-head” contests, and the GEN-2 version won the fourth fewest. As Axelrod emphasized in connection with TFT, beating one's opponents is not the path to success in a PD tournament. Suggestive as it is, however, the Stewart and Plotkin commentary leaves open the question of whether it is the ZD-character of strategies like GEN-2 that engenders their success.