 Second, consider the claim that future people should have a life that is well above the level of well-being specified by a threshold notion of harm. According to the Shift Thesis (introduced in  §4.3)  intergenerational sufficientarianism is compatible with denying that people have above-threshold justice claims and with understanding these claims as less weighty justice  claims.[14]  The second concern, in part, reflects a third concern, namely the notion that future people should be able to share (at least certain aspects of) the particular way of life of currently living people. But, presumably, currently living people do not violate the rights of future people by failing to sustain particularly valuable aspects of their way of life for them. Thus, if we take into account all three of the above restrictions, intergenerational sufficientarianism may specify no reason for preferring a future with people all of whom have lives far above the level of a sufficiency threshold to a future with no  people.[15]