 Finally, the error theorist could, instead, deny that “X is not permissible” entails “X is wrong”, or that “X is not wrong” entails “X is permissible”. Doing so would allow her to maintain the falsity of both  (1)  and  (2).  In short, nothing is wrong and nothing is permissible. Jonas Olson has advocated this view (Olson 2014: ch. 1; see Streumer &amp; Wodak 2021), arguing that the connections between permissibility and wrongness are best accounted for in terms of conversational implicature, not conceptual entailment. This view will be attractive for any error theorist who shares Mackie’s belief that error theory does not commit one to any (positive) first-order normative claims at all (Mackie 1977: 15–17). It also allows the error theorist to get out of saying that all things are permissible, which can seem independently unpalatable. On the other hand, she will still be committed to the claim that nothing is wrong, and it might seem like a small difference between this and the claim that all things are permissible. See Olson (2014: §1.3) for a much fuller treatment of this problem of formulation, and possible solutions.