 Two goals stand behind the composition of the Tiqqun. The primary one, as the title reveals (Emendation of the Opinions), is corrective. Motivated by confidence in Aristotelianism, Albalag adopts a critical stance towards any doctrine that deviates from Aristotelian teachings and rules. For him, most errors in the philosophical discourse are instances of deviation from Aristotle or misunderstandings of his teachings. The cumulative literature of commentaries on Aristotle, excluding Averroes’ commentaries, is replete with such instances. Avicenna is particularly regarded by Albalag as a major source of error and thus the process of “emendation” (Tiqqun) largely consists in systematic critiques of Avicennian philosophy. But Avicenna is not the sole target of criticism, though he is the central one. Albalag also criticizes other philosophers such as al-Farabi, Maimonides, and al-Ghazali—it is not unlikely that Albalag thought, like Medieval Latin philosophers, that Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah was a genuine representation of al-Ghazali’s philosophical view (for al-Ghazali’s philosophical image in Latin literature see Salman 1999; Shihadeh 2011).[1] Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah encompasses a concise presentation of the opinions of the philosophers, and as a result it furnishes Albalag with an ideal framework for pursuing the announced process of “emendation” (Tiqqun). In most of his discussions, critiques, and corrections Albalag derives what he regards as the correct understanding of Aristotle from Averroes’ writings. 