Within the framework of plural logic, however, there are two distinctively different ways that a theory can be ontologically committed to entities, or kinds of entity, corresponding to the distinction between distributive and collective predication (see Rayo (2007: 435–7), who calls the latter “plethological commitment”). Suppose that ‘K’ is a predicate that applies to plural terms. If ‘K’ applies distributively, then a theory that affirms the plural quantification “there are some things such that they are Ks” introduces no commitment beyond that of the singular quantification “there is something such that it is K”. But if ‘K’ is a predicate that applies collectively, then the plural quantification “there are some things such they are Ks” is committed to Ks in a distinctively plural way that, in general, cannot be captured in terms of its ontological commitments. For example, the mereological nihilist who holds that “there are simples arranged chairwise” is thereby ontologically committed only to simples, not to any plural entity containing simples; but she is also committed, in an irreducibly plural way, to there being simples arranged chairwise.