 Now, commonsense morality differs from utilitarianism not only in taking there to be restrictions on performing certain types of action—such as promise-breakings—even for the sake of bringing about the overall best outcome (i.e., agent-centered restrictions), but also in taking there to be options either to bring about the overall best outcome or to refrain from doing so (i.e., agent-centered options). To accommodate the latter, consequentializers have typically appealed to a dual ranking of outcomes (see Sider 1993 and Portmore 2011). To illustrate, recall self/other utilitarianism and imagine that you must choose between (a) giving your last aspirin to some stranger, alleviating their mild headache, or (b) taking it yourself, alleviating your severe headache. Assuming that everything else is equal, utilitarianism requires you to take the aspirin yourself, as this will bring about the overall best outcome: the one with less overall pain. But, intuitively, you are also permitted to give it to the stranger. Self/other utilitarianism accommodates this intuition by holding that the permissibility of actions depends on two different rankings of their outcomes: one that ranks them in terms of how good they are overall and another that ranks them in terms of how good they are for everyone but the agent. More specifically, self/other utilitarianism holds that an act is permissible if and only if there is no available alternative whose outcome outranks its outcome on both of these two rankings. And since taking the aspirin yourself outranks giving it to the stranger in terms of what’s best overall but giving it to the stranger outranks taking it yourself in terms of what’s best for others, both are permissible.