 Not only existing things but also all kinds of non-beings (nonentities, Routley 1980: 7) find their place in Meinong’s all-embracing theory of objects — among them even impossible objects, like the round square, as well as paradoxical, “defective” objects, like some forms of the liar or special cases of purely self-referential thinking (the thought about itself, for  example).[2]  Similar to Twardowski, Meinong maintains that talking about non-beings is not just speaking of nothing, i.e. there can be no objectless representations and thoughts. He clears up the apparently paradoxical sentence “There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects” (1904b, §3) by introducing two meanings of “there are”: first as outside-being (pre-giveness), second as being, and he tries to give a rational account of the paradoxical sentence by referring to two closely related principles: (1) the “principle of the independence of so-being from being” [“Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit des Soseins vom Sein”], and (2) the “principle of the indifference of the pure object to being” (“principle of the outside-being of the pure object” [“Satz vom Außersein des reinen Gegenstandes”]) (1904b, §3–4).