  By contrast, “no-trace”, or strict, actualists  like Prior (1957), Adams (1981), and Fitch (1996) hew closely to the  intuition that, had a contingent individual a failed to exist, there would have been absolutely no trace, no metaphysical vestige,  of a — neither a itself in some non-concrete  state nor any abstract proxy for a. Hence, unlike trace  actualism, there are no such vestiges in the actual world of objects  that are not actual but only could have been. The logical consequences for no-trace actualists, however, appear to  be severe; at the least they cannot provide a standard   compositional  semantics for modal languages, according to which (roughly) the  meaning of a sentence is determined by its logical form and the  meanings of its semantically significant constituents. In particular, if there is nothing to play the role of a “possible  Exotic”, nothing that is, or represents, an Exotic in some  other possible world — a mere possibile, a contingently  non-concrete individual, an unexemplified haecceity — then the  strict actualist cannot provide standard, compositional truth  conditions for quantified propositions like   (23)  that yield the intuitively correct truth value. For, understood  compositionally,   (23)  is true if and only if ‘∃xEx’ is true at  some world w. And that, in turn, is true at w if and  only if ‘Ex’ is true at w for some value of ‘x’. But, as just noted, for the strict actualist, there is no such value of ‘x’. Hence, for the  strict actualist, ‘Ex’ is false at w for  all values of ‘x’ and, hence,   (23)  is false as well. (These issues are explored in much greater detail  in the entry on the  possibilism-actualism debate.)  