 Suppose someone is trying to determine whether she is obligated to teach a summer school course that students would greatly benefit from, but only if taught well. Do facts about how an agent would teach the course (e.g., well or poorly) have any role in determining whether she is morally obligated to teach the course? Actualists answer in the affirmative and possibilists in the negative. Possibilists hold that the deontic status of an act \(\phi\) depends on facts about how an agent could act were she to \(\phi\). So, according to possibilists, what determines whether she should teach the summer school course is whether she could teach it well, irrespective of whether she would teach it well. Actualists, by contrast, hold that the deontic status of an act \(\phi\) depends, in part, on facts about how an agent would act (under certain conditions) were she to \(\phi\). So, according to actualists, roughly what matters in determining whether one should teach the summer school course is whether she would teach it well, irrespective of whether she could teach it well.