 Despite this troubled scientific history, versions of nativism continue to appear in psychology. In this century, Evolutionary Psychology has resuscitated a brand of nativism that is strikingly reminiscent of the instinct psychology that prevailed in the wake of Darwin and James (Hampton 2004). Part of what makes the recurrence of nativism philosophically interesting is that many scientists have noted that the innate/acquired distinction is ultimately a false dichotomy (Kitcher 2001). All traits are influenced in their development by both environmental and genetic factors. Weismann’s insistence on the distinction aside, it is a mistake to classify traits as emanating either from the germ line or the environment. Moreover, ever since Baldwin (1896) it has been thought that complex behavioral adaptations can conceivably become fixed in a population by a process that relies heavily on experience. What then explains the persistence of the innate/acquired distinction in psychology? The following section reviews recent attempts by philosophers to identify what is at issue in disagreements over the meaning and utility of nativism in psychology and biology.