  Phenomenology is not the only source of analytic methodologies  outside those of the analytic tradition. Mention might be made here,  too, of R. G. Collingwood, working within the tradition of British  idealism, which was still a powerful force prior to the Second World  War. In his Essay on Philosophical Method (1933), for  example, he criticizes Moorean philosophy, and develops his own  response to what is essentially the paradox of analysis (concerning  how an analysis can be both correct and informative), which he  recognizes as having its root in Meno's paradox. In his  Essay on Metaphysics (1940), he puts forward his own  conception of metaphysical analysis, in direct response to what he  perceived as the mistaken repudiation of metaphysics by the logical  positivists. Metaphysical analysis is characterized here as the  detection of ‘absolute presuppositions’, which are taken  as underlying and shaping the various conceptual practices that can  be identified in the history of philosophy and science. Even among  those explicitly critical of central strands in analytic philosophy,  then, analysis in one form or another can still be seen as alive and  well.