 A more expansive conception of corrective justice was proposed by Jules Coleman (2001). Coleman compares the principle of corrective justice to that of retributive justice. He argues that, just as the principle of retribution does not contain a complete catalogue of the crimes worthy of punishment, but rather simply says that serious crimes merit retributive punishment, so, too, the theory of corrective justice is on its own silent on the question of the types of interpersonal wrongs that are its appropriate subject matter. For Coleman, then, the principle of corrective justice is a general principle of responsive conduct, which awaits an independent theory of tortious wrongdoing to which it is to be applied. Coleman offered several different accounts of the principle of corrective justice: on one version its purpose was to “annul” wrongful gains and losses; a different, later version emphasized the reversal of the effects of wrongful acts by the particular person responsible for them. On both of these accounts, the concepts of wrongdoing and responsibility are placeholders, consistent with a wide variety of views about which acts are wrongful and about the conditions under which someone can be responsible for an outcome.