 Balinski and Laraki (2010, pgs. 74–83) have an interesting spin on Saari’s argument. Let \(V\) be a ranking voting method (i.e., a voting method that requires voters to rank the alternatives). Say that \(V\) cancels properly if for all profiles \(\bR\), if \(V\) selects \(A\) as a winner in \(\bP\), then \(V\) selects \(A\) as a winner in any profile \(\bP+\bC\), where \(\bC\) is a Condorcet component and \(\bP+\bC\) is the profile that contains all the rankings from \(\bP\) and \(\bC\). Balinski and Laraki (2010, pg. 77) prove that there is no Condorcet consistent voting method that cancels properly. (See the discussion of the multiple districts paradox in Section 3.3 for a proof of a closely related result.) 