 Pluralist accounts of scientific representation commonly start from the assumption that models, simulations, and related media deliver partial, interest-dependent, hence contingent representations of the world. This pluralist stance is contrasted with a monist view according to which science ultimately aims at establishing a single, complete, and comprehensive account of the world (Kellert, Longino, &amp; Waters 2006b: x). An analogy with maps (Winther 2020) is often employed to explain that such a pluralist stance is compatible with some form of “minimal” (Longino 2002a) or “modest” realism (Kitcher 2001). Which aspects of a part of the world are represented by a cartographer depends on the intended use of the map, hence the production of a plurality of maps, whose conformity with the real world can be assessed on pragmatic grounds through successful use. Similarly, science produces a plurality of partial representations of a given phenomenon, depending on various epistemic and practical interests, whose conformity to the real world can be assessed on empirical grounds.