 The study of the structures of the contents of judgment as such, apart from its functions and contingent states, is one of the tasks Stumpf assigns to this part of eidology which he calls the theory of states of affairs. (A. Chrudzimski, 2015) One of Stumpf’s original contributions to logic rests on the notion of state of affairs, which was already used in the history of philosophy and especially by Lotze. (B. Smith, 1989, § 2) Stumpf already used this notion in his lectures on logic in 1888 (Q 13, p. 4), and it is now well-known that it has been subsequently taken over by many philosophers including Husserl and Wittgenstein. In 1906, Stumpf associates it with the concept of formation or product (Gebilde) and applies it to both intellectual and emotional functions, where in the latter case it is conceived as a value (also called Wertverhalt) on which ethics and practical philosophy in general are based. These Gebilde are objective entities that are related both to the concept of objective in Meinong, to that of objectity in Husserl, and to Bolzano’s concept of “proposition in itself.” (Stumpf, 1906b, p. 30) For this student of Lotze, the doctrine of Gebilde is not incompatible with the Platonic theory of ideas though “without its metaphysical conclusions.” (Stumpf, 1906a, p. 33) One can certainly entertain a formation such as a state of affairs without having it as an actual content of judgment, but it is then a mere abstraction. Because, says Stumpf, “the state of affairs cannot be immediately given for itself independently of any mental function, and therefore effectively. It can only be real as the content of a judgment that is actually taking place. […] So, functions (and indeed only the conscious functions which are properly present) are facts immediately known, while the Gebilde are facts only regarded as contents of functions.” (Stumpf, 1906a, p. 32) Objectivism is an important issue in Stumpf’s philosophy since it serves as one of his main arguments against psychologism.