 One major controversy over Aquinas’s writings concerns the variation in his writings over the roles analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality (or analogy in the Greek sense). In his early writings, Aquinas questioned whether the standard account of the analogy of attribution was sufficient for his purposes. In his commentary on the Sentences, he suggests that there is one kind of analogy in which the analogical term is used in a prior and a posterior sense, and another kind of analogy, the analogy of imitation, which applies to God and creatures. In his De veritate, he argues that the analogy of attribution involves a determinate relation, which cannot hold between God and creatures, and that the analogy of proportionality must be used for the divine names. We must compare the relation between God and his properties to the relation between creatures and their properties. It has been argued that Aquinas discovered that this solution was deeply flawed, given that the problem of divine names arises precisely because the relationship of God to his properties is so radically different from our relation to our properties. Accordingly, in his later discussions of the divine names, notably in the Summa contra gentiles and the Summa theologiae, Aquinas returns to the analogy of attribution, but links it much more closely with his doctrines of causal similitude. Montagnes has pointed out that Aquinas came to place much greater emphasis on agent causation, the active transmission of properties from God to creatures, than on exemplar causality, the creature’s passive reflection or imitation of God’s properties. In this context, Aquinas makes considerable use of his ontological distinction between univocal causes, whose effects are fully like them, and non-univocal causes, whose effects are not fully like them. God is an analogical cause, and this is the reality that underlies our use of analogical language. Other scholars, notably Hochschild, have argued that Aquinas never abandons the doctrine of the De Veritate. Citing passages in the Summa Theologiae that explicitly employ analogy of proportionality, Hochschild argues that Aquinas appeals to one or another classification of analogy based on the dialectical context of his remarks. Where the context calls for addressing the causal relationship between God and creatures, Aquinas appeals to classifications of analogy of attribution. Where the context calls for addressing the formal structure of the similarity between God and creatures, Aquinas appeals to analogy of proportionality. Hochschild argues furthermore that there is an asymmetrical relationship between analogy of proportionality and the forms of analogy of attribution that involve cause and effect relationships between analogates. Analogy of proportionality can occur with or without causal relationships between the analogates. (E.g. There is an analogy of proportionality between the intellect’s act of seeing and the eye’s act of seeing, but no causal relationship between them.) However, cause and effect relationships between analogates in an analogy of attribution always presuppose an analogy of proportionality as the formal structure of the similarity between the analogate that is the cause and the analogate that is the effect. 