 There are many other philosophically-interesting questions related to ensemble climate projection (Frame et al. 2007); just a few will be mentioned here. First, how can ensemble studies be designed so that they probe uncertainty in desired ways? Today’s MME studies do not probe structural uncertainty systematically, and it is unclear what it would mean to do so; there are questions about how to define the space of relevant models and how to sample it (Murphy et al. 2007). Second, how significant are robust results? Climate scientists often assume that agreement among projections has special epistemic significance—e.g., that we can be substantially more confident in those projected changes (Pirtle et al. 2010)—but Parker (2011) argues that it is difficult to make the case for this. There are also questions about how to quantify the extent of agreement or robustness (see Collins et al. 2013: Box 12.1) and about what it means for ensemble members to be independent, an important factor in interpreting the significance of robustness (Annan and Hargreaves 2017). Finally, to what extent do non-epistemic values influence ensemble results? Winsberg (2010, 2012; see also Biddle &amp; Winsberg 2009) identifies pathways of influence via model construction (see  Section 3.2),  which in turn affect probabilistic uncertainty estimates produced from ensemble results, though not necessarily in a way that raises concerns about “wishful thinking”. Parker (2014a) suggests that this influence might be dampened by representing uncertainty in coarser ways that also better reflect the extent of actual uncertainty, e.g., by using the IPCC imprecise probability intervals; the extent to which the value influence is escapable in practice, however, remains unclear.