 Frege (1892) and Russell (1903) had different opinions regarding the ontological import of nominalization. According to the former, nominalized predicates stand for a “correlate” of the “unsaturated” entity that the predicate stands for (in Frege’s terminology they are a “concept correlate” and a “concept”, respectively). According to the latter, who speaks of “inextricable difficulties” in Frege’s view (Russell 1903: §49), they stand for exactly the same entity. Mutatis mutandis, they similarly disagreed about other singular terms that seemingly refer to properties. The ontological distinction put forward by Frege is mainly motivated by the fact that grammar indeed forbids the use of predicates in subject position. But this hardly suffices for the distinction and it is dubious that other motivations can be marshalled (Parsons 1986). We shall thus take for granted Russell’s line here, although many philosophers support Frege’s view or at least take it very seriously (Castañeda 1976; Cocchiarella 1986a; Landini 2008).