 Bickle (2010) questions whether the “second-wave” of criticisms of the standard argument, those that challenge the multiple realization premise itself (discussed in  §2.4  and this section above), give aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists. Since psychoneural reductionism was one of the explicit targets of the standard multiple realization argument, one might plausibly assume that they do. Yet none of those who offer these “second-wave” challenges (Shapiro, Polger, Couch) identify themselves as “reductionists” (with the possible exception of Shapiro, and more recently Bechtel 2009, although his response to the multiple realization argument figures nowhere in his plumb for “mechanistic reduction”). Some of these “second-wave” critics, such as Polger 2004, are explicitly anti-reductionist. (Though Polger 2004 is also explicitly anti-anti-reduction. He argues that multiple realization has little if anything to do with reduction.) This fact alone should give a psychoneural reductionist pause. Second, the direction that the second-wave debates have developed, starting with Gillett’s (2003) criticisms—deeply into the nature of the realization relation, and so deeply into the metaphysics of science rather than into science itself—should prompt the psychoneural reductionist with a metascientific bent to simply tell the second-wavers, thanks for nothing! Does that leave psychoneural reductionism back on its heels, in light of the standard multiple realization argument? Not at all, Bickle (2010) insists. For the “first-wave” actual-scientific-history challenge to the first premise of the standard argument, and the initial critical discussions (see  §2.1,  §2.2, and  §2.5  above) turns out never to have been rejoined by anti-reductionists. Why not? Bickle speculates that metaphysics was the culprit. Non-reductive physicalists seem to have assumed that by rejoining arguments of metaphysicans like Kim (1992), they thereby dismissed the entire first-wave of challenges. Many of the challenges discussed in  section 2  above shows that this is not the case. There are numerous examples of multiply realized kinds that are components of scientific theories widely acknowledged to having been reduced to other theories. So multiple realization alone is no barrier to actual scientific reduction. The detailed scientific cases that illuminate many of those “first-wave” challenge to the standard multiple realizability argument remain unanswered to this day.