 Cappelen and Dever do, however, offer a distinct line of attack that bears directly on the existence of self-locating doxastic states. (Their attack builds upon suggestions in Magidor 2015.) Many of our cases of ignorance, similarity, and difference cite as evidence for the presence of significant self-locating beliefs an action performed by an agent. That Perry has resolved his ignorance about the identity of the messy shopper is indicated by his rearranging a sack; the difference between my taking my own pants to be on fire and my friend’s taking my pants to be aflame is indicated by my dropping to the ground and rolling around; etc. In each case, it is eventually argued that these actions cannot be entirely explained by descriptive or de re cognitive states, and thus that we need to attribute self-locating beliefs to the agents in question in order explain their actions. More generally, there is a consistent suggestion across the self-location literature that self-locating cognitive states play a central, and crucial, role in action explanation.