 The thought that the value of a consequence depends on what might have been is systematized by Bradley and Stefánsson (2017). Their proposal uses a version of expected utility theory developed by Jeffrey (1965) and axiomatized by Bolker (1966). Jeffrey replaces the utility function by a more general “desirability” function Des, which applies not just to consequences but also to prospects; indeed, it doesn’t distinguish between “ultimate” consequences and prospects, since its inputs are propositions. Bradley and Stefánsson propose to widen the domain of Des to include counterfactual propositions, thus allowing that preferences for propositions can depend on counterfacts. For example, a decision-maker can prefer “I choose the risky options and get nothing, and I wouldn”t have been guaranteed anything if I had chosen differently’ to “I choose the risky option and get nothing, and I would have been guaranteed something if I had chosen differently”, which will rationalize the Allais preferences. (Incidentally, their proposal can also rationalize preferences that seemingly violate EU because of fairness considerations, as in an example from Diamond (1967).)