 Inconsistent information is at issue also in certain works of fiction. Lewis’s classic 1978 paper proposed an analysis of the expression “true in such-and-such fiction” in terms of possible worlds. What holds in a certain fictional work is what holds at a set of possible worlds, properly selected via a series of (quite subtle and complex) clauses. But fiction can be occasionally inconsistent. Sometimes, this happens unintentionally: Conan Doyle’s The Sign of the Four describes Watson as limping because of a war wound at his leg. In A Study in Scarlet, however, Watson has no wound at his leg (for his wound is in his shoulder and he doesn’t limp). One may claim that the set of worlds that make such stories true has to be split into disjoint subsets, making true consistent fragments of the fiction. This strategy won’t always work, however, for inconsistencies in fiction may be intentional (as stressed in Proudfoot 2006). Suppose we write a novel, and in its first chapter we have the Mad Mathematician produce a round square. If the intentional inconsistency is excised, the fact that mathematicians all over the world are amazed by this result in the second chapter becomes unexplainable. A natural treatment of these cases, then, is obtained by admitting (appropriately selected) impossible worlds in the set of situations that realize what is told in the story (see e.g. Priest 1997b; Woods 2003, Chapter 6; Berto 2012, Chapters 7 and 8, Badura and Berto forthcoming).