 As in Velleman’s view, the upshot is that your various reasons are invariably accompanied by a further reason: not, as in Velleman’s case, wanting to know what you are doing and to understand yourself, but rather an interest in choosing more rather than less challenging – but nonetheless attainable – objectives. Katsafanas takes this interest to answer the complaint he directed at authorship views of action. If you approve of an aim, you want to achieve it to the greatest extent possible; therefore, if you are active, you are committed to more rather than to less challenging activities. (Although this underwrites the contrast between having more and having less reason to do something, Katsafanas does not regard it as inducing the commensurability of reasons across the board.) He also takes it to have consequences for substantive moral theory; just for instance, because the struggle to overcome resistance involves suffering, that sort of suffering counts as a good thing. 