  Following Hinton’s lead, Snowdon argues that from the fact that ‘looks’ sentences are true in cases of hallucination and in veridical perception, and are not ambiguous, it does not follow that they are made true by (or are true in virtue of) exactly the same kind of occurrence in both cases, for they may instead have disjunctive fulfilment conditions. According to the disjunctive theory Snowdon considers, the claim that ‘It looks to S as of there is an F’ should be treated as being true in virtue of two distinct sorts of states of affairs: Either (there is something which looks to S to be F) or (it is to S as if there is something which looks to S to be F). This disjunctive theory allows that the two cases (perception and hallucination), which are described in the same way, might be of a quite different nature. In particular, it allows that the kind of experience a subject has when she genuinely perceives the world is such that its intrinsic nature is not independent of the kinds of objects perceived. For Snowdon, the availability of this disjunctive approach to perceptual experience undermines the argument for the CTP, unless proponents of the argument can say something which is legitimately conceptual and which shows that this disjunctive approach must be wrong. (So note that according to Snowdon, an assertion of the disjunctive theory is not actually needed for a rejection of the Gricean argument for the CTP.)