 As in his 1935 discussion of need and nausea, Otherwise than Being argues that lived sensibility often overflows representation. And again, Levinas suggests sensuous modes different from Heidegger’s Befindlichkeiten (see  §2.2 above),  in which all understanding takes place for Heidegger (he-BT: 17). Indeed, interwoven layers of affectivity are unfolded in Otherwise than Being. Levinas explores the sensuous-affective proto-experience of the other in light of new moods, writing: “Remorse is the trope of the literal sense of sensibility. In its passivity is erased the distinction between being accused and accusing oneself” (OBBE: 125). Unlike Existence and Existents, wherein light overcame the distinction between subjects and objects, allowing the subject to make the object intelligible within its horizon of appearing (EE: 41), Otherwise than Being approaches transcendence in sensuous and temporal terms, arguing inter alia for the insistence of a past that eludes thematization (OBBE: 122–123). In that sense, transcendence for an embodied being is always transcendence-in-immanence. The affective “experience” of my relations with particular others is thus preserved as a trace or pre-thematic reminiscence of the flesh, as “a relationship with a singularity without the mediation of any principle, any ideality” (OBBE: 100). Invoking Otherwise than Being (OBBE: 105–107), John Llewelyn has called this affective dimension of invested selfhood, or “ipseity”, a “‘deep’ saying” that “bears witness to what is neither recollected nor forgotten in the epistemic sense of these terms when [or once] it is represented as a sign” (Llewelyn 2002b:  135).[32]