 Some or all of these assumptions and goals are rejected in pragmatic accounts of explanation. Early contributors to this approach include Michael Scriven (e.g., 1962) and Sylvan Bromberger (e.g., 1966), with more systematic statements, due to van Fraassen (1980) and Achinstein (1983) appearing in the 1980s. Since it is not always clear just what the points of disagreement are between pragmatic and traditional accounts, some orienting remarks about this will be useful before turning to details. Defenders of pragmatic approaches to explanation typically stress the point that whether provision of a certain body of information to some audience produces understanding or is illuminating for that audience depends on the background knowledge of the audience members and on other factors having to do with the local context. For example, an explanation of the deflection of starlight by the sun that appeals to the field equations of General Relativity may be highly illuminating to a trained physicist but unintelligible to a layperson because of their background. Factors of this sort are grouped together as “pragmatic” and their influence is taken to illustrate at least one way in which pragmatic considerations enter into the notion of explanation.