 Gendler’s wontianism focuses solely on the interactions between cognitive imagination and desire while other wontian theories shift the focus towards the role of conative imagination. Gregory Currie (2002) differentiates between two modes of imagining, belief-like (cognitive) imagining and desire-like (conative) imagining. He claims that imaginative resistance arises due to a lack of relevant antecedent desire that can ground one’s desire-like imaginings. Some imaginings are belief-like with respect to their inferential role: imagining that P can lead to new imaginings just as believing that P would lead to new beliefs. If one engages in belief-like imagining some proposition P in the course of reading a story, then they accept P as true within the story and make the appropriate connections and inferences that having such a belief requires. An example would be imagining that Don Quixote is fighting a windmill. Desire-like imaginings, on the other hand, are rather more constrained. Even though we do not seem to have any problem belief-like imagining something we do not believe, we cannot as easily desire-like imagine something we do not desire. This is because desire-like imagining requires there to be an antecedent desire. There are also internal connections between belief-like imaginings and desire-like imaginings when it comes to moral matters, just as there are internal connections between moral beliefs and desires (e.g., believing that X is good also involves desiring X). In an imaginative resistance case such as Giselda, to belief-like imagine that G is true requires one to have a desire-like imagining for female infanticide to occur. Since one’s desire-like imagining is conditioned by their antecedent desires, to have a desire-like imagining that female infants should be killed requires one to have an antecedent desire that female infants should be killed. When one lacks such an antecedent desire, one experiences imaginative resistance. 