  A number of arguments against Sylvan’s hypothesised intrinsic value of natural items focus on supposed problems that attend the apparently “cosmic” account of value that items are said to have in the absence of valuers (e.g., after the demise of the last man). Some focus on problems traditionally associated with moral objectivism. If value is conceptually independent of valuers then: moral intuitionism is an unacceptable consequence (cf. Mannison 1980, 57, the charge of “realism”); moral theory is inconsistent with (the preferred theory) moral projectivism (Carter 2004, who claims a projectivist theory can explain our intuitions concerning the last man); or such value is simply beyond epistemic access and irrelevant for decision-making (Justus et al. 2009, 187–8). The latter point echoes earlier claims in Thompson (1990), Grey (1993), and Fox (1995) that the hypothesis of intrinsic value in nature results in values that, being too far removed from human concerns, are irrelevant as an ethical guide to human action (Thompson 1990, 159–60; Grey 1993, 464) and, in any event, are unnecessary—an enlightened anthropocentrism is sufficient.