 Natural law theory, at present, has made significant concessions to mainstream liberal thought. In contrast certainly to its medieval formulation, most contemporary natural law theorists argue for limited governmental power, and do not believe that the state has an interest in attempting to prevent all moral wrongdoing. Still, most proponents of the “New Natural Law Theory” do argue against homosexuality, and against legal protections for gays and lesbians in terms of employment and housing, even to the point of serving as expert witnesses in court cases or helping in the writing of amicus curae briefs. They also argue against same sex marriage (Bradley, 2001; George, 1999b). There have been some attempts, however, to reconcile natural law theory and homosexuality (see, for example, Lago, 2018; Goldstein, 2011). While maintaining the central aspects of natural law theory and its account of basic human goods, they typically either argue that marriage itself is not a basic good (Lago), or that the sort of good it is, when understood in a less narrow, dogmatic fashion, is such that same-sex couples can enjoy it. Part of the theoretical interest in these arguments is that they allow for a moral evaluation of sexuality, still requiring it to realize the basic good of friendship if it is to be permissible, while avoiding what seem to be the various problematic aspects of contemporary natural law theorists’ denigration of same-sex sexuality in any form.