 Chomsky’s position, which denies that speakers using referential NPs refer to objects (on a particular standard understanding), appears to imply a rejection of natural language ontology as such. There are different kinds of ontological responses to the various Chomskyan challenges. First, one may adopt a different conception of reality. Reality need not be conceived as a mind-independent realm of material objects, subject to particular constraints on their spatio-temporal location. Instead it may be taken to consist in a plenitude of entities, including entities that are individuated by function and purposes. Second, one may adopt non-standard notions of an object that allow for apparently contradictory property attributions, such as “complex objects” that obtain properties from distinct entities of which they are composed (Arapinis &amp; Vieu 2015) or “variable embodiments” that inherit properties from different manifestations (Fine 1999). A third type of response is to revise standard views of predication by having predicates apply to underspecified conceptual units (“dot objects”), which are then mapped them onto real objects (Pustejovsky 1995) or to have predication be based on particular ways of property inheritance from parts or constituting matter (Liebesman &amp; Magidor 2017). 