 Most basically, China’s governmental structure in the Neo-Confucian era has four parts: (1) the emperor, imperial family, and inner-court attendants like eunuchs; (2) the outer-court ministers, bureaucracy, and the literati families who staff them; (3) the common people; and (4) the institutions that help to shape the ways in which (1)–(3) interact. One of the great debates of the Neo-Confucian era is about the relative importance or priority of institutions. This debate takes on many guises, but at bottom is the sense that there is a tension between two ways of understanding the structure that undergirds a well-ordered society. One sees institutions and their component parts (traditions, rules, and regulations, etc.) as more fundamental. The other sees the people who direct and belong to the institutions, and particularly the character of such people (understood as a combination of talents and ethical dispositions), as more fundamental. Where a philosopher stands on this issue can help to explain how they align on other critical issues in matters of governance. Those who tend to see institutions as more fundamental are more inclined to see legal and regulatory reform as the primary way of addressing large-scale problems. Those who see the character of people as more fundamental often think the solution to such problems lies in moral cultivation and transformation (in particular, of the emperor himself). To a certain extent, the former think that institutions should be designed to take human flaws and shortcomings into account, so that the state does not require large numbers of people to be virtuous in order to create social order, while the latter tend to worry that institutions designed for flawed people will, at least at certain levels, inhibit the kind of self-improvement that makes government truly transformative. For ease of reference, let us use the term “character-centered” and “institutionalist” to refer to these two positions.