 A second area of disagreement concerns the fate of natural kinds. Many scientific pluralists aim to reimagine the tradition of natural kinds in pluralist terms (Ereshefsky 2018; Kendig [ed.] 2015; Barberousse et al. 2020). One common strategy departs from a recognition of property clusters (Boyd 2021; Slater 2015) or nodes in causal networks (Khalidi 2018) that shape scientific ontologies. For example, classic examples of natural kinds such as gold, tiger, or water come with clusters of causally connected properties that make them suitable for scientific inquiry and distinguish them from gerrymandered entities such as the disjunctive kind gold-or-tiger.  Scientists can learn a lot about gold and they can learn a lot about tigers but there is little to learn about the disjunctive kind gold-or-tiger. Current accounts of natural kinds commonly hold that these insights about the cluster structure of the world can be embraced by pluralists while insisting that the prioritization of specific properties and clusters responds to contingent research interests and does therefore not converge on one absolute conception of the world (Franklin-Hall 2015). However, not all pluralists consider the tradition of natural kinds worth saving. Hacking (2007) influentially suggested that the tradition “is in disarray and is unlikely to be put back together again” and a number of philosophers have suggested to move on without natural kinds (Chakravartty 2017; Ludwig 2018; Brigandt forthcoming).