 According to Goldman, the lesson to be gleamed from synchronic actualist-possibilist cases is this: In determining what we are obligated at t to do at t, we should not hold fixed facts about what we are freely doing at t. Moreover, such synchronic counterfactuals do not determine in any way what an agent is obligated to do at any time. Consequently, the kind of immediate act-set that is a candidate for being obligatory is the fully specific simultaneous act-set that is immediately available to Jones. A performable fully specific simultaneous act-set is one such that one cannot also perform any other act-set at the relevant time. Goldman (1978: 190) calls such act-sets maximal conjunctive acts, but this entry will stick with the terminology of a fully specific simultaneous act-set in order to avoid ambiguation with other notions of act-sets at issue in this paper. Let’s suppose that the (immediate) fully specific simultaneous act-sets available to Jones are ranked from best to worst as follows. 