  Zeno’s account of how he defended Parmenides against those who  ridiculed him is designed to correct Socrates’ mistaken impression  that Zeno was basically just arguing for the same thing as  Parmenides, that the all is one. Zeno is portrayed as trying to  correct this mistaken view of his purposes as born of a superficial  understanding of Parmenides’ doctrine. Zeno’s arguments against  plurality will seem to entail Parmenides’ doctrine only if his  thesis, “one is” (hen esti), is taken to mean  that only one thing exists. However, the elaborate examination of  this very thesis, “one is” (hen esti), by  Parmenides himself in the latter part of the dialogue shows that  Plato thinks it is not to be understood in any such trivial sense.  For not only does Parmenides end up examining the relation of his One to other things, which would have been impossible if his doctrine  entailed their non-existence, but the relation other things have to  the One actually proves responsible in a way for their existence.  Zeno cannot be supposing that his arguments against plurality  entailed the doctrine of Parmenides when that doctrine is represented in this same dialogue by Parmenides himself as something altogether  more involved than the simple thesis that only one thing exists.  Nevertheless, Zeno’s description of the persons who attempted to  ridicule Parmenides is perfectly compatible with their  having understood the thesis, “one is” (hen  esti), as an assertion that only one thing exists. Zeno’s  arguments constitute an indirect defense of  Parmenides—“a sort of support” (boêtheia  tis, 128c6)—because they do nothing to disabuse his  detractors of their superficial understanding of his doctrine.  Instead, as Zeno says, he tried to show that the assumption that  there are many things has consequences every bit as unpalatable as  those Parmenides’ critics suppose his position has (cf. Procl. in Prm. 619.15–21). Thus, while Zeno accepts Socrates’ point that  his own arguments aim to show that there are not many things, he  corrects Socrates’ impression that, in arguing this point, he was  just saying the same thing as Parmenides in a different form. 