 As a consequence, the Skeptic conception of the end of life is similar in some ways to Epicurean and Stoic beliefs. For Epicureans the end is freedom from pain and distress; the Stoic identification of virtue and the good promises freedom from disturbance. While Pyrrho and Sextus hold freedom from disturbance to be the end of life, they differ from the former over the means by which it is achieved. Both the Epicureans and Stoics, for example, hold that a tranquil life is impossible in the absence of virtue. By contrast, Sextus does not have a lot to say in a positive vein about virtue, although he does recommend following traditional laws about piety and goodness, and he indicates that the Skeptic may live virtuously (PH I 17). Rather, it is for the Skeptics an epistemic attitude embodied in a distinctive practice, not virtue, that leads to the desired state. This alone would seem to be enough to disqualify Pyrrhonism as a form of eudaimonism.