Swinburne has argued that immutability is incompatible with acting freely, writing that an “agent is perfectly free at a certain time if his action results from his own choice at that time and if his choice is not itself brought about by anything else.  Yet a person immutable in the strong sense would be unable to perform any action at a certain time other than what he had previously intended to do.  His course of action being fixed by his past choices, he would not be perfectly free” (1993, p. 222).  One thing to note here is that if my past choices fix my present choice, it does not follow that they bring it about.  It may only follow that it is inevitable that I myself bring that choice about at that time.  So it is not at all clear that immutability is incompatible even with Swinburnean perfect freedom. More importantly, Swinburne's “perfect freedom” is a particularly demanding notion.  Even if my own past choices do bring about my present choice, many libertarians would allow that my present choice is derivatively free and responsible if the past choices that brought it about were libertarian-free (see e.g. Kane 1996, Stump 1996, Ekstrom 2000).  Most theists would be quite content with a God with full libertarian freedom.