  This feature of Broad’s theory is counterintuitive, and it gives rise to some intriguing, and arguably peculiar,  results.[14] Present purposes, however, will best be served by concentrating on two most fundamental problems faced by Broad’s account. The first worry concerns phenomenological adequacy. Consider again tone-phase D in Figure 9. As we have just seen, it is experienced as a whole throughout the period of sensing [A1-A2]. Broad may reject durationless acts of sensing, but he does not reject acts of sensing of varying extents or durations, and [A1-A2] includes as proper parts many acts of finite duration that are shorter than itself, and just as [A1-A2] apprehends D as a whole, so too do all these finite parts. In which case, instead of being experienced just once, won’t D be experienced many times over? How could it be otherwise, given that each of these finite parts includes an experiencing of the whole of D? If Broad’s model predicts the existence of experiences which do not actually occur, it seems safe to conclude that the mechanism at the heart of it is  flawed.[15]