 In contrast, phenomenological theories of theater, resting on the philosophical phenomenology of either Edmund Husserl (1913 [1981]), Martin Heidegger (1950 [2008]), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945 [2012]), or Bruce Wilshire (1982), gave rise to phenomenological theories of theater (Carlson 1984 [1993], States 1985, Rayner 1994, Garner 1994). The motive for phenomenological theorizing about theater, in large part, had to do with retrieving for theater studies and performance theory the spectator’s appreciation of the materiality of what has been performed. The single most important achievements of this movement were a) putting the spectator’s position foremost and b) regarding the spectator as someone who engaged in processes of understanding on the basis of both cognitive and affective responses. Merleau-Ponty, for example, was famous for making the observer’s perception of the world paramount. This could have translated into spectator-centered theories of theater and theater cognition. Unfortunately, most phenomenological research of theatrical productions focuses on either the plays themselves, as works of dramatic literature, or on the techniques of staging, principally the actor’s techniques. This orientation towards the means of producing performances, rather than the conditions of their reception, is fairly common among theater studies and performance theory. As a result, the writings of many phenomenologically oriented theater or performance theorists only begin with descriptions of a spectator’s experience and the cognitive challenges spectators face. This often has had the effect of estranging their views from attempts to answer the classical questions of aesthetics and philosophy of art, which are often drawn from the point of view of the amateur spectator or audience (Kristeller 1951: 517–521).