 To complete the notion of moral virtue we must consider the role reason plays in moral actions. Summing up at Book II.6, Aristotle says virtue is a disposition to choose, lying in the mean which is relative to us, determined by reason (1107a1). Since he is talking about choosing actions, he is focusing on the way moral virtue issues in actions. In turn, it is the role of practical wisdom (phronêsis) to determine choice. While moral virtues, virtues of character, belong to the part of the soul which can obey reason, practical wisdom is a virtue of the part of the soul that itself reasons. The virtues of thought, intellectual virtues, are knowledge (epistêmê), comprehension (nous), wisdom (sophia), craft (technê), and practical wisdom (1139b15–25). The first three grasp the truth about what cannot be otherwise and is not contingent. A good example of knowledge about what cannot be otherwise is mathematics. Craft and practical wisdom pursue the truth that can be had about what can be otherwise and is contingent. What can be otherwise includes what is made – the province of craft – and what is done – the province of practical wisdom (1140a1). While Aristotle’s account of practical wisdom raises several problems, we will focus on only two closely related issues. He says that it is the mark of someone with practical wisdom to deliberate well about what leads to the good for himself (to dunasthai kalôs bouleusasthai peri ta hautô(i) agatha). This good is not specific, such as health and strength, but is living well in general (1140a25–30). This description of practical wisdom, first of all, implies that it deliberates about actions; it is a skill for discerning those actions which hit the mean between the two extremes. However, the ambiguity of the phrase ‘what leads to the good’ might suggest that practical wisdom deliberates only about instrumental means to living well. Still since practical wisdom determines which actions hit the mean between two extremes, such actions are not instrumental means to living well – as though living well were a separate state. Actions which hit the mean are parts of living well; the good life is composed of actions under the headings of, for instance, honor and pleasure, which achieve the mean. In addition, the deliberation of practical wisdom does not have to be confined to determining which actions hit the mean. While Aristotle would deny that anyone deliberates about whether happiness is the end of human life, we do deliberate about the constituents of happiness. So, one might well deliberate about the ways in which honor and pleasure fit into happiness.