  Weatherson's theory is that the role of each precisification is to arbitrarily make one of the oi more natural than the rest. Typically, it is thought that the denotation of a term according to a precisification is determined directly. It is a fact about a precisification P that, according to it, ‘cloud’ denotes property c1. On Weatherson's theory this is not the case. What the precisification does is provide a new, and somewhat arbitrary, standard of naturalness, and the content of the terms according to the precisification is then determined by Lewis's theory of content. The denotations of ‘cloud’ and ‘that’ according to a precisification P are those concepts and objects that are the most natural according to P of the concepts and objects that we could be denoting by those terms, for all one can tell from the way the terms are used. The coordination between the two terms, the fact that on every precisification ‘that’ denotes an object in the extension of ‘cloud’ is explained by the fact that the very same thing, naturalness according to P, determines the denotation of ‘cloud’ and of ‘that’.