 First, it should be noted that the view of truth as a property is not as natural as it appears on the face of it. Frege brought into play an argument to the effect that characterizing a sentence as true adds nothing new to its content, for ‘It is true that 5 is a prime number’ says exactly the same as just ‘5 is a prime number’. That is, the adjective ‘true’ is in a sense redundant and thus is not a real predicate expressing a real property such as the predicates ‘white’ or ‘prime’ which, on the contrary, cannot simply be eliminated from a sentence without an essential loss for its content. In this case a superficial grammatical analogy is misleading. This idea gave an impetus to the deflationary conception of truth (advocated by Ramsey, Ayer, Quine, Horwich, and others, see the entry on  the deflationary theory of truth).