 We have dwelled in some detail on Polger and Shapiro’s (2016) book because of its scope and the unifying focus it offers for philosophical discussions of multiple realization, both historical and recent. Similarly, initial criticisms of the book ranged from ones squarely in philosophy of mind, to others aimed at more broadly metaphysics of science considerations. Not surprisingly, given that the book defends a version of mind-brain identity theory, which has been considered indefensible, or at best fringe, for some time, it met with rapid criticism from philosophers of mind. Ronald Endicott (2017) takes Polger and Shapiro to task for offering few (if any) examples of explicit mind-brain identities. Endicott’s criticism is fair enough, in one sense. Polger and Shapiro nowhere attempt to catalogue or discuss specific identity claims. Neither, of course, did U.T. Place or J.J.C. Smart in their seminal works first defending the view; but those works were published sixty or more years ago, and neuroscience has progressed rapidly over that time. Polger and Shapiro do criticize numerous claims to have found multiple realization of mind on brain, so perhaps those discussions can serve implicitly as mind-brain identity claims. But circa 2016, one reasonably could have hoped for some examples of specific mind-brain identities, and a defense of the evidence that supports them.