How should we understand the truthmaking relation, and the way in which the existence of the truthmaker is sufficient for the truth of the theory? On the orthodox necessitation approach to truthmaking (Fox 1987; Bigelow 1988: 125; Armstrong 1997: 115; Lewis 2001), this sufficiency is analyzed in modal terms as follows: x is a truthmaker for T iff T is true and, necessarily, if x exists, then T is true. (A plural version replaces the singular variable ‘x’ with a plural variable ‘xx’ (read “the xs”).) This leads to a familiar problem when truthmakers are sought for necessary theories: any entity (or plurality of entities) is a truthmaker for any necessary theory on the analysis. And there is the familiar fix: replace modal entailment (in the analysis of truthmaking) with a more discriminating entailment relation, perhaps some sort of relevant entailment (Restall 1996). But for many truthmaker theorists, no entailment relation will be able to capture the idea that truthmakers must be fundamental entities, and must ground the theories they make true. This drives these truthmaker theorists to introduce a primitive grounding or in-virtue-of relation to characterize the truthmaking relation: x is a truthmaker for T iff T is true and, necessarily, Ts truth is grounded in x (or T is true in virtue of the existence of x) (see Schaffer 2010 and Cameron forthcoming).  Call this the grounding account of truthmaking.[30]