 Matthew Liao has argued for “the genetic basis for moral agency” as a sufficient condition for full moral status that is more plausible and inclusive than a potentiality criterion (Liao 2010). It accords full moral status to humans who have lost the potential for agency, and to radically disabled humans who never had such potential, in any conventional sense of that term. But it includes these individuals at the cost of including almost all human embryos—a cost many would consider excessive. Moreover, Liao’s account requires a conceptually difficult, morally uncertain distinction between genomes that have and lack “the basis for moral agency” (e.g., Wasserman 2002; McMahan 2002, 2008). Potentiality accounts face similar line-drawing problems; the question is whether the shift from “potential” to “genetic basis” makes those problems any more tractable. The genetic basis account also shares what many would regard as a problem of “over inclusiveness”—they confer moral status on early embryos, which have the genetic basis for moral agency, at least as clearly as they have the potential for it. To justify abortion, proponents of either account must rely on a woman’s right to withdraw gestational aid.