 Unlike feminists who locate the main problem with adaptive preferences as lying with their obstruction of the agent’s autonomy, Khader rejects the view of adaptive preferences as autonomy deficits. She agrees that adaptive preferences can block the well-being of those who have them, but she argues that both procedural and substantive autonomy accounts either yield results that do not square with our intuitions, or commit us to invoking policies that are coercive and so anti-liberal. The general charge against procedural autonomy accounts is that they inevitably sneak in an objective notion of the good when they are supposed to be neutral, and that those who fail them are believed to lack mental capacities to understand or scrutinize their choices. The general charge against substantive autonomy accounts is that they inevitably involve disrespect for cultural diversity, with the result that those who fail them are deemed to have bad values that render inoperative their capacities to scrutinize their preferences (105). Either way, autonomy accounts have it that those with adaptive preferences are unable to make their own decisions, which is false and condescending (103, 105).