 An illustration of this alternative picture of eliminativism is provided by Paul Griffiths’ account of our commonsense notion of emotion (Griffiths, 1997). Griffiths argues that the category of emotion should be dropped from scientific psychology and replaced with categories that are better grounded in scientific psychology and neuroscience. He points out that the folk concept cuts across three different kinds of affective states: affect programs, higher cognitive emotions and social constructions. Affect programs are basic and automatic states such as fear or anger that have an evolutionary basis and that are triggered by specific conditions. By contrast, higher cognitive emotions, like jealousy or shame, and social constructions are much less automatic and more easily influenced by a broader range of factors like higher-order thoughts or cultural conditioning. Griffiths argues that these psychological types are almost certainly subserved by radically different cognitive mechanisms and consequently should not be lumped together under some superordinate commonsense category of emotion. Griffiths develops a similar line of argument against emotion based upon levels of analysis and the difference between function-based taxonomies as opposed to lineage-based taxonomies.