 Like most medieval authors, Olivi can be understood as a virtue ethicist. As with many of them, however, he does not defend virtue ethics in its strict Aristotelian guise. To begin with, he criticizes the Thomistic position, according to which some moral virtues are in the sensory part of the soul, but he is also critical of Bonaventure, who held that virtues belong to the free choice (liberum arbitrium) and thus include both the will and the intellect. Instead, Olivi places all virtues, including prudence, firmly in the will. Other powers of the soul may participate in these virtues due to their connection to the will, but apart from this connection they have no real virtues (Kent 1995, 233–36; Summa III q. 4, pp. 224–25, 231). Virtues, on Olivi’s account, are stable dispositions (or habits, habitus) of the will, which are generated by repeated actions, and they make good choices easier for the agent (Summa II q. 58, p. 432).