  One route to this view proceeds through the claims that a veridical perception of the world is a perceptual state with an intentional content containing demonstrative elements that refer to the mind-independent items in the environment that are perceived, and that truth-evaluable intentional contents with demonstrative elements that successfully refer are object-dependent. On this view, a particular experience E that is a veridical perception of a particular mind-independent object O will have an intentional content with a demonstrative element that successfully refers to O, and a distinct particular experience E* will have an intentional content with the same veridicality conditions only if its intentional content contains a demonstrative element that also refers to O. If E* is a hallucination it will not have an intentional content with a demonstrative element that successfully refers to O, so it will not have an intentional content with the same veridicality conditions as E. Suppose we now add the following assumption: If two experiences have intentional contents which differ in their veridicality conditions, then this is not just a respect in which these mental events differ, it is also amounts to a difference in their mental kinds. We can now derive the conclusion that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are experiences of different mental kinds. This last assumption needs to be made explicit, as it is not agreed upon by all (e.g., Burge 1993, 2005 and 2010). Note that acceptance of the assumption would also commit one to the following claim: If E* is a veridical perception of numerically distinct object O*, then E and E* are to be regarded as experiences of different mental kinds even if O and O* are perceptually indiscernible to the subject who perceives them. (For discussion of the status of that assumption, see Mehta 2014, Gomes and French 2016, Mehta and Garson 2016, and French and Gomes 2019).