 Of course, in light of sec, 1.2 and 1.4 above, we can foresee a downside to this. Both Grounding-Predicate-T and Grounding-Operator-T quantify over propositions that stand hyperintensionally to their truth-makers. It follows that both Grounding-Predicate-T and Grounding-Operator-T share a commitment with Necessitarian-T and Essentialist-T, viz. an ontology of abstract propositions which have their meanings essentially. But, again, this may be a commitment many grounding theorists have already made or be willing to accept if it gives them a good account of truth-making. Another issue is that there is no consensus upon the formal properties of grounding. Whilst, for example, Schaffer (2009: 376) has maintained that grounding is irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) has argued that the relation of truth-making isn’t any of these things. But Rodriguez-Pereyra also argues that grounding isn’t any of those things either. 