  Two points are worth noting. (i) Although doubts are classified as non-true (apramā) cognitions, they are not false. A false cognition is one whose content is “x is F” when in fact x is not F. (ii) Doubts are distinguished from other cognitions by virtue of having a special type of content, rather than by being propositional attitudes of a special kind. The Nyāya do not here say that we can take one of a series of attitudes towards the same proposition, believing, disbelieving, doubting, etc. Yet if the only thing which distinguishes a doubt is its having a content of the form specified in TS 71, then what differentiates the doubt that x is F from the belief that x is both F and not-F? Vardhamāna replies by drawing a distinction between actually having a contradictory belief and merely believing that one has a contradictory belief. The former is supposedly impossible, the supposedly contradictory belief that x is both F and not-F is really a belief that I have a belief whose qualificand is x and whose qualifiers are F and not-F. Since there are no genuine contradictory beliefs, there are no beliefs with the same content as doubts.