 Of course, whether one thinks that this kind of strategy is successful will likely depend upon how one understands the locution “for any x”. Not everyone will be persuaded. For instance, Ulrich Meyer (2005: 214, 2013: 68–69), when advancing his own “sceptical” challenge to presentism, considers a statement of presentism that’s very similar to the reading of P2 offered by Crisp (2004), in which the statement of presentism is equivalent to the claim that “only present entities exist temporally”. (On the assumption that “x exists within time” and “x exists temporally” are the very same notion, the two statements are equivalent.) However, Meyer argues that it’s clear enough that Curie exists temporally. After all, she has existed! And what can “x exists temporally” (or “x exists”) mean if not, simply, “x has existed, exists now, or will exist”?