 Moral rules play a role in guiding and evaluating action, to be sure, but so do rules of aesthetics and prudence: these too promote the general happiness, and as such provide reasons for action. There can, of course, be clashes between such rules of morality, prudence, and aesthetics—and, indeed, clashes of rules within those domains. In such cases, Mill writes, it is “requisite that first principles should be appealed to” (Utilitarianism, X: 226; cf. System, VIII: 951). Mill also allows that appeal be made directly to the principle of utility on occasions when an agent knows that following rules—moral, prudential, or aesthetic—would generate significantly less overall happiness than violating those rules (Utilitarianism, X: 223; Taylor’s Statesman XIX: 638–40). But Mill is unclear as to how often such clashes and exceptions license direct appeal to the principle of utility. To the extent that one ought often to ignore the rules of morality, prudence, and aesthetics, and act simply on the basis of which action is most choice-worthy according to the theory of practical reason overall, Mill is, in the end, pulled towards something which comes to resemble an act-utilitarianism position (Turner 2015).