 Everett’s line of attack is interesting and innovative, and (given the worries expressed about language-focused arguments) in some ways a model of how an antirealist should really pursue the battle against what she believes are ontological illusions. But the debate is not likely to end there. Although at least one influential (erstwhile) realist has conceded the power of Everett’s argument, proposing an antirealist notion of assumption-relative truth (Howell 2011, 2015) in place of the realist absolute notion he championed earlier (Howell 1979), other realists are likely to think that Everett underestimates the conceptual resources available to them. One may, for example, think that the bridging principles as stated are too simple to be applied across the board, and that they can be precisified in a way that is no longer ontologically problematic (Thomasson 2010). Or one may say that a distinction between ontic indeterminacy in a story and ontic indeterminacy with respect to, or out of, a story allows one to rebut the indeterminacy part of the critique (cf. Schneider &amp; von Solodkoff 2009 and Voltolini 2010). Alternatively, one may be able to rebut the critique in its entirety by appealing to more or less familiar neo-Meinongian distinctions between (i) predicative and propositional negation and (ii) modes of predication (alternatively, kinds of property) (cf. Voltolini 2010). Of course, antirealists take such distinctions to be poorly understood and part of what makes realism an unattractive option in the first place (in addition, they may unusable in complex fiction-involving sentences (see again Everett 2013; for a reply, cf. Voltolini 2015b)), so even if such rebuttals are successful on their own terms this is not likely to settle the realism-antirealism debate.