 It is common in everyday discourse and philosophical discussion to treat self-respect and self-esteem as synonyms. It is evaluative self-respect, typically, with which self-esteem is conflated (Dillon 2013). Evaluative self-respect and (high) self-esteem are both forms of positive self-regard concerned with one’s worth, both involve having a favorable view of oneself in virtue of one’s activities and personal qualities, and a person can have or lack either one undeservedly. Nevertheless, many philosophers have argued that the two attitudes are importantly different (for example, Dillon 2004, 2013; Harris 2001; Chazan 1998; Sachs 1981; Darwall 1977), although some theorists treat the evaluative stance as a form of self-esteem (“mortal self-esteem”). The main difference between the two is that evaluative self-respect is a normative stance and self-esteem is not: the former calls for justification in light of standards one has good reason to regard as appropriate, while the latter arises from beliefs about oneself whose justification need not matter to one and that need not involve standards-based self-assessment. Many philosophers agree that evaluative self-respect is morally important, which makes sense inasmuch as it is in the service of the moral demands of dignity, worthy character, agency, and one’s moral commitments, and so is a motivation for morally appropriate living. Self-esteem--having a good opinion of oneself or feeling good about oneself--is one of the most extensively studied phenomena in psychology and social psychology; it is generally regarded by social scientists as central to healthy psychological functioning and well-being, although they note that it has no necessary connection to moral values, is central to such negative states as narcissism, and can lead to serious disrespect of others and harm unless appropriately constrained (Baumeister et al 1996). (But see Keshen (2017) on the value of reasonable self-esteem.) One way of distinguishing evaluative self-respect and self-esteem is by their grounds and the points of view from which they are appraised. Evaluative self-respect involves an assessment from a moral point of view of one’s character and conduct in light of standards one regards as implied by one’s moral worth as an agent and a person. Self-esteem, as popularly and scientifically understood, is based both on whatever qualities or activities one prizes or thinks others prize, and on the esteem one believes one gets from others whose esteem one values. It does not essentially concern morally significant worth, appropriate self-valuing, or self-assessment from a moral point of view, and it can be based on features wholly unrelated to or even opposed to good character. For example, one can have a good opinion of oneself in virtue of being a good joke-teller or for having won an important sports competition and yet not think one is a good person because of it (Darwall 1977). And depending on what serves one’s psychological needs or suits one’s companions, one can derive high self-esteem from successful thuggery as from being honest and kind. To have self-esteem is to feel good about oneself; to have evaluative self-respect is to feel justified, to be able to hold one’s head up, look others in the eye, face oneself in the mirror. Another way of distinguishing them focuses on what it is to lose them: to lose evaluative respect for oneself is to find oneself to be shameful, contemptible, or intolerable; to lose self-esteem is to think less well of oneself, to be downcast because one believes one lacks qualities that would add to one’s luster (Harris 2001) or that others think less well of one.