 Finally, some proponents of teleological theories do not think that content is determinate in the cases used to illustrate the alleged problem. Dennett (1995) maintains that such content indeterminacy is unproblematic. Papineau (1998) maintains that content is indeterminate in the case of a creature that lacks a belief-desire psychological structure (although he abandons this position later in Papineau 2016). More recently, Bergman (2021) has argued that content indeterminacy in the frog case is acceptable, because (i) it is a type of indeterminacy that is comparatively ‘well-behaved’, more like vagueness than like other, more radical forms of semantic indeterminacy and (ii) there are good reasons to suppose that the indeterminacy does not generalize to the propositional attitudes of human beings. According to Bergman, this is an attractive position, not least because it can explain why theorists continue to disagree about what the correct content ascription in the frog case is.