 Negation also raises interesting questions for the theory in the Logic. The act of denial extends to the entire judgment; this is expressed by the linguistic “not” attaching to the verb. As Frege points out in his essay “Negation” (1918), this account does not neatly fit with the requirement that a false thought be recognized as false. It seems that propositions must be affirmed (as true) or denied (as a true negation). For example, to recognize that “3 is greater than 5” is false requires having a complete thought, and not merely fragments of a thought. Similarly, there seems to be no room for true thoughts that have false thoughts as their components, such as true conditionals with false antecedents. In addition, the Logic seems to have trouble with double negation. If denying separates the thought into its parts, then double negation would function as a sword that magically unites the parts it had sundered (Frege 1918 [1952: 122–129]). From a modern perspective, the root problem in treating negation as denial is once again the failure to distinguish the thought or proposition that is grasped from the act of judging it.