  A fourth alternative to the methodology assumed thus far is presented in a series of powerful papers by Mark Johnston, in which he defends  a view called “minimalism,” according to which the  metaphysical facts of personal identity are irrelevant to the  justification of our person-related practices and practical concerns, that the facts to which we think we are committed actually play only  a minimal role in those practices and concerns (Johnston 1987, 1989,  1992, and 1997; Wolf 1986 and Unger 1990 have argued in a somewhat  similar vein as well). Indeed, our practices here have a  justification independent of metaphysics – a coherentist  justification – so no metaphysical theory of personal identity  will imply any real revisions to them at all. Johnston illustrates  this point by talking about one of our practical concerns in  particular: self-concern. My self-concern is part of a wider pattern  of self-referential concern, a special non-derivative concern  I have for a certain limited network of people, all of whom bear certain  sorts of special relations to me: I care about my friends,  my family, and my self. I care about them for their own sakes and I would need a very good reason not to do so (which is so  far not forthcoming) (Johnston 1997, 158–159). Thus, in “the  particular case of personal identity, minimalism implies that any  metaphysical view of persons which we might have is either  epiphenomenal or a redundant basis for our practice of making  judgements about personal identity and organizing our practical  concerns around this relation” (Johnston 1997, 150).