 How might a deflationist respond to this alleged problem? The key move will be to focus on the property of being true. For the Moorean, this property is a simple unanalyzable one. But deflationists need not be committed to this. As we have seen, some deflationists think that there is no truth property at all. And even among deflationists who accept that there is some insubstantial truth property, it is not clear that this is the sort of property that the Moorean has in mind. To say that a property is unanalyzable suggests that the property is a fundamental property. One might understand this in something like the sense that Lewis proposes, i.e., as a property that is sparse and perfectly natural. Or one might understand a fundamental property as one that is groundable but not grounded in anything. But deflationists need not understand a purported property of being true in either of these ways. As noted in Section 1.2, they may think of it as an abundant property rather than a sparse one, or as one that is ungroundable. In this way, there are options available for deflationists who want to distinguish themselves from the Moorean view of truth.