 Larson and Ludlow are aware of this problem, considering it in §7 of their paper. They suggest two strategies. First they suggest altering the account so that the truth of (1) does guarantee the truth of (22). This is well and good, but it has to be done in such a way that we don’t lose our explanation of why (1) and (3) are consistent and why (1) doesn’t entail (4). Larson and Ludlow do not tell us how to thread that needle. Second, they consider admitting that (1) does not entail (22) and seeking to explain why (1) and (22) can nonetheless be used to report the same attitude by an auxiliary account. Again, this is well and good, but then they owe us an explanation of why we must go to such pains to explain one set of entailment intuitions semantically – namely, the intuition that (1) is consistent with (3) and so does not entail (4) – while being so cavalier about relegating other, equally (if not even more) robust entailment intuitions to a non-semantic theory. The availability of contextualist theories described above, and in particular Richard’s theory, which at least promises to respect both sets of entailment relations – that is, respect our intuitions of entailment failures, as in the Frege-style cases, as well as our intuitions about entailment successes, as in the relation between (1) and (22) – makes this second strategy all the more questionable.