  One concern arises from the theoretical role that hypothetical insurance markets are to play in the determination of what is to count as equality of resources. This role assumes increasing prominence in Dworkin's later work (Dworkin 2000, chapters 8–13; also Dworkin 20–11, Part 5, especially chapter 16). Dworkin eventually defines the equal distribution of privately held resources as the one that would issue from an initial auction in which all have equal bidding power to purchase materials resources, supplemented by hypothetical insurance markets against the possibility of suffering the bad brute luck of handicap or low marketable talent. From then on, ordinary market relations govern relations among individuals, and their upshot does not impugn the equality of the initial staring point unless new forms of brute luck intervene. For these Dworkin imagines further hypothetical insurance markets, in which the appropriate compensation for post-initial-auction bad brute luck is set by the average level of insurance that people would have purchased if they knew the incidence of the bad brute luck, its impact on people, and the available devices for mitigating it, but not their personal chances of suffering the bad brute luck. Given this background, just policies in actual societies should aim to mimic the results of these hypothetical equal mechanisms. In this exercise, we seek to undo the effect of brute luck but not option luck, that former being luck that falls on you in ways beyond your power to control and the latter being luck that you can avoid, and maybe reasonably avoid, by voluntary choice.