 The main challenge to Millian perfectionism’s status as the distinctly liberal ethic comes from moral contractualism/contractarianism, which can be divided into what might very roughly be labeled ‘Kantian’ and ‘Hobbesian’ versions. According to Kantian contractualism, “society, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good…” (Sandel, 1982: 1). On this view, respect for the personhood of others demands that we refrain from imposing our view of the good life on them. Only principles that can be justified to all respect the personhood of each. We thus witness the tendency of recent liberal theory (Reiman, 1990; Scanlon, 1998) to transform the social contract from an account of the state to an overall justification of morality, or at least a social morality. This is not to deny, however, that liberalism is, after all, essentially a view that there is such a thing as minding one’s own business, and that there is a sphere within which we have the right to say “It’s my life” while politely declining invitations to justify ourselves. Liberalism is the idea that there are limits to any need for public justification.