  Whether this reply works depends on how much Wellman is willing to pack into the requirement that the remainder state must still be able to “function.” Wellman’s account is somewhat vague in this regard, but it appears that he only includes the requirement that the state be able to perform the functions needed to secure basic rights and justice, maintain order, and provide essential infrastructure. If that is the case, then those who worry about licensing the secession of the haves from the have-nots might argue that the plebiscitary view permits the destruction of the modern welfare state, a form of polity that often requires significant redistribution of wealth from better-off regions to less well-off ones. Though Wellman is not clear about precisely what functions are necessary for the viability of a state, it is probable that the functions of a welfare state exceed the more minimal ones Wellman’s view likely requires. Thus, critics might argue, Wellman’s plebiscitary view is either a) too austerely libertarian or b) requires a modification and expansion of the viability proviso that the secession not seriously damage the welfare functions of the remainder state.