 Another traditional problem for expectational views is a charge of circularity (see Robins 1976; Prichard 1949; Warnock 1971). The problem is this: When I promise someone to do something then, if all goes well, as a result of my promise they come to trust that I will do that thing. But this trust, on the expectational view, is the source of my obligation to do what I promise. So it seems that the trust of my promisee is both the cause and the effect of my promise, and this seems an unacceptable circle. The problem is best framed in epistemic terms, as one of the reason that a promisee has to trust a promisor. The intuitively obvious reason for the trust a promisee has is that the promisor has promised, and as such has placed herself under a moral obligation to do the deed. This belief, combined with beliefs about the moral rectitude of the promisor, give the promisee a sound reason to believe that the promisor will keep her promise. The problem for the expectational view is that the promisee, on such a view, can’t rely on the fact of the promissory obligation as a reason to trust, since on this view that obligation rests on the prior fact of the trust itself. If the trust of the promisor is the ground of the moral obligation to keep a promise, then prior to the promisee coming to trust the promisor, no such obligation exists. So when the promisee goes searching for a reason to trust, the standard one is barred from consideration.