 What may be said in favor of the view? Consider the atomic predication Fa, where this is a formula that a logician would use to represent the claim that object a has property F. Coming to know that Fa, in the simplest cases, involves acquaintance with objects and properties. Coming to know that the wall is red by seeing that it is red often involves seeing the wall. The wall is not any sort of concept. According to a popular theory in perceptual psychology, seeing that the wall is red or straight typically involves perception of a constant property, the redness or straightness of the wall, and perception of it as constant (“property constancy”, “color constancy”, “shape constancy”). These properties are not concepts. There is thus some reason for thinking that perceptually coming to know that \(p\), in the simplest cases, involves epistemic contact with objects and with properties. If that is right, then two components of the view that to come to know that \(p\) in such cases is to come to have knowledge of facts are plausible. But even if perceptual knowledge of facts is allowed, it is not clear why one should think that instances of “knowledge that \(p\)” or of “coming to know that \(p\)” in which the substitutions for “\(p\)” are logically complex, constitute knowledge of robust facts. Similarly, if we consider the many and various types of coming to know that \(p\) in which the source of knowledge is not sensory perception but, for example, testimony or inference, we may think that in such cases there is no reason to think that what we come to know are facts.