  One reason to take pluralism about truth seriously, then, is that it provides a solution to the scope problem. In rejecting the ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to truth, pluralists formulate a theory whose generality is guaranteed by accommodating the various properties \(F_1 , \ldots ,F_n\) by which true sentences come to be true in different regions of discourse. A second and related reason is that the view promises to be explanatory. Variance in the nature of truth in turn explains why theories of truth perform unequally across various regions of discourse—i.e., why they are descriptively adequate and appropriate in certain regions of discourse, but not others. For pluralists, the existence of different kinds of truths is symptomatic of the non-uniform nature of truth itself. Subsequently, taxonomical differences among truths might be better understood by formulating descriptive models about how the nature of truth might vary between those taxa.