 The following paradox — a variation of the paradox of change — raises some new questions. It is due to the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus (c.280 B.C.E. – c.206 B.C.E.) and has been resurrected by Michael Burke (Burke 1994). In Chrysippus’s example, ‘Dion’ is the name of a human and ‘Theon’ is the name of the proper part of Dion that includes everything but his [Dion’s] left foot. Dion then loses his foot and Chrysippus wishes to know which of those objects — Dion or Theon — survives after Dion loses the foot. Burke’s example is to suppose that, at some point \(t'\) in the future, poor Oscar loses his tail. He then considers the proper part of Oscar, as he is now (at \(t)\), consisting of the whole of Oscar minus his tail. Call this object ‘Oscar−’.  According to the standard account of identity, Oscar and Oscar− are distinct at \(t\). and hence, by ND, they are distinct at \(t'\). (Intuitively, Oscar and Oscar− are distinct at \(t'\) since Oscar has a property at \(t'\) that Oscar− lacks, namely, the property of having had a tail at \(t\). Notice that this argument involves a tacit appeal to ND — or NI, depending on how you look at it). Hence, if both survive, we have a case of two distinct physical objects occupying exactly the same space at the same time. Assuming that is impossible, and assuming, as commonsense demands, that Oscar survives the loss of his tail, it follows that Oscar− does not survive. This conclusion is paradoxical because it appears that nothing happens to Oscar− in the interval between \(t\) and \(t'\) that would cause it to perish.