 This account makes it clear why Haidt favors the term “rationalist” for views like Turiel’s. The young child is portrayed as doing quite a lot of reasoning. But there is much in this account that is puzzling. The child is said perceive the validity of the assailant’s motive. How does he do that? How does he know which motives are valid and which are not? The child also judges that it would be more desirable if the victim is unharmed than if the victim is harmed. Why does the child find this outcome more desirable? Having judged that it is more desirable if the victim is unharmed, the child then makes an inference about how people should act—“people ought not to hit each other”. But this conclusion does not follow logically from the premise that it is more desirable if the victim is unharmed. So if the child’s inference is deductive then presumably the child is invoking one or more additional premises. What are they and how did the child come to believe them? If the inference is not deductive, what sort of inference is it, and how does the child come to have the capacity to make this sort of inference? Having made the judgment that the act in Event A is wrong the child will, if asked, make moral-pattern criterion judgments. How does he do that? Obviously, Turiel’s constructivist account of the processes underlying the formation of criterion judgments in response to questions about harmful transgressions leaves a lot unexplained.