 In the Munich and Göttingen circles, Husserl’s Ideas was intensively discussed. Parts of its research program were pursued further; to make just one example, Héring (1921) and Ingarden (1925) further developed Husserl’s eidetics (ontology of essences). Generally, however, the Ideas provoked what could be seen as a mirror image reaction, for it provided young phenomenologists with an opportunity to renew their commitment to a robust form of metaphysical realism, which was perceived as incompatible with Husserl’s transcendental idealism. Reality, it was claimed, exists independently of subjectivity (whether this is intended empirically or transcendentally). The clash between these two different approaches to phenomenology has been labeled “the realism-idealism controversy” (Ingarden 1929; Avé-Lallemant 1975b) and turned out to be a decisive episode in the history of the phenomenological movement. To mention but one of its most important consequences, Husserl referred to Pfänder’s dismissal of transcendental idealism (shared, as he writes, by “the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen tradition”) as the main reason for preferring Martin Heidegger as his successor for the professorship in Freiburg in 1928 (Husserl 1994: 180f).