 Fodor (1987) adopts a different strategy. He agrees that physically identical individuals have different wide contents when embedded in different contexts. However, Fodor suggests that their beliefs still have the same narrow contents, which are functions from contexts to wide contents. You and your twin share this: a something (it is impossible to specify what this is) which when plugged in to the earthly context yields the (broad) content that water is wet, but when plugged into the twin-earthly context yields the (broad) content that twater is wet (a content expressed by the twin-earthly “Water is wet”, of course). This strategy has been objected to by Stalnaker (1989) and Block (1991) on the grounds that narrow content, as conceived by Fodor, is not, in fact, content at all. If narrow contents, as Fodor argues, map contexts of thinking onto truth-conditions, they do not themselves have truth-conditions and therefore fail to qualify as contents in any recognizable sense. According to Stalnaker (1989), narrow content is, therefore, nothing more than syntax (understood as functional or computational role).