 Doubts about the integrity of groups are sometimes sociological rather than ontological. Generally, we might suppose that the groups to which we ascribe rights have a unity and identity that is independent of, and that provides the foundation for, our ascription of rights to them. A group, such as an ethnic or cultural group, has a certain “natural” existence and we recognise it as having rights because of the kind of existent it is. In reality, however, pre-institutionalised groups are shifting and changing entities and lack clear boundaries. In addition, any section of humanity that we might fasten upon as a group is likely to be part of a larger sociological entity, and to have within it smaller entities, that might also claim to be “groups”. So there can be a significant element of arbitrariness about the segments of humanity that we identify as “groups”. We may suppose that, in ascribing rights to a group, we merely acknowledge the entitlements of a pre-existing entity, but, in reality, it may be the ascription of rights itself that identifies, creates and fixes a segment of humanity as a “group”. (Flanagan 1985; Kukathas 1992, 110–15; Mitnick 2006; Offe 1998, 125–31; Waldron 2002. Cf. Mello 2004; Sharp 1999.)