 Meinong employed the many values of increasable possibility to give an account of probability. While Łukasiewicz’s procedure in his 1913 monograph was based on a different idea, he continued to be pulled towards the idea that infinite-valued logic might be able to shed light on probability. At the very latest by 1935, with the publication of a short article on probability and many-valued logic by Tarski, he knew that the most straightforward approach, that of identifying probabilities with truth-values between 0 and 1, would not work. The reason is that because of probabilistic dependence, probability is not extensional: if \(p\) is the proposition that it will rain in Dublin tomorrow and \(Np\) is its negation, the probability of the contradictory conjunction \(KpNp\) is 0, but if \(p\) has degree of truth \(\tfrac{1}{2}\), so does \(Np\), and so \(\tval{KpNp} = \tfrac{1}{2}\) in both Ł\(_3\) and Ł\(_{\aleph_0}\). Despite this, as late as 1955 Łukasiewicz could still muse,