 Whatever the political failings of the Kyoto School thinkers may be, it is clear that certain crudely one-sided condemnations are at least as simplistic and misleading as are the occasional attempts of overzealous acolytes to whitewash everything they ever said or wrote. It is, for example, highly misleading to refer to the Kyoto School’s philosophy of history as “a thinly disguised justification … for Japanese aggression and continuing imperialism,” or to claim that “no group helped defend the state more consistently and enthusiastically … and none came closer … to defining the philosophic contours of Japanese fascism” (Najita &amp; Harootunian 1998, 238–39; for a severe critique of such polemical claims, see Parkes 1997 and 2011). The latter dishonor, namely that of attempting to give quasi-philosophical expression to Japanese fascism, surely goes to the proponents of “Imperial Way Philosophy,” who in fact harshly attacked the “world-historical philosophy” of the Kyoto School for being insufficiently Japan-centric (see Ōhashi 2001, 71–72).