 In recent years, new kinds of FB tests experiments have shown that children as young as 25 months (Southgate, Senju, &amp; Csibra 2007); 15-months (Onishi &amp; Baillargeon 2005); and 13-months (Surian, Caldi, &amp; Sperber 2007) can pass language-free versions of false-belief tasks. Taken at face value the new infant data suggests that very young children must have some command of the concept of belief, even though much older children lack, as we have seen, the capacity to pass standard, verbally based, FB tasks. These findings have led to the articulation of the so-called developmental “paradox” (Southgate 2013; De Bruin &amp; Newen 2014). Why is it the case that cognitively typical 3–5-year-old children struggle with explicit FB tests if they are already competent with FP at much younger ages?