 Classical theists are not without responses to these criticisms. One well-known reply, used by Augustine and Aquinas, is to invoke the distinction between divine permission and divine causation of human wickedness and suffering. On this view, the evil in the world is permitted by God in order to bring about a greater good. For example, the Exultet of the Easter Vigil, sometimes ascribed to Ambrose of Milan, speaks of the sin of Adam and Eve as a blessed fault (O felix culpa!) that made possible the sacrificial death of Christ. Process theists argue that there can be no distinction between permitting and causing in a being that creates the universe ex nihilo. On the principles of classical theism, whatever is divinely “permitted” is also divinely created to be as it is (cf. Griffin 1976, 63–64 and 82–83)—this is one of the few points on which process theism agrees with John Calvin (Case-Winters, 1990, 71). On the process view, creaturely decisions are themselves acts of creation, which means that the universe is a joint product of God and the creatures. Process theists do not see how, in creation ex nihilo, creaturely decisions that God permits are not orchestrated by God so as to fulfill the purposes God has for them. Albert Einstein is reported to have said that God does not play dice with the universe. Although he was not a classical theist, his view on this issue is in accord with that philosophy. God may, as it were, allow or permit the dice to fall where they may, but only if they fall as God desires them to fall; this seems different in name only from playing with loaded dice. Hartshorne replies, “Einstein’s rejection of a ‘dice-throwing God’ was a great man’s error. And human individuals are some of the dice …” (Hartshorne 1967a, 113).