 At the very beginning of the chapter on supposition, like Walter Burley, Wyclif divides supposition into improper, in which a term stands for something different from its primary significatum by special custom (ex usu loquendi), and proper, in which a term stands for something by the virtue of the expression itself. So a term has improper supposition when it is used in a figurative speech. It is the case of the term ‘cup’ in the sentence ‘I have drunk a cup &lt;of wine&gt;’. Wyclif divides proper supposition into material, when the term stand for itself or its sound (as it occurs in “‘I’ is a pronoun” or “‘Iohannes’ is trisyllabic”), and formal, when the term stands for what it properly signifies. Formal supposition is twofold: simple and personal. Like William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, and Burley, and against Ockham and his followers, Wyclif affirms that the supposition is simple if the term stands for an extra-mental universal only, as it occurs in ‘Man can be predicated of every man’, and ‘Man is a species’. According to Wyclif, in both cases the term ‘man’ supposits for the human nature, which is an extra-mental form common to a multiplicity of singulars. Simple supposition is divided into equal and unequal. A term is in simple equal supposition if it stands for the common nature that it directly signifies, as it occurs in ‘man is a species’. A term is in simple unequal supposition when it stands for (1) a less common nature than that it signifies, as it occurs in ‘substance is a species’, or (2) a concrete accident or the characterizing property (pro accidente vel proprio primo), as it occurs in ‘this universal-man is capable of laughing’ (‘hic homo communis est risibilis’) — where the presence of the demonstrative ‘this‘ modifies the significate of the subject-term ‘universal-man’, so that in the sentence it supposits for that concrete exemplification (the human nature proper to an individual man) which is identical with the subject of inherence (a given human being) of the accidental form, or characterizing property (in the example, the capacity-of-laughing), signified by the predicate-term. The supposition is personal when the term which plays the role of subject in a sentence stands for one or more individuals. In the first case, the supposition is personal and singular, as it occurs in ‘this man is’ (‘hic homo est’); in the second one, it is personal and common. The personal and common supposition is twofold. If the term stands for many singulars considered separately or for some (that is, at least one) determinate individual named by the common term itself, the supposition is personalis distincta (or determinate, as Wyclif calls it in the final section of the chapter 12), as it occurs in ‘these (men) are’ (‘isti sunt’). If the term stands for many singulars considered together, the supposition is a personal universal supposition (personalis universalis). In turn, the personal universal supposition is divided into confused and distributive (confusa distributiva) and merely confused (confusa tantum). There is suppositio personalis communis universalis confusa distributiva when the (subject-)term stands for everything which has the form it signifies, as it occurs in ‘every man is’ (‘omnis homo est’). There is suppositio personalis communis universalis confusa tantum when the form (or property) signified by the term at issue is affirmed (or not affirmed) equally well of one of the bearers of that form as of another, since it applies (or does not apply) to each for exactly the same reasons, as it occurs in ‘both of them are one of the two’ (‘uterque istorum est alter istorum’), where the expression ‘one of the two’ has merely confused supposition, since none of the two can be both of them. The confused suppositions are so called since they involve many different individuals, and this is the case for the subject of a universal affirmative proposition (De logica, chap. 12, pp. 39–40).