 To clarify the topic under consideration, three comments are in order. First, our use of “moral perception” in this sub-section is confined to modes of perception associated with the five senses plus proprioception and excludes consideration of other mental phenomena such as emotions which, on some accounts, are perceptual or quasi-perceptual states. (Moral emotions are taken up in the following sub-section.) Second, contemporary discussion of moral perception centers on whether it is possible to perceive moral properties without postulating a special moral sense for detecting moral  properties.[12]  Third, it is assumed (though by no means uncontroversial) that perceptual experience has informational content understood as providing accuracy conditions of one’s perceptual experience, analogous to truth conditions for beliefs (see the entry on the  contents of perception).  Thus, if I’m having a visual experience as of a red object spatially located on the table in front of me, then my visual experience includes as part of its content the presentation of the property redness and is thus accurate in this regard just in case the object I am looking at is red.