 Clearly too, understanding the relationship of consciousness to self-consciousness with respect to the reflexivity theme will play an important role in determining what to say about self-knowledge. For instance, proponents of higher-order thought or inner sense theories of consciousness will have different strategies available in accounting for the special self-knowledge consciousness affords (and face different challenges) than those who reject these accounts. For example, obviously, one cannot offer an inner sense account of self-knowledge if one thinks there is no inner sense. And if one does believe in inner sense, special questions arise about how to account for the possibility of introspective error and self-correction. Also, even if one distinguishes consciousness from state self-consciousness, one may think that consciousness makes possible a form of self-consciousness—a first-person form of reflection—with distinctive epistemic properties (as, e.g., in Gertler 2012a; Siewert 2012). We might note further that having a rich conception of consciousness, and putting this to work in a unified and comprehensive account of introspective self-knowledge fits naturally into an “internalist” view of justification: if, as an internalist, you think that what justifies your judgments needs to be appropriately available to you, a consciousness-based conception of self-knowledge may seem tailor-made to tell us what “appropriate availability” comes to here. (See Smithies 2019.)