 It’s hard to see why. For the serious question that concerns people worried about whether artifacts could think concerns whether those artifacts could in fact share the genuine, theoretically interesting, explanatory properties of a thinking thing (cf. Jackson 1998, pp. 34–5). We might have no empirical, scientific reason to suppose that genuine, biological animacy (n.b., not merely the perhaps purely syntactic, linguistic feature [+animate]!; see supplement §2) actually figures among them. And so we might conclude that, despite these supposed constraints of natural language, inanimate computers could come to “think” after all. Indeed, perhaps, the claim that thinking things must be alive is an example of a claim that is analytic but false, rather as the belief that cats are animals would be, should it turn that the things are actually robots from Mars; and so we should pursue the option of polysemy and “open texture” that Chomsky also endorses, and proceed to allow that artifacts could think.