 Earlier Mohist texts give no simple, unified definition of benefit (lì 利), instead characterizing it loosely as an objective list of material and social goods, specifically wealth, population, and social order, this last good   comprising a list of virtues and patterns of conduct.   By contrast, the Canons take happiness or delight (xǐ 喜) as a criterion of benefit (lì) and thus of what is morally right (yì): “Benefit is what we get and are happy” (A26). Accordingly, “dislike” is a criterion of harm and thus of what is wrong: “Harm is what we get and dislike” (A27). This characterization of benefit and harm in terms of psychological attitudes is a remarkable shift from earlier Mohism. The new account can probably explain the older one, insofar as the Mohists might claim that wealth, population, and social order are basic needs whose satisfaction makes all people happy. But the new account opens up conceptual room to revise and expand Mohist ethics. Since what makes people happy is likely to vary in different circumstances, the content of the social dào 道 may change over time, and wealth, population, and social order may not be the only goods that it aims to promote. 