  A final revisionist strand now emerging in the literature takes the agent’s better judgment even farther out of the picture. In an outstandingly lucid and stimulating essay published in 1999 (see also his 2009, ch. 4), Richard Holton argued that weakness of will is not action contrary to one’s better judgment at all. The literature has gone astray in understanding weakness of will in this way; weakness of will is actually quite a different phenomenon, in which the agent’s better judgment plays no  role.[14]  For Holton, when ordinary people speak of weakness of will they have  in mind a certain kind of failure to act on one’s  intentions. What matters for weakness of will, then, is not whether you deem another course of action superior at the time of action. It  is whether you are abandoning an intention you previously formed.  Weakness of will as the untutored understand it is not  akrasia (if we reserve that term for action contrary to  one’s better judgment), but rather a certain kind of failure to stick to  one’s plans.[15]  This understanding of weakness of will changes the  subject in two ways. First, the state of the agent with which the  weak-willed action is in conflict is not an evaluative judgment (as  in akrasia) but a different kind of state, namely an  intention. Second, it is not essential that there be  synchronic conflict, as akrasia demands. You must  act contrary to your present better judgment in order to  exhibit akrasia; conflict with a previous better  judgment does not indicate akrasia, but merely a change of  mind. However, you can exhibit weakness of will as Holton understands it simply by abandoning a previously formed intention.