 Critics countered that, while the historicist upstarts had scored some damaging critical points, their positive accounts of scientific rationality were underdeveloped, vague, and unconvincing. Political revolution and religious conversion as models of rational behavior?! Clark Glymour (1980: 7, 96ff) called the new approach “the new fuzziness”. Could intuitive judgment really replace standard confirmation theory? And what would be the analogous relation of evidence to theory at the metamethodological level, where now “theory” was the set of methodological rules or theory of rationality itself? (Historicists replied that it is not their fault if real-life decision-making is a messy business that often outruns available formal rules.) Shapere (1984: chs. 3–5) was a severe early critic of Kuhn, and Lakatos (1970: 178) reported that Kuhn had replaced rationality with “mob rule”. Since Shapere and Lakatos were historicists, we see that the historicists could disagree sharply among themselves. Feyerabend will provide the most vivid example.