Intentional realism is realism regarding representation. At a minimum, this position holds that representational properties are genuine aspects of mentality. Usually, it is also taken to hold that scientific psychology should freely employ intentional descriptions when appropriate. Intentional realism is a popular position, advocated by Tyler Burge (2010a), Jerry Fodor (1987), Christopher Peacocke (1992, 1994), and many others. One prominent argument for intentional realism cites cognitive science practice. The argument maintains that intentional description figures centrally in many core areas of cognitive science, such as perceptual psychology and linguistics. For example, perceptual psychology describes how perceptual activity transforms sensory inputs (e.g., retinal stimulations) into representations of the distal environment (e.g., perceptual representations of distal shapes, sizes, and colors). The science identifies perceptual states by citing representational properties (e.g., representational relations to specific distal shapes, sizes, colors). Assuming a broadly scientific realist perspective, the explanatory achievements of perceptual psychology support a realist posture towards intentionality.