 Accommodating fallible foundations complicates some aspects of the traditional view introduced above. First, it no longer seems that Russell and Price’s criterion that is reminiscent of the method of doubt is a very good method for determining what one is acquainted with, for there will be some objects of acquaintance that are susceptible to some degree of doubt. However, the method of doubt might remain useful as a guide to the sort of thing with which one can be acquainted: for any physical object, I can conceive of a case in which any justification I have for believing that it exists is just as it is now, and yet there is no such object, and nothing remotely like it, in my vicinity. Second, we said above that noninferential knowledge is secured by acquaintance with truth makers, while inferential knowledge is secured by acquaintance with logical and probabilistic connections between the propositions known and what one infers from those propositions. One natural way for the acquaintance theorist to accommodate fallible foundations is to say that p is noninferentially justified for one only if one is directly aware of some fact that either makes true or makes probable for one that p; if the subject’s justification for believing that p depends on one’s justification for some other proposition(s) then the justification is inferential.