 Finally, it should be noted that there are some fictionalists who do seem to want to make some stronger claims about the analogy between mathematics and fiction. Such people might have to take objections of the above kind more seriously. But none of the fictionalists discussed in this essay endorses any very strong claims of this kind; in particular, none of them says anything that entails that there are no important disanalogies between mathematics and fiction. On the other hand, it should be noted that Yablo and Bueno have made some claims in this connection that go beyond what fictionalists need to say. For instance, Bueno (2009) says that mathematical objects are similar to fictional characters in that they are abstract artifacts (in saying this, he follows Thomasson’s (1999) view of fictional characters). And Yablo has made some relatively strong claims about an analogy that he thinks holds between mathematical utterances and metaphorical utterances, or figurative utterances. Thus, Yablo’s particular version of fictionalism is open to objections to the effect that mathematical utterances are in fact not similar or analogous to metaphorical utterances. Some objections of this kind have been raised by Stanley (2001), and Yablo responds to them in his (2002a). But since Yablo doesn’t claim that mathematical utterances are analogous to fictional utterances, he does not have to respond to objections of the kind mentioned at the start of the present subsection.