 What about (b.ii)? Direct evidence bearing on it is scarce. However, Simulation Theorists can give an argument along the following lines. First, one owes an explanation of why belief-like imaginings are, well, belief-like—as we have said above, it seems that they have the same type of content as, and a functional role similar to, genuine beliefs. A possible explanation for this is that both types of mental states are generated by (cognitive processes implemented by) the same cognitive mechanism. Second, it goes without saying that our mind contains a mechanism for generating beliefs (the belief-forming mechanism), and that there must be some mechanism or another in charge of generating belief-like imaginings. It is also well known that cognitive mechanisms are evolutionary costly to build and maintain. Thus, evolution might have adopted the parsimonious strategy of redeploying a pre-existing mechanism (the belief-forming mechanism) for a non-primary function, i.e., generating belief-like imaginings—in general, this hypothesis is also supported by the idea that neural reuse is one of the fundamental organizational principle of the brain (Anderson 2008). If one puts these two strands of reasoning together, one gets a prima facie case for the claim that imagining believing is implemented by the reuse of the belief-forming mechanism—that is, a prima facie case for the conclusion that imagining believing satisfies (b.ii). Since imagining believing appears also to satisfy (b.i) and (a), lacking evidence to the contrary, Simulation Theorists are justified in considering it to be a high-level simulation process.