 However, one might suspect that the sufficiency principle is not true after all. For instance, in cases like Shells, it does seem as if the causal conditions that give rise the agent’s awareness could also produce false awareness. Moreover, nothing Śrīharṣa says in fact decisively supports this  principle.[15]  But it is worth pointing out that Śrīharṣa needs nothing as strong as the sufficiency principle to make the point that he wants to make. The general objection seems to be this. Suppose we explain the status of any awareness-episode as knowledge by appealing to the good-making features of the relevant causal mechanism—the putative epistemic virtues of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher—that gives rise to it. We may say that these epistemic virtues are the ones that guarantee that the awareness-episode won’t be false. But an accidentally true awareness-episode is one which is produced by a causal mechanism that lacks all of these knowledge-conducive epistemic virtues, and that is why it isn’t guaranteed to be true. This explains why such awareness-episodes seem true as a matter of luck. But the problem is this. No matter what these truth-guaranteeing epistemic virtues are, it will always be possible to find episodes of awareness which are produced by causal mechanisms that possess all these virtues, but nevertheless only accidentally true. In this sense, even if the new definition of knowledge is fleshed out in terms of knowledge-conducive epistemic virtues, it won’t be able to rule out cases of knowledge-destroying epistemic luck. So, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher’s appeal to causal conditions that would never give rise to false awareness-episodes seems mistaken. 