 While different versions of deflationism can be correlated to some extent with different positions in this chart, some chart positions have also been occupied by more than one version of deflationism. The labels ‘redundancy theory’, ‘disappearance theory’ and ‘no-truth theory’ have been used to apply to analytic versions of deflationism: positions \(\mathbf{A}\) or \(\mathbf{B}\). But there is a sense in which position \(\mathbf{A}\) is also occupied by versions of what is called “disquotationalism” (although the most prominent disquotationalists tend to be leary of the notions of analyticity or synonymy), and what is called “prosententialism” also posits an equivalence of what is said with the left- and right-hand sides of the instances of (ES). The latter version of deflationism, however, does this without making the left-hand sides about sentences named via quotation or about propositions understood as abstract entities. No deflationist has offered an account occupying position \(\mathbf{C}\), \(\mathbf{E}\), or \(\mathbf{F}\) (although the explicit inspiration some disquotationalists have found in Tarski’s work and his deployment of material equivalence might misleadingly suggest position \(\mathbf{E})\). Paul Horwich (1998a) uses the label ‘minimalism’ for a version of propositionalist deflationism that takes the instances of (ES-prop) to involve a necessary equivalence, thereby occupying position \(\mathbf{D}\). To a large extent, philosophers prefer one or another (or none) of the positions in the chart on the basis of their views from other parts of philosophy, typically their views about the philosophy of language and metaphysics.