 The latter claim is shown as follows: assertions of the form ‘S is  P’[8]  involve the relevant mode of being of the significate of the predicate (henceforth ‘of the predicate’). In assertions where real accidents are predicated (e.g., being white, running, etc.), the relevant mode of being of the predicate is actual existence; therefore, their truth-makers must be real things in the external world (Ebbesen 1987: 160). Likewise, in assertions where logical intentions are predicated (e.g., belonging to a species or genus), the relevant mode of being of the predicate is mental existence; therefore, their truth-makers are thoughts. But in essential predication, the relevant mode of being is neither actual nor mental existence, because essences are notionally independent of any sort of existence; therefore, the truth-makers are simply the quiddities understood and subsequently signified by the subject and predicate (Ebbesen 1987: 160). Therefore, ‘man is an animal’ is true even when no real man exists, simply because being an animal is a definitional part of being a man. 