 The significance of these determinations becomes clear if one considers the other kinds of status (aḥkām: literally “judgments, statutes, precepts”) Avicenna assigns to existence in addition to necessity and possibility (which in Ilāhiyyāt I, 1, 7, 16–19 are said to be among the proper accidents of being), namely priority and posteriority, on the one hand, and richness and poverty (or indigence), on the other (Ilāhiyyāt, VI, 3, 276, 13–277,  3).[10]  These determinations explain the distinction between essence and existence (or “proper” and “affirmative” existence) and are, in turn, clarified by the notions of “nexus” and “need”. Indeed, what is necessary in itself is ontologically and axiologically prior to the possible because it is independent, whereas the possible is posterior precisely because it depends on a cause. Insofar as it is autonomous, the necessary is also rich, while the possible, which is posterior and secondary, is needy, poor or indigent. The necessary is “rich” because it is independent of any thing; the possible is “poor” because it cannot exist without something else (i.e., without the cause). From a theoretical point of view, these determinations immediately refer to a causal relation that is either negated (by what is prior, rich and necessary) or affirmed (by what is posterior, poor and possible). In other words, the determinations Avicenna calls the kinds of status of existence serve to establish a clear distinction between a kind of existence (i.e., one existent) that is necessarily uncaused and a kind of existence (i.e., of existent things) that is necessarily  caused.[11]  It is in fact in the light of the relationship between the absolute Principle and the world that they reveal their true significance. They have an absolute or a relative meaning according to the causal relation to which they refer. If the causal relation is relative and consequently concerns secondary causes, these determinations are relative, so that the cause is said to be necessary, prior and rich only with respect to its effect, not in itself. If the relation is absolute (if it refers to the First Cause), they are absolute: in this case, the cause is necessary, prior and rich in itself.