 Porchat (1993) distinguishes between two kinds of skeptical arguments: dialectical and empirical. This is a significant contribution of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism to skepticism. Let us consider, first, dialectical arguments. The mode of diaphonía, in Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism, is the crucial one. But, of course, Porchat also considers the other modes of Agrippa as important skeptical weapons against dogmatism. More importantly, he recognizes that for ancient Pyrrhonism the skeptical method of antinomies (arguing both pro and con with equal persuasiveness) is indispensable against the dogmatic claim that some doctrines and arguments are felt stronger than others. That is, the method is indispensable to neutralize that dogmatic experience of unbalanced arguments, by making stronger the weaker arguments. By arguing on both sides of an issue, the skeptic experiences them as being equally strong. Why do they seem equally powerful in the skeptic’s intellectual experience? For the following reason: any criterion proposed to decide the issue will itself be part of the dispute, and disagreement about it re-emerges. Skeptics do not commit themselves to these dialectical arguments. They just use what dogmatists admit against dogmatism. Their whole point is to induce suspension of judgment in dogmatists while still maintaining their own epokhé.