 Especially when concentrating on just one art form and, hence, possibly losing sight of Goodman’s more general and systematic project, it might pass unnoticed that the separation between evaluative and ontological claims, in Goodman, is borne by an approach for which whatever individuates an artwork in the different art forms does not necessarily individuate all of the artwork’s properties, in which, aesthetically, we are interested. What Goodman says, e.g., about literature applies to all art forms: “defining literary works no more calls for setting forth all their significant aesthetic properties than defining metals calls for setting forth all their significant chemical properties” (1976, 210). After all, in art forms like music written according to traditional Western notation, which have developed a notation, we are legitimately interested in the different performances of a work of art—and in the best ones among them—precisely because what defines them as performances of a work is not the same as the set of aesthetic properties the work has to offer. On the other hand, one might be suspicious of the degree of inclusiveness of aesthetic properties (i.e., of non-work-defining properties that may nonetheless be the object of aesthetic attention) Goodman allows. That is, one might wonder whether the sufficiency claim, for which mere compliance with a “score” (in Goodman’s technical sense of the term) is all that is needed to identify, within art forms that have notations, bona fide work instances. With respect to the allographic arts, Goodman is opposed to making any concession to the relevance of historical properties to the individuation of artworks—it’s all left to the rules of the notation, at the syntactic or, if applicable, the semantic level. Hence, a work of music is whatever the “score,” semantically, individuates; and a work of literature is the text itself, the “script,”identified by the syntactic requirements of notations. Yet, in either case, there would be room for a modified notion of the allographic (investigated, for music, by Levinson 1980), according to which a “score” or a “script” are best understood, not just as structures, but as ones projected within given contexts. Such a move would allow restricting the range of aesthetic properties a given artwork can comprise. A performance of Beethoven’s Fifth executed so as to last a year, within such a notion of the allographic, could be considered the performance of a derivative (and bizarre) work, not of the Fifth. Similarly, interpretations of a novel that were to run against what is compatible with a given historically located projection (say, because anachronistic, or because incompatible with the genre a work is in) could, then, be declared inadmissible, or admissible as interpretations of an identical text, yet one projected within a different context and effectively amounting to a different work.