 Early medieval logicians could deal with singular future statements as statement types with truth-values changing in accordance with the time of assertion, as in Aristotle and Hellenistic philosophy. (For the prevalence of temporally indefinite sentences in ancient philosophy, see Hintikka 1973: Ch. 4; Bobzien 1998: 66–67, 100–101, 109–111.) In the theological context of timeless divine omniscience, it was more natural to regard these statements as temporally definite. Abelard calls statements propositions (propositio) and what is asserted by a statement its dictum. He considered that a statement is true or false when its dictum is true or false. In dealing with prophesy, Abelard suggested that the dictum about a singular event is first expressed by a future tense proposition and then by present and past tense propositions. (For the nature of the dictum, contrasted with the ‘facts’ and ‘propositions’ of twentieth-century philosophical jargon, see Marenbon 1997: 202–209). The view of a fixed propositional content was developed further by twelfth-century authors who were later called nominales. One of the theses of this group was “What is once true is always true”. (See Iwakuma and Ebbesen 1992: 196, 199–201, 205–206 for the relevant texts. For the history of the principle, see also Marenbon 1992: 58–61 and Ebbesen 1992: 73–74.) This thesis was employed in the discussions of how the beliefs of Abraham and others who lived before the coming of Christ and believed various things about him were the same as the beliefs of those who live after His coming. The reason for asking this was that the previous beliefs were formulated in future tense statements and the latter in present or past tense statements. According to the nominales, one could regard as basic a temporally definite propositional content the meaning of which is expressed by various tensed expressions depending on when they are uttered. While tensed statements about temporally definite singular events have a changing truth-value, the corresponding non-tensed dicta are unchangingly true or false (Nuchelmans 1973: 177–189; for some later examples, see also Nuchelmans 1980; Lewis 1995; Goris 2001). Peter of Poitiers (c. 1130–1205), one of the authors taking this approach, argued that while the singular statements about contingent things are immutably true or false because of God’s eternal choice, their unchanging truth-value could be otherwise. God does not know contingent things through tensed statements, since their truth-value is changeable. If God’s knowledge is described by using tensed statements, analogously to the articles of faith before and after the coming of Christ, one should read them so that they signify the same (Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae I.7, 133–143; I.12.199–223; I.14.328–253). This became a well-known position since it was also employed in Peter Lombard’s Sententiae (I.39.1; I.41.3).