 Contemporary philosophical investigation into questions about the nature of persons and personal identity may seem very far from these ancient discussions in classical Indian philosophy. The Non-Reductionist view so popular among the mainstream Hindus is not in favour these days. The most important reason to deny that we are separately existing non-physical soul substances is that such things are impossible to trace through space-time. If we are essentially non-physical souls, there still would be no way to know that you now are one and the same person that committed the crime at an earlier time. If judgments about personal identity were grounded on judgements about the identities of immaterial souls, then personal identity would be completely mysterious (Perry 1978, 402–3). It is true that we sometimes lack epistemic access to metaphysical truths. But if this were the right metaphysical theory it should undermine all confidence in our judgments of identity in a way that seems bizarre (Shoemaker and Tobia, forthcoming). That might seem bizarre from a contemporary point of view, but the Hindu Non-Reductionists are not going to be worried by these objections. Most classical Indian philosophers, except the Cārvākas, agree that ignorance about our own natures— about who and what we are—is the cause of our bondage in the cycle of birth and rebirth and the suffering that comes with it. The Upaniṣadic sages were no strangers to metaphors and mysteries. Their strategy was to heighten the mystery associated with knowledge, “not so much in a self‐serving secretiveness or a disinclination to share the knowledge that gives them power but as response to a deep respect for the power of that knowledge, and a recognition of the need not to be frivolous either with the knowledge itself or with its potential recipients” (Ganeri 2007,13). The Katha Upaniṣad puts it thus: “Hidden in all the beings, this self is not visibly displayed. Yet, people of keen vision see him with eminent and sharp minds.” (KU 3.12).