 Anderson (1967) formulated a system of deontic logic based on \(\mathbf{R}\) and, more recently, relevance logic has been used as a basis for deontic logic by Mares (1992) and Lou Goble (1999). These systems avoid some of the standard problems with more traditional deontic logics. One problem that standard deontic logics face is that they make valid the inference from \(A\)’s being a theorem to \(OA\)’s being a theorem, where ‘\(OA\)’ means ‘it ought to be that \(A\)’. The reason that this problem arises is that it is now standard to treat deontic logic as a normal modal logic. On the standard semantics for modal logic, if \(A\) is valid, then it is true at all possible worlds. Moreover, \(OA\) is true at a world \(a\) if and only if \(A\) is true at every world accessible to \(a\). Thus, if \(A\) is a valid formula, then so is \(OA\). But it seems silly to say that every valid formula ought to be the case. Why should it be the case that either it is now raining in Ecuador or it is not? In the semantics for relevant logics, not every world makes true every valid formula. Only a special class of worlds (sometimes called “base worlds” and sometimes called “normal worlds”) make true the valid formulae. Any valid formula can fail at a world. By allowing these “non-normal worlds” in our models, we invalidate this problematic rule.