  Another place in which singular terms were used was suppositional descent, as when one infers from “Every man is running” that Socrates is running or Plato is running or Cicero is running, or that this man is running, and that man is running. In the earlier Middle Ages, logicians did not seem to worry about the use of proper names as opposed to demonstrative phrases, but there was some discussion of possible problems in the later period. One problem had to do with the fact that there are different types of singular name. Men are called Socrates, Plato and Cicero, but donkeys are called Brownie (Brunellus), Tawny (Favellus) and Little Grey (Grisellus), so what happens if someone produces the inference, “Every man is running, therefore Brownie is running and Tawny is running”? After all, this inference has exactly the same logical form as “Every man is running, therefore Socrates is running and Plato is running.” Moreover, even if one has the correct type of proper name, its bearer may die, rendering the conclusion false while the premise remains true. If one adopts the preferred solution of replacing proper names by demonstrative phrases, a similar problem arises. If ‘this’ does not succeed in pointing to a living man, then “Every man is running, therefore this man is running” may have a true premise and a false conclusion. The problem was dealt with by the provision of extra premises which ensured that the very same things referred to by a true premise are the things referred to by the demonstrative phrases in the conclusion.