 There are, however, another group of contemporary philosophers of mathematics whose views seem close to formalism, namely (some among the) fictionalists. Now the term ‘fictionalist’ can mislead as not all fictionalists assimilate mathematics to fiction. And even if one did, the question would arise: ‘What philosophical account of fiction, and discourse about fiction, does one adopt?’ Many philosophers resile from a realist ontology of fictional characters just as many reject a realist—platonistic—ontology for mathematics. A very simplistic anti-realism about fictionalism might analyse such statements as ‘Oliver Twist was born in London’ as true (or correct) just in case that sentence, or a synonym, occurs in Dickens’s novel (Field, 1989: 3). Even if this worked for fiction, which it pretty clearly does  not,[5]  a parallel approach for mathematics is patently absurd. If a mathematical thesis is proclaimed a theorem, with or without proof, in a journal, be it however respectable then, even if this claim is never challenged and the assertion accepted by the mathematical community this by no means entails that the thesis is true (or correct, if one dislikes applying truth predicates to mathematical sentences). Given the number of “theorems” whose purported proofs were later discovered to be incorrect, we can be pretty sure some falsehoods will wrongly remain accepted for all time as proven. Moreover there will be no end of mathematical claims, some true, some false, which never make it into the mathematical literature at all, never being considered by actual mathematicians.