Elster’s argument occurs in two steps. The first one is the filtering step, and it starts with the idea that the public holds normative expectations regarding what representatives are supposed to say.[43] One of these expectations is that any overt reference to mere self-interest is deemed unacceptable in the course of justifying their position,[44] which leaves open the question of whether it is acceptable to refer to the self-interest of their class of electors.[45] Another expectation is that representatives must justify their position by referring to minimally general principles. Finally, there is also a social norm favoring argument over bargaining,[46] such that, whenever the debate takes place in public, deliberation oriented towards the force of the better argument should be promoted. At the very least, the entails the need to disguise overt threats as warnings (Elster 1998a: 103–104). Normative expectations such as these that regard acceptable discourse thus act as a filter on what representatives are permitted to say. Importantly, it is not hypocrisy as such that filters out the set of unacceptable speech elements. However, it allows the representative to engage in a discourse in which he does not necessarily believe. In other words, this account does not necessarily presuppose a normative expectation among the public that politicians ought to be sincere.[47] Actually, hypocrisy is rather an enabling factor (allowing for an initial gap between what is said and thought), and not a cleaning up factor.