  We can imagine Ramsey unpacking this argument further. Statements like (3.3) commit us to the existence of facts if any statements do; they constitute our best effort to explicitly affirm the existence of facts.  Since even statements like (3.3) don’t commit us to facts, because they’re just paraphrases of statements like (3.4), we cannot have reason to believe in the existence of facts at all. To transpose a remark of Ramsey’s from another context, if you can’t say that facts exist, you can’t whistle it either. We could call this Ramsey’s ‘redundancy theory of facts’, emphasising another parallel, this time with his famous redundancy theory of truth (according to which ‘\(a\) has \(R\) to \(b\) is true’ says the same as ‘\(a\) has \(R\) to \(b\)’). 