 Aristotle repeatedly says that these rhetorical arguments persuade people either by proving or by (merely) seeming to prove (Rhet. I.2, 1356a3–4 and I.2, 1356a19–20); accordingly, he lists topoi for real (Rhet. II.23) and merely apparent enthymemes (Rhet. II.24) (see below  § 7).  Obviously, Aristotle refers here to fallacious or deceptive arguments, for these arguments have a similar persuasive effect, if the fallacy or deception goes unnoticed by the audience (for people will think, i.e. take it to be the case, that something has been proven). One might wonder whether the inclusion of only seemingly probative arguments is compatible with Aristotle’s general tendency to base rhetorical persuasion on (real) proofs. However, the treatment of fallacious rhetorical arguments is strictly parallel to what happens in the case of dialectic. For dialectic too, includes a part dealing with sound or valid arguments (namely in Topics II–VII) and a part that analyses fallacious arguments (namely in the Sophistical Refutations). It is part of the rhetorician’s competence also to know about fallacious arguments, if only in order to detect them, when they are used by opponents.