 On the basis of these facts, Avicenna observes that associated with moving bodies there is a certain possibility or capacity (imkān) to traverse some spatial magnitude. Moreover, this capacity corresponds with the starting and stopping of the motion (that is, a kinematic magnitude). When the body is moving slower, a greater amount of this possibility is required to cover the same spatial magnitude as that of a faster moving body. Given this possibility’s relation and correspondence with both spatial and kinematic magnitudes, Avicenna concludes that this capacity must be some magnitude that stands in some relation to the distance and speed. This magnitude is neither the magnitude of the body, whether the body’s bulk or weight, nor the magnitude of the motion, whether the speed or motivity, nor the magnitude of the distance traversed. Instead, this magnitude—again, the possibility belonging to a moving body to cover more or less distance at a fixed speed—concludes Avicenna, is what we call time (zamān). 