 Act-consequentialists are committed to the evaluative rankings of outcomes being explanatorily prior to the deontic statuses of the actions that produce them, but they’re not committed to the evaluative rankings of outcomes being explanatory prior to the deontic statuses of attitudes, such as the attitude of respect towards ends-in-themselves. Given this, earnest consequentializers can argue that there’s nothing that precludes them from holding either that persons are ends-in-themselves who are owed respect or that this fact is explanatorily prior to the evaluative rankings of outcomes. That is, earnest consequentializers can argue that you have a duty to respect persons and that this duty gives rise to a duty to prefer that you not treat them as a mere means—even as a mere means to that of preventing the mafia from killing five others. What’s more, given this duty to prefer the outcome in which you refrain from killing the one to the outcome in which you kill the one as a mere means to preventing the mafia from killing the five, the former outranks the latter from your evaluative position. And this, given act-consequentialism, explains the impermissibility of your killing the one to prevent the five from being killed by the mafia. Thus, the earnest consequentializer hopes to consequentialize the deontic verdict that it’s wrong for you to kill the one even to prevent the mafia from killing the five without giving up the plausible thought that the rationale for this ultimately lies with your would-be victim and their value as an end-in-themself (see Portmore forthcoming and Portmore 2019: 235–7).