 Some have criticized the very existence of reasons to act for (or against) other reasons by pointing out that acting for (or against) other reasons is not something we can choose to do (Whiting 2017; Adams 2021). Others have pointed out that the reasons provided by authoritative directives are best understood as reasons that causally constrain our capacity not to conform with the directives in question (Shapiro 2002). Others have argued that what Raz calls exclusionary reasons are ultimately simply reasons that outweigh competing reasons (Mian 2002), reasons that affect the weight of first order reasons (Perry 1989) or reasons that causally change the factual circumstances in a way that triggers pre-existing reasons (Enoch 2011 and 2014). Finally, others have accepted that exclusionary reasons exist, while rejecting the claim that it is ever reasonable to exclude entirely from consideration otherwise valid reasons (Regan 1987; Gur 2007). This has led to formulation of alternative models, according to which obligations are best understood as providing “presumptive reasons”, as opposed to exclusionary reasons for action (Schauer 1991; Renzo 2019). According to these models, competing reasons for action are not excluded altogether from the deliberation of the agent. Rather, the second-order reasons created by the obligation merely create a presumption in favour of their exclusion. Subject to certain epistemic conditions being met, the presumption can be rebutted (but see Venezia 2020).