One theory of law – really a family of theories – offers a natural explanation of the relevance of the typical normative arguments. Theories in this family hold that legal obligations are constituted by certain genuine normative (or moral) obligations.[40] For example, according to the moral impact theory, the relevant obligations are, roughly speaking, those that obtain in virtue of the actions of legal institutions (Greenberg 2014). At the fundamental level, therefore, what the determinants of the content of the law are – and how they contribute to the content of the law – is determined by all relevant values. Thus, for example, a statute’s contribution to the content of the law is the impact of its enactment, in light of fairness, democracy, and any other relevant values, on our obligations (and rights, permissions, powers, and so on). Consequently, on the moral impact theory, a natural way to argue for a method of interpretation is to argue that the way in which the method of interpretation takes sources to contribute to the content of the law is supported, on balance, by the relevant values.