 So there are some general reasons to think theological voluntarism promising. The reasons are stronger yet when one is proceeding from theistic starting points. (This is not trivial, since a number of theistic philosophers reject theological voluntarism.) But these reasons, while suggestive, are rather generic: they point to the promise possessed by theological voluntarism, though they do not fix for us on a particular formulation of the view. The general schema for a particular theological voluntarist position is ‘evaluative status M stands in dependence relation D to divine act A’ (cf. Quinn 1999, p. 53, which I follow here except to substitute the more general ‘evaluative’ for Quinn’s more specific ‘moral’). So there are at least three choices that have to be made. We need to say something about  what sorts of evaluative statuses  depend on God’s will. We need to say something about what are the  relevant acts of divine will.  And we need to say something about what the  dependence relation  is supposed to be. (These are not independent questions, of course.)