 Following Scotus, Kilvington maintains that at the same instant in which the divine will wills A, it is able not to will A, and thus he accepts Scotus’s synchronic contingency; nevertheless, he does accept Scotus’ concept of instantiae naturae. To save God’s absolute free will and at the same time to avoid the prospect of mutability in God’s decision-making, Kilvington asserts that by his absolute power God can make himself not will A, while A is what God, by his ordained power, wills in that particular instant, and this happens in eternity. Such internal acts of God do not cause any changes in his external acts, since God’s will is immutable. Consequently, by his absolute power, God can undo the past without causing any change in history, such as, for example, Abraham’s non-existence. God, whose absolute power is infinitely infinite, can cause the past not to be the past, because there is no past for God. To say that God cannot undo the past simply means that God has not revealed a given thing, such as the restoration of one’s lost virginity. It is also not contradictory for God’s absolute power to create the world from eternity, or to annihilate it. The world’s annihilation would not be less just than its continued existence, since God’s justice stems from his essence, which, like his power, is absolute and ordained. However, God cannot do so by his ordained power, since, even being infinite, his ordained power is infinitely less powerful than his absolute power.