 For Lyotard, there is “no knowledge in the matter of ethics”, nor is there a theoretical truth to adhere to in politics. Rather, politics is a matter of a diversity of opinions, as the non-Platonic Greeks believed, and is about nothing but this plurality of opinions. The ability to judge is a “power to invent criteria”, that is, create new rules not recognized by the dominant modes of thinking politics. This claim brings Lyotard’s thinking of the political close to Hannah Arendt’s thinking of action and her notion of “thinking without banisters” after modernity’s loss of authority. Politics, she believed, became ideological at best and totalitarian at worst if wedded to notions of truth, such as involved in the metanarratives of Marxist economic theory and its inexorable laws of history, or the racist theories of Nazism. The task, for Lyotard, is to see that questions of justice and prescriptive language games are not simply about obeying laws. Rather, the task is to develop an attunement to the plurality of opinions and language games. “We have to judge case by case”, he avers, pointing to Aristotelian phronēsis or practical wisdom as a model, but without an overarching community telos as in Aristotle’s (384–422 BCE) Nichomachean Ethics (Just Gaming, 47). Even such seemingly universal prescriptions, such as “thou shall not kill”, are anything but, since exceptions are invariably made concerning those lives that are to be taken in terms of the death penalty or in war. The point, then, is not that Lyotard’s “pagan” ethics and politics leads to irresponsibility, but the opposite. If it were just a matter of having a sure knowledge or absolute set of laws to follow, then politics would be pre-programmed and there would be no judgment worthy of the name.