In short, Sidgwick’s argument explicitly refers to a non-ideal public (“society as actually constituted”, “mankind in general” or “the vulgar”, as opposed to “an ideal community of enlightened Utilitarians”). And his view then has to do with a logic of confinement, which is necessary to preserve the practice’s acceptability. Because of this, several of the reasons for secrecy that underlie Sidgwick’s discussion of the lying case would not apply if we were all enlightened utilitarians. However, it is worth noting that, besides the “self-effacement” argument, Adrian Piper has argued that there may be utilitarian grounds for secrecy in an ideal community of enlightened utilitarians as well. For knowing that in such a society, e.g., promises might not necessarily be kept—keeping them depending in each case on the outcome of a utilitarian calculus—will cause significant coordination problems due to lack of predictability of other people’s action. In the absence of secrecy, such an ideal society would then become less efficient (Piper 1978: 198–199).