 We might wish to add further conditions ensuring that F is minimal (there is no proper sub-collection of F that grounds all the grounded facts) and F is unique—F is the only collection that satisfies these conditions. Another option is to interpret completeness (or unique minimal completeness) as being characteristic but not definitional of absolute fundamentality (Bennett 2017: Ch. 5). (Whether definitional or not, the grounding role that absolutely fundamental facts play potentially makes the cost of positing such facts worth paying—see Bliss 2019 for discussion.) Still another option for the grounding theorist is to be a pluralist about notions of absolute fundamentality, characterizing independence, completeness, and perhaps further notions as well such as ineliminability, granting that they might (in special cases) pull apart. (See Raven 2016 for discussion of ineliminability in this context.)