 Several philosophers suggest that as far as feelings go, gratitude requires some degree of goodwill toward a benefactor, understood as wishing a benefactor well (Walker 1980–1981; Herman 2012). Goodwill in this sense should be understood not strictly speaking as an affect, but as a disposition to have certain affects in certain situations—what we might call an affective disposition (Manela 2016b). For a beneficiary to have goodwill toward his benefactor is for the beneficiary to have dispositions to be pleased if things go well for her and a disposition to be sad or upset when things go poorly for her (Manela 2016b). Insofar as goodwill is necessary for gratitude, it may mark another distinction between prepositional gratitude and propositional “gratitude” (Manela 2016a). I can be perfectly grateful that it did not rain on my wedding day without wishing anyone well. By contrast, it seems that I fail to be grateful to a benefactor if I fail to wish her well after she does me a good turn.