 William Craig has argued that this move is incompatible with an A-theory of time (2001, 119–23). In a sense Wierenga need not care.  He was not aiming to show that omniscience, immutability and an A-theory are compatible, but only that omniscience and immutability are compatible.  If the conjunction of omniscience, immutability and a B-theory is consistent, its members are pairwise consistent, for if there were a contradiction between any two conjuncts, the whole conjunction would ipso facto be inconsistent. But in any case, Craig's charge misfires.  This first move is compatible with real passage. The first move entails only that if time passes, passage is not represented by first one thing and then another being true.  Passage is instead represented by something within the overall set of eternal truths- perhaps something as simple as an assertion that time passes, or even that each time, when present, is all there is to temporal reality.  Passage can also appear in our story as what explains change in what we have access to and perhaps in the overall cognitive import of our belief-states.  Wierenga's view can allow that the times he speaks of are A-theoretic, existing only when present.  The view requires not that times be tenselessly there but that their haecceities be always and atemporally available.