 Jaegwon Kim (1992) suggests, and John Bickle (1998: Chapter 4) emphasizes that guiding methodological principles in contemporary neuroscience assume continuity of underlying neural mechanisms across the nervous systems of different species. This assumption informs many neuroscience experimental techniques and conclusions drawn from experimental results. Continuity is assumed both within and across species. If radical multiple realizability of the sort championed by anti-reductionist philosophers actually obtained among existent species, contemporary neuroscientific experimental techniques and practices built upon this continuity assumption should bear little scientific fruit. Why experiment on the macaque visual system to investigate human visual processing, if we can’t safely assume some fairly strong continuity across these species? Why should positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) reveal common areas of high metabolic activity during psychological task performance, both across and within individual humans—now down to less than a millimeter of spatial resolution in fMRI—if multiple realizability were as prevalent or widespread as many nonreductive philosophers assume? (see  §1.5  above). Standard neuroscientific experimental procedures, and even clinical diagnostic tools widely used by practicing neurologists and neuropsychologists, would seem hopelessly naïve in the face of common philosophical assertions about the extent of multiple realizability. But these procedures and tools do work, and are not hopelessly naïve.