  One might also object to Prichard-style arguments that (a) they are question-begging, since egoists will hardly agree that my reason for helping is something other than the benefit to me, and (b) given disagreement over this claim about my reason, the appropriate response is to suspend judgment about it.  Alison Hills, in 2010 parts II and III (directed at rational egoism), replies to (a) that moralists can assure themselves by giving arguments that start from premises like “I have a reason to help regardless of whether doing so contributes to my self-interest,” provided this premiss is not inferred from the falsity of rational egoism — perhaps it is self-evident.  In reply to (b), she argues that disagreement over the premiss does not require moralists to suspend judgment about it, although disagreement over an egoistic premiss like “I have reason to help only because doing so benefits me” does require egoists to suspend judgment.  The difference is that rational egoists aim at knowledge, and for putative knowledge, in cases of disagreement between epistemic peers, suspension of belief is required.  Moralists aim primarily not at knowledge but at the ability to draw, on their own, true moral conclusions from the evidence.  Since aiming at this ability requires not giving weight to the conclusions of others, suspension of belief in cases of disagreement is not required of them.