 Mental illnesses (and the term “mental health” itself) also have traditionally posed considerable problems for categorization and conceptualization for both medical practitioners and philosophers of medicine. Many authors advocate the case that it is critical to make a distinction between mental and physical illness (Macklin 1972), particularly because of the moral implications associated with labeling a condition as mental or psychological. Psychiatry is a field which has historically been loaded with value judgments, many of which were quite dubious. There is a long history of using mental illness as a way to categorize behaviors which are socially deviant as well as those conditions of ill health with no apparent organic cause and which do not otherwise fit into our dominant biomedical model. Many scholars (e.g., Ritchie 1989; Gaines 1992; Mezzich et al. 1996; Horwitz and Wakefield 2007; Demazeux and Singy 2015) have critiqued approaches and the underlying assumptions of the various editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual published by the American Psychiatric Association, which is a “bible” for psychiatric conditions for many practitioners and also has considerable public influence for instance on who can seek care. Key examples of contested issues within the DSM include the highly politicized nature of the processes of revision across various editions, various cultural, sexist, and gender biases inherent in specific diagnostic categories, and the relatively weak reliability and validity of the classification system.