 If the starting point for theorists in this strand of contemporary philosophy of action is joint action (and its associated collective intentionality), it is by no means the endpoint. Specifically, there is the important matter of the relationship between joint action and social institutions. For example, while joint actions per se do not seem to necessarily involve rights, duties and other deontic properties (see Gilbert 1989 for a contrary view), it is self-evident that social institutions do so. Theorists within this recent tradition agree that joint actions—or perhaps the collective intentionality definitive of joint actions—is at least one of the building blocks of social institutions. However, the question remains as to the precise relationship between joint actions (and its associated collective intentionality) on the one hand, and social institutions on the other. More specifically, there is the question of how, or if, we-intentions can generate deontic properties, such as the institutional rights and duties definitive of institutional roles. 