 The question of how to justify partiality to friends, relatives, intimates, and others to whom we bear “special” relationships has implications for many questions concerning impartiality and our broader obligations, and to the issue of who gets included in the community of moral recognition. Consider, for instance, the moral questions that arise with respect to our treatment of non-human animals. While it may once have been plausible (or generally regarded as such) to see the fact that a given organism belonged to the human species as indicating that it possessed intrinsic properties grounding a special moral status, and hence was entitled to better forms of treatment than “mere” animals were entitled to, such a view is no longer clearly defensible. Accordingly, in recent decades many consequentialists have used some form of “marginal cases” argument to argue that we have more moral obligations to non-human animals than has generally been recognized. If we would object to killing and eating a human individual for food—even a severely cognitively disabled human individual who is, say, no more intelligent than the average pig—how can we justify killing and eating pigs for food? How we think about marginal cases arguments, and obligations to non-humans, will likely reflect what we think regarding the nature of partiality to particular humans. Holding some version of the individuals view, for instance, would seem to lend support to the common consequentialist contention that obligations to individuals (whether human or non-human) must depend on the intrinsic qualities of those individuals, rather than on our relations to them. Thus, to eject some individual from the community of moral recognition merely because it belongs to a different species, and not our own, would constitute a violation of moral impartiality at least somewhat comparable to regarding some human as not worthy of moral consideration because they belonged to a different ethnic group (Singer 1974; see also McMahan 2002, 218–28).