 Reid appears to acknowledge that allowing the sense of beauty this cognitive dimension does not commit one to realism regarding beauty: he appears to acknowledge that it is one thing to allow that the deliverances of internal sense comprise judgments and yet another to allow that the positive judgments they sometimes comprise are sometimes true (Reid 1785 [1969, 783]). The case Reid makes for realism regarding beauty (and sublimity) is complex. He makes a straightforward appeal to common sense (Reid 1785 [1969, 770]). He argues, after Descartes, that our possession of an inherently fallacious sense would make a deceiver of God (Reid 1785 [1969, 783]). But his deepest and most complicated reason for thinking beauty real has to do with the nature of the properties that he takes to ground beauty. Following Burke, Reid identifies the affect properly inspired by beautiful objects as love (this contrasts with the affect properly inspired by sublime objects, which he identifies as admiration). Since we properly love only what is good, the properties that properly inspire love must be perfections or excellences of some kind. It follows that the beauty of an object has its ground in whatever perfections properly inspire our love for it, and so has whatever reality those perfections have.