 The description of this strand of the debate sidesteps the fact that it is not entirely clear whether the point of Tuomela’s and Miller’s analysis of we-intention is to provide a reductive account of collective intentionality. In fact, Tuomela has repeatedly rejected this interpretation of the analysis (see, for instance Tuomela 1995, chap. 9; Tuomela 2005: 342). He clarified that his analysis of we-intention, which remained essentially unchanged throughout subsequent work of his, “is rather meant to elucidate the irreducible notion of we-intention in a functionally informative way” (Tuomela 2005: 358) and grounded in an “ontically individualistic or, better, interrelational” framework (2005: 342). This suggests reading the analysis not as reductive but as explicative in the sense that it explicates the complex structure of attitudes that constitutes an individual agent’s we-intending. This again provides the core element of Tuomela’s conception of the intentionality that guides joint action, i.e., the analysis of what he calls ‘joint intention:’