 Metaphysical critiques of panentheism provide a basis for both the theological and experiential criticisms made by Christian theists. Four types of metaphysical critiques have been made. One criticism is that panentheism fails to maintain an ontological distinction between God and the world (M. Leidenhag 2014, 215, 219, 220). While panentheism identifies differences between God and the world, the distinction is one of characteristics rather than one of being. Although different forms of panentheism understand similarities and differences between God and the world in different ways, both Hegel and Whitehead refer to differences between God and the world that are important. Hegel’s dialectical panentheism distinguishes between God prior to creation and creation in God (Tabaczek 2013, 151). Whitehead describes God as non-temporal and events composing the world as temporal (Bracken 2015, 542). Clayton identifies the difference between God and creation as differences in essence and function (2001,210). The modal status of the world in relation to God provides a related challenge to panentheism. Göcke concludes that the significant difference between panentheism and classical theism is that according to panentheism the world is an intrinsic property of God while classical theism holds that the world is an extrinsic property of God (2013b, 74). A third type of critique is that panentheism holds an inadequate concept of transcendence. According to J. Cooper, if God’s transcendence does not infinitely exceed God’s immanence, God’s presence, knowledge, and power are limited rather than complete, immediate, and unconditioned (2006, 322–328). Whitehead’s understanding of God’s transcendence is limited because God only influences events before or after the decisions of the events. God cannot be present simultaneously with the event. Likewise, Hegel’s denial of divine simplicity makes ontological difference between God and the world impossible thus limiting God’s transcendence (Tabaczek 2013, 151, 154). While Clayton and others have identified top-down causation as indicating God’s vertical transcendence, Jensen finds this inadequate because they are unable to identify clearly God’s presence in the causal nexus of the world (2014, 131). However, Bracken rejects the necessity of a causal joint when both top-down and bottom-up causation take place (2014, 10). Also, Clayton counters that few process panentheists accept a full equality between finite actual occasions and the divine actual occasion or occasions. God being the chief exemplification of creativity indicates a difference between God and actual occasions and thus a vertical transcendence (Clayton 2015b, 27). Finally, Bracken’s field understanding of panentheism gives priority to God as the regent subsociety (2014, 79–80). The fourth metaphysical criticism grows out of a technical aspect of Whitehead’s cosmology, the relation between creativity and God. Whitehead attributes metaphysical ultimacy to creativity and understands God as the primordial manifestation of creativity. This appears to leave God in a secondary position (Hosinski 2015, 275). John B. Cobb, Jr. resolves the problem of the priority of creativity by identifying creativity as an abstract metaphysical principle rather than an actuality more important than God (1982, 126 and see Nobharu 2015, 499). Bracken considers creativity to be the systematic whole rather than a greater reality than God (1992, 216, 214).