  The jurisdictional theory of immigration emphasizes that, while political states are morally required to respect everyone’s human rights, they are obligated to protect the rights of only those within their territory.  Given this, whenever someone moves to a new state, the citizens of the receiving country become responsible for this newcomer in a way that they were not before her arrival.  It would thus seem weird to suppose that everyone should be free to move to whatever country they like, because this would entitle each of us to unilaterally impose moral responsibilities upon others.  If we value individual liberty, then we should begin with at least a presumption against others being at liberty to unilaterally foist these responsibilities on us (Blake 2013).  Our immunity against unwelcome obligations may not be absolute, but it would presumably require a compelling competing consideration to outweigh it.  If someone could not enjoy sufficient protection of her human rights unless she moved to Canada, for instance, then this vulnerable person may be entitled to immigrate without permission even though this move will saddle Canadian citizens with moral duties to which they did not consent.  But if someone whose rights are adequately respected elsewhere sought to move to Canada merely because she thinks she would be happier there, Canadians would be well within their rights to forcibly exclude her if they would prefer not to be responsible for protecting her human rights. 