 Now, the supra-individual stream must not be confused with a collective consciousness. For consciousness is a constituting rather than a constituted phenomenon; following Husserl, Stein holds that the constituting consciousness—the “ultimately constituting stream” of experiences (letztkonstituierender Fluß)—is essentially egoic, and ipso facto individual in nature (1922: 118–119[140–141]). Accordingly, the communal stream is as a constituted stream, constituted by individual’s “pure egos”. And yet, in communal experiences, the respective subjects of experience and the “individual personality” of the members are modified in a certain way and impacted by the very communal experience. In terms of the modified subject of communal experiences, we must assume a certain “collective personality” (Gesamtpersönlichkeit; 1922: 114[135], see also 227[272]). A good way to understand this claim is by considering the distinction between the “phenomenal” and the “ontic subject” of shared experiences (Schmid 2009: 65ff.). While the phenomenal subject of the communal stream is a communal one, its ontic bearers are the individual members (1922: 114[134]). (This certainly should not imply that Stein holds that all constitution, and in particular the constitution of the shared values and objects, or the life-world, is reducible to individual processes. Quite the contrary: Like virtually all phenomenologists, Stein stresses the importance of intersubjective constitution, which is accomplished precisely by communities of individuals acting together; 1922: 139–140[165–166].)