 While Maimon’s objections to Kant focus on specific issues that arise in the Critique, they all rest on Maimon’s commitment to a type of ‘skeptical rationalism.’ Maimon notes that in the Versuch über die Transcendentalphilosophie the important problem of the quid juris was “presented in a much wider sense than that in which Kant takes it, and thereby [such a position] allowed a place for Hume’s skepticism in its complete power. On the other hand, the complete solution to this problem necessarily leads to Spinozistic or Leibnizian dogmatism.” (GW I, 558 | LB 254) Maimon’s position is then dogmatically rationalist insofar as it endorses the standards of reason found in Leibniz and Spinoza, but it remains empirically skeptical insofar as he agrees with Hume that such standards of reason are never met in our experience of the world.