 Several lines of argument have been used to establish the authority of the earlier self over the current self. One is to deny altogether the independence of the current self's interests. On this interpretation, the conflict described above is merely apparent. Once the current self falls below the relevant threshold of capacity, she is incapable of generating her own independent interests, and, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, her fundamental interests are really defined by the earlier self. The interests of the current self are straightforwardly not authoritative since they are merely apparent interests. Further, even were we to accept that the current self has her own independent interests, there are other reasons to see those interests as lacking authority. If one insists on the priority of respect for autonomy over beneficence, or if one views the capacity for autonomy as the essential core of a person, the interests of the earlier self will be seen as having authority over the current self because only the earlier self is capable of autonomy. Ronald Dworkin's analysis combines all of these lines of argument (Dworkin 1993).