 As the earnest consequentializer sees things, moral theories are to be differentiated by what they take the ultimate right- and wrong-making features of actions to be, not by what they take the ultimate rationale for an act’s being right or wrong to be. To illustrate, consider utilitarian theological voluntarism again. It holds both that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that it accords with God’s will and that God is perfectly good and, so, wills each of us to maximize the good, which they take to be hedonic utility. In their view, the ultimate rationale for an act’s being obligatory is that it produces the best outcome. For they hold that an act’s outcome being best is what explains why God (being perfectly good) wills the agent to perform it. And God’s willing the agent to perform it, in turn, explains why it’s obligatory. But, as earnest consequentializers see things, this doesn’t make the view act-consequentialist. Indeed, they see it as a rival to act-consequentialism given that it holds that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that it accords with God’s will, not that its outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative. And this does seem to be a significant difference. For if the theological voluntarist were to be convinced that, in fact, God isn’t perfectly good and even wills us to torture children for fun, they would be forced to concede that it would be right to do so. By contrast, the act-consequentialist’s view of what’s right is independent of their view on what God wills. Given this, earnest consequentializers think that we should conclude that a theory that holds that the ultimate right-making feature of an act is that its outcome is not outranked by that of any available alternative is act-consequentialist even if it holds that the rationale for the wrongness of your killing the one to prevent the mafia from killing the five ultimately lies with your would-be victim and their value as an end-in-themself.