  The musical work, Ingarden argues, is distinct from experiences of its composer and listeners, and cannot be identified with any individual sound event, performance or copy of the score. But nor can it be classified among ideal entities, since it is created by a composer at a certain time, not merely discovered [Ontology, 4–5]. It thus apparently falls between categories such as the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’, and so accepting the existence of musical works (like literary works) seems to require us to accept the existence of things in a category distinct from either of those — that of purely intentional objects. The musical work is a purely intentional object with its ‘source of being in the creative acts of the composer and its ontic foundation in the score’ [Ontology, 91]. In itself, a traditionally scored work of Western music is a schematic formation full of places of indeterminacy (e.g. it may be indeterminate exactly how loudly a note is to be played, or how long it should be held), which are filled out differently in various performances. Unlike the literary work, however, the work of music is not a stratified entity, there being no essential representing function of the sounds of the musical work (unlike the sounds of a novel).