 Notably, there has recently been an attempt by philosophers to appeal to results from empirical psychology to explain away some set of intuitions or other, and this strategy has been applied in the area of moral luck in particular. For some examples, see Domsky (2004) and Royzman and Kumar (2004) whose explanations in different ways support the preservation of our adherence to the Control Principle, and see Enoch and Guttel (2010) for a reply to both. Psychologists and experimental philosophers have also simply tried to offer explanations of our intuitions, particularly of ones that appear to conflict as we find in the debate about moral luck. For example, see Cushman and Green (2012), who offer an explanation of apparently conflicting intuitions about moral results luck in terms of two dissociable processes, and Björnsson and Persson (2012), who offer an explanation in terms of shifting explanatory perspectives. In an interesting set of studies, Kneer and Machery (2019) found that when participants were asked for comparative judgments about pairs of scenarios, varying only in outcome, they tended to offer anti-moral luck responses, judging agents in both scenarios equally blameworthy. In contrast, in related studies in which each participant only saw one scenario without a comparison, participants’ judgments of degrees of blameworthiness varied by scenario, with the more harmful outcome scenarios receiving judgments of higher degrees of blame. However, Kneer and Machinery found that the differences in judgments in these cases was nearly entirely mediated by a disproportionate attribution of negligence to the agents in the harmful scenarios, suggesting the possibility that, when presented only with one scenario, participants read backwards from harm to a morally significant attribution of features in the agents. If this is correct, then it may not be outcome per se that provides the grounds of differential judgments, but, rather, a distinct morally salient feature of agents that is often associated with outcome. Taken together, Kneer and Machery’s studies support the idea that people have anti-results-luck intuitions and lay theories, and that where they appear to have pro-results-luck intuitions, these can be explained as people tracking something only contingently associated with outcome rather than outcome itself. It is worth noting, however, as several of these authors do themselves, that even if we were confident in our possession of psychological explanations of our intuitions, there would still be philosophical work to do to sort out what the normative facts are. But it is helpful to have a growing body of systematic studies of intuitive reactions to scenarios involving moral luck, as well as investigation into the features of cases people find salient.