  The fourth, fifth, and sixth clusters concerning evolutionary, methodological, and moral problems are easier to address, since the new understanding of moral knowledge is based on (a) current knowledge of evolution, (b) the methodologies of (i) naturalized epistemology, (ii) reflective equilibrium when expanded to include moral consistency reasoning (Campbell 2014, 2017), and (iii) pragmatic naturalism, and (c) moral concerns raised by feminists. When moral knowledge is interpreted to be consistent with psychological and evolutionary studies of morality, these studies and the methodologies listed tend to reinforce the group-centered conception of moral knowledge. Issues will remain, such as the ontological one just noted, but on balance the problems for moral knowledge are diminished. The moral problems of bias raised in feminist epistemology are no exception, since the feminist literature cited above emphasizes the social nature of moral knowledge. That said, resolution of the bias paradox in feminist epistemology may require a realist moral ontology (as noted in section 6) and it may be unclear how to provide it. Our view that moral knowledge is possible is therefore qualified.