 Hanks’ explanation of why propositions as act types of the sort described have truth conditions comes in two steps. First, Hanks argues that token acts of predicating properties of objects have truth conditions. Hanks recognizes that some may doubt whether act tokens are the kinds of things that can be true and false. His main argument that they can be is that we have adverbial modifiers ‘truly’ and ‘falsely’ and that these attribute properties to action tokens. So just as ‘quickly’ in ‘Obama quickly stated that Clinton is eloquent.’ attributes a property to Obamas’s action, so Hanks claims that ‘truly’ in ‘Obama truly stated that Clinton is eloquent.’ attributes the property of being true to an action of Obama. Hanks then tries to argue that the action type of predicating being a demagogue of Cruz inherits the property of having truth conditions from its instances. Note that here it must be actual and possible instances that truth conditions are inherited from, since Hanks wants propositions that have never been and never will be tokened to have truth conditions. The argument here is complex since Hanks notes that types inherit certain kinds of properties from tokens and not others. Hence, Hanks seeks to explain why the having of truth conditions is the kind of property a type inherits from its (actual and possible) tokens. 