We conclude this section with an example to illustrate the above concepts. Recall again the coordination game of Figure 4: there are two actions for player 1 (Ann), \(u\) and \(d\), and two actions for player 2 (Bob), \(r\) and \(l\). Again, the preferences (or utilities) of the players are not important at this stage since we are only interested in describing the players’ information. The following epistemic-plausibility model is a possible description of the players’ informational attitudes that can be associated with this game. The solid lines represent player 1’s informational attitudes and the dashed line represents player 2’s. The arrows correspond to the players plausibility orderings with an \(i\)-arrow from \(w\) to \(v\) meaning \(v\preceq_i w\) (we do not draw all the arrows: each plausibility ordering can be completed by filling in arrows that result from reflexivity and transitivity). The different regions represent the players’ hard information.