 The claim that philosophers shouldn’t rely on intuitions constitutes a broad attack on conceptual analysis, in both its traditional and experimental guises. Not surprisingly, there have been several defenses of the importance of intuitions for doing philosophy. For instance, some philosophers argue that in order even to pick out the kind of interest, we need to rely on our intuitive sense of what belongs in the category (e.g., Goldman 2015). To determine the characteristics of knowledge, we need to have a way of picking out which items are genuine members of the kind, and for this we must rely on our intuitive understanding of knowledge. In addition, if we reject outright the appeal to what intuitively belongs to a category, it’s hard to make sense of the intelligibility of eliminativism (e.g., Bermúdez 2006: 305), since eliminativists typically argue that there is a mismatch between intuitive notions of, e.g., free will, and the kinds of things in the world. To give up on the significance of characterizing our intuitive commitments is to preemptively exclude eliminativist views, which have long been regarded as of central philosophical interest.