 Reinach 1911 followed Husserl: states of affairs are the “correlates” of judgement and assertion (See Meinertsen 2020 for a comparison between Reinach and Armstrongian states of affairs). If, for instance, a particular rose exists, a range of states of affairs exists that depend on the rose, whether they obtain or not (see Reinach 1911: 340). If I judge that the rose is blue, I judge incorrectly, because the judged state of affairs exists, but does not obtain. The property of states of affairs to obtain or fail to obtain distinguishes them from facts. As we have seen in section 2, the “space” of states of affairs helps Reinach to clarify the notions of modality and probability (see Reinach 1911: 339–40).  Reinach (1911: 338f) proposed, but did not argue in detail, that states of affairs are the relata of the ground-consequence relation. If an event a causes an event b, the state of affairs that a occurs is the ground of the state of affairs that b occurs. States of affairs figure prominently in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Potter (2011, 106) speculates about the influence of Austrian philosophers on Wittgenstein in this respect.