 How are we to establish this? How can we be sure there aren’t other sources of disutility. For instance, perhaps it is a virtue of a credence function if the credences it assigns cohere with one another in a particular way, and a vice if they do not. This is a coherentist claim of the sort endorsed for full beliefs, rather than credences, by the likes of BonJour (1985) and Harman (1973). Or perhaps it is a virtue of a credence in a particular proposition if it matches the degree of support given to that proposition by the agent’s current total evidence. This claim is dubbed evidential proportionalism by Goldman (2002: 55–7). Recent proponents might include Williamson (2000) and White (2009). Another possibility: perhaps the verisimilitude or truthlikeness of your credences is a source of their epistemic utility over and above their gradational accuracy (see entry on  truthlikeness).  Graham Oddie (2019) argues in favour of this. Each of these seem plausible. How is the credal veritist to answer the objection that there are sources of epistemic disutility, such as these three, that go beyond gradational inaccuracy? Of course, it is notoriously difficult to prove a negative existential claim, such as the credal veritist claim that there are no other epistemic vices beyond inaccuracy. But here is a natural strategy: for each proposed candidate epistemic vice besides accuracy, the credal veritist should provide an account of how its badness derives from the badness of inaccuracy.