  Although Albalag does not devote a specific discussion to the theory of knowledge, many questions pertaining to the limit, means, and features of human knowledge recur throughout the Tiqqun. His treatment of these questions show indebtedness to Aristotelian epistemological theories as expounded by Arab Aristotelians, in particular Averroes. Following the framework of the theory of representational knowledge, standard among Arab Aristotelians, Albalag divides knowledge into representation and assent. The former, which is a prerequisite for the latter, is acquired by definition, while assent is acquired by a proof (Tiqqun [Logic]: 98; cf. Maqāṣid: 12). As noted previously, Albalag adopts the Aristotelian theory of syllogism, assigning a primary significance to demonstrative syllogisms in evoking certain assent. Moreover, like Averroes, Albalag places conspicuous emphasis on the empirical foundation of human knowledge (for Averroes’ epistemology see Black 2019). Intelligible thoughts arise in the soul through the cognitive process of abstraction and syllogistic reasoning. Without external images, Albalag affirms, it would be impossible for the soul to apprehend the intelligible forms, just as it is impossible for a person who is deprived of visual data to apprehend the quiddity of colors (Tiqqun, n.11: 16, n.44: 71; cf. Aristotle  De Anima III, 7, 431a, 14–17).