 Notwithstanding these attempts, however, it came to be widely accepted that disposition ascriptions cannot be analyzed in an extensional language (Burks 1951, 1955; Pap 1958; Sellars 1958). This had the effect of turning philosophers’ attention to the connection between disposition ascriptions and counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. In fact, it was generally recognised from the very beginning of philosophical research about dispositions that disposition ascriptions are closely linked with counterfactual conditionals: ‘\(x\) is soluble at \(t\)’ is associated with ‘\(x\) would dissolve if put into water at \(t\)’. This idea, however, was overlooked for decades partly due to the then popular epistemology of radically empiricist kind and partly due to the lack of a proper semantic understanding of counterfactual conditionals. But it later came to be brought into the spotlight largely due to the revival of the philosophy of modality from the early 1970s. (For a historical survey of the debate regarding conceptual analyses of dispositions, see Malzkorn 2001 and Bird 2012.)