 In some instances, reliable misrepresentations provide another take on some of the familiar content-determination problems. So, take attempts to use normal conditions to distinguish between content-determining causes and non-content-determining causes. Even in normal conditions, color representations are not caused by colors, but by, say, surface reflectances under certain conditions of illumination, just in the way that, even in normal conditions cow representations are sometimes not caused by cows, but by, say, a question such as, “What kind of animal is sometimes named ‘Bessie’?” Take a version of the asymmetric dependency theory. On this theory applied to color terms, it might seem that there is no red-to-“red” law on which all the other laws depends in much the same way that it might seem there is no unicorn-to-“unicorn” law on which all other laws depends. (Cf. Fodor (1987, pp. 163–4) and (1990, pp. 100–1)).