 Condillac addressed this problem in the Treatise of Sensations by recognizing a level of pre-linguistic reflection that is common to animals and human beings. At the same time, Condillac insisted drawing a distinction between the pre-linguistic capacities of human beings and those of animals. He described at length how the statue acquires the ideas of extended objects by touch and how it comes to refer the causes of sensations received by the other senses to these objects. Touch is considered as a sort of pre-linguistic instrument of analysis: it originally discriminates parts outside of parts in its objects and by its means, sensations become ideas, that is, they acquire a reference to external objects. Condillac then argued that animals must be inferior to humans because their sense of touch is not as developed as that of human beings. He thought that human hands and fingers are uniquely adapted to receiving a multiplicity of different impressions and therefore the human sense of touch is able to discriminate more accurately the qualities of objects than that of other animals. From this difference of degree, Condillac went on to argue for a difference of kind between the soul of animals and that of humans: God in his benevolence would not trap a soul capable of superior operations in an inferior body like that of animals; therefore, the soul of animals must be of an inferior kind (Treatise, The Plan of This Work, Note).