 Otherwise than Being opens with a general overview of the argument, in which being and transcendence are also named “essence” and “disinterest”. Emphasizing the processual quality of being, Levinas will refer to it equivalently as “being” or “essence”, venturing that he might even have used the dynamic form essance (OBBE: 187 note 1). Responsibility will be focused and discussed as the condition of possibility of all verbal signification (OBBE: 43–47). But the themes of conversation and teaching recede into the background. He now makes a more strategic use of the body as flesh, that is, as a locus with simultaneously an inside and an outside, as in Merleau-Ponty. Subjectivity is again framed affectively as the coming to pass of responsibility, although this time the phenomenological analysis of intentionality is analyzed into its primitive layer of sensibility that Levinas calls “pre-originary susceptiveness [susception pré-originaire]” (OBBE: 122, 136–138). For him, that means that subjectivity always entails pre-cognitive dimensions that are from the outset intersubjectively conditioned. The other has become other-in-the-same, as indicated. But the other-in-the-same is not objectively different from the factical other who faces me, because neither are objects and both are expressions or modes of alterity. As we will see, the other-in-the-same describes a pre-thematic “investiture” (because I never know when I first experienced this other in me; OBBE: 125): “All my inwardness is invested in the form of a despite-me, for-another” (OBBE: 11). In Otherwise than Being, Levinas has returned to Husserl’s inquiries into passive synthesis, to the latter’s perplexities about the stretch of retentions of passive experiences, about the unbidden spontaneity of our associations, and the near-infinity of sensuous horizons—all part of a process unfolding in what Husserl called in 1926 “a phenomenology of the so-called unconscious” (Husserl 2001: 201 and “Appendix 19” 512–519). In light of this return, we should not approach interiority and exteriority as opposed terms, but as dimensions of intersubjectivity and the inhabitation of a self by alterity.