In the literature on human cognition, awareness of what one knows is called “metacognition” and it is associated with a “feeling of knowing”.  Smith and colleagues claim that investigating metacognition in animals could provide information about the relation of self-awareness to other-awareness (theory of mind), and that their results already show that “animals have functional features of or parallels to human conscious cognition” (Smith et al. 2003; Smith 2009).  They also raise the question of what this might tell us about the phenomenal features of that cognition.  Browne (2004) argues that the dolphin research cannot support the connection to theory of mind, but that it nevertheless is relevant to consciousness in dolphins, particularly within the theoretical framework provided by Lycan, described above. The notion of metacognition also seems relevant to questions about access consciousness. (For additional discussion of self awareness and metacognition, readers are referred to the section on  theory of mind and metacognition in the entry on   animal cognition.)