 One Murdochian strand in care ethics that has been influential outside the care ethics context is particularity—an emphasis on the limits of universal principle and impersonality to capture the substance of appropriate moral response. This particularity takes two forms, or at least two emphases, one on the particularity of situations—the (alleged) impossibility of coming up with a set of general moral principles or a moral code that will always prescribe the right action (McDowell’s emphasis, and the focus of what is called “particularism” [Hooker &amp; Little 2000]). The other is on the particularity of persons as objects of moral attention and concern. (There are other typologies of particularism. See Driver 2012.) Both dimensions are present in Murdoch’s thought and in care ethics, and the person-focus is more central to both Murdoch and care ethics. Millgram finds a resource for particularism in Murdoch’s emphasis on finding the best description of a situation (Millgram 2002), but situation-particularity remains within the “action/reasons for action” framework that Murdoch definitively transcends, and person-particularity is crucial for her doing so.