 Reiman agrees with Risse and Zeckhauser that some forms of racial profiling can make a significant contribution to overall safety, but he also supports Lever’s view that racial profiling in a racist society is likely to exacerbate racism and increase the violation of the rights of those victimized by it. While he holds that “profiling is not intrinsically racist” (2011: 17), Reiman argues that Risse and Zeckhauser have not set the bar sufficiently high for profiling to be justified. He contends that, in light of its likely exacerbation of existing racism, “racial profiling [must] be used only for grave crimes and only where there is abundant evidence of its likelihood of significantly increasing apprehension of perpetrators of such crimes” (17). In a similar vein, Hosein argues that profiling is justified only when the social benefits are “compelling” and “there are no other means of achieving the same benefits without creating similar injustice” (2018: e16). For Reiman, Hosein and other critics, then, an adequate appreciation of the connection of racial profiling to systemic injustice compels the conclusion that, if profiling can be justified at all, it is in a narrower range of circumstances that what the Risse- Zeckhauser argument allows. 