 The actual refutation or, rather, historical erasure of natural law was the work of post-Kantian historians like C. F. Stäudlin (1761–1826), J. G. Buhle (1763–1807), and W. G. Tennemann (1761–1819), whose versions of the history of moral philosophy ironically left Grotius, Pufendorf and Thomasius (Barbeyrac’s protagonists) with only minor roles to play. Even so, natural law remained a presence in the nineteenth century. Thus, Fichte (The Foundations of Natural Law [Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre, 1796–97]), Schelling (A New Deduction of Natural Law [Neue Deduction des Naturrechts, 1797]), and the young Hegel (The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law [Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, 1802–3]) all published works on “natural law” (Naturrecht) – showing that the idiom remained serviceable (Klippel 1997, 2012). In the British domain, insofar as it was not also ‘idealized’, Bentham’s vague and dismissive attitude toward ‘natural rights’, and the comparatively circumscribed ‘ethics’ of Mill’s utilitarianism, found little connection with modern natural law, even through its own eighteenth-century inheritance which that approach had helped to shape. The rebirth of Thomism in the Catholic world toward the end of the century, and the permutation of natural into human rights before and after the First World War, made the disjunction and the amnesia complete.