 Thus far the moral complexities of revolutionary jus ad bellum have been the focus of the discussion, emphasizing in particular the difficulty of satisfying the requirements of rightful authority and proportionality. The jus in bello component of a theory of just revolutionary war is also morally complex. A key issue that a theory of the morality of revolutionary war ought to address is whether widely accepted jus in bello norms apply without exception to war-making by revolutionaries or whether, instead, revolutionaries are morally permitted to undertake acts of war that the military personnel of states are usually prohibited from performing. This is not a merely theoretical issue: revolutionary warriors have often engaged in various morally problematic forms of “irregular” warfare. They have assassinated civilian leaders and other civilians such as government bureaucrats and judges, attacked regime forces while wearing civilian attire (not wearing uniforms or insignia as required by the laws of war and not carrying weapons openly), and engaged in terrorism, deliberately killing individuals who had no discernible connection with the regime by detonating bombs in public places.  [9]  Furthermore, in order to mobilize people to join the revolution or to deter them from aiding the regime in suppressing it, they have engaged in acts of terrorism against the oppressed. 