 Barnett (2002) suggests that the puzzle is best addressed by shifting from a promissory theory of contracts to an adjacent consent-based theory (Barnett 1986). While the concepts of consent and promise fall in the same normative family (Hurd 1996), the criteria for consent may be less demanding. Nevertheless, the view confronts parallel worries, since what was consented-to remains opaque. Barnett suggests that a consumer’s consent is limited to those terms that are not radically unexpected (637), but the basis for such empirical assumptions about consumer intent remains unclear. It is doubtful that the average consumer considers the question of what, if anything, she is consenting to when she mindlessly clicks “I agree” (Radin 2007; 2014; Kar &amp; Radin 2019). Ultimately, the problem is not even due to standard forms including standard(or non-bespoke) terms or the terms being unread by the consumer. The problem stems directly from the fact that the consumer’s actions in virtue of which the law finds an intention to be bound appear thoughtless—that is, lacking in intentionality.