 In those situations in which we can assume that there is a fact of the matter (for example, a defendant has—or has not—committed a murder), which each agent has a (noisy) opinion about, the truth-tracking properties of belief merging operators can be investigated (Hartmann et al. 2010; Hartmann and Sprenger 2012; Cevolani 2014). The question is then whether a certain aggregation method selects the right decision. Williamson (2009) argues that aggregating the evidence on which the judgments are based is best for judgment aggregation, as it would yield to the right decision. The three-step proposal he advocates distinguishes between three types of propositions: evidence, beliefs and judgments. Evidence is the support for an agent’s beliefs and judgments, and it is the right candidate for merging techniques. Judgments, on the other hand, are best dealt with decision theory that maps degrees of beliefs and utilities to judgments.