 It isn’t just that semantic nonfactualism eliminates a candidate for the constant element uniting embedded and unembedded uses of the same normative expression. Such nonfactualism also serves to complicate the semantics, because it eliminates a straightforward and easy way of explaining how different beliefs can be inconsistent and how one belief can commit one to another.  On a standard model for belief in general, belief content is propositional and two beliefs are inconsistent when their contents – the propositions they are directed at – are inconsistent. And one belief logically commits one to another when the content of the first entails the second. Those two ideas, plus an account of what it is for contents – that is propositions – to be inconsistent is all you need to explain the logical relations among beliefs. It isn’t even really important to this general point that the contents be propositions.  The point is that if you treat all beliefs as inheriting their logical properties from the logical properties of their contents in this way, you get a relatively simple story about attitudinal inconsistency and commitment. 