 In addition to integral wholes and universal wholes, Boethius introduces a third basic type of whole to medieval philosophers: the whole consisting of “powers” (potentiae) or “virtues” (virtutes) (On Division 888a). These wholes are often called “virtual wholes” or “potential wholes”. This article will follow that practice, but it should be understood that in medieval contexts “potential” usually signifies something that is in some respect not fully actualized, and, hence, in some contexts “potential whole” and “potential part” refer to things that are possibly, but not actually divided, as when a continuum with a certain magnitude is potentially divisible but not actually divided into halves or fourths, or when a substance is said to be potentially divisible into its elemental constituents (see Pasnau 2011, 606–629). This standard sense of “potency” is even at work in the potential wholes that Boethius is talking about, since the soul’s powers are typically related to the soul’s “operations”, or activities, and these activities are clearly not always occurring. A soul might have the power to see or the power to think, even though it is not presently seeing or thinking. Nonetheless, these Boethian potential wholes are actual and actually possess these potential parts; they are not “potential” in the sense that they are possible things or things that are merely capable of being divided. 