  One formulation of disjunctivism invokes the notion of a fundamental kind. (This formulation is principally due to Martin, but see also Snowdon 2005a, p. 136. For discussion of this formulation, see Logue 2013). According to this formulation, the disjunctivist is committed to denying that veridical perceptions, illusions and hallucinations are conscious events of the same fundamental kind. The assumption here is that for mental events, there is a most specific answer to the question, ‘What is it?’ that tells us what essentially the mental event is, and thereby specifies its fundamental kind. On this formulation, the disjunctivist is committed to denying that whatever fundamental kind of conscious event occurs when one is veridically perceiving the world, that kind of event can occur whether or not one is veridically perceiving. Let us call a view of this sort fundamental kind disjunctivism.