However, since the modal translation of mathematical axioms is taken to be true, the question arises as to what makes such statements true. For instance, when it is asserted that ‘it is possible that there are structures satisfying the axioms of Peano Arithmetic’, what is responsible for the truth of such statement? Clearly, the modal structuralist will not ground the possibility in question on the actual truth of the Peano axioms, for this move, on a reasonable interpretation, would require platonism. Nor will the modal structuralist support the relevant possibility on the basis of the existence of a consistency proof for the Peano axioms. After all, any such proof is an abstract object, and to invoke it at the foundation of modal structuralism clearly threatens the coherence of the overall view. Furthermore, to invoke a modalized version of such a consistency proof would beg the question, since it assumes that the use of modal operators is already justified. Ultimately, what is needed to solve properly the ontological problem is a suitable account of modal discourse.