The term “phenomenology” had been coined by the Swiss mathematician (and Kant correspondent) J.H. Lambert (1728–1777) in his The New Organon of 1764, and in a letter to Lambert, sent to accompany a copy of his Inaugural Dissertation (1770), Kant had proposed his own project of a “general phenomenology” as a necessary propaedeutic presupposed by the science of metaphysics. Such a phenomenology was meant to determine the “validity and limitations” of what he called the “principles of sensibility”, principles he had (he thought) shown in the accompanying work to be importantly different to those of conceptual thought. The term clearly suited Kant as he had distinguished the phenomena known through the faculty of sensibility from the noumena known purely conceptually. This envisioned phenomenology seems to coincide roughly with what he was to eventually describe as a critique of pure reason, although Kant’s thought had gone through important changes by the time that he came to publish the work of that name (1781, second edition 1787). Perhaps because of this he never again used the term “phenomenology” for quite this purpose.