 Nolan (2001) and Cameron (2008) argue that considerations of theoretical parsimony can lead us to reject ontological infinite regresses even if such regresses are not metaphysically impossible. A theory that yields an ontological infinite regress of course thereby yields an infinite ontology. Even if we are not in the situation (discussed above in section 1.2) where we have independent knowledge that we are dealing with a finite domain, this could still be a mark against the theory, simply on the grounds that it is an unparsimonious ontology. So for example, we might object to the claim that material objects are gunky—with each part of them being divisible into further proper parts—not because there’s any inconsistency in the hypothesis, or because it leads to an infinite chain of ontological dependence and thereby leaves the existence of all things unexplained, but simply because it means that whenever there is an object somewhere, there are in fact infinitely many objects there. A gunky world is an ontologically extravagant world, and so we have the same kind of reason to reject the hypothesis that things are gunky as we have to reject needlessly complex hypotheses about how things behave (e.g., the Ptolemaic theory of planetary motion with its epicycle upon epicycle): other things being equal, we should prefer simpler theories and more economical ontologies over complex theories and more expansive ontologies.