 Consider the sentence ‘∃x Parent(x)’. Any criterion that focuses on the question—what entities need to be among the values of the variable ‘x’ in order for this sentence to be true?—appears to get the ontological commitments of the sentence wrong (see Rayo 2007: 431–2). For the sentence appears to be ontologically committed to children no less than to parents; but children do not need to be taken to be values of the variable in order for the sentence to be true (assuming, that is, that it is possible for a parent not also to be a child). We have here, it seems, a stark division between two approaches to ontological commitment: the quantifier approach, which looks only to the values of the variables of the sentences of a theory, and the entailment approach, which looks to the existential entailments of the theory, and ignores whether or not the entities whose existence is entailed are values of the theory's variables. In cases where predicates express extrinsic properties, the quantifier approach undergenerates; it misses ontological commitments.