  Possibilists who accept that one ought to advise Procrastinate to \(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\) will deny that this suggests that Procrastinate truly has an obligation to \(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\). Rather, they’ll hold that Procrastinate’s advisor has an obligation to advise Procrastinate to do something she is obligated to refrain from doing. Possibilists will point out that Procrastinate’s advisor, just like Procrastinate, is obligated to do the best she can. In this case, doing the best she can requires advising Procrastinate to \(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\) since Procrastinate won’t \(\langle a \lamp b\rangle\) no matter what Procrastinate’s advisor says. Thus, the best Procrastinate’s advisor can do is to get Procrastinate to \(\langle{\sim}a \lamp{\sim}b\rangle\) and that requires telling Procrastinate that she ought to \(\langle{\sim}a\rangle\). Erik Carlson gives this response in his (1995: 127) article. Fred Feldman gives this response in his (1986: 57) book and puts the point thusly.