 Studies concerning Giles’ natural philosophy focused mainly on his treatment of some pivotal concepts of Aristotle’s Physics.  Cecilia Trifogli opened new perspectives in this field, devoting her attention to the notions of place and motion (especially in the void, see Trifogli 1992), underlining that “Giles’ emphasis on the role of place in the description of motion seems to lead to a quantitative and relational notion of place. Giles, however, does not completely substitute the Aristotelian notion of place for that of place as distance. Place as distance is only one of the two notions of place which appear in his commentary. The other, which is related to material place, assumes an intrinsic connection between place and the located body that cannot be founded on distance alone” (Trifogli 1990a, 350). Giles’ distinction was referred to as an opposition between material place (the limit of the containing body) and formal place (distance from the fixed points of the universe) (Donati-Trifogli 2016). Trifogli also investigated Giles’ notions of time and infinity, emphasizing that his whole approach to natural philosophy is distinguished by a tendency towards a metaphysical interpretation of Aristotelian concepts, as opposed to a physical and quantitative one (Trifogli 1990b, 1991). For example, Giles conceives of time not as a quantity pertaining to every kind of motion, but rather as the same thing as motion, seen under a different aspect. His concept of time rests in fact essentially on a broad notion of succession, which allows him on one hand to retain the unity of the concept of time, but, on the other hand, to acknowledge the existence of different times (Trifogli 1990b, Donati-Trifogli 2016) Giles distinguishes between two kinds of duration: extrinsic duration is the time of celestial motion, and is obviously one in number. Intrinsic duration depends on the different motions taking place in the sublunary world and is therefore plural (Donati-Trifogli 2016).  A similar attitude emerges also from the analysis of Giles’ controversy on angelic time with Henry of Ghent (Porro 1988, Porro 1991, but see also Faes de Mottoni 1983). Both authors thought that the time in which angels exist, unlike sublunar time, is a discrete succession of instants. Giles and Henry disagreed, however, on the relationship existing between angelic and sublunar time. In particular, Henry rejected Giles’ thesis that more instants of angelic time can correspond to one and the same instant of sublunar time. This difference of opinion rested in part on diverging concepts of angelic motion, which can be istantaneous according to Henry, but not according to Giles.