 Apart from the general evidence on behalf of the Doctrine of Types, Nietzsche’s strongest targeted argument for the epiphenomenality of consciousness depends on a piece of phenomenology, namely, “that a thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, and not when ‘I’ wish” (BGE 17). If that is right and if actions are apparently “caused” by thoughts (by particular beliefs and desires), then it follows that actions are not caused solely by our conscious mental states, but rather by whatever it is (i.e., type-facts) that determines the thoughts that enter consciousness. Thus, it is the (autonomous) causal power of our conscious mental life that Nietzsche must be attacking. Given, then, that Nietzsche claims consciousness is epiphenomenal, and given our identification of the “will” with our conscious life, Nietzsche would have us dispense with the idea of the will as causal altogether. (This gives Nietzsche a novel argument against hierarchical accounts of free will favored by some compatibilists: see Leiter 2002: 93–96. It also undermines more recent forms of compatibilism based on reasons-responsiveness: if deliberation, or conscious reasoning,, is epiphenomenal, then why should an antecedent but non-causal correlation between antecedently consciously experienced reasons and a subsequent action ground responsibility? Barometers drop before storms, after all, but they do not cause them and are not blameworthy for them. See Leiter 2019: 144–146). Since the conscious will is not causal, the Free Will Thesis is false.