Whatever the merits of Dworkin's ideal of distributive justice as fair insurance, it looks to be rejecting the idea of justice as luck egalitarianism. Whereas the luck egalitarian holds that chosen and courted inequalities do not qualify for compensation to restore initial equality, Dworkin's hypothetical insurance schemes would allow compensation for health woes triggered by voluntary behavior and unemployment compensation for the person who loses her job through her faulty conduct (but for a contrary interpretation, see Ripstein 2007: 100). Whether compensation ought to be carried out depends on what the average member of the community would purchase under the imaginary conditions deemed to be fair. Moreover, whether compensation is owed to a particular individual does not depend on the particular values, desires, risk preferences, aims and ambitions, and so on of the particular individual, rather on what the average member of the community would choose. The key divide for distributive justice is no longer, in Dworkin's mature view, the divide between what lies within the individual's power to control and what does not. Depending on how one evaluates Dworkin's later views, one might regard the divergence between later Dworkin and luck egalitarian or level-playing-field equality of opportunity as either a criticism of the former or of the latter (for criticisms of Dworkin's views from opposed perspectives, see Anderson 1999; Scheffler 2003; Cohen 2004; and Fleurbaey 2008: chapters 6–10).