 In a similar vein, John MacFarlane (2004, Other Internet Resources; henceforth cited as MF2004) contends that a fuller understanding of how logical consequence normatively constrains reasoning may help us settle long-standing issues in the philosophy of logic, debates surrounding the very nature of validity. Attempts at resolving such questions have been thwarted because of their suspect methodology: they relied on the unreliable (because theory-laden) testimony of our intuitions about validity. Appealing to the normative role of logic, MacFarlane hopes, would give us a new angle of attack and hence a potentially better handle on these vexed questions. MacFarlane, too, may therefore be read as suggesting that a proper account of logic’s normative role in reasoning will ultimately enable us to hone in on the correct conception of logical consequence. As examples MacFarlane considers the dispute between advocates of relevantist restrictions of the notion validity and those who reject such restrictions (see entry  relevance logic),  and the question of the formality of logical validity (see entry  logical consequence).  The  hope, in other words, is that an account of the normative role of  logic, will help us pin down the correct concept of validity. In this  respect, then, MacFarlane’s project may be thought to be more  ambitious than Field’s whose aim is to provide a logic-neutral  core concept of validity in terms of its normative role. For  MacFarlane a correct account of the normativity of logic would  constitute a potential avenue through which logical disputes may be  decided; for Field such an account merely renders such disputes  intelligible and so serves as a starting point for their  resolution.[2] 