 He plainly states that ‘universals do not exist’ (TUP, 4.5 ff.), which does not seem to be a mere thesis which he rejects just for the sake of argument, because throughout his work he will refer to this claim (‘we have already shown that universals do not exist’). He is a nominalist in accepting only particulars which for him are external, macroscopic, non-momentary and material objects. On another occasion (TUS 24) he criticises the view that composite macroscopic wholes cannot exist, and what exists instead are their parts only (a typical Buddhist nominalist position). He concludes there is no way to demonstrate that composite wholes are non-existent. Interestingly, he nowhere links the idea of composite wholes (and the paradox of the whole and its parts), which he seems to accept, to idea the universal (and the paradox of the universal and the particulars as its instantiations), which he clearly rejects. These two concepts, the wholes and universals, were generally analysed in India jointly as two aspects of the same problem: just as the whole exists (or does not exist) through its parts, in the very same way also the universal exists (or does not exist) through its particulars. Interestingly, Jayarāśi never links these two issues, precisely because, it seems, he admitted the existence of macroscopic objects of our experience (i.e., composite wholes) whereas he rejected the existence of universals. Being a sceptic, he does seem to accept a ‘commonsensical view’ of the world that consists of such macroscopic objects, but not of invisible atoms or universals, demons and god. In line with this approach, he seemed also to maintain that consciousness is a product or combination of the four elements (see above). It should not come as a surprise to discover that all these views he shared with genuine materialists of the Cārvāka / Lokāyata tradition.