 The initial difficulty is that such works do not fit neatly into the standard ontological bifurcation between concrete, spatiotemporal objects such as hats and hacksaws and abstract, eternal objects such as numbers and sets. Like concrete objects, but unlike abstract objects, repeatable works of art appear to be created and may change or be destroyed. Unlike concrete objects, but like abstract objects, they do not appear to be located in space and time. Amie Thomasson (1999; 2004; 2006) sought to resolve this difficulty by proposing an intermediate ontological category of abstract artifacts—abstract in that they are not located in space and time; artifactual in that they are intentionally created and can be destroyed. Thomasson originally proposed this new category as part of her theory of fictional characters, but she noted its usefulness to the analysis of the literary works those characters inhabit, repeatable works of art in general, and perhaps other social objects as well. (For application to repeatable works of art, see the essays in Art and Abstract Objects (Mag Uidhir 2012). Applications to other social objects include software (Irmak 2012), establishments (Korman 2020), and normativity (Frugé 2022).)