 The epistemic/psychological interpretation of these formulations of formal consequences has not gone uncontested; arguably, they are equally compatible with a semantic interpretation emphasizing the signification of sentences (Read 2010, 178). But it is clear that, while the Parisian tradition defined the concept of formal consequence in terms of (ST), the British tradition formulated the same concept in terms of (Co). Both were ideas that had been floating around for centuries, but which yield very different conceptions of what counts as a formal consequence. These two approaches are not only intensionally divergent; they also disagree on the extension of the class of formal consequences. (ST)-formal consequences do not include enthymematic consequences such as ‘Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal’, but (Co)-formal consequences typically do. For British authors, the class of material consequences is often composed exclusively of consequences of the kind ‘from the impossible anything follows’ and ‘the necessary follows from anything’, which satisfy the truth-preservation criterion (TP) a fortiori, but typically fail relevant/containment criteria. ‘God does not exist, therefore you are a donkey’ counts as a valid consequence according to (TP) (‘God does not exist’ is considered to be an impossible sentence), but the consequent is not contained in the antecedent in the same way as in ‘Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an animal’. To mark this distinction, 14th century British authors would typically view the former as a material consequence and the latter as a formal consequence (Ashworth &amp; Spade 1992).