When we find people seeming to disagree about some matter, that is often because there are considerations on either side of the issue, none of which can be easily dismissed. And which of these one focuses on can affect one’s view as to the truth of the proposition in question. So, for instance, if Mary and John focus on the various ways in which Smith might be mistaken (e.g., because of a misprint in the itinerary), this can get them thinking that he does not know, especially if focusing on a possibility tends to make one over-rate its probability. (See especially Feldman 2001, 74–78. For similar ideas, see Williamson 2005a, 112; 2005b, 226; Hawthorne 2004, 164-165; Conee 2014, 76–79; and Rysiew 2001, 502–505.) A related suggestion is made by Gerken, whose ‘epistemic focal bias’ account includes the following “principle of contextual salience”: