 Moral goodness is itself explained in terms of moral virtue and vice concepts. There is no such thing as being morally good, full stop, but only morally good-in-a-way; by being brave, generous, just, prudent, etc. To have a moral virtue is a way of being good, but it is a “second-order” way of being good, because moral goodness is defined in terms of other kinds of goodness. (Thomson 1996, 144–147; 1997, 279–281; 2001, 59–67). As the examples of the good toaster and the good knife illustrate, for Thomson the morally good is just one sub-class of good things (and it is not a particularly large sub-class; the non-morally good is vastly larger than the morally good). In addition to the morally good, there are four other sub-classes of goodness: the useful (as in “good for” governing a verb), the skilful (“good at”), the enjoyable, and the beneficial (as in “good for” governing a noun) (Thomson 1996, 131–133). In general, Thomson suggests, a virtue is a trait such that, whatever else is true of those among whom we live, it is better if they have it (Thomson 1997, 282). For example, generosity is a moral virtue because generous people will act in ways that are beneficial for others.