  A prominent objection to the Equal Weight View and other views that prescribe doxastic conciliation is that such views are self-defeating. For expressions of this objection, see Elga 2010, Frances 2010, O’Connor 1999, Plantinga 2000a and 2000b, Taliaferro 2009, Weatherson 2014, and Weintraub 2013. For responses, see Bogardus 2009, Christensen 2009, Elga 2010, Graves 2013, Kornblith 2013, Littlejohn 2013, Matheson 2015b, and Pittard 2015. In brief, there is disagreement about the epistemic significance of disagreement itself, so any view that calls for conciliation upon the discovery of disagreement can have it that it calls for its own rejection. For instance, a defender of the Equal Weight View could become aware of enough individuals that are suitably epistemically well-positioned on the epistemology of disagreement that nevertheless deny that the Equal Weight View is correct. Following the prescriptions of the Equal Weight View would require this defender to abandon the view, and perhaps even accept a competitor account. For these reasons, Plantinga (2000a) has claimed that such views are, ‘self-referentially inconsistent’ (522) and Elga (2010) has claimed that such views are ‘incoherent’ and ‘self-undermining’ (179). Such a worry seems to apply to the Equal Weight View, the Justificationist View, and the Total Evidence View. Since all three views prescribe conciliation in at least some cases, they are all (at least in principle) subject to such a result.