 A generalization is given by the sequential priority rules (List 2004b; see Dietrich 2015 for further generalization). Here, for each profile \(\langle J_1, J_2 , \ldots ,J_n\rangle\), the propositions in \(X\) are collectively adjudicated in a fixed order of priority, for instance, a temporal or epistemic one. The collective judgment on each proposition \(p \in X\) is made as follows. If the majority judgment on \(p\) is consistent with collective judgments on prior propositions, this majority judgment prevails; otherwise the collective judgment on \(p\) is determined by the implications of prior judgments. By construction, this guarantees consistent and (absent ties) complete collective judgments. However, it is path-dependent: the order in which propositions are considered may affect the outcome, specifically when the underlying majority judgments are inconsistent. For example, when this aggregation rule is applied to the profiles in Tables 5, 6, and 7 (but not 8), the collective judgments depend on the order in which the propositions are considered. Thus sequential priority rules are vulnerable to agenda manipulation. Similar phenomena occur in sequential pairwise majority voting in preference aggregation (e.g., Riker 1982).