 The way al-Fārābī builds the referred analogy echoes Alexander and Themistius (Davidson 1992: 50). Al-Fārābī describes the relationship of the active intellect and the material intellect as that held between the sun and sight (al-Fārābī LI: 24–27; LC: 218–219; OI: 74–75). As H. A. Davidson (1992: 50–51) states, the analogy is built upon Aristotle’s theory of vision, but al-Fārābī stresses the sun as the source of the  light.[7]  Therefore, al-Fārābī equates the sun as the source of light with the active intellect, and not with the light itself. In this sense, following Davidson’s description, the light from the sun does four things: (1) it enters the eye and turns its potential vision into actual vision; (2) it enables potentially visible colors to become visible in actuality; (3) it itself becomes visible to the eye; and (4) it renders the sun, its source, visible to the eye. The analogy works as follows: (1) the active intellect turns the material or passive intellect into intellect in actuality; (2) it transforms potential intelligibles (sense impressions stored in the imaginative faculty) into actual intelligibles; (3) it itself becomes an intelligible object for the human intellect; and (4) it renders the active intellect as an intelligible object for the human intellect. With this analogy al-Fārābī suggests that the active intellect provides some sort of illumination or flow of light by which the human intellect is actualized enabling it to grasp the forms by abstraction.