 The most common entry-point for thinking that there may be a metaphysical difference between stuff and things is by noting that while common things, such as dogs and rocks, can be unqualifiedly counted, there are also stuffs, such as water and air, which cannot be unqualifiedly counted. But the entry point can be even more rudimentary, possibly pre-linguistic. As Burge (1975, 199) notes, “from early childhood we learn to distinguish compact, enduring things from the stuffs of which they are consituted. We count the former and measure the latter. We treat things as stable points of reference … stuffs we think of as amorphous and protean.” Philosophers and linguists have often latched onto this distinction by noting the difference between what are called ‘mass terms/nouns’ and ‘count terms/nouns.’ Burge goes on, “Mass terms are typically used to measure the masses—count nouns, to number the multitudes” (1975, 199).