 Finally, it should be noted that HD-confirmation offers no substantial relief from the blite paradox. On the one hand, \(e = raven(a) \wedge ex_{t\le T}(a) \wedge black(a)\) does not, as such, HD-confirm either \(h = \forall x(raven(x) \rightarrow black(x))\) or \(h^* = \forall x(raven(x) \rightarrow blite(x))\), that is, for empty \(k\). On the other hand, if object \(a\) is assumed to have been sampled from ravens before \(T\) (that is, given \(k = raven(a) \wedge ex_{t\le T}(a))\), then \(black(a)\) is entailed by both “all ravens are black” and “all ravens are blite” and therefore HD-confirms each of them. So HD-confirmation, too, sanctions the existence of confirmation relations that seem intuitively unsound (indeed, indefinitely many of them: as we know, other variations of \(h^*\) can be conceived at will, like the “blurple” hypothesis). One could insist that HD does handle the blite paradox after all, because \(black(a)\) (given \(k\) as above) does not HD-confirms that a raven will be white if examined after \(T\) (Kuipers 2000, 29 ff.). Unfortunately (as pointed out by Schurz 2005, 148) \(black(a)\) does not HD-confirm that a raven will be black if examined after \(T\) either (again, given \(k\) as above). That’s because, as already pointed out, HD-confirmation fails the predictive inference condition (PIC) in general. So, all in all, HD-confirmation can not tell black from blite any more than Hempel-confirmation can.