 However, a few contract law doctrines address distributive concerns more directly. For a time, it looked as if the doctrine of “unconscionability” might inscribe substantive limits on contractual inequality into consumer law, at least with respect to low-income consumers (UCC: §2-302). The doctrine of unconscionability has two components: “procedural unconscionability” arises when one side exploits inequalities of bargaining sophistication or power to its advantage; and “substantive unconscionability” arises when the terms struck unreasonably, and extremely, favor one side. Traditionally, both elements must be separately demonstrated to establish unconscionability, but for a brief period, it looked as if substantive unconscionability, standing alone, might allow a consumer to avoid an onerous contractual obligation (see, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 1969). This line of doctrine was quickly narrowed (see, e.g., Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., Inc., 1971). Today, unconscionability requires (to varying degrees in different jurisdictions) a procedural element, so that a contract’s substantive injustice is not, without more, sufficient to render it unenforceable. Moreover, on the conventional interpretation, the procedural element requires some sort of bargaining abuse so that it is not enough that one contracting party is less economically privileged and therefore more economically vulnerable. Other doctrines that subject contractual terms to distributive scrutiny similarly emphasize procedural and transactional aspects of justice. The doctrine of contra proferentum, for example, calls for contracts to be interpreted against their drafters. And any number of provisions in the UCC authorize courts to fill contractual gaps, interpret ambiguous terms, or regulate renegotiation, with courts often exercising their discretion in ways that favor unsophisticated (and often poorer) parties (Rakoff 2016). For this reason, although the application of doctrines like unconscionability might be driven by considerations of distributive justice, the law does not make distributive justice a freestanding criterion for the enforceability of contracts. An argument might be made that the law embodies an Aristotelian conception of commutative justice (Gordley 1991), so that contractual exchange must deploy a “just price,” which allows neither party to enrich itself at the expense of the other; but an analogous claim that the law exemplifies a general concern for social and income inequality would be hard to maintain.