 This is most obviously apparent in Zhuangzi’s appeal to the indexical phenomena of language, which Zhuangzi used as a foil against the Mohists’ claim that the meanings of terms can reliably fix their designations. He seems to have in mind what we would understand by the term “indexical” today: a term whose designation is fixed not only by its meaning but also by facts about the conditions surrounding its utterance. Such facts are relevant to the determination of the shifting referents of pronouns (“I”, “you”), demonstratives (“this”, “that”), and spatial and temporal adverbs (“here”, “there”, “yesterday”, “now”, “before”), and Zhuangzi appeals to all of these in a variety of elliptical and argumentative contexts. His general view seems to be that different perspectives or standpoints involved in the utterances of terms have important bearings on how these terms are used and what they refer to. The so-called impure indexicals “this” (bi) and “that” (shi) (see the entry on  indexicals),  commonly used in Classical Chinese for naming objects (“This is a horse”, “That is an ox”), make the perspectivalism of Zhuangzi’s approach clear: