 Other feminists add to Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice just as they do to her account of testimonial injustice. Following up on Charles Mills’ account of white ignorance (1998), Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. (2012), for example, conceives of the consequence of this structural prejudice as a willful hermeneutical ignorance in which “dominantly situated knowers…continue to misunderstand and misinterpret the world” (2012, 716). Dotson uses this idea of willful hermeneutical ignorance to identify a third feature of epistemic injustice along with testimonial and hermeneutical injustice: namely contributory injustice in which willful hermeneutical ignorance compromises a speaker’s epistemic agency and obstructs the capacity to contribute to a community’s collective hermeneutical resources (2012, 31). Fricker now distinguishes between “in-group intelligibility” within marginalized groups and their “frustratingly failed attempts to communicate” (2016, 167) with dominant groups. 