 Finally, while this section has focused on the issue of the bearing of descriptive decision theory on its normative counterpart, it should be noted that there has been some discussion of the converse direction of influence. Both Guala (2000) and Starmer (2005) have argued that the development of descriptive theories of choice has been guided by a bias towards retaining a core of principles taken to be normatively adequate. In the case of decision making under risk these are essentially the transitivity component of Weak Order and Stochastic Dominance, which are satisfied according to the vast majority of non-SEU theories that have been developed to  date.[25]  Starmer claims to find an argument justifying this practise in a well-known paper by Friedman and Savage (1952). This line of thought, which Starmer takes issue with, proceeds from the assumption that bona fide principles of rationality would be evident as such to most subjects and that decision makers will accordingly behave in line with them.