 Cognitive successes can differ from each other by virtue of qualifying different kinds of things. For instance, a cognitive success—like that of making a discovery—may be the success of a person (e.g., Marie Curie), or of a laboratory (Los Alamos), or of a people (the Hopi), or even, perhaps, of a psychological fragment of a person (the unconscious). But some kinds of cognitive success—like that of having successfully cultivated a highly discriminating palate, say—may be the success of a person, and perhaps even of a people, but cannot be the success of a laboratory or of a psychological fragment. And other kinds of cognitive success—like that of being conclusively established by all the available evidence—may be the success of a theory, but cannot be the success of a person—or like that of being epistemically fruitful—may be the success of a research program, or of a particular proof-strategy, but not of a theory. Indeed, there is a vast range of things, spanning different metaphysical categories, that can enjoy one or another kind of cognitive success: we can evaluate the cognitive success of a mental state (such as that of believing a particular proposition) or of an act (such as that of drawing a particular conclusion), or of a procedure (such as a particular procedure for revising degrees of confidence in response to evidence, or a particular procedure for acquiring new evidence), or of a relation (such as the mathematical relation between an agent’s credence function in one evidential state and her credence function in another evidential state, or the relation of trust between one person and another).