 The flipside of this understanding of service of God in terms of radical human autonomy is that halakhah must be understood as expressing a form of primordial divine heteronomy. This yields a fertile area of comparison to Levinas in Fagenblat 2004, though as Fagenblat notes, for Levinas the realm of the ethical itself is a realm of transcendence beyond discursive human rationality. Unlike Leibowitz, for Levinas we need not go as far as mitzvoth to find the realm of  transcendence.[15]  Either way, whether Leibowitz’s views on the distinction between religion and ethics hold up depends in large part on 1) whether one can indeed justify morality on rational or naturalistic foundations, or whether it does in some way transcend human nature; and 2) the viability of his radicalized notion of freedom as the seat of ultimate  value.[16]