 A third type of objection to state-oriented extended mind is the original intentionality objection, versions of which have been leveled by Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2008), Fodor (2009), and Rowlands (2010). In a tradition instigated by Brentano, original intentionality is often taken to be the hallmark of the mental. Original intentionality is defined as intentionality that is not derived. And derived intentionality is intentionality that derives from the mental activity, often mediated by social conventions, of a subject. The intentionality of the sentence, “The Museum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street”, is clearly derived intentionality. In itself, this sentence is merely a pattern of shapes against a contrastive background and, in principle, could mean anything. To mean something, it must be interpreted, and its intentionality is, therefore, derived. Beliefs are mental entities. If original intentionality is the hallmark of the mental, then the sentence in Otto’s notebook is not mental. Therefore, the objection runs, it is difficult to see how it could be a belief.