 Umut Baysan (2018) raises two challenges. His first is squarely within philosophy of mind. He contends that Polger and Shapiro change “the rules of the game” over which functionalists/realization physicalists and identity theorists are disputing. Polger and Shapiro saddle the former with defending a general hypothesis, i.e., all psychological kinds are functional kinds or realized kinds; while identity theorists seek only to defend a far weaker existential claim, i.e., that there are some instances of mind-brain identities. Second, and more generally, Baysan takes Polger and Shapiro to task for limiting their concern to the empirical hypothesis, multiple realization, and refusing to speak to concerns about metaphysically possible realizers of mental kinds, or multiple realizability. Baysan insists that some philosophers are still concerned with the latter, and a work that purports to be a book-length treatment of the general topic will leave these philosophers justifiably disappointed. On the first point, Baysan is right that Polger and Shapiro do seek to reorient this fifty-year-old debate, and they characterize functionalism and realization physicalism as quite general hypotheses. But Baysan’s account of Polger and Shapiro’s weakened identity theory seems to miss the point of their explicit reformulation of the multiple realization problem, into first and foremost the question, 