 Another challenge to sense-data theory sought to reveal a “sense-datum fallacy” (Chisholm 1957: 151–152). The charge is that sense-data theorists make inferences like this: something appears elliptical, therefore what we see is an appearance that is  elliptical.[20]  The fallacy consists in simply assuming that if something appears a certain way (such as Price’s flat circle produced by a spherical ball), something must exist that is that way (a sense datum). Critics then argue that, in asserting that something appears elliptical (or flat), one might simply be describing the character of the appearance, not asserting that an item with an elliptical shape (or flat surface) is present. Afterall, we normally do accept that things need not be as they appear. In response, it has been contended that sense-data theorists do not simply move from “appears elliptical” to “is elliptical” (Smith 2002: 35–36). Rather, the positing of sense data most commonly arises through acceptance of an act-object analysis of perception  (item 8),  which also affirms that the objects of perception are directly apprehended  (item 1)  and that they are as they appear  (item 3).  The arguments from Variation and Illusion may then be used to contend that we often experience perceptual objects whose properties are distinct from the properties ascribed to material objects, as in the penny appearing elliptical, and that from the qualitative similarity of illusions (or variant appearances) and alleged direct perceptions, we should conclude that we are always acquainted with sense data. Such arguments may indeed be challenged, but there has been no simple and unwary move from appears such to is such.