 Price distinguishes, in a way that anticipates Kant, two ways in which my action may be free: the first, physical liberty, is freedom to choose; the second is moral autonomy. Freedom of choice is required for agency and hence for moral responsibility. But that freedom allows us to act wrongly as well as rightly, to be irrational as well as rational, to go astray as well as to go aright. When we go astray, Price contends, by doing something we know we shouldn’t, we feel ourselves unfree, in that we have lost control. We lack self-mastery or moral autonomy: we have succumbed to temptation, instead of obeying the moral law. As with Kant, moral autonomy is the triumph of both rationality and morality over countervailing desires, since we always have most reason to fulfill our moral obligations. Price contends also, in good Platonic fashion, that when we follow virtue we do what we (really) want. It is fairly common to distinguish those parts of one’s personality with which one identifies, and that are taken to be its central core, and those impulses that are seen as external, alien, or even threatening. The metaphor of addiction or enslavement is virtually irresistible in explaining this distinction: we are under attack by passions which can take control of us if we are not careful, so that we no longer do what we want to do, but what these alien forces or siren voices tempt us to do. If we give in too often we will have lost the battle and our autonomy; we will no longer be in charge of our own lives, but succumb to what we reject, and even hate. Some philosophers hold that the agent has considerable choice in determining which parts of her personality are central and which peripheral. Price claims, however, that the central core of our identity is metaphysically fixed.