 Apart from the difficulties that must be handled by particular formulations of theological voluntarism, there are a number of objections that have been levelled against theological voluntarist views as such. A wide variety of these objections are helpfully discussed in Quinn 1999 (pp. 65–71) and Evans 2013 (pp. 88–117). Here I will consider only two objections, but they are the two that are characteristically taken to be the most powerful perennial objections to theological voluntarism: first, that theological voluntarism is incompatible with any substantive sense in which God is good; second, that theological voluntarism entails the arbitrariness of morality. While these objections have been answered plausibly in recent formulations of theological voluntarism, the way that these objections have been answered leave theological voluntarists open to a different objection: that theological voluntarism is not adequately motivated as a philosophical position, even for theists. I conclude with a brief discussion of this worry.