  In the rest of his paper Davidson sets out to vindicate that very  possibility. The phrase “all things considered” is not,  as it might seem, merely a minor difference in wording that allows  weakness of will to get off on a technicality. Rather, that phrase  marks an important contrast in logical form to which we would need to attend in any case in order properly to understand the structure of  practical reasoning. For that phrase indicates a judgment that is  conditional or relational rather than  all-out or unconditional in form; and that  difference is   crucial.[9]  We can better see the relational character of an  all-things-considered judgment if we first look at evaluative  judgments that play an important role in an earlier phase of  practical reasoning, the phase where we consider what reasons or  considerations favor doing a and what reasons or  considerations favor doing b. (For simplicity, imagine a  case in which an agent is choosing between only two mutually  incompatible options, a and b.) These  prima facie judgments, as Davidson terms them, take the form: