 There is also controversy concerning the relationship between Arendt’s notions of radical and banal evil. In a letter she wrote to Gershom Scholem in response to some critical comments he made about Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt writes “You are completely right that I have changed my mind and no longer speak of radical evil” (Arendt and Scholem 2017, 209). This suggests that by the time Arendt wrote Eichmann in Jerusalem she had abandoned the notion of radical evil. However, several Arendt scholars reject this view (Berstein 2002; Birmingham 2019). For example, Peg Birmingham argues that “Arendt never wavers in her claim that extreme [or radical] evil is the systematic production of perfect superfluousness” (Birmingham 2019, 160). According to Birmingham, “[Arendt’s] account of the banality of evil is an account of the production of the moral thoughtlessness that is concomitant with [radical evil]. They are interdependent” (Birmingham 2019, 160). 