 Jason Bridges (2006) argues that the core hypothesis of informational semantics conflicts with the idea that psychological laws are non-basic. As we have just observed, causal theories are often taken to offer mere sufficiency conditions for meaning. Suppose, therefore, that we suitably restrict the scope of a causal theory and understand its core hypothesis as asserting that all “X”s with the content X are reliably caused by X. (Nothing in the logic of Bridges’ argument depends on any additional conditions on a putative causal theory of mental content, so for simplicity we can follow Bridges in restricting attention to this simple version.) Bridges proposes that this core claim of a causal theory of mental content is a constitution thesis. It specifies what constitutes the meaning relation (at least in some restricted domain). Thus, if one were to ask, “Why is it that all ‘X’s with content X are reliably caused by Xs?,” the answer is roughly, “That’s just what it is for ‘X’ to have the content X”. Being caused in that way is what constitutes having that meaning. So, when a theory invokes this kind of constitutive relation, there is this kind of constitutive explanation. So, the first premise of Bridges’ argument is that causal theories specify a constitutive relation between meaning and reliable causal connection.