 Familiar considerations from the philosophy of language make it clear that one should distinguish interrogative sentences from their contents and distinguish both of these from the speech acts that can be performed via the utterance of interrogative sentences. For example, Belnap and Steel (1976, 3) understand a question to be an abstract thing for which an interrogative sentence is a piece of notation. This parallels the distinction between propositions and the declarative sentences that express them. The structure and composition of a question (understood as the abstract content of an interrogative sentence) vary from theory to theory. The speech act of asking a question is standardly regarded, e.g., by Searle (1969, 69), as a special case of the illocutionary act of requesting. Searle distinguishes requesting information (asking a real question) from requesting that the hearer display knowledge (asking an exam question). Åqvist (1965) connects questions with speaker knowledge rather than hearer knowledge by proposing that to ask a question is to command the hearer to cause the speaker to know the question’s answer.