 The first of these goods was the appreciation of beauty, which for Moore combined the cognition of beautiful qualities with an appropriately positive emotion toward them, such as enjoyment or admiration. We listen to music, for example, hear beautiful qualities in it, and are pleased by or admire those qualities. But the value here is entirely contemplative; Moore saw no separate worth in what the romantics had especially valued, the active creation of beauty. He might say that an artist must understand and love his work’s beauty if he is to create it, perhaps even more than someone who merely enjoys it, but the value in his work is still not distinctively creative. In characterizing this good Moore gave a further reductive analysis, this time of beauty as “that of which the admiring contemplation is good in itself” (1903: 201–02/1993: 249–50). Beauty too, then, was not a distinct normative concept but analyzable in terms of goodness. He did not notice, however, that this definition seems again to open him to an open-question argument, since it reduces the claim that it is good to contemplate beauty to the near-tautology that it is good to contemplate what it is good to contemplate.