 If Buchak (2014) is right, no agent should have beliefs in lottery propositions–these beliefs would necessarily be formed on the basis of purely statistical evidence. Kelly and Lin (2019) give another scenario in which Humean agents seem radically skeptical, but in situations which are evidentially unproblematic. Suppose the luckless Job goes in for a physical. On the basis of a thorough examination, the doctor forms the following dire opinion of his health: her degree of belief that Job will survive exactly \(n\) months is \(\frac{1}{2^n}.\) Therefore, her degree of belief that Job will not survive the year is \(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} + \cdots + \frac{1}{2^{12}} &gt; .999.\) Shockingly, the Humean thesis prevents the doctor from forming  any non-trivial beliefs. Let \(\leq n\) be the proposition that Job survives at most \(n\) months and let \(\geq n\) be the proposition that he survives at least \(n\) months. Let \(B\) be the strongest proposition that the doctor believes. Suppose for a contradiction that \(B\) entails some least upper bound for the number of Job’s remaining months, i.e for some \(n\), \(B\) entails \(\leq n\) and does not entail \(\leq n^\prime \) for any \(n^\prime \lt n\). By construction, \(\Pr(B| \geq n) = \frac{\Pr(n)}{\Pr(\geq n)} = \frac{1}{2}\) for all \(n\). But since \(\geq n\) is compatible with \(B\), the Humean thesis requires that \(\Pr(B| \geq n) &gt; \frac{1}{2}.\) Contradiction. 