 (1) The argument from publicity: Rawls contends that utilitarianism, perfectionism, and other “teleological” conceptions are not likely to be freely acceptable to many citizens when made fully public under the conditions of a well-ordered society. Recall the publicity condition discussed earlier: A feature of a well-ordered society is that its regulative principles of justice are publicly known and appealed to as a basis for deciding laws and justifying basic institutions. A conception of justice that cannot maintain the stability of a well-ordered society that satisfies the publicity condition is to be rejected by the parties in the original position. Rawls contends that under the publicity condition justice as fairness generally engages citizens’ sense of justice and remains more stable than utilitarianism (TJ 177f./154f.). For public knowledge that reasons of maximum average (or aggregate) utility determine the distribution of benefits and burdens would lead those worse-off to object to and resent their situation, and reject the principle of utility as the basic principle governing social institutions. After all, the well-being and interests of the least advantaged, perhaps even their basic liberties, are being sacrificed for the greater happiness of those who are already more fortunate and have a greater share of primary social goods. It is too much to expect of human nature that people should freely acquiesce in and embrace such terms of cooperation. By contrast, the principles of justice are designed to advance reciprocally everyone’s position; those who are better off do not achieve their gains at the expense of the less advantaged. “Since everyone’s good is affirmed, all acquire inclinations to uphold the scheme” (TJ, 177/155). It is a feature of our moral psychology, Rawls contends, that we normally come to form attachments to people and institutions that are concerned with our good; moreover we tend to resent those persons and institutions that take unfair advantage of us and act contrary to our good. Rawls argues at length in chapter 8 of Theory, §§70–75, that justice as fairness accords better than alternative principles with the reciprocity principles of moral psychology that are characteristic of human beings’ moral development. 