 However, philosophers have expressed several doubts about whether or not it is possible for God to possess middle knowledge, doubts that parallel those expressed above in connection with the possibility of God’s foreknowledge of the contingent future. For one thing, they wonder about subjunctive conditionals of freedom: can we really assume that these are either true or false? How can they be true if (for example) the person in question is never in the situation and never actually makes a choice? What “grounds” them or makes them true? A second worry about Molina’s picture has to do with the nature of knowledge. Even if a given counterfactual of freedom is true, knowing a proposition requires that a person be able to distinguish what is true from what is false. The worry here is that perhaps not even God could distinguish true counterfactuals of freedom from false ones. (For more detailed discussions of these objections, see Adams 1977, Freddoso’s introduction to Molina 1988, Craig 1987, Flint 1988, Flint 1998, Hasker 1989, Davison 1991, and Perszyk 2011, and Oppy and Saward 2014; for a clever attempt to explain prophecy without middle knowledge, see Pruss 2007 and the response from Corabi and Germino 2013.) 