 This debate could happen at a general level – whether it is more important to understand things in general at a conceptual or a “worldly” level. (Here, and in what follows, we use “worldly” to refer to metaphysical matters – matters that are in the realm of what our thoughts and concepts are about.) But it might be that there are special considerations regarding the normative domain that point us in one direction or the other. Consider an illustrative case: the debate around G.E. Moore’s famous “Open Question Argument” early in the twentieth century, at least on one interpretation of the argument (see entry on  moral non-naturalism, section on the open question argument).  Moore argued, in Principia Ethica, that for any proposed analysis of moral concept &lt;M&gt; in terms of natural concept &lt;N&gt;, someone who fully grasped and understood the relevant concepts could still grant that something is N but wonder whether it is M. (For example, a speaker competent with the concepts involved could sincerely wonder: “It’s painful, but is it bad?”) But such questions would not be “open” to competent speakers if M could be analyzed in terms of N. So, there can be no analysis of any moral concept in purely natural terms (Moore 1903 [1993: ch. 1]).