 A second problem is that it seems morally objectionable, and possibly wrong, that people do not benefit equally from personal relationships and the goods they generate. Some people are lonely, out of no choice or fault of their own; and those who do enjoy (good) personal relationships have partners who can be very unequally resourceful and/or invested in the relationship. This is a distributive objection (Scheffler 2001), and it obtains independently from the truth about the existence and nature of associative duties. However, if we do have associative duties towards our near and dear, rather than mere reasons to bestow personal relationship goods onto them, the inequalities and unfairness are even more evident. Personal relationship goods have both instrumental and non-instrumental value (the next section unpacks these different kinds of value and the way it bears on matters of justice). To illustrate, love is non-instrumentally valuable to the beloved, and it also allows the beloved to enjoy other desirable things—such as pleasure, or the advantages of having someone who knows her well and who is motivated to serve her interests. Therefore, the enjoyment of functional loving relationships makes one better off. Further, some of the benefits that loving relationships bestow on the beloved can have a positional aspect—that is, they give the beloved a competitive edge over others when it comes to opportunities for goods that are external to the relationship. For instance, the formal and informal education that loving and resourceful parents give to their children do not merely make these children better off than they would otherwise be; but, because they place them in more advantageous positions in the competition for the social goods, they render children who do not benefit from loving and/or resourceful parents worse off (Brighouse &amp; Swift 2006).