 The progressive completion of a volitional intention that initiates and controls a physical performance aimed at a desired end is a voluntary action. On Ricoeur’s view, the decision indicates a present or future voluntary action which depends on me and which is within my power. But, as seen above, Ricoeur’s position adopts a means-end conception of deliberation and action, and this masks an important distinction introduced by Husserl between two kinds of volition, namely, the distinction between action-will [Handlungswille] and decision-will [Entschlußwille]. Actions executing an action-will are initiated by a desire for an end that is not explicitly intended in the willing. They involve no prior choice and manifest themselves in the very performance of the  action.[19]  We shall call these voluntary actions. Actions executing a decision-will, that is a prior choice or intention, are initiated by a choice in the light of an end that is explicitly intended in the  willing.[20]  We shall call these chosen actions. Chosen actions differ from voluntary actions, then, in that they not only aim at a desired end but are explicitly undertaken in the light of that end. I might eat a chocolate sundae because, as a matter of desire, I like sundaes, but I might choose to snack on a piece of fruit (rather than the sundae) for the sake of my health. Eating the fruit is chosen as conducive to the end (Sokolowski 1985: 11; Drummond 2020a). In chosen action the agent wills that the action be done as conducing to an articulated end, whereas in merely voluntary action the agent wills that the object of desire be realized by acting. While the outcome of a merely voluntary action aiming at a particular end and that of a chosen action aiming at the same end might be the same, the intentional structures of the two volitional experiences and the actions undertaken to fulfill them differ.