  Furthermore, how strong does a contrary reason need to be to constitute a reasonable doubt? Parallel question: how probable does a story need to be to be a “real possibility”? To be a real possibility in an epistemic sense, a sense relevant to the reasonableness of the belief, would it have to be at least 5% probable?  It wouldn't need to be 50% probable. Is it somewhere in the middle, say, 25–33%? And we mustn't confusedly bring in considerations of practical rationality here. We might say, speaking loosely, that there is a “real possibility” of a loaded gun going off accidentally even though this is extremely rare. But what about just aiming a standard six-shooter revolver down range with one bullet spun into the magazine? We would bet against the first pull of the trigger resulting in a fired bullet. But would this be a real possibility, in van Inwagen's sense? It's hard to say, but here is an argument that it is. It seems wrong to believe that the gun will not fire. That suggests that the threshold for reasonable belief is above 83%. So the thesis that there are real possibilities which include both God that exists and that there exists evil of the sort we find may only entail that there is about 10–15% likelihood that there is such a possibility. So a real possibility containing both God and evil such as we take to exist in this world might make it unreasonable to believe that there is no God, but it certainly doesn't rule out agnosticism concerning whether God exists or a weak atheism to the effect that it is very probable that there is no God. 