 Composite substances appear to comply with (SUB-2): for, plausibly, although they possess proper parts, they do not depend for their identity upon those parts, since which objects those parts are does not help to determine of which substances they are parts (the same objects being capable of becoming parts of many different substances). Moreover, substances quite generally do not depend for their identity upon their (accidental) particularized properties, if such exist, nor upon the events in which they participate, nor upon the places they occupy, nor upon other substances. The particularized properties (i.e., tropes or modes) of substances and the events in which substances participate—that is, items such as the particular redness of this apple and the assassination of Caesar—would appear to depend for their identity upon those substances, which precludes the reverse relationship from obtaining, on pain of circularity. (However, see Keinänen &amp; Hakkarainen 2014 for discussion; in particular, they propose a strategy for identifying tropes that does not entail circularity in the individuation of tropes. See also Moltmann 2019, which discusses the problem of spatial location related to tropes and other entities.) As for places, although a physical substance must indeed occupy some place, which place it occupies does not determine which substance it is, since substances may exchange places.