 Tarski (1983) adopted a view according to which truth cannot be defined for natural languages. It has been argued in Hintikka &amp; Sandu (1999) that this was due to Tarski’s belief that compositionality fails in natural  languages.[60]  \(\mathbf{IFL}\) does not have a Tarski-type compositional semantics, but it admits of formulating a self-applied truth-predicate. The proposed reason why Tarski believed it not to be possible to discuss the notion of truth in natural languages themselves cannot, then, be entertained from the viewpoint of \(\mathbf{IFL}\). For, the case of \(\mathbf{IFL}\) shows that the failure of Tarski-type compositionality for a language does not entail the impossibility for the language to define its own  truth-predicate.[61] 