 An alternative view of legal purposes, however, returns the law to the metaphysics of causation. That view holds that criminal law serves the value of retributive justice just as tort law serves the value of corrective justice. Retributive justice requires that those who culpably cause harm suffer the censure and deprivations constitutive of punishment; corrective justice requires that those who culpably cause harm to another correct that injustice by compensating that other. In both cases, serving such kinds of justice demands that one not identify “cause” as used in legal liability rules as anything other than that with which it is identified in such justice theories. Because such moral theories of justice require that the true metaphysics of causation determines when someone has caused an injury or other harm to another, so too must the law of torts and of crimes. On such an alternative view of the rationale for causal requirements in the law of torts and of crimes, the lawyer thus must “adventure herself with the philosopher” on the metaphysics of causation. Those who so adventure themselves will not regard all the candidates for the law’s concept of causation with equal favor.