  Forms are limited to these incomplete properties because, on this line of reasoning, these properties present special problems when they are instantiated in particulars. Chief among these problems is ‘the compresence of opposites’. This is the phenomenon where, with respect to any incomplete property, F, every sensible particular that is F is, in some sense, also not-F. So, if Elsie the cow is large, she is also not-large; for Elsie is large in comparison to her calf but not-large in comparison to Elmer the bull. Thus Elsie is large and not-large. Since, according to this approach, Plato is seeking a large that is the unqualified bearer of largeness, and since every particular is disqualified in light of compresence, Plato postulates a Form, Largeness Itself, to be the unqualified bearer. By way of contrast, properties such as being brown or being a cow do not suffer compresence when instantiated by particulars. That is, Elsie is a cow and is not not-a-cow; she is brown (imagine she is brown all over) and is not not-brown. (In the modern parlance, being a cow is classified as an essential property of Elsie whereas being brown is an accidental property. Thus the proponent of Forms only for incomplete properties looks to a special subset of the accidental properties, namely those where there is no unqualified possessor.)