 In the wake of Shelby, states that had been subject to the federal preclearance requirement (as well as a number of states that had not been subject to it) have adopted laws and practices that make voting more difficult than it had previously been and that disproportionately disadvantage blacks, members of indigenous tribes, and other racial minorities. These laws and practices include photo ID and proof of citizenship requirements, restrictions on early voting and mail-in ballots, and a reduction in the number of polling places. The prevention of voter fraud is the main rationale offered for such measures. However, litigation challenging the measures has been mounted across the country. Where a discriminatory intent can be shown, the measures are vulnerable to judicial invalidation (NAACP v. McCrory 2016), but absent a “smoking gun” showing such intent, the measures have been generally upheld (see, e.g., Brnovich v. D.N.C. 2021). Their critics have contended that the measures violate section 2 of the VRA because their disproportionate racial impact means that the measures “result[ ] in … [a]n abridgment of the right to vote” on account of race (VRA: section 2; Commission on Civil Rights 2018; Herron and Smith 2016). But legal and philosophical questions remain about how to interpret the results-oriented language of section 2 and whether an intent to discriminate should be seen as a necessary element of any viable claim of racial discrimination in electoral arrangements (Altman 1998). 