 Although the trio is jointly contradictory, each claim is individually plausible: (A) seems obvious; (B) follows from the familiar Aristotelian argument that a power capable of understanding all bodies must itself contain the nature of no body (LongAnima III.4); (C) is a consequence of Ibn Rushd’s eventual conclusion that the various strategies for situating an immaterial power within a human being—his own and that of earlier commentators—were all failures. The genius of his ultimate position was to find a way for all three claims to be embraced. In one sense, human beings are individual composites of matter and substantial form, and so wholly corporeal. Although he consistently describes both the material and the agent intellect as parts of the human soul (e.g., LongAnima III.5 {406}), they are souls and actualities only equivocally: they are not the actuality of a body (LongAnima II.7, II.21, III.5 {396–7}). When human beings are conceived in this narrow way, (C) is true and (A) is false.