 Here is just one way such a story could go (FitzPatrick 2017a). Recall the possibility discussed in sub-sections 2.2 and 2.3, that in early ancestral environments involving mostly small in-group interactions, where there were relatively few opportunities for ‘wasting’ altruistic tendencies on outsiders, natural selection gave rise to some fairly indiscriminate dispositions involving sympathy and altruism. (Or again, recall the adaptive plasticity model from Buchanan and Powell 2018, discussed in section 3.4, which posits environmentally sensitive inclusivist tendencies as part of evolved human psychology.) As long as such indiscriminate altruism contributed more to fitness in that environment than it detracted from it through occasional ‘misfirings’ of such sentiments and behaviors directed at non-cooperators, it could very well have evolved as a simple fitness-enhancing mechanism (Kitcher 2006b). Someone who wishes to debunk impartial utilitarianism might then tell a story according to which the utilitarian’s impartial sympathy and concern is nothing but an extension of this evolved psychological trait, whereby it is systematically ‘misfiring’ (from a biological point of view) in our current environment. More precisely, the story would be that current utilitarian beliefs represent a cultural refinement of such evolved tendencies via an application of reasoning, such as the consistency reasoning utilitarians employ in arguing for an “expanding circle” of moral concern and an increasingly impartial altruism. The debunker will claim that however rational such inferential steps may be in themselves, they are still just operating on certain moral starting points that are ‘contaminated’ by evolutionary influence: namely, deeply ingrained moral intuitions about the intrinsic badness of suffering wherever it occurs, or the goodness of pleasure, which trace back to evolved psychological dispositions to recoil at suffering and injury, and to feel sympathy for others. Basic utilitarian moral intuitions, no less than non-utilitarian intuitions, may ultimately be nothing but illusions foisted on us by our evolutionary history, rooted in contaminated starting points (Ruse 2006). In both cases, proponents of the moral views in question have moved well beyond the original evolved dispositions, through culturally-developed reasoning that has refined them in various ways. But if this doesn’t save non-utilitarian moral beliefs given the debunking story about the contaminated starting points, then it won’t save utilitarian moral beliefs either.