 It is difficult to state Marty’s theory of meaning for two reasons. First of all, he speaks of meaning in at least two different senses. In the “narrower” sense, Marty regards the contents of mental acts as the meaning of an expression. In the second sense, which might be called the meaning in the wider sense (Marty 1908a, 291–292), he also considers the meaning of an expression to be its communicative function. In this wider sense the meaning of a statement, for instance, is not merely something contained in the consciousness of the speaker who makes the statement or even some sort of entity that exists outside of his or her consciousness. The meaning of the statement can rather only be formulated by saying that the interlocutor intends to evoke a like judgment on the side of the hearer – what he or she judges should be accepted. This is the so called primary communicative intention of the speaker. Moreover, by uttering a statement the speaker secondarily manifests that he or she judges that such and such is the case. This manifestation of the act of judging is the so called secondary communicative intention of the speaker, which serves as means for attaining the primary goal (Marty 1908a, 284n., Cesalli, Mulligan 2017, 260, Janoušek 2017, 243). Here, however, we confront the second reason why it is difficult to shortly state Marty’s theory of meaning in general terms. The primary communicative function of an expression will vary according to the type of expression in question. It is thus indispensable to elaborate on meaning as communicative function by examining its variety. This will be done here with respect to the autosemantica, as indeed Marty does at length in his main work.