 The publication of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), ironically, was among the historical developments that contributed to a loss of confidence in science. Kuhn’s work, which turned “paradigm” into a household word, was widely regarded as assimilating revolutions in science to revolutions in politics, where one theory succeeds another only upon the death of its adherents. It was interpreted as having destroyed the myth that philosophers possess some special kind of wisdom or insight in relation to the nature of science or the thought processes of scientists with respect to their rationality, almost as though every opinion were on a par with every other. A close reading of Kuhn’s work shows that these were not his own conclusions, but they were enormously influential. And among the public at large and many social scientists, the tendency to no longer hold science in high esteem or to be affected by its findings has induced political ramifications that are inimical to the general good. When our beliefs are not well founded, actions we base upon them are unlikely to succeed, often with unforeseen effects that are harmful. Rational actions ought to be based upon rational beliefs, where science has proven to be the most reliable method for acquiring knowledge about ourselves and the world around us.