 As we saw in the previous section, Haslanger (2000b) brought attention to the need for revisionary or ameliorative approaches in feminist philosophy, as opposed to purely conceptual or descriptive approaches, which focus on the concept we have or the objective type that we actually track. The idea of a revisionary or ameliorative approach to the analysis of our concepts has been a very influential one in philosophy, but Haslanger’s work has served as a kind of reminder of the significance of aiming for the concepts that would best serve our purposes and aims, rather than merely revealing the ordinary concepts that we happen to have, which is the task that many projects in recent mainstream analytic philosophy seem to have paid attention to. Haslanger’s work has inspired a lot of interesting ameliorative projects in philosophy of gender and race and social philosophy more in general (see for instance Glasgow 2006, 2009 and Mallon 2006 on ‘race’, Barnes 2016 on ‘disability’, Dembroff 2016 on ‘sexual orientation’, as well as many of the papers on ‘woman’, ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ cited in the previous section). As suggested above, the notion of an ameliorative project in philosophy is not new, but in our view the impetus that this methodological approach in philosophy has experienced recently owes much to the centrality that this notion has played in recent developments in philosophy of gender and race over the last two decades.