 (4) Multi-criterial predicates. We may assume that the semantics of a predicate is specified by means of its criteria of application. Now ordinary language hosts predicates with different, and occasionally conflicting, criteria of application (e.g., ‘left wing’): some criteria for applying a predicate \(P\) (e.g., caring about social welfare, raising minimum wages) may entail that object \(m\) (e.g., a political party) is in the extension of the predicate, some others (promoting nationalism, oppressing immigrants), that \(m\) is in its anti-extension, or negative extension. Criteria can in some cases be encoded by such things as meaning postulates (or other similar, albeit more sophisticated, semantic devices); but conflicting meaning postulates may be embedded in our standard linguistic practices, and difficult to detect and identify. If the extensions of our ordinary predicates are constrained by our intuitions, and such intuitions turn out to be inconsistent, a good semantic account of the situation may well have to reflect this fact (accepting, in our example, that a party counts as both left and right wing), instead of destroying it by means of some regimentation (e.g. via the usual parameterisation, or distinction of respects). As Priest 1987, pp 67–9, clarifies, it is also hard to analyse such situations as cases of vagueness (so that a party has to be understood as being left wing to some degree, and right wing to some degree).