 Indeed, as Benjamin Ferguson has argued, the most prominent accounts of fair transaction make unfair transactions pervasive. If exploitation is tantamount to unfair transaction, then exploitations are pervasive too. Yet, as he argues, if nearly all transactions are exploitative, “then what is the point of singling out particular practices, such as commercial surrogacy, sweatshops, and price gouging as wrongfully exploitative?” (Ferguson 2020: 536). Furthermore, the problem isn’t merely that exploitation might be widespread—after all, he notes, many other wrongs might also be widespread. Rather, the pervasiveness of unfair transaction is such that we can have good evidence to believe that a transaction is unfair (and thus, for purely distributive accounts exploitative) without knowing which party benefits unfairly. In such cases it would be inappropriate to blame either of the transactors, which, he argues, “conflicts with the ordinary intuition that exploiters are morally responsible and blameworthy for exploiting” (Ferguson 2020: 537). Ferguson argues that these problems can be overcome by appending a second condition that refers to exploiters’ attitudes to the standard requirement that exploitations are unfair. In the next section we consider three ‘attitudinal conditions’ that might be appended to the unfairness requirement.