 Van Cleve (2015: 105–110) dismisses Wolterstorff’s argument on the ground that there is an equally good counter argument as follows. It is an epistemic principle that you know X is F only if you know what it is to be F; Reid thinks we know of many things that they are green; so, we must know what it is to be green. Someone might object that Reid adheres to a different epistemic principle in the passage we just discussed. In a note citing this text, Van Cleve admits Reid’s position is unclear but takes the last part of the passage to say the relative notion enables us to know what it is to be green, namely, to manifest certain sensations. In his opinion, Reid favors this view of SQs. Reading the passage this way renders the contradiction irrelevant but leaves the many texts that would seem to identify SQs with the unknown causes of known effects out of account. As Nichols (2007: 6.4) puts it, the dispositional interpretation makes nonsense of Reid’s frequent claims that he does not know what SQs are. Nichols finds evidence of the causal basis theory in Reid’s use of SQ terms in talking about the causes of SQ sensations and concludes that all relevant texts considered, we should take him to accept a physical microstructural account of SQs (Nichols 2006: 6.6).