 It was noted at the beginning that there are many things one can be a sentimentalist about. We are now in a position to make some observations about relationships among them. First, explanatory sentimentalism is clearly independent of the rest. It is perfectly possible that emotions play some significant role in explaining moral judgment, whatever such judgments or moral facts consist in, and whether or not they’re sources of moral knowledge. To be sure, if some simple form of judgment sentimentalism is true, emotions offer a kind of constitutive explanation of moral judgments – if I’m angry with you, this explains why I morally judge you’ve wronged me, because it constitutes my judgment. And explanatory sentimentalism clearly has epistemic implications. If emotions both explain our beliefs and justify them, our moral verdicts are vindicated. If, in contrast, emotions explain our beliefs but do not justify them – if explanatory sentimentalism is true but epistemic sentimentalism is false – we end up with a skeptical view.