  The introduction of ‘\(Q_{R}\)’, ‘\(Q_{G}\)’, and so forth, at the start of this article might have occasioned some suspicion. Assume that spectrum inversion does not occur, and consider a counterfactual situation in which, as Block puts it, “spectrum inversion is rife” (1990, 55). Suppose that philosophers in this counterfactual situation introduced qualia terminology in the way it was introduced in section 1. If their qualia terminology is meaningless, then it is hard to see why our terminology is better off—we use ‘\(Q_{R}\)’ just as it is used in the counterfactual situation. If, on the other hand, their qualia terminology is meaningful, then presumably ‘\(Q_{R}\)’, as they use it, refers to something other than a quale. (Since spectrum inversion is rife, their use of ‘\(Q_{R}\)’ is not associated with any particular quale.) Again, given the overlap in use, why suppose that our word ‘\(Q_{R}\)’ is any different? Either way: ‘\(Q_{R}\)’ does not refer to a quale. There is a threat, then, that qualia cannot be named in a public language—that they are ineffable (cf. Dennett 1988, 228–9). Indeed, that seems to be Block’s opinion: “if an inverted spectrum is possible, then experiential contents that can be expressed in public language (for example, looking red) are not qualitative contents, but rather intentional contents” (1990, 55; see also Block 2007, 73–4). (“Qualitative contents” are qualia that are not representational properties: see subsection 3.2.)