 Whatever the merits of this view about how thick and thin differ only in degree, it doesn’t follow simply from conceding that evaluative terms may be descriptively thick to varying degrees. This concession allows a binary distinction between purely thin evaluative concepts and thick evaluative concepts that are characterized by having some or other degree of non-evaluative content (cf. Dancy 2013: 48–9). More definite conclusions about Scheffler’s proposal would require reflection on whether his examples could plausibly belong to a separate third category of evaluative terms that are neither thick nor thin, and on whether a principled distinction can be drawn between different kinds of non-evaluative content. In the latter case a paradigmatic thin term such as ought might be a little bit thick if it implied can, and yet lack a kind of non-evaluative content that is possessed only by thick terms proper. Perhaps, for instance, the non-evaluative aspects of tactful and cruel distinguish their meanings from other evaluative terms in a way that can doesn’t do with ought.