 Fear (metus) and wonder (admiratio), together with the theory of the imitation of affects, are notions that are fundamental to Spinoza’s accounts of human society. Reasonable citizens (or all citizens insofar as they are reasonable) will willingly obey the rules of the state (IVp37s2, IVp73). Fear, in the Ethics, seems to be government’s most valuable means of bringing passionate citizens to cooperate and obey: at IVp37s2, Spinoza suggests that states should rely on threats. In the Theological Political Treatise, however, Spinoza’s accounts of religion, and particularly of miracles and scripture, suggest that devotion devotio, a passion associated with wonder at Ethics IIIp52s, is a better political motive than fear. In Chapter 5, for example, Spinoza writes of Moses’s introduction of religion into the Hebrew state: