 FitzPatrick (2008) illustrates this position with the case of Mr. Potter, a powerful businessman who engages in ruthless business practices while thinking they are “permissibly aggressive”, therefore acting from ignorance of their wrongness. FitzPatrick (2008: 601, 609) agrees with volitionists that Mr. Potter is blameworthy for his ruthless business behavior only if (and because) he is blameworthy for the ignorance from which he acts; and also agrees that if it turned out that he’s blameless for the latter, he’d be blameless for the former as well (2008: 602). But FitzPatrick sharply disagrees with volitionists on the conditions that must be satisfied for ignorance to be culpable. In his view, ignorance is culpable when it results from the violation of epistemic obligations regarding which the agent could reasonably have been expected to comply given her cognitive capacities and the opportunities provided by her social context, and when such violation is due to the agent’s epistemic vices such as “overconfidence, arrogance, dismissiveness, laziness, dogmatism, incuriosity, self-indulgence, contempt, and so on” (2008: 609). According to FitzPatrick, when this is the case the agent bears direct responsibility for her ignorance even if her benighting acts—i.e., the acts that evinced the epistemic vices just listed —were themselves performed out of ignorance of their wrongness. (FitzPatrick’s position, according to which culpability for unwitting wrongdoing is partially explained by the fact that the ignorant agent should and could have known better has important similarities with the capacitarian view discussed in  sect. 3.4  below.)