 Since Cook Wilson’s philosophy was largely defined in opposition to British Idealism, it is worth beginning with some points of explicit disagreement. Roughly put, under the idealist view knowledge is constituted by a coherent set of mutually supporting beliefs, none of which are basic, while others would be derivative. Surprisingly, when H. H. Joachim published The Nature of Truth (1906), perhaps the best statement of the coherence theory of truth usually attributed to the British Idealists, Cook Wilson criticized him for relying on a discredited ‘correspondence’ theory (SI, 809–810). Cook Wilson did not argue directly against the coherence theory, as Russell did (Russell 1910, 131–146), but simply took the opposite foundationalist stance. He reasoned that the chain of justification ought to come to an end and that this end point is some non-derivative knowledge, which he called ‘apprehension’ (SI, 816). As he put it: “it becomes evident that there must be apprehensions not got by inference or reasoning” (UL, § 18).