 Here we find a very different account of the basis of obligation: we are obliged to perform or avoid certain actions which are incompatible with our consciences, because we will be guilty of inconsistency if we don’t. To put it in slightly different terms, we are obliged to perform or avoid certain actions which are compatible or incompatible with our natures as rational beings, because we will be less than human if we don’t. Grotius adopts this idea for himself, modifying it in keeping with his rich conception of human nature: for him, natural law obliges us to perform actions which conduce to our rationality, sociability and need for self-preservation. This thought underlies several of his specific laws of nature—such as, for instance, the law that evil deeds must be corrected. Grotius places this obligation under the heading of compensatory justice (DIP, Chap. Two). The “task of compensatory justice” is “restitution”: using the example of theft, Grotius explains that “such justice requires that the thing taken shall be returned” (ibid.). Evil deeds have disturbed the moral and legal equilibrium of society; they have unjustly benefited some while unjustly harming others. Since it is imperative to maintain healthy social relations, it is imperative that evil deeds be punished.