 Another approach to this issue is developed in Beddor (2021), who offers a synthesis of a reliabilist view with a “reasons first” account of justification of the sort developed by John Pollock (see, e.g., Pollock 1987, 1995). On Pollock’s view, a belief is justified as long as it is based on a chain of undefeated reasons that support it. One distinctive feature of Pollock’s framework is that he goes on to define defeaters in terms of reasons: a defeater for a belief B is a prima facie reason to believe that B is false (rebutting defeater) or a prima facie reason to believe that the agent’s beliefs do not support B (undercutting defeater). Beddor suggests that by supplementing this account with a reliabilist analysis of prima facie reasons (of the sort sketched above), we get a view that is faithful to the main motivations for reliabilism, while also providing a more satisfactory treatment of defeat.