 Those who argue that it is permissible for revolutionaries to target civilians tend to argue that only those civilians who contribute in some significant way to the oppressive activities of the regime lie beyond the protection of the jus in bello norm of discrimination. The basic idea here, as Finlay puts it, is to justify such acts as the targeting of individuals who are morally liable to be killed because they are not morally innocent, that is, they are active and significant contributors to the regime’s violent injustices (Finlay 2015: 55–86, 217–218). But what counts as significant contribution is both unclear and disputed. For example, a farmer who supplies food for a tyranny’s secret police or repairs the vehicles that they use to hunt down dissidents clearly makes a contribution to their depredations, but it is unclear whether that sort of contribution makes her liable to lethal attack (Fabre 2009, Frowe 2014).