 While Kant’s ethical theory makes frequent reference to the ends or purposes adopted by human beings, the “Critique of Teleological Judgment” is concerned with the idea of ends or purposes in nature. (For the terms “end” and “purpose” as translations of the German Zweck, see footnote 2.) Among the most striking elements of Kant’s account of natural teleology are (i) his claim, in the “Analytic of Teleological Judgment”, that organisms must be regarded by human beings in teleological terms, i.e., as “natural purposes”, and (ii) his attempt, in the “Dialectic of Teleological Judgment”, to reconcile this teleological conception of organisms with a mechanistic account of nature. These are described here in  Section 3.3  and  Section 3.4,  respectively. Prior to this,  Section 3.1  outlines Kant’s notions of purpose and purposiveness in general and  Section 3.2  sketches nature’s “purposiveness for our cognitive faculties”, i.e., its amenability to empirical scientific enquiry. The discussion of biological teleology and its relation to mechanism in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 is followed by two sections dealing with further aspects of Kant’s teleology:  Section 3.5  deals with Kant’s view that nature as a whole may be regarded as a system of purposes, and  Section 3.6  with the implications of this teleological view of nature for morality and religion.  Section 3.7  returns to Kant’s biological teleology, considering briefly its implications for contemporary biological thought.