 Let’s return now to the three central questions capacitarians must answer to give plausibility to their view. The first concerns the nature of the norms of awareness supporting the claim that certain unwitting wrongdoers should have known better. The central function of these norms is to set a standard against which failures of awareness are evaluated to determine which ones are defective and which don’t. When failures of awareness aren’t defective, it isn’t the case that the involved agents should have known better and thus they are excused for their unwitting wrongdoing. Capacitarians agree that norms of awareness are sensitive to the agent’s cognitive capacities and circumstances (Sher 2009: 110; Clarke 2014: 167; Murray 2017: 516; Rudy-Hiller 2017: 413; FitzPatrick 2017: 37). They also agree that these norms are derivative, in the sense that both their content (the considerations agents should be aware of) and their normative force (their bindingness on agents) come from another set of norms, namely moral ones. In other words, it’s because awareness of certain considerations is necessary for fulfilling moral obligations that such awareness can be demanded of agents (Sher 2009: 111–2; Murray 2017: 515).