  In making this last point, Jacobi paraphrases Thomas Reid, without however mentioning him explicitly in this immediate  context.[6]  He apparently thought that he was deploying against Hume the same line of argument already advanced against him by his Scottish ‘common sense’ critic. He was also thereby clarifying what he meant by ‘intuition’ — that supposed immediate apprehension of truth that gives rise to belief. It now appears that the intuition in question is a product of the ‘senses’. It is not, however, anything blind, for — as understood by Jacobi in the spirit of Reid, and certainly in contrast to both Hume’s and Kant’s notion of sensibility — ‘sensations’ are not passive impressions of the mind but exhibit rather from the start a complex relation between subject and object that can then be developed into even more reflective (i.e. representational) forms. Jacobi actually says that he is dependent on Spinoza for the seminal idea of his present method of deriving reflective representations from the senses (Jacobi, 1787: 120, note 25). More significant, however, than any reference to Hume, Reid, or Spinoza, is that he also refers to Kant and his transcendental method deliberately, thus betraying that he (Kant), rather than any of them, had been his main concern all along (Jacobi, 1787: 119–20, &amp; 120, note 25). Jacobi had been advancing a theory of knowledge that, in his opinion, could compete with Kant’s. For it explained the basic facts of experience, and even explained the factual necessity of certain fundamental concepts arising in the course of it, without incurring the kind of formalism that, in his opinion and many of Kant’s contemporary critics, affected Kant’s own transcendental method. Jacobi’s first representations were allegedly drawn from experience directly. They were not applied to it a priori, in the manner of Kant’s categories which Jacobi regarded rather as nothing more than ‘prejudices of the intellect’.