 Thiel attributes to Shaftesbury the metaphysical position that the self, that which constitutes the identity of a person, is a simple immaterial substance (Thiel 2011: 241–2). Jaffro distinguishes “between a normative sense of ‘being oneself’ or ‘remaining the same person’, and the metaphysical sense, that is, personal identity,” and argues that Shaftesbury is more concerned with the former (Jaffro 2014: 158). Winkler (2000) and Purviance (2004) pursue a similar line, arguing that Shaftesbury does not intend to provide an answer to the metaphysical question of personal identity. Shaftesbury’s interest in selves and identity, on this view, is practical rather than metaphysical. His concern is to explain a sense of self and identify that is a moral achievement—namely, the achievement of internal harmony of all one’s psychological principles, both at one moment and through time. On these readings, the important point is that achieving this synchronic and diachronic internal harmony ought to be a person’s fundamental goal, and Shaftesbury intends to give his readers guidance on how to achieve it.