  Much jurisprudential writing on interpretation in legal reasoning is concerned with how to strike the right balance between the conserving and creative elements in interpretation, and with the constraints which are and/or should be operative upon judges as they undertake this balancing act. Some theorists claim that such concerns about how one ought to interpret the law indicate that it is part of the way that we think about this practice that we regard rival interpretations as subject to objective evaluation as good or bad, better or worse, correct or incorrect (Dworkin 1986; Raz 1996b and 1996c). On this view, characterisations of interpretation which attempt to impugn the objectivity of such evaluations (e.g. Levinson 1982) are to be understood as revisionist accounts which attempt to persuade us that all is not as it appears to be with our practice of judging interpretations to be good or bad, better or worse, correct or incorrect as we currently understand it (see e.g. Raz 1996b).