  Some philosophers, however, conceive of the link between events and facts as being much closer than this—close enough to justify assimilating the two categories (Wilson 1974; Tegtmeier 2000) or at least treating both as species of the same “state of affairs” genus (Chisholm 1970). This has two main consequences. On the one hand, because facts corresponding to non-equivalent propositions are distinct, events conceived of as facts or fact-like particulars are fine-grained entities that cannot be freely re-described or re-identified under different conceptualizations: the fact that Caesar died violently is different from the fact that he died, hence the death of Caesar and his violent death would be two different events (Chisholm 1970, 1971), as opposed to one and the same event under different descriptions (Davidson 1969; Anscombe 1979). On the other hand, because linguistic expressions of facts are semantically transparent, a Fregean line of argument could be concocted to show instead that events construed as facts are too coarse-grained, to the point of melting into a single “big” entity (Davidson 1967a). (The argument is known as the “slingshot argument” (Barwise &amp; Perry 1981).)