 Even on the literalist account of the ontology of mathematics, there are still many mathematical entities with which mathematicians might engage but which do not exist in the extramental world (e.g., a complex and extraordinary geometrical shape with no counterpart in the sensible world). Avicenna believes that the faculty of imagination (mutakhayyila) can construct mental images of such objects by analyzing, synthesizing, separating, and combining the images of simpler items that have previously been perceived by and stored in our cognitive faculties (Zarepour 2021: sec. 3). But if we endorse the abstractionist construal of Avicenna’s ontology of mathematics, then all mathematical objects are mental constructions. There exists no mathematical object in the extramental world which could directly be perceived by the estimation. On this interpretation, the faculty of estimation cooperates with the faculty of imagination to produce idealized objects, none of which has a counterpart outside our minds. It is the mental acts conducted by these faculties which enable us to construct geometric shapes and numbers (Ardeshir 2008; Tahiri 2016; 2018).