 This conception of truth making avoids the “category” mistake that results from attempting to define truth-making in terms of entailment. It also makes some advance upon (Virtue-T) and its primitive use of “in virtue of” because at least (Necessitation-T) relates the notion of truth making to other modal notions, like that of necessity, upon which we have some independent handle. But what is there positively to be said in favour of conceiving of truth-makers in terms of “necessitation”? Suppose that T is a candidate truth-maker for a truth p even though T fails to necessitate p. Then it is possible for T to exist even when p is false. Armstrong now reflects “we will surely think that the alleged truth-maker was insufficient by itself and requires to be supplemented in some way” (1997: 116). Suppose this supplementary condition is the existence of another entity, U. Then “T+U would appear to be the true and necessitating truth-maker for p” (2004: 7). Armstrong concludes that a truth-maker for a truth must necessitate the truth in question.