In light of the internalism/externalism distinction, let us revisit the eliminativist challenge raised in §5.1: what explanatory value does intentional description add to formal-syntactic description?  Internalists can respond that suitable formal syntactic manipulations determine and maybe even constitute narrow contents, so that internalist intentional description is already implicit in suitable formal syntactic description (cf. Field 2001: 75). Perhaps this response vindicates intentional realism, perhaps not. Crucially, though, no such response is available to content externalists.  Externalist intentional description is not implicit in formal syntactic description, because one can hold formal syntax fixed while varying wide content. Thus, content externalists who espouse CTM+FSC must say what we gain by supplementing formal-syntactic explanations with intentional explanations. Once we accept that mental computation is sensitive to syntax but not semantics, it is far from clear that any useful explanatory work remains for wide content. Fodor addresses this challenge at various points, offering his most systematic treatment in The Elm and the Expert (1994). See Arjo (1996), Aydede (1998), Aydede and Robbins (2001), Wakefield (2002); Perry (1998), and Wakefield (2002) for criticism. See Rupert (2008) and Schneider (2005) for positions close to Fodor’s. Dretske (1993) and Shea (2018, pp. 197–226) pursue alternative strategies for vindicating the explanatory relevance of wide content.