 The connection with intuitionism, then, is clear: but what is the relevance of the CH correspondence to formalism? There are, in the first place, clear overlaps between some forms of intuitionism and certain formalist positions. Not the philosophical intuitionism of the founding father Brouwer, of course, with its ontology of mathematical objects as mental constructions and an epistemology in which mathematical knowledge is based on internal reflection on the succession of ideas; this is a mathematical metaphysics far removed from formalism. But many constructivists have embraced, without accepting his metaphysics, the Brouwerian identification, or close linkage, of mathematical correctness (truth, if one is prepared to speak of mathematical truth) with provability. This sort of identification is more than congenial to a certain brand of formalism, one which rejects the idea that mathematical theses represent a mind-independent reality and which also divides the sheep from the goats on the basis of those which are provable, in some formal system, versus those which are disprovable.