 Baxter (2001) relies on the notion of aspect and on the relativization of numerical identity to counts. In his view, both particulars and properties have aspects, which can be similar to distinct aspects of other particulars or properties. The numerical identity of aspects is relative to standards for counting, counts, which group items in count collections: aspects of particulars in the particular collection, and aspects of universals, in the universal collection. There can then be a cross-count identity, which holds between an aspect in the particular collection, and an aspect in the universal collection, e.g., the aspects Hume as human and humanity as had by Hume. In this case, the universal and the particular in question (humanity and Hume, in our example) are partially identical. Instantiation, e.g., that Hume instantiates humanity, then amounts to this partial identity of a universal and a particular. One may have the feeling, as Baxter himself worries (2001: 449), that in this approach instantiation has been traded for something definitely more obscure, such as aspects and an idiosyncratic view of identity. It can also be suspected that particulars’ and properties’ having aspects is presupposed in this analysis, where this having is a relation rather close to exemplification itself.