 Kripke allows that the sceptic’s proposal is “absolutely wild”, and that she is “crazy” if she “proposes [her] hypothesis sincerely”. He grants, however, that it is not logically impossible, and so “there must be some fact about my past usage that can be cited to refute” that hypothesis (1982: 9). That is, there must be some fact about my past usage that determines that I meant addition by ‘plus’ in the past, and thus that (again, assuming that I intend to use the expression in the same way I have been using it so far) I should answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’. Importantly, the sceptic does not question my memory concerning past use; indeed, she goes as far as to allow that the exercise of my cognitive powers is faultless, and that I have access to all the facts about my mind and behaviour that are potentially constitutive of my meaning one thing rather than another (1982: 14). Her thought is that if I am not able, even in such cognitively ideal conditions, to provide the fact in virtue of which I mean addition, a fact that properly singles out the function of addition rather than the function of quaddition, it is because there is no such fact. Furthermore, the focus is on past use because “if I use language at all, I cannot doubt coherently that ‘plus’, as I now use it, denotes plus” (1982: 13). But, if the sceptic’s challenge succeeds, it can be generalized, for “if there was no such thing as my meaning plus rather than quus in the past, neither can there be any such thing in the present” (1982: 21). (The fact that the sceptic grants the idealisation of our cognitive powers in the way that she does shows that her argument is not of a piece with the argument of the epistemological sceptic, who is concerned with whether our actual cognitive capacities can lead to knowledge. See Boghossian 1989 [2002: 150]. For dissent over this point, see Ginsborg 2018. Martin Kusch takes the argument to be metaphysical [2006: xiv], but, in contrast with Boghossian, he takes the dialogic setting to play an essential role in it.)