 Kelly and colleagues suggested that this idea might be useful in interpreting Turiel’s work. On this interpretation, the ordinary term “moral judgment” is hypothesized to be a psychological natural kind term, and it is the job of psychology to determine the essential features of the psychological natural kind that the term denotes. The obvious way to do this would be for psychologists to discover a cluster of nomologically linked properties that are shared by most instances of what they take to be intuitively clear cases of moral judgments, one or more of which is missing in most cases of judgments that they intuitively take not to be moral judgments. This, Kelly and colleagues suggested, looks to be exactly what Turiel and his colleagues have done. Turiel and other social domain theorists take some of the transgressions they use in their experiments to be intuitively obvious cases of moral transgressions, and these are judged, by most participants, young and old, to be authority independent, and generalizable to different locations and to different times. The experimenters take other transgressions to be intuitively obvious cases of conventional transgressions, and these are judged, by most participants, to be authority dependent and not generalizable to different locations or to different times. If all of that is true, then—for the reasons set out by Putnam, Devitt, and Kornblith—Turiel and his colleagues can plausibly claim to have shown that both moral judgments and conventional judgments are indeed psychological natural kinds, and to have discovered the essential features of those kinds. And that would provide an excellent reason to think that the pattern of criterion judgments that is hypothesized to identify moral judgments actually does identify moral judgments, and that the pattern of criterion judgments that is hypothesized to identify conventional judgments actually does identify conventional judgments.