 RFM is perhaps most (in)famous for Wittgenstein’s (RFM App. III) treatment of “true but unprovable” mathematical propositions. Early reviewers said that “[t]he arguments are wild” (Kreisel 1958: 153), that the passages “on Gödel’s theorem… are of poor quality or contain definite errors” (Dummett 1959: 324), and that (RFM App. III) “throws no light on Gödel’s work” (Goodstein 1957: 551). “Wittgenstein seems to want to legislate [[q]uestions about completeness] out of existence”, Anderson said, (1958: 486–87) when, in fact, he certainly cannot dispose of Gödel’s demonstrations “by confusing truth with provability”. Additionally, Bernays, Anderson (1958: 486), and Kreisel (1958: 153–54) claimed that Wittgenstein failed to appreciate “Gödel’s quite explicit premiss of the consistency of the considered formal system” (Bernays 1959: 15), thereby failing to appreciate the conditional nature of Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem. On the reading of these four early expert reviewers, Wittgenstein failed to understand Gödel’s Theorem because he failed to understand the mechanics of Gödel’s proof and he erroneously thought he could refute or undermine Gödel’s proof simply by identifying “true in PM” (i.e., Principia Mathematica) with “proved/provable in PM”.