 Objection from Moral Properties. According to this objection, if non-cognitivism is true, then something is bad (good, evil, etc.) only if a person has an unfavorable attitude towards it; however, having such an attitude (the objection goes) cannot be a necessary condition for an event’s being bad (good, evil, etc.). Consider, for example, Blanshard’s (1949) example in which a rabbit has been caught in a severe hunting trap for several days, causing the rabbit unnecessary, prolonged, and extreme agony. According to Blanshard’s understanding of non-cognitivism, until a person has an unfavorable attitude towards such an event or state of affairs, the rabbit’s being in such agony would not be bad. Since (the objection continues) this conclusion is absurd, Stevenson’s account of moral thought must be false. However, this objection conflates Stevenson’s theory of moral thought with a theory of moral properties, assuming as it does that having, for example, an unfavorable attitude towards an event constitutes the badness of that event, at least in part. But this is the kind of moral metaphysics that Stevenson’s theory is designed to avoid. According to Stevenson, either there is nothing that constitutes badness (or goodness, etc.), because there are no such moral properties, or, perhaps better: questions concerning what constitutes the badness of an event are ethical questions of what to disapprove of—questions to which non-cognitivism as a metaethical theory offers no answers. Non-cognitivism is silent on what it is in virtue of which things have the moral properties that they have (if they have any). It just tells us what it is to think that something is bad.