 While this strategy might seem to some to be promising in the moral case, it faces special problems in the case of meaning, content and rules (Boghossian 1989, 1990; Miller 2015a). In order for the strategy to be able so much as to be pursued, there has to be such a thing as complying or failing to comply with a subsidiary norm—and so, a fortiori, such a thing as complying or failing to comply with a norm as such. An error theorist about rule-following, however, denies precisely that there are facts about norm-compliance and non-compliance. Having argued that all statements about rule-compliance are false, the error theorist apparently lacks the resources for telling a story about the pragmatic utility of our continuing to engage in the practice of making judgements about rule-following. The upshot seems to be that, if we accept that there are no facts about speakers in virtue of which expressions have meaning, embracing an error theory will not prevent the notion of meaning from “vanishing into thin air”.