 We turn now to examine a family of views that resist the regress argument by appealing to Strawson’s (1962 [2003]) influential idea that praise-/blameworthiness tracks the agent’s quality of will. There are different ways of cashing out what exactly ‘quality of will’ means (Shoemaker 2013), but the basic idea is this: an agent is praiseworthy for an action or an attitude that accords with the demands of morality if the performance of the action or the holding of the attitude arises from proper regard or concern for another person’s morally significant interests. Conversely, an agent is blameworthy for an action or attitude that conflicts with the demands of morality if the performance of the action or the holding of the attitude arises from lack of proper regard or concern for those same interests. The key insight that quality-of-will theorists bring to bear on the debate over the EC is that an agent need not believe that her action is right/wrong (or that she has reasons in favor or against doing it, or that she is doing something morally risky) for the action to express the quality of her will and thus for her to be praise-/blameworthy in performing it. For example, when an ancient slaveholder beats her slave she clearly evinces lack of regard for the slave’s interests, quite irrespectively of what her owns views about the permissibility of slavery are or whether she has ever paused to consider the issue (Rosen 2003: 72). Thus, if an agent’s evinced quality of will is all that matters for blameworthiness (something that Rosen denies), the slaveholder is manifestly blameworthy. On this view, then, de dicto awareness of the action’s moral significance isn’t required for blameworthiness (Fields 1994; Arpaly 2003 &amp; 2015; Harman 2011 &amp; 2015; Talbert 2013 &amp; 2017a; Littlejohn 2014; Mason 2015; Björnsson 2017b; Weatherson 2019: ch. 5), and the same goes for praiseworthiness (Arpaly 2003 &amp;  2015).[8],  [9]