 What the experimental literature truly appears to show is a world of behavior that is usually noisy from the theorist’s point of view. The noise in question arises from substantial heterogeneity, both among people and among (person, situation) vectors. There is no single structural utility function such that all people act so as to maximize a function of that structure in all circumstances. Faced with well-learned problems in contexts that are not unduly demanding, or that are highly institutionally structured people often behave like expected utility maximizers. For general reviews of theoretical issues and evidence, see  Smith (2008)  and  Binmore (2007).  For an extended sequence of examples of empirical studies, see the so-called ‘continuous double auction’ experiments discussed in  Plott and Smith 1978  and Smith  1962,  1964,  1965,  1976,  1982.  As a result, classical game theory can be used in such domains with high reliability to predict behavior and implement public policy, as is demonstrated by the dozens of extremely successful government auctions of utilities and other assets designed by game theorists to increase public revenue  (Binmore and Klemperer 2002).