 Creationists themselves claim that the appeal to creation does solve a number of significant problems that afflict other metaphysical theories. There is, for example, no mythical god Moloch, for nobody has created such an object by gathering various properties and embedding them in a certain narrative. And although they share all the properties attributed to them in the respective renditions of Don Quixote, there are two Don Quixotes, Cervantes’s and Menard’s, not just one, because there were two utterly independent acts of authorial generation (cf. Voltolini 2006: 32ff.). It is not clear, however, how creationists can deal with a related problem that affects their theory, the problem of indiscriminable fictional objects (Kroon 2015). Intuitively, there were thousands of fictional dwarves who took part in Tolkien’s War between the Dwarves and Orcs, without Tolkien’s engaging in thousands of acts of dwarf-creation. (In response to this worry, some creationists have denied that there are such characters; see, for example, Voltolini 2006: 209–11.)