 After Bratman’s philosophy was published, researchers tried to formalize this theory using logical means. We mention here three well-known approaches. Cohen and Levesque (1991) tried to capture Bratman’s theory in a linear-time style temporal logic where they added primitive operators for belief and goal as well as some operators to cater for actions, such as operators for expressing that an action is about to be performed  \((\lhappens \alpha)\), has just been performed \(\ldone \alpha)\) and what agent is the actor of a primitive action (\(\lact i\ \alpha\): agent \(i\) is the actor of \(\alpha\)). From this basic set-up they build a framework in which ultimately the notion of intention is defined in terms of the other notions. In fact they define two notions: an intention_to_do and an intention_to_be. First they define the notion of an achievement goal (A-Goal): an A-Goal is something that is a goal to hold later, but is believed not to be true now. Then they define a persistent goal (P-Goal): a P-Goal is an A-Goal that is not dropped before it is believed to be achieved or believed to be impossible. Then the intention to do an action is defined as the P-Goal of having done the action, in a way such that the agent was aware of it happening. The intention to achieve a state satisfying \(\phi\) is the P-Goal of having done some action that has \(\phi\) as a result where the agent was aware of something happening leading to \(\phi\), such that what actually happened was not something that the agent explicitly had not as a goal.