 Therefore, it seems that the invisibility problem is closely connected with the originality problem. But although all new skeptics think there is an invisibility problem for Latin American philosophy, they disagree about what to make of the originality problem. For new skeptic Maite Ezcurdia (2003), it does arise. On her view, of four kinds of originality she identifies as desirable in philosophy (viz., interpretative, argumentative, problem-making, and problem-solving), Latin American philosophy comes out as having interpretative originality, yet lacking originality of the other three kinds. In particular, Ezcurdia contends that an improvement in problem-solving originality is needed for fixing the EDP, which would in turn lead to a solution to the IDP. On the other hand, Eduardo García-Ramírez (2011, p. 13) dismisses the originality problem but writes: “even though there is enough originality, most Latin American philosophy is haunted by the two proceedings of arrogant reasoning: internal visibility is a function of the external partly because Latin American philosophy is not used to thinking on its own.” Questions arise, however, as to how could there be enough originality in a philosophy that’s not used to thinking on its own?