 There are at least three serious difficulties for the causation formulation. The first we may call the ‘Humean worry’. Once we allow that its being morally obligatory to φ is distinct from God’s commanding/intending φ-ing, there is the question of what reason we would have for thinking that its being morally obligatory to φ necessarily obtains if God’s commanding/intending φ-ing obtains. And whatever answer the defender of this view offers, it must be consistent with the causation formulation of theological voluntarism. But it is unclear what would do the trick. One way to try to make this necessary connection is by holding that there is a prior moral obligation to obey God; and so, whenever God gives a command/has an intention that one perform some action, it follows that one is morally obligated to perform the action commanded/intended. But we cannot take this route, because if the causation formulation is correct, then all moral obligations are caused entirely by God’s commanding/intending activity; there cannot be, then, this prior moral obligation to obey God that would serve as part of the explanans for the necessary connection between divine commands/intentions and moral obligations.