 As before, if the Kantian moral conclusions are to be binding, then not only must the practice conception entail the Kantian conclusions, but the practice conception of action must be shown to be nonoptional. The game of baseball gives its players reasons, but you can always choose not to play in the first place, and you can choose to stop playing; what’s more, the rules of baseball themselves bring baseball games to a close. In either case, the reasons of baseball do not – or cease to – apply to you. Intendo must therefore be a game that you cannot walk away from. But why can’t you simply stop playing Intendo, and start producing – not perhaps ‘actions’, but activity of some other kind – that is not practice-governed? We have already gestured at one answer: the importance of living in a practice-informed world. One further answer Schapiro might give is that you can’t do that – where the modality of the ‘can’t’ is the modality of freedom. (Since reasons are a practice status, questions having to do with practical reason do not arise for the alternative forms of activity.) 