 Although other philosophers (in particular Heidegger, Schelling, and Bergson) make time important, Rosenstock-Huessy was not at all convinced that they had done it sufficiently. In the case of Schelling and Bergson it was because they remained imprisoned by the mechanistic conception of sequential time in which past, present and future move in the one direction. Thus, in the opening chapter of volume 2 of the In the Cross of Reality, he takes issue with Schelling’s declaration in the Ages of the World that ‘the past is known, the present cognized, the future intimated’ (2009, 2 16). While Schelling is a major critic of mechanistic philosophy, and his call for a narrative philosophy is explicitly acknowledged by Franz Rosenzweig as being one of the most important precursors of the new thinking, the notion of time expressed here is decisively sequential and not at all at odds with the mechanistic conception of time which has evolved out of  philosophy.[13]  Such a representation of space and time as one finds in the new sciences of the philosophies of Descartes, Newton, and Kant (for all their differences), certainly enables the sharpening of our understanding and observation of causal or material process. However, socially and personally we experience time as the push of the past and the future. Our present is not simply a passing point on a one-way flow, but the intersection of past and future in our present—future coming back to us as much as past coming toward us. Rosenstock-Huessy believed that this is how we experience the historical catastrophes which come from the conflict between suffocating spaces and the freedom to found a new time. Heidegger’s emphasis upon thrownness and projection make him much closer to Rosenstock-Huessy, but his substitution of historicity for real history, and hence real times, evident in the above discussion on names, remains a dividing line between them.