 The first step in the analysis of the existent  (al-mawǧūd)[6]  is to acknowledge its absolute priority: the existent as such is indefinable (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 29, 5–31,9; cf. I, 2, 13, 8–13): everything implies the notion of the existent and cannot exist outside of it. In fact, whereas a definition serves to answer the question about the quiddity (māhiyya: what is it: mā huwa?) of a thing, the existent as such cannot have a quiddity (one cannot investigate its māhiyya: Ilāhiyyāt, I, 2,13,  8–13).[7]  In order to ask what a thing is, one cannot avoid referring to being, which is exactly what allows us to conceive all things, whether they are sensible, imaginary or intelligible, as existent. According to Avicenna’s formula, which had a great impact on Thomas Aquinas (and on medieval Western philosophy in general), the existent is—together with the thing, the necessary and the one—one of the “intentions” (maʿānī; intentiones) that are “imprinted in the soul in a primary way” (Ilāhiyyāt, I, 5, 29, 5–6; 30, 3–4).