 All theorists who accept a causal construal of agents’ control over what they do—and this includes most compatibilists as well as many incompatibilists—can accept that agents cause their free actions (or events internal to these actions). After all, we accept that the sun causes sunburn and that, when water dissolves sugar, it causes the sugar to dissolve. However, it is widely thought that causation by such things is reducible to, or consists wholly in, causation by states of these things or events involving them, and this is precisely what is denied with respect to the agent causation that is invoked by agent-causal theories of free will. The denial raises the question whether any intelligible account of agent causation can be given. Even some proponents of agent-causal views (e.g., Taylor 1992: 53) seem doubtful about this, declaring agent causation to be strange or even mysterious.