 If upon deducing one proposition from another, s comes to justifiably believe Q8* for the first-time, the inference from P8 to Q8* arguably transmits doxastic justification. (See the supplement on  Transmission of Propositional Justification versus Transmission of Doxastic Justification.)  It is more dubious, however, that when s’s support for P8 is constituted by s’s seeing that P8, Moore* is also transmissive of propositional justification. For instance, one might contend that Moore* is non-transmissive because it instantiates the disjunctive template described in Sect. 3.2 (cf. Wright 2002). To start with, P8 entails Q8*, so (a) is satisfied. Let R* be the proposition that this is no hand but s is victim of a hallucination of a hand held up before her face. Since R* would be true if Q8* were false, (d) is also satisfied. Furthermore, take the grounds of s’s justification for P8 to be s’s seeing that P8. Since this experience is a state for s indistinguishable from one in which R* is true, condition (b) is also satisfied. Finally, it might be argued that the proposition that one is not hallucinating is a presupposition of the cognitive project of learning about one’s environment through perception. It follows that R* is incompatible with a presupposition of s’s cognitive project of learning about one’s environment through perception. Thus (c*) appears to be fulfilled too. So Moore* will not transmit the justification that s possesses for P8 to Q8*. 