 According to the common interpretation of the opening passage of the Categories, equivocal terms are correlated with more than one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing different natures, whereas univocal terms are correlated with only one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing one and the same nature. In his last commentary on the Physics (after 1324), Burley had maintained that the term ‘being’ is at the same time univocal and equivocal with respect to the categories, as a single concept corresponds to it (broadly speaking univocity), but the categorial items share it in different ways, according to a hierarchy of value (broadly speaking equivocity)—see his Expositio in libros octo Physicorum, lib. I, tr. 2, cap. 1, ed. Venice 1501, fols. 12vb-13ra. In turn, Wyclif had admitted three main types of equivocity: by chance (a casu), analogical, and generic, the second of which applies to the relationship between being and categories (De ente praedicamentali, cap. 2). Alyngton recognises four main kinds of equivocity: by chance; deliberate (a consilio); analogical; and generic. Equivocals by chance are those things that just happen to have the same name, but with different meanings and/or reasons for imposing the name. Those things are deliberate equivocals which have distinct natures but the same name, and are subordinated to different but correlated concepts. Those things are analogical which share the nature signified by their common name in various degrees and/or ways. Generic equivocals are those things which share the same generic nature in the same way, but have distinct specific natures of different absolute value (In Cat., cap. de aequivocis, fol. 70r-v). So, within Alyngton’s system, what differentiates analogy from univocity is the way in which a certain nature (or property) is shared by a set of things: analogous things share it according to different degrees (secundum magis et minus, or secundum prius et posterius), univocal things share it all in the same manner and to the same degree (In Cat., cap. de univocis, fol. 71v). Alyngton argues that being is not a sort of genus in relation to the ten categories, since it does not manifest their essence, nor is it predicated univocally of them; being is analogous in relation to the ten categories. It is the basic stuff of the metaphysical structure of each reality, which possesses it in accordance with its own nature and level in the hierarchy of essences (In Cat., cap. de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum, pp. 255–56).