 A notable recent development in the discussion of why-questions is Skow 2016, which begins with two key ideas: first, that a theory of explanation ought to be a theory of answers to why-questions, and, second, that a theory of answers to why-questions is a theory of reasons-why. Skow goes on to defend the view that all reasons-why are causes or grounds, and he argues that reasons-why come in levels. At one level there are reasons why \(P\), and at a higher level there are reasons why \(Q\) is a reason why \(P\). For example, if I strike a match and the match lights, my striking the match is a reason why the match lit, and the relevant physical laws are reasons why striking the match is a reason why it lit. These physical laws are not lower-level reasons (i.e., reasons why the match lit); thus the higher and lower levels are distinct. The levels are not strictly disjoint, however, as the presence of oxygen in the air is both a reason why the match lit and a reason why striking the match is a reason why it lit.