 In Western philosophy and psychology, emotions are defined as inner psychological states with subjective feelings that are contrasted with cognitive states and processes of the mind. If one believes that ‘1+1=2’, this cognitive state, in itself, does not come with particular feelings, motivate specific actions, or facilitate observable embodied expressions. Nor does it draw any evaluative judgments. Regardless of one’s feelings or motivations, one can simply believe that ‘1+1=2’ is true. In addition, emotions are often associated with strong desires or passions that can conflict with rational reasoning and reflective thinking. In his Republic (Book IV), Plato argues that the soul (psyche) consists of three distinctive components, reason (logistikon), spirit (thumoeides), and appetite (epithumetikon). He puts reason against the affective components of the mind. Stoic philosophers characterized emotions as inexplicable passion, uncontrollable urge, or irrational fear. According to Arius Didymus (a Stoic philosopher of the early Roman Empire), emotional states are “excessive impulses which are disobedient to reason” (translated in Pomeroy 1999: 65A). Descartes (1649 [1989: 385]) believed that passion is internal dispositions and tendencies moved by external events that can go against rational understanding of the world. Although recent publications demonstrate strong academic interest in emotions in Western philosophy and psychology (Damasio 1994; De Sousa 1987; Gibbard 1990; Haidt 2001; Lutz 1988; Nichols 2004; Nussbaum 2001; Prinz 2004; Solomon 1984), emotions are still understood from the viewpoints of subjectivity, phenomenality, motivation, passion and desire. 