 A more extreme egalitarianism—“all-luck egalitarianism” to use an apt phrase coined by Shlomi Segall (2010, 46)—has it that “differential option luck should be considered as unjust as differential brute luck” (Segall 2010, 47; cp. Segall 2013, 64–82).  For if what really drives egalitarians is the conviction that people should not be worse off than others as a result of causes for which they are not responsible, then, arguably, it follows that differential option luck is unjust. After all, a gambler is not responsible for the outcome of her gamble being what it is rather than something else it could have been.  This view does not commit its advocates to the position that the state (or, for that matter, anyone else) should prevent conduct that might lead to inequalities reflecting differential option luck: advocates of the view may care about welfare too and rightly think that welfare is promoted when the outcomes of gambles are allowed to stand, or they might distinguish between legitimacy—“the property something has when... no one has a just grievance against it” (Cohen 2011, 125) and justice and think that state intervention to eliminate differential option luck would be ilegitimate even if it would thereby bring about a less unjust distribution. Again, the claim that differential option luck is bad is consistent with the view that, given that people do choose to gamble, it is better, all things considered, if differential option luck is not eliminated, even if it would be better, justice-wise, if people had chosen not to gamble in the first place (Lippert-Rasmussen 2001, 576; compare Cohen 2011, 124–143; Persson 2006).