  There are at least four other areas of applied ethics that seem to  bear a relation to personal identity, and we will lay out the issues  of each very briefly. First, there is a problem of justifying  therapeutic treatment for patients with Dissociative Identity  Disorder (DID, formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder). The  worry here comes from the attractive thought that each of the  distinct personalities of someone with DID is in fact a different  person (Wilkes 1988; Dennett 1976). If so, then a therapy that  aims at  eliminating one or more of the alter personalities in favor of one of them would be, prima facie, immoral. (Morton Prince,  one of the first psychologists to work with a DID patient, wrote that his aim was indeed to kill off what he thought of as the  “non-real” personalities of his patient, Christine  Beauchamp. See Prince 1905.) But this verdict is quite  counterintuitive: surely the therapist is helping the patient  with DID when his work produces only one healthy personality, not  doing anything immoral. The issue, then, is about the moral  ramifications of cutting off personal identity in an unusual sort of  way. In addition, there are intriguing issues regarding identity and  both legal and moral responsibility in patients with DID. What if one alter commits a crime, say? Is the patient with DID responsible or is only the offending alter responsible? If the latter, how is a fair  punishment to be effected? (For further discussion of these issues,  see Wilkes 1981, 1988; Hacking 1991, 1995; Lizza 1993; Braude 1995,  1996; Radden 1996; Sinnott-Armstrong and Behnke 2000; Kennett and  Matthews 2002; and DeGrazia 2005).