 McCain discusses the potential problem that it might be implausible to require that basing relations be direct (McCain 2012, p. 368–369). To use McCain’s example, suppose that Sally believes that p and that p ⊃ q (“p implies q”), and validly infers, and thereby comes to believe, that q. She also believes q ⊃ t, and validly infers t from her beliefs that q and q ⊃ t. On McCain’s theory of the basing relation, since Sally’s beliefs that p and p ⊃ q are not direct causes of her belief that t, her belief that t is not based on those beliefs. In other words, on McCain’s theory, the basing relation is not transitive. This raises questions about whether McCain’s theory adequately accounts for our pre-theoretical account of the basing relation. In particular, does McCain’s theory correctly identify one’s reasons for one’s beliefs? McCain replies that, given his theory, we can still claim that, e.g., Sally’s belief that t is dependent on her beliefs that p and that p ⊃ q, even if not based on them.