 This is a contending and plausible hypothesis for a role for the second step in the B-Deduction. One might ask, however, whether the account Kant provides can respond convincingly to van Cleve’s objection. Even on certain idealist views, such as Leibniz’s and Kant’s according to Robert Adams (1983, 1994: 217–61, cf. Wilson 1987), our ordinary sensible representations of space, and of physical entities more generally, may not represent them as they really are. By contrast, on Berkeley’s idealist position as represented in the third of the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (Berkeley 1713/1998), the properties of physical entities match our sensible representations of them exactly, without a possibility of a mismatch; the oar in the water really is bent when I see it as bent. On the type of idealism Kant endorses (and one might of course question whether it has been established), the possibility of a mismatch remains in place even if our representation of space structures space itself (Pereboom 1988; Stang 2018; Jauernig 2021). For instance, we may sensibly represent space as Euclidean while is in fact Riemannian. One might respond that the representation that structures space would then also be Riemannian, and we would have a match. But then a crucial feature of our representation of space would be inaccessible absent serious empirical investigation, and the nature of the project would be altered.