 Kalligone is a polemic against Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, more precisely against its first half, the “Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment,” loosely structured in parallel with Kant’s work, although with numerous digressions, sometimes even in dialogue form, and statements of Herder’s own positions. Like Herder’s polemic with Lessing in the Groves of Criticism, his response to Kant’s work is longer than its target, and not all of its themes can be discussed here. In ways anticipated in Herder’s earlier work, Kalligone attacks Kant’s methodology and his neglect of the concrete rôle of the senses in a discipline that is, as defined by Baumgarten, supposed to focus precisely on them. In an expression of the naturalism that pervades his work, Herder also attacks Kant’s appeals to the “supersensible” in his interpretation of aesthetic experiences, especially the experience of sublimity. But Herder’s most vehement objections are to Kant’s insistence upon the disinterestedness of aesthetic judgment and to his exclusion of a rôle for determinate concepts in the free play of the mental powers in aesthetic experience, which Herder sees as excluding any rôle for the knowledge of truth in aesthetic experience. We will focus here on Herder’s criticisms of the disinterestedness and non-conceptuality of aesthetic judgment.