 More moderate (Yagisawa would say: too moderate) realists treat impossible worlds as ersatz constructions: abstract entities on a par with ersatz possible worlds (see e.g. Mares 1997, Vander Laan 1997). Modal ersatzism comes in various shapes (Divers 2002, Part III, is by far the best critical evaluation in the literature). If one takes possible worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions (as per Adams 1974), impossible worlds could be sets of propositions that are inconsistent and/or incomplete. Similarly, Plantingan ersatzism (possible worlds are particular states of affairs) or Stalnakerian ersatzism (possible worlds are world-natures or maximal properties) could be easily extended to accommodate impossible worlds. All hands agree that such worlds come at no great ontological or theoretical cost, once one has accepted ersatz possible worlds. After all, ersatz worlds are abstract: they account for impossibilities, not by instantiating them as Lewisian worlds do, but by representing them in some way or other. Jago (2012) takes both possible and impossible worlds to be constructions out of positive and negative facts, such as Barack Obama’s not being French (see the entry on  facts).