 Many philosophers have been especially interested in the possibility that grammar masks the underlying structure of thought, perhaps in ways that invite mistaken views about how ordinary language is related to cognition and the world we talk about. For example, similarities across sentences like ‘Homer talked’, ‘Nobody talked’, and ‘The nymph talked’ initially suggest that the corresponding thoughts exhibit a common subject-predicate form. But even if ‘Homer’ indicates an entity that can be the subject of a thought that is true if and only if the entity in question talked, ‘Nobody’ does not; and as we’ll see, ‘The’ is complicated. Philosophers and linguists have also asked general questions about how logic is related to grammar. Do thoughts and sentences exhibit different kinds of structure? Do sentences exhibit grammatical structures that are not obvious? And if the logical structure of a thought can diverge from the grammatical structure of a sentence that is used to express the thought, how should we construe proposals about the logical forms of inferences like (1)–(6)? Are such proposals normative claims about how we ought to think/talk, or empirical hypotheses about aspects of psychological/linguistic reality?