 Theophrastus abandoned some of Aristotle’s statements about propositions, and in particular his account of the quantifiers (see Brunschwig 1982; Mignucci 1998). He distinguished, for instance, between singular and particular propositions, maintaining that the former are definite while the latter are indefinite; that is to say, he considered propositions AiB and AoB to be indefinite, because in cases such as “Some man is just” and “Not every man is just” the quantifier picks up at least one individual without specifying which one (frs. 82A–E FHS&amp;G). Moreover, Theophrastus claimed that the proposition “Not every B is A” has a different meaning from the proposition “Some B is not A”, since the latter means that there is at least one B which is not A, whereas the former implies that there are several Bs which are not As (fr. 83 FHS&amp;G). Finally, he used the expression “by transposition” (kata metathesin / ek metatheseōs) to indicate affirmative propositions whose predicates are indefinite, e.g., “A man is not-just” (frs. 87A–F FHS&amp;G), and he established the convertibility of universal negative sentences (frs. 90A–B FHS&amp;G).