 More positively, Crusius endorses the principle of determining reason but denies that it admits of unlimited use, which he claims, echoing Lange, would entail fatalism. Rather, Crusius excludes what he terms “free first [or fundamental] actions” from the scope of the principle. These actions are such that they proceed directly from the basic powers of the acting substance under appropriate circumstances (Crusius 1745: §82), but are such that they can be undertaken or omitted by the acting subject (that is, they are not determined) (Crusius 1743: §XXV). That such actions are possible, Crusius claims, is clear given that God’s action would be of this sort, but also given the testimony of our own inner experience, which discloses the acts of our own will to be just such actions (Crusius 1743: §IX). Crusius thus accepts that the principle of determining reason holds for all events that are not the result of a free first action, whereas free first actions no doubt have a cause but are not such that could not have occurred otherwise (or not at all).