 One objection that can be raised against Millikan’s theory has to do with omnipresent beneficial background conditions. The prima facie worry is whether her theory succeeds in ruling them out as contents of ordinary perceptual representations. To stay with the same example, consider that other things besides frog food were required for a contribution to fitness on past occasions when the frog’s perceptual representation was used by the prey-catching system (e.g., oxygen and gravity). Does her theory entail that the frog’s perceptual representation has, in addition to the content there is frog food, contents like the oxygen concentration is above 18% or the local value of gravity is close to g? According to several interpreters, Millikan can easily avoid this consequence. She can admit that there are many conditions that the frog’s representational state (state R, for short) must correspond to if the prey-catching system is to fulfill its functions, but insist that it is only those conditions that are specific to R (i.e. that are not required, and do not Normally obtain, when R is absent) that constitute R’s content (Shea 2005, 40; Bergman  2021, 3–4).[13]  This would rule out conditions involving the oxygen concentration or the value of gravity. (Interestingly, Millikan herself seems to favor a different answer to the problem, one that mirrors her reply to the next objection; cf. Millikan 1993, 127.)