 The second reason to define mind-dependence ecumenically is that this is the best way of making sense of the extant literature. Sharon Street’s body of work is an example. She describes her position as committing her to mind-dependence (Street 2016: 298n). But she describes it differently in different places: she writes (2012) that normative truth consists in what follows from within the practical point of view; or (2008) that normative facts are constituted by facts about the agent’s judgments; she (2016) characterizes mind-dependence views at those on which “things [are] valuable ultimately because we value them” (emphasis added). So we should understand the defining relation of mind-dependence so that it encompasses all of these relations. Below, we will call this generic relation “grounding”, for simplicity. This term is imperfect – grounding has become intensely theorized and disputed – but we use it as a stand-in for a broad kind of metaphysical dependence.