 To illustrate, Nolan considers the famous example of someone suggesting that the Earth is held up by resting on the back of a giant turtle, which is in turn held up by resting on the back of another turtle, which is in turn … and so on, turtles all the way down. There does not appear to be an inconsistency hiding in this regress, nor does it thwart an attempt at analysis. For all we know, space is infinite, so there’s no problem fitting all these turtles in, so we’re not in a case where we know independently that we’re dealing with a finite domain. This is not a regress that involves ontological dependence, so there are no concerns about the existence of things going ungrounded. Of course, we have pretty good empirical evidence that the infinite turtles hypothesis is false, since we have gone into space and can’t see any world turtles. But even putting that aside—let’s suppose we’re considering the hypothesis prior to our going into space—there is something intuitively weird about the turtles hypothesis. Nolan suggests it is the ontological extravagance of the view. He says (2011, 534–5)