 The second worry about the causal formulation I will call the ‘lack of precedent worry’. Moral properties and states of affairs supervene on nonmoral properties and states of affairs. The intuitive idea is that there can be no differences in moral status without some difference in nonmoral status. The causal formulation satisfies the supervenience constraint—the differences in nonmoral status concern God’s commands/intentions—but it does so in a way that is unprecedented and mysterious. When we look at the specific ways in which changes in nonmoral facts can make a difference to the moral facts that hold, there is a pretty limited number of intelligible relationships that can hold between these nonmoral facts and the moral facts that supervene on them. A nonmoral fact can be part of what constitutes a reason to perform an action. (That you promised to φ can be cited in explaining why you have a reason to φ your promising to φ constitutes, at least in part, the reason that you have to φ.) It can be part of an enabling condition for that reason. (The existence of a social practice of promising can be cited in explaining why you have a reason to φ; the existence of that practice might explain why your promise has the reason-giving force that it has.) It can be cited as a defeater-defeater for a reason. (While the fact the promisee told you that you need not fulfill your promise to φ typically releases you from your promise to φ, the fact that you threatened to beat up the promisee if he or she did not tell you that you need not fulfill your promise invalidates that release, and can be cited in explaining why you have a reason to φ.) But while theological voluntarism holds that a fact—the fact that God commands/intends that one φ—explains why one has a reason (in this case, an obligation) to φ, the causal view holds that this fact falls into none of the familiar explanatory categories: it is not constitutive of the reason, it is not an enabling condition for the reason, it is not a defeater-defeater for the reason. The way that the fact is supposed to explain the reason is merely causal: it just brings the reason about, exclusively, totally, immediately. This is an entirely unfamiliar phenomenon: nowhere else do we encounter a merely causal connection between a nonmoral fact and a moral one. (The appeal to the very strangeness of divine causation itself is not sufficient to answer the objection. For there is an extra strangeness here: that the relationship between nonmoral and moral facts is in every case with which we are familiar a rational relationship, whereas on the causal formulation of theological voluntarism the relationship is merely causal. Creation ex nihilo does not constitute carte blanche to multiply strangenesses. Interestingly, though, Wielenberg 2018 (p. 18), which rejects the project of theistic ethics, appeals to just this sort of causation to explain the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral.)