 More central to Locke’s distinction of P/SQs is the question why idea-quality resemblance and non-resemblance are important in Locke’s view. RT is said to be a consequence of the argument that establishes the P/SQ distinction in Essay 2.8–14—what does the further thesis do for Locke? In sections 16–19, the resemblance/non resemblance dichotomy and the real/imputed quality dichotomies coincide (Rickless 2014: 88–90). E. J. Lowe (2005: 51–2) suggests that in denying resemblance in the case of ideas of SQs, Locke “expresses the view that the ideas mislead us into taking a dispositional property to be a real non-dispositional quality”. But although we do commonly make this mistake according to Locke, the fault is not with what ideas represent but our tendency to conflate ideas and qualities.