 This line of thought leads to a potential worry, however. For logical norms do not merely bind us in the way that the rules of a game bind us. I hold myself to be answerable to the rules governing a game (of chess, say) so long as I wish to participate in it. However, the normativity of logic does not seem to be optional in the same way. The norms of logic are themselves responsible to our broader epistemic aims (and would thus need to be coordinated with other epistemic norms). Hence, if my epistemic aim is, say, acquiring true beliefs (and avoiding false ones), this may give me a reason to prefer one set of logical norms over another. For imagine I could choose either of two logics \(L_{1}\) and \(L_{2}\). Suppose, moreover, that \(A\) is true and that \(A \models_{L_{1}} B\) but \(A \not \models_{L_{2}} B\), for some relevant proposition \(B\). Even according to Beall and Restall, not all logics are equal. To pass muster, a logic must satisfy certain core conditions. In particular, it must be truth-preserving. Assuming that both \(L_{1}\) and \(L_{2}\) are truth-preserving, it follows that \(B\) is true. But then it would seem that there is a clear sense in which \(L_{1}\) outperforms \(L_{2}\) in terms of the guidance it affords us. According to the norms \(L_{2}\) gives rise to, there is presumably nothing amiss about an agent who believes \(A\) but not \(B\); according to \(L_{1}\) there presumably is. Hence, \(L_{1}\) is more conducive to our epistemic aims. It follows that whenever two putatively equally correct logics, \(L_{1}\) and \(L_{2}\) are such that \(L_{2}\) is a proper sub-system of \(L_{1}\), one would appear to have reason to opt for \(L_{1}\) since it is more conducive to one’s aim of having true beliefs. In cases where we are dealing with two logics \(L_{1}\) and \(L_{2}\) such that \(\models_{L_{1}}\) and \(\models_{L_{2}}\) are not sub-relations of one another, things may be more complicated. All the same, even in such cases, it may well be that our overarching epistemic aims and norms give us reason to prefer one logic over another, and hence that from the standpoint of these epistemic aims, the logics are not equally good after all. The aim of these considerations is not to undermine forms of logical pluralism like the one advanced by Beall and Restall, but merely to point out that once we take the normative dimension of logic into account, we must also reckon with the broader epistemic goals, which the norms of logic may be thought to be subservient to.