 This mainstream view rejects the command theory of law (e.g., John Austin), which construes law as orders of a sovereign backed by the threat of sanctions; the view that the function of law is to identify delicts (conduct characterized as illegal) which are the condition of a sanction (a coercive act against the law-breaker) (e.g., Kelsen); as well as predictive theories of law (e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes) which reduce law to predictions about the application of sanctions (Hart 1961 [2012]). Instead, the primary function of law is to provide a structure for generating norms that guide human behaviour, with or without the existence of effective sanctions, as in Joseph Raz’s hypothetical “society of angels” (Raz 1999: 159). On this view, enforcement mechanisms operate as a mere contingent back-up plan for cases where law fails in its primary function.