We see here a special case of apperception as an interaction among conflicting representational masses, in which one representational group is not only “noticed” but evaluated by another, held to what (from its perspective) is perceived as an alien claim. Now, on the one hand, since the soul is postulated as a unity, the difference between how one is, and how one judges that one ought to be, indicates an inner conflict. On the other hand, the moral personality, as a manifestation of the integral soul, must or ought also to be integrated. In short, the conflict must be resolved so that the judged will is brought into agreement with the aesthetic (apperceiving, evaluating) will, and so “merge into a single person”: “[T]his person represents the ideal of an ethically self-determining will” (PS I: 202; cf. 131). But since this ideal is rarely if ever achieved, we constantly feel compelled to “interrupt our activity and alter our mental disposition from within”. Thus, for the sake of the unity of the moral personality, the human takes as a categorical imperative what previously was but an aesthetic judgment.