 To make a start let us go back to an assumption we quietly made three paragraphs back: that welfare levels are among the things that people deserve. This claim does not seem controversial. It follows from the common idea that the wicked deserve to suffer, and the saintly deserve to prosper, for to prosper is to have a relatively high welfare level. But philosophers who attempt to formulate (welfarist) desert-sensitive theories of intrinsic value often make a stronger assumption: that when it comes to determining the intrinsic value of a possible world, all that matters is the extent to which people get the welfare levels they deserve. Suppose I deserve an apology from my neighbor in virtue of the fact that he (inadvertently) tore up some of the plants in my yard. But suppose also that I do not really care about my yard, or about the quality of my relationship with my neighbor. Getting the apology would mean nothing to me, nor would I be upset if my neighbor did not apologize. The apology would not make my life better or worse. Then on the stronger assumption, the intrinsic value of the world is not higher if I get the apology than if I don’t – even though only if I get the apology do I get something I deserve. 