  A further worry about Berkeley’s system arises from the idea-bundle account of  objects.[23]   If there is no mind-independent object against which to measure my ideas, but rather my ideas help to constitute the object, then how can my ideas ever fail—how is error possible?  Here is another way to raise the worry that I have in mind: We saw above that Berkeley’s arguments against commonsense realism in the first Dialogue attempt to undermine (1) claims that heat, odor, taste are distinguishable from pleasure/pain and (2) the claim that objects have one true color, one true shape, one true taste, etc.  If we then consider what this implies about Berkeleyian objects, we must conclude that Berkeley’s cherry is red, purple, gray, tart, sweet, small, large, pleasant, and painful!  It seems that Berkeley’s desire to refute the mechanist representationalism which dictates that objects are utterly unlike our experience of them has lead him to push beyond common sense to the view that objects are exactly like our experience of  them.[24]   There is no denying that Berkeley is out of sync with common sense here. He does, however, have an account of error, as he shows us in the Dialogues: