 Another way of accommodating strong convictions about the full moral status of all human beings grounds that status in actual relationships between cognitively normal and radically-disabled human beings. Because of their duties of partiality, the close relatives of radically impaired individuals must treat them as if they had full moral status. This could be regarded as an agent-relative status: for close relatives and no one else, radically disabled humans actually have full moral status. But because of the full moral status of those close relatives, other human beings must respect their duty to regard their disabled kin as full moral equals. They do not, however, have to assume that duty themselves. Some proponents of individual-attribute accounts—McMahan, for example—appear to take this view. In contrast, some of the group-based accounts in the next section hold that the “tie of birth” requires all cognitively nondisabled human beings to accord full moral status to radically-impaired human beings, regardless of their relationship. A weaker version of this derivative or courtesy position does not claim that a human being with radical cognitive disabilities actually has full moral status even for close family members, merely that they must treat her as if she did. This reduces somewhat (but does not eliminate) the disparity between family members and third parties, but only by downgrading the moral status of radically-impaired humans even for their most significant others.