 Consensus conferences and other mechanisms for reaching group judgments are clearly no panacea. Miriam Solomon (2015), for instance, argues that consensus conferences tend to “miss the window of epistemic opportunity” in that they often take place after the medical community has already settled an issue. More important in the present context is the observation that while these conferences possibly help to control some forms of partiality, they are ineffective in reducing others and may be responsible for the introduction of new biases. One concern is that panel members may read the existing evidence selectively, for instance, because of weighing salient studies or studies that are available to them more heavily. Another is that phenomena such as groupthink (Janis 1982) and peer pressure may influence results. In an NIH consensus conference panel members have to come to a verdict after only two days of hearings and deliberations. Under these conditions it is certainly possible that more outspoken panel members or those who perform well under extreme pressure have a undue influence on results. Moreover, it is not clear that excluding clinicians who have published on the issue at hand is always such a good idea. After all, it is not implausible to maintain that those scientists who actively work on a research topic are those who best understand it and therefore can make the best informed judgments. For these and other reasons, Solomon (2007, 2015) explores the consequences of judgment aggregation. In this process group members typically do not deliberate but instead cast their opinions which are then aggregated using some pre-determined procedure. The majority rule would be a simple example of such a procedure.