  Critics of the plebiscitary theory raise the further objection that views like Wellman’s would result in a proliferation of secessions. The domino effect objection, as it might be called, refers to the concern that, if all that is needed to establish a potentially viable secessionist group is a mere majority vote in any plebiscite, then the institutionalization of this view will license the secessions of increasingly numerous and subsequently smaller and smaller groups. This would likely be disastrous for political and economic stability in the given regions and internationally. Again, plebiscitary theorists refer back to the viability proviso in response. The successful creation of a fully autonomous state that can both maintain political legitimacy (through the satisfaction of its political functions) and that can be reasonably expected to persist over time is a tall order—one that many (if not most) aspiring secessionist groups are not likely to meet. Indeed, Wellman argues that the likelihood of a secessionist group’s ability to achieve such an ambitious and complex task decreases as its population and resources dwindle in size (Wellman 2005: p. 7–8). The viability proviso, then, serves as a practical limitation on the kinds of plebiscites that can in fact form viable secessionist groups, which significantly decreases the likelihood that an international splintering of states will occur if the plebiscitary view were implemented.