Some interpretative issues can quickly be disposed of. First, the Kantian test applies specifically to political maxims and is the equivalent in that sphere of the more general categorical imperative.[3] This is why Kant refers to it as the “transcendental principle of the publicity of public law” (1795 [1923: 382]). Second, this Kantian test is a merely negative one: passing the test is only a necessary condition for a maxim’s rightness. It is therefore not sufficient to guarantee that all maxims that pass this test are right. This is suggested both by the expression “wrong if” and by Kant’s explicit statement: “this principle is, furthermore, only negative, i.e., it only serves for the recognition of what is not just to others”.[4] Such a reading entails a difference with the categorical imperative insofar as the latter is a necessary and sufficient condition for permissibility. Third, it is also clear from the principle that neither an action itself, nor the actual motives underlying such an action (Davis 1991: 418) must be capable of being successfully disclosed in order to guarantee that they are not wrong. The test applies only to the maxim of such an action, which indicates one respect in which such a hypothetical test might leave room for actual secrecy. This claim is true irrespective of whether David Luban is correct in suggesting that: