 Third, if a proposition appears under careful scrutiny to be or entail a contradiction, then is there even a proposition before the mind? If you require for x’s salvation that x believe that God is one and God is three, what exactly are you demanding that x believe? Before x can affirm a proposition as true x must understand it, but how can x affirm as true a proposition that appears necessarily false? Such a ‘proposition’ is arguably not a proposition at all. God is simple but free appears to be in like case. As a matter of pure logic, there are of course necessarily false propositions: take the members of a contradictory pair of propositions and conjoin them, e.g., snow is white &amp; snow is not white. This necessarily false proposition is arguably not a possible object of belief because of our charitable tendency to re-interpret blatant contradictions in some innocuous way. When our hermeneutical charity is thwarted, however, we suspend belief, not in a proposition, but in a putative proposition’s being a proposition, or in a verbal formula’s expressing a proposition.