 By Neutrality and Universal Domain, \(V\) must elect candidate \(C\) in this election scenario.  Notice that this last election scenario can be generated by permuting the voters in the first election scenario (to generate the last election scenario from the first election scenario, move the first group of voters to the 2nd position, the 2nd group of voters to the 3rd position and the 3rd group of voters to the first position).  But this contradicts Anonymity since this requires \(V\) to elect the same candidate in the first and third election scenario. To extend this result to more than 3 candidates, consider a profile in which candidates \(A\), \(B\), and \(C\) are all ranked above any other candidate and the restriction to these three candidates forms a Condorcet component.  If \(V\) satisfies Unanimity, then no candidate except \(A\), \(B\) or \(C\) can be elected. Then, the above argument shows that \(V\) cannot satisfy Resoluteness, Universal Domain, Neutrality, and Anonymity.  That is, there are no Resolute voting methods that satisfy Universal Domain, Anonymity, Neutrality, and Unanimity for 3 or more candidates (note that I have assumed that the number of voters is a multiple of 3, see Moulin 1983 for the full proof). 