  We can also re-examine the issue of the rationality of  akrasia in light of this analysis of weakness of will; for  we can distinguish between akratic and non-akratic cases of the  latter. As McIntyre points out, resolutions typically rest on  judgments about what it is best that one do at a (future) time  t. If an agent fails to act on a previously formed  resolution to do a at t, thus exhibiting weakness  of will, we can distinguish the case in which he still endorses at  t the judgment that it is best that he do a at  t (even though he does not do it) from the case in which he  abandons that judgment as well as his resolution. In the latter,  non-akratic type of case, the agent in effect rationalizes his  failure to live up to his resolution by deciding that it is not after all best that he do a at t. McIntyre points out  that the traditional view that akrasia is always irrational  seems to give us a perverse incentive to rationalize, since in that  case we escape the grave charge of practical irrationality, being  left only with the procedural practical defect present in all cases  of weakness of will (McIntyre 2006, p. 291). But this seems implausible: are the two sub-cases so radically different in their  rational status? Indeed, she argues, if anything, akratic weakness of will is typically rationally preferable to rationalizing  weakness of will (McIntyre 2006, p. 287; pp. 309ff.).  “In the presence of powerful contrary inclinations that bring  about a failure to be resolute,” she writes, “resisting  rationalization and remaining clearheaded about one’s reasons to act  can constitute a modest accomplishment” (McIntyre 2006,  p. 311). Have we witnessed the transformation of  akrasia from impossible, to irrational, to downright  admirable?