  Schlick thought the situation in physics presented a thorough-going analogy with Poincaré’s treatment of the conventionality of geometry. Schlick noted, first of all, that Poincaré’s geometric conventionalism was founded on the Kantian insight that it is only the behavior of bodies in space that forms the object of study, so that the resulting physics is “the product of two factors, namely the spatial properties of bodies and their physical properties in the narrower sense” (Schlick 1979a, 169; Cf. also 1979a, 230–233). The point of Schlick’s reference to Poincaré is to illustrate the particular variety of conventionalism operative in Poincaré’s treatment of geometry, in order to apply it to the case of Special Relativity.  And just as Poincaré isolated two factors in the treatment of the motion of rigid bodies, in general any true theory may be regarded as the product of a reference-system, or representational scheme, and the judgments formulated in that system. Since there are alternative ways of securing univocal coordination, the components with respect to which distinct but equivalent representations differ are artifices of the representational scheme. Parting from Poincaré, Schlick recognized that the representational framework that appears simplest when regarded in isolation may nonetheless require excessively complicated formulations for the description of reality. And he insisted – contra Poincaré – that it is the simplicity of these formulations that is the most compelling desideratum, not the simplicity of the representational scheme. Thus, the representational scheme that allows for the simplest description of reality is always to be preferred – so much the worse for Euclid, and Poincaré, too.