 Other theorists have criticized standard teleosemantics as being too liberal. A very influential objection along these lines has been raised by Tyler Burge (2010, 303–307, 315–319; 2014; see also Rescorla 2013). Burge starts from the assumption that a theory of representation should attribute representational states to a system only if such attributions have genuine explanatory value (due to the fact that they can figure in distinctively psychological explanations). He then argues that teleosemantic theories, as well as all other naturalistic (“deflationary”) theories, attribute representational states to very simple organisms, e.g. to plants, protists and bacteria, where it is clear that such attributions have no explanatory value. This leads him to conclude that teleosemantic theories invariably attribute representational states “too broadly” – or, in other words, that teleosemantic theories are too   liberal.[22] 