 Common forms of consequentialism go on to say that whether an action A is permissible or impermissible is determined by how the intrinsic value of the world that would be actual if A were performed compares to the intrinsic values of the worlds that would be actual if the alternatives to A were performed instead. (The alternatives to A are the actions other than A that are “open” to the agent at the time he performs A.) One standard form of consequentialism says that an act A is permissible if and only if none of the worlds that would be actual were the agent to perform one of the alternatives to A has a greater intrinsic value than the world that would be actual were he to perform A. Thus, in a consequentialist framework, if one holds that facts about desert make a difference to intrinsic value, one may also hold that facts about desert make a difference to whether an act is permissible or impermissible. If, in virtue of the fact that only Jones deserves a raise, it is better to give a raise only to Jones, then the right thing to do is to give the raise only to Jones. 