 Paul Benson is one feminist who makes this point about the agent’s circumstances and relates it to women’s responsibility for immoral action (2000, 79–85). Benson argues for imposing a self-worth condition on responsibility. He argues that in order for an agent to be morally responsible, it must be the case that we can hold her responsible for her actions. For this, a person has to be worthy of a social standing, that of an eligible participant in moral exchanges that involve, for example, offering reasons, seeking to be excused, begging forgiveness, and blaming someone. Being a participant in such moral exchanges requires that the person respond to moral treatment such as blame, and that she recognize the legitimacy of this demand. It is appropriate to hold someone responsible just in case it is appropriate to hold the person to the demand for a suitable response, but, significantly for feminist purposes, it requires that the person to whom the response is directed does not regard herself as unworthy of this kind of moral exchange. One factor that can interfere with the agent’s regard for her own worth, according to Benson, is the internalization of oppressive social norms. Not having proper regard for one’s own worth may involve not believing that it is one’s place to take responsibility for one’s actions. In such cases, it is not appropriate to hold these agents fully responsible for their actions. One feature distinguishing Benson’s account from non-feminist accounts of responsibility that determine responsibility on the basis of features like having a capacity for critical reflection, being able to make choices, and knowing what one is doing, is the fact that Benson’s account is sensitive to a person’s sense of her worth as it is affected by internalizing oppressive social norms.