 One influential account of partiality’s justification appeals to the value of personal projects. Since personal projects and/or the ability to pursue personal projects are important, and since agents who were required to be completely impartial in every aspect of life would be unable to pursue such projects, we should allow that people are not required to be absolutely impartial in every aspect of life. Bernard Williams (1981) famously argues that at least some of an agent’s projects – he calls them “ground projects” – are fundamental components of the agent’s identity, and an agent who gives them up, because she is required to do so by morality, or for any other reason, will find herself with no reason to be moral, to go on living, or to do anything at all. Other philosophers, including Wolf (1992; see also 1982), MacIntyre (1984), Sandel (1982), and Stroud (2010) also base the justification of partiality on the value and significance of personal projects and commitments. (For Sandel and MacIntyre this means, largely, commitments to the political community that has formed one’s identity and to which one owes one’s allegiance.)