 Instrumentalist defenses of democracy aim to show that democratic decision-making procedures are best able to produce legitimate outcomes. The most famous version of this argument is based on the Condorcet jury theorem (for a recent discussion, see List and Goodin 2001). In its original formulation, the Condorcet jury theorem assumes that there are two alternatives and one of them is the correct outcome, however defined. Take the latter to be the legitimate outcome. The theorem says that if each voter is more likely to be correct than wrong, then a majority of all is also more likely to be correct than wrong. In addition, the probability that a majority will vote for the correct outcome increases with the size of the body of voters. Since democracy has a greater constituency than any other regime, the theorem gives an argument for why democracy is best able to generate legitimate outcomes. In addition to arguments based on the Condorcet jury theorem, there are other attempts to defend the instrumental epistemic value of democracy. Landemore (2012), for example, offers an argument for the instrumental epistemic value of democracy that rests on the potential of decision-making mechanisms that bring together diverse perspectives to outperform decision-making by less diverse groups, e.g. groups of experts.