 Others contend that this gets the relationship backwards. First, it is doubtful whether one could have an obligation to obey an illegitimate regime. We might think that “acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to obligations” (Rawls 1971: 343; but cf. Simmons 1979: 78–79). If so, at least some conditions of legitimacy precede an obligation of obedience. Second, there are substantive reasons for thinking we would not have obligations to obey if the law were not already justified in upholding its requirements “with steel”. A legal system that could not justifiably coerce could not assure the law-abiding that the recalcitrant will not take them for suckers. Without being able to solve this assurance problem it would be unjust to impose obligations on them, and unjust to demand their obedience. Underlying this suggestion is that idea that familiar idea that effectiveness is a necessary—but certainly not sufficient—condition for justified authority. (See Kelsen 1960 [1967: 46–50]; cf. Finnis 1979: 250. For an alternative formulation of the view that there can be no duty to obey until we have established the right of the authority to coerce, see Ripstein 2004.)