 These philosophers refuse to allow themselves to be pre-occupied by the epistemological issues that they see as arising from a mistaken starting point. Instead of asking how I can justify my belief in the world and others, they take for granted that the individual’s experience is such as to exist in a world and for others and address questions that concern this starting point, such as: what makes this starting point possible (Husserl &amp; Merleau-Ponty); how can we explain/understand the structures of the being of subjectivity in such a way as to include the world and others (Heidegger); how do I encounter the Other (Sartre). Crucial to the defense of this non-Cartesian starting point is a non-Cartesian conception of mind in relation to body. The conceptual divide between mind and body that one finds in Descartes’ philosophy is taken by these thinkers to be “inadequate to phenomenology” (Overgaard 2006).