 De Brigard (2014b) reviews several positions that have historically been defended regarding the relationship between traces and perceptual representations. Semidirect representationalism holds that perception is indirect and that traces are the same as the representations involved in perception. Indirect representationalism holds that perception is indirect and that traces are distinct from the representations involved in perception. As De Brigard emphasizes, what ultimately matters here is relationships among contents rather than vehicles. He thus distinguishes between content invariantism, which holds that the content of the trace is the same as that of the perceptual representation, and content variantism, which holds that the content of the trace may differ from that of the perceptual representation. In practice, since the invariantist/variantist distinction cuts across the semidirect/indirect distinction, which concerns relationships among vehicles rather than contents, semidirect and indirect representationalism can often be grouped together. Direct representationalism holds that perception is direct and that traces are created after perception occurs. Extending De Brigard’s nomenclature, direct relationalism would hold that perception is direct and that remembering does not involve traces.