 Being non-numerically one, then, is compatible with being accidentally numerically one in any one instantiation. But a problem immediately arises: is being non-numerically one compatible with being accidentally numerically many in many instantiations? On the one hand, thinking this seems a natural way of understanding the theory, given its realist character; on the other, we have just seen Scotus deny that this kind of unity belongs “to anything existing in two individuals.” Perhaps we should say that the nature is really in many individuals, but does not “exist” in many individuals, since existence is precisely a property of concrete particulars. Elsewhere, indeed, Scotus draws an analogy with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, according to which there is numerically one nature shared by three distinct persons (Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 39 (Scotus [OO], 7:408; Spade (1994), 44)). And this suggests, contrariwise, that just as something numerically one is in three persons, so something with less-than-numerical unity is in many individuals. Perhaps there are just no principled rules for counting items with less-than-numerical unity. (For an excellent discussion of some of these problems, see Paasch (2014).)