  Other theorists, by contrast, are more drawn toward the externalist  shoreline. They emphasize the motivational importance of factors  other than the agent’s evaluative judgment and the divergences that  can result between an agent’s evaluation of her options and her  motivation to act. They are thus disinclined to posit any strong,  necessary link between evaluative judgment and action. Michael  Stocker, for instance, argues that the philosophical tradition has  been led astray in assuming that evaluation dictates motivation.  “Motivation and evaluation do not stand in a simple and direct  relation to each other, as so often supposed,” he writes.  Rather, “their interrelations are mediated by large arrays of  complex psychic structures, such as mood, energy, and interest” (1979, pp. 738–9). Similarly, Alfred Mele proposes as a  fundamental and general truth—and one that underlies the  possibility of akrasia—that “the motivational  force of a want may be out of line with the agent’s evaluation of the object of that want” (1987, p. 37). Mele goes on to offer  several different reasons why the two can come apart: for example,  rewards perceived as proximate can exert a motivational  influence disproportionate to the value the agent reflectively  attaches to them (1987, ch. 6). Such wants may function as  strong causes even if the agent takes them to constitute  weak reasons.