 Some moral knowledge, it is agreed, involves the transmission or extension of other moral knowledge already achieved. If Solomon tells me the treaty is unjust, I may know this by relying on his testimony. If every member of the Diogenes Society whom I have met is honest, then I may know that Walter, who is also a member, is honest. Here, I rely on an induction from my other moral knowledge. While highly interesting, these types of knowledge are typically regarded as derivative (Zangwill 2006) and are therefore set aside in arguments over moral particularism. The question is what explains our most basic moral knowledge. How strong an assumption can be made about our moral knowledge while remaining on ground common to both generalists and particularists? Obviously, particularists will not grant that we have knowledge of moral principles, and the point of surest agreement is that we sometimes know the moral status of a particular case, e.g., that this act was wrong. However, most arguments both for and against particularism deploy somewhat stronger assumptions. 