 This was an innovative theory for dealing with future contingent statements as omnitemporally true or omnitemporally false or, if these were tensed, as antecedently true or antecedently false. The truth-values of statements about contingent things, though temporally immutable from the beginning of the world and also immutably known by God, were metaphysically contingent. The consequence from knowledge or truth to necessity, whether causal or semantic, was denied. The contingency of the created order was based on God’s eternal and and free providential choice that involved the acts of the created will as free. Anselm formulated this traditional view, following Augustine, as follows: “It is both necessary that God foreknows what will come to be and that God foreknows that something will freely come to be” (De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio, 1.1; cf. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, 3.3.8). Anselm argued that that predictions are true or false and their truth can be understood as the correspondence to what will happen, although what will contingently happen is not known to human beings without supernatural help. This was the standard view of the possibility of prophesy. (See the above quotation from Anselm’s Cur Deus homo; Peter Abelard, Glossae super Peri hermeneias, IX.69–85; Anonymous, Summa Duacensis, 129–130.)