 Another way to give consciousness a starring role is suggested by Siewert 2014 who uses consideration of blindsight scenarios to argue that the only perception that will supply the mind with an understanding of type demonstratives (e.g., “this shape”) and so be capable of functioning in empirical concept acquisition, is the experiential, conscious kind. (If this shape looks no way to you at all, you will not understand by vision just which shape this shape is, and thus won’t be in a position to learn visually, e.g., this shape is a circle.) Partly on these grounds it is argued that mind requires consciousness. And given a cognitively rich view of experience, we can see how consciousness (of the right sort) will be sufficient for mind as well. Siewert’s view, like Smithies’, sets aside the original/derived contrast. But both crucially rely (as does Searle’s) on a requirement that certain facts about the mind should be discernible from the first-person point of view. Doubts about these views are likely to challenge the legitimacy of that reliance (see, e.g., Shoemaker’s 1994 criticism of Searle).