 Stein defends the reality of essences. An essence is not just a name, rather a name is an expression of an essence. Concepts are human inventions; essences are not (1950/2006: 62[66]). The formation of concepts is based on grasping the essences (Stein 1950/2006: 72[73]). The being of essences, however, is inefficacious and potential. What is real or actual is the individual. Stein’s example of essence is “joy”. Joy becomes actual and efficacious because of its essence, which is timeless (1950/2006: 91[95]). There exists an individual’s joy. There is no such thing in the real world as “joy in general” (1950/2006: 75[76]); nevertheless, joy has an “essentiality” (Wesenheit; 1950/2006: 77[78]) that defines it and distinguishes it from other emotions. Stein claims essences belong to objects (e.g. my joy) but “essentialities” are ideal and are independent of objects (e.g., joy as such) (1950/2006: 72[73]). An object without an essence is unthinkable (1950/2006: 77[78]).