 The second type of group-based account  (Sec. 5.2)  acknowledges the moral significance of the group-based attributes relied on by the first type of group-based accounts. But it denies that the full and equal moral status of human beings can be grounded in any specific attribute, even indirectly, that can be described in morally neutral terms. These accounts regard “human being” as a thick normative concept, grounded in language and social practice, that is not necessarily coextensive with the biological category of “Homo sapiens,” and that has moral content that cannot be derived from any descriptive attribute associated with it. The judgment that a being is human and therefore must be treated respectfully does not consist of a value-neutral biological classification and an argument that establishes the moral status of beings so classified. The requirement for certain kinds of treatment, and the prohibition of others, is part of the meaning of “human being” and implicit in the recognition that a given individual is a human  being.[9]  Proponents of these accounts thus reject the very attempt to identify a criterial attribute possessed by all beings with the moral status of cognitively normal human adults (Diamond 1978; Edwards 1997; Byrne 2000). These philosophers reject the treatment of cognitively nondisabled adults as a paradigm for full moral status, and of infants, young children, and radically cognitively disabled adults as “marginal cases” whose moral status needs to be justified by  extension.[10]