 Burge's reasoning has a distinctly transcendental flavor (see the entry on  transcendental arguments).  Transcendental reasoning also fuels Moran’s agentialism. But while Burge uses it to establish a general entitlement to self-ascriptions, Moran deploys it to show that self-knowledge can be achieved in a specific way, namely by reflection on reasons. He reasons as follows. We could not engage in rational thought unless we had the “epistemic right” to the assumption that our attitudes are shaped by our reasons. (This is “something like a Transcendental assumption of Rational Thought” (Moran 2003: 406).) So we do have the epistemic right to that assumption. And our right to that assumption gives us the epistemic right to use the transparency method associated with Evans’ famous remarks: to answer the question “do you believe that p?” by considering reasons bearing on p (ibid.) So the self-ascriptions produced by the transparency method constitute knowledge.