 Examples of other such aggregation problems to which Arrow’s theorem has been applied include: intrapersonal aggregation problems (e.g., May 1954; Hurley 1985), theory choice (e.g., Okasha 2011; cf. Morreau 2015), evidence amalgamation (e.g., Stegenga 2013), the aggregation of multiple similarity orderings into an all-things-considered similarity ordering (e.g., Morreau 2010; Kroedel and Huber 2013), decision-making under normative uncertainty (e.g., MacAskill 2016), and radical interpretation in the face of competing criteria of interpretation choice (Hattiangadi 2020). In each case, the plausibility of Arrow’s theorem depends on the case-specific plausibility of Arrow’s ordinalist framework and the theorem’s conditions.