  Much about Leibniz’s own positive conception of matter as it is  studied by physics can be gleaned from his criticisms of his  predecessors. So, for example, his critique of atomism already  suggests that Leibnizian bodies must always be flexible or  “soft” to some   degree,[13]  fill every region of the natural world, and be infinitely divisible,  indeed, be infinitely divided. Likewise, his critique of the  Cartesian conception of matter implies that the properties of bodies  are not limited to their passive powers, that bodies must always  admit of intrinsic variety, and that ordinary physical objects such  as desks and chairs must be ontologically dependent upon a deeper  level of metaphysical reality. Nonetheless, we should be able to get  an even better grip on Leibniz’s positive conception of matter by  looking more explicitly at four passive powers, or forces, which he  attributes to bodies as they are studied by the physicist. 