 Much of the philosophical work engaging sinful actions in contemporary philosophy of religion has been in connection with the problem of evil, understood as a family of related arguments that take among their premises facts about evil and seek to conclude either that God (understood as having a particular nature) does not exist or that it is irrational to believe that such a being exists. Sinful acts and moral evil are often taken to be either co-extensive or nearly so (see Hasker 2008: 160), and so versions of the problem of evil that focus on the problem of moral evil also often talk about sin. The main thrust of most of the versions is that an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God would not allow human beings to perpetuate or suffer horrendous evils. Because human beings do both perpetuate and suffer horrendous evils, either God must not be all-powerful, all-knowing, and/or all-good, or God must not exist. The question of sin is not, however, limited to discussions of the logical problem of moral evil; it also comes up in discussions of evidential versions of the problem of evil and even the problem of natural evils (see, for instance, Swinburne 2009 and 1978); van Inwagen 2006: lecture 7; and O’Connor 1991).