 Interpretation offers a neat answer to the ER-problem. The account also explains the directionality of representation: interpreting a model in terms of a target does not entail interpreting a target in terms of a model. However, it has been noted that Interpretation has difficulty accounting for the possibility of misrepresentation, since it seems to require that the relevant objects, properties, and relations actually exist in the target (Shech 2015), although this objection turns on a very strict reading of Contessa’s account. This problem is solved in Díez’s (2020) “Ensemble-Plus-Standing-For” account of representation, which is based on conditions that rule out a mismatch concerning the number of objects in the collection. Contessa does not comment on the applicability of mathematics but since his account shares with the structuralist account an emphasis on relations and one-to-one model-target correspondence, Contessa can appeal to the same account of the applicability of mathematics as the structuralist. Like Suárez, Contessa takes his account to be universal and apply to non-scientific representations such as portraits and maps. But it remains unclear how Interpretation addresses the Problem of Style. As we have seen earlier, in particular visual representations fall into different categories and there is a question about how these can be classified within the interpretational framework. With respect to the Question of Ontology, Interpretation itself places few constraints on what scientific models are. All it requires is that they consist of objects, properties, relations, and functions (but see Contessa (2010) for further discussion of what he takes models to be, ontologically speaking).