  When Buridan considers questions such as “whether universals actually exist outside the soul” (TDUI: 137), his remarks are almost always aimed at clarifying the meaning of the term ‘universal’ with respect to other terms such as ‘individual’, ‘particular’, and ‘singular’. His rejection of realism is expressed in the claim that universal terms have no ultimate significate, i.e., nothing outside the soul they can ‘make known’ as  such.[41]  Hence, an account is needed of what such terms mean. Here, it is almost as if Buridan thinks there is something ill-formed about propositions where the term ‘universal’ occurs in the subject position, for when confronted with them his first move is always to tell us how the term ‘universal’ is to be understood (QIP 3: 136, ll.  477–488).[42]  He argues further that the primary signification of ‘universal’ is ‘predicable of many’, which makes it a term of second intention, or a term of terms, since only terms are predicable (QIP 3: 135–136; 4: 139; TDUI:  148).[43]  The second-intentional status of the term ‘universal’ is also evident in propositions, where it does not signify a ‘what’ but a ‘how’, i.e., how we conceive of something—in this case how the term so designated is “indifferent to many supposits,” or individuals  (TDUI: 59; see Zupko 2013b).[44]  As we saw above, logic is the study of terms such as ‘proposition’ taken materially, signifying actual tokens of the type (QDI I.1: 6). Moving from propositions to arguments, Buridan insists that terms in the premises and conclusions of demonstrative arguments must be taken as standing materially, i.e., for themselves in the particular discourse conditions which surround them, rather than personally, for their extra-mental significates (QIP 1: 128, ll. 223–237). Likewise, the proximate object of scientific knowledge is the actual demonstrated or demonstrable conclusion rather than the state of affairs it signifies, although Buridan is willing to concede that “the terms of those demonstrable conclusions, or even the things signified by those conclusions” might be considered “remote”, or secondary, objects of knowledge (QIP 1: 127, l.  208–209).[45]  Careful and systematic analysis is the best antidote for metaphysical perplexity because the trouble usually begins with untutored persons who use some word or concept without knowing what it means.