 A policy of disillusionism is present in the optimistic skepticisms of several leading moral responsibility skeptics (e.g., Spinoza, Pereboom, Waller, Levy, Caruso, Harris, Vilhauer, Milam, and Morris). These optimistic skeptics maintain that life without basic desert moral responsibility is not only possible, but also preferable. Prospects of finding meaning in life or sustaining good interpersonal relationships, for instance, would not be threatened (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a; Waller 2011; Sommers 2007a; Milam 2016, 2017). They further maintain that morality and moral judgments would remain intact (see Pereboom 2001, 2014a; Waller 1990, 2004). And although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penalty, would be ruled out, they argue that the imposition of sanctions could serves purposes other than the punishment of the guilty—e.g., it can also be justified by its role in incapacitating, rehabilitating, and deterring offenders (see Pereboom 2001, 2013b, 2014a; N. Levy 2012, 2015; Caruso 2016, 2017, forthcoming-a; Pereboom &amp; Caruso forthcoming; Corrado 2013, forthcoming-a; Vilhauer 2013a,b; Focquaert, Glenn, Raine 2013, forthcoming; Murtagh 2013).