 And it follows from these considerations, first, that although some individuals may be, a parte rei, formally one apart from the thinking of the mind, nevertheless several individuals which are said to be of the same nature are not one thing with the true unity which is in the things, but only either by way of being grounded or through the intellect … It follows, secondly, that it is one thing to speak of formal unity and another thing to speak of the community of this unity, for unity is in things, as has been insisted; community, however, properly and strictly is not in things, for no unity which exists in things is common, as we have shown, but there is in singular things a certain similarity in their formal unities in which their community is grounded, which community the intellect is able attribute to such a nature, as conceived by it, which similarity is not properly unity, since it does not represent the undividedness of the entities on which it is based but only their congruence or their relation or their co-existence with one another (DM VI 1.12).