 Richard J. Arneson raises another worry about this type of appeal to psychological connections to ground special obligations. As both he and the advocates of such accounts point out, my strongest psychological connections are those that I bear to myself. But if such psychological connections are supposed to underlie obligations to take special care of those to whom I bear such connections, then it follows that my strongest special obligations are to myself, and so I am morally obligated to give special weight to my own interests. Arneson argues that any account of “special-ties partiality”, in order to be acceptable, must not have the consequence that we each have special obligations to be partial to ourselves. Perhaps, however, one could meet Arneson’s objection, by refusing to use the word ‘obligation’: we have various kinds of fundamental agent-relative reasons, and one of those reasons is to take special care of ourselves. Couched in terms of reasons, rather than in terms of obligations, the latter claim does not seem at all implausible.