 Sanford Goldberg asks what constitutes the speech act of assertion, and what epistemic norm assertion should satisfy. He says that assertions are “speech acts in which a given proposition is presented as true, where this presentation has certain force (what we might call assertoric force)” (Goldberg 2015: 5) and that “[i]t is mutually manifest to participants in a speech exchange that assertion has a robustly epistemic norm; that is, that one must: assert that p, only if E(one, [p])” (p.96), where ‘E’ stands for a description of a mutually manifest epistemic standard. But this opens up the question as to what counts as asserted content, for linguistic as well as social, legal, and ethical purposes. Is it merely minimal content? But, perhaps, there is no such thing as minimal content in that here are no core meanings, no context-free concepts (cf. Rayo 2013)? Or, perhaps, one ought to opt for Levinson-style presumptive meanings (Section 1.3), or context-driven defaults (Sections 1.7–1.8), or even interactive meanings that emerge thanks to salience and defaultness of certain interpretations (Section 4)? Scope for theorizing and experimentation is still ample.