 The probabilistic nature of The Turing Test is often overlooked. True enough, Moor (1976, 2001)—along with various other commentators—has noted that The Turing Test is “inductive,” i.e. that “The Turing Test” provides no more than defeasible evidence of intelligence. However, it is one thing to say that success in “a rigorous Turing test” provides no more than defeasible evidence of intelligence; it is quite another to note the probabilistic features to which we have drawn attention in the preceding paragraph. Consider, for example, Moor’s observation (Moor 2001:83) that “… inductive evidence gathered in a Turing test can be outweighed by new evidence. … If new evidence shows that a machine passed the Turing Test by remote control run by a human behind the scenes, then reassessment is called for.” This—and other similar passages—seems to us to suggest that Moor supposes that a “rigorous Turing test” is a one-off event in which the machine either succeeds or fails. But this interpretation of The Turing Test is vulnerable to the kind of objection lodged by Bringsjord (1994): even on a moderately long single run with relatively expert participants, it may not be all that unlikely that an unintelligent machine serendipitously succeeds in the imitation game. In our view, given enough sufficiently long runs with different sufficiently expert participants, the likelihood of serendipitous success can be made as small as one wishes. Thus, while Bringsjord’s “argument from serendipity” has force against some versions of The Turing Test, it has no force against the most plausible interpretation of the test that Turing actually proposed.