 Special obligations are obligations owed to some subset of persons, in contrast to natural duties that are owed to all persons simply qua persons. Common sense morality seems to understand us as having special obligations to those to whom we stand in some sort of special relationship, e.g., our friends, our family members, our colleagues, our fellow citizens, and those to whom we have made promises or commitments of some sort. Special obligations are often appealed to in arguments against consequentialism, because consequentialism is unable to accommodate agent-relative reasons and genuinely special obligations are agent-relative reasons. Attempts to defend special obligations run up against objections from insiders – why suppose that I am obligated to do more for certain persons just because I happen to stand in some special relationship to them? – and also from outsiders – why do other persons get more benefits just because they happen to stand in special relationships to other persons? Attempts to ground special obligations have appealed to diverse states of affairs, including the intrinsic nature of the special relationship, the nature of the party to whom the obligations are owed, the expectations of the party to whom the obligations are owed, and the nature of persons as psychological continuants bound by relations between mental states.