  The net result of Rehberg's participation in the philosophical controversies of the late 1780s and early 1790s was a deeper skepticism.  There were two basic themes behind his skepticism. First, his adoption of Kant's critical thesis that we cannot know things-in-themselves, and that all knowledge is limited to appearances.  Second, Rehberg's insistence that, even within the realm of appearances, there is a fundamental chasm between the universal and particular, between what we think and what we sense.  There were in turn two aspects behind this latter dualism: that the universal concepts of theoretical reason cannot sufficiently explain or describe something particular; and that there is no criterion by which to apply the universal principles of practical reason to ordinary life.  It was this latter aspect of the second theme, which was essentially an argument in behalf of the necessity of judgment to solve the basic problems of politics, that was decisive for Rehberg's political philosophy. 