 The essential point here is that poverty usually entails a limitation of the kind of liberty that the classical liberal professes to be concerned with. One major reason why poverty typically “bites” into one’s quality of life is that it reduces the range of actions that one can perform without being subject to intentional coercion by others (see Waldron 1993b, Cohen 1997, Swift 2001: 70–71). Imagine, for example, that you are poor and that you wish to get a train from City A to City B. Because you are poor, you cannot buy a ticket for the journey. Because you get on the train without a ticket, the train guard makes you leave the train at Town C, long before you reach your intended destination of City B. Your ability to act as you wish has here been limited by the intentional coercion of others. Or imagine that you are homeless and unable to afford to rent a place to sleep. You locate a field in which to sleep. But the field belongs to someone else, and when the landowner discovers your presence by means of their closed-circuit television camera system they call the police who wake you up and drag you off the land. Once again, your ability to act as you wish is quashed by the intentional coercion of others. By the same token, if the government were to provide you with the money to buy a train ticket or to rent a space to sleep in, then you would become able to perform these actions without being subject to the intentional coercion that you are subject to when you lack this money.