 Studies on the Ars (Ruiz Simón 1998; Rubio 2008a; Jaulent 2010) show that it addresses the criticism made by Llull to Scholastic logic. This criticism has two great stages: on the one hand, the insufficiency of the demonstration by syllogisms—the basis of all Scholastic science—to reveal new truths, because it only explicitly states the relationship between known facts and evident principles (Ruiz Simón 1998), thus relegating dialectics (or ars inveniendi), which consists of finding arguments and counterarguments based on some loci or “places”, to the domain of opinion. On the other hand, this criticism (Jaulent 2010) addresses the fact that demonstration by syllogisms only works through second intentions, that is, it describes relationships within logical propositions and not according to objects in reality, which are conceptualized as first intentions.