 This is the strategy adopted by Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer (2014) in an effort to support Sidgwick’s principle of Universal Benevolence, i.e., impartial utilitarianism. That principle is inconsistent not only with moral egoism but with any moral stance that incorporates limited forms of partiality (such as special duties to family and friends even when not utility-maximizing, or constraints against taking certain means when promoting utility, or moral permissions to favor oneself or loved ones to some degree over strangers). So in order to discredit such competing moral views, they claim that one can tell debunking evolutionary stories to ‘explain away’ these non-utilitarian moral beliefs as unreliable products of distorting evolutionary influences: people believe such things only because natural selection shaped human moral psychology in the direction of selfishness and at best parochial altruism, for Darwinian reasons having nothing to do with moral truth. Then, in effect, they treat the possibility of telling such debunking evolutionary stories as sufficient to undermine epistemic justification for the targeted moral beliefs. At the same time, however, they maintain that their own favored ethical beliefs, involving strict impartiality, are invulnerable to any similar treatment, so that we can remain confident in the rationality of utilitarian morality.