Of course, one wants to know how to make sense of the idea that passage is real only in time. Stump and Kretzmann (1981) gave a take on this while retracting Kretzmann's original commitment to (1)–(4).  Suppose presentism.  On the Stump-Kretzmann picture, each time t, when present, is “ET-simultaneous” with the life of an eternal being.  So that life is ET-simultaneous with t. So all times, precisely in their presentness, are just ET-simultaneous with an eternal life. But in an eternal life, nothing passes.  If it did, that life would have earlier and later parts: it would be temporal, not eternal.  So in God's eternal life, each time, precisely in its presentness, remains: nothing ever ceases to be ET-simultaneous with God's life, for that would entail an earlier and a later simultaneous to God's life, and so in God's life.  So while times pass in time, they do not pass relative to eternity.  Leftow (1991) offers a broadly similar picture, but works with a differently-defined simultaneity-relation.