 For Anderson logic is the science of the most general features of reality. Logic is not simply a useful calculus following on from an initial choice of primitives, and Anderson’s logic is not simply one version of predicate calculus among others. His view is that logic describes the general structure of facts and the relations between them. It provides the conditions of possibility for all discourse, but it is not about forms of language nor about special status entities such as universals. It is about the most general features of facts. Underlying this propositional view of reality is the thesis that things within space and time are irreducibly complex. Every situation has both particular and general aspects represented by the subject and predicate functions within the proposition. Every predicate can be the subject of a further proposition. The simplest unit is a being there and so, a state of affairs in which a particular is characterised in some specific way, but neither the particular nor the universal could exist independently. We never arrive at absolutely simple elements in any field. The quest for such simples urged by Russell, Moore and the early Wittgenstein indicated a residual rationalist element in their thinking. On the other hand, against the idealist opponents of these early realists, Anderson of course insisted that no entities could be constituted, wholly or in part, by their relations (EMP, 43). 