 The so-called naïve approach to negotiating sequential decisions serves as a useful contrast to the other two approaches. The naïve agent assumes that any path through the decision tree is possible, and so sets off on whichever path is optimal, given his/her present attitudes. For instance, a naïve Ulysses would simply presume that he has three overall strategies to choose from: either ordering the crew to tie him to the mast, or issuing no such order and later stopping at the sirens’ island, or issuing no such order and later sticking to his course. Ulysses prefers the outcome associated with the latter combination, and so he initiates this strategy by not ordering the crew to restrain him. Table 5 presents the static counterpart of naïve Ulysses’ decision problem. In effect, this decision model does not take into account Ulysses’ present knowledge of his future preferences, and hence advises that he pursue an option that is predicted to be impossible.