 Taken by itself, this account contains no built-in time asymmetry. That comes only when the account is combined with the asymmetry of overdetermination: the (alleged) fact that effects are rarely overdetermined by their causes, but causes are very often overdetermined by their effects. Taking an example from Elga (2000): suppose that Gretta cracks an egg at 8.00 (event c), pops it in the frying pan, and eats it for her breakfast. What would have happened had c not occurred? The right answer (Answer 1) is that the egg would not then have been fried and Gretta would not have eaten it – and not (Answer 2) that she would still have fried and eaten the egg, but these events would somehow have come about despite her failing to crack it in the first place. The question is: how does Lewis’s analysis of the similarity relation deliver Answer 1 and not Answer 2? In particular, consider worlds where there is perfect match of particular fact until just before 8.00, and then a miracle, and then no perfect match of particular fact thereafter. Call the closest such world World 1. Now consider worlds where there is no perfect match of particular fact before 8.00 (and in particular, Gretta does not crack the egg), a miracle just after 8.00, and then perfect match of particular fact thereafter. Call the closest such world World 2. (Intuitively, in the first case we keep the past fixed, insert a miracle just before 8.00 so that c doesn’t occur, and the future unfolds thereafter according to the (actual) laws. In the second case, we keep the future fixed, insert a miracle just after 8.00 so that c doesn’t occur, and the past unfolds according to the (actual) laws.) Why is World 1 closer to actuality than is World 2?