 A well-known such approach is the bundle theory, which takes particulars to be nothing more than “bundles” of universals connected by a special relation, commonly called compresence, after Russell (1948: Pt. IV, ch.  8)[8].  Despite well-known problems (Van Cleve 1985), this view, or approaches in its vicinity, keep having supporters (Casullo 1988; Curtis 2014; Dasgupta 2009; Paul 2002; Shiver 2014; J. Russell 2018; see Sider 2020, ch. 3, for a recent critical analysis). From this perspective, that a particular exemplifies a property amounts to the property’s being compresent with the properties that constitute the bundle with which the particular in question is identified. It thus looks as if exemplification is reduced to compresence. Nevertheless, compresence itself is presumably jointly exemplified by the properties that constitute a given bundle, and thus at most there is a reduction, to compresence, of exemplification by a particular (understood as a bundle), and not an elimination of exemplification in general.