 Peter Klein and Ted Warfield’s 1994 paper in Analysis initiated a lively and instructive debate on the relationship between coherence and probability (e.g., Klein and Warfield 1994 and 1996, Merricks 1995, Shogenji 1999, Cross 1999, Akiba 2000, Olsson 2001, Fitelson 2003 and Siebel 2004). According to Klein and Warfield, just because one set of beliefs is more coherent than another set, this does not mean that the first set is more likely to be true. On the contrary, a higher degree of coherence can, so they claimed, be associated with a lower probability of the whole set. The idea behind their reasoning is simple: We can often raise the coherence of an informational set by adding more information that explains the information already in the set. But as more genuinely new information is added, the probability that all the elements of the set are true is correspondingly diminished. This, Klein and Warfield wrote, follows from the well-known inverse relationship between probability and informational content. They concluded that coherence is not truth conducive.