 Moore expressed the realist side of his non-naturalism by saying that fundamental moral judgements ascribe the property of goodness or badness to states of affairs, though especially in Principia Ethica he tended not to distinguish moral concepts and moral properties. Like others of his time, he seems to have taken the realist view that moral judgements are objectively true for granted; he certainly did not defend it extensively against anti-realist alternatives. Thus the first sentence of Principia Ethica refers casually, and without any sense of controversy, to the “truth” of some ethical judgements (1903: 1/1993: 53). In this he was doubtless influenced by the grammar of moral judgements, which have a standard subject-predicate form, as in “x is good.” But it may also be relevant that, at least early on, the only version of subjectivism he seems to have been aware of was the naturalist view that to say “x is good” is to report some psychological fact such as that you approve of x or that most people in your society do. In his later book Ethics he argued, among other things, that this view does not allow for moral disagreement, since, for example, my report that I approve of x and your report that you disapprove of it can both be true (1912: 100–03/1947: 62–64/1965: 42–43). Late in his life he encountered the non-cognitivist emotivism of C.L. Stevenson, which says that moral judgements express rather than report feelings and therefore can conflict (Stevenson 1942). He initially conceded, surprisingly, that Stevenson’s anti-realist view had as good a claim as his own to be true (1942: 544–45), but shortly after he reverted to his earlier non-naturalism, saying he could not imagine what had induced him to consider abandoning it (Ewing 1962: 251).