  A second possible line of response from pluralists is that their view is not necessarily inconsistent with a monistic account of either the meaning of ‘true’ or the concept TRUTH. After all, ‘true’ is ambiguous only if it can be assigned more than one meaning or semantic structure; and it has more than one meaning only if there is more than one stable conceptualization or concept TRUTH supporting each numerically distinct meaning. Yet, nothing about the claim that there is more than one way of being true entails, by itself, that there is more than one concept TRUTH. In principle, the nature of properties like being true—whether homomorphism, superassertibility, coherence, etc.—may outstrip the concept thereof, just as the nature of properties like being water—such as H\(_2\)O, H\(_3\)O, XYZ, etc.—may outstrip the concept WATER (see, e.g., Wright 1996, 2001; Alston 2002; Lynch 2001, 2005c, 2006). Nor is monism about truth necessarily inconsistent with semantic or conceptual pluralism. The supposition that TRUTH is both many and one (i.e., ‘moderate monism’) neither rules out the construction of multiple concepts or meanings thereof, nor rules out the proliferation of uses to express those concepts or meanings. For example, suppose that the only way of being true turns out to be a structural relation \(R\) between reality and certain representations thereof. Such a case is consistent with the existence of competing conceptions of what \(R\) consists in: weak homomorphism, isomorphism, ‘seriously dyadic’ correspondence, a causal \(n\)-place correspondence relation, etc. A more sensitive conclusion, then, is just that the objection from ambiguity is an objection to conceptual or semantic pluralism, not to any alethic theory—pluralism or otherwise.