 The negative case for Aristotelian constructivism consists in the critique of the Kantian account of practical reasoning, its form, reach, and powers. Under attack is the claim that practical reasoning is law-like, i.e., governed by the requirement of universality. According to some critics, Kantians have a difficult time explaining how to apply universal rational principles to concrete cases (Höffe 1993; LeBar 2013b; Millgram 2005: chapter 6). In this respect, the Aristotelians claim to have a significant advantage because Aristotelian constructivism allows practical reasoning to adapt to particular cases. Aristotelian constructivism works out a story about the norms for success in judgment, which is considered a problem for Kant and an unrecognized lacuna in contemporary Kantian ethics (Millgram 2005: chapter 6). Because of its appeal to moral laws, Kantian ethics is often criticized either for entailing rigorism or for empty formalism. In either case, Kantian ethics seems incapable of accounting for the relevance of circumstances for ethical judgments. This is a problem that Kantian constructivists address (O’Neill 1975; Herman 1993), but inadequately, according to the Aristotelians (LeBar 2013b.