 Just as Descartes rejects Aristotelian definitions as objects of intuition (Aristotelian definitions like “motion is the actuality of potential being, insofar as it is potential” render motion more, not less, obscure; see AT 10: 426, CSM 1: 49), so too does he reject Aristotelian syllogisms as forms of deduction or inference (see Gaukroger 1989; Normore 1993; and Cassan 2015). The validity of an Aristotelian syllogism depends exclusively on its form. For example, “All As are Bs; All Bs are Cs; all As are Cs”. Here, no matter what the content, the syllogism remains valid. For Descartes, by contrast, deduction depends exclusively on its content. What is intuited in deduction are dependency relations between simple natures. I simply see that shape depends on extension, or that doubt depends on knowledge of the difference between truth and falsity, etc. These dependencies are immediately revealed in intuition and deduction, without recourse to syllogistic forms.