 A non-omnipotent agent can bring about or actualize (e) by bringing it about that a snowflake falls when in fact no omnipotent agent ever exists. But, it is clear that an omnipotent agent cannot bring about or actualize (e). For although an omnipotent agent can bring it about that a snowflake falls, surely, an omnipotent agent cannot bring it about that no omnipotent ever exists, nor would this conjunct of (e) obtain if there were an omnipotent agent. Moreover, we may assume that there are possible worlds, \(W\) and \(W^*\), such that \(W\) and \(W^*\) share the same history up to a time \(t\), no omnipotent agent ever exists in \(W^*\), and a contingently omnipotent agent, Oscar, is omnipotent for the first time at \(t\) in \(W\). We may also assume that \(W^*\) is a world in which at \(t\) some non-omnipotent agent actualizes (e). On the other hand, evidently, if in \(W\), Oscar is omnipotent at \(t\), then at \(t\) Oscar cannot actualize (e). Note that since the second conjunct of (e) is not unrestrictedly repeatable, this is consistent with Hoffman and Rosenkrantz’s account of omnipotence; their account does not require an omnipotent agent to be able to bring about a conjunctive state of affairs one of whose conjuncts is not unrestrictedly repeatable. On the other hand, Flint and Freddoso’s account of omnipotence implies that in \(W\), at \(t\) Oscar has the power to actualize (e). This implication holds for the following reasons. First, (e) is not a member of a world-type-for-Oscar, inasmuch as (e) is neither a “counterfactual of freedom,” the negation of one, nor a conjunction of such “counterfactuals of freedom.” Second, we may assume that a world-type-for-Oscar is true in both \(W^*\) and \(W\), since the assumption that an agent is not omnipotent in one possible world, and is omnipotent for a time in another possible world, does not necessitate any difference in the world-type for that agent which is true in those worlds. Third, it is possible for someone at \(t\) to actualize (e) in a world, \(W^*\), that has the same history up to \(t\) as W.[5]  Thus, arguably, Flint and Freddoso’s account of omnipotence requires that in \(W\) an omnipotent agent, Oscar, at \(t\) has the power to actualize (e), when Oscar lacks this power. If this is right, then their account does not provide a logically necessary condition on  omnipotence.[6]