 Based on his stability theory of laws, Lange also proposes an argument for the autonomy and irreducibility of special science laws. Recall that arguing for the autonomy and irreducibility of the special sciences with respect to physics was one of the crucial motivations to start the debate on cp-laws (see section 2.2). Suppose that the laws of a certain special science \(D\) are stable with respect to the purposes of \(D\). This pragmatic restriction is unique to \(D\). In other words, \(D\)’s laws are stable for counterfactual suppositions that violate other disciplines’ laws, for example the laws of fundamental physics. For instance, Lange (2002, 420) claims that ‘the area law would still have held had there been birds equipped with organs weakening gravity’s pull somewhat’. Having organs that weaken gravity’s pull is understood as a violation of the law of gravitation. Thus, \(D\)’s laws are stable under some counterfactual supposition for which fundamental physics is unstable. This unique range of stability makes \(D\) epistemically autonomous as a scientific discipline because \(D\)’s laws can figure, for instance, in explanations answering some why-questions that no other discipline can answer as adequately as \(D\) itself (cf. Lange 2000, chapter 8; Lange 2002, 420f.; also Reutlinger &amp; Koch 2008).