The principle advantage of entailment accounts over quantifier accounts is that they have no problem with implicit ontological commitment. (Or, more exactly, since different entailment accounts will differ as to what counts as implicit content, entailment accounts have no problem with what counts as implicit ontological commitment by that account's own standards.) If ‘∃x Human(x)’ entails not only that humans exist, but that humanity exists, then it is ontologically committed to properties or universals, even though no property or universal is the value of any quantified variable. If ‘∃x Parent(x)’ entails that children exist, then ‘∃x Parent(x)’ is ontologically committed to children, again, even though it need not “quantify over” any children. An entailment account, unlike the quantifier account, gets these cases right—supposing, that is, we want our account to capture implicit ontological commitment.