 In response to objections, some consequentialists have proposed that what makes a world better or an act permissible is determined by reference to the all things considered good, where the all things considered good is a matter both of how much aggregate wellbeing a world contains and the extent to which that world realizes still other ideals or values, including, for example, fairness, desert, equality, human flourishing and the prioritization of the needs of the least well-off (Temkin 1993, 221–27). An alternate approach retains additivity for the purpose of determining a world’s overall value but also notes that we might understand what is to be added up as indicated not by individual wellbeing levels but rather by those levels adjusted in some way to reflect values beyond how well off a person is in a given world. See Broome 2015, Broome 1991 and Feldman 1997. Both sorts of approaches seem able to provide a plausible response to the nonidentity problem. But they also may have the ability to avoid the repugnant conclusion – to explain, for example, by reference to the ideal of human flourishing (Temkin) or the concept of desert (Feldman) how it can be morally better to produce a smaller number of extremely well off individuals rather than a very large number of people whose lives are only barely worth living.