 The very idea of unconscious mental imagery may raise some philosophical eyebrows and some philosophers indeed build consciousness into their definition of mental imagery (Richardson 1969, pp. 2–3, Kung 2010, p. 622). But if mental imagery is perceptual representation that is not directly triggered, then the bar for unconscious mental imagery should not be higher than the bar for perception per se, that is, for perceptual representation that is directly triggered. And we have plenty of evidence that perception is often unconscious: subjects with blindsight are not conscious of what they are staring at, but what they see systematically influences their behavior. And the same goes for healthy subjects when they look at very briefly presented or masked stimuli (see, e.g., Kentridge et al. 1999, Kouider &amp; Dehaene 2007 as two representative examples of the vast literature on unconscious perception). If perception can be unconscious, then so can mental imagery.