 Bealer (1987, 1999) defends similar proposals. Neither Bonjour nor Bealer are in fact particularly concerned to defend the analytic by such claims, but their recourse to mere understanding of propositional content is certainly what many defenders of the analytic have had in mind. Katz (1998, pp. 44–5), for example, explicitly made the very same appeal to intuitions on behalf of the analytic claims supported by his semantic theory. Somewhat more modestly, Peacocke (1992, 2004) claims that possession of certain logical concepts requires that a person find certain inferences “primitively compelling,” or compelling not by reason of some inference that takes “their correctness…as answerable to anything else” (1992, p. 6; see also his 2004, p. 100 and the other references in fn 9 above for the strategy, and fn 7, as well as Harman, 1996 [1999], and Horwich, 2000, for qualms).