 The same goes for perception, analogy, and testimony. With testimony, for example, we may be aware of a defeater, a speaker’s being a liar, for instance, but in such a case we do not take ourselves to be presented with news. Perceptual and other awarenesses do not occur when blocked, when defeated in this way. A good example is the fallacy called bādhita, “defeated in advance.” No inference purporting to show that fire is cold can be successful because we already know it’s hot. But of course some defeaters occur to us only later, and for a time we are fooled. In the market, we learn that the piece of shell we thought was silver is really only mother-of-pearl. Awarenesses are presumptively knowledge, but are also defeasible. The exception concerns certain matters known by apperception (see below), which, Gaṅgeśa argues, are known without the possibility of being wrong.