 phenomenal intentionality  for detailed discussion of this perspective, and its many variants.) -->This approach often trades on the idea that there is a difference between what comes by intentionality in some secondary or derivative way (as when an image or inscription is interpreted as referring to something), and what has intentionality in an original or more fundamental way. The proposal would be: consciousness, and only consciousness, brings with it original intentionality. It would be natural to assume further that only beings that have original intentionality truly have minds. Consider how this works in the case of Searle (1990, 1992). He distinguishes between what he calls “intrinsic” intentionality on the one hand, and merely “as if” and “interpreter relative” intentionality, on the other. We sometimes may speak as if artifacts (like thermostats) had thoughts and wants (“Mr. Thermostat thinks it’s too warm in here”)—but this isn’t to be taken literally. And we may impose conditions of satisfaction on our acts and creations (words, pictures, diagrams, etc.) by our interpretation of them—but they have no intentionality independent of our interpretive practices. The intentionality of mental states, on the other hand, is neither a mere manner of speech, nor is our possession of it derived from others’ interpretive stance towards us. But then: what accounts for the fact that some states of affairs in the world have intrinsic intentionality—that they are directed at objects under aspects—and why they are directed under the aspects they are (why they have the content they do)? With conscious states of mind, Searle says, their phenomenal or subjective character determines their aspectual shape. Where non-conscious states of mind are concerned, there is nothing to do the job but their relationship to consciousness. The right relationship, he holds, is this: non-conscious states of mind must be potentially conscious. If some psychological theories (of language, of vision) postulate an unconscious so deeply buried that its mental representations cannot even potentially become conscious, so much the worse for those theories.