 There are two main strategies to show that wide mental contents can legitimately enter into causal explanations. The first strategy is to argue that the causal efficacy of a mental state with wide content derives from the causal efficacy of a corresponding internal state. To use a non-mental example, we often say that a mosquito bite causes swelling, even though being a mosquito bite is a relational property. However, one worry with this approach is why it doesn’t show that wide contents are not causally relevant after all, because it is the internal component (the skin itching, swollen skin disturbance) that is doing all the causal work. A different way to defend the explanatory relevance of wide content is to identify its distinctive explanatory role without them being parasitic upon the causal efficacy of intrinsic properties. For example, according to Dretske (1988), when my intention to drink water causes me to raise my glass, the behavior that is the object of the causal explanation is not a single event, but a complex process where an internal state causes some bodily movement. Dretske argues that the wide content of my intention plays a causal role because it provides a structural explanation of how the internal brain state comes to be recruited to cause the bodily movement. Williamson (2000) offers a different account of the explanatory role of wide contents. He thinks they provide us with a better understanding of the connection between the mental states of an agent and his actions in the non-immediate future, because our actions typically involve complex interactions with the environment. (For further discussion, see the entry on  mental causation).