 Regarding the first question, it is obvious that existing systems for the generation of international law (e.g., custom and treaties) are not meaningfully “democratic”. International law is created by states, many of which are not themselves democratic, and the process by which they create such law cannot itself be described as democratic. However, many writers have advocated introducing democratic features into international law-making. One example is Ronald Dworkin, who canvassed the idea of establishing a world legislative body through a Global Legislative Convention. The body would operate by means of a four-majorities system. Proposed laws would need to receive votes representing states with a majority of the UN General Assembly’s members’ total populations, a majority of votes in the General Assembly, a majority of votes in the Security Council, and a majority of votes among the Council’s permanent members (Dworkin 2013: 28). One potential concern about this proposal is that it operates via majorities among states (weighted to some extent by their populations), rather than among all individual persons throughout the globe. This worry may be mitigated somewhat if we suppose that the states participating in this process must themselves be sufficiently representative of their populations.