 Arguments from ignorance get a lot of attention in debates about self-locating belief. They have the same general form as the knowledge argument against materialism in the philosophy of mind (Jackson 1982, 1986): we build a case in which a subject is stipulated to have all of the K-type knowledge there is to have, elicit the intuition that they still display a particular sort of ignorance, and conclude that not all knowledge is of type K. It’s easy to see the messy shopper case contributing to this sort of argument: We build a version of the messy shopper case in which Perry, before his epiphany, is already in all the relevant states of de re belief, and all the relevant states of descriptive belief, but still has something to learn. We conclude that there are some states of belief of a distinctively self-locating (“essentially indexical”) kind, that aren’t states of de re or descriptive belief. Perry already believes all of the relevant traditional propositions, so there must be states of belief that aren’t states of believing P for some traditional proposition P.