 The pre-conditions of collective experiences are debated in early phenomenology. According to Walther, what makes an experience ours is a complex structure of social cognition: the individuals, under condition of common knowledge, empathize with each other and mutually unify, where “unification” is described as a particular affective state (see León &amp; Zahavi 2016; Zahavi &amp; Salice 2016). Other authors, e.g., Stein, emphasize a rationality requirement: among other conditions, for an experience to qualify as collective, it has to be entertained for a group’s reason. Accordingly, a single individual could live through a collective experience as long as that experience is sustained by a group reason (Stein 1922: 123; Szanto 2015). Other authors, e.g., Stavenhagen, put a self-understanding as a group member at the core of collective experiences: for an experience to qualify as such, the subject must understand herself as belonging to a group. Interestingly, Stavenhagen identifies several factors that could lead to that self-understanding (Salice forthcoming B): sharing preferences with others, having mutual respect, or being part of an “emotional tradition” are elements that can elicit that particular self-understanding.