 The appeal to intensional “in the fiction” operators is a well-known strategy for dealing with the apparent truth of statements like  (6),  and because it is available to Russell this may seem like good news for Russell’s antirealism, especially given the way the strategy might be extended to external meta-fictional statements like  (4)  and  (5).  But such an amended version of Russellianism faces a problem already faced by the unamended version of Russell’s view. If such a Russellianism is to provide the correct analysis of sentences like (6), one has to assume that proper names are synonymous with definite descriptions. This is because the strategy used in arriving at a sentence like (6IR) involves replacing a proper name (“Apollo”) with an equivalent definite description (“the sun-god”). But there are well-known, and widely accepted, arguments against such a descriptivist view of proper names (Donnellan 1972, Kripke 1972 [1980], 2013). In particular, descriptions of the sort that speakers or communities standardly associate with a name might simply fail to fit what the name really refers to (in the actual world and relative to other possible worlds). One response to this objection as far as fictional names like “Apollo”, “Holmes”, etc., are concerned is to reject descriptivism about ordinary names but endorse it for fictional names (see, for example, Currie 1990: 158–162). On the surface, however, this looks like an unpromising move: for one thing, it is possible to attempt to engage in conversation about Apollo, believing he is real, before coming to the realization that he is merely a mythological figure, a possibility that is hard to explain if ordinary names and fictional names have entirely different sorts of meanings.