 For terms to apply to God and creatures in a non-univocal way (bi-ishtirāk) is a common state of affairs for Ibn Rushd (LongMeta XII.39 {1620–4}). It arises, for instance, not just in the case of knowledge but also in the case of will. For, since God “is exempt from passivity and change,” He does not exercise will in the usual sense of the term (Incoherence I.3 {148}). Still, in another sense God is “an intending and willing agent” (Kashf 5.80 {163}) in virtue of the special causal relationship that God has to the world. Similarly, Ibn Rushd affirms, in a special sense, that God is the creator of the world (QPhys 3; Kashf 5.78–91 {161–173}), and that God exercises providence (ʿināya) over all existent beings, though he denies that any individual enjoys a special divine providence (LongMeta XII.37 {1607}, XII.52; EpiMeta 4.176–81 {166–71}). It is difficult to assess the degree to which, on this account, either God’s will or the world is necessitated (Belo 2007; Hourani 1962; Taylor 2014).