 A concern for the type view is whether there will be “missing propositions” — truths or falsehoods which have never been entertained.  One drawn to the type view may allow for the existence of uninstantiated types to account for the existence of these propositions.  However, given that propositions are claimed to derive their representational features from their tokens, such uninstantiated types would lack representational features, and so lack truth-conditions.  Hanks suggests dealing with such propositions counterfactually.  Even if no one had ever predicated eloquence of Clinton, the proposition that Clinton is eloquent is true iff Clinton is eloquent because if someone were to predicate eloquence of Clinton, the token would be true iff Clinton is eloquent.  Predicative types, then, inherit their representation features from both their actual and possible tokens.  This response, however, leaves us with the question of truths for which there are not even any merely possible tokens — for example, mathematical truths that are too complicated for any finite mind to grasp.  What, if anything, provides the truth-conditions of these propositions?