 Moreover, even if one denies the principle of explanation, there is second, much shorter, response to Udayana’s argument. In Udayana’s argument, the occasionality of the putative effect is the explanandum, while the causal relevance of the causal condition is the explanans. Śrīharṣa asks whether there is a relation between these two properties. If there is no relation, the explanandum could indeed obtain without the explanans. In that case, the explanation wouldn’t really work. If there is a relation, Śrīharṣa could offer another regress argument that applies to relations in general. The thought is this. Suppose there are two entities a and b such that whenever b occurs, a also occurs. So, there must be a relation R between a and b that explains this pattern of co-occurrence. The question is this: How is R related to a and b? If we say that there is no further relation R* by which a or b is related to R, then, again, we would be unable to explain the correlation between a and b. If we acknowledge that there is such a relation, we could ask again how a or b is related to R*. Thus, an infinite regress will be unavoidable.