 What is the coherentist’s response to the regress? The coherentist can be understood as proposing that nothing prevents the regress from proceeding in a circle. Thus, \(A\) can be a reason for \(B\) which is a reason for \(C\) which is a reason for \(A\). If this is acceptable, then what we have is a chain of reasons that is never-ending but which does not involve an infinite number of beliefs. It is never-ending in the sense that for each belief in the chain there is a reason for that belief also in the chain. Yet there is an immediate problem with this response due to the fact that justificatory circles are usually thought to be vicious ones. If someone claims \(C\) and is asked why she believes it, she may reply that her reason is \(B\). If asked why she believes \(B\), she may assert \(A\). But if prompted to justify her belief in \(A\), she is not allowed to refer back to \(C\) which in the present justificatory context is still in doubt. If she did justify \(A\) in terms of \(C\) nonetheless, her move would lack any justificatory force whatsoever.