 Interestingly enough, the challenge that Meiland directs at Erdmann can be met. Remmel Nunn has suggested that Jerry Fodor’s functionalism provides us with a method for conceptualizing a situation in which an entity is restricted to using one, and only one, set of formal principles even though a different set may be operative under different conditions. According to functionalism humans can be compared to computers. Humans come equipped with a built-in ‘language of thought’, that is, a language that functions like the machine table of a computer. Now a computer is not able to compute formulae that are not among those in the vocabulary of its machine table. But this does not mean that the machine table of any given computer is without alternatives, that ‘there cannot be systems of logical laws which are inconsistent with those of a given automaton’. Thus we can imagine that a given computer is so designed that it systematically makes (what we regard as) a formal mistake M. In this case, the machine would be unable to detect the mistake M, ‘for M would constitute one of the laws by which the automaton detects errors’ (Nunn 1978, 347).