  Similarly, Sparrow (2011a) points out the profound tension between the consequentialist justifications favored by liberal eugenics advocates and their assurances about the preservation of reproductive liberties. For example, taking Savulescu to task, Sparrow draws attention to the fact that in order to address concerns about colluding with unjust social norms – which Savulescu does by admitting that in certain cases parents ought not choose the “best” child for their social environment, given sexism, racism, etc. – Savulescu must revert to attending to social consequences, rather than individual welfare.  But, this would commit proponents to sacrifice the well-being of individuals for the sake of social goals (2011a: 35–36). At a minimum, this calls for some justification about what social goods would trump the reproductive choices of individual prospective parents and about who should be making those decisions.