 Miller (2019) and Sorgiovanni (2018) also raise concerns about the viability of Ginsborg’s “primitive” rule-following. In particular, Miller (2019) points out that her argument for why rules do not guide agents, is based on the (mistaken, and disproven by Wittgenstein himself) assumption that being guided by a rule necessarily requires interpreting that rule (2019:  746).[41]  What’s more, Miller takes issue with her primitive normativity by claiming that the attitude of “taking-to-be-appropriate” cannot really be made sense of unless we expect the speaker to already take e “to have a meaning or to be governed by a standard of correctness”. Finally, Miller (2019: 755–757) and Verheggen (2015) argue that we have little reason to prefer Ginsborg’s partial reductionism over both non-reductionism and reductionism as Ginsborg’s proposal seems to face the same challenges raised against those two opposing views.