 One might be dubious that such an explanatory strategy can be successfully executed all the way through—can we really tell the whole story of an action without invoking self-locating representation at any stage? Will this work across all examples of human action, and all action descriptions we might be inclined to use? (See Torre 2018 and Ninan 2016 for doubts on each front.) There’s also a tricky question here about argumentative burdens, and what’s required to discharge them. Suppose it’s granted that there could be agents—like Cappelen and Dever’s god—who performed intentional actions without possessing any self-locating doxastic attitudes. One might still maintain that real-life humans employ self-locating representations in their practical deliberations, and perhaps that we are wired up so as to be incapable of intentionally acting without invoking self-locating attitudes. (Indexicals might not be essential for all agents, but self-locating attitudes might be essential for us.)