 Following Avicenna’s faculty psychology and the new division between concupiscible and irascible emotions, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas treated emotions as acts of the sensory moving powers. While Albert employed the Stoic-based classifications of Nemesius of Emesa and John Damascene in his works (De homine q. 66–67; De bono 3.5.2–3), Thomas Aquinas put forward a new taxonomy (Summa theologiae II-1, 22–48) which was probably influenced by John of la Rochelle. Albert argued that emotions should be regarded as qualities as Aristotle described them in Categories 8 (De bono 3.5.1, 3.5.3). Aquinas defended the characterization of them as movements of the soul, finding the basic classificatory principles of emotions in Aristotle’s doctrine of contrary movements in Physics V.5. Bonaventure differed from these authors in relativizing the difference between sensory and intellectual moving powers and attributing emotions to the intellectual soul in a proper sense and not merely metaphorically as was traditionally done. In addressing the soul of Christ in the third book of his Commentary on the Sentences, Bonaventure argues that there were concupiscible and irascible parts in Christ’s intellectual will as well as passions of joy and distress. Similar ideas were also put forward earlier in the so-called Summa Halensis (Bonaventure, Sent. III.16.2.1 (354); III.33.1.3 (717); see also Prentice 1957; Vaura 2017). Even though Bonaventure’s account remained sketchy, it influenced the Franciscan view of the emotions of the will that came to be more systematically analyzed by John Duns Scotus.