  The specific way in which FitzRalph addresses the problem is in terms of the revelation of future contingents. Given that future contingents have a determinate truth—namely, that they will happen and cannot not happen—how can their truth, as known by God, be revealed by him to a created intellect without their losing their contingency? As Leff points out, the problem as set out by his contemporaries was whether God’s knowledge of the future was different from that of the present and the past (Leff 1963: 40). According to Wodeham, Buckingham, and Holcot, God’s knowledge about the future must be related to the contingency of the future, and, therefore, this knowledge is of a different kind from God’s knowledge of the past and present. FitzRalph accepts the distinction, seeking to defend his position as being consonant with Augustine in the 83 Questions and De Trinitate. It was, in fact, a position rejected by Bradwardine and Gregory of Rimini.