 A further objection to making the social minimum work-conditional comes from philosophers influenced by the left-libertarian tradition reviewed above (see section  2.3).  As we saw above, left-libertarians believe that, ideally speaking, individuals have a right to an equal share of resources that are an inheritance from nature or from past generations. Thus, imagine that ten people arrive on an island and find that it contains a factory containing ten machines. The machines can be used to produce the food, clothing and shelter that the islanders need to survive. The left-libertarian will argue that in principle each islander should receive one machine—that is, an equal share of the machines in the inherited factory. Now suppose that one of the ten islanders, call them Drew, decides not to work their machine but to rent it out to other islanders who are prepared to work it for a price. Drew does no work, but simply lives off the rent that other islanders pay them for the use of the machine that they have been allocated. Now, depending on how high the rent is, Drew could conceivably be receiving an income close to their society’s social minimum, and they will be doing no work in return for this income. But the left-libertarian will argue that this is not unjust because Drew is only here making use of their rightful share of society’s inherited goods. As we noted above, it is difficult in practice to divide inherited resources up literally in this way. But we can perhaps identify these resources, assess their market value, and give everyone a grant of income or wealth equivalent to a per capita share of the market value of these resources. Some people might choose to live off this grant without doing any work (or doing as little work as possible). But, according to the left-libertarian, this is no different to Drew deciding to do no work and to live off the rent they can get from charging others to work on their machine: it is a legitimate use of one’s rightful share of society’s inherited resources. Subject to important nuances and variations, a number of philosophers have employed this type of argument in recent years to defend the payment to each citizen of a universal basic income or a universal capital grant (see Steiner 1994; Van Parijs 1992, 1995; Ackerman and Alstott 1999; Dworkin 2000; Birnbaum 2012; Widerquist 2013; Bidadanure 2019).