 When Marty speaks of the meaning of a statement as the content of the judgment which is thereby expressed, he is well aware of opening the possibility of comparisons with similar concepts in the work of various philosophers, e.g. the proposition in itself (Satz an sich) (Bolzano), the state of affairs (Sachverhalt) (Stumpf and Husserl), and the objective (Objektiv) (Meinong). Accordingly he faces the same difficulty that these others also had to face, i.e. determining the ontological status of such a thing (or non-thing). It is Marty’s view that contents of judgment exist in the sense that it is correct to accept them and are furthermore non-real. What it means to be real for the mature Marty is to be involved in a causal nexus. (On his earlier view, real was whatever could be subsumed under the Aristotelian categories.) While he regards physical and mental things or events as real, he maintains that contents of judgment, i.e. the meanings of statements “in the narrower sense”, have only a co-becoming (Mitwerden), which does not allow them to be characterized as real. Thus, in working out a descriptive semasiology of statements Marty puts forward a very important ontological thesis.