 Theistic mentalism with divine simplicity is the view that necessarily existing abstracta are identical with divine mental states, and that God is simple. Because God is simple, each abstract object is identical with God and thus each other. This is a view held most famously by Augustine and  Aquinas.[11]  Because this is a mentalist view, the criticisms leveled in the section on theistic mentalism without divine simplicity will apply here. In addition, the person who accepts divine simplicity alongside her divine mentalism also will face  criticisms of divine simplicity.  Plantinga (1980) is perhaps the locus classicus of contemporary criticism of divine simplicity. He argues that according to divine simplicity, God is identical with his attributes and has (all of) his attributes essentially. But, he argues, God isn’t an attribute; and God has many different attributes. (For discussion more sympathetic to divine simplicity, see Mann 1982; Stump and Kretzmann 1985; Leftow 1990; Stump 1997; Wolterstorff 1991; and Bergmann and Brower 2006.) The sorts of difficulties that Plantinga has raised have seemed decisive to many. (It is beyond the scope of this essay to evaluate them, however.) This isn’t to say that they can’t be met. But the theistic mentalist who accepts divine simplicity has, prima facie, a great number of difficulties with her view.