 Ockham’s position thus turns out to be a variety of haecceitism (in a more modern sense of the word). Maintaining that substances are primarily diverse does not amount to having no theory of individuation. Indeed, it presumably entails that their diversity is not explained by, say, qualitative distinction. Thus, Ockham holds that two things, each per se singular, can be “precisely similar” to each other (Ockham, Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 6, n. 108 (William of Ockham [OT], 2:196, l. 17; Spade (1994), 171)). And this seems to entail some form of haecceitism. The difference between this view and that of Scotus is that the haecceity defended by Scotus is – in some minimal way – hypostatized. Some modern accounts of haecceities resemble Ockham’s view more than Scotus’s: the uniquely instantiable, non-qualitative property of (say) being identical with Socrates – Socrates’s haecceity (in the modern terminology) – does not carry the kind of ontological weight that Scotus wants to place on haecceities as he understands them: