 Koslicki (2020) provides another mixed solution. She accepts (primarily for Quinean reasons) that there is a problem of transworld identity for certain individuals including people: one that can be solved only by attributing to them non-trivial individual essences; she argues that these consist in their individual forms. Such an individual form would provide a substantial answer to questions such as ‘what makes an individual Noah in the “role-switching” world rather than Adam?’ Thus, it would appear, the problem of transworld identity for individuals such as Noah and Adam is replaced by a problem of transworld identity for their individual forms. But why is this supposed to represent an improvement? As Fine puts it: ‘Why should we not simply take the crossworld identity of [non-form] entities as given and not standing in any need of a criterion?’ (2020, 430). One reason (considered by Koslicki) is conceptual. It is thought that we need to make sense of de re modal claims in terms of de dicto modal claims. However, if individual forms are to come to the rescue, the question arises how the individual forms are to be distinguished from one another. The problem is acute in cases where the individuals in question are otherwise indiscernible (Fine 2020, 432). Moreover, it is not clear that Koslicki’s invocation of the fact that individual forms—unlike, say, unanalysable haecceities—have a ‘qualitative’ element (2020, Sections 3.3.4–3.5) is supposed to help with this problem.