 Where we stand on this issue may turn on what we understand a human right to be. The orthodoxy among moral and political philosophers has been that human rights are moral rights which individuals possess in virtue of their humanity. If we opt instead for a purely legal conception of human rights (e.g. Buchanan 2013; Macklem 2015), the question of whether group rights might be human rights may be settled by legal fiat: if law declares a group right to be a human right, a human right it will be. Similarly, if we adopt a “political” conception of human rights, according to which a right is “human” not because it is grounded in our humanity but in virtue of the role it plays, or should play, in international political practice (e.g. Beitz 2009; Rawls 1999; Raz 2010), group rights will figure among human rights if they are reckoned suitable for that role. But, if we stick with the traditional moral conception of human rights and take the adjective “human” seriously (e.g. Griffin 2008; Tasioulas 2007; Wellman 2011), the possibility of group human rights remains controversial. Human beings are individual beings so that, if human rights are rights we hold as human beings, they would seem to be of necessity individual rights. Moreover, the misgivings many people entertain about the potential of group rights to rival and threaten individual rights are likely to be all the greater if the rights we ascribe to groups are human rights which might match and override the human rights of individuals.