 Since deflationists place such heavy emphasis on the role of the concept of truth in expressing generalizations, it seems somewhat ironic that certain versions of deflationism have been criticized for being incapable of accounting for generalizations involving truth (Gupta 1993a, 1993b; Field 1994a, 2008; Horwich 1998a (137–8), 2001; Halbach 1999 and 2011 (57–9); Soames 1999, Armour-Garb 2004, 2010, 2011). The “Generalization Problem” (henceforth, \(GP)\) captures the worry that a deflationary account of truth is inadequate for explaining our commitments to general facts we express with certain uses of ‘true’. This raises the question of whether and, if so, how, deflationary accounts earn the right to endorse such generalizations.