 Expected utility theory recommends agents to take the course of action that, among the available alternatives, maximizes expected utility. On this view, the standard of proof is met whenever the expected utility (or cost) of a decision against the defendant (say, a conviction) is greater (or lower) than the expected utility (or cost) of a decision in favor of the defendant (say, an acquittal) (DeKay 1996; Hamer 2004; Kaplan 1968). Let \(c(CI)\) be the cost of convicting a factually innocent defendant and \(c(AG)\) the cost of acquitting a factually guilty defendant. For a conviction to be justified, the expected cost of convicting an innocent—that is, \(c(CI)\) discounted by the probability of innocence \([1-\Pr(G\pmid E)]\)—must be lower than the expected cost of acquitting a guilty defendant—that is, \(c(AG)\) discounted by the probability of guilt \(\Pr(G\pmid E)\). This holds just in case 