 Malebranche insists that God’s general will is operative not only in the order of nature, but also in the “order of grace.” However, he notes that the production of effects in the latter order also involves human action that is free in the strong sense of not being determined by anything external to the agent. His appeal to this sort of freedom is in fact central to his solution to the problem of moral evil, that is, the compatibility of sin with God’s goodness. According to Malebranche, God is not responsible for sinful action since such action derives not from Him but from sinful agents. Arnauld objects that this solution is “more pelagian than anything in Pelagius,” and that one must side with Augustine, who declared Pelagianism a heresy. Malebranche responds that he did not follow Pelagius in denying the importance of grace, and that Augustine himself had emphasized our freedom in action.