 As he says, it is important to view speaker meaning as a deontological concept – that is, view it from the perspective of moral philosophy and norms of what actions are permitted or not permitted in conversation. Viewing speaker meaning as deonotological puts emphasis on practical applications of speech, on such moral norms and on the consequences of conversational behaviour. And this is where defaultness comes to the fore, propelled by the question as to what kind of content speakers ought to be held accountable for. Should it be the kind of meaning that speakers feel committed to, or the kind of meaning that they, sometimes inadvertently, communicated? Or, perhaps, merely the minimal semantic content? Emma Borg (2019), for example, distinguishes between what she calls (i) strict liability, that is liability for the minimal proposition pertaining to one’s utterance, delimited according to the principles of her Minimal Semantics (Borg 2004, 2012), and (ii) conversational liability (a gradable concept), applied to potential interpretations of an utterance in the context of conversation. But such philosophical solutions don’t go far enough in that they merely offer a more fine-grained classification rather than implementable answers. Next, Elder and Haugh (2018) focus on ‘the most salient propositional meaning that is ostensively made operative between interlocutors’ (p. 595), which allows them to offer a proposal with more direct utility for discussions of moral responsibility. The concept of dynamic, operative meaning allows them to argue that it is the addressee’s response that makes the speaker accountable for the emergent meaning – the meaning that the interlocutors settle for in the next turn when the original speaker becomes aware of their ‘reflexive accountability’. But, again, feasibility of implementation has to wait for a model with some predictive power.