Subjectivist views are most prominent among those who interpret probability assignments in a pragmatic fashion, and motivate the representation of belief with probability assignments by the afore-mentioned Dutch book arguments. Central to this approach is the work of Savage and De Finetti. Savage (1962) proposed to axiomatize statistics in tandem with decision theory, a mathematical theory about practical rationality. He argued that by themselves the probability assignments do not mean anything at all, and that they can only be interpreted in the context where an agent faces a choice between actions, i.e., a choice among a set of bets. In similar vein, De Finetti (e.g., 1974) advocated a view on statistics in which only the empirical consequences of the probabilistic beliefs, expressed in a willingness to bet, mattered but he did not make statistical inference fully dependent on decision theory. Remarkably, it thus appears that the subjectivist view on Bayesian statistics is based on the same behaviorism and empiricism that motivated Neyman and Pearson to develop classical statistics.