 This position of Schleiermacher’s might seem to court the following sort of problem, though: What if the moral values of a society or an individual conflict with the ideal of humanity? What if, for example, the society is Nazi Germany or the individual Hitler? In the Soliloquies Schleiermacher tries to forestall this sort of problem by limiting the forms of moral distinctiveness and individuality that he supports to those that are compatible with, or even conducive to, the ideal of humanity. Thus he expresses his commitment to moral distinctiveness or individuality in such formulas as that a person should be an individual “without violating the laws of humanity”, that “each human being should represent humanity in his own way”, and that what is valuable is a person’s “distinctive being and its relation to humanity”. Similarly, his championing of (moral) diversity or individuality is always combined with requirements of a measure of conformity with a broader species-wide or societal whole.