 Avicenna went against the Islamic doctrine of bodily resurrection and, reading Aristotle from a Platonist perspective, argued that each human has an intellect which, unlike the other parts of the soul, is immaterial—if it were not immaterial, he argues, it could not perceive universals—and, being immaterial, is immortal (see, e.g., the passage from The Salvation translated in Khalidi 2005: 27–58). Averroes, too, was unwilling to accept bodily resurrection in any straightforward way, and, in face of al-Ghazālī’s criticisms of Avicenna in this regard, he falls back on saying that philosophers uphold resurrection because they hold that the masses should believe this widely-held religious doctrine and so they do not contradict it publicly (Averroes Incoherence [1954: 359–363]). Averroes does not, however, at all follow Avicenna’s Platonizing interpretation of Aristotle’s views about the soul: in his Great Commentary on On the Soul, he argues that there is, indeed, an imperishable intellect, but it is an independently existing immaterial being. It needs humans, however, for thinking to take place, since thinking requires images, which humans process in their corporeal brains. Just as the book in front of me makes the visual perception I am having of it veridical, so the processed images in our brains of bodily things enable the one independent, immaterial intellect to think truly using  universals.[31]