 On a recent view developed by Beall and Restall (2000, 2006), called by them “logical pluralism”, the concept of logical truth carries a commitment to the idea that a logical truth is true in all of a range of items or “cases”, and its necessity consists in the truth of such a general claim (see Beall and Restall 2006, p. 24). However, the concept of logical truth does not single out a unique range of “cases” as privileged in determining an extension for the concept, or, what amounts to the same thing, the universal generalization over a logical form can be interpreted via different equally acceptable ranges of quantification; instead, there are many such equally acceptable ranges and corresponding extensions for “logical truth”, which may be chosen as a function of contextual interests. This means that, for the logical pluralist, many sets have a right to be called “the set of logical truths” (and “the set of logical necessities”), each in the appropriate  context.[3]  (See the entry on  logical pluralism.)  On another recent understanding of logical necessity as a species of generality, proposed by Rumfitt (2015), the necessity of a logical truth consists just in its being usable under all sets of subject-specific ways of drawing implications (provided these sets satisfy certain structural rules); or, more roughly, just in its being applicable no matter what sort of reasoning is at stake. On this view, a more substantive understanding of the modality at stake in logical truth is again not required. It may be noted that, although he postulates a variety of subject-specific implication relations, Rumfitt rejects pluralism about logical truth in the sense of Beall and Restall (see his 2015, p. 56, n. 23.), and in fact thinks that the set of logical truths in a standard quantificational language is characterized by the standard classical logic.