 Given that appreciation of certain artworks is embedded in a user’s interactivity, philosophers are then tasked with defining interactive art in a manner that eliminates unsanctioned actions from constituting a kind of interactive work. One could imagine, for example, someone hacking into a digital file to manipulate a digital image, thus generating new instance-properties of the work. That, and more benign actions such as reading chapters of, let us say, a digitized copy of The Brothers Karamazov in random order may change the properties of the work, but such activities are not prescribed. This, once again, underscores the importance of the artist’s sanction. Bearing this in mind and relating it to computer art, Dominic Lopes offers the following definition, “A work of art is interactive just in case it prescribes that the actions of its users help generate its display” (Lopes 2010:36, original emphasis). Similarly, Berys Gaut’s definition states that “a work is interactive just in case it authorizes that its audience’s actions partly determine its instances and their features” (Gaut 2010: 143, original emphasis). In specifying certain actions as prescribed and authorized, these often-cited definitions restrict the kinds of works that ought or ought not be considered candidates for an interactive art category.