 While the philosophical literature on the multiverse continues to grow (see (Collins 2009, 2012) and (Kraay 2014)), many of the arguments against it share a common premise: a multiverse would not, by itself, be a sufficient explanation of fine-tuning. More would have to be known about the way in which universes are produced. By analogy, just because a roulette wheel has 38 spaces does not guarantee that the probability of Red 25 is 1/38. If the wheel is rigged in some way—by using magnets for example—to prevent that outcome, then the probability might be extremely small. If the table were rigged and yet Red 25 was the actual winner, that would require a special explanation. Likewise, if a property has zero measure in the space of possible universes, and yet that property is observed, its existence would still require an explanation (Earman 1987, 315). This is true regardless of whether the space of universes is finitely or infinitely large. In order to explain fine-tuning, the multiverse proponent would still have to show that the life-permitting universes do not have zero measure in the space of all universes (Koperski 2005, 307–09). 