 Dupré (1993, 28) argues that promiscuous realism about natural kinds reflects our classificatory practices within the context of both common sense and particular sciences. The kinds classified by common sense and scientific practice often cross one another. For example, in common sense we classify lilies as a certain kind of flower. However, in biological classification the genus Lilium comprises over one hundred species, including bulbs such as garlic and onions. Moreover, species with the name “lily” in common sense do not all in fact belong to the lilium genus in biological classification (e.g., Calla Lilies and Canna Lilies). Therefore, common sense and biological science provide us with pluralistic ways of taxonomizing lilies. Each is equally legitimate, according to Dupré, depending on our interests. Furthermore, Dupré (1993, 38) argues that cross-classification occurs even within the context of a science. Taking the biological classification of species as an example, he argues that there are countless ways of taxonomizing species, depending on the model of biological systematics that is used (see Section 2.1 below). There are equally legitimate, objectively grounded ways of classifying natural kinds. There is accordingly no unique way of carving nature at its joints; different systems of classification are equally acceptable, scientifically, and metaphysically.