 A little reflection suggests that the vast majority of the propositions that we know or are justified in believing have that status only because we know or are justified in believing other propositions. So, for example, I am justified in believing that there is at least one dog in our neighborhood, because I am justified in believing that my next door neighbor has a dog; I am justified in believing that our garbage will get picked up tomorrow, because I am justified in believing that tomorrow is Tuesday and that our garbage gets picked up every Tuesday; and I am justified in believing that there is going to be at least some rain in the next week, because I am justified in believing that the forecast calls for a good deal of rain, and that forecasts are almost always right when it comes to similar short-term forecasts in this area. And the dependence seems to be inferential in nature: in each case, I am justified in believing the former only because I have inferred it, or at least am able to infer it, from the latter. Foundationalists about justification want to contrast my foundationally justified belief (knowledge) with a kind of justified belief (knowledge) that doesn’t involve the having of other justified beliefs (knowledge). There is no standard terminology for what we shall henceforth refer to as foundational justification  (knowledge).[2]