 Minimalist non-cognitivists have regrouped in various ways.  One way is to resist the extension of the minimalist strategy to belief (Sinclair 2007). Another is to distinguish minimal and robust notions of belief and representation. Minimal beliefs would need only to be states of mind expressed in assertions by indicative sentences, while robust beliefs would meet some stronger requirement of representationality (Blackburn 2006).  Non-cognitivism would then be committed to the view that moral judgements did not express robust belief (Sinclair 2006; McDonald 2012). The hope would be to contrast the entire minimalist package with robust truth, robust truth-conditionality, and robust belief. Such quasi-realist minimalists would be trying to find truth conditions which are (1) sufficient to make sense of using sentences having such truth-conditions in all of the ways that we use paradigmatically truth-apt sentences, and (2) which still fall short of robust representational truth conditions. 