 The last of the many accounts that emerged in the discussion about thought experiments is what could be called the “mental–model account”. It attracts the most followers (see Andreas 2011; Bishop 1998; Cooper 2005; Gendler 2004; Palmieri 2003; Nersessian 1992, 1993, 2007; McMullin 1985; Miščević 1992 and 2007). When we conduct a thought experiment, according to champions of this view, we manipulate a mental model instead of the physical realm: “The general claim is that in certain problem-solving tasks people reason by constructing a mental model of the situations, events, and processes that in dynamic cases can be manipulated through simulation” (Nersessian 2018, p. 319). Like physical models, mental models are non-propositional in nature. This means first of all “that the carefully crafted thought–experimental narrative focuses on the construction of a model of a kind of situation and manipulating that model through simulation affords epistemic access to certain features of current representations in a way that manipulating propositional representations using logical rules cannot” (Nersessian 2018, pp. 319–320). A narrative functions as a kind of user-manual for building the model, but it isn’t identical to a thought experiment.