 First, note that any solution must ensure that the truth-makers deliver the “right results” with respect to what’s true about the past. To illustrate, consider the following natural progression of an object through time. Our story begins with a green banana. Time passes; the banana ripens. The banana is now yellow, but it was green. The world now instantiates the property having contained a green banana (so says the Lucretian). So far, so good. But consider a progression where the banana ripens and yet the world comes to instantiate a different Lucretian property. Suppose that the world instantiates having contained a red banana instead. This is problematic. In the scenario imagined, though it was the case that the world contained a green banana, &lt;There was a green banana&gt; is false; and, despite the world never having contained a red banana, &lt;There was a red banana&gt; is true. Although the problematic progression is deviant, the worry with property solutions is that these kinds of progression appear possible, given the advertised metaphysic. If such deviant progressions are possible, we can object to these present entities being the right kind of truth-makers for truths about the past (see Tallant &amp; Ingram 2012; Cameron 2013; Leininger 2015).