 One might worry, as did Alfred MacKay (1968), that this means that Donnellan is open to the charge of offering a Humpty Dumpty view of definite descriptions—one on which there are no substantive constraints on what token descriptions can be used to refer to. Interestingly, Donnellan (1968)’s response was to appeal to the Gricean theory of meaning, thus raising the possibility that what he meant by ‘having in mind’ is something akin to the Gricean’s notion of having a referential intention. As we saw above, however, there is reason to think that even this sort of move won’t suffice to head off the collapse of intentionalism into Humpty Dumpty-ism in a fully general sense. So there is still reason to be concerned that Donnellan’s willingness to jettison the explicit descriptive material as a constraint on referential success is perhaps a bridge too far.