  This raises a question: why do only real, intrinsic changes matter? It would be silly to ascribe to friends of DDI some sort of pre-given general antipathy against real, intrinsic change. Disliking such change makes as little sense as disliking universal properties- and while nominalists campaign endlessly against these, it is not because they have emotional attitudes toward them. Like nominalists, DDI's friends simply followed various specific arguments, discussed below, where they seemed to lead. And they seemed to lead to a denial that God can change really and intrinsically, but not to a denial of all divine change tout court. The arguments which led philosophers to exempt God from real, intrinsic change all had to do with ways real, intrinsic change or being capable of it might make God less perfect. It isn't plausible that extrinsic change or openness to it could make something more or less perfect. I am exactly as impressive a man with a dog on my left as I am without a dog on my left, though the dog might improve the scene including me. And I am no whit less impressive for being open to having a dog move nearby.