 John Hawthorne questions whether apparent rational insights or rational intuitions as understood by BonJour and Bealer, respectively, provide evidence for the beliefs which are based on them. He assumes that these intellectual seemings manifest themselves to inner consciousness “by a special kind of phenomenology” (Hawthorne 2013: 215). He then wonders whether any of the following would provide evidence: a seeming without the relevant phenomenology he calls Glow, a seeming with a Glow of which the person is unaware (if this is even possible), a seeming with a known Glow which is unreliable. He seems to think that good answers to these questions would require abandoning the “internalist mandate” that drives these views that “allow only that which is ‘accessible’ from the inside to count as relevant to justification” (Hawthorne 2013: 216). As we’ve seen, Chudnoff thinks that intuitions have a distinctive phenomenology that provides reason to believe that the propositions which are their objects are true (2011b, esp. secs. 6 &amp; 7); others think that they need not have a distinctive phenomenology (Sosa 2013; Boghossian forthcomingb). One might maintain that at least in certain circumstance, being in the mental state with the relevant phenomenology necessarily gives you prima facie reason to believe the proposition consideration of which caused that intuition, that is, gives you a reason to believe that proposition even though that reason might be undermined or overridden by further considerations.