 Wilson (2009) responds to these concerns by analogical attention to color metamerism, in which colors of the same hue, saturation and brightness can differ in respect of color, and are moreover reasonably taken to have physical determination dimensions. One metameric moral is that properties such as color may have physical determination dimensions; a second is that which determination dimensions are had by a given higher-level property may be science-relative. Applying the morals: there is no in-principle problem with mental properties’ having physical determination  dimensions;[44]  moreover, which dimensions are associated with mental properties may be science-relative. This allows accommodation of mental multiple realizability: mental properties with diverse physical realizers can be exactly alike, relative to the determination dimensions associated with psychology, compatible with these mental properties being different, relative to a lower-level physical science distinguishing these realizers. And given that different sciences may treat a single determinable as having different determination dimensions, mental properties may be super-determinate relative to a purely psychological science, while being further determined relative to a lower-level science.