  Some theories posit the existence of a singular representation of attitude-objects. According to MODE (“Motivation and Opportunity as Determinants”; Fazio 1990; Fazio &amp; Towles-Schwen 1999; Olson &amp; Fazio 2009) and the related MCM (“Meta-Cognitive Model”; Petty 2006; Petty et al. 2007), attitudes are associations between objects and “evaluative knowledge” of those objects. MODE posits one singular representation underlying the behavioral effects measured by implicit and explicit tests. Thus, MODE denies the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes. The difference between implicit and explicit measures, then, reflects a difference in the control that subjects have over the measured behavior. Control is understood in terms of motivation and opportunity to deliberate. When an agent has low motivation or opportunity to engage in deliberative thought, her automatically activated attitudes—which might be thought of as her “true” attitudes—will guide her behavior and judgment. Implicit measures manufacture this situation (of low control due to low motivation and/or opportunity to deliberate). Explicit measures, by contrast, increase non-attitudinal contributions to test performance. MODE therefore provides empirically-testable predictions about the conditions under which a person’s performance on implicit and explicit measures will converge and diverge, as well as predictions about the conditions under which implicit and explicit measures will and will not predict behavior (see Gawronski &amp; Brannon 2017 for review). 