 Unfortunately this account threatens to over-generate truth-makers for necessary truths—at least if the notion of entailment it employs is classical. It’s a feature of this notion that anything whatsoever entails a necessary truth p. It follows as a special case of this that any claim that a given object exists must entail p too. So it also follows—if (Entailment-T) is granted—that any object makes any necessary truth true. But this runs counter to the belief that, e.g., the leftovers in your refrigerator aren’t truth-makers for the representation that 2+2=4. Even worse, Restall has shown how to plausibly reason from (Entailment-T) to “truth-maker monism”: the doctrine that every truth-maker makes every truth true (whether necessary or contingent). Every claim of the form p ∨ ~p is a necessary truth. So every existing thing s is a truth-maker for each instance of this form (see preceding paragraph). Now let p be some arbitrary truth (grass is green) and s any truth-maker for p ∨ ~p (a particular ice floe in the Antarctic ocean). Now it is intuitively plausible that something makes a disjunction true either by making one disjunct true or by making the other disjunct true (Mulligan, Simons, &amp; Smith 1984: 316). This is what Restall calls “the disjunction thesis”. It follows from this thesis that either s makes p true or s makes ~p true. Given that p is true, neither s nor anything else makes it true that ~p. So s (the ice floe) must make it true that p (grass is green)! But since s and p were chosen arbitrarily it follows that all truth-makers are on a par, making true every truth (Restall 1996: 333–4).