  One may also want to distinguish between dynamic events, such as John’s walking, and static events, such as John’s resting under a tree. According to some authors, the latter are not events proper because they do not involve any change (Ducasse 1926). In the most abstract construal, a change is an ordered pair of states of affairs: an initial state and an end state (von Wright 1963). More substantial accounts of events as changes describe them as exemplifications of dynamic properties, i.e., properties that an object has by virtue of a “movement” in some quality space (Quinton 1979; Lombard 1979, 1986). However, the question of whether all events should be or involve changes of some sort is controversial (Montmarquet 1980; Steward 1997; Mellor 1998; Simons 2003) and it may be argued that it is ultimately a matter of stipulation—hence of little metaphysical import (Casati &amp; Varzi 2008).