 Does making the proposition expressed by the conditional context-dependent escape Lewis’s result that a conditional probability is not the probability of the truth of any proposition? Lewis showed that there is no proposition \(A*B\) such that in every belief state \(\mathbf{p}(A*B) = \mathbf{p}_A (B)\). He did not rule out that in every belief state there is some proposition or other, \(A*B\), such that \(\mathbf{p}(A*B) = \mathbf{p}_A (B)\). However, in the wake of Lewis, Stalnaker himself proved a stronger result, for his conditional connective: the equation \(\mathbf{p}(A\gt B) = \mathbf{p}_A (B)\) cannot hold for all propositions \(A, B\) in a single belief state. If it holds for \(A\) and \(B\), we can find two other propositions, \(C\) and D (truth-functional compounds of \(A, B\) and \(A\gt B)\) for which, demonstrably, it does not hold. (See Stalnaker’s letter to van Fraassen published in van Fraassen (1976, pp. 303–4), Gibbard (1981, pp. 219–20), and Edgington (1995, pp. 276–8).