 The strength of this line of reasoning depends in part on the debatable issue of who shoulders the burden of proof on the question of equal epistemic footing. Those siding with Plantinga argue in essence that unless exclusivists must acknowledge on epistemic grounds that are (or should be) accepted by all rational people that those holding incompatible beliefs are actually on equal footing, exclusivists can justifiably deny that this is so and thus need not engage in belief assessment (Kim 2011). Those supporting obligatory belief assessment argue that exclusivists are the ones who shoulder the burden of proof. Unless it can be demonstrated on epistemic grounds that are (or should be) accepted by all rational people that proponents of the competing perspectives are not actually on equal epistemic footing, exclusivists must consider their challengers on equal epistemic footing and are thus obligated to engage in belief assessment (Basinger 2002, 26–27). Or, to state this important distinction another way, it is Plantinga’s contention that we need not acknowledge that those with whom we disagree are actually on equal epistemic footing unless it can be demonstrated objectively that they are equally knowledgeable and sincere, while his critics maintain that we must acknowledge that those with whom we disagree are on equal epistemic footing unless we have an objective means of demonstrating that we are in fact more knowledgeable and/or sincere than they. Most philosophers of religion side with the critics in this case and thus assume that actual peer conflict cannot be denied (Byrne 2011, 30).