 The non-prescriptive nature of much empirical research into responses to the environment contrasts with a view influential in philosophical aesthetics according to which there are quite demanding cognitive requirements for a correct aesthetic appreciation of nature. The question mirrors one we have already discussed for the arts: what factors, other than the sensory appearance of an object, are relevant to enjoying, appreciating and judging it aesthetically? In the case of the arts we saw that one answer is to consider the work’s category—the (artistic) kind of thing it is (Walton 1970; see above  Section 5).  Allen Carlson (2000) extends this idea to the aesthetics of nature, arguing that a scene or object must be understood as belonging to a natural kind, and as having the causal history characteristic of that kind; that is the right way to perceive it and aesthetic judgements about it are correct only if they are tied to that category. This implies that much human aesthetic experience of nature has been radically incorrect, being uninformed by the relevant scientific facts and often infused with notions of supernatural creation. Some will find this an acceptable consequence; we are used to thinking that many long-standing human ethical judgements have been radically mistaken, and aesthetic judgements might go the same way. Others however, question whether the aesthetic delight one takes in, say, a bird in flight depends for its acceptability on understanding the natural history of the creature (Budd 2001).