 If there are necessary moral principles, it might seem that they must be exceptionless. If lying is, in virtue of its nature, wrong, then all lying is wrong. And the same will hold for any other principles. But such moral rigorism seems deeply implausible. While some (most notably Kant) have bitten the bullet, most of us believe that there are circumstances in which it is permissible, or even required, to lie. Price agrees. Principles can conflict and none automatically trumps the others. Which principle should govern our actions will depend on the circumstances. In some cases of conflict, it is clear what morality demands. But in many cases it is not: “doubt arises; and we may thus be rendered entirely incapable of determining what we ought to chuse” (R 167). The lack of clarity here is epistemic, not metaphysical: “Truth and right in all circumstances, require one determinate way of acting” (R 167). But since what that way is can be unclear, there can be disagreements between right-minded people about what to do. None of this, however, impugns our knowledge of the fundamental principles.