  This decompositional conception of analysis set the methodological  agenda for philosophical approaches and debates in the (late) modern  period (nineteenth and twentieth centuries). Responses and  developments, very broadly, can be divided into two. On the one hand, an essentially decompositional conception of analysis was accepted,  but a critical attitude was adopted towards it. If analysis simply  involved breaking something down, then it appeared destructive and  life-diminishing, and the critique of analysis that this view  engendered was a common theme in idealism and romanticism in all its  main varieties—from German, British and French to North  American. One finds it reflected, for example, in remarks about the  negating and soul-destroying power of analytical thinking by Schiller   [Quotation],  Hegel   [Quotation]  and de Chardin   [Quotation],  in Bradley's doctrine that analysis is falsification   [Quotation],  and in the emphasis placed by Bergson on ‘intuition’   [Quotation].  