 Surprisingly, classical game theory fails to support this intuition. From a classical game theoretical point of view, the fact that the right-side traffic rule is common knowledge between agents does not make it rational to act accordingly. All that can be said is that it is rational for A to stick to the convention if A expects the other to stick to the convention, too. However, the same holds true for a violation of the convention. If A expects B to violate the convention, it is rational for him to do likewise in order to avoid a collision. As there is common knowledge of rationality, however, A knows that B will stick to the convention only if he or she expects A to do likewise. Thus the condition cannot be settled, and the assertoric judgment that it is better to stick to the convention cannot be derived from the hypothetical judgment that this is the thing to do if the other does so as well. As the rational choice, classical game theory recommends a mixed strategy in such situations, which is remarkably bad advice for real life, and luckily descriptively inadequate.