 The argument that is given to support the destructive claims is that (i) knowledge of one’s mental events requires that these events cause one’s knowledge, but (ii) epiphenomenalism denies physical effects of mental events. So, either we cannot know our own mental events, or our knowledge of them cannot be what is causing the plainly physical event of our saying something about our mental events. Thus, suppose \(S\) is an epiphenomenalist, and that \(S\) utters “I am in terrible pain.” \(S\) is committed to the view that the pain does not cause the utterance. But then, it seems, \(S\) would be making the same utterance whether or not a pain were occurring. If this is so, then \(S\)’s testimonies about \(S\)’s own pains are worthless — both to us and to \(S\). They cannot be taken to represent any knowledge about pains on \(S\)’s part (if \(S\)’s epiphenomenalist view is true). In fact, on an epiphenomenalist view, all the arguments for epiphenomenalism and rebuttals to counterarguments we have reviewed might be given even if we were all zombies — i.e., even if we were all possessed of physical causes of our utterances and completely devoid of any mental life whatsoever.