 The considerations of  section 5.1  and  section 5.2  suggest that currently living and future people can have a just claim to compensation owing to what was done to others in the past. If so, currently living people ought to attempt to counteract the negative impact of past wrongs for the well-being of current and future people. However, one could argue that such an interpretation of the relevance of past injustices is incomplete when understood as a statement of how we ought to respond to the fact that past people were severely wronged. To many it is intuitively plausible that present generations can have duties to dead victims owing to the wrongs committed against them (by others) in the past. The moral significance of past wrongs does not exclusively lie in their impact on present and future people’s well-being; rather, the significance of past wrongs is also to be seen in the fact that past people were victims of these injustices. If this intuition can be defended, we have duties to past generations that are grounded in past deeds. This would imply that at least some aspects of historical injustice cannot be accounted for by an historically informed theory of justice between contemporaries (or between contemporaries and future people).