 Archibald Alison, whose Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste first appeared in 1790, follows after Gerard in several respects. He follows after Gerard in holding that objects of taste are not naturally pleasurable, as Hutcheson had supposed, and so follows after Gerard in holding that objects of taste must acquire their pleasurability from something else that is naturally pleasurable. He follows after Gerard, moreover, in holding that this acquisition depends centrally on association, and follows after Gerard, finally, in holding that the naturally pleasurable something else is—at least typically and at least in part—a mental operation of some sort. But he departs from Gerard regarding both the role of association and the identity of the naturally pleasurable mental operation. Whereas Gerard holds association merely to be a vehicle by which pleasurability is transmitted from the naturally pleasurable mental operation to the object of taste, Alison holds association also to be the central mental operation from which pleasurability is transmitted to the object taste.