 Of course, not all teleological theories share the broad features of consequentialism and egoism. Classical Natural Law theories (Finnis [1980], Murphy [2001]) are teleological, in the sense that they seek to explain what we ought to do in terms of what is good, but they do so in a very different way from consequentialism and egoism. According to an example of such a Natural Law theory, there are a variety of natural values, each of which calls for a certain kind of distinctive response or respect, and agents ought always to act in ways that respond to the values with that kind of respect. For more on natural law theories, see the entry on  the natural law tradition in ethics.   And Barbara Hermann has prominently argued for interpreting Kant’s ethical theory in teleological terms.  For more on Herman’s interpretation of Kant, see the entry on  Kant’s Moral Philosophy,  especially section 13. Philip Pettit [1997] prominently distinguishes between values that we are called to “promote” and those which call for other responses.  As Pettit notes, classical consequentialists hold that all values are to be promoted, and one way of thinking of some of these other kinds of teleological theories is that like consequentialism they explain what we ought to do in terms of what is good, but unlike consequentialism they hold that some kinds of good call for responses other than promotion.