 On another note, John McDowell described knowledge in ‘Knowledge and the Internal’ as a “standing in the space of reasons” and argued against an “interiorization of the space of reasons” that would occur if one were to think of knowledge as achieving flawless standings in the space of reason, “without needing the world to do us any favours” (McDowell 1998 395–396). If appearances were to be misleading, it would be argued that this not be the result of faulty moves within the space of reason but simply an “unkindness of the world”. This conception, McDowell sees as opening the door to an ‘hybrid’ account of knowledge, with flawless standings in the space of reasons as an internal part, which would provide necessary conditions for knowledge, and favours from the world—when thing are as they appear to be—as an extra condition (McDowell 1998, 400). But, McDowell concludes, “the very idea of reason as having a sphere of operation within which it is capable of ensuring, without being beholden to the world that one’s postures are all right […] has the look of a fantasy” (McDowell 1998, 405). This is so precisely because the resources from the space of reasons could not provide factiveness on their own, so knowledge could not be completely constituted by standings within it. To rid oneself of the fantasy, one needs simply to recognize that on occasions when the world is what it appears to be, this favour is “not extra to the person’s standing in the space of reasons” (McDowell 1998, 405) and that “we are vulnerable to the world’s playing us false; and when the world does not play us false we are indebted to it” (McDowell 1998, 407). Here too, although the terminology is taken from Wilfrid Sellars, there is a recognizable source in Cook Wilson.