 In turn, Gabriela Basterra has recalled that Kant’s moral law, understood as the basis of a positive feeling and as the object of our greatest respect (Achtung) is cognized a priori, and even the respect we experience for it is not of empirical origin. Respect is thus a unique affect that motivates my will to follow the moral law, though it is not a feeling in an empirical psychological sense (Kant 1788 [2002]). Instead, it is something that affects me, and Basterra compares it to the affection that Levinas identifies as the interruption of my activity by the other who faces me (Basterra 2015). Once again, the two philosophies are different, notably because they entail distinct approaches. But it remains that, like Kant’s a priori, we cannot assimilate the motivation experienced before the face of the other to a subjective state or to an objective concept.