 Like Hume, Kant takes virtue to be central to human morality. But his basic conception of virtue differs from Hume’s, as does his catalogue of particular virtues and vices. According to Kant, virtue is the form in which a being with an imperfect or non-holy will expresses her supreme commitment to morality. Virtue is such a being’s continually cultivated capacity to master her inclinations so as to fulfill her duties; a capacity whose cultivation and exercise is motivated by respect for the moral law (Denis 2006; Baxley 2010; Wilson 2015a). Several related claims are integral to Kant’s view. First, virtue is a general disposition to do one’s duty out of respect for the moral law (CPrR 5:128, 160; C 27:300). Second, virtue is a kind of strength. More specifically, virtue is “a moral strength of the will” (MM 6:405) or “moral strength in adherence to one’s duty” (Ant 7:147). Third, virtue presupposes opposition and entails internal struggle. Virtue’s primary opponent is the “radical evil in human nature”—a propensity to adopt maxims that prioritize self-love (and inclinations generally) over the moral law (Rel 6:29, 35–37, 57 n., 58). It is because of radical evil that virtue implies struggle and demands strength. The fundamental task of the virtuous person is to achieve the proper ordering of her incentives, giving the moral law undisputed priority over self-love. Finally, virtue is moral self-constraint “based on inner freedom” (MM 6:408), which is the capacity to act on the autonomously chosen principles of morality, even in the face of temptation (MM 6:394, 405). Virtue both expresses and promotes inner freedom. The greater one’s moral strength and self-constraint, the more one acts on reason rather than inclination or impulse (MM 6:382 n).