 Various arguments have been offered against the alleged results of empirical findings for motivational internalism. Some have argued that VM patients lack moral concepts (Kennett and Fine 2007), that VM patients make moral judgments only in what R. M Hare (1963) called the “inverted commas” sense (Kennett and Fine 2007), that VM patients are, in fact motivated when they make moral judgments (Kennett and Fine 2007), that the evidence offered for the claim that VM patients make moral judgments without experiencing emotion “is not decisive” (Prinz 2015), that we have reasons to doubt that VM patients have moral beliefs (Cholbi 2006), and that VM patients have impaired agency and so do not make genuine moral judgments, which require agency (Gerrans and Kennett 2010). In varying ways, these responses challenge whether it is conceptually coherent to treat cases of VM patients as cases of amoralism. Insofar as the disagreement concerns the conceptual coherence of amoralism, it is uncertain how appealing to the empirical literature helps to advance the debate. Of course, Roskies might (following Prinz (2015), see below) maintain that internalism is in fact a psychological rather than a conceptual thesis, in which case these criticisms of the conceptual coherence of treating cases of VM patients as cases of amoralism would no longer apply.