  Dual process theories of moral psychology reject the moral sentimentalism claim that all moral judgments are made in the same way.  Dual process theories maintain that we have two systems of moral decision-making: a system for Utilitarian reasoning that is driven by affect-less, abstract deliberation, and system for Deontological reasoning that is driven by automatic, intuitive, emotional heuristics like gut feelings (Greene, 2014). Dual process theories are meant to explain the seemingly inconsistent moral intuitions ordinary folks have about moral dilemmas. For example, in a standard trolley case where an out-of-control trolley is heading toward five innocent, unaware individuals on the track ahead, most people have the intuition that we ought to throw the switch so that the trolley goes onto a spur of the track, thereby killing one person on the spur but saving five lives.  However, in the footbridge variation of the trolley problem where saving the five lives requires pushing an individual off a footbridge to derail the trolley, most people have the intuition that we should not do this even though the consequences are the same as in the standard trolley dilemma. The dual process theory holds that in the former case, our reasoning is guided by a System-2 type of abstract reasoning. However, in the latter case, our moral reasoning is guided by an aversive physiological response triggered by imagining pushing an individual off a footbridge. The dual process view partially vindicates the moral sentimentalist position insofar as it posits a distinctive System 1 type of moral reasoning that is based on embodied gut instincts. However, it maintains that there is a separate system operating on different inputs and processes for more abstract moral reasoning.