 As Kripke points out, complications arise due to the fact that we can apparently re-use names. So, I may have come across the name ‘Napoleon’ via a chain of use leading back to the most famous of French generals. Having heard the name, I may now decide to call my cat, who likes to imperiously survey the domain of my apartment, ‘Napoleon’. When I use the name in this way, my intentions make it the case, Kripke claims, that I have introduced a new name, or at least a new use of the name. This is in spite of the fact that there is a very real sense in which I inherited the name from a historical tradition that traces back to 18th century France. The take-home is this: not every sort of causal connection to previous use is equal, according to the causal theorist. Some will help to fix reference, whereas others are irrelevant. And while it would certainly be nice to have a complete theory of which of these is which, a detailed account of all this has proven remarkably difficult to  offer.[5] 