 Despite Fârâbî’s saying in I,91 (cited just above) that being-as-having-a-quiddity-outside-the-soul is more widely extended than being-as-true, it emerges from his later discussions that, taking “quiddity outside the soul” in a strict sense, having a quiddity outside the soul is more demanding, and that we must first ask whether something is in the sense of true, i.e., whether a given concept is instantiated outside the soul, and only then, if the answer is yes, ask whether what instantiates it is also circumscribed by a quiddity outside the soul. If a concept is not instantiated outside the soul, such as (for Aristotle and Fârâbî) the concept of vacuum, then, while there vacuum has a quiddity-in-an-extended sense, since we can ask “what is vacuum?” and answer the question by giving an explanation of the name “vacuum”, a so-called “nominal definition” which identifies what concept the word “vacuum” stands for, nonetheless vacuum has no quiddity in the proper sense, and certainly no quiddity outside the soul (I,91 p.118,4–9). Even after we have determined “that what is understood by the expression is the same outside the soul”, we can still ask “does it exist [hal mawjûd] or not?”, meaning now not “is it true?” but rather “does it have some thing by which its constitution [qiwâm] [is] and which is present in it” (III,229  p.214,4–9).[26]  This will be “one of the causes of its existence”, so that “our saying ‘does the thing exist?’ in the second way” is equivalent to “does it have a cause by which its constitution [is] in its essence?” (III,229 p.214,11–13). For