 So consider (ii), i.e., claiming that while some special obligations may initially appear to be non-contractual in nature, they are really contractual. We can see, for example, Locke’s famous appeal to the notion of tacit consent in the political context as an instance of this second strategy. In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke claims that we have special political obligations, i.e., obligations to our own government that we do not have to all governments. He himself, however, imagines someone responding, when he proposes that these special political obligations are contractual in nature, “[t]hat all men being born under government, some or other, it is impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful government” (61). In other words, given our situations as being born into particular governments, it certainly doesn’t appear that our special obligations to our governments are contractual in nature. Thus, if we accept voluntarism (as Locke clearly did), then it seems that we cannot have special political obligations.