 Before, we said that metaphysical explanations “derive their explanatory power” somehow from non-causal relationships. More specific proposals about the nature and varieties of metaphysical explanation diverge over which relationships those are, and how that work is carried out. Any proposal, though, must confront perhaps the most striking feature of any form of explanation, one that seems even more surprising in the case of metaphysical explanation. Metaphysical explanations seem to have one foot in the world—something to do with the way it is (causally or non-causally) structured seems to play a role. Metaphysical explanations are metaphysical, after all (or so one might think). Yet they seem to have another foot in our thought and communication about the world—our desire for explanation (even if not a natural one, as Aristotle claims) is at least in part a desire to understand, to make the world intelligible to ourselves and others, to learn the why and how of things and what to expect, to satisfy our curiosity. Metaphysical explanations are explanations, after all (or so one might think). Yet how could metaphysical explanation be at once metaphysical, but also a form of explanation?