 Hook provided naturalistic rebuttals to these two arguments advanced by Stevenson on the attitudinal interpretation of ethical statements. Hook argued that in the case in which seeming agreement on all the facts was conjoined with a continuing disagreement in attitude, it was not legitimate to exclude the possibility of an undisclosed factual disagreement. Future investigation might uncover disagreement about relevant facts that could have an impact in changing attitudes. Hook’s claim is that the premise of Stevenson’s argument, namely, that all the facts relevant to attitudes in a moral dispute have been discovered, is not demonstrable. That is, there is no form of completeness theorem which would explicate the notion of all the facts. Thus, the pragmatic thesis that normative statements are empirical appraisals that are open to confirmation by future consequences is not refuted by Stevenson’s identification of disagreement in attitude, since the discovery of future facts may bring about a change in attitude.