 Moreover, Olivi is careful to secure the freedom and autonomy of the will even against its own dispositions: virtues and vices do not determine our choices. A virtuous person is more likely to make good choices than a vicious one, but ultimately every choice is always up to the will (Bobiller 2020, 155–56), and the agent can always act against her virtuous or vicious dispositions. Olivi emphasizes that this kind of freedom is a necessary condition for being morally responsible of one’s actions: “Where the freedom of the will is missing, there is absolutely no ground for merit and demerit” (Summa II q. 57, 337). Another important aspect of Olivi’s virtue ethics is that he plays down the role of external action and focuses instead on the will of the agent: the moral value of our actions stems from the internal intention and the free decision to perform those actions (see, e.g. Summa II q. 113, p. 307; ibid., q. 118, p. 443; Normore 2004, p. 144).