Feminist bioethics’ theoretical approaches also take some distinctive approaches to ontology and epistemology that challenge traditional philosophical positions on the way that knowledge, subjectivity and moral agency are mobilized within ethical discourse. The search for a more satisfactory moral grounding for bioethics has taken feminist scholars in several directions. A few favor dispensing with principles entirely and reconstituting bioethics through narrative case-specific interpretation along the lines pioneered by Nel Noddings (1984) and her followers. Others, without going this far, are nevertheless convinced that narrative approaches have useful applications in bioethics (e.g., H.L. Nelson 2001). Yet others have criticized the abstract universal approach to theory construction from the perspective of European thought (e.g., Mary Rawlinson 2001); noting the masculine markings of the allegedly generic human subject in philosophy, they decry the failure of purported universalists to recognize the particularities of women’s disparate conditions. Other groups of feminists have ventured along the different routes of post-structuralist and postmodern theory on the one hand (Shildrick 1997; Shildrick and Mykitiuk 2005) and particularism (Little 2001) on the other, to challenge other kinds of claim to universality . And yet other feminists think a framework that incorporates universal principles can and should continue to constitute one dimension of an adequate bioethical theory, provided that these principles are formulated in non-exclusionary terms that reflect the relational context and empirical realities of individual lives.