  The second treatise of the book raises another important philosophical problem, the significance of the concept of time. One of the roots of the principle of the existence of God is God’s independence of time. In Albo’s discussion of this root, he discriminates between two different concepts of time, Aristotelian-physical and Neoplatonic-ontological. Two central trends appear in the academic literature on this topic. The first places the concept of time at the focus of the discussion, attempting to clarify the relationship between the two different concepts of time that appear in Albo’s discussion (Harvey 1979–80). Those scholars who take the second position discuss Albo’s concept of time as part of their attempt to identify his cosmogonic view, in other words, which theory of the origin of the world he upholds (Klein-Braslavi 1976, 118–120, 126; Rudavsky 1997, 470–473). In this context, we should point out that comprehensive study of Albo’s writing on this issue reveals a certain difficulty in categorizing his exact position.  Together with explicit dogmatic statements supporting the theory of creation ex nihilo appearing in the first treatise, we find other statements, although less overt, some of which argue for the eternal existence of matter, and some of which even support the eternal existence of the world (Ehrlich 2009a, 94–112).