 English fourteenth-century authors often commented on the terminological distinctions between determinate and indeterminate truth and falsity. Ockham characterized all prospective truths, whether necessary or contingent, as immutable and therefore determinate, but there were other suggestions as well. Walter Burley, Richard of Campsall, Arnold of Strelley, and Robert Holkot preferred to call true propositions about future contingent things as indeterminately or contingently true. Some commentators have argued that speaking about this special mode of being true or false was an attempt to modify bivalence by formulating an idea of many-valued logic, see Normore 1982, 1993; Gelber 2004: 224–250. For further texts and studies on late medieval controversies related to foreknowledge, freedom and future contingents, see Genest 1992; Schabel 2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2011a, 2011b; Schabel, Friedman, and Balcoyiannopoulou 2001; Rossini and Schabel 2005; Thakkar 2005, 2010. 