 Here is a second strategy in defense of scientific objectivity for subjective Bayesians: distance themselves from any substantive theory of inductive inference and hold instead that Bayesian epistemology can be construed as a kind of deductive logic. This view draws on some parallel features between deductive logic and Bayesian epistemology. First, the coherence of credences can be construed as an analogue of the logical consistency of propositions or all-or-nothing beliefs (Jeffrey 1983). Second, just as premises are inputs into a deductive reasoning process, prior credences are inputs into the process of an inquiry. And, just as the job of deductive logic is not to say what premises we should have except that they be logically consistent, Bayesian epistemology need not say what prior credences we should have except that they be coherent (Howson 2000: 135–145). Call this view the deductive construal of Bayesian epistemology, for lack of a standard name.