  From what we have seen, the commonplace thesis cannot be sustained. It would in many ways have been nice if chance of a process and randomness of its product had gone hand in hand—the epistemology of chance would be much aided if it invariably showed itself in random outputs, and we could have had a tight constraint on what outcomes to expect of a repeated chance process, to say nothing of the further interesting consequences the thesis may have for random sampling or probabilistic explanation, mentioned in the introduction. But the counterexamples to the thesis in  §§4–5  show that it is false, even in its most plausible form. Various attempts to salvage the thesis, by appeal to non-standard accounts of chance or randomness, fail to give us a version of the thesis of much interest or bearing on the issues we had hoped it would illuminate. A final attempt to argue directly for the thesis from the connections between chance, randomness, and determinism also failed, though it does shed light on all three notions. It is safest, therefore, to conclude that chance and randomness, while they overlap in many cases, are separate concepts.