 Human beings, of course, desire many things besides happiness—Mill acknowledges this fact as “palpable” (Utilitarianism, X: 234). Insofar as what we desire is taken as evidence of what is desirable, this might seem incompatible with Mill’s second subclaim—that happiness is exhaustive of the desirable. Mill’s strategy for establishing that happiness is the only desirable thing is to show that although there are other things which are desired by human beings, such things are desired only because of the relation they bear to happiness. Many things, of course, are desired merely as means to happiness. Upon inspection, such things do not strike us as ultimately desirable, but merely as useful mechanisms for bringing about that which is ultimately desirable. Mill recognises, however, that not all desiderata besides happiness are desired merely as means. Some people, for instance, “desire virtue for its own sake”—as a matter of “psychological fact”, they desire it “disinterestedly, for itself” (Utilitarianism, X: 237, 235). This does not threaten the claim that happiness is the only thing ultimately desirable, Mill argues, because for such individuals, virtue is desirable because it forms a part of their happiness.