 A somewhat less idealized view of the constituency of public reason is offered by Gaus (2011), who suggests that we should conceptualize the members of this constituency—he calls them Members of the Public—as moderately idealized counterparts of the real people to whom our moral and political rules apply. These Members of the Public “are not so idealized that their reasoning is inaccessible to their real-world counterparts” (Gaus 2011, 276), but instead are idealized in the following sense: they hold the beliefs that their real-world counterparts would be justified in holding after engaging in a “respectable amount” of good reasoning (Gaus 2011, 250)—reasoning that starts from the evaluative commitments of the real-world agents they represent and from the level of Kohlbergian moral reasoning those agents are capable of (Gaus 2011, 277). This modest level of idealization ensures that the constituency of public reason will be far more diverse than the one envisaged by Rawls. This constituency will include members who adhere to different standards of rationality and have widely divergent sets of normative beliefs, including very divergent beliefs about basic matters of justice. This conception of the constituency of public reason thus purchases inclusivity, and greater approximation to real people’s moral judgments. But this may come with a substantial cost, since it is less clear how such a diverse constituency may agree on any rules at all, let alone rules that we can be confident would reflect our considered judgments about morality and justice (Quong 2014).