 The current debate about cognitive penetration is informed by more recent experiments in psychology. For a case of a top-down effect in the current literature, consider “memory color” in Hansen et al.’s banana (2006). When subjects were asked to adjust an image of a characteristically yellow object until it was achromatic, they overcompensated by adjusting until the image was slightly bluish. Subjects did not overcompensate with objects that were not characteristically yellow. The type of case presented by Hansen et al. is much harder to explain away as not really involving top-down effects than those in the classic philosophy of science literature. (For related examples, see Delk and Fillenbaum 1965 or Olkkonen, Hansen, and Gegenfurtner 2008. For further discussion of whether and how there might be top-down effects on perception, see Macpherson 2012, Deroy 2013, Firestone and Scholl 2016; Green 2020).