 Moore’s other chief good of personal love also involved admiring contemplation, but now of objects, namely persons, that are not just beautiful but also intrinsically good (1903: 203/1993: 251). Since for Moore the main intrinsic goods were mental qualities, such love involved primarily the admiring contemplation of another’s good states of mind. In so characterizing love Moore was applying one of four recursive principles he used to generate higher-level intrinsic goods and evils from an initial base-set of goods and evils. The first principle says that if state x is intrinsically good, admiringly contemplating, or loving, x for itself is also intrinsically good (1903: 203–04, 217/1993: 251–53, 265). Thus, if person A’s admiringly contemplating beauty is good, person B’s admiringly contemplating A’s admiration is a further good, as is C’s admiration of B’s admiration, and so on. A second principle says that if x is intrinsically evil, hating x for itself is intrinsically good (1903: 217/1993 265); thus, B’s feeling compassionate pain at A’s pain is good. And two final principles say that loving for itself what is evil, as in sadistic pleasure in another’s pain, and hating for itself what is good, as in envious pain at his pleasure, are evil (1903: 208–10, 211–12/1993: 257–58, 259–60). Though Moore stated these four principles separately, they all make morally appropriate attitudes to intrinsic goods and evils, ones whose orientation matches their objects’ values, additional such goods and morally inappropriate attitudes additional evils. The principles were by no means unique to him; they had been defended earlier by Rashdall and Brentano and would be defended later by Ross. But Moore’s formulation was in two respects distinctive. Rashdall and Ross called the higher-level values they generated virtues and vices, as it is indeed plausible to do; surely benevolence and compassion are virtuous and sadism vicious. But Moore preferred to define the virtues instrumentally, as traits that cause goods and prevent evils, and said that as such they lack intrinsic worth (1903: 172–77/1993: 220–26). Rashdall and especially Ross also held that virtue is the greatest intrinsic good and vice the greatest evil. In contrast, Moore suggested that the value of an appropriate or inappropriate attitude is often less than the value of its object; thus compassion for another’s pain, though good, is not as good as the pain is evil, so the combination of one person’s pain and another’s compassion for it has on balance negative value. “We have no reason,” he wrote, “to maintain the paradox that an ideal world would be one in which vice and suffering must exist in order that it may contain the goods consisting in the appropriate emotion towards them. … we cannot admit the actual validity of any of the arguments commonly used in Theodicies; no such argument succeeds in justifying the fact that there does exist even the smallest of the many evils which this world contains” (1903: 220/1993: 268)