 A contrasting approach to the unity of the Critique of Judgment goes by way of Kant’s moral teleology, and invokes Kant’s claim that the Critique of Judgment is intended to bridge the gulf between nature and freedom (Introduction II and III, 175–177). This approach is implicit in many discussions of the relevance of Kant’s aesthetics to his account of morality (see  Section 2.8),  which in turn can be connected to his theory of teleology through the idea that the human being, as a free and rational agent, is the “ultimate purpose” [Endzweck] of nature (see  Section 3.6).  Gardner (2016) offers an explicit defence of this kind of approach, drawing on the idea that aesthetic experience reveals the suitability of nature for human moral agency; this idea is also emphasized in Wicks (2007). Savile (2021) invokes a related idea and ascribes it to Kant under the label of “aesthetic humanism”. Vaccarino Bremner (forthcoming) develops this kind of approach in detail by focussing on Kant’s idea of culture, which Kant identifies as the ultimate purpose [letzter Zweck] of nature (5:429), and which, on her view, mediates between nature itself and the final purpose [Endzweck] of nature, that is the human being as a moral agent.