 Like Plato, Aristotle is a eudaimonist in that he argues that virtue (including in some way the moral virtues of courage, justice and the rest) is the dominant and most important component of happiness. However, he is not claiming that the only reason to be morally virtuous is that moral virtue is a constituent of happiness. He says that we seek to have virtue and virtuous action for itself as well (Nicomachean Ethics, 1097b 1–10); not to do so is to fail even to be virtuous. In this regard, it is like pleasure, which is also a constituent of the happy life. Like pleasure, virtue is sought for its own sake. Still, as a constituent of happiness, virtuous action is grounded in the highest end for a human being. One can discern in the Nicomachean Ethics two different types of argument for the link between virtue and happiness. One is based on Aristotle’s account of human nature and culminates in the so-called function argument of Book I. If happiness is excellent or virtuous activity of the soul, the latter is understood by way of the uniquely human function. If one understands the human function then one can understand what it is for that function to be done excellently (1098a5–15). This sort of argument has been criticized because it moves from a premise about what humans are to a conclusion about what they ought to be. Such criticism reflects the modern claim that there is a fact-value distinction. One defense of Aristotle’s argument holds that his account of human nature is meant both to be objective and to offer the basis for an understanding of excellence. The difference, then, between modern moral theory and ancient is over what counts as an objective account of human nature. However, even if we accept this defense, we can still ask why a human would consider it good to achieve human excellence as it is defined in the function argument. At this point another argument for the link between happiness and virtue – one more dispersed in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics – becomes relevant; it is based on value terms only and appeals to what a human might consider it good to achieve. Aristotle describes virtuous activity of the soul as fine (kalos) and excellent (spoudaios). Finally, the link between virtue and happiness is forged if a human sees that it is good to live a life that one considers to be fine and excellent.