 Against the second assumption, that we might fail to draw an evaluative conclusion from what others regard as definitive evidence, Foot argues in “Moral Beliefs” that we all have reason to act in view of what is demonstrated to be in our interests. If an action can be shown to be in our interests, we have reason to do it. So, one can say, at least pro tanto, that we ought to do it, and would be irrational and bad not to do it, all else being equal. Foot then aims to show that cultivating the virtues is always in one’s interest, and failing to do so is necessarily against one’s interest. She thereby claims to show that we each have reason to cultivate the virtues, regardless of our present desires. In the course of her argument, she attempts to refute the position advocated by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, namely, the view that it is more profitable to be unjust, a view which she calls “Thrasymachus’ thesis” (1959 [VV 125]). So, she aims to persuade us that justice, along with the other so-called ‘cardinal virtues’ of courage, prudence, and temperance, are in some sense profitable, even though these virtues may at times ask us to make drastic sacrifices, even to the point of laying down our lives.