On the “connection of denoted meanings” view (abhihitānvāya) accepted by Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, words convey their meanings, and then, in conjunction with three conditions, these meanings are related together through secondary meaning (lakṣaṇā). The three conditions mentioned in section 4.3 are expectancy of connections (ākāṅkṣā), semantic fit (yogyatā), and cognitive contiguity (āsatti or sannidhi). Expectancy of connections is defined either syntactically or in terms of a hearer’s psychological state of desiring words to fit together. Semantic fit is the requirement that the sentence makes sense, prima facie, and contiguity is the requirement that words are uttered in a temporally adjacent sequence or that they are closely related in the hearer’s mind. The view that the meaning of a sentence is due to the secondary signification of words is not necessarily connected to Bhāṭṭa view that words denote universals, as Vācaspati, in his Drop of Truth (Tattvabindu), defends this position despite elsewhere subscribing to Nyāya theories of meaning. Vācaspati argues explicitly that indication is responsible for the relationship (anvaya) between word-meanings and argues that it is commensurate with a Naiyāyika position (Sastri 2014; Phillips 2015).