 In the 1950s there was an analytic revolution in English-speaking aesthetics. Prior aesthetic theories were considered to be too speculative and unclear. Dewey’s work was caught up in this condemnation. Arnold Isenberg, for instance, in a founding document of analytic aesthetics, originally published in 1950, dismissed Art as Experience as a “hodgepodge of conflicting methods and undisciplined speculations”, (1950 [1987: 128]) although he found it full of profound suggestions. Dewey’s theories of expression and creativity were particular targets of analytic attack. His was among the views singled out in a general critique of expression as a defining characteristic of art, although often his own distinctive theory was ignored in the process. A situation followed, and continued well into the 1980s, in which, according to one editor of The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Dewey’s aesthetics was virtually ignored (Fisher 1989). While Monroe Beardsley, one of the most important late twentieth century aestheticians, kept an interest in Dewey alive (1958, 1975, 1982), particularly in his discussions of aesthetic experience, other major figures, including Arthur Danto, Mary Mothersill and Richard Wollheim, completely ignored him. Nelson Goodman may be a partial exception (Freeland 2001). He certainly shared with Dewey a conviction that art and science are close in many ways. And, like Dewey, he replaced the question “what is art?” with “when is art?” They also both took a naturalist approach to the arts. However, Goodman, who never refers to Dewey in his Languages of Art (1976), saw art in terms of languages and other symbol systems, whereas Dewey saw it in terms of experience.