 Another possible objection is that Descartes’ high justificatory standards generate a de facto truth condition: because having Cartesian certainty entails that one’s beliefs are true, truth is a necessary condition of knowledge. But this objection misses a key point. As suggested in the Second Replies passage, Cartesian certainty – understood in terms of indubitability – does not, strictly speaking, rule out the broad possibility that we are in error. The notions of indubitability and truth are different: that “p is indubitable” entails not that “p is true,” but that “there can be no reasons for doubting p.” Descartes’ final solution to the Evil Genius Doubt entails not that an evil genius cannot be, but that it cannot be coherently conceived. And that it cannot be coherently conceived, thinks Descartes, gives us “everything that we could reasonably want” – not because such coherence is the goal, but because of what it establishes, truth-wise.