 Legal moralism is an initially simple and natural position to take in delineating the legitimate boundaries of the legal use of coercion. At its heart is a strong link between moral wrongdoing and legal (especially criminal) wrongdoing. In the 1960s Herbert Hart applied the label “legal moralist” to his intellectual sparring partner, Lord Patrick Devlin, and the label stuck (Hart 1963; Devlin 1965). Devlin’s account, which we come to below, has led to numerous responses; beyond Hart himself a sample might include: Rostow (1960), Ronald Dworkin (1965), Ten (1972), Feinberg (1987), Kane (1994), Jeffrie Murphy (1999), Gerald Dworkin (1999), Kekes (2000), Nussbaum (2004, 2010), Wall (2013). While many of the responses to Devlin have been heavily critical, the approach is alive and well and continues to develop in the hands, among others, of self-declared legal moralists, such as Michael Moore and Antony Duff (Duff 2016: 96, 2018; Moore 1997, 2014) and in writers who seem at least broadly favourably disposed (Tadros 2016a: 169–170). Something akin to it is also found implicit in a vast range of legal writing.