 Brentano divided the attitudes of the conscious mind into three basic species. There was mere conception or presentation, having something before one or present to one, without taking up any further conscious stance towards it; there was the theoretical acceptance of something as real, true, existent, believable… and there was finally the other non-theoretical acceptance or rejection which is present in our feelings,… our desires, and all our practical decisions… We may well doubt whether pure presentation has that priority in mental life which Brentano gave to it, whether it is not perhaps rightly regarded as a deficient mode of attitudes far more involved and existential. However this may be, the value of the scheme is that is places the aesthetic field very satisfactorily—the aesthetic field is one of suspended conception, of pure having something before one to contemplate. It is a field essentially divorced from the Yes-No of belief and conviction, as it is divorced from the other Yes-No of practical concern…When we are aesthetically minded we are interested in what comes before us purely as an instance of character regardless as to whether there really is, or is not, such a thing or sort of thing, and our interest is moreover, not concerned, as practical interest always is, to bring what is merely thought of or intended into the field of reality, or to push something from the field of reality out into the field of the merely thought or intended. (1967d [1972: 94])