  Raterman (2006, 222) and Brennan (2007, 112) both claim that Aristotle denies that modesty is a virtue, as he thinks that a virtuous person is justified in making claims about their own merit. Some have also had a hard time squaring virtues like modesty and humility with Aristotle’s ideal of the great-souled man (megalopsuchos), who deserves honors and knows it (see Nicomachean Ethics IV.3).  Those working in a religious context influenced by Aristotle have to balance these competing ideals; see Foley (2004, 407ff.) and McCloskey (2006, 183). Some passages used to support the idea that Aristotle denies modesty is a virtue (Nicomachean Ethics 1108a32 and 1128b10–35) concern the Greek term aidōs, which is sometimes translated as ‘modesty’ but also commonly rendered as ‘shame’. Some modern interpreters have drawn from Aristotle to support the idea that modesty is a virtue: Driver (1989, 380) notes that Aristotle says the truthful person is inclined to understate the truth (Nicomachean Ethics 1127b4–8), Winter (2012) draws heavily from Aristotle in defending modesty as a virtue, and Hazlett (2012) defends intellectual humility as an Aristotelian mean state between dogmatism and timidity. Whatever Aristotle’s view of modesty, other Greek philosophers use the term aidōs to name a virtue. Epictetus, for example, uses it to refer to a good quality that involves taking other people’s  point of view into consideration; see  Epictetus: Appropriate Other-Concern  and the discussion in Kamtekar (1998).