 Vetter (2014, 2015) challenges what she calls ‘the standard conception of dispositionality’, according to which a disposition \(D\) is individuated by the pair of its stimulus condition \(S\) and its manifestation \(M\), and its modal nature is at least approximately captured by a counterfactual conditional ‘If \(x\) were in \(S, x\) would \(M\rsquo\). The alternative she proposes is the possibility conception of dispositionality according to which a disposition is individuated by its manifestation \(M\) alone and its modal nature is that of possibility, best characterised by ‘\(x\) can \(M\rsquo.\) On this conception, the stimulus condition plays no role in individuating dispositions. Hence dispositional sentences are akin to ‘can’ sentences. With this in the background, Vetter first proposes an analysis of comparative dispositional ascriptions which says that \(x\) is more disposed to \(M\) than \(y\) iff \(x\) would \(M\) in more cases than \(y\), where cases are triples of a world, a time, and an object. For instance, to say that \(x\) is more disposed to break than \(y\) is to say that \(x\) would break in more cases than \(y\). Vetter then proposes that \(x\) is disposed to break simpliciter just in case it breaks in a sufficiently large proportion of the relevant cases, where context may determine what counts as sufficiently large.