 The importance of (CompE) can be illustrated as follows. Consider the case of a father suspected of abusing his son. Suppose that the child does claim that s/he has been abused (label this evidence \(e\)). A forensic psychiatrist, when consulted, declares that this confirms guilt \((h)\). Alternatively, suppose that the child is asked and does not report having been abused \((\neg e).\) As pointed out by Dawes (2001), it may well happen that a forensic psychiatrist will nonetheless interpret this as evidence confirming guilt (suggesting that violence has prompted the child’s denial). One might want to argue that, other things being equal, this kind of “heads I win, tails you lose” judgment would be inconsistent, and thus in principle untenable. Whoever concurs with this line of argument (as Dawes 2001 himself did) is likely to be relying on the relevance notion of confirmation. In fact, no other notion of confirmation considered so far provides a general foundation for this judgment. \(F\)-confirmation, in particular, would not do, for it does allow that both \(e\) and \(\neg e\) confirm \(h\) (relative to \(k\)). This is because, mathematically, it is perfectly possible for both \(P(h\mid e \wedge k)\) and \(P(h\mid \neg e \wedge k)\) to be arbitrarily high above \(\bfrac{1}{2}.\) Condition (CompE), on the contrary, ensures that only one between the complementary statements \(e\) and \(\neg e\) can confirm hypothesis \(h\) (relative to \(k\)). (To be precise, HD-confirmation also satisfies condition CompE, yet it would fail the above example all the same, although for a different reason, that is, because the connection between \(h\) and \(e\) is plausibly one of probabilistic dependence but not of logical entailment.)