 According to a Brentanian conception of judgment, when we judge, the object is given to us by an act of presentation. Given this fact, Twardowski's analysis of ‘presented’ in terms of modifying vs. attributive adjectives is fundamental to understand what is exactly ‘judged in a  judgment.’[5]  For it is not only in presentations that we can distinguish act, content and object, but also in judgments. When we pass a judgment, we either accept or reject an object through a content. All judgments have a form which can be linguistically expressed as ‘The object A exists’ or ‘The object A does not exist.’ The object of judgment (A) is what is judged in a judgment. This object is the object of the presentation at the basis of the judgment, it is not the content of the presentation; it is the object presented in the attributive sense, not in the modifying sense. The content of a judgment is the existence or non-existence of the object presented. It might seem strange at first to hear Twardowski say that the content of a judgment is the (non-)existence of the object, but Twardowski has something like the following in mind: we judge about the object A that it exists (or that it does not exist). Twardowski's analysis clarifies what is going on when we judge, in a Brentanian theory of judgment, that the aether does not exist. Judging that the aether does not exist means rejecting a physical space-filling substance outside my consciousness. The object of this judgment is not mental. However, this does not mean that there is nothing inside my consciousness: there is a mental content, through which the aether is presented and judged as non-existing. That content, present in me, however, exists; it is the aether itself that does not exist.