Grosseteste’s discussion of non-temporal modalities and their relation to God’s power is most fully set out in the earlier recension of On Free Decision.  Focusing on necessity, he writes that “something is called necessary in that it has no capacity, either not to be, or not to have been, or not to be going to be. [The dictum] ‘that two and three are five’ is necessary in this sense, because it has no capacity not to be true in the present, or in the future, or in the past, or ever, be it with or without a beginning” (Lewis 2017, 39,41). He goes on to describe the corresponding notion of contingency as a matter of a proposition’s having “a capacity for being true and being false without a beginning.” What is necessary in this sense utterly lacks a power to be false. What is contingent, in the corresponding sense, could have had from the beginning a different truth-value, though it may well lack a power to change its truth-value from that which it actually has. Grosseteste holds that this kind of contingency of propositions about future events or things implies that the things or events the proposition is about may themselves be called contingent, and that this kind of contingency is sufficient for the freedom of our future acts.