 It follows from Schellenberg’s premises  (4)–(6)  that, necessarily, if God exists, then, for any capable finite person S and time t, it is not the case that S is at t nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. In short, God’s existence entails there’s never any nonresistant nonbelief. To assess this implication we must assess the premises from which it follows. In this section, we focus on premise  (5)  and a particular kind of assessment, something analogous to theodicy in the literature on the problem of evil. To help us keep our focus, suppose we grant premises  (4)  and  (6).  Moreover, since we want to assess premise  (5)  from as sympathetic a position as we can, suppose we grant Schellenberg’s claim that one is open to a positively meaningful, reciprocal, and conscious relationship with another, in a manner consistent with perfect love, only if one never does anything (by commission or omission) that would result in the other being prevented from participating in that relationship, just by trying. Given these suppositions, we might wonder whether it is possible that God perfectly loves such finite persons as there may be and yet, for at least some of them, God does something (by commission or omission) that results in them lacking belief in God’s existence—even though they have the capacity for a positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship with God and they are not in a state of resistance to God. In particular, we might wonder whether there are any reasons for a perfectly loving God to do something (by commission or omission) that would result in nonresistant nonbelief in persons who are capable of relating personally with God in this way.