 Guided by the idea that variation in some judgments might challenge our trust in them (Machery 2017, Chapter 4), the negative program has led experimental philosophers to examine whether moral judgments vary across cultures and other demographic groups (see also Graham et al. 2016; Doris et al. 2020). Early research focused on the distinction between causing harm as a means or as a side effect, and failed to find any cultural variation using the footbridge and the bystander versions of the trolley case (Hauser et al. 2007; Moore et al. 2011), but a few articles have observed differences among Americans, Russians and Chinese (Ahlenius &amp; Tännsjö 2012), English and Chinese (Gold et al. 2014), and Yali horticulturalists in Papua (Sorokowski et al. 2020). A recent study of moral judgments in 45 countries found that people find it less acceptable to cause someone’s death as a means to prevent a greater harm than as a mere side effect; they also find it less acceptable to cause someone’s death as a means to prevent a greater harm when the death results from “personal force”, i.e., when the force that impacts the victim originates in the agent’s muscles; but the interaction between these two factors, which had been observed in the USA, was only found in Western countries (Bago et al. 2022). Moral dilemmas that investigate the permissibility of causing harm to prevent a greater harm also elicit different judgments from men and women: in a metaanalysis of 40 studies, men were more likely to find it permissible to cause harm to prevent a greater harm in this kind of moral dilemmas (Friesdorf et al. 2015). Hannikainen, Machery and Cushman (2018) have also shown that Millenials are more likely to find it permissible to cause harm to prevent a greater harm in the footbridge case than Gen Xers and Boomers, suggesting that the relevant moral norms might have culturally evolved. 