 But even in the face of such worries, Nietzsche does not simply give up on truthfulness. Instead, he calls for a “critique” that will “experimentally” assess its value and legitimacy (GM III, 24). That experiment can be no other than the “life of the thinker” we met with already—the same “ultimate question” about the extent to which truthfulness can “endure incorporation” and be made compatible with life (GS 110). Again and again, in fact, Nietzsche presents this question, “the question of the value of truth” (BGE 1), as his distinctive question, the one centrally driving his philosophy (BGE 1; GM III, 24, 27, GS 110, 324, 344, 346; see also BGE 204–13, 227–30). It can carry such central significance only because, in Nietzsche’s eyes, the honest devotion to truth was both so indispensably valuable and (potentially) dangerous.