 Epistemology has a double fact as its object: the known fact and the fact of knowing. Knowing is judging an objective (state of affairs, see below 4.3.1) with entitlement [Berechtigung] – both external and internal (1915, Chapt. IV). The external entitlement is provided by the truth or truth-conduciveness of the judged objective, the internal by evidence [Evidenz]. Evidence is not just a subjective feeling of conviction; it is an objective feature of the mental act of judging (with or without certainty) and not of its mental content. Following Brentano, Meinong stands up for a concept of evidence as a basis for the theory of knowledge. Meinong, for instance, accepts Brentano’s views on evidence about the distinctions “direct–indirect” and “a priori–a posteriori”. Direct evidence may be given as a borderline case in inner perception, which is also evidence a posteriori (1906, §§9–13), and in knowledge of axiomatic truths, which is evidence a priori (1906, §1; 1915, §55). Like Brentano, Meinong also thinks that perceiving and remembering are always cases of judging and not just representing (1915: 606–7, 613) and that a judgement is indirectly evident if it is concluded from directly evident judgements. On the other hand, Meinong deviates in certain respects from Brentano’s theory of evidence. Already in 1886, Meinong adds “evidence for presumption” [Vermutungsevidenz] to “evidence for certainty”. He realizes that we trust in memory, outer perception, and induction not blindly and by chance, although our trust in these abilities does not derive from anything else. This confidence, Meinong concludes, can be counted as a further source of knowledge. It manifests itself as direct evidence, but evidence for something that may be erroneous, not certain, and he therefore calls it “direct conjectural evidence” ([unmittelbare Vermutungsevidenz], 1886: 30–34). Brentano, who only accepted “evidence for certainty”, strongly disapproved of Meinong’s conception. He considered Meinong’s introduction of a new special mode of cognition rather as a cutting than an unravelling of the Gordian knot (Kindinger 1965, 22–3). – Actually this disagreement was the beginning of the estrangement between them.