  There is a broad sense of “moral naturalism” whereby a moral naturalist is someone who believes an adequate philosophical account of morality can be given in terms entirely consistent with a naturalistic position in philosophical inquiry more generally. As science has developed over the last several centuries, it has seemed to many that the kinds of facts that scientists investigate through empirical methods are the only kinds of facts that there are. Religion and superstition have fallen by the wayside; the only things that we ought to believe in are the kinds of things that science can tell us about. This increasingly common attitude combines a metaphysical doctrine—that the only things that exist are natural things—with an epistemological doctrine—that we know about the world strictly by the use of experimentation and other empirical methods. Moral naturalism refers to any version of moral realism that is consistent with this general philosophical naturalism. Moral realism is the view that there are objective, mind-independent moral facts. For the moral naturalist, then, there are objective moral facts, these facts are facts concerning natural things, and we know about them using empirical methods.