 As we’ve seen, at Level 1, the adverbialist denies that perceptual experiences are direct presentations of objects. And at Level 2, in explaining character, the adverbialist assigns no role to the direct presentation of things, just ways of sensing. But then if it is an aspect of the phenomenology of experience that our experiences have direct objects, then it is not clear that the adverbialist has the resources to capture this. For the adverbialist, to capture your experience of a snow-covered churchyard we invoke seeing whitely not seeing a white thing. How, then, can we explain why phenomenologically, your experience is directly of a white thing – or even why it seems to be object-directed in this way? Butchvarov’s charge is that the adverbialist doesn’t have the resources to answer these questions. (See D’Ambrosio (2019) for a recent adverbialist attempt to capture something like object-directness).