 If this is right, then the status of thick words as evaluative depends on contingent facts about the pragmatics of our use of those words. There is then an important sense in which thick terms are, on this view, descriptive in their semantic content. So although there is a broader kind of speaker competence which involves understanding the conversational defaults associated with the relevant words, this is not the kind of semantic competence that could ground an argument for generalism or particularism. Semantic competence with thick words is also unlikely to commit one to any interesting moral principles. Depending on our views of concepts, this view about thick language can allow that some thinkers' concepts of justice, generosity, and courage may be evaluative. But that is unlikely to be essential to those concepts, nor will the capacity forthought about justice and other thick notions depend on having genuinely evaluative thick concepts (Väyrynen 2013: 123–4, 206). In that case, competence with concepts like justice, courage, and generosity is also unlikely to commit us to any interesting moral principles.  Moreover, the more modest form of generalism may require that a concept isn't a concept of justice, or courage, or generosity, unless it is evaluative. In that case the pragmatic view of thick evaluative language would support the view that there are no thick evaluative concepts and, therefore, no such thing as competence with thick evaluative concepts.