Theories of truth and predication are closely related to theories of  properties and  property attribution. To say that an open formula \(\phi(x)\) is true of an individual \(a\) seems equivalent (in some sense) to the claim that \(a\) has the property of being such that \(\phi\) (this property is signified by the open formula). For example, one might say that ‘\(x\) is a poor philosopher’ is true of Tom instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher. Quantification over definable properties can then be mimicked in a language with a truth predicate by quantifying over formulas. Instead of saying, for instance, that \(a\) and \(b\) have exactly the same properties, one says that exactly the same formulas are true of \(a\) and \(b\). The reduction of properties to truth works also to some extent for sets of individuals.