 Malcolm understands 302 as providing an “external attack” on the possibility of a private language (contrast the argument of  §1.1).  That is to say, 302 is designed to show the difficulty that one runs into if one begins with the idea that one knows from one’s own case what it is to feel pain: one risks conceptual solipsism.  [12]  Colin McGinn has suggested that the problem raised in 302 can be thought of in the following way: if I learn through introspection what it is, say, to be in pain, then there is a “a way of thinking about my experiences which (a) only I have and (b) enters into my understanding of the concept in question” (1984: 127). The way I learn about the object of my thought here is as something that has a “distinctively first-person element” from which it seems impossible to prescind (ibid). This explains why I can make a transition from the pain in my hand to the pain in my arm, but it is “none too easy a thing” to make a transition from a pain that I feel in my hand to a pain that you feel somewhere in your body (for a very different interpretation of the 302, see Kripke 1982, Postscript).