 To recap, strong representationalism is the modern day’s direct realism about perception, where adverbialism is replaced by representationalism run on a naturalistic story about how perceptual experiences acquire their (analog) representational content that in turn constitutes their phenomenology. So, according to strong representationalism, pain experiences feel the way they do in virtue of their representational content, and nothing else. They represent various disorderly conditions of bodily tissue. The way they represent these conditions is analogous to the way our visual system represents colors. If colors are (at least, partly) objective features of surfaces like their surface spectral reflectances, our visual experiences don’t represent colors as such, so we cannot come to conceptualize colors as spectral reflectances on the basis of their “grainless” visual presentations. So it is no objection to representationalism that our pain experiences don’t represent tissue damage as such, which is to say that we cannot necessarily conceptualize what pain experiences represent as tissue damage solely on the basis of these experiences.