 Carel’s stress on experience is directly challenged by views like Gadamer’s. He insists (1996, 113) that it is absurd to ask someone if they feel healthy, since health is “not a condition that one introspectively feels in oneself. Rather, it is a condition of being involved, of being in the world, of being together with one’s fellow human beings, of active and rewarding engagement in one’s everyday tasks”. Gadamer’s healthy person is someone who is in harmony with their social and natural environment, and disease is a disturbance of this harmony. Canguilhem (1991, 2012) thinks of health as flexibility, in the sense that a healthy organism can tolerate environmental impacts, adapts to new situations and possesses a store of energy and audacity. This is not something that can be measured by physiology (2012, p.49). Canguilhem’s approach suggests what is wrong with Gadamer’s objection to phenomenological accounts of health. A phenomenological account does not have to hold, as Gadamer seems to have supposed, that there is a special feeling that is the feeling of being healthy. Rather, for a view like Canguilhem or Carel’s, healthy people experience the world as an arena to express themselves in rather than a bunch of threats. Antonovsky (1987) puts this in terms of a sense of coherence which enables one to understand the environment and mobilize internal resources against external stressors. It may well be that perspectives like Carel’s are neglected in contemporary medicine, and that they are especially important in disability studies. However, it does not follow that the concepts of health and disease, rather than aspects of our practices that employ those concepts, should be reformed along the lines she suggests. In general, though, accounts of health, compared to those of disease, are less concerned with trying to capture a scientific or clinical concept.