 Due to these and other problems—see Holland (1954) for a detailed discussion of the empiricist theory, versions of which he attributes to Russell (1921) and Broad (1925), in addition to Hume—the empiricist theory has few contemporary defenders. One exception is Byrne (2010), who endorses a neoempiricist theory which sees the content of memory and the content of imagination as degraded and transformed versions of the content of perception. The neoempiricist theory distinguishes between memory and imagination by claiming that memory necessarily preserves cognitive contact with the original event, whereas imagination may involve cognitive contact but does not preserve it. Both aspects of this claim are problematic. The claim that memory necessarily preserves cognitive contact may be undermined by the generative character of remembering, at least if an extreme form of generationism is assumed. And the claim that imagination does not preserve cognitive contact is difficult to reconcile with the fact that imagining draws on stored information. Like the classical empiricist theory, moreover, the neoempiricist theory fails to deal with both aspects of mnemicity, focusing exclusively on the distinction between remembering and mere imagining and saying little about the distinction between successful and unsuccessful remembering. It may therefore not have a significant advantage over the classical empiricist theory.