 Nonetheless, as Lewis (1948, reprinted in Lewis 1970, 318–321) notes in a breakdown of cases, the probabilistically qualified subjunctive \((S \amp A) \rightarrow  (h)E\) (“If one were to seem to see a doorknob and have the experience of reaching out with one’s hand, then, in all likelihood, one would seem to feel something hard and round”) is compatible with occasional failures of prediction. Thus, he can point out that in cases where the truth of \(M\) (“One’s fingertips have been permanently anaesthetized”) somehow doesn’t affect the sensory cues and is recent enough to have not (yet) significantly altered the patterns in the data D, e.g. of instances of \(E\) usually following \(S\) and \(A, (S \amp A) \rightarrow(h)E\) remains true when \(P\) (“There is a doorknob before one”) and \(M\) are true. That’s because in such cases \((S \amp A) \rightarrow(h)E\) is still supported by the extant data of experience and memory D in accord with the a priori rules, despite the truth of \(M\), and the reliability of that probability assessment is still warranted by the data and rules for judging reliability, although \(M\) might affect the actual reliability of the probability assessment in the cases at hand, and might eventually affect the actual frequency of \(E\) over time. Much depends here on the understanding of probability statements and conditionals, and Lewis’ account isn’t without its tensions. In different (but more normal) cases where \(M\) does manifest itself by affecting the sensory cues, making \(S_1\) true, for example, one seems to have tingly, numb fingertips, in addition to \(S\), one seems to see a doorknob, \((S \amp S_1 \amp A) \rightarrow\) not \((h)E\) might indeed be true, but, as Lewis would emphasize, it is consistent with \((S \amp A) \rightarrow(h)E\). Finally, in yet different (and bizarre) cases where the longstanding truth of \(M\) when \(P\) was true in the past didn’t affect the sensory cues but significantly affected the pattern with \(E\), making D1, e.g. \(E\) not usually following \(S\) and \(A\) in recalled instances, the actual empirical data, rather than D as in the first case, it seems that D1 wouldn’t have led us to expect \(E\) upon \(S\) and \(A\). However, that expectation is constitutive in part of our objective thought \(P\), and thus, as Firth (1950) suggests, the failure of the sensory conditional \((S \amp A) \rightarrow(h)E\) to hold relative to D1 is arguably irrelevant to its entailment by the thought we express by “P”. In any case, one might wonder how sensory conditionals like \((S \amp A) \rightarrow  (h)E\), which, for Lewis, express generalizations concerning what any one would (likely) experience and which must do so if they are to provide the empirical content of objective judgements about an interpersonal material world, can nonetheless be warranted inductively by premises concerning only patterns in the personal experience of the putative knower, in particular how their probability can be judged to be sufficiently reliable, without reference to any background beliefs about how the material world interacts with persons generally and their bodies to affect experience. 