 Formally, it is fairly simple to show that (SP) characterizes relevance confirmation (see, e.g., Crupi, Festa, and Buttasi 2010, 80; Hájek and Joyce 2008, 123), but the philosophical import of this result is nonetheless remarkable. For illustrative purposes, it is useful to assume the endorsement of the principle of total evidence (TE) as a default position for the Bayesian. This means that \(P\) is assumed to represent actual degrees of belief of a rational agent, that is, given all the background information available. Then, by clause (i) of (SP), we have that the occurrence of \(e\), a consequence of \(h \wedge k\) (but not of \(k\) alone), confirms \(h\) relative to \(k\) provided that \(e\) was initially uncertain to some degree (even given \(k\)). In other words: \(e\) must have been predicted on the basis of \(h \wedge k\). Moreover, again by (i), the confirmatory impact will be stronger the more surprising (unlikely) the evidence was unless \(h\) was conjoined to \(k\). So, under TE, relevance confirmation turns out to embed a squarely predictivist version of hypothetico-deductivism! As we know, this neutralizes the charge of underdetermination, yet it comes at the usual cost, namely, the old evidence problem. In fact, if TE is in force, then clause (ii) of (SP) implies that no statement that is known to be true (thus assigned probability 1) can ever have confirmatory import. 