 However the debate between simulation theorists and theory theorists turns out, or whether some sort of hybrid combination of the two proves correct, we should once again bear in mind the point made at the end of Section 2.1. Since even the most ardent simulation theorist will allow that we have mental concepts, it is doubtful that the simulation perspective actually poses a significant threat to eliminativism, and it seems possible for there to be a version of eliminative materialism that could be reconstructed within the simulation framework, even for beliefs and desires. For example, it is at least conceivable that the decision-making machinery that is taken off-line to simulate the reasoning of another person could take as input cognitive states other than beliefs and desires, but that we somehow mistakenly conceptualize as beliefs and desires. On this admittedly speculative scenario, our ability to predict and explain the behavior of others would be simulation-based, and yet our conception of how minds work would be so far off that an eliminativist verdict would be appropriate.