 One can, though, grant impartiality a significant, even central and foundational, role while allowing that our actions and motives may often be partial in nature. As Brad Hooker has pointed out, there are at least three levels at which assessments of moral impartiality may be made. First, one may ask whether moral rules are being impartially applied. Second, impartial benevolence may be used as a direct guide to practical decisions. And third, the content of first-order moral rules may be assessed from an impartial standpoint (Hooker 2010) More recently he has suggested that for the purposes of moral and political philosophy, it may be less useful to focus, as Gert’s analysis does, on the notion of impartial treatment, than on “impartiality in the application of rules” and “impartiality in justification of behavior.” After all, he writes, “impartial treatment, according to [Gert’s] account of it, not only is not always a moral requirement but also is sometimes morally forbidden” (Hooker 2013, 722). According to Hooker’s account of impartial application of rules, “When a rule is applied across a set of cases, the rule is not applied impartially if and only if both (a) the agent is at least sometimes guided by partiality and (b) this conflicts with being guided by the distinctions identified by the rule as pivotal” (2013, 721). The analysis is intended to allow that some rules might (legitimately) require partiality—for instance, a rule requiring parents to take care of their own children. Such a rule could nonetheless be partially or impartially applied, and agents might be blameworthy for failing to apply them impartially even when they are not blameworthy for engaging in the various forms of partiality that are required by the rule.