 This move to reject hedonism can take the consequentializer even further when it’s combined with the rejection of utilitarians’ narrow conception of an act’s outcome. Utilitarians tend to think of an act’s outcome as consisting solely in what’s causally downstream from the act. For they hold that hedonic utility is all that matters and that things that are not causally downstream from the act—things such as whether the act is an instance of keeping a promise, whether the agent’s motive in performing it was virtuous, and whether there’s a victim of some past injustice who would be compensated by it—don’t themselves affect how much hedonic utility it produces. But there’s no reason why the act-consequentialist can’t be concerned with more than just the causal consequences of an act. And, so, it’s now standard to construe the outcome of an act broadly to include everything that would be the case if it were performed. (Of course, if it’s indeterminate what would be the case if it were performed, we would need to switch from talking about the act’s outcome to talking about its prospect, which is a probability distribution consisting of all its possible outcomes and their associated probabilities. But I’ll ignore this complication in what remains.)