 The most common worry for subjective Bayesianism is that, on that view, anything goes. For example, under just Probabilism and Regularity, there is a prior that follows enumerative induction and there also is a prior whose posterior never generalizes from data, defying enumerative induction (see Carnap 1955 for details, but see Fitelson 2006 for a concise presentation). Under just Probabilism and the Principal Principle, there is a prior that follows Ockham’s razor in statistical model selection but there also is a prior that does not (Forster 1995: sec. 3; Sober 2002: sec.  6).[7]  So, although subjective Bayesianism does not really say that anything goes, it seems to permit too much, failing to account for some important aspects of scientific objectivity—or so the worry goes. Subjective Bayesians have replied with at least two strategies.