 Jeremy Waldron (1993) restated the substance of Proast’s objection for a contemporary audience. He argued that, leaving aside Locke’s Christian arguments, his main position was that it was instrumentally irrational, from the perspective of the persecutor, to use force in matters of religion because force acts only on the will, and belief is not something that we change at will. Waldron pointed out that this argument blocks only one particular reason for persecution, not all reasons. Thus it would not stop someone who used religious persecution for some end other than religious conversion, such as preserving the peace. Even in cases where persecution does have a religious goal, Waldron agrees with Proast that force may be indirectly effective in changing people’s beliefs. Some of the current discussion about Locke’s contribution to contemporary political philosophy in the area of toleration centers on whether Locke has a good reply to these objections from Proast and Waldron. Tuckness (2008b) and Tate (2016) argue that Locke deemphasized the rationality argument in his later writings. 