 The above responses to Hart’s ambivalence about the legal status of international law has granted his premise that a full-fledged legal system requires a rule of recognition. Even on this basis, critics like Jeremy Waldron have rejected his “very poor” arguments for a qualified scepticism about the legal character of international law (Waldron 2014: 213). However, Hart’s leading critic, Ronald Dworkin, contested this premise itself. According to Dworkin, the determination of law is not ultimately grounded in a social rule—a rule of recognition—widely accepted by officials and others as the right standard for identifying law. Instead, legal requirements emerge through a process of “constructive interpretation” that requires the interpreter to discern the set of underlying moral-political principles that best fit and justify the relevant legal materials, e.g., in the case of international law, the raw data of treaties, state practice, opinio juris, international declarations, etc. (Dworkin 1986). Unlike Hart, Dworkin’s view of international law is part of his theoretical ambitions to establish that genuine law is morally binding on its subjects (see  section 4  on Legitimacy).