 While particularism has strong affinities with non-naturalism, the most prominent argument for particularism—the argument from the holism of reasons—has proceeded from a more targeted and specific claim about the metaphysics of moral reasons (see McNaughton 1988; Dancy 1993; Little 2000). According to holism about reasons, a consideration that counts as a reason in one case may not count as a reason in another case, or may count as a reason, but in a different direction. By way of illustration, the fact that a remark would be funny might be, in one case a reason for making the remark, in another case a reason against making the remark, and in still another case no reason at all. In short it depends on context. Importantly, holism is meant to be a universal and modal claim. It says that for any consideration that is a reason it is possible that that consideration might behave differently in another case. Thus understood, holism is consistent with the possibility that some considerations are, as a matter of fact, reasons (of the same force and direction) in every case. Holism also seems to presuppose that the considerations that are reasons are not brutely unique; the insight of holism—if it is an insight—is built upon the thought that a consideration which is a reason in one case is repeatable in other cases. Only if, for example, the funniness of a remark is a consideration that is repeatable can we say, as the holist wants us to, that the funniness of a remark is a reason in one case but is not a reason in another.