 In figure 2(b) smooth curves are drawn through the lines and circles to illustrate a more general form of the voting game. The utilities to cooperators and defectors are represented by two S-shaped curves. The curves intersect in two places. Now, instead of a single point of minimally effective cooperation, we have a small region between the two curves where cooperation beats defection. In terms of the polluted lake example, we might suppose that to the left of the first intersection, pollution is so bad that my additional contribution makes it no worse, and to the right of the second intersection, the lake is so healthy that it can handle my refuse with no ill effects. The intersection points are both equilibria, the polluting and fastitidious residents both lose by changing behavior. In terms of the voting example, we might suppose that the behavior of non-supporters is uncertain and the region between the curves represents the situations in which my vote increases the odds of winning in a way that exceeds my cost of voting. 