  A full discussion of the controversy over theory of mind (e.g., Heyes 1998; Lurz 2011; Andrews 2012) deserves an entry of its own, but it is worth remarking here that the theory of mind debate has origins in the hypothesis that primate intelligence in general, and human intelligence in particular, is specially adapted for social cognition (see Byrne &amp; Whiten 1988, especially the first two chapters, by Jolly and Humphrey).  Consequently, it has been argued that evidence for the ability to attribute mental states in a wide range of species might be better sought in natural activities such as social play, rather than in laboratory designed experiments which place the animals in artificial situations (Allen &amp; Bekoff 1997; see esp. chapter 6; see also Hare et al. 2000, Hare et al. 2001, and Hare &amp; Wrangham 2002).  Alternative approaches that have attempted to provide strong evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman animals under natural conditions have generally failed to produce such evidence (see, e.g., the conclusions about theory of mind in vervet monkeys and baboons by Cheney &amp; Seyfarth 1990, 2007), although anecdotal evidence tantalizingly suggests that researchers still have not managed to devise the right experiments. Furthermore, theory of mind — and social cognition more broadly — are active areas of research, and it is quite possible that new research will reveal evidence of theory of mind in nonhuman animals.  