 Aside from what we now consider to be a straightforwardly false characterization of the cognitive capacities of animals, this non-cognitive reading faces textual hurdles. Kant claims that animals enjoy mental representations, and that postulating such representations is necessary for explaining sophisticated animal behavior. Kant is on record in various places as saying that animals have sensory representations of their environment (CPJ 5:464; cf. An 7:212), that they have intuitions (LM 28:449 (c. 1784/85); LM 28:594 (c. 1790/91); LL 24:702 (c. 1792); OP 21:82), and that they are acquainted with objects though they do not cognize them (JL 9:64–5; see also Notes on Logic 16:342–4 (c. mid/late 1760s); LL 24:845ff (c. 1780–1); LL 24:730–1 (c. 1792)). However, interpretation of these texts, and others, is not uncontested (e.g., Fisher 2017; van den Berg 2018; see also the sources cited in  §2  above). It is also not entirely clear that Kant’s views on this matter remain consistent throughout his career, with some arguing that at least his pre-critical views are clearly incompatible with a cognitivist position regarding animal minds (Leland 2018a,b).