 In later papers, Floridi explores the concept of distributed moral actions (2013, 2016). He argues that some moral significant outcomes cannot be reduced to the moral significant actions of some individuals. Morally neutral actions of several individuals can still result in morally significant events. Individuals might not have intended to cause harm, but nevertheless their combined actions may still result in moral harm to someone or something. In order to deal with the problem of subsequently assigning moral responsibility for such distributed moral actions, he argues that the focus of analysis should shift from the agents to the patients of moral actions. A moral action can then be evaluated in terms of the harm to the patient, regardless of the intentions of the agents involved. Assigning responsibility then focuses on whether or not an agent is causally accountable for the outcome and on adjusting their behavior to prevent harm. If the agents causally accountable - be they artificial or biological - are autonomous, can interact with each other and their environments and can learn from their interactions they can be held responsible for distributed moral actions, according to Floridi (2016).