 Fourth, one might bite the bullet and embrace one of the two radical forms of relativism discussed by YVH. The simpler one is to add thoughts as parameters, resulting in the view that YVH call “thought-relativism” (pp. 80–81). (The other one is “extension-assignment relativism.”) YVH give detailed arguments against such views, but Chalmers suggests that they might still have promise (Chalmers 2018). As Chalmers notes, it seems that we can have thoughts like “the thinker of this very thought is human,” where the truth or falsity of the thought depends on the identity of the thought token being evaluated. Speaks (2021) explores some ways of developing thought-relativism, but argues that the view, if developed in such a way that it gives the right results about a priori knowledge, will “collapse into quasi-internalism” (Speaks 2021, p. 3044).