 Naturally, there are alternative solutions to the problem of negative singular existence statements. Among other things, it is possible to reject premise 4 without committing oneself to an ontology of nonexistent objects. One might simply accept a positive Free Logic, i.e., the conjunction of the following two principles: 1. Singular terms do not need to denote anything in order to be meaningful. 2. Sentences containing non-denoting singular terms can be true. (This strategy is to be found, for instance, in Crane 2013.) One of the difficulties of this solution, however, is to give an account of what makes such sentences true, i.e., of what their truthhmakers are (given the principle that, for every true sentence, there is something in the world that makes it true, i.e., something that is the sentence’s truthmaker). For the special case of negative singular existence sentences, one might claim that that their truthmaker is just the entire world (see, e.g., Crane 2013, Section 3.5; for more about Crane’s position see Section 5.1 below). However, this answer to the truthmaker question is not available for the problem of fictional discourse, which provides another important motivation for a commitment to nonexistent objects.