  One less-than-satisfying way to avoid this fallacy is to read the two Premises conditionally: if blacks enjoy full moral status, then disfranchisement counts as a wrong, particularly given the psychological evidence of the First Disfranchisement Premise. This kind of reading simply takes the wrongness of disfranchisement as a consequence of the condition that blacks are rational beings in the sense required for membership in society. That gives the argument a bit more nuance, since technically Crummell is not asserting that blacks have that status; he would simply be supposing, as if for the sake of argument, that they do, but then showing that, if they do, then the psychological state of blacks counts as a harm. The problem with this reading is that it offers no more than what any conditional logical proof can offer—support for the conditional in question—when what one really seeks is support for the antecedent as well. It may be that the connection between condition and consequence is made, but what we really want is some reason to think that the condition has indeed been satisfied in the case of blacks. It is easy to construct, for instance, a paternalistic counter-argument on which black discomfort with their disfranchisement results from exposure to abolitionist opinions. On that reasoning, the obvious solution is to limit the exposure rather than grant blacks the right to vote—an obviously dissatisfying conclusion, to say the least.