 Parke (2014) argues against the epistemological dependency thesis by undermining two premises that she believes support it: first, that experiments generate greater inferential power than simulations, and second, that simulations cannot surprise us in the same way that experiments can.  The argument that simulations cannot surprise us comes from Morgan (2005).  Pace Morgan, Parke argues that simulationists are often surprised by their simulations, both because they are not computationally omniscient, and because they are not always the sole creators of the models and code they use.  She argues, moreover, that ‘[d]ifferences in researcher’s epistemic states, alone, seem like the wrong grounds for tracking a distinction between experiment and simulation’ (258).  Adrian Curry (2017) defends Morgan’s original intuition by making two friendly amendments.  He argues that the distinction Morgan was really after was between two different kinds of surprise, and in particular to what the source of surprise is: surprise due to bringing out theoretical knowledge into contact with the world are distinctive of experiment.  He also more carefully defines surprise in a non-psychological way such that it is a “quality the attainment of which constitutes genuine epistemic progress” (p. 640).