 Genera are divisible into their subordinate species, whereas what Boethius calls “universal wholes” are divisible into their subordinate individuals. In the medieval tradition that follows Boethius, these subordinate items are said to be “subjective” parts of the universal whole or the genus, since the part is a subject and the whole is predicable of the part. Socrates is a subjective part of Human Being and a subjective part of Animal, and Human Being and Animal are predicable of Socrates. That is, Socrates is a human being, and Socrates is an animal. However, to be a true subjective part, not only must the name of the whole be predicable of the part, the definition of the whole also must be predicable of the part. A statue of Socrates could in some contexts be called a human. For example, suppose someone points to the statue and says, “That’s a man.”, and then she points to another statue and says, “And that’s a horse.”. This person is saying something intelligible, but the statue of Socrates cannot be a subjective part of Human Being, since the statue is not a rational mortal animal; in substance it is some marble shaped like a human with certain features. Socrates, however, is a subjective part because he is a human being and a rational mortal animal. Likewise, the statue of a horse is not a horse in the proper sense, that is, in the same sense that the Black Stallion and Mr. Ed are horses. 