 Are there predicates that we apply to states of affairs and that are distinctive of them? States of affairs are said to obtain or not, while Fregean thoughts are true or false. In contrast, facts exist; a fact cannot be qualified as obtaining or not obtaining (see Betti 2015: 35). However, it seems difficult to get a grip on the difference between obtaining and non-obtaining on the one hand, and truth and falsity on the other. Prima facie, the state of affairs Socrates’s being wise obtains if, and only if, it is true that Socrates is wise (see Plantinga 1974: 45–6; see also Betti 2015: 35). Pollock (1984a: 53) correctly observes that “obtaining and not-obtaining are truth-like properties”. But why are they just truth-like and not just truth and falsity under a different label; why can the obtaining of a state of affairs not be identified with the truth of a thought or proposition?