 Govier’s position is causally relational: interpersonal conditions affect the emotions, which in turn affect the capacities for critical reflection required for autonomy. However, McLeod’s and Benson’s positions are constitutively relational because the self-regarding attitudes necessary for autonomy are themselves understood as constitutively relational. We saw that McLeod adopts a moral notion of justified self-trust as necessary for autonomy, which makes hers a weak substantive position. Her position is also constitutively relational because agents can be wrong to trust themselves, for example, when they overestimate their own competence. Hence features of the world—facts about the agent’s competence—are necessary for justified self-trust that in turn is necessary for autonomy. Benson claims that although what is required for a sense of self-worth will be different in different agents, nevertheless there is a common feature: “the sense of worthiness to act that is necessary for free agency involves regarding oneself as being competent to answer for one’s conduct in the light of normative demands that, from one’s point of view, others might appropriately apply to one’s actions” (Benson 1994, 660). The definition of self-worth required for autonomy on Benson’s analysis employs interpersonal relations and hence his account is constitutively relational.