  Grosseteste’s account of time appears to be closely related to his conception of existence, as presented in his commentaries on the Posterior Analytics and Physics and in On Truth (Rossi 1981, 290–291; Dales 1963a, 7; Baur 1912, 141; see also Lewis 2009).  Grosseteste holds that a created thing’s existence just is its dependence on God.  Thus, a thing does not depend on God for its existence; its dependence on God is its existence.  Grosseteste appears to equate this relation of dependence with the relation of adherence to the  at-once of eternity mentioned in his account of time. He remarks that “something no more partakes of actual existence except insofar as it adheres to the first being that is all at once” (Dales 1963a, 96–97).  He does not seem to realize that the relata of the relation of adherence in his account of time and of the relation of dependence in his account of being are different: in his account of time it is an instantaneous bit of a thing’s existence that adheres, while in his account of existence it is the thing itself that is dependent and existence is itself treated as a relation, not as the term of a relation.