 This claim that the analysis of language can provide a consistent guide for action is precisely what the Daoists targeted in their objections and the main focus of their philosophical skepticism. What is surprising is that Daoist skeptics like Zhuangzi do not reject the Mohists’ basic view that the world is populated by various kinds of objects with real similarities and differences. They agree, moreover, in their basic understanding of how objects undergo different forms of transformation in time; the Mohists even give us distinct terms to convey these differences. The difference is that, in Zhuangzi’s view, no matter how much analysis we undertake, or how finely we discriminate, our language will never secure enough traction in reality to provide us with a constant guide for action. Zhuangzi was so unsatisfied with the ongoing debates of his times that he was compelled to develop what he took to be a transcendent philosophical worldview not limited by the hope of resolving these debates through simple explications of semantic distinctions. Life is larger than what can be grasped by the human capacity for reason, and there are forms of intuitive knowledge or experience that cannot be explained by the crude implements of language.