 Early assessments gleaned from anecdotes of the behaviors of individual animals seemed to return a positive answer to the titular question (Byrne &amp; Whiten 1991). Subsequent, more controlled, experiments raised questions about that verdict. In naturalistic settings, non-human great apes exhibit impressive social intelligence (Byrne &amp; Whiten 1997, Suddendorf &amp; Whiten 2003). Despite this, experimental findings are equivocal about whether, to what extent, and in what ways they are aware of other minds. Initially, there was only negative evidence that chimpanzees and orangutans understand the concept of belief, even when tested by simplified non-verbal versions of the “location change” false belief tasks (Povinelli &amp; Eddy 1996; Povinelli 1996, 2003; Call &amp; Tomasello 1999; Penn &amp; Povinelli 2007).