 In relation to the triad, a prominent reading of Locke has him impute epistemic authority to sensory ideas as giving knowledge of their causes (Ayers 1991: vol. 1, ch. 18). Locke is attributed A and B but not C. It is doubtful that Descartes, who distinguished sensing from judging, would endorse A. Among the classical sense-data theorists, many would deny A, distinguishing sensing and “acquaintance” from “knowing that”; sensing red may usually and non-inferentially lead to knowing that s is red, but not as a simple matter of entailment. Russell explicitly denied A; sensing may be unacquired but “knowing that” involves judging, not mere sensing, and the universals that enter judgments of sensory quality (such as whiteness) are acquired, affirming C. Sellars himself rejects A, complicates B, and affirms C, adopting (by assumption) a position of “psychological nominalism” (1956: §29), according to which kind-terms, including color terms, and the ability to be aware of color instances are learned as part of a linguistic and conceptual web of meaning (holism).