  Actually, the relation among the virtues seems tighter than that, for it seems that the unjust person necessarily fails to be wise,  courageous, and temperate (cf. Cooper 1998). You might try to deny this. You  might say that a person could be courageous—with spirited  attitudes that track perfectly what the rational attitudes say is  fearsome and not, in the face of any pleasures and pains—but  still be unjust insofar has her rational attitudes are inadequately  developed, failing to know what really is fearsome. But Socrates  seems to balk at this possibility by contrasting the civically  courageous whose spirit preserves law-inculcated beliefs about what  is fearsome and not and the genuinely courageous in whom, presumably, spirit preserves knowledge about what is fearsome and not (430a–c).  So you might say instead that a person could be  moderate—utterly without appetitive attitudes at odds with what his rational attitudes say is good for him—but still be unjust  insofar as his rational attitudes are inadequately developed and fail to know what really is good. But this picture of a meek, but moderate soul seems to sell short the requirements of moderation, which are  not merely that there be no insurrections in the soul but also that  there be agreement that the rational attitudes should rule. This  would seem to require that there actually be appetitive attitudes  that are in agreement with the rational attitudes’ conception of what is good, which would in turn require that the rational attitudes be  sufficiently strong to have a developed conception of what is good.  Moreover, it would seem to require that the rational attitudes which  endorse ruling be ruling, which would in turn require that the  rational attitudes are at least on the path toward determining what  really is good for the person. If these considerations are correct,  then the unjust are lacking in virtue tout court, whereas  the just possess all of the virtues.