 Wright and Boghossian recently offered independent arguments to the effect that the adoption of a non-reductionist view of meaning does not secure the intelligibility of the idea of guidance by a rule. According to Wright, the only way in which rule-following can be understood is if it conforms to what he calls “the modus ponens model” (2007: 491). The model states that an act is a genuine instance of rule-following if it can be rationalized by, on the one hand, citing the rule and, on the other, indicating that the circumstances, which must be specifiable without appealing to the rule, call for its application. Wright investigates basic cases of language use, and argues that if we assume that the modus ponens model applies to these cases, we are saddled with an Augustinian picture, according to which conceptual capacities are necessarily prior to capacities to use language. At the same time, he accepts that Wittgenstein has revealed the bankruptcy of the Augustinian picture in Philosophical Investigations; so, the idea of antecedent conceptual capacities is unintelligible. This is taken to show that the modus ponens model cannot apply to basic cases. Wright calls this “the minor premise problem”, and argues that it compels us to accept that “in the basic case we do not really follow—are not really guided by—anything” (2007: 497).