 The genuine objects of emotions are called “dignitatives”; examples are the good and the beautiful. Ought [Sollen] and expediency [Zweckmäßigkeit] are the paradigms of the so-called desideratives, the genuine objects of desires (1917, §11). Like objectives, the genuine objects of thinking, both dignitatives and desideratives can subsist or  not,[3]  and they are ideal objects and cannot be reduced to something mental or physical. As value properties are not reducible to natural properties, they are in some way unanalyzable. Goodness, for example cannot be defined in terms of pleasure, and moral value judgements are not to be reduced to psychological or sociological reports on moral behavior. Furthermore, dignitatives and desideratives have a complex nature because the presuppose certain things and states of affairs. A person has an aesthetic emotion, for example, when a building is presented to her as beautiful. The presented beauty (of the building) is the genuine, proper object [Eigengegenstand] — the dignitative — of the aesthetic emotion, while the building itself is the presupposed, appropriated [angeeignete Gegenstand] of the emotion in question. Dignitatives and desideratives then are objects of higher order (1917: 107–8 [95–6]) — they are superiora (see above 5.5; against the view that ought is an object of higher order, see Weber 2004: 31–3). Just as one can see four nuts as a square of nuts, or a circle with two dots and an arc as a smiling face, so a donation to a charitable fund can be seen (grasped) as a morally good deed. Grasping value properties can be interpreted as a certain kind of grasping of a Gestalt, as Ehrenfels and other Gestalt theorists might have said. There are, we might say, good-Gestalten (the Gestalt of the moral good, the aesthetic good, and so on). The main difference between this sort of “value perception” and sensory perception is that, instead of (or in addition to) sense impressions, emotional impressions are involved. Meinong thinks that “the indefinability of impersonal values is not to be put on a par with the one of color or sound, but rather with the one of melody or form [Gestalt]” (1923, Chapt. IV, §7: 161).