  Byrne and Logue (2008) and Snowdon (2005a) argue that that this sort of epistemologically motivated view need not preclude the idea that it is possible to identify a perceptual state that is common to veridical perception and hallucination. The suggestion is that one can accept the claim that there is an epistemically distinguished category of experiential state that can only obtain when one veridically perceives the world, and yet one can consistently maintain that it is also possible to identify a kind of perceptual state, of which some positive account can be given, which can obtain whether one is veridically perceiving the world, or merely having a subjectively indistinguishible hallucination. One can therefore be an epistemological disjunctivist without accepting metaphysical disjunctivism. However, note that if one holds that the epistemological feature that is present in the case of veridical perception and lacking in the case of hallucination is fundamental to the kind of mental state it is, then this would make one a fundamental kind disjunctivist (see section 2.1.1).