 It is the commitment to opposition within (what are judged to be) the prevailing structures that has led some radical critics of loyalty (e.g., Agassi, 1974; Greene, 1973) to see it as—at bottom—a conservative virtue. It is conservative, though in a positive sense of that word: it involves a commitment to securing or preserving the interests of an associational object, an object that is, or has come to be, valued for its own sake (whatever else it may be valued for). Nevertheless, the existence of a loyal opposition need not preclude the possibility that a more radical opposition might and indeed should subsequently be mounted. If the loyal opposition proves incapable of “reforming” the object of loyalty, the exit option (or something stronger) might be taken. In such cases it could be argued that the object of loyalty was no longer worthy of loyalty or had forfeited its claim to it. It is only if we mistakenly or misguidedly think of loyalty as making an unconditional claim on us that a derogatory charge of conservatism against a loyal opposition will have traction (see Kleinig, 2019).