 We started out with Russell’s adverse verdict on his own meta-ethics: “I am not, myself, satisfied with what I have read or said on the philosophical basis of ethics” (RoE: 165/Papers 11: 310–11). And we can see in a sense that he was right. Every meta-ethic that he developed seems to be subject to insuperable, objections. But although Russell’s writings on ethics are unsatisfactory, this does not mean that they are worthless. Meta-ethics is a difficult subject and it is hard to get it right. And if we ever are to get it right, we must learn from those, like Russell, who got it interestingly and instructively wrong. In the course of his long philosophical career, Russell canvassed most of the meta-ethical options that have dominated debate in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries—naturalism, non-naturalism, emotivism and the error-theory, and even, to some extent, subjectivism and relativism. And though none of his theories quite worked out, there is much to be learned from his mistakes. Nor is this all. His arguments as well as his theories are often interesting and instructive. As we have seen, the ethical corollary to the argument of “Seems Madam? Nay, It Is,” puts the kybosh on any attempt to resolve Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason by arguing that although we are distinct beings with different interests in the world of Appearance, we are, in Reality, all one  (§3).  Russell’s arguments against objectivism are often quite powerful, and one anticipates Gilbert Harman’s, influential argument that objective values can be safely dismissed since they lack explanatory power  (§9.3–9.4).  Russell’s damning critique of Moore’s analytic consequentialism led Moore to abandon the view and perhaps to give up his “unduly anti-reforming” moral conservatism. Moreover Russell’s indirect influence on meta-ethics may have been profound since the Open Question Argument, was probably invented to deal with Russell’s ideas. Finally, in the realm of normative ethics, Russell developed a sensible and humane version of consequentialism, which (despite its shaky meta-ethical foundations) is resistant, if not immune, to many of the standard criticisms, especially if combined—as Russell thought it should be combined—with a healthy dose of political skepticism. It provides a powerful tool for social and political criticism, a tool which Russell vigorously employed on a vast range of topics in his writings on practical ethics.