 First, although he says there exist five basic prima facie duties, what he is referring to are not really duties (RG 20; FE 84–85). Prima facie duties do not state our actual obligation or duty proper – the thing we ultimately ought do – in a particular situation (RG 20). Instead, each duty rests on a separate and distinct ground and specifies a consideration counting in favour of or against an act or what to set ourselves to do, morally speaking.[1] As David Phillips puts it, ‘[t]he characteristic of being a prima facie duty is the characteristic of having a certain degree of obligatoriness or weight in virtue of being of a single morally significant kind’ (2019, 23). For example, that an act fails to fulfil a promise counts against it being right, and that an act produces the most surplus good counts in favour of it being morally right. Considerations of this sort have to be weighed and balanced against each other in deciding what we ought to do all things considered or simpliciter.