 At this point we have reviewed the three most common complaints about the constitution view: the impenetrability worry, the extensionality objection, and the grounding problem. A fourth and final concern is what we might call the anthropic objection (see, for example, Sosa 1987, Sider 2001, pp. 156–8, and section 2.5 of the entry on  ordinary objects.)  So far, we have focused on the question of whether two material objects—like David and Lump—could exist at the same place and time. But why stop at two? Consider the mereological sum of David and Lump’s material simples. Those simples existed long before David or Lump came into existence, so the sum would appear to be another object in addition to the statue and the lump. But why stop at three? Consider the instatue that coincides with David whenever that statue is indoors and then goes out of existence whenever David is taken outside (cf. Hirsch 1982, p. 32). There is also the tablestatue (that exists when and only when the statue is on a table), the litstatue (that exists when and only when the statue is in the light), the dinnerstatue (that exists only when the statue’s sculptor is eating dinner), and so on. Ernest Sosa (1987) refers to this multiplication of entities as “the explosion of reality”.