  Fifth, another line of response for legal probabilists is to concede that the paradoxes of naked statistical evidence demonstrate the inadequacy of simple probabilistic thresholds as proof standards (Urbaniak 2019). Instead of the posterior probability of liability, a number of scholars have focused on the likelihood ratio \(P(E\pmid H)/P(E \pmid H')\). Their argument is that, even though naked statistical evidence can support a high posterior probability of liability, the likelihood ratio of this evidence equals one because it could be presented against a defendant no matter what the defendant did. If so, naked statistical evidence should have no evidential value (Cheng 2012; Sullivan 2019). However, Dahlman (2020) has criticized this argument noting that, under plausible assumptions, the likelihood ratio of naked statistical evidence is significantly greater than one.  Di Bello (2019) argues that in cases such as Prisoner and Gatecrasher the likelihood ratio could take a range of different values depending on the background information that is taken into account. The likelihood ratio of naked statistical evidence in those scenarios is therefore neither one nor greater than one, but strictly speaking unknown (for a critique of this argument, see Urbaniak et al. 2020).