 It is true that some of Strauss’s sketches of revelation do not make revelation compelling from a philosophical point of view. If the question about the relation between revelation and philosophy pertains to a decision for faith or philosophy, Strauss’s conception of revelation sounds very much like Kierkegaard’s conception according to which a leap of faith defines revelation. This theological vantage point is similar to Strauss’s description of Franz Rosenzweig and Karl Barth’s reawakening of theology. Yet Strauss explicitly rejects this sort of theological decisionism because, he argues, this position amounts to a “farewell to reason.” By mistakenly assuming that Strauss defines revelation as blind faith, many of Strauss’s interpreters have concluded that he does not in the end take revelation seriously from a philosophical point of view. In support of this position, Meier in fact quotes Julius Guttmann’s critical response to Strauss, which is that Strauss shows an “indifference towards the content of revelation… Whether Jewish or Christian revelation is of concern makes no difference whatsoever” (as quoted in Meier 2006, p. 20). For Guttmann, this supposed indifference to revelation’s content means that Strauss gets medieval Jewish rationalism wrong. For Meier, this supposed indifference means that despite what seems to be Strauss’s defense of revelation’s capacity to criticize philosophy, revelation is in the end for Strauss a straw man. As Meier puts it, “What appears to the believer to be ‘indifference’ proves on closer inspection to be a conscious dissociation and ultimately a rejection” (Meier 2006, p. 20, note 25). 