 The central question concerning memory in small-scale groups is perhaps whether such groups manifest emergent, robustly collective forms of memory. A range of views on this question are available (Barnier, Sutton, Harris, &amp; Wilson 2008; Wilson 2005), but the conservative view is certainly that, while remembering may be affected by the social context in which it occurs, it is itself always a strictly individual-level process. The conservative view is the natural starting point, but there is a surprisingly good case to be made for the radical view that remembering is sometimes a group-level process. A promising place to look for robustly collective forms of memory is in transactive memory systems (Wegner 1987): stable, ongoing groups characterized by a division of responsibility for remembering and a shared metacognitive awareness of that division (Kirchhoff 2016; Theiner, Allen, &amp; Goldstone 2010; Tollefsen, Dale, &amp; Paxton 2013). Drawing on Wimsatt’s (1986) notion of emergence, for example, Theiner (2013) has provided a rigorous argument for the view that transactive memory systems manifest a form of emergent memory, in the sense that the group has a memory capacity of its own, over and above those of its individual members. Drawing on a somewhat different theoretical framework, Huebner (2013, 2016) has developed a complementary approach. Thus, while the question remains open, the conservative view may no longer be the obvious starting point.