 The central reasons one might doubt the strong equivalence just suggested between Hilbert’s method and Frege’s proposal are that (i) it is not clear just what kind of language Frege has in mind, and (ii) it is not clear whether the class of terms Frege would count as “logical”, i.e., the class whose members μ must map to themselves, is the same as the class of terms that Hilbert would count as having a fixed interpretation. If Frege’s class of fixed terms is wider than is Hilbert’s, and/or Frege’s language lacks some of the terminology of Hilbert’s, then a demonstration of independence in Hilbert’s sense will not imply the existence of a mapping demonstrating independence in Frege’s sense. One way to think of the crucial question is as the question whether terms like “number” or “between”, terms that Frege treats as susceptible to conceptual analysis, will be allowed in the language that Frege is concerned with (as opposed, say, to requiring the language to contain only “fully-analyzed” terms), and whether such terms will be amongst those that μ maps to arbitrary new terminology. Frege himself notes the importance of the second terminological demarcation problem just raised, i.e., the problem of determining which terms are mapped to themselves, and remarks that this problem is one that would need to be addressed in order to turn his sketch into a workable strategy. Because he never answers the question of the fixed terminology or of the kind of language in question, Frege’s proposal is not sufficiently determinate for a clear comparison with Hilbert’s. We are left, then, with the interpretive issue of making sense of Frege’s proposal of a method and subsequent apparent repudiation of it, while recognizing the incomplete nature of that proposal. (For further discussion of the 1906 text, see: Ricketts 1997, Tappenden 2000, Blanchette 2014.) 