 This problem is supposed to be overcome in Tversky’s contrast account (1977). This account defines a gradated notion of similarity based on a weighted comparison of properties. Weisberg has recently introduced this account into the philosophy of science where it serves as the starting point for his weighted feature matching account of model world-relations (for details see Weisberg 2012, 2013: ch. 8). Although the account has some advantages, questions remain whether it can capture the distinction between what Niiniluoto (1988: 272–274) calls “likeness” and “partial identity”. Two objects are alike to the extent that they co-instantiate similar properties (for example, a red phone box and a red London bus might be alike with respect to their colour, despite not instantiating the exact same shade of red). Two objects are partially identical to the extent that they co-instantiate identical properties. As Parker (2015: 273) notes, contrast based accounts of similarity like Weisberg’s have difficulties capturing the former, and this is often pertinent in the context of scientific representation where models and their targets need not co-instantiate the exact same property. Concerns of this sort have led Khosrowi (2020) to suggest that the notion of sharing features should be analysed in a pluralist manner. Sharing a feature sometimes means sharing the exact same feature; sometimes it means to share features which are sufficiently quantitatively close to one another; and sometimes it means having features which are themselves “sufficiently similar”.