 Some defenders of nudges suggest that because it is often impossible to frame a decision without pointing the decision-maker in some direction, there is nothing manipulative about framing such decisions in one way rather than another. For example, physicians must provide outcome information either in terms of fatality rate or survival rate (and if they give both, they must give one first), and cafeteria managers must choose something to put at eye level in the displays. This being the case, why think that deliberately choosing one way of framing the decision over another is manipulative? Some defenders of nudges suggest that in cases where it is inevitable to introduce a non-rational influence into decision-making, deliberately doing so is not manipulative. But there are reasons to be wary of this line of thought. Suppose that Jones is traveling to a job interview on a subway car so crowded that it is inevitable that he will bump up against his fellow passengers. Suppose that he capitalizes on this fact to deliberately bump his rival job candidate (who is on the same subway car) out the door just as it closes, thus ensuring that he will be late for his interview. Clearly the fact that it was inevitable that Jones’s rival would be subjected to some bumping does not excuse Jones for intentionally bumping his rival out the door. Similarly, even if we inevitably introduce non-rational influences into each other’s decision-making, that fact seems insufficient to prove that such influences can never be manipulative. No doubt this analogy is imperfect, but it should suffice to call into question the assumption that a deliberate nudge is not manipulative simply because some nudging is inevitable. (For a similar argument, see Douglass 2022.)