 Let us grant that Śrīharṣa’s refutation-arguments are in fact successful in undermining the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika project of defending a dualistic ontology on which the world is populated by things that are distinct from the self or consciousness. Can Śrīharṣa himself defend the kind of non-dualism that he endorses? Somewhat surprisingly, Śrīharṣa argues that inquiry into the question of non-duality—the question of whether only the self or consciousness is ultimately real—is futile. His argument is a version of Meno’s paradox (Carpenter &amp; Ganeri  2010).[24]  He imagines an opponent who asks, “What is the method of knowing non-duality, i.e., the non-distinctness of everything from the self?” The response is this: when asked by someone who rejects the doctrine of non-duality, this question doesn’t make sense (KKh 69–73). The argument takes the form of a dilemma: either the opponent is aware of what non-duality is, or she is not.