 Kuhn often described his two-process view as “Kant with moveable categories”. Accordingly, there is also a dialectical, quasi-Hegelian reading: from the myriad of micro-decisions by the community of scientists in a given field over time, with lots of fits and starts, a progressive enterprise emerges, although not one that is teleologically converging on the metaphysical truth about the universe or on any other “end”. However, on this view we have abandoned the idea that individual scientific decisions are typically driven by an explicit concern for rationality. In several areas of philosophy there are heated controversies about whether higher-order emergents have genuine causal power and hence genuine explanatory force. To that degree, it remains unclear what role the desire to be rational plays, as opposed to more mundane motives. This problem arises for other historicists as well, as David Hull will note. (See the entries on  mental causation  and on  internalist vs. externalist conceptions of epistemic justification.)