With the aim of identifying the exact implications of Kant’s and Sidgwick’s views, let us look more closely at the examples they provide in the course of their discussions. We shall begin with Sidgwick, who contrasts two cases: lying and celibacy.[10] The argument unfolds as follows. First, some types of behavior are morally acceptable only if they remain (very) restricted in scope.[11] If lying and celibacy were to become widely practiced, this would become a problem for utilitarians, according to Sidgwick. However, as long as they remain marginally practiced, to an extent that is justified on utilitarian grounds, they should be accepted. Second, the question arises as to whether we should recognize all this publicly. Albeit not raising any difficulty in the case of celibacy,[12] publicly abandoning an absolute prohibition on lying might not be acceptable for utilitarians. Sidgwick writes: