 There are views that come very close to justification rules. Maitra and Weatherson (2010: 112) propose what they call The Evidence Responsiveness Rule: that one assert that p only if one’s attitude towards p is properly responsive to the evidence (they also propose to complement it with an action rule, that it is proper to assert that p only if acting as if p is “the thing for you to do”). Smithies (2012) defends the view that p is assertable only if you have a justification to believe that you are in a position to know that p (cf. Koethe 2009, Rosenkranz forthcoming). This version of  (JNA)  restores a guiding normative role for knowledge, while accommodating many of the intuitions that motivate a preference for  (JNA)  or  (KNA)  (for a critique, see M. Smith 2012).