 More recently, however, Stephen Emet (2010) and Christopher Howard (2021) have argued that act-consequentialist counterpart theories are explanatorily inadequate for a different reason. They argue that, in taking the Compelling Idea to be something such as  Reasons for Preferring Ground Deontic Statuses,  the earnest consequentializer is forced to give up a plausible rationale for certain deontic verdicts. Take, for instance, the deontic verdict that it would be wrong for you to kill even in a situation in which the mafia has credibly threatened to kill five innocent strangers unless you kill a sixth (C. Howard 2021: 728). Howard claims that, in providing a rationale for this verdict, the earnest consequentializer must eschew the plausible view that it lies with the fact that your potential victim has the kind of value that calls for your not treating them as a mere means and must instead embrace the implausible view that it lies with the fact that you, the agent, ought to have a self-centered, and self-indulgent, preference for keeping your own hands clean. He argues that since your reasons for refraining from treating your potential victim as a mere means