 The problem of the single case is that the finite frequentist fails to see intermediate probabilities in various places where others do. There is also the converse problem: the frequentist sees intermediate probabilities in various places where others do not. Our world has myriad different entities, with myriad different attributes. We can group them into still more sets of objects, and then ask with which relative frequencies various attributes occur in these sets. Many such relative frequencies will be intermediate; the finite frequentist automatically identifies them with intermediate probabilities. But it would seem that whether or not they are genuine probabilities, as opposed to mere tallies, depends on the case at hand. Bare ratios of attributes among sets of disparate objects may lack the sort of modal force that one might expect from probabilities. I belong to the reference class consisting of myself, the Eiffel Tower, the southernmost sandcastle on Santa Monica Beach, and Mt Everest. Two of these four objects are less than 7 feet tall, a relative frequency of 1/2; moreover, we could easily extend this class, preserving this relative frequency (or, equally easily, not). Yet it would be odd to say that my probability of being less than 7 feet tall, relative to this reference class, is 1/2, although it is perfectly acceptable (if uninteresting) to say that 1/2 of the objects in the reference class are less than 7 feet tall.