 Some ways of doubting that we are in a favorable epistemic state are easy to understand and unproblematic. Socrates was confident that he did not know the answers to his most important questions. He believed he did not have the answers, or the right kind of grasp of answers, that would be required for knowledge of what, for example, piety, virtue, and justice are. This recognition led him to avoid endorsing or believing particular answers to his questions, and motivated him to go around town asking others for their answers and making awkward observations about their replies. Though the authorities prosecuted him for this, his offense was not an epistemic irrationality; the belief states he had—doubt about himself that he knew the answers, and lack of confidence in particular answers—fit together sensibly. Moreover, as Socrates told his interlocutors, his acknowledgment that he did not know had the salutary effect of making it possible for him to find out. If he were sure that he already knew, then he would not have motivation to look for the answer.