 The analysis of knowledge from the middle 20th century onward (see Ichikawa &amp; Steup 2012 [2018]) largely follows a particularist strategy, in so far as, especially following Gettier (1963), candidate criteria for knowing are tested for adequacy against paradigmatic cases of knowledge as reference points (Shope 1983). Such a strategy marks a shift from earlier influential strategies, such as by Descartes and Hume, both of whom took as a starting point—and in a way that is in principle open to skepticism—that only the obvious and what is proved deductively on its basis can possibly be known (Sosa 1980: 4). Whereas a standard objection against the particularist is that she begs the question against the skeptic, the most standard objection against the methodist starting point is not so easily captured. As Chisholm puts it, beginning (as the methodist does) with a broad generalization would