 This way of thinking of propositions is not universal, however. For many authors, a central role of propositions is to play a certain role in the theory of mental states and/or linguistic meaning (see the entry on  propositions).  This role is often taken to motivate an account of propositions as more “finely individuated” than properties. For example, some would distinguish the proposition that there are vixens from the proposition that there are female foxes, on the grounds that someone could believe one but not the other, while also identifying the property of being a vixen with the property of being a female fox. Many who hold such views also recognise a coarser-grained domain of entities—sometimes called ‘states of affairs’ (see the entry on  states of affairs)—that  stand to 0 as \(n\)-ary properties stand to \(n\). Some also recognise fine-grained entities, sometimes called concepts, that stand to positive integers as propositions stand to 0. For example, they may say that the concept being a vixen is distinct from the concept being a female fox, although they correspond to the same property. In this setting, it is less obvious how one might understand comparisons of naturalness for propositions and concepts, assuming one wants to allow for differences in naturalness between distinct propositions corresponding to the same state of affairs, or between distinct concepts corresponding to the same property. The question how such comparisons might be conceived, and whether they have anything to do with naturalness for properties, will depend on issues in the theory of mental and linguistic content that are beyond the scope of this article.