  In recent years scholars have problematized both the general rationalist/empiricist distinction and the “continental rationalism”/“British empiricism” divide. As Norton has shown, the “British” in “British Empiricism” can be called into question when we take notice of the important role played by the French philosopher Pierre Gassendi in the propagation of empiricist thinking in the period (Norton 1981). Indeed, British philosophers in the relevant historical period were far less disconnected from the Continent than they are today. Philosophical crossings from Britain were frequent and fruitful. In particular, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume all crossed the Channel. Further, Loeb (1981) argues with some plausibility that the rationalist-empiricist divide neglects strong rationalist strands in Locke’s and Berkeley’s thought. Increasingly, scholars of the early modern period (but again, recall Goldstone’s critique of early modernity as a periodization) are looking outside the bounds of the rationalist/empiricist distinction in order to more accurately capture the intersections and divergences present in the constellation of ideas in the period.