 Bodily IEM has been taken by some as evidence that the self is embodied. For instance, Evans (1982) and Cassam (1997) use bodily IEM as an argument against the Cartesian view of the self. In a nutshell, one can self-ascribe bodily properties as well as mental properties to the self without self-identification. Hence the object of such judgments, the self, is not a Cartesian ego, but a bodily subject of both mental and physical properties. However, others wonder if one is entitled to draw such a metaphysical conclusion from the epistemological fact of bodily IEM (Chen 2011; J. Smith 2006). Some further deny that bodily self-ascriptions display the same type of IEM as mental self-ascriptions (Shoemaker 1968; Coliva 2012). The IEM of pain self-ascriptions, for instance, is said to be absolute or logical. On this view, there is no possible world in which one can feel pain and be mistaken about who is feeling pain. By contrast, one can easily conceive a case of a cross-wiring scenario such that A is connected through A’s proprioceptive system both to A’s body and to B’s body. Then A can feel B’s legs being crossed. The question then is whether this cross-wiring scenario invalidates bodily IEM. One can also wonder about actual breach of bodily IEM, such as the rubber hand illusion in which subjects self-ascribe a hand that does not belong to them (Mizumoto &amp; Ishikawa 2005). However, one might reply that none of these thought experiments or bodily illusions show that bodily sensations fail to guarantee IEM because the epistemic grounds of bodily self-ascriptions in these cases differ from ordinary somatosensory judgments (Salje 2017; Vignemont 2012). At most, they show that bodily IEM is only de facto (Evans 1982).