 For Roberts, a possible world w in which there exists only a single particle traveling at constant velocity throughout all of history and relative to a context in which the salient theory is, say, Newtonian Mechanics, ‘It is a law that all particles have a constant velocity of one meter per second’ is true just in case the reference of the ‘that’ clause plays the law role in the salient theory, which it doesn’t in this case. It might play the law role relative to some other theory, but this would be a different context. A single generalization cannot both play the law role and also not play the law role relative to a single theory, and so a different salient theory and so a different context is required for ‘It is a law that all bodies travel at one meter per second’ to be true (Roberts 2008, 357–61).  What is enticing about this reply is that it does not reject any intuitive claim about the laws in the various possible worlds. The antisupervenience judgments about what are the laws are reasonable claims given the contexts. It is just that there is a failure to recognize the influence of context. So, for example, Maudlin’s so-called two possibilities would be seen by Roberts as descriptions of a single possibility that are made relative to two contexts with different salient theories: General Relativity and some rival theory of gravity. (Parallel points could be made about Tooley’s examples involving the 10 different kinds of fundamental particles.) The key is the context sensitivity that is built into the truth conditions of lawhood sentences. Other views that take lawhood sentences to be context sensitive might also be able to avail themselves of Roberts’ challenge to the antisupervenience examples. What is not compelling about Roberts’ position, though, is his view on the context dependence of lawhood ascriptions. His view is devised for one particular phrase of English: ‘law of nature’, but it would be better if the contextual treatment of ‘law of nature’ melded neatly with the context dependence of other natural language words and phrases. We should try to understand the context dependence of our ‘law of nature’ talk by appeal to linguistic principles, and the investigation should be driven by considerations of conversational practice (Carroll 2018, 131–32). ‘Law of nature’ should not be an isolated freak of our language (cf., Unger 1971, 202) on the verb ‘to know’.