 Now Moore’s twin assumptions have subsequently fallen upon hard times. The first leads straight to the Paradox of Analysis (see Langford 1942), whilst the second would exclude synthetic identities such as water is H2O. But if they were correct, the OQA would indeed dispose of the desire-to-desire theory along with kindred theories such as Hume’s. It is notable that David Lewis, who revived Russell’s theory in 1989 (without realizing it was Russell’s), explicitly affirms what Moore implicitly denies—that there can be unobvious analytic truths; that is, truths not evident to every competent speaker (see Lewis 1989 and Pigden 2007). But if Moore were correct and there were no such things, then naturalistic analyses of the moral concepts such as Russell’s would be in big trouble. The BTA only works against some naturalistic analyses of “good”, namely those that define “good” in terms of some property that the theorist wishes to promote. The OQA, if it works at all, works against them all. It seems very likely that what prompted Moore to invent his philosophical weapon of mass destruction was the desire-to-desire theory of Bertrand Russell.