 Based on their own reasoning concerning rational resoluteness, Gauthier (1994) and McClennen (1990; 1997) argue that rational resoluteness can help an agent do well in autonomous benefit cases like the toxin case. They maintain that being rational is not a matter of always choosing the action that best serves one’s concerns. Rather it is a matter of acting in accordance with the deliberative procedure that best serves one’s concerns. Now it might seem as though the deliberative procedure that best serves one’s concerns must be the deliberative procedure that calls for always choosing the action that best serves one’s concerns. But autonomous benefit cases like the toxin case suggest that this is not quite right. For, the deliberative procedure that calls for always choosing the action that best serves one’s concerns does not serve one’s concerns well in autonomous benefit cases. More specifically, someone who reasons in accordance with this deliberative procedure does worse in autonomous benefit cases than someone who is willing to resolutely stick to a prior plan that he did well to adopt. Accordingly, Gauthier and McClennen deny that the best deliberative procedure requires one to always choose the action that best serves one’s concerns; in their view, the best deliberative procedure requires some resoluteness. Relatedly, they see drinking the toxin in accordance with a prior plan to drink the toxin as rational, indeed as rationally required, given that one did well to adopt the plan; so rationality helps one benefit, rather than hindering one from benefiting, in autonomous benefit cases like the toxin case.