 On the other side of the coin, “biochauvinism” is the term applied to the view that there is something philosophically unique about biological organisms—due to their basic nature and/or the limitations of human knowledge’s access to them—that makes them the biological world fundamentally unlike the rest of the world (Wolfe 2015). Vitalism—the view that life has some animating entity (along the lines of spirit) that animates matter into a living being—is one form of such biochauvinism (Wolfe 2015). Another form of biochauvinism is the use of phenomenology to assert that human lived experience partly operates within a space-time context that is different from that of a rock (Wolfe 2015). Wolfe finds that sort of view inside the influential phenomenological work of  Maurice Merleau-Ponty  (Wolfe 2015) (See  Section 5  on phenomenology). Thus there are two rather opposite senses in which we can chauvinistically hold that the biological world is special: