 As has been mentioned, Berkeley is sometimes classified as an early sense-data theorist. The issue is complex. On the one hand, he claims to be a champion of common sense who “believes [his] senses”, that is, who holds that “the real things are those very things I see and feel” and that “colours and other sensible qualities are on the objects” (Three Dialogues, 1713: Third Dialogue [2008: 210]). Berkeley holds that we are immediately aware only of sensory ideas, and passages such as these might suggest that those ideas bear property-instances of red or other qualities. On the other hand, he speaks of light and color as “passions or sensations in the soul” (Three Dialogues, First Dialogue [2008: 178]), describes figures and colors as “sensible appearances”, and equates them with sensory “ideas” (Three Dialogues, First Dialogue [2008: 185]). In the Principles (1710: pt 1, art. 72), he speaks of God ordering our “sensations”, which he equates with the “appearances of Nature”. He never speaks of sensory ideas as being red, but only as being instances in which we see red or have the sensation or appearance of red.