Goodman and Quine first discuss nominalistically acceptable reductions of platonist statements. “Platonist” here refers to the use of terms for classes, numbers, properties, and relations—in short, anything that is not a concrete particular.  The first examples are straightforward and their resolutions are well-known today.  “Class \(A\) is included in class \(B\)” can be rendered as “Everything that is an \(A\) is a \(B\)” (where “\(A\)” and “\(B\)” now stand for the appropriate predicates, rather than for classes). “Class \(C\) has two members”, or “The number of \(C\)s is 2”, is rendered as “There are two \(C\)s”, and spelt out formally (based on Russell’s theory of definite   descriptions—see  the discussion in the entry on Russell)  as: