 Many share the intuition that those who commit wrongful acts, especially serious crimes, should be punished even if punishing them would produce no other good. Consider, for example, being the sentencing judge for a rapist who was just convicted in your court. Suppose that he has since suffered an illness that has left him physically incapacitated so that he cannot rape again, and that he has enough money to support himself without resorting to criminal activities. Suppose that this suffices to ensure that there is no need to deter or incapacitate him to prevent him from committing serious crimes in the future. Suppose, in addition, that you could sentence him to spend his days on a tropical island where he has always wanted to go, and where he will spend most of his days relaxing and pursuing his interests. You can, however, impose one condition on his time there: he must regularly report to a prison to be filmed in prison garb, and these videos will be posted online, sending the message that he is serving hard time for his crimes. As long as this ruse is secure from discovery, it could meaningfully contribute to general deterrence. But even if the goods normally cited by consequentialists to justify punishment—incapacitation and deterrence—are achieved, is that the sentence he should receive? Many share the intuition that there is still some reason to want him to be punished more harshly (see Moore 1997: 98–101).