  Natural law theory of law thus finds itself, in this respect, approximated to by Ronald Dworkin’s account of law and adjudication, not only in frontier situations like Nuremberg but also in the day-to-day working of a sophisticated legal system. Normal adjudication and judicial reasoning has two dimensions or criteria for distinguishing correctness from incorrectness in judgments. One dimension comprises social-fact sources (statutes, precedents, practice, etc.), called by Dworkin “legal materials.” The other dimension comprises moral standards, presumptively those prevalent in the judge’s community but in the last analysis just those standards that the judge can accept as in truth morally sound. An interpretation of our law which is morally sounder will be legally correct even if it fits the legal materials less closely than alternative interpretations, provided that it fits those social-fact sources “enough.” The moral standards thus applied, which Dworkin (in line with natural law theory) treats as capable of being morally objective and true, thus function as a direct source of law (or justification for judicial decision) and, in a certain sense, as already law, except when their fit with the whole set of social-fact sources in the relevant community is so weak that it would be more accurate (according to Dworkin) to say that judges who apply them are applying morality not law (and thus, if they said they were applying law, would be mistaken or lying—a lie which Dworkin considers sometimes commendable). Dworkin 1978, 326–7, 340. 