 While ignorance arguments often need to become quite odd and science-fictional, difference arguments don’t. Here is why: The most obvious strategy for responding to both sorts of arguments is to identify some piece of Simple Picture-friendly information that would resolve the ignorance, or mark the doxastic difference. In ignorance cases, this strategy can initially look very promising. If Lingens thinks of himself as the unique bearded man in a plaid shirt reading a biography of Rudolph Lingens, then learning the Simple Picture-friendly information that the bearded man in a plaid shirt reading a biography of Rudolph Lingens is in the Stanford library will resolve his ignorance. So to keep Simple Picture-friendly information from resolving Lingens’ ignorance, we need to make sure Lingens doesn’t think that he’s the unique bearded man in a plaid shirt reading a biography of Rudolph Lingens. He needs to think that—or at least, leave open the possibility that—there’s another bearded man in a plaid shirt reading a biography of Lingens somewhere. More generally, there needs to be no unique Simple Picture-friendly description of himself available to Lingens, because any such description would allow some Simple Picture-friendly information to resolve his ignorance. Similarly for de re belief—the subjects of ignorance cases mustn’t be in a position to uniquely identify themselves de re.