 In formulating his account of criterion judgments indicating that a participant’s normative judgment is a moral judgment, Turiel focused on three features—authority independence, universalizability in space, and universalizability in time—that had been discussed by the philosophers who contributed to the definition of morality literature. But, as noted in  Section 2,  those philosophers reached no agreement about whether these features are necessary conditions for a judgment to count as moral. And Turiel made no effort to advance or resolve the arguments found in the philosophical literature. He contributed nothing to the descriptive project of analyzing the ordinary concept of moral judgment. Nor did he offer any normative arguments aimed at showing how our ordinary concept of moral judgment should be revised. Rather, it seems, he simply picked a cluster of disputed philosophical proposals, and claimed that they could be used to identify genuinely moral judgments. So what justification do we have for the claim that the criterion judgments Turiel uses actually do identify moral judgments? The problem is nicely, though inadvertently, underscored by Judith Smetana in a passage describing work using the social domain theorists’ experimental paradigm. “Children”, she tell us,