  For Hare, however, any apparent case of akrasia must in fact be one in which the agent is actually unable to do  a, or one in which the agent does not genuinely evaluate  a as better—even if he says he   does.[4]  As an example of the first kind of case Hare cites Medea  (Hare 1963, pp. 78–9), who (he contends) is powerless, literally helpless, in the face of the strong emotions and desires  roiling her: she is truly unable (psychologically) to resist the temptations besieging her. A typical example of the second kind  of case, on the other hand, would be one in which the agent is  actually using the evaluative term “good” or  “ought” only in what Hare calls an  “inverted-commas” sense (Hare 1952, p. 120;  pp. 124–6; pp. 164–5; pp. 167–171).  In such cases, when the agent says (while doing b) “I  know I really ought to do a,” he means only that most  people—or, at any rate, the people whose opinions on such  matters are generally regarded as authoritative—would say he  ought to do a. As Hare notes (Hare 1952, p. 124),  to believe this is not to make an evaluative judgment oneself;  rather, it is to allude to the value-judgments of other people. Such  an agent does not himself assess the course of action he fails to  follow as better than the one he selects, even if other people  would.