 The strong asymmetricalist position leads to the “paradox of negative judgment”: if a positive statement refers or corresponds to a positive fact, to what state of affairs does a negative statement refer or correspond? What in fact is a negative fact? For Bergson (1911, 289), negation is necessarily “of a pedagogical and social nature”; for Wood (1933, 421) it is “infected with error and ignorance”. According to Wittgenstein (1953, §447), “the feeling is as if the negation of a proposition had to make it true in a certain sense in order to negate it”. Givón (1978, 70) points to the discourse presuppositionality of utterances like “My wife is not pregnant”. Psycholinguistic studies have shown that negation is easier to process when the denied proposition, if not already in the discourse model, is at least a plausible addition to it (e.g., “The whale is not a fish/?bird”; cf. Wason 1965; Horn 1989, Chapter 3).