 In step one a spoken sentence is produced which expresses a judgment, in such a way that the judgment is the meaning of the sentence and the sentence is the sign of the judgment. The process goes as follows. A non-enduring mental product, a judgment (together with the action of judging), which is non-perceptible, gives rise—by being its (partial) cause—to a non-enduring psychophysical product, a spoken sentence, which is perceptible. In this case, the spoken sentence is the expression of the judgment (§30). Now, if the spoken sentence becomes itself a partial cause of another judgment, which (we would say) is a token of the same type of the initial judgment (by partially causing an action of judging which produces that other judgment in another person or at a different time in the same person), then the spoken sentence can also count as the sign of the judgment, and the judgment as the meaning of the expression (§32, §34). The condition just sketched in the antecedent is fundamental: without it, a sentence p might very well have been an expression of a judgment j once (j was a partial cause of p), but no meaning is linked with p: for, if p is incomprehensible, namely it is not a partial cause of another judgment j′, then nothing can be said to be its meaning (§31).