 But positing truth-makers for atomic truths doesn’t obviate the need—supposing maximalism—to posit additional truth-makers for negative and universal truths. This becomes apparent in the case of negative truths when we compare the truth-tables for conjunction and disjunction with the truth-table for negation. The former tell us that the truth of a disjunctive formula is determined by the truth of one or other of its disjuncts, whilst the truth of a conjunctive formula is determined by the truth of both its conjuncts. But the truth-table for negation doesn’t tell us how the truth of ~P is determined by the truth of some other atomic formula Q from which ~P follows; it only tells us that ~P is true iff P is false. The strategy for avoiding bespoke truth-makers for logically complex truths can’t get a grip in this case: there’s no Q such that supplying a truth-maker for it obviates the necessity of positing an additional truth-maker for ~P (Russell 1918–19: 209–11; Hochberg 1969: 325–7).