 At issue in these latter sort of “richness” controversies is, roughly speaking, the amount of “richness at a level”—e.g., how finely differentiated is spatial experience of an array of objects? These contrast with the earlier indicated issues concerning what we might call “richness of levels” in experience. For example, does subjective experience not only distinguish (“at a level”) differences in (e.g.) how far a surface bulges out, but differences of additional levels—say, whether an object is spherical or cubical, and not just these, but whether it is a ball or a chair? It seems clear one can have a rich view with respect to one sort of issue, while maintaining sparseness at the other. If the question is richness “at a level” Dennett would seem to hold a sparse view relative to Prinz. But if we are asking about richness “of levels”, the comparison comes out differently: Dennett’s view of consciousness, as Prinz (disapprovingly) notes, puts no limits on what sort of properties might figure in its content.