 It is tempting to think that the foundationalist is better off appealing to some special relation that I have to my pain which makes it unnecessary to look to other beliefs in order to justify my belief that I’m in pain. It is the fact that I have a kind of access to my pain that no one else has that makes my belief foundationally justified while others must rely on inference in order to discover that I am in this state. This takes us to another classical version of foundationalism, the acquaintance theory. Perhaps the best known proponent of an acquaintance theory is Bertrand Russell (1910–11, 1913; for more on the acquaintance theory, see entry on  knowledge by acquaintance vs. description).  But it takes little imagination to read the view into most of the British empiricists. Roughly the view is that what justifies S in believing that he is in pain is the fact that S is acquainted with his pain in a way in which he is not acquainted with any contingent facts about other people, the physical world, the future, and so on. Russell (1910–11) characterizes acquaintance as a relation of direct or immediate awareness, a relation in which, as he and some others have put it, something is “presented” or simply “given” to the subject (Lewis 1929 and 1946; Moser 1989: 80ff.; Fales 1996).