 Moreover, Olivi rejects the Aristotelian notion of matter as pure potentiality and attributes a certain level of actuality to it: “The essence of matter means some act or actuality, which is nevertheless sufficiently distinct from the act which is a form” (Summa II q. 16, pp. 305–6). A number of different views on the nature of matter were debated in the thirteenth century, and Olivi’s theory was an original contribution to the debate. According to him, ‘actuality’ can be taken as an analogous notion that applies both to forms that are actual in a “determining and indeterminable” way, and matter that is actual in an indeterminate way and needs to be perfected by a form to turn into an actual substance. Olivi is careful to explain that matter’s having both actuality and potentiality does not mean that it is composed of act and potency, as if from form and matter. Rather, the actuality of matter is indeterminate and in that sense it is the same thing as the potentiality of matter, and therefore these two aspects of matter should be understood as two rationes, which do not introduce any real distinction (ibid., pp. 309–10; see Rodolfi 2010; Suarez-Nani 2009, 29–44). However, Olivi rejects Bonaventure’s theory of seminal reasons (rationes seminales), i.e. the idea that matter was imbued in the creation with latent structures that are actualized over time and thus explain the emergence of new substantial forms from the potentiality of matter. He accepts the term itself, but proposes a deflationary interpretation of it as various forms of efficient causality (Summa II q. 31).