 Finally, Brito’s logic of intentions results in a major departure from the logical tradition represented by Kilwardby and his contemporaries: the exclusion of truth from the realm of logic (see Mora-Márquez 2015b: ch. 4). According to Brito, logic does not deal with truth because it does not deal with real things per se, and real things, regardless of whatever second intentions they may fall under, are the truth-makers of assertions (QPm; QPm-1980: 138–139). The truth of an assertion such as ‘every man is an  animal’[7]  depends on a real identity holding between man and animal—a real identity that is independent of the fact that man is a species, a subject, a substance, etc. In other words, such an identity is independent of the second intentions that qualify the cognitive apprehension of man. Despite this, second intentions do play a role in the validity of deductions that have ‘every man is an animal’ as a premise, for second intentions are the principles of a syllogism’s validity. But they are not the principles of an assertion’s truth or falsity, and hence truth is no longer a logical concern. 