 If generics are indeed sensitive to such factors, it may be possible to explain why some generics are accepted even though the property is not prevalent among members of the kind. What, though, of generics such as “books are paperbacks” or “school teachers are female”? People tend to reject such generics, despite judging that the property in question is highly prevalent (Prasada et al. 2013). One proposal is that generics may be sensitive to the nature of the exceptions to the generic claim (Leslie 2007, 2008). That is, amongst the members of the kind that fail to have the predicated property, it may matter how they fail to have the property—in particular whether they simply lack the property, or whether they have an equally salient, concrete, positive property instead. The non-infected ticks simply do not carry Lyme disease—they do not have an alternative property instead. However, the books that are not paperbacks are instead hardcover. Similarly, people who are not right-handed are instead left-handed; elementary school teachers who are not female are male. Intuitively, one might feel as though one would be “overlooking” these hardcover books, these left-handed individuals, and these male school teachers if one accepted the generics in question. Thus, it is possible that generics may be sensitive to the nature of the exceptions to the generalization. However, more empirical investigation is needed on this point.