 A major reason for cognitive neuroscientist co-opting degeneracy in this fashion is the frequency of anomalous results in functional neuroimaging studies that show activations of brain areas that differ across subjects, or even in a single subject across performances of the same experimental task,. Figdor discusses numerous examples from recent cognitive neuroscience, and carefully separates cases of degeneracy that count as multiple realizations from others that do not. She concludes that her “sketch of degeneracy in cognitive neuroscience suffices to show that [multiple realizability] is a viable empirical hypothesis (2010: 237). And she concludes by addressing specifically Bechtel and Mundale’s (1999) empirical arguments challenging multiple realizability from functional imaging studies (see  §2.3  above). Bechtel and Mundale’s claim that neuroscience has been useful for psychology is true, Figdor asserts, but does not challenge a degeneracy-based empirical case for multiple realizability. And Bechtel and Mundale’s stronger claim, that neuroscientists implicitly assume the falsity of multiple realization as reflected in their accepted practices, is itself shown to be false by the use of degeneracy in cognitive neuroscience.