Proponents of the responsibility account often ground these verdicts in a particular conception of distributive justice, according to which fairness requires individuals to bear the costs of their own risk-imposing activities (McMahan 2005a; Otsuka 1994; see also Montague 1981; Draper 2009, 2016; Gordon-Solmon 2018). On this view, we should treat agents like Driver and Homeowner as engaging in moral gambles. If a gamble turns out badly and the agent ends up threatening harm to an innocent person, it is fairer that the gambler suffer harm, rather than the victims, because they are responsible for the fact that a harm now has to be borne by somebody (even if taking the gamble was justified according to the agent’s evidence). Hence, the agent who took the gamble forfeits her right not to be harmed for the sake of her victim. McMahan also argues that if two or more people bear responsibility for a threat of unjust harm, it is fair to make the most responsible person bear the full costs of preventing that harm, if defensive costs cannot be divided between them. On this view, liability has an important comparative dimension, and slight differences in responsibility can make a decisive difference to liability (McMahan 2011a: 551).