  It should be noted that Rawls put much store by ‘the good’ of a well-ordered political society (2001, 198–9) and admitted that perfectionist views about valuable ways of living might play a role in legislative decisions about ‘suitably circumscribed questions’ such as the protection of wildlife habitat (2001, 152n26).  However, he retained a traditional view of perfectionism as in principle inegalitarian, involving the idea that ‘some people have special claims because their greater gifts enable them to engage in the higher activities that realise perfectionist values’ (2001, 152). ‘Egalitarian perfectionists’ such as the author of this entry, in contrast, argue it is human flourishing that we should seek to make more equal in our theories of justice.  On this, doubtless controversial, view, the concern for impartiality in the law should not be allowed to have ‘imperialistic designs’ on all political questions (Sypnowich 2017, 85–7), so that the community forfeits its responsibility to foster equal human wellbeing.