 Kamtekar noted several differences. One is that, on the Aristotelian picture, virtues are supposed to be, “dispositions to respond appropriately—in judgment, feeling, and action—to one’s situation” (2004: 477). Furthermore, Aristotle was clear that they require practical wisdom, which is a “disposition to deliberate well about what conduces to the good life in general” (2004: 480). And while the virtues do require cross-situational consistency, this needs to be handled carefully, since it is consistency relative to the individual’s own outlook on life, as shaped by her values, goals, plans, and the like. So to outside observers, someone might be acting very inconsistently, but from her own perspective the pattern of behavior makes perfect sense (2004: 485, for criticism of this response, see Adams 2006: 121; Sosa 2009: 280–283; Merritt et al. 2010: 358–360).