 Leslie (2015b) offers an alternative account of how some generics can have normative force, building on the work of Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) on dual character concepts. Knobe et al. note that certain concepts seem to have dual normative/descriptive senses. For example, we might say of a professional scientist who cares only about getting grants and publications and not at all about discovering the truth that though there is a sense in which they are clearly a scientist, there is also a sense in which they are not a (true) scientist. Conversely, we might say of a postal worker who applies the scientific method whenever they can and who cares about truth above all else that even though there is a sense in which they are clearly not a scientist, there is nonetheless a sense in which they are a (true) scientist. Leslie proposes that a given generic has normative reading just in case the kind in question is associated with a dual character concept.