  As DNA banking and DNA data banking efforts proliferate with few laws to restrict the future use of samples or prevent the transfer of data, and given that any blood or tissue collection is a potential DNA bank, people may lose any hope of keeping their genetic profile private. The U.S. Department of Defense has the world's largest DNA bank: all military personnel are required to provide blood and saliva samples so that the remains of missing soldiers can be identified (McEwen 1997). The U.K.'s forensic DNA bank will eventually include a substantial portion of its population: the 2003 Criminal Justice Act requires anyone arrested for—not necessarily charged with, much less convicted of—a recordable offense to submit a DNA  sample[56]; in the U.S. such requirements vary state-by-state (McEwen 1997). As the technology becomes cheaper, the proposal to create a national DNA data bank by sampling every newborn child could arise (Bereano 1992). This repository of data would serve a number of purposes in addition to forensic ones: provide an identity tag (like social security numbers); enable economic planning based on genetic risk factors; support research into the genetic basis of medical and behavioral traits; identify remains; identify children recovered after being kidnapped; monitor individuals presumed to be predisposed to criminal violence; identify potential transplant donors; etc. A number of countries have already created population-level DNA banks and data banks to aid in research into complex diseases (Kaiser 2002), with deCODE Genetics’ initiative in Iceland, which combines genetic, medical, and genealogical data and operates on the basis of presumed consent, the most well-known. On a smaller scale, DNA is also banked by researchers in academic institutions, commercial labs, and hospitals. Additional privacy concerns arise in research contexts where DNA profiles are linked to phenotypic features (clinical data and lifestyle information) and not used just for forensic identification. Bioethicists looking at “biobanks” have focused on the problems prospective research poses for consent, and the adequacy of such provisions as opting in or opting out, waiving or giving blanket consent, withdrawing or renewing consent, etc. (Helgesson and Johnsson 2005; Shickle 2006). Onora O’Neill (2001) questions whether informed consent even remains a realistic goal given the amount of genetic data being banked. She argues that consent to specific propositions cannot be extended to closely related ones, and that the lack of explicit dissent cannot be taken as tacit or implied consent. O’Neill reminds us that consent to the collection, storage, and use of genetic and other data is not sought within the confines of the doctor-patient relationship where privacy is governed by professional standards; rather, the relationship is many-many and privacy is dependent on methods of data protection for which public rather than individual consent becomes appropriate. However, as genetic sequencing becomes a routine part of health care, with all the information researchers need contained in patient records, similar concerns about privacy will arise in the health care sector (Hansson 2004).