 Obviously, a theory that is egoist at its foundations is in severe tension with the Ownerless Suffering Argument; and though it may be less obvious, there is an equally strong tension between that argument and a view that tells me to prioritize my own virtue over the cultivation of virtue in others. Harris does not think that this consideration is decisive, however, since he regards the Ownerless Suffering Argument as itself a mere upāya. It must be an upāya, Harris says, since it relies on the Abhidharma understanding of the doctrine of no self, whereas Śāntideva’s actual view belongs to a very different form of Buddhist philosophy, the Madhyamaka. It would follow that we cannot use the Ownerless Suffering Argument to ascertain what kind of ethical theory, if any, Śāntideva would actually be prepared to defend as a final account of what reasons we have. 