 There are several different kinds of remarks to make here. First, there are many serious objections to substance dualism. Second, there are many serious objections to theism. Third, even if theism and substance dualism are both allowed to pass, it remains quite unclear why thinking machines are supposed to be ruled out by this combination of views. Given that God can unite souls with human bodies, it is hard to see what reason there is for thinking that God could not unite souls with digital computers (or rocks, for that matter!). Perhaps, on this combination of views, there is no especially good reason why, amongst the things that we can make, certain kinds of digital computers turn out to be the only ones to which God gives souls—but it seems pretty clear that there is also no particularly good reason for ruling out the possibility that God would choose to give souls to certain kinds of digital computers. Evidence that God is dead set against the idea of giving souls to certain kinds of digital computers is not particularly thick on the ground.