 Although Maimon’s positive system was of interest to the German philosophical community in the 1790s, his greatest influence was as a skeptic, and in particular as a critic of the ‘cognitive dualism’ that characterized Kant’s critical philosophy. The force of Maimon’s objections to Kant was felt most directly by Fichte, who in the Wissenschaftslehre devotes considerable attention to Maimon’s skeptical challenge to Kant. For Fichte, Maimon pointed out the fatal shortcomings of Kant’s system, but failed to move beyond a skepticism about the prospects for knowledge. This is reflected in Fichte’s claim that Maimon’s position “would ground a skepticism that taught us to doubt our own existence.” (GA I, 2: 369) Fichte sought to remedy this situation by developing a more thoroughgoing idealistic account of experience, one which placed the notion of ‘positing’ at the center of the system. Only in so doing, Fichte claims, can both Kant’s dualism and Maimon’s skepticism be avoided.