 “Eugenics” is a term loaded with historical significance and a strong negative valence. Its literal meaning – good birth – suggests a suitable goal for all prospective parents, yet its historical connotations tie it to appalling policies, including forced sterilizations, selective breeding programs in North America and Asia, and horrifying concentration camps and mass exterminations in Nazi Germany. Undoubtedly, we have an obligation never to forget the Holocaust, or indeed, any of the horrible policies and actions that have been justified in the name of creating better people. Yet intuitively we have some moral obligation to promote good births – to have, in the most literal sense, eugenic aims. Indeed, if parents are encouraged to provide the best environment for their children (good nutrition, education, health care, a loving family situation, etc.), why not also encourage them to ensure their children have good genes? And if we have some moral obligation to secure the well-being of our future children (a question explored extensively in the literature on the non-identity problem; see the entry on  the nonidentity problem),   do these obligations entail the use of reprogenetic technologies and practices?  This question is particularly important given that current genomic science and technology permit significant control over reproductive choices. Can these contemporary practices be distinguished, in their aims, forms, justifications, and likely consequences, from the clearly morally impermissible eugenic programs of the past?