 Is (5) true in \(w\)? There are two different ways of understanding this question. On the one hand, it could mean something roughly like this: if \(w\) actually obtains (contrary to what astronomers tell us), is Phosphorus the second planet from the sun? The answer to that question is surely ‘no.’ ‘Phosphorus’ refers to whatever is actually the last celestial body visible in the morning, and on the assumption that \(w\) actually obtains, that object is Saturn, and is therefore not the second planet. As Chalmers would put it, (5) is not true at w considered as  actual.[5]  But we can also interpret the question differently: if \(w\) had obtained, then would Phosphorus have been the second planet? In considering that question, we are not hypothetically assuming that the object that actually satisfies the reference-fixing description is Saturn. Instead, we can draw freely on our belief that the object actually fitting the description is Venus, so that the name picks out Venus in all possible worlds. Since Venus is the second planet in \(w\), it is true to say: if \(w\) had obtained, then Phosphorus would have been the second planet. In Chalmers’s terminology, (5) is true at w considered as counterfactual.