 The second core claim of Millikan’s theory, in a nutshell, is this: every representation belongs to a set of interrelated representations, and the representations of this set must correspond to certain other (usually external) states in a systematic way to enable the consumer to perform its proper functions. Or, to put it differently, (i) every representation R that is sent by a producer P to a consumer C belongs to a set of interrelated representations that P can send to C, and (ii) each representation of this set, if it is tokened, must ‘map onto’ (correspond to) a particular state of affairs in order for C to function properly (Millikan 1984, 96–102; 1989b, 283–290; and 2004, 71–86). The particular state that a representation must map onto is, of course, the represented state of affairs, the content of this representation. (Note that, strictly speaking, this formulation of Millikan’s second claim only covers descriptive/‘belief-like’ representations; Millikan’s theory of directive/‘desire-like’ representations and her account of ‘pushmi-pullyu representations’, i.e. of representations that are at once descriptive and directive, will be omitted here. For details on directive representations, cf. Millikan 1984, 96–102 and 2004, 191–201; for pushmi-pullyu representations, cf. Millikan 1995.)