 However, and partly due to his reluctance to consider the artist’s intentionality as being decisive in the comprehension of the work of art (which in some way prefigures the late Romantic ideal of l’art pour l’art), Schlegel did not underline a necessary moral purpose in aesthetic objects. And yet, for Schlegel, this did not imply that the contemplation and understanding of art should lose its moral aura. Quite to the contrary, for Schlegel, art has the power to elevate us above our ordinary encounters with the world, above the sorrows and daily troubles of life. This is why he argued that the purpose of art could not be a mere imitation or reduplication of the world as it is, because in this case, apart from the fact that music, dance, architecture, and so many other art forms become totally inexplicable, the best works of art would be the ones that deceive the most, in the sense that the viewer would find himself prevented from contemplating the work of art as a work of art. Clearly, if the purpose of art were to replicate nature (understood as an object rather than a subject) the aesthetic objects would evoke no particular interest beyond mere ornamentation. But, for Schlegel, both the contemplation/critique and the production of art should be seen as the result of creative activity. 