 As Lynch (2012) points out, these tensions are not the only, or perhaps, the central one’s raised by critics of deflation. For such critics, self-deception involves a deeper behavioral conflict. Specifically, what self-deceivers say about p is at odds with their non-verbal behavior, which justifies the attribution of the belief that ~p (Audi, 1997; Patten 2003; Funkhouser 2005; Fernández 2013). For example, Ellen says that she is doing well in her biology class, but systematically avoids looking at the results on her quizzes and tests. She says she doesn’t need to look; she knows she didn’t miss anything. When her teacher tries to catch her after class to discuss her poor grades, she is rushes off. Similarly, when she sees an email from her teacher, she ignores it. Ellen’s behavior suggests to these critics that she knows she is not doing well in her biology class, despite her avowals to the contrary. Insofar as deflationary approaches deny people like Ellen know the truth, they fail adequately to explain her self-deception. While some propose these cases as a type of self-deception deflation cannot explain (Fernández 2013), others go further, suggesting these cases show that deflation is not an account of self-deception at all, but of self-delusion (Audi 2007; Funkhouser 2005). In either case, critics think such cases cannot adequately be explained by deflationary account.