 Harm to others, can be contrasted with moral wrongfulness or immorality—the legal moralist’s starting point; with offence to others; and with harm to persons choosing to engage in, or consenting to, the relevant conduct (anti-paternalism). At least as far as Mill’s canonical statement is concerned, moralism, offence and paternalism are ruled out as legitimate bases for legal coercion. The State may legitimately stop A from beating up B, thereby limiting his freedom of action, because this prevents harm to B. And it may stop A from stealing from B for the same reason. But the State oversteps its proper limits on this view if it purports to stop A smashing up his own property; or to protect C from the distaste she will feel knowing that A is doing this. And it may not treat the wrongfulness of conduct, in the absence of any unconsented-to harm, as a basis for legal coercion: it may not for example prevent “bloody gladiatorial contests presented by voluntary performers before consenting audiences” (Feinberg 1984: 13). For the harm principle, says Mill, is “entitled to govern absolutely the dealing of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control” (Mill On Liberty, Ch. 1, para 9)