 Suppose speaker S expresses proposition P in words W. And suppose circumstances are such that if we were to understand S as out to vouch for the truth of P and P alone, no more and no less, in uttering W, we would thereby portray S as avoidably violating maxim M or at least, avoidably inviting the suspicion that she is avoidably violating it, with the consequence that either her contribution is gratuitously unresponsive to her audience’s informational needs or she is gratuitously neglecting to maintain her reputation as cooperative, rational, and unconfused. In either case, she wouldn’t be behaving as a cooperative, rational, unconfused speaker must. To clear her her of this charge, to square our interpretation of her words with the governing supposition that she is behaving as a cooperative, rational, unconfused speaker must, we need to find something more or something else she might be out to vouch for.