  In the preceding section of this essay, I organized my discussion of the problems that Darwin’s allies had with Darwin’s Darwinism around five issues: [i] the role of chance as a factor in evolutionary theory and the theory’s apparently probabilistic nature; [ii] the nature of selection; [iii] the question of whether selection/adaptation explanations are teleological; [iv] the ontological status of species and the epistemological status of species concepts; and [v] the implications of Darwin’s insistence on the slow and gradual nature of evolutionary change. I claimed that one very good reason for continuing to characterize one dominant approach to evolutionary biology, that represented by the so-called ‘Neo-Darwinian Synthesis’, as ‘Darwinism’ is that its proponents side with Darwin on these issues (and on many less fundamental ones besides). That in itself is remarkable, but it is the more so because the Darwinian position on each of these issues is under as much pressure from non-Darwinian evolutionary biologists today as it was in the wake of the Origin. It is not surprising, given the situation as I have just characterized it, that historians and philosophers of biology have made significant contributions to the discussion, especially in pointing out the underlying philosophical issues  and conceptual confusions and ambiguities that stand in the way of resolving the issues at hand, and their historical origins.