 In contrast with Avicenna, there are philosophers who endorse mathematical continuity and physical atomism simultaneously. For instance, Shahrastānī (d. 1153) insists that the judgment of the faculty of estimation is not reliable enough to convince us that the physical magnitudes can bear potentially infinite divisions. He believes that physical magnitudes are not infinitely divisible. The number of their parts, either actual or even potential, is finite. Shahrastānī reminds us that although the size of the universe is imaginable to be infinite, philosophers usually reject that the universe is infinite. Relying on a similar approach, Shahrastānī contends that although every magnitude is imaginable as infinitely divisible, there are strong arguments which show that the faculty of estimation is mistaken in this case and no physical magnitudes are infinitely divisible. Infinite extendibility of the size of the universe in the estimation is compatible with the universe being finite. Similarly, infinite divisibility of magnitudes in the estimation could be compatible with their having only a finite number of (potential) parts in the extramental world, or so Shahrastānī seems to believe (al-Shahrastānī Summa philosophiae, 513; McGinnis 2019). This means that if we take mathematical objects as merely estimative constructions, then we can reconcile purely mathematical continuity with physical atomism.