Kant could avoid the detachment problem if he holds, as some interpreters claim, that it is impossible to will (Wille) immoral ends (Schroeder 2005b, §3).  If this interpretation is right, then reason would never require one to will immoral means.  But it would also leave Kant without an account of instrumental incoherence, at least as we have been understanding it.  After all, agents can display instrumental incoherence in the pursuit of both moral and immoral ends.  To use Kant’s own examples, the doctor who doesn’t intend the means believed necessary to making his patient healthy is instrumentally incoherent in the same way as is the poisoner who doesn’t intend the means believed necessary to kill his victim (4:415).  So, this interpretation would have Kant avoiding the detachment objection, but at the cost of no longer presenting an account of instrumental incoherence that holds regardless of whether the end is reasonable or good.  