 This is not quite right. For while Ockham does not need an account of indivisibility (since a tenet of Ockham’s nominalism on the question of universals is that nothing real is divisible into subjective parts), he certainly needs an account of the distinction of one substance from another, as Black’s reflections on the principle of the identity of indiscernibles forcefully show. In fact, Ockham claims that a substance is singular through itself (“se ipso”: Ockham, Ordinatio I, d. 2, q. 6, n. 105–107 (William of Ockham [OT], 2:196, ll. 2–12; Spade (1994), 171)). And it seems to me that this claim does indeed constitute an attempt at a solution to the problem of distinction. For Ockham is a nominalist about many more properties than Scotus is, as well as being a nominalist on the question of universals. Thus, Ockham believes that the set of those predicates that involve no ontological commitment (that is to say, predicates that do not signify anything extramental other than merely the substance itself) includes the Aristotelian genus, specific difference, and proprium (necessary but non-defining property) (see e.g. Moody [1935], 97–106, 145–51). Substances themselves are primarily diverse according to Ockham – their distinction from each other is not explained by anything other than their own self-identity, and ipso facto not by any qualitative or relational feature of themselves. Self-identity is not, however, a real feature of the substance in any sense distinct from itself or its nature. And this is the result not of Ockham’s nominalism on the question of universals, but of his nominalism on the question of inseparable properties. And much the same seems true of the other opponents of Scotus mentioned above.