 This is not to suggest that the anthropological interpretation of the empirical results should be taken as uncontroversial. Binmore  (1994,  1998,  2005a,  2005b) has argued for many years, based on a wide range of behavioral data, that when people play games with non-relatives they tend to learn to play Nash equilibrium with respect to utility functions that approximately correspond to income functions. As he points out in  Binmore (2005b),  Henrich et al.’s data do not test this hypothesis for their small-scale societies, because their subjects were not exposed to the test games for the (quite long, in the case of the Ultimatum game) learning period that theoretical and computational models suggest are required for people to converge on NE. When people play unfamiliar games, they tend to model them by reference to games they are used to in everyday experience. In particular, they tend to play one-shot laboratory games as though they were familiar repeated games, since one-shot games are rare in normal social life outside of special institutional contexts. Many of the interpretive remarks made by Henrich et al. are consistent with this hypothesis concerning their subjects, though they nevertheless explicitly reject the hypothesis itself. What is controversial here—the issues of spin around ‘orthodox’ theory aside—is less about what the particular subjects in this experiment were doing than about what their behavior should lead us to infer about human evolution.