Prompt:
Analyze this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada and explain how it applies refugee definition:

RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR: TA6-14652 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Claimant(s) XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Date(s) of Hearing February 27, 2008 Date(s) de l'audience Place of Hearing Toronto, Ontario Lieu de l'audience Date of Decision March 6, 2008 Date de la décision Panel Diane L. Tinker Tribunal Counsel for the Claimant(s) Carla Sturdy Barrister & Solicitor Conseil(s) du / de la / des demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Tribunal Officer T. Smith Agent(e) des tribunaux Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX (the claimant) is a citizen of the People's Republic of China. She claims to have a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of the Communist regime and in particular, the Public Security Bureau, by reason of her religious beliefs as a member of an underground Christian church. In addition, she claims to be a person in need of protection because she would be subjected personally to a risk to her life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or to a danger of torture in the People's Republic of China. ALLEGATIONS: The claimant alleges that she was not allowed to further her education upon completion of middle school in 1999 because she was a girl. The claimant stated that she obtained employment in 2000 and gave most of her money to her parents but was able to save a little. The claimant alleges that in XXXXX 2006, she had asked her parents for some money in order for her to go to school. The claimant maintains that her parents refused and thus, she maintains she became severely depressed. In XXXXX 2006, the claimant stated that a good friend of hers noticed her depression and thus told her about the miracles of Jesus and eternal life. After one discussion with her friend, the claimant decided to attend the underground Christian church with her. The claimant stated that she attended the underground Christian church in the People's Republic of China until XXXXX, 2006, when the Public Security Bureau raided it. The claimant stated that she was able to escape and go into hiding. While in hiding, the claimant maintains that she learned that the Public Security Bureau was looking to arrest her. The claimant therefore made arrangements to leave the country. The claimant alleges that she arrived in Canada on October 15, 2006 and filed for refugee protection a few days later. DETERMINATION: I find that the claimant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. ANALYSIS: Identity: The claimant's oral testimony and the supporting documentation1 filed establish her identity as a national of the People's Republic of China. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is not, nor has ever been, a member of an underground Christian church in the People's Republic of China and is not, nor has ever been, a Christian. The claimant alleges that she decided to attend the underground Christian church with her friend, in XXXXX 2006, after only one conversation about Christianity, even though she had no prior knowledge of it. The claimant indicated that she knew that the underground Christian church was illegal prior to her attending and maintained that if caught, she thought she would be locked up for the rest of her life. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that it is not plausible that the claimant would attend an illegal organization after only one discussion, having no prior knowledge of the religion (other than the one discussion) and perceived the consequences of getting caught as incarceration for life. Moreover, the claimant had been saving money to go to school and thus could have gone on saving money in order to have enough to attend, as she had already waited seven years. Furthermore, the claimant maintains that the members of the underground Christian church, pledged 50 yuan each per month in order for her to go to school on her very first attendance, which I also do not find plausible, as there is nothing to indicate that the claimant at this time was going to continue her attendance at this church. The claimant stated that on the day of the raid by the Public Security Bureau, she was acting as a lookout at the back of the premises where the church service was being held and that her other friend, Ms. XXXXX, whose home the service was in, was the lookout at the front. The claimant maintains that she received a telephone call from Ms. XXXXX at the same time all the members from the service were running out the back door. The claimant indicated that Ms. XXXXX had told her the Public Security Bureau was approaching and to leave. The claimant stated that she then left and after her, Ms. XXXXX left. However, the claimant indicated that Ms. XXXXX was arrested. The claimant thus indicated that she was the second last person to leave, as Ms. XXXXX went back into the house to turn off the lights. When asked as to why Ms. XXXXX would do this if, as the claimant indicated, there was an escape plan, the claimant stated that Ms. XXXXX wanted to turn off the lights so that it was more difficult for the Public Security Bureau to find the believers. I reject this explanation, as all of the believers had already left. Furthermore, as there had been an escape plan in effect, as per the claimant, then someone inside the house would have been responsible to turn off the lights. The claimant's explanation was that the person was in a hurry to leave. I reject this explanation. The claimant maintained that this church had been in existence since 2003 without incident and had indicated that there was an escape plan. Furthermore, I reject the claimant's testimony that Ms. XXXXX, who was the last person to leave was arrested, as well as two others, but not the claimant, who maintains she was the second last to leave, would have been arrested as well. The claimant's explanation was that perhaps she ran faster than others. I reject this explanation, as the claimant maintained that the fellow believers ran in all different directions and thus would have no idea if she ran faster than others. In summary, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that due to a number of implausibilities, that the claimant is not, nor has ever been, a member of an underground Christian church in the People's Republic of China. The claimant provided a photocopy of a summons2 at the hearing. I give this document no weight, as it is a photocopy only and it was provided only on the day of the hearing, although it was dated XXXXX, 2006. Furthermore, country documentation3 obtained from independent sources indicate that there is a flourishing trade of fraudulent documents, including identity documents and summonses, used by refugee claimants. I further find, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is not, nor ever was, a Christian. The claimant produced a Certificate of Baptism4 and a church letter5 to corroborate her attendance at church here in Canada. The church letter indicates that the claimant has been attending the XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX, a Pentecostal church, since XXXXX, 2006. The panel notes that the claimant, who alleges to have arrived in Canada on a false passport, could not provide any evidence, such as a baggage tag, boarding pass, etc., to establish as to when she actually arrived. The claimant indicated that she had been attending this church on a regular basis. The claimant was asked by the panel Member a number of questions concerning the Pentecost. The claimant had been asked as to what religious holidays are observed by Christians. The claimant indicated Easter, Christmas and Good Friday. The claimant was asked if she wished to add to her answer and she replied in the negative. The claimant was then asked as to why she failed to mention the Pentecost, as she attended a Pentecostal church. The claimant indicated that she had never celebrated it. It was pointed out to the claimant that her church letter indicates she has been attending the XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX since XXXXX of 2006 and thus has been attending for over a year, therefore, she would have observed the Pentecost. The claimant stated that the Pastor mentioned it but never celebrated it. I reject this explanation, as the claimant attends a Pentecostal church and thus this religious day would have been observed. The claimant was asked four times to name the day that Jesus resurrected from the dead. The claimant initially had no answer, then said Christmas, then after Good Friday and then said the Pentecost. The panel Member indicated to the claimant that the day was called Easter. The claimant was then asked as to what the significance of Easter is to Christians. The claimant stated that was the day Jesus was resurrected and reborn. When asked if she wished to add to her answer, she replied in the negative. I find that the claimant does not possess some basic tenets of Christianity: Although Christ was resurrected on Easter, the claimant failed to state that he died on the cross for Christians' sins in order for humans to have eternal life, which is a cornerstone of Christianity. The claimant was asked as to what the role of the Holy Spirit was. The claimant stated that it was to protect countries if there were difficulties, which is incorrect. The correct answer is that the Holy Spirit is to lead Christians to wisdom and to have a greater understanding of the Holy Scriptures. The claimant also did not know where the Pentecost and Holy Spirit are found in The Bible, being the Book of Acts. The claimant was able to answer some questions about Christianity. However, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is not, nor ever was, a Christian as a result of her limited knowledge of the Pentecost (although maintaining she attends a Pentecostal church on a regular basis) and her inability to name Easter or the significance of it to Christians, a cornerstone of Christianity. Any knowledge that the claimant has learned about Christianity could easily have been acquired here in Canada in order to manufacture her claim. In addition, having found the claimant was a not member of an underground Christian church in the People's Republic of China and is not being pursued by the Public Security Bureau, I also find, on a balance of probabilities, that she can return to the People's Republic of China without fear of persecution. In this regard, if the claimant wishes to become a Christian and practice this religion in the People's Republic of China, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that she can do so freely in a registered church as vast and increasing numbers of Chinese citizens now do without fear of persecution. Country documents6 indicate that there are tens of millions of Protestants in the People's Republic of China who attend registered churches and the number is growing. The Christian Science Monitor reported in a 2004 article that there are plans to build two Protestant churches in Beijing that will hold four to five thousand people. There is no evidence that registered church members are constrained from practicing their religion freely. In addition, there is evidence that house churches are discouraged but increasingly tolerated. The Christian Science Monitor noted the relaxation of authorities' treatment of unregistered Protestant churches in major cities. Furthermore, a Brock University professor undertook a fact finding mission to the People's Republic of China and noted that religious groups in Shanghai (where the claimants are from) have "excellent" relations with local authorities. In another scholarly study, it was noted that there appears to be a measure of acknowledgement by the Chinese government that Christianity is growing rapidly and may even be benefiting a "spiritually hungry population". However, another study indicated that the government believes that religions play a role in cushioning the societal transformations brought on by the People's Republic of China's accession to the World Trade Organization. I therefore find, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant has failed to satisfy the burden of establishing a serious possibility that she would be subjected personally to a risk to her life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or to a danger of torture by any authority in the People's Republic of China. CONCLUSION: I therefore determine that the claimant is neither a Convention refugees nor a person in need of protection. The Refugee Protection Division therefore rejects her claim. "Diane L. Tinker" Diane L. Tinker "March 6, 2008" Date REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / ETHNIC ORIGIN / ARBITRARY ARREST AND DETENTION / UNREPRESENTED CLAIMANT / DISCLOSURE / TRANSLATION / NON COMPLIANCE WITH RULES / OMISSION / FACT / MILITARY SERVICE / PORT OF ENTRY / PERSONAL INFORMATION FORM / MALE / NEGATIVE / TURKEY 1 Exhibit C-3, photocopies of the claimant's resident identity card, hukou and graduation certificate. 2 Exhibit C-6, photocopy of summons. 3 ExhibitR/A-1, item 3.17, Information Request CHN100510.E, "Reports of the manufacture, procurement, distribution and use of fraudulent documents." 4 Exhibit C-4, photocopy of above certificate. 5 Exhibit C-5, photocopy of above letter. 6 Exhibit R/A-1, item 12.9, Information Request CHN100387.E. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR: TA6-14652 5 RPD.15.7 (October 2007) Disponible en français

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: TA6-14652

### Key Issues
the panel Member a number of questions concerning the Pentecost. The claimant had been asked as to what religious holidays are observed by Christians. The claimant indicated Easte

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: person in need of protection. ANALYSIS: Identity: The claimant's oral testimony and the supporting documentation1 filed establish her identity as a national of the People's Republic of China. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is not, nor has ever been, a member of an underground Christian church in the Peo

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
Explain how this Federal Court of Appeal of Canada decision clarifies immigration law:

Château d'Ivoire Stores Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2023-05-12 Neutral citation 2023 FCA 100 File numbers A-71-22 Decision Content Date: 20230512 Docket: A-71-22 Citation: 2023 FCA 100 CORAM: BOIVIN J.A. LOCKE J.A. LEBLANC J.A. BETWEEN: CHÂTEAU D'IVOIRE STORES INC. Appellant and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent Dealt with in writing without appearance of parties. Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 12, 2023. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: LOCKE J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: BOIVIN J.A. LEBLANC J.A. Date: 20230512 Docket: A-71-22 Citation: 2023 FCA 100 CORAM: BOIVIN J.A. LOCKE J.A. LEBLANC J.A. BETWEEN: CHÂTEAU D'IVOIRE STORES INC. Appellant and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT LOCKE J.A. [1] This matter arises from a statutory appeal before the Federal Court that was brought by the appellant, Château d’Ivoire Stores Inc. (Château d’Ivoire), in respect of a decision of the Director and Chief Executive Officer (Director) of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC). The Director’s decision confirmed a notice of violation that imposed administrative monetary penalties on Château d’Ivoire pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17. [2] In this Court, Château d’Ivoire appeals an Order of the Federal Court (2022 FC 405, per Justice Peter G. Pamel), which dismissed its motion under Rules 317 and 318 of the Federal Courts Rules, S.O.R./98-106, for disclosure of certain documents. Château d’Ivoire had brought the motion after FINTRAC denied its request under Rule 317 to provide the documents because they had not been considered by the Director, the decision-maker of the impugned decision. [3] For convenience, I reproduce the text of Rule 317(1) here: Material in the Possession of a Tribunal Obtention de documents en la possession d’un office fédéral Material from tribunal Matériel en la possession de l’office fédéral 317 (1) A party may request material relevant to an application that is in the possession of a tribunal whose order is the subject of the application and not in the possession of the party by serving on the tribunal and filing a written request, identifying the material requested. 317 (1) Toute partie peut demander la transmission des documents ou des éléments matériels pertinents quant à la demande, qu’elle n’a pas mais qui sont en la possession de l’office fédéral dont l’ordonnance fait l’objet de la demande, en signifiant à l’office une requête à cet effet puis en la déposant. La requête précise les documents ou les éléments matériels demandés. [4] Rule 350 provides that Rules 317 to 319 apply, with such modifications as are necessary, to statutory appeals of the kind brought by Château d’Ivoire before the Federal Court in this case. [5] At the request of the parties, this appeal has been heard on the basis of the parties’ respective memoranda of fact and law, and without an oral hearing. [6] The gist of Château d’Ivoire’s argument before the Federal Court (and before this Court) is that, because the Director made her impugned decision by simply accepting a recommendation that she received from her FINTRAC staff, FINTRAC should have provided all of the documents in its possession that related to the notice of violation. Château d’Ivoire argues that the document production should not have been limited to the material that was provided to the Director because she effectively delegated her decision-making authority to her staff, and simply rubber-stamped the recommendation she received. Château d’Ivoire argues that the Director, and FINTRAC, should not be able to shield relevant documents from scrutiny by engaging in such an exercise of delegation. [7] The Federal Court concluded that Château d’Ivoire had provided little direct legal support for its position. It did concede at paragraph 23 that: [i]t would be rather Kafkaesque for an administrative decision-maker to be able to shield the material relevant to an application for judicial review or a statutory appeal by delegating decision-making authority to staff who would then simply place limited material before the decision-maker with a draft decision, ready to be signed without question. [8] However, the Federal Court continued by concluding that “there is no evidence to suggest that that is what happened in this case, and suggesting it does not make it so.” (paragraph 23). The Federal Court stated that the Director was entitled to rely on staff to review the matter and make a recommendation, and there was no evidence that, in doing so, she had delegated her decision-making authority. The Federal Court concluded that the evidence indicated in fact that the Director made the impugned decision herself. [9] The Federal Court referred to some of the abundant jurisprudence to the effect that a party requesting documents pursuant to Rule 317 is entitled only to relevant material that was before the decision-maker when the decision was made (e.g. 1185740 Ontario Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), 1998 CanLII 7910 at para. 11 (F.C.T.D.), aff’d [1999] F.C.J. No. 1432 at para. 3 (F.C.A.) (QL)). The Federal Court also noted that Rule 350 does not require a heightened standard of disclosure for statutory appeals: Athletes 4 Athletes Foundation v. Canada (National Revenue), 2020 FCA 41, [2020] F.C.J. No. 557 at para. 22. [10] The Federal Court acknowledged that Rule 317 may be broadened where a breach of procedural fairness is alleged, but it found that Château d’Ivoire had failed to establish the relevance of the documents in issue to the purported breach, which would be necessary for the Federal Court to exercise its discretion in this regard: Gagliano v Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities), 2006 FC 720, [2006] F.C.J. No. 917 at paras. 51-52, aff’d 2007 FCA 131, [2007] F.C.J. No. 467. [11] Château d’Ivoire argues that the Federal Court erred in law, and that a standard of correctness applies in this appeal. This suggests that Château d’Ivoire does not take issue with the Federal Court’s factual conclusions. However, many of Château d’Ivoire’s submissions suggest that it does not accept all of these conclusions. In any case, the standard of review in this appeal is as indicated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235: correctness on questions of law (see paragraph 8), and palpable and overriding error on questions of fact or of mixed fact and law in which there is no extricable issue of law (see paragraphs 10 and 36). To the extent that Château d’Ivoire takes issue with any of the Federal Court’s factual findings, it must convince this Court that the Federal Court erred in making such findings in a way that is both palpable (i.e. obvious) and overriding (i.e. going to the core of the outcome): Canada v. South Yukon Forest Corporation, 2012 FCA 165, [2012] F.C.J. No. 669 at para. 46. [12] I agree with the Federal Court’s legal conclusion that the scope of document production under Rule 317 is generally limited to material that was before the decision-maker when the decision was made. I also agree that the Director was entitled to seek a recommendation from a FINTRAC staff member. I am not convinced that the Federal Court erred in law. [13] I am also not convinced that the Federal Court made a palpable and overriding error on any question of mixed fact and law. I agree with the Federal Court’s conclusion that the evidence in this case does not support any broader application of Rule 317. The Federal Court was entitled to conclude that the Director had made her own decision based on the documents that were provided to her, and had not delegated her decision-making authority (Galipeau v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 984, 257 A.C.W.S. (3d) 587). The evidence cited at length in Château d’Ivoire’s memorandum of fact and law does not compel a different conclusion. The Federal Court was also entitled to find that there was no indication of any effort to use delegation to shield documents from scrutiny. Finally, the Federal Court was entitled to find that there was no link of relevance between the alleged breach of procedural fairness and the documents sought by Château d’Ivoire. [14] Of course, nothing in this decision, or in the Federal Court’s Order under appeal here, is determinative on the issues that are to be considered in the statutory appeal of the Director’s decision. Château d’Ivoire remains entitled to argue its case, even though it is not entitled to compel production of the documents in question here. [15] I would dismiss the present appeal with costs. "George R. Locke" J.A. "I agree. Richard Boivin J.A." "I agree. "René LeBlanc J.A." FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: A-71-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: CHÂTEAU D'IVOIRE STORES INC. v. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA MOTION DEALT WITH IN WRITING WITHOUT APPEARANCE OF PARTIES REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: LOCKE J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: BOIVIN J.A. LEBLANC J.A. DATED: MAY 12, 2023 WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY: Guy Du Pont, Ad.E. Léon H. Moubayed Matthias Heilke For The Appellant Benoît de Champlain Isabelle Mathieu-Millaire For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP Montréal, Quebec For The Appellant Shalene Curtis-Micallef Deputy Attorney General of Canada For The Respondent

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Château d'Ivoire Stores Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)

### Key Issues
here, is determinative on the issues that are to be considered in the statutory appeal of the Director’s decision. Château d’Ivoire remains entitled to argue its case, even though

### Standard of Review
conclusions. In any case, the standard of review in this appeal is as indicated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235: correctnes

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: cial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC). The Director’s decision confirmed a notice of violation that imposed administrative monetary penalties on Château d’Ivoire pursuant to the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c. 17. [2] In this Court, Château d’Ivoire appeals an Ord

### Precedential Value
As a Federal Court of Appeal decision, this ruling has significant precedential value and is binding on the Federal Court and administrative tribunals like the Immigration and Refugee Board. It establishes legal principles that must be followed in similar cases and provides authoritative interpretation of the relevant legislation.


Prompt:
Explain how this Refugee Appeal Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada interprets refugee law:

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC0-11253 MC0-11254 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal [REDACTED] [REDACTED] XXXX Personnes en cause Date of decision February 25, 2022 Date de la décision Panel Susan Brown Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Julien Labrie-Masse Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] The Appellants [REDACTED] (Principal Appellant) and his spouse [REDACTED] are citizens of Sudan. The Principal Appellant fears the Sudanese authorities and the female Appellant was traumatized by female genital mutilation (FGM) and fears re-circumcision. [2] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the Appellants were not credible with respect to material aspects of their claims. The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in its analysis of their credibility and incorrectly applied the Gender Guideline.1 [3] Following my own review, I find that the Appellants did not credibly establish their claims. DECISION [4] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. BACKGROUND [5] According to their Basis of Claim forms (BOCs)2 the Appellants were born in 1984 and 1995. At five years of age the female Appellant was circumcised. [6] At 11 years old the Principal Appellant was a trainee with the XXXX XXXX and at 13 years old he was in the Quran Association. He escaped from a camp associated with the Quran Association when he realized it was recruitment mechanism for the ruling party. When he was asked why he left, he said that his father was ill. [7] In XXXX 2000 the Principal Appellant was arrested for participating in a demonstration against national service and female circumcision. After XXXX XXXX he was released without trial. [8] In 2002 the Principal Appellant and others established the XXXX XXXX Association at XXXX University to help needy students financially, the Appellant the XXXX. On [REDACTED] 2002, the Principal Appellant and others were arrested by members of the security services after participating in a meeting with students about suspensions. He was beaten and released the same day after "signing engagement and declaration." The University closed the Association for the safety of students. [9] On [REDACTED] 2004, the Principal Appellant participated in a lecture and march protesting the situation in Darfur and was arrested with many demonstrators by police forces. He was severely beaten and questioned about his relations with the armed movement of Darfur. He was released on the XXXX day. The Principal Appellant and others were tried before a judge, who adjourned for a month. The Principal Appellant was not summoned again and did not participate in any demonstrations. [10] When the Principal Appellant completed his university studies in XXXX 2006, he received telephone calls from unknown people saying they knew his movements and from friends in the ruling party asking him to join. He couldn't find a job. He went to South Sudan and was threatened in Juba by citizens while working for [REDACTED] in 2007. He could not find work anywhere in Sudan because political affiliation was a condition of employment. [11] The Principal Appellant found a job in Oman and paid an employee at the airport to facilitate his travel without a security screening. He worked in Oman for 10 years. He visited with his family in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates or Egypt and rarely in Sudan "because going in and out is a risk." [12] During high school and university, the female Appellant was fined, attacked and abused for wearing pants. She participated in a passive demonstration on XXXX XXXX against price increases and for the release of the [REDACTED] 2013, prisoners. She was gathered up with others by the campus police but escaped with two other students. [13] The Principal Appellant visited Sudan in XXXX 2018 to attend to his sick father and on leaving the hospital was taken to a government building forced to sign a "commitment not to travel, assist security and testify about some merchants in crimes related to destabilizing security and undermining power, punishable by death, and [he] was threatened with death if [he] regressed or refused." He escaped the same day by skipping the security checks and entering safely directly with an airport employee. [14] In XXXX 2018 the Appellants travelled to the United States (US) for fertility treatments and the Principal Appellant lost his job. The Appellants cannot return to Sudan because of the problems of the Principal Appellant and the female Appellant will be circumcised again. The Appellants considered seeking asylum in the US but heard it was difficult and sought asylum in Canada on August 1, 2018. The female Appellant gave birth to XXXX XXXX on [REDACTED] XXXX. NEW EVIDENCE Some of the documents presented by the Appellants are accepted as new evidence [15] The Appellants' claims were heard on December 8, 2020, and the RPD gave its decision on December 14, 2020. The Appellants did not present any new evidence with their appeal record which was received on August 9, 2021. [16] On December 21, 2021, the RAD sent a notice to the Appellants and the Minister that it would be referencing the most recent National Documentation Package for Sudan3 and seeking any submissions by January 5, 2022. The Appellants asked for an extension of time until February 4, 2022, which was granted. [17] On January 7, 2022, the following documents were received from the female Appellant: A. Statement of the female Appellant dated [REDACTED] 2021, and certified translation;4 B. Pierre Tick, Sudan: after the criminalization of female circumcision, the challenge of law enforcement. May 4, 2020, www.la-croix.com;5 C. Siegfried Modola/Reuters, Sudan is moving towards criminalization of female circumcision, May 6, 2020, www.lemonde.fr;6 D. Unattributed, Sudan's midwives told to stop genital mutilation on mothers after birth, November 29, 2019, thejapantimes;7 E. Unattributed, Sudan: sexual violence as a weapon of massive repression in Khartoum (UN), December 21, 2021, news.un.org;8 F. Gregoire Sauvage, In Sudan, army uses rape to intimidate protestors, December 24, 2021, www.france24.com;9 G. UK in Sudan on Twitter, Statement of Sexual Violence Against Women During Protests, December 23, 2021, Twitter.10 [18] On February 4, 2022, additional written submissions were received from counsel for the Appellants attaching the documents sent in January, documents A-G.11 [19] As the Appellants did not make any submissions about the new evidence, I will assess it as a Rule 29 application. Section 110(4) of the Immigration Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provides that an appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. In Singh12 the Federal Court of Appeal dictates a narrow interpretation of section 110(4): the conditions set out therein must be met, and there is no room for discretion on the part of the RAD. If the section 110(4) threshold is met, then the new evidence must also meet jurisprudential requirements of credibility, relevance and newness.13 [20] There is a different test for the submission of new evidence under Rule 29. In deciding whether to admit new evidence under Rule 29, I must first consider any relevant factors including: (a) the document's relevance and probative value; (b) any new evidence the document brings to the appeal; and (c) whether the person who is the subject of the appeal, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document or written submissions with the appellant's record, respondent's record or reply record.14 If the evidence addresses all the Rule 29 factors, I must then determine whether it meets the subsection 110(4) legislative and jurisprudential requirements. [21] As the Appellants were invited by the RAD to make submissions, document A, the female Appellant's unsworn statement and the Appellants' counsel's additional submissions are admissible. [22] Documents B-D all predate the RPD decision, and document D was presented to the RPD and already forms part of the record.15 Since the documents were publicly accessible and sourced from the internet, I find that the section 110(4) threshold is not met and the documents are not admissible. [23] Documents E-G postdate both the RPD decision and the submission of the appeal record, and bring new evidence to the appeal about the use of sexual violence by security forces to supress protests in Khartoum in XXXX 2021. The female Appellant references the events in her statement. I find that these documents are admissible as new evidence. ANALYSIS [24] The RPD did not find the Appellants credible and identified issues with: the omission of the Principal Appellant's XXXX 2018 arrest from his original BOC; inconsistencies about his involvement with the Quran Association and National Congress Party; inconsistent evidence about his arrests; omission of reference to threatening telephone calls in his testimony; and contradictory evidence about fertility treatments in the US and gender of their children. [25] The RPD also found that the Principal Appellant did not establish a sur place claim based on his participation in demonstrations in Canada 2018 and 2019 or that the female Appellant cannot return to Sudan because she was circumcised and could be subject to FGM again. The RPD also found that the interests of the Appellants' Canadian-born children cannot be considered as they are not refugee claimants. [26] The Appellants argue the RPD erred in its analysis of their credibility and incorrectly applied the Gender Guideline. [27] I have reviewed the evidence on the record, including the transcript of the hearing on December 8, 2020, the Appellants' arguments, new evidence and additional submissions. As detailed below I find that RPD made some errors, but those errors were not determinative. I find that the RPD applied the Gender Guideline and was correct in finding that the Appellants did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, crucial elements of their claims. Analysis of credibility in refugee claims [28] The process of determining whether a claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection under the IRPA requires the RPD to decide whether they believe the claimant's evidence and how much weight to give that evidence. In determining this the RPD must assess the credibility of the claimant and the documentary evidence.16 The law "imposes a duty upon RPD members to assess the credibility of refugee claimants."17 [29] The Federal Court18 has laid out the relevant principles in analyzing credibility in the context of refugee claims: * Refugee applicants are presumed to tell the truth, but this is a presumption rebuttable by the applicant's lack of credibility, e.g. where the evidence is inconsistent with sworn testimony or where the applicant's explanation for the inconsistencies is not satisfactory; * Even though they may be insufficient when taken individually or in isolation, the accumulation of contradictions, inconsistencies and omissions regarding crucial elements of a refugee claim can support a negative conclusion about an applicant's credibility; * A negative credibility finding cannot be based on minor contradictions that are secondary or peripheral to the refugee protection claim; * A lack of credibility concerning central elements of a refugee protection claim can extend and trickle down to other elements of the claim and be generalized to all of the documentary evidence presented to corroborate a version of the facts; * Credibility findings should not be made based strictly on the absence of corroborative evidence. Where corroborative evidence should reasonably be available to establish an essential element of a claim and there is no reasonable explanation for its absence, a decision maker can draw a negative inference of credibility based on the claimant's lack of effort to obtain such corroborative evidence; and * Conclusions can be drawn concerning an applicant's credibility based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality. Omission of 2018 arrest from original BOC [30] The Appellants' BOCs were received on August 1, 2018, there was no reference in the Principal Appellant's original BOC narrative to his return to Sudan in XXXX 2018 due to his father's illness or his alleged arrest on [REDACTED] 2018. In fact, the BOC says that he "went to Republic of Egypt for my father and my mother treatments and I was spending my vacations in United Arab Emirates and rarely in Sudan because going in and out is a risk."19 [31] Less than two weeks before the RPD hearing on December 8, 2020, the Principal Appellant presented an amendment to his BOC narrative saying that he left Sudan for the last time in XXXX 2018 because his father had a severe accident while visiting his brother and he visited him in hospital. "When I left the hospital, right at the exit, I was taken to a government building in Khartoum where I was forced to sign a commitment not to travel, assist security, and testify about some merchants in crimes related to destabilizing security and undermining power, punishable by death, and I was threatened with death if I regressed or refused. I escaped on the same day by skipping the security checks and entering safety directly with an airport employee."20 [32] When the RPD asked the Appellant why he did not mention that he was arrested in Sudan in XXXX 2018 he said, "I was not aware that I am supposed to tell all those details at time...number one; number two, when we arrived at the shelter, we were in very bad condition and my wife health wise ...."21 [33] The RPD noted that the Principal Appellant "was precise with other allegations found in his extensive story to support his refugee claim. If it was the case that [the Principal Appellant] was arrested on [REDACTED] 2018, when he left Sudan secretly, [the RPD] would have expected him to say so at the first opportunity."22 The RPD did not find that the Principal Appellant's explanation for the omission reasonable. [34] The Appellants do not make any submissions about this finding other than a general submission that the weaknesses in the Principal Appellant's testimony are not fatal to the point of doubting that he was politically active.23 [35] The requirements for the completion of a BOC form are outlined in the RPD Rules24 and referenced in the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) Rules.25 The BOC is intended to provide details about the reason refugee protection is being sought. The Federal Court "has confirmed on numerous occasions that all the important facts and details of a claim must be included, and failing to do so can affect the credibility of all or part of a claimant's testimony."26 [31] This Court has confirmed on a number of occasions that all the important facts of a claim must appear in the PIF and that failing to mention them could affect the credibility of part or all of the testimony. Furthermore, the RPD is entitled to review the contents of the PIF before and after its amendment and may draw negative inferences about credibility if matters it considers important were added to the PIF by an amendment later (Taheri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 886, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1252, at paragraphs 4 and 6; Grinevich v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (1997) 70 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1059, [1997] F.C.J. No. 444). [32] It was open to the panel to gauge the principal applicant's credibility and to draw negative inferences about the disparities between her statements in the original PIF, in the interview notes, in the amended narrative of the PIF and in the viva voce testimony, for which the principal applicant provided no satisfactory, plausible or credible explanation in the circumstances (He v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1994), 49 A.C.W.S. (3d) 562, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1107). In this case, and the Court agrees with counsel for the respondent, the evidence shows that the applicants' story and narrative changed over the last two years.27 [36] A recent decision of the Federal Court says that "[i]t is risky not to disclose in the initial BOC Form all of the facts and details that are important to a claim for refugee protection, even if these facts and details are later revealed in subsequent versions of the BOC Form. A convincing explanation will then be required to justify the delay in disclosing them .... While it is certainly open to a claimant for refugee protection to amend his or her BOC Form, these amendments, according to the case law of this Court, must generally be limited to minor or secondary details of the account forming the basis of the claim for refugee protection so as not to risk impugning the claimant's credibility."28 [37] I find this is an omission about a material element of the Appellants' claim and agree with the RPD that the Principal Appellant's explanation is not reasonable in the context of his 10-page, detailed BOC narrative and it results in a negative credibility finding. I note that the Principal Appellant's immigration forms29 did not reference the XXXX 2018 arrest although they were signed only XXXX months later on July 31, 2018. [38] Following my own review, I found contradictory evidence about the Principal Appellant's trips back to Sudan. As noted above he said in his BOC that he rarely returned to Sudan, met his family elsewhere and did not mention his XXXX 2018 visit. When questioned directly by the RPD how many times he returned to the Sudan between 2008 and 2018, he said that he returned three times.30 None of these trips back to Sudan are referenced the Principal Appellant's BOC narrative. This is not a determinative credibility finding as it was not put to the Principal Appellant for explanation but it does support the negative credibility conclusion. Inconsistent evidence about membership in Quran Association [39] The Principal Appellant gave the following evidence about his memberships: BOC Testimony Corroborative Evidence When I was 11 years old, I had school training in open camp (from XXXX pm to XXXXpm). We had a simple field exercises and we were known as 'XXXX XXXX.31 So when I was 11 years old, I was not in high school yet. It's a camp that belong to the Quran Association. We receive military training except for using weapons or arms.32 Appellant was a member of the National Congress Party, received training courses, participated in a number of camps and was a member of the ([REDACTED]) in schools until high school.33 I was in the 8th level of school, when I was 13 years old, I was in the Quran Association.34 RPD: ...so when did you join the Quran Association? Appellant: I was in Grade 5, elementary.35 When we finished school, we were gather in a camp for 40 days because we were outstanding student. After the camp attendance, I realized that it is a kind of recruitment to work with the political party. XXXX days later, I escaped from the camp...I let them know that I wasn't willing to work in the XXXX XXXX association anymore...36 RPD:...did you join the National Congress Party at any point? Appellant: When I was active at the Quran Association, the association itself was affiliated with the National Congress Party, and also when I was in the camp of [REDACTED] XXXX they would also - the belonged to the National Congress Party.37 [40] The RPD found the Principal Appellant's evidence about his membership in the Quran Association and the National Congress Party confusing. While the Principal Appellant is clear that he was a member of the XXXX XXXX when he was 11 years old and he was member of Quran Association when he either 11 years or 13 years, it is not clear when and if he joined the National Congress Party. The corroborative evidence definitively states that he was a member of the National Congress Party while the Principal Appellant testified that he was affiliated with the National Congress Party through the Quran Association and the XXXX XXXX. The BOC suggests that he was not a member of the National Congress Party because he says that after he completed his university in XXXX 2006, he "received messages through friends who are still with the ruling party asking me to join them so I can insure my future or go to military training in order to find a job."38 [41] I find the Principal Appellant's evidence inconsistent and agree with the RPD that the evidence is confusing. That the Principal Appellant was being recruited to join the ruling party in 2006 is not consistent with his claim that he was considered a political opponent by the authorities. Inconsistent evidence about arrests [42] The Principal Appellant evidence about his arrests is inconsistent: BOC Amended BOC Immigration forms39 Corroborative evidence Testimony XXXX 2000 XXXX 2000 arrested and detained for XXXX XXXX40 Arrested in 2000 and detained for XXXX days Arrested for XXXX days in his last year of high school in 200041 XXXX 2000 arrested and put in prison in side a military camp ... for XXXX XXXX...42 2000 arrested and detained for XXXX days43 [REDACTED] 2002 [REDACTED] 2002, released the same day44 Not referenced. XXXX 2003 Not referenced Arrested in 2003 and detained for XXXX days End of XXXX 2003 arrested for XXXX XXXX45 [REDACTED] 2004 [REDACTED] 2004, released after XXXX days46 Not referenced. [REDACTED] 2004, arrested... for XXXX days then they took our address as a guarantee and released us.47 [REDACTED] 2004, arrested for XXXX days48 XXXX 2018 No reference XXXX 2018 taken to a government building49 Not referenced. [REDACTED] 2018, arrested by three officers of the state50 [43] In his BOC the Principal Appellant said the XXXX XXXX Association in XXXX University was established in 2002 and he was the XXXX and he and others were arrested by members of the security services on [REDACTED] 2002 "as a result of participation in a meeting with students about suspending student because of material reasons...[t]hey were released the same day after signing engagement and declaration. The University decided to close the Association for the safety of students."51 [44] When the RPD asked the Principal Appellant how many times he was arrested and detained between 2001 and 2005, he said, "twice: 2003 and 2004."52 The Principal Appellant said that he was arrested at the end of XXXX in 2003 because they were trying to restore the activities of the University of XXXX students' union which were opposed by the government. He testified that the interrogating officer referenced that he was active in the XXXX XXXX Association "so it appears that -or I feel that they were against even the foundation of this association."53 [45] The RPD found that the Principal Appellant was inconsistent about the treatment of the XXXX XXXX Association by the authorities. I also note the Principal Appellant gave different reasons for the arrests (in 2002 it was for participation in a meeting about suspending students for nonpayment of fees and in 2003 it was for trying to restore the activities of the student union) and the absence of any reference to an arrest in 2002 in the immigration forms and to an arrest in 2003 in the BOC. [46] The RPD incorrectly found that the Principal Appellant referenced [REDACTED] 2003, as the date of the demonstration in Darfur in his testimony, I find that references in his testimony were all to [REDACTED] 2004. I note, however, that the Principal Appellant's immigration forms say that he was arrested in 2003 by the security forces of Sudan because "he is a supporter of the Darfur cause."54 [47] The evidence about what happened after the Principal Appellant and others were released after being arrested at the Darfur demonstration on [REDACTED] 2004, is not clear: BOC Testimony Corroborative evidence The situation continued until the XXXX day, they released us with the place of residence as a guarantee. After many of us had a mock trial in XXXX Courthouse, XXXX XXXX...The Judge asked us if we wanted to postpone the hearing. We said: No. But he postponed the Court decision after one month. During that month, we didn't do any activity except going to the University to attend lectures and going back home. We hadn't been summoned again. RPD: What happened after XXXX days? Appellant: They held a court for us at XXXX XXXX, the XXXX XXXX, there was a court there...so the judge postponed the hearing because not all the people were present...the hearing was postponed was one month afterwards, they never called us again. RPD: So you were released after XXXX days...when was the trail? Appellant: After one month approximately...I attended the trail and -but the judge postpone the hearing because not all the people were present.55 This continued for XXXX days then they took our address as a guarantee and released us based on that. We received an order to attend at XXXX Court at XXXX XXXX and the judge...adjourned the case for a month and we were not called back.56 The situation continued until the third day, when they released us with the guarantee of our place of residence, and after that a court was held for a group of us in a mock trial in XXXX Court XXXX XXXX headed by Judge ... who asked us if we wanted to postpone, we answered no, but he postponed the ruling for a month...but we were not called again.57 [48] The RPD noted discrepancies in the evidence about whether there was a trial (the BOC and one statement refer to a "mock trial") and whether the hearing or the ruling was postponed (the BOC refers to postponing the "Court decision" and a statement to the "postponed ruling"). I also note that the Principal Appellant identified the reason for the postponement as "not all the people were present" which is not corroborated in the statements or referenced in his BOC. [49] The RPD made a negative credibility finding on the basis of this inconsistent evidence. [50] As detailed above the Principal Appellant did not reference the [REDACTED] 2004, arrest in his immigration forms. [51] As noted above the Appellants do not make any submissions about this finding other than a general submission that the weaknesses in the Principal Appellant's testimony are not fatal to the point of doubting that he was politically active.58 [52] Even though they may be insufficient when taken individually or in isolation, I find that this accumulation of contradictions, inconsistencies and omissions regarding crucial elements of the Principal Appellant's claim support a negative conclusion about his credibility. Omission of reference to telephone threats [53] In his BOC the Principal Appellant said that after he completed his university studies in XXXX 2006 that he "was receiving calls from unknown people. They were telling me that they knew all my movements, my place, my addresses."59 The RPD made a negative credibility finding because the Principal Appellant failed to reference these calls in the hearing when asked about problems he faces in Sudan. I do not find this a determinative finding because the RPD did not question the Principal Appellant directly on this issue. Contradictory evidence about fertility treatments and gender of children [54] In their BOCs the Appellants say that they travelled to the US in [REDACTED] 2018 to have infertility treatments and that they were expecting a girl and feared FGM. The RPD noted that the female Appellant was pregnant when they entered the US and that she gave birth to XXXX XXXX. The RPD found that it could not adjudicate the claim on the possibility that they could have daughters in the future. Gender [55] The RPD stated in its decision that it considered the Appellants' claims in light of the Gender Guideline.60 [56] When the RPD asked the female Appellant why she could not go back to Sudan, she testified that she was afraid of returning to Sudan because she was told that she was pregnant with XXXX XXXX.61 In response to questions from her counsel the female Appellant also testified that she was circumcised at five years old and suffers monthly as a result, her mother was recircumcised after delivering her youngest brother and the whole issue is traumatic for her. She said that she fears that they will redo the circumcision and she does believe that she could survive in "such a place where I faced a traumatic incident."62 [57] The RPD found that the objective evidence did not support the female Appellant's allegation of recircumcision. While the RPD agreed that FGM is a traumatic event it did not find that the female Appellant "was traumatized to the point that she cannot return to Sudan, a country where she lived between 1995 and 2018." 63 [58] The Appellants argue that the RPD did not properly apply the Gender Guideline. Specifically, they submit that: the RPD devoted less than five minutes to questioning the female Appellant; the questions the RPD put to the female Appellant were trivial and reflected a superficial knowledge of her claim; the RPD did not undertake the procedures suggested in the Gender Guideline for victims of sexual violence64; and, the RPD did not allow the female Appellant the time she needed to provide testimony that she found painful to deliver. [59] Following my own review of the female Appellant's BOC and the questions posed by the RPD I find that she was afforded the opportunity to provide her testimony. The RPD asked about the allegations in her short BOC narrative, specifically her arrest in 2013 for not dressing appropriately and her fear of circumcision for her unborn daughters who turned out to be sons. The female Appellant does not identify a fear of recircumcision in her BOC. I also note, as detailed above, that the female Appellant was questioned at length by her own counsel about the trauma of her circumcision and her fear of recircumcision. Neither the female Appellant nor her counsel asked for the treatment of her testimony contemplated by section D.3 of the Gender Guideline. [60] The Appellants argue that the RPD did not take sufficient account of the trauma of her circumcision at five years old but I note that the Appellants did not present any psychological or medical evidence to corroborate their allegations and did not demonstrate that the female Appellant's trauma prevents her return to Sudan. [61] The RPD did err when it stated that there was not any documentary evidence of recircumcision. I note that the Appellants presented a November 29, 2019, news articles which stated: "[i]n a practice known as reinfibulation, about a quarter of mothers are stitched up again after giving birth, according to a report this week by anti-FGM campaign group 28 Too Many."65 [62] I agree with the Appellants66 that the objective evidence is that the practice of FGM is prevalent in Sudan "the country ranks fifth among counties practicing FGM/C worldwide." The same objective evidence says that girls are usually cut between 5 and 9 years old but abandonment of FGM is on the rise. Over 50% of women aged 15-49 believe that FGM/C should be abandoned with support higher in urban than rural areas.67 The Appellants submit that this trend "does not affect the reality of FGM still being widespread in Sudan "and the absence of a legal framework or political willingness to address the issue." 68 [63] I do not agree that there is an absence of a legal framework of political willingness to address the issue. The objective evidence69 reports that on July 13, 2020, the Sudanese Official Gazette published Law No. 12 of 2020, which amends 15 provisions of the Penal Code of 1991. According to Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari, the new provisions are part of Sudan's efforts to eliminate all laws that violate human rights and "demolish any kind of discrimination that was enacted by the old regime" to enable the country to "move toward equality of citizenship and a democratic transformation."70 The new law introduces an amendment to the penal code that criminalizes the act of FGM for the first time in the country's history. The law punishes FGM with imprisonment for up to three years, a fine, and the permanent closure of the site where the crime took place (Law No. 12, art. 2(a)(23), adding Penal Code art. 141(a)). Law No. 12 also increases the penalty for the crime of rape from imprisonment for a maximum of 10 years to life imprisonment. (Law No. 12, art. 2(a)(25), amending Penal Code art. 149.)71 [64] In her statement the female Appellant says the even if the law criminalizes circumcision that the "tribe and clan stick to the tradition...they don't give up easily from their customs and traditions" 72 but she does not reference any objective evidence to support her statement. [65] I find that, given the evidence of changing attitudes about FGM and the criminalization of the act of FGM, the Appellants have not established that there is more than a mere possibility that the female Appellant would face recircumcision in Sudan. [66] In her statement the female Appellant also submits that she cannot "live in Khartoum or Kassala because there is no security or gender equality". She says that as a single woman she will be deprived of her rights, being independent, freedom of opinion and "I will be destined to be raped." 73 [67] The female Appellant's assertion that she is a single woman is not consistent with the evidence on the record that she is married the Principal Appellant since [REDACTED] 2014.74 The only objective evidence referenced by the female Appellant to support her submissions is to the events reported in the new evidence, documents E-G,75 about the use of sexual violence by security forces to supress protests in Khartoum in December 2021. [68] I find that the Appellants have not established the female Appellant's profile as someone who faces more that the mere possibility of gender-based persecution in Sudan. Sur place claim [69] The Principal Appellant presented photographs of his participation in a demonstration in Canada against the government of Sudan and said that expressed his opinion on social media, namely Facebook. The RPD found that there was insufficient evidence that the Principal Appellant's Facebook messages and activism in Canada have come to the attention of the Sudanese authorities or that he has been identified as a political opponent in Sudan. [70] The Appellants submit that nowhere in the Principal Appellant's BOC or his counsel's submissions did he make a sur place claim. The Appellants argue that the only question to be answered by the RPD is whether there is a risk, on a balance of probabilities, that the Principal Appellant would be intercepted upon his return to Sudan and subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. [71] The Appellants cite objective evidence that there is evidence that those who openly oppose the government from abroad will be likely be arrested on return.76 The same objective evidence concludes, "when taken in the round, the evidence does not indicate that there is a clear and systematic pattern of ill-treatment of asylum seeking in general sole on the grounds of having claimed asylum ...."77 [72] I agree with the RPD that the Principal Appellant did not credibly establish that he has been identified as a political opponent in Sudan, as detailed above, and he did not present any evidence that his activities in Canada have come to the attention of the Sudanese authorities. I find that the Principal Appellant did not establish that there is more than a mere possibility that he would be intercepted on his return to Sudan and risk harm from the Sudanese authorities. Best interests of the Appellants' children [73] The Appellants agree that their Canadian-born children are not refugee claimants. Any examination of their interests falls outside the jurisdiction of both the RPD and RAD.78 [74] The Appellants submit that the RPD should have considered whether the autism of one the children would result in their discrimination or persecution but do not reference any objective evidence to support their submission.79 [75] As discussed in a 2017 RAD decision,80 the IRPA does not give the RPD or the RAD the authority to make decisions based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds and Parliament has provided other means including pre-removal risk assessment or humanitarian considerations under section 25 of the IRPA. CONCLUSION [76] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) "Susan Brown" Susan Brown February 25, 2022 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guidelines 4:Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Guideline issued by the Chairperson pursuant to section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 13, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Gender Guideline). 2 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 14-50, Exhibits 2.1 and 2.2, BOC as amended by page 127, Exhibit 4. 3 RAD-1, National Documentation Package, Sudan, 30 July 2021. 4 P-3, Female Appellant submision, January 2022, pages 2 and 3. 5 Ibid., pages 4 and 5. 6 Ibid., pages 6 and 7. 7 Ibid., pages 8 and 9. 8 Ibid., page 10. 9 Ibid., pages 11-14. 10 Ibid., page 15. 11 P-4, Additional written submisions, February 2020. 12 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 13 Ibid., and Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385. 14 RAD Rules, rule 29(4). 15 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 182, Exhibit 4. 16 Legal Services, Immigration and Refugee Board, Assessment of Credibility in Claims for Refugee Protection, December 2020, Foreword. 17 I.P.P. v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 123 (CanLII), para. 129. 18 Lawani v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 924 (CanLII), paras. 21-26. 19 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 23, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 20 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 126, Exhibit 4. 21 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, page 19. 22 RPD -1, RPD Record, page 8, RPD Decision, paras. 25 and 26. 23 P-2, Appellants' Record, page 13, Appellants' Memorandum, para. 41. 24 Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012256 (RPD Rules). 25 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012257 (RAD Rules). 26 Ogaulu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 547 at para. 18. 27 Zeferino v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 456 at paras. 31 and 32. 28 Occilus v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 374 (CanLII), at paras. 23 and 24, citing Hamidi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 243 at para. 27. 29 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 81 and 85, Exhibit 1, Schedules A and 12. 30 Transcript of hearing of December 8, 2020, pages 14 and 15. 31 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 15, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 32 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, page 4. 33 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 134, Exhibit 4. 34 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 16, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 35 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, pages 4 and 5. 36 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 16 and, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 37 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, page 6. 38 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 20, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 39 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 81 and 85, Exhibit 1, Schedules A and 12. 40 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 17 and 18, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 41 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 134, Exhibit 4. 42 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 138, Exhibit 4. 43 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, pages 7 and 8. 44 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 18 and 19, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 45 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, pages 10 and 11. 46 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 19 and 20, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 47 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 140 and 154, Exhibit 4 48 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, pages 9, 11 and 12. 49 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 127, Exhibit 4, Amended BOC narrative. 50 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, pages 18, 30-34. 51 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 18 and 19, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 52 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, page 10. 53 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, page 11. 54 RPD-1, RPD Record, pages 81 and 85, Exhibit 1, Schedules A and 12. 55 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, pages 11 and 12. 56 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 140, Exhibit 4. 57 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 154, Exhibit 4. 58 P-2, Appellants' Record, page 13, Appellants' Memorandum, para. 41. 59 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 21, Exhibit 2.1, BOC narrative. 60 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 8, RPD Reasons, paragraph 24. 61 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, pages 21 and 22. 62 Transcript of hearing on December 8, 2020, pages 35-38. 63 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 11, RPD Reasons, paragraph 43. 64 Gender Guideline, section D.3. 65 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 182, Exhibit 4. 66 P-4, Additional written submissions, February 2022, page 2, para. 2. 67 RAD -1, National Documentation Package, Sudan, 30 July 2021, tab 5.10: ?Improved Understanding of FGM/C Abandonment among Sudanese Families in Khartoum and Kassala States. Chr. Michelsen Institute. Nafisa Bedri; Yussra Mohammed. September 2020, page 9. 68 P-4, Additional written submisions, February 2020, page 2, para 4. 69 RAD-1, National Documentation Package, Sudan, 30 July 2021, tab 9.3: ?Sudan: New Law Amending Penal Code Takes Effect. United States. Law Library of Congress. Global Legal Monitor. George Sadek. 23 July 2020. 70 Ibid., tab 9.3, page 1. 71 Ibid., tab 9.3, page 2. 72 P-3, Female Appellant submision, January 2022, page 2. 73 Ibid., page 2. 74 RPD-1, RPD Record, page 31, Exhibit 2.1, BOC form, question 5; page 37, Exhibit 2.2, BOC narrative; page 92, Exhibit 1, Generic Application, question 16. 75 P-3, Female Appellant submision, January 2022, pages 10-15. 76 RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Sudan, 31 March 2020, tab 14.5: ?Country Policy and Information Note. Sudan: Return of unsuccessful asylum seekers. Version 4.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. July 2018. page 22. 77 Ibid., tab 14.5, page 6. 78 X (Re), 2013 CanLII 94640 (CA IRB), para. 46. 79 P-2, Appellants' Record, page 11, Appellants' Memorandum, para. 31. 80 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 142905 (CA IRB), paras. 43, 56 and 57. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC0-11253 MC0-11254 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: MC0-11253

### Key Issues
lants credible and identified issues with: the omission of the Principal Appellant's XXXX 2018 arrest from his original BOC; inconsistencies about his involvement with the Quran As

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: gue that the RPD erred in its analysis of their credibility and incorrectly applied the Gender Guideline.1 [3] Following my own review, I find that the Appellants did not credibly establish their claims. DECISION [4] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor pers

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
What are the implications of this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Refugee Law Lab Reporter for similar cases?

2023 RLLR 120 Citation: 2023 RLLR 120 Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division Date of Decision: December 20, 2023 Panel: Kate Bilkevitch Counsel for the Claimant(s): N/A Country: Cameroon RPD Number: VC3-09637 Associated RPD Number(s): N/A ATIP Number: A-2024-00593 ATIP Pages: N/A DECISION [1] MEMBER: This is the decision of the Refugee Protection Division, the RPD, in the claim of [REDACTED] as a citizen of Cameroon, who is claiming refugee protection pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. ALLEGATIONS [2] The claimant’s allegations are contained in his Basis of Claim form. To summarise only briefly, the claimant has a fear of persecution at the hands of the Cameroonian authorities because of his background as an anglophone and his perceived support of the separatist movement due to his employment as an XXXX in the conflict zone. DETERMINATION [3] I find that the claimant is a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the Act. He has established a serious possibility of persecution should he return to Cameroon. ANALYSIS Identity [4] With respect to the issue of identity, the claimant’s identity as a national of Cameroon has been established by the sworn statement in his Basis of Claim form, his testimony, a copy of his national identity card, birth certificate, and a copy of his Cameroonian passport. There is a presumption that sworn testimony is true unless there is sufficient reason to doubt its truthfulness. A finding that the claimant lacks credibility may be based on the failure of the claimant’s account to stand up to scrutiny or unexplained inconsistencies, omissions, or contradictions. Further, the presumption of truthfulness does not apply to inferences or speculation for which there is no evidentiary basis. The claimant testified in a detailed manner. His testimony was straightforward, spontaneous, and consistent with his Basis of Claim narrative. The claimant elaborated in-depth on different aspects of the claim, such as his study and subsequent employment as an XXXX, his detention by the security forces in Cameroon, his escape and internal relocation in Cameroon, and his subsequent journey to Canada. I found the claimant overall credible in relation to his experiences in Cameroon in 2022. [5] Additionally, the claimant provided ample documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations of risk. For instance, the claimant adduced records demonstrating his education and employment, four (4) witness statements, medical certificates, and an arrest warrant. I have no reason to doubt the authenticity of these documents. Consequently, I give these documents full weight as I find them to be authentic, and they are probative of the issue at hand as they confirm the claimant’s allegations. Overall, I accept the following allegations on the balance of probabilities. The claimant worked as an XXXX in war-torn northwest Cameroon. He was arrested and detained twice in 2022, the first time in XXXX and the second time in XXXX of that year. The first time the claimant was arrested on suspicion of collaborating with a separatist on XXXX XXXX, 2022. The claimant worked on XXXX XXXX to the village that was used by separatists to launch their assaults from. [REDACTED] by the military, but the claimant made attempts to XXXX XXXX as his extended family and friends lived in that village and struggled without XXXX for several weeks. The claimant was detained and tortured for [REDACTED] XXXX XXXX. The claimant was released upon fee payment produced by his brother. The claimant was forced to sign an undertaking prior to his release. [6] The claimant had no problem with the authorities after his release and continued his work as an XXXX. However, on XXXX XXXX, 2022, he was stopped at a checkpoint and questioned about some XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX in his possession. The claimant explained to the military that these items were for a contract he had. However, he was perceived to be collaborating with a separatist who needed XXXX XXXX for their hideouts in the bush. The claimant was detained for XXXX XXXX and was set to be executed, like several of his cellmates. However, his former classmate was a guard in the detention centre, and out of compassion, the man assisted the claimant to escape. The claimant hid in another village for about [REDACTED] XXXX XXXX communicating with his wife by phone only. However, in late XXXX, his wife was informed that a warrant for the claimant’s arrest was issued. This led the claimant to decide to leave Cameroon for Nigeria. The claimant could not stay in Nigeria as the country frequently deported Cameroonian refugees back to Cameroon. As a result, he made the decision to travel to Canada, where he had family members. [7] Since his departure from Cameroon, the authorities visited the claimant’s brother and wife. Both were interrogated and asked about the claimant’s whereabouts. Based on the totality of the evidence before me, on a balance of probabilities, I accept that the claimant has been targeted by the Cameroonian authorities between XXXX and XXXX 2022. Nexus [8] In order to satisfy the definition of a Convention refugee found in section 96 of the Act, the claimant must establish that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. In this case, I find the claimant’s allegations established a nexus to the Convention ground of political opinion or imputed political opinion. When considering the claimant’s past treatment by the authorities due to the fact that he had been perceived to collaborate with the separatists on two (2) separate occasions combined with his status as a failed anglophone asylum seeker from the northwest part of Cameroon, I find that the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution based on his imputed political opinion. As such, I have assessed his claim under section 96 of the Act. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution [9] I find the claimant would face a forward-looking risk of persecution if returned to Cameroon. This persecution would take the form of physical violence, arbitrary arrest or detention, and psychological and physical abuse from the police authorities in Cameroon. I have accepted the claimant’s testimony that the Cameroonian authorities have already detained and abused him because of his perceived association with a separatist movement. The claimant was also accused by the authorities of helping anglophone separatists. In addition, the claimant is a young man who has now spent a significant amount of time abroad. If returned to Cameroon as a failed refugee claimant, this would also contribute to his profile as a person Cameroonian authorities would likely suspect of having an anti-government political opinion. I have based my findings on the following country condition information, which corroborate the claimant’s allegations and indicate that he would face a forward-looking risk. [10] At Tab 2.1 of the National Documentation Package for Cameroon, there is the U.S. Department of State report indicating that Cameroonian authorities have in the previous year been known to conduct arbitrary arrests or detentions, unlawful or arbitrary killings including extrajudicial killings by security forces, forced disappearance, torture, and cases of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment. And this report also indicates there has been abuse and retaliation against family members for offences allegedly committed by an individual. Much of these abuses have been associated with the armed conflict between anglophone militant groups and the majority francophone government. Many unarmed civilians have been affected by this violence and the government is known to use excessive force on civilians. They are known to raid anglophone neighbourhoods in Cameroon while searching for suspected militants. [11] A report at tab 2.3 of the NDP confirms the conflict between government security forces and anglophone separatists has resulted in widespread civilian deaths and displacement. The same report indicates that anglophone activists have faced harassment, violence, and arrests for their activities. I find that the claimant, who worked as an electrician in the anglophone region of Cameroon and who is perceived to have ties to separatists would on a balance of probabilities be perceived as a person who holds anti-government views. A report at Tab 2.5 of the NDP confirms that government forces have committed widespread human rights abuses including extrajudicial and summary execution across Cameroon since the year of at least 2020. A report at Tab 13.2 indicates Cameroonian authorities have imposed restrictions on anglophone regions including curfews, bans on public meetings, and other restrictive measures. The same report indicates that anglophone Cameroonians who have been living abroad for some time have been arrested upon their return to the Yaoundé or Douala airports in Cameroon. Those arrested include failed asylum seekers. Failed asylum seekers who are anglophone have been imprisoned, harmed, and fined. [12] The claimant himself has already been detained and accused of supporting anglophone militants, and his refugee claim is based on these circumstances. I find these circumstances contribute to the risk he would face if he returned to Cameroon, as he would likely be targeted by police for questioning or abuse at the airport, not only due to his previous detention, but also as a failed asylum seeker. Ultimately, I find the claimant has established that he has been arrested, detained, and targeted by the Cameroon state on the basis of his perceived political opinion. I find the claimant, as someone who has already been identified by the state as a person who holds anti-government views and sympathising with the separatist cause faces a serious possibility of persecution if he returns to Cameroon. Given that there are no credibility issues with respect to the allegations of the claimant combined with the documentary evidence set out above, I find that the claimant’s subjective fear has an objective basis. State Protection and Internal Flight Alternative [13] As the state is the agent of persecution in this case, I find the state would not be able to provide meaningful or reasonable protection to the claimant. I find the presumption of state protection in this case has been clearly rebutted as the state is the agent that the claimant fears. Further, as the state is the agent of harm in this case, and given that the state has access to the entirety of its territory, I find that the claimant faces a serious possibility of persecution throughout Cameroon. As a result, there is no viable Internal Flight Alternative in all of Cameroon. CONCLUSION [14] For all of the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the claimant is a Convention refugee and I, therefore, accept his claim. This is the end of the decision. ——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: 2023 RLLR 120

### Key Issues
that there are no credibility issues with respect to the allegations of the claimant combined with the documentary evidence set out above, I find that the claimant’s subjective fea

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: should he return to Cameroon. ANALYSIS Identity [4] With respect to the issue of identity, the claimant’s identity as a national of Cameroon has been established by the sworn statement in his Basis of Claim form, his testimony, a copy of his national identity card, birth certificate, and a copy of his Cameroonian passport. There

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.