Prompt:
Analyze this Refugee Appeal Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada and explain its implications for refugee determination:

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC1-04814 MC1-04815 / MC1-04816 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Personnes en cause Date of decision February 9, 2022 Date de la décision Panel Joseph W. Richards II Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Annabel Busbridge Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative [REDACTED] XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss these appeals. [2] [REDACTED] XXXX (the Principal Appellant or the PA), XXXX XXXX (the Associate Appellant or the AA), and [REDACTED] XXXX (the Minor Female Appellant or the MFA) are citizens of Kenya. The PA is the daughter of the AA and the mother of the MFA. [3] The Appellants fear harm at the hands of police officers and government agents who, in 2017, wanted the PA to poison Mr. XXXX, an independent political candidate for whose campaign the PA XXXX. The police officers threatened to kill the PA's entire family if she did not comply. The adult Appellants also allege that they were assaulted due to their affiliation to Mr. XXXX. These events occurred in late 2017, and prompted the Appellants to flee to the United States of America (USA) in early XXXX 2018. In late XXXX 2018, they arrived in Canada, irregularly. Mr. XXXX also now resides in Canada and was granted refugee protection in May 2021. [4] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the Appellants were nationals of Rwanda and Kenya, and that they failed to establish either section 96 or section 97 harm in both of these countries. [5] The Appellants submit that there was a breach of their right to procedural fairness because they were not afforded a meaningful opportunity to respond to the allegations regarding their Rwandan nationality, and because their former counsel (FC) was incompetent. They further maintain that they face section 96 and/or section 97 harm if returned to Rwanda or Kenya. [6] The determinative issue in this appeal is the Appellants' prospective risk of harm in Kenya. After reviewing all of the admissible evidence and submissions, I did not find a material breach of the Appellants' right to procedural fairness either by the FC or by the RPD Panel. The rules of natural justice have been met. Moreover, the Appellants failed to sufficiently establish a risk of prospective harm in Kenya. DECISION [7] I dismiss the appeals. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND NEW EVIDENCE The test for admitting new evidence [8] According to the law,1 I can only accept evidence that: (i) arose after the RPD decision; or (ii) was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or (iii) that the Appellants could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [9] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.2 Selected portions of the new evidence are admissible [10] A focal aspect of this appeal is the Appellants' submissions regarding procedural fairness. They submit that they were not afforded an opportunity to meaningfully respond to the issue of their Rwandan nationality. They also contend that due to inadequate representation, several relevant documents were not submitted to the RPD. [11] As a result, the new evidence that they intend to rely upon can be broadly divided into two categories: (i) documents seeking to establish a procedural fairness infringement and (ii) documents going to the merits of the Appellants' refugee claims. I recognize that there is some overlap. For instance, the PA's affidavit seeks to explain both how the RPD's proceedings were unfair and how the other new documentation meets the legal test, mentioned above. [12] I find that the new evidence that falls into the first category is admissible, specifically: i. portions of the affidavit of the PA dated September 9, 2021 (paras. 6-20, 22-25, 27-29); ii. portions of the affidavit of the AA dated September 9, 2021 (paras. 5-6, 8-10); iii. the affidavit of the PA dated October 7, 2021; and iv. the letter to the Appellants' former counsel dated September 10, 2021 [13] Under the circumstances, I find that the Appellants could not reasonably have been expected to fully raise their procedural fairness argument prior to the RPD's decision. The aforementioned new evidence is credible as to source and circumstances (the documents are signed and dated), contain evidence that is relevant to the issue of procedural fairness, and are new. [14] The admissibility of the other new evidence (the remaining portions of the affidavits of the PA and AA, and the documents listed A to J in the Appellants' Record3) hinges on my decision regarding procedural fairness. These documents do not explain how the RPD proceedings were unfair and do not otherwise support their procedural fairness argument. Instead, they relate to the merits of the Appellants' refugee claims. An oral hearing is not permitted [15] Although I have admitted some new evidence, it does not raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellants and would not, on its own, justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. Therefore, I am not permitted to hold an oral hearing, pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). The Appellants' right to procedural fairness was not materially breached [16] When procedural fairness is raised as an issue, the proper approach is to ask whether the requirements of natural justice in the particular circumstances of the case have been met.4 In a claim for refugee protection, procedural fairness ensures that claimants understand the proceedings, have a reasonable opportunity to tender any evidence that supports their claims, and are given a chance to persuade the RPD that their claim is well-founded. Indeed, an allegation of inadequate representation goes to the issue of the claimants' right to fully present their case. [17] A breach of procedural fairness does not necessarily result in relief in every case. For instance, according to the case law, if it is apparent that the decision-maker would have reached the same decision notwithstanding the breach of procedural fairness, and no purpose would be achieved by referring the matter to the RPD for re-determination, the decision should stand.5 [18] When inadequate representation is alleged, it must first be determined that counsel's actions or omissions constitute incompetence. Then, the claimant must establish that a miscarriage of justice resulted. Therefore, a finding of incompetence will only rise to the level of a breach of natural justice in extraordinary circumstances: it must be established that but for the conduct of counsel, the outcome of the RPD hearing would have been different.6 [19] After reviewing the evidence and submissions, I find that, on a balance of probabilities, the requirements of natural justice have been met in this case. I note the following facts, in particular: i. The Basis of Claim (BOC) form clearly indicates that claimants are responsible for providing supporting documentation. Claimants are also invited to provide a detailed description of whether they or their families have been harmed, mistreated, or threatened by any person or group.7 ii. The BOCs of the adult Appellants are accompanied by fulsome narratives, which detail an assault against the PA on XXXX XXXX, 2017, threats at gunpoint on XXXX XXXX, 2017, and a violent police encounter on XXXX XXXX, 2017. iii. The Appellants were reasonably aware that their status in Rwanda would be an issue during the RPD proceedings. The AA's BOC form indicates that her current status in Rwanda is "citizen" and her narrative states that she fears returning to Rwanda.8 The PA's BOC refers to the AA as possessing both Kenyan and Rwandan citizenship.9 At the RPD hearing, after making several amendments to their BOC on their own initiative, the adult Appellants affirmed that their BOCs were complete, true, and correct. The adult Appellants do not require the use of an interpreter, speak and understand the English language, and have extensive work and academic backgrounds.10 These facts, considered cumulatively, make the Appellants' explanation - that they believed that only grammatical changes to their BOCs were permissible at the RPD hearing - unreasonable. iv. The Appellants allege that they provided additional documentation to their FC at the second client meeting of April 30, 2021. The FC asserts that the decision to not disclose all of the documents to the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) was strategic, and borne out of suspicions of fraud. The FC triaged the provided documents, advising the Appellants to focus on those which directly support the allegations contained in their BOC forms. On May 5, 2021, the FC submitted twelve documents to the IRB.11 Under the circumstances, the FC's conduct was reasonable, and it did not constitute incompetence. For instance, this is not a case where the representative made assurances that all documentation would be submitted and failed to do so. It is also not a case where counsel did not submit any of the supporting documentation given to him, as such a decision could be construed as manifestly prejudicial to a claimant's interests. Instead, the Appellants' own evidence reveals that during the April 2021 client meeting, the FC canvassed and prioritized the documentation that directly referenced the Appellants. The Appellants blindly trusted the FC, and accepted his advice and strategic decisions.12 Five days later, the FC submitted selected documents to the IRB. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, the Appellants are objecting to the FC's decision-making. v. At the end of the RPD hearing, the FC spontaneously requested to submit post-hearing disclosure related to Mr. XXXX's political activities. The Panel granted this request.13 On May 21, 2021, this documentation was sent to the Tribunal.14 [20] To be clear, legal representatives enjoy a wide latitude in advocating for their clients. Different representatives adopt different strategies. A representative's conduct must be analyzed globally, without the benefit of hindsight, and should not descend into a microscopic inquiry. The key concern from the perspective of the rules of natural justice is whether the Appellants were able to fully present their case. [21] The FC's representation clearly focussed on the Appellants' risk of harm in Kenya, as it relates to political violence. This is consistent with the fact that the Appellants were referred to the FC by Mr. XXXX - an acquaintance of the PA, a client of the FC, and a Kenyan politician who was subjected to political violence. Indeed, the Appellants' allegations primarily relate to their connection to Mr. XXXX. [22] In contrast, the Appellants' status in Rwanda appears to have been a peripheral consideration. This approach may have been reasonable if the FC held the position that none of the Appellants were Rwandan nationals or if there was demonstrable evidence that returning to Rwanda was impossible (e.g. an ongoing civil war). However, the FC has long maintained the position that the AA is eligible for Rwandan citizenship. This admission means that he was aware that the status of the AA - and, by extension, the status of the PA and the MFA - would likely be canvassed by the Panel. I note that the FC was informed by the IRB, prior to the hearing, that the National Documentation Packages (NDPs) for both Kenya and Rwanda would be relevant.15 It is trite law that if a claimant has multiple countries of reference, then a risk of section 96 or section 97 harm in all of those countries must be established in order to successfully claim refugee protection. [23] At the RPD hearing, the FC did not attempt to elicit any testimony or make meaningful submissions regarding the legal status of each Appellant in Rwanda. Instead, his stated strategy was to emphasize the AA's affinity to and extended residency in Kenya. Such factors are largely irrelevant in determining whether Rwanda is a valid country of reference, and whether the Appellants face a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of section 97 harm there.16 [24] During the RPD hearing, the FC did give the PA another opportunity to explain why she believes that she cannot return to Rwanda. The FC also referred to the Appellants' prospective risk of harm in Rwanda in his closing submissions.17 However, the FC's failure to meaningfully engage with the threshold question - the Appellants' status in Rwanda - is a glaring omission pertaining to an important issue in the Appellants' claims. [25] For their part, the Appellants contend that they never even discussed the issue of Rwandan citizenship with the FC. The FC submits that it was discussed, which is the only reason why the Appellants showed him the AA's certificate of registration as a Kenyan citizen.18 Given that the Appellants all possess Kenyan passports, presenting a certificate of registration would only plausibly occur in the context of a discussion, however brief, regarding the AA's Rwandan origins. On a balance of probabilities, I find that the Appellants did discuss their status in Rwanda with the FC prior to the RPD hearing. [26] The issue of the Appellants' status in Rwanda involves the interpretation of Rwandan nationality laws. It is the type of issue that does not necessarily require further preparation by the refugee claimants themselves. Instead, claimants would necessarily rely on their legal representative to address this issue by consulting the relevant portions of the NDP and by advancing legal arguments on their behalf. [27] I find that the omissions of the FC constitute negligence as it pertains to the representation of the Appellants on the issue of their status in Rwanda. However, I do not find that the outcome of the RPD proceedings would have been different, but for the FC's negligence. Accordingly, a miscarriage of justice did not result. [28] I reach this conclusion for two primary reasons. First, even if it were determined that the Appellants were not Rwandan nationals, their claims would still have been rejected because they failed to establish a forward-facing risk of persecution in Kenya. Second, the Appellants were given ample opportunities at the RPD hearing to elaborate about their fear of returning to Rwanda. Credible and persuasive testimony in that regard would have cured any inadequacy in the legal representation vis-à-vis their status in Rwanda. [29] I realize that the Appellants are also of the view that if the FC had submitted additional documentation that was provided to him before the hearing, the outcome of the RPD hearing would have been different, in that a well-founded fear of persecution in Kenya would have been established. These documents included different lease agreements from the PA's husband, letters from the lawyers of the PA's father, and an affidavit and medical note from the AA's sister.19 However, the FC gave them legal and strategic advice regarding those documents, which the Appellants ultimately accepted. Given the profiles of the adult Appellants and their prior experience in changing representatives, I find that if they were unsatisfied with the FC's advice on April 30, 2021, they had more than a reasonable opportunity to request that the FC modify his strategy, seek a second opinion, attempt to postpone their RPD hearing, secure alternate representation, and/or represent themselves. Moreover, the Appellants have not established, on a balance of probabilities, that the FC's assessment of their documentary evidence itself constitutes incompetence. [30] In light of the adult Appellants' extensive BOC narratives, it was reasonable for the FC to focus on the most credible evidence directly tied to the Appellants' allegations. The FC's decision-making in this regard was indeed strategic in nature. Reviewing it without the benefit of hindsight, I find that the FC's assessment of the Appellants' documentation did not constitute inadequate representation. [31] The adult Appellants had a fulsome opportunity to present cogent oral evidence about their prospective risk of harm at the RPD hearing. They attested to the completeness of their BOC forms and testified that the PA's husband had been harassed by the police after the Appellants' departure. The PA testified that she is not involved in any political activities, nor does she have plans to be politically active in the future. The Panel specifically asked both the PA and AA to describe the basis for their forward-facing fear of persecution.20 [32] I appreciate that the Appellants feel that they were not adequately prepared by the FC for the RPD hearing, and that they were pressured by the FC to offer less than candid testimony. However, in light of the aforementioned facts, the profiles of the adult Appellants, and the clear instructions contained in the BOC forms, I find that the Appellants had a reasonable opportunity to fully present their case. For the same reasons, I also find that the FC's alleged mid-hearing warning about providing inconsistent testimony did not constitute coercion or undue pressure. Counsel are permitted to advise their clients about the consequences of their testimony; such communications are generally appropriate unless it can be established that the clients were pressured into providing false or misleading testimony. On a balance of probabilities, I find that the conduct of the FC, as alleged, did not meet that threshold. [33] Furthermore, I do not find that the questioning by the RPD panel infringed upon the Appellants' right to procedural fairness. Claimants are not entitled to advance notice of the Panel's exact questions. The time spent on a given issue may not align with a claimant's expectations, and may vary based on the nature of the claim, the determinative issues, and the quality of the evidence. After reviewing the conduct of the RPD Member, I have not found sufficient evidence to be satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellants were unduly interrupted during their testimony or that they were otherwise discouraged or prevented from testifying truthfully, completely, and accurately. For instance, the Appellants provided robust answers to questions about their fear of returning to Rwanda and Kenya.21 [34] Overall, I am not tasked with deciding whether the Appellants received perfect representation or whether they have an expert knowledge of the law and RPD proceedings. Rather, the question before me is whether, in all of the circumstances, the FC and/or the RPD effectively inhibited the Appellants from reasonably presenting their entire case. I answer that question almost exclusively in the negative. The FC's negligence was limited to his failure to adequately advance an argument on the Appellants' status in Rwanda, however no miscarriage of justice resulted from that conduct. [35] Therefore, I conclude that the requirements of the rules of natural justice were met, in that the Appellants' right to procedural fairness was not materially breached. The remaining new evidence is inadmissible [36] The substantive content of the remaining new evidence (see para. 14, supra) arose prior to the RPD hearing. I have not found a material breach of the Appellants' right to procedural fairness. Therefore, there is no reasonable explanation why this documentation could not have been provided prior to the RPD's decision. An appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) is not an opportunity to correct a deficient record. [37] As a result, none of the remaining new evidence is admissible. ANALYSIS [38] My role is to look at all of the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.22 Rwanda is a valid country of reference [39] The RPD found that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellants are all Rwandan nationals.23 After my independent assessment of the evidence, I reach a slightly different conclusion, which ultimately has the same effect; Rwanda is a valid country of reference for all of the Appellants. [40] The term "countries of nationality" in section 96(a) of the IRPA includes potential countries of nationality. Where citizenship in another country is available, a claimant is expected to make attempts to acquire it. Thus, it is incumbent on a claimant to show, at the time of the hearing, that they have a well-founded fear of persecution (or risk of section 97 harm) in every country where it is within their control to acquire citizenship. In the refugee determination process, those countries are collectively referred to as "countries of reference". Therefore, depending on the circumstances, claimants can be construed as nationals of countries that they are not yet legally recognized as citizens of. [41] I note that the Appellants testified that they did not make inquiries with Rwandan authorities regarding their status in the country. [42] The objective country documentation is helpful in determining how particular nationality laws apply to the facts. This case presents some challenges because Rwandan citizenship law has undergone significant revisions since the nation became independent in 1962. [43] The evidence demonstrates that dual nationality is permitted. Any person who has one Rwandan parent is considered Rwandan. Those who were deprived of Rwandan nationality between November 1, 1959 and December 31, 1994 due to an acquired foreign nationality, can re-acquire their Rwandan nationality of origin, without application, upon their return. Moreover, all persons with Rwandan origin and their descendants have the right to acquire Rwandan nationality upon request.24 [44] Regardless of whether the AA renounced or was deprived of Rwandan citizenship after becoming a Kenyan national, the law allows her to re-acquire her status in Rwanda, through mere formalities. Based on the broad constitutional provisions protecting descendants of holders of Rwandan nationality of origin, both the PA and MFA are clearly eligible for Rwandan citizenship through attribution.25 [45] The Appellants cite various provisions of the Code de la nationalité rwandaise and assert that the PA is not Rwandan because children of a Rwandan mother and a non-Rwandan father can only claim Rwandan citizenship between the ages of 18 and 21 years old.26 However, those statutory provisions, enacted in 1963, have long been superseded by a nationality framework which takes a decidedly more generous approach to citizenship. For instance, it no longer matters whether a person's Rwandan origins are maternal or paternal.27 [46] The RPD drew an adverse credibility inference due to inconsistent evidence about the AA's status in Rwanda. The RPD correctly highlighted discrepancies between the BOC, the immigration forms, and the AA's testimony. The AA attributed the error to her first RPD counsel, an explanation which I find is unreasonable given the Appellants' profiles and their unequivocal affirmation at the beginning of the hearing that the BOC forms were accurate. The Appellants take the position that the AA's status in Rwanda has no bearing on the credibility of her story or on her subjective fear of returning to Kenya and Rwanda: as a result, the Panel's finding was illogical. [47] I disagree with the Appellants' position. Because of the lack of reasonable explanations for the discrepancies in question, a negative credibility finding is warranted. The RPD did not find that this inconsistency undermined the Appellants' overall credibility. The negative credibility finding does, nevertheless, impugn the trustworthiness of the Appellants' opinion regarding their status in Rwanda. In contrast, the RPD essentially found that the AA's testimony on this issue was unreliable, and so the BOC, by default, should be relied upon in finding that the AA is a citizen of Rwanda. [48] My independent assessment takes a slightly different, more nuanced approach. I find that both the Appellants' testimony and their BOC forms fail to credibly establish the Appellants' status in Rwanda. However, the uncontested biographical details in this case (e.g. the origins of each Appellant, and the AA's acquisition of Kenyan citizenship after her marriage) combined with the thorough and pertinent country documentation about nationality in Rwanda's NDP are sufficient to allow me to determine the relevant issue before me: per my analysis, above, Rwanda is a valid country of reference (or country of nationality) for each Appellant. [49] At the same time, there is insufficient credible evidence before me that the AA is currently a Rwandan citizen. The RPD was not required to make that precise finding, and it erred by doing so. The Appellants failed to establish a forward-facing risk of harm in Kenya [50] The RPD found that the Appellants failed to establish a prospective risk of harm in Rwanda and Kenya. After conducting my independent assessment, I agree with the RPD's conclusion; the Appellants have adduced insufficient credible and trustworthy evidence to establish a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of section 97 harm in Kenya. [51] As mentioned above, the PA is no longer politically active in Kenya and has not expressed any desire to be, if returned. The Appellants were threatened in 2017 by persons who wanted her to poison Mr. XXXX, a person who has since successfully obtained refugee protection in Canada. When asked whether she played a publicly visible role in Mr. XXXX's campaign, the PA responded that she mainly just [REDACTED] XXXX.28 Therefore, I disagree with the Appellants' argument that the RPD misconstrued or otherwise downplayed the PA's role in Mr. XXXX's campaign. [52] I have no reason to doubt that the events of XXXX, XXXX, and XXXX 2017, occurred as alleged. The RPD did not question their occurrence, and thus the RPD did not err by not referencing the supporting documentation. The RPD appropriately focussed its analysis on the Appellants' forward-facing risk. [53] The PA testified that her husband has had to relocate multiple times, and has been followed by police officers and unknown individuals who have inquired into the PA's whereabouts. The PA's father was similarly approached in XXXX 2019. When weighing this evidence against the gravity of the threats of 2017 and the continued presence and relative safety of several of the Appellants' close relatives in Kenya, I find that the Appellants failed to present sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence to establish a serious possibility of persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, a risk of section 97 harm, if they returned to Kenya. [54] Without a forward-facing risk of harm in Kenya, the Appellants do not meet the definition of Convention refugees or persons in need of protection. Because this finding is determinative of the present appeals, I need not consider the Appellants' risk of harm in Rwanda. CONCLUSION [55] I dismiss the appeals and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) Joseph W. Richards II Joseph W. Richards II February 9, 2022 Date 1 Subsection 110(4), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 2 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96; Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385. 3 Exhibit P-1, Appellants' Record, at pp. 11-46. 4 Ching v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 725, at para. 75: "... the Supreme Court of Canada set out a list of factors affecting the duty of procedural fairness and emphasized that the content of the duty must be determined in the specific context of each case. The Court noted that the factors were not exhaustive and reiterated that procedural fairness is based on the principle that individuals affected by decisions should have the opportunity to present their case and to have decisions affecting their rights and interests made in a fair and impartial and open process "appropriate to the statutory, institutional, and social context of the decision." 5 Roy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 768, at para. 34: "While there is no need to establish a prejudice in order prove (sic) a breach of procedural fairness based on inadequate interpretation, the Applicant is required to demonstrate that the breach of procedural fairness was material to the Board's decision in order for this Court to intervene" [citations omitted]. 6 Isugi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1421 (CanLII), at paras. 26-27. 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2.1, PA's Basis of Claim (BOC) form, at pp. 10-11. 8 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2.2, AA's BOC form, at pp. 31, 36 at para. 4. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2.1, PA's BOC form, at p. 16. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 1, Schedule A forms, at pp. 85, 93. 11 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 144-145. 12 Exhibit P-1, Appellants' Record, Affidavit of the PA, at p. 3, para. 10. 13 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at p. 37, lines 23 - 41. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at p. 202. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 224. 16 Exhibit I-1, Former counsel's response to allegations of inadequate representation, October 4, 2021, at para. 25. 17 Transcript of the RPD hearing, at p. 34, lines 6-8; p. 36, lines 13-29. 18 Exhibit I-1, Former counsel's response to allegations of inadequate representation, October 4, 2021, at para. 19. 19 Exhibit P-1, Appellants' Record, Affidavit of the PA, p. 3, para. 10. 20 Transcript of the RPD hearing, at p. 19, lines 40-43; p. 20, line 22. 21 Ibid., at pp. 16-20. 22 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Reasons and Decision, at paras. 6-10. 24 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Rwanda (April 16, 2021), item 3.11, Rwanda, July 25, 2008, at p. 8 (Article 3); p. 9 (Article 6); p. 16 (Article 22). 25 Ibid., item 3.12, European University Institute. European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, April 2020, at pp. 8, 12, 15-18. 26 Exhibit P-1, Appellants' Record, Affidavit of the PA, p. 5, at para. 25. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, NDP for Rwanda (April 16, 2021), item 3.12, European University Institute. European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship, April 2020. 28 Transcript of the RPD hearing, at p. 24. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC1-04814 MC1-04815 / MC1-04816 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: MC1-04814

### Key Issues
the claim, the determinative issues, and the quality of the evidence. After reviewing the conduct of the RPD Member, I have not found sufficient evidence to be satisfied, on a bal

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: g new evidence is admissible. ANALYSIS [38] My role is to look at all of the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.22 Rwanda is a valid country of reference [39] The RPD found that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellants are all Rwandan nationals.23 After my independent assessment of the evidence, I rea

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
What compliance obligations are created by this Federal regulations from the Canadian government?

# Feed Grain Transportation and Storage Assistance Regulations CRC, c 1027 Regulations Prescribing Terms, Conditions and Rates of Payments Related to the Cost of Feed Grain Transportation and Storage, Made for the Benefit of Livestock Feeders in Eastern Canada, British Columbia, the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories Enabling authority: LIVESTOCK FEED ASSISTANCE ACT ## Short Title 1 These Regulations may be cited as the Feed Grain Transportation and Storage Assistance Regulations. ## Interpretation 2 In these Regulations, *Act* means the Livestock Feed Assistance Act; (Loi) *Board* [Repealed, SOR/89-521, s. 2] *British Columbia* [Repealed, SOR/89-521, s. 2] *livestock* [Repealed, SOR/89-521, s. 2] *mixed feed oats* means the grade of grain established under section 17 of the Off Grades of Grain and Grades of Screenings Order; (avoine à bétail mélangée) *No. 1 feed screenings* means the grade of screenings established under subsection 16(3) of the Off Grades of Grain and Grades of Screenings Order; (criblures de provende n o 1) *Prairie Region* [Repealed, SOR/89-521, s. 2] *sample feed grain* means the grade of grain established under section 19 of the Off Grades of Grain and Grades of Screenings Order. (grain à bétail sur échantillon) *Western Canada* [Repealed, SOR/80-846, s. 1] ## Designations 3 Rye, grain corn, No. 1 feed screenings and sample feed grain are hereby designated as feed grain for the purposes of the Act. 4 All that area of Ontario lying west of the meridian passing through the eastern boundary of the former city of Port Arthur as it existed on December 31, 1969 is hereby designated as a part of Eastern Canada for the purposes of the Act. 5 All classes of animals, including birds and fish, that are raised for food, for agricultural purposes or for the purpose of fur production are hereby designated as livestock for the purposes of the Act. ## Payments in Respect of Transportation 6 (1) Where a feed grain set out in the heading to column III of Schedule I, II or III is transported during the period beginning on January 1, 1993 and ending on March 31, 1993 to a destination set out in column II of an item of that Schedule in an area set out in column I of that item, the payment related to the cost of transportation of that feed grain shall be made by the Minister at the rate set out in column III of that item. (2) Where a feed grain set out in the heading to column III of Schedule I, II or III is transported after March 31, 1993 to a destination set out in column II of an item of that Schedule in an area set out in column I of that item, the payment related to the cost of transportation of that feed grain shall be made by the Minister at ninety per cent of the rate set out in column III of that item. (3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), where a feed grain set out in the heading to column III of Schedule IV is transported after January 31, 1994 to a destination set out in column II of an item of that Schedule in an area set out in column I of that item, the payment related to the cost of transportation of that feed grain shall be made by the Minister at the rate set out in column III of that item. (4) Notwithstanding subsection (2), where a feed grain set out in the heading to column III of Schedule V is transported after December 31, 1994 to a destination set out in column II of an item of that Schedule in an area set out in column I of that item, the payment related to the cost of transportation of that feed grain shall be made by the Minister at the rate set out in column III of that item. (5) Notwithstanding subsection (2), where a feed grain set out in the heading to column III of Schedule VI is transported after March 31, 1995 to a destination set out in column II of an item of that Schedule in an area set out in column I of that item, the payment related to the cost of transportation of that feed grain shall be made by the Minister at the rate set out in column III of that item. (6) Notwithstanding subsections (2) to (5), no payment related to the cost of transportation of a feed grain shall be made under these Regulations in respect of a feed grain transported after January 9, 1996. (7) No payment referred to in subsections (2) to (6) shall be made unless a request for the payment is received by the Minister before May 31, 1996. 7 (1) No payment related to the cost of transportation of feed grain by motor vehicle shall be made by the Minister unless (a) the owner of the motor vehicle was the owner or wholesale seller of the feed grain transported therein; or (b) the owner of the motor vehicle (i) was a licensed common carrier, and (ii) had issued a bill of lading that correctly set out the destination of the feed grain. (iii) [Repealed, SOR/81-561, s. 1] (2) [Repealed, SOR/80-846, s. 3] ## Payments in Respect of Storage 8 (1) Every payment related to the cost of feed grain storage in Eastern Canada shall be made by the Minister exclusively with respect to feed grain grown in Canada and stored in a vessel in Eastern Canada, except at the City of Thunder Bay. (2) The rate of payment related to the cost of feed grain storage referred to in subsection (1) is (a) $2.95 per tonne for wheat; (b) $5.20 per tonne for oats; and (c) $3.69 per tonne for barley. (3) No payment related to the cost of feed grain storage in Eastern Canada shall be made by the Minister if the feed grain could be stored in another available storage facility. ## Records 9 Every payment related to the cost of feed grain transportation or storage shall be made on the condition that the person who receives the payment (a) keeps books of account, records, bills of lading and invoices respecting the purchase and sale of feed grain; (b) retains all such books of account, records, bills of lading and invoices for six years after they are established; and (c) makes all such books of account, records, bills of lading and invoices available for inspection and audit by an authorized representative of the Minister during normal business hours. ## Conditions of Payment 10 (1) Subject to subsection (2), every payment related to the cost of feed grain transportation shall be made on the condition that the feed grain has been or will be fed to livestock at the destination in the area in respect of which the payment is made. (2) Where (a) feed grain has been or will be fed to livestock at a destination in an area other than the destination in the area in respect of which the payment referred to in subsection (1) is made, and (b) the cost of transportation to the first-mentioned destination is less than the rate for the destination in respect of which that payment is made, the payment shall be considered to be an overpayment to the extent of the difference between the cost of transportation and that rate. 11 Every payment related to the cost of feed grain storage shall be made on the condition that the feed grain has been or will be fed to livestock in Eastern Canada.

Response:
## Analysis of REGULATIONS-FED: Feed Grain Transportation and Storage Assistance Regulations

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
The document contains provisions related to immigration procedures, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.

### Application to Immigration Cases
These regulations provide specific implementation details for broader legislative frameworks. Practitioners should ensure strict compliance with procedural requirements, timelines, and documentation standards. The regulations must be interpreted consistent with their enabling legislation and may be subject to challenge if they exceed the authority granted by the statute.