Prompt:
What specific procedures does this Federal regulations from the Canadian government establish for immigration processes?

# Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Regulations CRC, c 1015 Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Regulations Enabling authority: FAIR WAGES AND HOURS OF LABOUR ACT 1 [Repealed, SOR/99-362, s. 2] ## Interpretation 2 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Notice 2.1 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Application 3 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Determination of Fair Wages 4 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Schedule of Wage Rates 5 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] 6 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Hours of Work 6.1 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Provisions to Be Included in Contracts ## Fair Wages 7 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] 8 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Non-discrimination 9 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] 10 [Repealed, SOR/99-362, s. 5] ## Withholding Payment 11 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Subcontracts 12 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Default 13 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## Books and Records 14 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] 15 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1] ## General 16 [Repealed, SOR/2013-204, s. 1]

Response:
## Analysis of REGULATIONS-FED: Fair Wages and Hours of Labour Regulations

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
The document contains provisions related to immigration procedures, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.

### Application to Immigration Cases
These regulations provide specific implementation details for broader legislative frameworks. Practitioners should ensure strict compliance with procedural requirements, timelines, and documentation standards. The regulations must be interpreted consistent with their enabling legislation and may be subject to challenge if they exceed the authority granted by the statute.


Prompt:
What is the key legal reasoning in this Refugee Appeal Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada?

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC3-00542 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal [REDACTED] Personne en cause Date of decision June 14, 2024 Date de la décision Panel Daphnée Ouellet Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Angelica Pantiru Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister Mikael Bélanger Karan Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss this appeal for the reasons that follow. [2] The Appellant, [REDACTED], is a citizen of Mexico, hailing from the State of Veracruz. There, he worked as a XXXX XXXX for the Secretariat of Public Security (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública - SSP) from late 2014 until his departure in early 2019. * Impugned Refugee Protection Division Decision [3] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the Appellant was excluded pursuant to s. 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and Article 1F(a) of the Convention.1 It considered that the Minister had met its burden of showing that there were serious reasons for considering that the Appellant was complicit in proscribed acts, including unlawful arrests, torture and enforced disappearances amounting to crimes against humanity, by way of his voluntary, significant, and knowing contribution to the SSP in Veracruz. [4] In coming to this conclusion, the RPD reasoned that there was no requirement for crimes against humanity to be committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack in Canadian law. * Intervention from the Minister via the Canadian Border Services Agency [5] The Minister, represented by the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), intervened before the RPD and led the questioning with regard to the Appellant's excludability under Article 1F(a). It also intervened in this appeal with additional submissions from the CBSA.2 In summary, it agrees with the RPD's conclusion as to the Appellant's exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the Convention and it is also argued by the Minister that no requirement exists for the proscribed acts to be committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack in Canadian law. The Minister asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) dismiss the appeal and confirm the Appellant's exclusion. * Grounds for Appeal [6] The RPD's exclusion findings are contested.3 It is argued that the RPD incorrectly concluded that the Appellant was complicit in committing crimes against humanity because it failed to analyse the essential elements on which this could be based pursuant to the Rome Statute, the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (CAHWCA)4, and following the Court's jurisprudence in Verbanov5, setting out the requirement that crimes against humanity be committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy. [7] The Appellant submits that some corrupt SSP officers and politicians colluded with the cartels, but that it was not committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy. [8] The Appellant also argues that the funding and assistance by the United States to Mexican authorities since 2006, in the context of the war against drugs, shows that the policy was not aimed at the systemic violation of human rights, but rather aimed at the eradication of organized and cartel crime, and drug trafficking. According to the Appellant, concluding otherwise would be absurd because the United States cannot be held to support the systemic violation of human rights. * Determinative Issue [9] The determinative issue in this appeal relates to the exclusion under Article 1F(a) of the Convention. I will explain below why the RPD erred in its legal analysis, especially as it relates to the requirement for a State or organizational policy when assessing the Appellant's complicity in crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, I find that the RPD's overall conclusion was correct and that the Appellant is excluded. I will give my reasons below. BACKGROUND AND CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS [10] The Appellant hails from Xalapa, Veracruz, where he completed his [REDACTED] XXXX and then worked as a XXXX. In 2014, the Appellant saw an online recruitment posting for XXXX XXXX and decided to apply. [11] He was first sent for XXXX training until XXXX 2014, and then worked as a XXXX XXXX for the Secretariat of Public Security (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública - SSP). He was posted to the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for Veracruz ([REDACTED] [REDACTED] De Veracruz) from XXXX 2015 until XXXX2019. He was stationed in the XXXX XXXX ([REDACTED]), with field missions to XXXX and XXXX, Veracruz.6 [12] During his training in 2014, the Appellant heard about other XXXX XXXX being corrupt, being involved with organized crimes, the use of arbitrary detention and torture of detainees, as well as the disappearance of various individuals, including journalists.7 Some trainees chose to leave without facing consequences, but the Appellant chose to remain.8 He also heard of detainees being taken to the nearby zoo housing wild animals, including crocodiles, lions and jaguars, but he believes that the animals were no longer there during his time in training.9 Country reports on the situation in Veracruz during this period document rumours from the family members of disappeared persons who believed their relatives had been fed to these animals.10 11 12 [13] The Appellant fled Mexico after he faced problems for [REDACTED] [REDACTED] XXXX, and that he received threatening phone calls. He was advised by his superior to quit his job to avoid harm, and he fled to Canada in XXXX 2019. ANALYSIS [14] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision. I conducted an independent review of the evidence, including the audio-recording of the RPD hearing. I therefore reviewed the decision by applying the correctness standard as I find that the RPD had no meaningful advantage.13 [15] On my own assessment, I find that the RPD erred in its legal analysis, as it relates to the requirement for a State or organizational policy when assessing the Appellant's complicity in crimes against humanity (see below - 1). Nevertheless, I find that the RPD did come to the correct conclusion regarding the Appellant's exclusion pursuant to Article 1F(a) of the Convention, and I will explain why (see below - 2). 1- The RPD Incorrectly Applied the Legal Test for Exclusion for Crimes against Humanity [16] The Appellant is challenging the RPD's assessment of his excludability, and more specifically the conclusion that a State or organizational policy is not part of the definition for crimes against humanity in Canadian law. On my own review, I agree with the Appellant that the policy requirement was a necessary element of the crime to be established in this case. I will explain. a) The legal framework for assessing exclusion for crimes against humanity [17] The RPD applied the framework set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugesera14, and found that there was no requirement for the proscribed acts to be committed pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack in Canadian law. [18] The RPD considered the Appellant's argument that the Rome Statute now imposes this requirement, as discussed in the decision of the Federal Court in Verbanov15, but determined that the Rome Statute was not a complete codification of international law and that it governs the International Criminal Court, a body which is complementary to national jurisdictions. It thus concluded that the test set out in Mugesera was still the applicable one in Canadian jurisdictions. [19] In my view, the RPD was not entirely wrong in stating that the test set out in Mugesera is still good law, especially regarding proscribed acts perpetrated before the signature of the Rome Statute. Recent case-law does confirm this.16 [20] What the RPD failed to consider or correctly understand here, however, is that there is an additional criterion - that has been incorporated into Canadian law through the CAHWCA and case-law - for acts that occurred after July 17, 1998.17 [21] This was particularly relevant, in the present case, given that the Appellant joined and was part of the SSP between 2014 and 2019. All potentially excludable acts - to which he might be found complicit - took place after the incorporation of the Rome Statute, through the CAHWCA, into Canadian law. [22] There is, in fact, a legal presumption included to the effect that the Rome Statute is an expression of customary international law featured in the CAHWCA which applies to situations that arose after the adoption of the Rome Statute. Indeed, section 6 (4) of the CAHWCA titled "Interpretation - customary international law", indicates that: For greater certainty, crimes described in articles 6 and 7 and paragraph 2 of article 8 of the Rome Statute are, as of July 17, 1998, crimes according to customary international law, and may be crimes according to customary international law before that date. This does not limit or prejudice in any way the application of existing or developing rules of international law. [emphasis added]18 [23] In Verbanov, Justice Grammond relied on this, and also referred to paragraph 223 of the Tadic19 Appeals Judgement of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to affirm that the definition of international crimes featured in the Rome Statute further supports the presumption articulated in section 6(4) of the CAHWCA that articles 6 to 8 of the Rome Statute are part of customary international law starting on July 17, 1998.20 [24] It seems to me that Canadian law is clear concerning acts that took place after that date. [25] The Minister argues in its intervention before the RAD that there has been no subsequent decision by the Federal Court, following Verbanov, other than the one cited by the Appellant, in the case of Jean-Baptiste21, where this issue was addressed in obiter. [26] I respectfully must disagree with the Minister here. First, the Minister's intervention does not address the above-mentioned presumption set out at section 6 (4) of the CAHWCA for acts committed after July 17, 1998, which is part of Canadian law. This was the very basis of the Court's decision in Verbanov, as mentioned. [27] Second, there are subsequent cases, both from this Board22 and the Federal Court23 which recognized the approach in Verbanov and the necessity to distinguish between acts perpetrated before and after July 17, 1998. What was reiterated in a recent decision, however, is that the policy requirement does not necessarily entail a formal written policy: the Verbanov decision does not stand for the proposition that the government's constitution or a formal written policy specifically endorsing human rights abuses must exist before a finding of crimes against humanity can be made. In fact, Justice Grammond said quite the opposite, concluding that "this judgment should not be understood as shielding police officers from the accountability warranted by the commission of heinous crimes. Whether the torture of detainees is conducted pursuant to a State or organizational policy is an issue that must be decided on a case-by-case basis, according to the evidence."24 [28] This issue is particularly relevant to the present case, and I will return to it later, when examining whether the policy requirement is met, based on the evidence. [29] In its intervention, the Minister also seems to rely on recent Federal Court decisions in Wijenayake25 and Oworu26 to argue that an "official policy" was not deemed a requirement to establish complicity in crimes against humanity in those cases. It seems to me that these scenarios touched rather upon the previously-mentioned issue of determining whether the policy in question must be a formal or written policy - which the Verbanov case had already answered in the negative - while putting the emphasis on proving the existence of such a policy on a case-by-case basis [cf. above at para. 27.]. [30] In fact, in the excerpt cited above from the Oworu case, Justice Ahmed found the RAD's conclusion to be reasonable that the proscribed acts had been committed by police as a routine practice and in a widespread and systematic manner with impunity, indicating tacit endorsement of these practices.27 [31] Meanwhile, Wijenayake made no reference to Verbanov or the policy requirement, and the facts took place during the Sri Lankan civil war in a wide period spanning from 1992 until 2016; therefore, covering both periods before and after the Rome Statute came into force. In Wijenayake also, there appeared to be no debate regarding the existence of a policy to use torture by police and authorities more generally, as demonstrated in the country evidence cited by the Court.28 [32] In the latter case also, Justice Go found that the Board had conducted its analysis through the relevant legal framework and referenced both the CAHWCA and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Mugesera.29 Certainly, the Court did not state or imply at any point that the presumption set out at section 6 (4) of CAHWCA would be inapplicable to acts committed after July 17, 1998. [33] Further, in the two above-cited cases referenced by the Minister, the issue before the Federal Court was whether the person in question had been sufficiently complicit in proscribed acts, rather than any dispute regarding their qualification as international crimes. [34] For all these reasons, the Minister's argument that the Rome Statute requirement of the existence of a state or organizational policy does not apply in Canadian law has failed to convince me. [35] In my view, a government or state policy tacitly endorsing such actions, when committed in a widespread and systematic manner, could - in some cases - meet the requirement of the Rome Statute and, therefore, Canadian law, for the reasons which I have set out. I find that this is the case here, and I will examine it further below. [36] Finally, the Minister also relies on a citation from the Supreme Court of Canada in Ezokola30, to argue that a strict interpretation of crimes against humanity would be against the object and purpose of the Convention.31 This is not my reading of those paragraphs, which explicitly weigh the necessary balance to be struck between not creating safe havens for perpetrators of international crimes and promoting the humanitarian aim of the Refugee Convention.32 The Court, in fact, referred to paragraph 2 of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Guidelines on International Protection on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses, which explicitly makes the case for a restrictive interpretation of the exclusion clauses. 33 [37] It seems to me that balancing these objectives is what the Court also had in mind in Verbanov when assessing the evolution of international criminal law, whether customary or conventional, as applied in the Canadian context.34 [38] I find that the definition of crimes against humanity contained in the Rome Statute, via the Schedule contained in CAHWCA, was therefore appropriate to apply to the present case. As stated in Verbanov, this Board had found that international criminal law, and in particular the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) which the CAHWCA seeks to implement, has evolved since the backdrop against which Mugesera was decided, and that the existence of a State (or organizational) policy was a mandatory element of the concept of "widespread or systematic attack" in order to qualify certain acts as crimes against humanity.35 b) The existence of a state or organizational policy in the present case [39] As mentioned, the definition of "crime against humanity" in the Rome Statute, and particularly the definition of an "attack directed against any civilian population" as set out at Article 7(2)(a) includes the requirement that the attack be "pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack".36 [40] Canadian case-law has already recognized that civilian detainees are part of an identifiable group (ie. a civilian population) for the purpose of crimes against humanity.37 [41] Moreover, when examining the meaning of "State or organizational policy" found at 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, the Federal Court in Verbanov stated as follows38: The meaning of policy was further defined through the following provision of the Elements of Crimes, a set of guidelines adopted by the Assembly of State Parties pursuant to article 9 of the Rome Statute: 3. [...] It is understood that "policy to commit such attack" requires that the State or organization actively promotes or encourage such an attack against a civilian population. [Footnote] A policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would be implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organizational action. [42] However, as previously mentioned, there is no requirement that this policy be written or formal; it simply must be proven by the evidence on a case-by-case basis.39 [43] In the present case, the Minister had disclosed relevant and incriminating country evidence on this issue40, prior to the start of the RPD hearing, and the Appellant had multiple opportunities to be questioned on, and respond to, this information throughout the hearing. [44] This evidence - which the RPD also cited in its reasons - contains clear descriptions of the use of torture as a common place, widespread and systematic practice by police and other security forces throughout the country, starting well before the Appellant joined the SSP.41 It also shows an increase in these practices in the context of the war on drugs, after 2006.42 [45] Further, the RPD relied on the country evidence when finding that the State of Veracruz had the highest number of reported cases of torture and that the SSP as well as the Veracruz Civil Force - to which the applicant belonged - were directly implicated in at least hundreds of cases of enforced disappearances during the period of 2013-2018.43 [46] Moreover, the RPD cited country evidence regarding the fact that the former governor of the State of Veracruz between 2010 and 2016, Javier Duarte de Ochoa, had established a policy by the Minister of Public Safety of unlawful arrests, torture and enforced disappearances of persons believed to be linked to criminal groups.44 45 [47] The Appellant's argument, on appeal, appears to be that former governor Duarte (as other former governors of Veracruz) was merely a corrupt official that colluded with criminal organizations for his own personal gain.46 It is argued that this was not part of a policy. This argument does not appear to be based on actual expert evidence but rather counsel's own interpretation of the situation in Mexico given that there is no reference or citation to support this.47 [48] It seems to me that the above-cited country evidence, and other evidence on the record, rather establishes the existence of such a policy given the numerous actors involved and the widespread nature of these practices that were systematically endorsed and/or covered up with officials acting at all levels of government - including police forces, prosecutors, and the judiciary. [49] Similarly to the facts in Owuru, proscribed acts have been committed by police as a routine practice and in a widespread and systematic manner with impunity, indicating - at the very least - tacit endorsement of these practices.48 [50] For example, the country evidence on record reported that: "From the beginning of 2007 through the end of 2015, the CNDH received 9,401 complaints of torture and ill-treatment".49 Data on torture and ill-treatment in Mexico understate the incidence of these crimes because law enforcement agencies and judicial institutions that generate the data are often the same agencies accused of perpetrating or tolerating torture and ill-treatment. This leaves the victims reluctant to report crimes, and leaves the perpetrators well positioned to stymie any investigation. In 2012, the UN Committee Against Torture expressed concern about the "allegations of complicity between public prosecutors and police investigators" as well as about "the reports that public prosecutors and, on occasion, judges themselves disregard defendants' claims that they have been tortured or classify the acts in question as constituting less serious offences." Similarly, the report of UN Special Rapporteur Juan Méndez on his April-May 2014 visit to Mexico identified the misclassification of torture as a structural flaw that fosters impunity.50 [51] The Appellant does not appear to specifically challenge this country evidence, but rather relies on a different tab of the National Documentation Package (NDP) for Mexico, showing that military personnel have been reported to perpetrate various crimes against the civilian population, in the context of the war on drugs.51 [52] However, on my own review of this document, I note that it clearly states: "According to Mexico's 2019 National Survey on Victimization and Perceptions of Insecurity, the country's police forces continue to have lower levels of citizen trust and are viewed as more corrupt than Mexico's armed forces. Less than 60 percent of those surveyed trusted Mexico's state or municipal police forces, while more than 64 percent viewed them as corrupt. Mexican police forces also have a long history of perpetrating human rights violations. The use of torture among police forces is widespread, and police have participated in several documented cases of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and forced disappearances."52 [53] But also: "Forces at all levels are riddled with corruption, and citizens widely view police as ineffective in enforcing the law or even believe they enable crime."53 [54] Therefore, the arguments raised by the Appellant regarding the country evidence are not persuasive given that both the Mexican military and police forces could be committing abuses simultaneously. One does not exclude the other, and the evidence rather points to this. [55] I find that the evidence does establish a policy that was, at the very least, tacitly endorsed and carried out by diverse government actors on a wide scale, and at all levels - as set out by the above-cited excerpts. [56] The evidence relied upon by the RPD clearly sets out, for example, that: "Veracruz's state apparatus has been tailored to create, protect and conceal criminal interests".54 This is not the result of individual corrupt officials, but rather an issue that exists at a systemic level, and that has been implemented gradually and purposefully. [57] It also seems to me, as the Minister points out in their intervention before the RAD, that the Appellant's own testimony regarding the fact that he was specifically instructed by his superiors from the outset not to speak out against acts does establish a policy to cover up severe abuses -including the use of ill-treatment and torture of detainees and enforced disappearances by police - and that this was widely known, endorsed, and covered up at all levels.55 This is significant in the evaluation of the Appellant's complicity in these acts, as I will examine below, given this repeated confirmation that he was instructed to remain silent on such abuses from the start, and chose to continue supporting an organization with a criminal purpose, despite knowing this.56 [58] Finally, the Appellant appears to argue that Mexican authorities could not be perpetrating crimes against humanity because some of these policies were put in place and/or financed with the assistance of the United States in the context of the so-called war against drugs since 2006. As mentioned already, the country evidence sets out that some of these practices pre-date the 2006 war against drugs, but also, that the situation has greatly worsened since. In my view, this is not a persuasive argument from a legal standpoint given the compelling country evidence on the record. [59] On my own independent analysis of all the evidence, and for the reasons I have set out above, I find that the evidence does establish that a policy existed in which members of the SSP and security forces carried out acts of torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention on a widespread and systematic basis, against members of the civilian population - in particular civilian detainees - in Veracruz. There was also a policy silence imposed on members of the security forces, which the Appellant testified to, that actively encouraged the continuation and amplification of abuses on a widespread and systematic basis. 2- The Appellant is Excluded from Refugee Status [60] As the Minister correctly highlighted in their RAD intervention57, there has been no challenge to the RPD's conclusion regarding the fact that there were serious reasons for considering that he was complicit to numerous crimes committed by the SSP against the civilian population in Veracruz, and I have not identified any errors by the RPD on this point. [61] The RPD provided its reasons for finding that the Appellant had made a knowing, voluntary and significant contribution to crimes against humanity, as defined by international instruments.58 I agree with the RPD. [62] To summarize, the Appellant confirmed his direct involvement in the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for several years on the basis of anonymous and/or unchecked information. I find that this was a significant contribution to the acts committed against these persons, during or following their arrest. [63] The Appellant further confirmed that he had knowledge of the fact that torture and enforced disappearances were used against these civilians in a widespread and systematic manner, and that a policy of silence against these abuses was enforced. [64] He also confirmed that he could have left the SSP after being aware of these crimes, and that some of his colleagues did, which led the RPD to conclude that his contribution was voluntary in nature. I agree. [65] These findings are uncontested on appeal, and I adopt them as my own. CONCLUSION [66] Overall, the RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is excluded from refugee protection due to serious reasons for considering that he was complicit in crimes against humanity perpetrated by Mexican authorities, including the SSP and other security forces in Veracruz. DECISION [67] For the above reasons, I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is excluded from protection by the combined effect of Article 1F of the Convention and s. 98 of IRPA. (signed) Daphnée Ouellet Daphnée Ouellet June 14, 2024 Date 1 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137 and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, New York, 31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267; accession of Canada to both on 4 June 1969 [Convention]. 2 Minister's Intervention Record, Memorandum of Intervention, at pp. 4-12. 3 Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at pp. 4-16. 4 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (CAHWCA), SC 2000, c 24. 5 Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 (CanLII). 6 Transcript of August 3, 2022, RPD Hearing, at pp. 32-33. 7 Ibid., at pp. 12-23. 8 Ibid., at p. 83. 9 Ibid. at pp. 53, 54, 59, 60. 10 Ibid. at p. 60. 11 RPD Record, M-20, The Intercept, May 20, 2018, Code Name Jaguar: How a Top Police Official Carried Out a Reign of Terror in Mexico, available online at: https://theintercept.com/2018/05/20/code-name-jaguar-how-a-top-police-official-carried-out-a-reign-of-terror-in-mexico/ 12 RPD Record, M-19, Business Insider, June 11, 2018, A former Mexican governor has been accused of involvement in forced disappearances, and it points to a sinister problem with Mexico's police. Available online at: https://www.businessinsider.com/javier-duarte-former-veracruz-mexico-governor-accused-disappearances-2018-6 13 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration, 2016 FCA 93, [2016] 4 FCR 157; Rozas Del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145, [2019] 2 FCR 597. 14 Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 SCR 100. 15 Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 (CanLII). 16 Gupa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 157 (CanLII). 17 Ibid., at paras. 49-52. 18 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (CAHWCA), SC 2000, c 24. 19 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Appeal Judgement), Case No. IT-94-1-A, ICTY, 15 July 1999. 20 Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 (CanLII), paras. 23-26. 21 Jean-Baptiste v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 1362 (CanLII), at paras. 33-37. 22 See for example: Qazizada v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2021 CanLII 88344 (CA IRB), at para. 13; Ahuday v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 CanLII 18564 (CA IRB), at para. 6; Massroua v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 CanLII 37033 (CA IRB), at para. 131: "The period under review, December 2014 to May 2015, falls after the coming into force of the Rome Statute and the CAHWCA, which incorporates the Rome Statute, therefore the latter is applicable. The Rome Statute adopted as a necessary ingredient of crimes against humanity that the organization in question have a policy of committing the proscribed act(s)." 23 Akinpelu v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 400 (CanLII), at paras. 41-43; Wardak v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 422 (CanLII), at paras. 62-63; Gupa v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 157 (CanLII), at para. 49. 24 Akinpelu v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 400 (CanLII), at para. 43, citing: Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 (CanLII), at para. 76 [emphasis added] 25 Wijenayake v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1224 (CanLII). 26 Oworu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1035 (CanLII). 27 Ibid., at para. 38: "While crimes are not committed by the NPF and the SARS pursuant to official policy, it is nonetheless established to be a routine practice, and the evidence does not support a conclusion that these acts are only carried by rogue actors. If that were the case, one would expect it to be a relatively uncommon occurrence with meaningful efforts to identify, punish and prevent such behaviour; conversely, the evidence establishes that while mechanisms exist for the investigation of police misconduct, practically speaking they are highly ineffective such that the police continue to carry out these activities in a widespread and systematic manner with impunity." 28 Wijenayake v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1224 (CanLII), at para. 23: "torture is the most common method of criminal investigation, and that it is unapologetically used by Police Officers and endorsed by Senior Officers. There are no real repercussions for Officers who engage in torture, and "[t]he consequences of all of the above are in inordinate escalation in acts of torture, their level of barbarity and concomitant brutality." 29 Ibid., at para. 19. 30 Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2013] 2 SCR 678, at paras. 32-38. 31 Minister's Intervention Record, Memorandum of Intervention, p. 12, at para. 37. 32 Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2013] 2 SCR 678, at para. 35. 33 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003, https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/unhcr/2003/en/14733, at para. 2: The rationale for the exclusion clauses, which should be borne in mind when considering their application, is that certain acts are so grave as to render their perpetrators undeserving of international protection as refugees. Their primary purpose is to deprive those guilty of heinous acts, and serious common crimes, of international refugee protection and to ensure that such persons do not abuse the institution of asylum in order to avoid being held legally accountable for their acts. The exclusion clauses must be applied "scrupulously" to protect the integrity of the institution of asylum, as is recognised by UNHCR's Executive Committee in Conclusion No. 82 (XLVIII), 1997. At the same time, given the possible serious consequences of exclusion, it is important to apply them with great caution and only after a full assessment of the individual circumstances of the case. The exclusion clauses should, therefore, always be interpreted in a restrictive manner. [emphasis added]. 34 Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 (CanLII), at para. 49. 35 Ibid., at paras. 40-41. 36 Rome Statute of the ICC, Articles 7(1), 7(2)(a), Schedule to the CAHWCA 37 Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 (CanLII), at para. 60; citing: Khachatryan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 167; Sarwary v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 437; Vaezzadeh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 845; Hadhiri; Talpur v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 822. 38 Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 (CanLII), at para. 20. 39 Akinpelu v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2024 FC 400 (CanLII), at para. 43, citing: Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Verbanov, 2021 FC 507 (CanLII), at para. 76. 40 In particular see: RPD Record, M-2, Open Society Foundations (OSF), Undeniable Atrocities: Confronting Crimes against Humanity in Mexico, 27 June 2016, also available online at: https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/osi/2016/en/111338; M-11, International Crisis Group (ICG), Veracruz: Fixing Mexico's State of Terror, Latin America Report N°61, 28 February 2017, also available online at: https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/icg/2017/en/115888; Business Insider, A former Mexican governor has been accused of involvement in forced disappearances, and it points to a sinister problem with Mexico's police, June 11, 2018. Available online at: https://www.businessinsider.com/javier-duarte-former-veracruz-mexico-governor-accused-disappearances-2018-6; 41 RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at para. 12: "In 2003, the Committee Against Torture reported that torture in Mexico "was not exceptional or occasional...to the contrary, the police commonly use torture and resort to it systematically as another method of criminal investigation." 42 Ibid., "Reports of torture and other ill-treatment increased as violence spiralled in Mexico after 2006, as a result of the government's "war on drugs". Even if recent reports of a decline by the CNDH [National Human Rights." Commission] are correct, torture and ill-treatment remains widespread - 600 per cent higher in 2013 compared to 2003." 43 RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at paras. 13-14. 44 Ibid., at para. 15. 45 RPD Record, M-19, Business Insider, A former Mexican governor has been accused of involvement in forced disappearances, and it points to a sinister problem with Mexico's police, June 11, 2018. Available online at: https://www.businessinsider.com/javier-duarte-former-veracruz-mexico-governor-accused-disappearances-2018-6 46 Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at paras. 31-33. 47 Ibid. 48 Oworu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1035 (CanLII), at para. 38. 49 RPD Record, M-2, Open Society Foundations (OSF), Undeniable Atrocities: Confronting Crimes against Humanity in Mexico, 27 June 2016, https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/osi/2016/en/111338, at p. 46. 50 Ibid. 51 Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at paras. 34-43. 52 RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package, Mexico, 29 April 2022, tab 10.4: Police reform and security strategies in Mexico in the context of the war on drugs and U.S. support for these efforts. Washington Office on Latin America. Maureen Meyer. July 2020, at p. 2 [emphasis added]. 53 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 54 RPD Record, M-11, International Crisis Group (ICG), Veracruz: Fixing Mexico's State of Terror, Latin America Report N°61, 28 February 2017, also available online at: https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/icg/2017/en/115888, at p. 1 [emphasis added]. 55 Transcript of August 3, 2022, RPD Hearing, at pp. 20, 57, 70, 78, 83. 56 Ibid. 57 Minister's Intervention Record, Memorandum of Intervention, p. 4, at para. 4. 58 RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at paras. 28-65. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC3-00542 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: MC3-00542

### Key Issues
ed before the RPD and led the questioning with regard to the Appellant's excludability under Article 1F(a). It also intervened in this appeal with additional submissions from the C

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: hy the RPD erred in its legal analysis, especially as it relates to the requirement for a State or organizational policy when assessing the Appellant's complicity in crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, I find that the RPD's overall conclusion was correct and that the Appellant is excluded. I will give my reasons below. BACKGR

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
How does this Federal Court of Canada decision impact immigration procedures?

Ortiz Celedon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2023-12-18 Neutral citation 2023 FC 1718 File numbers IMM-528-22 Notes A correction was made on December 20, 2023 Decision Content Date: 20231218 Docket: IMM-528-22 Citation: 2023 FC 1718 Toronto, Ontario, December 18, 2023 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pentney BETWEEN: JORGE WILSON ORTIZ CELEDON IVETTE CECILIA ROMERO PRIETO SOFIA ORTIZ ROMERO Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent JUDGMENT AND REASONS [1] The Applicants in this case are Jorge Wilson Ortiz Celedon (the Principal Applicant), his spouse Cecilia Romero Prieto, and their daughter Sofia Ortiz Romero. They are citizens of Columbia, who claimed refugee protection in Canada due to persecution from a criminal gang called Los Rastrojos. [2] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denied the Applicants’ claim. They seek judicial review of this decision. [3] The Applicants’ refugee claim is related to the experience of the Principal Applicant’s mother. She owned agricultural land in Colombia, and between 2001 and 2005, Los Rastrojos murdered some other local landowners for refusing to turn over their land. In April 2011, the group occupied his mother’s land, and she continued to receive threats after that. She eventually received protection from the Colombian government and was compensated for the loss of her land. The mother left Colombia and claimed refugee status in Spain, where one of her daughters lives. Two of the Principal Applicant’s brothers also fled to Spain where they made refugee claims. [4] The Principal Applicant and his family moved into another property owned by his mother. In January 2021, unknown persons came to that property, yelling and asking about the Principal Applicant’s mother. After this event, the Applicants left to stay with the wife’s sister before fleeing to the United States and eventually arriving in Canada. Seven days before leaving Colombia they made a denunciation to the Fiscalia but did not name the Los Rastrojos. There is no evidence that the Applicants have followed up on this complaint since they left Colombia. [5] The Applicants submitted a refugee claim after their arrival in Canada, claiming to fear persecution by the Los Rastrojos. The RPD assessed their claim under section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c 27, because they had not established a nexus to a Convention ground. Their claim was dismissed because the RPD found they had failed to rebut the presumption of state protection, and they had an Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) in Colombia. [6] The Applicants submit that the RPD decision is unreasonable because: it failed to recognize the importance of land ownership in Colombia and thus did not examine the case in its proper context; the IFA conclusion is flawed because there is evidence that state protection is inadequate; and the RPD failed to consider the evidence about the means and motivation of the criminal group. [7] None of the Applicant’s arguments can succeed. The RPD decision is reasonable. [8] While the RPD acknowledged the mother’s experience of being dispossessed of her land at the hands of the Los Rastrojos, it also noted the protection and financial compensation she received from the government. Refugee law protects people, not their property, and forcible loss of land is not a recognized ground of protection under the Convention. The RPD did not ignore the context of the case. [9] The RPD decision examined the measures taken by Colombia to offer protection to its citizens from threats by criminal gangs. It outlined the various measures provided to the Principal Applicant’s mother, including a bullet proof vest, cellphone, secure transportation, and a bodyguard. The RPD also examined the objective country condition evidence on the practical availability of such measures, and concluded that reasonably effective state protection was available in Colombia. There is no basis to interfere in this determination. The RPD correctly noted that the law does not demand perfection; adequate protection is all that is required: Samuel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 762 at para 32. In this case, the RPD’s conclusion that such measures were available to the Applicants is reasonable based on the evidence in the record. [10] The Applicants point to a statement in the country condition evidence that they suggest indicates state protection measures are not effective, particularly in rural areas. I am not persuaded that this one comment is enough to cast doubt over the decision. The RPD is presumed to have considered all of the evidence, unless there is a clear contradiction involving a key point, and it is not the role of a court on judicial review to re-weigh the evidence. [11] Turning to the IFA determination, the RPD’s finding that the Applicants had not demonstrated that the Los Rastrojos had the means and motivation to pursue them in the IFA locations is reasonable. The Applicants point to evidence cited by the RPD in support of their argument that the criminal group has alliances that would enable it to track them down in the IFA locations. Once again, this amounts to asking the Court to re-weigh the evidence. The RPD discussed the evidence in some detail, noting that there were indications that the group had lost power and influence, and may have disbanded. The fact that it preferred this evidence over the excerpts relied on by the Applicants is not unreasonable. There is no basis to interfere with the RPD’s findings on this point. [12] For these reasons, the application for judicial review will be dismissed. [13] There is no question of general importance for certification. JUDGMENT in IMM-528-22 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: The application for judicial review is dismissed. There is no question of general importance for certification. “William F. Pentney” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-528-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: JORGE WILSON ORTIZ CELEDON ET AL v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: toronto, ontario DATE OF HEARING: december 14, 2023 JUDGMENT AND REASONS: PENTNEY J. DATED: december 18, 2023 APPEARANCES: DANIEL L. WINBAUM For The Applicant SIMAROOP DHILLON For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Daniel L. Winbaum Barrister & Solicitor Windsor, Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Celedon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

### Key Issues
e dismissed. [13] There is no question of general importance for certification. JUDGMENT in IMM-528-22 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: The application for judicial review is dismiss

### Standard of Review
Ortiz Celedon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2023-12-18 Neutral citation 2023 FC 1718 File numbers IMM-528-22 Notes A correction was made on December 20, 2023 Decision Content Date: 20231218 Docket: IMM-528-22 Citation: 2023 FC 1718 Toronto, Ontario, December 18, 2023 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Pentney BETWEEN: JORGE WILSON ORTIZ CELEDON IVETTE CECILIA ROMERO PRIETO SOFIA ORTIZ ROMERO Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent JUDGMENT AND REASONS [1] The Applicants in this case are Jorge Wilson Ortiz Celedon (the Principal Applicant), his spouse Cecilia Romero Prieto, and their daughter Sofia Ortiz Romero. They are citizens of Columbia, who claimed refugee protection in Canada due to persecution from a criminal gang called Los Rastrojos. [2] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denied the Applicants’ claim. They seek judicial review of this decision. [3] The Applicants’ refugee claim is related to the experience of the Principal Applicant’s mother. She owned agricultural land in Colombia, and between 2001 and 2005, Los Rastrojos murdered some other local landowners for refusing to turn over their land. In April 2011, the group occupied his mother’s land, and she continued to receive threats after that. She eventually received protection from the Colombian government and was compensated for the loss of her land. The mother left Colombia and claimed refugee status in Spain, where one of her daughters lives. Two of the Principal Applicant’s brothers also fled to Spain where they made refugee claims. [4] The Principal Applicant and his family moved into another property owned by his mother. In January 2021, unknown persons came to that property, yelling and asking about the Principal Applicant’s mother. After this event, the Applicants left to stay with the wife’s sister before fleeing to the United States and eventually arriving in Canada. Seven days before leaving Colombia they made a denunciation to the Fiscalia but did not name the Los Rastrojos. There is no evidence that the Applicants have followed up on this complaint since they left Colombia. [5] The Applicants submitted a refugee claim after their arrival in Canada, claiming to fear persecution by the Los Rastrojos. The RPD assessed their claim under section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c 27, because they had not established a nexus to a Convention ground. Their claim was dismissed because the RPD found they had failed to rebut the presumption of state protection, and they had an Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) in Colombia. [6] The Applicants submit that the RPD decision is unreasonable because: it failed to recognize the importance of land ownership in Colombia and thus did not examine the case in its proper context; the IFA conclusion is flawed because there is evidence that state protection is inadequate; and the RPD failed to consider the evidence about the means and motivation of the criminal group. [7] None of the Applicant’s arguments can succeed. The RPD decision is reasonable. [8] While the RPD acknowledged the mother’s experience of being dispossessed of her land at the hands of the Los Rastrojos, it also noted the protection and financial compensation she received from the government. Refugee law protects people, not their property, and forcible loss of land is not a recognized ground of protection under the Convention. The RPD did not ignore the context of the case. [9] The RPD decision examined the measures taken by Colombia to offer protection to its citizens from threats by criminal gangs. It outlined the various measures provided to the Principal Applicant’s mother, including a bullet proof vest, cellphone, secure transportation, and a bodyguard. The RPD also examined the objective country condition evidence on the practical availability of such measures, and concluded that reasonably effective state protection was available in Colombia. There is no basis to interfere in this determination. The RPD correctly noted that the law does not demand perfection; adequate protection is all that is required: Samuel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 762 at para 32. In this case, the RPD’s conclusion that such measures were available to the Applicants is reasonable based on the evidence in the record. [10] The Applicants point to a statement in the country condition evidence that they suggest indicates state protection measures are not effective, particularly in rural areas. I am not persuaded that this one comment is enough to cast doubt over the decision. The RPD is presumed to have considered all of the evidence, unless there is a clear contradiction involving a key point, and it is not the role of a court on judicial review to re-weigh the evidence. [11] Turning to the IFA determination, the RPD’s finding that the Applicants had not demonstrated that the Los Rastrojos had the means and motivation to pursue them in the IFA locations is reasonable. The Applicants point to evidence cited by the RPD in support of their argument that the criminal group has alliances that would enable it to track them down in the IFA locations. Once again, this amounts to asking the Court to re-weigh the evidence. The RPD discussed the evidence in some detail, noting that there were indications that the group had lost power and influence, and may have disbanded. The fact that it preferred this evidence over the excerpts relied on by the Applicants is not unreasonable. There is no basis to interfere with the RPD’s findings on this point. [12] For these reasons, the application for judicial review will be dismissed. [13] There is no question of general importance for certification. JUDGMENT in IMM-528-22 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: The application for judicial review is dismissed. There is no question of general importance for certification. “William F. Pentney” Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-528-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: JORGE WILSON ORTIZ CELEDON ET AL v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: toronto, ontario DATE OF HEARING: december 14, 2023 JUDGMENT AND REASONS: PENTNEY J. DATED: december 18, 2023 APPEARANCES: DANIEL L. WINBAUM For The Applicant SIMAROOP DHILLON For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Daniel L. Winbaum Barrister & Solicitor Windsor, Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: n its proper context; the IFA conclusion is flawed because there is evidence that state protection is inadequate; and the RPD failed to consider the evidence about the means and motivation of the criminal group. [7] None of the Applicant’s arguments can succeed. The RPD decision is reasonable. [8] While the RPD acknowledged the

### Precedential Value
This Federal Court decision has persuasive value for similar cases before the court and provides guidance to the Immigration and Refugee Board on the proper interpretation of law and procedural requirements. While not binding on other Federal Court judges, it establishes a precedent that will often be followed for consistency.


Prompt:
What specific procedures does this Federal regulations from the Canadian government establish for immigration processes?

# Ottawa International Airport Zoning Regulations CRC, c 100 Regulations Respecting Zoning at Ottawa International Airport Enabling authority: AERONAUTICS ACT ## Short Title 1 [Repealed, SOR/2009-231, s. 7] ## Interpretation 2 [Repealed, SOR/2009-231, s. 7] 3 [Repealed, SOR/2009-231, s. 7] ## Application 4 [Repealed, SOR/2009-231, s. 7] ## General 5 [Repealed, SOR/2009-231, s. 7] ## Natural Growth 6 [Repealed, SOR/2009-231, s. 7] 7 [Revoked, SOR/79-897, s. 1]

Response:
## Analysis of REGULATIONS-FED: Ottawa International Airport Zoning Regulations

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
The document contains provisions related to immigration procedures, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.

### Application to Immigration Cases
These regulations provide specific implementation details for broader legislative frameworks. Practitioners should ensure strict compliance with procedural requirements, timelines, and documentation standards. The regulations must be interpreted consistent with their enabling legislation and may be subject to challenge if they exceed the authority granted by the statute.


Prompt:
Analyze the legal requirements established in this Federal legislation from the Canadian government:

# Addition of Lands to Reserves and Reserve Creation Act SC 2018, c 27, s 675 An Act to facilitate the setting apart of lands as reserves for the use and benefit of First Nations and the addition of lands to reserves Assented to 2018-12-13 ## Short Title ### Short title 1 This Act may be cited as the Addition of Lands to Reserves and Reserve Creation Act. ## Interpretation ### Definitions 2 The following definitions apply in this Act. *band* has the same meaning as in subsection 2(1) of the Indian Act. (bande) *First Nation* means a band, or an Indigenous group that is party to a self-government agreement implemented by an Act of Parliament. (première nation) *governing body* in relation to a First Nation that is a band, means the council of the band, as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Indian Act, or, in relation to a First Nation that is an Indigenous group that is party to a self-government agreement implemented by an Act of Parliament, means the council, government or other entity that is referred to in the agreement as being authorized to act on behalf of the Indigenous group. (corps dirigeant) *interest*, in relation to lands in Canada elsewhere than in Quebec, means any estate, interest or right of any nature in or to the lands and includes an easement, a servitude, a lease and a licence, as defined in section 2 of the Federal Real Property and Federal Immovables Act. (intérêt) *Minister* means the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations. (ministre) *reserve* has the same meaning as in subsection 2(1) of the Indian Act. (réserve) *right*, in relation to lands in Quebec, means any right of any nature in or to the lands and includes a licence, as defined in section 2 of the Federal Real Property and Federal Immovables Act, and the rights of a lessee. (droit) 3 [Repealed, 2019, c. 29, s. 377] ## Setting Apart of Lands ### Setting lands apart 4 (1) The Minister may, by order, at the request of the governing body of a First Nation, set apart as a reserve any lands the title to which is vested in Her Majesty in right of Canada or for which Her Majesty in right of Canada has the administration and control. ### Interests or rights (2) Lands set apart as a reserve under this section are subject to any interest or right of a person or entity in or to the lands if (a) an agreement between the First Nation and Her Majesty in right of Canada — including an agreement in respect of which Part 2 of the Manitoba Claim Settlements Implementation Act applied, as that Part read immediately before its repeal, or in respect of which the Claim Settlements (Alberta and Saskatchewan) Implementation Act applied, as it read immediately before its repeal — contemplates the continuation of interests or rights of that kind, and any requirement of the agreement with respect to the continuation of the interest or right has been satisfied; (b) the interest or right has been granted or conceded to the person or entity under the Federal Real Property and Federal Immovables Act ; or (c) the interest or right is granted to the person or entity in accordance with section 5 or 6. ### Interest or right in reserve land (3) As of the time when the Minister sets apart any lands as a reserve under this section, an interest or right referred to in paragraph (2)(a) or (b) is deemed to be an interest or right in or to the lands in the reserve. ### Moneys paid to Her Majesty (4) Any moneys paid to Her Majesty in right of Canada as a result of an interest or right referred to in subsection (2) are deemed to be moneys collected, received or held by her Majesty for the use and benefit of the First Nation. ### Non-application of Statutory Instruments Act (5) The Statutory Instruments Act does not apply in respect of an order made under subsection (1). ### Designation 5 (1) If the governing body of a First Nation has requested that the Minister set apart certain lands as a reserve, the First Nation may designate, conditionally or unconditionally, any interest or right in or to the lands, including for the purpose of the replacement of an existing interest or right in or to those lands. The designation may be made either (a) before the title to the lands or the administration and control of the lands are transferred to Her Majesty in right of Canada; or (b) before the lands are set apart as a reserve under section 4. ### Application of Indian Act (2) Sections 39.1, 40.1 and 41 of the Indian Act apply in respect of a designation under subsection (1), any references to Minister in those sections being read as references to Minister, as defined in this Act. ### Power of Minister (3) On the acceptance by the Minister of a designation made under subsection (1), the Minister may grant the designated interest or right to a person or entity. ### Effect (4) If a designation made under subsection (1) is accepted by the Minister, the designation takes effect at the time the lands are set apart as a reserve under section 4. Any resulting grant of the designated right or interest, if the grant is made before the lands are set apart as a reserve, also takes effect at the time the lands are set apart as a reserve. ### Acts deemed to have been done under Indian Act (5) As of the time when the Minister sets apart any lands as a reserve under section 4, any designation made under subsection (1), and any resulting grant that was made under subsection (3), are deemed to have been designated or made, as the case may be, under the Indian Act. ### Issuance of permits by Minister 6 (1) If the governing body of a First Nation has requested that the Minister set apart certain lands as a reserve, the Minister may authorize, by permit, a person or entity for a period not exceeding one year or, with the consent of the governing body of the First Nation, for any longer period, to occupy, use or reside on any of those lands or exercise any other right on them, including for the purpose of replacing an existing interest or right of that person or entity in or to those lands. The permit may be issued either (a) before the title to the lands or the administration and control of the lands are transferred to Her Majesty in right of Canada; or (b) before the lands are set apart as a reserve under section 4. ### Effect (2) Permits issued under subsection (1) and the rights granted by those permits take effect at the time the lands are set apart as a reserve under section 4. ### Acts deemed to have been done under Indian Act (3) As of the time when the Minister sets apart any lands as a reserve under section 4, a permit issued under subsection (1) and any consent given under that subsection, are deemed to have been issued or given, as the case may be, under the Indian Act. ### Authorization — transfer or grant 7 (1) If the governing body of a First Nation has requested that the Minister set apart certain lands as a reserve and an Act of Parliament or a provincial legislature authorizes Her Majesty in right of a province, a municipal or local authority or a corporation to take or to use lands or any interest or right in lands without the consent of the owner, the Minister may authorize, with the consent of the governing body, a transfer or grant of any of the lands that the governing body has requested be set apart as a reserve, or any interest or right in or to those lands, to a province, authority or corporation, subject to any terms that may be prescribed by the Minister. The authorization may be made either (a) before the title to the lands or the administration and control of the lands are transferred to Her Majesty in right of Canada; or (b) before the lands are set apart as a reserve under section 4. ### Acts deemed to have been done under Indian Act (2) If the Minister has made an authorization under subsection (1), as of the time when the Minister sets apart any lands as a reserve under section 4, the Governor in Council is deemed to have consented to the taking or using of the lands under subsection 35(1) of the Indian Act and the authorization is deemed to have been made, and any terms prescribed by the Minister under subsection (1) are deemed to have been prescribed, under subsection 35(3) of that Act. ### Exchange 8 In the case where a First Nation has entered into an agreement that proposes that certain lands in the First Nation’s reserve be exchanged for lands that are to be set apart as a reserve, references to the Governor in Council in paragraph 39(1)(c) and section 40 of the Indian Act are to be read as references to the Minister if (a) the Minister has approved the terms of the exchange; and (b) the surrender made in respect of the exchanged lands is assented to by a majority of the electors of the First Nation in accordance with subparagraph 39(1)(b)(iii) of that Act.

Response:
## Analysis of LEGISLATION-FED: Addition of Lands to Reserves and Reserve Creation Act

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
The document contains provisions related to immigration procedures, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.

### Application to Immigration Cases
When applying this legislation to immigration cases, practitioners should consider both the explicit requirements and the underlying policy objectives. The provisions must be interpreted in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, international obligations, and relevant jurisprudence. Particular attention should be paid to procedural fairness requirements and the proper exercise of discretionary authority.