Prompt:
How does this Federal Court of Appeal of Canada decision affect immigration jurisprudence?

Gordon v. Canada Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2023-01-20 Neutral citation 2023 FCA 12 File numbers A-394-19 Decision Content Date: 20230120 Docket: A-394-19 Citation: 2023 FCA 12 CORAM: BOIVIN J.A. RENNIE J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. BETWEEN: ALLAN JAY GORDON AND JAMES ALLAN DEACUR Appellants and HIS MAJESTY THE KING Respondent Heard by online video conference hosted by the Registry on January 16, 2023. Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on January 20, 2023. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: BOIVIN J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: RENNIE J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. Date: 20230120 Docket: A-394-19 Citation: 2023 FCA 12 CORAM: BOIVIN J.A. RENNIE J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. BETWEEN: ALLAN JAY GORDON AND JAMES ALLAN DEACUR Appellants and HIS MAJESTY THE KING Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BOIVIN J.A. [1] Allan Jay Gordon and James Allan Deacur, the appellants, challenge the decision of Barnes J. of the Federal Court (the Judge), rendered on June 25, 2019 (Judge’s decision, 2019 FC 853). In his decision, the Judge dismissed the appellants’ actions in damages against the Government of Canada. [2] The appellants’ civil actions arise out of a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) criminal investigation that began in 1995. That investigation followed a number of routine audits into scientific research and experimental development (SR&ED) tax credit claims, submitted on behalf of taxpayer clients of James A. Deacur and Associates Ltd. (JAD) in exchange for a contingency fee. The CRA investigation resulted in the indictment and prosecution of James Allan Deacur and Allan Jay Gordon on five counts of fraud, attempted fraud, and possession of the proceeds of crime. The preliminary hearing on these charges occurred over the course of almost 4 years between 1999 and 2003. The appellants were ultimately committed to stand trial; however, on September 24, 2004, the proceedings were stayed. [3] In March 2006, together with JAD, the appellants instituted proceedings before the Federal Court. They sought several million dollars in damages on the basis of multiple causes of action, including negligent investigation, breach of their rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11 (the Charter), misfeasance in public office, malicious prosecution, and intentional interference with contractual relations (Judge’s decision at para. 3). [4] The trial before the Judge took place between October 15, 2018, and December 20, 2018, followed by oral argument during the week of February 4, 2019. In total, 23 witnesses testified and 461 exhibits were produced. [5] In a 135-page decision, the Judge found that the CRA investigation was focused on the appellants’ use of backdating documents to claim SR&ED expenses, purportedly incurred in previous years (Judge’s decision at paras. 24-47). In some instances, this method involved the creation of a shell corporation and backdated contracts for the SR&ED. Sometimes, the wages of employees allegedly involved in SR&ED work were calculated after the fact according to JAD’s assessment of the fair market value for the labour. The Judge found that these methods, used in a variety of contexts and combinations, were indefensible and amounted to misrepresentation (Judge’s decision at paras. 77, 80-81, 83, 134, 258, 262). [6] The Judge recognized that the CRA investigators owed the appellants a duty of care (at paras. 141-66), but found that the investigation was not carried out in a manner that could be characterized as negligent and was not motivated by malice or any other improper purpose (Judge’s decision at paras. 243-44, 263). The Judge concluded that there was ample support for the investigation as a whole and that while there may have been some missteps during the investigation, the Judge observed that “there is no such thing as a perfect investigation” (Judge’s decision at paras. 270-73). The Judge thus dismissed the actions. [7] Unsatisfied with this outcome, the appellants ask our Court to set aside the Judge’s decision and render judgment in their favour. The appeal of the corporate appellant JAD was dismissed by Order of our Court on January 27, 2021, for failure to obtain legal representation. The appellants before our Court are accordingly Allan Jay Gordon and James Allan Deacur. [8] On appeal from a first instance decision of the Federal Court, the appellate standards of review apply: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 [Housen]. Following Housen, questions of law are reviewable for correctness, whereas questions of mixed fact and law as well as questions of fact are reviewable for palpable and overriding error. [9] Before our Court, the appellants raise a suite of issues, contesting the Judge’s findings at every turn. Although some of these issues are framed as questions of law, when the substance of the appellants’ arguments is reviewed, they are all questions of fact or mixed fact and law. As such, the issues in this appeal may be distilled into a single question: Did the Judge make any palpable and overriding errors in his assessment of the evidence? [10] The appellants allege that the Judge’s misunderstanding of the legal requirements for a valid SR&ED tax credit claim led him to disregard or fail to give sufficient weight to evidence that demonstrated that the CRA investigation was unfounded, negligently conducted, or motivated by an improper objective, namely, the personal financial gain of individual CRA investigators. [11] In essence, the appellants contend that the procedures set out in the Taxation Operations Manual (TOM) 11 for CRA investigations were not properly followed. The appellants also argue that certain claims they prepared were accepted by CRA auditors on appeal, either before or after the preliminary inquiry took place, thus validating their method of claiming SR&ED tax credits. The appellants similarly rely on what they characterize as the prior approval of their method of claiming SR&ED credits by a law firm that was later involved in the prosecution of the appellants. The appellants further allege that the CRA’s preferred method of valuing labour costs was flawed and therefore, the CRA investigation into suspected inflated wages was negligent. According to the appellants, the Judge erred in misapprehending these facts and the evidence supporting them, leading him to dismiss their arguments without substantive engagement on his part. [12] I cannot agree. [13] The Judge’s analysis demonstrates a thorough and careful assessment of the evidentiary record before him. Based on this record, the Judge found that the appellants had not met the burden of demonstrating that the investigation was legally unsound or that CRA officials acted unlawfully, maliciously, or negligently in the conduct of the investigation (Judge’s decision at para. 277). In particular, the Judge emphasized the competence and fairness of the lead investigator, contrary to the appellants’ assertions otherwise (Judge’s decision at paras. 4, 13-15). With respect to the argument in connection with the TOM 11 for CRA investigations, the Judge rightly noted that the TOM 11 “is a set of guidelines that have no binding legal effect and their breach is not evidence per se of a wrongful prosecution or negligence” (Judge’s decision at para. 168). The Judge also considered and rejected the appellants’ contention that the investigation into inflated wages could be isolated from the way that JAD documented and presented claims to the CRA (at paras. 72-76, 82-83). The Judge found that there is little dispute as to what actually occurred during the investigation at issue: despite the passage of over twenty years, the CRA investigation was well documented and, beyond the appellants’ bare assertions, there are few factual disagreements in the record. [14] In addition, much of the evidence relied on by the appellants before our Court was comprehensively and explicitly addressed by the Judge in his detailed analysis of the parties’ submissions. The Judge considered the appellants’ evidence that the CRA validated their method of backdating records to establish a value for SR&ED claims (Judge’s decision at paras. 85-112). The Judge found that there was never any express endorsement of the methods used by the appellants and that the outcome of those cases did not amount to a repudiation of the criminal investigation (Judge’s decision at para. 96). The appellants failed to direct this Court to any evidence demonstrating otherwise. [15] On this basis, I also cannot conclude that it was an error for the Judge to dismiss each of the appellants’ claims, with more or less detailed analysis, including those asserted under the Charter and that for misfeasance in public office (Judge’s decision at paras. 244, 269). Not only did the Judge find that there was not sufficient evidence to prove the appellants’ claim in negligence, the Judge found that the investigation, while imperfect, was nonetheless conducted diligently and based on substantial evidentiary support. Hence, as the Judge found, the evidence could not establish a Charter violation or misfeasance. [16] In conclusion, it is recalled that a trial judge’s findings of fact are owed a great deal of deference. Palpable and overriding error is a very high standard, which recognizes the privileged position of the trial judge in hearing witness testimony first-hand (Housen at paras. 12-14). In this case, the Judge made thoughtful findings as to the credibility of various witnesses as well as findings of fact where testimony conflicted, to which deference is owed. Also, as the respondent underscores, it is a well-established principle that a judge is presumed to have considered all of the evidence (Housen at para. 46, 72; Mahjoub v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 157, 387 C.R.R. (2d) 1 at para. 67). In light of these principles and the failure of the appellants to demonstrate a palpable and overriding error, I am of the view that there is no reason to disturb the Judge’s findings. [17] For all of these reasons, I would accordingly dismiss the appeal, with costs payable by the appellants to the respondent. "Richard Boivin" J.A. "I agree. Donald J. Rennie J.A." "I agree. Sylvie E. Roussel J.A." FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: A-394-19 STYLE OF CAUSE: ALLAN JAY GORDON AND JAMES ALLAN DEACUR v. HIS MAJESTY THE KING PLACE OF HEARING: By online video conference DATE OF HEARING: January 16, 2023 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: BOIVIN J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: RENNIE J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. DATED: January 20, 2023 APPEARANCES: Allan Jay Gordon ON HIS OWN BEHALF James Allan Deacur ON HIS OWN BEHALF Wendy Linden Rishma Bhimji Kieran Woods For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: A. François Daigle Deputy Attorney General of Canada For The Respondent

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Gordon v. Canada

### Key Issues
e appellants raise a suite of issues, contesting the Judge’s findings at every turn. Although some of these issues are framed as questions of law, when the substance of the appella

### Standard of Review
ons of law are reviewable for correctness, whereas questions of mixed fact and law as well as questions of fact are reviewable for palpable and overriding error. [9] Before our Cou

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: annot agree. [13] The Judge’s analysis demonstrates a thorough and careful assessment of the evidentiary record before him. Based on this record, the Judge found that the appellants had not met the burden of demonstrating that the investigation was legally unsound or that CRA officials acted unlawfully, maliciously, or negligent

### Precedential Value
As a Federal Court of Appeal decision, this ruling has significant precedential value and is binding on the Federal Court and administrative tribunals like the Immigration and Refugee Board. It establishes legal principles that must be followed in similar cases and provides authoritative interpretation of the relevant legislation.


Prompt:
What legal tests are applied in this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada?

RPD File No./No de dossier de SPR: VA6-02821 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Claimant(s) XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Date(s) of Hearing 12 December 2007 and Date(s) de l'audience 05 February 2008 Place of Hearing Lieu de l'audience Videoconferencing held in Toronto, ON Fait par vidéoconférence à Date of Decision 29 February 2008 Date de la décision Panel Tribunal Counsel for the Conseil(s) du / de la / des Claimant(s) Nil mandeur(e)(s) d'asile Tribunal Officer Jonathan Joshi-Koop Agent(e) des tribunaux Designated NIl Représentant(e)(s) Representative(s) Désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister Nil Conseil du ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX claimant, came to Canada from the Republic of Turkey on July 29, 2006, and several days later made a claim to be in need of refugee protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, ("the Act").1 He says that he is a Convention refugee on account of his nationality and political opinion, and that he faces a risk to his life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, and a danger of torture, in Turkey. [2] The hearing of this claim began on December XXXXX, 2007. The interpreter became ill during the hearing and the matter was put over for completion on February 5, 2008. On that date the claimant appeared representing himself and indicated that he no longer wished to be represented by anyone else. The panel canvassed with him whether he wished to continue at that point, and that he did understand that he had the right to be represented by counsel. The panel is satisfied that the claimant did understand that he had the right to be represented by counsel and that he did wish to continue on February 5, 2008, without counsel, but by representing himself. The hearing continued, and was completed, that day. [3] During the hearing on February 5, 2008, the claimant indicated that he had additional evidence which he wished to put in front of the panel. The panel agreed to accept all of the material the claimant wished to produce. This included the originals of two letters or call-up notices going to the issue of military service.2 [4] As received, the material submitted post-hearing by the claimant includes documents which appear to be in Turkish, but are not in English or French, and as such do not comply with the rules of the Refugee Protection Division.3 The panel is returning that material to the claimant and has not relied on it, one way or another, in reaching this decision. The claimant has a duty, in representing himself, to comply with all of the requirements of the law. The panel will not excuse him from such requirements simply because he has chosen to represent himself. Identity and Citizenship [5] The claimant travelled to Canada as a seaman. He has a genuine Turkish passport issued in his name, which was seized by the Canadian immigration authorities, which contained a valid Canadian visa.4 Copies of various other documents going to personal identity were also entered into evidence.5 The panel is satisfied with the claimant's personal identity, and that he is a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. Determination [6] These are the reasons for the decision that XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX is not in need of refugee protection. Circumstances [7] The circumstances supporting the claimant's application for refugee protection are summarised in his Personal Information Form.6 There are two bases to the claim: a history of arrest and detention which the claimant alleges he experienced in Turkey; and his decision that he will not serve in the Turkish military. Arrests and Detentions [8] The claimant says that he is of Kurdish and Alevi background, and as such attended demonstrations and celebrations from time to time. On three of these occasions he was arrested and detained - in XXXXX 2003, in XXXXX 2005, and in XXXXX 2006. In XXXXX, 2003, he was picked up by the police on the street because he was wearing a T-shirt that had the name of an Alevi organisation, the Haci Bektas Veli Association, and kept 5 - 6 hours, during which he was beaten. In XXXXX, 2005, the claimant was one of those arrested "in the chaos" which followed a police intervention; he was kept overnight, questioned and beaten. In XXXXX, 2006, he was "among those protestors" arrested; he says that the police became aware that he had been arrested the previous year, detained him for about 24 hours, questioned and beat him. When he was released, although he was not charged with anything, the police said that they would be "watching" him. Military Service [9] The claimant says that, as a Kurdish and Alevi person, he cannot agree to serve in the Turkish armed forces. As military service is mandatory in Turkey, this will result in his being charged and imprisoned. In support of this arm of his claim, the claimant submitted various documents which appear to show that he is subject to call-up in Turkey.7 [10] The claimant did not raise the question of military service, and his wish to avoid it, at the initial interview which launched his claim for refugee protection, or in his Personal Information Form. He was asked about this, since he raised it at his hearing. He gave several reasons for the omission: (a) the interpreter who helped him with the Personal Information Form said it was not such a big issue that it should be mentioned; (b) that he did not tell the immigration officer because he was afraid of state officials; and (c) that he did not know that he had to tell the officer about his objection to military service. Analysis [11] The panel does not accept the claimant's explanations for omitting any reference to his objection to military service from his interview with an immigration officer at the port of entry, and from his Personal Information Form. The panel expects that a person who fears a risk of persecution, or to his life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, and seeks protection from Canada for those risks and dangers, will tell a representative of Canada all of the reasons for his fear. [12] The panel notes as well that the instructions in Question 31 of the Personal Information Form are very clear: "...set out in chronological order all the significant events and reasons that have led you to claim refugee protection in Canada."8 The reasons given by the claimant for failing to comply with these instructions, as set out in points [10] (a) - (c) above, do not constitute explanations which the panel can rely on to excuse the claimant from the requirement to have disclosed the basis of his claim in a timely manner. [13] The panel concludes that the objection to military service which the claimant alleged at his hearing has been fabricated, or made up, after completing the Personal Information Form, in order to bolster the claim for protection. The panel does not accept, or believe, that the claimant has an objection to military service in Turkey which would form a basis for his claim to refugee protection. He may be subject to call-up at this point in time, in Turkey, but the panel does not believe that the claimant has a fear of military service in Turkey which could or would go to form a fear of persecution, or of a risk to life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or of a danger of torture. [14] This leaves the claimant's allegations with respect to the history of three arrests and detentions. However, because the panel has found that the claimant has manufactured one arm of his claim, one of the two bases of his claim for protection in Canada, the panel finds that it cannot rely on this other arm of his claim either. That is, the claimant's testimony in general is neither reliable nor credible, and as such it cannot support his claim on any arm, or basis. [15] It is possible, however, that the claimant fabricated one arm of his claim (military service) and that the other arm (three arrests and detentions) is, at least more or less, true. The basis for such a finding by the panel does not exist, in the presence of a prior finding of lack of credibility, but the panel's responsibility is to determine future risk even in the case of opportunist or false claims. [16] Even if, however, the panel had found that the claimant had successfully established that there were three occasions on which he had been arrested and detained, this would not be sufficient to demonstrate more than a mere possibility of persecution, or a risk to life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, in Turkey, today, in the circumstances as alleged by the claimant. In XXXXX 2003 he was stopped by police because of the T-shirt he was wearing; they took him in, questioned him, beat him up and released him. In XXXXX 2005 he was arrested a second time in a chaotic scene at a demonstration, taken in, questioned and beaten. The third time, in XXXXX 2006, he was picked up again at a demonstration, questioned and beaten. Throughout these years the claimant worked continuously in an occupation which required international travel on a Turkish passport, without difficulty or hindrance. The panel does not consider that this history is sufficient, by itself, to raise more than a mere possibility of persecution, or a risk to life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture. [17] This leaves only the claimant's ethnicity and religion. The panel accepts that the claimant is a Kurdish person of Alevi background from Turkey. This however is insufficient for a finding that he is in need of refugee protection. In Turkey today, people are not in need of refugee protection simply because of their ethnic and religious background as Alevi Kurds. Conclusion [18] The claimant XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX is not in need of refugee protection, under section 96, or under section 97, of the Act, and accordingly his claim for protection is rejected. (signed) "Carolyn McCool" 29 February 2008 Date (day/month/year) REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / RELIGIOUS BELIEF / FREEDOM OF RELIGION / CREDIBILITY / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE / MALE / NEGATIVE / CHINA 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 2 Post-hearing Exhibit 13. 3 Copies of this material remain in Post-hearing Exhibit 13. 4 Exhibit 2, (un-paginated.). 5 Exhibits 4 and 6: copies of resident identity card, household register, and various other documents. 6 Exhibit 1. 7 Exhibits 11 and 12, and Post-hearing Exhibit 13. 8 Exhibit 1. Bold in original. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR : RPD.15.7 (October 2007) Disponible en français RPD File No./Dossier: VA6-02821 5 RPD File No./Dossier: VA6-02821 1

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: VA6-02821

### Key Issues
ntion; he was kept overnight, questioned and beaten. In XXXXX, 2006, he was "among those protestors" arrested; he says that the police became aware that he had been arrested the pr

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: bjection to military service. Analysis [11] The panel does not accept the claimant's explanations for omitting any reference to his objection to military service from his interview with an immigration officer at the port of entry, and from his Personal Information Form. The panel expects that a person who fears a risk of persecu

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
Explain the purpose and application of this section of Anti-terrorism Act:

# Anti-terrorism Act SC 2001, c 41 An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism Assented to 2001-12-18 ### Preamble WHEREAS Canadians and people everywhere are entitled to live their lives in peace, freedom and security; WHEREAS acts of terrorism constitute a substantial threat to both domestic and international peace and security; WHEREAS acts of terrorism threaten Canada’s political institutions, the stability of the economy and the general welfare of the nation; WHEREAS the challenge of eradicating terrorism, with its sophisticated and trans-border nature, requires enhanced international cooperation and a strengthening of Canada’s capacity to suppress, investigate and incapacitate terrorist activity; WHEREAS Canada must act in concert with other nations in combating terrorism, including fully implementing United Nations and other international instruments relating to terrorism; WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada, recognizing that terrorism is a matter of national concern that affects the security of the nation, is committed to taking comprehensive measures to protect Canadians against terrorist activity while continuing to respect and promote the values reflected in, and the rights and freedoms guaranteed by, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ; AND WHEREAS these comprehensive measures must include legislation to prevent and suppress the financing, preparation, facilitation and commission of acts of terrorism, as well as to protect the political, social and economic security of Canada and Canada’s relations with its allies; NOW, THEREFORE, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as follows: ## Short Title ### Short title 1 This Act may be cited as the Anti-terrorism Act. # PART 1 ## Criminal Code 2 to 23 [Amendments] ## Consequential Amendment 23.1 [Amendment] # PART 2 ## Official Secrets Act 24 to 30 [Amendments] ## Consequential Amendments 31 to 42 [Amendments] # PART 3 ## Canada Evidence Act 43 and 44 [Amendments] ## Consequential Amendments 45 and 46 [Amendments] # PART 4 ## Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act 47 to 75 [Amendments] ## Consequential Amendments 76 to 86 [Amendments] # PART 5 ## Amendments to Other Acts 87 to 112 [Amendments] # PART 6 ## Registration of Charities — Security Information 113 The Charities Registration (Security Information) Act is enacted as follows: ## Amendments to the Income Tax Act 114 to 118 [Amendments] # PART 7 ## Coordinating, Review and Commencement Provisions ## Coordinating Amendments 119 to 144 [Amendments] ## Review and Report ### Review 145 (1) Within three years after this Act receives royal assent, a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this Act shall be undertaken by such committee of the Senate, of the House of Commons or of both Houses of Parliament as may be designated or established by the Senate or the House of Commons, or by both Houses of Parliament, as the case may be, for that purpose. ### Report (2) The committee referred to in subsection (1) shall, within a year after a review is undertaken pursuant to that subsection or within such further time as may be authorized by the Senate, the House of Commons or both Houses of Parliament, as the case may be, submit a report on the review to Parliament, including a statement of any changes that the committee recommends. ## Coming into Force ### Coming into force * 146 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the provisions of this Act, other than sections 1, 24, 25, 47, 48, 76 to 86 and 119 to 145, and the provisions of any Act that are enacted by this Act come into force on a day or days to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council. ### Part 6 (2) Part 6 comes into force on a day to be fixed by order of the Governor in Council. * [Note: Sections 1, 24, 25, 47, 48, 76 to 86 and 119 to 145 in force on assent December 18, 2001; sections 2 to 23.1, 26 to 46, 49 to 51, 53, 65 and 66, subsections 67(1) and (4) to (9), sections 68 to 73, 75 and 87 to 118 in force December 24, 2001, see SI/2002-16; section 52, subsections 67(2) and (3) and section 74 in force June 12, 2002, see SI/2002-86; sections 54 to 57, 58, 59 to 64 in force January 6, 2003, see SI/2002-164.]

Response:
## Analysis of LEGISLATION-FED: Anti-terrorism Act

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
The document contains provisions related to immigration procedures, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.

### Application to Immigration Cases
When applying this legislation to immigration cases, practitioners should consider both the explicit requirements and the underlying policy objectives. The provisions must be interpreted in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, international obligations, and relevant jurisprudence. Particular attention should be paid to procedural fairness requirements and the proper exercise of discretionary authority.


Prompt:
How does this Federal Court of Appeal of Canada decision affect immigration jurisprudence?

Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Senate) Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2023-05-24 Neutral citation 2023 FCA 111 File numbers A-265-21 Decision Content Date: 20230524 Docket: A-265-21 Citation: 2023 FCA 111 CORAM: RIVOALEN J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. GOYETTE J.A. BETWEEN: PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA Applicant and SENATE OF CANADA Respondent Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 16, 2023. Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 24, 2023. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: RIVOALEN J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: ROUSSEL J.A. GOYETTE J.A. Date: 20230524 Docket: A-265-21 Citation: 2023 FCA 111 CORAM: RIVOALEN J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. GOYETTE J.A. BETWEEN: PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA Applicant and SENATE OF CANADA Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT RIVOALEN J.A. [1] This is an application for judicial review of the arbitral award rendered on September 9, 2021 (2021 FPSLREB 103) by the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board (the Board) established pursuant to section 50 of the Parliamentary Employment and Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 33 (2nd Supp) (the Act). [2] In its decision, the Board rejected the applicant’s proposal seeking a new appendix to the collective agreement between the bargaining unit composed of all employees of the Building Operations Section and the Material Management and Logistics Section (the bargaining unit) and the Senate of Canada. The proposal consisted of a Memorandum of Understanding that included a lump sum payment of $2,500 to each member of the bargaining unit for general damages to compensate for the stress, aggravation, and pain and suffering experienced related to the employer’s implementation of the Phoenix pay system. The applicant justified the proposal in an attempt to mirror an agreement between tens of thousands of employees from the core public administration and the Treasury Board (2020 Phoenix settlement agreement). [3] The parties agree that the standard of review of the Board’s decision is reasonableness. The question before the Court is whether the arbitral award was reasonable within the meaning of Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653 [Vavilov]. [4] The applicant submits that the arbitral award is unreasonable and must be set aside. The applicant says that the Board rejected its proposal for the lump sum payment of $2,500 on the erroneous basis that it was not convinced that the implementation issues experienced by members employed by the Senate of Canada were sufficiently widespread to justify an award of damages when compared to the issues experienced by the employees of the core public administration. [5] The applicant raises four principal arguments. [6] First, the applicant submits that the Board failed to grasp the distinction that, in the 2020 Phoenix settlement agreement reached between the Treasury Board and the applicant, there was no requirement for the applicant’s members to provide evidence of stress, aggravation, or pain and suffering related to a specific Phoenix-related pay problem in order to receive general damages of $2,500. According to the applicant, while the employees working at the Senate of Canada did not experience the same serious or widespread pay problems as those experienced by employees of the core public administration, they nonetheless experienced stress and should be entitled to the same damages award. [7] Next, the applicant contends that the Board committed a retrospective parsing of the data that was before it. The applicant argues that at the relevant time, there was evidence before the Board that employees of the Senate of Canada experienced pay problems and that members of the bargaining unit would not have known whether those problems were associated with the Phoenix pay system. [8] In addition, during oral submissions, the applicant took the Court to the record and relied on evidence from the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance that the impacts of the Phoenix pay system varied across departments of the core public administration and that those departments responded differently to the challenges. For example, Correctional Service Canada transferred its pay services to the Miramichi Pay Centre and experienced significant pay problems, whereas Statistics Canada retained its compensation advisors and was able to mitigate the problem associated with the Phoenix pay system. [9] Finally, as it did before the Board, the applicant points to employees working for the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) who received the lump sum payment of $2,500 without having experienced any Phoenix-related pay problems. The applicant argues that, in its analysis on this point, the Board improperly treated general damages as if they were part of total compensation. [10] Going further, the applicant now stresses that the issue before the Board was whether the employees of the bargaining unit would have experienced the same stress, aggravation, or pain and suffering about the potential for serious pay problems that employees of the core public administration had experienced. [11] I am of the view that the applicant’s arguments cannot stand. I see no basis to conclude that the Board’s decision was unreasonable. [12] Under the judicial review framework set out in Vavilov, a reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Vavilov at para. 85). The burden is on the party challenging a decision to show that it is unreasonable, a conclusion that requires showing that the decision contains a serious flaw. In addition, the reviewing court must refrain from reweighing and reassessing the evidence considered by the decision maker. Reviewing courts must also ordinarily refrain from deciding the issue that was before the decision maker and must respect the decision maker’s role and expertise (Vavilov at paras. 75, 83, 100, 125). [13] The Board, in this case, had wide authority—under the interest arbitration process—to resolve matters referred to it, determine the appropriate terms and conditions of employment, and impose those terms via a binding award. This Court has recognized that interest arbitrators are afforded wide discretion to settle the terms of the parties’ collective agreement, and the decisions they make are almost always policy determinations and rarely involve legal issues. Additionally, this Court has recognized that the need for finality, which animates the need for deference in labour cases generally, is particularly acute in interest arbitration cases (Laurentian Pilotage Authority v. Pilotes du Saint-Laurent Central Inc., 2018 FCA 117, 299 A.C.W.S. (3d) 235 at paras. 60-61, 63). [14] As its reasons disclose, the Board took into account the factors set out in section 53 of the Act. It weighed the evidence and considered the proposals made by the parties. At paragraphs 82 to 85 of its reasons, the Board set out a coherent and rational basis for its decision to reject the proposal for a lump sum payment of $2,500 to each member of the bargaining unit. While the Board recognized that the employees of the Senate of Canada were not able to escape all the frustrations associated with the Phoenix pay system, it determined that the employer was responsive. [15] Weighing all considerations, the Board acknowledged that it had more evidence before it on the Phoenix-related pay issues than a differently constituted Board had in its previous decision in Public Service Alliance of Canada v. House of Commons (2021 FPSLREB 45). However, the Board was not prepared to establish the precedent of matching the 2020 Phoenix settlement agreement in the arbitral award and did not accept that matching a damage award designed to compensate employees for the specific problems that occurred in the Treasury Board’s jurisdiction was justified by a comparability argument. The Board found that the applicant had not provided evidence of problems of similar or substantial extent to those experienced in the core public administration. [16] The Board was not convinced by the situation of the CRA employees, noting at paragraph 84 of its reasons that these employees received a smaller general economic increase for 2020 than that awarded by the Board in its arbitral decision. It was within the Board’s ambit to consider total compensation in conducting its comparability analysis with respect to the employees of the Canada Revenue Agency. [17] In response, the evidence submitted by the respondent before the Board was that it implemented efficient and flexible mechanisms to mitigate against any negative impacts the Phoenix pay system caused to its employees. [18] In addition, the respondent offered extensive reasons for opposing the lump sum payment proposal. It outlined the history of the Phoenix implementation in the core public administration and provided reasons why that history differed considerably from that experienced by employees of the Senate of Canada. The respondent noted that in the July 2018 report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance, the office of the Auditor General of Canada observed that in June 2017, there was over $520 million in outstanding pay for public servants due to errors caused by the Phoenix pay system. As of January 2018, there were 633,000 pay action requests pending, representing an increase of 28% from the data collected in June 2017. [19] As previously mentioned, the Board considered and weighed the proposals from both sides, as it was required to do. There was no evidence before it that any of the applicant’s members working at the Senate of Canada had experienced stress, aggravation, or pain and suffering from Phoenix-related pay problems, let alone problems of similar or substantial extent to those experienced by the employees of the core public administration. [20] Furthermore, there was evidence before the Board of the grievances and lawsuits filed by employees of the core public administration because of the Phoenix-related pay issues, which culminated in the 2020 Phoenix agreement reached between the Treasury Board and the applicant. As part of that agreement, the applicant agreed to withdraw all related grievances, unfair labour practices, and litigation, and agreed not to support or pursue new litigation with regard to these matters. [21] There was no evidence of any grievances or lawsuits commenced on behalf of members employed by the Senate of Canada. [22] With all of this context in mind, and being of the view that the applicant has not met its burden, I cannot find that the arbitral award is unreasonable. [23] I see no serious flaw in the Board’s reasoning, based on the record that was before it and the positions taken by both parties in the arbitral dispute. The arbitral award is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis that is justified in relation to the record and the Board’s authority under the Act. [24] The applicant is asking this Court to reweigh the evidence that was before the Board, which is not its role. I see no reason to intervene. [25] For these reasons, I would dismiss the application for judicial review with costs. "Marianne Rivoalen" J.A. “I agree. Sylvie E. Roussel J.A.” “I agree. Nathalie Goyette J.A.” FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: A-265-21 STYLE OF CAUSE: PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA v. SENATE OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: Ottawa, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: May 16, 2023 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: RIVOALEN J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: ROUSSEL J.A. GOYETTE J.A. DATED: MAY 24, 2023 APPEARANCES: Andrew Astritis Simcha Walfish For The Applicant Carole Piette Jean-Michel Richardson For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Raven, Cameron, Ballantyne & Yazbeck LLP/s.r.l. Ottawa, Ontario For The Applicant Emond Harnden LLP/s.r.l. Ottawa, Ontario For The Respondent

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Senate)

### Key Issues
inced that the implementation issues experienced by members employed by the Senate of Canada were sufficiently widespread to justify an award of damages when compared to the issues

### Standard of Review
3] The parties agree that the standard of review of the Board’s decision is reasonableness. The question before the Court is whether the arbitral award was reasonable within the me

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: applicant argues that, in its analysis on this point, the Board improperly treated general damages as if they were part of total compensation. [10] Going further, the applicant now stresses that the issue before the Board was whether the employees of the bargaining unit would have experienced the same stress, aggravation, or pai

### Precedential Value
As a Federal Court of Appeal decision, this ruling has significant precedential value and is binding on the Federal Court and administrative tribunals like the Immigration and Refugee Board. It establishes legal principles that must be followed in similar cases and provides authoritative interpretation of the relevant legislation.


Prompt:
Analyze the requirements set out in this Federal regulations from the Canadian government:

# Hatchery Regulations CRC, c 1023 Regulations Respecting the Improvement of Poultry Stock and the Eradication of Disease in Poultry Stock Enabling authority: HEALTH OF ANIMALS ACT [Repealed, SOR/2022-218, s. 4]

Response:
## Analysis of REGULATIONS-FED: Hatchery Regulations

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
- # Hatchery Regulations CRC, c 1023 Regulations Respecting the Improvement of Poultry Stock and the Eradication of Disease in Poultry Stock Enabling authority: HEALTH OF ANIMALS ACT [Repealed, SOR/2022-218, s. 4]

### Application to Immigration Cases
These regulations provide specific implementation details for broader legislative frameworks. Practitioners should ensure strict compliance with procedural requirements, timelines, and documentation standards. The regulations must be interpreted consistent with their enabling legislation and may be subject to challenge if they exceed the authority granted by the statute.


Prompt:
What administrative law principles are applied in this Federal Court of Canada decision?

Manjarres Chavez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2023-07-21 Neutral citation 2023 FC 1007 File numbers IMM-9373-21 Decision Content Date: 20230721 Docket: IMM-9373-21 Citation: 2023 FC 1007 Ottawa, Ontario, July 21, 2023 PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Elliott BETWEEN: RONALD ENRIQUE MANJARRES CHAVEZ YOSWALL ANDRES MANJARRES GUTIERREZ VIVIANA CARRILLO ALZATE CHRISTOPHER MANJARRES CARILLO JACOB JOSE MANJARRES CARRILLO ROGER JUNIOR CARRILLO ALZATE JANES CARRILLO ALZATE LUISA MARGARITA HINCAPIE GARCIA MONICA INES VEGA CAMACHO YULIETH MARGARITA CARRILLO VEGA HELEN TATIANA CARRILLO VEGA, AND JANYS SOFIA CARRILLO VEGA Applicants and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent JUDGMENT AND REASONS I. Overview [1] The Applicants seek judicial review of a November 23, 2021 decision [Decision] of the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] rejecting their claims for refugee protection under section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. [2] For the reasons that follow, this application will be dismissed. II. Background [3] The Applicants, Ronald Enrique Manjarres Chavez, his wife Viviana Carrillo Alzate, and 10 members of their family, including their children, are all citizens of Colombia. [4] In August 2014, Ms. Alzate, who held a security position at the international airport in Santa Marta, conducted a seizure of packages identified to be narcotics. These narcotics belonged to Los Pachencas, a local and regional narco-paramilitary group that controls drug trafficking routes in the Caribbean. [5] Ms. Alzate began receiving threats and demands from Los Pachencas to conspire with them by allowing future narcotic packages to be trafficked through the airport. In March 2016, she fled Colombia with her husband, Mr. Chavez, and their children to the United States (US). [6] In March 2018, Mr. Chavez’ nephew was approached by Los Pachencas demanding to know where Ms. Alzate was, and he soon fled Colombia to the US as well. [7] In October 2018, Los Pachencas began threatening Ms. Alzate’s brothers, one of whom worked in security at the Santa Marta Port Authority, to conspire with them. Both brothers fled with some of their immediate family to the US in November 2018. [8] The Applicants arrived in Canada between January and April 2019 and sought refugee protection. [9] The children and stepchildren of Ms. Alzate’s brothers who remained in Colombia have continued to be threatened and extorted by Los Pachencas in Santa Marta. III. Decision under Review [10] The RPD accepted the Applicants’ claims as largely credible and found that they were targeted by Los Pachencas as alleged. [11] The RPD concluded that the Applicants are not persons in need of protection under subsection 97(1) of IRPA on the basis that they have a viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) in Tunja, Colombia. [12] Based on the country condition evidence in the National Documentation Package (NDP) for Colombia, the RPD found that Los Pachencas mostly operate out of Santa Marta and their sphere of influence is limited to the same area. The RPD did not find objective evidence to show that Los Pachencas have the means to locate a target in Tunja, which is located 815 kilometres away from Santa Marta, nor that they would expend their limited connections with authorities to locate the Applicants in Tunja. [13] The RPD also found that Los Pachencas are no longer interested in locating Ms. Alzate or Mr. Chavez’ nephew, since several years have passed since they last received threats. While the RPD acknowledged that Los Pachencas’ motivation to locate Ms. Alzate’s brothers may be stronger based on the continued threats against their children and stepchildren, the RPD did not find that the brothers’ relocation to Tunja would amount to a subsection 97(1) risk. [14] As such, the RPD found on a balance of probabilities, that Los Pachencas do not have the means or motivation to locate the Applicants in Tunja such that they face a section 97(1) risk should they return to Colombia. IV. Issues and Standard of Review [15] The Applicants submit that the RPD’s IFA analysis is unreasonable. [16] First, the Applicants argue that the RPD erred in finding that Los Pachencas do not have the ability to track the Applicants to Tunja. [17] Second, the Applicants argue that the RPD erred in assessing Los Pachencas’ interest in the Applicants. [18] The parties agree that the applicable standard of review is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] at para 23. [19] A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker. The reasonableness standard requires that a reviewing court defer to such a decision: Vavilov at para 85. [20] The onus is on the Applicants to demonstrate that the Decision suffers shortcomings such that it no longer bears the hallmarks of reasonableness, namely justifiability, transparency, and intelligibility: Vavilov at paras 99-100 and 125. V. Analysis A. IFA Test [21] The two-prong test for determining whether refugee claimants have a viable IFA is well-established: Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589 (CA) [Thirunavukkarasu]. [22] The Applicants only challenge the RPD’s assessment of the first prong of the IFA test. [23] The first prong of the IFA test requires the RPD to be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimants being subject to persecution in the proposed IFA: Thirunavukkarasu at para 9. Once the RPD identifies a proposed IFA, claimants bear the burden of showing the IFA does not exist by establishing that they face a serious possibility of persecution on a balance of probabilities: Henao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 84 at paras 10 and 16. B. Did the RPD err in finding that Los Pachencas do not have the ability to track the Applicants to Tunja? [24] The Applicants argue that the RPD erred in finding no serious possibility of persecution in Tunja by misconstruing or ignoring the country condition evidence for Colombia. [25] The RPD acknowledged the Applicants’ claim that Los Pachencas would use their connections with authorities to track targets to areas outside of Santa Marta, their primary area of operation. The RPD noted that the articles submitted by counsel specifically mentioning Los Pachencas and their connections with authorities were limited to the area of Santa Marta or the Department of Magdalena, or when connections to authorities were used to access high-level information about counter-narcotics activities. However, the RPD found that “the NDP is silent on Los Pachencas’ connections with the authorities”. The RPD also found that there was “no evidence” of Los Pachencas using any connections to track low-level targets, such as the Applicants, across Colombia to areas outside of their usual operations. [26] The RPD similarly found that while evidence demonstrated that criminal groups are able to track victims across the country through alliances, the evidence did not support that Los Pachencas specifically have a criminal network in Tunja. The RPD noted that the only documented alliance between Los Pachencas and another national criminal group had ceased. [27] Finally, the RPD pointed to instances of some of the Applicants or their family members relocating to other areas of Colombia, during which they continued to receive threats from Los Pachencas but were not found by them, as indicative of Los Pachencas’ lack of ability to track the Applicants outside their area of influence. [28] The Applicants quote extensively from documentary sources in the NDP, which detail the collusion between paramilitary groups or new armed groups and Colombian authorities. The Applicants also emphasize an excerpt from a Response to Information Request [RIR] stating “criminal groups are ‘definitely’ able to track targeted individuals” across the country, and another document stating that alliances between paramilitaries are in constant flux. [29] The Applicants argue that the RPD engaged in a pattern of unreasonably discounting the general evidence detailing the ability of criminal, paramilitary, or new armed groups to track their targets to areas outside of their influence. The Applicants submit that since Los Pachencas fall within the definitions of criminal, paramilitary, or new armed groups, the RPD ought to have considered the evidence specific to Los Pachencas in the context of the general evidence about these groups’ means. [30] The Applicants take particular issue with the RPD’s statements that the NDP is “silent” on Los Pachencas’ connections with authorities and that there is “no evidence” that they would use connections to pursue low-level targets across Colombia. With respect to the latter statement, the Applicants also argue that the RPD imported an “unreasonable standard”, asserting that the abundance of homicides in Colombia results in only high-level cases being newsworthy. [31] The Applicants submit that these statements clearly demonstrate a misunderstanding or ignorance of the evidence. The Applicants rely on Chauhdry v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 8322 (FC) [Chauhdry] to argue that the RPD cannot find a viable IFA in the absence of sufficient evidence solely on the basis that a claimant has not fulfilled their onus of proof. [32] The Respondent counters that it was open for the RPD to find insufficient evidence of Los Pachencas’ relationship with Colombian authorities or of any criminal network in Tunja through which they could track the Applicants based on the evidence. [33] The Respondent asserts that the Applicants’ reliance on the RPD’s specific statements to demonstrate that evidence was ignored is misplaced, noting that none of the evidence pointed to by the Applicants was either critical or contradictory to the RPD’s conclusions. Further, the Respondent challenges the Applicant’s reliance on specific NDP evidence, such as the general statement that criminal groups are “definitely” able to track targets across the country. The Respondent points out that this statement was an introduction to more group-specific information, which the RPD did consider regarding Los Pachencas. [34] Reviewing the Decision as a whole and the evidence that was before the RPD, I find that the RPD conducted a reasonable analysis of the documentary evidence. [35] It was open to the RPD to weigh the evidence specific to Los Pachencas, or lack of, to draw an inference that they do not have the means to track the Applicants to Tunja, or that they would not use their connections to authorities to track the Applicants as low-level targets. [36] As the Respondent submits, decision-makers benefit from the presumption that they considered all the evidence before them and need not cite every piece of evidence: Rahal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 319 at paras 38-39, citing Cepeda-Gutierrez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 1 FC 53 (FCTD) at paras 16-17. [37] While I agree that the RPD’s statement that the NDP was “silent” on Los Pachencas’ lacks nuance, as the Applicants themselves point out, technically this statement is not incorrect. Further, the Applicants have not persuaded me that the evidence they cite squarely contradicts the RPD’s finding with respect to Los Pachencas’ connections with authorities being limited to the areas of Santa Marta or the Department of Magdalena. [38] I have considered the RIR excerpt relied on by the Applicants states that criminal groups are “definitely” able to track targets across Colombia specifically contained information about Los Pachencas on this topic. The RIR goes on to state: The Senior Analyst stated that Los Pachenca are "very focused" on the Atlantic Coast and in urban centres such as Barranquilla, Cartagena, and Medellín, and they can "easily" track targets in those areas (Senior Analyst 8 July 2021). The same source indicated that it is "not known" whether Los Pachenca have a "particular network" in Bogotá but added that this would not be a barrier to finding someone, since it is "relatively easy" to hire a tracker in the capital city (Senior Analyst 8 July 2021). Further and corroborating information about Los Pachenca's ability to track their targets could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. [Emphasis added] [39] Again, the RPD’s conclusion that there was “no evidence” that Los Pachencas could or would use their connections to track their targets to Tunja does not contradict the aforementioned NDP evidence. [40] Based on a holistic review of the reasons, I find the RPD’s IFA analysis was linked to and consistent with the documentary evidence. The analysis is transparent and intelligible and the RPD’s conclusions were reasonably available to it. Though the Applicants understandably disagree with those conclusions, that alone is not sufficient to warrant this Court’s intervention on judicial review. [41] The onus was on the Applicants to prove their specific claim that there is a serious risk they would face persecution in Tunja by Los Pachencas’ ability to track them there through their connections with authorities. The RPD simply found insufficient evidence to support this specific allegation. It is not the function of this Court to re-weigh the evidence before the RPD. [42] In their Reply, the Applicants submitted that the RPD unreasonably imported a higher burden of proof by requiring specific evidence of the particular agent of persecution using their connections in the ways feared by the Applicants. As acknowledged above, I agree that the RPD’s reasons on their face appear to apply a strict approach to the assessment of evidence by using statements such as “silent” and “no evidence”. However, my reading of the reasons does not suggest that the RPD applied a heightened burden of proof. [43] I find this Court’s analysis in Adeleye v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 81 [Adeleye] instructive on this point. In Adeleye, the refugee claimant similarly advanced specific allegations that the existence of bribery allowed their agents of persecution to track her personal information. In upholding the Refugee Appeal Division’s [RAD] finding that the claimant did not adduce sufficient evidence to support this specific claim, the Court stated: 29 In this case, Ms. Adeleye was not alleging that corruption in Nigeria generally was a concern. She specifically claimed that bribery had allegedly allowed her agents of persecution to trace her banking transactions, her mobile phone history and her driver's licence in order to find her. Ms. Adeleye herself focused her allegations on these particular incarnations of bribery and corruption in Nigeria. It was thus amply reasonable for the RAD to look, in the country documentary evidence, for materials relating to these particular uses of bribery and corruption to access information to which a requester is not entitled. It found none, and determined that Ms. Adeleye's assertions that her banking transactions, mobile phone or driver's licence could be reliably used to track her were speculative. It was Ms. Adeleye's burden to provide sufficient evidence to support her claim on the bribery front, but she failed to do so. [Emphasis added] [44] For the reasons set out above, I find that it was similarly reasonable for the RPD to find insufficient evidence establishing the Applicants’ specific allegations. C. Did the RPD err in assessing Los Pachencas’ interest in the Applicants? [45] The Applicants also argue that the RPD unreasonably found that Los Pachencas’ are no longer interested in the Applicants to an extent that amounts to a subsection 97(1) risk. [46] In arriving at the conclusion that Los Pachencas are no longer interested in Ms. Alzate, the RPD relied on the fact that six years had passed since they threatened her and that she would no longer work at the Santa Marta airport, which would reduce their motivation in targeting her. The RPD also noted that Ms. Alzate’s parents were forcibly displaced from their farmland to Santa Marta, allegedly by Los Pachencas, but found no allegation that these actions were connected to Los Pachencas’ past interest in Ms. Alzate. The RPD also noted over three years have passed since Mr. Chavez’ nephew last received a threat from Los Pachencas, and that his parents have continued to live in Santa Marta without incident. [47] With respect to Ms. Alzate’s brothers, the RPD considered that their children and stepchildren in Colombia continue to pay extortion to Los Pachencas. However, the RPD noted in light of its findings about Los Pachencas’ means that they lived in Cali without being found by Los Pachencas in 2019. The RPD also placed weight on how the children and stepchildren have not moved from Santa Marta despite these threats. Similar to Ms. Alzate, the RPD found that her brother who worked at the Port would no longer do so upon return, hence reducing Los Pachencas’ motivation to target him. [48] The Applicants argue that the RPD made a plausibility finding based on speculation when it found that Los Pachencas are no longer interested in the Applicants since their parents in Santa Marta have not been approached. The Applicants explain that Los Pachencas’ pattern of threats revolve around family members who live with the Applicants or who were present during threats, rather than extended family members like parents, who have never been approached. [49] The Applicants submit that the level of Los Pachencas’ interest in Ms. Alzate and her brothers was evident by the threats the Applicants and their family members received, which continued over many years. The Applicants also take issue with the RPD’s characterization of the Applicants as “low-level” targets, highlighting that Los Pachencas’ interest in Ms. Alzate and her brother who worked at the Port Authority stemmed from their interest in surpassing counternarcotic activity. [50] The Applicants also challenge the RPD’s reliance on the instances where family members relocated to other areas of Colombia and were not found by Los Pachencas, stressing that it was due to Los Pachencas’ cyclical level of interest in the Applicants. [51] The Applicants further assert that the proposed IFA of Tunja in this case is unrealistic, as it would require the Applicants to hide their whereabouts from family members, namely the children and stepchildren of Ms. Alzate’s brothers, who remain targets of Los Pachencas in Santa Marta. The Applicants submit that an IFA is not viable under the first prong of the test if claimants are required to hide their whereabouts from their family: Zamora Huerta v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 586 at para 29 [Huerta]; Ali v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 93 at para 49 [Ali]. [52] The Respondent disputes that the RPD made any plausibility findings. The Respondent maintains that the RPD’s assessment was based on the sufficiency of evidence and that its findings stemmed from reasonable inferences based on the facts before it. The Respondent argues that the Applicants seek to have the Court reweigh evidence. [53] With respect, I am not persuaded by the Applicants’ submissions. Before the RPD, beyond their Basis of Claim narratives that cite their continued fear, there was no evidence contradicting the RPD’s specific findings about Los Pachencas’ interest in the Applicants since their departure from Colombia. [54] I note that these narratives claim that Los Pachencas continue to threaten Ms. Alzate’s brother’s children and stepchildren in Colombia with extortion demands, and that these threats began as a result of Los Pachencas’ interest in Ms. Alzate’s brothers. However, based on my findings above with respect to the RPD’s assessment of Los Pachencas’ means, and the evidence on the record, it was not unreasonable for the RPD to place weight on the children and stepchildren’s temporary move to Cali without being found. [55] I note also that the Applicants mischaracterize the RPD’s finding in this respect, as the reliance on the children and stepchildren’s move to Cali pertained more so to the RPD’s conclusions about Los Pachencas’ means, rather than their interest in the Applicants. It was also reasonable for the RPD to note they have not left Santa Marta despite the resumption of these threats upon their return from Cali. [56] Based on the record, the arguments the Applicants now raise were not before the RPD. For example, the Applicants did not explain in their submissions that Los Pachencas’ interest in the Applicants or their family members was cyclical. The Applicants’ written submissions also do not purport that the Applicants would have to hide their whereabouts from their family members in Colombia if they returned to Tunja. [57] This distinguishes the case at bar from Ali, where there were submissions before the RAD that the claimants would be unable to safely contact their family members if they returned to Pakistan: at para 48. I also find Huerta distinguishable because the RAD in that case specifically found that an IFA existed “provided [the claimant] took reasonable precautions and not reveal her new location to relatives and friends”: at para 29. The RPD made no such statement here. [58] I agree with the Respondent that the Applicants’ arguments amount to asking the Court to reweigh evidence. I do not find that the Applicants have raised a reviewable error. The Applicants cannot fault the RPD for failing to address certain possibilities or failing to make certain inferences from the evidence when these allegations were not part of the record: see Saliu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 167 at paras 57-58. [59] Finally, with respect to the Applicants’ two main arguments before this Court, I turn back to Adeleye, which reminds reviewing courts of the importance of deference when conducting a reasonableness review of decisions that turn heavily on factual findings: 25 The RAD's conclusions on the existence of an IFA are essentially factual: they are based on ample documentary evidence, and they go to the very heart of its expertise in matters of immigration and refugee protection. It is well established that the RAD takes advantage of the specialized knowledge of its members to assess evidence relating to facts that fall within its area of expertise. In such circumstances, the standard of reasonableness requires the Court to show great deference to the RAD's findings. It is not the task of a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence on the record, or to reassess the RAD's findings of fact and substitute its own (Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 SCC 31 at para 55). Rather, it must consider the reasons as a whole, together with the record (Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at para 53), and limit itself to determining whether the conclusions are irrational or arbitrary. [60] Considering the RPD’s thorough analysis of the evidence, and the lack of errors or omissions in its reasoning that are critical or that squarely contradict the record, I cannot find that the conclusions in the Decision are “irrational or arbitrary”. The Applicants have not demonstrated that there are “shortcomings or flaws” which are “sufficiently central or significant to render the decision unreasonable”: Vavilov at para 100. VI. Conclusion [61] The RPD’s Decision concluding that the Applicants have a viable IFA in Tunja is reasonable. [62] The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed. [63] There is no question for certification. JUDGMENT IN IMM-9373-21 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: The application is dismissed. There is no serious question of general importance for certification. "E. Susan Elliott" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-9373-21 STYLE OF CAUSE: RONALD ENRIQUE MANJARRES CHAVEZ, YOSWALL ANDRES MANJARRES GUTIERREZ, VIVIANA CARRILLO ALZATE, CHRISTOPHER MANJARRES CARILLO, JACOB JOSE MANJARRES CARRILLO, ROGER JUNIOR CARRILLO ALZATE, JANES CARRILLO ALZATE, LUISA MARGARITA HINCAPIE GARCIA, MONICA INES VEGA CAMACHO, YULIETH MARGARITA CARRILLO VEGA, HELEN TATIANA CARRILLO VEGA, AND, JANYS SOFIA CARRILLO VEGA v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario DATE OF HEARING: February 9, 2023 JUDGMENT AND REASONS: ELLIOTT J. DATED: JULY 21, 2023 APPEARANCES: Lisa Winter-Card For The Applicants Rachel Beaupre For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Lisa Winter-Card Barrister and Solicitor Welland, Ontario For The Applicants Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Manjarres Chavez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

### Key Issues
they return to Colombia. IV. Issues and Standard of Review [15] The Applicants submit that the RPD’s IFA analysis is unreasonable. [16] First, the Applicants argue that the RPD er

### Standard of Review
n to Colombia. IV. Issues and Standard of Review [15] The Applicants submit that the RPD’s IFA analysis is unreasonable. [16] First, the Applicants argue that the RPD erred in find

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: nts submit that the RPD’s IFA analysis is unreasonable. [16] First, the Applicants argue that the RPD erred in finding that Los Pachencas do not have the ability to track the Applicants to Tunja. [17] Second, the Applicants argue that the RPD erred in assessing Los Pachencas’ interest in the Applicants. [18] The parties agree th

### Precedential Value
This Federal Court decision has persuasive value for similar cases before the court and provides guidance to the Immigration and Refugee Board on the proper interpretation of law and procedural requirements. While not binding on other Federal Court judges, it establishes a precedent that will often be followed for consistency.


Prompt:
Analyze this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada and explain how it applies refugee definition:

RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR : TA6-15683 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Claimant(s) XXXXX XXXXX Demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Date(s) of Hearing July 2, 2008 Date(s) de l'audience Place of Hearing TORONTO Lieu de l'audience Date of Decision August 11, 2008 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the Claimant(s) Lisa Rosenblatt Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du / de la / des demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Tribunal Officer S. Indrasigamany Agent(e) des tribunaux Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre XXXXX XXXXX, a citizen of Pakistan, claims refugee protection pursuant to Sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act1 (IRPA). ALLEGATIONS The specifics of the claim are set out in the narrative to the claimant's Personal Information Form2 (PIF), the following is a summary. The claimant is an adherent of the Ahmadi faith. Throughout her life, she and her family have suffered as a result of her religious affiliation. Her husband's cousin was murdered, a brother-in-law beaten, and another brother-in-law murdered. Her husband's XXXXX was sabotaged, and her children were harassed and discriminated against. She suffered frequent verbal abuse for her faith, and was sometimes prevented from attending at her mosque or offering prayers uninterrupted. On two occasions, she was accosted by assailants who treated her in a disrespectful and threatening manner. She fled to Canada in XXXXX of 2006. DETERMINATION I find that the claimant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, because the risk she faces in Pakistan is that of discrimination and harassment, not persecution. ANALYSIS Identity The claimant's identity as a Pakistani national is established by her testimony and by the personal identity documents filed, including her Pakistani passport and National Identity Card3. Her identity as a member of the Ahmadi faith is established by her testimony and by the Ahmadi certificate filed.4 Credibility Taken as a whole, I found the claimant's testimony to be credible. She answered questions in a forthright and spontaneous manner. She did not embellish or overstate, even when testifying about portions of her claim that might have seemed weaker than other areas. While there were some minor inconsistencies and contradictions, these did not affect the material aspects of her claim. Persecution vs. Discrimination or Harassment The determinative issue in this claim is whether the claimant faces persecution on account of her religion if she returns to Pakistan, or whether what she faces is in fact discrimination, harassment, or both. The claimant is Ahmadi, and there is ample objective evidence before the Board about the poor treatment of Ahmadis in Pakistan. Although Ahmadis consider themselves to be Muslims, Pakistan's constitution and laws forbid them from referring to themselves as such. Pakistan's penal code not only has general blasphemy provisions, but also specific articles forbidding Ahmadis to propagate their faith or to use Muslim terminology in reference to various religious figures and places of worship.5 In practice, these laws are used to target and harass some Ahmadis.6 Between 1984 and December of 2004, an estimated 4000 cases were brought against Ahmadis under the blasphemy laws.7 Approximately thirty-five percent of all blasphemy cases lodged are against Ahmadis,8 quite out of proportion to their presence in the general population, which is two percent or less.9 False blasphemy charges are commonly filed against Ahmadis, as well as other religious minorities, for personal or economic reasons.10 Appeals courts have overturned all blasphemy convictions, though until such a ruling the accused is required to remain in prison, generally in poor conditions.11 Perhaps encouraged by the government's discriminatory approach toward Ahmadis, Pakistani society often treats them poorly as well. They suffer educational, employment, and economic discrimination,12 and in some instances violence.13 In many cases, Ahmadis cannot count on police protection, and police may in fact collude with anti-Ahmadi elements.14 Do the general conditions faced by Ahmadis in Pakistan give the claimant an objective basis for a well-founded fear of persecution? The fact that oppressive laws exist, and are used to target and harass some Ahmadis, does not in itself establish that all members of the group have good grounds for fearing persecution.15 The laws are clearly discriminatory, but it is the implementation of the laws that must be considered in determining whether persecution is occurring or seriously possible. Since even professing the Ahmadi faith is considered to be illegal and blasphemous, each Ahmadi could, in theory, face the death penalty under Pakistan's penal code.16 There is no evidence of such executions; rather, the evidence is that appeals courts have overturned all blasphemy convictions. The claimant testified that she was able to regularly attend an Ahmadi mosque, as well as go house-to-house, providing information about Ahmadi meetings which took place at the home of a local Ahmadi leader. She experienced harassment on the way to the mosque, and when providing information, but was not prosecuted. I have no doubt that Pakistan's laws, which are clearly discriminatory toward all Ahmadis, do give rise to persecution in some, perhaps many, instances. However, I do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that the implementation of such laws create a situation where each and every Ahmadi suffers persecution or faces the serious possibility of such. It therefore seems prudent to review Ahmadi claimants' fears of persecution on an individual, case-by-case basis,17 and I turn to the specifics of the claimant's case. The claimant's PIF details a number of acts of alleged persecution. In 1974, her husband's cousin was murdered during a period of anti-Ahmadi violence, while her brother-in-law was badly beaten. After that time, her husband's XXXXX XXXXX was sabotaged by neighbouring landowners. In their neighbourhood, the family was subject to verbal abuse and threats and feared for their safety, causing them to relocate in 1983 to the Ahmadi-majority city of XXXXX. After moving to XXXXX, the family experienced more difficulties. The claimant's children were verbally abused and harassed at school, and her son was accosted by another student with a knife, though he was not injured due to the intervention of other students. While the claimant did not provide dates for these incidents, it would seem they occurred between 1983, when the family moved to XXXXX, and 1990, when the affected son moved to Germany and was accepted as a Convention refugee there. In 1996, another son was arrested by police after a local mullah filed a complaint that the son and his friends were conspiring to harm him. The son was arrested, charged with a criminal offence, and jailed. He was released on bail and in 1998 fled to South Africa, where he was accepted as a Convention refugee. While all of this information is informative background material, it does not in itself assist in establishing the claim. The acts of violence against cousin and brother-in-law, as well the difficulties the claimant's immediate family suffered afterward, happened more than 30 years ago. The incidents of harassment in XXXXX happened between twenty and twenty-five years ago, while her son's arrest happened more than a decade ago. Circumstances in Pakistan have changed repeatedly and dramatically since that time18, and these acts of violence and harassment from many years ago do not assist the Board in determining whether the claimant would have a well-founded fear of persecution upon her return. The next instance of alleged persecution occurred in 2003, when the claimant's brother-in-law was murdered in the city of XXXXX, after receiving numerous threats from local extremists. No one has been arrested, and the victim's lands were seized and his family forced to leave the village where they lived. This incident, though unfortunate, does nothing to support the claimant's case. There is no evidence that the victim was Ahmadi, though perhaps this is implied by inclusion of the incident in her PIF. Even if I assume that he was Ahmadi, I am left with the murder of an Ahmadi relative, some years ago, in a different city than the one she lived in. The claimant has not suggested that her family has been specifically targeted. It is not enough to point to persecution suffered by a family member unless such persecution is likely to affect the claimant directly,19 and the claimant has not established such a connection. The most relevant incidents of alleged persecution are two instances where the claimant was accosted, as well as the claimant's difficulty in attending her mosque. The claimant alleges that two women came to her door and asked for a drink of water. When she opened the door, they began to verbally abuse her and pull her hair. When she screamed for help, they left. Although the claimant wasn't certain when this happened, it seems from her PIF and her oral testimony that it occurred somewhere between 2003 and 2005. On another date in the same time period, she was accosted by a mullah in the street, who verbally abused her and pulled off her headscarf, an act very insulting to those of her faith. Other mullahs were present and some threw stones, though she did not suggest that she was struck or injured. It is possible for an incident of mistreatment to be harassment and discrimination, and yet not be serious enough to constitute persecution.20 Although the line between harassment and persecution is difficult to draw, I find that in these instances the claimant did not suffer a serious degree of harm or a serious violation of her human rights. While these two incidents were undoubtedly demeaning and frightening, they constitute harassment but not persecution. The claimant also testified about her difficulties in attending her mosque. She would attempt to attend her mosque for Friday prayers, but sometimes would suffer verbal abuse from people who had gathered outside the mosque. On other occasions, she was not able to reach the mosque, and had to turn back because of the presence of Muslim extremists. Nonetheless, she testified that she was able to attend at the mosque three or four times per month. While in the mosque, she found it difficult to concentrate on her prayers because she feared the mosque might be attacked, and because a nearby Sunni mosque loudly broadcast anti-Ahmadi messages over its loudspeakers. Freedom of religion is recognized as a fundamental human right by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.21 According to the UNHCR Handbook, persecution for reasons of religion can take various forms, including prohibition of membership in a religious community or of worship, or serious measures of discrimination imposed upon persons because they practice their religion. 22 In this claim, a line must again be drawn between harassment and persecution. I find that the claimant was harassed because of her religion, but not persecuted. I accept that she practiced her religion in the face of considerable adversity. She was subjected to verbal abuse and in some cases was unable to attend her place of worship. However, her testimony also made it clear that she was able to participate extensively in the life of her religious community. She distributed information about religious meetings, participated in those meetings, and regularly attended at an Ahmadi mosque. She testified that other members of her family were similarly involved. She even had plans to go on a pilgrimage to an Ahmadi gathering in the United Kingdom, and obtained a British visa for that purpose. In the end she did not attend, but that was for financial reasons, not because she was prohibited. The claimant did not have perfect freedom to practice her religion, but the difficulties she experienced in doing so amount to harassment, and were not serious enough to constitute persecution. Though the incidents of mistreatment do not, when considered individually, constitute persecution, I have also considered whether the relevant incidents could be regarded as persecutory if considered together.23 I find that, even taken cumulatively, they do not constitute persecution. Over a period of two or more years, she was accosted twice; in one incident her headscarf was pulled off, in the other incident water was thrown in her face. She was also regularly prevented from attending her place of worship, and her worship was sometimes disrupted. These are all unfortunate incidents; however, even when considered together, they are not of such a serious nature that they rise to the level of persecution.24 The definition of a Convention refugee is forward-looking. Even though I have found that the claimant did not suffer persecutory acts while in Pakistan, I have also considered whether there is a serious possibility that she might suffer such acts upon her return. The claimant testified that if she were to return to Pakistan, she would experience the same abuse, the same fear, and the same misery as she did in the past. As I have found that she did not establish relevant past incidents of persecution, it follows that similar treatment in the future would also not amount to persecution. Given the situation of Ahmadis in Pakistan, it is almost a certainty that the claimant will be subject to discrimination and harassment upon return to Pakistan, and that is regrettable. However, I must consider whether there is a serious possibility of persecution, and I find that there is not. The claimant has not established on a balance of probabilities that she faces a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual punishment or treatment in Pakistan. As noted above, the claimant herself anticipates, upon return, more of the treatment she previously experienced. She was asked if she would be physically attacked upon return, and she replied only that this would be possible. If her assessment is correct, she faces a possibility of harm, but has not established that it is more likely than not. As such, I find that she is not a person in need of protection as defined in Section 97(1) of the IRPA. CONCLUSION The claimant was found to be a citizen of Pakistan and an adherent of the Ahmadi faith. I found that if she returns to Pakistan, she faces a serious possibility of discrimination and harassment, but not of persecution. For the reasons set out above, I find that XXXXX XXXXX is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, and therefore reject her claim. "EDWARD BOSVELD" EDWARD BOSVELD August 11, 2008 Date REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / RELIGION / RELIGIOUS BELIEF / HARASSMENT / FREEDOM OF RELIGION / DISCRIMINATION / FEMALE / NEGATIVE / PAKISTAN 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 2 Exhibit C-1. 3 Exhibit R/A-2. 4 Exhibit C-2. 5 Exhibit R/A-1, National Documentation Package, Pakistan, item 12.6, RIR PAK100057.E., 31 August 2005. 6 Exhibit R/A-1, NDP 12. 25, RIR PAK102653.E., 26 November 2007. 7 Exhibit R/A-1, NDP 12.6. 8 Exhibit R/A-1, NDP 12.25 9 Exhibit R/A-1, NDP 12.1 10 Exhibit R/A-1, NDP 12.6 11 Exhibit R/A-1, NDP 12.25 12 Exhibit R/A-1, NDP 12.6 13 Exhibit C-3, Item 4, U.K. Home Office Report on Religious Freedom, April 2008, p. 11. 14 Ibid. 15 Butt, Abdul Majid (Majeed) v. S.G.C. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1224-93), Rouleau, September 8, 1993. 16 Exhibit C-3, Item 12, Pakistan: The Land of Religious Apartheid and Jackboot Justice, Asian Centre for Human Rights, August 2007, p. 111. 17 Ahmad, Irfan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2725-96), Joyal, July 4, 1997. 18 Exhibit R/A-1, Item 2.1. 19 Tomov, Nikolay Harabam v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-10058-04), Mosley, November 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1527. 20 Moudrak, Vanda v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D. no. IMM-1480-97), Teitelbaum, April 1, 1998. 21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. res 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). 22 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, 1992, paragraph 72. 23 Madelat, Firouzeh v. M.E.I., Mirzabeglui, Maryam v. M.E.I. (F.C.A. nos. A-537-89 and A-538- 89), MacGuigan, Mahoney, Linden, January 28, 1991. 24 Naikar, Muni Umesh v. M.E. I. (F.C.T.D., no. 93-A-120), Joyal, June 17, 1993. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR : TA6-15683 7 RPD.15.7 (October 2007) Disponible en français

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: TA6-15683

### Key Issues
to be credible. She answered questions in a forthright and spontaneous manner. She did not embellish or overstate, even when testifying about portions of her claim that might have

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: harassment, not persecution. ANALYSIS Identity The claimant's identity as a Pakistani national is established by her testimony and by the personal identity documents filed, including her Pakistani passport and National Identity Card3. Her identity as a member of the Ahmadi faith is established by her testimony and by the Ahmadi

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.