Prompt:
Explain the purpose and application of this section of Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada Act:

# Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada Act SC 2014, c 20, s 376 An Act to establish the Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada Assented to 2014-6-19 ## Short Title ### Short title 1 This Act may be cited as the Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada Act. ## Interpretation ### Definitions 2 The following definitions apply in this Act. *administrative tribunal* means a body referred to in the schedule to this Act. (tribunal administratif) *Chief Administrator* means the person appointed under subsection 5 (1). (administrateur en chef) *Minister* means the Minister of Justice. (ministre) *Service* means the Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada established by section 3. (Service) ## Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada ### Establishment of Service 3 The Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada, consisting of the Chief Administrator and employees of the Service, is established as a portion of the federal public administration. ### Principal office 4 (1) The principal office of the Service is to be in the National Capital Region described in the schedule to the National Capital Act. ### Other offices (2) The Chief Administrator may establish other offices of the Service elsewhere in Canada. ## Chief Administrator ### Appointment 5 (1) The Chief Administrator is to be appointed by the Governor in Council to hold office during pleasure for a term of up to five years. ### Re-appointment (2) The Chief Administrator is eligible for re-appointment at the end of each term of office. ### Status of Chief Administrator 6 The Chief Administrator has the rank and status of a deputy head of a department. ### Absence or incapacity 7 (1) If the Chief Administrator is absent or incapacitated or the office of Chief Administrator is vacant, the Minister must appoint another person to act as Chief Administrator, but a person must not be so appointed for a term of more than 90 days without the approval of the Governor in Council. ### Powers, duties and functions (2) The person acting as Chief Administrator has all of the powers, duties and functions of the Chief Administrator conferred under this Act or any other Act of Parliament. ### Salary and expenses 8 (1) The Chief Administrator is to be paid the remuneration that may be fixed by the Governor in Council and is entitled to be paid reasonable travel and living expenses incurred in the exercise of his or her powers or the performance of his or her duties and functions while absent from the Chief Administrator’s ordinary place of work. ### Compensation (2) The Chief Administrator is deemed to be a person employed in the public service for the purposes of the Public Service Superannuation Act and to be employed in the federal public administration for the purposes of the Government Employees Compensation Act and any regulations made under section 9 of the Aeronautics Act. ### Chief executive officer 9 The Chief Administrator is the chief executive officer of the Service and has the control and management of the Service and all matters connected with it. ### Responsibility 10 The Chief Administrator is responsible for the provision of the support services and the facilities that are needed by each of the administrative tribunals to exercise its powers and perform its duties and functions in accordance with the rules that apply to its work. ### General powers 11 (1) The Chief Administrator has all the powers that are necessary to perform his or her duties and functions under this or any other Act of Parliament. ### Contracts, etc. (2) The Chief Administrator may enter into contracts, memoranda of understanding or other arrangements, including contracts to engage the services of legal counsel or other persons having professional, technical or specialized knowledge to advise or assist an administrative tribunal or any of its members. ### Limitation 12 The Chief Administrator’s powers, duties and functions do not extend to any of the powers, duties and functions conferred by law on any administrative tribunal or on any of its members. ### Delegation 13 The Chief Administrator may delegate to any employee of the Service any of the powers, duties, and functions conferred on the Chief Administrator under this Act or any other Act of Parliament. ## Administrative Tribunal Chairpersons ### For greater certainty 14 For greater certainty, the chairperson of an administrative tribunal continues to have supervision over and direction of the work of the tribunal. ## Employees of the Service ### Appointment of employees 15 The employees who are required for the purposes of the Service are to be appointed under the Public Service Employment Act. ## General ### Deeming — filing documents and giving notice 16 Any provision of an Act of Parliament, or of a regulation, that requires the filing of a document with, or the giving of a notice to, an administrative tribunal is deemed to require that document to be filed with, or the notice to be given to, the Service, as the case may be. ### Deeming — amounts payable 17 Any provision of an Act of Parliament, or of a regulation, that requires an amount to be paid to an administrative tribunal is deemed to require that amount to be paid to the Service. ### Amounts for operation of administrative tribunal 18 Any amount to be paid for the operation of any administrative tribunal may be paid out of moneys appropriated by Parliament for the expenditures of the Service.

Response:
## Analysis of LEGISLATION-FED: Administrative Tribunals Support Service of Canada Act

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
The document contains provisions related to immigration procedures, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.

### Application to Immigration Cases
When applying this legislation to immigration cases, practitioners should consider both the explicit requirements and the underlying policy objectives. The provisions must be interpreted in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, international obligations, and relevant jurisprudence. Particular attention should be paid to procedural fairness requirements and the proper exercise of discretionary authority.


Prompt:
How does this Federal Court of Appeal of Canada decision affect immigration jurisprudence?

Bhamra v. Canada (Attorney General) Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2023-05-31 Neutral citation 2023 FCA 121 File numbers A-53-21 Decision Content Date: 20230531 Docket: A-53-21 Citation: 2023 FCA 121 CORAM: DE MONTIGNY J.A. LASKIN J.A. MACTAVISH J.A. BETWEEN: HARJINDER BHAMRA Appellant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent Heard by online video conference hosted by the Registry on May 30, 2023. Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 31, 2023. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: MACTAVISH J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: DE MONTIGNY J.A. LASKIN J.A. Date: 20230531 Docket: A-53-21 Citation: 2023 FCA 121 CORAM: DE MONTIGNY J.A. LASKIN J.A. MACTAVISH J.A. BETWEEN: HARJINDER BHAMRA Appellant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT MACTAVISH J.A. [1] The Minister of Employment and Social Development refused Harjinder Bhamra’s application for a disability pension under the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-8 (CPP) because she failed to establish that she had a severe and prolonged disability prior to the end of her minimum qualifying period. The General Division of the Social Security Tribunal upheld this decision, and the Tribunal’s Appeal Division dismissed Ms. Bhamra’s application for leave to appeal the General Division’s decision. The Appeal Division’s decision was subsequently upheld by the Federal Court, and Ms. Bhamra now appeals to this Court from the Federal Court’s decision denying her leave to appeal. [2] Our role in an appeal such as this is to determine whether the Federal Court identified the correct standard of review − correctness or reasonableness − and whether it properly applied that standard: Northern Regional Health Authority v. Horrocks, 2021 SCC 42 at para. 12; Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at paras. 45-47. This has been described as requiring us to “step into the shoes” of the Federal Court judge, focusing on the administrative decision below − here, the decision of the Appeal Division. [3] The Federal Court properly identified reasonableness as the standard of review to be applied to the Appeal Division’s decision: Cameron v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 100 at para. 3. Moreover, as will be explained below, I am satisfied that the Federal Court properly applied that standard in concluding that the Appeal Division’s decision was reasonable. [4] Entitlement to a disability pension is governed by the provisions of the CPP, paragraph 42(2)(a) of which states that a person shall only be considered to be disabled if he or she is determined to have a severe and prolonged mental or physical disability. A disability will be considered to be severe only if the person is incapable of regularly pursuing any substantially gainful occupation, and a disability is prolonged only if it is determined that the disability is likely to be long, continued and of indefinite duration, or is likely to result in death. [5] There was no dispute before either Division of the Social Security Tribunal or before the Federal Court that Ms. Bhamra’s minimum qualifying period expired on December 31, 2013. She argued before us, however, that the expiry of her minimum qualifying period should have been set at some unidentified date after December 31, 2013, so that she could receive benefits for the disability caused by her cancer and the effects of her treatment. [6] Unfortunately for Ms. Bhamra, it was not open to any of the decision makers involved in this case (including this Court) to change the end date of her minimum qualifying period. This date is established by operation of a formula set out in the governing legislation, and is based on the earnings and contributions of the individual claimant. The application of this formula in Ms. Bhamra’s case results in her having a minimum qualifying period that ended on December 31, 2013. [7] The case of J.J. v. Minister of Employment and Social Development, 2018 SST 1041, also does not assist Ms. Bhamra. Paragraph 3 of that decision simply notes that the application of the legislative formula to J.J.’s personal circumstances resulted in a minimum qualifying period that would expire some time after he became disabled. [8] It is not disputed that Ms. Bhamra stopped working in late November of 2013, prior to the expiry of her minimum qualifying period, because she slipped and fell, fracturing her ankle. Ms. Bhamra was off of work for a period of time, but the medical evidence before the General Division was that her injury was treated and resolved, and that she could have returned to work once her ankle injury had healed. [9] In light of this, the General Division quite reasonably found that Ms. Bhamra’s ankle injury was not “severe” and that she was thus not disabled prior to December 31, 2013. [10] Before Ms. Bhamra could return to work, however, she became ill. In March of 2014 – that is, after the expiry of her minimum qualifying period – she began experiencing symptoms, including significant abdominal pain. This led to her being diagnosed with ovarian cancer some months later, and she underwent various forms of treatment, including surgery and chemotherapy. [11] When she applied for disability benefits in June of 2014, Ms. Bhamra attributed her inability to work to her ovarian cancer. She did not identify her ankle injury as being a disabling condition. Ms. Bhamra subsequently advised the General Division that she suffered from a range of conditions as a result of her cancer and its treatment, including depression, numbness and pain in her hands and feet, arthritis and headaches. She confirmed that her depression, and the numbness and pain in her hands and feet, only began after she had chemotherapy – after the expiry of her minimum qualifying period. [12] Ms. Bhamra contended, however, that she had suffered from symptoms of her ovarian cancer prior to December 31, 2013. She stated that she thought that she had had a fever in July of 2013, suggesting that this might have been a symptom of her cancer. There was, however, no medical evidence to support this claim. Moreover, as Ms. Bhamra had continued to work through and after her fever, the General Division was not persuaded that the fever or the condition that caused it satisfied the definition of a “disability” under the CPP. [13] The General Division further noted that Ms. Bhamra had provided little in the way of medical evidence with respect to her cancer, and that what evidence there was was insufficient to support a finding that it had caused her to become disabled before December 31, 2013. [14] As Ms. Bhamra had failed to establish that it was more likely than not that she was disabled within the meaning of the CPP prior to the end of her minimum qualifying period, the General Division dismissed her appeal. Ms. Bhamra then sought leave to appeal the General Division’s decision to the Appeal Division. [15] It is the responsibility of the General Division to assess the facts, and then, taking the relevant legal principles into account, to determine on the basis of its findings whether the test for disability has been met in a given case: Hillier v. Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 11 at para. 2. The powers of the Appeal Division are more restricted, however, and it may only grant leave in certain, limited situations. Amongst other things, leave will not be granted unless the appellant can demonstrate that the appeal has a reasonable chance of success: subsection 58(2) of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act, S.C. 2005, c. 34. [16] The Appeal Division considered the arguments advanced by Ms. Bhamra, concluding that her appeal should be dismissed. In coming to this conclusion, the Appeal Division noted that the General Division had correctly held that having based her claim for benefits on her cancer and the results of her treatment, Ms. Bhamra had to establish that these conditions caused her to have become disabled prior to December 31, 2013. After examining the evidence before it, the General Division had found that the evidence did not demonstrate that Ms. Bhamra was disabled as of that date, and the Appeal Division found that the General Division had not erred in coming to that conclusion. [17] In determining whether the Appeal Division’s decision was reasonable, the Federal Court had to look at the decision-making process followed by the Appeal Division and its outcome. In this case, the Appeal Division provided internally coherent reasoning for its decision to deny leave to appeal to Ms. Bhamra, and its determination that she had not established an arguable case was justified, transparent and intelligible. It was, moreover, justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bore on the decision: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras. 12, 86 and 99. The Federal Court thus did not err in its application of the reasonableness standard to the Appeal Division’s decision. [18] I recognize that this decision will undoubtedly have harsh consequences for Ms. Bhamra, and I sympathize with her situation. However, in the absence of a reviewable error on the part of the Federal Court, there is no basis to grant her relief. Consequently, I would dismiss the appeal. “Anne L. Mactavish” J.A. “I agree. Yves de Montigny J.A.” “I agree. J.B. Laskin J.A.” FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD Docket: A-53-21 STYLE OF CAUSE: HARJINDER BHAMRA v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: BY ONLINE VIDEO CONFERENCE DATE OF HEARING: May 30, 2023 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: MACTAVISH J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: DE MONTIGNY J.A. LASKIN J.A. DATED: may 31, 2023 APPEARANCES: Harjinder Bhamra on their own behalf Ms. Sandra Doucette For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Shalene Curtis-Micallef Deputy Attorney General of Canada For The Respondent

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Bhamra v. Canada (Attorney General)

### Key Issues
nt refused Harjinder Bhamra’s application for a disability pension under the Canada Pension Plan, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-8 (CPP) because she failed to establish that she had a severe a

### Standard of Review
Court identified the correct standard of review − correctness or reasonableness − and whether it properly applied that standard: Northern Regional Health Authority v. Horrocks, 20

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: dismissed. In coming to this conclusion, the Appeal Division noted that the General Division had correctly held that having based her claim for benefits on her cancer and the results of her treatment, Ms. Bhamra had to establish that these conditions caused her to have become disabled prior to December 31, 2013. After examining

### Precedential Value
As a Federal Court of Appeal decision, this ruling has significant precedential value and is binding on the Federal Court and administrative tribunals like the Immigration and Refugee Board. It establishes legal principles that must be followed in similar cases and provides authoritative interpretation of the relevant legislation.


Prompt:
What are the implications of this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Refugee Law Lab Reporter for similar cases?

2023 RLLR 99 Citation: 2023 RLLR 99 Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division Date of Decision: November 21, 2023 Panel: C. Adolph Counsel for the Claimant(s): Tina Hlimi Country: Turkey RPD Number: TC2 25778 Associated RPD Number(s): N/A ATIP Number: A-2024-00593 ATIP Pages: N/A DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX is a citizen of Türkiye. He is claiming refugee protection pursuant to Sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)[1]. Preliminary Matters [2] At the end of the hearing, counsel requested that she provide written submissions due to a time constraint on the hearing day. The panel accepted. Counsel’s submissions were provided on time[2] and were considered. The following week counsel made an application for post-hearing disclosure: she requested the panel recall that she had only recently been retained – the claimant had been unrepresented prior to her engagement – and therefore she had not been able to properly assist him in the gathering of documentary evidence to support his claim. The panel found the package submitted at Exhibit 10 was both relevant and probative. The panel also found that a reasonable explanation for the post-hearing disclosure had been provided. The panel therefore accepted the post-hearing disclosure. ALLEGATIONS [3] The claimant’s allegations are fully set out in his BOC form and narrative at Exhibit 2. In summary, he is making his claim on the basis of his Alevi religion and his opposition political opinion, as a supporter of the Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP) also known in English as the People’s Democratic Party. He fears persecution by the authorities in Türkiye. DETERMINATION [4] Having considered the totality of the evidence, the panel finds the claimant to be a Convention Refugee pursuant to section 96. He faces a serious possibility of persecution on a balance of probabilities on the basis of his religion and political opinion. [5] ANALYSIS Identity [6] The panel finds the claimant established his personal and national identity on a balance of probabilities. The panel relies on the copy of his Turkish national identity card and the copy of his passport’s identity page at Exhibit 8. Both documents contain the same national identity number, and I find this is sufficient to establish that he is who he says he is, and the country of reference is Türkiye. [7] The panel did notify[3] the Minister because a US biometrics match returned a different passport number than the one the claimant supplied at Exhibit 4. The Minister replied[4] to say they had nothing to add and would not intervene in the claim. The panel asked the claimant for an explanation for this discrepancy, and he replied that he did not know. He testified that he had presented his one and only Turkish passport to the US authorities at the border with Mexico, and that they had taken it and not returned it to him. The panel accepts his response and description of the circumstances of his entry into the US. In the panel’s experience as a hearer of the claims of persons who transit into Canada via Mexico and the US, this kind of discrepancy between the number on their passport and the number entered by the US authorities occurs frequently and rarely do claimants have a full explanation. The panel notes that the US biometrics match provides a number, but no photograph of the passport it refers to. The panel finds this introduces the possibility of error. The panel draws no negative inference on the claimant’s identity and credibility and finds the claimant succeeded in establishing his identity on a balance of probabilities. Nexus [8] The panel finds there is a link between the claimant’s fear of return and the Convention grounds: religion and political opinion. The claim is assessed under s. 96. Credibility [9] A claimant is presumed to be credible unless there is reason for doubt. The panel found the claimant to be a credible witness. He testified in a clear, direct, spontaneous and unembellished manner about both his Alevi faith and his opposition political opinion. There were no inconsistencies, omissions or discrepancies of note. The panel found no reason to disbelieve him that the authorities perceive him as a political opponent because of his Alevi faith and his support for the Halkların Demokratik Partisi, (HDP), an opposition political party. His testimony is presumed to be true. Alevi faith [10] The claimant testfied that he is Alevi, that he has Alevi beliefs and values, that he is from an Alevi family and that the authorities view Alevis as opponents because Alevis do not have the same values as members of the Turkish Sunni majority. He testified he has attended at an Alevi ritual centre as part of his spiritual practice. [11] The claimant provided a detailed letter from an Alevi spiritual leader, who also includes documentary evidence of his credentials as well as an identity card. In this lengthy letter, this Alevi leader states that he comes from a long family line of Alevi spiritual leaders, and that his father and grandfather all have known the claimant’s family over the years. The writer himself has known the family for two decades, and that the family has in the past offered their own home as an Alevi meeting place. [12] I accept this documentary evidence and find that on a balance of probabilities, the claimant comes from an Alevi family. [13] But the letter does not mention the claimant himself. As such the panel finds this letter does not directly corroborate the claimant’s allegation that he is a true believer, or that he is seen by the authorities as an Alevi. [14] However, the writer states: “we the Alevis are still not sure whether to carry out our rituals in secrecy or in public. Simply because being blacklisted is a high risk for those Alevis attending open rituals in Alevi ritual centres that are not allowed to be registered as ritual centres, the police could detain all the people praying there with the accusation that they’re involved in illegal political (subversive or separatist) gatherings. Türkiye is a Muslim country, at least that is what it practically is. This means anyone who openly declares themselves as Alevi may be accused of being involved in “separatism” under the accusation that the prayers are aiming to divide the unity of the nation on sectarian lines.” [15] I accept this this letter from an Alevi spiritual leader and give it full weight. I find on a balance of probabilities the meaning of this passage is that that, if found engaging in collective religious expression, Alevis are imputed by the authorities to have an opposition political opinion. I find this letter-writer established himself to be qualified to provide this evidence, since he established himself to be from a long line of Alevi spiritual leaders. On a balance of probabilities, he himself conducts Alevi rituals and therefore faces this risk himself. I also find this evidence to be corroborated by the objective evidence which will be discussed later. I therefore find that since the claimant testified credibly that he has attended Alevi houses of worship, on a balance of probabilities he faces a risk of being seen by the authorities as both an Alevi and a separatist political opponent. Political involvement [16] The claimant alleges that he is not an official member of the HDP, but that he is an active supporter of the party. The claimant provided a letter from his father at Exhibit 10 which discusses the claimant’s political involvement, to which the panel assigns full weight. On a balance of probabilities, the claimant is a supporter of the HDP as he alleges. Subjective Fear [17] The claimant testified to four arrests, in XXXX 2018, XXXX 2019, XXXX 2020 and finally, in XXXX 2021. The first three were for his pro-HDP political activity including XXXX XXXX and [REDACTED]. The fourth arrest came minutes after he left the company of other pro-HDP volunteers. He testified that it was the treatment he received during this arrest that shook him: he provided details in his narrative. He testified, consistent with this narrative, that he was told he was involved with a separatist party. He was told he could only be released if he worked with the police in the future. Upon release, he testified, they told him to report to the police once a week, and also to show up whenever required. Upon release, he learned that family members who had gone out to police stations to look for him had also been detained. I find the claimant established his past arrests, that the police expect the claimant to report to them, and that on a balance of probabilities he has missed many reporting appointments by now. I find that on a balance of probabilities, his return without a passport would trigger official interest at the airport. I find the claimant has established his subjective fear of return. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution [18] The National Documentation Package contains several documents which report that people who oppose the current AKP government face persecution in Türkiye, and that Alevis and HDP supporters in particular face a risk from the authorities. [19] The National Documentation Package lists multiple examples of the use of “terrorist” and “separatist” by the authorities to identify people with political opinions viewed as threatening. The US State Department[5] reports that even in the last year, there were credible reports of arbitrary killings, suspicious deaths of people in custody, arbitrary arrest and the continued detention of thousands of people viewed by the authorities as political opponents, often as “separatists” and often for purported ties to terrorism. Supporters of the claimant’s HDP are frequently dubbed separatists[6] and terrorists[7], though the HDP is an opposition political party and not a terrorist or separatist movement[8]. The panel accepts the objective evidence and finds that people viewed by the authorities as political opponents face a risk of charges on serious crimes which can result in long detentions and worse. The panel finds, based on the objective evidence and on a balance of probabilities this includes HDP supporters. [20] In addition to suppressing opposition political movements, Turkish authorities have also enforced a view of the country as Sunni Muslim and ethnically Turkish. According to a report entitled The Myth of Tolerance[9] by the European University Institute, Türkiye sees itself as a Turkish Sunni Muslim nation. According to this report they can also expect harsh treatment if they are seen as going against the Sunni Turkish social order. [21] Alevis are religiously different from Sunnis[10] and often ethnically and linguistically different from Turks, according to this report. Alevis often experience suppression of their religion. Alevi houses of worship are still not recognized by the authorities as legitimate: they have no legal status[11]. Police use harsher methods in neighborhoods with a large Alevi population[12]. Government attitudes are mirrored in public attitudes: there have been instances in which Alevi homes have been vandalized, with an X to imply the occupants should be killed, or with expressions such as “get out.” [13] The European court of Human rights has ruled that Türkiye violates the rights of Alevis[14]. The government denies Alevis the right to establish places of worship. The number of Alevi houses of worship in the country is not sufficient to meet the demand[15]. The panel accepts the documentary evidence and finds it establishes that Alevis are persecuted in Türkiye. [22] The religious leader cited earlier states that Alevis found to be worshiping by the authorities can be accused of separatism, of trying to divide the country along sectarian lines. I find the objective evidence is consistent with this evidence, because it establishes that Türkiye sees itself as a Sunni nation and suppresses religions that are not Sunni Islam. [23] The panel finds the objective evidence corroborates the claimant’s allegation that the authorities would see him upon return as an Alevi and pro-HDP political opponent. His subjective fear of return has an objective basis. He has a well-founded fear of persecution. State Protection [24] There is a presumption that a state can protect its own citizens unless it is in total breakdown. Türkiye is a functioning state. However, the panel finds that it would be objectively unreasonable for the claimant to seek the protection of the state given that the main agent of persecution is the state. The panel therefore finds, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, there is no adequate state protection for him. Internal Flight Alternative [25] Since the claimant fears the Turkish authorities, and they control the entirety of the country, the panel finds that the claimant would face a serious possibility of persecution throughout Türkiye, and accordingly there is no viable internal flight alternative available to him. CONCLUSION [26] Based on the totality of the evidence, the panel finds the claimant to be a Convention refugee on the grounds of his political opinion and religion. He faces a serious risk of persecution in Türkiye. [27] His claim is accepted. ——— REASONS CONCLUDED ——— [1] Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended, sections 96 and 97(1). [2] Exhibit 9. [3] Exhibit 5. [4] Exhibit 6. [5] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 2.1: Turkey (Türkiye). Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022. United States. Department of State. 20 March 2023. [6] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 4.16: Country Policy and Information Note. Turkey: Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Version 4.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. March 2020. [7] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 1.10: General Country of Origin Information Report: Turkey. Netherlands. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 March 2022. [8] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 4.16: Country Policy and Information Note. Turkey: Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Version 4.0. United Kingdom. Home Office. March 2020. [9] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 13.3: Comprehensive Report on Turkey: The Myth of Tolerance. European University Institute. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. Ayhan Kaya. 2012. [10] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.3: The Alevi faith, including principles, beliefs, traditions, and ritual practices (2019–November 2021). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 26 November 2021. TUR200820.E. [11] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.10: Country Update: Turkey. Religious Freedom in Turkey in 2021. United States. Commission on International Religious Freedom. December 2021. [12] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.2: Situation of Alevis, including political and religious rights; treatment of Alevis by society and authorities; state protection (2019–November 2021). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 3 December 2021. TUR200819.E. [13] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.1: Turkey. International Religious Freedom Report for 2021. United States. Department of State. 2 June 2022. [14] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.5: The Alevis’ fight for recognition in Turkey. Deutsche Welle. Tunca Ögreten. 26 January 2020. [15] National Documentation Package, Türkiye, 31 July 2023, tab 12.1: Turkey. International Religious Freedom Report for 2021. United States. Department of State. 2 June 2022.

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: 2023 RLLR 99

### Key Issues
on Act (IRPA)[1]. Preliminary Matters [2] At the end of the hearing, counsel requested that she provide written submissions due to a time constraint on the hearing day. The panel a

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: on and political opinion. [5] ANALYSIS Identity [6] The panel finds the claimant established his personal and national identity on a balance of probabilities. The panel relies on the copy of his Turkish national identity card and the copy of his passport’s identity page at Exhibit 8. Both documents contain the same national iden

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.