Prompt:
Analyze this Federal Court of Appeal of Canada decision and explain its precedential value for immigration cases:

Sedghi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2023-10-10 Neutral citation 2023 FC 1601 File numbers IMM-7898-22 Decision Content Date: 20231010 Docket: IMM-7898-22 Citation: 2023 FC 1601 Ottawa, Ontario, October 10, 2023 PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice McVeigh BETWEEN: DARIUSH SEDGHI Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent JUDGMENT UPON application for judicial review to set aside a decision of an officer of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (the “Officer”), dated August 8, 2022, in which the Officer refused the Applicant’s application for a Labour Market Impact Assessment exempt work permit under administrative code C11 pursuant to the International Mobility Program. The Officer found the Applicant failed to demonstrate his proposed business would generate significant economic, social or cultural benefits or opportunities for Canadian citizens or permanent residents under section 205(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (“IRPR”); AND UPON reading the written submissions and hearing the oral representations of counsel for the parties; AND UPON reviewing the Certified Tribunal Record (“CTR”); AND UPON determining that this application should be granted for the following reasons: [1] The Applicant alleges the Officer erred by misconstruing publicly available guidance for visa officers under the C11 administrative code, known as “Entrepreneurs or self-employed individuals seeking only temporary residence – [R205(a) – C11] – International Mobility Program” (the “Guidelines”). The Applicant argues the Officer also erred by requiring the Applicant to meet requirements which were not set out in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (“IRPA”), the IRPR or the Guidelines. [2] In the Global Case Management System (“GCMS”) notes, the Officer highlighted four points about the Applicant’s application: 1) the business premises, 2) the initial investment, 3) the hiring plan and 4) whether the company created a significant benefit. Under the Guidelines, the first three factors are all considerations that visa officers can assess to determine the last point; that is, whether the business establishes a significant benefit. As noted, the Officer ultimately denied the application on that basis, finding the proposed business would not create a significant benefit as required under section 205(a). [3] The Applicant alleges the Officer erred on several points in their decision, particularly their reasoning process on the first two considerations: the premises and the investment. I will also address the Applicant’s arguments concerning the interpretation and application of “significant benefit.” [4] First, the Applicant alleges the Officer erred by requiring him to lease physical premises, while rejecting any other type of office arrangement. In the GCMS notes, the Officer states, “An account statement for virtual office address at … has been provided. Given the generic needs for office space (for only himself at first), it is not known why the applicant has not secured a lease/physical premises where he will go to work.” [5] Upon review, the Applicant’s business plan does not specify that physical premises are required. Rather, pages 21-22 of his business plan state that, “Upon the approval of Mr. Dariush Sedghi’s work permit, the Company will search the local area to identify the best-suited premises for its specific operations. From its office, the Company will be able to reach potential clients nationwide, as the majority of its consulting activities can be conducted online.” From this wording, the business plan uses qualifying language when discussing the proposed office space, meaning that, even if the Officer presumed physical premises were required, the business plan clearly states the company will search for such space upon approval of the work permit. Second, the business plan never actually specifies what type of premises are needed (i.e. physical or virtual). Third, the business plan indicates a large portion of the company’s activities will be conducted online, which would suggest a virtual office is acceptable to some degree. [6] The Officer does not provide an explanation of their reasoning process on this point, despite implying the lack of premises is a negative factor in the application. In my view, the decision is unreasonable as the Officer has failed to provide their rationale for why the Applicant is required to lease a property, particularly given his business plan. [7] Second, in relation to finances, the Applicant argues the Officer erred in law by requiring the Applicant to have an initial investment amount in the form of liquid cash. The Applicant states liquidity is not mandated by the IRPA, the IRPR or the Guidelines. At the hearing, the Applicant argued he provided proof of his finances and they were more than adequate to be viable. The Applicant claims he submitted three forms of assets and has approximately $358,775.53 in liquid assets, even though the initial investment amount was only $200,000. Therefore, the Applicant argued he had more cash than is necessary. The Applicant’s affidavit states, “In addition, should the business in Canada require more cash, two of the fixed assets, namely Bahar Property, which is currently being rented, and the Mazandaran Villa, can also be liquidated which will provide an additional $323,289.00 CAD for further investment in Canada.” [8] The Applicant presented a second asset, the Adak Control Arya Company (Ltd.) (“Adak Control”) shares, of which he owns 80% and his wife owns 20%. The Applicant argues the Officer misinterpreted the Adak Control share valuation, however he did not provide an explanation for the 2012 valuation in his application. In the GCMS notes, the Officer acknowledged it was not immediately clear what the value of the shares was presently. [9] The third asset the Applicant provided was real estate, including property appraisals, title deeds and a rental agreement. The Applicant showed these properties were valued at more than $600,000 and could be liquidated. The Officer did not find the Applicant’s real estate constituted a positive factor given it was not representative of available liquid cash. The Applicant contends that, in any event, he has provided proof of sufficient financing with his liquid assets, even without the consideration of the other two fixed assets (one of which is rented and could be liquidated to provide additional investment funds). [10] As such, the Applicant argues the Officer’s reasoning is vague and ignores evidence about the liquidity of his equity investments. I agree that the Officer fails to explain why liquid assets are necessary for commencing the company and paying employees. As well, the Officer does not clarify why the Applicant’s real estate and subsequent rental agreement are insufficient to show the Applicant’s financial position. The reasoning is absent from the GCMS notes themselves, meaning there is no adequate justification for liquid cash as opposed to equity investments. [11] In determining whether the business presented a significant benefit under section 205(a), the Guidelines indicate that the criteria of the business premises, financial ability and hiring plan all should form part of the “significant business” analysis. [12] On a final note, the Applicant claims the Officer made an error of law and ignored evidence in their interpretation and application of “significant benefit.” The Applicant argues the Officer improperly concluded that the company would not be distinguishable in the marketplace, noting the identification of potential competitors is a routine practice. Additionally, the Applicant argues the Officer ignored evidence showing how the company would provide cultural, economic and social benefits. The Applicant said these benefits would include boosting efficiency in the manufacturing sector, improving the competition mix, providing high value training, transferring knowledge, creating jobs, contributing to Canadian tax revenues, ameliorating the impact of Covid-19 on manufacturing and contributing to the standard of living via foreign direct investment. [13] I note the submission letter from the Applicant’s immigration consultant (in the completed application package), on page 21 of the CTR, lists cultural benefits of the proposed business and states that: Enhancing cultural diversity in the Canadian manufacturing sector: Increasingly the Canadian manufacturing sector (ranging from manufacturers of furniture, doors and windows to medical devises, etc.) are coming from business immigrant community with diverse cultural backgrounds. The management consulting sector increasingly need to cope with such a transformational cultural change in Ontario and beyond. Coming from a Middle Eastern background and having worked with a variety of clients from various countries particularly in Asia, Mr Sedghi’s company will significantly contribute to filling the existing gap in the manufacturing consulting industry in Canada. [14] While this statement is not included within the business plan itself, it formed part of the application and would have been placed in front of the Officer and should have been considered as one factor and it appears it was not considered. [15] In conclusion, the issue of finances and business premises are significant parts of the decision, forming half of the rationale. Here, however, the Officer has failed to explain why their reasoning on these issues is justified. Thus, the lack of reasoning on these factors, which are material, render the decision unreasonable (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 100). I will grant this application. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: The application for judicial review is granted and is sent back to be re-determined by a different officer. No question of general importance is certified. blank "Glennys L. McVeigh" blank Judge

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Sedghi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

### Key Issues
why their reasoning on these issues is justified. Thus, the lack of reasoning on these factors, which are material, render the decision unreasonable (Canada (Minister of Citizensh

### Standard of Review
Sedghi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2023-10-10 Neutral citation 2023 FC 1601 File numbers IMM-7898-22 Decision Content Date: 20231010 Docket: IMM-7898-22 Citation: 2023 FC 1601 Ottawa, Ontario, October 10, 2023 PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice McVeigh BETWEEN: DARIUSH SEDGHI Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent JUDGMENT UPON application for judicial review to set aside a decision of an officer of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (the “Officer”), dated August 8, 2022, in which the Officer refused the Applicant’s application for a Labour Market Impact Assessment exempt work permit under administrative code C11 pursuant to the International Mobility Program. The Officer found the Applicant failed to demonstrate his proposed business would generate significant economic, social or cultural benefits or opportunities for Canadian citizens or permanent residents under section 205(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (“IRPR”); AND UPON reading the written submissions and hearing the oral representations of counsel for the parties; AND UPON reviewing the Certified Tribunal Record (“CTR”); AND UPON determining that this application should be granted for the following reasons: [1] The Applicant alleges the Officer erred by misconstruing publicly available guidance for visa officers under the C11 administrative code, known as “Entrepreneurs or self-employed individuals seeking only temporary residence – [R205(a) – C11] – International Mobility Program” (the “Guidelines”). The Applicant argues the Officer also erred by requiring the Applicant to meet requirements which were not set out in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (“IRPA”), the IRPR or the Guidelines. [2] In the Global Case Management System (“GCMS”) notes, the Officer highlighted four points about the Applicant’s application: 1) the business premises, 2) the initial investment, 3) the hiring plan and 4) whether the company created a significant benefit. Under the Guidelines, the first three factors are all considerations that visa officers can assess to determine the last point; that is, whether the business establishes a significant benefit. As noted, the Officer ultimately denied the application on that basis, finding the proposed business would not create a significant benefit as required under section 205(a). [3] The Applicant alleges the Officer erred on several points in their decision, particularly their reasoning process on the first two considerations: the premises and the investment. I will also address the Applicant’s arguments concerning the interpretation and application of “significant benefit.” [4] First, the Applicant alleges the Officer erred by requiring him to lease physical premises, while rejecting any other type of office arrangement. In the GCMS notes, the Officer states, “An account statement for virtual office address at … has been provided. Given the generic needs for office space (for only himself at first), it is not known why the applicant has not secured a lease/physical premises where he will go to work.” [5] Upon review, the Applicant’s business plan does not specify that physical premises are required. Rather, pages 21-22 of his business plan state that, “Upon the approval of Mr. Dariush Sedghi’s work permit, the Company will search the local area to identify the best-suited premises for its specific operations. From its office, the Company will be able to reach potential clients nationwide, as the majority of its consulting activities can be conducted online.” From this wording, the business plan uses qualifying language when discussing the proposed office space, meaning that, even if the Officer presumed physical premises were required, the business plan clearly states the company will search for such space upon approval of the work permit. Second, the business plan never actually specifies what type of premises are needed (i.e. physical or virtual). Third, the business plan indicates a large portion of the company’s activities will be conducted online, which would suggest a virtual office is acceptable to some degree. [6] The Officer does not provide an explanation of their reasoning process on this point, despite implying the lack of premises is a negative factor in the application. In my view, the decision is unreasonable as the Officer has failed to provide their rationale for why the Applicant is required to lease a property, particularly given his business plan. [7] Second, in relation to finances, the Applicant argues the Officer erred in law by requiring the Applicant to have an initial investment amount in the form of liquid cash. The Applicant states liquidity is not mandated by the IRPA, the IRPR or the Guidelines. At the hearing, the Applicant argued he provided proof of his finances and they were more than adequate to be viable. The Applicant claims he submitted three forms of assets and has approximately $358,775.53 in liquid assets, even though the initial investment amount was only $200,000. Therefore, the Applicant argued he had more cash than is necessary. The Applicant’s affidavit states, “In addition, should the business in Canada require more cash, two of the fixed assets, namely Bahar Property, which is currently being rented, and the Mazandaran Villa, can also be liquidated which will provide an additional $323,289.00 CAD for further investment in Canada.” [8] The Applicant presented a second asset, the Adak Control Arya Company (Ltd.) (“Adak Control”) shares, of which he owns 80% and his wife owns 20%. The Applicant argues the Officer misinterpreted the Adak Control share valuation, however he did not provide an explanation for the 2012 valuation in his application. In the GCMS notes, the Officer acknowledged it was not immediately clear what the value of the shares was presently. [9] The third asset the Applicant provided was real estate, including property appraisals, title deeds and a rental agreement. The Applicant showed these properties were valued at more than $600,000 and could be liquidated. The Officer did not find the Applicant’s real estate constituted a positive factor given it was not representative of available liquid cash. The Applicant contends that, in any event, he has provided proof of sufficient financing with his liquid assets, even without the consideration of the other two fixed assets (one of which is rented and could be liquidated to provide additional investment funds). [10] As such, the Applicant argues the Officer’s reasoning is vague and ignores evidence about the liquidity of his equity investments. I agree that the Officer fails to explain why liquid assets are necessary for commencing the company and paying employees. As well, the Officer does not clarify why the Applicant’s real estate and subsequent rental agreement are insufficient to show the Applicant’s financial position. The reasoning is absent from the GCMS notes themselves, meaning there is no adequate justification for liquid cash as opposed to equity investments. [11] In determining whether the business presented a significant benefit under section 205(a), the Guidelines indicate that the criteria of the business premises, financial ability and hiring plan all should form part of the “significant business” analysis. [12] On a final note, the Applicant claims the Officer made an error of law and ignored evidence in their interpretation and application of “significant benefit.” The Applicant argues the Officer improperly concluded that the company would not be distinguishable in the marketplace, noting the identification of potential competitors is a routine practice. Additionally, the Applicant argues the Officer ignored evidence showing how the company would provide cultural, economic and social benefits. The Applicant said these benefits would include boosting efficiency in the manufacturing sector, improving the competition mix, providing high value training, transferring knowledge, creating jobs, contributing to Canadian tax revenues, ameliorating the impact of Covid-19 on manufacturing and contributing to the standard of living via foreign direct investment. [13] I note the submission letter from the Applicant’s immigration consultant (in the completed application package), on page 21 of the CTR, lists cultural benefits of the proposed business and states that: Enhancing cultural diversity in the Canadian manufacturing sector: Increasingly the Canadian manufacturing sector (ranging from manufacturers of furniture, doors and windows to medical devises, etc.) are coming from business immigrant community with diverse cultural backgrounds. The management consulting sector increasingly need to cope with such a transformational cultural change in Ontario and beyond. Coming from a Middle Eastern background and having worked with a variety of clients from various countries particularly in Asia, Mr Sedghi’s company will significantly contribute to filling the existing gap in the manufacturing consulting industry in Canada. [14] While this statement is not included within the business plan itself, it formed part of the application and would have been placed in front of the Officer and should have been considered as one factor and it appears it was not considered. [15] In conclusion, the issue of finances and business premises are significant parts of the decision, forming half of the rationale. Here, however, the Officer has failed to explain why their reasoning on these issues is justified. Thus, the lack of reasoning on these factors, which are material, render the decision unreasonable (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 100). I will grant this application. THIS COURT ORDERS THAT: The application for judicial review is granted and is sent back to be re-determined by a different officer. No question of general importance is certified. blank "Glennys L. McVeigh" blank Judge

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: of the “significant business” analysis. [12] On a final note, the Applicant claims the Officer made an error of law and ignored evidence in their interpretation and application of “significant benefit.” The Applicant argues the Officer improperly concluded that the company would not be distinguishable in the marketplace, noting

### Precedential Value
As a Federal Court of Appeal decision, this ruling has significant precedential value and is binding on the Federal Court and administrative tribunals like the Immigration and Refugee Board. It establishes legal principles that must be followed in similar cases and provides authoritative interpretation of the relevant legislation.


Prompt:
What legal errors did the Federal Court of Appeal identify in this Federal Court of Appeal of Canada decision?

Andrews v. Canada (Attorney General) Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2023-05-31 Neutral citation 2023 FCA 119 File numbers A-13-22 Decision Content Date: 20230531 Docket: A-13-22 Citation: 2023 FCA 119 CORAM: DE MONTIGNY J.A. LASKIN J.A. MACTAVISH J.A. BETWEEN: JILL ANDREWS Applicant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 29, 2023 Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 31, 2023 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: LASKIN J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: DE MONTIGNY J.A. MACTAVISH J.A. Date: 20230531 Docket: A-13-22 Citation: 2023 FCA 119 CORAM: DE MONTIGNY J.A. LASKIN J.A. MACTAVISH J.A. BETWEEN: JILL ANDREWS Applicant and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT LASKIN J.A. [1]The applicant, Ms. Andrews, seeks judicial review of a decision of the Federal Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board (2021 FPSLRB 137). In its decision, the Board dismissed her application under section 61(b) of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Regulations, S.O.R./2005-79, for an extension of time to file a grievance against the termination of her employment. Subsection 61(b) authorizes the Board to grant an extension “in the interest of fairness”. [2]The applicant’s collective agreement set a 25-day time limit for filing a grievance, which, in her case, ran from January 31, 2020. The applicant applied to the Board for an extension on May 4, 2021, some 15 months after the deadline had passed. [3]The applicant based her application on what the Board described as “the well-known criteria” set out in Schenkman v. Treasury Board (Public Works and Government Services Canada), 2004 PSSRB 1 at para. 75, for determining whether the Board should exercise its discretion under section 61(b). These criteria comprise (1) clear, cogent and compelling reasons for the delay; (2) the length of the delay; (3) the due diligence of the grievor; (4) balancing the injustice to the employee against the prejudice to the employer in granting an extension; and (5) the chance of success of the grievance. [4]In addressing the first four criteria, the main factor on which the applicant relied was that “[it had] taken [her] over two years (from March 18, 2019 to April 28, 2021) to do a complete review of the 1,975 pages of documents related to [her] employment case, and prepare comprehensive electronic documents”. Somehow, she misunderstood the process and mistakenly believed that these steps were necessary before a grievance could be filed. She also claims that she did not realize that there was a deadline for filing the grievance. [5]As authorized by section 22 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board Act, S.C. 2013, c. 40, s. 365, the Board decided the application based on the written material filed, without holding an oral hearing. In its reasons it reviewed the parties’ submissions on each of the Schenkman criteria, noting before doing so the statement in Martin v. Treasury Board (Department of Human Resources and Skills Development), 2015 PSLREB 39 at para. 70, that the criteria are not all necessarily of equal importance, and their weight in any particular case may differ. The Board concluded that, weighing the Schenkman criteria, it was not in the interest of fairness to grant an extension. The applicant seeks judicial review of that decision. [6]Before this Court, the applicant also seeks the admission of fresh evidence in support of her application, comprising 40 additional documents. She acknowledges that these documents were not themselves before the Board. However, she submits that the Board had before it some of the information the documents contain. [7]This Court summarized the law governing the admission of fresh evidence on judicial review in its decision in the companion application commenced by the applicant, Andrews v. Public Service Alliance of Canada, 2022 FCA 159, leave to appeal refused, 2023 CanLII 10480 (SCC), challenging the Board’s dismissal of her claim that her bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation. As the Court there set out (at paras. 18-21), the general rule, subject only to limited exceptions, is that the only evidence that can be considered on judicial review is the evidence that was before the administrative decision-maker. Here, the applicant relies on the exception for “general background”, which the case law describes as evidence providing general background where that information might assist the court in understanding the issues relevant to the judicial review, but does not add new evidence on the merits. [8]In my view, the evidence the applicant seeks to adduce here does not come within the “general background” exception. Rather, the motion to adduce the 40 documents amounts to an attempt to reconstruct the specifics of the applicant’s interactions and communications with her employer and with her bargaining agent, so as to buttress her case on the merits. I note in addition that all of these documents were available to her when she filed her application and her reply with the Board. The applicant’s fresh evidence motion should therefore be dismissed, and the proposed fresh evidence struck from the record. [9]The applicant also submits that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness and natural justice, and that its decision is accordingly reviewable on the standard of correctness. Under this rubric she argues that while the Board was correct in utilizing the Schenkman criteria to assess whether it should exercise its discretion to grant an extension, the Board “failed to correctly consider the overall circumstances of the matter, thus impacting its assessment and application of the Schenkman criteria to the facts of the matter”, and that “had the Board correctly considered the totality of the circumstances, it ought to have allowed [her application]” (Applicant’s memorandum at paragraphs 62-63). [10]Properly characterized, these submissions go not to procedural fairness and natural justice but to the merits of the Board’s decision. The standard of review applicable to the Board’s discretion to grant an extension of time under section 61(b) is reasonableness: Popov v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 177 at para. 10. [11]Reasonableness is a deferential standard. It does not entitle a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence before the decision-maker, as the applicant would have this Court do. Rather, our role is limited to focusing on the decision actually made, and to ascertaining whether it is “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para. 85. [12]As the applicant acknowledges, the Board applied the proper criteria in considering her application for an extension of time. In doing so, it considered the facts before it, and explained in its reasons its assessment of each criterion and its overall conclusion. In light of the Board’s process and its reasons, I cannot agree with the applicant that its decision was unreasonable. [13]I would, therefore, dismiss the application. At the hearing, the respondent withdrew the claim for costs included in the respondent’s memorandum. It follows that no costs should be awarded. [14]When this application was commenced, the style of cause named the respondent as Deputy Head – Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The parties are agreed that, having regard to rule 303(1) and (2) of the Federal Courts Rules, S.O.R/98-106, the proper respondent is the Attorney General of Canada. The style of cause should be amended accordingly, as reflected in these reasons and the Court’s judgment. “J.B. Laskin” J.A. “I agree. de Montigny J.A.” “I agree. Mactavish J.A.” FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD Docket: A-13-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: JILL ANDREWS v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: OTTAWA, ONTARIO DATE OF HEARING: May 29, 2023 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: LASKIN J.A. CONCURRED IN BY: DE MONTIGNY J.A. MACTAVISH J.A. DATED: mAY 31, 2023 APPEARANCES: Jill Andrews ON HER OWN BEHALF Chris Hutchison For The respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Shalene Curtis-Micallef Deputy Attorney General of Canada FOR THE RESPONDENT

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Andrews v. Canada (Attorney General)

### Key Issues
he court in understanding the issues relevant to the judicial review, but does not add new evidence on the merits. [8]In my view, the evidence the applicant seeks to adduce here do

### Standard of Review
of the Board’s decision. The standard of review applicable to the Board’s discretion to grant an extension of time under section 61(b) is reasonableness: Popov v. Canada (Attorney

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: oherent and rational chain of analysis” and “justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para. 85. [12]As the applicant acknowledges, the Board applied the proper criteria in considering her application for an extension

### Precedential Value
As a Federal Court of Appeal decision, this ruling has significant precedential value and is binding on the Federal Court and administrative tribunals like the Immigration and Refugee Board. It establishes legal principles that must be followed in similar cases and provides authoritative interpretation of the relevant legislation.


Prompt:
What compliance obligations are created by this Federal regulations from the Canadian government?

# Quebec Airport Zoning Regulations CRC, c 104 Regulations Respecting Zoning at Quebec Airport Enabling authority: AERONAUTICS ACT ## Short Title 1 These Regulations may be cited as the Quebec Airport Zoning Regulations. ## Interpretation 2 In these Regulations, *airport* means Quebec Airport, L’Ancienne Lorette, in the Province of Quebec; (aéroport) *airport reference point* means the point described in Part I of the schedule; (point de repère de l’aéroport) *approach surface* means an imaginary inclined plane the lower end of which is a horizontal line at right angles to the centre line of a strip and passing through a point at the strip end on the centre line of the strip; (surface d’approche) *horizontal surface* means an imaginary horizontal plane centering on and located 150 feet above the assigned elevation of the airport reference point; (surface horizontale) *Minister* [Revoked, SOR/93-401, s. 2] *strip* means a rectangular portion of the landing area of the airport, especially prepared for the take-off and landing of aircraft in a particular direction and being (a) 1,200 feet, including the runway, in the case of the runway designated as 12-30, and (b) 1,500 feet, including the runway, in the case of the runway designated as 06-24; ( bande) *transitional surface* means an imaginary inclined plane extending upward and outward from the outer lateral limits of a strip and its approach surface to an intersection with the horizontal surface or other transitional surfaces. (surface de transition) 3 For the purposes of these Regulations, the airport reference point is deemed to be 200 feet above sea level. ## Application 4 These Regulations apply to all lands, including public road allowances, adjacent to or in the vicinity of the airport, as more particularly described in Part II of the schedule. ## General 5 No person shall erect or construct, on any land to which these Regulations apply, any building, structure or object or any addition to any existing building, structure or object, the highest point of which will exceed in elevation at the location of the highest point any of the surfaces hereinafter set out that project immediately over and above the surface of the land at that location, namely, (a) a horizontal surface, the outer limits of which may be described as follows: BEGINNING at the intersection of the Northwesterly boundary of Highway No. 2 with the lot line between lots 113-30 and 114-10; THENCE, following the Northwesterly boundary of Highway No. 2 in a Southwesterly direction to its intersection with the Northwesterly production of the lot line between lots 124 and 123; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the parish line between the Parishes of L’Ancienne Lorette and Ste Foye; THENCE, following the last mentioned parish line in a Southwesterly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lot 22-1, Parish of Ste Foye, and lot 506, Parish of L’Ancienne Lorette; THENCE, following the same parish line in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the Northeasterly production of the parish line at the Southerly limit of lots 507 to 520; THENCE, following the last mentioned parish line to its intersection with the Northwesterly boundary of lot 6, Parish of Ste Foye; THENCE, in a Southwesterly direction to its intersection with the most Northerly corner of lot 521, Parish of L’Ancienne Lorette; THENCE, following the lot line between lots 521 and 522 in a Southwesterly direction to its intersection with the parish line between the Parishes of L’Ancienne Lorette and St. Félix; THENCE, following the last mentioned parish line in a Northwesterly direction, then in a Southerly direction, then in a Southwesterly direction to a point where there is an angle in the parish line at a corner of lot 533, Parish of L’Ancienne Lorette; THENCE, in a general Westerly direction to its intersection with the intersection of lot 556-23 with the parish line between the Parishes of L’Ancienne Lorette and St. Augustin; THENCE, following the last mentioned parish line in a Southwesterly direction to its intersection with the Southwesterly boundary of lot 564, Parish of L’Ancienne Lorette; THENCE, following the parish line between the Parishes of L’Ancienne Lorette and St. Augustin in a Northwesterly direction to a point on the Southerly boundary of Calvaire Lake; THENCE, following the last mentioned boundary in a general Southwesterly direction to a point on the parish line between the Parishes of L’Ancienne Lorette and St. Augustin; THENCE, following the last mentioned parish line and its production thereof in a Northwesterly direction to its intersection with the Northwesterly boundary of Highway No. 2; THENCE, following the last mentioned boundary in a Southwesterly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lots 612 and 615; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Northwesterly direction a distance of six hundred feet (600′) to a point; THENCE, following a line parallel to the Northwesterly boundary of Highway No. 2 in a Southwesterly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lots 616 and 620; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Northwesterly direction to its intersection with the Southeasterly boundary of the Canadian National Railway right-of-way; THENCE, following the last mentioned bound in a general Westerly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lots 621 and 624; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Northwesterly direction to its intersection with lot 649; THENCE, following the lot line between lots 649 and 622 in a Northeasterly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lots 649 and 652; THENCE, following the lot line between lots 649 and 652 and the lot line between lots 650 and 651 in a Northwesterly direction to its intersection with the Southeasterly boundary of lot 705; THENCE, following the lot line between lots 705 and 651 in a Northeasterly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lots 651 and 654; THENCE, in a Northwesterly direction to its intersection with the intersection of lot 703 with the lot line between lots 758 and 759; THENCE, in a general Northerly direction to its intersection with the intersection of the Northerly boundary of Notre Dame Road with the lot line between lots 744 and 749; THENCE, in a general Northeasterly direction to its intersection with the intersection of the Northeasterly boundary of Drolet Road with the concession line between Concessions I and II; THENCE, following the Northeasterly boundary of Drolet Road in a Northwesterly direction to its intersection with the parish line between the Parishes of St. Ambroise de la Jeune Lorette and L’Ancienne Lorette; THENCE following the last mentioned parish line in a Northeasterly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lots 330 and 333; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the Southerly boundary of the Hydro-Quebec right-of-way; THENCE, following the last mentioned boundary in a general Northeasterly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lots 260 and 261C; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the parish line between the Parishes of St. Ambroise de la Jeune Lorette and L’Ancienne Lorette; THENCE, following the last mentioned parish line in a Northeasterly direction to its intersection with the Northeasterly boundary of lot 289, Parish of L’Ancienne Lorette; THENCE, following the same parish line in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the Northwesterly boundary of Promenade Road; THENCE, following the northwesterly boundary of said road in a northeasterly direction to its intersection with the northwesterly production of the lot line between lots 239 and 240; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the Northwesterly boundary of St. Jean Baptiste Road; THENCE, following the same general direction to its intersection with the intersection of the Southeasterly boundary of St. Jean Baptiste Road with the lot line between lots 232 and 234; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the Northwesterly boundary of lot 98; THENCE, following the Southeasterly boundary of lots 232, 231 and 230 to its intersection with the Northwesterly boundary of lot 112-42; THENCE, following the lot line between lots 112 and 112-5 to 112-42 and its production in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the Southeasterly boundary of St. Paul Road; THENCE, following the Southeasterly boundary of said road in a Southwesterly direction to its intersection with the lot line between lots 113 and 116, 114; THENCE, following the last mentioned lot line in a Southeasterly direction to its intersection with the Northwesterly boundary of Highway No. 2 being the Point of Beginning, (b) the approach surfaces abutting each end of the strip designated as 12-30 and the strip designated as 06-24, and extending outward therefrom, the dimensions of which approach surfaces are six hundred (600) feet on each side of the centre line of the strip at the strip ends for strip 12-30, seven hundred and fifty (750) feet on each side of the centre line of the strip at the strip ends for strip 06-24 and two thousand (2,000) feet on each side of the projected centre line of the strip at the outer ends for strips 12-30 and 06-24, the said outer ends being two hundred (200) feet above the elevations at the strip ends, and measured horizontally ten thousand (10,000) feet from the strip ends and their abutting surfaces, and (c) the several transitional surfaces, each rising at an angle determined on the basis of a ratio of one (1) foot vertically for every seven (7) feet measured horizontally from the outer lateral limits of the strips and their abutting surfaces, as shown on Plan No. M-2440 (A, B, C) dated December 5, 1962, of record in the Department of Transport at Ottawa.

Response:
## Analysis of REGULATIONS-FED: Quebec Airport Zoning Regulations

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
The document contains provisions related to immigration procedures, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.

### Application to Immigration Cases
These regulations provide specific implementation details for broader legislative frameworks. Practitioners should ensure strict compliance with procedural requirements, timelines, and documentation standards. The regulations must be interpreted consistent with their enabling legislation and may be subject to challenge if they exceed the authority granted by the statute.


Prompt:
Analyze this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Refugee Law Lab Reporter and identify key legal issues:

2023 RLLR 106 Citation: 2023 RLLR 106 Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division Date of Decision: February 3, 2023 Panel: Isis Van Loon Counsel for the Claimant(s): N/A Country: Lebanon RPD Number: VC2-02639 Associated RPD Number(s): N/A ATIP Number: A-2024-00593 ATIP Pages: N/A DECISION [1] MEMBER: This is a decision of the Refugee Protection Division in the claim of XXXX XXXX (ph), also known as XXXX XXXX, as a citizen of Lebanon who is claiming refugee protection pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. In rendering my reasons, I have considered and applied the Chairperson’s guidelines on women refugee claimants fearing gender-related persecution as well as the Chairperson’s guideline on proceedings before the IRB involving sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics to ensure that appropriate accommodations are made in questioning you, as well as the overall hearing process, and in assessing your claim. DETERMINATION [2] I find you are a Convention refugee as you have established a well-founded fear of persecution based on a Convention ground. ANALYSIS Identity [3] Your passport lists your first name as XXXX and your gender as male. However, you are a transgender woman and you prefer XXXX and the female pronouns. According to the CBSA notes, when you first came to Canada, you used the name XXXX in the past, and this is recorded in the XXXX 2022 interview with CBSA in Exhibit 1. I also note that the medical reports vary. Some use XXXX and some use XXXX, with the same last name. So, I find that your identity as a national of Lebanon is established by your testimony as well as the supporting documentation on file, which includes a certified true copy of your passport in Exhibit 1. [4] You told me that you were not sure if your father holds Armenian citizenship but that he might. And, in fact, during the break, you conferred with your brother, who said, no, he does not. I would be inclined to agree with you based on the Armenian law as well in Tab 3.1, the law of the Republic of Armenia on the citizenship of the Republic of Armenia states under article 1 that you are not allowed to hold citizenship simultaneously in Armenia and in another state. Article 11 states that any children born to Armenian parents are Armenian regardless of where they were born. However, you are a Lebanese citizen, and I am satisfied that even if — and this is a big if based on what you have told me — your father had held Armenian citizenship when you were born, you are not able to hold Armenian citizenship because holding citizenship in another state — because you hold citizenship in another state, Lebanon. [5] So, your allegations are set out in your Basis of Claim form and by your testimony. The following is an extremely brief summary. You are transgender and you fear persecution as a transgender women if you were to return to Lebanon. Credibility [6] A presumption before me is that what you tell me is true. However, this can be rebutted in appropriate circumstances, such as omissions, lack of detail, contradictions, et cetera. In your case, you provided detailed answers to my questions. You seem very well-aware of and well-informed. And I really found nothing to disbelieve you on. In fact, I accept what you have told me as credible. [7] Furthermore, you provided credible documentation in support of your claim, including Canadian medical documents reporting [REDACTED] XXXX XXXX over time in response to treatment. Upon review of the lab results, I find no reason to doubt their authenticity and, therefore, place significant weight on them as they serve to corroborate what you have been telling me. [8] So, I found you to be credible witness and you have backed it up with your documentation as well. So, I believe what you have alleged in support of your claim. Nexus [9] I find the persecution you face has a nexus to the Convention grounds. You have demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution based on your membership in a particular social group, as a transgender woman. Therefore, I have assessed your claim under section 96. [10] Now, a well-founded fear of persecution must include both a subjective and an objective basis for that fear and it must be forward-looking. Based on your testimony, and supporting documents, as well as the country condition documents for Lebanon, I do find you have a well-founded fear of persecution for these reasons. [11] So, in terms of subjective fear, you came to Canada on XXXX XXXX of 2020 on a student visa. That student visa in Exhibit 1 shows it was valid until XXXX of 2024. You applied for asylum, signing your Basis of Claim form on January the 4th of 2022, while that student visa was still valid. You explained to me that you did not apply for asylum until over a year after your arrival because you thought at first that you would be able to apply to stay in Canada on a permit after graduation, but later, this felt too uncertain and risky to you to take a chance on that. You also told me that you sought out medical assistance with XXXX shortly after arriving in Canada and you were able to start XXXX XXXX within a few months of arriving. So, I find that you have adduced sufficient credible evidence to establish your subjective fear of returning to Lebanon. Objective Basis [12] I asked you what would happen if you went back to Lebanon to live as XXXX, and you said you would face legal as well as health issues. You said that it is not a good situation for transgender people in Lebanon. You said you had gone to doctors in Lebanon who refused to treat you when you were 17. You also told me that you researched the discrimination you would face in the workplace, that you have read news stories about that, and that you would not be able to have your state identity documents reflect your true gender. You told me that you would risk being killed, and, minimally, would suffer mentally, and that you had had a really difficult time when you were in Lebanon as well. And you told me quite clearly that you just simply would not be able to live as yourself in Lebanon. [13] There is abundant objective country evidence in the current National Documentation Package for Lebanon which confirms the situation for transgender women, such as yourself, in Lebanon. NDP 6.10, the Queer Refugee Hearings Program reported that while there are no specific stats, that LGBTQ activists estimate there are a couple of thousand transgender individuals in Lebanon and transgender women face systemic discrimination in education, employment, housing, and the provision of health care. They are also at greater risk of arbitrary arrest, which is often accompanied by physical violence by law enforcement officials. Trans women also face routine violence and the threat of violence by members of the public and they are denied police protection, which compromises their ability to live in safety and positions them in a perpetual state of precarity. This discrimination, which emanates from severe social stigma and isolation, is worsened by a lack of resources tailored for trans people’s needs and by their difficulty in obtaining identification documents that reflect their true gender and expression. [14] NDP 6.3 says many of the same things about the systemic discrimination and education, which you, in fact, described to me your experiences in education when you were in grade school, employment, housing, and the provision of health care, greater risk for arbitrary arrest. Now, while the Lebanese law does not specifically explicitly criminalize being trans, article 534 of the Penal Code punishes any sexual intercourse contrary to the order of nature with up to a year in prison. And the law has been regularly enforced to arrest transgender women who are misidentified as gay men. Trans people are also targeted under laws of violating public morality, incitement to debauchery, and secret prostitution. This is NDP 6.4. The most common patterns for arrests are based on individuals visually inscribed with non-normative gender looks or through collecting mobile data mostly accessed during the investigation without any written judicial authorization. [15] So, I mentioned a bit about the police targeting and violence, and a 2015 study identified anecdotal evidence from local trans women who reported either themselves or their friends had been arrested several times on the streets for masquerading as women and were often detained for long periods of time without receiving information or legal assistance. A 2019 report by Helem, Human Rights Watch, and MOSAIC found that transgender women are at greater risk of arbitrary arrest and physical violence at police checkpoints. That is NDP 6.9. In addition to the state, there is considerable non-state violations of the rights of LGBTQ people, including abuse, assault, and an absence of legal protection for these human rights violations, according to NDP 6.5. [16] So, I am satisfied that this ongoing systemic discrimination, harassment, and, in fact, violence, and other forms of mistreatment of transgender women both from state and non-state sources denies you your key human dignity and your core human rights to live and be who you are, and that, therefore, this amounts to persecution. Accordingly, I find that your fear of persecution in Lebanon is well-founded. State Protection and Internal Flight Alternative [17] In this case, a primary agent of persecution is the state, so the persecution that you would face if you return to Lebanon would be at the hands of the authorities. And accordingly, find there is no state protection available to you and the presumption of state protection is rebutted. [18] The state is in control of all of its territories and the mistreatment of transgender women is found across society throughout the country. Therefore, on the evidence before me, I find that you would face a serious possibility of persecution throughout Lebanon. There is no viable internal flight alternative where you could safely relocate given your particular circumstances. CONCLUSION [19] Based on all the evidence before me, I conclude that you are a Convention refugee, and therefore, I am accepting your claim. ——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: 2023 RLLR 106

### Key Issues
face legal as well as health issues. You said that it is not a good situation for transgender people in Lebanon. You said you had gone to doctors in Lebanon who refused to treat y

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: based on a Convention ground. ANALYSIS Identity [3] Your passport lists your first name as XXXX and your gender as male. However, you are a transgender woman and you prefer XXXX and the female pronouns. According to the CBSA notes, when you first came to Canada, you used the name XXXX in the past, and this is recorded in the XXX

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
Analyze this Refugee Appeal Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada and explain its implications for refugee determination:

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC1-02576 MC1-02577 / MC1-02578 / MC1-02579 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED][REDACTED] Personnes en cause Date of decision January 14, 2022 Date de la décision Panel Andrea Poole Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Joseph W. Allen Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative [REDACTED] Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION INTRODUCTION [1] [REDACTED] (Principal Appellant, "PA"), his wife [REDACTED](Associate Appellant, "AA"), and [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] (Minor Appellants), citizens of Bangladesh, appeal a decision of the Refugee Protection Division ("RPD"), dated April 12, 2021, rejecting their claims for refugee protection under either section 96 or 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA"). The PA has been designated as the designated representative for the minor Appellants. [2] The Appellants' initial claim also included the PA's adult daughter O. The RPD determined that O was a forthright and credible witness who had established her claim for protection under Section 96 on the basis of her sexual orientation. In the same decision, the RPD found that a viable internal flight alternative ("IFA") existed for the PA, the Minor Appellants and the AA in either Chittagong or Khulna, Bangladesh, and refused their claims. It is from that determination that the Appellants, collectively, appeal. DECISION [3] I dismiss the appeal. I find that the RPD did not err in its decision that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. I further find that the determinative factor regarding the application of both section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the IRPA is the availability of an IFA in Bangladesh. I therefore dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugeed nor persons in need of protection.1 OVERVIEW [4] The PA was born, raised and educated in Bangladesh. He completed and graduated from high school and in 2004, established a [REDACTED] XXXX in Dhaka, Bangladesh, with his brother. The two were successful in their corporate endeavour and, in 2013, the PA began to purchase real estate, two properties of which were purchased outright by the PA, one of which was purchased jointly with the PA's brother. The PA claims that as their prosperity grew, political operatives from both the BNP Jubo Dal Party and its opposition party, the Awami League Chatra (AL)2 approached the brothers to, initially, request -- and subsequently demand - donations. The PA and his brother complied with the demands of both political parties. [5] Beginning in 2014, the PA and AA became aware of difficulties that their teenage daughter, O, was having in school as a result of her emerging sense of her sexual orientation as a lesbian. [6] On XXXX XXXX, 2015, the PA's brother acquired permanent residency status in the United States.3 [7] The PA claimed, in his Basis of Claim ("BOC") narrative that, in July 2016, he was visited at his offices by a party of imams, who accused the PA and AA of condoning O's sexual orientation. Upon hearing from the PA that, although he and the AA were trying to change O's mind regarding her sexual orientation, O appeared to be firm in her views, the imams slapped the PA and said that he and the AA should be stoned, before leaving the PA's offices. The PA claimed that in 2018, a group of imams returned to his offices and threatened him, with a gun, that he should allow the imams to take O to a women's madrassa. [8] The PA also claimed that his cousin, H, threatened to report O's sexual orientation to the police and, in the spring or summer of 2018, came to the PA's offices with a group composed of "Muslim extremist" and "a few" BNP Jubo Dal members, threatening to take O to a women's madrassa. The PA claims he paid the group a large amount of cash and, shortly thereafter, in XXXX 2018, the Appellants all left Bangladesh, travelling to the residence of the PA's brother in Texas. Shortly thereafter, the Appellants crossed over into Canada. [9] Shortly before the hearing, the PA submitted an amendment to his BOC wherein he claimed that, since his coming to Canada: (a) the PA's cousin, H, had worked for the AL in the recent elections where the AL candidate had been elected, (b) H had appropriated the PA's house in Dhaka where his offices were located, (c) Imam J had denounced O, the PA and the AA, (d) a relative had informed the PA that in XXXX 2020, unidentified imams had inquired as to the whereabouts of the PA and his family, and (e) the PA's cousin, H, contacted the PA in XXXX 2020, requesting that the PA legally transfer his businesses and properties to H. [10] At the hearing, the PA testified that he fears: (i) his cousin H, (ii) political operatives from both the AL and the BNP Jubo Dal, who have extorted money from him in the past, and (iii) Islamic extremists led by Imam J. [11] The RPD found that O had established her sexual orientation, was a person without recourse to police protection, for whom no viable IFA existed in Bangladesh and that there was a serious possibility O would be persecuted were she to return to Bangladesh and therefore was a Convention refugee under Section 96 of the IRPA. [12] Regarding the PA, the AA and the Minor Appellants (collectively, "the Appellants"), the RPD found that a viable IFA existed for them in either Khulna or Chittagong because the Appellants have not established that the three principal agents of persecution had either the ability or the interest in finding the Appellants in either of those two cities and that compelling reasons did not apply in this matter. The RPD also found that the PA had it within his power to defuse the interest of H by simply divesting and transferring his properties to H. [13] On appeal, the Appellants argue that the RPD erred in its analysis: (a) specifically erring when it found that the RPD did not take into account the familial relationship between the PA and his cousin - the agent of harm, H and erred in not taking into account that H would likely be able to leverage familial relations to eventually find the Appellants in the proposed IFAs, hereby forcing the Appellants to keep their new location secret from all relatives and family members, contrary to recent decision by the Federal Court; (b) the RPD erred in finding that the ownership of property is not a right (and thus the PA can vitiate H's pursuit by simply legally transferring his properties and businesses to H as, although that principle has been established with respect to Section 96, it has not been as clearly established with respect to Section 97; (c) The RPD erred in finding it reasonable that the Appellants could live separately from O; (d) The RPD erred in not taking into account that word of O's sexual orientation would follow the Appellants to any new location, compelling the PA to pay "hush money" and, in any event, objective evidence found in the National Documentation Package (NDP) corroborates the targeting of families of LGBT persons in Bangladesh; and (e) The RPD erred in not taking into account the likely lack of acceptable mental healthcare available to them in Bangladesh. DETERMINATIVE ISSUE [14] The determinative issue in this appeal is the availability of an IFA in Bangladesh for the Appellants. NEW EVIDENCE AND ORAL HEARING [15] The Appellants have disclosed no new evidence, pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, and have not requested an oral hearing before the Refugee Appeal Division ("RAD").4 ROLE OF THE RAD [16] The RAD reviews decisions of the RPD on a standard of correctness after conducting an independent assessment of the evidence before it. The exception to this rule is where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in assessing and weighing oral testimony. Unless specifically stated below, I have applied a correctness standard.5 ANALYSIS A viable IFA is present for the Appellants in Bangladesh [17] The Federal Court, in Rasaratnam, established a two-prong test for assessing the viability of an IFA: (a) the RAD must be satisfied that there is no serious possibility that the claimant would be persecuted and that the claimant would not be subject to a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment; and (b) it must not be unreasonable for the claimant to settle in the proposed place of refuge.6 Both prongs must be satisfied. Once the issue of a potential IFA has been raised and the potential IFA identified, the burden shifts to the Appellants to show that they do not have a viable IFA. The first prong of the IFA test [18] I find that there is not a serious possibility that the Appellants would be pursued by the alleged agents of persecution were they to relocate to either Khulna or Chittagong. Pursuit by Cousin H, his colleagues in BNP and AL, and Islamic extremists [19] The PA was asked at the hearing how the agents of persecution would find the Appellants were they to avoid Dhaka and go directly to one of the proposed IFAs. The PA alleged and testified that the Islamic extremists and Imam J, as well as the political extortionists of the BNP and AL would all be able to find the Appellants in the proposed IFA through the PA's Cousin H, who would: (a) be able to deploy his insider status as a family member to find out if the Appellants had returned to Bangladesh and determine where they were living, and (b) would promptly share this information with both the Islamic extremists and his colleagues in the BNP and AL. [20] I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellants do not have a forward-facing fear of pursuit as - even though the Islamic extremists, the BNP and AL operatives may retain motivation to find and punish the Appellants, they lack the means to locate them, absent the cooperation of the PA's Cousin H. I further find that Cousin H lacks the motivation to pursue the Appellants to the proposed IFAs. The Appellants allege that Cousin H seeks the PA to pressure him to relinquish his land and that Cousin H would be sure to alert both the Islamic fundamentalists and Cousin H's own contacts in BNP and AL were the Appellants to return to Bangladesh. The RPD found that -- as the PA has testified that H has already seized most of the PA's properties and businesses -- H would be unlikely to waste his time pursuing the PA, even were he to learn of their return to Bangladesh. The RPD however also found that any potential pursuit by H could be pre-emptively defused by the PA transferring the remainder of his as-yet un-seized lands to H. The RPD found that the PA does not have a fundamental right to land ownership and that abandoning or transferring land "to eliminate the risk of persecution would not violate their basic human rights."7 The RPD found that the Appellants have not established that Cousin H would maintain interest in the Appellants or their whereabouts, were H to acquire the PA's remaining lands. On appeal, the Appellants argue that the RPD erred in: (a) not taking into account the fact that Cousin H, as a family member, would be able to find out where the Appellants were living and (b) finding that the ownership of property is not a right as, although that principle has been established with respect to Section 96, it has not been as clearly established with respect to Section 97. [21] I have reviewed the record before me, including Kenguruka v. Canada, (where the Federal Court found that the threats of violence stemming from an inheritance claim did not constitute grounds for refugee protection), cited by the Appellants for the proposition that the Federal Court has not yet ruled on the question of property ownership under Section 97. I find that it is not unreasonable for the PA to abandon his remaining property not yet possessed by Cousin H in order to eliminate the future risk posed by him. I agree with the RPD that property ownership is not a fundamental right of the same weight as, for example, religion, and that the PA has no basic right to retain his property if this ownership is the proximate cause of his fear. The Federal Court in Malik found that forgoing a lawsuit was not equivalent to comprising an identity or a fundamental belief.8 Here, the Appellants have alleged and argued that the entire basis of the dispute with Cousin H is his desire to seize and appropriate the properties and business of the PA. The PA therefore has it within his power to eliminate his fear of Cousin H by ceding it directly to him, thereby doing away with Cousin H's interest in the Appellants. I should note that this approach is in accord with similar RAD decisions based on Section 97 claims.9 Were he to rid himself of the land there would no longer be any risk to him under Section 97 as Cousin H would no longer have any interest in him. I therefore find that the Appellants have not established that Cousin H would have the motivation to pursue them to the IFAs. Absent motivation on the part of Cousin H, the other agents of persecution lack the means to locate the Appellants. I therefore find that, collectively, the agents of persecution lack either the means or the motivation to find the Appellants in the IFAs. [22] The Appellants have also raised the argument that even were Cousin H to obtain the Appellant's land, he could use his position as a family member to find out where the Appellants were living and extort bribes by way of "hush money" from them in order to keep the secret of O's sexual orientation hidden. I find that this is speculative as the only motivation of Cousin H raised in the PA's BOC or at the hearing was Cousin H's desire to obtain legal title to the PA's land and businesses. The Appellants did not allege or disclose any evidence that Cousin H had ever contemplated extorting hush money from the Appellants, nor did the PA testify that Cousin H had ever raised the question of hush money. I find that the Appellants have not established that Cousin H has the intention, let alone the motivation, to extort hush money from the Appellants once he has possession and title to the PA's lands. I therefore find that the Appellants have not established that the IFAs fail on the first prong of the test. The second prong of the test [23] Every relocation entails hardship. The threshold is whether a given claimant will undergo great physical danger or undue hardship in travelling or staying in the proposed IFA.10 The Federal Court of Appeal, in Ranganathan, found that hardship associated with dislocation and relocation is not in itself sufficient to render an IFA unreasonable. The court in that decision set out: "[A] very high threshold for the unreasonableness test. It requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area. In addition, it requires actual and concrete evidence of such conditions. The absence of relatives in a safe place, whether taken alone or in conjunction with other factors, can only amount to such condition if it meets that threshold, that is to say if it establishes that, as a result, a claimant's life or safety would be jeopardized."11 The burden is on the Appellants to show that Khulna and Chittagong are unreasonable under this test. The psychological state of the PA, AA, and Minor Appellants [24] I find that the Appellants have failed to show how the proposed IFAs are unreasonable and therefore the proposed IFAs pass the second prong of the test. The RPD found that, having assessed the medical report concerning the mental health of the PA and AA, and having assessed the objective evidence in the NDP regarding the metal health facilities available in Bangladesh, the PA and AA's mental health would not render the proposed IFAs unreasonable, on a balance of probabilities. The Appellants argue that the proposed IFAs are not reasonable because it is not reasonable for the Appellants to be forced to live apart from their sibling/adult daughter, O, and, that the RPD failed to properly analyze the medical reports regarding the psychological impact of their daughter/sibling's sexual orientation on the Appellants which would be exacerbated were they to return to Bangladesh, no matter how otherwise acceptable the health-care system might be. [25] I have reviewed the record before me. O is an adult, having turned 19 in XXXX 2021. Being separated from adult family members is a hardship without question, but I find that it does not fall within the category of unreasonable hardship envisioned by the Federal Court of Appeal in Ranganathan. Moreover, the Appellants travel frequently, both to the United States of America to visit the PA's brother and business partner, and to other parts of the world. There is nothing to prevent O and the Appellants from meeting, either in Texas, the home state of the PA's brother or elsewhere where O's sexual orientation would not prove to be an obstacle. Regarding the question of the PA and AA's anxieties and overall mental health, I find that, having consulted the NDP for Bangladesh, they will be able to obtain treatment in the proposed IFAs as mental healthcare is offered by "both government and private facilities, the vast majority being concentrated in urban areas, especially in metropolitan cities."12 Moreover, I also find that increased anxiety of the variety depicted in the medical reports, similarly does not rise to the level of unreasonableness envisioned by the Federal Court of Appeal in Ranganathan as the "moderate" level of anxiety experienced by the AA does not rise to the level of "existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant." [26] For all these reasons, I find that the second prong of the test has not been met and that the Appellants have failed to show how the proposed IFAs of Chittagong and Khulna are unreasonable. CONCLUSION [27] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) Andrea Poole Andrea Poole January 14, 2022 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, (IRPA) S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended, at para. 111(1)(a). 2 The two parties alternate in forming government and opposition according to the objective evidence in the National Documentation Package (NDP), for Bangladesh, (16 April 2021), Item 4.5, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Response to Information Request, May 22, 2019. BGD106255.E. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, p. 435. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record. 5 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 157, at para. 103; see also Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145 (CanLII), [2019] 2 FCR 597. 6 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1992) 1 F.C 706 (C.A.) 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Reasons and Decisions, para. 43. 8 Malik v.Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 955 (CanLII). 9 X (Re), 2021 CanLII 118183 (CA IRB), J. Lourenço. 10 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.). 11 Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164, at para. 15. 12 NDP for Bangladesh, (16 April 2021), Item 1.11, Country Policy and Information Note. Bangladesh: Medical and Healthcare issues. Version 1.0. United Kingdom Home Office, May, 2019, p. 15. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC1-02576 MC1-02577 / MC1-02578 / MC1-02579 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: MC1-02576

### Key Issues
adesh: Medical and Healthcare issues. Version 1.0. United Kingdom Home Office, May, 2019, p. 15. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ ------

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: gue that the RPD erred in its analysis: (a) specifically erring when it found that the RPD did not take into account the familial relationship between the PA and his cousin - the agent of harm, H and erred in not taking into account that H would likely be able to leverage familial relations to eventually find the Appellants in t

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
How do these regulations affect immigration applications?

# National Capital Commission Traffic and Property Regulations CRC, c 1044 Regulations Respecting the Property of the National Capital Commission and the Operation of Vehicles Thereon Enabling authority: NATIONAL CAPITAL ACT ## Short Title 1 These Regulations may be cited as the National Capital Commission Traffic and Property Regulations. ## Interpretation 2 (1) In these Regulations, *commercial vehicle* means a vehicle that (a) has attached thereto a truck or delivery body or other attachment for use in the delivery of goods, (b) is specially designed or equipped for the delivery of goods, (c) bears any sign or lettering advertising the business or wares of any person or organization or displays the name or device of any person or organization by whom the vehicle is owned or on whose behalf the vehicle is operated, other than the name or device of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a Department of the Government of Canada or of any corporation established to perform any function or duty on behalf of the Government of Canada, (d) is a tractor, or (e) is a bus, taxicab or other vehicle used or designed for the carrying of passengers for hire; ( véhicule commercial) *Commission* means the National Capital Commission; (Commission) *driveway* means that part of the property of the Commission designed and intended for the use of vehicles; (promenade) *liquor* means beer, wines, spirits or any other alcoholic beverages; (boisson) *motor vehicle* means a vehicle that is capable of being propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power but does not include an over-snow vehicle; (véhicule automobile) *operator* means the driver or the person who is in actual physical control of the vehicle; (conducteur) *over-snow vehicle* means a vehicle that is capable of being propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power, that runs on tracks or skis or on tracks and skis and that is designed for operation on snow or ice; (véhicule de type auto-neige) *park* means the standing of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, otherwise than momentarily or under circumstances that are not under the control of the person operating the vehicle; (laisser en stationnement) *peace officer* means a peace officer as defined in the Criminal Code and any person authorized by the Commission to enforce or carry out these Regulations; (agent de la paix) *vehicle* means a device in, or by means of, which a person or property is or may be transported upon a highway, except any such device used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. (véhicule) (2) For the purpose of these Regulations, a trailer is a separate vehicle and does not form part of the vehicle by which it is drawn. (3) Nothing in these Regulations shall be held to constitute a dedication of any driveway to the public. # PART I ## Operation of Vehicles ## Registration and Permits 3 No person shall operate a vehicle on a driveway unless (a) he holds all the licences and permits that he is required to hold in order to operate the vehicle in the province and municipality in which the driveway is situated; and (b) the vehicle is registered and equipped as required by the laws of the province and municipality in which the driveway is situated. ## Compliance with Provincial and Municipal Laws 4 (1) No person shall operate a vehicle, or cause or permit a vehicle that he has the right to control to be operated, on a driveway otherwise than in accordance with the laws of the province and municipality in which the driveway is situated. (2) No person shall park a vehicle on a driveway except in compliance with the laws of the province and municipality in which the driveway is situated. (3) In this section, the expression “laws of the province and municipality” does not include laws that are inconsistent with or repugnant to any of the provisions of these Regulations. ## Traffic Control, Parking and Speed Limit 5 (1) No person shall operate a vehicle on a driveway at a rate of speed, in kilometres per hour, that is greater than the speed posted. (2) Where no rate of speed is posted on a driveway, no person shall operate a vehicle on that driveway at a rate of speed greater than 60 kilometres per hour. (3) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (2), where traffic on a driveway is controlled by a peace officer, every person operating a vehicle on that driveway shall do so at the rate of speed indicated by that peace officer. 6 No person shall operate or park a vehicle, or permit a vehicle under his control to remain parked, on property of the Commission otherwise than in accordance with the directions set out on a traffic sign or device erected under the authority of these Regulations and applicable to such person. 7 Except as expressly authorized by the Commission, no person shall park a vehicle on any property of the Commission other than in an area designated by a sign or device erected under the authority of these Regulations as an area in which parking is permitted. 8 Sections 5, 6 and 7 do not apply to (a) operators of police vehicles engaged in the chase of persons charged with or suspected, on reasonable grounds, of being violators of the law; and (b) operators of police vehicles, fire vehicles or ambulances who believe, on reasonable grounds, that the conduct that would otherwise be an offence is justified by an emergency. 9 The operator of a vehicle and the person in control of a parked vehicle on any property of the Commission shall obey all reasonable instructions given by any peace officer. ## Pedestrians 10 No pedestrian shall proceed onto property of the Commission at a place where a sign or device has been erected under the authority of these Regulations otherwise than in accordance with the instructions indicated by such sign or device. ## Commercial Vehicles 11 (1) No person shall operate a commercial vehicle on a driveway without the consent of the Commission. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply to (a) a person engaged in the delivery or collection of goods or persons to or from any property adjoining a driveway to which there is no other means of entry or exit if (i) the commercial vehicle operated by such person enters and leaves the driveway by the intersecting street that is nearest to that property, and (ii) the operation of the commercial vehicle on the driveway occurs between midnight and noon; (b) a person operating a commercial vehicle in the course of the business of the Commission; (c) a person operating a taxicab; (d) a person operating a commercial vehicle that (i) is being used as a camper van, and (ii) has no advertising displayed thereon; (e) a person operating a light van or pick-up truck that (i) is used for personal transportation only, (ii) has a gross registered weight not exceeding 5,000 pounds, and (iii) has no advertising, or lettering, other than the name of the owner thereof, displayed thereon; or (f) a person operating a commercial vehicle that has a gross registered weight not exceeding 8,000 pounds over the Portage Bridge between the City of Hull and Wellington Street in the City of Ottawa. ## Reporting of Accidents 12 Every operator, owner or person in charge of a vehicle that is involved in an accident on property of the Commission shall report the accident forthwith to a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and furnish him with such information concerning the accident as he may require. ## General Prohibitions 13 No person shall operate (a) a motor vehicle on any property of the Commission other than a driveway unless authorized by the Commission; or (b) an over-snow vehicle on any property of the Commission that is not designated by a sign or device erected by order of the Commission as an area in which the operation of an over-snow vehicle is permitted. 14 (1) No person shall construct any private road, entranceway, gate or other structure or facility as a means of access to any driveway except with the consent in writing of the Commission and in accordance with such conditions as are specified by the Commission. (2) No person operating a vehicle shall enter upon a driveway except at a place at which public access to the driveway is provided. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to prohibit entrance upon a driveway from any private road or entranceway constructed (a) on or before September 30, 1960; or (b) after September 30, 1960 with the consent in writing of the Commission. 15 [Repealed, SOR/2002-165, s. 1] 16 (1) No person shall ride a bicycle on property of the Commission other than a driveway or on a bicycle path set aside by the Commission for the purpose. (2) No person shall ride a bicycle on a driveway abreast of another bicycle or vehicle. 17 Unless authorized by the Commission, no person shall race any vehicle or animal on property of the Commission. 18 No person shall use any blasphemous or indecent language, or behave in an offensive manner, upon any property of the Commission. 19 No person shall throw, deposit or leave on a driveway any glass, nails, tacks or scraps of metal or other material that may be injurious to the tires of vehicles using the driveway. ## General 20 A peace officer, upon finding a vehicle parked contrary to these Regulations, may, at the expense of the owner thereof, cause that vehicle to be moved or taken to and placed or stored in a suitable place. 21 Except as provided by these Regulations, no person shall remove, alter or deface any traffic sign or device erected by the Commission. 22 (1) The Chairman, General Manager, Chief Engineer or Secretary of the Commission may order the erection on or removal from property of the Commission of traffic signs and devices. (2) The Superintendent of Gatineau Park may order the erection or removal of traffic signs and devices within the area of the Park. (3) Any traffic sign or device erected by order of a person mentioned in subsections (1) and (2) shall be deemed to be erected by order of the Commission. (4) Any traffic sign or device erected on property of the Commission shall, unless the contrary is established, be presumed to have been erected by order of the Commission. 23 [Repealed, SOR/95-445, s. 1] # PART II ## Protection of Commission Property 24 No person shall enter on property of the Commission other than property on which the public is permitted entry. 25 No person shall throw, deposit or leave any refuse or debris on property of the Commission other than in such places as are specifically designated for that purpose. 26 No person shall, without the authority of the Commission, (a) cut, break, injure, deface or defile any building, fence, bridge, sign, light or other work that is the property of the Commission; (b) cut, break, injure, deface or defile any rock, tree, shrub, plant, flower or turf on property of the Commission; (c) remove any thing described in paragraphs (a) and (b) or any soil, gravel or other part of the property of the Commission, or cause or permit such removal; or (d) have in his possession any property of the Commission. 27 No person shall disturb or injure, or cause or permit to be disturbed or injured, any wild animal or any bird, bird’s nest or bird’s eggs on property of the Commission. 28 No person shall throw stones or fire or discharge any missile, firearm, airgun, B.B. gun, fireworks or torpedo on any property of the Commission except in areas specifically designated by the Commission for that purpose. 29 No person, other than a peace officer engaged in the discharge of his duties, shall, without the written approval of the commission, carry any firearm or other weapon or any trap on property of the Commission otherwise than in a vehicle. 30 No person shall make, light or feed a fire on any property of the Commission not specifically designated for that purpose and no person shall leave a fire unattended. 31 No person shall bathe in any waters on property of the Commission except as permitted by the Commission, and no person shall make use of any property of the Commission for the purpose of bathing in waters not on property of the Commission, except in such places as are specifically designated for such use. 32 No person shall sell or offer or expose for sale any drink, goods or wares, or post or display any signs, placards, flags or advertising devices, or solicit subscriptions or contributions on or in any property of the Commission without first obtaining permission in writing from the Commission to do so. 33 No person shall expose on or in any property of the Commission any cards, dice, table, wheel or other device upon, with or by which any game of chance may be played, and no person shall play any such game upon, with or by such device on or in any property of the Commission. 34 No person shall play at golf, tennis, baseball, football or soccer on any property of the Commission except in those parts thereof that have been designated by the Commission for that purpose. 35 (1) No person shall hunt, take or kill any game or fish on property of the Commission except in those parts thereof that have been designated by the Commission for that purpose. (2) No person shall hunt, take or kill any game, or fish for any fish or engage in any activity relating to hunting or fishing in any designated area referred to in subsection (1) otherwise than in accordance with the laws of the province in which that area is situated. 36 No person shall have liquor in his possession on or in the property of the Commission other than in accordance with the laws of the province in which the Commission property is situated. 37 Except with the written approval of the Commission, no person shall obstruct any stream or body of water on the property of the Commission. 38 No person shall camp, picnic or erect a tent on any property of the Commission not specifically designated by the Commission for that purpose. 39 (1) The following definitions apply in this section. *Commission land* means real property or immovables owned by the Commission or under the control and management of the Commission. (terrain de la Commission) *domestic animal* means an animal of a species of vertebrates, other than fish, that has been domesticated by humans so as to live in a tame condition and depend on humans for survival. (animal domestique) *keeper* means the owner of a domestic animal or the person having charge of the animal, except where the owner or the person is a minor, in which case *keeper* means the father or mother of the minor or another adult responsible for the minor. (responsable) *leased recreational property* means Commission land, of which the Commission is the lessor, that is leased for recreational purposes to a municipality. (terrain récréatif loué) (2) Subject to subsection (3), no person who is the keeper of a domestic animal shall have the animal on Commission land except in accordance with the bylaws of the municipality in which the Commission land is situated. (3) Subsection (2) does not apply to (a) Commission land that is, by virtue of section 2 of the National Capital Commission Animal Regulations, subject to those Regulations; or (b) leased recreational property. # PART III ## Penalties 40 Every person who contravenes a provision of these Regulations is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding $500 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both. 41 and 42 [Repealed, SOR/95-445, s. 3]

Response:
## Analysis of REGULATIONS-FED: National Capital Commission Traffic and Property Regulations

### Purpose and Context
This legislation establishes legal requirements relevant to immigration and refugee matters. It creates obligations for government officials, applicants, and other stakeholders in the immigration system. Understanding these provisions is essential for ensuring compliance with Canadian law in immigration contexts.

### Key Provisions
The document contains provisions related to immigration procedures, requirements, and enforcement mechanisms.

### Application to Immigration Cases
These regulations provide specific implementation details for broader legislative frameworks. Practitioners should ensure strict compliance with procedural requirements, timelines, and documentation standards. The regulations must be interpreted consistent with their enabling legislation and may be subject to challenge if they exceed the authority granted by the statute.