Prompt:
How does this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada evaluate refugee protection needs?

Immigration and Refugee Board Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié Refugee Protection Division Section de la protection des réfugiés RPD File No. / No de dossier de la SPR : MA7-01836 Private Proceeding Huis clos Claimant(s) Demandeur(e)s d'asile XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX Date(s) of Hearing Date(s) de l'audience April 30, 2008 Place of Hearing Lieu de l'audience Montréal, Quebec Date of Decision Date de la décision May 7, 2008 Panel Tribunal Me Alain Bissonnette Claimant's Counsel Conseil du demandeur d'asile Me Gisele Barraza Tribunal Officer Agent du tribunal Normand Leduc Designated Representative Représentant désigné N/A Minister's Counsel Conseil du ministre N/A INTRODUCTION XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX, a Mexican citizen, is claiming refugee protection under section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the Act). She alleges that she was persecuted by reason of her membership in a particular social group and that she would be personally subjected to a risk to her life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, as well as to a danger of torture, should she return to her country. SUMMARY OF ALLEGED FACTS The claimant, who was a XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX in Mexico State, alleged that her problems began in early XXXXX 2006, when XXXXX XXXXX and XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX, who benefited from police protection, demanded modest amounts of money from the claimant to prevent her business from being attacked. The claimant alleged that on XXXXX, 2006, XXXXX XXXXX and XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX showed up at her business and ordered her to give them 200 pesos, which she refused to do. She also alleged that when she refused, these two people tried to steal her XXXXX -her main work tool-but that she stopped them by asking some friends to help and fighting the two people, who then hit her and threatened to kill her. The claimant alleged that on XXXXX, 2006, she filed a complaint with the public ministry in XXXXX XXXXX (Mexico State). The claimant alleged that on XXXXX, 2006, she decided to close her business and go to live with an aunt in a village in the region of XXXXX in XXXXX XXXXX. She also alleged that on XXXXX, 2006, at that location, she received a telephone call during which her life was threatened. The claimant alleged that on XXXXX, 2006, she returned to Mexico State and reopened her business, even though she feared for her life. She also alleged that on XXXXX, 2006, she returned to the public ministry to follow up on her complaint of XXXXX, 2006, but that she was told that she had to pay 500 pesos to access the information and receive a copy of her complaint. The claimant alleged that from XXXXX 2006 to XXXXX 2007, XXXXX XXXXX and XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX regularly threatened to kill her and asked each time for about 100 to 200 pesos, but that she always refused to pay them. The claimant alleged that on XXXXX XXXXX 2007, XXXXX XXXXX came to her business and threatened to kill her if she said anything, and he stole the previous day's proceeds, an amount of 2,500 pesos. She also alleged that she then decided to sell her business and leave her country. The claimant left Mexico on March 5, 2007, and claimed refugee protection in Canada the same day. ANALYSIS Given the copy of the claimant's passport submitted into evidence,1 the panel is satisfied as to her identity. The determinative issue in this case is whether the claimant did what was necessary in the circumstances to seek and avail herself of the protection of the Mexican authorities. When asked during the hearing whether she had filed a complaint about the death threats that she received, the claimant answered that she had referred to the death threats in the complaint that she had filed on XXXXX, 2006. She also stated, in response to a question from her lawyer during the hearing, that the surveillance report written by the executive committee of the market where she worked mentioned these threats.2 When asked whether she subsequently alerted the authorities to the death threats and the ensuing extortion demands, the claimant answered that on XXXXX, 2006, she had wanted to follow up but was told that she had to pay 500 pesos to access the information and to receive a copy of her complaint. When asked whether she then took any other steps with the Mexican authorities, such as asking other market merchants and the market's executive committee for support, the claimant answered that she had not taken any other steps because she was afraid. When asked during the hearing whether she had filed a complaint about the alleged extortion on XXXXX, 2007, or about the death threats uttered at that time, the claimant answered that she had not because the authorities had done nothing previously. During her submissions, the claimant's lawyer referred to the documentary evidence indicating that complaints are rarely filed in Mexico. The lawyer stated that in the claimant's case, she complained once, but nothing came of it. The claimant's lawyer also stated that the documentary evidence indicates that in Mexico, human rights are not respected and that violence against women goes unpunished.3 The applicable test concerning the issue of whether state protection might reasonably be forthcoming must be objective.4 Mexico is a democratic country, and there is a presumption that the state is capable of protecting its citizens.5 In Mexico, criminality in general and corruption within the police forces6 are serious problems. However, the documentary evidence also indicates that efforts are being made to resolve the real and perpetual problems of criminality and corruption within the police forces and the judicial system, and that results are being seen, especially in the fact that criminals and corrupt police officers and civil servants have been arrested, tried and convicted.7 The government also finances organizations that help people who have difficulty obtaining state protection.8 When the absence of state protection is raised, evidence of the state's inability to provide protection must be adduced.9 This evidence must be relevant and must have probative force; in other words, a claimant seeking to rebut the presumption that state protection exists must submit relevant, reliable and convincing evidence.10 When a state is in effective control of its territory, has military, police and civil authorities, and makes serious efforts to protect its citizens, the mere fact that those efforts are not always successful is insufficient to rebut the presumption of state protection.11 That being said, state protection must be more than theoretical: it must be practical, real and effective,12 and a citizen is obligated to seek protection from the authorities of his or her country, unless it is objectively reasonable not do so, that is, unless such protection would not have been forthcoming.13 Based on all of the documentary evidence, the panel is of the opinion that the claimant's testimony and her lawyer's arguments do not constitute convincing evidence that the presumption that the Mexican authorities are capable of protecting their citizens has been rebutted in the claimant's case. Moreover, the panel is of the opinion that this is not a situation in which it was unreasonable to expect the claimant to take steps, beyond the local authorities,14 to alert the Mexican authorities and to seek their protection, particularly by telling them that she knew the identity of the two people who were threatening to kill her and who were constantly trying to extort money from her, XXXXX and XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX.15 Although according to her testimony she received constant death threats, the claimant gave the Mexican authorities a chance to protect her only once, on XXXXX, 2006. Consequently, the panel is of the opinion that she did not demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that she did what was necessary in the circumstances to avail herself of her country's protection.16 The claimant instead chose to come to Canada, but claiming refugee status in a state that is a signatory to the Convention must be a last resort. The above analysis deals with paragraph 97(1)(b) of the Act. The claimant presented no evidence that she was persecuted on any of the grounds listed in section 96 of the Act or that there are reasons to believe that she may be subjected to a danger of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture. CONCLUSION The panel determines that the claimant is not a refugee under section 96 or a person in need of protection under section 97 of the Act. For these reasons, her claim for refugee protection is rejected. Alain Bissonnette Me Alain Bissonnette May 7, 2008 Date 1 The copy of the passport is among the immigration documents filed as Exhibit A-2. 2 This document was filed as Exhibit P-6. 3 She then referred to the Amnesty International document at Tab 2.2 of the National Documentation Package on Mexico, January 30, 2008, filed as Exhibit A-1, as well as to a document by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mexico: State protection (December 2003 - March 2005), May 2005, 46 pages, at Tab 9.2 of the package. 4 Judge v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (IMM-5897-03), Snider, August 9, 2004; 2004 FC 1089, at paragraph 10: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2004/2004fc1089/2004fc1089.html. 5 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689; Ortiz Juarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (F.C., IMM-2410-01), Justice Phelan, March 6, 2006; 2006 FC 288: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2006/2006fc288/2006fc288.html. 6 Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mexico: Police - May 2004, 24 pages, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/publications/index_e.htm?docid=268&cid=145, at Tab 10.1 of the National Documentation Package. Also read Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Mexico: State protection (December 2003 - March 2005), May 2005, 46 pages, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/publications/index_e.htm?docid=283&cid=145, at Tab 9.2 of the National Documentation Package. 7 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Possible recourse for victims of bribery demands/corruption by government officials federally, MEX42663.E, October 1, 2004, 6 pages, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=432402, at Tab 9.8 of the National Documentation Package. 8 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, List of government-funded institutions that assist those having difficulty obtaining state protection, MEX43164.E, November 2004, 10 pages, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/research/rir/index_e.htm?action=record.viewrec&gotorec=432388, at Tab 9.7 of the National Documentation Package. 9 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Maria del Rosario FLORES CARRILLO, (No. A-225-07), Létourneau, Nadon, Sharlow, March 12, 2008; 2008 FCA 94, paragraph 38: decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/en/2008/2008fca94/2008fca94.html. 10 Idem, paragraph 30. 11 M.E.I. v. Villafranca, Igancio (F.C.A., No. A-69-90), Hugessen, Marceau and Décary, December 18, 1992. 12 Judge v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (IMM-5897-03), Snider, August 9, 2004; 2004 FC 1089, at paragraph 9: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2004/2004fc1089/2004fc1089.html; Kaur v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (IMM-2302-05), de Montigny, November 7, 2005; 2005 FC 1491, at paragraph 28: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2005/2005fc1491/2005fc1491.html; and Peralta Razo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (IMM-209-06), Dawson, November 30, 2007; 2007 FC 1265, at paragraph 10: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2007/2007fc1265/2007fc1265.html. 13 Trejo Soto v. Canada (M.C.I.), (IMM-282-05), Pinard, December 20, 2005, paragraph 7; 2005 FC 1654: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2005/2005fc1654/2005fc1654.html; Castro, Karen Rutter v. M.C.I., (IMM-4187-06), Kelen, January 17, 2007, at paragraph 14; 2007 FC 40: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2007/2007fc40/2007fc40.html. 14 Salazar Santos v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (IMM-4602-06), Barnes, July 30, 2007; 2007 FC 793, at paragraph 15: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2007/2007fc793/2007fc793.html; Perez Burgos, Gerson Alejandr v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (IMM-2028-06), Blanchard, December 21, 2006; 2006 FC 1537, at paragraph 35, citing Zhuravlvev, Anatoliy v. M.C.I., (F.C.T.D., IMM-3603-99), Pelletier, April 14, 2000: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2006/2006fc1537/2006fc1537.html; Martinez Dorado v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (IMM-7491-05), Harrington, July 27, 2006; 2006 FC 928, at paragraph 10: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2006/2006fc928/2006fc928.html. 15 Torres Lopez v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (IMM-3688-06), de Montigny, February 22, 2007; 2007 FC 198, at paragraph 22: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2007/2007fc198/2007fc198.html. 16 Campos Navarro v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), IMM-3158-07, de Montigny, March 17, 2008; 2008 FC 358, paragraph 17: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2008/2008fc358/2008fc358.html; Sanchez, Lizette Guzman v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, IMM-2420-07, Noël, January 18, 2008; 2008 FC 66, at paragraph 12: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fr/2008/2008cf66/2008cf66.html. REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / HARASSMENT / EMPLOYMENT / STATE PROTECTION / FEMALE / NEGATIVE / MEXICO --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- RPD File No. / No de dossier de la SPR : MA7-01836 6

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: MA7-01836

### Key Issues
also stated, in response to a question from her lawyer during the hearing, that the surveillance report written by the executive committee of the market where she worked mentioned

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: ction in Canada the same day. ANALYSIS Given the copy of the claimant's passport submitted into evidence,1 the panel is satisfied as to her identity. The determinative issue in this case is whether the claimant did what was necessary in the circumstances to seek and avail herself of the protection of the Mexican authorities. Whe

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
What factors were considered in this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada?

RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR : TA7-02522 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Claimant(s) XXXXX XXXXX Demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Date(s) of Hearing August 27, 2009 Date(s) de l'audience Place of Hearing Toronto, Ontario Lieu de l'audience Date of Decision September 17, 2009 Date de la décision Panel M. McCaffrey Tribunal Counsel for the Claimant(s) John Rokakis Conseil(s) du / de la / des demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Barrister and Solicitor Tribunal Officer N/A Agent(e) de tribunal Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre [1] XXXXX XXXXX is a citizen of Haiti who seeks refugee protection pursuant to pursuant to subsections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act1 (IRPA). Allegations [2] The claimant alleges that armed men, presumed to be from the Fanmi Lavalas (FL) faction, entered his home around 6 pm in the evening of XXXXX, 2001. He saw the intruders go towards the room of his brother, XXXXX, but fled the house before he was detected or knowing what happened later. He declared that he learned of his brother's death the following day, whereupon he fled into hiding. In XXXXX 2002, he left his hiding place and travelled to the USA on an altered USA passport. He was arrested upon arrival, detained for eight months and convicted in US Federal Court of uttering a false document. His subsequent claim for asylum was denied on XXXXX, 2006. He came to Canada seeking protection in February 2007. He claims a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his imputed political opinion and his membership in a particular social group, namely the family of XXXXX XXXXX. Issues and Determination [3] The panel finds that the claimant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The determinative issue was the credibility of the claimant. The panel's reasons are as follows: Identity [4] The claimant's identity is evidenced by his birth certificate,2 and US Immigration and State of Florida photo identification issued in his name.3 The panel is satisfied that the claimant is a citizen of Haiti by birth at Gonaïves. Credibility [5] It is established law that the claimant's sworn testimony is presumed to be true, unless there is valid reason to doubt its truthfulness.4 Unfortunately, the extent of the contradictions and instances of implausibility in matters central to the claim for protection give rise to doubt the claimant's credibility as a witness. [6] In his Personal Information Form (PIF),5 the claimant declared that he returned to his home after the incident with a friend named XXXXX. In his oral testimony, however, he claimed to have returned to the home with his cousin, XXXXX. When asked to explain this contradiction, the claimant replied he decided to put in his PIF exactly what he had told the US immigration authorities in his claim for asylum in that country. The claimant said that, apart from this part, the PIF narrative was complete and truthful. However, the panel draws negative inference from this contradictory testimony concerning who returned to the house with him. He had an opportunity when he made a claim in Canada to correct the "error" in names, he failed to do so. The panel did not find his explanation to be persuasive. [7] The claimant declared in his PIF and subsequent oral testimony that his brother XXXXX was dead. However, there is no death certificate attesting to this fact. Under further questioning, the claimant stated he believed his brother to be dead because the house was empty upon his return and he has had no contact with his brother since the incident. He also testified that he has had no news whatever from Haiti since his departure, and is not aware of the fate of his half-siblings still living in Haiti, according to the PIF. Absent any corroborating evidence, the panel finds that the death of the claimant's brother is speculation on his part. [8] The claimant testified that he spent one year in virtual house arrest, never leaving the home or backyard of his hiding place in a remote part of Haiti. He testified that, at the end of this year, he took a day-long trip on public transport, with many comings and goings in the vehicle en route, to take his flight from Port au Prince airport. Any number of people could have recognized him on this long journey and put his life in jeopardy. The panel finds it unreasonable behaviour for someone who allegedly spent a year in hiding fearing for his life. The panel finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant did not spend one year in hiding away from Gonaïves and that he has embellished his testimony in order to bolster his claim. [9] Before setting out on this trip, the claimant testified and confirmed that his cousin had given him a US passport in his name and the sum of 300 Haitian dollars. He twice stated he was given nothing more. When asked about how he boarded the plane at the airport he replied that he had a ticket. When asked if he had purchased the ticket with the money his cousin had given him, the claimant replied that the cousin had given him the ticket also, further contradicting previous sworn testimony. The panel draws a negative inference from this testimony. [10] After weighing the testimony and the claimant's written evidence, the panel finds that he is not a credible or trustworthy witness. Well-founded fear of persecution Nexus: a. Political Opinion [11] The claimant alleges that he fears persecution by reason of his political opinion. He declared that he attended two meetings of the political party MOCHRENA (Christian Movement for a New Haiti). These meetings took place in XXXXX, 2001, and the second in XXXXX, 2002, or 18 months apart. He claimed no membership in the party and no other involvement with MOCHRENA in Haiti. He did not participate in either of the two meetings he attended. Even if the panel were to accept his testimony as credible, and the panel does not, the limited nature of his participation amounts to a trivial political profile. [12] Speaking to the fate of returnees to Haiti, in a response to a request for information from the IRB, the UNHCR representative in Canada replied in part: [13] Some people are more likely than others to be targeted upon returning to Haiti because of their involvement in political or other activities (ibid.). The risks that a person faces when returning to Haiti depend on that person's political role or past and [translation] "are not necessarily related to that person's status as a Haitian who has lived abroad".6 With respect to the general situation in Haiti, the most recent report from Amnesty International for 2008 stated that levels of politically-motivated violence remained low.7 The most recent US State Department report declared that the government or its agents did not commit any known politically-motivated killings.8 [14] After weighing the claimant's declared fear against the preponderance of the documentary evidence, the panel finds that the claimant's fear of persecution by reason of his political opinion, imputed or otherwise, is not well-founded. b. Membership in a Particular Social Group [15] There is no evidence of the claimant's brother being an active member in the MOCHRENA, apart from the claimant's own testimony, which the panel determined was not credible or trustworthy. There is no reliable evidence before the panel to establish nexus based on membership in a particular social group, namely the family of his brother XXXXX. The panel does not find any well-founded fear of persecution for the claimant on Convention grounds. The panel determines that the claimant is not a Convention refugee. Personalized Risk [16] There was no evidence adduced to support a personalized fear of torture or risk to life or to cruel or unusual treatment or punishment, if the claimant were to return to Haiti. The panel finds there is no such risk and determines that the claimant is not a person needing protection, accordingly. Conclusion [17] The panel finds that the claimant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person needing protection. The panel therefore rejects his claim. (signed) "M. McCaffrey" M. McCaffrey September 17, 2009 Date REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / IMPUTED POLITICAL OPINION / PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP / FAMILY / HIDING / PERSONNAL INFORMATION FORM / CONTRADICTIONS/ GENERALIZED RISK / MALE / NEGATIVE / HAITI 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 2 Exhibits C-2, C-3. 3 Exhibit R/A-2 4 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.) 5 Exhibit C-1. 6 Exhibit R/A-1, item 14.1 7 Ibid, 2.2 8 Ibid, 2.1 --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RPD.15.7 (February 12, 2009) Disponible en français RPD.15.7 (February 12, 2009) Disponible en français RPD File No. : TA7-02522 RPD File No. :TA7-02522

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: TA7-02522

### Key Issues
ly the family of XXXXX XXXXX. Issues and Determination [3] The panel finds that the claimant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The determinative issue

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: ding protection, accordingly. Conclusion [17] The panel finds that the claimant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person needing protection. The panel therefore rejects his claim. (signed) "M. McCaffrey" M. McCaffrey September 17, 2009 Date REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / IMPUTED POLITICAL OPINION / PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP / F

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
What precedents are cited in this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Refugee Law Lab Reporter?

2023 RLLR 119 Citation: 2023 RLLR 119 Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division Date of Decision: December 19, 2023 Panel: Hannah Gray Counsel for the Claimant(s): N/A Country: Russia RPD Number: VC3-07126 Associated RPD Number(s): VC3 06774, VC3 06775 ATIP Number: A-2024-00593 ATIP Pages: N/A DECISION [1] MEMBER: So I have considered your testimonies today, and the other evidence in your case and I will now give you my decision orally. And you will also receive a written version of this decision in the mail, okay? So I will begin by telling you that my decision is a positive one (1), and I have accepted each of your claims, so congratulations. [2] CLAIMANT: Thank you. [3] ASSOCIATE CLAIMANT: Thank you very much. [4] MEMBER: You’re very welcome. I’m now going to read you the reasons for my decision, and they’re a bit lengthy, so just bear with me while I read those, okay? [5] Okay, this is the decision of the Refugee Protection Division in the claims of XXXX XXXX, and his spouse, XXXX XXXX, and their daughter, XXXX XXXX of Ukraine, who are claiming refugee protection pursuant to section 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the IRPA. [6] At the hearing, the associate claimant, who is the mother of the minor claimant, acted as the designated representative for her daughter pursuant to subsection 167(2) of the Act, and Rule 20 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules. [7] I have considered and applied the Chairperson’s Guideline 4 on Gender Considerations in Proceedings Before the Immigration and Refugee Board, which offers guidance with respect to any gender-specific issues present in this claim. [8] I’ve also applied and considered the Chairperson’s Guidelines on child refugee claimants, procedural and evidentiary issues as it relates to the claim of the minor claimant. [9] The claimants were self-represented for their hearing. DETERMINATION [10] I find that the claimants are Convention refugees pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA based on their well-founded fear of persecution in Ukraine. I also find that the principal claimant is a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the IRPA based on his well-founded fear of persecution in Russia. ALLEGATIONS [11] The specifics of the claim are stated in the claimant’s Basis of Claim forms and narratives in evidence. The claimants are a Ukrainian and Russian family from Ukraine. The principal claimant is a 34-year old Russian male, along with his 34-year old Ukrainian wife and their seven-year old Ukrainian child. [12] The claimants lived in XXXX (ph), Kyiv, Ukraine. In late XXXX 2022, the claimants fled from Ukraine to Switzerland after the Russian occupation of Ukraine as there was missiles and bombing of their country and their hometown, specifically. [13] The claimants then came to Canada in XXXX 2022, and made their refugee claim shortly after. The principal claimant is politically opposed to Russia’s military campaign and operation in Ukraine and does not want to participate in any war activities if he were forced to return to Russia now. The principal claimant moved from Russia to Ukraine in 2006 to study and has not been back to Russia since 2013. He received his Ukrainian permanent residency in 2014, and the principal claimant and associate claimant were married in 2015. [14] The principal claimant’s passport expires — Russian passport expires in 2025, and he does not want to approach the Russian government to renew it for the purposes of applying for a permanent residency in Canada. [15] Okay, I will now assess whether there’s any possibility for article 1(e) exclusion for the principal claimant regarding his permanent resident status in Ukraine. An article 1(e) exclusion is whether the principal claimant should be excluded from refugee protection due to his permanent residency in Ukraine. The principal claimant provided his permanent resident permit for Ukraine in evidence. Pursuant to article 1(e), the Convention refugee definition does not apply to a person who’s recognized by the authorities of a country in which they have taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of nationality of that country. The test for determining whether article 1(e) applies is set out in Zhang and Zhang states that considering all relevant factors to the date of the hearing, does the claimant have status substantially similar to that of its nationals in the third country. If the answer is yes, the claimant is excluded; if the answer is no, then the next question is whether the claimant previously had such status and lost it or had access to such status and failed to acquire it. If the answer is no, the claimant is not excluded under article 1(e), and if the answer is yes, the RPD must consider on balanced factors — various factors. These include, but are not limited, to the reason for the loss, which is voluntary or involuntary, whether the claimant could return to the third country, the risk the claimant would face in their home country, and Canada’s international obligations, and any other relevant facts. [16] I find that the claimant had status in Ukraine substantially similar to that of Ukrainian nationals at the time of the hearing. However, in assessing whether an individual has status substantially similar to that of nationals of a third country, the jurisprudence as how a number of basic rights that are associated with nationality, including the right to return to the country of residence, the right to work freely without restrictions, the right to study, and full access to social services. The status should not be a temporary one (1) that must be renewed, and which may be cancelled. The claimant’s permanent residence permit for Ukraine was issued in 2014, as he was first in Ukraine — as he moved to Ukraine to study in 2006 and lived with his Ukrainian grandmother. The claimant testified that he initially went to Ukraine to study and then met his now wife, who is the associate claimant, and he has not returned to Russia since 2013. He further testified that as a Russian in Ukraine he’s not able to acquire Ukrainian citizenship as he would first have to denounce his Russian citizenship. And Russia does currently not allow any Russians in Ukraine to denounce their citizenship. With that said, I do find that the status or the permanent resident status afforded to the principal claimant did allow him the rights that are substantially similar to those held by nationals of Ukraine. As the claimant was able to travel freely, and he also had the right to obtain employment and experience access to education and other social services in Ukraine. [17] However, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine the situation has deteriorated, and it is not clear whether or not permanent residents of Ukraine who have Russian citizenship are able to travel freely in and out of the country. [18] Okay, so based on all the evidence before me, I do find that permanent residents of Ukraine in the past did have rights substantially similar to nationals. That being said, the purpose of article 1(e) is to exclude individuals who do not require protection because they have some form of surrogate protection in another safe country where they enjoy substantially the same rights and obligations as nationals of that country. And while there has been some disagreement in the Federal Court as to whether any risk in the 1(e) country should be examined by the Refugee Protection Division, and whether it should be done at the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment stage, the Refugee Appeal Division decision MB800025 was identified as a jurisprudential guide that states that the preferred interpretation of the Convention is that allegations of risk in any country of residence are to be taken into consideration in the analysis of whether a refugee claimant is excluded from refugee protection under article 1(e). The RAD noted that despite some divergence, the court has consistently endorsed the approach of the RPD and RAD members in assessing the risk in the article 1(e) country. The reasoning being that people who face persecution or serious harm in their country of residence cannot be said to enjoy surrogate protection, as is the case in this claim. [19] Also, the object and purpose of the Convention in article 1(e) require decision-makers to consider any risk raised by a claimant in their country of residence before they can be excluded from refugee protection. This framework respects Canada’s international obligations that flow from article 1(e). Therefore, I have adopted this framework and assessed the risks to the principal claimant in Ukraine. [20] The principal claimant testified that he’s a Russian citizen and would not be allowed to re-enter Ukraine using his Russian passport at this time due to the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine which began in February 2022. He testified that even if he were somehow able to re-enter Ukraine, he would face harm as a Russian citizen who would be perceived as being pro-Russian, and he would also face a risk of harm from the ongoing bombings and missiles in Ukraine now. [21] Therefore, based on the claimant’s testimony, and the objective evidence which will be assessed below, I find that he has established a nexus to the Convention on the grounds of his imputed or actual political opinion as a Russian in Ukraine if he were to return to Ukraine now. I also considered that the claimant would face a risk in Ukraine as someone who could be forced into conscription by the Ukrainian military. [22] According to the National Documentation Package for Ukraine, at NDP item 2.2, an Amnesty International Report states that members of far right groups target marginalized groups with harassment, intimidation, and violence, and often with total impunity. [23] NDP article — item 1.27 is article for a report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe which state that there are numerous reports of individuals perceived as being pro-Russian supporters who are mistreated and beaten by police, volunteer defence force members and others in territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine. The mistreatment, carried out by police officers, members of the territorial defence or civilians, usually consists of such individuals being duct taped to electricity poles or trees, partially or fully stripped, beaten, including with sticks and rods, and sprayed with paint or having the word marauder written on their body or clothes. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has documented more than 45 such cases. [24] But that was as of June 2022, and the number is most likely higher at this point in time. [25] Based on the totality of the evidence before me, I find the principal claimant has established a subjective fear of persecution that — and it objectively — and he has established that his subjective fear is objectively well-founded. And I find the principal claimant would find a risk of persecution in Ukraine based on his imputed or actual political opinion if he were to return now as a Russian citizen. ANALYSIS Identity [26] I am satisfied with the personal and national identity of the principal claimant as a citizen of Russia which is established by his testimony and the copies of his passport in evidence. I’m also satisfied with the personal and national identities of the associate claimant and minor claimant as citizens of Ukraine which is established by the associate claimant’s testimony and the copy of their passports in evidence. Credibility [27] When a claimant swears to the truth of their allegations, this creates a presumption that those allegations are true unless there’s reason to doubt their truthfulness. In this case, I find no reason to doubt the truthfulness of the claimants. They testified in a straightforward, forthright, detailed and candid manner, and there were no material inconsistencies, omissions, or contradictions between the claimants’ testimonies and the other evidence in this case. They did not exaggerate or tailor their evidence. And in summary, their testimonies were consistent with the other evidence on the central aspects of their claims. [28] I find the claimants provided ample details to expand upon their allegations, and they also provided a great deal of evidence prior to the hearing, which included a number of identity documents as well as their birth-certificates and newspaper articles, and they also including, during the hearing, social media posts that the principal claimant wrote on both Facebook and Instagram that he submitted into evidence during the hearing. [29] Given the claimants’ careful testimonies, I find they have established on a balance of probabilities, the facts alleged in their claims. Including that the claimants are a mixed Russian/Ukrainian family, and they fear a risk of harm in both Russia, due to their political opinion or imputed political opinion, as well as in Ukraine due to the ongoing war. [30] In sum, I find the claimants to be credible witnesses and, therefore, believe what they have alleged in support of their claims. Nexus [31] To qualify for refugee status under the refugee Convention, an individual must demonstrate that they have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. The allegations establishing nexus to the Convention for the principal claimant on the ground of his imputed or actual political opinion as a Russian who has publicly shared his anti-Russian views with his community both on social media as well as in person, or on the phone. Furthermore, the associate claimant and minor claimant have established a nexus to the Convention as they are members of a particular social group, as women or girls who face a risk of gender-based violence in a situation of war in Ukraine. [32] Based on the aforementioned evidence, I will assess their claims under section 96. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution and Risk of Harm for the Principal Claimant in Russia [33] The principal claimant testified that he will be arrested and harmed if he returns to Russia now as he will be perceived as a foreign agent or a spy as he lived in Ukraine since 2006 and married a Ukrainian. He further testified that he has since the war began he has shared his political views speaking out against the Russian Regime on social media as well as the family members in Russia who strongly disagree with his perspective. The principal claimant fears a risk to his life due to his actual or imputed political opinion in Russia. [34] According to the National Documentation Package at item 2.23 of the NDP, an Austrian Red Cross Report from May 2022, states that, on the 7th of April 2022, they published an article which deals with the prosecution of anti-war dissidents in Russia. This report notes the following. The authorities are exerting unprecedented pressure on dissenters. There are mass detentions and protest participants are being threatened with criminal prosecution for participating in activities of extremist organizations. The details of criminal cases against those opposing the war are not always known but their overall demeanour and the identities of those persecuted suggests the authorities are using the war as an excuse to crush dissent and totally cleanse civil society. Despite the numerous instances of violence perpetrated by representatives of the authorities who unjustifiably detain people at demonstrations, not a single criminal court case has been filed in response to these acts. Nonetheless, criminal proceedings can taint people against protestors for violence against police officers. Experience has shown that unbiased investigations and due process in such cases are not upheld in Russia. On the contrary, judicial proceedings are characterized by a blatant disregard for procedural norms and evidence for the defence. Penalties are disproportionate even for formal charges. [35] According to the Russian NDP at item 2.26, it states that media and internet providers or social networks which make information about the conflict in Ukraine accessible to the Russian public, are threatened with criminal prosecution and asked to remove the information. Furthermore, the principal claimant stated that he would be refused — that he could be forced to be conscripted into the Russian military if he were to return to Russia now. [36] According to NDP item 8.1, persons refusing to take part in the hostilities in Ukraine, as well as their family members, could face persecution by the authorities. Persons persecuted by law enforcement and convicted prisoners were also reported to be among the involuntary recruits. Human Rights activists reported that interned men who refused their deployment to Ukraine were threatened with contrived criminal proceedings. [37] In sum, based on all the evidence before me, I find the principal claimant has established that he would face a serious risk to his life if he were to return to Russia now as a Ukrainian permanent resident who lived in Ukraine for many years. His fear is indeed well-founded. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution and Risk of Harm in Ukraine [38] I also find the associate and minor claimants have established a well-founded fear of persecution in Ukraine based on their actual or imputed political opinion. As well as they could face persecution in Ukraine due to the ongoing war and a particular risk if they’re women or girls. [39] The National Documentation Package for Ukraine which includes a U.S. Department of State Report at item 2.1 indicates that in Russian controlled areas of Ukraine, Russian-led forces have engaged in unlawful or widespread civilian harm, and forced disappearances, or abductions, and torture or physical abuses of punishment. The report also states that in these areas there are significant human rights issues including arbitrary arrests, political prisoners, serious restriction on free expression, and substantial interference with freedom of assembly and religion. And the associate claimant and the minor claimant could be perceived as being pro-Russian due to their membership in a particular social group as family members of the principal claimant. [40] NDP item 1.6 for Ukraine states that since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine the ACLED records nearly 40,000 political violence events across the country. Three-quarters of these events are shelling, artillery and missile strikes, mostly effecting the north-eastern, eastern, and southern regions of Ukraine. [41] Meanwhile the long range strikes, including those deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure which pose a permanent threat and continue to induce extreme hardship for communities who are farther afield from the frontline. [42] Amnesty International Reports at item 1.7 of the NDP for Ukraine that according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, nearly one-third of Ukrainians have been displaced by the conflict and 6.2 million people remain displaced within Ukraine, and 7.8 million are estimated to be refugees in Europe. [43] Regarding any additional risk that the associate claimant and minor claimant may face as women or girls in Ukraine is corroborated in the NDP. The objective evidence, in particular a rapid gender analysis by Care International and U.N. Women at NDP item 5.6 states that women constitute the majority of those displaced within and outside of the country. And they face significantly increased safety and protection risks. Incidents of gender-based violence, particularly domestic violence and conflict related sexual violence. This report further delves into the challenges for women of all ages to access agent services in war torn areas of Eastern Ukraine, and many have fled and faced further hurdles in accessing safe shelters in the Western Region of the country. [44] Women and girls are also more at risk of conflict-based sexual assault. And NDP item 5.2 states that there is increasing and concerning media reports on conflict related sexual violence emerging in Ukraine. [45] Based on the totality of the evidence before me, I find that the associate and minor claimant have established a well-founded fear of persecution in Ukraine due to their membership in a particular social group as women or girls, as well as their actual or imputed political opinion as they are in a family with a Russian citizen and, therefore, I find the claimants would face a serious forward-facing possibility of persecution if they were to return to Ukraine now. State Protection and Internal Flight Alternative in Russia [46] In all refugee claims the state is presumed to be capable of protecting their citizens unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, given that the government is an agent of persecution for the principal claimant in Russia, it appears objectively unreasonable for the principal claimant to seek the protection of the state. Consequently, the presumption of state protection has been rebutted. [47] With respect to an Internal Flight Alternative, or IFA, I do not find that the principal claimant could safely live in any other part of Russia given that the agent of persecution is the government, and he cannot be expected to hide from the state. State Protection and Internal Flight Alternative in Ukraine for the Associate and Minor Claimant [48] I find there is clear and convincing evidence that the Ukrainian state is in a state of complete breakdown as a result of the ongoing large-scale Russian invasion and that for this reason the presumption of state protection has been rebutted. State protection would not be available to the claimants if they were to return to Ukraine now and seek it. Furthermore, in regard to the Internal Flight Alternative, the UNHCR at item 1.23 of the Ukrainian NDP states that it does not consider appropriate to deny international protection to Ukrainians and former habitual residents of Ukraine on the basis of an internal flight or relocation alternative. [49] Based on this evidence and considering the current state of events in Ukraine, I find there is no viable Internal Flight Alternative available for the claimants there. CONCLUSION [50] For the reasons above, I determine that the claimants are Convention refugees pursuant to section 96 of the Act and I accept each of their claims. [51] Thank you for bearing with me through that lengthy set of reasons, and congratulations. ——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: 2023 RLLR 119

### Key Issues
espect to any gender-specific issues present in this claim. [8] I’ve also applied and considered the Chairperson’s Guidelines on child refugee claimants, procedural and evidentiary

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: ken into consideration in the analysis of whether a refugee claimant is excluded from refugee protection under article 1(e). The RAD noted that despite some divergence, the court has consistently endorsed the approach of the RPD and RAD members in assessing the risk in the article 1(e) country. The reasoning being that people wh

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
How does this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada evaluate refugee protection needs?

RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR: TA6-16488 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Claimant(s) XXXXX XXXXX Demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Date(s) of Hearing July 16, 2009 Date(s) de l'audience Place of Hearing Toronto, Ontario Lieu de l'audience Date of Decision September 1, 2009 Date de la décision Panel L. S. Hart Tribunal Counsel for the Claimant(s) Kumar S. Sriskanda Barrister & Solicitor Conseil(s) du / de la / des demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Tribunal Officer N/A Agent(e) de tribunal Designated Representative(s) XXXXX XXXXX Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre [1] XXXXX XXXXX (the claimant) is a citizen of the People's Republic of China (China). He claims refugee protection pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.1 ALLEGATIONS [2] The claimant alleges that he was introduced to Christianity in 2004, by his second wife. He began to attend her Roman Catholic house church in XXXXX 2004. He was baptized in China on XXXXX, 2005. The claimant came to Canada to visit his daughter on XXXXX, 2006. He found out from his step-son that his church in China was raided in XXXXX 2006, that his wife had been arrested and detained and that the Public Security Bureau (PSB) was looking for him. The claimant decided to make a claim for refugee protection after discussing the situation with his daughter. DETERMINATION [3] For the reasons that follow, I find that the claimant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. ANALYSIS Identity [4] The claimant's testimony and the supporting documentation2 filed establish his identity as a national of China. Credibility [5] The determinative issue in this claim is the credibility of the claimant's Personal Information Form (PIF)3 narrative and oral testimony concerning his membership in an underground church in China, his pursuit by agents of the PSB and his identity as a Christian. I find that the claimant was not a credible witness. The reasons for this decision are noted below. THE CLAIMANT'S INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY AND MEMBERSHIP IN AN UNDERGROUND CHURCH [6] The claimant stated in his PIF that he was introduced to Christianity by his second wife in 2004. At that time, he was suffering from insomnia and his wife thought that it would lessen through prayer. He began to attend her underground Roman Catholic church in XXXXX 2004. He stated in his Personal Information Form that there were 70 to 80 members of that church who attended services, which were held every Sunday in a shed behind someone's house and that the windows of the shed were covered. The claimant stated in his PIF that he only found out that it was illegal to believe in the Roman Catholic religion in China after attending the church three to four times. At the first sitting of the hearing, the claimant was able to testify for a short period of time. When asked if he knew that the church was illegal, he replied that when he went there, he thought that it was legal. This statement contradicts his statement in his PIF that he eventually found out that his church was illegal. When asked where the services were held, he replied that they gathered in a big courtyard at XXXXX XXXXX home outside in the open. This contradicts his statement in his PIF that the group met in a shed with covered windows. When asked the name of the priest, the claimant stated that the priest's name was XXXXX XXXXX, that he was not known by any other name and that he was at the services every week. This contradicts the claimant's statement in his PIF that the priest was named Father XXXXX and that he only appeared at their services every one or two months and on important holidays. I was unable to adequately clarify these contradictions at the hearing as the claimant was not well and was unable to continue. The hearing was adjourned to another date. However, on that date, though the claimant appeared, he was completely unresponsive and was unable to testify. His daughter, XXXXX XXXXX, was appointed as his Designated Representative at this time. [7] I have considered the above noted contradictions in the claimant's testimony and the fact that he has not provided a reasonable explanation for any of these contradictions due to his medical state, which is noted in two medical reports submitted.4 I also note that the claimant has provided a baptismal certificate, issued by Rev. XXXXX XXXXX, from his church in China.5 I have considered this baptismal certificate and I do not find it plausible that an underground church or the priest who presides over an underground church would provide any written documentation regarding activities of that church, considering the serious consequences of being discovered. Having considered this implausibility, as well as the claimant's statement at the hearing that the church met outside in a courtyard and that while the he was attending the church, he was not aware that this was an illegal organization, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the church the claimant attended in China was not an illegal underground Roman Catholic church. I further find, on a balance of probabilities, that the church the claimant attended in China was a legal organization and was therefore not raided by the Chinese authorities. THE PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU'S PURSUIT OF THE CLAIMANT [8] As noted above, I have found that the claimant attended a legal church in China. I therefore find, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is not being sought by the Public Security Bureau for his attendance at an illegal underground Roman Catholic church. IS THE CLAIMANT A GENUINE PRACTITIONER OF CHRISTIANITY? [9] The claimant has alleged that since coming to Canada, he has been a member of our XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX. He provided two letters from the church6 confirming that he was registered as a member of the church in XXXXX 2006 and that he has been attending church services since then. Based on these two letters, I accept, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is a practicing Roman Catholic even though I was unable to test his knowledge of his religion because of his medical state. [10] I have considered whether the claimant can return to China and practice his faith there. I have found that the church he attended in China was not an illegal organization and was not raided by the authorities as alleged. I further find, on a balance of probabilities, that if he were to return to China, he would legally be able to practice his religion at that church. [11] On the basis of the totality of the evidence and the cumulative findings noted above, I find that the claimant has not satisfied his burden of establishing a serious possibility that he would be persecuted or that he would be personally subjected to a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture by any authority in China. CONCLUSION [12] Based on the foregoing analysis, I determine that the claimant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. The Refugee Protection Division therefore rejects his claim. "L. S. Hart" L. S. Hart "September 1, 2009" Date REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE / FAILURE TO TESTIFY / DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE / CONTRADICTIONS / PERSONAL INFORMATION FORM / TESTIMONY / FREEDOM OF RELIGION / MALE / NEGATIVE / CHINA 1 As enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 96, 97(1)(a) and 97(1)(b). 2 Exhibit R/A-2, a certified true copy of the claimant's passport, submitted by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 3 Exhibit C-1. 4 Exhibit C-4 and post-hearing documents received from counsel, dated XXXXX, 2009. 5 Exhibit C-2. 6 Exhibit C-3 and post-hearing documents received from counsel, dated XXXXX, 2009. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RPD.15.7 (February 12, 2009) Disponible en français RPD.15.7 (February 12, 2009) Disponible en français RPD File No. : TA6-16488 RPD File No. :TA6-16488

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: TA6-16488

### Key Issues
RPD File No. / N° de dossier de la SPR: TA6-16488 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Claimant(s) XXXXX XXXXX Demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Date(s) of Hearing July 16, 2009 Date(s) de l'audience Place of Hearing Toronto, Ontario Lieu de l'audience Date of Decision September 1, 2009 Date de la décision Panel L. S. Hart Tribunal Counsel for the Claimant(s) Kumar S. Sriskanda Barrister & Solicitor Conseil(s) du / de la / des demandeur(e)(s) d'asile Tribunal Officer N/A Agent(e) de tribunal Designated Representative(s) XXXXX XXXXX Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre [1] XXXXX XXXXX (the claimant) is a citizen of the People's Republic of China (China). He claims refugee protection pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.1 ALLEGATIONS [2] The claimant alleges that he was introduced to Christianity in 2004, by his second wife. He began to attend her Roman Catholic house church in XXXXX 2004. He was baptized in China on XXXXX, 2005. The claimant came to Canada to visit his daughter on XXXXX, 2006. He found out from his step-son that his church in China was raided in XXXXX 2006, that his wife had been arrested and detained and that the Public Security Bureau (PSB) was looking for him. The claimant decided to make a claim for refugee protection after discussing the situation with his daughter. DETERMINATION [3] For the reasons that follow, I find that the claimant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. ANALYSIS Identity [4] The claimant's testimony and the supporting documentation2 filed establish his identity as a national of China. Credibility [5] The determinative issue in this claim is the credibility of the claimant's Personal Information Form (PIF)3 narrative and oral testimony concerning his membership in an underground church in China, his pursuit by agents of the PSB and his identity as a Christian. I find that the claimant was not a credible witness. The reasons for this decision are noted below. THE CLAIMANT'S INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIANITY AND MEMBERSHIP IN AN UNDERGROUND CHURCH [6] The claimant stated in his PIF that he was introduced to Christianity by his second wife in 2004. At that time, he was suffering from insomnia and his wife thought that it would lessen through prayer. He began to attend her underground Roman Catholic church in XXXXX 2004. He stated in his Personal Information Form that there were 70 to 80 members of that church who attended services, which were held every Sunday in a shed behind someone's house and that the windows of the shed were covered. The claimant stated in his PIF that he only found out that it was illegal to believe in the Roman Catholic religion in China after attending the church three to four times. At the first sitting of the hearing, the claimant was able to testify for a short period of time. When asked if he knew that the church was illegal, he replied that when he went there, he thought that it was legal. This statement contradicts his statement in his PIF that he eventually found out that his church was illegal. When asked where the services were held, he replied that they gathered in a big courtyard at XXXXX XXXXX home outside in the open. This contradicts his statement in his PIF that the group met in a shed with covered windows. When asked the name of the priest, the claimant stated that the priest's name was XXXXX XXXXX, that he was not known by any other name and that he was at the services every week. This contradicts the claimant's statement in his PIF that the priest was named Father XXXXX and that he only appeared at their services every one or two months and on important holidays. I was unable to adequately clarify these contradictions at the hearing as the claimant was not well and was unable to continue. The hearing was adjourned to another date. However, on that date, though the claimant appeared, he was completely unresponsive and was unable to testify. His daughter, XXXXX XXXXX, was appointed as his Designated Representative at this time. [7] I have considered the above noted contradictions in the claimant's testimony and the fact that he has not provided a reasonable explanation for any of these contradictions due to his medical state, which is noted in two medical reports submitted.4 I also note that the claimant has provided a baptismal certificate, issued by Rev. XXXXX XXXXX, from his church in China.5 I have considered this baptismal certificate and I do not find it plausible that an underground church or the priest who presides over an underground church would provide any written documentation regarding activities of that church, considering the serious consequences of being discovered. Having considered this implausibility, as well as the claimant's statement at the hearing that the church met outside in a courtyard and that while the he was attending the church, he was not aware that this was an illegal organization, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the church the claimant attended in China was not an illegal underground Roman Catholic church. I further find, on a balance of probabilities, that the church the claimant attended in China was a legal organization and was therefore not raided by the Chinese authorities. THE PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU'S PURSUIT OF THE CLAIMANT [8] As noted above, I have found that the claimant attended a legal church in China. I therefore find, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is not being sought by the Public Security Bureau for his attendance at an illegal underground Roman Catholic church. IS THE CLAIMANT A GENUINE PRACTITIONER OF CHRISTIANITY? [9] The claimant has alleged that since coming to Canada, he has been a member of our XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX. He provided two letters from the church6 confirming that he was registered as a member of the church in XXXXX 2006 and that he has been attending church services since then. Based on these two letters, I accept, on a balance of probabilities, that the claimant is a practicing Roman Catholic even though I was unable to test his knowledge of his religion because of his medical state. [10] I have considered whether the claimant can return to China and practice his faith there. I have found that the church he attended in China was not an illegal organization and was not raided by the authorities as alleged. I further find, on a balance of probabilities, that if he were to return to China, he would legally be able to practice his religion at that church. [11] On the basis of the totality of the evidence and the cumulative findings noted above, I find that the claimant has not satisfied his burden of establishing a serious possibility that he would be persecuted or that he would be personally subjected to a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture by any authority in China. CONCLUSION [12] Based on the foregoing analysis, I determine that the claimant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. The Refugee Protection Division therefore rejects his claim. "L. S. Hart" L. S. Hart "September 1, 2009" Date REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION / RELIGIOUS PRACTICE / FAILURE TO TESTIFY / DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE / CONTRADICTIONS / PERSONAL INFORMATION FORM / TESTIMONY / FREEDOM OF RELIGION / MALE / NEGATIVE / CHINA 1 As enacted by S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 96, 97(1)(a) and 97(1)(b). 2 Exhibit R/A-2, a certified true copy of the claimant's passport, submitted by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). 3 Exhibit C-1. 4 Exhibit C-4 and post-hearing documents received from counsel, dated XXXXX, 2009. 5 Exhibit C-2. 6 Exhibit C-3 and post-hearing documents received from counsel, dated XXXXX, 2009. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RPD.15.7 (February 12, 2009) Disponible en français RPD.15.7 (February 12, 2009) Disponible en français RPD File No. : TA6-16488 RPD File No. :TA6-16488

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: person in need of protection. ANALYSIS Identity [4] The claimant's testimony and the supporting documentation2 filed establish his identity as a national of China. Credibility [5] The determinative issue in this claim is the credibility of the claimant's Personal Information Form (PIF)3 narrative and oral testimony concerning hi

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
What are the implications of this Refugee Protection Division decision from the Refugee Law Lab Reporter for similar cases?

2023 RLLR 114 Citation: 2023 RLLR 114 Tribunal: Refugee Protection Division Date of Decision: November 27, 2023 Panel: Ademiju Olatunji Counsel for the Claimant(s): David P Yerzy Country: Tajikistan RPD Number: VC3-02614 Associated RPD Number(s): N/A ATIP Number: A-2024-00593 ATIP Pages: N/A DECISION [1] MEMBER: These are the reasons for the decision in the claim of XXXX XXXX, a citizen of Russia who is claiming refugee protection pursuant to section 96 and section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. ALLEGATIONS [2] The following is a brief synopsis of the allegations put forth by the claimant in his Basis of Claim form. The claimant is a 40-year-old male who holds dual citizenship in Russia and Tajikistan. He alleges that he fears persecution at the hands of Russian authorities due to his political opinion on the war in Ukraine, his refusal to be conscripted to participate in the war, and his participation in protests against the war in Ukraine while in Canada. He does not support Russia in its war against Ukraine because Russia is killing innocent civilians and raping women. He stated that the Russian military came to his father’s house in Russia, where he had previously stayed, to ask for him but his father stated that he does not know where he was. He also stated during his oral testimony that some notices to appear were left for him at his workplace to report for military service, but he tore the notices and refused to appear because he does not support the war in Russia. [3] The claimant stated that he does not support the war in Russia because he believes the war is not just unjustified, but that Russia is also killing civilians and committing other atrocities against civilians in Ukraine. The claimant further alleges that Russians from Tajikistan are overly targeted in the conscription exercise of the Russian authorities at the beginning of the war, but now, everybody is a target. The claimant also alleges that he will not be able to practice Islam should he return to Tajikistan, as he will be labelled an extremist. He stated that he will not be allowed to preach Islam’s orders and he would be required to trim his beard if he goes out in Tajikistan. [4] The claimant came to Canada through the US in XXXX 2022. Since coming to Canada, he has participated in protests against the war in Russia — the war in Ukraine. I find that the claimant is a Convention refugee as he has established a serious possibility of persecution in Russia and Tajikistan for the reasons contained below. [5] On identity. I find that the claimant’s identity as a national of Russia and Tajikistan is established on a balance of probabilities by his Russian and Tajikistan passports submitted to the Board. Nexus [6] For a claimant to be considered a Convention refugee, the well-founded fear of persecution must be by reason of one (1) or more of the five (5) grounds, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. The persecution that the claimant alleges — that the claimant allegedly faces in Russia has only as a nexus to a Convention ground, that is political opinion. The persecution the claimant allegedly faces in Tajikistan has a nexus to the Convention ground of religion. Therefore, his claim is being assessed under section 96 of the IRPA and not under section 97. Allegation of Persecution in Russia [7] On credibility, the Board presumes claimants are telling the truth unless there is a valid reason to doubt it. However, this presumption does not apply to inferences speculations. I note that the claimant did not include some information he related in his oral testimony in the Basis of Claim form. In particular, I note that the information about the military dropping notices to appear at his workplace was not included in his Basis of Claim. The claimant stated that he is only providing more details in his oral testimony as against the brief summary provided when he made his claim. [8] He stated that when he made his claim, he just came to Canada, had to use an interpreter, and all the stress impacted on his ability to provide further details. I do not accept the explanation of the claimant in this regard. I find that the claimant in this case has had opportunity to update his Basis of Claim form and he provided disclosures to the Board after submitting the Basis of Claim form. I find that the non-inclusion of the information does impact negatively on his credibility. I do not accept the allegation that notices were dropped at the claimant’s workplace in respect of the conscription for military service. However, I do not find that the non-provision of the information in his BOC goes to the root of his claim, considering other evidence provided by the claimant. Based on the presumption of truthfulness, I accept on a balance of probabilities that the claimant fled for Russia in order not to be conscripted to military service in the war in Ukraine, because he believes Ukraine is indiscriminate — because he believes that Russia is indiscriminately killing civilians in Ukraine and committing war crimes. [9] I also accept that the claimant participated in protests against the war in Ukraine while in Canada, and that he has been labelled a traitor by his former friend due to the fact that the claimant fled Russia to Canada. I accept that the claimant will not continue to express his opposition to the war in Ukraine if he is removed to Russia, not because he does not want to express his political opinion, but because Russian authorities crack down on protesters and forcefully send them to the warfront. [10] Apart from his testimony, the claimant also provided corroborating documentary evidence in support of his claim. He provided a chat conversation with a friend who now refer to him as a traitor because he left Russia for Canada rather than fight in the war. He also provided pictures of himself taken in Canada, showing him holding the flag of Ukraine along with other people. The claimant further provided pictures of himself praying in a mosque in Canada and of a plaque he received recognizing his participation in the Islamic community in Canada. I have no reason to doubt the genuineness of these documents, and I accept them as genuine. I thus place full weight on these documents. Failure to Claim in the US [11] The claimant entered the US in XXXX 2022 before coming to Canada. And he stated that he told the refugee officials at the US that he would be asking for refugee protection. He stated that he did not stay in the US because his intention was to come to Canada. He says that he does not want to live in the US because of the level of crimes and the fact that people walk with guns, and it is not peaceful — it is not as peaceful in the US as it is in Canada. I note the claimant entered Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2023. I accept the claimant’s explanation as reasonable. I thus do not to make any negative credibility finding in this regard. CONCLUSION and Credibility [12] Based on the claimant’s testimony and the documentary evidence mentioned above, I accept the allegation that the claimant has a subjective fear of persecution. I accept, rather, that the claimant has a subjective fear of persecution in Russia because of his political opinion. Well-Founded Fear of Persecution [13] To establish his status as a Convention refugee, the claimant has to show that there was a serious possibility that he will be persecuted if he moved to Russia. I find that the evidence presented in support of his allegations establishes a serious possibility of persecution for the claimants if he is forced to return to Russia. My reasons are as follows. [14] The National Documentation Package at Tab 12.3 shows that political opinion against the authorities is dealt by Kremlin with an iron hand which is against international law. Tab 12.3 states that decades after Boris Yeltsin freed the last of Soviet-Arab political prisoners. The widespread detention of activists, regime opponents, and disfavoured minorities is once again being practiced under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin, since he first became president in 2000 and especially his formal return to the Kremlin in 2012. The Kremlin has engaged in a wide region crackdown on civil society, political opponents, critical voices, unpopular minorities, and anyone else it views unfavourable or as a threat. [15] The reports at Tab 12.3 goes on to state that this persecution is only increasing. In its February 2015 lists, Memorial Human Rights Centre, one (1) of Russia’s oldest and largest human rights organizations, identified 46 political prisoners in the country. As of March 2019, however, its lists contained 236 individuals, including many in Russia-occupied Crimea. These numbers, however, reflect only cases that have been carefully reviewed and vetted, and thus conform to a rigorous definition of political prisoner. The true number is undoubtedly much higher. The same report continues to states, “some of these prisoners have been accused of crimes they simply did not commit – murder, sexual abuse, espionage, treason, or possession of drugs or weapons. The majority, however, are charged for engaging in activities that are clearly protected under international law. These latter cases are enabled by an ever-increasing array of law, specifically designed to criminalize acts of everyday life and, therefore, allow the authorities to arrest, detain, and imprison anyone they want.” [16] A report by Human Rights Watch at Tab 2.18 of the NDP shows that Russia brutally cracks down on anti-war protesters, arresting them and subjecting them to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. The claimant in this case not only holds a political opinion against Russia on the war in Ukraine, but he has also participated in protests against the war while in Canada. This, coupled with the knowledge of his flight to Canada and the (inaudible) given to him by his friends, heightens his fear of persecution if he returns to Canada (sic). [17] The objective evidence establishes that political opinion against the government in Russia, whether real or imputed, is seen as dissent and punished. It also establishes that anyone trying to evade the mandatory military call up is then criminally tried. The objective evidence at Tab 8.2 further shows that punishment for evading criminal service in Russia is deprivation of liberty for up to 10 years. The objective evidence before me also shows that ethnic minorities in Russia, such as Russians from Tajikistan, are more likely to be mobilized for military service in the war. The claimant, who is 40 years of age, never served in the military, in the Russian military, and as such is a good candidate to become conscripted into military service. In this case, the claimant is not a conscientious objector to military service as its objection is not a global objection to war, but to the unprovoked killing of civilians and other atrocities being committed by Russia in the war in Ukraine. It is on these ethical grounds that the objection of the claimant of the war is based. [18] The view that the — view of the claimant is that Russia is committing war crimes in Ukraine by the indiscriminate murder and raping of women. It is also noted in the documentary evidence before me, particularly in the news release by Global Affairs Canada submitted by the claimant. The same documents also stated that — stated the view that Russia has committed war crimes in Ukraine. [19] Excuse me. I say that again. [20] The same document also stated that the view that Russia has committed war crimes in Ukraine was confirmed in September 2022 by the United Nations Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry. I find that the reasons raised by the claimant in objecting to military service in the war between Russia and on Ukraine is based on ethical considerations for which a person who objects to military service may be offered protection. As highlighted in Lebedev v. Canada 2007 FC728. Therefore, based on all the evidence before me, I find that the claimant will face a serious possibility of persecution if he is forced to return to Russia. I find that the claimant’s fear are indeed well-founded. [21] On state protection. I find that it will be objectively unreasonable for the claimant to seek the protection of the state in light of his particular circumstances. States are presumed to be capable of protecting their citizens, except in situations where the state is in complete breakdown. In this case, the claimant cannot be expected to seek the protection of the state since the government of Russia is the agent of harm. The authorities in Russia are in control of the entire territory of the country. And the treatment for anyone indulging in political dissent and refusing conscription service is the same throughout Russia. Therefore, I find that the presumption of state protection has been rebutted. And based on country condition documents, there is no state protection for the claimant in this country. Internal Flight Alternative [22] I have also considered whether there is a viable internal flight alternative for the claimant. Using the two (2) prong test developed by the Federal Courts of Appeal in Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 1FC 706, which requires the RPD to consider on a balance of probabilities whether one (1), there is no serious possibility the claimant will be prosecuted or subjected to personal risk — subjected personally to a risk of section 97(1) harm in the proposed IFA, and two (2), whether the conditions in the proposed IFA are such that it will not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant, for him to seek refugee there — to seek refuge there, rather. [23] On the evidence before me, I find that there is a serious possibility of persecution for the claimant throughout Russia. There are no parts of the country where he will not face a serious possibility of persecution as the authorities in Russia are in control of the entire territory of the country. Therefore, for reasons similar to those in relation to state protection, I am satisfied that the claimant does not have a viable internal flight alternative in Russia. Allegation of Persecution in Tajikistan Credibility [24] I find the claimant credible in respect of his claim in regards to the acts of discrimination he will face should he return to Tajikistan. The claimant testified in a straightforward manner and submitted documents depicting his practice of Islam. I have no reason not to believe his evidence. In particular, I find that the claimant is a Muslim who goes to the mosque, pray, and associates with other Muslims. I also accepts that the claimant believes that sharing his belief about Islam is an important aspect of his practice of Islam. I accept the allegation that he has been warned about preaching to people in Tajikistan. And as it stands, the risk of being arrested for not trimming his beard in Tajikistan. [25] On well-founded fear of persecution. Based on the evidence before me, I find that the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his religion as a Muslim in Tajikistan. I find that the act of discrimination rises to the level of persecution warranting protection. The claimant detailed in his narrative how he was introduced to Islam, his belief that the proper practice of Islam is tied to receiving God’s blessings and how (inaudible) to preach to other — to others in Tajikistan about Islam. He also stated that he was threatened with jail time by the police and was warned about his frequent activities in Tajikistan in XXXX 2020 and narrated how this prompted him to return to Russia. [26] In his oral testimony, he stated that that the government has restricted the attendance at mosques to the age of 40, whereas the proper practice of Islam requires teaching children about Islam from the time they are born. He also stated that the government will not allow people to grow their beards in Tajikistan. The essence of the claimant’s allegation against Tajikistan is that the discrimination he faces on his religious practice are persecutory. A significant part of this aspect of his claim relates to his inability to preach about Islam to others. The claimant believes that preaching to others is an integral part of his religion, which has brought blessings to him personally. Nature of the Legal Regime Regarding the Practice of Islam in Tajikistan [27] The claimant states that he does not wish to return to Tajikistan because the government there has created a legal regime that suppresses the practice of Islam and the expression of one’s faith publicly. While the overwhelming majority of those in Tajikistan are Muslim, the evidence on file is that Tajikistan’s government, has strongly — sorry — has strongly authoritarian impulses and that it has taken steps to maintain total control of Muslim activity in the country. On this, I refer to the National Documentation Package for Tajikistan at Tab 12.3. [28] The government of Tajikistan is not democratic. It generally restricts freedom of expression and security forces commit torture and abuse detainees with impunity. The specific steps that the government as taken to restrict the practice of Islam includes people — one (1), people must leave the mosque after prayer and only state-dictated summons are allowed to be read by state-appointed imams in state-permitted mosques. I refer to Tab 12.3 of the National Documentation Package for Tajikistan. Tab 12.3 also shows that restriction on religious education without state’s permission, including punishing offenders in this regard, is practiced in Tajikistan producing, distributing, and exporting items of a religious nature or religious literature which has not been censored by the government is banned. Punishments for disobedience includes fines and seizures of equipments used in contravening the law. [29] Another step used to restrict the practice of Islam includes the ban on the wearing of hijabs and — excuse me. Another step is that the president has pronounced citizens should stop wearing a hijab and beards. Every society has limits towards its regards as acceptable behaviour. But in some countries, the norms of the society may be so constraining that they interferes with the exercise of human rights. Where these restrictions are entrenched in law and backed up by coercive action and penalties, the claimant who transgresses the conventions of their own land and perhaps at the same time, violating the law may be at risk of serious harm. The refugee system protects those in such situations who have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. In this respect, persecution is the sustained or systemic failure of state protection in relation to one (1) of the core entitlements which have been recognized by the international community. I referred to the case of Canada Attorney General v. Ward, 1993 2SCR 689. [30] The Board’s legal resource on such claims states that when dealing with the norms of other societies, the Refugee Protection Division should bear in mind that “an application of the Convention refugee definition involves measuring the claimant’s situation and any actions visited on the claimants against human rights standards which are international. It is not appropriate to simply refer to the notions of propriety favoured by the majority or the rulers in the claimant’s own land.” The central documents describing the rights to religious freedom as international law is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. Article 18 of the Covenants states that religious freedom includes the freedom not only to all religious beliefs and values, but also to manifest them. It states “everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The right (inaudible) include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private.” So, manifest his religion or believe in worship, observance, practice, and teaching. [31] I refer to the UN General Assembly document on International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, dated 16th December 1966. While inability to practice religion is often enforced or accompanied by other types of serious harm, the deprivation of religious freedom is serious and (inaudible). On this I refer to the book, the Law of Refugee Status, published by Cambridge University Press and authored by Utawaji Foster (ph) in 2014. [32] As the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated, if a person is forbidden to practice his religion, the fact that he is not imprisoned, tortured, or banished, and is even allowed to attend school does not mean that he is not a victim of persecution. I referred to the case of Bokolades (ph), Seventh Circuit of the US Court of Appeal at 1997 at page 405. Restrictions on the public display of religion have been considered by the Federal Courts. The Immigration and Refugee Board has a legal resource on its website, which summarizes the Canadian law regarding refugee claims involving religious wars. The resource provides a summary of the Federal Court’s decisions regarding when such restrictions shall be considered persecutory and when the merely discriminatory instruments, where the (inaudible) cost does not rise to the level of persecution. I have relied on this resource in formulating this reason. [33] Turning to the case law. Fosu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1994 90 FCR 182 (ph) dealt with the well-founded fear of persecution of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Ghana, which had prohibited religious services and proselytizing. The case stands for the proposition that freedom of religion includes the freedom to “demonstrate one’s religion or belief in public, or in private by teaching practice, worship, and the performance of rights. It seems that the persecution of the practice of religion can take various forms, such as prohibiting — prohibition on worshipping in public or in private, giving or receiving religious instruction, or the implementation of serious discriminatory policies against persons on account of their practice of religion”. [34] In Kaya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 445 (sic), that case considered that proposition in the context of Türkiye’s restrictions on wearing hijab in government institutions. It is held that a policy of secularism, supported by a ban on religious dress of any sort being worn in government buildings did not constitute, particularly (inaudible) in the circumstances. The courts in Kaya distinguished Fosu on the facts, finding that Mrs. Kaya was entitled to practice a religion in public in Türkiye and to wear her hijab in public. I find that the situation of this claimant in Tajikistan is more akin to this situation in Fosu and less like the situation in Kaya. This is because, unlike the more limited restrictions on wearing hijab in Türkiye, the restrictions in Tajikistan amounts to a blanket prohibition of sharing its religious beliefs with others in all public places. This restriction amounts to a limitation on the claimant’s rights. So, manifests is a religion or belief in practice, which infringe upon the claimant’s rights in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. [35] There are sceptical limits to Article 18 rights. Article 18(3) three of the Covenant specifies that “the freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety or the health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”. Indeed, the government of Tajikistan justifies its restrictions on the practice of Islam as necessary to combat “extremism” and to respond to the group of ISIS and as a part of the war on terrorism, noting the security concerns that originates from (inaudible) Afghanistan. On this point, I refer to the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression on its mission to Tajikistan. The commentary from the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the rights of freedom of opinion and expression have generally concluded that such restrictions on expression are not justifiable limitations on freedom of religion pursuant to Article 18(3). [36] For example, the aforementioned UN Special Rapporteur conducted a mission to Tajikistan. The resultant reports included the following conclusion. “The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned by the allegations on the undue interference of government authorities in manifestation of religious expression and education. The Special Rapporteur is particularly disturbed by the allegations on the repression against individuals based on their (inaudible) adherence to certain religious groups”. The reports dismiss Tajikistan government’s attempted justification for these religious restrictions when calling upon the governments of Tajikistan “to recognize both in law and practice the expression of religious freedom as an individual rights, subject only to those restrictions that are permitted under international human rights law”. [37] In sum, I conclude that the Tajikistan government is not respecting such rights and that it is restricting, and that these restrictions are not permissible once under the Covenant. Effects of Legal Regime on Religious Restriction on the Claimant [38] The restrictions on the claimant’s religious freedom have had a profound effect on him. In fact, the claimant testified that preaching and talking to others about Islam is so important as part of his religious practice that he chose to leave Tajikistan for Russia rather than leave without the ability to preach Islam. During the hearing — excuse me, please. [39] When assessing whether there is an objective basis which supports the claimant, I have concluded that Tajikistan in fact has significant restrictions on the practice of Islam. I have concluded that these restrictions violates the claimant’s religious freedom as guaranteed in international human rights instruments. Finally, I have concluded that these restrictions on the claimant’s religious practice are of particular importance to the claimant and that the effect of the restrictions on the claimant of a sufficiently serious character so as to constitute persecution. The consequences of having to hide, change, or renounce his religious practice will significantly interfere with his dignity and security of his person. As such, I find that the claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Tajikistan. State Protection in Tajikistan [40] I find that it would be objectively unreasonable for the claimant to seek protection of the state in light of his particular circumstances. As stated previously, states are presumed to be capable of protecting their citizens, except in situations where the state is in full, complete breakdown. In this case, the claimant cannot be expected to seek the protection of the authorities in Tajikistan, as the government is the agent of harm. The authorities in Tajikistan are in control of the entire territory of the country, and the treatment for anyone indulging in banned or restricted religious activities is the same throughout the country. Therefore, I find that the presumption of state protection has been rebutted. And based on country condition documents, there is no state protection for the claimant in Tajikistan. Internal Flight Alternative [41] I have also considered whether a viable internal flight alternative exist for the claimant. Using the same two (2) prong test in Rasaratnam v. Canada, which requires the RPD to consider only balance of probabilities whether one (1), there is a serious possibility the claimant will be persecuted or subjected to — or subjected personally to a risk of section 97 harm in the proposed IFA, and two (2), the conditions in the proposed IFA are such that it will not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant’s, for him to seek refuge there. On the evidence before me, I find that there is a serious possibility of persecution for him throughout Tajikistan. There are no parts of the country where he will not face a serious possibility of persecution, as the authorities in Tajikistan are in control of the entire territory of the country. Therefore, for reasons similar to those in relation to that of civil protection, I am satisfied that the claimant does not have a viable internal flight alternative in Tajikistan. CONCLUSION [42] Based on the above analysis, I conclude that the claimant is a Convention refugee as per section 97 of the IRPA. Accordingly, I accept his claim. ——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: 2023 RLLR 114

### Key Issues
oped by the Federal Courts of Appeal in Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1992 1FC 706, which requires the RPD to consider on a balance of probabilitie

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: USION [42] Based on the above analysis, I conclude that the claimant is a Convention refugee as per section 97 of the IRPA. Accordingly, I accept his claim. ——— REASONS CONCLUDED ———

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.