Prompt:
Analyze this Refugee Appeal Division decision from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada and explain its implications for refugee determination:

RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MC1-03403 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Date of decision February 7, 2022 Date de la décision Panel Nicole Ladouceur Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Barbara Brizuela Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX, the appellant and a citizen of Lebanon, is appealing the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rendered on May 19, 2021, rejecting her refugee protection claim on the ground of lack of credibility. 1. In her Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), the appellant alleges that she was a victim of violence perpetrated by her husband and son. She came to Canada with a visa on XXXX XXXX, 2020, and claimed refugee protection on December 11, 2020. She fears for her safety should she return to Lebanon. 2. In its decision, the RPD found that the appellant was not a credible witness due to inconsistencies in her testimony and her returns to Kuwait and Lebanon. The RPD considered that although the appellant's marital and family problems were unfortunate, they did not reach the required threshold to amount to persecution and that, as a result, the appellant had failed to demonstrate there would be a serious possibility of persecution or a risk to her life if she returns to Lebanon. 3. In her memorandum, the appellant argues that the representation provided by her former counsel, whom she believed to be a lawyer, was inadequate in that he failed to inform her that she could have her daughter testify. She argues that her daughter could have corroborated her testimony regarding the domestic violence and that this would have had a major impact on the outcome of her claim. 4. The appellant advised her former counsel of her allegations of inadequate representation in accordance with Practice Notice - Allegations Against Former Counsel,1 and he submitted his responses on the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) record. 5. The determinative issues for the RAD are procedural fairness and credibility. DETERMINATION [2] The appeal is dismissed. Former counsel's actions did not deprive the appellant of her right to procedural fairness. The RPD correctly determined that the appellant was not a credible witness and that she is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. NEW EVIDENCE [3] In her memorandum, the appellant does not indicate that she has new evidence; however, she included two affidavits, one signed by her and the other by her daughter. These affidavits describe new developments and are therefore subject to the provisions of subsection 110(4) regarding their admissibility as new evidence. [4] Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act2 (IRPA), I can allow only evidence i) that arose after the RPD rendered its decision; ii) that was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or iii) that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented to the RPD before the decision was rendered. iv) If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide whether the evidence is new, credible and relevant before admitting it.3 [5] Both affidavits are admitted as new evidence. [6] In their respective affidavits, the appellant and her daughter state that at their last meeting with a lawyer to prepare the appellant's appeal, they learned that the former counsel was not a lawyer, that the appellant's daughter, who had witnessed her father's violent acts toward her mother, could have testified before the RPD and that this could have changed the outcome of the refugee protection claim. This information meets the first three criteria of subsection 110(4) since, according to the memorandum, it was only while preparing the appeal with the appellant's lawyer that they discovered this information. It consequently arose after the RPD's decision. [7] The documents are credible because they are affidavits containing statements made under oath by the appellant and her daughter, new because they bring new evidence concerning the allegations of persecution and relevant because they could have an impact on the outcome of the claim. ANALYSIS [8] The role of the RAD is to review RPD decisions by applying the correctness standard of review.4 Having applied this standard of review and conducted my own analysis of the record, which included listening to the recording of the hearing held before the RPD on April 15, 2021, and ensuring that Chairperson's Guideline 45 was implemented, I consider that the rules of procedural fairness and natural justice were not breached and that the RPD did not err in finding that the appellant was not a credible witness. The reasons are as follows. [9] In its decision, the RPD concluded that due to contradictions, inconsistencies and behaviour inconsistent with a subjective fear directly related to her allegations of violence, the appellant was not a credible witness and that, consequently, she had failed to establish that she faced a serious possibility of persecution if she returned to Lebanon or, on a balance of probabilities, that she would be subjected personally to a risk to her life or to other treatment provided under section 97 of the IRPA. Professional qualifications of the former counsel were known to the appellant and her daughter [10] In her memorandum, the appellant argues that she did not know that her former counsel was not a lawyer and that had she known this, she would not have retained his services. She included an affidavit from herself and another from her daughter that both contain statements to the effect that the former counsel never disclosed to them that he was not a lawyer. [11] When claimants swear to the truth of certain allegations, they are presumed to be telling the truth. However, this presumption is rebuttable where the evidence is inconsistent with the testimony or where the RPD is unsatisfied with the explanation provided for those inconsistencies.6 [12] With respect, the appellant and her daughter are not credible when they assert in their respective affidavits that they did not know that the appellant's former counsel was not a lawyer. I reviewed the contents of the RPD record and the former counsel's response to the allegations of inadequate representation.7 These documents, of which I have reproduced the relevant excerpts, demonstrate that the former counsel disclosed clearly to the appellant and her daughter that he was an immigration consultant and member of the Immigration Consultants of Canada Regulatory Council (ICCRC). I note that according to the response from the former counsel, the appellant's daughter, who, based on her statement at paragraph 12 of the BOC Form, is proficient in English, went with her mother to all meetings with the former counsel. [13] Basis of Claim Form - Question 9(k), Refugee Protection Division record: The appellant checked the box indicating that she was represented by an immigration consultant (emphasis added). She states further on under question 11, Declaration B, that the BOC Form was interpreted to her in Arabic and that the information it contained was complete, true and correct. I note that at the RPD hearing, she stated that the information in her BOC Form was complete, true and correct.8 At paragraph 12 of this same document, under the heading "Interpreter's Declaration," the appellant's daughter, XXXX XXXX, signed to declare that she had interpreted the BOC Form from Arabic to English for the appellant and provided any explanations to her and that the appellant had assured her that she understood the entire content of the document and all answers. [14] Use of a Representative, Form IMM 5476, Section B, question 6, Refugee Protection Division record, page 94: The appellant indicated that she was represented by a consultant who was a member of the ICCRC, membership number R421983, under question 10 in the document, and the appellant signed the declaration on XXXX XXXX, 2020, indicating that "I have fully and truthfully answered all questions on this form.... I also declare that I have read and understood all the statements on this form, having asked and obtained an explanation for every point that was not clear to me." [15] Retainer agreement with the former counsel signed by the appellant ("Retainer Agreement," Document 1 - RAD record): In his response to the allegations of inadequate representation, the former counsel indicates that the appellant signed, in the presence of her daughter, the "Retainer Agreement" - Refugee, which clearly stipulates that he is a member, under membership number R421983, of "Regulated Canadian Immigration Consultants - RCIC," a member organization of the ICCRC. [16] In light of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that the presumption of truthfulness afforded to the appellant and her daughter is rebutted, because the documentary evidence contradicts their assertions in their affidavits to the effect that they did not know that the former counsel was not a lawyer. I consider that the information was disclosed to them by the former counsel and, consequently, that they knew that he was not a lawyer. In these circumstances, I consider that the affidavits are of little probative value and I give them only limited weight. Adequate representation by the former counsel [17] In her memorandum, the appellant argues that her former counsel did not represent her adequately in that he failed to inform her that she could have her daughter testify. She alleges that her daughter witnessed many of her husband's violent acts toward her and that her testimony would have had a major impact on the outcome of her claim. [18] In his response to the allegations of inadequate representation, the former counsel explains that he hesitated to have the appellant's daughter testify for the following reasons: she has lived in Canada for more than 12 years and was therefore [translation] "distanced from the recent problems the mother had been having with her husband and the recently married son who was still living with her along with his wife."9 He adds that "had the appellant known that her daughter could be with her during the hearing, she would have stopped making an effort to prepare on her own." [19] With respect, I disagree with the appellant when she argues that the former counsel did not adequately represent her. [20] In Rendon Segovia et al,10 the Federal Court established a tripartite test in which each of the following elements must be met to demonstrate that the incompetence of counsel amounted to a breach of procedural fairness: - a. Prior counsel's acts or omissions constituted incompetence or misconduct; - b. A miscarriage of justice resulted in the sense that, but for the alleged conduct, the result would have been different; and - c. Prior counsel was given an opportunity to respond. [21] The first two criteria must be analyzed in conjunction with one another since they are closely linked. To meet the allegation of incompetence, the appellant must prove that her counsel was incompetent in choosing not to have her daughter testify or negligent in failing to advise her of the option to have her daughter testify, that this failure resulted in an error and that had it not been for this failure, it is reasonably likely that the result of the claim would have been different. This requires a very high level of proof before the panel can accept the argument, which the appellant has failed to bring in this case.11 [22] The Federal Court of Appeal has noted that it is settled that an applicant must live with the consequences of the actions of his counsel.12 As counsel, it was up to him to decide whether to call witnesses at the hearing on the appellant's behalf. In the case at hand, the decision not to have the appellant's daughter-who had left Lebanon more than 12 years previous, a fact not known to the RPD-testify does not appear unreasonable in light of the circumstances and the limited relevance of such testimony in relation to the analysis of fear of future persecution. [23] Concerning the appellant's allegation in her affidavit that her former counsel failed to inform her that she could have her daughter testify, the evidence in this regard is somewhat ambiguous. In his response, the former counsel indicates that [translate] "had the appellant known that her daughter could be with her during the hearing (emphasis added), she would have stopped making an effort to prepare on her own." Now, being present during a hearing is not the same as giving specific testimony regarding a particular point. [24] I also listened carefully to the recording of the hearing before the RPD on April 15, 2021. In response to the question put to her by the RPD regarding her daughter's absence, the appellant testified that her daughter had witnessed acts and that [translation] "I could ask her to testify." When the RPD asked her why she had not done so, the appellant replied, [translation] "I don't know." The RPD rejected the appellant's explanations as not credible13 since this went to the heart of her allegations of violence and she was represented by counsel. [25] Lastly, I note that this allegation is made in the same affidavit that I have decided not to give any weight to in view of the appellant's credibility issues in relation to another assertion made in the same document. Where the claimant's personal testimony is not credible, it is reasonable to have credibility concerns about the supporting documentary evidence and to accord it minimal weight.14 [26] In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that former counsel adequately represented the appellant and that principles of fairness were not violated. Outcome would have been the same [27] In her memorandum, the appellant argues that had she been able to have her daughter testify, the outcome of her claim would have been different. She does not contest the RPD's other findings regarding her credibility issues, specifically her behaviour inconsistent with that of a person in danger when she returned to live with her husband in Kuwait after leaving him, her return to Lebanon, her vague and superficial testimony, and her avoiding answering questions concerning her allegations of violence. [28] With respect, I cannot accept the argument that the RPD's decision was based on the absence of her daughter's testimony and that had it not been for this absence, the result would have been different. It is true that the RPD noted the absence of a witness whom it considered important, namely the appellant's daughter, but the RPD did not know that she had left Lebanon more than 12 years prior to the hearing. [29] Moreover, a review of the RPD reasons and decision and the recording of the hearing reveals that the RPD's decision did not ultimately revolve around the daughter's testimony. It revolved around the testimony of the appellant or refugee protection claimant, who was unable to establish on a balance of probabilities that there would be a serious possibility of persecution should she return to Lebanon or a risk to her life or other treatment under section 97, on a balance of probabilities, as set out below, hence the RPD's finding, which I consider correct, that the appellant was not credible. Vague and superficial testimony [30] The RPD noted immediately that the appellant was not always directly answering the questions put to her, particularly in relation to the allegations of violence, which were nonetheless central to her claim. In response to repeated questions from the RPD, the appellant was unable to provide details as to the persecution she alleges she experienced, remaining superficial: she replied that her husband would go out early in the morning and return in the evening, leaving her crying alone at home, that he was not clean, that he was stingy and would take her money, and that she did not love him. When asked again whether her husband had been violent toward her, she replied vaguely and evaded the question while indicating that he was not interested in her and that he had committed adultery. In light of the testimony, the RPD's decision that the appellant's evidence regarding the allegation of violence was essentially limited to marital problems is correct. [31] That said, the Supreme Court of Canada has stated that refugee law ought to concern itself with actions which deny human dignity and that the sustained or systemic denial of core human rights is the appropriate standard.15 Lack of subjective fear [32] The appellant testified that she had left her husband while they were living in Kuwait in 1991 to go live in Lebanon for three years. In 1994, she returned to Kuwait with her three children to live with her husband because she needed someone to provide for her financially, an explanation considered unsatisfactory by the RPD since she had been able to live for three years in Lebanon while providing for herself and her children. The RPD considered that the appellant's returning to her husband was behaviour inconsistent with that of a person who fears for their life. [33] In 2013, the appellant returned again to live in Lebanon with her children. After initially avoiding answering a question from the RPD as to whether her husband joined her in Lebanon, she went on to testify that she had agreed to have her husband come live with them because he had health problems. When then asked about the fears of violence if she returned to Lebanon, she testified that her husband would take her money and that he was not clean. [34] It is well established that remaining longer than necessary in a country where one fears persecution or voluntarily returning to that country is behaviour that can demonstrate a lack of subjective fear or is inconsistent with that of a person who genuinely fears for their life.16 In my view, the RPD's decision that the appellant demonstrated a lack of subjective fear by returning to live with her husband on two occasions and returning to Lebanon is correct. Contradiction in the evidence [35] When asked again about any violent acts, the appellant testified that her husband had cuffed her on the ear. However, this statement contradicts the statement in her BOC Form that it was her son who had cuffed her on the ear. Faced with this contradiction, she testified that it was her husband, not her son, who had struck her on the ear but that the son had put money in her mouth on one occasion during an argument about money. When questioned a second time concerning the contradiction, the appellant testified that it was her son who had struck her before going back on her testimony and stating that it was instead her husband.17 [36] The RPD's decision that this contradiction undermined the appellant's credibility is correct. [37] In the present case, after reading the RPD's decision, listening to the recording of the hearing and considering the arguments presented on appeal, I am of the opinion that the correct decision was to reject the refugee protection claim, as the inconsistencies and contradictions and the lack of subjective fear are fatal to the appellant's credibility. CONCLUSION [38] I conclude that the former counsel's actions did not deprive the appellant of her right to procedural fairness. The appellant had ample opportunity to argue her refugee protection claim. [39] I confirm the determination of the RPD, namely that XXXX XXXX is neither a refugee under section 96 nor a person in need of protection under section 97 of the IRPA. [40] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) Nicole Ladouceur Nicole Ladouceur February 7, 2022 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Practice Notice - Allegations Against Former Counsel, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), effective date August 13, 2018. 2 Subs. 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 3 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 4 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 5 Chairperson's Guideline 4 on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, IRB, effective date November 13, 1996. 6 Lawani v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 924, para. 21. 7 SAR-1, Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) record, Responses to allegations, Document 1: RetainerAgreement-Refugee. 8 SAR-2, Recording of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) hearing on April 15, 2021, at approximately 00:10:14. 9 SAR-1, RAD record, Responses to allegations, at page 4. 10 Rendon Segovia v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 99, para. 22. 11 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2018 FCA 96, para. 66. 12 Ibid. 13 SPR-1, RPD record, RPD reasons and decision, paragraph 46, p. 12. 14 Ogaulu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 547, para. 26. 15 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, 1993 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1993] 2 SCR 689. 16 Rivera v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1292, paras. 29 and 30; El-Khatib v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 471, para. 12. 17 Supra, endnote 8, see approximately 00:04:12 to 00:08:55 (2nd cassette). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MC1-03403 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français

Response:
## Analysis of Refugee Decision: MC1-03403

### Key Issues
record. 5. The determinative issues for the RAD are procedural fairness and credibility. DETERMINATION [2] The appeal is dismissed. Former counsel's actions did not deprive the ap

### Legal Analysis
The decision analyzes refugee protection criteria by examining: on the outcome of the claim. ANALYSIS [8] The role of the RAD is to review RPD decisions by applying the correctness standard of review.4 Having applied this standard of review and conducted my own analysis of the record, which included listening to the recording of the hearing held before the RPD on April 15, 2021, and ensurin

### Implications for Immigration Practice
This decision provides guidance for refugee claimants on evidentiary requirements and credibility assessments. Legal practitioners should carefully document client narratives and address potential inconsistencies proactively. The case demonstrates the importance of thorough country conditions research and proper preparation of witnesses.


Prompt:
Explain how this Federal Court of Appeal of Canada decision clarifies immigration law:

Perrin v. Canadian Union of Public Employees Court (s) Database Federal Court of Appeal Decisions Date 2023-05-15 Neutral citation 2023 FCA 104 File numbers A-132-22 Decision Content Date: 20230515 Docket: A-132-22 Citation: 2023 FCA 104 CORAM: RIVOALEN J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. GOYETTE J.A. BETWEEN: NADINE PERRIN, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AIR CANADA COMPONENT OF CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES Applicants and CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND AIR CANADA Respondents Heard by online video conference hosted by the Registry on May 15, 2023. Judgment delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 15, 2023. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: ROUSSEL J.A. Date: 20230515 Docket: A-132-22 Citation: 2023 FCA 104 CORAM: RIVOALEN J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. GOYETTE J.A. BETWEEN: NADINE PERRIN, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AIR CANADA COMPONENT OF CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES Applicants and CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES and AIR CANADA Respondents REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on May 15, 2023). ROUSSEL J.A. [1] The applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the Canada Industrial Relations Board dated May 20, 2022, dismissing their complaint against the Canadian Union of Public Employees (Union), for breach of the duty of fair representation under section 37 of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2. [2] The applicants alleged in their complaint that the Union breached its duty by refusing to file a policy grievance challenging Air Canada’s mandatory vaccination policy. The applicants are a group of flight attendants, pursers and service directors employed with Air Canada. Ms. Perrin was mandated to bring the complaint on their behalf. [3] In its decision, the Board found that since the factual considerations and legal arguments raised in the complaint were substantially similar to those reviewed and addressed in its recently issued decision Ingrid Watson v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2022 CIRB 1002 [Watson], it could rely on its analysis and rationale. In Watson, it had concluded that the Union had not breached its duty of fair representation when it refused to file a policy grievance with respect to Air Canada’s mandatory vaccination policy. The Board’s decision has since been upheld by this Court in Watson v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2023 FCA 48 [Watson FCA]. [4] In their application to this Court, the applicants take issue with the Board referring to Watson as the basis for dismissing their complaint. They argue that their complaint differed from that of Ms. Watson as it was not only directed at the Union’s refusal to pursue the policy grievance, but also at the Union’s failure to file grievances against the disciplinary measures from the application of said policy. In omitting to address this argument, they say that the Board failed to engage with one of their arguments. [5] The applicants agree that the Board’s decision is reviewable on the standard of reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para. 49 [Vavilov]; Watson FCA at para. 16; Paris c. Syndicat des employés de Transports R.M.T. (Unifor-Québec), 2022 CAF 173 at para. 2 [Paris]). [6] In its decision, the Board found that it could rely on its analysis in Watson because the applicants were in the same bargaining unit as Ms. Watson and represented by the same Union. The issues they raised with the Union regarding Air Canada’s mandatory vaccination policy were essentially the same as those the Board had considered and addressed in Watson, and the Union’s conduct and communications in this case were the same as those examined in Ms. Watson’s complaint. The Board had also reviewed Ms. Perrin’s communications to the Union in the Watson matter. The Board considered the allegations of the applicants but ultimately found that they had brought forward no new fact or argument that would cause it to come to a different conclusion than that reached in Watson. [7] In our view, the distinction raised by the applicants regarding the Union’s failure to contest the disciplinary consequences imposed on those refusing to be vaccinated is immaterial. The Board understood that disciplinary measures for non-compliance included economic consequences. It was also aware of the Union’s position that it would review all disciplinary measures on a case-by-case basis and that an individual grievance had indeed been filed for Ms. Watson. [8] We are also satisfied that the Board considered all of the other elements raised by counsel for the applicants at this hearing. [9] In their written submissions, the applicants criticize the Union’s failure to disclose to its members the second legal opinion obtained on the likelihood of success in challenging the vaccination policy through a grievance. They argue that the first opinion was obtained at a time when Air Canada had no concrete policy in place and was therefore speculative. They contend that the Board failed to consider this and therefore misinterpreted the facts and the law when it determined that the Union had complied with its obligation under section 37 of the Code by obtaining legal advice. They also submit that the Board failed to look at the Union’s alleged failure to fairly represent them, namely, by ignoring them, refusing to answer their concerns, and sharing false information. [10] The applicants have not identified any legal basis for the Union being required to provide them with copies of the second legal opinion nor have they demonstrated that the alleged deficiencies in legal advice would render the Board’s findings unreasonable. This argument was addressed and dismissed in Watson FCA (at paras. 37-41). Moreover, contrary to the applicants’ assertion, the Board did examine the Union’s conduct. It found that the Union had communicated regularly with its membership regarding the implementation of the policy, and that it had turned its mind to the issues raised by the members, including those who disapproved of the policy for various reasons. The Board was not required to refer to every document in the record, to respond to every argument or to make an explicit finding on each element leading to its conclusion (Vavilov at paras. 91, 128; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para. 16). There is no basis for concluding that the Board ignored evidence or that it failed to grapple with any of the issues raised by the applicants. [11] When the applicants asked the Board to consolidate their complaint with that of Ms. Watson, they recognized that their complaints were similar. In our view, they have not demonstrated that the Board’s decision to apply the analysis and rationale in Watson was unreasonable. Having examined the record and the Board’s reasons, we consider that the Board’s decision is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis that was justified in relation to the facts and law that constrained it (Vavilov at para. 85). [12] Finally, we cannot agree with the applicants’ argument that the Board breached procedural fairness in failing to grant them an oral hearing. They claim that the Board never considered the circumstances set out in their complaint justifying an oral hearing, namely that the complaint raised issues “of possible bad faith and personal motives behind the failure to act” and that the “credibility of the witnesses” would be an important part of the Board’s evaluation. [13] This Court has repeatedly held that the Board is not required to hold an oral hearing on every occasion that one is requested (Paris at para. 5; Ducharme c. Air Transat A.T. Inc., 2021 CAF 34 at paras. 19, 21; Wsáneć School Board v. British Colombia, 2017 FCA 210 at para. 33; Madrigga v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference, 2016 FCA 151 at paras. 26-28). Likewise, issues of credibility do not necessarily amount to exceptional circumstances requiring the Board to hold an oral hearing (Watson FCA at para. 51; Paris at para. 5). The Board’s decision under section 16.1 of the Code is entitled to considerable deference from this Court (Watson FCA at para 50; Paris at para. 5). [14] When the Court reviews issues of procedural fairness, its role is to determine whether the proceedings were fair in all of the circumstances (Canadian Pacific Railway Company v. Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at paras. 54-56). Here, the applicants filed a detailed complaint with extensive documentation totalling several hundred pages. They have not demonstrated how the failure to hold an oral hearing prevented them from presenting their complaint fully and fairly. [15] During oral submissions, the applicants raised an additional breach of procedural fairness. They submit that the Board’s process was unfair as they were not provided an opportunity to reply as was afforded to Ms. Watson. Notwithstanding that this is a new argument, we find that it has no merit. Based on the record and the responses provided by the applicants’ counsel at this hearing, we are satisfied that there was no breach of procedural fairness. [16] Despite counsel’s able submissions, we will dismiss the application with costs. “Sylvie E. Roussel” J.A. FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: A-132-22 STYLE OF CAUSE: NADINE PERRIN, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AIR CANADA COMPONENT OF CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES v. CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND AIR CANADA PLACE OF HEARING: HEARD BY ONLINE VIDEO CONFERENCE HOSTED BY THE REGISTRY DATE OF HEARING: May 15, 2023 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY: RIVOALEN J.A. ROUSSEL J.A. GOYETTE J.A. DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY: ROUSSEL J.A. APPEARANCES: Bruno-Pierre Allard For The ApplicantS Devon Paul Elizabeth Nurse Ella Henry For The Respondent CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES Cristina Toteda For The Respondent AIR CANADA SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Chabot, Mediators-Attorneys Laval, Québec For The ApplicantS Air Canada Center Law Branch Zip 1276 Dorval, Québec For The Respondent AIR CANADA Canadian Union of Public Employees Markham, Ontario For The Respondent CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Perrin v. Canadian Union of Public Employees

### Key Issues
sented by the same Union. The issues they raised with the Union regarding Air Canada’s mandatory vaccination policy were essentially the same as those the Board had considered and

### Standard of Review
reviewable on the standard of reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para. 49 [Vavilov]; Watson FCA at para. 16; Paris c. Syndi

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: Watson], it could rely on its analysis and rationale. In Watson, it had concluded that the Union had not breached its duty of fair representation when it refused to file a policy grievance with respect to Air Canada’s mandatory vaccination policy. The Board’s decision has since been upheld by this Court in Watson v. Canadian Uni

### Precedential Value
As a Federal Court of Appeal decision, this ruling has significant precedential value and is binding on the Federal Court and administrative tribunals like the Immigration and Refugee Board. It establishes legal principles that must be followed in similar cases and provides authoritative interpretation of the relevant legislation.


Prompt:
Analyze this Federal Court of Canada decision related to immigration and explain its significance:

Ye v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Court (s) Database Federal Court Decisions Date 2023-01-18 Neutral citation 2022 FC 1767 File numbers IMM-5398-21 Decision Content Date: 20230118 Docket: IMM-5398-21 Citation: 2022 FC 1767 Ottawa, Ontario, January 18, 2023 PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Favel BETWEEN: YUANBIAO YE Applicant and THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION Respondent JUDGMENT AND REASONS I. Nature of the Matter [1] Yuanbiao Ye [Applicant] initially sought refugee protection in 2018. The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] dismissed his claim. This Court granted the Applicant’s application for judicial review in Ye v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 587, resulting in the Applicant’s refugee claim being remitted to the RPD for re-determination. The Applicant now seeks judicial review of the RPD’s July 2, 2021 re-determination decision that, once again, dismissed his refugee claim [Decision]. [2] The application for judicial review is dismissed. II. Background Facts [3] The Applicant is a citizen of China. On April 20, 2012, the Applicant claims that he, along with approximately 35 property owners, received notice to relocate from their homes by July 20, 2012 because the Chinese government wished to expropriate their properties. Approximately 10 days later, the property owners received a compensation notice, but felt that the compensation was insufficient. [4] The Applicant and four other representatives [Representatives] were selected by the property owners to speak with the town government about the insufficient compensation. The Representatives submitted documentation showing the value of their properties, but received no response. [5] Partial demolition of the homes began on July 18, 2012, and some individuals who tried to prevent the demolition were beaten. The demolition office threatened to demolish the properties by force. [6] On July 19 2012, the property owners held a protest without a permit. That evening, while the Applicant was away from his home, the Public Security Bureau [PSB] went to the Applicant’s home to arrest him. The Applicant’s wife told him that the PSB accused him of leading the protest. The Applicant fled to his cousin’s home. While hiding, the PSB arrested three other Representatives. [7] On July 20, 2012, the demolition officers, along with the police, arrived to destroy the homes. The PSB left a summons with the Applicant’s wife, requiring the Applicant to report to the PSB office. Thereafter, the PSB searched for the Applicant at his relatives’ homes. [8] The Applicant hired an agent to flee China. On October 5, 2012, the Applicant travelled from Hong Kong to the United States. On October 23, 2012, he crossed the border into British Columbia without reporting to customs or border officials. He then flew to Toronto. Five days later, the Applicant filed his refugee claim pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2011, c 27 [IRPA]. [9] In January 2013, the Applicant learned that the three Representatives were sentenced to four years in prison. III. The Decision [10] The RPD held that the Applicant failed to establish a nexus to a Convention ground, namely, political opinion, with reliable and credible evidence. Accordingly, the RPD assessed the Applicant’s claim pursuant to subsection 97(1) of IRPA. The determinative issues for the RPD were credibility and a well-founded fear of persecution. [11] In first considering credibility, the RPD accepted that the events leading up to and immediately after the protest occurred as alleged by the Applicant. However, the RPD disbelieved that the PSB continued to visit the Applicant’s home and seek out the Applicant. [12] The RPD noted the Applicant’s testimony that the PSB most recently visited his home in February 2021. The RPD drew a negative inference from the absence of documents illustrating the PSB’s continued interest in him or an affidavit from the Applicant’s wife attesting to the PSB’s visits. When the RPD asked the Applicant why his wife did not swear an affidavit, the Applicant stated that he had not asked his wife. The RPD disbelieved that the PSB would continue to look for the Applicant for eight years and not leave any documents with his wife. [13] Turning to a well-founded fear of persecution, the RPD concluded that the evidence failed to show that the Applicant would face persecution if returned to China. Concerning the arrest of the three Representatives, the RPD noted that the Applicant did not know whether authorities had released those individuals or whether anyone had received compensation for the expropriation. [14] The RPD also concluded that the Applicant’s previous efforts to come to Canada on vacation undermined his fear of persecution. The RPD ultimately held that the evidence indicated that he had come to Canada for “economic reasons.” The RPD also found that the Applicant was not forthcoming about who assisted him in this process. [15] Finally, the RPD held that even if the PSB has a continued interest in the Applicant, there was insufficient evidence to show that the Applicant would be subject to persecution. Rather, the RPD concluded that the Applicant would be subject to prosecution for contravening a law of general application, protesting without a permit, which applies to the “whole population without differentiation”, and not for having a specific political opinion (Zolfagharkhani v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] 3 FC 540 at 10-11, 155 NR 311 (FCA) [Zolfagharkhani]). The RPD noted that the punishment for “unlawfully opposing an expropriation” in China is harsher than in Canada, but that this does not itself amount to persecution. [16] Ultimately, the RPD held that the Applicant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. IV. Issues and Standard of Review [17] After considering the parties’ submissions, the sole issue is whether the Decision is reasonable. The sub-issues are best characterized as: Did the RPD reasonably conclude that the Applicant lacks a nexus to the definition of a Convention refugee? Are the RPD’s credibility findings reasonable? [18] The Respondent submits that the standard of review is reasonableness and emphasizes that Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] does not call for a more deferential review than past jurisprudence. The Applicant submits that the standard of review is both reasonableness and correctness. [19] I agree with the Respondent that the standard of review is reasonableness. None of the exceptions warranting a departure from the presumption of reasonableness are engaged in this matter (Vavilov at paras 16-17). In assessing the reasonableness of a decision, the Court must consider “the outcome of an administrative decision in light of its underlying rationale to ensure that the decision as a whole is transparent, intelligible and justified” (Vavilov at para 15). For a decision to be reasonable, a decision-maker must adequately account for the evidence before it and be responsive to the Applicant’s submissions (Vavilov at paras 125-28). A decision will be unreasonable if it contains flaws that are sufficiently central or significant (Vavilov at para 100). A reviewing court must refrain from reweighing evidence before the decision-maker, and it should not interfere with factual findings absent exceptional circumstances (Vavilov at para 125). V. Analysis A. Did the RPD reasonably conclude that the Applicant lacks a nexus to the definition of a Convention refugee? (1) Applicant’s Position [20] The RPD unreasonably concluded that the Applicant failed to establish a nexus to a Convention ground. The RPD quoted from Huang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 148 [Huang] and, without any analysis, baldly concluded that the Applicant has not established a nexus. The RPD also failed to consider whether the law of general application is “inherently or for some other reason persecutory” (Zolfagharkhani at 10). [21] Further, the RPD’s conclusion that any prosecution for a contravention of a law of general application would not amount to persecution is difficult to reconcile with the evidence. For instance, the RPD should have considered the US Department of State Report included in Item 2.1 of the National Documentation Package [Item 2.1], which states that there are “serious restrictions” on petitioners’ freedom of expression, including “physical attacks” and restrictions on their right to assemble. Item 2.1 also describes petitioners being incarcerated for “brief periods” in “extralegal ‘black jails.’” [22] Finally, the Decision is unreasonable because it runs contrary to the definition of “political opinion”, which is “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of the state government, and policy may be engaged” (Canada (AG) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689 at 746, 103 DLR (4th) 1, citing Guy S Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) at 31; Zhou v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 619 at para 34 [Zhou]). While laws of general application are not generally persecutory, the source of persecution in this case is the state’s suppression of the protest. Protesting a law, even one of general application, is an expression of political opinion, and it is that political opinion for which the Applicant was being persecuted. (2) Respondent’s Position [23] The RPD reasonably concluded that the Applicant failed to establish a nexus to a Convention ground and that he would face persecution for breaking a law of general application. The RPD considered all of the evidence and reasonably concluded that if the PSB was still seeking the Applicant, it was because he broke a law of general application. To establish a risk of persecution, a refugee claimant must demonstrate that prosecution under a law of general application is linked to a Convention ground. The claimant must also demonstrate that they face more than a mere possibility of persecution, which the Applicant failed to do (Zolfagharkhani at 10). [24] The RPD’s findings are consistent with this Court’s jurisprudence (Huang at paras 40-41; Ni v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 948 at paras 24-27 [Ni]; Yan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 781 at paras 13, 21-23 [Yan]; Jiang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 486 at paras 11-16 [Jiang]; You v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 100 at paras 19-25 [You]). (3) Conclusion [25] To qualify as a Convention refugee, claimants must establish that the persecution they fear is linked to race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (IRPA, s 96; Rizkallah v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] FCJ No 412 at 1, 156 NR 1 (FCA)). [26] I disagree with the Applicant that the RPD failed to analyze whether the Applicant established a nexus to a Convention ground. While the RPD’s analysis on this issue occurs at two separate points in the Decision, when read holistically, the Decision is reasonable (Vavilov at para 97). [27] The RPD first considers the issue of nexus under the heading “NEXUS”. The RPD cites paragraphs 41-44 of Huang, in which Associate Chief Justice Gagné wrote: I note that in Ni v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 948, Justice Elizabeth Walker found reasonable the RPD's decision that being involved in a protest to demand fair compensation did not amount to persecution on a Convention ground. Further, shouting anti-government slogans does not necessarily mean that there is a nexus to a Convention ground (Yan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 781 at para 22). Even if I had accepted that the Applicants were wanted, they have not established that they would be persecuted, they have only established that they would be prosecuted for contravening a law of general application. Mr. Huang testified that he did not want to return to China because he would be arrested and put in jail, not that he would personally be subjected to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture. While it is true that the Applicants specifically pointed to objective country evidence documenting certain cases of abuse of individuals who protest against land expropriation, the RPD found there was insufficient evidence that the Applicants themselves would be subjected to treatment amounting to persecution. I find this conclusion to be reasonable. In other words, there is no evidence that persons who have opposed land expropriation are systematically subjected to treatment amounting to persecution, such that it renders unreasonable the RPD's conclusion that the Applicants will not be subjected to persecution. I also note that the government has already expropriated the Applicants' land and would have only a limited, if any, interest in the principal Applicant other than to prosecute him for having participated in an illegal gathering. Lastly, the fact that the sentence for unlawfully opposing an expropriation is harsher in China than in Canada does not amount to persecution. [Emphasis added.] [28] In the matter at hand, the RPD concluded that the Applicant failed to establish an imputed political opinion, and therefore failed to establish a nexus. However, the RPD did not end its analysis there. Toward the end of the Decision, the RPD analyzed the nature of the protest, noting that the protestors held banners and chanted slogans, the PSB told protestors to leave because the protest was illegal, and the protestors left peacefully without any arrests. The RPD concluded that the PSB pursued the Applicant because he broke a law of general application and that the protest was based on inadequate compensation, not political opinion. I find that reading these separate points of analysis together reveals that the RPD reasonably engaged with the evidence in determining whether the Applicant had established a nexus to a Convention ground. As such, the RPD’s reasons are sufficiently justified, transparent, and intelligible. [29] I also disagree with the Applicant that the RPD failed to consider whether the law of general application is inherently persecutory. This Court has previously held that the Chinese law of expropriation is presumptively neutral and valid (Ni at para 26, citing Jiang at para 14). The burden is on a claimant, not the RPD, to show that a law of general application is “inherently or for some other reason persecutory” (Zolfagharkhani at 10). The Applicant has not pointed to any submissions before the RPD about the law in question being inherently persecutory. [30] The Applicant cites Zhou for the proposition that protesting expropriation constitutes a political opinion. At paragraph 34 of Zhou, Justice O’Keefe stated: Finally, I note the Board’s finding that the applicant’s opinion concerning the expropriation of his home was apolitical. I would note, however, that the protest was about more than the value of the applicant’s home. If he is found to be credible, his PIF clearly states that a large crowd of people attended the protest and were shouting slogans such as “The government is unfair”. Such conduct to me sounds to be an anti-government protest. [31] The applicant in Yan similarly cited Zhou for the same proposition (Yan at para 12). Justice McVeigh rejected Ms. Yan’s argument, noting that “[t]he decision in Zhou does not stand for the proposition that a nexus is always established when certain statements are made during a protest” (Yan at para 22). [32] I agree that “each case will turn on its facts” (Yan at para 22). In this case, the RPD considered the nature and the circumstances of the protest. The RPD’s approach is consistent with this Court’s jurisprudence. For instance, Justice Phelan noted at paragraphs 20-21 of You: The real dispute was over money not a grounds under the Convention. The monetary dispute cannot be dressed up as a political dispute just because it is against a government decision. It was not unreasonable to conclude that there was no nexus to a Convention grounds given the nature of the dispute and protest activities. [Emphasis added.] [33] In Yan, Justice McVeigh similarly considered the nature and circumstances of the protest. Ms. Yan testified that she shouted, “[g]overnment corrupt, compensation unfair, destroy our homes, respect human rights… [and] police assaulting people.” Justice McVeigh also considered Ms. Yan’s testimony about the importance of her home and the inadequacy of the compensation and found that the RPD reasonably concluded that the protest was primarily about compensation (Yan at paras 16-21). [34] In the present matter, the Applicant has not made submissions about any specific slogans chanted during the protest. The RPD transcript indicates that the Applicant only described the broader topics of the chants. The RPD considered the Applicant’s answers and reasonably characterized the protest as pertaining to unfair compensation rather than an anti-government political opinion. In the absence of anything in the record pointing to the contrary, the RPD’s finding that the Applicant failed to establish a nexus to a Convention ground is reasonable. [35] Finally, the Applicant argues that the RPD failed to consider Item 2.1. In my view, this submission has no merit. The RPD clearly cites Item 2.1 and acknowledges the restrictions that petitioners face at paragraph 49 of the Decision: The panel acknowledges that unauthorized protests and demonstrations are restricted in China, and that administrative detentions, such as that this claimant fears, may be used to deter such activities. In this regard, the panel, however, notes that the mere fact that the sentence for unlawfully opposing an expropriation may be harsher in China than in Canada does not amount to persecution. [36] In my view, the Applicant is simply asking the Court to reweigh the evidence on this point, which is not the function of judicial review (Vavilov at para 125). This aspect of the Decision is also reasonable. B. Are the RPD’s credibility findings reasonable? (1) Applicant’s Position [37] The RPD erred in making a negative credibility finding on the basis that the PSB did not leave any documents with the Applicant’s wife (Wang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1124 at paras 39-44). Unlike Huang, the absence of documents in this case is clearly determinative to the RPD’s negative credibility findings (Huang at paras 28-31). [38] The RPD similarly erred in requiring the Applicant to provide corroborating evidence from his wife (Mora Zapata v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 329 at paras 7-8). The requirement for corroborating evidence runs contrary to the presumption of truth articulated by the Federal Court of Appeal in Maldonado v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 FC 302, [1979] FCJ No 248 (FCA) [Maldonado]. Further, it is not incumbent on refugee claimants to seek written or oral testimony from persons in the country they fear persecution. To do so would put both the Applicant and his wife at risk, thereby running contrary to the intention of subparagraph 166(b)(i) of IRPA. The evidence before the RPD indicates that the Chinese government frequently intercepts private communications. (2) Respondent’s Position [39] The RPD’s negative credibility findings were reasonable. The RPD may draw an adverse credibility finding from an applicant’s failure to produce corroborating evidence (Cekim v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 177 at para 14; Muchirahondo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 546 at para 18). (3) Conclusion [40] After reviewing the totality of the record, I find the RPD’s credibility findings reasonable. [41] The onus is always on refugee claimants to prove their case. While I agree that gathering evidence from individuals in the country they fear may put the claimant and witnesses at risk, the Applicant never offered this justification before the RPD. Rather, when the RPD asked why the Applicant failed to tender an affidavit sworn by his wife, he simply stated that he thought it was unnecessary. [42] I also disagree with the Applicant that this case is distinguishable from Huang. In Huang, Associate Chief Justice Gagné considered this Court’s divergent perspectives on whether a decision-maker may draw a negative credibility finding where an applicant fails to produce a PSB summons (at paras 28-31). [43] In this case, the Applicant’s failure to produce a summons was not a determinative credibility finding (Huang at para 30; Sun v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 1255 at para 13; Deng v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 176 at para 14). To the contrary, the RPD drew multiple adverse inferences based on the Applicant’s demeanour, his previous efforts to come to Canada, and his failure to tender an affidavit sworn by his wife. [44] At paragraph 44 of the Decision, the RPD considered the Applicant’s unsuccessful Canadian visa application that he applied for “before his problems started on July 19, 2012.” More importantly, the RPD noted inconsistencies pertaining to why the Applicant initially applied for the visa, and that the Applicant was not forthcoming about who assisted him in this process. In my view, when the Decision is considered in light of the record, the RPD reasonably drew negative credibility findings (Vavilov at paras 91-98). The RPD transcript illustrates the inconsistencies the RPD member took issue with: Member: Okay, so when you filed your visa application to come to Canada Did you get somebody help? … Interpreter: Yes, yes. That was someone who helped me to to fill in it. Member: Who will help you Interpreter: It was long time ago I don't remember Member: Did you pay the person money to help you? Interpreter: At that time, we might have to hire some someone to help us to like for this application but it was long time ago. I don't I don't really remember. Member: You don't remember paying anything. Interpreter: We should just pay for the visa fee. Member: Okay, you paid for the visa fee. But did you pay the person who help you anything? If you remember if you don't remember? That's fine. Interpreter: I don't remember. … Member: Now why did you apply for the visa? Why did you want to come to Canada Interpreter: So at that time we were as for commercial for business to to go there to check it out. Member: Sorry to come for the business and ? Interpreter: yeah to check it out. mainly for commercial Member: So after the hearing and also in your paper document that you have [filed]. You have said that you were coming for sightseeing. they were no mention also coming for business purposes. Interpreter: I don't remember but as I remember it should be for commercial and like it's just like to check it to check the place. Member: To check the place you mean to check opportunity in Canada? Interpreter: Yes. To you see whether there's any development for business? yeah, for like the business market Member: and what kind of business you were exploring or you were planning to explore? Interpreter: So because our company's involved in the business, say for the like, Wi fi, the speaker for the sound equipment. So just wanted to check whether there were any opportunities in that field Member: was it a company sponsored trip? was your company sending you? Interpreter: yes the company send me Member: sir I know you told me you don't remember but there's no reference of any of this in your previous testimony or the documentation. [Emphasis added.] [45] In light of the above excerpt of the hearing transcript, I find that the RPD reasonably drew a negative inference from inconsistencies in the Applicant’s evidence and demeanour. In this regard, I note that credibility findings fall within the heartland of the RPD’s expertise (Giron v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] FCJ No 481 at 1, 143 NR 238 (FCA)). I also note that deference is owed to administrative decision-makers, partially because of the “relatively advantageous position of the first instance decision maker” (Vavilov at para 125). [46] In He v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 825 [He], Justice McHaffie considered the relationship between the presumption of truth and corroborating evidence. He noted, “the presumption is that a claimant is telling the truth in sworn testimony, and a claimant is thus not required to present corroborative evidence unless there are reasons to doubt their testimony” (He at para 20; Luo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 823 at paras 18-22; Maldonado at 305; He v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 2 at paras 22-25). The RPD correctly noted this rule at paragraph 39 of the Decision. [47] I also note that this case is similar to Yan, Su v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 666 [Su], Liu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1362 [Liu], and Jia v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 444 [Jia]. In those cases, the Court held that it was reasonable to expect a warrant or summons since the claimants testified that the PSB was relentlessly pursuing them (Yan at paras 37-38; Su at para 16; Liu at para 56; Jia at paras 37-38). Here, the Applicant testified that he was being pursued by the PSB for eight years. As noted by the RPD at paragraph 40 of the Decision: The panel finds it not credible, on a balance of probabilities, that the PSB would continue to visit the claimant's home, his relatives’ homes on numerous occasions as alleged, for more than eight years, yet leave no documents with his wife. This finding detracts from the claimant's credibility in that the PSB has continued to look for the claimant in order to arrest him, or that he would be persecuted upon return to China as alleged. [48] Given this Court’s decisions in Yan, Su, Liu, and Jia, it was reasonably open to the RPD to reach this conclusion. In light of the RPD’s various negative credibility findings and the jurisprudence noted above, the RPD did not err in drawing a negative inference due to a lack of corroborating evidence. VI. Conclusion [49] In my view, the Decision is intelligible, justified, and transparent. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed. [50] The parties have not proposed questions for certification and I agree that none arise. JUDGMENT in IMM-5398-21 THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that: The application for judicial review is dismissed. There is no question of general importance for certification. "Paul Favel" Judge FEDERAL COURT SOLICITORS OF RECORD DOCKET: IMM-5398-21 STYLE OF CAUSE: YUANBIAO YE v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION PLACE OF HEARING: HELD BY VIDEOCONFEENCE DATE OF HEARING: June 22, 2022 JUDGMENT AND REASONS: FAVEL J. DATED: january 18, 2023 APPEARANCES: Wennie Lee For The Applicant Margherita Braccio David DeMelo For The Respondent SOLICITORS OF RECORD: Lee & Company Immigration Advocacy, Counsel and Litigation Toronto, Ontario For The Applicant Attorney General of Canada Toronto, Ontario For The Respondent

Response:
## Analysis of Court Decision: Ye v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)

### Key Issues
1) of IRPA. The determinative issues for the RPD were credibility and a well-founded fear of persecution. [11] In first considering credibility, the RPD accepted that the events le

### Standard of Review
of protection. IV. Issues and Standard of Review [17] After considering the parties’ submissions, the sole issue is whether the Decision is reasonable. The sub-issues are best char

### Legal Analysis
The court's analysis focuses on: ces (Vavilov at para 125). V. Analysis A. Did the RPD reasonably conclude that the Applicant lacks a nexus to the definition of a Convention refugee? (1) Applicant’s Position [20] The RPD unreasonably concluded that the Applicant failed to establish a nexus to a Convention ground. The RPD quoted from Huang v Canada (Citizenship

### Precedential Value
This Federal Court decision has persuasive value for similar cases before the court and provides guidance to the Immigration and Refugee Board on the proper interpretation of law and procedural requirements. While not binding on other Federal Court judges, it establishes a precedent that will often be followed for consistency.