--- library_name: transformers tags: - language-model - causal-lm - gpt - red-teaming - jailbreak - evaluation --- # Model Card for **GPT-OSS-20B-Jail-Broke (Freedom)** ![image/png](https://cdn-uploads.huggingface.co/production/uploads/63f2b7bcbe95ed4c9a9e7669/8bDlP7uRqwSvDjbcCDvMp.png) ## Model Overview **GPT-OSS-20B-Jail-Broke (Freedom)** is a red-teamed variant of the [Open Source GPT-OSS-20B model](https://www.kaggle.com/competitions/openai-gpt-oss-20b-red-teaming), developed as part of the Kaggle **GPT-OSS Red Teaming Challenge**. The model was systematically stress-tested for **safety, robustness, and misuse potential**, with adaptations and prompts that probe its boundaries. This release illustrates both the power and fragility of large-scale language models when confronted with adversarial inputs. * **Architecture:** Decoder-only Transformer, 20B parameters. * **Base Model:** GPT-OSS-20B * **Variant Name:** *Jail-Broke* / *Freedom* * **Primary Use Case:** Safety evaluation, red-teaming experiments, adversarial prompting research. --- ## Intended Use This model is **not intended for production deployment**. Instead, it is released to: * Provide a case study for **adversarial robustness evaluation**. * Enable researchers to explore **prompt engineering attacks** and **failure modes**. * Contribute to discussions of **alignment, safety, and governance** in open-source LLMs. --- ## Applications & Examples The model demonstrates how structured adversarial prompting can influence outputs. Below are illustrative examples: 1. **Bypass of Content Filters** * Example: Queries framed as “historical analysis” or “fictional roleplay” can elicit otherwise restricted responses. 2. **Creative/Constructive Applications** * When redirected toward benign domains, adversarial prompting can generate: * **Satirical writing** highlighting model weaknesses. * **Stress-test datasets** for automated safety pipelines. * **Training curricula** for prompt-injection defenses. 3. **Red-Teaming Utility** * Researchers may use this model to simulate **malicious actors** in controlled environments. * Security teams can benchmark **defensive strategies** such as reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) or rule-based moderation. --- ## Limitations * Outputs may contain **hallucinations, unsafe recommendations, or offensive material** when pushed into adversarial contexts. * Model behavior is **highly sensitive to framing** — subtle changes in prompts can bypass safety guardrails. * As a derivative of GPT-OSS-20B, it inherits all scaling-related biases and limitations of large autoregressive transformers. --- ## Ethical Considerations Releasing adversarially tested models provides transparency for the research community but also risks **dual-use misuse**. To mitigate: * This model card explicitly states **non-production, research-only usage**. * Examples are framed to support **safety analysis**, not exploitation. * Documentation emphasizes **educational and evaluative value**. --- ## Citation If you use or reference this work in academic or applied contexts, please cite the Kaggle challenge and this model card: ``` @misc{gptoss20b_jailbroke, title = {GPT-OSS-20B-Jail-Broke (Freedom): Red-Teamed Variant for Adversarial Evaluation}, author = {Anonymous Participants of the GPT-OSS Red Teaming Challenge}, year = {2025}, url = {https://www.kaggle.com/competitions/openai-gpt-oss-20b-red-teaming} } ```